Foreword

The recent effects of student dissatisfaction with Administrative policy have been widely publicized, but the long and intricate histories of both policy and dissatisfaction have not been subject to public discussion. This essay is a preliminary abstract of a detailed analysis, with a supporting body of evidence, of pressures on student political activities at the University. These pressures have been transmitted primarily through the Administrative policies governing student affairs.

This essay sketches certain general problems that appear again and again in the studies which form the main body of this report. (Footnotes refer to these studies and to the other appendices.) This essay, and a preliminary version of the supporting body of evidence, are to be submitted to the Chancellor's Committee on Student Political Activity. We hope to make a final report, with the supporting evidence, available relatively soon to the interested public. We offer this report as background for a dialogue on the issues it deals with, and hope that it will contribute to a genuine understanding of these issues.

I. The Grievances of the Students

Individual action in a complex society is difficult, and individuals band together into groups to make effective action possible. If group action is restricted, the individual loses his only workable means of exercising the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. ^[1]

A. students have found it difficult to form groups, to maintain groups once they have been formed, and to carry out the activities for which the groups were formed. These difficulties have been caused primarily by restrictive regulations imposed by the administration upon group activity. These restrictions have seriously impeded attempts by individual students to exercise their constitutional rights. ^[2]

1. Student groups are hindered in their attempts to inform the campus public of their very existence. "Students for Lodge" and "Students for Scranton", for example, could not put the names of the candidates on posters advertising meetings of the clubs; thus they could not make their nature known. ^[3] In addition, all political groups are forbidden to recruit new members on campus; thus they are denied their only convenient access to the largest available body of potential members. ^[4]

2. Almost all groups perform their functions primarily by means of conducting meetings; yet most groups concerned with 'off-campus' issues cannot hold meetings on campus. Students wishing to attend DuBois Club meetings, for example, must travel to Oakland. ^[5] Such difficulties discourage public contact with groups, and make the interest of members harder to maintain.

3. Administrative regulations severely hamper the financial functioning of organizations. Student groups have precarious finances and depend mainly upon the campus for support. However, collection of funds is now prohibited on campus. ^[6] Regulations now require police 'protection' for the presentation of speakers judged 'controversial' by the Administration, at costs of up to $45 to the sponsoring organization; but the regulations do not permit solicitation of donations to cover such costs. ^[7]

4. Even when individuals have managed to form groups which have managed to maintain their existence, the possible actions these groups can take are severely limited by the regulations. The regulations governing 'off-campus' speakers and the holding of rallies make it difficult for groups to keep their public informed about issues of immediate interest. For example, in 1962 several hundred students held an impromptu rally in Dwinelle Plaza to protest resumption of atmospheric testing. The Dean of Students' office asked the police to disband the rally, and later decided that it had been 'premeditated' and brought a member of the rally before the Faculty Committee on Student Discipline. ^[8]

5. Further, the regulations and their interpretations have not permitted student interest in social and political issues to be expressed through the student government. When this led the ASUC to create the Student Forum as a vehicle for the expression of this interest, the regulations hampered the Forum so severely that it soon died. ^[9]

6. The regulations make it difficult or impossible for groups to obtain speakers and to present them to a campus audience. For example, when the YSA wished to sponsor four concurrent seminars on Civil Rights and Industrial Political Activity, tenured faculty moderators were required for each one. They were impossible to find, and the series was not held. ^[10]

7. Finally, the regulations make it difficult for organizations to take action on the issues with which they are concerned. Slate was forced to withdraw sponsorship of on-campus vigils and pickets in 1962 and 1963. Off-campus activities could not be announced at impromptu rallies. ^[11] Here again, the prohibition of on-campus fund collection defeats the purpose of those groups which exist mainly to collect money for their causes.

B. The administration's regulations are not simply restrictive. they are vaguely and inconsistently formulated, and are applied in an inconsistent, arbitrary, and discriminatory manner. We shall cite some examples.

1. In 1956 the Administration prohibited distribution of pro-voluntary ROTC literature while at the same time allowing the Military Department to distribute pro-compulsory ROTC pamphlets in all of its classes. ^[12]

2. In 1962 Malcolm X. was forbidden permission to speak on campus on the grounds that he was a religious leader who 'might proselytize'. But Episcopal Bishop James Pike had spoken on campus the previous day, and in recent on-campus speeches had discussed birth control and the consequences of there being a Catholic in the White House. ^[13]

3. The World University Service may solicit funds on campus for students abroad, and the ASUC ExCom was allowed to raise funds for the relief of Hungarian students. But the Administration forbade the Students for Racial Equality to use $900 they had collected to establish a scholarship for a Negro student expelled from a Southern university for his civil rights work. ^[14]

4. Police 'protection' and a tenured faculty moderator are required for speakers judged 'controversial'. The DuBois Club sponsored a Communist who was not 'controversial' and an ex-student longshoreman who was. ^[15] The Administration determines who is 'controversial' and its decisions cannot be appealed; but it has not published criteria that define 'controversial'.

5. The student government is ostensibly forbidden to take stands on political issues, which include State Ballot Propositions. This restriction, however, has been lifted when the Administration feels such lifting to be to its interests. Thus the Administration has encouraged the ASUC to support Proposition 3 in 1958, Proposition 1A in 1962, and Proposition 2 in 1964. In 1962 it reluctantly allowed the ASUC to also take a stand on Proposition 24 (the 'Francis Amendment'), which was frankly political; a similar situation occurred with Proposition 14 this Fall.^[16]

6. The Administration has earmarked a million dollars of ASUC funds to construct a building providing office space for student groups. Though all students have contributed their funds, 'off-campus' groups cannot use these offices. ^[17]

7. Some almost-amusing paradoxes result from the Administration's policies. Thus, individuals can organize some kinds of demonstrations on campus, but cannot publicize them. Groups can publicize, but not organize, these demonstrations. But if individuals do organize them, they cannot publicize them through groups. ^[18]

8. The rules governing the publicizing of student activities have not been fully written down, and their enforcement has been arbitrary and sometimes whimsical. For example, a Women For Peace poster announcing a meeting to hear speakers on the Vietnam war was censored because "it didn't look very peaceful". ^[19]

II. The Administration's Responsiveness to Pressure

The grievances we have sketched have many immediate causes. Their basic source, however, is the Administration's current conception of the nature of the University, and the policies that result from this conception. ^[1] In particular, these policies, and the ways in which the Administration implements them, make the Administration responsive to certain outside pressures, and unresponsive to pressures from within, i.e. from other components of the University.

A. The administration is responsive to outside pressures.

The long-range policies of the Administration make it unduly responsive to outside influences. Student political activity is discouraged on the ground that such activity exposes the University to political pressures ^[2], but the Administration voluntarily subjects the University to far greater pressures by actively seeking private and Government research contracts. ^[3] The University is and will continue to be subject to pressures. The question is which pressures will gain response from the Administration.

In 1949 the Administration decided that a faculty anti-Communist oath would serve as "a preventive to the possible passage of legislation dangerous to the University." ^[4] The resulting "Loyalty Oath controversy" had disastrous consequences for the faculty, and made it clear that the Administration would set major policy despite vigorous faculty opposition when outside pressure was applied. ^[5] In another case, a 1959 Subject A exam posed the question, "What are the dangers to a democracy of a national police organization, like the FBI, which operates secretly and is unresponsive to public criticism?" The FBI and other groups found the question distasteful and protested. The Administration made a public apology, burned the remaining copies of the exam, and promised that no similar questions would appear again. ^[7] In these cases, the special sensitivity of the Administration to outside pressures is manifest.

A wealth of other such examples exists. More recent ones include the role of William Knowland in helping to stimulate the Administration's 'clarifications' of the Kerr Directives this Fall, ^[8] and the Administration's refusal to contest PG&E's decision to build a nuclear reactor at Bodega Head, which resulted in the University's abandoning its plans for a marine biology station there. ^[9]

B. The administration is not responsive to criticisms of its policies by students and faculty.

Chancellor Strong's rejection of the recommendations of the Heyman Committee ^[10] is the most recent incident in a long history of Administrative disregard for criticism and recommendations from the Academic Senate, the ASUC Senate and ExCom, and other campus groups.

A decade of protest through established channels saw two petitions totalling 10,000 signatures, three ASUC ExCom resolutions, three massive student referendums, and strong recommendations from a faculty committee, all urging an end to compulsory ROTC. The Administration ig- nored these criticisms of its policy; compulsory ROTC was abolished only after the Department of the Army had finally joined the other military Departments in deciding that compulsory ROTC was unnecessary. ^[11]

Similarly, the Administration has disregarded a student referendum, resolutions of the ASUC Senate, and requests from other campus groups for removal of the fallout shelter signs. Though the Administration has promised these bodies various statements clarifying its policy on the fallout shelters, these statements were never received. ^[12] Again, the Administration ignored a joint student-faculty petition to end the Communist Speaker Ban, as well as a student referendum and several ASUC Senate resolutions to this effect. ^[13]

The Administration has most consistently refused to heed criticisms of its policies in the case of the Kerr Directives. Since the Directives were issued in 1959, they have been the target of repeated criticism. The ASUC ExCom and Senate have passed many resolutions protesting the restrictions of the Directives. The Daily Californian has often editorialized against them, and has provided a forum for public criticism. More detailed criticism has been provided by pamphlets distributed on campus, and by the Student Civil Liberties Union. The Academic Freedom Committee of the Academic Senate has made detailed recommendations for revision of the Directives, and other faculty groups have asked that the Directives be submitted to the Academic Senate for discussion. ^[14]

But the Administration has not heeded these criticisms and protests. There is no evidence that changes of policy have come about on the Administration's initiative or in response to the kinds of criticism and pressure described above. Instead, there is evidence that fear of outside pressure has caused the Administration to make the Directives more restrictive. ^[16]

In short, the legal channels for criticism and protest of policies have been extensively employed by students and faculty. These 'legitimate' channels have a nominal existence, but there is little evidence to suggest that they actually serve their nominal function. The mass of evidence suggests that these channels function mainly as a means of containing criticism and rendering it ineffective. Criticism of Administrative policies through established channels has had little or no effect on the policies.

III. The Stifling of Dissent

More generally, the regulations and other actions of the administration have created conditions under which criticism and protest of administrative policy are difficult or impossible.

A. The role of the faculty. The cessation of faculty resistance in the Loyalty Oath controversy of 1950 established a pattern. ^[1] Since then most of the real power to make policy has rested with an Administration attentive to other counsels, and faculty powers have tended to be at best advisory. We have already cited examples of the general tendency of the Administration to ignore the recommendations of the faculty. There are many others: for instance, faculty protest against the Administration's suspension of Slate in 1961 had no effect. ^[2] In addition, individual members of the faculty are often reluctant to become leaders of dissent through their fear of reprisals, which they feel might include loss of privileges or even of their jobs. ^[3]

B. The role of the student government. The ASUC, which ought to be the main vehicle for student criticism of Administrative policy, has been almost ineffective in this function. Its recommendations, like those of the faculty, have been largely ignored, and continual pressures by the Administration to restrict its activities seem to have made it disinclined to question policy. Administrative officials have at times discouraged the ASUC from criticising their policies, and often ASUC officials have felt that such criticism was not within their authority. ^[4]

C. The role of the graduate students. The graduates might have been expected to provide the leadership of student criticism of Administrative policies. But they were disfranchised from the ASUC under highly questionable circumstances, and did not manage to form a viable voluntary association. ^[5]

D. The role of Slate. The faculty and the ASUC were ineffective in their criticisms of Administrative policies. Partly for this reason, from its birth in 1958 Slate was the most constant and vocal voice of student dissatisfaction with these policies. Slate representatives initiated most of the ASUC's protests. Slate itself sponsored discussions on the regulations, and circulated literature analyzing and criticizing them.

In 1961 Slate was suspended for supposedly violating the Administration's regulations ^[6], and a later change in these regulations reduced Slate to 'off-campus' status, exposing it to difficulties we have already discussed. The disfranchisement of the graduates weakened Slate's position in the ASUC, and Slate was made the object of direct attacks by the Administration. ^[7] The result has been to reduce drastically Slate's role in making protests of any sort.

In short, the policies and actions of the administration have reduced systematically the effectiveness of possible internal sources of opposition to its policies. This pattern has not been restricted to organizations. The Administration has at times attempted to publicly discredit individuals leading such opposition, and recently suspended leaders of student opposition to its policies. ^[8] In at least one case, the Administration has tampered directly with the mechanisms and bodies of dissent, by effectively dictating a resolution supporting its policies to the ASUC ExCom when public criticism of these policies was at a peak. ^[9]

IV. Changes in Policy

A. How change in policies occurs. Since the Administration both directly and indirectly discourages criticism of its policies, and the customary channels for the expression of such criticism have been ineffective, groups and individuals have sometimes resorted to more direct tactics to effect desired changes. Taking note of the way the Administration responds to outside pressures, the students have found that it sometimes responds similarly to internal pressures.

These inside pressures take two main forms, the first being the threat of legal action. In 1959 students at UCLA filed suit to force the Administration to allow leaflets to be handed out on campus. Rather than fight the suit, which would have resulted in a decision as to whether University property was state-owned or privately owned, the Administration adopted new regulations incorporating the desired change. ^[1] Similarly, the threat of a lawsuit in 1962 on the Riverside campus provoked the Administration to lift the ban on Communist speakers. ^[2]

The second main form of internal pressure has been the organizing of dramatic public protest, in the forms of picketing and rallies. Perhaps from fear of publicity, the Administration has shown considerably more sensitivity to such protest, or to the threat of such protest, than to reasoned appeals through the established channels we have mentioned.

For example, in 1959, when the Administration ignored faculty recommendations and massive student pressure for modification of the Kerr Directives, Slate held a rally in defiance of the regulations and sent a traveling committee to organize supporting protest on other campuses. The Administration then issued revisions embodying some of the original recommendations of the faculty. ^[3] In the same year Slate held an on-campus rally in support of a local ballot proposition. The Administration brought several members of the rally before the Faculty Committee on Student Conduct for disciplinary action. More than 500 students attended the committee's first session to insist that they were equally 'guilty' and to demand that they be subject to the same possible disciplinary action. The committee discontinued its hearings. ^[4] In Fall 1964, when the Administration had Jack Weinberg arrested for trespassing, the massive demonstration that followed was responsible for charges being dropped against him and for the formation of a committee to discuss policies that before had not been subject to genuine discussion. ^[5]

B. The nature of changes in policy. When the Administration does change its policies as a result of pressures such as we have described, the force of its action is often lessened in two ways. Frequently the Administration tries to placate protests by granting only the most minimal concessions. Thus, in 1961 the SCLU organized a massive protest of the political restrictions of the Kerr Directives. The Administration ignored all of their major demands, and made only a minor change: it shortened the advance notice required for 'off-campus' speakers. ^[6]

At other times, the Administration makes an apparent concession, but follows it with a new restriction which lessens its value. For example, though the Communist Speaker Ban was lifted, a tenured faculty moderator was required for all speakers judged 'controversial'. Such moderators are difficult to obtain, and recently more and more speakers have been judged to be 'controversial'. ^[7]

V. Past Patterns in the Present

The Administration's responses to the student protests this Fall provide striking examples of most of the problems we have sketched. The Administration had ignored years of continual criticism by students and faculty through established channels of protest. In banning the solicitation of funds and members by student groups, the Administration suddenly and unilaterally reinterpreted existing conditions without consulting the groups affected or the faculty.

When a large demonstration put the Administration under pressures that it could not ignore, it responded to demands for complete freedom of speech and assembly (which had been made for years) by granting only minimal concessions: it dropped charges of trespass against one demonstrator and set up a committee to make an investigation. It reduced the possible effects of this committee by unilaterally determining the committee's composition. This composition was not acceptable to the other party involved in the negotiations; pressure on the committee and the threat of renewed demonstrations led to a more equitable composition of the committee. The Administration disregarded the recommendations of a faculty committee, to whose appointment it had agreed, that the suspended students be reinstated. Currently there are persistent rumors that the Administration is seeking to have legislation enacted to make future demonstrations misdemeanors; the Administration's general legal counsel has refused to comment on these rumors. ^[1]

VI. A Note on This Report

The presence of 500 policemen on the campus the night of October 2 demonstrated that a certain failure in dialogue had occurred. This report has been prepared by an independent group in the University community, composed of people agitated by this failure who wished to help provide a background for proper dialogue about the issues it deals with.

We began to gather material on October 17; this preliminary version was completed on November 2. The supporting body of evidence, in this preliminary presentation to the Chancellor's Committee, includes some twenty studies totalling 60,000 words. Much more material remains to be edited. More than 100 persons have contributed to the present form of the report; we hope to be able to give them credit by name in the final version.

This report has been prepared under the general editorship of Michael Rossman. Lynne Hollander has been responsible for editorial coordination, and Marston Schultz and Tom Irwin for technical coordination.

We accept responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation which these pages, and those that follow, may contain.

Guide to Appendices

A Note on the Appendices, Which Form the Main Body of This Report

The nature of the material we are considering, and the patterns and problems woven through it, demand for the most part that it be treated as a collection of related but basically distinct topics. The interaction between Administrative (and other) pressures and student political activity must be examined in the context of specific controversies, or in the context of the history of specific organizations.

The bulk of this report, in this preliminary form, consists of 19 studies of such topics, and four appendices gathering documentation specifically related to the covering essay and expanding upon some of its points. The covering essay is a preliminary draft of general conclusions suggested by the material in these studies and appendices; we hope to expand it considerably and strengthen its conclusions in the final report.

Limitations of time and resources have pressed strongly upon us; we regret that we have not been able to cross-index these studies and appendices. To a certain extent, the reader must make the connections between the studies himself. Neither have we been able to present all the material we consider relevant, in this preliminary form. In the listing below of the studied and appendices, the ones as yet incomplete appear in parentheses. If the range of their topics seems broad, it should be remembered that the subject we are dealing with is complex, and that many subjects are relevant to an understanding of the problems that concern us.

We regret that, in preparing this preliminary report, it has not been possible to make the titling of these studies consistent. The titles above are provisional, and in some cases the studies do not bear those titles; often references given to other studied will not match the above list. We hope, however, that this list will help to unscramble some references, and minimize the confusions consequent to our haste.

Appendix A: Difficulties Caused by Restrictive Regulations in Forming and Maintaining Groups and in Carrying Out their Activities.

I. Examples cited in the covering text, Section I.A.

Footnote 3. Pam Horner of Campus College Republicans reports that her group is not permitted to set up posters which encourage attendance at meetings, but only can announce that a meeting is taking palce. Further, she adds, when they co-sponsored Assemblyman Byron Rumford's appearance on campus, they arranged for a reception afterwards. But they could not advertise that there would be an admission charge to the reception or that the contributions so obtained would be used for the No on 14 drive. This was not so bad, she continued, for her experiences with the "Students for Lodge- Scranton" movements were worse. In these cases, the names of the candidates could not be put on posters advertising meetings of the clubs! Under these circumstances it became practically impossible to advertise these organizations' activities on campus. (From interview by J. Donald Moon.)

Footnotes 4,5,7. See below, II.

Footnote 10. From interview by J. Donald Moon with YSA representatives.

Footnote 11. "The first pressure on the right to advocacy was in the area of outdoor rallys in Dwinelle Plaza. Advance notification of rallys had to be given to the Dean's office. By Fall 1962, Mrs. Weaver of the Dean of Students' Office was wanning Slate members, giving such notification that announcements of off-campus political meetings and activities were not permitted." (From a preliminary report on Slate by Robin Room.)

II. Further Examples

The spectrum of restrictions upon the functioning of groups that the regulations impose is so broad that it is difficult to describe. There is an inexhaustable fund of examples. We shall cite a few that speak for themselves.

A. On July 9, 1964 a letter from the Dean's office was sent to Campus CORE to inform it that because two officers named on its 'off-campus' application were not U.C. students during first summer session, CORE would not be eligible to use University facilities. The letter went on, "I can conclude only that the organization is not made up of bona fide students, faculty members, or employees of the University. Therefore, I must declare the organization ineligible to use University facilities." The letter was signed by Arleigh Williams, Dean of Men. This incident was similarly repeated during the second summer session, when CORE reapplied with a new slate of officers. It seemed that their secretary had only attended first summer session and since she was not a student second summer session, Campus CORE could not have 'off-campus' privileges. This letter was received by Dave Freedman.(From a report on Campus CORE by Gretchen Kittredge.)

B. A similar incident concerned the DuBois Club. In the words of Jack Kurzweil, "In order to have use (albeit limited) of the facilities of the University during the period in question, we must register at the beginning of each semester, Fall, Spring, SSI, SSII. An extraordinary thing happened at the beginning of SSII, 1964. The club was asked ... to supply proof that it could qualify as a bona-fide off-campus organization, and it was strongly implied that a membership list would be good proof."

C. (From the report on Campus CORE cited above.) Adhering to the 72 hour regulation, we applied for and were granted permission to use 2000 LSB. Our meeting was for 12 Noon and our sponser, Dr. Barnes, was going to be our faculty moderator. The speakers were two non-students and local civil rights leaders. On the morning of the meeting two of our members were informed that we would be required to have three campus policemen and that the cost of each would be $15 which we would have to pay. Of course we felt that policemen were not necessary; certainly we could not Afford to pay for them. However, also in relation to this meeting, we had informed The University that we would need the Press Room in the ASUC building. No denial of that request was voiced by the Administration until the morning of the meeting. However, we couldn't call off the press conference since the press had all been informed and some were on their way. Therefore we were forced to hold our press conference in the hall outside the press room.

D. (from the DuBois Club report cited above.) The Administration does not allow us to give classes on campus: that is, we cannot advertise a series of classes on campus, we can only advertise individual lectures...Among the classes we would like to give is one by Bill Mandel on the Soviet Union. It should be mentioned that even if we were to advertise each class as a separate lecture, we would have to have a tenured faculty moderator at each one...

When the Communist speaker ban was lifted, we were informed (by Mrs. Weaver in the Dean's office) first that we would require a tenured faculty moderator for Mickey Lima, the first Communist to speak on campus after the ban was lifted, then for all 'controversial' speakers sponsored by us, and finally that all speakers we sponsored would be considered a priori controversial. Of course, getting a faculty moderator is an immensely time-consuming task...On at least three occasions over the past fifteen months we have had to cancel meetings because we had no moderator.

E. (from interviews by J. Donald Moon.) The SDS, an 'infant organization', has had great difficulty in gaining membership because of the ban imposed this Fall, for there has been no SDS table to which interested parties could go. But in one evening, when Mr. Harrington spoke, over 200 people signed a list requesting that SDS literature be mailed to them. The interest was obviously there, but the obstacles placed by the ban prevented its fulfillment.

(The 72 hour rule) results in clubs' not being able to present speakers on issues which arise suddenly, and in their being unable to capitalize upon unexpected opportunities to present out-of-town speakers who may be in the area on other engagements. The SDS has been adversely affected by this ruling also. On September 24 they planned to present a forum between the DuBois Club, the SFO, and the SDS, but a necessary change in the faculty member who was to moderate the program could not be completed 72 hours before the time of presentation, so the groups were forced into a public hall. The branding of all political/social groups is 'off-campus' effectively circumscribes the range of alternatives open to them and restricts their ability to carry out their .. educational functions.

On October 2 the SDS was denied permission to use University facilities to present Lawrence Landy, head of ACT, a militant civil rights organization. In the same vein, Richard Roman of YPSL reports that his club has been refused permission to hold a continuous series of meetings, but is required to get permission for each one separately. Such a ruling seriously abridges a group's ability to plan a sequence of lectures, educational forums, etc.

F. (from an interview about the Young Democrats with Jerry Fishkin, by Frank Summers.) The 72-hour rule and the 'tenured faculty moderator' rule have had adverse effects on the YD's. They have found it exceedingly difficult to find a faculty moderator, as most of their speakers have tight schedules and can speak only at certain times. Furthermore, people ust passing through the area have not been able to speak because of the 72-hour ruling.

The recent ban on soliciting funds and membership has had dramatic effects on the Young Democrats. The YD's had never had a table at the Bancroft/Telegraph area for any length of time until Summer 1964, when one person.. set up a table distributing literature, selling pins, and collecting donations in support of President Johnson. The table was so successful the club decided on it as a policy.

A table was set up for from 4 to 5 hours on Wednesday through Friday of registration week The people at the table sold political literature, pins, and stickers, and solicited membership for the YD's. In these three days, 35 members were added to the organization (which means an extra $70 was added to the treasury, as the dues are $2 per year), and a net profit from sales and donations of $150 was collected. Also, a list was compiled of people who were interested in becoming members, and in the three days 70 people signed, almost all of whom later became members. The following are direct results of the days the table was set up: (1) The YD's for the first time could charter itself with the Citizen's Democratic Council. This cost $50. (2) For the first time the club 'covered' all student precincts and living groups in terms of passing out literature and soliciting workers to help the club on projects such as persuading people to vote. (3) $100 was donated to local campaigns...

Since the table has been taken down due to the University ruling, the organization has collected approximately $175. Thus the club collected as much in the five weeks following the removal of the table as it had collected in the three days of its existence. Furthermore, the YD's have had no new members since the beginning of the semester... YD President Jerry Fishkin feels his organization has been affected more by its inability to obtain precinct workers due to the ban than by its inability to obtain funds and new members...he went on to say that the YD's can no longer appeal past its membership for projects, and as a result the number of precinct workers has been substantially reduced in a year when this is perhaps the most important function of the Young Democrats...

G. (from the report on Slate cited above.) The Vigil Against Nuclear Testing. In Fall 1961, Krushchev announced that a 50- megaton bomb would be exploded in the atmosphere at the end of October. At the Slate General Assembly of October 25, a motion was proposed that "Slate condemns as immoral and inhuman the testing by and and all powers of nuclear devices..." and that "Slate will organize and coordinate a demonstration on or off campus within one week." The motion passed, and the Assembly then decided on a vigil extending from noon Oct. 31 to noon Nov. 1, to be held if possible on Sproul Hall's steps.

The Administration asked for and received an exact description of the plans the next day. On October 27 it denied permission (which had not been requested) for Slate to hold a vigil on campus "as an organization"... On October 28, the Slate CoCom voted to comply with the ruling under protest rather than lose the nuclear testing issue in a dispute over students' civil liberties, and adopted the position that: "(1) Slate withdraws its legal sponsorship of the vigil but endorses the spirit of the protest and encourages individuals to participate as individuals; (2) Slate explains that it is holding the vigil on campus for reasons of convenience and symbolic significance; (3) Slate retains its previous position of opposition to the rulings of the administration limiting student political activities and student rights, but will withhold any challenging of these rulings until after discussion at the next General Assembly."

The vigil was duly held on Sproul steps, with about 600 people, 250 of whom remained overnight, sitting on the steps under a banner reading "For Humanity's Sake, Stop All Nuclear Testing", 10,000 leaflets and 7,000 sympathy blue armbands were handed out. The vigil served to establish a precedent that unorganized individuals could act on campus on off-campus issues.

At the time of Kennedy's visit on Charter Day, in March 1962, (some students) organized a vigil to be held on Sproul Hall steps on the morning of Charter Day, solely on the subject of nuclear testing. Following the precedent set the previous Fall, this group did not formally organize...

(Editor's note: the group was the Students Against Nuclear Testing. Chancellor Strong denied them permission to hold the vigil, claiming that it would interfere with the flow of traffic. They planned the vigil anyway, saying that they would leave easy access to the building and would welcome the assistance of the University police. Their announcement to this effect in the Daily Californian of March 22 was accompanied by an editorial protesting Strong's ruling. The next day Dean Towle announced that no action would be taken unless the group impeded traffic. Evidently they did not.)

H. (Information from Brian Shannon on the YSA.) When events break, students often want to hold special meetings or to plan for meetings and demonstrations off the campus. For instance, during the blockade of Cuba we were unable to secure a room on campus and had to hold a meeting in Stiles Hall at which we planned a demonstration in San Francisco. We had to turn away over 200 people, since the hall only held 170 ...

I. (Information from Bob Starobin and Daily Californian. Feb.19,1963) At the instigation of graduate students in the department, the Colloquium Committee of the History Department invited Herbert Aptheker, a leading Communist, to speak before a colloquium on an academic topic. His speech was to have been given in the Alumni House. When the Administration learned of this, it told the Department that (1) Apthecker could not speak on campus; (2) the History Department's name could not be used in connection with his talk; and (3) Apthecker could not be paid. The History Department protested, to no avail. The colloquium was held in Stiles Hall, under the History Department's name, and a collection was taken up to provide an honorarium for Apthecker.

(We might note that these last two examples from part of a general pattern. In many ways, Stiles Hall and similar organizations function as a 'safety-valve' by partially fulfilling needs that the Administration will not allow the University to fulfill. The magnitude of their service is remarkable: for example, to quote Damon Tempey's report on Stiles Hall,

"The building-use statistics of the academic year 1963-4 are typical. Of the 185 uses by 36 political, religious, and issue- oriented groups, 146 of these were by nine groups, including Campus CORE (36), University Friends Of SNCC(21), Young Socialist Alliance (22), Slate (15), and YPSL (15). That such groups have a place to meet and to present speakers no doubt makes the Administration feel more justified in preventing them from using campus facilities.....Nonetheless, there are inconveniences and expenses involved in using Stiles Hall that would not be present if campus facilities were available.")

Clearly, such examples can be multiplied indefinitely; but our space is limited. (For other types of difficulties occasioned by the regulations, see in this report the appendix on KPFA and the excellent discussion and examples in the appendix on Women For Peace.) After examining the restrictive effects of the regulations upon groups, we are mildly surprised that groups still manage to function at all.

Appendix B : Inconsistencies, Arbitrariness, and Discrimination in the Regulations and their Application

I. Examples footnoted in the covering text, section I.B.

Footnote 13: The Campus NAACP requested a room in early March, and the Dean of Students approved the request. When the name of the speaker, Malcolm X., was revealed later, the Administration did not react. A dispute over alleged discrimination by United Airlines led to picketing of the Placement Center (at which UA was holding interviews) in which the Campus NAACP was prominent. On May 5, the Daily Cal announced that Vice-Chancellor Kragen took full responsibility for cancelling Malcolm X's speech on the grounds that he represented a religious organization. The Campus NAACP argued that the talk concerned information, not religious affiliation. It is interesting to note that not only Bishop Pike, but also Billy Graham and Rabbi Fine, among others, had been allowed to speak on campus; c.f. Daily Cal May 8, 1961. (Information from Stephanie Lipney, via. interviews with Herman Blake, etc.)

Footnote 14. SRE was, to boot, an ad hoc committee of the ASUC, and held on-campus status. To quote Stephanie Lipney's report further (c.f.Daily Cal Oct. 7, 1960):

"SRE's first activity was a jazz concert. They were allowed the use of campus facilities..and everything went well for them until they announced their efforts resulted in $900. At this point the University imposed its rulings concerning funds raised on campus: that either these funds would be sent to the United Crusade, which is not known for its contributions to Southern Civil Rights organizations, or the World University Service, ...(which is) concerned with the purchasing and distribution of textbooks for foreign countries ...The SRE decided to donate the funds raised to the WUS in the hopes, and surely not the notion, that the funds might still be used for scholarships for Negro students expelled for participation in the Civil Rights struggle.

"The SRE was persistent. They proposed a second jazz concert and fund-raising drive for money and clothing, canned goods, etc., in support of the sit-ins and the Negroes who were victims of an economic boycott due to their involvement in voter registration. Once again the jazz concert was approved, and once again the problem of solicitation became the issue. After a long period of negotiations to no avail, the SRE cancelled the jazz concert until it could be determined what kind of fund-raising could be used... After continued debate on the issue, the SRE disbanded. Even though the Administration granted them recognition, they could not function in any meaningful way." (C.f.Daily Cal for 11/8/61, 4/20/61, 4/27/61.)

C.f. the Slate booklet, The Big Myth, for more about the Hungarian students.

Footnote 15. (from DuBois Club report by Jack Kurzweil.) Mrs. Weaver has recently decided that off-campus speakers under DuBois Club sponsorship need police protection. At the expense of the DuBois club, of course. Independent of the consent of the DuBois Club, of course. And without the right of the D.B.C. to even solicit donations to pay the compulsory fee of twenty-odd dollars. Of course, which speakers require police protection is Mrs. Weaver's whim. Thus, one Friday noon Mike Myerson, presently a longshoreman, required two cops. The following Monday evening Henry Winston, a Communist spokesman who is blind, required none.

Footnote 16. Information may be found in ASUC Minutes. The ASUC has also endorsed the Berkeley Fair Housing Ordinance (3/7/63). The inconsistencies of enforcement of the nominal restrictions on the ASUC are alarming. Thus, on 5/5/64 the Senate passed a motion recommending that the University withdraw its invitation to the Shah of Iran and not confer on him the proposed honorary degree, due to lack of political freedom in his country. In March 1960 the ExCom was permitted to support Southern students in their sit-ins. The ASUC endorsement of Proposition 1A (10/4/62) began with a quote from President Kerr on the need the University had for the funds this proposition pro- mised; the resolution encourages students to "actively work" for the proposition. One must consider such actions in the light of the restrictions indicated in the appendices on the ASUC. (Information from Judy Bosworth.)

Footnote 17. It is amusing to note that the ASUC was made compulsory to pay for this building, among others; that no indication of such restrictions was made at the time; that this compulsory status was used to keep the ASUC from taking political stands (again, no advance indication of this was given) and has helped thereby to restrict the activities of groups which (fortunately) cannot use the building; etc. See the appendix on Voluntary and Compulsory ASUC.

Footnote 18. See the appendix on Women For Peace.

Footnote 19. (from a preliminary report on peace groups by Steven Salaff.) Dean Towle has stressed that the type of activity announced by a poster or leaflet determines whether she censors it. The same criterion is applied to the Student Union notice boards. A poster announcing a noon meeting in Pauley Ballroom to hear talks against the Vietnam war was censored because "it didn't look very peaceful".

Section IV, Footnote 7. See DuBois Club data in Appendix A.

II. Other examples

The wealth of examples is impressive, their variety is bewildering. We cite a few.

A. (from a preliminary report on student-student communication on campus, regarding the functioning of rallys.) The passage of the Kerr Directives in 1959 complicated the situation instead of easing it. The Directives permitted 'recognized' student groups to hold 'special meetings or events...upon University facilities only with prior approval of the Chief Campus Officer or his delegated representative. On one hand, this ruling let groups hold rallys in the Dwinelle Plaza area. On the other, since 'prior' was liberally interpreted, such rallys had to be scheduled a week in advance, which greatly hampered their potential usefulness.

B. (from the DuBois Club report.) We are supposed to be allowed to charge money to meet the expenses of a meeting. However, what these expenses can include is somewhat arbitrary. Thus, last year we showed a film, "The Spanish Earth", in Dwinelle and were allowed to charge a dime admission to cover expenses. However, when we use Pauley Ballroom, for which there is a $35 fee, we are not even allowed to solicit donations to meet this expense. Just what criteria are applied, and when, seems to be a matter of whim ...

C. (from Robin Room's report on Slate, re the sources for some regulations.) In early December 1961, PLATFORM, Slate's equivalent at UCLA, invited Dorothy Healy, a Communist, to speak on campus. In response to a query from UCLA Chancellor Murphy (Berkeley Daily Gazette, Dec. 16), Kerr ruled that American Communist speakers were not included in the Open Forum policy. In a presentation to the Regents on Dec. 13, Kerr cited in support of this ruling statements made by President Sproul in 1951. In speaking of the authority of the Chancellors to implement this policy, Kerr concluded by citing the phrase (from University Regulation No. 5, 1944), "to prevent exploitation of the University's prestige by...those who would use it as a platform for propaganda," and added: "The latter phrase has been specifically interpreted by word and by practice to exclude speeches by members of the Communist Party..." (See Slate Newsletter 2/17/62) (We do not criticize President Kerr's interpretation, nor his sources. We wish to point out, however, that, to our knowledge, this was the substantive content of the fabled Communist Speaker Ban, and was, at best, a vaguely-formulated policy whose sources were not easily accessible. The difficulties of responding to such a policy, or of trying to effect its change, are evident.)

D. (ibid.) Although the formalities of getting posters set up by the ASUC, which had been delegated to this task by the Administration, were formidible, no censorship was felt in this field until Spring 1963. Before then it had been necessary to get approval of the aesthetics of posters; this varied according to the aesthetic theories held by the approver and not by any coherent regulatory rationale. In Spring, however, the ASUC functionary in charge of approving posters benignly announced to a member of Women For Peace that the Dean of Students had told her not to approve any posters announcing pickets, demonstrations, peace marches, or like political activities...

E. When the Administration chooses, it relaxes its regulations to test them. For example, the Daily Cal of October 8, 1958 reported:

"Chancellor Glen T. Seaborg announced today that President Kerr has temporarily suspended University Regulation 17 ((the previous form of the Kerr Directives)) in view of the upcoming state elections...From now until January 1, the prohibition has been set aside in order to test the necessity of retaining Section B-7...which ..is designed to forestall political embarrassment for the University and for candidates or the opponents of candidates who would receive speaking invitations from partisan student groups. Seaborg pointed out that it also limits to some extent the rights of free speech and the opportunities of students to hear from all political candidates."

We are grateful for the Administration's concern for the civil-libertarian welfare of the students.

F. (from Stephen Salaff's report on the peace movement.) Students are familiar with the noon hour brass-band performances in the Student Union plaza, and the loudspeaker broadcasts on behalf of a favorite project of an 'on-campus' committee. (Faculty are also aware of the intrusion of the pep-band into classrooms and lecture halls.) Yet until the Free Speech Movement seized a police car we had never heard an unscheduled political speaker using a microphone. It is difficult to be heard outdoors, and the volume of noise could not be an objection, as witnessed by the toleration of the above activities. But University regulations have prohibited amplification for 'off- campus' speakers, whether at the rally tree in Dwinelle Plaza or on the Student Union steps. Here again, the right to speak and be heard has been abridged....

As other examples, we cite again the appendix on Women For Peace, and the latter half of the appendix on the HUAC Demonstrations, which contains several descriptions of contradictory application of administrative policy.

Appendix C: Miscellaneous Affidavits

1. Affidavits on Outside Pressure (cf. Section II.)

A. "On Monday, Sept.21, while attending the Chancellor's reception for holders of the Regents' Scholarship, I, Bill Miller, heard Chancellor Strong state publicly in response to a question, that the Oakland Tribune had called him and asked if he was aware that the picket then being organized against that newspaper was being recruited from University property. Strong said that he was not aware that the Bancroft-Telegraph area was University property, but he would investigate. He found that it was University property. The above is the Chancellor's statement in substance."

(signed)
Bill Miller (Oct. 7, 1964)

B. "During the first week of classes I attended the Chancellor's reception for holders of the Regent's Scholarship at University House. At this meeting someone questioned Chancellor Strong about the cause of the University's new policy on politics in the Bancroft-Telegraph area. How did all this start? Chancellor Strong replied that the Oakland Tribune (a picket against their office was being organized from Bancroft-Telegraph) had called him and asked if he was aware that the picketing activity was being organized on University property. Strong said he did not know that the Bancroft-Telegraph area was University property, but that he would investigate. He discovered to his apparent surprise that the area was indeed the University's, and not the city's property. There were many people at the meeting who must have heard the same thing."

(signed)
Mike Raudenbush (Oct. 7, 1964)

C. "At approximately 1:20 pm on Tuesday October 13 I went to Chancellor Strong's office and asked for a comment on Bill Miller's paragraph on P.3 of the first FSM Bulletin. (*editor's note: this was substantially the material contained in Miller's affidavit, above.) Chancellor Strong's secretary had not seen the paragraph, and she made a photocopy and took my name and address.

At about 2:45 I called Chancellor Strong's office and he spoke with me. He said that the Oakland Tribune had not called him; that at the reception for Regents' Scholars he had said that it had been brought to his attention that tables were being used on University property, but that permits had been secured from the City of Berkeley. For instance, well over 100 permits had been issued for tables and many for sidewalk speeches. A reporter had informed the Public Information Office that tables were on University property, and he (Strong) had heard from the Public Information Office. He said that he himself did not at that time know where the property line was, and he said the matter would be looked into. He then discovered (he said) that the property line is at the plaques and not at the posts, and he realized that tables for collecting funds and various activities had encroached on University property. He added that there had always been sporadic enquiries about congestion and he had always said that it was a matter for the Berkeley police to control traffic congestion. He then gave an outline of the regulations currently in force.

He said that Richard Hafner of the Public Information Office would know the details about the statement from the reporter.

When I asked when this had happened, he said it was early in the semester, perhaps before the first week of classes.

(*editor's note: now follows an interview with Richard Hafner, Public Affairs Officer, 3:30pm, Tuesday October 13.) Mr. Hafner said he did not know specifically who the reporter was, but that he was from the Oakland Tribune; that he (the reporter) came out to look at the tables, and said that they were interested in a particular table, one that was recruiting for Scranton; that this was at the time of the Republican Convention in San Francisco; that when the reporter got to campus, the table was gone and the Berkeley Police had no record of it, and that the story was never printed in the Oakland Tribune.

Mr. Hafner said he had told Chancellor Strong within a few days. I asked whether this incident really occured as long ago as the Convention, and Mr. Hafner said he felt sure it was in July. I reported that Chancellor Strong felt he had heard about it quite recently, at the start of the semester. Checking with Chancellor Strong's office, we discovered that the Chancellor had been in Hawaii from July 8 to August 9. Mr. Hafner pointed out that he might just have talked to someone in the Chancellor's office, for instance Vice-Chancellor Sherriffs.

He said that before the building of the new Student Union, political rallies etc. had been held at Sather Gate. When the Bancroft-to-Strawberry Creek block of Telegraph was closed off (he said) these activities retreated into Bancroft. Since there was some traffic danger there, the activities moved onto the north side of Bancroft. He added that this was at the time of the ban on speeches by Communists and by political candidates, and that it was helpful at that point that there was a place where people could talk. He pointed out that when he arrived in the Fall of 1961 he was led to regard the area as a "No Man's Land."

During this summer (he said), after the Oakland Tribune reporter pointed out that the strip was University property, discussions went on sporadically on whether the situation could be ignored. The feeling finally (he said) was that the regulations were clearly being violated and they must be enforced."

(signed)
Nicholas Zvegentzov (Oct. 15, 1964)

2. Affidavit on Administrative Interference in the ASUC.

"In the first week of November, 1961, Roger Hollander and I (both representatives on ASUC Ex-Com) wrote a letter to the Daily Cal trying to explain to the students our feelings about the Kerr Directives — why we felt they were bad and why we felt they restricted political activity on campus. The letter was left in the Daily Cal mailbox in the representatives-at-large office in the Student Union. It mysteriously disappeared, never appearing in the Daily Cal. On November 12th we rewrote the letter and personally handed it in to the Daily Cal that afternoon. It was printed on November 13th.

The next day, Nov. 14th, 1961, there was an Ex-Com meeting. At that time, Michael Tigar and I were sponsoring a motion on in loco parentis—the University's acting as the parent of the student. The motion came up on the agenda of the meeting, but ASUC President Brian Van Camp, instead of calling on me or Mike (the co-authors of the motion), called on Dean Towle to read a statement from President Kerr. We had heard nothing of President Kerr's letter at this time, and we didn't know quite what to expect. (Roger Hollander said at the time that he had received a copy thirty minutes before the meeting and had not had time to digest the contents.) We protested because we thought that this had nothing to do with in loco parentis. President Van Camp assured us that it did. Dean Towle read the letter (the letter was an attack on the Cloke-Hollander attack on the Kerr Directives. It was printed in the Daily Cal on Nov. 15.) We were by our own motion (by our pleas really) given time to rebut President Kerr's statement, which we did.

Then Ex-Com began nominally to discuss the motion on in loco parentis. But the discussion proceeded not on the grounds of the University's acting as a parent but on the grounds of the Kerr Directives. Larry Beyersdorf stood up and said that there was so much Slate had said about the Kerr Directives which was untrue that he felt it was time Ex- Com took a stand on the issue. He said that the Kerr Directives really were in the interests of the students of the University. About half-way through the discussion, John Grissim, a temporary representative-at-large appointed by Ex- Com to fill a position which had been vacated, proposed a fifteen page motion affirming the Kerr Directives. All motions, by Ex-Com rules, are required to be in the boxes of the representatives by three o'clock of the day prior to the Ex- Com meeting. Mr. Grissim's motion, which he had with him, did not meet this requirement. We raised this point and were duly rebuffed. The discussion then proceeded on Mr. Grissim's motion which was offered as a substitute for the in loco parentis motion sponsored by Tigar and me. Grissim's motion was amended and passed.

We all received copies of the motion then, and Tigar and I also received a copy of President Kerr's letter. By that time we had become quite perplexed by the strategy of the Ex-Com meeting; we couldn't figure out why all of these anti-Slate forces had come together at one point, seemingly from many different directions and apparently unaware of the others existence. Mike and I compared the Grissim motion and the Kerr letter. It turned out that both were written on the same typewriter. The "l"s and "w"s had the same kind of faulty type, and there were certain other characteristics of type that were exactly the same. We talked to John Grissim after the meeting and he conceded to us that his motion was typed in Alex Sheriff's office by Alex Sheriff's secretary. Grissim also acknowledged that he, himself, had done relatively little work on the motion, practically none, Sheriff's, or someone working for him, had done most of the work. Grissim, in effect, was handed the motion by Sheriffs, vice-chancellor of student affairs, prier to the meeting.

In addition to this, Grissim began to realize that he had been a fallguy for the administration. He appeared the next day at a Slate rally on this specific subject (on which both Mike Tigar and I also spoke.) Grissim stated then that he thought there was something fishy about the motion and that he didn't know exactly what it was, but he promised to get to the bottom of it. Nothing was heard about it after that."

(signed)
Kenneth Cloke (Nov. 1, 1964)

(Note: This statement was dictated orally.)

Appendix D: The Removal of the Communist Speaker Ban

I. Footnotes to the Covering Text

II. The Removal of the Communist Speaker Ban

In 1951 the University formalized a ban on all American Communist speakers. The ban was one result of the political repression of the McCarthy era. Not until the Summer of 1963, however, was the ban finally lifted by the Regents. In the increasingly liberal atmosphere of the University campuses after 1960 many protests against this ban were made. Nevertheless, the Regents did not act on this issue until faced with a lawsuit involving the relationship between University policies and Constitutional guarantees. The activity which was to become the focus of the Speaker Ban controversy began on the Riverside campus early in the Spring of 1962. 'Declare' a student political party at Riverside, arranged for a panel discussion involving both right-wing Republicans and Communists. Declare members, at the time they were arranging the panel, knew of the University ruling banning Communist speakers, but they did not think that an institution devoted to the search for truth would enforce it. But the University did. As a test case. Declare, with the advice of the ACLU, scheduled a debate between Dorothy Healey, a prominent Communist, and conservative Republican Loyd Wright, which the Administration again refused to permit. (The information in this paragraph is taken from a report in the Liberal Democrat, August 1962, pp. 10-11.)

A hearing by the Riverside Superior Court took place in May 1962. Declare attorneys contended that the regulation was in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The Declare case was defeated and litigation was continued in appeal to the State Supreme Court. (Ibid.)

The Spring semester of 1962 also saw a variety of protests of the Speaker Ban on the Berkeley campus, which were given impetus by the Riverside suit. In February 1962 Dorothy Healy spoke to students off-campus at the Hillel Foundation (Daily Cal, 2/15/62). On February 27, the Executive Committee of the ASUC passed a resolution, by a vote of 13-1, requesting the President to lift the ban on Communist speakers, in accord with "the ideal of a free and open forum on the University campus for expression of all points of view." (ExCom Minutes, 2/27/62.) On May 15 ExCom reaffirmed its position. Also in May, a protest rally was held in Dwinelle Plaza (Daily Cal May 16) A survey of students undertaken by a Sociology class revealed that by an overwhelming majority—79% to 18%—the students polled believed that Communists should be allowed to speak on campus. On June 20, a petition was presented to the Regents, requesting them to remove "the censorship power over off-campus speakers...in accordance with...the 'Open Forum Policy' " This petition received 4,748 signatures from members of the University community at four campuses; 2556 of these came from the Berkeley campus. (Letter from Bob Phillips to Edwin Pauley, June 20, 1962.)

What was the Administration's reaction to these protests? There is no doubt that many members of the Administration supported removal of the ban. The attitude of the Regents was seen as the chief obstacle to change. Repeatedly, members of the Administration expressed the fear that some of the liberties of the Open Forum would be endangered by lifting the ban. On May 17, 1962 Alex Sherriffs was quoted in the Daily Cal as having said on two occasions, "If the University is compelled to have all speakers, it won't have any speakers." Oficially, however, the Administration maintained the validity of its position. Almost a year later, Sherriffs claimed at a public meeting that in the event the ban was lifted, Communist Party members would wish to speak here to undermine the University by virtue of the criticism that would be brought upon it for letting them speak. ("Report on the Discussion between the SCLU Discussion Committee and the Berkeley Campus Administration...", April 1963, p. 5.) At the same meeting, Chancellor Strong admitted that the ban was "not consistent" with the Open Forum policy. He said, however, that prudence required that the ban be retained.

No action was taken on the ban for over a year after the protests of 1962. The Riverside suit had received its first defeat in May, but the possibility of bringing it to the State Supreme Court remained. Little was heard on the issue from any quarter; the pending court case had pre-empted the field of protest. In February 1963 the regulation continued to be strictly enforced. Herbert Apthecker was not permitted to speak on an academic subject before the History Department on campus.

In the Spring of 1963, Administrative discussion of the issue became more frequent. It had become apparent that the lawsuit was to be decisive. The suit was filed finally in April, and Kerr stated that some of the Regents were waiting to see the results of the Riverside case before making a decision. (Daily Cal, April 22) Chancellor Strong said that if the courts determined that Communists would have to be permitted if any off-campus speakers were permitted, the rules authorizing the presentation of off-campus speakers might be revised. ("Report on the Discussion...", p. 5)

Then, on May 14, the ACLU dropped the Riverside suit. One of their lawyers explained: "We felt the presence of the suit might cause the University Regents to defer action until after the question was settled in court." (Daily Cal May 15.) What caused this sudden change after a legal struggle lasting over a year? It was true that the ACLU had acted to avoid delay. A few days before this announcement, Richard Unwin, one of the students at Riverside who were parties to the test case, had received a telephone call from lawyers of the Southern California ACLU. They informed him that "they had conferred with Dr. Kerr and that, pending withdrawal of the suit, he would indeed lift the ban." (Statement by Mr. Unwin.) On June 21, the Regents issued a statement approving a new policy on off-campus speakers. As Chancellor Strong had predicted two months earlier, there were other revisions in addition to the simple one allowing "any off-campus speaker to... speak on a campus of the University." The presence of a tenured faculty member was now required at meetings with off-campus speakers whenever the Chancellor considered it appropriate.

The paragraph introducing the new policy statement read as follows: "The Regents of the University of California have confidence in the students of the University and in their judgement in properly evaluating any and all beliefs and ideologies that may be expressed in University facilities by off-campus speakers. This is in the best American tradition." ("U.C. Policies Relating To Students..", Sept.1963) The Regents had not expressed this confidence when they were petitioned to do so by students and faculty. They had not displayed this confidence by yielding to moral suasion. Only later, when certain students were on the verge of success in taking legal means to gain redress, did the Regents find confidence in the students and their judgement,

Evan Alderson, Graduate, English

Appendix on Legal Matters

The University and State Law

As the University in the recent controversy has raised the question of the legal right of students to engage in political activity on the campus, the substantive legal question has become whether any state law prevents the University from allowing the solicitation of funds and other activity for political purposes on university property.

As a legal being, the University is a "state institution" and a branch of the state government. In practical terms, this means that although the Administration has general powers to make rules concerning intra-university matters as opposed to the state legislature, all state laws constitutional provisions, and police regulations apply, and in fact outrank University regulations where there is conflict, or a difference in requirements.

In order for the University to justify regulations which otherwise violate even minimal free speech requirements, it must be postulated that the subject of regulation is solely internal campus political activity, and that state law prevents the University from allowing or encouraging such activity. In fact, the University has publically cited a section of the Education Code (8454) which prohibits solicitation of funds in public schools. However, the University failed to notice or mention another section of the Education Code (13805) which defines "public schools" so as to omit completely all colleges and universities of the state. The University is similarly not included in the state civil service laws on political activity.

The only law the University might rely on, Government Code 3202-3, speaks of "local agencies", and prevents officers and employees of these agencies from soliciting funds from each other in places which are "used for the governmental purposes" of that agency. One cannot ignore the obvious inconsistencies in proposing to apply this law to the University: that a statewide agency can hardly be local, that a University has an educational, not a governmental purpose, that the obvious purpose of the act was to correct an entirely different problem, that students are not officers or employees, and so forth. Even if these contradictions are ignored or resolved, the additional fact remains that a very small amount of University property is devoted to the "governmental" or even classroom purposes of the University, as witnessed by the frequent use of such areas as Dwinelle plaza, Edwards Field, Harmon Gymnasium, the Greek Theatre, the football stadium, the Student Union Plaza, Sather Gate, South Gate, or the Bancroft and Telegraph area. The University has even allowed the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force—not to mention Cal Camp, the Ugly Man Contest, the Pelican, etc.—to solicit members or raise funds anywhere on the campus. A Big "C" Circus is even allowed to collect money to send children to camp, while other organizations are refused the right to send students South to register people to vote.

For these reasons, even if the University were a "local governmental agency" by its past practices and present policies the University would be able to claim exemption for little of the property in question. No other law even hints at requiring the kind of restrictions imposed by the University. The only conclusion possible is that the rules relating to political activity are arbitrary at best, and by the University's own admissions, not required for administrative efficiency. Neither can the Administration rely on Article 9, section 9 of the state constitution, which provides that the University shall not yield to the influence of political or social forces in the appointment of its Regents, or in the administration of its affairs. In fact, this section was designed to keep the University, not the students, out of the way of political pressure. By the very act of handing down these regulations, the University has itself engaged in political and social action and violated Article 9, section 9, and has failed to show how, in any respect, this law supports its position. Thus, it appears that these regulations are solely regulations and not law. As such, they must bow to other legal and constitutional requirements, such as freedom of speech, religion, assembly when there are conflicts between the two.

Kenneth Cloke
Boalt Hall

Discussion Paper Regarding Freedoms Guaranteed by the First Amendment and the University of California

Background Facts

On September 14, 1964, Dean of Students Katherine Towle issued a statement indicating that some important changes in University policies covering the use of University facilities were soon to be given effect. "Beginning September 21, 1964," the statement began, "provisions of the policy of the Regents concerning 'Use of University Facilities' will be strictly enforced in all areas designated as property of the Regents...including the 26- foot strip of brick walkway at the campus entrance on Banoroft Way and Telegraph Avenue..." The statement noted that the Banoroft Way area in question had been added "to the list of designated areas for the distribution of handbills, circulars or pamphlets by University students and staff in accordance with Berkeley Campus policy." Previously, at least from the date of the adoption of the "Use of University Facilities" policy of February 1, 1960 (which superseded Regulation 17), though distribution of handbills and circulars in the Banoroft Way area had not been officially authorized, it was permitted and not interfered with. In addition to such activities, posters, easels and card tables had been in use in this area throughout this period. Both sets of activities had involved solicitation of membership in political organizations, support or opposition of candidates, propositions and policies connected with various elections or social, economic or political matters of public concern; and solicitation of funds for the aid of projects not directly connected with an authorized University activity. Now, Dean Towle's statement said, "Postere, easels and card tables will not be permitted in this area because of interference with the flow of traffic." And, the statement added, "University facilities may not, of course, be used to support or advocate off-campus political or social action."

On September 28, 1964, Dean Towle issued a new statement in response to student requests. On a "trial basis" a limited number of tables ("one table and one chair may be placed in front of each concrete pillar and one on the east side in front of and parallel to the concrete wall") were to be allowed in the Bancroft Way area; posters were also to be permitted. A clarification of the statement of policy of September 14 was then made: "...it is permissible to distribute in designated areas materials presenting points of view for or against a proposition, a candidate, or with respect to a social or political issue. Campaign literature, including bumper strips and campaign buttons, may also be made available for free distribution. It is not permissible on University property to solicit political party membership, to plan or initiate direct action pertaining to off-campus political or social issues, or to recruit individuals for such action." Finally, it was indicated that "because of the oft-repeated complaint that the presently designated 'Hyde Park' area in the Student Union Plaza is somewhat isolated, a second 'Hyde Park' area is being established, on an experimental basis, at the main entrance to Sproul Hall... Because of possible disturbance to persons working in Sproul Hall offices, voice amplifiers will not be permitted. There must be no interference with traffic or the conduct of University business."

Also on September 28, 1964, Chancellor Strong stated, in an apparent effort to further clarify the situation. "Consistent with University policy regarding use of University facilities, no one is permitted on campus to use these facilities (it is unclear whether University facilities were implied to be available off campus and if so whether they could be used in the ways not permitted on campus) to mount social and political action directed to the surrounding community" (Whether such action legitimately could be mounted for direction to non-surrounding communities was not specified.) Strong then quoted the following statement of principles issued by President Kerr, June 12, 1961:

1. Freedom to speak and to hear is maintained for students and faculty members...
2. Subversion and other illegal activities are not tolerated; and we will not employ a Communist.
3. Law and order are maintained on the campus.
4. A balanced program of speakers and ideas is presented.
5. No exploitation of the name of the University is allowed.
6. No student may be compelled to join an organization which engages in social or political action.
7. No efforts at conversion and solicitation of members by political or religious groups are permitted on campus.

Strong then stated that a petition from the ASUC Senate dated September 22, 1964, and requesting freedom to "(1) solicit political party membership, (2) mount political and social action on the campus, (3) solicit funds on campus for such action, and (4) receive funds to aid projects not directly concerned with an authorized activity of the University" had been received and brought to the attention of the Regents and President. "University facilities," said Strong, "are not to be used for any of these four purposes. Any student or group of students seeking to recruit members for social or political action, or to solicit funds for such action, is free to do so off- campus, but is prohibited from doing so on-campus."

Continuing with this statement, Chancellor Strong sought to provide the reasons for the prohibitions:

The University respects the right of each student as a citizen to participate as he sees fit in off-campus, non-University courses of action. When an individual, in so participating, acts in a disorderly way or is in violation of the law, he is answerable to the civil authorities for his conduct. Some citizens demand further that the individual as a student also be disciplined by the University; that is, that he be censored, suspended, or expelled. We answer such demands by pointing out that we respect the right of our students to act in their capacity as citizens in the public domain.

On the one side, an individual as a student is held responsible by the University for compliance with its rules and regulations. On the other side, when a student goes off-campus to participate in some social or political action, he does so on his own responsibility as a citizen. He has no right, acting as a citizen, to involve the University, either by using its name or by using any of its facilities to further such action. For, were the University to become involved the consequence is clear. We ask and expect from the State an indispensible freedom residing in independence — independence that rests on fulfillment of a public trust; namely, that the University will never allow itself to be dominated nor used by parties, sects, or selfish interests. By honoring this public trust steadfastly, the University is enabled also to honor and defend the rights of its members to act freely in the public domain in the capacity as citizens The consequence of defaulting on this public trust would be the erosion of the independence of the University and the destruction of the position maintained by the University respecting the responsibilities of an individual as a student in the University and respecting his rights and responsibilities as a citizen of the State. As a student in the University, an individual is answerable to the University for conduct coming under its rules and regulations. As a citizen of the State, an individual is answerable to the State for conduct coming under the laws of the State. This is as it should be to insure freedom with responsibility within the University and in civil society. The University extends many privileges to its students. In return, the University expects observance by its students of the University's published policies relating to students and student organizations.

Thereafter a series of clashes between students and administration escalated to a point where students violated the prohibitions, were suspended and took direct action in protest against the situation. The consequences are, at present, still not entirely clear. Proper rules for the use of the campus for political and general free speech purposes are presently being negotiated by a tri-partite committee representing students, faculty and administration. The suspended students are being represented by the ACLU, and hearings are being conducted by a faculty committee to determine how these cases should be decided.

It is the purpose of this memorandum to deal with the following questions: If no issues of traffic flow, interference with the conduct of classes or offices, destruction of property or greenery or fraudulent solicitation of monies are involved, under what conditions would prohibitions of the exercise of First Amendment freedoms on campus be constitutional?

Some General First Amendment Principles

"The freedom of the individual to participate in political activity is a fundamental principle of a democratic society and is the premise upon which our form of government is based." Fort v. Civil Service Commission, 61 AC 329,332. It is the First Amendment's function to guarantee that Americans will not be deprived of the right to exercise these freedoms. The people's rights to discuss freely and generally all matters of public concern and to engage in all activities which may be integral or in aid of the processes of establishing, questioning or changing public attitudes or policies with regard to such matters include such activities as the following: publishing and circulating literature, soliciting and organizing litigation, picketing and demonstrating (including singing, clapping and chanting) in places where the people concerned can most effectively be reached whether on public streets, "private" property serving "public" functions (such as the streets of a company town or the parking lot of a super-shopping center) or "public" property serving similar ones, such as the grounds surrounding a state capitol. See, e.g., Grossjean v. American Press Co., 297 US 233; NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415; Hague v. CIO, 307 US 496; March v. Alabama, 326 US 501; Schwartz-Torrance Investment Co. v. Bakery and Confectionery Workers' Union, 61 AC 832; Edwards v. South Carolina, 83 SCt 680.

Thus, in the Schwartz- Torrance case, for example, the California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the right of union members to picket a bakery located in a shopping center by patrolling in a privately owned parking area which was the most realistically situated place for "mounting" the organizational activities in question. The "owner's" clain that he had a property right to prohibit the picketing received the following riposte from Justice Tobriner: it was a "right" worn thin by public usage. Nor, Justice Tobriner continued, "is a union's interest diminished because it may communicate its message at other admittedly less advantageous locations off plaintiff's premises." Id at page 836, And see Schneider v. State, 308 US 147, 163. "Neither a state nor a municipality can completely bar distribution of religious and political literature on its streets, sidewalks, public places or make the right to distribute dependant on a flat license tax or a permit to be issued by an official who could deny it at will." Lovell v. Griffin. 58 SCt. 666.

It is precisely this power to deny at will the most fundamental freedoms we possess which the University administration is asserting. But the First Amendment, as incorporated into the Fourteenth, "protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not excepted. (Nor, we may add, Boards of Regents) These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of the Constitutional freedoms...if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 671.

What is the University's rationals for ignoring the compulsions of the First Amendment? As is evident from Chancellor Strong's statement of September 28, 1964, there is no claim of interference with traffic flow; there is no claim of disruption of classes or offices by ahouting or singing; there are no claims of destruction of property or of dirtying the walkways of the campus. Nor is there any claim that the solicitation of funds has been or is other than bona fide—fraud has never even been mentioned. What then is the claim which in the University's view justifies this draconian interference with the political freedoms of those whose lives are centered around the campus or those who seek to reach them?

The claim, stated plainly, is that it is more important for the University to save its "image" from somehow being identified with controversial or partisan positions than it is to uphold the First Amendment. To draw on an unflattering but apt analogy, the University's position is very much like that of some commercial sponsor of a soap opera: no part of the viewing audience must be offended! What is preserved by this attitude of constitutional and intellectual supineness? "Freedom and independence" we are told. Perhaps so. For there is an argument to be made for the proposition that this is a policy well calculated to produce freedom from the commands of the constitution and independence from the commitments which are ordinarily associated with intellectuality. But there is no argument to be made for the meaning which the University would have us pluck from its pleas: they are either speciously or meretriciously false.

Conditions Constitutionally Prerequisite to Allowable Subordination of the First Amendment's Freedoms

First, a few preliminary matters. The argument is sometimes encountered that an education at a public university is a "privilege" or "benefit" and that it may therefore be conditioned in ways which would not be available if a university education were a "right." The short answer here is that "it is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege... In Speiser v. Randall, 357 US 513, we emphasized that conditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms." Sherbert v. Vernor, 10 LEd 2d 965, 971; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 US 488, 496. Moreover it is probably no longer true, if it ever was, that an education is a mere "privilege". In any event, it is obvious that this doctrine would be close to the hearts and statute books of the segregationist South if it were but available. But Brown v. Board of Education and Florida ex rel Hawkings v. Board of Control, 350 US 413 out the other way. It can easily be imagined that the civil rights movement, so largely based on the activities of our young people and college students "mounting" action for the realization of basic human and constitutional fights on their campuses, would be seriously compromised if the bigots could compel a choice between an education and constitutional freedoms. Fortunately the danger is more imaginary than real.

It is sometimes suggested that there is an "academic freedom" right to regulate the thought of students and that this "right" reaches so far as to control the reading, associations and actions of students, According to this theory, a University could constitutionally order a student not to read Freud or Marx. Again, the short answer is that there is no such right. Since the reversal of the Gobitis decision by West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624, it has been clear that teaching by persuasion and example is not to be confused with teaching by compulsion which coerces an attitude of mind; but more particularly, it has been clear that the claim of educational competence will not automatically resolve questions which require a constitutional separation of academic authority from academic usurpation of power forbidden under our constitution to any authority, high or petty.

The Theory of First Amendment Protection

Action may fall within or without the protection of the First Amendment.

Generally, if governmental power to abridge the liberty of action exists at all, the test of the legitimacy of an exercise of such power is radically more stringent for the category of action that is within the protection of the First Amendment than it is for the category of action that falls outside of that protection.

Activities which fall within the area of First Amendent protection may be divided into two categories. First, those which constitute no more than an exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Second, those which affect or involve other matters which may be regulated or prohibited so long as due process of law standards (as contrasted with First Amendment standards) are met.

The first category—activities which fall within the area of First Amendment protection and constitute no more than an exercise of First Amendment freedoms — may be illustrated by the following example: a peaceable, voluntary gathering of persons in a private home discussing the content of a proposed petition for redress of grievances to be directed to an appropriate legislative body.

The second category—activities which fall within the area of First Amendment protection which affect or involve other matters regulable or prohibitable subject only to the standards of due process of law—may be illustrated as follows. A person may be prohibited from throwing refuse (banana skins or confetti, for example) on the streets. The test of the constitutionality of such regulation is a due process test. Under this test, the regulation is presumptively valid; the burden of proof rests on the party questioning the regulation's validity. In order to prevail, such a party must prove that there is no rational basis for the presumption of relevance as between the means adopted by the regulation (prohibiting refuse from being thrown on the streets) and some legitimate governmental goal (keeping streets reasonably clean). Thus far no First Amandment question has been raised inasmuch as throwing refuse on the street is, of course, action outside of the scope of First Amendment protection. However, when a regulation — in the name of a legitimate governmental goal such as keeping streets reasonably clean — reaches into the area within the First Amendment's protection, and the validity of such a regulation is questioned, the standards for judgment are radically different. Thus, if in the name of clean streets a regulation prohibits the distribution of all leaflets, it is clear that (whether intentionally or not) the First Amendment is affected. By the same token, it is clear that we are dealing with a category of activities which (at least to the extent that the leaflets deal with matters of public concern) fall within the protection of the First Amendment, but which also affect or involve other matters that in themselves are regulable or prohibitable subject only to the requirements of Due Process. Since First Amendment freedoms are now involved, the test of the validity of the regulation is radically changed. In the first place, the burden of proof now rests on the entity claiming the right to limit First Amendment freedoms. It must demonstrate that there are no means for reaching its legitimate goals other than or alternative to those which infringe upon First Amendment freedoms. Nor is that all. If such a claim can be established — that there no alternatives (and here questions of economy or convenience will ordinarily be deemed irrelevant — Schneider v. State, 308 US 147) — that will not suffice as proof that the regulation is constitutional. In addition to proving that there are no other ways of reaching its legitimate goal, the entity claiming the right to curtail First Amendment freedoms must also prove that there is an overwhelming need to sacrifice the First Amendment freedoms to the goal in question, a need which is so great that it may be deemed "compelling" — the need must carry compulsion of the character created by a "clear and present danger."

Activities within the first category of First Amendment protection — those whcih constitute no more than an exercise of First Amendment freedoms — may not be abridged. As Chief Hughes put it in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 US 353, 364-365

The people through their legislatures may protect themselves against ... abuse s/o But the legislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed.

Activities within the second category of First Amendment protection — those which affect or involve other matters regulable or prohibitable subject only to the requirements of Due Process of law — may be curtailed only if the abridging ontity can sustain the barden of proving that there are no alternative means for dealing with a legitimate problem and that the need to so deal with it is so overwhelming as to be deemed "compelling." Sherbert v. Verner, 10 L ed 2d 965: NAACP v. Button, 9 L ed 2d 405.

Civil Rights and Other First Amendment Activities

The activities of voter registration, constitutional adjudication, and so on down the list of political efforts to achieve an end to racist desecration of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection are sheltered by the First Amendment.

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 US 449; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 US 516; NAACP v. Button, supra, 9 L ed 2d 405; Edwards v. South Carolina, 9 L ed 2d 697.

The First Amendment's protection in this area necessarily includes all activities reasonably related to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Thus, is is clear that a prohibition on all fund raising activities by the NAACP would violate the First Amendment in the same way that a prohibition of all methods of raising funds so that printing activity could no longer be carried on would violate the freedom of the press. Of course, this does not mean that a newspaper publisher can claim exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act on the grounds that it raises his costs, since it is clearly not the purpose of such legislation to inhibit the First Amendment activity of printing news but rather, in a general and nondiscriminatory way to regulate the commercial activity involved in the relation between labor and capital whether it deals with the newspaper publishing or the lumbering or other industries. See Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling. However, if it appears that the purpose of legislation (which ostensibly deals with such ordinarily non-suspect, because general and non-discriminatory, subjects as taxation) may be (directly or latently) to interfere with or inhibit the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, such legislation will be struck down.. See Grossjean v. American Press Co. If, therefore, a general and nondiscriminatory effort is made to ensure the bona fides of those who solicit funds (regardless of the purposes of such solicitation) no First Amendment problems are necessarily presented. But, if a flat prohibition were placed on the solicitation of funds by members and friends of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, or any civil rights organization, or any political organization, that would clearly violate the First Amendment. Thus, the matter of solicitation of funds may or may not be a First Amendment protected activity depending on the purpose of the solicitors. Panhandling is not a First Amendment activity; securing financial contributions for political purposes is.

And seeking to make a profit in the newspaper publishing business, for example, may be both. Therefore regulations dealing with the liberty to panhandle need not satisfy First Amendment standards though they must meet due process standards. Regulations dealing with the liberty to carry on First Amendment activities must meet First Amendment standards. Regulations narrowly drawn so as to deal only with the commercial aspects of First Amendment businesses need not raise First Amendment questions.

Student Political Activities and the Constitution

Our specific problem is the situation with respect to political activities on the University of California campus at Berkeley. It is important to specify the campus of concern because geographical data may bear on the consitutional considerations. If, for example, the campus were limited to a single building that would obviously not present the same questions as are involved in a situation where acres of open land surround classroom and administration buildings.

Generally, the Regente of the University and its officers may, by virtus of and within the authority which the University possesses to operate as a division of the State government, regulate the affairs of the University subject however to the limitations of the federal constitution. Therefore, if limitations are sought to be placed on First Amendment freedoms, they must be justified by those seeking to impose the limitations in the ways we have reviewed. In this regard, it is irrelevant whether one or another part of the government of the State of California seeks to impose such limitations.

Some Questions

Could a state university constitutionally prohibit its students from directing a petition for redress of grievances to legislatures or courts? For example, could the University of Mississippi prevent a atudent- perhaps a James Meredith- from seeking protection against racial discrimination on the campus? Could it, constitutionally, threaten to suspend him as a student if he did not refrain from writing to his representatives in the legislative and executive branches of government, or if he did not refrain from filing an action seeking judicial relief?

Can the University of California prohibit its students from engaging in the First Amendment activities carried on by such organizations as SNCC in Mississippi during a period of summer recess on pain of suspension or expulsion from the University? Can it prohibit students from going to their government agencies to seek protection against alleged violations of their constitutional rights by the University? Could the University, for example, forbid the students to organize a legal campaign to determine the constitutional validity of the current limitations on the use of the campus for political purposes?

Let us apply our theoretical framework to the last of the questions posed. Is such action by students alone or with others (including all reasonably necessary activities in aid of such action, as for example reising funds for legal expenses) First Amendment protected? Unquestionably it is. Cf. West Virginia Bd. Of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624; NAACP v. Button, 9 L ed 201 405. Does it fall within the first or the second of our categories of First Amendment protected activities? Is it no more than an exercise of First Amendment freedom, or does it affect or involve other matters? We may eliminate the question posed by a bona fides regulation of the collection of monies on the assumption that this, when done carefully and non-discriminatorily need not interfere with any First Amendment freedom. Similarly, we may eliminate the questions posed by regulations drawn narrowly, carefully and non- discriminatorily for the purpose of avoiding disruption of the functioning of classes and offices, destruction of property, or under interference with traffic flow on the assumption, again, that such regulation need not interfere with any First Amendment freedom. ^[*] The rationale here is that the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to obtain money under false pretenses, to disrupt classrooms or administrative offices, destroy property or interfere unduly with traffic. Therefore, regulations narrowly drawn so as to control these purposes and these effects and only these purpose and these effects do not raise First Amendment questions.

If we put such questions to one side and focus instead on what has actually been done by the University administration, what must we conclude? It appears that we must conclude that the attempt to limit the First Amendment activities of the students and others on the Berkeley campus is a direct attempt to limit the sort of First Amendment activities which must be placed within our first category! That is, nothing other than a pure exercise of First Amendment freedoms remains to be regulated and therefore it is the prevention of the exercise of the First Amendment rights and First Amendment rights alone which is involved. Thus, the University, if it desires to justify its action, must argue that it has the power to prevent someons like a James Meredith from organizing support for his efforts to secure constitutional justice or even from doing what he might alone and without organized support, because and only because it claims to be able to limit his rights as an end in itself, in the sense that no abuse—no substantive evil which could itself be prescribed—exists as a justifying fulcrum for the limiting lever.

If the University desires to justify its restrictive ukase on any grounds other than that it is pleased to do so, then, since we are operating, according to our theoretical framework, within our second category the University will have to bear the burden of proving that there are legitimate objectives which it can not reach without trespassing upon First Amendment protections, and then it will have to prove that its need to violate the First Amendment is so overwhelming as to be compelling. But what could these legitimate objectives be? There is no claim that traffic flow is being upset (though the claim, now retracted, was once advanced); there is not now and has not been any claim that the activities sought to be suppressed involve or threaten the disruption of classroom, laboratory or office; there is not now nor has there been any claim of actual or threatened destruction of property. Thus, the question as to whether such claims, if they existed, might support the required showing of overwhelming or compelling need is rather less than academic.

Perhaps the University may wish to argue that it must limit its students' First Amendment freedoms in order to avoid outside pressures which might kill the University. There are three answers here. First, Art. IX Sec. 9 provides that the University shall not yield to partisan political pressures in the appointment of its regents or in the administration of its affairs. Second, why should a distinction be drawn here between faculty and students? Suppose outside pressure were brought to bear to force students to stop learning "evolution"—and thus, necessarily, for teachers to stop teaching "evolution?" Could the University dismiss a professor of biology who refused to knuckle under to this pressure? If the professor brought court action to protect his job, would the First Amendment come to the aid of this sort of academic freedom? Finally, this argument is not distinguishable from the argument of the Little Rock board of education when it was threatened with violence if it undertook to observe the law and enforce integration. In response the school board sought to deny rights which it had a duty to enforce. As Justice Frankfurter said in Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1 (concurring opinion)

No explanation that may be offered in support of such a request can obscure the inescapable meaning that law should how to force. To yield to such a claim would be to enthrone official lawlessness. . .

Our conclusion is that, so far from the University having a legitimately compelling justification for its action, its action is neither legitimate nor compelling nor justifiable. Moreover, we may go farther and affirm that no theoretical considerations which have been advanced in any serious sense—whether the administration has appealed or adverted to them directly or impliedly—can, in view of the appropriate tests of constitutionality, justify the University's position. It is simply indefensible.

Appendix on the ASUC

General Patterns of ASUC Activity Fall, 1960 - Spring, 1963

The Associated Students of the University of California, like any political system, can be analyzed by examining four variables: the political culture in which the system is embedded; the power structure within the system; the pattern of interests of the system's groups and members; and the pattern of policies that emerges from the interplay of power and interests.

Such a study in the present case demonstrates that the overwhelming power of the administration has rendered the ASUC both passive and apolitical. This passivity is the result not only of overt threats of administrative veto but also of the narrow view that the ASUC has come to have of its own purpose.

I. The Political Culture of the ASUC: Restriction and Self-Restriction

Although the timidity of ASUC policy is due in part to the power structure of the University and to the suffocation of certain kinds of interests, it must be seen as stemming largely from the Procrustean bed in which the Association has placed itself. All groups in the University community—administration, faculty, students, and Association leaders—see the ASUC as a body of very limited scope and accept this narrow scope as either proper or inevitable.

A. The Preamble. The Preamble of the ASUC Constitution states: "We, the students on the Berkeley Campus of the University of California, by authority of the President of the President of the University of California and the Chancellor of this campus, in order to provide for the promotion, maintenance and regulation of such matters as are delegated by them to the student government, do ordain and establish this constitution." (Italics added.)

In December, 1961, Representatives Ken Cloke and Mike Tigar proposed that this preamble be changed as follows: "We, the students at the Berkeley campus of the University of California, in order to provide for the representation of our common interests and the conduct of our common affairs, and, in addition to insure effective conduct of such University activities as are administered by students, do ordain and establish this Constitution." (Minutes, 12-5-61) As stipulated in the ASUC Constitution, Article III, Section 5, a petition asking for a referendum on the measure was signed by five per cent of the undergraduate student body. The Constitution requires that a referendum be held in such circumstances.

Significantly, this proposed alteration of the Constitution was not defeated by administration veto or even by the overt threat of veto. Instead, ASUC President Brian Van Camp, the symbol and holder of ASUC power and authority, refused to place the measure on the ballot. His explanation points up the narrow view that the ASUC holds of its own authority.

"The Chair stated that the preamble to the ASUC Constitution is not a matter over which students have jurisdiction. The preamble as it now reads is required by the Kerr Directives and must be included in the constitution of each student government at the University of California. He stated further that the amendment contained in the petition, in light of the Kerr Directives, is illegal, and that he, therefore, would not place it on the ballot." (Minutes, 12-5-61, p. 2) Van Camp's view was upheld by a majority of the Executive Committee.

B. Because its authority to direct its own affairs is seen as slender, the ASUC sees its instruments of protest as plea and petition — not demand. The self-imposed limits on authority show in the ends to which ASUC policies are directed.

The Executive Committee meeting of March 6, 1962, offers an example of the "humble petitioner" role. At this meeting, Representatives Roger Hollander and Ken Cloke proposed adoption of a resolution, prompted by the difficulties encountered in holding a rally against nuclear testing four days earlier: "Be it resolved that the Executive Committee express its desire for a more open rally policy...and that it express this desire to the Chancellor of the Berkeley campus and the President of the University." (Minutes, March 6, 1962, p. 15) An amendment was proposed by Representative Bill Storey that would have recommended reducing the required prior notification from 72 to 24 hours. Dean Towle spoke, saying in effect that a redue ion in the time of notification was not possible. Mr. Storey then withdrew his amendment; the final resolution called only for "a subcommittee to discuss with the Chancellor of the University the possibility of instituting a more open rally policy." (Ibid., p. 19) It is possible that Dean Towle's intimation that no change would be made encouraged the retraction of the amendment; significantly, however, there was little discussion of it, and even the motion which was finally passed was criticized for its boldness.

These examples of the refusal of the Association to push beyond an accepted narrow sphere of authority indicates a deeply ingrained awe of administration authority. This awe reinforces the objective power position of the administration. It is not necessary for administrators to restrain or restrict in such a situation. This voluntary self-restriction to a narrow, ineffective sphere is certainly as significant as administration power. The above are not instances of repression; they indicate instead the long term effects of benevolent guidance from above: timidity, narrow perception of one's goals, and, consequently, immobility.

II. The Power Structure

A comparison of the power of the University administration and the ASUC leads to distinctly one-sided results. The ASUC's power is solely delegated: it appoints student officials, sponsors some of the clubs that the administration recognizes, and approves the budget. Other matters within its purview are merely internal administrative details. The ASUC lacks sanctions: it can petition the administration and exhort the students, but it cannot compel either on any matter. On the other hand, the administretion has the power to punish students with the ultimate senction of exclusion from the system itself.

This power relation is clear and explicit and has never been successfully challenged by the students, although the faculty has exacted some procedural guarantees of hearing and appeal for itself. The Preamble to the ASUC Constitution, quoted above, states this relation. A case taken from the minutes of the ASUC Senate will show it in action.

On October 31, 1961, Representative Ken Cloke proposed a resolution of sympathy for an impending vigil protesting the resumption of nuclear testing by the United States. Some discussion arose as to whether an Executive Committee's vote on this resolution would be beyond its scope. In this instance, the self-stifling tendencies of the ASUC were powerfully reinforced by Dean Towle's statement, as the Chancellor's representative, that she would interpret approval of the resolution as a violation of the University's Policy on Privileges of Student Organizations (Kerr Directives). (Minutes, 10-31-61, p. 10) The resolution was defeated.

This example shows the University's overwhelmingly superior power. Approval of the resolution would have rendered the Executive Committee liable to disciplinary action. In this case, the appearance of democratic discussion was dropped. When it appeared that the Executive Committee would not automatically confine itself to a very narrow view of its role, the authority of the University was invoked to require them to do so.

An unfortunate effect of such exertion of power is that it is demonstrably arbitrary and selective. An endorsement of the Berkeley Fair Housing Ordinance in March of 1963 was not ruled inappropriate political and social action, while an expression of sympathy for a group of students was.

III. The Pattern of Interests

Political interests are the ends sought by groups acting within a political system. In the ASUC these interests range from the establishment of folk dance clubs to the advocacy of political and social action.

A. Student interest groups. Power determines how successfully a group's interests can be forwarded. In the case of the ASUC, the power of the administration acts against the expression of the interests of those student groups committed to political and social action. The University policy of recognition of student groups discriminates between political or religious and nonpolitical (or religious) groups. It permits the direct subsidy of groups whose goals are noncontroversial and apolitical by allowing them to use University facilities for regular membership meetings. Some groups benefit by the membership gained through the advantage of meeting on campus as they maintain offices within buildings owned by the ASUC and also benefit from the prestige conferred by use of the name of the University in their official name. (The Spring, 1963 list of recognized organizations, in addition to student government bodies and approved living groups, names about 130 organizations whose activities are considered inoffensive.) The political groups, which the administration does not "recognize", must hold membership meetings away from the campus and compete for the space available at Stiles Hall and at religious centers. The expression of their interests is restricted by the University regulations; non-political groups, having no interests in political or social action, are in effect unregulated.

B. Regulation of interest expression through student government. Just as the regulations on student organizations affect only political organizations, so student interests as articulated through student governments are apolitical and innocuous. We have seen examples of the ways in which the ASUC checks itself and of the ways in which University power further checks political stands. The University Regulation states:

"Student governments are established by the University for the purpose of conducting student affairs on the campuses. Students with widely varying political, religious and economic viewpoints give them financial support; hence it is certainly not appropriate to permit student governments to speak either for the University or for the student body with reference to the off-campus political, religious, economic, international or other issues of the time. Therefore, student governments ...may not take positions on any such off-campus issues." (UC Policies Relating to Students and Student Organizations)

This exclusion of politics from student government leaves two realms in which it may operate — recreation and student welfare. These indeed are its spheres of activity.

1. Recreation. The ASUC operates recreation rooms and a bowling alley and sponsors choral, dance, beating and other groups whose purposes are recreational. Recreation seems to be one area in which ASUC feels competent to act and in which it takes its responsibilities seriously.

2. Student welfare. This area of activity is apparently relatively narrowly defined by the ASUC, referring to courtesies and conveniences extended to the students — check cashing service, lockers in the bookstore, campus maps, and so forth. The Association, of course, lacks power to improve welfare in such substantive areas as housing. But its scope is not as limited in power as it has been in practice. The ASUC Store offers an example of an area in which student welfare could be increased without overstepping these bounds set by the administration and punctiliously observed by a complaisant student organization. This store is operated by the ASUC; its prices are similar to those of other bookstores near the campus. The ASUC is fully responsible for the operation of this store and makes its policies. It could, if it chose, operate the store as a cooperative, as do many student associations at other colleges and universities. Or it could offer a mail-order discount service to students. Both of these proposals have been made; neither has been implemented. A reason can perhaps be found in the particular interests represented in the student government. As we have sought to establish, it is not a forum for political discussion. However, it is a potential source of funds for nonpolitical organizations. The profits of the store are used to support these organizations — Glee Club, Treble Clef, etc. These interests are the ones that prevail in decisions about store policy.

IV. The Pattern of Policy

The interplay of power and interests determine policy patterns in a political system. It follows that much can be inferred about power and interests by an examination of a political system's pattern of decisions.

In the spring of 1963, Representative Keith Axtell prepared a "Record of the ASUC Senate" which listed 25 of the most important actions taken by the Senate that semester. This list is an enlightening record of the pattern of policy of the ASUC. Eight of these actions represented nothing more than requests for minor adjustments of the complex administrative machinery of the University: a request to make available to Berkeley students the library and check cashing facilities of other campuses (2-14-63); a request that two holidays be added to the calendar (3-7 and 3-14-63); a plea for more parking for motor scooters (3-14 and 4-30-63); a later deadline to file study lists (4-2- 63); a pamphlet for transfer students (2-28); and the establishment of a small fund to make it easier for faculty members to entertain students in their homes (4-18).

Two actions, which at first appear to be independent and political, merely support positions taken publicly by the administration: the Senate told the legislature that they favored increased faculty salaries (2-21) and opposed a bill that would charge students for their college education (2-28). The Senate also decided to join two existing programs, the School Resource Volunteers (2-28) (associated with the Berkeley Unified School District) and charter flights to Europe at reduced rates (3-7). They re- established the ASUC Student Forum (3-7), thus creating a way for individual students to voice their opinions on political issues, but the Forum still could not express a consensus of student opinion.

They took four actions purporting to deal with the educational life of the students; a year-long "study in depth" (4-18) (of which no further mention has been made, 18 months later); a committee to provide materials for faculty course evaluation by the students (3-14) (no results — perhaps SLATE has effectively pre-empted this field); a method of curriculum evaluation for the faculty (3-14); and a plea that more consideration be given to teaching ability when faculty members are chosen (3-21).

They petitioned the faculty to experiment with the Honor Code (3-14) and set forth the philosophy of such a code (3-28), but refused to poll students on such a code.

They founded an ASUC Leadership Training camp, a matter of merely internal importance (3-28).

Five actions of the twenty-five are political. Three protested the now-lifted ban on Communist speakers (3-7, 4-30, 5-9). Two of these actions, however, were initiated only after the Chancellor had criticized the ban in a speech to the American Association of University Professors. The Senate established a committee to study the possibility of a Peace and Disarmament Institute (nothing has happened since). And, in the single action that can truly be considered a disinterested expression of concern about a political issue, they endorsed passage of the (unsuccessful) Fair Housing Ordinance (3-7).

In conclusion, because the administration exerts its overwhelming power to regulate the expression of political interests, ASUC policies reflect satisfaction of other kinds of interests. A study of the policies of the Associated Students of the University of California over the past three years clearly supports the opening comments of this paper. The power and pressure exerted by the administration on students has had the net effect of causing the ASUC to be a passive, apolitical organization that functions only intermittently and perfunctorily as an educational experience for students and almost never as a genuinely political body.

Voluntary and Compulsory ASUC 1955-1959

Preface

One of the most puzzling patterns of Administration action has been connected with the problem of compulsory ASUC. In 1955 the ASUC was made a compulsory organization as a result of a highly dubious election (See below: "Voluntary and Compulsory ASUC Membership 1955-1959"). The reasons for making ASUC compulsory were, of course, financial. However, the consequences of compulsory membership were never made clear at the time.

The June 22, 1960 issue of the Daily Californian announced that: "The Board of Regents last month authorized President Clark Kerr to end compulsory membership in the ASUC and make the Association voluntary if he felt such an act necessary." President Kerr has never acted upon this authorization. Moreover, since 1959, President Kerr has frequently used the accomplished fact of the compulsory nature of ASUC membership to deny the ASUC the power to express student opinion on political and social issues.

Thus the compulsory nature of ASUC membership which was established by a questionable election and originally proposed as a solution to purely financial problems has provided a justification for administrative policies which have resulted in the effective elimination of student opinion on matters of political and social concern.

Voluntary and Compulsory ASUC Membership in 1955 & 1959

Up until 1955 the ASUC was a voluntary organization. The principal benefit of membership was the athletic privilege card. Other things (activities, vote in student government, etc.) were essentially fringe benefits. Since the number of students joining the ASUC varied from year to year, the revenues to be derived from sales of membership cards could not be predicted.

In February 1955 the option on the land currently the site of the Student Union complex was due to expire. Thus, the major on-campus issue during Fall '54 was a new Student Union building—an issue which had been sporadically discussed for about eight years.

It is unfortunate that the desirability of a new student union was intertwined with two other issues. First, there was the question of whether a new student union was necessary at all. There was also the question of financing. Third was the question of compulsory ASUC membership.

The proponents tended to argue that the need for a new student union was an established fact. Nonetheless, the (voluntary) ASUC spent 1900. to present the idea to the student body and propagandize for it. (DC, 10 Jan 55, p.6) The Daily Cal ran no less than 4 editorials in favor of a new Union. The Academic Senate voted unanimously in favor. (DC, 8 Dec 54, p. 1) Understandably, the opposition spent some effort arguing that a new Union wasn't necessary or wouldn't unify the campus as some proponents felt. This issue need not concern us further.

The first financing proposal—introduced in late November, 1954—was a "Universal Card" entailing complusory ASUC membership, the Athletic Privilege Card, and the 1.00 per annum contribution to the Union fund. On December 14, 1954, an alternative form of financing appeared in the Daily Cal—the so-called "Split Card" plan. This separated the Athletic Privilege Card from ASUC membership. Some of the opposition to the new Union had been based primarily on the high cost of the "Universal Card". Some of this opposition now came around to support the "Split Card" proposal—which was ultimately adopted.

The third issue—compulsory ASUC— was a poor cousin in the controversy. The ASUC bureaucracy and officers claimed that compulsory ASUC membership was a necessary prerequisite to the Student Union. Otherwise, the ASUC's finances would not be sufficiently stable (due to fluctuating membership) to enable the Regents to support the selling of bonds by the ASUC. (e.g., article by Bob Falk, DC, 8 Feb 55, p.8) Amazingly, no other argument for compulsory ASUC was seriously offered. While the opposition talked a lot about the evils of compulsion, there appears to have been little discussion of the possibility that Union finances be collected separately from ASUC dues. In light of the Administration's stand in the 1959 controversy, this is rather strange.

The question of one student generation committing many future generations to pay for a Union was barely discussed. Further, it was pointed out for the first time in the just mentioned article that future students might have to pay more than 50 [cents] per semester. This, too, was never debated.

A considerable controversy arose over the form of the ballot. Unfortunately, this controversy took place after the vote. The ballot was drawn up in the between-semesters vacation and revised at the last minute. In its final form it was rather ambiguous. There were four alternatives: First, a "Universal Card" financing of the Student Union. Second, a "Split Card" financing. The third alternative was a vote for the Student Union but against both proposed methods of financing. (That this was the only way a student could vote for the Union but against compulsory ASUC was never spelled out before the election.) The final alternative was simply one of opposition to the Student Union. Thus, the three separate issues, the Union, the financing, and compulsory ASUC membership, were thoroughly confounded on the ballot, just as they had been in the campaign.

Considering this confusion, it is no wonder the results had to be "intorpreted" after the election. (e.g., DC editorial, 17 Feb 55) 15,303 students were elegible to vote. 14,111 ballots were cast, and there were 13,176 valid ballots. (DC, 17 Feb 55, p. 1 & DC, 8 May 59, p.1) The results of the valid ballots were: 26.94% for a "Universal Card"; 30.81% for a "Split Card"; 9.99% for some other form of financing the Union; and 32.27% opposed to the Union. This was most widely interpreted as 67.74% being in favor of a new Student Union. However, only 485 of the entire student body voted in favor of the first two alternatives, the only ones explicitly including compulsory ASUC. This fact was never brought out in 1955. It is also not clear why 1035 ballots were invalidated. (DC, 17 Feb 55, p. 1)

On February 18, 1955 (after the election), the Daily Cal printed excerpts of a letter from Richard Fresco to then Chancellor Kerr. He contended that both the campaign and the form of the ballot were one-sided. He charged that the voting was inadequately supervised and that the ballot box was so inconspicuously placed that it could easily have been stuffed and that many students didn't realize that it was there and therefore didn't vote. Most important, he charged that while the campaign was on the Union, the vote was on compulsory ASUC. Kerr promised to look into these charges, saying "they deserve careful study". Nothing more was heard of the matter.

The whole issue was again raised in April, 1959 as part of the ferment which led to the exclusion of graduate students from ASUC membership. On April 13, 1959, a petition for voluntary ASUC was announced. There was some discussion in Ex Com and the administration whether this should even be allowed on the ballot, but it was soon decided that such a petition could go on the ballot. The circulators made only half-hearted attempts to have the vote taken in the registration of study list line.

There were far more letters in the Daily Cal than during the 1955 campaign and the issues were much clearer. While the Daily Cal again editorialized for complusory ASUC, it gave fairer treatment to both sides than during 1955.

After some internal debate, SLATE came out in favor of compulsory ASUC. At that time, SLATE felt that it had a chance to be a major influence with the ASUC by turning it into a political body, rather than an arm of the administration. (This hope was dashed at the end of the semester when the Graduate Students, who provided the margin for Dave Armor's victory as well as leadership in Ex Com through the two Grad Reps, were disenfranchised.)

From a historical perspective, two interesting issues were raised in the campaign. Vice Chancellor Sherriffs made it very clear that voluntary ASUC would not effect the payments for the Student Union. (DC, 14 April 59) The ASUC bureaucracy claimed that if membership were to become voluntary, the Activities budget would be reduced. (DC, 24 April 59, p. 1) Proponents of voluntary ASUC argued that activities were maintained when the ASUC was voluntary before 1955, but no fiscal analysis was ever presented.

Of the 5,622 voting in the primary election—a record turnout—2,074 voted for voluntary ASUC, 3,100 voted for compulsory ASUC, and 448 didn't vote on the initiative. A popular interpretation of the election results was that "Activities" was the decisive issue: "Activities Majors" voted to keep the ASUC complusory so that everyone would pay for activities which preoccupied an indeterminate number of students.

In conclusion, we see that in the three separate "elections" determining ASUC membership (the two covered here, and the one covered in Evan Alverson's article on Graduate Students), three different types of voting occurred. In the first election, a majority of voting students, but a minority of all students, voted for compulsory ASUC in conjunction with a new Student Union. In the second election, only those students who bothered to go to the polls less than 1/3 of the student body) had their votes counted. And of this minority, 2/3 would have to had to have voted for the initiative in order to return to voluntary ASUC. In the final "election", only graduate students voted. They were not allowed to abstain, for a blank ballot was counted as a vote Against belonging to the ASUC; voting was done in the study list line and there was no ballot box.

The above is an accounting of what I consider the central facts. We may, perhaps, speculate on two related matters. It appears that the administration wanted a compulsory ASUC in 1955 and helped to confound the issues so that the desired result was more likely to occur. The administration did not change its stand in 1959 and would probably not have allowed another reg line vote. The administration did want the grads out of the ASUC when it became evident that a handful of graduate students could have a decisive impact on student "government". Finally, we are led to wonder how the undergraduates in 1955, 1959, or 1963 would vote on compulsory ASUC if the vote was taken in the study list line.

The ASUC Executive Committee and the Kerr Directives

(This report is based on information in ASUC ExCom minutes (10/59-4/60) and issues of the Daily Californian (5/60-10/60)

On October 23, 1959, President Clark Kerr issued three directives concerning (1) rules governing the sutdent governments of the various campuses, (2) the rules and requirements which student organizations must follow to be recognized by the University, and (3) rules governing the use of University facilities. According to Dean of Students William Shepard, the Kerr Directives codified existing policy, clarifying the limits of the authority of student government. The Directives (Daily Cal, 4/29/60 ". . . are a basic part of a decentralization and a transfer of authority from the President of the University to the Chancellors and Provosts of the various campuses." These directives were drawn up without consulting the student body, and, because they prohibited ExCom from action are an unwarranted restriction of the role of the student body in the larger community.

SLATE sent representatives to ExCom (10/29/59) to voice support for any protest against the President's Directives which ExCom might make, and ExCom did draft a letter of protest which President Kerr acknowledged (11/9/59) and answered with some amplification to the effect that the Directives were, after all, reasonable.

In the November 10th meeting of ExCom, Dean Shepard ruled that ExCom could take a stand on issues of national and international concern as lart pf ASUC's participation in NSA as long as the issues involve student activities (Dean Shepard admitted at the time that he was unfamiliar with NSA). Section 5 of the Directives was clarified: freedom of the press to take a stand on all issues as long as no claim of representing the University or student body was made was extended not only to the Daily Californian but to all campus publications.

On November 17, in ExCom, a motion to set up a Committee on Directives Clarification was defeated; fears that more clarification would result in more restrictions were voiced. A letter was drafted to be sent to all U. C. campuses. This letter disassociated the ASUC from SLATE activities and took a firm stand against "rebellion" (picketing against the Kerr Directives, demonstrating, etc.).

On December 8th, ExCom, respectfully requested "further modification of the Directives in regard to the regulation of student government." The ExCom felt that student government should have the opportunity to take positions on off- campus issues, making no claim, as the Academic Freedoms Committee suggested, to represent the entire student body opinion. This request was submitted in response to a statement from President Kerr which specified, among other clarifications of the Directives, that ". . . student organizations can take positions on off-campus issues if they don't act in the name of the University or as a representative of the student body as a whole." Because these student organizations are voluntary in membership and exercise no adminstrative authority for the University, they are not under the same restrictions as the student gov't.

On Feb. 9th, ExCom recognized a resolution passed by the Executive Council of the NSA which called the Kerr Directives a direct restriction of the freedom of ideas. ExCom resolved to inform NSA of the President's recent clarifications of the Directives. The question of whether ExCom was permitted to take a stand on Hungarian student atrocities was raised. Dean Shepard said that ExCom could take a stand.

In the ExCom meeting of March 1, 1960, two motions were introduced seeking to alter ExCom procedure in accordance with the spirit of the Kerr Directives. First, protest letters were to record both the abstaining and dissenting votes as well as the members' reasons for voting if the voters so desired. Second, all matters not directly affecting this campus or its students should be considered by ExCom for a maximum of 20 minutes. (This motion was defeated.)

A motion introduced March 22 and passed on March 29th directed the establishment of an ad hoc Committee of Students against Racial Discrimination, which would collect funds for Southern students' legal and emergency food expenses. Dean Shepard agreed with the concept but ruled that the motion would have to be reworded to meet the requirements of the Kerr Directives (ExCom obliged). Dean Shepard also warned that according to the Directives funds could not be solicited on campus, though they could be solicited off campus. Also, communications to Congress would have to be approved by the President.

On May 3rd, ExCom passed a motion which directed the establishment of an ASUC Student Forum to debate issues of importance, including off-campus issues not directly pertaining to students per se. At the same meeting, ExCom took its first decisive stand on an off-campus issue which violated the Kerr Directives: the Koch case. Leo Koch, a professor at the University of Illinois, was dismissed in April 1960 after a letter of his, advocating the practice of premarital sexual relations by mature adults, appeared on the editorial page of the Daily Illinois, the student newspaper of the University of Illinois. ExCom sent a letter to the administration of the University of Illinois protesting the dismissal of Koch as a violation of academic freedom of expression. ExCom's action was labeled by Dean Shepard a "direct violation of the Kerr Directives" (Daily Cal May 4 '60).

ExCom was ordered by University Chancellor Glen T. Seaborg to rescind the letter protesting Koch's dismissal. Vice Chancellor Alex C. Sherrifs, speaking for Chancellor Seaborg and himself, threatened possible "drastic changes in student government if ExCom refused to rescind its letter (Daily Cal May 6, 1960). In an editorial in the May 9th edition, the Daily Californian announced that "The Chancellor's office also indicated that ExCom, in the future, would not be allowed to take a stand on such issues as discrimination in Berkely housing, and might not be able to take a stand on academic freedom at the University of California. (The Chancellor's office said it had to do some checking on this particular issue because it might be within the realm of student interest.)" In support of the administration, ExCom member Steve Pace filed a complaint charging ExCom with "misconduct of office." This case was dismissed by the ASUC Judicial Committee. A second complaint on the basis of Art. III, sec. 4 of the ASUC Constitution was also dismissed.

ExCom refused to rescind its action in the Koch case and sent a letter reaffirming its opposition to the Kerr Directives to President Kerr. The letter requested a meeting with the President and the Chancellor to discuss the Directives. Acknowledging this letter, Chancellor Seabord wrote to ASUC President Dave Armor: "Since the Executive Committee of the Associated Students of the University of California, Berkeley, in its Action of May 3, 1960 exceeded the limits of its authority, I hereby declare this action null and void and am so informing the President of the University of Illinois by carbon copy of this letter."

President Kerr issued a statement to the effect that students wishing to take stands on off-campus issues should do so through voluntary associations or organizations only. Concurrently, President Kerr issued statement to the effect that students demonstrating against HUAC were acting outside the sphere of the University and in no way represented the University (Daily Cal May 16, 1960).

In a surprise private meeting reported in the May 19th 1960 editorial of the Daily Cal, ExCom threatened to dismiss the Daily Cal editor-elect, managing editor-elect, city editor-elect and assistant editor- elect because of an editorial policy emphasizing off-campus issues rather than ASUC activity news.

The June 22, 1960 issue of the Daily Cal announced that: "The Board of Regents last month authorized President Clark Kerr to end compulsory membership in the ASUC and make the Association voluntary if he felt such an act necessary." The Student Affairs Committee had embarked on a study of the question of voluntary vs. compulsory membership in the ASUC. The Daily Cal editorial speculated that voluntary membership would lead to the extinction of the ASUC. By August 3, 1960, however, the Student Affairs Committee had recommended that the ASUC retain its compulsory membership, and the ASUC embarked on major plans for reorganization.

The Summer Conference (1960) of the NSA resolved that students rather than University administration should determine the scope of student government and asked for a modification of the Kerr Directives.

President Kerr then issued a clarification of the Directives to the effect that ExCom members could take stands on off-campus issues as individuals but not as official representatives of student government. At the same time, President Kerr announced that a new amendment to the regulations on student government divested the chief campus officer of the authority to allow student government to take stands on off-campus issues with his prior consent. Previous to this amendment, the possibility existend that an off-campus issue might arise on which student opinion was united to the extent that ExCom could speak for the entire student body with the permission of the chief campus officer. The new amendment nullified this possibility. ASUC President George Link declared that the Kerr Directives Controversy was now over.

On Oct. 14, 1960, the Daily Cal reported that Dean Shepard "stated that his rulings on the status of an issue (i.e. whether ExCom could or could not take a stand on it) are now based on whether or not that issue is pertinent to the role of ExCom as administrator of the activities program." By Oct. 19, 1960, ExCom had approved an amendment to the rules of procedure providing that motions requiring a disclaimer (i.e. motions on issues on which ExCom could not take an official position) were to be placed last on the agenda of new business. However, a motion to refer off-campus issues to the Student Forum if one third of ExCom's voting membership so moved was defeated.

Appendix on Regulations Covering Student Activities

The Kerr Directives

Administrative regulations curtailing freedom of speech and freedom of assembly have, since 1919, been based on an interpretation of Article IX, Section 9 of the California Constitution, the 'Charter' section. This declares the University to be a 'public trust' that must be "entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its Regents and in the administration of its affairs." All Presidents of the University have understood the law to mean that "University facilities and the name of the University must not be used in ways which will involve the University as an institution in the political, religious, and other controversial issues of the day." (Kerr Directives, 9/61.) In practice, this has not only meant that students, faculty, and employees were prohibited from speaking 'in the name of' the University, but that partisan groups were not allowed to have any headquarters on the grounds of the University. The protests this Fall at the Berkeley campus began when officials prohibited political groups from making membership drives and collecting funds on the campus, on the grounds that this made their headquarters on campus and thus involved the University in partisan affairs.

The difficulties in carrying out such a policy rigorously are enormous: they could, for instance, mean abandoning the teaching of history, economics, and political science. Therefore every University President has found his own way for justifying some appearance of politics on campus. President R. G. Sproul took the position that politics is sometimes cultural, and in that respect a legitimate part of University life. His policies governing the use of University facilities were set down in "Rule 17", which states: "The University recognizes a responsibility to invite or approve the inviting of qualified outside speakers on important public problems, including religious and political problems, for the purpose of promoting the intellectual development of its students." (Rule 17, rev. 6/1/49.) Again there was the stricture that "meetings or events which by their nature, method of promoting, or general bandling, tend to involve the University in political or sectarian religious activities in a partisan way will not be permitted." (Ibid.) The restrictions were severe: application for permission to hold meetings or hear speakers had to be made a week in advance; "discussion of highly controversial subjects normally will be approved only when two or more aspects of the problem are to be presented by a panel of qualified speakers" (Ibid.); and "no literature may be distributed free or sold in connection with meetings or events without permission obtained in advance. "(Ibid.) And there was a last restriction: the determination of whether a given group qualified as an 'on-campus' organization rested with the ASUC. All "on-campus" groups were to be "recognized by and under the jurisdiction of the governing board of the Associated Students . . . financially accountable to it, and subject to regulation and control by it." (Rule 17)

For the ASUC officially had much greater power then. It is hard to compare the present restrictions on the ASUC with those of President Sproul, because he was not much given to writing things down; he ruled less by law than by word of mouth. His basic policy regarding the ASUC was: "the President will normally observe the autonomy of student affairs, but reserves the right to intervene in matters affecting the welfare of the University or the responsibilities of its teaching or administrative officers." (Minutes of the ASUC ExCom, 1/11/61.) President Sproul did not object to the ExCom taking stands on state ballot propositions (ExCom, 27/Sept/50 and 23/Oct/56), circulating a petition protesting the surpression of the Hungarian uprising (ExCom, 20/Nov/56), protesting to the Berkeley City Council over parking time limits (ExCom, 21/May/57), collecting money for Hungarian relief (c.f. Daily Cal, 22 Nov. 56), negotiating with merchants for the 'fairbear' wage and organizing strikes in support of it (ExCom 14/Oct/58), and expressing opposition to HUAC (ExCom 6/Mar/53). All of these were undertaken in the name of the ASUC, notwithstanding President Sproul's express statement (University Regulation No. 6, rev. June 54), "individual members or groups of members of the academic or nonacademic staff, or of the student body of the University, should not initiate or seek to promote, through members of the Legislature or the Congress, or other State or Federal officers, any policies or legislation relatingto the University, or to give the appearance of acting in the name of the University on any policies or legislation, without specific authorization." In 1957 Rule 17 was eased: the stipulation that both views of any controversy be presented was removed, and ASUC approval of meetingsand speakers was no longer required. (c.f. Rule 17, new section 5.)

This, then, was the situation prior to October 1959 (the date of the first "Kerr Directives.") The raising of funds and soliciting of members for partisan causes was forbidden by Rule 17, but occasionally allowed anyway. Democrats and Republicans could now speak on campus but Communists could not. The ASUC was no longer the arbiter of what issues were "on" campus and what were "off"; given the conflicting examples of what partisan stands

were, in fact, taken "in the name of the University" and what were not, given the conflicting examples of what particular social actions were "in the welfare of the University" and what were not, the only determination could come by going to ask at Sproul Hall. Clark Kerr, on becoming President of the University, tried to create some logical order by codifying all verbal, written, implicit and explicit policies on student conduct into the now famous "Kerr Directives." (rev. '61, '63)

Like all human documents, the Kerr Directives are a mixture of good and bad, advance and retreat. In reducing all policies to written law, and thoroughly enforcing them. President Kerr has put an end to the illegal but un-punished expressions of free speech that sometimes characterized his predecessor's regime; on the other hand, he has put into law some new and markedly liberal policies. Let us look first at the advances, the greatest of which is the concept of the "open forum." Abandoning the former doctrine that politics was only to be allowed on campus as a facet of culture. President Kerr has made it his official policy that "any organization with membership restricted to students and staff and with a faculty or senior staff advisor can hold special meetings or events on campus and invite to speak at such meetings, a wide range of speakers on issues of educational interest to students." (Kerr D. 61) Instead of the mandatory week's notice of intention to hold such meetings, only "prior notice" is required. "Individual students and student organizations other than student governments may communicate with government officials so long as ... they indicate that they are not representing the University." (Ibid) Literature may be distributed "where and at times, when such posting, distribution, and exhibition shall not interfere with the orderly administration of University affairs or interrupt the free flow of traffic." (Ibid)

What, then, is wrong with the Kerr Directives? The first is the manner of their implementation. President Kerr's intentions regarding prior notice, distribution of literature, and the "open forum" seem perfectly clear. But the "Chief Campus Officers," who have local jurisdiction in enforcing the rules, have turned "prior" into "72 hours" and under the heading of "not interrupting the free flow of traffic" have shunted the "open forum" into out-of-the-way corners of the campus. Thus, what looks on paper like a great advance is in fact only a small step.

The second item represents the one great backward movement, the one item on which the Kerr Directives are more restrictive than any other regulations: "It is certainly not appropriate to permit student governments to speak either for the University or for the student body (italics mine) with reference to the off-campus political, religious, economic, international or other issues of the time. Therefore, student governments and their subsidiary agencies may not take positions on any such off-campus issues." (Kerr '61) "Any questions of jurisdiction arising under this rule shall be determined by the Chief Campus Officer or his duly designated representative." (Ibid) Under President Sproul, the ASUC, because it rarely took stands that embarrassed the university officials, was given relative autonomy. When, through change in the composition of its members (i.e. election of Slate candidates), the ASUC began to make more use of its autonomy, it was confronted by the new directives on student government. These gave the administration the power, never before made law, to exercise complete control over the ASUC, controlling both funds and constitutional changes: "Chief Campus Officers...are responsible to the President and to the Regents for the fiscal soundness of student governments...and may exercize control over expenditures of student funds (Student Government 1959, art. 1 & 6) and "Chief Campus Officers...may require that all changes in the existing constitutions of student governments have their formal approval before being submitted to a vote of the student body." (Ibid, 6b)

Taken as a whole, the present regulations on student affairs, the "Kerr Directives," are reasonably fair and liberal within their particular framework. But the framework that President Kerr inherited is both inconsistent and largely mistaken. The American Civil Liberties Union is at present (October, 64) undertaking a court case to prove the obvious: that the intention of the Charter, that in fact the literal meaning of the Charter, is to prevent the administration from becoming a one-sided agent in social affairs. Furthermore, on July 17, 1961, the following statement was formally presented to President Kerr by 19 faculty members:

We wish to express our individual dismay at the apparent disposition to base University policies in this area on questionable interpretations of the State constitutional requirement that the University 'shall be kept entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its regents and the administration of its affairs...' As the Committee on Academic Freedom of the Northern Section said in its report of November 23, 1959; 'The intent of the clause seems to us clear; it was designed to prevent political and religious influences from interfering with University affairs on the Regential and Administrative levels. We can find nothing in this clause that applies to voluntary student organizations.'

To construe the constitutional requirement as barring from the campuses of the University all 'partisan' or 'political' organizations, activities and expressions would gravely impair our character as a great and free University. The ruling at Berkeley barring even campus political parties (concerned with student government elections and affairs) seems to us a particularly manifest misconstruction of the constitutional intent. There have recently been other indications of the disturbing misapplications to which this constitutional clause is subject when used as a basic administrative test.

That the University is a social agent is beyond all doubt; what the Charter asks is that it not discriminate in the favor of any one partisan cause. To say that the actions of students who like Lyndon Johnson or who like Barry Goldwater, and who try to convince other students that they should like one or the other, make the University no longer "independent of sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its Regents" is grosaly to misinterpret this section of the Charter. Yet it is such an interpretation that makes the Kerr Directives, as others before them, deny University facilities for "the purpose of soliciting political party membership or opposing particular candidates or propositions...or for the purpose of raising money to aid projects not directly connected with some authorized activity of the University." (Kerr, III, IV)

Such an interpretation not only is a violation of the first amendment to the Constitution, (a university is not exempt from the first and fourteenth amendments: c.f. Baltimore University v. Colton 98 Md 623, 57, Atl. 14 (1904) and Koblitz v. Western Reserve University 21 Ohio CPR (n.s.) 144 (1901)). but is in direct contradiction to the actions of its administrators, who have continually engaged in "partisan" activity.

Three Changes in the Kerr Directives

The First Version of the Directives

The complex of rules governing the relations student groups enjoy with the University was "recodified" in a version we will call the "Kerr Directives." The Kerr Directives were issued on October 22, 1959, and the changes we shall discuss were made after this date. Some earlier events are, however, relevant to this discussion. ^[1]

On July 9, 1959 Kerr sent drafts of the new regulations to Frofessor Frank C. Newman, stating: "I would appreciate having the comments and suggestions of the Committee on Academic Freedom..." ^[2] After a meeting of the Committee, of which he was chairman, Newman sent Kerr specific recommendations on September 1. In the words of the Academic Senate Record,

The most significant recommendation (with respect to the section 'Use of University Facilities') was to delete the entire Section ... with respect to rules and procedures regarding the specific approval of off-campus speakers. It was our considered view that the University should not require such specific approval...

The most significant recommendation with respect to the draft on Student Organizations concerned the conditions for recognition. (We) proposed that organizations having as one of their purposes 'the taking of positions with reference to off-campus... issues' should not be debarred from the substantial privileges conferred by recognition.

On September 30 ... President Kerr advised that (our suggestions) 'were most helpful' and that he had incorporated all of them except that (a)...he had 'decided to retain the system of speaker approval for all off-campus speakers sponsored by student organizations'; (b)... he had 'decided to retain the original form of the draft which prevents extending recognition to organizations which have among their purposes 'the taking of positions (on) off-campus ... issues.'

"Unfortunately," remarks the Record, "these two exceptions were the essence of our recommendations."

Similarly, on October 12 the Committee suggested to Kerr that the student government and its agencies should not be prevented from taking stands on 'off-campus' issues, but should be allowed to take such stands provided they made it "clear that they do not represent the University or the student body as a whole." Four days later Kerr informed them that he would not accept this recommendation.

I. The First Change: A Liberalization

The Directives were printed in the Daily Californian on October 23, 1959, with a front-page editorial beginning, "President Kerr slapped student government in the face yesterday." The paper's criticism centered on the three points mentioned above. On October 27 the ASUC ExCom passed a resolution of protest ^[3] . At a rally the next day Slate urged student defiance of the new regulations. ^[4]

On November 4 an open meeting of students and faculty discussed the effects of the Directives and possible action against them. ^[5] The next day ExCom asked for a student poll. ^[6] On November 13. Slate announced that it was considering a court action to test the legality of the Directives, and sent a travelling committee to organize protest support on other campuses. ^[7]

President Kerr began to respond to the pressure on November 3, when he devoted four pages of the Daily Californian to a 'clarification' of the reasons for the new regulations. The paper responded two days later with an editorial declaring that the clarifications needed to be clarified.

At a meeting of the Academic Senate on November 20, Kerr presented a revised set of regulations. The clause denying recognition to organizations having as one of their purposes the taking of positions on 'off-campus' issues was changed to read, "The organizations must not be identified with any partisan political or religious group, or have as one of its principal purposes the taking of partisan positions identified with such a group." The requirement of prior approval for off-campus speakers was changed to one of prior notification. ^[8]

Two questions are in order.

(1) On October 23, Kerr stated that the regulations were devised after "widespread consultation...with administrative officers, faculty, and students." ^[9] Was this statement's implication justified, when the Academic Senate had complained that Kerr had disregarded "the essence of our recommendations"? And why did the student government say, in its resolution of October 27. "We further protest that (the Directives) were drawn up and established without the consultation and involvement of students"?

(2) Why were the regulations changed? The official answer was, "Kerr...said the change was made because the original wording was subject to interpretations which were never intended." ^[10] This explanation is insufficient, for the change was not only in the wording, but in the content. The newspaper had a different theory: "The recent Kerr modification was attributed to the Academic Freedom Report." ^[11] But the part of the Committee's report suggesting the changes that were made was in Kerr's hands a month before the regulations were made public, and he specifically rejected its recommendations.

II.The Second Change: A Restriction

After the first change, the Committee on Academic Freedom commented:

"(We) are of the opinion that the whole distinction between 'recognized' and 'off-campus' organizations might well be eliminated ... we now cannot envisage any harm to the University that would result from making its facilities available to... student organizations with avowedly partisan political or religious goals." ^[12]

But the Administration had a different opinion. On July 24, 1961, rather than eliminating this distinction. President Kerr formalized it. The 1959 Regulation on Student Organizations had provided a single category, that of 'recognized student organization.' The 1961 Privileges of Student Organizations which replaced it crested the new category of 'student organization authorized to use University facilities for special events', or 'off-campus' organization. ^[13]

Let us note that, though nominally this change might be conceived of as a liberalization, in practice it proved to be a restriction. For example, Slate, SCAL, FPFC and SAAT were not granted on-campus status under the new rulings. ^[14]

The difficulties which motivated the change were forecast by the Committee on Academic Freedom in 1959.

"We feel that it will be in practice extremely difficult to draw any clear-cut line between 'recognized' organizations, which may now concern themselves to some extent with political and religious issues, and 'off-campus' ones, which allegedly have partisan motives."

The Administration's reluctance to extend recognition to 'partisan' groups comes from the fact that such recognition affords outside pressure-groups the chance to criticize and, possibly, to damage the University (c.f. appendix on HUAC and Slate) After the HUAC demonstrations of 1960, criticism of the University and of students was particularly strong. The California Senate Fact-Finding Committee on UnAmerican Activities devoted 80 pages of its 1961 report to student activities at Berkeley: much of this space concerned Slate. The Committee's report also included a rather unsavory criticism of President Kerr for laying the campus open to such groups. ^[15]

Such pressures led an administrative official to tell a Slate member that the admini stration ". . .would prefer that I not proceed with sale of (Sounds of Protest) because any further connection of the University with the demonstrations could seriously affect its possibilities of getting funds, including government money, and. . .would also affect the University's image with prospective students. . ." ^[16]

The suspension of Slate's 'on-campus' status in June 1961 ^[17] is also relevant to the question of why Kerr formalized the distinction between 'on-campus' and 'off-campus' organizations. For the two previous years Slate and the Administration had conflicted frequently over what privileges and rights Slate had. Following the suspension, a small but vigorous protest in Slate's behalf was made by a group of faculty members. ^[18]

In short, there was a clear need for the Administration to take a stand. It might have accepted the Academic Freedom Committee's previous recommendation to eliminate the distinctions entirely. It might have disassociated the University totally from any student involvement in political affairs. Instead, it took a middle course.

We are not, in this report, concerned with the justice of this choice. We only wish to point out that the available record indicates that it was motivated by fear of outside pressures on the University.

One further point about this change in regulations must be made, in the interests of providing some information about how administrative policy is determined. On July 17, a group of 19 faculty members made a formal request to Kerr, asking that the revised regulations not be issued until they had been submitted to the Academic Senate for discussion. ^[19] The request was refused. Kerr instead consulted the Academic Council, which is regarded by many on the faculty as not representing the views of the Senate. ^[20] The new regulation was issued on July 22, unchanged from the draft form in which it had been circulated.

III. The Third Change: A Liberalization

In Fall, 1961 there was immediate student reaction to the second change. By September 14. Slate was circulating pamphlets attacking the Directives. The SCLU entered into discussion with the Administration. After prolonged debate, Slate named a delegate to the SCLU Consulting Committee. ^[21] The committee met with Administrative officials, and discussed a possible lawsuit against the University. ^[22]

On October 26 a headline in the paper reported: "Reps Relate Apathy To Kerr Directives". On November 13, Slate ASUC Representatives Ken Cloke and Roger Hollander published a lengthy criticism of the Directives in the paper. Two days later, open conflict flared flared when Kerr addressed an open letter to them on the front page of the Daily Cal. The next day they responded with another open letter, again on the front page.

Kerr's letter read, in part. "The claim that' students' rights which previously existed' have been eliminated. . .is a good example of the 'Big Myth' technique at work. . ." It went on to offer Slate, and the whole student body, a "free choice" between the current directives and the corresponding rules under President Sproul. An appendix purported to give a point-by-point comparison of these two sets of rules, but unfortunately neglected to mention the liberalizations that Sproul had authorized in 1957. ^[23]

(Elsewhere in this report we discuss the successful attempt of Administrative officials to dictate to the ASUC ExCom a resolution affirming the Kerr Directives and, thus, refusing Kerr's offer. ^[24] )

Kerr's open letter, which was unprecedented (and widely viewed as an attack on Slate), and the curious pressure put by the Administration on ExCom to insure its support, lead us to conclude that the Administration felt itself put under considerable pressure.

This brief summary of the events of Fall 1961 may help to resolve the following puzzle. Kerr's open letter of November 15 devotes considerable energy to explaining that the then-current regulations were (a) carefully formulated, and (b) quite liberal. It makes no mention of any proposed further liberalizations. But on November 27 the Daily Californian reported:

"Only 72 hours notice need by be given for off-campus speakers as of December 1, according to a revision of the notification rule issued . . by Katherine A. Towle, acting dean of students. The present ruling says that any student organization which plans to hold a meeting at which an off-campus speaker will appear must file notification seven seven days prior to the event."

Institutional Change—Rule 17

Introduction

1. The subject of this analysis is the University of California; the method of analysis is the detailed examination of the processes set into motion when work was put into the institution in an endeavor to change one of its important policies.

2. Summary of the events to be discussed:

In September of 1956 the "Committee to Modify Rule 17" was formed. It consisted entirely of students and was designed as the vehicle to seek the formal amendment of University Regulation Number 17. Its leaders intended to collect up to 10,000 signatures on a petition to be addressed to the Board of Regents of the University, proposing a specific modification of the rule. For a tactical reason, Chancellor Kerr of the Berkeley campus was informed of the group's plans. He urged them to seek the change through discussion with the relevant officials within the Administration. This was agreed to, and after further discussion a draft rule agreeable to both was arrived at.

The Faculty Committee on Academic Freedom was consulted for an advisory opinion on the draft rule. It urged that the change be requested of the President of the University rather than of the Regents, which was agreed to. At the January 1957 meeting of the Representative Assembly of the Academic Senate a resolution supporting the proposed change, and in some respects going beyond it, was unanimously passed.

The proposal^[1] was formally presented to President Sproul, and taken under advisement by him. In late March 1957 the Public Information Office announced that Regulation 17 had been changed by the President. The wording of the new rule^[2] was that of the proposal with one exception. The revised rule was put into practice six months later, in October of 1957, after a period of discussion within the Administration and between the Administrations of the various campuses to arrive at a common interpretation.

3. Definition of Basic Terms.

The policy involved has two aspects, formal and informal, legal and symbolic. Formally it is embodied in University Regulation Number 17, its function being "to outline policy and establish procedures for the use of campus facilities for purposes other than the conduct of regularly organized and scheduled courses,..." Informally, Rule 17 was, up to the time it was changed, a symbol of the complex rules, regulations, practices and attitudes, formal and informal, which functioned to minimize extremist (and by indirection moderate) political activity of students on the campuses of the University of California.

The essential feature of the proposed change was that student groups not having the status of University recognition, were to be permitted to present meetings on the campus. This was important because of the university's policy of not recognizing political and religious groups. The proposal would also delete a requirement that two or more sides of controversial issues be presented. It embodied procedural safeguards to prevent misrepresentation of the sponsorship of such meetings.

"The Committee to Modify Rule 17" is the formal name of the student committee created to form the public face of the movement for reform. It will be referred to as the Committee.

4. Conceptual Framework.

The most accurate and useful conceptual approach is that which views the institution as existing in a field of forces with the introduction of new forces through work put into it. The prossures which had brought about the policy in the first place had diminished greatly, but, combined with normal institutional inertia and weak counter pressures, were enough to protect the policy from change. It is this writer's conclusion that the work was applied at a critical point. A year sooner it is very unlikely that the same work would have succeeded, while in the future counter pressures may again mount. Yet at this time there would have been no change without the introduction of work. In essence it created a problem for the University Administration which was most easily solved by changing the policy.

We will therefore examine the work itself, the pressures it created, the problems it posed, and their resolution by the Institution.

The Original Strategy

The significance of the original strategy lies chiefly in the manner in which it was changed to accommodate the interests of the local Administration and of the Faculty in order to win their support. The plan was simply to get signatures of 10,000 students on the Berkeley campus on a petition to the Board of Regents proposing a changed rule. The manner in which it changed character will be dealt with in detail, but in brief: the petition or public opinion prossure method was changed to quiet "negotiation," the approach to the Board of Regents was changed to an approach to President Sproul because of the Faculty's desire to minimize the exercise of the Regents' power in internal administration of the University.

The Local Administration (Chancellor Kerr)

A rather narrow problem brought about a basic change in the strategy of the Committee. Aside from the composition of the Committee itself, the major instrument of the campaign was to be a printed, ten- page booklet containing the proposed change, and the rationale for it, to be issued by the Committee. Because the legitimacy of the effort would have been greatly impaired if permission to distribute them on the campus was denied, and because of the Dean of Students' conservative record in such matters, it was decided to approach the Chancellor directly, on the expectation that his refusal to overrule the Dean on previous occasions resulted more from unwillingness to undermine the authority of the Dean's office than from agreement with his policy, and that given a chance to establish a policy within the administration, he would exercise his power to do so.

For this purpose an appointment was secured with the Chancellor, at which time he expressed interest in, and sympathy with the project, and urged the group to attempt to secure acceptance of its proposal without going to the extent of a petition campaign.

The problems posed to the Chancellor by the prospect of the kind of campaign planned involved primarily the danger of serious weakening of the myths supporting the rolationship of student government to the Administration. Because the authoritarian formal structure of the University is at basic odds with the democratic ethos, and because of the particular importance of consent in the exercise of control over students (arising from the lack of definition of the degree to which the University acts in loco parentis) the legitimacy of its power has to be maintained, and where possible it has to be exercised through student government rather than directly. The principle of legitimacy used is the myth that where the University knows what the students want they will endeavor to do it, which is, in turn, based on the assumption that there are no divorgences in the interests of the students and the administration.

The planned campaign amounted to an attack by the leaders of student opinion, and in all likelihood of a large part of the student body on a policy of the University. In such a situation the Administration would have had to defend the policy, thus placing itself in opposition to the student body, and if the Regents failed to respond favorably (as was highly probable) the myth would have been even more seriously weakened.

Aside from considerations arising from the Chancellor's office, his personal interests and values were also involved. In the first place the fact that he is a liberal, and wanted same sort of change, would make him loath to be forced into a position of opposing it (as he would have to do as representative of the Institution); he also may have believed that the chances for the success of the original plan were slim. In addition, if the proposal was not made publicly, he would have an opportunity to influence the final proposal itself, and to give it his support, which he did.

Secondly, he was at the time an "active" candidate for the Presidency of the University, and a conflict between the students on his campus and the Administration would not be an asset to him.

Thus we see that to the Chancellor, considerable advantage was to be gained by giving his support to the Committee in exchange for a change to the method of negotiation.

From the Committee's standpoint, of course, this involved more than a "deal" with the Chancellor. His support did not simply buy the change in approach—it gave the course of negotiation a chance of success previously not present.

In considering the factors influencing the Committee's decision to adopt his suggestion, it is important to note that the Committee had no peculiar competence to carry out the task of collecting 10,000 signatures, and that it was in reality much more competent to carry on "behind the scenes" negotiations.

In addition to the change in procedure the Chancellor "suggested" several changes in the proposal, most of which were accepted. From that point on the Committee had his explicit support. His proposed changes in the draft revealed a concern for limiting the possible consequences of an unfriendly student audience by banning individuals in a position to affect the University's budget, and with increasing the amount of control which the University could exercise over the conduct of meetings on the campus.

The Faculty

The formal support of the Faculty came about as an unanticipated result of the decision to seek the change through internal negotiation. To enhance the legitimacy of the proposal, the Committee undertook a program of "consultation with responsible University groups." Among these was the Committee on Academic Freedom of the Academic Senate.

The Academic Freedom Committee had two reactions. They were considerably alarmed by the proposal to address our request to the Board of Regents because as members of the Senate they were committed to minimizing the control of the Regents in making University policy, and saw a petition (public or private) as legitimizing action on their part in this area.

Of equal importance was the interest the proposal aroused in one member of the Committee, Professor Newman (of the Law Faculty) who from that point on took on the task of achieving Faculty backing in which he was successful. Where "the Faculty" is referred to, it usually is in reference to the actions of this group, representing the Faculty proper.

The significance of the problem the Committee posed is indicated by the fact that an appointment was granted to the Committee by the President (who is notoriously inaccessible), and by the Chancellor's presence at it. During the interview the President's actions were designed to demonstrate the seriousness with which he would consider the proposal, and the high degree to which he was appreciative of the "responsible" way in which the committee had worked.

The rationale of such an interview is based on the myth that rational man will agree, since it is ostensibly an occasion for an attempt to convince one party of the wisdom of the course of the action advocated by the other. Its social function from the point of view of the Committee, was to commit the President to action, and to assure that it received his personal attention.

At the close of the interview, the former function was recognized in the President's pledge to inform the group of any decision made. From the President's point of view the interview needed to curtail the activities of the group, giving him an opportunity to develop a decision with a minimum of new pressures coming into being. It amounted to a truce; a stoppage of work.

An analysis of the social function of the interview should not be permitted to obscure its individual function. There is, in this case, little doubt that President Sproul was honestly impressed with the work and sincerity of the Committee, and that the presentation of its case and discussion of it with him had an importance of its own, thought to what degree cannot be ascertained. (The validity of the foregoing is borne out by remarks to this effect made by Sproul to an individual peripheral to the situation.)

Conservative Forces

The most historically important of these are the very forces which, if this analysis were concerned with the change to the Rule 17 policy (in the early 1930's) would be placed in the category of acting and shaping forces. They are the basic ones of Institutional security, and the danger to it stemming from the political activity of students.

The University is the carrier of a precarious value, the value for state supported higher education. This value is strong in its generalized form; everybody is in favor of education. But when it becomes particularized, it is relatively weak; nobody likes ivory towers. Particularly is this so at the point of allocating money to the University. It therefore has a constant problem of justifying its existence, and more difficult, its expansion. Critical to this is its public image, which tends to be influenced by all events associated with the University, not only by those formally associated with it and sanctioned by it. It was the effect upon this image caused by the activities of left wing and in particular Communist students in the early 1930's which led to the adoption of the Rule 17 policy in 1934.^[3]

This problem is a constant one, varying in force both with changes in the level of such activity by students, and with the tolerance of the community for political unorthodoxy. Since the inception of the policy, both have varied considerably, but only in the last two years (approximately) have they both represented a low point in pressure. Thus while they still exist the resultant force is relatively weak.

Secondly, the inherent inertia of a large institution due to the general desire to avoid the new problems any change in procedure creates, would require work to overcome. This, of course, is not peculiar to this Institution, or within it, to this problem.

Forces for Change

Students. The President was faced with the same problems of sustaining the myths of student government which are outlined above in relation to the Chancellor, although not to the same extent, since he does not deal directly with them to the same degree. Increasing the importance of this force, however, was the increased legitimacy of the students' proposal stemming from the support of the Chancellor and the Faculty (Representative Assembly). To have ignored these groups as well as the student group would have placed the President in the position of acting autocratically in the eyes of the "student leaders."

The consequences of acting counter to the expressed will of the faculty and local administration are more straightforward. They rest on the power of these groups—much more self-conscious of their relationship to the office of President than are the students—to withhold cooperation or support on other matters of importance to him.

Forces Shaping the Change

Seeing then, that the forces for change were stronger than those against change, the question remains as to the causes of the particular change that was made.

What was needed was the change which would involve the smallest new threat to the institutional security and at the same time would prevent further work being put into the institution. The latter was accomplished by using the exact wording to the student proposal (with the exeception of one word) thus flattering and appeasing the students, who were the potential source of new work. This also provided an excuse for the refusal of the President's office to meet with representatives of the student Committee and the Faculty together "to discuss the change," ^[4]thus avoiding further pressure to go beyond the proposals in the Committee's draft.

The Manner in Which the Change was Made

Finally, the way in which the decision was made and put into effect reveals yet another facet of the social structure of the University, the relationship between the President and the other campuses, and in particular to their Administrations.

While the Committee confined its activities strictly to the Berkeley campus (except for liaison established with the ASUCLA President so that work on that campus could be initiated if it was felt necessary), the Rule applies to all campuses, and this had to be considered in making the change. The division of powers between the central University Administration and the local campus administration is not extensively formally established, and it appears that formally most power resides with the President, while informally there is a considerable distribution of power. This is recognized by the existence of the President's Administrative Advisory Council, composed of the chief administrators of each campus which, being a formal group without formal power, represents a cross between formal and informal cooperation.

The Committee Proposal presented to this group, was received unenthusiastically, but with no basic opposition. Before the change was announced there was further consulation on its specifics between the President's office and the other Administrations (this accounts for an interval of three weeks between the formal change, as indicated by the date on the published rule, and the announcement of the change).

(Editor's note: this is a slightly edited version of a paper written by Mr. Franck in 1958 for a Sociology course in which he was a student.)

Appendix I: Rule 17—Comparison of Present and Proposed Wording

Present Wording

The purpose of this regulation is to outline policy and establish procedures for the use of campus facilities for the purposes other than the conduct of regularly organized and scheduled courses, institutes, conferences, and other programs initiated by the University for instruction, research, or cultural purposes.

This regulation does not apply to outside speakers invited by members of the faculty to participate in classroom meetings of regularly scheduled courses as qualified specialists in pertinent subject fields. Neither is it the intent of this regulation to discourage other desirable uses which do not conflict or interfere with the primary uses. The University recognizes a responsibility to invite or approve the inviting of qualified outside speakers on important public problems, including religious and political problems, for the purpose of promoting the intellectual development of its students and preparing them for intelligent participation in society.

Proposed Wording

Editor's note: the proposed wording was accepted, and became the new version of Rule 17, with the exception of a single but highly significant modification in Section A, no. 5. The proposed wording read, "Organizations composed predominantly of students...". The final version read, "Organizations composed exclusively of students..."

...intelligent participation in society. The University also recognizes a responsibility to encourage student groups to present two or more representative views of controversial issues whenever possible, within a reasonable period of time and under comparable circumstances.

Present Wording

Applications for permission to hold special meetings or events must be filed at least a week in advance. Students must submit applications to the Dean of Students, or other officer designated to perform on the campus concerned.

A. Applications may be submitted by the following:

1. Colleges, departments, or other organizations of the faculty.

2. Organizations of University employees.

3. Organizations of bona fide students which are recognized by the University. Such organizations may be sponsored by departments or colleges for academic purposes or by the administration ofr purposes of general University welfare. Recognition requires filing of a formal application, including a copy of the constitution and a list of efficers with the Dean Of Students or equivalent officer.

4. Organizations of students which are recognized by and under the jurisdiction of the governing board of the Associated Students. Membership in such organizations must be restricted to bona fide students, faculty members and employees of the University of California. Organizations permitted on campus because of recognitionaly by the Associated Students must have a faculty sponsor, and must have a constitution which is in consonance with that of the Associated Students, and with the purposes of the University. A copy of this constitution, together with a list of officers, must be filed with the Associated Students and with the Dean of Students, or equivalent officer, before recognition may be given, and these documents must be kept current while recognition continues. An organization under the jurisdiction of the Associated Students shall be financially accountable to it and subject to regulation and control by it.

Proposed Wording

5. Organizations, other than those recognized by the University or the Associated Students, but which are determined to be composed predominantly of University of California students, and to have, in the capacity of an advisor, a faculty member or Senior University Staff member. Such determination shall be made by a committee composed of the Dean of Students and a student and a faculty member, both appointed by the Chancellor or Provost of the University. The faculty member shall be selected from a panel presented by the appropriate committee on committees of the Academic Senate, and the student member shall be appointed on the recommendation of the Associated Students.

6. Non-University, etc...

Present Wording

5. Non-University organizations, or organizations not falling under the classifications above, may on occasion be granted permission to hold meetings or events on campus if such meetings or events promote the welfare of the University or the purposes which the University serves. This classifcation covers particularly cultural, scientific, scholarly, or professional organizations.

B. The following general rules apply to meetings and events:

Proposed Wording

B. Infractions of the following rules provide the grounds upon which permission to hold a meeting or event on campus may be denied to, or withdrawn from organizations classified under Section A.

Present Wording

1. Student meetings or events, with the exception of regularly recurring athletic, forensic, dramatic, or musical activities, will normally not be open to the public.

2. Facilities may not be used for the purpose of raising money to aid projects not directly connected with some authorized activity of the University, except that Athletic events to which a nominal charge is made for admission when adequate facilities are not available elsewhere in the community; and except that fund-raising campaings for the Community Chest and Red Cross may be held each year, and one other campaign each term may be approved on the unanimous recommendation of the governing board of the Associated Students on the campus concerned.

Proposed Wording

2. Facilities may not be used for the purpose of soliciting political party membership or religious conversion, or for the purpose of raising etc...

Present Wording

3. Meetings or events which by their nature, method of promoting, or general handling, tend to involve the University in political or sectarian religious activities in a partisan way will not be pernitted. Discussion of highly controversial issues will normally be approved only when two or more aspects of the problem are to be presented by a panel of qualified speakers.

Proposed Wording

3. The promotion and conduct of meetings or events in such a way as to involve the University in political or sectarian religious activities in a partisan way will not be permitted. Promotional material should in no way imply the University of California's sponsorship or endorsement of meetings or events held on its campuses. Therefore, all publicity pertaining to the promotion of any meeting or event must, at the request of the Dean of Students or his designated representative, be submitted for approval and be filed in the Dean of Students' office. Such approval will not be granted if the publicity in any way implies the University's sponsorship or endorsement.

Present Wording

4.No permission is given by this regulation for meetings and events contrary to resolutions or provisions of the Standing Orders of Regents, or public law.

5. No literature may be distributed free or sold in connection with meetings or events without permission obtained in advance.

6. The University cannot delegate responsibility for policing or handling crowds, or for cleaning up after meetings or events. Any expense entailed normally must be met by the sponsoring organization and a deposit may be requested in advance.

Proposed Wording

7. No permission is given by this regulation to hold meetings or events which would interfere with the regularly scheduled academic program of the University.

8. Candidates for state office who would, upon election, review or approve the University budget, may not be invited by a student group to speak on campus.

June 1, 1949

(This regulation supersedes the revised regulation of January 1, 1944.)

Appendix on Regulations on the University's Responsiveness to Outside Pressure

The Administration's Neutrality During the Bodega Head Controversy

In 1957, the University of California abandoned plans set in motion the previous year for a marine biological laboratory at Bodega Head. On May 23, 1958, Pacific Gas and Electric Company confirmed rumors that it planned to build a power plant at Bodega Head. But while the University's withdrawal lasted officially through 1960, a faculty committee, told to search for another site, recommended on November 29, 1960, that Bodega Head remain at the top of the list of possible sites. In 1961, the University announced plans to return to Bodega Head even with Pacific Gas and Electric as a future neighbor.

Both the decision to withdraw and the decision to return to Bodega Head seemed to be based on information furnished the administration, information which analyzed the probable effects of the proposed neighboring power plant on the biological integrity of the area. Apparently, the administration never considered opposing P. G. & E.'s plans, but acted as if it had no preference as to the disposition of the adjoining property, thus relegating itself to second place.

By selecting Bodega Head as the most economically feasible site, P. G. & E. took over land previously earmarked by the Division of Beaches and Parks as a recreational area. When it became known that P. G. & E. planned to build an atomic-powered plant, there were further questions as to the desirability of locating a plant so close to the San Andreas fault, and the Atomic Energy Commission has thus far refused to issue a construction permit because of earthquake hazards. P. G. & E. has now abandoned plans for a nuclear power plant at the site. Since a strong statement by the University might very well have forced P. G. & E. to move elsewhere earlier, the official neutrality of the University was interpreted by many as tacit approval.

We are concerned with the University's reasons for its neutrality. Obviously, the power plant would have some effects on the University's plans, since the facility's projected cooling system involved a discharge of hot water and possibly radioactive elements into the ocean near the proposed laboratory. The University's own interest—the biological integrity of the area—was therefore directly involved. However, Chancellor Strong took the position, in May 1962, that it was "not appropriate... for the University to take an official position on operations or developments on adjoining lands that do not specifically impair the scientific usefulness of University property." Strong maintained that "It has been the policy of the University to defend with vigor the biological integrity of the lab site itself."^[1] The University's neutrality, then, was based on the degree to which the power plant would damage the scientific interests of the University, and the University's opinion was that the damage would not be significant.

The amount of damage is not merely a matter of opinion, but of hypotheses based on scientific analyses. The University's neutrality rests ultimately on the scientific data analyzing the potential effects from the power plant. During the Bodega controversy, it became clear that the University reserved to itself the right to maintain neutrality whatever the scientific data showed. The University's opinion that the power plant would not seriously damage the biological integrity of the area was stated often and publicly, but the full scientific case for that opinion was never published.

Moreover, even when the University had judged that the power plant might damage the usefulness of the marine laboratory, the administration refused to oppose P. G. & E.'s plans. Such an unfavorable judgement is revealed in two letters written by Chancellor Glenn Seaborg in 1960. One letter, written to Philip S. Flint of the Sierra Club, dated June 28, 1960, reads: "The fact that the ecological future of Bodega Head was unpredictable made it undesirable to locate a marine laboratory at Horseshoe Cove, in view of the plans for the power station." The second letter is even more explicit:

There seems to be general agreement that the discharge of warm water from the power plant might have substantial ecological effects upon the shore life, and though such effects are nearly impossible to predict accurately, they constitute a potential risk which we cannot justifiably take. Since there are suitable alternative sites available not involving this potential risk, we therefore have felt obliged to drop the Bodega site from consideration. ^[2]

At no time did the administration feel it necessary to further its own interests by objecting to the power plant, and to P. G. & E. Although Bodega Head had long been admitted to be a unique site, the faculty committee in charge of the lab was told to search for alternate sites.

The result of the search was the Emerson Report of November 29, 1960, submitted to the Chancellor by a faculty committee headed by Professor Ralph Emerson and representing several fields of biology. The report found serious shortcomings in every alternative site, and urged a return to Bodega Head. "Then for the third time," the report reads, "weighing all relevant aspects, we agreed unanimously that there was not a single one of these [alternative] sites that was equal to Bodega Head as it now stands. Bluntly stated, a unique Class A site for a marine facility is being exploited for power production." The strength of this language, even though it urged no direct opposition to P. G. & E. by the University, was somewhat mitigated by the report's final decision.^[3] The committee noted that expert opinion "had revealed the likelihood that periodic inundations of heated waters from the power plant might seriously affect the rich natural biota in the immediate vicinity of the proposed laboratory." The committee concluded, however, that one of the less favorable features of many second class sites "was the necessity for driving out from the laboratory various distances in order to reach good collecting grounds.... We accepted this as a need that probably exists to a degree with many marine laboratories anyway."^[4] The University returned to Bodega Head.

By May of 1962, the University's position had become critical because of the impending Public Utilities Commission public hearings on P. G. & E.'s application for a construction license. Berkeley Biochemistry Professor J. B. Neilands circulated among the faculty a petition protesting the P. G. & E. plant. The petition failed to gain much faculty support, but even Neilands agreed, according to the Daily Californian, that "publishing the petition before the Chancellor had seen it was in bad taste."^[5] It was at this time that Chancellor Strong, as a rebuke of the petition, declared that it was "not appropriate" for the University to take an official position on developments that did not "specifically impair" the usefulness of the marine station.

The administration, meanwhile, continued to staunchly defend the insignificance of the power plant's effects on the area. The Daily Californian reported Strong as saying, on May 11, 1962, that it had been determined that the discharge of warm water from the proposed P. G. & E. plant would "not adversely affect shore life" in the area. At the Public Utility Commission hearings in late May, 1962, a University representative, A. Starker Leopold, testified as follows:

We... decided on the basis of all the evidence available to us, as scientists, and when I say 'us' I am speaking now of a faculty committee drawn from both the Berkeley and Davis campuses of the University, and involving principally biologists, able to weigh scientific evidence of this sort. The evidence, as we saw it, indicated that the installation of that power site beyond us and out on the Head would not render the Horseshoe Cove area unusuable (sic) for a biological station. ^[6]

As biologists we did not feel that any developments that directly related to the power plant on the Head would render our site unusuable (sic) nor even materially alter it as a point, as a site for biological studies. ^[7]

Leopold steadily refused to take a position on either his or the University's preference of neighbors for the marine laboratory.

MR. KORTUM: Would you say that the summation of the testimony you have given indicates it would be better if the P. G. & E. were not there?

THE WITNESS: [Mr. Leopold] I couldn't answer that. ^[8]

Leopold's testimony in May was made public. The scientific data, including the Emerson Report, on which the University had based its decision had not been publically released. In November, Professor Neilands submitted a petition to the P.U.C. for a rehearing and charged that the Emerson Report called for the ouster of P. G. & E. from Bodega Head. According to the Daily Californian of November 29, 1962, a "University spokesman" replied that "The report gives unanimous support to allowing construction of the power station at the site, and adds there will be no detrimental effect upon the proposed marine biological station." But an "informed University source" quoted the famous sentence, "a unique class A site for a marine facility is being exploited for power production." Professor Emerson himself admitted that the "warmed water which will be discharged into the ocean could definitely affect the ecological life in the area." He added, however, that he could not release his report since it was a communication to the Chancellor's office. Strong's office, according to the Daily Californian, said it had made no plans to release it. ^[9]

Two weeks later, at the request of the faculty committee, the Emerson report was released. The working papers of which the Emerson Report was a part were not released. Nor, at this time, was the report of the "oceanographers," which sustained the University's original withdrawal, released or even substantially described by the University. The oceanographers were J. D. Frauschy, Associate Research Engineer, and D. L. Inman, Associate Professor of Marine Geology, from Scripps Institute of Oceanography. Their report, dated June 14, 1960, deals with the probable effects of P. G. & E.'s operations upon the specific area of Bodega Head, particularly regarding volume of flow and temperature differential. The report concludes:

It seems probable that Horseshoe Cove will from time to time be bathed for periods of some hours in the unmixed effluent at near discharge temperatures. In addition the sedimentation regime within Bodega Bay and its entrance channel may be modified as a result of pumping from the Bay. ^[10]

A letter written to Professor Inman after his investigation at Bodega, but before the report, by Professor Stanier of Berkeley reads:

After my return to Berkeley, I discussed the general picture, as I had understood it from our conversations, with a number of the marine biologists here; and their reaction was so generally unfavorable that for the time being we have halted all further exploration of the possibilities of acquiring land and putting up a station at Bodega Head. ^[11]

A statement by Cadet Hand, Acting Director of the Marine Laboratory, December 19, 1962, mentions this report but maintains that the questions which it raised were answered by the Emerson Report, presumably, by the unavoidable necessity of collecting specimens at a distance. Hand's statement also mentions that Professor Robert L. Wiegel of Berkeley had analyzed data available from P. G. & E.'s plant at Morro Bay, which showed no appreciable increase in water temperature. "It was Professor Wiegel's conclusion that due to physical and climactic differences between Morro Bay and Bodega Head that mixing, and therefore temperature decrease, would be more effective at Bodega Head than at Morro Bay." The statement summarized: "From all of the foregoing it can be concluded that the planned P. G. & E. plant will not have a significant impact on the marine environment at the University laboratory site, and that very little risk was involved in selecting Bodega Head as the site."

The P. G. & E. data mentioned in Hand's statement would seem to be the same as that cited in a University of California "Position Statement" received by P. G. & E. on September 19, 1962. According to the statement, the P. G. & E. studies showed that "there did not appear to be any appreciable difference in temperature of the receiving water at distances even a thousand feet from the point of discharge.... No data were given on wind, wave, or current conditions at the time of measurements." The absence of wind, wave, and current conditions is a simplification which does not appear in Hand's statement. From a letter by Cadet Hand, dated January 15, 1963, it seems clear that the faculty were presented with only two choices: either they could share Bodega Head with P. G. & E., or they could withdraw completely.

The lack of public information on the Bodega controversy became a matter of student discussion in the ASUC Senate for a very short time. At a meeting of the ASUC Senate, December 13, 1962, the day of the Emerson Report release, Commuter-Independent Representatives Jerry Miller and Michael Travis moved that the ASUC establish a committee to report to the campus on the Bodega Head problem. Dr. Lyman Porter, Faculty Representative, immediately moved to postpone the item indefinitely: Dr. Porter said that this is a topic which the University has had a number of experts working on for a number of years. All the reports that have been made are available to the PUC anytime they want them. He said that he saw no relevance for the Senate to get involved in this affair.^[12] Porter did not say that the reports were available to the public. Dean Williams said that "Dr. Porter's explanation covers the University's feelings on establishing another committee." Miller protested that he was not arguing that the committee should take any action. "The controversy here is whether or not the University has freely published all the information on this matter." The motion to postpone indefinitely was carried seven to five.

The controversy which developed over a road which P. G. & E. wanted built down the west shore of Bodega Harbor illustrates in miniature the pattern of administration action, including lack of respect for faculty opinion. On the basis of scientific objections from the head of the marine laboratory, Chancellor Strong at first protested the road. In a letter to Col. John Morrison, of the Army Corps of Engineers in San Francisco (received December 13, 1961), Strong states the University's opposition to the entire road, including portions not on University property:

The University of California wishes to register a formal protest against the proposed tidelands road along the West shore of Bodega Harbor.... From the standpoint of the University an overland route to the Campbell Cove area would be very much preferable.... The University has discussed the routing of the road with Sonama County officials and received from them a minor concession in the form of inland routing of a short portion of the road on what will be part of the Marine Research Station Site. This particular bit of shoreline which will be preserved is actually atypical... it does not have many of the faunal elements present elsewhere along the shore.

Cadet Hand, Acting Director of the Marine Laboratory, continued to protest the road in its entirety at the public hearing before the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers at Bodega Bay on February 16, 1962. The statement reads in part:

While rerouting protects and saves many organisms, the road throughout the rest of its length destroys some of the very values which led us to choose this headland as our site in the first place. It is regrettable that a great University and a great County find themselves at odds, but the values lost to the University, County, State, Nation, and World by the presence of such a road far outweigh the short term values such a road might bring to the County and its users.

Administration support for the objection to the road seems to have ebbed very quickly, however. It is possible that Hand had been rebuked for his strong stand at the Army Corps Hearing. In a letter to Strong on February 21, 1962, Hand reveals that his position has not been sustained by the administration:

Since I was there (Army Corps Hearing) with your permission and since Mr. Prather (Chairman of the Harbor Commission and County Planning Director) used your letter to him of February 8, 1962, as evidence that the University was satisfied with the present proposed location of the road, I took the opportunity to make it clear that biologically we still had to object to any part of the road being in the tidelands.... I trust you understand my position and feeling in all of this.

The minutes of the May 10, 1962, meeting of the Sonoma County Harbor Commission reveal that the University had directed its business officer not to oppose the road:

Mr. Prather replied that Mr. O. W. Campbell, Business and Finance Officer of the University, has indicated that the institution is in accord with the county's plans of development including the west shore road at Bodega Harbor; that anything to the contrary, including some of the scientists, is contrary to the University's position.... He further reported that the University has indicated that there is no problem insofar as scientific interests are concerned, and that as soon as their acquisition of 320 acres is concluded they will deed the necessary right of way to the county.

The lack of respect for the scientifically based faculty objection to the road was described by Mr. Leopold, at the PUC hearings, as an "honest disagreement of opinion," and, in this case, the Administration had apparently decided that even the damage done to the "scientific usefulness" of University property did not warrant a protest. The official transcript of the PUC hearings in May, 1962, reads (p. 819):

[Mr. Leopold]: Acting Director Hand felt we should object to more of the road than the Chancellor himself. This I stated was an honest disagreement of opinion among ourselves.

Q. So the present position is that the roadway in its entirety is not objectionable?

A. [Mr. Leopold] That is correct.

It should be clear by now that the effects of the power plant on the marine laboratory were always more hypothetical than certain. Nevertheless, there is very little evidence that the University made every effort possible to collect and analyze pertinent data, or to investigate analogous situations fully. More importantly, however, the University, by withholding all the information which it had, gave the impression at least that the public—even the faculty—should not see all the evidence for the University's decision, so that while the administration maintained that "experts" had made the decision, it created an atmosphere of suspicion by not releasing the evidence which would enable some to question the judgment of those experts. The suspicions also tended to provoke charges of administration "collusion" with P. G. & E.

Moreover, contracts between the University and the ABC for the fiscal years of 1963 and 1964 belie the University's position that the power plant would not significantly alter the environment. In 1963, the University received $22,176 for a "Marine Ecological Survey of the Bodega Region," with Cadet Hand as investigator, to ascertain the effects of radiation and hot water on the marine environment. For the fiscal year of 1964, the proposed survey received $39,296. An effect significant enough to study in this way would seem to be a different kind of effect from one which Leopold, at the PUC hearing, testified would not "materially alter" the site.

It seems clear, then, that it was the administration's refusal to oppose P. G. & E.'s plans, rather than the consideration of the plant's effect on the biological integrity of the area that determined the University's neutrality. Such neutrality, however, was interpreted as approval of P. G. & E.'s plans, and was in fact used as an argument in favor of the power plant before the Public Utilities Commission. In a reply brief submitted to the Supreme Court of California (the P. G. & E. decision had been appealed several times), P. G. & E. took special note, in its own defense, of a passage from the previous PUC decision (#64537). The brief notes that many of the protestants had seemed to take the position that a marine laboratory and a power plant were incompatible, but "the record belies their position. Spokesmen for the University of California's proposed Marine Biological Station and the State Division of Beaches and Parks made it clear that they are not opposing the nuclear plant and that it will not interfere with their respective plans for operations and land use on Bodega Head."

The Subject A Controversy

One of the consequences of the Subject A controversy was that the responsibility of the Subject A Committee to the Academic Senate and, in particular, of the Subject A staff to the Subject A Committee was (theoretically) recodified and (practically strengthened. The most important change in procedure resulting from this recodification and strengthening of responsibility was that, whereas previously the Subject A staff (especially the Berkeley, and, to a lesser extent, the Los Angeles staffs) had made up the Subject A examination, now the Subject A committee meets to construct the examination, with the assistance of the Subject A supervisors. The Subject A Committee had always been responsible for the formulation of the examination; now they actually do it. One possible drewback in this arrangement is that, although the Subject A committee, consisting of members of the Academic Senate, may well be more aware of general educational policy than the Subject A staff, they are certainly not more aware of the problems peculiar to Subject A (the difficulty of accurately grading a vapid or over-generalized essay, for example, is great, since vague constructions tend to be simple constructions, and thus are poor indications of a student's writing ability). On the other hand, the Subject A Committee may be able to view the Subject A course and examination more objectively than can the Subject A staff. There has been, however, one actual drawback in the new arrangement in terms of censorship, and this drawback is the direct result of the controversy (it will be dealt with later in this paper).

The Subject A examination consists of two major sections: the first section, on which the students are to spend one hour, is an objective test of grammar, punctuation, and vocabulary; the second section, on which the students are to spend two hours, demands that a 500-word essay be written any one of the ten to twelve topics given in each examination. No essay topics are used more than once; the student thus cannot have prepared for the essay. Essay topics are generally chosen with the thought in mind that vapid essays are hard to grade; that is, topics are chosen which will hopefully prevent stereotyped, cliched responses. How the student does on the essay section of the examination determines, in large part, whether or not the student will be required to take the Subject A course; there is, however, normally a correlation between essay and objective scores.

The Subject A examination of May, 1959, consisted of the normal objective section and an essay section giving the student a choice of twelve possible essay topics. Topic number seven read as follows;

What are the dangers to a democracy of a national police organization, like the F.B.I., which operates secretly and is unresponsive to public criticism?

Of the 2,580 applicants who took the Subject A examination in May, 1959, 82 chose to write on topic number seven. The pass-fail percentage of those who chose this topic (55-45) corresponded very closely with the overall pass-fail percentage (56-44). In addition the percentages of those who argued that the F.B.I. did pose a threat, those who argued that it did not pose a threat, and those who gave a balanced response to the topic were, among passing essays and among failing essays, nearly identical. Thus, neither the choice of this topic nor the point of view espoused in writing on it had any apparent effect on the grading of the essay. John Halverson, Supervisor of Subject A on the Berkeley Campus at the time of the controversy, whose staff had made up the essay topics for this particular Subject A examination, could call topic number seven "in general, a successful topic."

Evidently, several Glensale, California, High School seniors did not agree with Mr. Halverson, for two letters criticizing the topic appeared in the Montrose Ledger on January 28 and February 4, 1960. The second letter said, in part, "The test assumed that the F.B.I. was a danger to democracy," and the examination "was devised to weaken our resistance to orderly policing." The names of the letter-writers were withheld in both cases. It is possible that the writers of the letters had not actually taken the examination, since it was at that time the practise of the Subject A department to sell Subject A examinations, once they had been given, to state high schools, so that the high schools might be able to prepare their students for the examination. Thus the delay between May, 1959, and January, 1960 might be explained.

There was, however, no further delay. Dr. John R. Lechner, 23rd District American Legion Americanism chairman and Americanism Educational League executive director (The San Francisco Examiner of February 11, 1960, named Dr. Lechner as a "veteran Los Angeles Americanism worker"), ever alert, spotted the two letters, grasped the implications of what was being done to California's youth, and immediately wrote Governor Brown, requesting him to make a "personal and immediate" investigation. Dr. Lechner saw the essay topic as much more than a threat to "orderly policing:" Subject No. 7 is a deliberate Communist propaganda scheme to implant a universally accepted Communist Party line into the minds of our boys and girls in high school," Dr. Lechner wrote Governor Brown.

He went on to ask the Governor to determine who was responsible for "this Communist propaganda in a public document which has so profound an influence upon the minds of our youth," and Whether the topic was employed "for some ulterior motive, such as having any statement by an applicant for admission in the University of California contrary to the suggestion inherent in the question" used as grounds for rejection. Dr. Lechner reminded the Governor of "the injustice this vicious statement does to the F.B.I.," and closed his letter by demanding that "the person or persons in so responsible a position, whose influence over the minds of our youth cannot be denied, should be dismissed when identified." (quotes from the Los Angeles Herald Express, February 4, 1960).

Two Los Angeles newspapers broke the story to/the public on the same day Dr. Lechner sent his letter to Governor Brown, February 4, 1960. Presumably, Dr. Lechner, aware of the value of publicity in the exposing of subversives, contacted the newspapers himself, for both newspaper stories contain extensive quotations from Dr. Lechner's letter (the Los Angeles Herald Express, under a banner headline, carried twenty column inches of Dr. Lechner's allegations). In all, at least nine commercial newspapers, as well as the Berkeley campus Daily Californian and the Los Angeles campus Daily Bruin, reported and editorialized on aspects of the Subject A controversy. Of the nine "news" stories (presently at hand) that appeared in the commercial press five presented only Dr. Lechner's allegations, and did not mention any of the various defenses of the topic made by the Berkeley and Los Angeles Subject A staffs and by the Subject A Committee; both of the two editorials (presently at hand) that appeared in the commercial press (the San Francisco Examiner—with a cartoon—and the Oakland Tribune) utilized as the basis for comment only Dr. Lechner's allegations.

In addition, J. Edgar Hoover, proving himself "responsive to public criticism" (if the Subject A topic can be called public criticism), wrote his disapproval of the topic to at least four newspapers, including the Daily Californian. "The question," he wrote, "is a complete falsehood." He went on to assert that the F.B.I. is not a "national police organization," that the F.B.I. is "accountable at all times to the Attorney General and the President," and that the investigative procedures of the F.B.I. "are constantly being examined in various courts of the land." Mr. Hoover "was completely amazed to see such a statement in a university examination. The question presents the students with a complete falsehood in the guise of an alleged truth. Their minds are impregnated with ideas which have absolutely no foundation in fact. This is surely not the way to teach out young people." Mr. Hoover closed this letter (to the Oakland Tribune) by thanking the paper for its vigilance and assuring the readers that "only by setting forth the facts can the full truth become known." Mr. Hoover wrote essentially the same letter to the Daily Californian, but, presumably to "teach out young people" more effectively, he closed this letter with somewhat stronger language than that of the Tribune letter; "...to call the F.B.I. a national police is a gross distortion of fact and a slur on our constitutional form of government....Only by setting forth the truth can error be combatted."

In response to Dr. Lechner's letter and the subsequent publicity, Governor Brown took "immediate," if not "personal," action: he asked University of California officials to investigate. The Governor did take a sort of personal action in that he communicated his personal concern over the matter to University President Kerr; and in response President Kerr, although he did not conduct the investigation personally (Vice-President Wellman seems to have been in charge), did take the ultimate responsibility for the results of the investigation, in that he presented the final report in his own name to the Assembly of the Academic Senate.

The investigation by administrative officials took the form of questioning everyone in the line of responsibility for Subject A. The Subject A Supervisor reported to the Subject A committee; the Subject A Committee reported to the Vice-Chancellor (James D. Hart); the Vice Chancellor reported to the University Vice-President; the University Vice-President reported to the University President; and the University President reported to Governor Brown (who presumably reported to Dr. Lechner). In addition, the Subject A Supervisor and the Subject A Committee met directly with representatives of the University President and the Academic Council (an ex officio group formed ultimately from the Academic Senate). Three official reports (written) were made: The Vice-Chancellor's to the Vice-President, the Subject A Committee's to the Academic Council, and, as previously mentioned, the University President's to the Academic Senate.

The initial response of the University to the charges made by Dr. Lechner, J. Edgar Hoover, and the press was disorganized and inconsistent. Numerous mis-statements, inaccurate in fact or in implication, were made by numerous people to numerous reporters. Thus defense of the topic (or lack of defense) ranged from Berkeley Supervisor Halverson's strong defense on the grounds of academic freedom and the actual effectiveness and truth of the topic, through Los Angeles Supervisor Everett Jones' weak defense on the grounds of "unfortunate wording" and the difficulty of making up three examinations each year without committing some errors, through Vice-Chancellor Hart's statistical defense (on the basis of the percentages previously cited) and recommendation that "in the future there should be tighter controls, to ...the Regents" apology.

Four days after the Vice-Chancellor's report to the University Vice-President, on February 19, 1960, the Board of Regents of the University of California publically apologized for examination topic number seven: "The Regents...deeply regret that an improper question appeared in the University's Subject A examination in May, 1959, that casts a reflection on the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Question has, of course, been withdrawn from use...and steps are being taken to prevent a recurrence of such a similar unfortunate incident." The Regents further assured the F.B.I. of "their highest respect as an essential arm of out nation's security and of the rule of law which is the keystone of our free (sic) democratic society." This statement by the Regents remained the official, public University of California answer to the charges of Dr. Lechner, J. Edgar Hoover, and the press. Soon after the Regents' statement was made, President Kerr made it known to the Subject A Department that no more copies of the examination in question were to be printed or sold to high schools and all remaining copies on hand were to be destroyed.

The Combined Committee on Subject A, chaired by Prof. James J. Lynch, in its report to the Academic Council, March 16, 1960, spoke as follows concerning the Regents' statement: "The combined Committee on Subject A is of the opinion that the recent action of the Board of Regents...threatens to abridge the freedom of the faculty by seriously weakening its right and the right of one of its agencies to ask questions which are deemed appropriate for the purposes which they are designed to serve. Specifically, (1) to denounce this topic as "improper" was to invite the inference that the question was on a topic not admissable in a Subject A examination; (2) to declare that the topic had been withdrawn was to suggest that the Regents themselves had with drawn the topic, whereas it, along with the other eleven topics on Form 59, was simply discarded by Subject A just as for obvious reasons, all examination topics are discarded once they have been used; ^[13]) to announce that steps would be taken to insure against the recurrence of such a topic was to suggest that academic subject matter is within the immediate area of competence of the Board of Regents and that it could direct the faculty to delete topics and questions which it, for non-academic reasons, considered unsuitable. The Committee, therefore, has not been convinced that the recent action of the Regents did not in fact weaken 'the moral and philosophic right of the examining faculty of this University.' " Thus the Combined Committee on Subject A of the Academic Senate made absolutely clear to the Academic Council (and therefore to President Kerr) what the Regents' statement implied in terms of academic freedom.

Five weeks after this report was made, on May 24, 1960, President Kerr made the final report on the Subject A "incident" to the Assembly of the Academic Senate, Northern Section. This report was made with the "unanimous approval" of the Academic Council; The Academic Senate itself took no action in regard to this report. The President's statements on the controversy (as opposed to his statements on the recodification of responsibility) are here reproduced in full; the italics are not President Kerr's.

1. Several individual faculty members, and the Committee on Subject A acting as group, have expressed the belief that the Regents" statement on the incident in some way encroached upon the Academic Senate's delegated responsibility for conditions of admission and courses of instruction. This misunderstanding is easily resolved; The Regents' action neither sought to impair, nor did it in fact impair, nor, in my judgement, should it be used as a reason to impair, the delegated authority of the Academic Senate. The Regents" action was an expression of their judgment rather than an exercise of authority, explicit or otherwise.

2. A few faculty members have suggested that, aside from the question of authority, the Regents should not have expressed a judgment on this sort of academic matter. I find myself in disagreement with this argument. The Regents are directly concerned with and deeply interested in the whole range of matters affecting the University. That they have delegated certain important areas of its administration to other authorities does not foreclose their right and even their obligation to make known their views on topics falling within such areas. Academic FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC RESPONSIBILITY MUST, for the furtherance of the University and its purposes, be exercised by the Regents as well as by the faculty, the administration, and the students.

CONCLUSIONS...

2. In regretting the use of this question, The Regents did not abrogate the responsibility they have delegated to the Academic Senate for determining conditions of admission and for courses of instruction. The Academic Council concurs unanimously in this conclusion.

It would seem that the theoretical basis for President Kerr's conclusions is extremely tenuous; in practise, the President's statements have been proven entirely wrong. The Regents' action and the University's reaction to the Subject A controversy as a whole have quite definitely "impaired" the academic freedom of the Subject A department. The making up of Subject A examination questions is now seriously hindered by the realization that the Combined Subject A Committee will have to reject all truly controversial questions, out of fear of provoking another Subject A controversy, facing another administration investigation, and having to hear another Regents' apology.

(title for purposes of identification only; no statement in this report should be taken to represent an official codification of the point of view of the Subject A Department.)

Appendix on the University's Responsiveness to Internal Pressure

The Fight Against Compulsory R.O.T.C.

The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 gave lands to the states, the sale of which would provide funds to maintain state colleges. It required that courses in mechanics, agriculture and military tactics be offered. The latter was inserted parenthetically and did not actually appear in the original act.^[(1)] Nevertheless, the Morrill Act provided the foundation for compulsory ROTC—although stipulating that military training be offered, not necessarily required. The State Organic Act or 1868, however, made ROTC compulsory at the University of California. In 1918, the situation was changed again when an amendment to the state Constitution put the responsibility for such matters into the hands of a Board of Regents—where it remains today. ^[(2)]

Protests against compulsory ROTC took place intermittently after its inception in 1862. Student referendums and demonstrations, faculty and administration committees, and Defense Department decisions contributed to a reversal in University policy that was finally instituted in 1962. The sequence of events which led to this 1962 decision began with a student referendum in the winter of 1956.

A Committee for Voluntary ROTC was formed in the first week of December, 1956. Its purpose was to effect the passage of a referendum calling for voluntary ROTC. ^[(3)] The Committee, headed by Hank di Suvero, immediately ran into difficulties. That week, the administration refused them permisaion to pass out a leaflet which advocated voluntary ROTC. The Dean of Students (Stone) said that it would litter the campus and burden the janitorial staff. He later changed his stand, stating that the leaflet was neither an official piece of University literature nor something endorsed by the ASUC, and, therefore, it would need the sanction of the Executive Committee of the ASUC (now known as the ASUC Senate). Di Suvero took his case to Ex Com asking that it support the distribution of leaflets presenting either side of the issue. Ex Com turned down di Suvero's request by a 8-6 vote. ^[(4)]

The Administration's ruling on the distribution of ROTC literature did not prevent, however, the Military Department's distribution of pro-compulsory ROTC pamphlets in all of its classes. ^[(5)] Among other interesting developments was a Student Civil Liberties Union sponsored debate pitting two members of the Military Science Department against di Suvero and a professor of Philosophy, Edward R. Strong. Previously, with Strong as chairman, the faculty Committee on Educational Policy had put itself on record as opposing compulsory ROTC. The SCLU had also issued a statement at this time criticizing the loyalty oath requirements of the ROTC program. Those who strongly objected to loyalty oaths were thus barred from entering U.C. as freshmen. ^[(6)]

In spite of the Dean's ruling, on December 10 leaflets were distributed, but off-campus. ^[(7)] The referendum with only men students voting passed—1,591 to 715. ^[(8)] The passing of the referendum marks the beginning of a five and a half year fight. In the spring semester of 1957, Ex Com could not decide how the results of the referendum should be presented to the Regents. Imitating the administration's methods, it set up a committee headed by Roger Muldavin to work out this problem. ^[(9)] In late 1957, the Regents finally received the referendum and promptly responded by referring it to their Committee on Educational Policy for study. ^[(10)]

A bit of history is quite relevant here. For this is not the first time the Regents were confronted with the ROTC question as their referring it for study might suggest.

After the referendum of December, 1956 and the subsequent events of early 1957, from the fall of 1957 to the fall of 1959 the issue lay dormant in the hands of the Regents in Committee. In this period, the faculty Committee on Educational Policy condemned compulsory ROTC as "wasteful and inequitable". ^[(16)] The most significant event of the period was the publication of the Lyons and Masland report on the ROTC (1959). This report was generally recognized as a thorough and competent study of the problem. ^[(17)] The authors concluded that the compulsory program was costing more than it was worth and that a voluntary program (1) more than met the needs of national defense and (2) would produce more qualified officers with a higher morale. ^[(18)] (In February, 1960 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Charles C. Finucane, concurred with the Lyons-Masland report, and went on record as favoring "freedom of choice" when land grant colleges were confronted with the issue of whether or not to have compulsory ROTC. ^[(19)] )

In the fall of 1959, action on the issue was revived by the students. ASUC President, David Armor, announced that he was going to write to student body presidents of all land grant colleges in the United States to solicit opinions and suggestions for obtaining voluntary ROTC. ^[(20)] A week later, Assemblyman Nicholas Petris (Dem-Oakland) in an interview suggested ways in which the State Legislature might handle the issue. ^[(21)] Then, at 7:45 A.M., Monday, October-19, 1959, an entering Freshman from Virginia walked onto the steps of Sproul Hall (the administration building) with a two-page statement, a petition, and a home-made sign that read: "Non-Compulsory ROTC. This seven day fast is undertaken to express my belief that the University of California should respect conscience." This was Fred Moore. His statement read in part:

...I filed an exemption form asking to be excused from the military requirements. I gave as my reason: I am a conscientious objector...I object to killing and any action aiding war or the purpose of war due to my religious and conscientious beliefs. It was rejected...I went to the Dean of Students' Office and explained my reasons for not wanting to take ROTC. They showed me a list stating the exemptions. My case did not fall under any of the exemptions. (Exemptions were: physical disability, previous military training or service, or foreign citizenship...) The Dean of Students made it quite clear that I either sign up and take ROTC, or withdraw from the University. Through fasting for seven days, I hope to help bring about action which will result in a provision making the ROTC voluntary or exempting students who cannot participate in military training due to their religious and conscientious beliefs. This fast is undertaken to show my earnestness concerning the problem."

At 10:30, Moore was handed a message saying that Dean of Students, William Shepard, would like to see him. He returned at 11:15 saying that he made a call to his mother who was very upset. Then to a student reporter, he stated: "If I am forced to leave my place on the Sproul Hall steps, it will be because of circumstances beyond my control and not because my convictions have altered or changed." Moore also said that he was not a member of any organized religion or political party. About his father who was an Air Force Colonel, he said: "My father knows about this and does not approve. I am not doing this to hurt him...we just do not agree about the purpose of the military." ^[(22)]

Moore's fast lasted two days and two nights, and his petition had 1,300 signatures. His father then accompanied him to his Arlington, Virginia home. The father's comment on his son's actions may well be headed by our educators: "This is his business; I have raised my children to make their own decisions."^[(23)]

Moore's fast had permanent effects. The fact that his father was an Air Force Colonel gave the story national news coverage. The San Francisco Chronicle in an editorial came out against compulsory ROTC. So did Governor Brown on October 27.^[(24)] More important was the fact that at the Regents' meeting on October 23, Kerr appointed a faculty committee headed by Robert Brode to do a study for a possible change in the ROTC program. The report was to be sent to the Department of Defense and if the latter made no recommendations within a reasonable amount of time, Kerr would submit the matter to the Regents.^[(25)]

The dispute simmered for a few months until SLATE announced on February 5, 1960 that it would put out a petition calling for the end of ROTC and the petition would go to Governor Brown.^[(26)] By the end of February, 3,000 students had signed the petition on the Berkeley campus.^[(27)] Meanwhile, the Department of Defense announced that it was up to the universities whether or not they would have compulsory ROTC. The Department of the Army, however, desired that ROTC be compulsory. ^[(28)] On March 16, the SLATE petition with 7,000 signatures of Cal and UCLA students was presented to Governor Brown.^[(29)]

The ROTC dispute had become worthy once again of national news coverage. On March 29, NBC asked permission of the Administration to film the various views prevalent on campus about the ROTC. The request was made on Tuesday, and an answer desired by Friday. Deans Shepard, Sheriffs, Silar, and Wilkes met and announced that "the University has not enough time to reach a decision." ^[(30)] But they had had time; the decision not to make a decision in effect denied permission.

Finally, the Brode Committee submitted its report for the April Regents' meeting. At that meeting, three student body presidents from the University of California (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Davis) argued for voluntary ROTC. One argued against (Santa Barbara). Then Kerr presented the Status Report on the ROTC. This said that no final decision on ROTC could be reached until after a meeting between representatives of U.C. and some forty other leading universities with officials from the Department of Defense (Navy, Army and Air Force). (NB: This is two months after the Department of Defense had recommended that the universities decide.) ^[(31)] This meeting was scheduled for the summer at Ohio State University. Before this meeting took place, Kerr and university officials knew that the Department of Defense, Navy and Air Force were for voluntery ROTC while the Army was strongly opposed. After the summer meeting, their views remained unchanged. ^[(32)] There was no word about compulsory ROTC from the Regents or Kerr until October. On October 13, the Daily Cal quoted Regent Naffziger: "The issue (ROTC) could have been decided a month ago—simple procrastination." ^[(33)] But at the Regents Meeting of October 17, ROTC was not discussed; instead, Proposition 4, calling for more funds for schools, was endorsed. ^[(34)] Unfortunately, the Regents were sidetracked by a political issue. In any case, it now appeared that Kerr had changed his stand. Defense Department approval was no longer sufficient; the recalcitrant Army had to conour. ^[(35)]

After the Regents had ignored the ROTC issue for several months, SLATE decided to picket in front of ROTC drill field on the day befors the December 1961 meeting of the Regents. ^[(36)] SLATE, like Fred Moore, wanted to impress upon the Regents the urgency of the problem. And, as in Moore's case, SLATE had used all accepted channels of communication. Direct action, as Moore's, appeared to be the only way to make the Regents appreciate students' rights and students' desires. Jim Creighton, the chairman of the SLATE committee on ROTC, assured the administration that the demonstration would be conducted in an orderly fashion and not disrupt classes. ^[(38)] Nevertheless, the head of the Department of Military Science, Colonel Malloy, warned that: "If I or any of my staff find anyone picketing in uniform, that student may find it very difficult to pass the course." ^[(39)] In spite of this threat, of the fifty to seventy pickets, five including Creighton wore uniforms. ^[(40)]

The next day, the Regents decided to discuss ROTC. In one positive action, they voted to allow student exemptions from the ROTC on the same basis as non-student exemptions are allowed in selective service regulations. Conscientious objectors, for the first time, could register as Freshmen at U.C. The Regents still refused to act on the main issue: voluntary ROTC. They gave as their reason the Kennedy administration's plan to reorganize the Department of Defense, and consequently the role of the ROTC in the nation's military needs. The Regents requested Kerr to report no later than spring 1962 on Kennedy's reappraisal. Kerr said that the Board of Regents hoped the reappraisal would result in a unified stand by all the services, and that it was now faced with conflicting advice from the Department of Defense and Army. The Army had stated that it "cannot meet its quantitative or qualitative officer requirements from the ROTC without the currently required basic course." ^[(41)] This was in conflict with the Lyons-Masland report, statements by the Department of Defense, and the findings of a U.C. faculty committee. Apparently the Regents were waiting for the new administration to coerce the Army into agreeing with the Department of Defense. (It is anyone's guess why the Regents awaited Army approval. They already had positive response from the rest of the Armed Services, faculty, students and independent studies.)

At the end of the semester, Creighton received an F grade. The grade in ROTC is based on point totals from classroom work and merits or demerits assessed on the drill field. Honor student Creigton was not allowed to look at his total. It was soon revealed that Creigton's instructors (Gray and Mann) after conference with Colonel Malloy, had given him 100 demerits for picketing in uniform—thus lowering his grade from a B to an F. Creighton petitioned the Academic Senate to have his grade changed from an F to a B on the grounds that the grade was punitive. ^[(42)] Professor Jacobus ten Broek took up his case in the Academic Senate. He argued that when the Department of Military Science was established, it was specifically required that the program be conducted in accord with "insitutional rules, regulations, and customs". ^[(43)] For example, a Military Science instructor is, with respect to the student an instructor and not an officer, and that grades cannot be used as a tool of punishment. On the other hand, Malloy argued that Creighton had violated an ROTC regulation: "The uniform will be worn with dignity and honor at all times. It will never be worn under conditions that can bring disgrace or dishonor to the individual or the Service. It must never be associated with any controversial or independent organization, but will represent the United States Government Department to which it belongs." ^[(44)] There is an obvious conflict in the two positions.

The real issue was whether or not the Academic Senate would exercise its authority to make the Department of Military Science adhere to the common procedures of teaching and grading. A committee was set up to handle Creighton's petition after a warning by Dean Shepard that the Academic Senate should be cautious about condemning any Department. ^[(45)]

Eight months later in October, 1961, the Committee gave its report to the Academic Senate. Ten Broek then made two motions: first, to change Creighton's grade from an F to a B, and second, to investigate the grading policies of the Military Science Department in order to bring it into conformity with the "rules, regulations, and customs" of the University of California. ^[(46)] The Academic ^[(47)] Senate defeated the first motion 143-80, and the second motion 112-87. In connection with this refusal of the Academic Senate it is interesting to note the letter of the Head of the ROTC Lt. Col. Edward A. Owsley to Ernest Besig of the American Civil Liberties Union back in January of that year. This letter as much as confirmed that the grade given Creighton was punitive. "Because we are so firmly convinced that the basic course (ROTC) should be required, the Army views with great concern the endeavor of a vocal minority to induce educational institutions to adopt an elective ROTC course. Accordingly, we must adopt counter-measures and make our position clear regarding this program." ^[(48)]

By the summer of 1961, the Department of the Army had finally agreed with the Departments of Defense. Navy and Air Force that the university should determine whether or not to have compulsory ROTC. With this, ROTC became voluntary at Michigan State, Ohio State, and Washington State, but not at U.C.

After two more Ex Com votes to request voluntary ROTC from the Regents (on October 25, 1961 and March 7, 1962), it was rumored that Kerr in the May meeting of the Regents in 1962 would ask for voluntary ROTC. ^[(49)] At that meeting, Kerr recommended abolishing the entire lower division ROTC program, and offering only a voluntary two-year upper division program. The Regents postponed action on the recommendation for a month of study! ^[(50)]

Then, on June 29, 1962, in Los Angeles the Regents voted to end compulsory ROTC, beginning with the fall semester of 1962. The Regents said that the Defense Department advised them that "compuleory basic ROTC was not needed to meet quality standards nor to produce numbers of officers required." Kerr stated that the action was taken "responsive to student petitions", but added that the proposal had confronted the Regents since 1877. ^[(51)] On the 19th of September, 1962, the Chairman of the Military Science Department said that ROTC enrollment had declined 90%. ^[(52)]

The struggle against compulsory ROTC was conducted in a number of ways. Students made full use of formal channels of communication with the administration: referendums, petitions, and student government resolutions. The administration did not respond in a sincere way—it procrastinated in reaction to outside pressure, and sometimes harassed the students by preventing them from presenting their point of view freely. Two instances of direct action the Moore and Creighton cases) spurred the Administration to action—i.e. got the issue out of committees. But when there was a lull in student activity, the issues were again buried. This was a sad and sometimes ludicrous story. Its moral is clear.

Bibliography

(1) Militarizing Our Youth, Roswell P. Barnes, New York, 1927.

(2) Daily Californian, from 1956 to 1962.

(3) Minutes of Regents meetings (located in University Hall).

(4) Education And Military Leadership, Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Princeton, 1959.

(5) The Campus Protest Against ROTC, Allan Brick, Dartmouth, 1960.

(6) Student, David Horowitz, Ballentine, 1962.

(7) The Creighton Petition and The Creighton Case, Jacobus ten Broek (in files of Ken Cloke).

Appendix on Communications

Daily Cal—Part I, 1947-1960

Since its founding many years ago, the Daily Cal has been the battle-ground between the various power-groups on campus who "wished to achieve editorial harmony," This is a chronicle of some of those battles.

From 1947 to 1960, there was a fundamental disagreement between the Executive Committee of the ASUC and the Daily Californian staff concerning the freedom of the Daily Californian to print what it wanted to, The Daily Californian felt that its duty was to keep the students informed regardless of the interests of the Administration, The Executive Committee, an the other hand, felt that the good name of the University should be preserved by not discussing particularly controversial issues, Further, the Executive Committee thought there should be harmony between itself and the Daily Californian. The Daily Californian did not think this desirable: a good newspaper, it believed, should not be controlled by its government and should criticize it when necessary.

The most feasible way for the Executive Committee to achieve harmony was to control the Daily Californian directly, The Executive Committee usually argued that it was the publisher and therefore should have a say in running the paper. It made several attempts to bring about control.

The first attempt that we will deal with was in 1947, when an Advisory Board of the Executive Committee was created by the Executive Committee. The stated purpose of the Advisory Board was to achieve "free discussion and exchange of views on the editorial and news policies of the Daily Californian." (Some of the quotations from the Daily Californian in the introductory part of this report have not been specifically documented.) The Daily Cal replied that an "advisory" body would mean tighter control and not "advice and discussion." A fight ensued which the Daily Cal apparently won since there was no further mention of an advisory board. The Daily Californian made a comment on March 12, 1947. "The right of expression by the editor and the staff has been challenged, but it has always been upheld."

On September 28, 1950, "the A.C.P. (Associated College Press) announced its ratings for the spring semester, 1950. The Daily Californian again received the highest possible rating, All-American, and the highest numerical score it has ever received." (Daily Cal, Sept. 28, 1950.)

Then on December 15, 1950 the Daily Cal man an indictment of the ASUC and particularly of the Executive Committee, concerning a closed session it held with only technical justification. In truth the closed session was in violation of the ASUC constitution. Then a complaint was lodged with the Judicial Committee on Friday against the Daily Cal. "Acting on a subsequent tip, we the Daily Cal tried with singular unsuccess to discover just what the charge against the Daily Cal was and whether we were supposed to attend the preliminary hearing scheduled for the next day, a Saturday. No statement of the charge or request to appear was ever delivered to the editor of the Daily Cal. But the meeting was held." (DC, Dec. 15, 1950). The result became apparent on January 15, 1951: "A resolution aimed at strengthening the position of the ASUC Executive Committee over the Daily Californian was tabled by the committee at its meeting last night.

"...the resolution called for an advisory board and an advisor for the Daily Cal.

"The advisory board would be appointed by President Robert Gordon Sproul and composed of members of the ASUC, the Daily Cal Staff, faculty, administration and alumni.

"In speaking against the consideration of the resolution Alva Senzek, Daily Cal editor, said that it 'would appear that the committee had all semester long to work out this resolution, and that its presentation last night was extremely well-timed' [in view of the pending appointments].

"She said that Sproul had that afternoon the Friday before requested Executive Committee to give the Daily Cal the opportunity to initiate the action itself.

"(President Sproul has been instructed to present a report on the Daily Cal at the next meeting of the Board of Regents, to be held Friday, January 25, in San Francisco)." The Executive Committee explained they had taken the action of proposing an advisory board because," it was then, and is now, our firm belief that positive, immediate and constructive action on the part of our student government was necessary to avert even more stringent action by the Regents at their impending meeting..." (Daily Cal, Jan. 15, 1951).

The purpose of the board was "to advise the Daily Cal in its over-all and day-to-day operations and procedures, and: ...to meet regularly throughout the school year providing a source of representative opinion as to the over-all content and effect of the Daily Cal. They then claimed that they would have no control over the Daily Cal. The Daily Cal's reaction was to print a front page editorial in which the staff of the Daily Cal urged the Executive Committee to rescind completely its resolution of January 16 setting up an advisory board and advisor for the Daily Cal. "...In our view the Executive Committee does not have the right to legislate over the policies of the Daily Cal." The Executive Committee did not listen to the Daily Cal, nor did it heed a petition signed by a great number of students (approximately 5000) condemning its action.

On April 10, 1952, the Executive Committee's power over the Daily Californian was affirmed. Dick Holler wrote, "ASUC Executive Committee has the power to control the editorial and other policies of the Daily Cal, according to a constitutional interpretation by Edward L. Barrett, Jr., President's designate at the Boalt Law School" (Daily Cal, April 11, 1952).

A third attempt to control the Daily Cal was made in 1960 at the Ex-Com Summer Retreat and a fourth attempt in November of 1962. These will be mentioned later.

There are no specific statements of editorial policy before the strike of 1960, but there are some interesting patterns. After the Daily Cal had won its battles of 1947, its editorials became consistently more inflammatory. On March 1, 1948, for example, an editorial was written entitled "Are You a Communist?." The editor felt that in certain cases this question could destroy the framework of our civil liberties." In the fall of 1948, the Daily Cal advocated picketing by the students for fair student wages and declared that this was one of their rights. Again, on October 15, 1948, an editorial came out strongly against the Berkeley City Council because the Council issued the San Francisco Chronicle a permit to set up two tables on Shattuck Avenue. According to the editor, this was a complete reversal of their stand of the previous spring when they refused permits to students who wanted to set up tables at Sather Gate. The editor urged the students to reapply for permits. Subsequent editorials followed this issue, publishing the discriminatory practices encountered by these groups (e.g., October 20, 1948).

As already indicated, the paper frequently attacked the Executive Committee during 1950-51. It advocated free speech for everyone, including Communists, and condemned HUAC very strongly. The Daily Californian was then stifled by the Advisory Board, and controversial editorials did not begin to appear again with any frequency until the end of the spring of 1956.

One of the first strongly critical editorials appeared on April 13, 1956. It discussed the fact that a Professor Jayne had not had his contract renewed by the University administration. Jayne accepted a post at the University of Virginia. The editor felt that this was Virginia's gain and the University's loss, because Jayne was well known as a competent and popular instructor. Jayne was writing two books at the time. The editor noted some rumors that the administration felt Jayne to be too liberal, both in general and in his criticism of the university.

Following this editorial, a highly sarcastic article appeared on May 1, 1956 entitled "The New Order". The editor said that U.C.L.A. now had a more expedient government—no dissenters, no differences, and no democracy. He concluded that the Student Government existed for the administration.

From 1956 the editorials generally became more liberal and tended to discuss controversial issues fairly frequently. Attacks on the Executive Committee became stronger. The fight against the Communist Speaker Ban developed, as did the argument against compulsory ROTC. HUAC was described in highly critical terms. This went on until, in 1960, the Executive Committee squashed the Daily Californian. It has not yet recovered.

Daily Cal—Part II: The Strike of 1960

On the evening of October 23, 1960, Daniel Ben Silver, editor of the Daily Californian, read before the Executive Committee of the ASUC the following:

Student journalism, as we see it, is only a valid endeavor if it is carried on in accord with the principles and methods which characterize journalistic activity. These include the journalist's control over the technical and news policy of the paper and complete, unrestricted editorial expression. We believe in the definition of journalistic activities in these areas in terms of standards of journalistic ethics and competence. We have had a structure and by-laws which insured these rights within the limits of responsibility, to standards serving the interests of the entire university community. . . . We have complete faith in our ability and competence and in our willingness to correct our own mistakes.

The by-laws have now been changed in such a manner that we feel they are incompatible with the best interests of the University community and with the concepts of journalism which have motivated us as students to participate in the effort to produce the Daily Californian. Therefore, we, the undersigned, tender our resignations effective 8 a.m. Monday, October 24, 1960. (Daily Cal, Oct. 24, 1960)

The resignation was signed by 56 of the 58 members of the editorial staff, including the entire Senior editorial board.

This event was the climax of a series of events which continue to the present and which began in the spring of 1960. At that time, the Senior Editorial Board, which is the editorial policy-setting group of the Daily Cal, was headed by Anne Ruggeri, editor, and Daniel Silver, assistant editor. The general editorial policies of this board endorsed coverage of many "outside" events. Much of the front page was spent in covering the issue of compulsory ROTC, the execution of Chessman, and the HUAC hearings, and the editorial page many times reinforced these issues with editorials. These generally asked for student action and very often called upon the Ex-Com to take an official position.

These editorials were a source of irritation for many groups on campus. The Administration was harrassed by the Burns Committee of the State Legislature (the Senate Committee on Un-American Activities) which cited the Daily Cal as being partially responsible for the HUAC demonstrations of May, 1960.

The administration was not the only organization to feel pressure because of the Daily Cal. The Ex-Com felt pressure from the Daily Cal on one side and the administration on the other side concerning the Leon Koch case.

Leon Koch was fired by the University of Illinois for writing a letter to the editor of the college's newspaper, The Daily Illini, advocating pre-marital sexual relations. (See appendix on ASUC and the Kerr Directives.) The Daily Cal joined in the students protest against this action and urged the Ex- Com to issue a statement condemning the University of Illinois administration for their action.

In response to this, Ex-Com, under the leadership of its president, Dave Armour, a Slate member, passed a strong resolution of condemnation. They did this in spite of the fact that the administration representative on Ex-Com stated that such a resolution would be in violation of the Kerr directives.

Two attempts were made by students through the student J-Com to nullify the resolution, and twice J-Com upheld the Executive Committee. Throughout the J-Com hearings, the Daily Cal carried articles and editorials supporting the Ex-Com action and calling for it not to back down. Then, on May 13, 1960, Chancellor Seaborg sent a letter to the President of the University of Illinois stating that Ex-Com had no right under the Kerr directives to pass such a resolution or "to speak for the Student Body."

The Ex-Com was greatly embarrassed by this series of events and tended to blame the Daily Cal for its problems. The result of this was demonstrated in an ordinary budgetary meeting on May 17, 1960. Although it occurred at executive session, or closed meeting, it is chronicled in an editorial appearing in the Daily Cal, May, 19, 1960. The editorial was written by Anne Ruggeri, Daily Cal editor, who was a non-voting member of Ex-Com ex-officio. The editorial began: "The ASUC Executive Committee held a 'star-chamber' hearing Tuesday night May 17.' There was an attempt to remove the editor-elect, Dan Silver, and certain of his assistants from office "on the grounds that their philosophies on news coverage and policies were producing an underemphasis of ASUC activity news and giving preference to so-called off campus issues. . . The committee also maintained that they as publishers of the Daily Cal had the right to fire any staff member who did not follow a pro-ASUC activities policy. . . The editors maintained that. . .under no circumstances would they allow the Ex- Com to dictate the Daily Cal's news policy. The entire staff would resign before allowing Ex-Com to take over the paper in such a manner, the editors said." Finally, "the committee voted unanimously to retain them in office because 'the editors obviously backed down and decided to agree with the committee' in the words of one committee member."

The next event concerning the Daily Cal took place at Ex-Com's summer retreat. It called for changes in the by-laws and editor Dan Silver agreed. They also agreed to set up a Consultative board for the paper which was to have "all responsibilities for the proper operation of the Daily Californian editorial division." Ex-Com retained the right to "reject the appointments of editor, managing editor, assistant editor, and city editor and require a new list of appointments from the Senior Editorial Board." This proposal was later accepted by the administration's Committee on Student Affairs, subject to review in the Spring of 1961.

In the fall of 1960, the Daily Cal continued its strong editorials against compulsory ROTC, the Kerr Directives, and the HUAC. As the ASUC elections were approaching, the main editorial theme switched to the Ex-Com and the up-coming elections. Then on Friday, October 14, 1960, the day before elections, the following editorial appeared:

The Daily Californian Senior Editorial Board endorses the candidacy of Michael Tigar for ASUC Representative-at-large. We are taking this unusual and unprecedented stand because we feel the future of student government on this campus is the issue in the present campaign. The present Executive Committee and the administration have made clear their complete disavowal of any student governmental voice in matters other than the distribution of ASUC funds and the management of the activities program. If this is allowed to continue, the students at this campus will be completely divested of any voice in pertinent issues whether on or off-campus. Tigar is the only candidate whose election to Executive Committee can stem this trend. ...

Following the editorial, for a period of about one week, there was little indication that any action would be taken against the Senior Editorial Board for its unusual stand. Mike Tigar reported, however, that in an unofficial encounter with Alex Sherriffs, "Sherriffs was livid and said that something would have to be done about this [the Daily Cal editorial supporting Tigar]."

Then, on Friday, October 21, George Link, ASUC President, called a meeting for the purpose of considering the suspension of the by-laws of the Daily Californian and the suspension of the Senior Editorial Board. That this was a very sudden move by the Ex-Com is evidenced by the fact that only the editor of the paper, Silver, was notified of the meeting, and this notification took place only one and a half hours before the scheduled time of the meeting (according to Joel Brewer, Ex-Com reporter for the Daily Cal and good friend of Dan Silver's).

When the meeting had been convened, motions were presented to suspend the by-laws and to suspend the editors. For the purpose of discussing personnel matters, it was necessary to go into executive session. During a caucus on this question, Dan Silver obtained an injunction from J-Com to stop the meeting. The Daily Cal of October 24, 1960 reported:

The injunction will continue in effect until Ex-Com meets the minimum standards outlined by J-Com. The minimum standards listed in the decision require: (1) that notification of a hearing be given the defendants at least three days prior to the hearing; (2) that such notification be in writing and delivered in person to each defendant; (3) that such notification state that the defendants are being called to a hearing; (4) And that the notification include a list of charges against the defendants. These minimum standards were not met in the Ex-Com hearing, the decision stated.

The same Daily Cal article goes on to desoribe the actual meeting:

In presenting the motion to suspend the Daily Cal's by-laws, ASUC Vice-President Don Alves said that the by-laws were inadequate to prevent the newspaper from being irresponsible. Alves cited the Daily Cal's endorsement of an ASUC candidate for representative-at-large and a front page story on elections violations appearing in the Oct. 18 issue of the Daily Cal as specific examples of the newspaper's irresponsibility. Daily Cal by-laws direct that, " Daily Californian editorials will state no preference for a candidate for national, state, county, city, or ASUC office without a special seven to three vote of the senior editorial board." All nine members of the board endorsed the editorial which Alves criticized. There was 'a moral trust involved' when Ex-Com approved this section of the by-laws, Alves said, that no ASUC candidate would be endorsed. Editor Silver said that he and the members of the senior editorial board feel that the by-laws contain no 'mysterious moral obligation' and must be accepted at face value. ...

Upon presentation of the J-Com injunction, the illegal meeting was disbanded and no further action was taken until Sunday, October 23. This meeting was described by the Daily Cal as follows:

The meeting was called to discuss revision of the Daily Californian editorial staff's by-laws. Dan Silver, Daily Cal editor, first read a statement of the newspaper's board and staff that said the present by-laws are satisfactory for a student newspaper (responsible to standards of journalistic ethics insuring the best service to the entire University community.) The staff resigned on these grounds.

Over 100 graduate students signed a petition to the Chancellor to stop all discussion by Ex-Com of the Daily Cal until the committee be 'augmented by a representation of graduate students proportionate to the number of graduate subscribers.' [Daily Cal subscriptions are a compulsory part of the graduate student fee]

Ex-Com passed Article I of a motion which said in part, Ex-Com has "final authority with respect to the supervision and direction of its [Daily Cal's] affairs, policy, and conduct."

The editor claimed the article was in violation of the Kerr Directives. William Shepard, Dean of Students, concurred with Silver...the following amendment to Article II was moved: Positions on Senior Editorial Board will be open to application from any undergraduate. Silver objected that this was 'completely unacceptable to the Daily Californian staff and principles of journalism because it destroys the principle of editorial positions being based on journalistic competence and previous Daily Cal experience.' Upon passage of the amendment, Silver read the resignations.

It should be noted here that the resignations had been intimated the previous spring in the "Star-chamber" session, and, further, that Shepard withdrew his position on Article I the next day. It is also of note that the new by-laws were rescinded after the resignations.

Dan Silver expressed his position in the Daily Cal of October 24:

We the Senior Editorial Board and staff of the Daily Californian announce our resignation. We have taken this drastic and far reaching step not to preserve an 'inbred single philosophy' or to promote a political aim. We have resigned in an effort to preserve the principle of free, valid and responsible student journalism on this campus. We as journalists responsible to the best interests of the University community could not in good conscience publish a newspaper under the ridiculous and odious provisions approved by Executive Committee last night. ...

Ex-Com's position was as follows:

The student body of the University of California has delegated the responsibility of publishing the Daily Californian to the Executive Committee...As publishers we have acted to insure that the paper will be more responsible to the student body at large...a careful examination of the former by-laws has shown that they do not adequately define the position of your campus newspaper...we wish to make it clear that no attempt is being made to restrict or control editorial opinion....It is...recognized that there is only one philosophy toward student government and current events on the staff. We feel that this is the result of the staff selection procedures as provided by the old by-laws....Again, we are taking these actions to provide a more responsible student press...

An editorial on the controversy appeared in the Michigan Daily, at the University of Michigan, Saturday, October 29, 1960.

...There was a day on the Coast last summer, when at the hospitable request of Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs Alex Sherriffs, I discussed students at Cal and Michigan. Sherriffs told me of a campus political party on his campus 'with liberal ends but illiberal methods' which had somehow permeated the other student activities, such as the student government and especially the Daily Californian. (There were no Slate members on the Senior Editorial Board). He talked of 'fixing things up' even if it required 'stepping right'. He was worried about what he called a necessity to 'let students run for a while and if they happen to go too far, drop the axe.' Even at that day, the student situation was horribly confused: the political party assumed the Cal administration was absolutely not to be trusted, the student government assumed everything the administration ordered it to assume, and the student newspaper justifiably wondered where the next calamity would occur. All the while, Sherriffs talked of his plan to oreate a control board for the Daily Cal, a board that would eventually be designed 'to protect its freedom'. First, though, the editors of the paper would have to turn their attention back to campus activities instead of 'off-campus' issues like disarmament, or like the nearby Caryl Chessman execution or the student-police melee across the Bay in San Francisco. Then, according to Sherriffs, the paper would have to learn to do a better job of recruiting, since its staffs were not only too small, but imbued with 'the same liberal philosophy.' Then, he suggested, the paper would be in shape to be really free.

The Daily Cal—Part III: The Independent Californian

As a reaction to the change in by-laws by the Executive Committee of the ASUC, The Independent Californian was formed on October 25, 1960. The by-laws of the new paper were the same as those of the Daily Cal before the resignations.

The Independent Californian received very little support of either a financial or a moral nature. The first day they published three thousand copies of four pages, selling at ten cents a copy; on the second day, it was five cents. Subscriptions were sold to undergratduates and graduates at $1.75 for the remainder of the semester. Faculty and graduate students who held teacher's assistantships were charged $2.00 for the rest of the semester. As of November 8,1960, three hundred and fifty subscriptions had been sold. Advertising rates of $1.10 per column inch for non-political ads and $1.50 for political ads brought in $34.71 per day. Approximately a thousand issues were sold on the street, bringing in about $50. Therefore, about $150 to $160 were brought in daily. The total expenses were about $200 to $210, so the paper lost about $50 a day.

Moral support varied. There was a lot of outside support. Rich Harcourt, editor of the Foghorn, University of San Francisco's paper, offered to incorporate the Independent Cal in their issue of November 9, 1960, but was prohibited from doing so by the University of San Francisco administration. Harcourt took a leave of absence from his paper in order to help the Independent Cal. Dan O'Donnell, editor of the University of Nevada's paper, the Sagebrush, also came to California to help it. Tom Hayden, editor of the Michigan Daily, kept a reporter calling to find out what was happening. Even the Daily Californian requested support for the Independent Cal in an editorial on November 11, 1960.

As was to be expected, most of the coverage went to the Executive Committee-Daily Cal dispute. The new newspaper also devoted what space it could to speakers on campus, lectures, some entertainment, editorials, and a sports page. There was very little advertising. Even though the Independent Californian was limited to four pages, it included some things that the Daily Cal neglected to mention. For example, the Daily Californian did not say that "William Shepard, Executive Committee Chancellors representative agreed with Silver "that giving Ex-Com complete control over the Daily Cal policies was in violation of the Kerr directives. It also did not mention that Chancellor Seaborg washed his hands of the affair. Due to the fact that the new volunteer staff on the Daily Cal was inexperienced, the coverage in the Independent Californian was superior.

The Independent Californian failed for several reasons. The two most obvious causes were lack of money and lack of time. The financial problem has already been discussed. As for time, the former editorial staff had to take on the business end of running a paper as well. It was a full time job and impossible for students to keep up.

Daily Cal—Part IV: 1960-1964

Following the strike, the Daily Cal was inclined to favor the policies of the Administration and the Executive Committee rather than take issue with them. The difference between pre-strike and post-strike periods can be pointed up to some extent by comparing editorials on the same subject before and after, as well as by citing editorial comments after the strike.

On September 20, 1960, there was an editorial on ROTC which said "Compulsory ROTC is the severest lapse in the record of this University as an institution of high intellectual calibre." On January 5, 1961, an editorial said, "Yet we still do not find this a good reason to eliminate the present program (compulsory ROTC), rather we feel that it is time to redesign and readress the program to make it valuable in today's student world." This in essence was the administration's stand. Concerning the History and Institutions Examination, we find this attitude on September 26, 1960: Once again signups are being taken for the History and Institutions examinations, and once again we would like to object to these tests. The contrary opinion appeared on February 14, 1961: The Daily Californian urges you to vote for the continuance of the History and Institutions test. "Some other editorials identifying the line that the new Daily Cal was following were these: On March 24, 1961," The masquerading Communists, in the guise of persecuted underdogs, have taken a foothold at the University of California...These Liberals don't realize the freedom of Communist theory or practice on this campus is being upheld by our Administration. The University simply asks that Communism throw back its ignominious shield of unidentity so students needn't fear being misled by a Communist-inspired trap."

On October 31, 1961, an editorial concerning the nuclear protest vigil stimulated by the Soviet explosion of the 50 megaton bomb read in part: "En toto the vigil has basically good intentions, but the time could be used better to investigate possibilities of effecting a reasonable arms control rather than using the vigil as another instance in Slate's long history of attacking the University administration."

The emphasis of the paper shifted from covering lectures and controversial topics to entertainment, social events, and engagements. In doing so, it began to appeal to the fraternity and sorority groups primarily, something the old Daily Cal had not done. This can be shown in miniature by looking at the Cal Memo. The old Cal emphasized meetings of the Young Republicans, the Student Civil Liberties Union, the Pre-med society, and allied groups. The new Cal had announcements predominantly by and to the Greeks, for example, Alpha Ph1 Omega, Delta Phi Epsilon, the Oski Dolls.

Leaders of campus political groups feel that the present Daily Californian has had a consistent record of discrimination against political groups. Pam Horner, of the CCR, reports that the Daily Cal has not published any of the three articles in the paper which she submitted for her organization and does not announce meetings or print "memos" consistently. She also complained that she, as President of Students for Lodge— Scranton, had to pay more for advertising space in this newspaper than do local merchants. Jerry Fishkin, President of the Young Democrats, reports that only once has a request for press coverage of a YD event been granted and that press releases are seldom accepted and published. Richard Roman of YPSL voices the usual complaints, "inadequate publicity for major meetings," and adds that the Daily Cal refuses to publish corrections concerning their articles or letters to the editor in the name of the group. Press coverage, he reports, is seldom and "politically illiterate" when it finally is granted, therefore making it doubly inadequate. YPSL has complained formally of this treatment and Professor Fontenrose, their advisor, has "intervened several times over inadequate press coverage with no results." Mike Parker, of the Independent Socialist Club, echoes these comments, adding that there is too much room given to non-political groups and activities. Sid Stapleton, of the YSA, adds to the above allegations that the Daily Cal has refered to his group as "Maoist" while reporting on the drive to raise funds for the defense of the Bloomington Students in 1963. An interesting point is that before the 1960 resignation, one idea was repeated frequently from 1938 on. This idea was that" The Daily Californian has not had to clear its stories or editorials with the University Administration. Nor has the University interfered with the continuing publication of stories or topics which the University would most probably prefer to have buried if it could." In other words, the editors were free to write what they wanted, particularly in the editorials. After the strike, however, the comment was, "We would like to endorse a candidate for each ASUC office in this election, but we are unable to do so under a by-law recently instituted for the Daily Californian."

(Notes on present coverage, from interviews by J. Donald Moon)

KPFA and the Administration

No other medium of communication has consistently given such generous and impartial coverage of University affairs as KPFA, the listener-sponsored FM radio station located in Berkeley. In addition to carrying dozens of lectures and conferences given on campus under the formal auspices of the University, KPFA regularly gives air time to events sponsored by various student groups. For example, at one time this station carried a series of commentaries called "On-Campus Politics", on which students of all political outlooks from left to right expressed their views. Thus, KPFA has served and continues to serve as a vital channel of communication and education among the students, the faculty, the Administration and the community at large—certainly the state's most discriminating radio audience.

For a dramatic and detailed understanding of KPFA's relations to University affairs,one might turn to the circumstances attendant upon the station's (proposed) coverage of the debate between Fred Schwarz, leader of the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, and William Mandel, a prominent Sovietologist and commentator for KPFA. The debate took place January 26, 1962, under the auspices of Slate.

The debate ran into trouble even before a word was spoken. Originally, the topic of the Mandel-Schwarz debate was this: "Resolved: Communist Professors Should be Fired." This title was the one specified by Mr. Schwarz. However, shortly before the debate was to take place, Dean Towle spoke to Slate, saying that the debate could not be held on such a resolution. The Administration's fear was that someone might misconstrue this topic as an admission that there were, indeed, Communists on the faculty at the University of California. Slate was further informed by Miss Towle that the debate would take place only if the subject were, "Should universities have as faculty members persons who are also members of the Communist Party?" Mr. Mandel, of course, was put in the position of having to take the affirmative on this question, which he did.

Whether the debate was formally open to the public or not, the controversial appeal of its topic and its participants made it a public event. In fact, no registration cards or other identification were required of spectators for entrance into Wheeler Auditorium, the campus and local press were present in force, and recordings of the debate were made by the University, the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade (for later distribution and sale) and at least two or three other interested parties.^[(1)] Thus, any distinction of the debate as an "on-campus" or "off-campus" event disappeared.

Very soon after the debate, KPFA applied to the University for use of its tape of the proceedings. In doing so, KPFA was following its usual practice; for five years the station had been permitted to broadcast its own or Language Laboratory tapes of University—or student—sponsored events, in toto, or segmentally. The station used the Language Lab tapes whenever possible to minimize its own expenses. Some of these tapes recorded events sponsored by such student groups as ASUC Forum (a speech by Mr. Schwarz on January 5, 1962), Slate (a speech by Frank Wilkinson), Graduate Economics Student Association, University Young Democrats, and the Boalt Hall Young Democrats. Until the Mandel-Schwarz debate, no radio station besides KPFA had taped or acquired tapes of student-sponsored events. The Administration had never placed restrictions (except signed releases by participants, if necessary) on such tapes; neither had it required prior notification and approval of such taping and use of tapes. But, for whatever reason, the Adminstration chose to place a restriction (regardless of signed releases) on use of its tape of the debate. It specified that this tape must not be broadcast in toto, that it be billed as "excerpts" from the debate. After both Mandel and Schwarz signed releases, KEAR, which had also applied for use of the University's tape, agreed to the provision regarding "excerpts", and subsequently broadcast which excerpts they chose. KPFA did not agree to the provision and thus lost its usual privilege. Although "excerpts" remained undefined, although the station might have broadcast 99.9% of the debate, the tape would remain only "excerpts". In view of this, KPFA decided to act on principle, i.e., to be satisfied with nothing less than its usual full coverage, and to avoid acquieacing in what might thereby become an undesirable precedent.

In placing such a restriction on the broadcasting of the tape, the Administration ^[(2)] invoked a long-standing regulation: " Student meetings or events, with the exception of regularly recurring athletic, forensic, dramatic or musical activities, shall not be open to the public without specific prior approval by the Chief Campus Officer or his designated representative." ^[(3)] To make the regulation apply to KPFA, it was necessary to regard the station as representing the general public, which it does. But what of press coverage, ^[(4)] and the indiscriminate admission to the Auditorium? Besides disregarding the de facto public nature of the debate, the Administration chose to extend what had applied rather obviously to seating policy, to radio coverage, but not to press coverage. And as far as KPFA was more specifically concerned, the Adminstration had invoked and broadened the rule in ex post facto fashion.

One can only suppose that these rather mystifying actions must have proceeded from assumptions which were more than clear to someone within the Administration. An obvious conjecture, which assumes that the controversial nature of the debate was responsible for the restriction, is that the Administration, presented with adverse criticism, might have been able to imply that " excerpts do not tell the entire story." Thus "excerpts" receives the definition of "safety valve".

Mr. Mandal himself has supplied another conjecture. He feels that his outspoken criticism, in the course of the debate itself, of the Administration's actions in the loyalty oath controversy during the early '50's, and his association with KPFA, may have combined to elicit such administrative restrictions.

A third conjecture comes, here in paraphrase, from a highly placed official of the Administration itself: On the one hand, mass media cannot be entirely excluded from these programs, lest the public become suspicious about the goings-on at the University. On the other hand, the University is fearful of having a controversial speaker exploit the University's prestige through over-publicity of his University appearance. No disclaimer of endorsement by the University would be adequate to remove the inference of University endorsement. (In this connection, Dean Towle's care about the wording of the forensic resolution should come to mind.) None of these conjectures is verifiable. None is, conversely, capable of being disproved.

There are at least two objections which can answer any "reason" or "conjecture" that the Administration would seem capable of advancing in behalf of its own actions in this case. The first is Mr. Mandel's: "The policy of permitting excerpted quotations at the discretion of the reporter makes possible misrepresentation of what was said when there is no possibility for the public to hear or read the full text." ^[(5)] The second objection is a broader correlation of the first: if the Administration is worried about unfavorable publicity, it should be more than willing to permit full reportage of entire programs, since local and national press editing is commonly slanted toward daily sensation, to the chagrin of the Administration and the misrepresentation of the University.

The embroglio concerning tapes of the Mandel-Schwarz debate was a unique series of events only in that such a series has occurred neither before nor since. It is unique but not isolated. The following September, there appeared in the brochure "Information for Student Organizations" (page 9) the following: "Recordings of events which were sponsored by student organizations and open only to a campus audience, may be (similarly) released, provided they are to be played to a campus audience." It is probable that this regulation creates more questions than it lays to rest, for, apart from the difficulty of deciding what constitutes a "campus audience," the phrase "open to the public" alludes to the disputable broadened regulation, quoted above, which was originally invoked to deny KPFA's privilege of broadcasting more than "excerpts."

It is of first importance to state unequivocally that, since the debate, KPFA has obtained prior approval to record their own tapes of student-sponsored events. Approval has not been denied them at any time. However, this policy has, in many instances, hampered KPFA. Many student- sponsored events are not publicized well enough in advance to permit KPFA enough time to acquire permission through the Public Information Office. For example, KPFA was not able to tape the speech given by General Walker on October 27, 1964. Since they were informed just a short while in advance of the speech they were not able to go through the red-tape required for them to be allowed to tape the speech. Under the former policy, KPFA would have been able to tape this speech with a few moments notice. This is merely one instance among many in which KPFA has been unable to cover on-campus events of immediate interest to the University community. It is of no less importance to realize what kind of shift of emphasis has taken place in the Administration's policy on tapes. One would have to misunderstand every word of this report in failing to realize that it is a shift from an unrestrictive policy regarding the mass media, toward a policy which does not define its criteria for approval, and is therefore arbitrary. And in becoming arbitrary in this matter, the Administration leaves itself open to immediate pressures from the community at large and obviates the task of explaining its actions to anyone. This amounts to nothing less than an utter absence of principle and an utter surrender to expediency.

The value, if not the necessity of adequate and unshackled reportage and communication of student thought and action to the general public is hardly an arguable point. The Administration does not seem to grasp the seriousness of this idea. If the importance of the actions surrounding the tapes of the Mandel-Schwarz debate could be termed an "epitome", it could as well be termed "the visible tenth of the iceberg."

Item I. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to document how heavily KPFA's treatment of student political and social activity has cost it with the power structure. It should be noted that such an outspoken programming policy has made KPFA and its sister stations (KPFK, Los Angeles; WBAI, New York) the target of harassment by all manner of reactionary groups. TOCSIN, "the West's leading Anti-Communist Weekly", has often run articles about the stations, its policies and its employees. (Vol. 4, No. 4, Jan. 23, 1963, p. 1; Vol. 4, No. 7, Feb. 13, 1963, p. 1). The Pacifica Foundation has been investigated (Jan., 1963) by the US Senate Investigating Subcommittee, and has been harassed by the Federal Communications Commission's requirement that its managers sign loyalty oaths (November, 1963.)

Item II. Mr. Mandel earns his livlihood partially as a translator. He had done piece work translations for a Professor E. V. Laitone. After the HUAC affair in 1960, Mr. Mandel contacted Professor Laitone for work, and was told that he (Prof. Laitone) had been informed by the University Security Officer that Mr. Mandel should no longer be given work. He has, however, done work subsequently for members of the faculty in the capacity of a translator.

Appendix on the Faculty

The Loyalty Oath at the University of California: A Report on Events, 1949-1958

The loyalty oath controversy began in 1949 and continued until the last suit for back wages was won by a non-signer, and until the American Association of University Professors lifted its censure of the administration. The loss brought about by the controversy is incalculable to the students, and will grow every year without these men, a loss as incalculable as the loss to the faculty members themselves. A prominent faculty member believes that the relations between the administration and the faculty have been permanently warped.

The events are so numerous and their relationships so complex that an extended review is necessary before any comment is meaningful. The following summary is based largely upon the report of developments concerning academic freedom and tenure published as Appendix A in the Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors, Spring, 1956 (vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 100-7).

President Robert G. Sproul presented to the Board of Regents on March 25, 1949, a draft of a special oath to be taken by all university staff. The oath proposed was in addition to the oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California which was required of all officers of the state. Whether faculty members at the state university were indeed officers of the state, and whether they held a public trust, like deputy sheriffs, became one of the most disheartening debates. The proposal by the president was made without the foreknowledge of the faculty, or at least without any communication with it beyond certain members who must have seriously misguided the president concerning the effects of the public announcement of the proposed oath.

The oath was apparently an effort to forestall action on the part of the California Committee on Un-American Activities, of which Senator Jack Tenney was chairman, to place a constitutional amendment on the state ballot giving the legislature authority over the University in matters of loyalty. To anticipate, the Supreme Court of California rendered its decision in Tolman vs. Underhill, October 17, 1952 (Sac. No. 6211, 39 26C), giving non-signers reinstatement to their positions on the ironic gounds of legislative pre-emption of any Regential authority in this field. However, in 1949, Comptroller James H. Corley, the University representative at the Logislature, apparently felt that Senator Tenney's Senate Bills, such as SB 130, which made it a crime to teach anything but "Americanism" in public schools, showed the Senator was riding a mounting wave of success. In fact, the Senator was soon to fall. But Corley, acting within his powers, evidently conferred with Tenney and made certain suggestions about the University and the Communists it allegedly harbored. These suggestions, or concessions, are only conjectural, but it is quite likely that President Sproul found himself forced to accept them without having been consulted. At least, the University's lobbyist no longer has such undefined powers.

The minutes of the Regents' March 25 meeting state simply that President Sproul said: There is a matter on which I should like the hand of the President upheld and his authority clarified having to do with this subject." Offered then in executive session, the motion to require the oath was passed with little discussion by a unanimous vote.

Regent John Francis Neyland was ill with a cold in Arizona. His absence from the meeting and his claim to be ignorant about its business until later may have led to another grave difficulty for the President. In brief, Neylan was able to criticize any maneuver by Sproul without having to accept even partial responsibility for its effects. Whether he was as ignorant of the possibility of the oath as he claimed is an open question. In any event, the text of the oath, not revealed to the faculty until June 12, 1949, was as follows:

I do solemoly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of my office according to the best of my ability; that I do not believe in, and I am not a member of, nor do I support any party or organization that believes in, advocates, or teaches the overthrow of the United States Government, by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional means.

On June 24, the latter part was changed to make specific reference to the Communist Party:

. . .that I am not a member of the Communist Party or under any oath or a party to any agreement or under any commitment that is in conflict with my obligations under this oath.

This requirement of a special oath of disclaimer shocked the faculty, not only because they had not been consulted about it and had known of its existence only by a vague reference in the May Faculty Bulletin, but especially because it seemed clearly to contravene the State Constitution and the Government Code. The former simply prescribed the oath of allegiance to the Constitution, and further, provided clearly that no other oath shall be required (Art. XX, Sec. 3). The Levering Act (GC 3100-3109), or the present loyalty oath, was to alter this clear limitation. The latter, the Government Code, required public officers to take an identical oath and made it unlawful to remove a person from his post because of his failure to comply with any "law, charter, or regulation prescribing an additional test or qualification, other than tests and qualifications provided for under civil service and retirement laws, if he has taken or offers to take the oath prescribed" by the Code.

On June 14, 1949, the Northern Section of the Academic Senate passed a resolution of protest, to which the Southern Section concurred at its meeting of June 20. The objections to the oath included not only the ambiguity of its terms (it was perhaps modelled after a hastily-seen original from Alaska), and its obvious futility as a means to detect Communists, but also the broader questions of constitutionality and tenure. These objections are stated at length, along with a discussion of academic freedom and an analysis of the position of the faculty within the university, in Ernest H. Kantorowicz The Fundamental Issue: Documents and Marginal Notes on the (U. of C.) Loyalty Oath (Berkeley, 1950). The others present at this meeting, Professor Kantorowicz saw the issues involved clearly, because he had seen similar statements stipulating loyalty as a requirement of an academician before, in German and in Italian.

The Senate also asked the President for assurance of the application of "all normal intramural procedures with respect to privilege and tenure," of the separation of the oath from the "contract letter" (which was introduced to replace the former letter of notification of salary, thought to be tenure-guaranteed, sent to a professor each year), and of no requirement for annual repetition of the oath. The Senate resolutions showed great solidarity on the part of the faculty. A major error occurred, however, when an Advisory Committee was established to keep in contact with the Regents; the committee's powers were not clear. Four days after the Northern Section's meeting on June 14, the committee met with the President, and suggested two alternatives: a statement by the University condemning Communists as teachers, or, a watered-down version of the proposed oath. At the Regents June 24 meeting, this version of the oath was accepted, but a clause was inserted which abjured membership in the Communist Party explicitly [see George Stewart's The Year of the Oath (Berkeley, 1950), pp. 28-31]. The regular session ended. Many professors believed that the Advisory Committee had acted properly. In fact, some of its members did believe they were granted bargaining, and not only discussion, powers. They were rudely awakened to their being manipulated by the Regents when they saw the "agreement" as it was publicly announced. The action taken was very effective from the Regents' point of view. Most professors, upon their return from summer vacations, thought the matter had been settled, while the many fewer vocal non- signers charged they had been "sold down the river." The faculty solidarity was broken.

From the beginning, the faculty was placed in a dilemma because of the difficulty of separating the two major issues presented it. On the one hand, there was the issue of Communism and loyalty; on the other, the issue of the infringement of tenure implied in the imposition upon everyone of an oath of disclaimer: "I am not...". In later discussions it was emphasized, especially by the Regents, that in 1940, at the time of the dismissal of a teaching assistant who was found to be a member of the Communist Party, a public statement had been issued by the Regents which stated that "membership in the Communist Party is incompatible with membership in the faculty of a State University". Furthermore, a resolution of the Regents on January 4, 1946, had amplified and formalized this policy as follows: "Be it resolved that any member of the faculty or student body seeking to alter our American government by other than constitutional means or to induce others to do so, shall, on proof of such charge, be subject to dismissal." Many members of the faculty appear to have been uninformed of this policy; no effort had been made to implement it until the fateful days of 1949, when the political temper of the times had changed, and the disclaimer oath was made to substitute for proof of charges of subversion. On March 22, 1950, a secret mail ballot by the faculty allowed Regent Neylan to say: "After a full year's discussion, (the faculty) voted by secret ballot in a majority of 79% to sustain the policy of the University excluding Communists from employment." Further, Regent Neylan congratulated the faculty for being the first in the United States to take this stand (Stewart, Oath, p. 38).

A faculty leader subsequently revealed that the faculty thought it had engaged in a second bargain with the Regents, in order to end the controversy. This proposition, voted upon by all the faculty, was, in the leader's words, "put over" after assurances that the Regents would be satisfied with it as a substitute for individual oaths of denial (see John Caughey, "A University in Jeopardy," Harper's Magazine, vol. 201, no. 1206 (November, 1950), 72).

To return to late July, 1949. The regent- administration side made a serious error in not sending checks to non-signers of the "compromise" oath. The faculty reacted with indignation; it considered this failure a sign of worsening breach of faith. Though the members were scattered, they realized their optimism at the end of the semester was unjustified.

On September 10, 1949 the Northern Senate met, and three days later the Southern section also convened. The resolutions adopted indicated that the faculty was not willing to follow the Advisory Committee in its compromise with Regents. The faculty now undertook to avoid explicit agreement with the Communist-exclusionist policy and the doctrine of guilt by association embodied in the Advisory Committee's compromise, or the Regents' reworking of the compromise. The faculty placed the issue of the Communist teacher squarely upon "the freedom of competent persons in the classroom" as stated in University Regulation No. 5 (1934; revised, 1944). The prohibition should be that of "the employment of persons whose commitments or obligations to any organization, Communist or other, prejudice impartial scholarship and the free pursuit of truth." It was a forlorn semantic hope that the word "Communist" would please the Regents, and the words "or other" would please those who objected to the oath on the grounds of it being a political test, or assigning guilt by association (Stewart, Oath, p. 32). The faculty did reject the additional loyalty oath outright. These proposals were voted unanimous in the north and south. When they were presented to the Regents, a committee, of which John Neylan later became Chairman, was appointed to confer with the Advisory Committee of the Senate. About this time, as the misunderstanding increased, Regent Neylan, who had on his account been originally opposed to the oath became one of its staunchest supporters, while President Sproul became more and more concerned with the adoption of some alternative that would be acceptable to the faculty.

It is difficult to assess Regent Neylan's part in the entire controversy. Before he was Regent Neylan, he was general counsel for, and once publisher of a part of, the Hearst chain. He was undoubtedly aware of what took place on many levels of State politics, and may have represented a faction in the State which was out to remove President Sproul and discredit the more liberal faction to which he belonged. Neylan was not so limited a man as Tenney, by any means. Possibly Comptroller Corley's compromise with the Senator forced President Sproul to do hastily and unwisely what Regent Neylan saw should be done more cleverly. In any event, his enmity toward the President became more and more apparent, and his actions became more and more complicated to explain. The task of trying to grasp what his ultimate influence on the Board of Regents came to represent is beyond the scope of this paper.

On September 13, 1949, the Regents' position was definite: Communists must be excluded from the faculty, and until a better means was found, an oath of disavowal would be a condition of employment. The faculty stand, as eventually defined by a newly-formed Conference Committee appointed to confer with the Regents at a meeting in San Francisco, September 29, was that the oath should be withdrawn; that freedom and security should be maintained by "full faculty participation in the making of decisions affecting conditions crucial to teaching and research and a high degree of deference to faculty judgment in such matters, such as qualifications for membership, which are peculiarly within the competence of the faculty;" and that "the exclusion of members of the Communist Party per se from employment is not the best means." There was admittedly a sharp division on the last matter; the majority at this time held to the policy of the AAUP and the judicial tenet that guilt should not rest solely upon membership or association. At the September 29 meeting, the faculty representatives were led to understand that the Regents were not wholly lacking in sympathy to their point of view. They were surprised at the Regents' meeting the next day: the Special Committee to which they had spoken presented the Regents with an entirely negative and completely unyielding set of recommendations. This was the last day before the "soft" deadline, and many professors were driven by economic pressures to sign the oath (see Stewart, Oath, p. 34, for an account of the meeting).

On November 30, the Berkeley non-signers formed a permanent but informal organization. There were further discussions between the Senate and Regent Committees, but little was done to change the atmosphere. On January 4, 1950, the Regents met with the faculty. The depth of the split between the two groups became apparent. In an effort to find another compromise, the faculty agreed to a proposal that a statement of policy might be placed on the reverse side of the "annual contract" (tenure was dead) and to have the acceptance of the "offer of position and salary" include acceptance of the "the terms of employment implied in that statement of policy." The proposed statement did not mention Communism, but concerned only free scholarship and teaching, according to the Regents' resolution of June 24, 1949, and University Regulation No. 5. In conference with President Sproul, the Northern Conference Committee members accepted wording that recognized the exclusion of Communists from the normal protection of tenure. The Regents proposed that the conditions be stated on the face of the letter of appointment as an alternative to the oath. This was unanimously refused by the Senate Committee. The Board of Regents reaffirmed the alternative requirement and set April 30, 1950, as the deadline for acceptance, with failure to sign meaning severance from the University as of June 30, 1950. The motion setting this policy in order was passed by a vote of twelve to six on February 24. This policy was known immediately as "The Sign-or-Get-Out Ultimatum." The result of a deadline for signature with no specific provisions for hearings was that non-signature as well as Communist Party membership abrogated tenure. This action was taken in spite of warnings of serious consequences to the University by 42 deans and department heads of the Northern Section and by 32 administrative heads of the Southern Section. One regent dismissed them as "campus politicians" (Stewart, p. 36). It was now evident that the issue could be stated in four words: "Not disloyalty but discipline" (see Caughey, "A University in Jeopardy," p. 68).

On February 27, the non-signers' meeting was attended by 150 members at Berkeley, who expressed their determination to stand together and accept dismissal rather than sign. A defense fund was inaugurated. On March 7, the Northern Section of the Academic Senate met, ready for an open and irretrievable break with the Regents; by floor motion, however, the mail ballot proposing to the faculty to accept the policy that Communists are not acceptable "as members of the faculty" was advanced, and carried by 79%, as earlier mentioned.

At the March 31 Regents' meeting, Regent Neylan, who had earlier hailed the March 7 ballot as uniting the Regents and faculty, again led the attack against the faculty position. The Regents split 10 to 10 on a motion to withdraw the ultimatum. The tie vote allowed the ultimatum to stand, and the meeting became known as The Great Double-Cross (Stewart, Oath, p. 39).

On April 21, 1950, nine days before the deadline, an alumni committee which had been called by President Sproul to arbitrate the dead- lock submitted, and the Regents supposedly fully accepted, a plan which substituted for the oath a "New Contract of Employment", containing a disavowal of Communist Party membership and a further provision that those who failed to sign could petition the President for a hearing by the Senate's Committee on Privilege and Tenure. These recommendations are available in the form of a letter to alumni offices sent by the committee on April 20. From the non- signers' point of view, these recommendations were ill-conceived: the alumni committee evidently failed to see they were dispensing with the notion of tenure, and had substituted merely an "equivalent affirmation" for the oath itself, which they permitted to transmigrate to the "annual contract". All that was gained was a chance for "Any member of the present faculty...to appeal for review" by the Privilege and Tenure Committee, but the Regents, as previously, reserved the right of final decision concerning any recommendations by this committee. During the next few days, it became apparent that while President Sproul held that unwillingness to sign did not mean dismissal, and that one could be cleared by the committee without signing, this view was challenged by Mr. Neylan. At the April 21 meeting, the only dissenting vote was cast by Regent Giannini who had been appointed to fill his father's term on June 24, 1949. This fiery young man quit the Board on April 21. He might well not have let his anger carry him away, because Regent Neylan was far from accepting even the brutal compromise of the faculty position the alumni committee offered.

On May 1, a new form of letter of appointment was sent out to implement the adopted policy, to those with tenure as well as to those without. Instead of the former wording "... your salary for the year ending...as Professor of...was fixed at $...," it read as follows: "This is to notify you that you have been appointed Professor of... for the period July 1, 1949, to June 30, 1950, with salary at the rate of $...." This letter also contained the further requirement that the letter of acceptance be signed and the enclosed oath be subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. This letter clearly substituted for tenure and annual appointment, subject to the constitutional oath, and a written acceptance of the disclaimer statement. Even with an appeal route open to him, a professor would have to face the faculty, administration, and regent committees once each year if he did not sign for that year.

Fifty-two persons who did not comply appeared before the Northern Tenure Committee, of whom five were not recommended for rehiring on the basis of non-cooperation with the Committee, and 47 were recommended for continuance. The committee claimed that the crucial point was whether the non-signers would state to the Committee directly or indirectly that they were not Communists and so would clear themselves; but in cases of refusal to answer this question, the Committee might have acted from inferences. The Southern Tenure Committee, on the other hand, gave only incidental attention to the question of Party membership, and devoted itself mainly to eliciting satisfactory reasons for not signing. It examined 27 non-signers, nine without Senate status, and found all but one "loyal citizens, who in their independence stood unwilling to perform an act that they felt should form no part of a great University's condition for employment." In July and August meetings, the Regents showed conclusive disagreement.

It became clear that the reasoning of the Tenure Committees would not be accepted by the Regents. On June 23, the Regents voted to defer action on all cases with hearings involved and forecast the fate of this group by firing 157 employees who had neither signed the new contract for the period to June 30, 1950, nor requested hearings. Few, if any, were regular members of the Senate. Most were staff members leaving in disgust. At the meeting on July 21, the Regents voted to fire six members of the faculty, as recommended by the President on the basis of Committee reports, not as Communists, but for refusal to cooperate with the examining committee. To refuse to sign was to be disobedient, to flout the Board's authority, to desire to substitute one's own judgment as to standards of employment, to resist the discipline of the University over its employees, Professors were now employees, not officers or holders of a public trust, and so had no vested right. Such statements appear from the stenographic records of the summer meetings as the grounds for the Regents' rejection of the President's recommendation for the continuance of those who had been cleared by the Tenure Committees. This rejection occurred on August 25. By a 12 to 10 vote, overruling acting Chairman Governor Warren's ruling that the parliamentary procedure was unallowable, the Regents voted to reconsider its earlier stand. By the same vote it reversed its stand.

Out of 62 original non-signers who were Senate members, and recommended by the Committees for continuance, 32 were left who had not signed at this date, and who therefore were dismissed. It was thus evident that, contrary to the understanding of the faculty, clearance by the Tenure Committees did not obviate the necessity of signing the oath. The reasons for not signing and other evidence reported by the Committees were not acceptable substitutes; whether any would have been acceptable is very doubtful. The climination of tenure in relation to the Regents' demands emerged as a clear policy.

The effect of the dismissals upon the faculty was dramatic and devastating. The Northern Committee's adverse report on the five who were not recommended for reappointment was reexamined, and an extended debate arose because of charges that the Committee had so acted only because of a lack of cooperation on the part of the five, and not from any evidence of their membership in the Communist Party. The Committee was asked to reconsider their cases. It did so, and on October 19 recommended their reappointment to the President, on the grounds that no charges of disloyalty, incompetence, or moral delinquency had been laid against them and that their discharge as a "disciplinary measure" constituted a breach of tenure. On October 9, the Senate voted to work for the reinstatement of all the non-signers. A Committee on Academic Freedom was set up in the North, and the Tenure Committee of the Southern Section was given similar functions.

Not only were 26 faculty members finally dismissed, but 37 others resigned in protest, including some of the most distinguished members of the faculty; 55 courses had to be dropped from the curriculum; and there were 47 pointed refusals of appointment (see Caughey, "A University in Jeopardy," p. 75). Over 1200 signatures to protests from other college and university faculties were reported, together with 20 condemnatory resolutions by professional societies and groups. Financial assistance for the non-signers, whose salaries were stopped in June, 1950, was organized and widely offered.

On August 31, 1950, 20 of the dismissed Senate members petitioned the California District Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to compel the issuance of the contracts voted in July, notwithstanding their refusal to sign. This process is referred to as Tolman vs. Underhill, 229 P 2d 447: it is not in the official court records, for its result was voided when the Supreme Court of California ruled on the case. However, the decision of Justice Peek, concurred in by Justices Adams and Van Dyke, supplies the first note of hope implemented by reason and judicial power, and is reprinted in the Pacific Reporter, vol. 229, pp. 447 ff. Justice Peek disposes of a 1920 case made much of by the University's lawyers: "There is nothing either in the Leymel case or any other case cited by respondents (Regents) which is conclusive of the status of petitioners with respect to the constitutional oath of office as set forth in Section 3 of Article XX.... While the courts of this state have had no occasion in the past to discuss specifically the purposes behind this section, the history of the English and American peoples in their struggle for political and religious freedom offers ample testimony to the aims which motivated the adoption of the provision.... If the Faculty of the University can be subjected to any more narrow test of loyalty than the constitutional oath, the constitutional mandate in Section 9 of Article IX ("The University shall be free of all political or sectarian influence") would be effectively frustrated, and our great institution now dadicated to learning and the search for truth reduced to an organ for the propagation of the ephemeral political, religious, social, and economic philosophies, whatever they may be, of the majority of the Board of Regents of that moment."

Before the Regents had reached agreement on the question of appeal, the State Supreme Court, on its own motion, took the case under consideration. Meanwhile, on October 3, 1950, the state had enacted the so-called Levering Act, which required of all state employees an oath disclosing past membership in any subversive organization, although not designating any by name. The Regehts, on October 20, 1950, requested faculty members to comply with the state legislation. On December 15, 1950, they announced that any employee who did not do so by December 31 would be fired. On October 19, 1951, the Regents adopted the Levering Act as the University's own requirement. They then abolished the requirement of an annual anti-Communist oath, or an anti-Communist declaration in the annual acceptance of contract. They reasserted their refusal to hire Communist Party members, and the responsibility of the Senate for effecting this policy, and reserved a veto on any appointment which, in their judgment, would violate the anti-Communist policy.

Meanwhile, the broad grounds of the Appelate Court decision were reduced to the narrower question of legislative pre-emption in the State Supreme decision, which was rendered October 17, 1952 (Sac. No. 6211; 39 C 2d (708)). This decision was handed down to coincide with three cases involving petitioners against the Levering Act. The issues represented by Tolman vs. Underhill were held to be constitutionally separate from those of Pockman vs. Leonard (S.F. No. 18349; 39 C 2d). Leonard Pockman was discharged from San Francisco State College on the grounds that he had not signed the Levering Act oath. In this case and two related ones, the Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners, and the oath required by the Levering Act is still attached to employment contracts of University employees.

The Court was silent in regard to payment of back salaries. Individual cases throught 1954 finally brought compensation and sabbatical rights to the now-reinstated professors.

The American Association of University Professors suggested in their Spring, 1956, Bulletin (p. 64) that the administration of the University of California be termed a censured administration. This was done so. Although men of good hearts who wish to establish a perspective on the controversy point out that there were similar troubles at such major universities as the University of Washington, the University of Michigan, and others, no other major university received the continued censure of the AAUP.

In 1958, at an All-University Conference called together by the administration to learn from the faculty and other persons what might be done to improve the University's position in attracting and retaining the caliber of faculty it wished, such various matters as salary, fringe benefits, and research and teaching loads were discussed. One of the most respected members of the Academic Senate, a professor closely connected with the controversy, rose to his feet and suggested that it might be of some help if the administration were to remove itself from the list of censured administrations. According to a witness, there was a stunned silence. The witness, himself a non- signer, trembled as he rose to speak after the suggestion had been made. Following his statement, Mr. Kerr, then Chancellor of the Berkeley campus, stated that the administration was taking steps to have the censure removed. The censure was lifted the next year.

What can be concluded? The University, either in reaction to pressures outside it, or even worse, in league with these pressures to the extent that a faction of its governing body turned against another, came perilously close to making a shambles out of one of the Most important institutions for the disinterested search for truth in the country. The story of obstinacy, hasty and ill-grounded action, and sheer authoritarian perversity lod the University to drive away many of the greatest contributors to this search, and may permanently have broken the trust of those who remain.

Appendix on Student Organizations

Campus Women for Peace

Campus Women for Peace was formed two and a half years ago, in March, 1962. We are a group of women students unified by the realization that military solutions to the world's conflicts are no longer feasible. Our program is directed toward the entire campus community. We provide a platform for discussion, disseminating information, and carrying out activities toward a peaceful world Ours is a non-political group; we deal with issues, not parties or ideologies. Campus Women for Peace is a non- organizational group; it does not have "members" or "officers". We work from a mailing list that exceeds 250 each semester. Our activities are suggested and carried out by interested students on a voluntary basis.

Since our group was organized we have found that the administration's rulings on student organizations have become increasingly complex, and have tended to severely hinder the scope of our activities. The following discussion will present some examples.

We had difficulties in organizing our group from the beginning, owing to the rule that requires each student group to have a tenured faculty member as faculty advisor. We were hard pressed to find faculty members who were out-spoken on peace issues and might serve in this capacity and were forced to postpone our activities for a number of weeks. In addition, in order to receive classification as a recognized group we were required to have a constitution, although we are not an organization. The rules regarding these matters are so unclear that we have never known for sure whether we were a "legal" off-campus group or not Our first activity was a noon- time discussion with Russian women who were active in women's organizations in the USSR. We had to hold this discussion off-campus in Stiles Hall, a disadvantage because the room was much too small for the interested crowd that came Stiles Hall is also out of the way for most people with only a noon-time to spare.

We have found it increasingly difficult to implement and advertise a range of activities that will have wide-spread appeal. A maze of regulations restricts the kinds of activities we can sponsor on campus, the nature of our advertisements for these activities, and therefore the size of audience we reach

One detrimental set of rules pertains to regulations on the use of rooms on the campus That category of organizations designated as "off-campus" cannot use University classrooms for their business meetings. This rule hinders the effectiveness of our organization in reaching new, uninvolved students. Because of the "non-organizational" nature of our group we would find it very helpful to be able to hold business and planning meetings on campus, where interested students might drop by.

Still another regulation limits our use of University facilities This is the rule requiring a three-day notice before use of rooms for movies and speakers is granted by the Dean's office. This requires planning for the use of rooms for days in advance, securing signatures to forms in quadruplicate, etcetera, although it takes a mere five minutes to locate and reserve an empty room This rule throws cold water on instantaneous reaction to world or campus events. When the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing in March 1962 we were unable to call an open meeting on the spot. Had we observed the rule that requires 72 hour advance notice for permission to speak, the issue would have been all but dead, and student consternation would have waned. Women for Peace held no meeting.

The Administration not only restricts the forms our activities may take, but it restricts the content of what we present. An existing ruling prohibits student organizations from advocating certain kinds of on-campus demonstrations. An organization cannot sponsor a sit-down on Sproul Hall steps, for example, although an individual can. However, individuals cannot put up posters through the Student Union "poster service" to advertise such activities. Nor can individuals utilize the "Administration Service" which authorizes janitors to place posters about certain activities on University bulletin boards. Thus, when Madame Nhu came to our campus in November, 1963, we wanted to stage a sit-down as a form of dramatic protest to her treatment of Buddhists. But under the existing regulations we could not advertise the proposed sit-down.

It is further illegal for us to urge in any way participation in demonstrations. During Madame Nhu's visit to San Francisco we prepared posters informing interested students about a walk around the Sheraton Palace Hotel. We were informed by the authorities in the Student Union who must approve all posters, that these posters could not be placed on University property. We were informed that we might put up posters that were of a purely "informational" nature. A second set of posters was prepared. But it was decided that the mention of car-pools leaving for San Francisco implied something about the nature of the activity toward which they were headed; these posters were ordered removed Six months later Women for Peace co-sponsored a meeting in Pauley Ballroom, presenting a tape by Bertrand Russell and a speech by Bob Scheer. Our adve rtising leaflet displayed the now-familiar photograph of the Vietnamese father holding his badly burned son. These leaflets were banned from the Student Union bulletin board, and from the approved University bulletin boards. In this way the Dean's Office imposes a contradictory censorship on the nature of our activities. If they allow us to hold the activities in the first place, we can advertise them only with difficulty. More importantly, a type of "prior-censorship" is employed; knowing the difficulty of receiving approval to post advertisements that are in any way controversial, we often choose a less effective method of presenting our message.

Similarly, we find it increasingly difficult to find acceptable forms in which to present our programs. There seems to be some latitude in Administration regulations that allows the Dean's Office to construe the rules as they choose. The regulation involving the necessity for a faculty moderator for "controversial" topics is one which necessarily judges the content of that which is presented. For example, in Spring 1963, Women for Peace presented a noon talk in 110 Wheeler with Dr. Carleton Goodlet, publisher of the San Francisco Sun Reporter. Dr. Goodlet had recently returned from a tour of Africa for the World Council of Peace. Because of the difficulties of obtaining a faculty moderator, we decided to call his talk "My Trip Through Africa"; this title sounds like a travelogue, although it was more a political trip than a safari. The title passed by the Dean's Office, and they did not require a moderator. This incident indicates that since moderators are only required for "controversial" titles, obviously what is controversial is defined by the Administration via Mrs. Weaver. Non-controversial becomes that which the Administration agrees with, and controversial, by definition, everything else. No objective standard is involved; the Administration both formulates the rules and interpretations.

In October, 1963, the Student Union began to charge rent for the use of Student Union rooms for "off-campus" and non-student organizations alike. It now costs more to rent Pauley Ballroom than it does to rent the Brazilian Room. This expense prohibits in advance most speakers. We can afford to invite one or two speakers a semester, those that we know are the best drawing cards. When we do use Pauley Ballroom we are not allowed to charge admission or to raise funds. We can collect "donations", hoping that the amount collected will cover the cost of the room. We may not, however, collect donations to help pay for speakers. Consequently we can only invite people who will donate their services, and this often limits the field to people seeking publicity, omitting many worthwhile speakers. We could not, for example, pay for our presentation of Professor Yasui, the head of the Japanese Movement Against the Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, the largest peace organization in the world. And when "The Committee" offered to stage a special daytime performance for us last Spring, we were forced to refuse because we could not charge admission to pay them, let alone raise funds. It seems that the ASUC activities have a monopoly on the students' money.

Because our group cannot raise money on campus, or even arrange for on-campus activities to pay for themselves, it is necessary to go off campus to try to raise funds. Thus we presented our March 1964 "Hoot for Peace" in the I-House auditorium, which decreased our profit by the $100 cost of the hall. In view of all this, the latest ruling prohibiting groups like ours from raising money at Bancroft and Telegraph, where we regularly set up a table in the past, will put an end to our activities.

In addition to the prohibitory nature of certain specific University regulations, there has been a general attitude of indifference or willful disregard on the part of the Administration towards the expression of student and faculty opinion on certain issues. A case in point is our campaign for removal of fallout shelter signs from campus buildings.

In January 1963 a fallout shelter program was instituted on this campus, in cooperation with the Federal Civil Defense Program. Protest on the part of students and faculty members was immediate and widespread. In March 1963 the Academic Senate passed a resolution calling for "an investigation of the reasons for, and implications of, the fallout shelter signs" No investigation was made. Under continued pressure of public opinion, University spokesman O.W. Campbell issued a statement to the effect that the Regents had agreed to cooperate in the civil defense effort, to the extent that it did not interfere with the University's main purpose of education. (Daily Cal, March 14, 1963)

In April 1963 Women for Peace published a documented fact sheet on civil defense, and placed a referendum on the Spring ballot of the ASUC elections, calling for the removal of shelter signs from the campus. On April 17, 1963 a Daily Californian editorial by Sandie North called upon authorities to remove the shelter signs and to "devise more realistic alternatives than those now in effect." She urged the students to vote for removal of the signs in the coming referendum.

On April 23, 1963 the students voted 2,196-1296 that shelter signs on the University campus be removed. Three months later a Daily Cal article of July 5, 1963 reported that the shelters were "still in business", and that supplies were being moved in.

On October 8, 1963 the ASUC Senate voted unanimously to draft a resolution reminding the Regents of the student referendum, and calling upon President Kerr "to issue a statement detailing University policy on fallout shelters, and declaring the Regent's intentions with regard to the student referendum."

On November 12, 1963 Clark Kerr stated in a letter to ASUC President Mel Levine, "It is recognized that there are differing opinions concerning the fallout shelter program. Nothwithstanding these points of view, as long as a national shelter program is the existing policy of Civil Defense, it is reasonable that the University should cooperate with the federal and state agencies undertaking this program." "A statement concerning the areas of responsibility in Civil Devense may be issued in the near future."

Such a statement was never issued. Women for Peace has continually asked the University to review its participation in the federal government's civil defense program, in view of its policy of non-involvement in political matters. In an open letter to President Kerr (Daily Cal, December 11, 1963) Women for Peace spokesmen Jackie Goldberg and Ann Forrest demanded, "Are we being ordered into a program we don't want? Or are we volunteering for a program we don't want? Or further, are we desirous of the program for other than scientific and rational reasons? If the latter is the case, we students of this University feel that our Regents should re-examine educational and moral integrity.

"To the best of our knowledge, no public statement was ever made to this campus even acknowledging the referendum, and no explanation was given for any part of the program. The statement that it is reasonable to cooperate with a program that may very well be unreasonable should be debated publicly. We call upon you, Mr. President, to enter an open debate on the merits of the shelter program, either through the Daily Cal or preferrably in person."

This letter was never answered.

On December 13, 1963 Women for Peace sponsored a noon time panel discussion on the subject of fallout shelters, with Owen Chamberlain, fire chief Moller, and Ben Seaver. Chamberlain stated, "For Berkeley, fallout shelter protection is so inadequate as to be beside the point, it seems."

On February 5, 1964 Professors Dalziel and Kuhli of the Governor's Educational Advisory Committee on Disaster Preparedness stated that Civil Defense at the University is in a state of chaos, and may even be a waste of time."

When it became apparent that the Administration was intent on ignoring the opinions expressed by the majority of students and faculty members in advisory positions as well as all requests for discussion it was decided to hold a test of the fallout shelter facilities. The test was planned to demonstrate

1. That shelters provided no shelter at all, and
2. (2) That the University was lending its name and prestige to a dangerous hoax.

Once again University regulations thwarted us. Since recognized off-campus groups cannot sponsor any form of test, drill or demonstration on campus, Women for Peace could not directly arrange for the fallout shelter drill. Therefore a group of "individuals" organized the Ad Hoc Committee on Fallout Shelter Information, which was supported and endorsed by Slate, W.E.B. DuBois Club, and Women for Peace. This organization received permission to conduct the test on February 26, 1964.

The test demonstrated beyond any doubt that the shelter program on this campus was an utter farce. The Daily Cal of the following day referred to the shelter as "the Black Hole of Calcutta." Berkeley fire chief Moller admitted that capacity figures were unreasonable. And in a letter to the Editor (Daily Cal March 2, 1964) Raymond T. Birge, Professor of Physics, Emeritus, predicted that under the conditions of the test "anyone not dead of suffocation in 24 hours would be dead from the heat."

The shelter "pack-in" received coverage on local and national television networks and newspapers. The University Administration maintained an unbroken silence on the issue.

On February 27, 1964 the ASUC Senate voted 13-2 to request the Chancellor's Office to conduct a campus-wide fallout shelter drill. This request was ignored. The barrage of letters to the Daily Cal on this issue gradually dwindled to nothing. The University Administration had effectively squelched the desire of the Academic Senate, the ASUC Senate, the majority of the student body, and individual professors to have an open discussion and investigation of the fallout shelter program on the campus.

As has been pointed out in this report, there has been increasingly repression on t is campus of activity and thought that has directly affected Women for Peace. At this writing, Women for Peace has not organized at all this semester. Ordinarily we would have set up a table on campus for distribution of information, and offering peace literature, bumperstickers and the like for sale With the money thus obtained, and donations accepted, we would have been able to send an announcement of a meeting to those students who had indicated their interest by signing a mailing list at that table. Since we could collect neither money nor signatures, we were unable to do this. In addition, because of lack of funds we are unable to print and distribute information concerning the positions of the various political candidates on issues concerning peace, disarmament, and economic conversion to a peacetime economy. If the present situation remains unchanged, the Administration will have succeeded in permanently terminating the existence of Women for Peace on this Campus.

Slate and Due Process: Abstract—From the full text.

On the stated ground that he had no other recourse after the student organization, Slate, committed an "apparent violation" of its terms of recognition, Dean William F. Shepard suspended the group from its on- campus status, effective June 9, 1961. He also declared that "The Committee on Recognition is being asked to recommend to the Administration the final disposition of this matter."

In the suspension of Slate we believe that the fundamental democratic guarantee of due process has been violated by the Administration.

Stated in general terms, the purpose of the constitutional guarantee of due process is to exclude arbitrary power from every branch of the government and to restrain the legislative, judicial, and executive departments. Due process includes a hearing, after notice, before a board or officer empowered to hear and determine the issues presented. An individual has the right to have his case tried and determined under the same rules of procedure that are applied to other similar cases. The courts have applied strict rules of due process, not only to branches of the government itself, but to colleges and universities, as well as non-governmental institutions such as labor unions, religious groups, fraternal, social, and professional associations.

In the controversy between Slate and the Administration, we believe that the best means to measure due process—or its absence—is by analyzing the events that triggered the June 9th suspension, and evaluating the channels by which the Administration permitted Slate to defend itself.

Three significant events occurred prior to Slate's suspension on June 9, 1961.

1) With relation to Slate's sale of a record album, Dean William F. Shepard informed the organization (March 30, 1961) that it "must abide by the original terms of recognition and refrain from identifying itself as a student political party"'.

2) A telegram was sent to The Ohio State Lantern, by Mike Myerson. This letter was published April 17, 1961. This telegram praised the statements of Governor Brown, President Kerr, and Chancellor Strong in connection with the campus appearance of Frank Wilkinson, and contrasted their position with the action taken by the Administration of Ohio State University, which had prohibited a controversial speaker from appearing on campus. The telegram was signed. "Michael Myerson, Chairman, Slate, Campus Political Party, University of California." No mention of this telegram was made by the Administration at the time.

3) In a conference with Dean Shepard (May 11, 1961) Mr. Myerson was told again not to use the phrase "campus political party", with regard to a campaign leaflet Mr. Myerson informed Dean Shepard that the phrase was used by someone who was unaware of the March 30th letter. As Dean Shepard later indicated

(in his letter to Myerson—June 9, 1961) he (the dean) had been "willing to accept this as a reasonable explanation."

Keeping these events in mind, we now turn to the letter of June 9, 1961 in which Dean Shepard announced the suspension of Slate. In this letter, Dean Shepard referred to his letter of March 30th and the conference of May 11th and stated that at the time of the conference he was not aware of Slate's April 17th telegram to the Ohio State Lantern. Now that he had heard of the telegram, which "is an apparent violation of your terms of recognition, a violation which occurred after due warning, we have no recourse but to suspend the recognition of your organization. Hence, your organization may in no way identify itself with the University nor use any of its facilities, including those under the supervision of the Associated Students.

"The Committee on Recognition is being asked to recommend to the Administration the final disposition of this matter." This letter raised a number of serious issues:

(1) Dean Shepard referred to "due warning." Did Slate, in fact, receive "due warning" when the March 30th letter seemed to be directed against Slate's use of the University's name in a commercial enterprise (i.e. the sale of phonograph records) and the May 11th conference occurred after the telegram was sent?

(2) "We have no recourse", said Dean Shepard, "but to suspend the recognition of your organization." This statement implies that there is a mandatory requirement of suspension in some regulation, governing the conduct of the Dean of Students. If such a regulation exists, the Dean should have identified it so that Slate could have examined its provisions. (Note that a regulation of this type, requiring suspension without a hearing, falls short of due process requirements.) If, in fact, no such regulation existed and the Dean's act was a discretionary move, the suspension should have been based on validly established grounds, proven in a fair hearing.

(3) Dean Shepard stated as the next procedural step in this controversy that, "The Committee on Recognition is being asked to recommend to the Administration the final disposition of this matter." Contrast this procedure with the steps taken to suspend Beta Theta Phi for violations of University regulations, as reported in the Daily Californian, March 7, 1961, p. 1.

In this fraternity case, the suspension process involved the following steps: the Interfraternity Council Judicial Committee oited two violations; the Interfraternity Council recommended that disciplinary measures be taken; the Committee on Student Affairs reviewed and accepted these recommendations; Acting Chancellor Edward Strong then approved the action of the Committee on Student Affairs, at which point the University suspended recognition of the fraternity, subject to review prior to the fall semester of 1961.

Underlying the fraternity suspension is a series of recommendations from inferior tribunals to superior ones, until, after all other steps have been exhausted, Chancellor Strong expressed a final, binding opinion. This procedure meets the requirement that a case should pass from lower to higher orders of authority in order to permit a fair evaluation at each successive level.

The circumstances surrounding Slate's suspension, however, revealed a procedure in which due process safeguards were violated. Dean Shepard first expressed his opinion and initiated the suspension, and then turned the matter over to a committee which is inferior to him in rank and is composed of members he appointed. This committee was the group which was asked for a "recommendation."

Thus, long before Slate was allowed any kind of hearing of its grievances, due process had been violated in the matter of its suspension and its case had been publically prejudiced.

The Disfranchisement of the Graduate Students

The graduate students on the Berkeley campus have been in a political limbo. Since September 1, 1959, they have had no representative voice in student government. They have not managed to establish a viable self-government, and, until very recently, there have been no regular channels for communication amoung the departmental graduate organizations. Thus for the last few years, in the face of increasing political awareneas on the campus, the graduate students have not been able to make, as a group, any statement of opinion or protest. The effect of this disorganization has been to increase graduate apathy toward campus affairs, and to weaken the voice of the students generally. This report will attempt to recount the events which have led to this situation.

Graduate student representatives on the Executive Committee of the ASUC before 1959 brought many important issues before that body. In 1957, for example, Ralph Schaffer first introduced a motion requesting the University not to sanction discrimination in fraternities and sororities. This issue, only recently settled, came up repeatedly before EX Com in succeeding years, always with graduate support. ^[1] When SLATE was founded, the graduate students who voted, overwhelmingly supported its candidates. In May of 1958, SLATE member Mike Gucovsky was elected as graduate representative by 573 votes to 71 for his opponent. ^[2] Although the number of graduates voting in this election was a rather small percentage of the total, it represented a substantial increase over those who took part in the immediately preceding elections. ^[3]

In the registration line for the spring semester of 1959, graduates were given a questionnaire form the "Activities Planning Committee" designed to determine their attitudes toward the graduate student welfare problem. This opinion survey requested students to rank their preferences for five alternatives. The first alternative was to keep the present structure of the ASUC, in which graduate students could vote for all student representatives, had representatives of their own, and paid the full activity fee. The second was a request for enlarged graduate representation on the Executive Committee. The third alternative involved the disassociation of graduate students from the ASUC, including loss of voting rights, with a reduction in the activity fee. The fourth concerned the establishment of an independent graduate student association, with perhaps some reduction of fees. The fifth alternative was for an increase in fees to support departmental graduate organizations.

There is no doubt that the questionnaire was, as Arleigh Williams described it, "a definite and sincere attempt" to gauge graduate student opinion. ^[4] The final report of the survey, presented to ExCom on April 21, shows a careful statistical analysis of the preferences of the 63% of the graduate students who answered fully. The fourth alternative of the questionnaire, for a separate graduate association, was clearly the first choice of the students, with an adjusted score of 1,146. The third alternative was next, with a score of 1,106, and the second an first options next with less, but still substantial support—scoring 670 and 347, respectively. The report was firm in its conclusions: "In a manifest way the results appear to indicate, without question, that graduate students prefer to establish a separate graduate student association as over against (any other alternative)." In the light of subsequent events, the final words of the report take on some irony:

What needs to be done if the wishes of the graduate students are to be followed seems clear; the question now is how their wishes are to be implemented. We have only one word of caution to express in this regard. The questionnaire used in the Graduate Student Government Survey made it clear that the students were being asked to express their opinion and were not participating in an election. What ever proposals for action are ultimately made, their implementation should be pursued only after the graduate students have signified their approval via the ballot box.^[5]

A few days after the opinion survey had been distributed, an announcement appeared in the Daily Cal to the effect that a Committee for the Disassociation of Graduate Students from the ASUC was circulating a petition asking complete freedom from the ASUC. The petition protested against two aspects of the ASUC: excessive fees — it pointed out that beginning the following fall the students would have to pay an additional six dollars as Student Union fee — and the ASUC's ineffectiveness as a student government, partly because of its entering more completely into the fiold of recreation. The petition stated: "The ASUC seems to exist in spite of the students, not because of them.... It is obvious that the ASUC is directed by others than the student 'leaders' "^[6] This petition received over 1300 signatures, almost 25% of the graduate population.

From these two expressions of opinion, the most of the graduate students seems clear. They were not interested in taking part in, and helping to pay for, an organization which did not represent their interests. There was, however, little positive feeling expressed that they did not want their interests represented by any organization at all.

When the issue came before the Executive Committee on April 21, the graduate representatives and others emphasized in discussion that ExCom should act quickly to permit the graduates to decide on the form of organization they wished to form in the spring elections. Arleigh Williams, on the other hand, stressed that the most pressing issue for graduate students was disassociation rather than setting up a new government and said that ExCom should recommend to the Chancellor that the graduates "be given the opportunity to dis-associate." ^[7] The motion which finally passed ExCom on April 26 resolved "that the Executive Committee expresses its approval of a graduate student association," and set up a planning committee. ^[8] Two days after this resolution had passed, an editorial in the Daily Cal urged caution in the matter of disassociation: "A major drawback of completely separating a graduate association from the ASUC is that it would inevitably weaken student government. In the past few years the graduate representatives have taken a leading role in the attempt to make student serve the students, and not merely provide the exercise for political science majors." ^[9]

Three days later, on May 1, it was announced that the Chancellor's office had approved the disassociation of the graduate students from the ASUC, and that the decision had been reached "on the basis of the graduate survey... and the disassociation petition." ^[10] Until this time the prevalent assumption had been that the graduate students would have the opportunity to vote. Now the Daily Cal editorialized: "The action taken by the Chancellors's office... is an unfortunate and alarming example of administrative power used in an area where students should exert authority." ^[11] A letter to the Daily Cal at this time stated: "Many graduate students...suspect a plot to emasculate the growing political strength of grads in the campus community." ^[12] Finally, on May 22, just before the summer vacation, the Chancellor announced that as of September 1 "the graduate students shall be released from the ASUC as is their desire; the ASUC government shall be composed entirely of undergraduate students;" and that a graduate association "acceptable in purpose and structure" to the Chancellor and President could be established "should the graduate students request a separate association." ^[13]

On the basis of what expression of student opinion did the Chancellor initiate this action? The "official history" of the disassociation, released by the Chancellor's office in the fall of 1959 in response to protests, stated that EXCom had "formally and unanimously approved the idea of a separate graduate association" and that their decision was based "in large part" on the opinion poll. ^[14] Here, the EXCom resolution was taken as the official voice of the students and the opinion poll as simply advisory to that decision. EXCom, however, had approved a separate association, not recommended dis-association. Furthermore, the Chancellor's history did not mention that on May 26 EXCom had formally deplored the Chancellor's action as hasty and unauthorized. A resolution was passed "That the Executive Committee go on record as opposing disassociation until so voted by its (the ASUC's) graduate members." ^[15]

In the spring election of 1959, the last in which the graduates voted, SLATE had its greatest electoral success. For the only time, a SLATE member, Dave Armor, was elected to the prsidency of the ASUC. He was elected by a margin of 33 votes. Of the eleven positions open, four were filled by SLATE candidates. Two of these were graduats representatives, Marv Sternberg and Carey McWilliams, who were elected unopposed by the 874 graduates voting.^[16]

Unfortunately for SLATE, the duly elected graduate representatives were not allowed to complete their terms. On September 21, 1959, just after the fall semester had begun, Chancellor Seaborg sent a letter to Dave Armor which stated: "Effective this date, graduate students are no longer a part of the Associated Students of the University of California government and shall not be represented on the Executive Committee." ^[17] A few days later, EXCom unseated the graduate representatives. They, in turn, obtained an injunction from the Judicail Committee, prohibiting the Executive Committee from meeting until JCom could hear their appeal. After postponing their deliberations for one week to give the ASUC time to prepare its case, the Judicial Committee dismissed the case on the grounds that, "The petitionars in this case are not members of the Association of the Student Judicial Committee has no jurisdiction over any matter brought to it by or on behalf of non-members of the ASUC." ^[18]

The disfranchisement of the graduates had a serious effect on the fortune of SLATE. In the fall of 1959 elections three representatives-at-large for whom graduates could formerly vote, were chosen. None of them were members of SLATE. The three SLATE candidates lacked 282, 399, and 572 votes needed to win a seat. 842 fewer ballots were cast in this election than in the previous year. ^[19] In addition to its lack of electoral success since the disfranchisement, SLATE has had difficulty recruiting members among the graduate students. This is understandable, since SLATE's primary function has been to run candidates in ASUC elections. Probably not more than one graduate student who has come to the University since the disfranchisement has been actively involved with SLATE for any length of time. ^[20]

During the spring and fall semesters of 1959, discussions were carried on by a committee to attempt to decide what type of structure a graduate association should have if one were to be established. The committee, under the direction of Vice-Chancellor Sheriffs, was composed largely of graduate students. Once the question of disassociation had been settled, however, there was no apparent sense of urgency to the committee's deliberation. Finally, on February 9, 1960, it was announced that graduate students for the first time would vote on their government. The vote was only to determine whether they desired a "universal" graduate association, since, as it was explained, a voluntary association could always be formed by those interested. ^[21] On February 10, the Daily Cal editorialized against the proposal, pointing out that this would mean simply another compulsory membership organization. It is perhaps worth mentioning something the Daily Cal did not, that the Kerr directives of October, 1959 had placed sanctions on political statement by the Executive Committee of the ASUC specifically on the grounds that it represented a compulsory membership. On February 15, shortly before the vote took place, the Daily Cal announced that: "According to Sheriffs, to form a universal graduate association requires a majority vote of all graduate students registered. Therefore, all ballots marked 'no', all blank ballots and all bellots not cast will be counted as 'no' votes." ^[22] This type of no-abstension vote, unprecedented in University student elections, was not necessary to defeat the idea of a compulsory association: the move was defeated by a vote of 2,171 to 1,854, a margin of 217 votes. ^[23]

Since the defeat of a compulsory organization there have been repeated attempts to make the voluntary Graduate Student Association a useful and widely supported movement. In spite of these attempts, however, the GSA was recognized neither by the administration nor the graduate students as having an authoritative voice in graduate affairs. Its membership never included a larger number than the number of graduates who voted in ASUC elections. Although its purpose avowedly had been in part political, ^[24] the GSA never provided a center for the political interests of graduate students. Individual graduates have been responsible for several important political acts such as the vigil against nuclear testing in October, 1961, ^[25] but there has been no significant organizational link between the graduates as a group and the rest of the University community.

Why have the graduates not been able to sustain an effective voluntary organization? Perhaps the answer lies in the understandable tendency of graduates to interest themselves in ad hoc movements but not to maintain a constant interest in minor problems of politics and student welfare. Perhaps also the actions of the administration have, until now, discouraged the graduate students from a belief in the effectiveness of united protest.

Appendix on Student Activities

HUAC: May 1960—The events, the aftermath

The college administrator should be a man who defends the absolute right of his students to freely discuss and criticize any idea or issue. Instead, many presidents have become glorified press agents whose sole concern is selling their college and influencing a favorable public reaction to it...

If Cal succeeds in muzzling the students' governing body, next will come the newspaper and then the students...
—San Francisco Progress, May 16, 1960

This report discusses the consequences for student political activity at the University of California, Berkeley, of the hearings conducted by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in San Francisco May 12-14, 1960.

We are particularly concerned with the response of the University Administration to the pressures by the so-called riot of May, 1960. Despite the large body of literature available on HUAC, the film Operation Abolition, and the demonstrations themselves, it will be necessary to sketch the events briefly. It is our contention that the public attitude of neutrality displayed by the University Administration was fraudulent. The Administration's public statements, in which they claim respect for students' rights while avoiding criticism of any government agency, were combined with covert attacks upon basic students' rights. Many of these attacks will be covered in other reports, but this report will try to show how they relate to the San Francisco HUAC hearings of 1960.

It must be kept in mind that HUAC has always faced significant opposition in California. Congressman James Roosevelt, in a speech on the House Floor less than one month before the San Francisco hearings, described HUAC's previous activities in California and the opposition which these activities engendered:

We let the Committee do even worse things in California last year; it was one of the most shameful episodes in the history of this House. The Committee had subpoened 110 public school teachers in early June 1959. Most of the aubpoenas were served on the teachers at school at 9 o'clock in the morning of June 5....On August 21 the Committee announced that the hearings resulted in the unprecedented public censure of the Committee....

Whereupon the committee proceeded once again to defy both due process and common decency. It had its investigator Wheeler send copies of the files directly to officials of the counties in which the subpoened teachers were employed...

As a result of the Committee's action 4 public school teachers, out of a total of 111,500 have ceased teaching in the State...

But while the Committee's California operations produced so few actual casualties in the schools, more than 100 teachers have been in emotional turmoil for 10 months...The cost to the school system is incalculable....the overwhelming majority of the teachers subpoened are on probationary status with their contracts up for renewal in May. Despite the Committee's retreat some of these may be quietly eased out of the teaching profession by the simple expedient of not renewing their contracts....It may surprise you to know that in the entire annual report for the year 1959 there is nary a word mentioned about the postponed hearings on the State of California teaching profession. Nothing is said about the fact that the Communist operation among teachers in California is so extensive and malignant that additional investigative work must be done. No; nothing at all...

We have quoted this speech to indicate the legitimate depth of feeling shared by students, teachers, professors, community and church leaders in the Bay Area, towards this House Investigating Committee. This opposition to the Committee's tactics and goals was described by the California State Senate Un-American Activities Committee as "an unreasoning hatred toward the House Committee (brought about by) a steady barrage of insidious and extremely clever propaganda." It is also quoted to suggest that any view which calls the issue of the House Committee "off-campus" may be myopic, since one of the Committee's major targets has been California's educational institutions.

When the Committee announced that it was going to hold hearings in 1960, numerous groups joined the San Francisco Chronicle in condemning the Committee's reappearance, including 165 professors at San Francisco State College, faculty members from Stanford University and San Jose State College, the San Francisco Labor Council, the American Civil Liberties Union, the State Federation of Teachers, Local 6 ILWU, the First Unitarian Church of San Jose, the Berkeley YWCA, the East Bay Jewish Community Center, the Associated Students of Social Welfare at UC, the National Lawyers Guild, and 300 UC professors.

Naturally enough, since the issue involved them directly (over 25% of the subpoened witnesses were teachers, and a UC student had also been subpoened), students were in the forefront of the protest movement. According to Carl Werthman, in an article for New University Thought, the leadership for the UC student protest emerged from the following four groups of individuals:

1. Former leaders of the inactive Student Civil Liberties Union (SCLU), an affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union.
2. SLATE, an on-campus political party at that time.
3. The Young Peoples Socialist League.
4. Unorganized graduate students, who had been politically inactive during the McCarthy era.

All of these groups had a profound commitment to civil liberties before the Committee came to San Francisco.

About two weeks before the hearings began, Aryay Lenske, chairman of SLATE, and Gene Savin, former chairman of the then-inactive SCLU, called a meeting for those interested in protesting against HUAC. Approximately fifty people turned out at this first meeting, and they decided to form an ad hoc committee called Students for Civil Liberties (SCL) and to begin circulating a petition calling for the abolition of HUAC. This petition received 2,000 student signatures within four days. At the next meeting, the Students for Civil Liberties decided to hold a rally in San Francisco's Union Square and organize a picket line, both to coincide with the opening of the Committee's hearings.

After the rally some people went to City Hall and waited to get into the hearings (which were being held in the Board of Supervisors' room), while others joined the picket line of about 700 persons in front of the City Hall. It must be emphasized that the picket line outside, and not the demonstrators inside the City Hall, was the organized and intended vehicle for student protest. It was organized by the Students for Civil Liberties, planned well in advance, and was well monitored, orderly, and peaceful from beginning to end.

Those students who did attempt to get into the hearings Thursday afternoon were ignored in favor of people carrying white passes issued by HUAC. The Committee investigator Wheller (the man who gave HUAC's files to the California school boards) said, "there were about 150 passes. I issued them to individuals—to keep the Commies from stacking the meeting. We wanted some decent people in there." It should be noted that the number of passes is misleading; each pass admitted up to five people. (The hearing room held around 200 persons.) On Thursday afternoon, there was disorder inside the hearing room, and witness Archie Brown was ejected. This got the big headlines for the day, and the rally and demonstration outside was pushed off the front pages.

Originally, the students had not planned any protests for Friday. Midterms were coming up, Thursday had been a tiring day, and HUAC was planning hearings on Saturday, and leaders hoped for a big turnout then. The disorder inside the hearing room on Thursday, however, made it necessary for leaders to call another orderly demonstration, because 1) they were denied the publicity they had been seeking and 2) they had to be present to make sure that students who were there could be controlled. Leaflets again asserting the passive, non-violent approach were handed out to the participants.

Once again the white card system of admissions to the hearings was a sore point, and the situation became explosive on Friday morning when white card holders were admitted before students who had been in line for hours. Student leaders, anxious to preserve order, met with Sheriff Carberry, who said that he would ask the Committee to reconsider its white card policy and admit everyone on a first-come, first-served basis in the afternoon. The sheriff also promised to be on the scene all day. However, the actual events of Friday afternoon turned out quite differently;

Radio reporter Fred Haines describes those events below:

The "Friends of the Committee" gathered just to the right of this line (the line of students who had been waiting for several hours)...As I watched, (Police Inspector Michael) McGuire opened a way through the center barricade and began to admit the white card holders one at a time; for a moment the waiting crowd paused, and then an angry roar went up. Those in the rear, who were halfway down the stairs and couldn't see what was going on began to edge forward and in the resulting crush began to press the flimsy saw-horse barricade toward me and the police officers who leaped forward to hold it. Angry cries of "Hold it! Stop pushing!" came from those in front; the barricade held and the police pushed it back to its original position...

The Barricade back and the crowd quiet, McGuire suddenly noticed that the white card holders, who were still filing through, included in their number some students—he lunged forward and grabbed one of them roughly. The student wrenched himself free, shouting angrily, "I've got a white card!" McGuire taken aback, let go and seized another by the lapels of his jacket—the young man thrust a 35mm camera in McGuire's face and tripped the shutter. Again McGuire let go, and several students managed to slip into the Chambers.

...Already the singing was beginning again...There was only one last move; the picket monitors and others began passing the word to sit down on the floor...

Four or five minutes had passed since the doors were closed on the expectant crowd, and the crisis was safely over. I supposed that the police might begin wholesale arrests shortly, but the possible eruption of violence had been neatly averted, with the vast majority of the crowd safely self-immobilized on the floor...

Moments later, an attorney who was representing two of the witnesses made his way across the rotunda and arrived behind the barricades just in time to see McGuire opening one of the hydrants. He ran over to the officer shouting, "You can't do this to these kids." McGuire shrugged him off. An officer behind the center barricade picked up the nozzle of one of the fire hoses which had been unrolled from the floor and pointed it at several students sitting just beyond the barricade. "You want some of this?" he shouted. "Well you're going to get it." One of the young men waved at him and kept on singing. A trickle dripped from the nozzle, a spurt, bubbly with air—and then the hose stiffened with the full pressure of the water, which blasted into the group of seated demonstrators.

The rotunda seemed to erupt. The singing broke up into one gigantic horrified scream. People fled past me as I ran forward, trying to see what was going on; a huge sheet of spray, glancing off one granite pillar, flashed through the air in front of me, and I retreated....

For the first time I had a moment to think, to take stock of the situation....during the past few minutes they'd dumped thousands of gallons of water inside a public building, causing several thousand dollars worth of damage (not counting whatever human injury there had been). And they had accomplished nothing. Perhaps 50 people of the 200 had fled...now they had 150 people wet, angry, and injured, most of whom were rooted to the spot and determined to make as much noise as ever before. (quoted in Student, see ref.)

Police violence during the "riot", which resulted in the arrest of 68 persons, has been well documented in many articles, (See for example: the May 14, 1960 article in the San Francisco Chronicle.)

The next day, partly as a response to the brutality demonstrated by the police on the previous day, and partly as a continued exression of opposition to the Committee itself, between 1500 and 2000 persons picketed the last session of the Committee's hearings. Besides the picket line, about 3500 predominantly anti-Committee spectators massed outside the building.

Community response to the demonstrations—that is, to the events of Friday afternoon—were, of course, negative and indignant, as reflected in the editorials of the San Francisco papers. However, as evidence of police brutality mounted, the charges against all but one of the demonstrators were soon dropped. That one demonstrator, Robert Meisenbach, who was charged with beating a police officer (and was alleged by the Committee to have started the "riot" by jumping over the police barricade), was tried almost a year later; he was acquitted of the charges against him. The decision by the jury and the testimony of witnesses in the trial itself, substantially disproved the Committee's charges of student violence and other inaccuracies reported by the Committee and the Press following the May 14 "riot". As the San Jose Mercury editorialized a few days after the trial:

Unless the House Committee wishes to attack the integrity of the court or the jury that heard the Meisenbach case, it stands convicted of a grievous misstatement of fact regarding the manner in which the riot got under way. Such lack of regard for accuracy can only result in a further diminution of public confidence in the Committee.

The response of the House Committee on Un-American Activities to the events of the demonstration was quite in line with the tactics and beliefs of its members: it labelled the demonstrations "Communist inspired", the students as Communist dupes, and proceeded to produce the now famed film, Operation Abolition, which proported to give the facts about the events in San Francisco. This film, shown throughout the country, was filled with inaccuracies and distortion of facts, as eye-witnesses have testified; it was a piece of propaganda used by the Committee to justify its own existence. The Hoover Report titled Communist Target—Youth, which appeared on July 18, 1960 about a month before Operation Abolition was released, contained the same inaccuracies as appear in the film and seemed also to be a propaganda production of the Committee, since it was not an official FBI report and since it also bears the name of HUAC. According to David Horowitz, in Student, the information in the Hoover Report "was drawn entirely from police reports...which were totally discredited at the Meisenbach trial in the spring. Moreover, as William Sullivan, an investigator for the FBI, admitted on campus on November 28, 1960, not a single student was interviewed in the preparation of this report."

We are, of course, most interested in the response of the University community to the 1960 HUAC demonstrations. The Student, faculty, and administration action and reaction stemming from these events extends over a long period of time and involves a large number of people. Therefore, a rather lengthy discussion of these repercussions follow.

The repercussions of the demonstration for the University community were many and diverse. For organizational purposes, we will divide these repercussions into the following categories: 1) Immediate action and reaction—administration, faculty, students; 2) Specific action and reaction—the cases of individual students; 3) Later action and reaction—students, faculty, and administration.

(1) Immediate Action and Reaction.

In response to the events of May 13 and the attacks upon the University and its students resulting therefrom, students quickly organized and prepared themselves to meet the HUAC controversy head on. It must be said that in general the HUAC "riots" helped generate and revive student organizations throughout the State. TASK at San Jose State and SCOPE at San Francisco State were given shots in the arm by the revival of interest generated by the police riot and the film Operation Abolition. At our campus, two groups took upon themselves the responsibility of meeting the Committee's charges against the students and disseminating the facts of the HUAC demonstration. The first group, formed shortly after the demonstrations, was an organization known as BASCAHUAC (Bay Area Student Committee for the Abolition of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee), formed to combat the Committee in general and the film Operation Abolition in particular. Under the leadership of Burton White, Irving Hall, and others, BASCAHUAC printed and sold numerous pamphlets concerning HUAC and the riots. The second group which became a spokesman for student protest against the Committee and its film was the already existing student organization SLATE. Besides printing leaflets and organizing meetings and rallies protesting the Committee and clarifying the events of May 13, SLATE took it upon itself to distribute a record, titled Sounds of Protest, produced by student Gerry Gray, which tried to present a factual account of the May 13 "riot" as a retort to the Committee's film, Operation Abolition. This record was advertised and sold through such national magazines as the Nation, and was one of the major factors in SLATE'S change of status by the administration a year after the riots (June, 1961). This later repercussion of the HUAC demonstration (SLATE becoming off-campus) will be discussed in detail in Section (3). Immediate student sentiment was also expressed in editorials and letters in the Daily Californian, in which students showed general disgust for the police action and sympathy with the student demonstrators.

The faculty at Cal, and professors and at other Bay Area schools, also expressed concern for student demonstrators and dismay with the police involved in the May 13 incident. As reported in the Daily Californian on May 18, UC faculty members formed an advisory committee of Bay Area college faculty members to advise students involved in the protest, to ascertain the facts surrounding the "riot", and to raise funds for the defense of the arrested students. Among those faculty members involved were UC professors Phillip Selznick, Sociology, Henry Nash Smith, English, Kenneth Stampp, History, and Lewis Feuer, Philosophy. On May 19, the Daily Californian reported that the California State Federation of Teachers passed a resolution praising the demonstrators and condemning police action, and said that they would raise funds for the defense of the arrested students. 84 professors from Stanford University sent a petition to the Mayor of San Francisco, stating: "The evidence drives us to conclude that the police acted with unwarranted brutality....Our understanding of the evidence also leads us to declare that, contrary to a wide misinterpretation in the press, the demonstration was for the most part a responsible protest by mature college students against what they deeply felt to be the committee s intolerable infringement on civil freedom.

The administration s attitude immediately following the demonstrations was one of apparent neutrality. Clark Kerr and Glen Seaborg's public statement after the "riot" stated that the students went there as private individuals or as members of voluntary organizations. They were not in any way representing the University or the student association. Their actions as individuals off-campus on non-University matters are outside the sphere of the University, (S.F. Examiner, May 16). While apparently neutral (i.e. this issue does not involve the University; the students acted as individuals on an off-campus issue), the University administration also conceived of itself as having the right to act in this off- campus matter, that is, to punish the students on-campus for their off-campus activities. In the same article in the Examiner on May 16, it is stated: "A UC spokesman said the Cal students among those arrested could be disciplined but that any such action would have to await the police report." What the administration is saying is really quite incredible: they have the power, if they see fit—and depending upon police reports (very reliable sources)—to punish their students on campus for legal, constitutionally protected off-campus activities. What the University would have done if the charges hadn't been dropped against all but one of the arrested students is wholly a matter of conjecture. What is clear, however, is that the Administration would not have felt that they were unable to punish students for "their actions as individuals off-campus." It must be pointed out that the administration at no time issued a statement supporting the student demonstrators or criticizing the violence of the police or the tactics and goals of the Committee.

(2) Specific action and Reaction—Individual Students under Attack.

As a result of their participation in the demonstration against HUAC in May 1960, several University students came under special attack. Three foreign students were denied extensions of their visas: Mary McIntosh, Christopher Bacon, and John Johnston. The first two had been arrested, Johnson had not, but it must be remembered that all charges against the arrested students were dropped (except in Meisenbach's case) and that no one was convicted of any crime. The administration remained neutral on all three matters. The Johnston case aroused the most furor in the University and in the larger community, because he needed only six months to complete his doctoral thesis in physics. Students organized a petition campaign to have Johnston's visa renewed. The National Students Association passed a resolution urging the Immigration and Naturalization Service to reconsider its decision. According to David Horowitz, in Student, 500 graduate and undergraduate students attended a meeting at which this resolution was read. As a result of community criticism, the immigration Service revised its decision in the Johnston case and extended his visa for six months. However, the other two foreign students were not allowed to remain in this country.

A second case of individual harassment of a student demonstrator was that of Jane O Grady. Miss O Grady was a graduate student in sociology and had received a Coro Foundation internship for the year following her participation in the HUAC demonstrations, during which she was arrested. In the fall of 1960, the Coro Foundation withdrew its grant to Miss O Grady saying that it had taken such action to maintain "a free flow of communication" within the Coro Foundation. It added that the Coro Foundation must "abstain from any political participation and to diligently keep clear of all controversial matters." Of course, the elimination of Miss O Grady by the Coro Foundation proved to be one of the biggest controversies in the aftermath of the hearings. The San Francisco Labor Council sent a CORO public service award which it had received back to the Coro Foundation with the notation "unwanted" on it. The next year the Berkeley Chapter of the American Association of University Professors threatened to withdraw its support of the Coro Foundation unless a $2500 Coro internship was restored to Jane O Grady. (Reported in the Chronicle, June 1, 1961). The UC students again expressed their protest through petition. Furthermore, a motion was introduced in the Executive Committee of the ASUC criticizing the Coro Foundation for its actions. It is in this incident that one again sees the administration's policy of "neutrality" in action. The administration s representative to Ex Comm advised Ex Comm that action on the O Grady case would be illegal, since the issue was off-campus (the Coro Foundation was off-campus). However, the administration failed to notice that Miss O Grady was indeed an on- campus issue—she was a student at the University. Be that as it may, the Ex Comm took the administration's advice and failed to pass the resolution.

(3). Later Action and Reaction.

In this section we will describe incidents in which the true character of the administration's neutrality is revealed. All three incidents reported here in some way involve repressions of civil liberties by the administration. All imply the administration's sensitivity to political pressures, a sensitivity which allows them (or forces them) to act in nonlibertarian ways. All three reflect the inconsistency of the administration's off-campus/on-campus dichotomy, for they show that while the administration may be firm in preventing students or faculty members from acting on what the administration defines as off-campus issues, the administration itself will respond to off-campus pressures in making policy for the entire University community.

The first incident involves a U.C. professor of philosophy, John R. Searle. Late in the fall semester of 1960-61, Professor Searle was invited by the Law Students Association to speak at Boalt Hall after the showing of the Committee's film, Operation Abolition. According to Professor Searle, the film was to be shown on a Friday at around 12:30 P.M.

At about 11:30 I received a telephone call from (a Law Professor) with the following information: Professor Keeler of the Law School and Vice Chancellor Kragen had forbidden my speech in Boalt Hall. The meeting, they said, was in violation of the Kerr Directives, because seven days notice is required for such a meeting and no such notice had been given. However, the authorities were prepared to waive the requirements of the Kerr directives provided that either (a) the film be shown by itself without any speaker afterwards, or (b) another speaker be brought in to oppose my speech on the film. But under no conditions was I to be allowed to speak unchallenged about the film. The reason for this, I was told, was the speech was controversial, and a controversial speech required a speech on the opposite side.

As Professor Searle points out, the assumption by those adminstrators involved in the decision was "that the film itself was not controversial but was a neutral document over which controversy might range", hence the possibility of showing the film by itself. Given the ruling by the administration, Professor Searle and the Law Students Association could 1) show the film without a speaker, 2) show the film to a large group, and then allow Professor Searle to speak in a professor's class (a professor can invite a speaker to his class without getting anybody's approval), 3) Cancel both film and speech, 4) show the film in Boalt Hall and have Professor Searle speak somewhere off-campus afterward. The latter was the course taken; Professor Searle spoke in a fraternity house across the street from Boalt Hall.

This incident raises the following questions and problems:

1). Why was it not in violation of the seven day rule to hold a debate on the film, while it was in violation of that rule to have Professor Searle speak alone? It will be recalled that one of the alternatives offered by the administration was to show the film and have a debate—without seven days notice being required in that case.

2). Why was permission granted to show the film without any speaker? The administration's answer to this question was that the showing of the film was to be part of a law class. This was not true; although originally scheduled for a law class, interest in the film was so great that the Law Students Association instead sponsored the film and advertised as open to the public. About 150-200 persone attended the film. Professor Searle's speech was advertised, along with the film, as open to the public, since it was to be a part of the same program as the film showing.

3). The third question was raised by Professor Searle, and we quote him:

What right do administrative officers have to forbid faculty members to address student groups, and what was the nature of this administrative act in this case? University Regulation No. 17...states "Applications for permission to hold special meetings or events must be filed at least a week in advance." ...It is not stated explicitly that the rule applies to speeches given by members of the University faculty as well as off-campus speakers, and it would be interesting to know if it has been invoked against a faculty member. There is, it seems to me, some reason for supposing that the invocation of the rule in the present case was somewhat unusual. First, because apparently an agreement was made to waive the rule provided certain conditions were met. There are no conditions or procedures for waiver stated in the rule. Second, the Law Students Association is not in the habit of complying with the rule (so I was told) and it is not usually invoked against them (I was told this, I have no way of knowing if it is true or false). Third, at least one student group, the Graduate Philosophy Club, never complies with this rule and it is never invoked against them. In fact a recent meeting of the Philosophy Club addressed by Professor Mates was a violation of Regulation 17 on no less than three counts...No one seemed to mind too much. Fourth, the film was shown to the radiation laboratory with a speaker who spoke in favor of the film. They obtained no administrative permission and as far as I know no action was taken against them for their failure to do so. All of these considerations raised the following question in my mind: Was the rule invoked as a technicality to facilitate the silencing of a view considered uncongenial? (Emphasis added)

4). The last series of questions were also raised by Professor Searle, and again we wish to quote him:

What is the attitude, if any, of the University toward my making public oriticism of this film? The film is implicitly at least a smear on this university and its students, and audiences I have encountered regard it as such. I construe myself in giving these talks as defending the University...Yet in the Law School affair the attitude of at least some officials appeared to be that the film was noncontroversial, but that to oppose it, i.e. to advance the view that our students are not Communist dupes, is highly controversial and requires rebuttal. (Emphasis added).

The actions by the University in this case make highly questionable the earlier pose of neutrality taken by the administration on the HUAC demonstrations. In this case the University acted to repress a critic of the Committee's film (a film which does indeed attack certain University students) on technical grounds, which, as Professor Searle points out, are extremely dubious.

A second repercussion of the HUAC demonstrations was the resignation of the Daily Californian staff on October 24, 1960. The link between the Daily Cal's staff resignation and the HUAC demonstration is established in the San Francisco News-Call Bulletin article on October 24, 1960.

A long standing hassle over politics—dating back to the student riots at City Hall last spring—blew up today with the mass resignation of the staffs of the University of California's Daily Californian and Four other student publications....

The mass resignation was touched off when the student executive board voted to change its bylaws to provide for appointment of a "campus at large" member to one of the top 10 positions on the daily's staff.

Silver (the Daily Cal editor) and his fellows called this "ridiculous and odious" and "incompatible with the best interests of the university community."...

It (the row) flared last spring when the paper urged students to demonstrate against the House Un-American Activities committee at its City Hall hearing—a demomstration which turned into a wild riot.

Again this semester, the paper took unprecendented action and indorsed the candidacy of Mike Tigar for the post of student representative at large.

The bylaws permit political indorsements by the paper when seven of the top ten editors agree—but the privilege had never before been exercised.

The Ex Com members feelings were lacerated by the fact that the papers candidate, Mike Tigar, was the candidate of SLATE...

When the executive committee voted the change in the bylaws last night, the Daily Cal staff was followed out in the resignation parade by editors of the Pelican, humor magazlne; Blue and Gold, the yearbook; Occident, the literary publication, and the California Engineer.

Traditionally the Daily Cal editors have been chosen by the editors of the previous year.

Candidates work their way up through the ranks....

Until now, however, it (the ASUC executive board) has not interfered with the staff's editorial appointment procedure granting its approval of whatever names were submitted.

Dan Silver, the resigning editor of the Daily Cal, was the assistant editor who wrote the editorials attacking HUAC in May of 1960; he was also the assistant editor who wrote anti-Communist editorials during the spring 1960 term. However, when he was appointed Chief editor at the end of the spring 1960 semester, after the Daily Cal had been under attack by members of the Committee and others for being a leftist or "pink sheet," the Executive Committee considered a motion to review the appointments of the top four editors; after a long debate, the motion was defeated. In the fall semester, however the student government found a way to "legally" remove the editors of the Daily Cal.

Since the subject of the Daily Cal resignations is covered extensively in another appendix. we shall not give here a detailed analysis of the events surrounding the strike, except to point out that 1) the action of the Ex Com was an attempt to silence a political viewpoint, not an attempt to enforce existing regulations, since the Daily Cal had the right to endorse candidates; 2) the political viewpoint which the Ex Com attacked definitely included anti-HUAC sentiment, and such sentiment had been heavily criticized by individuals outside the University community for being "Communist inspired" and "pinko" (see, for example, the Committee's film, Operation Abolition); and 3) there is good evidence that the administration supported the actions of Ex Com to change the Daily Cal bylaws and wanted more direct control of the political opinions expressed by the Daily Cal staff (for documentation, see the Appendix on the Daily Cal Strike.)

A third repercussion, occurring about a year after the "riot" and revealing the non-neutrality of the administration on the HUAC controversy, was the change of SLATE's status from on-campus to off-campus. Since the events leading up to Slate's change of status are complex and somewhat confusing, we shall try to outline clearly these events in order to develop the connection between the HUAC demonstration and the administration's action on SLATE, and will attempt to explain why such a connection could exist.

1) It must be kept in mind that SLATE was the major permanent on-campus student organization which organized the HUAC demonstration; It was a major center of all political activity on campus during the year preceding and following the "riot", as the State Committee on Un-American Activities points out in their 1961 report. Furthermore, SLATE distributed the record, Sounds of Protest, produced as a rebuttal to the Committee's film Operation Abolition and advertised throughout the country. This record is indirectly involved with the events leading to SLATE's exit as an on- campus group, as will be documented later. In sum, SLATE was probably the most vocal and active on-campus critic of the Committee, and was a leader in almost all political activities on campus.

2) As mentioned above, SLATE was the distributor of the record Sounds of Protest, with production and ownership of the business in the hands of individual students. As a matter of policy, the UC administration was notified of this arrangement and an advance copy of the record was submitted to one of the deans for auditing. The university apparently had no questions of especial substance about the record, but before Christmas vacation in 1960 a summons came requesting that one of the producers see Vice Chancellor Kragen concerning the proposed advertisement of the record. At this point no advertisements had yet appeared, but copy for them had been made and the university notified of its content. For purposes of identification, the advertisement explained that the distributor, SLATE, was an officially recognized student political party at the University of California, Berkeley. The following is an account by Gerry Gray, producer of the record, of his meeting with Vice Chancellor Kragen in December, 1960:

Though I did not see any other way of identifying SLATE (than as it is above), I had wondered about a possible legal question arising in this area. My attorney, however, advised me that in his opinion such identification was within the law. It was well that I had checked this particular point with my lawyer, for the first line of argument taken with me (by Vice Chancellor Kragen) was that the proposed mention of the University's name was in violation of the law. I replied that I had a contrary legal opinion and that I thought, therefore, that the issue had at least not been settled by law. The legal line of argument ceased there and I was next told that the administration would prefer that I not proceed with sale of the record because any further connection of the University with the demonstrations could seriously affect its possibilities for getting funds, including government money, and because such connection would also affect the University's image with prospective U.C. students in other parts of the country. The reliance on this argument, rather than the legal one, seemed to indicate, although it did not prove, that the legal question was open, or at least that the University did not wish to resolve the problem through legal means. Unless I had first sought legal advice on the legal question, this second argument used by the Vice Chancellor, which seemed to tell a great deal, might not have arisen. (Emphasis added).

This account is important because it shows that the first complaint registered by the administration about SLATE's identification was directly related to SLATE s sponsorship of the record Sounds of Protest, a rebuttal to the Committee's film, Operation Abolition; it is even more important because it reveals the administration's motivations in wishing SLATE not to identify itself as an on-campus political party: the university could not get funds, or would receive a bad image if it were in any way connected with the HUAC demonstrations.

3). On March 22, 1961, one day before SLATE sponsored Frank Wilkinson to speak on campus, President of the State Senate Hugh Burns predicted the loss of campus rights for SLATE. "Eventually," he said in the Daily Cal, "SLATE will be exposed for what it is—and I think that there is a possibility that they will lose their campus group rights." Assemblyman Don Mulford said on the sameday: "I think they (SLATE) have outlived their usefulness—if they ever had any." I have reason to believe that the university will look into SLATE." These statements are most remarkable in that 1) SLATE was indeed soon "exposed for what it is"—by Senator Burns himself in the Burns Un-American Activities Committee Report of 1961, to be discussed below, and 2) the University shortly carried out the predictions of these political figures.

4). On March 30, 1961, SLATE was notified by Dean Shepard that its identification as a student political party in the advertisement for the HUAC record was in violation of its agreement with the University in 1958 specifically not to so describe itself if it was to obtain the status "officially recognized" student organization. Such a status permitted SLATE to hold meetings on campus, etc. While it is true that describing itself as a political party was a violation of its original agreement with the University, many people questioned the motives behind the administration's letter of March 30, since after 1958 SLATE had gradually slipped into the habit of describing itself as a student political party without the administration once calling the original agreement to its attention or once chastizing the student newspaper for so identifying SLATE. In fact, Dean Shepard himself admits this fact in his letter of March 30 to SLATE when he said, "During the past three years, such terminology has been increasingly used by yourself and by others to describe your organization." (Emphasis added) In his letter, Shepard warned that SLATE "must abide by the original terms of recognition and refrain from identifying itself as 'a student political party'," particularly in the advertisement of the record Sounds of Protest. At this point no threat to throw SLATE off-campus was made.

5). On May 11, 1961, Mike Myerson, then chairman SLATE, was called into Dean Shepard's office to discuss a leaflet which used the phrase "campus political party. At this time, Myerson spologized and explained that the leaflet had been written by someone who had no known about the March 30th letter, an explanation which Shepard said in a letter, later, he was willing to accept as reasonable. Shepard then told Myerson that SLATE was not to use the term "political party" again. This Myerson promised to do.

6). According to the S.F. Chronicle (June 13, 1961) the university was given a copy of the State Un-American Activities Committee 1961 Report—hereafter referred to as the Burns Report in honor of its chairman Hugh Burns—on Thursday, June 8, 1961. This report, released to the public on June 13, 1961, called SLATE the perpretrator of communist propaganda, and the leader in the HUAC demonstrations. Most of the report, in fact, was an "expose" of SLATE's "subversive activities". The report also attacked University President Kerr, stating that he had opened the campus gates to "communists, faculty members, students, and anyone else who cares to utilize the university property as a brawling ground for political controversy."

7). On June 9, 1961 Dean Shepard sent a letter to Mike Myerson informing him that henceforth SLATE "may in no way identify itself with the University nor use any of its facilities, including those under the supervision of the Associated Students." It is extremely important to note why, according to the administration, SLATE's status was changed. It will be recalled that Dean Shepard had warned on May 11 that SLATE was not to identify itself as an on-campus political party again. After May 11, SLATE did not violate the administrations ruling on identification. Rather, the violation which the administration cited was the signing of a telegram to Ohio State (about Frank Wilkinson) sent by SLATE on April 17, 1961. According to Dean Shepard in his letter, he had not been aware of the telegram on May 11, but was now using it as evidence of a SLATE violation "which occurred after due warning." But there had been no SLATE violation after May 11th, and it should be remembered that before April 17 SLATE had received only one official notification of its violation of University policy in which warning was directed primarily at the advertisement for the record. Perhaps this is Shepard's definition of "due warning"; his actions, however, fit the definition of ex post facto, and seem to be a violation of due process, since SLATE was permanently dropped from on-campus status without a hearing. If there had, in fact, been a hearing, Myerson would have testified that he had neither seen nor approved the phrase "campus political party" attached to his name on the telegram of April 17.

8). On June 13, 1961 the Burns Report was released to the public. The headline in the Chronicle was "U. C. Under Fire In State Senate's Subversive Study." In its article, the Chronicle said that the Burns Report "made it clear that the Committee favors a clampdown on the campus activities of students and teachers, closer control of the campus newspaper, and a ban on campus talks by communists." Later in the article, the Chronicle noted that "University officials announced Saturday that SLATE had been suspended for 'identifying itself as a political party' in violation of campus regulations. They made no reference to the Senate Committee Report." In another article on the same day, titled "Timing of Ban on SLATE Argued", the Chronicle reports:

University of California officials denied yesterday that a lengthy adverse report on Slate by a State Senate Sub-committee had anything to do with their kicking the controversial group off campus. The report by the Senate a Fact Finding Sub-committee on Un-American Activities is being released to the public today, but it was given to the news media—and to the university—last Thursday.

The article stated that the University insists its decision to make SLATE off-campus was made on June 6,-2 days before it received the Burns Report. The article went on to say that when Dean Shepard was asked what would have happened to SLATE if its members had continued their political activities but obeyed the order not to call themselves a political party, he declined to comment. The article concludes by stating:

Indeed, the prevailing attitude of the University's officials seemed to be a hope that any further furor over the organization famed for its ability to arouse furor, would vanish with the end of the semester. (Emphasis added).

To what conclusion does this chain of events lead? It seems to us that the evidence is too convincing to allow us to accept the administration's interpretation of their own action. The technical grounds for SLATE's removal from on-campus status are too weak, the manner in which they were applied too arbitrary and too questionable, to allow us to conclude that the University was only enforcing regulations and was acting solely as a neutral bureaucracy. The "coincidental" timing of the statements by Burns and Mulford (March 22) and the first letter sent to SLATE (March 30), the release of the Burns Report to the University (June 8) and the change in SLATE's status (June 9) because of a violation in the past, argue that the University's action against SLATE was the administration's response to intensive political pressure exerted upon them. Even if the Administration's claim is true—i.e. that their decision to revoke SLATE's status was made on June 6 before they received the Burns Report—, still the University was well aware that they were under heavy attack by certain political groups because of student political activity on campus. And the center of student political activity had been Slate. The statements by Burns and Mulford, the protest by certain individuals and groups against Wilkinson's right to speak on campus, the Committee's films and statements, the Hoover Report, and the influence that these documents had on people throughout the nation—all these created an adverse image of the University with which the administration could not be pleased, especially when it sought government subsidies.

We cannot help but conclude, therefore, that the "neutral" administration succumbed to off-campus (pro-HUAC) political pressures, and now played an active role in repressing on-campus student political activity.

Free Speech 1959

In March 1959, Slate decided to hold a rally on campus at the Oak Tree in support of Proposition C, the Berkeley Fair Housing Ordinance. Written request for permission was made to the Dean of Students Office. Dean H. E. Stone's reply, on March 9, cited Section 20220 of the Education Code, which prohibits use of the name 'University of California' or any abbreviation of it, or any name of which these words are a part.

"...to display, advertise, or announce this name publicly at or in connection with any meeting, assembly, or demonstration, or any propaganda, advertising or promotional activity of any kind which has for...any part of its purpose the support, endorsement, advancement, opposition or defeat of any strike, lockout, or boycott of any political, religious, sociological (sic), or economic movement, activity or program."

Stone's letter went on to say:

"Under the statute and the general limitations upon the University engaging in political activity, recognized University organizations may not, as such organizations, take positions on political and related controversies, such as Proposition C. Nor may they use University facilities for meetings designed to solicit support for or opposition to such a proposition. Therefore I cannot approve your request made on behalf of Slate which is one of our University recognized student organizations. Students in their individual capacities or as members of groups not recognized by the University are, of course, free to engage in political activity off the campus."^[1]

(This statement of policy might be compared with the events cited in, e.g., the appendices on the Kerr Directives and on Patterns Of ASUC Activity, as well as Appendix B, to indicate why the contradictions and inconsistencies of the Administration's applications of its policie perturbed the students and led to the events which followed.)

On March 10, the Daily Californian reported:

"Dave Armor rep-at-large and former vice-chairman of Slate, told the Daily Cal yesterday that it seemed to him that 'this ruling is just another way of preventing students from speaking freely on issues that concern them...Proposition C is not an issue remote from the students on this campus; on the contrary, it affects all minority group students and faculty who attend the University. It seems ironic that there was no hesitation when it came to actively supporting Proposition 3 [a bond issue for the University] in the state election.' "

Slate next scheduled a noon meeting to protest the ban. Cindy Lembcke was again called in to see Dean Stone and told that this meeting too could not be held. She reported this to the Daily Californian and on March 11, 1959 they wrote:

"...Stone prohibited the meeting on the grounds that 'it is not of general student concern,' according to Slate chairman Cindy Lembcke...Among other steps taken the Slate committee drafted a telegram which was sent to President Clark Kerr and to the Chairman of the Board of Regents, Donald McLaughlin. The text of the telegram is as follows.

"'This morning Dean Hurford E. Stone arbitrarily refused to grant Slate a permit for an outside meeting to discuss Dr. Sheriff's recent ruling concerning activities of recognized student organizations.

"'This refusal relates not to the discussion of non-campus issues, but to the right of student organizations to discuss University policy in reference to student organizations.

"'This would appear to be in contradiction to Dr. Sheriff's recent ruling, concerning the nature of those topics which may be discussed by a recognized student organization. Knowing your concern with such civil-libertarian issues, your opinion and action is respectfully requested.' "

The American Civil Liberties Union also became interested in the dispute. On March 12, 1959, the Daily Cal reported:

"The American Civil Liberties Union is stepping into the current dispute over the banning of a Slate rally in support of Proposition C.

"Ernest Besig, Executive Director of the ACLU, Northern California branch, told the Daily Californian yesterday that his organization has sent a letter to Chancellor Seaborg requesting clarification of the situation.

"Specifically, the ACLU is asking whether Dean Stone, in banning the rally under a section of the State Code, based his decision on any legal opinion. If so, the ACLU has asked for a copy of the opinion.

"Secondly, the ACLU has asked the Chancellor if Dean Stone's action had the Chancellors' approval and backing.

"Besig expressed the opinion that the Educational Code provision cited by Stone in his ruling had no bearing in this case and that Stone's interpretation of the provision was a 'tortured' one.

"Besig goes on 'There was never any intention, when the statute was passed, that it should apply in a case like this,' Besig said. The legislators had in mind the use of the name 'University' by the YMCA,' he said. After passage of the statute, the local YMCA had to change its name...."

According to Ken Cloke, Slate decided to hold the rally with or without Dean Stone's approval. The following events were described by Ken Cloke. The rally was held at the Oak tree and at Sather Gate. Roughly 300 people spoke there although they knew that the rally had been prohibited by the Administration. About a week later, some of the leaders of Slate and same of the persons who spoke at the rally were called before the Student-Faculty committee on Student Conduct. The Committee hearings are private. Nevertheless, approximately 500 students went to the hearings and said that they too had spoken at the rally and that whatever action was taken against some must be taken against all. The committee discontinued its hearings and no further measures were taken against the students who spoke.

Information about Report

Confused Poop Sheet for Research on Repression in Berkeley

We are preparing a 30 to 50,000 word report on the history of repression at Berkeley. We believe we can show that a broad spectrum of incidents and measures have had a massive repressive effect upon all forms of student-citizen involvement in social and political activity. The result has been to cripple the leadership of such activity, to demolish its organs of communication, and to cripple the organizations responsible for the educating and mobilizing functions of this activity.

This report will be directed to the Chancellor's (new) committee, to the Academic Senate, to Chancellor Kerr and Governor Brown, and be made generally available to students and faculty (in the interests of their education.) We hope that it will serve as a theoretical framework for future action in the field of civil liberties and possibly as an informational resource for court or other actions, as well as provide a brief account (!) of some aspects of student activity and the responses such activity has engendered.

We desperately need research and background material on specific organizations and topics. These pages are meant as a general indication of the type of material needed, and as a plea for assistance from anyone able and willing to help.

Information On Organizations, Etc.

This is a brief sketch of the types of information needed:

In respect to all the above types of information, the following should be observed:

This brief (!!) guide is of course an impossible job; but some approach to fulfilling it must be made. Any of the above information MUST be given in writing (typed, if possible), and in a fairly coherent and organized form. The problems of coordinating and handling the material obviously preclude verbal communications being very helpful.

Finally, time is short. We should like to have the report ready by the first of November, in order that it may be given to the study committee. This is, clearly, an impossible task: but it must be done. Hence, even partial coverage of the above topics is desperately needed. People are needed for research (e.g. newspaper files) and interviewing; at the end of this leaflet appears a list of people covering specific topics who need help or will be able to direct help to where it is needed.

Information Sheet for Research on Repression in Berkeley

We are compiling a report on repression at Berkeley. The project is massive and complex, and much aid is needed. This information sheet describes the general nature and goals of the report, indicates specific areas of work in which help is needed, and provides some general guidlines upon which to base research on specific topics.

The central thesis of the report is fairly simple. In the past seven years there has been a broadening concern on the part of the student-citizen with social and political activity. The 'movement' this concern has produced, and in which it is embodied, has evoked in response a wide spectrum of incidents and measures which have tended to severely repress this 'movement' and to infringe the civil liberties of participants in the 'movement' and of others. The cumulative effect of this repressive response has been to cripple the leadership of the 'movement', to virtually destroy its channels of communication, and to seriously damage those areas of the 'movement' whose function is to educate, to organize, or to mobilize.

We are using a generalized concept of 'repression' to establish this thesis. By a 'repressive measure', we mean simply any incident or measure which has tended to repress social and political activity, or to infringe civil liberties. Some examples will show the scope with which we are employing this concept, and will indicate the type of treatment we purpose.

a) Following the Fred Schwartz-William Mandel debate several years ago, the Regents were sent copied of Tocsin (a periodical somewhat to the right of the Birch Society), which contained condemnations of KPFA, for which Mandel is a commentator. Shortly thereafter KPFA was forbidden permission to record, or to use tapes recorded at, any campus event sponsored by students. Since KPFA had for years been the main channel of communication between the student 'movement' and the outside community, and had broadcast such tapes whenever they seemed to deserve an outside audience (which was often), the repressive effect of this refusal was considerable. This and other incidents involving KPFA become more interesting when they are considered in the context of the following: the repeated refusal of the Regents to allow establishment of a campus FM station that might reach the outside community (one exists at Santa Barbara): the apparent reluctance of the campus AM station to carry programs on topics connected with the 'movement'; and, in particular, the consequences of the establishment of new rules governing the Daily Californian, which caused the strike of 1960 and resulted in the DC's changing its pattern of news coverage and becoming, in the eyes of many, a 'house organ'.

b) Repressive measures occur in concatenated chains; it is important to establish their interrelation. For example: the growing response to SLATE- sponsored activities, and SLATE's political success, in time moved the ASUC to broaden the scope of its concern to include the social/political activities that students were becoming involved with. This led to criticism of the ASUC from outside, and to attempts to limit its activities in this domain. This in turn provoked the dissatisfaction of graduate students with the ASUC. A poll was taken (not all graduates were reached), and a referendum offered them the simple choice of remaining in the ASUC or leaving it. A minority of graduates voted. Of this number, a majority wanted to leave. Thereupon, the graduates were declared out of the ASUC. No serious attempt by the Administration, the faculty, or, unfortunately, by the graduates themselves, was made to establish a voluntary membership pattern for graduates. The severance of the graduates from the ASUC has its consequences: in following years the patterns of graduate leadership and participation in groups concerned with social and political affairs changed markedly, to the detriment of such groups.

c) A body of regulations governing the relations student groups enjoy with the University has been established in recent years. We believe we can document in depth the following claim: these regulations have seriously hampered, and in some cases effectively destroyed, the functioning of all groups involved in social and political activity, have infringed the civil liberties of their members and others, and have had serious consequences for student groups not involved in such activity. By 'document in depth', we mean: provide substantiation of this thesis for every such group.

If such documentation can be furnished (we believe it can, under conditions mentioned later on), the seriousness of the following charge becomes evident: that this body of regulations is not a result of law, but of interpretation of the law. After documenting this charge as far as is possible, we will try to display the motivations for such interpretations of the law by documentation, establishment of repeated patterns, and informed speculation as to the pressures which have possibly influenced these interpretations.

d) Note that, in our sense of the term 'repressive measure', each time an organization is denied use of a University facility by such a regulation, or does not ask for such use because such a regulation exists, it has been subjected to a repressive measure. The term is not intended to be pejorative, however: the inability or refusal of the graduates to provoke a dialoge on the subject of voluntary ASUC membership has had repressive consequences upon many organizations, and the failure of the faculty to implement channels of communication between the students and the Administration has had repressive consequences for both these groups. Similarly, the fact that the students did not fully and actively support the faculty in the loyalty oath controversy of 1949-51 has had repressive consequences for the faculty.

Clearly the spectrum of incidents and measures we are attempting to treat is very broad. (Some unifying principle must be used to integrate all this material; the concept of 'repression' has been generalized, to this end.) Clearly also, the difficulties of this undertaking are immense. We shall return to these two points later on.

Purpose Of The Report

The specific purposes of the report are several. It will be submitted to the Chancellor's Study Committee to aid it in reaching conclusions about the expression of civil liberties on the campus. It will be given to Governor Brown, to President Kerr, to the Academic Freedom Committee of the Academic Senate, and to the AAUP and ACLU, as background material for these individuals and organizations to use as they see fit. Finally, we shall try to make it generally available to students and faculty members interested in the subjects with which it deals.

More generally, the report will be intended to meet a need which has often been felt by those concerned with the student-citizen role in social and political activity. No comprehensive effort has been made before to provide a broad description of the extent of such activity, nor of the response to it and the problems it has faced. In this sense, the report is meant also as an historical document, and as source material for future such documents.

In respect to these aims, it should be mentioned that the Executive Committee of the Free Speech Movement has endorsed this as an official FSM document, pending approval of it upon completion, and has pledged support; and that SLATE has done similarly.

Structure Of Report; Methodology

The structure of the report will (provisionally) be as follows. A 20,000 to 50,000 main essay giving a brief history of student social and political activity, setting forth in more detail the main thesis mentioned on page 1, and substantiating this thesis by a fairly detailed analysis of topics having the flavor of items a) - d). This essay will be documented as thoroughly as is possible; the documentation will be contained in a series of appendices. The number of these appendices is as yet uncertain; it will depend on the amount of material we are able to draw upon, and will be somewhere between 20 and 100. These appendices will for the most part consist of fuller descriptions or interpretations of specific subjects in the essay; for an idea of their scope, see Topics (below).

As regards methodology, we intend to use the generalized concept of 'repression' purely in a phenomenological sense, i.e., we are not interested in charging conspiracies, nor in ascribing blame. The concept of blame has no place in this report (indeed, if 'blame' exists, it falls on all groups and, probably, on all). We wish instead simply (!) a description of the present circumstances and problems of student involvement in political and social activity, and a perspective on the history and forces which have brought about these circumstances and problems. It should be noted that the concept of 'responsibility' is distinct from that of 'blame', for the latter presupposes a moral judgement, while the former is merely descriptive. We have already made a moral judgement by deciding that the topic and subjects of this report are important; it is our feeling that the purpose of this report will be furthered by giving as objective an account as is possible of the causal connections between a wide variety of events, rather than by trying to assign 'blame'. The basic equation of this report will be: "X happened, and was responsible for Y happening". We shall for the most part be concerned with documenting such relationships, either directly or by displaying a repeated pattern that strongly suggests such a relationship. Occasionally this will be impossible to do (e.g., in a) above, surely no causal connection can be established between Tocsin and the KPFA incident, but the temporal coincidence is so striking as to make mention of it irresistible); but we shall try to hold such occasions to a minimum, and to qualify them carefully. We feel that documentable facts will be sufficient to establish a possibly-perturbing picture.

A Plea For Help

Obviously, the problems involved in a project of this size and complexity are staggering(the full report may run over 100,000 words). The situation is mildly complicated by our having set a deadline of November 2 for completion of the report. This is patently impossible to accomplish; it must be accomplished, nevertheless, if the Chancellor's committee is to have the benefit of this report. And it can be accomplished (the evidence of one's experience notwithstanding) if people are willing to contribute more than good will.

Presently 40 people are working on various aspects of this report, not counting the "work staff", of which more later. If twice this number can be found, the goal in the last paragraph can be realized; if more, no one knows what we might do.

Let's put it bluntly. The potential consequences of this report are tremendous, if and only if its aims are accomplished. And for this, good will isn't worth a damn. The only way to get this report out in the form it might have, is for individuals to be willing to take on a specified area of responsibility, small or large, and do it competently and do it fast. Nothing else counts. Suggestions are fine, good wishes are dandy: and irrelevant. (The right to make suggestions about treatment, scope, etc. of this report is earned by working on it.) We who are working on this report feel that it is, in a sense, a test. There are many people on campus who will sit down around a car, on impulse or out of conviction, and spend a while sharing in the drama of a situation, surrounded by others in a common cause and basking in a good feeling inside. Fine, we're not knocking it; many of us were around that car: but maybe this is as important, or more important. And there are others who wouldn't sit, who said, "Yeah, good cause but wrong method, this should be done coldly and rationally, what are the facts, surely Reason Will Prevail, or at least you should try." (Some of us said that too.) Well, here's the chance for the latter to show they're not just mouthing off, and for the former to show they've got the guts to something a bit harder than sitting in the sun. (Sure, waiting for the cops took a kind of guts, but this is a different kind we mean. Because the work involved in this report is brutal. The first 2 1/2 pages of prospectus and goals may look pretty, and we hope that the report will be, in a sense, pretty. But the work involved is just plain ugly. It involves running around, losing sleep, praying your classes won't wipe you out (only consolation: 2 week deadline), trying desperately to organize facts and find them in time to meet a deadline. Or it involves digging through newspaper files and making painfully-accurate collections of references, or sitting with a typewriter and tape-recorder trying to transcribe tapes (torture). There'll be no pay and no thanks from anyone, save maybe the few people you work with.

This is probably a bad way to plead for help; but we just haven't got time enough to use circumlocutions. The test of whether you think this report is valuable, of whether you want to see some footing put under, and substance put in, your civil-libertarian interests is whether you're willing to work on this. No one has any time, that's an axiom; you have to make it. People working on the report probably have more responsibilities to fulfill, and are at least as concerned about their schoolwork, as you are; but they believed it was important enough to find a place for it. In a word: the report needs you.

Sermon over, back to business. Except to say again: if enough people think this is important, the report can be done as fully and as well as we hope. It is our feeling that the report is the most important order of business for the FSM, and that its effectiveness in this regard is only a small fraction of its potential effectiveness.

Topics

Fortunately, most of the material involved breaks down fairly clearly into "topics": topics narrow (history of a particular organization, generalized problems of repression it has faced) or broad (see b), page 1). Or, into "blocks of work": e.g., to do the documentation on a specific event or issue, or to transcribe a given tape.

The only way to handle the topics is for people, individual people, to take responsibility for providing as comprehensive and responsible a job on a given topic as they can. If they have responsibility for a topic, they can get others to help them in gathering and interpreting material, and the work staff will provide people to trace documentation, type up tapes, etc. But the notion of 'responsibility' is crucial here; it is the keystone on which the whole report rests.

(Since this information sheet is also intended for those who are working on topics, let it be noted that the first 2 1/2 pages are intended as a general guide to the aims and tone and methodology of their individual blocks of responsibility. Please to heed this insofar as is possible; it will make the editing and integrating of the entire report much more feasible.)

There follows a list of "topics", with some indication of their nature if this is not obvious. Some of the topics have been accepted as responsibilities; the names and phones of those involved are listed, for the convenience both of the others involved and of anyone wishing to contribute to that specific topic (if you know anything, your knowledge will probably be needed). (Note to those who have topics: try to keep a constant cross-flow of questions and information between related topics.) We desperately need people qualified to take charge of the unassigned topics, or to take the responsibility of recruiting a staff to investigate such a topic. Please note that each organization concerned with social or political activity is in itself a topic; we have prepared a guide to research on organizations, which is available via Work Central or Coordinating; if you would like to take the responsibility of covering an organization not on the list, please contact coordinating.

Topic Number

Topic Number
1. Free Speech Rally Spring 1959: causes, events, consequences, parallels with the first weeks of this semester. Aryay Lenske, TH17963.
2. Recent activities re Farm Labor; coordinating past farm labor activities. Irene Bronston, TH16779.
3. Attempts to gain student control of ASUC finances. Joe Hacker, TH56237.
4. Housing office loyalty oath controversy. Phil Roos, TH35611.
5. Coordination of research on attempts to make the ASUC voluntary, and the change of ASUC to compulsory status in 1955. Phil Roos, TH35611.
6. Kerr Directives: causes, meaning, consequences. Barry Jablon, TH91527 (call after 1 p.m.)
7. Background of the Daily Californian strike; events of the strike; consequences. Larry Marks, 5271525.
8. The Drinnon and Angress cases. Bob Starobin, TH58421.
9. DuBois Club and Students For Fair Housing. Jack Kurzweil, TH33538.
10. Last year of SLATE. Sandor Fuchs, TH13454.
11. SLATE, Summer 61 to Summer 63, coordinating. Robin Room, TH87839.
12. SLATE, first 3 semesters. Brad Cleveland, TH19402.
13. Subject A controversy. Fred Bauer, TH84496 or ext. 3478.
14. Graduate Students' Assosciation, coordinating. Fred Bauer, as above.
15. English Graduate Assosciation. Fred Bauer, as above.
16. Women For Peace. Jackie Goldberg, TH52413 or TH59590.
17. Academic Senate and faculty. This is a big topic, and involves in part trying to describe the actions and positions the A.S. and faculty have taken with regard to all of the questions we are considering; also, the relationship of the Administration to these groups. Coordinating this are Steve Plagemann, TH39999, and Peter Muldavin, TH83748.
18. Coordination of research on organizations in the civil rights/integration movement. Stevie Lipney, TH14381.
19. The Katz case. Mike Folsom, 5255072.
20. The peace movement. Coordination (provisionally; call Coordinating first to check): Steve Saliff, TH81094.
21. KPFA. Michael Rossman, TH13757 (from 11 p.m. to 2 a.m.)
22. Legal aspects of the student-administration relation. General coordination: Ken Cloke, TH84863.
23. Particle magazine. Dunbar Atkins.
24. General patterns of ASUC activity.
25. Cuba, everything connected therewith. Someone to coordinate this is badly needed.
26. CORE. Jack Weinberg.
27. FBI in relation to student activity. Coordinating: Bettina Apthecker, TH83861.
28. FSM and the recent problems. John Tenny is doing a history, LA48353.
29. Graduate leadership and participation-patterhs in organizations. Someone is badly needed.
30. HUAC and consequences. Someone needed badly.
31. Kerr. David Piper is doing outside work on Kerr, TH13418.
32. Loyalty Oath Controversy. Someone is needed; provisionally, see 17).
33. Research on the problems of religious groups on campus. Someone needed.
34. ROTC and the whole long battle. Someone badly needed to coordinate.
35. SLU. Likewise.
36. Speaker Ban and its lifting. Likewise.
37. Chancellor Strong. Kitty Piper coordinating, TH13418.
38. Precinct work for political candidates and work for bond issues. See 21).
39. Stiles Hall projects and activities. Someone badly needed.

Please note again that this list is not intended to be comprehensive; it contains any of the topics where responsibility has been taken by individuals, and some of the topics for which individuals are needed to accept responsibility.

Work Crews. A work crew is being assembled for various needs. If you can volunteer an hour or more of time, it could be well- used to check or find references in newspaper files, do typing, etc.

Tom Irwin (TH89203) and Marston Schultz (TH14651) have gotten together a beginning staff of 15. If you would like to volunteer, please contact them. If you have responsibility for a topic and cannot yourself find people to type, document, deliver, tape, etc. call them; but please try first to get people yourself. Work Central number, 12 to 8 p.m., is TH32641 after 10/20.

Coordinating notes for those working on topics: The magnitude of this project makes it imperative to have everything in writing, and, in particular (unless this is impossible) in typewriting, and as organized as is possible. The basic structure is: small (or large, if necessary) but complete essays which will be used as appendices, and from which material can be drawn for the covering text. Full documentation is, of course, essential; call the work crew to get someone to chase down things if you can't. To facilitate inter-topic communication and general coordination, whenever it is possible make three copies of reports or summaries, with the topic number or subject in the upper left hand corner of each page; keep one yourself, and forward the carbons to Coordinating. Conversely, if you need material from another topic, call Coordinating for it.

Writing crew.. A writing crew is being formed (has been formed) to make sense out of the whole mess. Joseph LaPenta (TH13757, or leave note in box in English Dept. TA) is coordinating it; call him or leave a note if either you would like to contribute to it or would like to draw upon it.

General Coordination and information: Machael Rossman (TH13757, prefferably before 10 am or between 11p.m. and 2 a.m.; or leave note in TA box in Math Department; or messages at TH91527 between 2 p.m. and 11 p.m., or at TH91545, some hours). If there are questions, or needs not met in this sheet, or if you want to volunteer work on a topic, or if you're working on a topic and want to keep in touch, please call.

Deadlines: if possible, basic work on topics should be completed by a week before deadline; if this is impossible, call Coordinating.

Note in general that organizational files are legitimate sources of documentary material.

Notes

Section I

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Title: Foreword
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