Monographs Prepared for A Documentary History of Migratory Farm Labor in California, 1938
The California Cotton Pickers Strike-1933
Raymond P. Barry (Editor)
Federal Writers Project
Oakland, California
A Bumper Crop
In September 1933, a bumper crop of cotton, ready for picking, whitened a hundred thousand acres of the hot, level plain that is known as the San Joaquin Valley: Merced, Fresno, Kings, Tulare, Kern, San Joaquin and Stanislaus counties. Never had California known a cotton crop so early and so abundant. From one small ranch of 27½ acres that year a grower harvested 16,500 pounds of cotton, 600 pounds to the acre, making a state and national record. Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 28,1933.
Cotton Pickers Arrive
Into the great valley, in the heat of late summer, swarmed an army of brown skinned people. They came by highway—men, women and children—in outmoded automobiles; whole families with what meagre household goods they possessed; the migratory farm laborers, moving in to pick the cotton.
Growers feared no labor shortage to harvest the bumper crop, and the Mexicans had long been preferred by the cotton growers as dependable farm workers. Ninety-five percent of the cotton pickers in the San Joaquin in 1933, it has been estimated, were Mexican. New York Times, Oct. 22, 1933.
Their Union Makes Demands
Mexicans were still the chief source of migratory workers in the California cotton fields, but changes were taking place, even in the ranks of the wandering bands of Mexicans:
"Stricter immigration regulations in 1929 limited the supply of such aliens. The depression here and improving conditions in Mexico caused the return of large numbers to the homeland. A depleted labor supply enabled the remaining Mexicans to organize, and several bitter labor struggles ensued." Beals, Carleton , America's Shantytown on Wheels, Forum and Century (Jan. 1938).
At the opening of the 1933 cotton picking season we find the Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union providing militant leadership for the Mexican pickers, drawing up and presenting their demands to the growers, and threatening a valleywide strike if these demands were not met. The demands of the union were three-fold:
- 1. - A wage rate of $1.00 per hundred pounds of cotton picked.
- 2. - Recognition of the union.
- 3. - Abolition of contract labor.
The demand for higher wages was the major demand. Further demands, union recognition and abolition of the contract labor system were included in practically every agricultural strike.
Cotton had always been a cheap labor crop, its development depending largely upon keeping the labor cost low. Johnson, C.S., Embree, E.R. and Alexander, W.W. The Collapse of Cotton Tenancy, Summary of Field and Statis. Surveys, 1933-35, 81 pp . ( Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1935). While the California wage rate had been somewhat higher than in other states, wages of cotton pickers had declined steadily with the price of cotton; Phillips, Hubert . The School Followed the Child, Survey, Sept. 1, 1931, Vol.66 . and in four years (1928-32) the picking wage had dropped from $1.50 to 40¢ a hundred pounds. Taylor, Paul S. , Mexican Labor North of the Rio Grand, University of California. Economics, Vol.6, Nov.1, 1928. In 1932 this low point was reached when the Agricultural Labor Bureau, an employers' organization, set the official picking wage for the San Joaquin Valley cotton at 40¢ a hundred. The scale seems to have varied from 40¢ to 60¢ in 1932. Oakland Tribune (California), Sept. 18,1933. A slightly higher rate is
Under these circumstances it was even less possible than it had been in previous years for the workers to put aside enough to carry them through the off seasons, when they must camp out and await the beginning of fresh harvests. To what extremes they were forced during these off season periods is indicated by the following report from the San Francisco Examiner:
"Two thousand destitute cotton workers, facing starvation in tent camps on the west side of Fresno County . . . were given relief by Fresno residents. Thousands of pounds of food, warm clothing and medical supplies were distributed under the direction of S. A. Ledbetter, head of the county public welfare department." San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 19, 1932.
In 1933 the picking rate was raised from 40¢ or 50¢ to 60¢ a hundred. The pickers, however, claimed that this wage was not enough. The fastest cotton pickers, those "born in the cotton" may pick on a single day at the peak of the season, as much as 500 or 600 pounds of cotton, but the average day's picking is much lower. A good picker averages 200 pounds a day, and women around 175.
Growers and their representatives claimed that pickers averaged 300 to 400 pounds of cotton a day; Western Worker, Oct. 30, 1933. Edson Abel, attorney for the California Farm Bureau, gives the average as 330 pounds a day. Abel, Edson , The Communist Menace to Agriculture, Pacific Rural Press (San Francisco), Feb. 1934. The Giannini Foundation gives the average picking of cotton per day as 200 pounds, Adams, R. L. Seasonal Labor Needs for California Crops Imperial County, Progress Report No. 13, June 1936, p.11 . which appears to be the figure commonly given. Caroline Decker, secretary of the C.A.W.I.U. stated that men pickers, at the 60¢ rate, averaged only $7.50 a week. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 21, 1933. The pickers, later in the season, lose much time on account of bad weather; after rain or heavy dew the cotton must be left to dry before it is picked.
The wage scale is set, each season, by the San Joaquin Labor Bureau, after receiving recommendations of the
Cotton Strike Threatens.
The union announced, on September 18, that unless its demands were met within 10 days a strike would be called. Early in October, at a conference of 25 locals, it was determined that on October 4 the union would call out the cotton pickers and tie up the 100,000 acre cotton harvest. The union had probably organized several thousand of these workers; the Hearings Before the US Congress Committee on Labor speaks of 4,000 union members. As the struggle increased in intensity, the membership grew. At the peak of the strike, although approximations vary,
The Growers Reply
The cotton growers refused the demands made by the C.A.W.I.U. They said that 60¢ was the maximum they could pay.
Cotton in the San Joaquin is grown on borrowed money and the growers, many of them financially involved to cotton finance corporations and power companies, and fearful of losing their farms if they did not make good in the cotton harvest, fought any attempt to increase the harvesting cost. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 21, 1933
Three-quarters of the 1933 crop had been contracted for by Japan at 7¢ per pound deFord, Miriam A. Bloodstained Cotton in California, The Nation, Oct. 22, 1933., a price only slightly better than the lowest depression figure of 1932, which was around 7¢. Year Book of Agriculture, 1933, p.480 . Prices
The majority of the growers, however, forced to contract their cotton long before it was ripe at a price set by the finance companies, and based on the 60¢ wage rate for harvesting, faced a selling price which was below the cost of production, and which offered little or nothing on their investment. Pacific Rural Press (San Francisco), Feb. 3, 1934.
Even those most sympathetic to the problems of the laborers were not unaware of the difficulties faced by cotton growers in 1933, and an article in the Western Worker, reviewing the cotton strike of 1933, vividly depicts the plight of the small farmer:
"In the spring of 1933 a great many growers contracted around seven cents . . . in the fall prices went up so that the growers could not pay their bills. . . .
"The small farmer, renting land, is financed by the gins. . . which have the right to set a price on the cotton for their own protection . . .
The gin or finance company get their money out first. . . . The finance companies take $7 to $8 a bale from the grower plus their regular rate of interest. . . . Ninety percent (of the growers) are mortgaged and many have not paid their interest and taxes for years." Western Worker (San Francisco), Feb. 28, 1935
Many of the small farmers were in sympathy with the cotton pickers and their difficulties; but, harassed by low farm income, mounting debt, and threatened with bankruptcy, they could do nothing to meet the increasing demands of the pickers. Lubin, Simon J. Cultivating Communism Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 14, 1934.
The farm workers, feeling the pulse of conditions which so vitally affected them, anticipating with the farmers in 1933 "a new deal for agriculture", Abel, Edson . op. cit. and being, we may be sure, well aware of the plans for government farm assistance and the growing tendency towards better prices for cotton, gained some degree of confidence and hope in participating in the benefits of better times.
In the summer of 1933 the U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Administration launched a plan for eliminating from production 58,000
The National Recovery Act went into effect in July, 1933. U. S. 73rd Congress Statutes at Large, 1933-34, p.203 . The effect of these governmental measures was soon observed in rising prices of cotton. Silvermaster, N. Gregory . Economic Trends in California 1929-34, ( California Emergency Relief Administration, San Francisco, Division of Research and Surveys), p.17 . Farmer representatives, however, claimed that labor, taking advantage of the National Recovery Administration, was immediately seeking increases in wages that would divert the promised benefits from the intended recipients. Abel, Edson . op. cit.
Claiming that the rising price of commodities which the farmer sells had not kept pace with the rising prices of commodities the farmer must buy, the cotton growers refused demands of the union for increased pay for cotton pickers.
Union Calls Strike
Its demands being refused, the C.A.W.I.U. on October 3, issued a call from union headquarters in Tulare to all cotton pickers in the San Joaquin Valley to strike, picket the cotton fields and prevent harvesting of the cotton. The strike was to begin in the southern regions and to sweep north as the crop ripened.
Called first in Tulare County it spread rapidly, involving county after county. Eight hundred were at once reported out in Earlimart, Tulare County; Bakersfield and Lerdo in Kern County; and at Corcoran in Kings County. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit. Five thousand more San Joaquin Valley cotton pickers followed suit, and as the strike swept northward into Fresno, Madera, Merced, Stanislaus and San Joaquin counties, along a hundred-mile front, the army of strikers grew until it reached 15,000 Quin, Michael . op. cit. to 18,000 Miny, Norman . California Dictatorship, The Nation, Feb. 20, 1935..
The strikers went from ranch to ranch persuading other
Farmers Rally Opposition
The cotton growers, having refused the union's demands, rallied their forces to oppose and to break down this new and threatening solidarity of the Mexican cotton pickers. New York Times Oct. 22, 1933, sec.4, p.1 . Blaming agitation by labor organizers, rather than low wages and bad working conditions, for unrest and labor disturbances in the agricultural fields, they hurriedly formed grower organizations for the express purpose of arming themselves to end the strike. deFord, Miriam A. op. cit.
In Pixley a "Farmers' Protective Association" announced it had enrolled 600 members, and planned to increase its membership to 2,000. At Corcoran, cotton growers in meeting, planned "drastic action"; the manager of one cotton gin, it was claimed, told farmers "the time has come for us to take the law into our own hands and drive the strikers from our farms." Western Worker (San Francisco), Feb. 28, 1935, p.1, col.1 . Growers were
Behind the strike, farm owners believed, was the "Communist menace", with its paid "agitators"; interested not in bettering wages or living conditions of the workers, but only in stirring up labor trouble. Abel, Edson . op. cit.
Farmers called upon merchants and "others" in the towns to help them in ending the strike. Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 7, 1933. When it was learned that many merchants and workers in the towns felt some sympathy with the strikers, the Growers' Protective Association published in local papers a message, threatening dire consequences to such sympathizers. This message reads, in part:
"We, the farmers of your community, upon whom you depend for support, feel you have nursed too long the viper at your door. The Communistic agitators must be driven from the towns by you, and your harboring
― 14 ―them further will prove to us your noncooperation with us and make it necessary for us to give our support and trade to another town that will support and cooperate with us." US House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
An ultimatum was issued, on some of the ranches, that workers return to work in the fields or leave. When they refused, the strikers and their families were evicted from the cabins they occupied on the cotton ranches, their belongings "hauled away to the highway". San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 6, 1933.
Wholesale evictions followed, and the Labor Clarion, publication of the A.F.of L. Central Labor Council, claimed that:
"Men, women and children were driven like cattle from their habitations by armed bands of farmers. . . . 2500 cotton pickers and their families, including 500 children were evicted from their shacks on cotton ranches." Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Oct. 13, 1939.
Having evicted the pickers from their temporary camps, the ranchers held meetings to draw up plans for "starving out" the strikers. New York Times, Oct. 22, 1933. They declared that they could get all the cotton
Cotton farmers wired the U.S. Immigration Commissioner, Washington, to deport Mexicans in the San Joaquin, asking the department to "deport all those aliens . . . who have become public charges . . . and are a menace to peace and health." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 24,1933
All labor leaders were ordered summarily to leave the district. The farmers, working hand in hand with the local authorities, reported by the hundreds to be sworn in as special deputies. In Kern County alone the sheriff swore in 300 of these extra deputies. They were heavily armed, and 600 permits were issued in one county for ranchers to carry weapons. New York Times, Oct. 22, 1933.
Farmers and Workers Clash
With the calling of the strike, disturbances and arrests soon followed. Strikers holding meetings, were arrested for "vagrancy" and for "disturbing the peace"; 5 in Fresno district,
With the ranchers armed and "ready to resist with gunfire, attempts of strikers to prevent harvest of their crops", the situation grew in intensity. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 8, 1933.
A meeting of strikers and small farmers at Woodville, Tulare County, on October 8, was raided, and a pitched battle ensued. It was claimed that 60 armed and drunken vigilantes tried to break through the workers' defense lines, but were unable to reach their speakers. In the melee a rancher, Daniel Nelson, suffered a broken arm. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
Answering these terroristic methods, strikers strengthened their picket lines, instructed all pickets to resist attempts of armed ranchers to drive them from the fields, cautioned them against starting trouble. In Kern County the strikers presented demands to the Board of Supervisors, asking relief for unemployed cotton pickers, recognition of the right to picket, and that guards be removed from the fields.
At Bakersfield 1,000 strikers paraded, demanding release of arrested workers. Two more strikers arrested during the demonstration were released.
Farmers, a thousand strong, from Kern, Kings and Tulare counties, mobilized at Corcoran "for a final drive to rid the southern San Joaquin Valley of agitators heading striking pickers." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 9, 1933. Plans were drawn up for proceeding with the cotton harvest; it was announced that pickers would be ordered to report to work immediately, and if they refused, "outside workers" would be brought in. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 9, 1933. In Kern Lake Bed, Kern County, it was reported
Organizational work was being done by strikers among the unemployed, to prevent them from strike-breaking.
In Kern and Tulare counties the strikers, mobilized 100 percent, pulled out the employees of 12 cotton gins. US House Committee on Labor, op. cit. By October 11, the strikers' army had grown to 15,000. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 11, 1933.
With the ranchers heavily armed and with pickers strongly entrenched behind a militant union, feeling ran high. Strikers organized defense and relief committees and openly displayed their union cards on caps and shirts. It was not long before the newspapers were carrying headlines of serious violence and deaths in the cotton fields.
The first serious outbreak occurred at Pixley, Tulare County, on October 10. There are many stories and versions of the events of that day. The strikers, it would seem, had been
Other versions state that the growers, in all-night meeting, were returning home when they met the dispersing audience from the strikers' meeting. The two hostile camps, coming face to face, indulged in some altercation. One young rancher is said to have suddenly yelled "Let them have it, boys!" Suddenly, from the armed ranks of ranchers, a shot was fired, followed by a volley of gunfire.
One of the Mexicans in the workers' ranks, Hernandez, fell dead. One report claims that after the "injured were loaded into private machines and ambulances and taken to the County Hospital at Tulare", Hernandez had "died on the road". San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 11, 1933. Another Mexican, Delfino Davila, with hands lifted, advanced. He too was shot, and fell, wounded, on his face. The firing continued, and Davila was killed as he lay there. (See Page 22) Eleven unarmed members
The crowd of strikers broke, those who had been dropped by the bullets of the ranchers lay where they had fallen, others fled to the union headquarters across the street. The ranchers ambushed themselves behind their parked cars and for several minutes kept up the firing. When peace officers arrived at the scene, the farmers stopped firing and drove away.
The rancher who fired the first shot claimed he had heard someone speak "disparagingly of the American flag." deFord, Miriam , op. cit. The Labor Clarion, on the other hand, related how shots from the ranchers' guns "ripped through the stars and stripes that hung over the doorway of strike headquarters"; and a correspondent of the San Francisco News told of "Two shot-torn American flags" over the doorway of union headquarters after the brutal shooting of unarmed strikers. Ibid.
* New York Times, Oct. 22, 1933.
* Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Oct. 20, 1933.
Reports on strike violence mention several times serious injuries received by a young man, whose name is not given:
"At Arvin they . . . blew off the arm of a 19 year old boy." Winter, Ella . Fascism on the West Coast, The Nation, Feb. 28, 1934, p. 24 .
Incensed at the killings in their ranks, thousands of workers held mass protest meetings and demanded that the vigilantes be prosecuted for violence. Five farmer vigilantes were arrested, and warrants sworn out for five more. At Corcoran and Pixley, strikers were arrested for "disturbing the peace." Meetings were held protesting these arrests of strikers. A committee, led by Pat Chambers and other eye witnesses demanded a hearing from the Governor of the State. But before he could leave for the hearing in Sacramento, Chambers was jailed on a charge of "Criminal Syndicalism", and bail, set at $2,000, was raised to $10,000. Pat Chambers brought suit for "malicious prosecution and false imprisonment", demanding $15,000 damages, against District Attorney Walter O'Gaught, Sheriff R. L. Hill and R. M. Petersen, Pixley rancher. Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Nov. 23, 1933.
Chambers went on trial on charge of criminal syndicalism, in Superior Court at Visalia on November 21. San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 22, 1933. He was later
Further to complicate matters, it was discovered that one of the Mexicans who had been shot, Delfina Davila, was not a striking cotton picker but the Mexican consular representative from Tulare. See Page 19 He had been sent to the cotton area by Consul Bravo of Monterey to investigate this strike which affected so many of his fellow countrymen. Bravo wired the Governor, blaming "hot heads" among the ranchers for the shooting, stating that to his knowledge 95 percent of the strikers were unarmed Mexicans, and that he planned to confer with the imprisoned strike leader, Pat Chambers.
Consul Bravo declared that the slaying of Davila was "an international affair." He demanded an investigation, in behalf of the citizens of the Central American Republic and sent special agents into the cotton area and nearby towns to investigate. Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 12, 1933. A full report of the affair, he said, would be forwarded to his government. He suggested indemnity for the slaying of the two Mexicans to the amount of $20,000.
The widow of Davila, it was reported, also filed suit for $75,000 against "eight cotton growers accused of shooting her husband." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 15, 1933. (Note: Although the Mexican consular offices have been communicated with for information on the matter, the writer of this monograph has been unable to ascertain what became of these suits for damages.)
The Mexican Consul arrived in Tulare County "to protect the interests of Mexicans." US House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
On the following day a strike committee demanded the bodies of the two Mexicans, but the coroner refused. However, when, on October 15, a double funeral was held, at Saint Aloysius Catholic Church in Pixley, the occasion was attended by thousands. Gathering from a 75-mile radius, 5,000 striking pickers — men, women and children — followed the funeral cortege to the cemetery a mile away, forming a solemn procession and marching with "military precision", San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 15, 1933. in the "most dramatic demonstration ever witnessed in the valley." U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
After the funeral a mass meeting of the strikers took place, when they voiced their determination to go back and strengthen the picket lines and continue the fight.
Later, on the same day as the Pixley killings, there was violence further south. In Kern County at Mitchell Corners, near Arvin, 25 armed ranch owners, led by deputy sheriffs, patrolled the cotton fields. They met a group of 100 strikers, led, (the Examiner claimed,) by one Alonzo Andrews, 27, "alleged red organizer", the strikers were ordered to "move on." They refused. Deputy Sheriff T. J. Carter advanced on the strikers with a tear gas bomb. Then someone fired, and Pedro Subia, a 57-year-old striker fell, shot in the chest. He died where he lay. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 11, 1933.
Witnesses later claimed that Subia was shot 11 times, and in the melee that followed, several others were wounded; tear gas bombs were hurled into the picket lines, and several of the vigilantes were set upon and beaten by the infuriated strikers. U S House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
Ranchers claimed that the bullet which felled Subia was fired by a striker from a nearby tree. Nine strikers, one a
At the Subia inquest held at Bakersfield, no substance was found to the charge that he was killed by another striker. Kern County Union Labor Journal (Bakersfield, California), Oct. 27, 1933.
Subia's funeral at Bakersfield was attended by 2,000 strikers, congregating from all camps in the area. They pledged themselves anew to stay out until a victory had been won. U.S. House Committee on Labor, loc. cit.
Part Played by Government Forces
Servants of the government, local and State, were not
Early in the strike, with many strikers evicted from their cabins on the cotton ranches, and with thousands milling about the highways, the State Highway Patrol was called in to "keep strikers moving". The use of the patrol in "critical emergencies" had been sanctioned by CALXE Attorney General U. S. Webb, and it had been called in during other farm and orchard disturbances in the State San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 9, 1933.
STATE highway patrolmen and sheriff's deputies were mobilized U.S. House Committee on Labor, loc. cit. by October 12 from all parts of the State. The highway patrol, drawn into the cotton area in large numbers, joined forces with the U. S. Labor Department, the Department of Justice, the State Labor Commission, and the Mexican Consul, to exert pressure for immediate settlement of the strike.
Edson Abel, attorney for the California Farm Bureau, claimed that "the law enforcing agencies were caught unprepared and in most cases time was lost in determining the proper steps
When, in the Shafter-Wasco district, 11 strikers were arrested on charges of "vagrancy" the Kern County Union Labor Journal claimed that:
"Arrests were made by Charles Ellsworth, who is deputy sheriff and at the same time superintendent of the HERBERT Hoover ranch, one of the ranches involved in the strike." Kern County Union Labor Journal (Bakersfield, California), Oct. 13, 1933.
When the farmers, early in the strike, evicted thousands of pickers and their families from the camps on cotton farms, the Labor Clarion charged that: "These unlawful proceedings were actually encouraged and participated in by peace officers." Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Oct. 13, 1933.
According to the New York Times, the strikers were refused
"The power of the blockade was not overlooked.. . . In some localities the starving policy went so far as to call forth assertions that local authorities would not permit relief agencies to supply food for the women and children in the strikers' camp. . . . Local authorities in the cotton counties took sides with the ranchers . . . the strikers, being itinerants, have no votes." New York Times, Oct. 28, 1933.
Local officials, it was claimed, joined with ranch owners in this policy to starve out the strikers:
"In one county a meeting of growers to make plans to starve out the strikers was attended by county supervisors, the district attorney, the sheriff and other officials." New York Times, Oct. 22, 1933.
Some relief was finally granted the families of striking cotton pickers. This granting of relief was hotly protested by growers, and was almost immediately withdrawn. We shall see that this starving policy was the cause of much tragedy in the pickers' camps, and later in the strike.
To preserve "law and order" special deputies were quickly sworn in throughout the cotton area. In Tulare County the supervisors
The ranchers and their sympathizers having been heavily armed, some local authorities took the precaution to warn against reckless use of firearms, and one district attorney in Madera, Sherwood Green, addressing a group of 300 growers, cautioned them not to shoot or kill anyone "except in self defense". This same official gave hearty approval, however, to the organizing of vigilante farmer groups and, perhaps having in mind a famous international example, suggested that a bottle of castor oil be poured down the throats of "labor agitators". San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 9, 1933. Other local authorities even went so far as to advise the farmers to use "force" against the agitators. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit. The pitched battles that followed between armed ranchers and newly appointed deputies and the unarmed groups of strikers, which resulted in three deaths, were perhaps, the inevitable result of such tactics.
Ten cotton ranchers, following the killings of the three Mexicans, had been held for murder. At Arvin, seven strikers
Miss deFord, writing in the Nation, claims that in the case of the strikers held for murder: "On investigation the Kern County grand jury refused to return murder indictments." deFord, Miriam A. op. cit.
Local officials, quite naturally in sympathy with the growers, both residents of the same communities, and having little in common with the migratory and union led laborers, used tear gas on the strikers, and "looked the other way" when farmers indulged in violence. deFord, Miriam A. op. cit.
After three lives had been lost, there was a "growing, frightened demand for peaceful settlement" and the citizens called upon the Governor to take action immediately to settle the strike and to protect life and property. Newspaper editorials also called upon the Governor to force a settlement; and the
Hoping to reach some understanding with striking pickers and cotton growers "State Mediator Herbert Williamson was sent to the strike . . . but his early efforts to bring peace met with little success." Ibid., Oct. 9, 1933.
Frank MacDonald, State Labor Commissioner, was instructed by the Governor to attempt a solution of the cotton strike Ibid., Oct. 10, 1933.; and
"Untold hardship will result in their eviction". MacDonald said he had been "informed that overtures had been made to Federal relief distributors to refuse them help", and that further, the cotton growers were threatening to "boycott merchants who sell them food." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 10, 1933. Said MacDonald "the consequences are liable to be nothing short of inhuman". When, almost two weeks later, a compromise agreement was finally reached, a "big delegation of valley leaders" calling on Governor Rolph in Sacramento made certain demands. Among these was the request that the Governor
Some of the ranchers, it was claimed, had objected to the agents of the Governor as being "every one of them . . . on the side of the strikers." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 11, 1933.
The Governor also sent Sheriff Cas Walser and Chief Criminal Deputy Vance Brite to the cotton area "to prevent threatened conflict between groups of growers and pickers." Ibid., Oct. 10, 1933. At Sacramento, it was claimed, Clarence Morrill, head of the State Criminal Identification Bureau, "blamed Communists for directing the strike." Ibid., Oct. 12, 1933.
Timothy A. Reardon, State Director the Department of Industrial Relations, was ordered to intervene by the Governor. Reardon, after visiting the strike area "demanded that the county authorities throughout the San Joaquin Valley disarm both growers and strikers. "Order"
After making a personal investigation in the strike area, Reardon said he was convinced that the growers could not afford to pay more than 60¢; but also that the demand by pickers for a higher scale was justified. In a communication to the Governor, he said he was "convinced that neither arbitration nor mediation could bring about a settlement" in the wage dispute, declared the State unable to settle the situation, and asked for Federal intervention. He had certain specific suggestions:
"Reardon pointed out that the Federal Government is now providing relief for strikers on the basis of $5 per week for married men and 33½ cents per day for single men.
"I believe the Government would save money if it would devote its expenditures to paying the difference between the strikers' demands and what the growers are able to pay." Ibid., Oct. 22, 1933.
Rabbi Reichert, N.R.A. Labor Mediator, had early interested himself in the cotton strike. on October 6, he had made public a letter to the Governor in which he charged that "In the great majority of clashes between the peace officers and strikers, the
"If the growers continue in their attitude of defiance and of force" said Reichert, "a most serious situation is threatened"; and warned that "any unfair treatment of labor" by the growers might result in the withholding of farm relief funds by the Federal Government." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 11, 1933.
He pleaded:
"Let differences be referred to properly constituted tribunals under the State Labor Commission and the National Recovery Administration and compel both sides to abide by the decision." Ibid., Oct. 12, 1933.
After the three killings of strikers by armed farmers, in a fiery denunciation of the "lawlessness, high-handed and outrageous methods of the farmers", Reichert said:
"Gangsterism . . . has been substituted for law and order in the cotton areas. . . .
"Justice demands that the guilty parties be brought promptly before the courts; . . . that the Governor suspend or remove the peace officers found responsible for the fact that armed bands of `vigilantes' were permitted to carry on their nefarious work unmolested.
"The protection of State and police . . . should be extended not only to property interests, but to working men as well." Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Oct. 13, 1933.
He charged that "days before the most serious outrages . . . were committed, the Governor was informed of what was impending," and called upon him to take immediate steps to "avert further tragedy." Challenged Reichert: "The solution is not in armed forces . . . suppression rarely settles any problems." Ibid.
The Examiner, on October 23, claimed that the Kern County Citizens' and Growers' Committee had wired Secretary of Agriculture Wallace, requesting that he send Federal mediators to settle the difference of growers and workers, stating they had lost all confidence in the efforts of State officials to bring an end to the strike. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 23, 1933.
On October 12, George Creel, head of the N.R.A. for California, was ordered by the Federal Government to intervene:
"Another move for Federal intervention was made by George Creel, National Recovery Administration District Administrator and representative of the Federal Labor Board in the cotton dispute. He invited participation of the U.S. Farm Credit Administration in conference seeking a settlement. Creel explained that the Government, through the Federal Land Bank and Intermediate Credit Bank, had $1,000,000 invested in the cotton crop and . . . that in the final analysis the Government had controlling power in the situation because of its investment." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 22, 1933.
Relief for the Strikers
As the strike dragged on the situation of the strikers became desperate. Relief agencies, both State and local had been plied with demands to aid the families of striking cotton pickers. At a meeting of 1,000 strikers in Visalia, demands were made for $5,000 county relief, to be distributed through committees of the union; also indemnities for the families of slain strikers. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
The strikers' committee which had gone to Sacramento to present their grievances to Governor Rolph, following the killing
While local officials were inclined to back the farmers in their evictions and refusal of aid to strikers, the Governor and R. C. Branion, Federal Relief Director, listened to the appeals and Branion went to the strike area with the expressed intention of seeing that "no one starved to death." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 13, 1933.
The State Relief Administration, in their report of assistance given to the strikers, comments as follows:
"Federal policy required that relief be given to strikers on the basis of need and eligibility regardless of labor controversies. . . . Accordingly, the State Relief Administration . . . impartially aided needy California strikers.
"In the cotton strike of October 1933, emergency relief was provided in Kern, Kings and Tulare counties for 2,070 families and 940 single persons . . . approximately 10,600 persons." , State Relief Administration of California, Review of Activities, 1933-35,( California State Printing Office, Sacramento, California), p.101 .
Relief was finally offered to the strikers, but on the understanding, the strikers claimed, that to obtain it they
"After the Governor's fact-finding committee made its recommendations, orders were given by the Relief Administrator to withhold relief from individuals refusing employment under the accepted agreement." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 28 1933.
Apparently the strikers and their families received relief, with perhaps minor exceptions, for about five days, or between October 22, when the pledge to obtain aid was abolished, and October 26, when relief was cut off pending settlement of the
In spite of their receiving some relief, during the 27 days that the strike continued, the conditions in the strikers camps became so bad and food so scarce that many tragedies occurred.
On October 11, occupants of the camps were already "urgently in need of food." Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Oct. 13, 1933. At the largest tent camp, at Corcoran, some 2,500 were concentrated. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 29, 1933. The strikers complained bitterly that they and their families were permitted to go without food, and a guard at the Corcoran camp, Gomez, claimed that:
"Farmers have burned wilted vegetables rather than give them to the strikers. . . . Dairymen have fed excess milk and cream to hogs before they would give it to the hungry children of strikers." Ibid., Oct. 13, 1933.
On October 11, a striker's baby, 3 months old, died of malnutrition at the camp near Corcoran, and two or three days
On October 20, a Mexican woman at the Corcoran camp died of pneumonia, and a sixth baby from malnutrition. Two days later another infant was taken from the camp to a hospital at Hanford, but died from "intestinal infection and malnutrition." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 22, 1933.
It was reported, in an article in the New Republic, that there were altogether nine deaths from starvation during the strike:
"Nine members of the strikers' tent city at Corcoran, mostly children, died of malnutrition - the result of efforts by growers and relief officials to starve the pickets into submission." Cotton Pickers in Central California, New Republic, Nov. 22, 1933.
The Labor Fact Book also gives nine persons "mostly children" who "died of malnutrition as a result of being refused relief." Labor Fact Book, Vol. II, p.163, ( International Pub. Co. Inc. New York, 1934).
After considerable newspaper publicity regarding deaths in the strikers' camps, a field agent of the State Emergency Relief Administration at Modesto, Bartle M. Harvey, issued a denial. He assured the reading public, through the medium of the Oakland Tribune, that:
"There will be no starving into submission of strikers" and that the Governor would see to it that "no one suffers either from lack of food or medical attention." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 20, 1933.
It will be noted that this statement does not refute charges that there had been many deaths already in the strikers' camps, but merely states the intention of the relief administration is not to starve the strikers into submission.
Two days later the pledge demanded of strikers' families to return to work in order to obtain food, was withdrawn and relief distributed to the starving families. Four days later, with the offer of a compromise agreement from the fact-finding committee, and before its official acceptance by either side,
"Just before the settlement, Federal Relief was secured; after the compromise it was withdrawn, and no credit . . . extended for food until after the picking of one bag of cotton." deFord, Miriam A. op. cit.
The granting of any relief to strikers was vigorously opposed by the cotton farmers and their representatives.
Protesting the distribution of free food to strikers, the Delano Chamber of Commerce sent a telegram to the Governor, claiming that this measure was prolonging the strike and making the farmers antagonistic. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 22, 1933.
Cotton Growers requested the Federal Government to reduce the amount of food relief to striking cotton pickers, so that the pickers would return to work. A telegram was dispatched to Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, which charged:
"Bountiful use of Federal funds for welfare is making it more pleasant and desirable for labor to accept charity than to work." Ibid., Oct. 23, 1933.
While there was still only an offered tentative agreement of the strike, Governor Rolph, it was claimed, concluded that "It seems the Government has got to stop feeding those strikers or they will never work"; and recommended "increased Federal aid for growers, and no food for strikers who refuse to work." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 24, 1933.
With the acceptance of the compromise agreement on October 26, relief was discontinued.
Protesting that "The distribution of food through Federal plans has been a scandal", the delegation of farmers that visited the Governor demanded that "Federal relief be shut off from able bodied idlers." Pacific Rural Press (San Francisco), Nov. 4, 1933.
In Kern County the welfare department promised pickers, returning to work under armed guard, that if they did not make enough to support themselves, they would be given county aid. Kern County Union Labor Journal (Bakersfield, California), Oct.27, 1933
Other welfare officials declared that in the cutting off of food relief "hunger would bring the men back to the fields" and
L. E. Ellett, a Corcoran cotton ginner, whose name appears frequently throughout the story of the cotton strike, took it upon himself to wire President Franklin D. Roosevelt, stating in part:
"Due to widespread publicity of federal beneficence . . . itinerant laborers and agitators from all parts have swarmed into the State to handle seasonal crops; hence, a large surplus of idle labor who resort to strikes when faced with starvation." Oakland Tribune, Oct. 25, 1933.
The San Francisco A. F. of L. publication charged strike breaking tactics on the part of the owners, and indifference as to future relief problems:
"Threatening the importation of strike breakers from Texas, the owners showed their utter indifference to the employment situation in the State. Such importation would add to the idle list after the crop is over and the relief problem would be greatly intensified." Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Oct. 20, 1933.
The Tribune claims that growers were advertising for pickers in other states:
"From Corcoran came news that thousands of cotton pickers had been invited by the growers, in advertisements in a Texas newspaper, to come to California to break the strike.
"Authority for this statement was L. E. Ellett, Corcoran cotton ginner, who declined to say who placed the advertisement, but said it appeared in a Dallas paper." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 24, 1933.
The finance companies, it was claimed, were also interested in strike-breaking:
"One grower refused to hire scabs, but the finance company put scabs in with the protection of armed guards." U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
Later, after the acceptance of the compromise agreement, as we shall see, several thousand pickers were brought in from Los Angeles County.
Investigators in the Strike Area
During the three weeks' strike, various officials of government agencies visited the cotton fields to investigate conditions in the strike area.
Rabbi I. F. Reichert, National Recovering Administration Labor Mediator, we have seen, early interested himself in conditions, protested to the Governor
The foreman of the Tulare County grand jury, J. R. Fauver, promised an investigation of strike violence, and of charges of murder and of criminal syndicalism.
State Labor Commissioner McDonald visited the camp at Corcoran. Bad as he must have found conditions at the camps, he is reported to have challenged the strikers, "I will warrant there is not one of you who wants to go back to Mexico!" The Mexican occupants of the camp, it is claimed, shouted angrily "No, no, we all want to go back!" Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 27, 1933. They further announced they had telegraphed former President Calles of Mexico, requesting repatriation by their government, and were awaiting his reply. Ibid., Oct. 28, 1933.
Timothy Reardon, State Director of the Department of Industrial Relations, ordered to intervene by the Governor, visited the strike area. His field representative, Mrs. Mabel Kinney, later visited the
George Creel, of the N.R.A., personally investigated conditions among the strikers. He reported the temporary camps "intolerable" and that an outbreak of infectious disease, small pox or typhoid, might spread throughout the State and cause hundreds of deaths. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 14, 1933.
The strikers' largest camp was at Corcoran, Kings County, where 2500 strikers and their families, including 500 children, pitched a tent city in the fields. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit. This camp grew, as the strike dragged on, until 4,000 persons, "twice the population of the town itself, were huddled in the space of two city blocks, without water or sanitation." deFord, Miriam A. , op. cit. By the end of the strike there were 5,000 in the camp. US House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
At least two deaths at the camp were attributed to bad housing conditions. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 20, 1933. The strikers sent delegations to the County Board of Supervisors, Bakersfield, complaining of the bad sanitary conditions in the camps. Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Oct. 13, 1933. Finally the local health officials, becoming concerned, gave the strikers 24 hours notice to install a water system or evacuate the Corcoran camp. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 21, 1933.
Strikers protested this evacuation order, refused to move, and demanded of government departments, additional sanitary facilities and a water supply for the camp. US House Committee on Labor, op. cit. On October 22, the Kern County Health Department announced that the Corcoran camp, "complying with regulations", was rushing the installation of a water system. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 28, 1933.
At the Hearings Before the Congressional Committee on Labor it was reported that several days later an eviction order was served against the camp; that strikers refused to move from this plot of land, the use of which had been granted them by a friendly farmer. They telegraphed the Mexican Government's Minister of War protesting the attempts at eviction from their camps. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
Sickness broke out in the squalid camps, typhoid, dysentery, pink-eye and diptheria. deFord, Miriam A. , op. cit. Three women in the camp, about to become mothers, were refused hospitalization. The State, however, overruled local authorities, and hospital care was promised. Many sick and wounded were denied entrance to local hospitals on the grounds that strikers were "transients." U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
On October 22, however, local health departments announced that arrangements were being completed with Federal authorities for furnishing medical care to the families of strikers; San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 22, 1933. and
After settlement of the wage dispute had finally been enforced, the camps were evacuated. The lessee of the plot of land at Corcoran, where thousands of strikers and their families had found refuge, was warned that unless the camp was immediately evacuated "he would be prosecuted for operating a public camp without a license." Ibid., Oct. 29, 1933. The camp was evacuated, and burned to the ground as a health measure. Ibid., Oct. 31, 1933.
Mediation Is Attempted, But Fails
There had been early attempts at mediation. As previously
Certain small farmers, organizing United Farmers' League locals, had been willing to grant the pickers' demands. While a few showed some disposition to mediate, the majority of the ranchers refused; some went so far as to threaten to let the cotton rot on the ground before they would grant the strikers' demands. US House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
Several of the big growers at Corcoran offered to compromise at 70¢, but this offer was rejected by the strikers, after a mass meeting of their ranks.
The State had also sent Herbert Williams as mediator, but his efforts proved futile. Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 9, 1933.
Two days later, in the Wasco district, a delegation of 30 farmers visited a camp of several hundred strikers and requested them to return peaceably to work, promising them "free
Cotton had been ready for picking for weeks, and day by day, as the harvesting was delayed, the fall weather, with its rains and frost and its damage to cotton, approached:
"Farmers were apprehensive for their crops, should a rain fall before they are harvested, the cotton will turn yellow, thereby depreciating in value. And should a frost fall before the harvest, it may take huge amounts from the value of the crop, experts said." Ibid., Oct. 13, 1933.
The Mexican Consul at Monterey, Enrique Bravo, who had protested treatment of the people of his nation, and the slaying of two his countrymen, offered cooperation in settling the strike. He assured the Governor of Calif that the Mexican workers, who comprised about 95 percent of the strikers, would abide by the laws and would return to work if given "assurance that their differences with the farmers would be submitted to fair arbitration." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 20, 1933.
Printed notices, signed by the Mexican Consul, the Governor
On the whole, however, Consul Bravo's stand does not seem to have been very favorably received by the strikers. They charged that the Mexican consul was trying to split their ranks, and voiced their stubborn opposition: "We're not going to let him do it; we're going to stick together!" Ibid., Oct. 13, 1933. Feeling ran high, especially in Pixley, scene of the brutal shooting of two Mexicans. Here the printed notices to strikers were torn to shreds by the pickers, shouting "Viva la huegla!" (Long live the strike). Ibid., Oct. 17, 1933.
The Governor had expressed himself willing to have a board of arbitration appointed for settling the strike, Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 12, 1933. and cotton
U.S. Senator Robert F. Wagner, head of the National Labor Board, wired George Creel, Regional Director of N.R.A., in San Francisco, to "exercise his good offices to end the strike through arbitration". Creel "turned the entire facilities of his vast organization into channels of mediation." He took up plans with the Governor for setting up a Federal-State arbitration board. Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 12, 1933.
Creel flew to Visalia, met and talked with growers and strikers, giving them the message that there must be an immediate settlement of the strike. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 19, 1933. "If State authorities cannot
"If Mr. Creel settles the cotton strike" said the New York Times Date? "it will be his largest achievement in industrial conciliation." Creel had already been active in many industrial and agricultural labor disputes.
The situation in the cotton strike was a difficult one. Ranchers, hostile towards "labor agitators", had been none too friendly to those who had been sent by the State to try and promote a settlement; had charged them with being "every one on the side of the strikers" and unable to see the farmers' side of the controversy. Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 11, 1933.
When it was proposed that a fact-finding committee be set up, to determine the facts from both sides, and suggest a basis for settlement, Edson Abel, attorney for the Farm Bureau, claimed that the growers were in accord with such action. However, they added a proviso that the personnel be composed of Archbishop E. Hannah of SF Dr. Tully Knoles of the College of the Pacific, and Dean O. L. McMurray of the Law School of the University of California.
Dean McMurray, it was discovered could not serve and Ira B. Cross, Professor of Economics, University of California, was proposed. The growers "immediately objected", but were overruled. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit. They had suggested Rev. Father William M. J. Lyons, President of Santa Clara University, and Bishop Philip G. Scher of Monterey as members of the committee. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 15, 1933.
Preliminary investigations to determine a basis for arbitration were begun October 16. Ibid. Two or three days later (there is some confusion in the dates of reports) the committee sat in session at Visalia to hear testimony and to arrive at conclusions regarding a settlement.
The committee, after hearing representatives from both growers and strikers was to determine: first the wage for picking cotton which growers could pay "under prevailing conditions"; and secondly the wage that would be adequate to provide a "proper standard of living" for the pickers. Abel, Edson , op. cit.
Dr. Cross stated that the committee would hear "anything that either side cared to present". Archbishop Hanna, chairman of the committee, seems to have found it necessary, however, to plead with those who testified:
"This commission was appointed by Governor Rolph and we come only to help you. We want to get the facts of this case and come to an agreeable settlement . . . we are here to seek facts and not hear disputes. Out of the facts we ought to be able to find a settlement." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 21, 1933.
The growers, who presented their case first, were found to be divided among themselves; in the words of Dr. Cross: "not a single unit, but individuals . . . none qualified to speak for the others." Ibid.
"The representatives of the workers offered to listen to any proposal the ranchers cared to make; but spokesmen for the ranchers said they were powerless to make any proposition." Ibid.
The Western Worker claims that the small farmers, at the
"The growers were represented by bankers, cotton gin owners and their agents. Edson Abel, attorney for the Farm Bureau Federation, did almost all the talking for the farmers." Western Worker (San Francisco), Oct. 30, 1933.
Testifying on behalf of the strikers, were many of the cotton pickers themselves, men and women, telling the reasons for the struggle. Pat Chambers, union leader and organizer, was brought to the hearings from the county jail under sheriff's guard. He was given an ovation by the workers. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit. Caroline Decker, secretary for the union, also testified in behalf of the striking cotton pickers. Western Worker (San Francisco), Oct. 21, 1933.
The Labor Clarion claimed that representation for the workers was inadequate: "With leaders . . . in jail under various charges . . . there appeared to be none among the strikers who could speak for them." Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Oct. 20, 1933.
Dr. Cross complained that: "At least a dozen local unions" seemed concerned in the struggle, and each particular matter had to be referred to their membership for action and approval. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 21, 1933.
Another reason for this lack of spokesmen for the strikers is given by Miss deFord:
"When Creel and the State's fact-finding committee . . . endeavored to negotiate with the strikers and asked for spokesmen, the strikers insisted unanimously that they had no spokesmen - that nobody could speak for them but Pat Chambers. Nothing could induce them to change their minds. It was a deliberate piece of tactics to keep official attention focused on Chambers and thus saved his life.
"Under the name of John Williams, he was in jail in Visalia on two criminal syndicalism charges, bail having been fixed at $10,000. There had been rumors of attempts to lynch him." deFord, Miriam A. , op. cit.
After a final all day session of the fact-finding committee, on October 20, at Visalia's municipal auditorium, San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 21, 1933. Archbishop Hanna and Dr. Knoles departed, and left Professor Cross to complete
In appointing the committee, Governor Rolph had stated that after a full investigation and summing up of the situation, its decision was to be final. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 14, 1933. There remained, however, among the ranks of the growers considerable dissatisfaction. They complained that two members of the committee had left before complete testimony of the strikers was taken, and "there remained only the member in whom the growers had no confidence." There was disagreement, also, as to the validity of the "facts" found by the committee. Abel later summed up the objections of the growers in an article in the Pacific Rural Press:
"The growers consented to put on their case first, and proceeded to do this in strict accordance with the understanding reached with Creel that the issues before the fact-finding committee, were how much the growers could pay and how much the pickers should receive to enable them to maintain a reasonable standard of living, The understanding was re-stated . . . during the hearing and its accuracy was not denied by the committee.
"However, when the Communist agitators composing the strike committee started putting on the strikers' case, about everything was touched upon but the wages necessary for a decent standard of living. . . . Cross, as spokesman for the committee, stated that
― 62 ―the committee was hearing anything that either side cared to present."Probably the growers were foolish to believe, after that broad intimation, that the agreement was not even a `scrap of paper' and that the committee would, in its final action, adhere to the original understanding. . . . The Committee wholly ignored the only evidence before it of the ability of the growers to pay." Abel, Edson , op. cit..
No copy of the hearings of the fact-finding committee is available. There was considerable disagreement regarding the mass of contradictory testimony presented by owners and their representatives, and by the strikers.
On the day following the committee's final meeting the Examiner claims that the hearings had been "a total loss", San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 21, 1933. and several days later, that growers had lost confidence in the committee. Ibid., Oct. 23, 1933.
By the time the fact-finding committee adjourned, it had reached the conclusion that without doubt, the civil rights of
Charging that the committee had made no inquiry as to the "rights" of the growers, M. V. Eastman, chairman of the Regional Farm Bureau Committee, claimed that the fact-finding body's investigation had been inadequate and that it had made a joke of its duties. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 24, 1933.
Edson Abel, attorney for the Farm Bureau, contended:
"No evidence was even attempted from the growers' side. It would have been futile anyway, in the absence of two members of the committee. . . . Only an erroneous view of the law permitted such findings. Abel, Edson , op. cit.
Further, that the recommendation to raise the picking wage to 75 cents:
"practically forced the great majority of growers to dig down in their pockets and to pay out more money than they could possibly receive for their cotton." Abel, Edson , op. cit.
Dr. Cross, the only committee member at the hearings, left the strike area for his home in Berkeley, expressing his regret that "certain attacks had been made upon the committee's integrity, personnel, and ability to render an impartial service." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 23, 1933.
The strike continued while the committee prepared its report and recommendations to present to Creel in San Francisco the following Monday, but many growers reported a steady turn towards normal harvesting. Oakland Tribune, (California), Oct. 20, 1933. The valley enjoyed comparative quiet; extra state highway patrolmen were withdrawn from Tulare County. Over the week end, hundreds of children, released from school and seeing in the strike a chance to make a little pocket money, swarmed into the cotton fields and picked cotton, oblivious to labor controversies and conflict between farmer and picker. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 23, 1933.
In Tulare County some of the growers had agreed to pay 75¢
The Examiner claimed that "most Kern County ranchers were offering 75¢ per hundred pounds . . . on stipulation that they
In Fresno County some of the growers agreed to the 75¢ rate. Ibid. The Tribune claimed that:
"The ranch owners . . . were prepared to raise wages to 75 cents to meet the rate agreed upon in other cotton counties . . . The pickers indicated that the new rate would be acceptable." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 26, 1933.
At Corcoran in Kings County, ranchers offered an 80¢
The strikers claimed that, in arriving at negotiations, the strike committee, led by Caroline Decker, had been entirely ignored. Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 26, 1933.
On October 22, more than 12,000 pickers were still out on strike in five counties, their leaders exhorting them to remain out until they had won the $1 wage. At Tulare in a special meeting of the central strike committee, under heavy guard of workers, it was decided to stay out and intensify picketing during the arbitration, and Caroline Decker announced that picketing would be continued "with renewed vigor". From the City of Madera, where a workers' conference had been called, came word that the strike had, for the first time, spread to Madera County. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 22, 1933.
In Kern County the pickets held their lines and "branded as false newspaper reports that strikers were returning to work."
The strikers charged that scabs were being brought into the valley to work under armed guards, and that hundreds were being deputized to protect the scabs from the peaceful picketing of strikers. Kern County Union Labor Journal, (Bakersfield, California), Oct. 27, 1933.
Strikers were also holding out for union recognition and release of their leaders from prison:
"The strikers say they will not return unless the union is recognized, their comrades released from prison, and all armed forces withdrawn from the area.
"The growers will not dream of granting any of these demands and, as Sheriff Buckner of Kings County put it, the situation is still full of dynamite." deFord, Miriam A. , op. cit.
The Tribune claimed that on October 26 the growers were still refusing to accept the union as spokesman for the pickers; Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 26, 1933.
There were threats from officials of further "drastic action":
"Governor Rolph (sat) in executive conference . . . in Sacramento with Gen. Seth Howard, California National Guard, and E. Ray Cato, Chief of State Highway Patrol . . . Reports at the capitol were that drastic action was being considered. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 24, 1933."
"Patrolmen from every part of the state moved into the strike area . . . In Kings County the sheriff requested troops be sent to the valley. Two companies of National Guard were awaiting orders to march into the strike field, each equipped with 64 men, machine guns and rifles." US House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
"Many were arrested on the picket lines during the past two days. About 60 strikers are now in jail." Ibid.
The New Republic Reported that:
"More than 1,000 strike breakers had been sent from Los Angeles to take the places of dissatisfied pickers and aid in breaking the strikers' morale." Cotton Pickers in Central California, New Republic, Nov. 22, 1933.
Compromise and Final Settlement
The fact-finding committee from San Francisco made its official report and recommended that the picking wage be raised to 75¢ a hundred, a compromise between the 60¢ offered by growers and the $1 rate demanded by the union. Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 24, 1933. It was felt the recommendation, approved by both George Creel and the Governor, was a fair one to both sides. State Labor Commissioner Frank C. MacDonald left for Visalia to present the proposal to growers and pickers. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 24, 1933.
Ellett, head of the Kings County Growers' Organization, said that only after all the growers had been instructed, would a decision be made; and that their acceptance would depend upon "consideration of the matter given by the Agricultural Bureau of the San Joaquin Valley." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 24, 1933.
On October 25, it was claimed, the San Joaquin Valley Labor Bureau, on behalf of the growers, agreed to the 75¢ scale. Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 24, 1933.
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle declared that the strike was "officially ended" on this date, when "80 percent of the growers agreed to the suggested wage." San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 5, 1933. (Quoted From Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Nov. 4, 1933.)
The civil authorities, following this decision by the ranchers, ordered the strike ended immediately, and the thousands of pickers return to work under the compromise agreement.
An official notice was sent to the C.A.W.I.U. by State Labor Commissioner McDonald, informing them that growers in Kings, Kern, Tulare, Madera and Merced counties, had accepted
"I am authorized by Governor Rolph to advise you of the cotton growers' action, inasmuch as your union was party to the findings of the fact-finding commission. It therefore becomes equally obligated and subject to the decision.
"You are, therefore, hereby officially requested to declare off and terminate the cotton pickers' strike and to authorize your members to complete picking the cotton at the rate of 75 cents per 100 pounds." Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Oct. 27, 1933.
The central strike committee held a meeting at Tulare to consider the compromise. It was attended by Frank C. MacDonald, who spoke to the 3000 or more strikers assembled. Before the meeting closed a standing vote was taken, and this went overwhelmingly in favor of returning to work at the 75¢ rate.
"This momentous decision, ending 22 days of strife and bloodshed was announced by Caroline Decker, a blonde slip of a girl, 21 years old, the acknowledged leader of 12,000 strikers. . . . Emerging from the crude strike headquarters she electrified mediators with the word the strike was over." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 27, 1933.
In four counties "growers were signing up workers through
At Corcoran, "last hotbed of the strike agitation", dissension still persisted. Growers were reported to be still refusing recognition of the union, and pickers refusing to return to work. At the Lovelace Smith ranch, it was claimed, a meeting was called "agitating for resumption of the strike", but this was "quickly dispersed by local officials." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 29, 1933.
When the Corcoran camp was burned to the ground, as a health precaution, strikers were either forced to return to the picking or move on to other localities. New Republic, Cotton Pickers in Central California. op. cit.
The Oakland Tribune claimed that many of the Mexicans moved away:
"Mexican occupants of Corcoran's tent city moved out to fields in other counties."
Also, that they refused to work in Tulare County "where two of their countrymen had been killed in strike riots." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 30, 1933.
As the Corcoran strikers made their way to other districts to work, 1,000 workers, needed to harvest the Corcoran crop, were being recruited through the U. S. Employment Bureau at Los Angeles. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 29, 1933.
A scheduled conference of the Governor with the workers, N.R.A. staff, producers and welfare representatives, was called off, after the Governor had telephoned sheriffs of the six counties affected, and learned that the pickers were going back to work.
On October 29, a United Press report from Fresno claimed that "Both growers and strike leaders agreed that about 6,000 of the 12,000 striking cotton pickers had returned to work." Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 29, 1933.
On the last day of October, the San Joaquin Valley cotton harvest was in full swing. An estimated 7000 strikers were back at work, together with 2000 additional workers from Los Angeles. Cotton gins were working with additional shifts, many planning to run day and night to handle deliveries delayed by the three-weeks strike. Cotton Pickers in Central California, New Republic op. cit.
While the union had accepted the compromise agreement, and pickers were returning to the fields to harvest the cotton at the 75¢ rate; and while the fact-finding committee had pleaded that the civil rights of strikers be protected, the local authorities were not at all inclined to forsake their "strong arm" methods in dealing with the pickers and their union leaders:
"All strike leaders have been ordered to leave the troubled area. If they remain, they are threatened with arrest on sight, since scores of John Doe and Jane Doe warrants, charging criminal syndicalism and vagrancy have been obtained from the courts by local officials.
"According to the San Francisco Chronicle, authorities of five counties intend to arrest strike leaders, set a heavy bail and continue cases from day to day so that by the time trials are scheduled the crops will have been harvested." Cotton Pickers in Central California, New Republic op. cit.
A "big delegation of valley leaders" also went to Sacramento and called upon Governor Rolph, demanding protection from "radical agitators", threatening that if they did not receive protection promised them by George Creel, they would "provide some of their own" on the grounds that "these are red-blooded Americans and not the big city type of human door-mats." They also demanded the ousting of all strikers from their camps, and cutting them off relief. The delegation, in no uncertain terms, "told Governor Rolph", had its picture taken, and then wondered "whether the Governor was really listening." The Valley Tells Governor Rolph (Editorial), Pacific Rural Press (San Francisco), Nov. 4, 1933.
Extent of Strike
The strike, beginning in the southern counties—Kings, Kern and Tulare—had spread north as the crop ripened, involving Madera, Fresno, Merced, Stanislaus and San Joaquin counties. Quin, Michael , op. cit.
In other California crops in 1933 there had been numerous labor disturbances, strikers and violence. Cotton, the last crop to be harvested, saw the largest and most serious of these. As stated, between 15,000 and 18,000 workers were involved, and for almost a month they succeeded in tying up the
"The largest agricultural strike in the history of the country" the cotton strike extended
"along a hundred-mile front, running north and south from Hanford and Visalia, to the rich Lake Bottom area in the Bakersfield-Arvin territory." Ibid.
Twelve cotton gin workers in Tulare and Kings counties were pulled out by strikers, "mobilized 100 percent". In many places it was estimated that 80 to 100 percent of the pickers were out on strike.
A. F. of L. Support
The A. F. of L. Building Trades Council at Visalia had pledged its support at the beginning of the strike. Within a week of this pledge, however, the State American Federation of Labor announced that it would not participate in the strike "because pickers were not affiliated with labor unions." U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
Effect of Strike on The Industry
With the cotton ready for picking, and harvesting tied up
Apparently if the cotton growers suffered losses on account of the cotton strike, these losses were small, for the crop reports of that year show considerable gains over the previous season:
"The most substantial gain in the field crops in 1933 was registered by the cotton industry. The total value of cotton and cotton seed in 1933 was $12,397,000 as against $5,051,000 in 1932, an increase of 145.0 per cent. The increase in the income from the cotton crop was due in part to increased production of cotton and cotton seed in 1933, as compared to 1932, and in part to the increased prices for cotton and cotton seed.
"Cotton production in California in 1933 amounted to 216,000 bales, as against 129,371 in 1932, while cotton seed production increased from 61,900 tons in 1932 to 94,300 tons in 1933." Silvermaster, N. Gregory . op. cit.
Attitude of Public
Considerable public feeling was aroused, during the cotton
The Hearst papers carried stories of armed strikers, San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 8, 1933. and the Pacific Rural Press carried an article by Edson Abel, in which stories of terrorism on the part of the strikers were alleged:
"Bombings and other forms of terrorism were indulged in by the strikers, cotton was fired on its wagons and scattered over the fields . . . invasions of private premises, intimidation of workers and destruction of private property frequently occurred." Abel, Edson . op. cit.
Stories of a Communist uprising, of armed cars bristling with firearms, were rife.
On the other hand, when on October 9, Rabbi Reichert made public his letter to the Governor, protesting employers' "outrageous treatment" of strikers, most of the newspapers headlined the story.
Later the newspaper headlines and front page editorials demanded "Stop the War", "Save the Crops", etc. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
The San Francisco Examiner date? claimed that the American Legion offered its services "to assist in efforts to enforce order." That the Ku Klux Klan take a hand in the strike was advocated editorially by the Visalia Times-Delta:
"As a further means of intimidating the workers the Ku Klux Klan was revived. The Visalia-Times-Delta of October 28 . . . advocated editorially that the Klan should take a leading part in suppressing strike activities." Cotton Pickers in Central California, op. cit. NEW Republic Visalia Times Delta Oct 28, 1933
The growers blamed "labor agitators" for the trouble:
"Cotton growers and citizens of Kern County are greatly concerned with interference by agitators with labor necessary to harvest the cotton crop. Intimidation of labor by
― 81 ―these groups seriously delaying harvesting and causing disaster to farmers and the cotton industry if continued." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 23, 1933.
Many persons sided with the growers in their belief that the whole difficulty lay with the "Reds", and we find in the columns of reader comment of that year, many expressions, on both sides, by self-appointed "authorities". One of these letters from the reading public contends that:
"While the wages paid for picking the cotton were small . . . the laborers who resided in the valley were satisfied, knowing that many others were without employment." Letters to the Editor, The Christian Century, Mar. 21, 1934, p.395, Vol.51 .
"Then came into the valley a group numbering thousands of Communists, calling themselves the Cannery & Agricultural Workers Industrial Union, led by Pat Chambers . . . demanded wages far beyond what the farmers could pay. . . . " Ibid.
The Native Sons of the Golden West in Oakland, California, interpreting the trouble in the agricultural fields as "Communistic
Another letter from the public, in the Christian Century claimed that: "Since the ranchers consider the workers in the valley as peons, they naturally have denied them the right to gather and to organize." The Christian Century, op. cit.
An article in the New Republic claimed that the strike was ended by a "mailed fist":
" . . . in three weeks, four were shot and killed by ranchers and local officials, forty-two were wounded, and more than a hundred were imprisoned on charges of criminal syndicalism, vagrancy and rioting." Cotton Pickers in Central California. New Republic op. cit.
The Hanford Chamber of Commerce commended the growers for their "spirit of Firmness." US House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
The Los Angeles Times, published by an owner of extensive farm lands, interpreted the agricultural labor difficulties in California as:
"A Communist drive . . . the genesis of a revolution . . . the overturn of the government . . . For this reason, defensive organization against communist organization is absolutely necessary. The action that is needed is to get rid of the reds in the most expeditious manner." The Christian Century, loc. cit.
A letter to the editor of the Christian Century claimed that:
"More directly responsible for this lawlessness than any other agency, in the opinion of a growing host, is the Los Angeles Times; the newspaper which speaks for the Chamber of Commerce groups, the Merchants and Manufacturers Associations, etc. . . . " Ibid.
Others questioned the too apt solution that trouble was solely due to "red" agitators:
"There is no doubt that, whether or not it originated with the Reds, Communistic propagandists took advantage of the conflict to throw themselves into the situation.
"On the other hand, it is certain that the great bulk of the migratory laborers are not able to distinguish between Marxism and Zoroasterism. What they wanted was more money for their labor." Forbes, Fred F. California Clash Called Civil War, New York Times, Oct. 22, 1933.
The Labor Clarion claimed that while the strike was led by the Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Union, an affiliate of the Communist Trade Union Unity League, most of the strikers were not communist, and named the growers' charges as "an effort to becloud the issue." Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Oct. 13, 1933.
The Clarion claimed that with wages "hardly more than a bare existence" the strikers were strongly behind the demand for higher wages, and that a large number of workers who were not members of the union had struck. Ibid.
The Western Worker voice of the Communist Party suggested other reasons on the part of growers besides the immediate necessities of the cotton harvest:
"Anxious to end the strike by terror and starving out the strikers . . . aware that a strong foundation for the agricultural Workers Industrial Union in the cotton fields would mean . . . the protection of workers in all other fields to which they would migrate". Western Worker (San Francisco), Oct. 30, 1933.
It claimed, further, that the strikers were constantly cautioned by their leaders not to violate the law, to "keep their mouths shut and arms folded" and not to be provoked into any sort of violence". Ibid., Feb. 28, 1935.
In Sacramento a group of clergymen urged the Governor to "force prompt arbitration or else declare martial law and protect life and property with troops" Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 12, 1933.; and in Oakland an "investigating committee of local pastors" made their recommendations for the settlement of the strike. Churchmen Investigate Strikes in California, The Christian Century, Nov. 8, 1933, vol.50 .
Rev. G. W. Alexander of the Rosewood Methodist Church, Los Angeles, writing to the editor of the Christian Century, claimed that:
". . . every friend of humanity is a red and a Communist out here. One need only permit a hearing for the brutally suppressed workers to be called a dangerous radical subsidized from Moscow.
"The A. F. of L., the Socialists, the Christians have never shown enough interest in the unskilled workers to try to organize them, with the result that their living conditions are unimaginable. I have visited the camps of the migratory workers and found them unendurable. So the Communists have found response to their friendship and aid." (Letter) The Christian Century, March 28, 1934.
The National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, interesting itself in the strike, urged the Governor to take "immediate action to suppress violence of police and vigilantes in the cotton area." New York Times, Oct. 22, 1933.
The American Civil Liberties Union also interested itself in what was going on in the cotton area. Planning meetings for a discussion of conditions, this organization was denied the use of public school buildings, and the proviso was made that "all speeches be submitted and approved in advance." The
From San Francisco a "committee of liberals" went to the strike area to investigate. The late Lincoln Steffens, author, with Mrs. Steffens visited in Tulare during the strike, and were accused of being "responsible for continued strike agitation." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 27, 1933.
Seven students from the University of California joined striking cotton pickers in the picketing, and were ordered by county officials to leave the district. Ibid., Oct. 20, 1933.
At the hearings of the US Fact-Finding Committee, two University of California students testified in behalf of the strikers. A. J. Elliott, supervisor of Tulare County, demanded an investigation of students injecting themselves into agricultural disputes "which are not their affair." Replying to the charges, Luther A. Nichols, comptroller of the university, stated that,
Articles in many of the national magazines, some by well known writers, focused considerable attention on the cotton strike in California and the conditions of the pickers. This was later to exert considerable influence in efforts to better the conditions of the migratory workers and to improve the camps where they must stay during cotton harvesting.
Sympathetic workers held protest meetings, after the Pixley and Arvin shootings, at San Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Jose, etc. They raised funds for relief of the strikers, and pledged solidarity and support of the Workers' International Relief and International Labor Defense campaigns. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
Points Gained by Workers
The union, in presenting its demands at the beginning of the cotton strike, had listed three demands:
- 1. A wage rate of $1 per 100 pounds of cotton picked.
- 2. Recognition of the Union.
- 3. Abolition of the contract labor system.
While the $1 wage demanded was compromised, the pickers did receive throughout the valley a wage rate of 75¢, as compared with the 60¢ rate before the strike. Pickers returned to the fields victorious, having won, at least in part, their major demand, that of increased wages. Cotton Pickers in Central California, New Republic op. cit.
"The fight led by the C.A.W.I.U. . . . in the cotton strike . . . won for the workers millions of dollars in increased wages." Western Worker (San Francisco), Aug. 23, 1934.
Not only did the workers receive more money for the harvesting of the 1933 cotton crop, but the following year wages for picking again went up, as a direct result of the strike in 1933:
"The wage was raised . . . to 75 cents . . . as a result of the cotton strike; and 90 cents to $1.00 . . . in 1934. . . .
"The growers admit that it was fear of strikes that led them to raise the wages in 1934, even when the leading `communist agitators' were in jail." The Nation, April 24, 1935.
The Western Worker also claims that: "As a result of the scale won, the ranchers publicly stated they would pay a fair
The Union's second demand had been for recognition of the union, and this was lost: "Their demand for the recognition of the Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union was denied." Cotton Pickers in Central California, New Republic op. cit. Although the compromise agreement was accepted by both growers and pickers, and about 75 growers had signed up through the union by October 31, official recognition of this bargaining agent for the strikers was never granted. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit. The farm owners had dealt with the Fact-Finding Committee, not directly with the union, in arriving at a decision in regard to the wage dispute; and the farmer organizations, the Farm Labor Bureau in particular, never recognized or directly dealt with the union. We have seen that after the acceptance of the wage compromise by the Farm Labor Bureau, on behalf of the farmers, the strikers were ordered to go back to work by the STATE Labor Commissioner, before they had, through their union, accepted the compromise. They had complained that in arriving
The third demand of the union — abolition of the contract labor system — was also denied, or apparently was never seriously considered. The practice was continued among the Mexican and other agricultural laborers, and still exists.
Later, as the strike and labor warfare progressed, there had been other demands, one of them, that imprisoned strikers be released. This demand was also denied. Cotton Pickers in Central California, New Republic op. cit.
"Most important of all" claimed Norman Miny, "workers went back to the fields satisfied they had won a great victory, behind the union one hundred percent." Miny, Norman . California Dictatorship, The Nation, Feb. 20, 1935. A tremendous impetus had been given to the wandering migrants, toward strong labor organization, in their own behalf. The following year the American Federation of Labor reported "40 directly affiliated unions" in the agricultural fields of California. Report of Proceedings, 1934, vol.54, p.57, (American Federation of Labor.)
An observer in the field later commented on this increased strength of the union:
"In the San Joaquin Valley, the Cannery and Agricultural Union obtained a rather large following . . . succeeded in curtailing the picking operations to an effective point. The advance knowledge of this plan was contributory to an increase in wage rates prior to the opening of the season. . . .
"A large number of generally regarded "dumb" Mexican and Negro workers were not affected by the claims that they would be cutting their own throats to strike against that rate. They struck, . . . the men went back to work at 15¢ more per 100.
"A lot of our generally considered `dumb' Mexican transient field workers were in that struggle, and saw what happened. They were mightily impressed with the fidelity of their leaders, and their capacity to suffer along with the `least of them' . . . I leave it to ordinary reason whether the chances are good or bad, that large numbers . . . of workers will follow the lead of the A. & C. Union. . . I leave it to common sense whether these workers so informed will or will not be insistent on being represented by the A. & C. Union. . . .
"It seems to me that it would be a little dangerous and in my opinion foolish to assume that the union has no strength and can wield no power. . . the correct assumption should be that the union is rather more powerful than weak. At least such a position ought to be taken by one who wishes to avoid bloodshed; for it is only in the case that it is strong that there is any chance of bloodshed . . .
"The deaths in the San Joaquin left Mexican workers' families to mourn . . . the
― 93 ―communist cause was advanced a long stride." Attorney Ernest Besig's letter to Gen. Pelham Glassford, (San Francisco), Apr. 20, 1934. Civil Liberties Union Files.
The union had also succeeded, to some extent, in clarifying the position of the agricultural laborer and the small farmer. Early in the strike, meetings had been held and attended by both workers and small farmers, protesting against the finance corporations and their control of agriculture in the State; and the small farmers had organized into United Farmer League locals. U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
The union, apparently, sought to preserve and to cultivate this understanding between small farmer and cotton picker after the strike was over, for
" . . . not long after the cotton strike, union members . . . succeeded in organizing, in the heart of the cotton area, a group of 60 small and middle farmers into the United Farm League." Decker, Caroline . California Workers Undefeated, The Nation, Apr. 24, 1935.
There were other indirect victories for the cotton pickers. Vigorously protesting the terrorist tactics of farmer "vigilantes"
Such well known persons as Rabbi Reichert and Simon J. Lubin raised their voices in publicly championing these lowest paid of California's workers. Many liberal and progressive groups, The International Labor Defense, American Civil Liberties Union, Workers' International Relief, Communist Party, a group of Protestant ministers and others took up the fight for these laborers least able of all workers to speak for themselves.
Even the Pacific Rural Press, which had all along championed the part of the farmers in the cotton strike, after the settlement did a "right about face" in an editorial by John E.
Pickett, editor:
"Wouldn't it be smarter for the farmer to get in the swim by agreeing to higher wages every time he can secure a marketing agreement which will peg the price of his crops higher? Instead of dissipating his energy fighting for low wages, why not spend his strength battling for a fair return for his crop.
"Instead of turning his shotguns on the poor devils who are pawns in the struggle for existence, why not turn such a battery of demand on Sacramento and Washington that they will have to do something about raising farm prices?
"Instead of being in the negative defensive position, why not be in the positive, aggressive position? The shout can be mightier than the shotgun." San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 31, 1933.
The editorial was quoted by the Examiner, as "plain talking" and "common sense". It was later suggested, by the Labor Clarion, for consideration for a state-wide Farmers' Recovery Conference, which was to discuss labor disturbances in Los Angeles. Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Nov. 3, 1933.
Considerable public interest was aroused in the cotton pickers of California; in their way of living, pitifully low earnings, their wretched camps. No doubt these many influences had their effect upon the cotton industry of the State, on the
Following the strike, in late October and November, there was labor difficulty in the pea fields in Imperial Valley, and it was charged by ranchers there, that the same "communist agitators" who had led the cotton strike, had also stirred up trouble in the Imperial Valley. Campbell McCullough's Report, Secretary of Los Angeles Regional Labor Board. (On file University of Calif Library, Berkeley.) Months of labor-grower warfare ensued. Finally Washington sent General Glassford to the valley to investigate.
After studying the conditions for two months, Glassford made his report. He charged growers with exploiting " a Communist hysteria for the advancement of their own interests", and of "mob rule". San Francisco Examiner June 27, 1934.
Among the recommendations made by General Glassford to clear up the situation were:
"That steps be taken to repatriate aliens . . . who are undesirable and who desire of their own free will to return to their own country."
"That the government appoint a `Labor coordinator to equalize and balance the labor supply. . . "
"That a permanent board or impartial administrator be set up by the Federal Government, to act in matters of dispute regarding wages . . . contract labor . . . hours, employment of women and children, transportation of workers, etc."
"Protection by the government of the `rights of free speech, free assembly; and that men, either citizens or aliens, shall not be harassed by amateur or self-appointed officers of the law."
"That the Federal government encourage the organization of workers, that collective bargaining may be effective in matters of wages and conditions, both working and living, and that the right to strike and peacefully picket shall be maintained."
And that "state and county authorities be urged by the U. S. Public Health service to improve living quarters" for the migratory workers. Report of Pelham D. Glassford, Federal Conciliator to Imperial County Board of Supervisors, June 23, 1934. (on file University of Calif Library, Berkeley.)
The government's interest in the migrant laborers in California's rich agricultural fields soon had its effects on the local situation. Shortly after the strike ended, H. A. Brock, Director of the State Department of Agriculture, met with growers and representatives of farm labor to "work out a wage and hour
In February, 1934, U.S. Senator Robert F. Wagner, chairman of the National Labor Board, announced the establishment of a "special commission to deal with agricultural disturbances in Southern California, particularly . . . among cotton pickers. Members on this commission included Dr. J. L. Leonard, chairman of the Los Angeles Regional Labor Board; Hon. Simon J. Lubin, State Department of Commerce of California; and Hon. Will J. French, formerly director of the California Department of Industrial Relations. Labor Clarion (San Francisco), Feb. 9, 1934.
Lubin, for many years an authority on California's agricultural labor problems (and former chairman of the Calif commission of Housing) offered certain suggestions for bettering the situation, for both the farmer and worker. These included:
"A planned production and selling program for California; long-time financing . . . to restore and maintain a measure of independence to farmers.
"Restoration of the Commission of Housing and Immigration, with adequate funds, and
― 99 ―enforcement of the labor camp laws . . . " Lubin, Simon J. Cultivating Communism, Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 14, 1934.
Lubin also recommended subsistence homesteads, "access to the land, especially for subsistence farms", this to be accomplished by the breaking up of large holdings in the State:
"A heavy tax . . . to be levied against land held for speculation . . . against absentee owners, or a bonus to those who cultivate their own holdings.
"The only conceivable outlet - short of complete communism - is access to the land, not for profit but for living." Ibid.
General Glassford, in his report to Washington, had also recommended:
"That efforts be made, particularly in the San Joaquin and coast valleys, to develop subsistence homesteads for agricultural laborers in order that there may be available, insofar as possible, an adequate resident supply of agricultural labor to produce and harvest the state's crops."
Glassford also suggested:
"Through cooperation growers might develop centrally located labor camps that would provide proper housing and living conditions at less expense than in camps located on
― 100 ―individual ranches." Report of Pelham D. Glassford, op. cit. June 23, 1934.
The plan for Federal labor camps was, according to the Pacific Weekly, not a new one:
"Thirty years ago the citrus growers toyed with the idea; in 1926, 1927 and 1931 the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce agitated for such a plan . . . involving the construction of 90 labor camps, scattered throughout the agricultural counties, capable of housing 4,500 families . . . and a Federal expenditure of $6,805,000."
Later plans specified that "each camp be restricted to from 200 to 300 persons, located upon private property whereever possible," and that each camp have a camp supervisor "under the control of individual grower or committee of growers." McWilliams, Carey., and Belmont, Clive . Farm Fascism, Pacific Weekly, April 6, 1936.
The cotton strike apparently hastened better housing plans. In April 1934, a district of about 11 acres was leased in Shafter, for a period of 5 years, at a rental of $105 a year. It was "to be used under the Federal-State program for transient relief, for the building of camps for transient agricultural workers." Kern County Labor Journal (Bakersfield, California), Apr. 6, 1934.
It was not until two years later, however, that the first two Federal migratory labor camps were opened, one at Marysville, Yuba County, the other at Arvin, Kern County, each to accommodate 100 families. Baxter, W. F. Migratory Labor Camps (reprint) Quartermaster Review, July-August, 1937. In October 1937 the Shafter camp with accommodations for 200 families was ready for occupation. It is of interest to note that camp superintendents are appointed by and directly under the control of the Federal Government.
Some of the cotton growers, following the strike, made very definite efforts to improve the housing for their cotton pickers. The next three years was to see considerable building of cotton camps, with board floors and side-walls for the pitching of the pickers' tents, usually with several water faucets to the camp, and at least some sanitary facilities approved by health authorities.
Dr. Paul S. Taylor, Professor of Economics, University of California, stated in 1935, that some of the growers were working "toward better housing, better employment methods, etc." He added, however, that the majority of the growers had not been impressed, and still preferred "to rely on the vigilantes, ordinances, and other similar methods." Taylor, Paul S., and Kerr, Clark , Uprisings on the Farms, Survey Graphic, Jan. 1933, p.19-22 .
Points Gained by Employers
The cotton growers, in accepting the recommendation of the fact-finding committee that they arbitrate the wage dispute, and pay pickers 75¢ a cwt. for harvesting the 1933 cotton crop, had given in to increased wage demands with no good grace, but rather in a spirit of desperation. The "arrival of autumn rains" Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 30, 1933., bringing with it the "threat of an early end of good picking weather, activated both growers and pickers" San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 29, 1933..
As spokesman for the growers, the San Joaquin Valley Agricultural Labor Bureau, which had officially accepted the compromise agreement, took care to point out in a statement it issued on the settlement that farmers had accepted only:
"In order to salvage what is left of the cotton crop, and in the interests of good American citizenship, law and order; and in order to forestall the spread of communism and radicalism and to protect the harvesting of other crops. . . " U.S. House Committee on Labor, op. cit.
George Creel, of the N. R. A., in explaining the government's right to intervene, it will be remembered, stated that the government had an investment in the cotton crop of $1,000,000. Oakland Tribune (California), Oct. 22, 1933. A day or so later the San Francisco Examiner carried a story that officials of the Federal Land Bank, attending the conferences, mentioned government "outstanding loans" on the cotton crop totaling $1,000,000. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 24, 1933.
Miss deFord, writing in the Nation, and describing the wage settlement, a raise from 60¢ to 75¢ per hundred pounds, says:
"The difference, the growers were given to understand, would be made up by a grant of a million dollars from the Federal Land Bank at Berkeley.
"When the growers had grudgingly accepted the higher rate, they were calmly informed by George Creel, N.R.A. Regional Director, who, with Timothy Reardon of the State Industrial Board, had been chiefly instrumental in bringing about the compromise, that he did not mean they would get any more money - but that they had already received a federal loan of a million dollars." deFord, Miriam A. , op. cit.
Creel, replying to this statement, in a letter to the editors, explained:
"The statement is absolutely false. At no time were the growers told that the Federal Land Bank would give them a grant of one million dollars.
"The article that appeared in the local press to this effect was based upon the incredible misunderstanding with Governor Rolph. At a conference I told him that the government had a million dollar lien on the San Joaquin cotton crop, and when he met the newspaper men he informed them that I had stated that the growers would be given one million dollars.
"The assumption that the Federal Land Bank, or any other government agency, would give one million dollars to any set of employers in order to supplement wages is a stupidity on its face." Letters to the Editor, The Nation, Feb. 21, 1934.
Before the publication of this letter by Creel, there had appeared, in the Pacific Rural Press of February 3, an article by Edson Abel, attorney for the California Farm Bureau, who, it may be remembered, had so much to say at the hearings of the fact-finding committee. In this article Abel affirmed that the compromise, accepted by the cotton growers "was sugared by publicity that the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank would loan cotton growers up to $1,000,000 with which to pay the added cost of picking."
"This was `baloney' credit, as Mr. Creel said later that what he had in mind was money which had already been loaned by the bank to cotton growers. The growers did not find this out until after they had agreed to pay the added bill." Abel, Edson , op. cit.
Speaking before the Commonwealth Club the following June, Ralph H. Taylor of the Associated Farmers claimed that:
"In the cotton strike the N.R.A. administrator stated that the farmers would have at least $1,000,000 additional credit with which to pay . . . added labor charges. This was to be a loan . . . but even this credit was withheld . . . after an agreement by the cotton growers to pay the additional picking wage which the N.R.A. administrator desired to have established." Taylor, Ralph H. (Associated Farmers of California) California's Embattled Farmers, Address to Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, June 8, 1934.
The Pacific Rural Press, in an editorial on the cotton strike, claimed that many of the growers felt they had been "sold out" The Valley Tells Gov. Rolph (Editorial) Pacific Rural Press (San Francisco), Nov. 4, 1933..
Timothy A. Reardon, State Director of the Dept of Industrial Relations,
Abel comments that:
"This experience should be of some value to other agricultural producers in its warning to them to be extremely careful in their acceptance of offers of mediation in the future." Abel, Edson , op. cit.
The cotton farmers had concluded that the whole situation in the cotton strike had been due to the "reds" and "labor agitators". Investigations by the Farm Bureau, of which Abel was attorney, and by the State Chamber of Commerce's Agricultural Committee, were said to have shown that labor troubles
The farmers and their followers, following conclusion of the strike, engaged in active organization of anti-communist groups. The California Farm Bureau reported a 20 percent gain in membership over the previous year, and the largest membership gain of the year in Tulare County. Pacific Rural Press (San Francisco), Nov. 24, 1934. The Western Growers' Protective Association, Associated Farmers, and other such groups were reported collaborating with the Anti-Communist Association in a common purpose - "to fight Communism . . . in and out of season." McWilliams, Carey, and Belmont, Clive . op. cit.
American Institutions, Inc., affiliated with the Associated Farmers, proposed legislative methods; and immediate deportation of radical aliens. They went as far as to advocate the dismissal of "communistically inclined" school teachers. Other farmer organizations announced they would furnish assistance
Farmers prevailed upon Mexican Consul Joaquin Terrazas to form a Mexican Workers' Association, its membership limited to Mexicans by birth, American by naturalization. Growers were to give hiring preference to this association, and Mexican workers soon were complaining that they were being forced to join this organization, "equivalent to a company union". McWilliams, Carey, and Belmont, Clive , op. cit. It is claimed by McWilliams and Belmont, writing in the Pacific Weekly that "With scarcely a single exception the local Mexican consuls . . . worked in close collaboration with the farm interests." Ibid.
Anti-picketing ordinances were among the remedies proposed for agricultural labor disturbances, and in April of the following year:
"A committee appointed by the State Chamber of Commerce and the California Farm Bureau Federation succeeded in having a representative
― 109 ―of each organization, tour counties telling what happened in strike areas in 1933."As a result over 20 counties passed anti-picketing ordinances . . . .
"Also, most of them have formed some sort of organization to meet communist activities. State-wide organization is being affected." Pacific Rural Press, Anti-Communist Progress, Apr. 14, 1934.
Courtesy of The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-6000; http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/
http://content.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb88700929&brand=calcultures
Title: Monographs prepared for A Documentary history of migratory farm labor, 1938
By: Federal Writers' Project, Author
Date: 1938
Contributing Institution: The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-6000; http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/
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