A History
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A History of Relocation at the Gila River Relocation Center
Foreword
It was often a difficult task to go on day after day, particularly in the period of voluntary relocation, and even during the first six months of the post-exclusion program, and visualize to what our small daily efforts would eventually lead. Factors of small import then, now loom large in retrospect. Techniques that were effective in an administrative way proved to be inadequate in a relocation center unless they were adapted to meet the needs of a people incareerated under circumstances deemed to be a military necessity.
No one segment of the appointed staff, whether it was the Relocation Division or any other, could truthfully assert that it had accomplished the job of DISPERSAL without relying on a number of assists both from other portions of the staff and from the people themselves. The Education Section contributed a great share of the final results, and the teachers who generally received small homage for their efforts should have in many cases received awards for merit. The Community Activities in pushing the Americanized activities among the young especially deserve unstinted praise. What occurred in subsidizing Japanese culture and sports must not be attributed to project personnel. Those deleterious effects need not be recalled now. Sections and persons at the Gila project have lent a magnificent hand in completing the program in a manner as' orderly as we had ever hoped for.
Such a program as this could not have been completed
Relocation Program Officer
Part I
Bare Awakening
Period
July 20,1942--Jan.31,1943
Chapter 1
The Meaning of a Relocation Center.
The arrival of a trainlead of Japanese-Americans on an extremely hot day, July 20, 1942, was a phenomenon to many of the appointed staff members in that the happening was an historical event, and, incidentally, a subject for curiosity since very few of us had ever known individual Americans of Japanese ancestry nor their alien parents. The youngatere and the old alike got out of the aroundhound buses with a bustle and aggressiveness that baffled us. Here were examples of a people who had been a harassed minority, torn from their fireplaces and again uprooted from temporary homes known as assembly centers, who now were displaying an almost audaoieus spirit in an effort once again to become adjusted to circumstances that certainly must last for the duration of the war. Few smiled as they were dumped into their new homes, but they submitted cheerfully to an ordeal of registration and immediately set out to cook their first meal and later set up their households.
The place that they were now to look upon as home was a strange looking spectrala in the midst of a desert. Crude roads were barely firm enough for the Greyhound buses to deliver their leads to the mess hall, where all families were given some leaway in picking out a one-room home. Small families and couples must crowd together in one of these rooms not larger than 24 feet in length and 20 feet
Few had actually anticipated a desert. The very name of Gila River had naturally intimated green and abundant water. Several actually packed their fishing equipment in the firm belief that such a river would afford them fishing. Weeks later some of this first contingent may have spoken of their bitter reactions when they first had a glimpse of the fury of the desert which to them meant a home during the balance of the war, but few of us could deteot the real thoughtsof such a phlagmatic group.
Few if any of the evacuees knew the meaning of the phrase “relocation center.” Nor did the rank and file of the appointed staff personnel when the writer accepted an offer from the Project Director, Eastburn Smith, there was an explicit acknowledgement that the facilities set up at Rivers were to be in status quo at least during war time. The statement was made with a ring of permenoney in it. For nearly all of the evacuees it represented a place where they could stay in a fairly homelike
The complex reactions to a new home were many. Since it was to be a place of more or less permanency it was urgent that everyone sacrifice his utmost now so that he need not build up too much sufferance later on. After all, was not this center an enlarged and revitalized assembly center where the patterns would be similar but far less restricted? At first there was a tugging even among friends to see who would be given advantageous housing. It was important to be near friends or relatives. Also, there was the important factor of getting a job with as much dignity to it as possible. It had to pay at least $16.00 per month and it should also by all means carry some supervisory functions. The matter of getting one's share of sorap lumber must also not be overlooked. The War Relocation Authority certainly seemed to have soottish enough traits as they would not furnish the bare assentials of a kitchen such as tables, shalrs, drawere or stands, so it behaved every family to get one of its members interested in carpentry enough to build a few pieces of furniture.
The center was, of course, in a state of flux until the last evacuee to arrive from an assembly center had been housed.
Chapter 2.
Substitution of Cotton Picking for Seasonal Leave.
As the Gila center was becoming a fairly staid community other centers were being disrupted by agricultural recruitments which were draining the labor pools by as many as a thousand workers in one place. Evacuees were going out to harvest critical crops such as sugar beets and vegetables for an indefinite period, and once again the communities became plagued with an acute labor shortage, more apparent than real, of course, since labor demands were always quite inflated.
A number of representatives of the larger magar beet companies attempted to drain the manpower from our center in like manner when they swooped upon us without warning during the second week in September. However, they were soon disquieted when Si pryer, our Acting Project Director, elected to favor the Arizona cotton growers above the beat bigwigs of Idaho, Utah and Colorado. Si considered himself an Arizona product, and this was one manner in which he could, perhaps, repay a favor.
The cotton growers from Casa Crande, Mesa, Chandler, Eloy and Coolidge visited us in great numbers, and it was soon evident that we would have to supply about 1500 pickers if the orders were filled. Certain growers viewed the communities at Gila as inexhaustible taps for their dwindling labor supply, and as an energetic peon source which would tide them over for another season. No one seemed concerned whether the Japanese-Americans had ever picked cotton before. But it was assumed that since they were good at stoop labor in vegetable fields in California they certainly could pick cotton.
As the growers were placing their offers we were waiting for Mr. Frase, of the Washington office, before actually proceeding with definite plans of recruitment. Finally, several days after, Mr. Frase arrived. He had spent considerable time with Governor Osborn and several influential farmers going over the possibilities of using this center as a labor pool. Shortly after he came to the project the Governor telephoned to learn if it were true that we could possibly supply 4500 cotton pickers. The optimum flitted in the rumor stage for a while,after which it was held probable that there were at least 4000 workers for cotton fields at the new “Jap” camp.
We were actually able to entice 215 pickers for the first day of picking, on September 25th, and this was a result of an intense campaign for volunteers. Our first example of evacuee participation occurred when Mas Yoshitsu brought together a number of leaders and asked that they cooperate in an attempt to secure at least four or five hundred able-bodied men or women
While this episodesshould have given us an insight into subsequent reactions, very few of us gave it any more than a passing thought since it was evident that no one had ever piored cotton and hence were not able to make a going wage. The greatest number to engage in this outside activity was 305, but the average numbered about 200 per day. They went out daily and returned every night in large trucks driven by evacuee crew leaders. Each cotton picker was given an identification card which was checked as he went in the morning and again as he returned at the end of the day.
Army orders 17 and 22, which had lifted the ban on Japanese going out into Maricopa and Pinal counties, were rescinded on November 7th. Cotton picking was over. Smith Thornburg, who was the largest grower involved, took up the matter with the military authorities in order to keep their labor supply intact. They did not realize that there had been a tacit agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the
Chapter 3
Possibilities for Relocation
It was possible for a limited number of evacuees to “live outside” during the first few months of center life. Possibilities for relocation usually consisted of four categories: (1) student enrollment, (2) persons with enviable trades, (3) Army enlistment, (4) hospitality offers.
What amounted to a body blow certainly occurred when it became known that relatively few of the young men or women would be able to enroll in colleges outside the prohibited areas. Education rated in the upper stratum among the Japanese as a factor important to living. They had previously sent far greater numbers to colleges and universities than any other minority. They had intended for a number of years to lighten the burden of their children through higher education. Now few could get Washington clearance. Many known as Kibeis were held in the mill because of what intellegence services considered as pro-Japanese influences. When ordinarily several hundred would be going to places of higher learning at this time of the year we permitted only one person to leave the center during August, and ten during the month of September.
The first sharp indication that I had about the real meaning of relocation occurred when Tom Holland visited our center during the last part of August. Mr. Holland, as Chief of the Employment Division in Washington, was interested in locating as many desirable applicants as possible for outside living, who, by plying their trades could earn a standard living. He was primarily interested in chick-sexers. This was an occupation largely monopolized by the Japanese-American, who either learned the trade through an apprenticeship in Japan or had worked as a helper among friends of his own race in this country. We found about a dozen able chick-sexers, of whom onlt two or three were mildly interested in any pursuit on the outside.
The males in the military age group were forgotten men in all centers until about the first of November, when we were notified that about 500 enlistees were wanted amongst the Japanese who had a thorough knowledge of the spoken Japanese. They had neither registered for the draft nor were called to the services, prior to this time. You heard a grumbling among the young men that they should be allowed to volunteer even though the privilege of being drafted could not for ulterior reasons now be reinstated. Perhaps the Army was opening a wedge, but the main emphasis was on knowledge of a foreign language.
“Hospitality offer” was a term, coined in the early days of center life, which persisted until the early part of 1945. Someone, either a friend, a beneficient employer, or a relative, who would be able to guarantee financial support as well as a place to reside, took it upon himself to offer refugs to an evacuee. In some cases families of mixed marriages were returning to California to join a parent who had not been forced to evacuate. In other instances there were persons joining acquaintances in Colorado and Utah who had settled there immediately after Pearl Harbor, and before the area exclusion orders were issued for California. This was a safe mode of relocation because all the safeguards for normal rehabilitation were there. However, the possibilities for much relocation in this manner were very narrow.
When, on November 18th, the National Director made a forceful speech to the temporary council and block manager group about the vistas that the people might look forward to in living outside againm though not in areas where their former homes were, there was a certain elation among the staff members. A sizeable number of the attending leaders also thought the speech had its good points. It provided good conversation for a number of days in the blocks, but it was soon and plainly evident that the overture to the people had failed. Condensed opinion was soon noticeable, and it was fairly plain that the rank and file were not open-
Chapter 4
Barriers to Relocation Awaredness
While other centers had dispensed a considerable amount of seasonal leave for persons who wanted to go outside and work in farm operations, they had thereby dulled to a certain extent the feeling of incarceration which evacuees felt at Gila. Here we were situated within Prohibited Zone Number 1, where movement was as restricted as if it had been transplanted to the state of California. phoeix, though barely 45 miles to the north, could not be visited. One could see the lights at night from various towns such as Chandler, Tempe,Mesa and Coolidge, but that had little meaning since the evacuees were unable to visualize what they looked like. To accentuate the isolation, there were MP's who guarded the periphery of the communities at two entrances.
It was readily understood that this set of circumstances would do little to create a requisite feeling of confidence and hope necessary for a person to want to go out and start life over again. Allens felt like forlorn people in terms of what the United States would possibly do for them. Although it was stipulated on November 28 that Japanese aliens could leave the center provided they (1) had a place to go and means to support them, (2) reassurance that a community would accept them, (3) that their records were clear with the FBI and (4) that they
Another barrier in the way of creating a consciousness for “outside” living was the “full employment” instruction which the evacues learned of on the 14th of November, Herein were stipulations which placed the responsibility upon the Project Director to provide work for everyone. If WRA employment was not available, then efforts should be immediately made to bring in private enterprise. There certainly was dire need for community-wide employment in order to maintain a healthful stir rather than encourage strifs and rumor which unemployment eventually led to.
However, all that the average person could expect on the outside during war was a livelihood, and now, with full employment on the project, it was possible to do almost as well here. Especially would this be true if employment were to berall both man and wife and to several mature persons in the ordinary family. If two persons worked in a family of four there certainly would be $32.00 in wages and about $12.00 in clothing every month, and in many cases this would be sufficient income to live on without dipping into family savings,
They were relatively free here, too, that is within the confines as such. It was not the Utopia they had lulled themselves into hoping while in assembly centers, but it was a appareut that project officials would leave the people largely to themselves in ordinary phases of conduct. There were no curfews. They could speak any language they desired without restraint. Here life could be almost as easy as one preferred in that they still received basic requirements such as food, lodging and medical attention, even though they failed to sign up for Project employment. Camp officials were fairly friendly, and the hostile public would be kept out generally. Issei could study Japanese culture and live with neighbors who had time and interest for the same type of culture. The women soon learned to love the place because for the first time in their lives they were relatively free from drudgery of the kitchen and the long hours in fields or assisting husbands in businesses. Now, by simply signing up in the Employment office they could become a waitress and work only about three hours a day or a kitchen helper and cook, with a little more responsibility, and obtain $15.00 per month.
If reception on the outside could be gauged by press releases appearing in Arizona papers, or by the talk of plain Arizona citizens, there wasactually little incentive for moving from a center. A considerable amount of cotton had been picked, but the average Arizonian soon forgot this gesture and usually reflected in terms of alara about the fact that the state had
Chapter 5
Staff Responsibility for Relocation
The administrative lines were quite nebulous in the early days of center life. The bureaucratio strata composed of manifold divisions, sections and units, inaugurated on the first of July, 1943, were only in the minds of the policy-makers during this period. There was a lot of over-lapping in functions, and what one project indulged in might not be characteristio of another.
During the first six months relocation activities were taken care of almost entirely by an Administrative Assistant under the direct supervision of the Project Director. John Landward, who handled the duties of this office, was responsible for a number of functions,including administration of welfare matters, requests for transfer from center to center and applications for leave clearance. In this period 120 persons left the center on indefinite leave. Of this number 45 went out for some type of schooling. Into the process of securing these clearances went a vast amount of work: the filling of
While the Employment division on the project did not handle relocation until about February 1, 1943, the responsibility for this program was always a function of the Employment division of the Washington office. A visionary by the name of Davis MoEntyre, visited our project on October 31st, and again on January 5th, in order to further the program of resettlement. He spoke of relocation as having first priority, and, while conferring with Councilmen and Block Managers, stated that WRA was equipped to clear 300 persons per day in the Washington office. During the middle of January the applications actually amounted to 20 per day.
After the turn of the year a change in attitude on relocation had taken place almost imperoeeptibly. The Reports Officer polled certain segments of the community and found that 43% of the group under 35 years of age wanted to relocats. While two-thirds of the interviewed Issei were flatly against relocation, the prospect did not look too dark. Such a condition would never have ocourred during the dark fall days of 1942. It was, perhaps, evident that the conditions of autonomy and security were at last losing their allure for the people. In any case, it was hard to reconoile with political events since WRA was incurring added enemies. Senators and congressmen
Part II
The Army Registration
Period
Feb.1, 1943--April 1, 1943
Chapter 1.
Preparations.
The young men in the center who had been born after July 1, 1924, and who had not registered with any draft board were requested to register at the project on the 13th of January. It was estimated that there were about 450 eligibles. The population generally regarded the registration passively, but at the same time many wondered why there was such sudden interest in the Japanese-American youngsters who had not been called up for drafting during the last twelve months. Perhaps they were going to reinstitute the draft, for was it not hard to reconoile the fact that there were hundreds of young men not being called with the ironic twist that several hundred were still in the army and who had been there prior to Pearl Harbor.
The forms to be filled out were simple, and in a short time all eligibles were registered. There were naturally questions raised as to the ultimate meaning of this program, but most people shrugged the matter off by saying that it was the means whereby the registrants would be granted a draft card. The draft cards would no doubt carry the same classification as those who were older than 18 or 19 years, but then what did it matter if they were classified as 4C? They did not differ much from their alien elders as to rights, and certainly a draft card disclosing the same status as aliens would not change matters much.
About two weeks later there was an announcement that
About six or eight reliable leaders, mostly Nisei, were called in and advised that the men from 17 to 38 were to be registered on a form known as “Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Anscastry” under the auspices of the U.S.Army. It was an Army form consisting of 24 items to be filled out which related to personal and employment history, foreign travel,membership in sundry organizations, Caucasian friends who could be termed references, details on foreign investmets, contributions and lists of magazines which were ordinarily read. In addition to the above statements there were also four questions which were to be asked by the Army representatives and answered in privacy. At the time we may have considered them important, but we could not foresee how utterly different they would be in interpretation, not what the ordinary reaction toward these questions would be. These queries seemed conventional enough at the moment, but as time went on they became sort of fulcrums on which the
We knew nothing about the real motivation which surrounded the coming of this registration. We had been told that the WRA needed a center-wide intrrogation to find out to how many they could give clearance for outside living. At the same time the Army seemed to have reversed its position about giving the Nisei a chance at volunteerig. These factors along with the Glamor from the public that something be done about making a determination as to loyalties, seemed plausible enough excuses for conducting such a registration.
When we discussed the implications with the Nisei leaders they seemed jubilant enough but feared that the people would not subsoribe to having their sons volunteer in a special unit which would be used militarily as a “Jim Crow” outfit similar to that for the Negroes. They suggested that we hold block meetings in order to explain to the Issei just how such units would be formed and the reason for segregation. There was a feeling that their sons were used to createe a second minority problem for the U.S.Army. This appeared to be the real obstacle in our way.
Chapter 2.
The Registration.
Registration commeneed on February 10th and ended March 13. Canal hall No. 13 in Canal and No. 41 in Butte
At the end of the first day it was quite shocking to learn that out of 173 registrants 107 had signed “No” to question 27, and that 52 had given a negative answer to question 28. Everyone began to study them:
- Question 27.
- Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?---
- Question 28.
- Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organization?_____”
In addition to plentiful noes it was a fact that the Army men did not have a single volunteer come forward. There must be some absurd misinterpretation in the community, many of us reasoned. While it could be shown that question 27 would not commit one to volunteering, or a rejection of same, there was something very vague and
After four days of registering the negative answers were so large in relation to the totals that the Project Director decided to call a halt. During the next few days the leaders of the loyal faction were called in, and as a result small compact teams were dispersed into every block to acquaint the people with the exact significance of the program. There were also mass meetings in mess halls, which were led by either Captain Thompson or some responsible staff member. Controversial discussions were avoided which concerned the ill effects of evacuation and the resultant loss of rights and property. But questions in English or Japanese which concerned either the questionnaire or enlistment were solicited. When the Issei or Kibei, however, took to the floor and began haranguing in Japanese it was difficult to stop their spleen. It proved very embarrassing for interpreters to translate the venom which filled their speeches. Why should their young men volunteer in the fact of face losing during the evacuation? Would not the volunteers be sent to various parts of the Pacific to face perhaps their own brothers and uncles in combat? Could
The Project Attorney was asked for an opinion on the construction and legal effect of these questions in terms of affirmative and negative answers. He held that a negative answer to question 27, where the subject was not a confirmed conscientious objector, could be construed as an unwillingness to obey the Selective Service laws. In case a person answered question 28 negatively,without having made formal demand for repatriation, that was a clear admission that he was a traitor to the United States. Captain Thompson held that a negative answer to question 27 was as damning to their citizenship as a like answer to 28. Although the opinion of the Project Attorney was circulated throughout camp most people felt like one vocal Nisei, “Mr. Terry's instruction was not accepted as authorative instruction.”
It had been evident during the last four days that there existed powerful external influences which had turned the center into a turmoil. When Captain Thompson interviewed the men for the second time he was told in many cases that they had been cooread into making a negative answer. It was impossible to find out, however, who was responsible for the coercion. No one would say that his parents had recommended a negative
Leads as to who ware dominant in trying to influence the registrants came from a number of sources. Appointed staff members of the Internal Security pointed out a few; loyal evacuee wardens of the same department accounted for several; and the balance were proffered by loyal leaders such as the Butte and Canal Central Block Managers. Records on the culprits were scant. Internal Security had practically nobs, and Statistics had nothing save some project employment history and pre-evacuation data; but it was important to act immediately and thereby demonstrate to the population that the administration would brook no interference.
The Project Director, Chief of Internal Security and the Project Attorney contacted the FBI and the U.S.Attorney in Phoenix, and requested presidential warrants to be issued for the arrest of the recalcitrant leaders. Approval of the plan was secured from Dillon Myer by telephone, and he insisted that if such a course were to be taken dossiers should be prepared immediately on all persons to be picked up.
All arrests were made in a matter of 30 minutes, without announcement, on the 16th and 17th of February. The FBI served notice on 15 aliens, and Internal Security staff members arrested 13 citizens. The aliens were dispatched to Lordsburg, New Maxico by Justice agents, whereas the citizens were taken to Moab Utah
There was a bristling tenseness in both communities, an increasing anger against staff members who participated in the arrests withthe agents and soldiers from the local post, and a violent reaction against the military personnel who were here to conduct the registration. As we reviewed the occurrence several months later an evacuee member of my staff said that I was fortunate in not living on the project at that time since my life would have been in danger.
The arrest of the citizens included largely a Kibei nucleus who had been instrumental in organizing an active club of about 800 Kibeis. Although the evidence acoumulated in the arrest of these persons was scant, I believe that the incarceration of these Kibei leaders did more than any other factor in maintaining relative quiet and establishing a record at the center for compliance in Selective Service laws.
The ratio of negative answers continued in approximately the same ratio, and the only difference caused by taking the disloyal group out of the project was a greater sense of security for those who did not care to be molested or threatened because of their affirmative answers. The registration of all male citizens in the military age group was finished on February 25. All those who had given negative answers to either question were called in at least once, and in a number of cases appeared several times to reconsider their answers. Only 21 were prevailed upon to change their answers to question 28.
Women of the same age group were next on the list for callins.
- Question 27
- If the opportunity presents itself, and you are found qualified, would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse corps or the WAAC?”__________
- Question 28
- Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organization?”__________
- Question 28 (Substitutute question for aliens)
- Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the efforts of the United States government?”__________
Sometime during the period of registration an analysis was made by staff members, Captain Norman Thompson and an anonymous Nisei. Viewpoints of these parties would, as of today, have changed perceptibly, but I believe they are worthy of insertion: Report of Relocation Staff Members on Loyalty Questions.
Motivating factors behind negative answers to question No. 28 generally fall into four categories which are listed below in what we consider their relevant importance:
- 1. Protest
- This negation is a formal protest against the removal from their homes on the west coast to assembly centers, and there to
relocation centers, which has resulted in loss of property, loss of social standing, loss of livelihood and loss of face because
of being classed in same group as enemy aliens, evacuation not forced on other races such as Germans and
― 31 ―Italians by special removal and discrimination against Japanese-American soldiers during last 15 months by their releases and change in draft classification. They are protesting that this registration does not guarantee full citizenship status and protection after the war. - 2. Pro-Japanese Sentiment.
- Although most of those whose answers are negative to question No. 28 are of the Kiebei group or who have close relatives living in Japan, there are others of the Nisei who feel an attachment to Japan and the Emperor because of the instruction and association with their parents or friends. Many of the Nisei feel that their hurts sustained during evacuation and since are too deep not to place such blame directly on the United States Government, and at the same time they think more kindly towards Japan assuming, without reasonable grounds, that no other country would have treated citizenship on the same basis save countries such as Germany. Oftentimes we feel that a considerable number of Kibei and Nisei are riding two horses, playing the possibilities of eventual defeats of either this country and Japan, hoping to ride the crest of victory with the winner. So much of this pro-Japanese feeling is generated with the notion that this government will not do much about such disloyalty, at least not order them back to Japan permanently.
- 3. Fear.
- Fear is being engendered by certain individuals among those registering to the extent that their lives as well as their immediate
families are in danger by affirmative answers. This is evidenced by veiled threats and also those coming out in the open.
Mothers are often told that if their sons either answer Yes or have intentions to volunteer that the lives of the whole family
cannot be safeguarded. If a Japanese boy leaves for the Army he often feels a certain fear that his parents or immediate family
may not be as well protected as they might be. This fear too is attached to the possibility of volunteers not having been
treated as well as other citizens in the Army; that the special combat units may be sent into action by officers with little
regard to the understanding of the Japanese-American situation. Also there seems to be deep-rooted feeling that public sentiment
will not keep pace with all efforts and actions
― 32 ―for distinguishment by this combat unit and that the public will feel more kindly toward them after the war. In other words, that this is a trap to entice the young men into service with no strong feeling on the part of the War Relocation Authority or the Army to take steps to enlighten the American people as to the actual efforts made by the Japanese-Americans in this war effort. - 4. Other Influences
- Due to tradition, the eldest son of a family feels complete responsibility for the parents and because of this feeling does
not want to break family ties and leave the parents unless there is a definite understanding that they will be cared for while
he is away and allowed to remain in the United States after the war.
Arguments that “yes” answered to Question No. 27 means immediate induction or at least availability for Army service. Answering “no” to this question has been argumentively interpreted as immediate necessity for repatriation in order to avoid military service.
Feeling by some persons that they do not want to fight for any country under such circumstances and that doing so makes them plain slackers.
Reasons for disloyalty registrations as interpreted by Captain Norman Thompson who personally interviewed over 700 of the Japanese-American citizens who have forsworn their allegiance to the United States. The majority of them are Kibei.
- Approx. 5% 1.
- Do not believe that public opinion in the United States will ever permit the assimilation of Orientals.
- Approx. 15% 2.
- Pacifist group does not want to bear arms for either the United States, Japan, or any other country. This group left Japan to avoid war service against China.
- Approx. 10% 3.
- Believe Japan will win the war.
- Approx. 20% 4.
- Elder sons with parents in Japan, or whose parents wish to return there, are bound by family tradition to provide for their
parents
― 33 ―and be governed by their wishes regardless of their own age or marital reesponsibilities. Parents first and country second. - Approx. 10% 5.
- Fear of losing inheritance rights to property in Japan
- Approx. 10% 6.
- Those who believe they will escape the United States Draft and be permitted to remain here after the war on the same basis as Issei have always enjoyed.
- Approx. 10% 7.
- Those who suspect that this registration is all a bluff and that no action will ever be taken to intern, draft or deport them.
- Approx. 10% 8.
- Nisei who are soreheads over evacuation, segregation in the Army (special combat group). Their attitude: to hell with everything.
- Approx. 10% 9.
- Nisei whose parents or relatives are now held in internment camps and whom they believe are guiltless. Their attitude: take my parents out of jail and I will volunteer right now and fight to the finish.
- 100%
Report on Loyalty Question from an Anonymous Nisei:
Through my personal observation of evacuee residents, including present military registrants and their parents, during past two weeks, I listed below some of the reasons which seem to be the motive in answering negatively to the Question 28 of the military registration:
- 1. Mass evacuation of Nisei and extremely keen feeling against the treatment which these Nisei received since the outbreak of war.
- 2. Classification of American born Japanese in class 4 under Selective Service law.
- 3. Calling citizens of Japanese ancestry as saboteurs, fifth columnists, &c., and constant appearance of newspaper articles on above charges without a single proof, particularly during first few months following Pearl Harbor attack.
- 4. Non-effectiveness of citizenship rights of Nisei in the United States.
It was so surprising to this observer that feelings as above were so high during past two weeks since the start of the registration. I do not know whether such feeling was the expression of their original feeling deeply rooted in their heart or the result of influence by others than themselves. Such feeling is so keen that some of the Niseis do not see the opposite view such as necessity of mass evacuation or the benefit to them in future of their expression of loyalty which will act as disapproval of alleged disloyalty. - 5. Some Nisei lost their confidence in their future as American citizens in the United States, presuming that they will always be under handicap, socially, raolally as well as under the restriction of civil rights.
- 6. Their willingness to give up citizenship and accompany their parents and go to Japan, where they feel their opportunities are more plentiful than in the United States.
- 7. Through the influence of their parents who still have such feeling that disobeying to the emperor of Japan means act of disapproval of ancestor worship. They feel that they have done terrible offense of their eternal teaching of ancestry worship. That words in Question 28 relating to emperor of Japan seem to have annoyed them very much, and that feeling must have influenced even Nisei.
- 8. Keen feeling against white Americans transplanted in their hearts since the war because of expression of American public, through newspapers and radios, of extreme hatred of Japanese. This feeling must have been stimulated by mass concentration of Japanese in camp.
- 9. Nisunderstanding on the part of some registrants that answering Yes on Question 27 means agreement to serve in the armed force of the United States even other than regular draft which might seem voluntary enlistment. Mr. Terry's instruction was not accepted as authoritative instruction. They further misunderstood that forming of Japanese combat duties and therefore answering Yes seems immediate or future result of death.
- 10. Concentration of these Nisei is this war-emergency period in such as enemy alien concentration camps
― 35 ―resulted in their being less conscious of duty, patriotism, heroism, to the nation at war neither to America nor to Japan. General breakdown. - 11. Their present condition drove them into despair. Some people do not think desply.
- 12. Lack of guiding principle in the community. Former leaders of community are now in internment camps. They were responsible in making and forming constructive public opinion. It is unfortunate that most of them are taken away since the outbreak of the war. I feel that America made the greatest mistake in not asking a thorough investigation of their characters and degree of their so-called “dangerous enemy aliens.” Their presence in the community would have been great advantage to the United States.
- 13. Minds of younger registrants are premature and entirely dependent upon parents for their future.
- 14. Older Nisei with family are afraid of being taken away from family.
- 15. Some feel very keenly the possible feeling of Americans toward Japanese in this country, and, therefore, they feel that their future in America is absolutely shut out.
| Total Eligible To Register | Total Registered | Replies to Question 28: Yes | Replies to Question 28: No | Replies to Question 28: No Reply | |
| Total | 9609 | 9609 | 8401 | 1204 | 4 |
| Citizens: Male | 2588 | 2588 | 1637 | 951 | 0 |
| Citizens: Female | 2394 | 2394 | 2142 | 252 | 0 |
| Aliens: Male | 2750 | 2750 | 2748 | 1 | 1 |
| Aliens: Female | 1877 | 1877 | 1874 | 0 | 3 |
Part III
Outside Employment
Period
April 1, 1943--Nov.1, 1943
Chapter 1
Sifting of the Population.
There was a measure of relief to everyone on the project when the tumultuous Army registration was over. Evacuees seemed outwardly little perturbed, but it was possible to learn through reliable sources that their outlook had undergone a vast change. The more forward type of Nisei who had been Americanized components of say Parlier, California, or Los Angeles, or other cities had been shocked to learn that so many of their race had elected to make vigorous protests when their nationality was at stake. One Nisei leader said: “I was sure surprised to see how people of my own race coated.” Plans began to crystalize as to how it would be possible to make a living on the outside for the entire family. Of course, they were dubious about becoming adjusted themselves to new people, different industries and particularly a colder climate, but a new desire had lately been sparked for outside living.
The young men and women of military age who had newly made a negative response on matters of loyalty were uncertain about their futures. Neither word nor directive seemed to come from Washington as to what would be done to them. They had been told that they would probably be interned. Their families were also disturbed because there would be possible disintegration of family ties, and that would amount to a calamity among the Japanese. In the meantime a few of the bold ones requested to change their answers and inquired whether it could be done orally or whether a formal application would have to be made. As a result, we
Congress was watching developments too. The persistent clamor set up by congressmen and the press from California, Washington and Oregon had alerted many other congressmen and papers to a study of the question. Senator Chandler, after holding a casual hearing in Phoenix had recommended (1) that all those who volunteered or could be drafted should be put in the Army, (2) that the disloyal should be sent to a concentration camp, and (3) that the loyal and able-to-work should be certified by the FBI and put to work.
Those of us on the staff who worked closely with the problem had been led to believe that as soon as the records and facts available through the Army registration had been checked by the Navy, Army or FBI, decisions would be made as to whether a person should be allowed relocation privileges or should be segregated. As time want on it developed that the implications were not so simple as that. Family ties were stronger than loyalty ties, and therefore led to an endless change in attitudes among those who were closely or distantly affected by the answers of their family members.
The bubble had burst during the registration with such a violence that many were in a state of bewilderment, trying disparately to make up their minds about a lot of factors. Dillon Myer, on the 13th of April, had stated that some thought was being given to bestowing the status of “friendly aliens” upon parents of Japanese boys in the Army. A few days later the officer in
There was a lull in leave clearance from approximately the 1st of February until the middle of April. The numerous applications submitted before the beginning of February were now reexamined and compared with data secured during the registration, and consequently few wires came to the project announcing the clearence of anyone. When determinations were made they came in by teletypes or on WRA 258 forms. If a person had been certified on a security angle for outside living, where he would have to restrict his path to areas outside the Pacific coast and states bordering the eastern and southern sea boards, then his name would be forwarded to the project on a form 258. If his record appeared to be quite favorable, then he could also reside say in New York City or Miami, Florida, which were in the Eastern and Southern Defense zones. A 258A would be sent in this case. And were the findings indicative of highly Americanssed activities, then a 258B form would be sent, which gave the person permission to reside anywhere, except in the restrictive parts of the Western Defense Command, and also approval to work in plants important to the deronse
It was important that we restrain people from going out who were without credentials, meaning leave clearance. We set up a project stop ledger of those who had answered No to both questions 27 and 28, and on applicants for repatriation. In addition, we added the names of those who had been paroled to the project from internment camps by the Justice Department. But people who did not appear on this ledger might not be able to go out. In order to be entirely sure about being able to relocate, there had to be a double check in the Leave office of the Employment division. If their names failed to appear on the stop ledger,and at the same time had not been forwarded by Washington on either a 258 form or by wire, they simply could not leave the center.
Until about the 8th of April the future of every evacuee was entirely within the scope of the Washington office of the WRA. Before this time the projects simply compiled information and waited for determinations to be made, or kept the wires burning incessantly about the probable clearances of individuals. Then the Administrative Instruction No. 22 was revised so as to permit the Project Director to issue indefinite leaves following an on-the-project investigation, and he change at Gila actually mattered little. However, it is well to evaluate the considerations under which leaves could be issued on the project level:
- (1) Applicant has registered for leave clearance during the military registration.
― 41 ― - (2) Applicant has answered question 28 in the affirmative without qualification.
- (3) Applicant has not applied for repatriation or expatriation.
- (4) Applicant is not a paroled alien or Shinto priest.
- (5) Applicant has not been denied leave clearance or had it suspended by the WRA national director.
- (6) Applicant has a job offer approved by the project outside employment office.
- (7) Applicant is not considered dangerous to public peace and security.
- (8) Applicant does not propose to be employed or reside in the Eastern Defense Command without authority.
Now there was a great number of evacuees who did not appear on the project stop,ledger or had been given clearance from Washington. A small percentage of aliens appeared on the stop list who had either asked for repatriation or were classed as parolees by the Justice Department, but the vast majority were in a nebulous class. It was a question whether clearance would ever come to the non-citizens. Washington was treading lightly on the Department of Justice charges, and their ability to get out seemed to hinge on this new authority granted to the Project Director. In the case at Gila, there was not any particular reason for denying clearance to aliens since it had been demonstrated already that many were worthy of trust, but now almost unobtrusively there was an amendment to an old instruction which placed clearance of about half of the adult population in the hands of the local director.
At this point the Project Attorney was quick to remind the Project Director that if clearance was to be provided in this manner it would be expedient to set up an elaborate method for arriving at a local determination. After all, it was
Another factor developed too which impressed the Project Director that it was wise to be careful. The first to go out were the young boys and girls who had been sufficiently Americanized to realize that living in a center was not the sensible way to live. While they were eager enough for such an adventure, they were woefully prepared. If they had known an employer it was perhaps their own father in a fruit and vegetable stand, or on a vegetable or fruit farm. They neither knew about the psychology of securing a job nor how to live on a limited budget commensurate with the earnings of a first job. Young men had gone out on a training program that folded abruptly, and the result was several wires sent to us collect for return fares back to the project. It was a proven fact that boys of the zoot suit type were becoming conspiouous in Chicago as they
Several evacuee leaders were naturally concerned about the departure of the irresponsible and immature. Their innate pride demanded that if some of the population relocated there should be a definite attempt to send out the exemplary persons first. After two leaders had returned in April from an exploratory trip in Chicago there were broad hints spread about that leadership should develop to this end. An endless amount of conversation did not bring forth any effective plans from the evacuees but it served to awaken the staff to a need for screening.
Screening committees which were talked about in April, May and june were not fully developed until the first evacuee week in July. These were instituted over the objections of the Employment Officer and the Deputy Director. We as objectors lost out readily because it was far more convincing to advocate the setting up of a cautionary measure,and subsequently scrapping it if it was not needed, than to commence with a liberal program without any precedents and soon find out that we had made irrevocable errors.
The functions of these committees were manifold. They not only investigated loyalty factors but scrutinized the employment opportunity that a person was going to accept to determine if he was qualified for the job. What had the person done on the project? If his record disclosed that he had
While we were primarily concerned during the spring with sending out examplary relocatees, there was another pressing problem which many of us on the staff considered the business of first and primary importance. That was to get those out of the center who were not considered loyal. A forward-looking editorial dated May 20th stated that segregation of the loyal and disloyal was inevitable. Who was to tell the method of arriving at the determination was unknown, and it certainly was problematical as to the basis of selection. But while the screening committees were examining applicants for indefinite leave who appeared in nearly all cases to be free from complaint there were cases that needed immediate reviewing, namely: (1) persons who had requested repatriation or expatriation and had not withdrawn their requests, (2) those who had answered the loyalty question negatively and had not attempted to change the answer, and (3) those who had been denied leave clearance by the war Relocation Authority.
The segregation committees set up for August 7th were composed of nearly all eligible staff members, many of whom were so ill equipped to serve that a comparative review of conclusions was astonishing. A few were liberal, but most of them were of the super-patriot type who thought that people having made a request for a change of answer would have to demonstrate otherwise their right to evade segregation. Many arbitrary decisions were made at that time which were neber appealed by evacuees, primarily because living in a relocation center did not seem to differ materially from life in a segregation center.
During the month of September, when it became generally known who were on the bonafide segregation lists, a number of evacuees began to have misgivings that the degregee movement would not necessarily free the camp of the disloyal. It was quite evident that people were planning to live in Tule Lake during war time and evenutally go to Japan, where they could reside among persons who had the same ideological ideas and customs. And, of course, Tule Lake was a stepping stone enroute to the mother country where families could be reunited. A great number of people had sons, daughters or parents in Japan, caught there in the whirlwind of war, and one of their most burning desires was to become reunited. Actually only a small percentage of the negative registrants went to Tule out of a movement totalling 1915.
A committee was set up on April 27 to consider the cases which were considered doubtful. The Project Director had been
At first these hearings were held before any type of docket was forwarded from Washington, so that if there were intelligence reports on the person we had none to serve as a guide. The committee members felt that they were making history and were sensitive to the fact that they were establishing a precedent in regard to determining colors of loyalty and disloyalty. There was feeling on our part that a person up for one of these hearings would have to make an extra effort of considerable portents to make amends for past actions. Many young men and women too were asked if they would volunteer for the Army in order to cancel the stigma of their registration errors or their ill-considered desires to become repatriated or expatriated.
The original committee on doubtful cases was soon determined to be inadequate to handle an appreciable number of hearings. The number was increased to about eight committees chosen by the Project Director. This did not
Until the latter part of October these hearings were associated with the Community Management division rather than Employment. It was felt that this business of telling who is loyal should be disassociated from the division which was the salesman of relocation. However, the Employment Officer, the Leave Officer, Project Attorney and the Chief of Community Management contributed the lion shares to a coordinated unit within the Community Management division. In the middle of October this department became so large that it was necessary to detail a high type person who would be able to coordinate the entire doubtful case program in the Project Director's
There was no uniformity among the committees as to how a case should be determined. In some cases the chairman wrote an opinion which represented the majority opinion, and in others each committeeman composed a recommendation of his own. After a few months the Chief of Community Management devised an interviewer's form which became mandatory for all members. To me it has always appeared as a menace to honest evaluation, but then posterity may want to know something of our methodsm so it is being embodied herewith:
Interviewer's Summary Concerning Applicant
For Leave Clearance
Instruction: Each interviewer is to fill out this form concerning each applicant for leave clearance in duplicate.
UNDERLINE ONLY THOSE WORDS OR PHRASES WHICH APPLY. Fill in blanks where necessary.
Name of Applicant:__ __________Age:_____Sex:__
Personal appearance:
Very healthy - Healthy - Below average health -Ill-Very neat - Neat - Averagely clean and orderly - Slovenly - Unkempt.
Attitude during hearing:
Eager - Pleasant - Cooperative - Talkative- Reticent- Uncooperative - Sullen - Nervous - Tense - Relaxed - Sincere - Vacillating - Alert - Lackadaisical-Cynical
Answers: (Interpreter: Used - Not used)
Direct - Evasive - Untruthful - Lengthy - Brief Sufficient - Intelligible - Incoherent - Halting Speaks English well - Speaks English fairly - Speaks English poorly.
Social attitude:
Friendly - Reserved - Hostile - Shy - Aggressive - Boasting - Sullen - Morose - Happy - Unhappy - Cheerful - Sad - Subdued - Disillusioned - Altruistie - Altruistic - Domineering - Submissive - Opportunistic.
Applicant appears to be:
Loyal to U.S. - A-loyal - Straddling - Disloyal to U.S. - Loyal to Japan - Interested in democratic principles - Knows meaning of democracy - Interested only in “his rights” - Family centered - Interested in “getting pub” - Influenced by friends - Interested in helping to win the war - Influenced by educational opportunities - Interested in peace and har mony. *(A-loyal means “without apparent loyalty for any country”).__________
I have known this applicant:_____Years_____Months_____Weeks Only since interview_____Casual acquaintance__
I consider the issuance of leave for the applicant:
Very advantageous and helpful to the war effort. Advantageous and safe for national security.
Not particularly advantageous but not dangerous for national security.
Not advantageous or advisable for public relations.
Not advantageous and dangerous to national security.
I recommend: Leave Clearance - Rehearing - Segregation.
Date__________Interviewer__________
The original hearing on June 22 discloses the early trends of questioning. They were inclined to be a bit verbose and dwelt lengthily on matters such as occupational backgrounds which later were briefed considerably. However, allowing for individual variations, they were fairly good patterns of hearings which were subsequently given. The more obvious difference occurred, as we make comparisons in these cases, in the attitude of staff members who made a decision. The first hearing and the conclusion of a committee member merits study, and is therefore recapped in this report:
Hearing on Changing Answer, Military Questionnaire
Gila River Project
Rivers, Arizona
SUBJECT: Miss O., Rivers, Arizona.
Oath administered by Notary public before witnesses, “Do you Swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?” Ans.: Yes, I do.
Q: Suppose, Miss O., you give us the reasonswhy you asked to have this hearing called.
A: At the time of this questionnaire I was so undecided and everything was balled up, and I jumped at conclusions, from bitterness. My dad is interned, and so, all the more, it made me feel that way.
Q: When did you have knowledge of this employment offer?
A: Sometime in April, after the registration.
Q: Is that the time you became interested in relocation?
A: More or less.
Q: Had you thought at the time of registration that an answer in the negative would mean that you couldn't go out, or hadn't you thought of it?
A: I didn't think of anything then.
Q: Just between the time you answered “No” and the time the offer came in, had you thought of changing the answer?
A: I was planning to change it before that time.
Q: Did you ask any of the Army sergeants or Captain Thompson about changing your answer at that time?
A: No.
Q: Will you explain what you mean by bitterness?
A: I was already in training and had to stand losing all that. I thought I would never get out of this place until after the war. My dad was taken in.
Q: Whom were you bitter against?
A: Against the government.
Q: Against the United States?
A: Yes, it would be.
Q: When did you register?
A: I think I was in February or March.
Q: Do you recall the date?
A: No.
Q: How long before the registration closed was it?
A: I don't know.
Q: Would you say it was 10 days?
A: I think our block was toward the end.
Q: After you registered were you informed that you had a right to change your answer before the registration closed?
A: No.
Q: Do you read the Gila News Courier? Did you see any notice about comments about changing your answer?
A: No.
Q: Weren't you reading the paper at that time?
A: I read it off and on, at least glance through the paper.
Q: When did you first make application to change your answer?
A: That was the beginning of May; no, it was before that. It must have been in April.
Q: Did you make a written request?
A: My first written request was made on May 21 or 23rd.
Q: Whom did you address that to?
A: Mr. Huso.
Q: Then you wrote this letter on June 19?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you write any letters in between?
A: No.
Q: In other words, your request to change your answer followed your job offer.
Q: When did you get your job offer?
A: In April.
Q: Did you feel that the treatment of evacuation and the internment of your father was such that you never wanted to stay in the United States?
A: I never did plan to go back.
Q: Where did you live before evacuation?
A: Suisun, California.
Q: Is that in a Japanese community?
A: Yes.
Q: Were you employed there?
A: No, I was going to school. That is where the family lived.
Q: What is your age?
A: 21 years.
Q: When is your birthday?
A: October 21.
Q: What occupation was your father engaged in?
A: Farming.
Q: What kind?
A: Fruit of all kinds--pears, peaches, &c.
Q: What organizations or clubs did you belong to?
A: We had a girls' club there, a Japanese girls' club.
Q: What were the objects of that?
A: More or less social reasons.
Q: Did you have anything besides social functions?
A: We had speakers.
Q: Where did you get the speakers?
A: From the town; like we had a lady speak to us on manners and social conduct. We also had sports and other activities.
Q: Were all the speeches in English?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you have any Japanese speakers?
A: I don't know. Not while I was there.
Q: Did you go to Japanese school?
A: Yes.
Q: How long?
A: Eight years.
Q: What other schooling did you have?
A: Grammar school, high school and three semesters of junior college.
Q: Did you have any technical training?
A: In Children's Hospital in San Francisco I had nurse's training.
Q: Was there a large number of girls and boys of Japanese ancestry at the American schools that you went to?
A: There were about 40 Japanese, and about 30 or 40 at junior college.
Q: How about the nurse's traing?
A: There were four of us.
Q: Have you ever been outside of the United States?
A: No, I haven't.
Q: What is your father's name?
A: T---O---.
Q: What is your mother's name?
A: K---O---.
Q: Did they come to this country together or did they marry after they got here? What year did they come?
A: They came together. They were married there. It was before 1914, but I'm not sure of the date.
Q: Was it before or after 1910?
A: It was after 1910.
Q: Are you the oldest in the family?
A: No, I am not. I have an older married sister and brother.
Q: What are the names and ages of your brothers and sisters?
A: T---U---(married sister); J---T---O---; H---, 19; I---,17; R---, 15; and W---, 12.
Q: Do all your brothers and sisters live here?
A: Yes.
Q: Does your mother live here?
A: Yes.
Q: Where is your father?
A: He is in Santa Fe,New mexico. Was recently in Lordsburg.
Q: Has he been paroled?
A: No.
Q: Do you know how the members of your family who registered answered the questionnaire?
A: They answered “No.”
Q: All of them?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you know whether Japan has requested the repatriation of your father?
A: Yes, they have.
Q: What position have your mother and father taken?
A: We said we are not repatriating. My father and mother said “No” on repatriation.
Q: Did you do that in writing?
A: Yes.
Q: Through our office?
A: Yes.
Q: Has your mother asked to join your father at Crystal City?
A: Yes.
Q: You have one married sister; what does your brother-in-law do?
A: He is working in the Housing Department.
Q: Did he also answer the questions “No”?
A: We thought that was one way of getting together by answering “No.”
Q: Did you discuss that before you registration came up?
A: We answered according to our feelings.
Q: Do you feel that if this job offer had not come up you would have changed your answer anyway?
A: Yes.
Q: Have any members of your family other than your father and mother visited Japan?
A: Yes. My sister and older brother.
Q: Did he receive part of his education there?
A: No. He went on his summer vacation.
Q: How long?
A: Three months.
Q: Is anybody in your family a member of the Gila Young People's Association?
A: No.
Q: What have you been working here as?
A: Student nurse.
Q: From the time you first came?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you have any religious faith?
A: No, not exactly.
Q: I assume that your parents' faith is Buddhist.
A: I think they are Nichiren, a branch of the Buddhist faith.
Q: How about the younger generation in your family?
A: Well, not exactly. We don't go to church.
Q: When your sister was married was she married in a Buddhist church?
A: Yes.
Q: Do any of your family ever go to church?
A: Well, I go to the Christian church once in a while.
Q: I take it you are pretty familiar with Japanese history, culture and traditions. Did you ever hear of the Ise Shrine?
A: No.
Q: Do you know what February 11 means to the Japanese people?
A: No.
Q: What does Kigensetsu mean?
A: I believe that means the birthday of someone; I don't know exactly.
Q: Were you registered with the Japanese consulate when you were born?
A: I think I was.
Q: What about February 22?
A: That's Washington's Birthday to me.
Q: Do you know whether your parents believe in the divinity of the Emperor of Japan?
A: I guess they do.
Q: What is your feeling on that subject?
A: Well, I have not been home very much.
Q: Have you any opinion on it, one way or the other?
A: No.
Q: Is it ever mentioned in your family life about the divinity of the Emperor?
A: I don't believe so.
Q: Does the Samurai tradition mean anything to you?
A: No.
Q: Do you know what it is?
A: Yes, in a way. That's the ancient custom of the Samurai, meaning the soldier.
Q: Do you feel that you personally have been persecuted by the United States more than other people of Japanese ancestry who were evacuated?
A: Not any more.
Q: More so?
A: No, not more so.
Q: You knew at the time of registration that at least a good many of the people were indicating loyalty to this country and you knew that some people were undertaking a willingness to volunteer to serve this country in various ways?
A: Yes.
Q: Did anybody attempt to influence your answer?
A: No, not much. My mother was saying that we should get together.
Q: What was her reason for that, do you think? Did you just accept your mother's suggestion along that line without knowing why?
A: I more or less felt that way at that time.
Q: Have you any idea why your father was interned?
A: No. We have written in, but have not heard much.
Q: Was he a member or an officer of any Japanese association?
A: Several years ago he was president of the Japanese Association at Suisun.
Q: Did he relinquish that post seven years ago?
A: Yes.
Q: Has there been talk in your family while you have been home about war and the relative merits of Japan and the United States?
A: I wasn't home. I came home at the time of evacuation.
Q: Do you have any opinion now as to whom you want to see win the war between Japan and the United States?
A: Yes, the United States.
Q: Do you feel that you are the only one in your family that feels that way about it?
A: I haven't talked to the others.
Q: You think you are the only one.
A: Yes.
Q: Are you willing to give up your family and its many heartaches?
A: Yes.
Q: Do the rest of your family know that you want to change your answer?
A: My mother knows.
Q: Regardless of your answer, the answer to this question will not be held against you. Do you consider that you have been treated fairly in this relocation center?
A: Yes.
Q: Let me ask you this. Suppose it were felt that your application were to be denied because perhaps for some reason that was thought for the best interests of all people connected in your case, would you then become bitter again?
A: No.
Q: Do you have confidence in the judgment of the administration that we will do the thing best for the general interest of the people in the center?
A: Yes.
Q: If, on the other hand, you were permitted to change your answer and were granted leave, and you had an opportunity to return to California, would you return to California?
A: I don't know whether I'd go by myself.
Q: Did your family suffer considerable financial loss through evacuation?
A: I say they did.
Q: Your father and mother were quite well-to-do, were they, and they lost a great deal of money as a result of evacuation?
A: Yes.
Q: Are you engaged to be married or anything of that sort?
A: No.
Q: At home, do you use the Japanese language?
A: We speak Japanese to our parents and English to the rest of the family.
Q: What organizations do you belong to here, if any?
A: None.
Q: No block clubs?
A: Yes, I do belong to a block club.
Q: Is that a branch of the Gila Young People's Association?
A: No, it has no connection.
Q: Suppose an approval is given by the relocation authorities to change your answer and you change. How would you react about the war as to who is winning, &c? Would you keep quiet or would you say anything about how you felt about the war?
A: I think I would.
Q: Would you make it know about how you felt about the war?
A: I guess I would.
Q: Would you be outspoken in regard to your attitude?
A: When I go outside I don't think anybody would be against the United States. I would speak in favor of the U.S. if that's what you mean.
Q: Haveyour parents gone back to Japan several times since they have been here?
A: My mothervwent back with my sister and then my grandfather passed away. Since my father was the oldest in the family, he had to go back.
Q: So you have a large number of relatives there?
A: Not on my dad's side. My mother has several.
Q: Are there other relatives interned at the present time?
A: No, we have no relatives here.
Q: When you answered “No” to the registration, did you feel you had done the right thing?
A: I had a guilty conscience.
Q: What did you feel guilty about?
A: I knew I wasn't telling the truth. It was a protest.
Q: You did know in answering “No” that your thoughts and desires were for Japan?
A: I didn't think it would determine my citizenship.
Q: How long did the Sergeant question you about your answer?
A: He didn't even question me.
Q: Whom did you give your answer to? Did he ask you twice if you wanted to reconsider your answer? Did he tell you about what might happen if a negative answer were given given?
A: No.
Q: Did he say anything about your citizenship as a result of your negative answer?
A: No.
Q: Had you made up your mind that you were going to say “No”?
A: Yes, but the Sergeant didn't say anything.
Q: Do you consider that you have dual citizenship?
A: I think I have.
Q: What does that mean to you?
A: It doesn't mean much to me. I haven't been to Japan at all.
Q: Did you feel that because of dual citizenship, you could ride both horses?
A: I never thought of that.
Q: When you signed the questionnaire, you were definitely antagonistic toward the United States?
A: Yes.
Q: But you have changed your mind now, and you say that the fact that this opportunity came along for you doesn't influence that change of mind at all.
Q: How would you feel if the women were drafted if the possibility were there? Would you be willing to go and sacrifice your life because of your feeling toward the United States?
A: I think I would.
Q: What would you do if Japan were able to effect an invasion of the United States?
A: I don't know what I would do. It depends upon where I would be.
Q: What would you do if you were here?
A: I couldn't do much.
Q: Would you have any idea? Assume that you were in Chicago doing this work you would like to be doing, and military engagements were taking place in that vicinity. What action, if any, would you take? Would you stay where you were and mind your own business, or would you attempt in any way to render aid to either side?
A: Yes, if I could be of any help.
Q: Suppose that before evacuation the Japanese had landed a force close to the town where you were living. What would have been your attitude at that time?
A: My attitude at that time would have been different than now.
Q: Would you have welcomed them?
Q: We would like to have you submit letters of reference from several of your friends with a statement of what you have been doing, &c.
Hearing concluded at 4:00 p.m.
Memorandum
SUBJECT; Miss O., Rivers, Arizona, hearing on changing answer to Military Questionnaire.
As a member of the committee who was on the hearing to determine whether Miss O.'s answer to the military questionnaire should be recommended to a change from No to Yes, I was very much impressed with Miss O.'s statements but believe that her answer reflected more a kindliness of heart rather than change in loyalty status.
She stated that all of her immediate family members had signed “No,” and that she was the only one to request a hearing for a change in answer. I still believe that the
Member, Hearing Board.
All committee members concurred that this person should not be allowed leave clearance, and the docket was sent on to Washington with a negative recommendation. This applicant for indefinite leave was held up by a series of hearings until March 17, 1944, when she relocated to Cleveland! And this case was by no means an exception in the clearance program.
Chapter 2.
Entrees to the Outside.
Provision for assisting persons financially who wanted to resettle on the outside was not made until March 24, 1943, and then it was so meagre that it did not materially affect relocation one way or another. The new instruction gave to resettlers in need a coach or bus ticket, three dollars per diem for meals while en route to his destination, and allowed the head of the family fifty dollars in grants with the stipulation that when his family followed there would be fifty additional dollars in grants allowed irrespective of the size of the family if there were at least three members.
The requisite of need became, of course, a joker in that many would indicate that they had five or ten dollars when it was probable that they had a good deal more. Whatever an applicant declared as cash assets was deduoted from the total sum that a person without any funds would receive. This led to a state of dishonesty which we knew could not help but exist, yet about which we could do little to rectify, especially is a person was considered to have limited means. In those days our evacuee contacts were very few, and our Welfare and Evacuee Property records were so scant that we actually did not have any method of determining whether persons had cash on hand or bank deposits. As a result, there were suggestions from the staff that we should investigate each case thoroughly as to cash worth, but, fortunately, the Project Director stipulated that no special investigations
hereas hopes of becoming a part of the outside world had previously hinged on whether an offer had been given an evacuee through friends, acquaintances, or by correspondence, now there had been established five principal relocation offices in Salt Lake City, Denver, Kansas City, Chicago and Cleveland which could assist at the place of relocation and act as liason agents in getting a job and as benefactor if the results did not turn out good.
The evacuees were quick to realize that there existed a large demand for domestic workers but they were dubious about the treatment they would receive when once out. During the first few months of 1943 the opportunities sent to the projects were largely domestic, with the possible exception of offers for skilled chick-sexers or auto mechanics. Many reasoned that this would mean a state of servitude since a dissatisfied stay at one home might not too easily lead to another opportunity. In any event,there was a dearth of applicants for jobs in homes. Unless there was an inordinate desire to get out into the larger cities, most of the early resettlers were still enrolling in schools or accepting farm work from evacuee friends or relatives who had already settled in states like Colorado, Utah or Idaho, or joining husbands in Camp Savage or some military camp. It was not until a much later date that the population objected so strenuously over the preponderance of domestic offers. However,
Relocation prior to the 1st of April was negligible. Only a few were going out each week, and no one seemed concerned about project employment being upset by any large exodus. The relocation figures from April 4th to June 10th indicate pretty well the initiation of the program:
| Week | Indefinite Leave | Seasonal Leave | Total |
| April 4-10 | 14 | 44 | 58 |
| 11-17 | 42 | 34 | 76 |
| 18-24 | 40 | 5 | 45 |
| 25-May 1 | 52 | 39 | 91 |
| May 2-8 | 24 | 42 | 66 |
| 9-15 | 90 | 26 | 116 |
| 16-22 | 36 | 18 | 54 |
| 23-29 | 88 | 13 | 101 |
| 30-June 5 | 66 | 7 | 73 |
| June 6-10 | 75 | 0 | 75 |
It was mandatory that persons before May 8th have a job or a hospitality offer by a reputable person before they were given indefinite leave. If they went out for schooling then they were processed under educational leave, which was a flexible category of indefinite leave. On the 8th May the National Director issued a directive which permitted evacuees to leave the center if a hostel or some responsible person had invited them to come out. A hostel at that time was more or less a rooming house operated by a friendly religious organization such as the American Friends Service or the Church of the Brethren. When this memorandum was issued there were only two hostels in
It became evident on the project, during the month of April, that the kind of jobs submitted to the project would have to be wider in scope if many people were to become itrested in relocating. There was quite a clamor among the young men for mechanical
During the late spring and summer the trends in the destinations of relocatees disclosed that Chicago was becoming the most popular area. People seemed to accept the evacuees there readily since it was a city of polyglot populations and jobs seemed to be plentiful in restaurants, hotels, garages, machine shops, printing houses, dress shops and, or course, domestic service. When Mr. Hikida and Mr. Oishi, leading evacuees, reported back to the project in the middle of April their evaluations on relocation possibilities in Chicago, we were in glowing spirits. At least this was true for outside employment staff members and evacuees closely associated with outside employment functions. We did not dare to publicize too widely their reports lest the unfounded rumor grow that their trip was financed entirely by the War Relocation Authority. Their reports, however, lent credence not only to the possibility for relocation but that in the case of Nisei it was absolutely safe and highly expedient for them to go out. They reported that a number of oldtime Japanese settlers there had openings for evacuee in their businesses, and they learned that
Whereas Chicago had been friendly, and was large enough wherein thousands might lose their identity, certain other sections in the country where opportunities existed in farming operations were being gradually ostracized for relocation. The National had been reportedly frightened into guaranteeing the governor of Arizona that neither seasonal nor indefinite leaves would be granted for residence after May 29. So many Japanese had flocked to the Rooky Mountain areas before and after evacuation that the public was becoming unfriendly, largely perhaps because of economic factors, but in any event prejudiced enough to warret a complete shutdown on indefinite leaves. Eight counties near Denver were restrioted for permanent relocation on July 24, while six counties in the Salt Lake area fell in the same catagory during August. When the Relocation Supervisor of Little Rock, Arkansas, discouraged relocation in the south it appeared as though the earn belt was being aingled out as if by omission to be the main relocation artery, since the Appalachian Mountains looked like a huge barrier presided over by the Japanese-American Joint Board which issued an occasional pass to seaboard states.
Our center consisted primarily of farmers from central and south central California. As long as relocation was uninhibited in Colorado and Utah, even the aliens had a desire to get out. The climate might vary from that found in Fresno or Guadalupe, but there was a ohance here to get back into vegetable growing and fruit raisning. The war had skyrocketed prices for vegetables,
We tried to impress upon all evacuees who accepted specific jobs that there was almost a sacred obligation attached to the acceptance of a job. There was a realization in certain quarters in Gila that this was an unrealistic way of gauging the labor market since good jobs did not remain open indefinitely; however, the fetish remained for months at this project and the Employment Division performed the necessary counseling to insure its success. In the meantime there was a great deal of irresponsible action by evacuees when they arrived at their destinations. In many cases there was a failure to show up for a job at all. Some evacuees had become impraotical about the rate of wages and thought that they were being victimized by employers who knew they were coming directly from a camp paying less than subsistance wages. In jumping essential jobs few were up-to-date on the stabilization program of the War Manpower Commission, which made it difficult for anyone to get another job. Conditions of this sort were forcefully brought to our attention by the Relocation Supervisor of Chicago, on May 14, when we were implored to instruct all relocatees about the added responsibilities of wartime living.
While we were prone to be severe with evacuees who did not report to jobs submitted by the WRA when they arrived at their destinations, we became aware of conditions existing in the relocation offices which were not exactly kosher. The Chicago area Supervisor stated that people coming in to Chicago were largely placed through the WRA office as against the letters returning to the project which were so critical of the various distriot offices that most of them recommended a search for their own job after they arrived there. One letter came from a responsible evacuee who had gone on to Cincinnati. It said in part: “The job offers that come into WRA is just plain loust... Most of the people who came here and found real good jobs found them thru their own initiative.” Another letter, from Chicago, dated October 11, was just as critical: “As a matter of fact, evacuee and employers alike, refer to the place as `THE CHEAP LABOR OFFICE.' Whether only those wrote back to friends who had some gripe to talk about can only be a matter of speculation. However, it is true that the vast majority of letters reporting the conditions of employment were extremely critical of the War Relocation Authority's job handling. As a result of such revelations we had by the first of October arrived at an impasse in regard to the many job offers we received from all field relocation offices. It was far better to get a friend to send out an offer of hospitality to the project, and go out without a definite job, than to be saddled down with an offer of which he knew nothing. This became our job counseling axiom after about two months of mail order
Jobs were plentiful everywhere, but the housing shortage was acute. In those days it was almost unthinkable for a head of a family to relocate with his entire family unless the situation he was destined for was tailor-made. As late as October 12th the Supervisor of the Chicago area counseled: “Housing for families remains acute, and we still advise the head of the family to come to Chicago alone and send for his family after hishas located housing.” While the Chicago area office was on record as saying that 10,000 more evacuees could easily come to Chicago, the letters from relocated evacuees considered that the saturation point had almost been reached. People were having a difficult time to find houses, and many in an act of finality gave up by saying, “Places are available to people with white faces but not to those with Oriental features.” In fact, very few of the avacuees thought that relocation could go on in a similar tempo without drastic assistance by the Authority. Too many were getting into the frame of mind disclosed by one letter writer when he said: “WRA is desirous of getting everybody out of the centers, but unless they take immediate initiative to see that housing is made available to the evacuees then, so far as I can see, the program so far as relocation is concerned is doomed to failure.” The efforts of the American Friends Service during the month of May to induce the evacuee families to come out as entire units did not meet
During the first experimental months of relocation we considered the progress on a more or less touch and go tempo. On the one hand it became steadily understood that jobs were quite numerous in a variety of occupations while on the other hand it was known that housing was becomingly increasingly difficult. The gate was not entirely closed when he departed, so for the sake of freedom it was, perhaps, worth the ohance to attempt living on the outside again, hoping that the job would turn out well and a house would somehow show up. However, the majority of people left in the centers felt that relocation would eventually tone down to a trickle. They still remembered the effects of the atrocity stories coming out of Japan. When the rumor about eight Japanese being killed in Salt Lake City spread in this center during June the story did not subside very easily. While none of our residents was involved in the Marengo, Illinois, incident, which primarily concerned the Curtiss Candy Company shortly after the “flyer execution” incident, there was considerable talk about the explosive prejudices on the outside. Then, too, many were sure that conditions were very uncertain since Mr. Myer had taken to the air in explaining the problems of the average evacuee to the public. As a matter of fact, there was perhaps more concern among staff members that the program would get
During the initial period of outside adjustment we attached a great deal of emphasis to the groundwork prepared by the relocation offices. They were contacting all the protective groups, which included all types of peace officers to make sure that it was safe for evacuees to come out for relocation. Civio leaders with liberal tendencies had been induced in appreciable numbers to take a definite stand in favor of this newly cognizant minority. And various types of leaders and organizations had been contacted to pave the way for favorable reception. In the midst of all these efforts put forth to assist the evacuees the average resident was almost oblivious to what was happening. There was neither proper appreciation nor any desire to find out just what was occurring. There was a little obtuse thinking when it came to discussion of the majority probleme, and it was not at all rare to find a considerable amount of prejudice amongst them against other races, particularly the Negro. In the words of one relocatee, “Wages are very low to start, and, from what I have heard, working conditions are not too good in that there is a mixture of all races working there, with Negroes predominating.” These conditions are noted so that it will not be forgotten that the average viewpoint of an evacuee became contorted during the year of 1943, largely, of course, because of unnatural living conditions within a center but also in some degree from the fact that we were doing some
Evacuees had assumed that the cost of living generally had risen out of bounds to such an extent that ordinarily entire families would not be able to make enough money to provide a decent living. The feeling among single men, too, was discouraging on this point. Even they lamented that their monthly wage would have to be a minimum of $150 to $200. To combat this thinking we prepared elaborate charts of living costs for cities like Kansas City, Chicago, Minneapolis and Cleveland, and posted them inside the Outside Employment offices. Interviewers attempted to explain how it was possible on the basis of incoming job opportunities to attain a normal living, but relatively few were interested and scarcely anyone looked at the charts. The kind of information that the residents were interested in came through the mails in the form of letters from reputable friends who told them frankly how much money they had left at the end of a month. A letter within a block from a relocatee who disliked outside living could be extremely damaging to the program, and likewise a favorable letter was out best resource in implementing it.
Chapter 3
The Local Scene
After February 1 the Employment and Housing Division, which had formerly catered to the two most vital needs of the evacuees,namely that of project jobs and project housing, now became known as the Employment Division and concerned itself with employment mainly and with relocation as a sort of foundling function. “Inside” and “outside” employment were terms which became familiar to everyone on the project. If a person wanted to work for the first time on the project or desired to change jobs, he went to the same office as those who wanted to take a whirl at a job, say in Chicago or Cleveland.
The Employment Officer who was in charge of the overall operations gave most of his time to inside employment problems of about 6000 workers, while relocation was handled by two other sections known as Outside Employment and the Leave Office. At first these three sections were in the same building, which added confusion in the minds of the evacuee as to what services were rendered by each. We had moved our office,on March 1, from the center of the camp in Block 42 to a warehouse building across the main thoroughfare from the Administration building as as to be in the midst of administrative traffic, but yet set apart from the main administrative offices because of the large amount of contacts we had. Since employment on the project was our main concern it naturally occupied the lion's share of our newly
In those days the leave regulations were voluminous and there seemed to be an endless amount of red tape that John Doe Tanaka was forced to go through if he decided to leave the center. He had been advised to make sure that he was eligible to leave by calling at the Leave Office. There the files would tall whether his name had either been teletyped or sent to us on one of the WRA 258 forms. If he had the desire to take leave and found that he was cleared he was fortunate because there seemed to be a multitude of frustrations among that group who had not yet been considered “lily white.” Then a leave clearance form, referred to in Part II, was given Tanaka to be filled out because the Leave Office wanted to make certain that their records were complete on every applicant. Everyone knew how the records during the Army registration had disappeared from under our noses, and even though they might now be in some safe repository in Washington, had resolved to have our files as replete as they possibly could be.
At this point John Tanaka had cleared the hurdle of clearance He was now directed to the Outside Employment section, where he would look over the employment offers sent in by the various outside relocation offices. By the first of May there appeared to be quite a selection outside the manial types associated with
The Leave Office would first request that an actual application for indefinite leave be made out on a WRA form 130, which specified the employment to be engaged in and indicated somewhat the extent of his resources. Since he would need a ration book for outside living he was referred to the ration desk where an application was made out. It was important, too, to receive as much money as possible from the WRA in defraying the expenses to a new location. A request was, therefore, made to receive enough money for a train ticket as well as three dollars per day with which to obtain meals. As long as he was considered the head of the family he would apply for the fifty dollar relocation assistance grant. He was given a form to sign and instructed that the remainder of the family could not receive any more in this type of grant than he was eligible for. Mr. Tanaka said that his birth certificate had been lost and that it would take months to get a certified copy, so the office would have to make out a
Checks were now made by the Leave Office with the Internal Security to determine if the applicant had a law-abiding record and with the hospital to learn if he had any communicable diseases or needed continued medical attention when he left the center. There was an effort made, too, in learning what his labor foreman or supervisor thought of him, which assisted the committee in evaluating his success in holding down a job. The entire file was in the hands of the screening committee on the appointed day of hearing, and when John Doe Tanaka had passed with flying colors he went back to his barrack wondering whether the WRA was attempting to encourage relocation by making it seem difficult to attain or whether it was uninterested in numbers so long as loyalty records seemed pure and unsullied and thereby was trying to assume the role of another intelligence agency.
John Tanaka awoke on the morning of his departure with the uncertain feeling of a young man leaving home. He had more readily thought of this relocation center as being a home than at the time he lived in an assembly center. There they had been
As the spring months moved along it became apparent that
Despite our worries about public acceptance, it was decided to set up another office primarily for outside employment. An entire barraok was requisitioned a short distance from our main office with a reception space of about 20 x 20 and sufficient room for files and interviewing desks. A bulletin board was set up outside the building, and another on the inside, with job offers posted as well as newspaper clippings which were beginning to arrive from field offices. About four of five homemade shelves were placed in the reception room and reading materials were spaced above tabs which indicated the state to which the data pertained. The place was airy, roomy and unfinished. At the time
The Outside Employment office was largely turned over to responsible evacuee for operation, and continued to be identified with evacuee leadership during the entire year. It is ourious to recall now that our original supervisor of the office was a brother of the famous Tokyo Rose. He did a remarkable job of relocation salesmanship, and, after he had ventured out himself at the end of the year, he acted as a liason representative who provided us with factual relocation trends in the midwest. In addition to the supervisor, there were three evacuee interviewers who handled catagorical placements such as farm, domestic and industrial; a publicity person in charge of briefing job offers for mimeograph distribution to the blocks; a clerk in charge of the files and a stenographer.
From inside employment records cards were prepared for all persons eighteen years and older and coded according to their skills. Those who had more than one skill were given as many supplementary cards as they were fitted for. When offers from the field specified need for gardeners or auto mechanics the file was sufficiently broken down so as to account for all those who were able to perform those types of work and in addition we included those who had requested that occupation regardless of
None of the evacuee had had experience in employment offices, either public or private, nor had any of them been in personnel work where counseling had been stressed. It became necessary to improve the counseling techniques, particularly because we were unable to draw into our offices Issei men of broad experiences. The Employment Officer conducted training courses in job placement twice a week identical to that used in the United States Employment Service. This resulted in an improved outlook for the interviewers and generated confidence in selling jobs opportunities; but the matching of jobs with applicants, which was the ultimate aim of the course, was not so readily done at a relocation center as within a federal employment office. Here we had a majority of applicants who were farmers but whose
There was little concern among young men or women about an ultimate plan for family relocation. Only rarely did anyone have vision or interest in planning for the remaining members of the family to follow him,and this philosophy persisted in the majority of cases until the state of California was reopened in December, 1944. When occasionally a head of the family declared that we had to provide a job for his entire family before he would become interested in leaving the center it created a small constarnation since those types of jobs were seldom on hand and it usually resulted in wiring the relocation office for a tailor-made opportunity. Where the relocatees got along nicely as a family unit several people in their block would learn of it. However, if, as in one case the employer turned out to be a cad, the whole community quickly learned about the maladjustment. In this instance a family of
The people in our smaller community, Canal, reacted diffently to opportunities on the outside. A small portion of the
The reaction of Canal residents sprang from different backgrounds. Nearly everyone there came originally from farms and small communities who generally held out against relocating to the larger cities. The exception to this rule was the younger people who were graduates of high school or had been given college training. When young people, and especially the girls, made up their minds for relocation they invariably were up against the objections of their elders. They were admonished that the people on the outside would not consider them on identical terms since the parents were not ready to believe that there existed such a multitude of jobs that if their first played out they could get another with ease. As time went on and the Issei population began to realize that relocation was to become the ideal pattern for the Authority the parental resistance also took on a certain pattern which was not diminished in intensity.
A committee of evacuees was appointed by the Community
After the two leaders had returned from exploratory trips to Chicago we on the staff had hoped that a series of group discussions could be held immediately. Shotaro Hikida, who understood evacuee psychology better than any other resident of the center, however, recommended caution. It had been noised about that the WRA had financed this exploration, and ugly rumors began to appear in various sections of the Butte community. When it was apparent that neither Mr. Hikida not Mr. Oishi was going to advertise their experiences a few began to call at their houses at night. Were conditions as favorable as depioted by the WRA? “For the Nisei, yes,” answered Hikida, “but for the Issei...well, time will help.” Only after a sufficient number had called on them surreptitiously was there any definite movement on foot to have them appear at gatherings sponsored by the Parent Teachers Association and various clubs. Oishi stayed in the background and shortly displayed some pessimistic tendencies, while Hikida glowed with enthusiasm at five or six appearances when he referred to Nisei relocation, but spoke in parables when he mentioned the outlook for Issei. Actually, Mr. Hikida had been convinced that a great proportion of Issei could be resettled but capitalized on a negative approach in order to stimulate some individual inquiries. He was the first apostle of indirection, and he continued to be valuable to the staff and useful to the communities until his departure in June of 1945.
During this period very little effort was made by either the Project Director or members of his staff to maintain a good working relationship with the Block Managers. There was a
Early in July it was found necessary to institute some type of counseling for relocatees since rumors persisted in many quarters, corroborated by letters from field offices, that resettlers were woefully ignorant of many wartime living conditions. They seemed to have forgotten the most elementary etiquette as it referred to dress and social contacts, and, because of camp living, were no longer up-to-date on how difficult it was to travel, how housing had become extinot, that the way to a grocery shelf was through a ration book, and other factors that all citizens were consoious of save those who lived in a
When cold weather set in during the latter part of November, and leaves began to taper off considerably, there was feeling among the Employment staff members that there was a definite end-point to relocation under the present system. We felt that only a limited number of the remaining residents would relocate. Although it appeared that most of the others (theoretically all of the others except those scheduled for segragation) wished to reestablish themselves in normal American communities they felt that they were unable to do so under
Estimates as to where the end-point would be reached varied of course, a great deal among different observers, evacuees and staff members alike. The most optimistic estimated that as many as5000 of the present population would leave in a more or less even flow with the then existing inducements. The more conservative insisted that there were only 1500 remaining residents who had any intentions of leaving unless conditions improved or unless they were forced to leave. There was unanimity on one basic point, and that was that there would be a certain appreciable residue of people whom we would never be able to relocate under the system of relocation then in operation.
These observations prompted the Employment staff (soon to be renamed Relocation) to conduct an extensive survey of the number of families on the project who were relocatable under
Part IV
Voluntary Relocation After Segregation
Period
Nov. I, 1943--Dec. 17,1944
Chapter 1
Introduction.
The period covered by this section of the report was one of transition. Before November 1, 1943, relocation was virtually non-existent in the scheme of project life and activity. After December 17, 1944, relocation emerged as the main artery in the stream of project life, and all other activities--even such vital ones as health and education--were tributaries.
The beginning of this transitional period was marked by the administrative reorganization which brought the Relocation Division into existence. Over 1700 people had relocated from the project before the Relocation Division was created. The tempo of relocation organizational activity was so slow throughout WRA at that time that the instructions outlining the reorganization did not reach the project for over a month after they were issued in Washington, and the change from Employment to Relocation at the project was not completed for nearly two months after that. Probably January 1, 1944, can be set down as the date when the Relocation Division first stood on its own feet and began to function as a unified, independent entity. Prior to this date no one on the appointed staff had been assigned to devote full time to the coordination and promotion of a relocation program. During 1943 the Employment Officer and his chief assistant, the Placement Officer, devoted most of their time and attention to project employment matters. The Leave Officer and the two Assistant Place-
Regardless of what latter day apologists or press agents may have to say about the overall policies and programs of the WRA throughout its existence, the evacuees and the operating personnel at the project level never seriously considered relocation an integral--much less a dominating--part of the program up to this time. All attention was concentrated upon project management, segregation, determination of various shades of loyalty, and other matters not organizally connected with relocation. Such leaves as had been granted were regarded only as concessions to the vocal minority within the project who chafed under the restraints of center life and appealed for restitution of their constitutional liberties, or to pressure groups on the outside such as the sugar companies and the farm labor associations who clamored for labor which they couldn't get elsewhere, or to the various conscientious individuals and organizations such as the American Friends Service Committee and the American Civil Liberties Union who viewed the relocation centers with alarm as un-American
Nevertheless there were formidable obstacles and opposition to be overcome, and much practical experience to be garnered by trial and error before the Relocation staff could obtain a firm grip on the problem at hand and work out an effective method of operation. It must be remembered that during this period the project Relocation staff was actually serving two masters with widely varied points of view: the avacuees who regarded relocation as a potential menace to their security and were unanimous in their belief that the Relocation Division should function solely as a service agency to those few people who independently and voluntarily decided to pursue their fortunes outside the camp
*. * So far as the government was concerned, that is. Internal pressures such as statements by the “wise men” of a block that if a certain Issei parent allowed his unmarried daughter to relocate to Chicago she would be subjected to disastrous moral influences were an entirely different matter.
*. * The ideas expressed by one such technical adviser were frequently in conflict with those put forward by others and appeared to have in common only the feeling, usually but not always stated, that if whatever innovation were in vogue among Washington thinkers at the moment were immediately instituted the evacuees would respond and the rate of relocation would be accelerated.
Despite the rough spots, however, it is believed that in the 13½ months covered by this part of the history valuable experience, which paved the way for smoother operation during the post-exclusion period, was acquired. How this experience was gained will be the subject of the remainder of the report, and the following outline, with an occasional digressive remark, will be followed:
- I. Leave Clearence Matters.
- II. Relations with Field Ralocation Officers.
- III. Evacuee Organizations.
- IV. Relationships with Project Staff Members.
- V. Distribution of Information.
- VI. Transportation, Leave Matters and Miscellaneous Matters.
- VII. Special Aids to Relocation.
- VIII. Counselling Program.
- IX. Conclusion.
Chapter 2
Leave Clearance Matters.
The fact that WRA had committed itself to a program of relocation, at least to the extent of setting up a Relocation Division at Washington and project levels, and of setting up field offices in most of the major cities outside the evacuated area, was by no means an indication that the witch-hunting phase of WRA was finished. Although the sound and the fury were diminishing considerably, unfriendly politicians and demagogues were continuing to deliver blasts, and unfriendly editors were continuing to publish conspicuously such blasts to the effect that the incompetent and Poliyanna WRA was deliberately sending forth dangerous, pro-Japanese enemy agents who were presumably mobilizing surreptitiously as the fifth column of America. Although the clamor for a transfer of all leave clearance matters to the Army seemed to be subsiding somewhat, there were still repeated public demands that the WRA exercise greater caution and apply sterner standards in processing leave clearence applications.
Furthermore, these external events appeared to have an even more sobaring effect upon the high project officials than upon the Washington policy makers. Consequently, when Washington instructions allowed any latitude at all in administrative interpretation
*. Virtually all Washington instructions received at the project concerning relocation matters were sufficiently vague or equivocal so that an accomplished “loophole sniper” could accommodate them to his own ends.
*. That is, that no one be granted leave clearance who might get in trouble either as a result of his past record or his personal conduct and thus reflect unfavorably upon the vigilance of the project officials. For a while this theory was even extended to the interpretation that “zoot-suiters” and others who were personally unkempt or suspected of moral laxity, should be denied leave clearance, even though there was no evidence in their record to indicate that they harbored any evil intentions toward the government of the U.S.
Project Screening.
Project screening, of course, was the most glaring example of the Project Director's being overly cautious to the detriment of speedier relocation. Although the Relocation Program Officer, with the backing of some of the staff members and all of the Washington relocation personnel who visited the project, made persistent attempts, in weekly reports, special memoranda, staff meetings and private conferences to persuade the Project Director that project screening committees were useless to the leave clearance program and downright harmful to the relocation program, the Director followed the equally persistent admonitions of the Project Attorney and insisted upon the retention of screening. Despite these repeated efforts, however, the project screening committees were continued uninterrupted right up until December 17, 1944, when the entire leave clearance procedure was taken out of the hands of the WRA!
Because the controversy flared up continuously during the period covered by this section of the report, and because the issue was peculiar to this project, itis considered worthwhile to review the argument briefly, pro and con. The thinking of the Project Attorney, which proved cogent to the Project Director, ran as follows:
- All residents who have not specifically been granted individual leave clearances by the Director must be approved for leave
by the Project Director before they may depart from the center
.
*. All indefinite and seasonal leave identification cards were signed by the Project Director, and all other leave papers were either signed by him or in his name by someone to whom he had delegated the authority.
- Hence the Project Director was personally responsible for authorizing the leave of each person who left the center.
- If, therefore, any former resident committed any act inimical to the war effort or was found to be a member of an un-American organization (e.g., the Black Dragon Society, which had been headlined in the Hearst press) after he left the center, the Project Director was liable to be held personally dereliet in his duty for having permitted such a person to leave the confinement of the camp where he had been placed by the U.S.Army.
- If after such an occurrence an investigation were held and it was learned that the Project Director had signed the
― 101 ―leave card of the person concerned without any knowledge or inspection of his background or his character, the Project Director could be held guilty of extreme negligence in a matter affecting the security of the United States. - The limitations of time made it impossible for the Project Director to conduct a personal inquiry before passing on each of the hundreds of leave applications which were being submitted.
- If, on the other hand, he could point out that he had commissioned three reputable members of his staff to conduct such an investigation and make a written recommendation regarding whether or not leave should be granted, and that all three, having access to all available facts and exercising independent judgment, had unanimously recommended approval, he could logically maintain that he had taken every step possible to prevent the prevent of the unfortunate disaster.
On the other hand, these are the main orguments which were advanced to support the thesis that project screening should be discontinued:
- No one who appeared before a screening committee was ever disapproved for leave by the committee. This consistent reaction would indicate conclusively that either (a) everyone who came before the screening committee was qualified for leave, or (b) the screening committees were incapable of detecting those persons whose leave would jeopardize the security of the nation. In either event the committees would be of no use.
- Since membership on the screening committees was
― 102 ―rotated among all members of the appointed staff, most of the members were completely in the dark regarding their responsibilities Hence they did not feel inclined to conduct a serious or involved hearing, but merely signed their approval if they thought “the person looked all right.” - Some members of committees did ask a number of questions many of which were unfortunate. For example, a non-English speaking Issei, who had been required by the Army only to assert that he would not willfully violate the laws of the land, might be asked, through an interpreter who was more sensitive regarding such matters than the inquisitor, “Would you bear arms against the Imperial Japanese Army if asked to do so by the United States?” In the same way some well meaning members who did not understand what their function actually was would usupp the counselling reaponsibilities of the Relocation Division and Welfare Section in their capacity as committee members. Frequently the advice dispensed in hearings was infconflict with the counselling program of Relocation and Welfare. As an extreme example, one member advised a young lady that she would be wise to change her hair style after relocating so that she could pass more easily as a Chinese.
- It was impossible to explain or to justify the screening process to the evacuees. Although all the other features of the leave
clearance process, such as doubtful case hearings, parolee permits, &c., were equally disagreeable and distasteful to the
residents, it was always possible to discuss them frankly with intelligent evacuees who would, in most cases, philosophically
― 103 ―accept them as necassary evils in time of war. Even when discussing extraordinary cases wherein these other features of the leave clearance process had brought about featurss hardship to an individual or a family, it was always possible for the project official to sympathize sincerely while regretfully pointing out, as a last resort, that, alas, the project had done everything possible to straighten the matter out, but Washington or Philadelphia or El Paso, as the case might be, had failed to act so there was nothing we could do but send another teletype. In the case of project screening, however, it was known that this was a strictly Gila-made instrution which could be abolished in an instant without recourse to washington or anywhere else. Consequently, project*. Project screening provided one of the few instances where the oft-heard evacuee complaint, “They do it different at Poston,” was accurate. Because there was a great deal of visiting between centers, the Relocation personnell were often hearing glowing reports from persons recently returned from poston about how certain matters were handled so much more expeditiously by the staff at Poston. For example, during the period when the Arizona OPA prohibited the issuance of food ration books to relocators prior to their departure from the center, we were repeatedly being told that Poston evacuees were getting their books before they left camp whereas Gila people had to apply at the board where they relocated, and then wait for days or weeks while their application was being processed. A check with both the state OPA and the Poston staff confirmed the accuracy of this report, but nevertheless it persisted in Gila. Similarly it was reported that Poston people were allowed much greater freedom than Gilans in the granting of daily or short term passes to visit Phoenix or neighboring communities. A check with the Project Director at Poston also discredited this report.
― 104 ―screening was an annoying handicap to those staff members who were endeavoring to build up evacuee organization such as the Relocation Planning Commission end the Community Councils. In meetings and such groups the screening procedure provided evacuee hecklers with ammunition that never missed its mark. - The screening process was a perpetual nuisance to the Relocation Division. Not only were the Relocation Program Officer's appeals for abolition of project screening unheeded, but he was saddled with the responsibility for its operation! The Leave Officer, who would have had no difficulty in keeping busy with his necessary functions such as Selectives service, doubtful case hearings, leave grants, &c., spent a disproportionate amount of his time in conducting the formalities of screening.
When the Relocation Program Officer attended the Conference in Chicago in March, 1944, he took up the matter of project screening with the Director who orally expressed the opinion that the screening institution at Gila should be done away with, and that, above all, aliens should not be subjected to such an inquisition. Upon return to the project this conversation was discussed with the Project Director who, as a result, issued the following written directive to the Relocation Program Officer which is
As of this date, you may discontinue hearings by the screening Committee.
As a substituse, all persons desiring leave should be scheduled through the regular Leave Clearance Committees. This will cover all persons, including aliens.
Once the person has received leave approval by the committee, the only further check to be made, at the time for a request for outside employment is filed, will be further questioning by the Leave Officer to determine whether there has been any change in the situation which would warrant disapproval of the leave by me.”
Since this memorandum served to becloud rather than to clarify, and to complicate rather than to simplify, it was decided that its real purpose was to preserve the status quo, so the status quo was preserved. Project screening stayed with us until December 17, 1944.
Doubtful Case Hearings. In November and December of 1943 the maohinery for hearing doubtful leave clearence cases was speeded up and remained in high gear throughout the winter and spring of 1944. In a letter to the project dated October 14, 1943, the Director had asked that all leave clearance hearings on doubtful cases be completed at the project by January 1, 1944. Had this policy been adhered to the relocation program in 1944 would have benefited inestimably, and voluntary relocation would have played a more conspicuous part in the WRA program.
According to the Director's Letter, on October 14, 419
In order to meet the deadline set by the Director, thirteen doubtful case hearings committees had been set up. Each consisted of three appointed staff members, including a chairman, and met once a week to hear from four to six cases per meeting. Stenographic notes were taken of each hearing by evacuee stenographers. These committees would have had no difficulty in finishing their
- Many of the dockets, all of which had been expected from Washington by at least November 1. had not yet arrived on January 1.
- Possibly as a result of the Tule Lake incident and subsequent unrestrained criticism of the WRA security measures, the number of evacuees who were placed on the doubtful list was greatly increased and the rate at which individuals were granted Director's clearance was greatly decreased.
Conseqqantly the doubtful case hearings were far from completed in January, 1944. On January 15, 1944, 403 leave clearance dockets had been returned to Washington with transcripts of the project hearing and recommendations of the committee members and the Project Director; and 241 others were awaiting hearings which could not be held until the dockets had been received from Washington. Some of the persons in the latter category were striving to obtain clearance in order to relocate, but in most cases teletypes to Washington failed to bring any response.
*. The frustration caused to many residents by these interminable delays was dramatically illustrated by the case of a young man who was anxious to be cleared so that he could relocate to Cleveland, where his Issei father had been successfully reestablished for several months. Several project officials were deeply interested in helping this lad because of their high regard for him and his family. Their combined inability to elicit a reply from Washington, however, merely contributed to his distraction, since each new failure contributed to the strength of his conviction that his case was hopeless. This despondency apparently preyed upon his mind until he became temporarily demented,and,one day in December, 1943, left camp on foot and walking confidently past the MP guard on duty at the main gate asserted blandly, “You can't hold me here. I'm the President of the United States.” When he continued on, ignoring the soldier's order to halt, he was felled by the soldier's revolver fire. By sheer good luck he was not fatally injured, but was able to recover both physical and mental well-being and to relocate happily the following spring.
On March 11, 1944, the picture had changed somewhat. A total of 882 hearings had been held. Of these 642 dockets had been complete at he project and returned to Washington with a file on the hearings, and 240 cases remained wherein the hearing had been held but the records had not been processed through the Project Director's office and dispatched to Washington. In addition there were 30 dockets on the project for persons who had not yet appeared before a hearing board, and 38 dockets for persons who had filed and never cancelled applications for repatriation. These persons the Leave Officer did not schedule for hearings because it was presumed that
In March and April the Washington bottleneck began to dissolve because each project had detailed at least one person to Washington for a month or more to read the dockets which had come in from the projects and make recommendations to the Director upon which he could base his decision. At the same time, however, a somewhat smaller bottleneck began to form at the project because the typing staff in the Project Director's office was unable to process the dockets as fast as the cases were being heard. In some cases as much as eight weeks' time clapsed between the date that the hearing was held and the date that the dooket was postmarked in the Rivers Post Office for transmittal to Washington. By August 1, 1944, there were only 187 dockets that had been transmitted to Washington but not yet acted upon by the Director.
In August, however, orders were received to schedule all persons who had applied for expatriation or repatriation through leave clearance hearings. Conscuqently, on September 1, there were only 68 dockets awaiting clearance in Washington, but there were 444 cases pending action at the project. Although it was difficult for either the evacuees or the staff to understand how any useful purpose was served by the hearings conducted for repartiates and expatriates, all of these persons were scheduled and brief inquiries were held. On December 17,
Parolees.
Throughout 1943 and the first half of 1944 there was a small but steady streem of men entering the center from Department of Justice Internment Camps. Most of them came from Santa Fe, New Mexico, and were coming to this center to join immediate family members who had been evacuated here. (It seemed that almost all of the parolees were family men.) The procedure for transferring these men was very simple insofar as the project was concerned. When the Department of Justice was prepared to parole an internee it issued a formal parole order and sent a copy to Washington WRA and a copy to the center. The center copy was delivered to Internal Security and filed without acknowledgment. Washington WRA then sent the Department of Justice an authorization for the parolee to be moved to the center indicated. The Internment Camp wired the center of the time of arrival and the mode of travel, and the parolee was received at the center. The Project Director never requested that he be consulted before a parolee was approved by Washington for admission to this center because it was assumed at this time that any parolee should have the opportunity to enter the center where his family lived when he was allowed to leave the internment camp.
The relocation of parolees was authorized, theoretically, shortly after the WRA relocation program was started, early in 1943. Actually, however, the barriers placed in the path of
The Immigration Service was considerably behind the WRA in recognizing that the Community Invitation plan was a feasible method of relocation. In February, 1944, a 14-year-old evacuee boy relocated to New York City in the company of two departed appointed staff members of the project who were not noted for their emotional stability. Although the possible dangers of this arrangement were discussed in great detail with the lad's parents, they felt confident that the plan would succeed and approved his departure. In a short time the boy fell out with the guardian-employers and left their home. He took up temporary residence at the hostel. His parents became very worried about him and applied for leave, hoping to depart as soon as possible to join him at the hostel. Since the father was a parolee who wished to relocate in a community where the District parolee
Parolee leave clearance was further complicated at the project because the Project Attorney, who was the supreme authority on leave clearance matters at this time, insisted that all parolees be given a special hearing before a doubtful case committee and that a copy of the transcript of this hearing be sent to the Immigration Service together with the application for a travel permit. This hearing was required even though it had never been requested by the Immigration Service (except possibly in some general phrase such as “all additional information known to the Project Director”) and it was known that the Immigration Service had held and recorded several exhaustive hearings on each internee before ever granting a parole. This practice was soon allowed to fall into disuse as a result of studied negligence upon the part of the Relocation Division. It was found that the Immigration Service acted just as rapidly upon those applications which did not contain project hearing transcripts.
Prior to August 10,1944, parolees who wished to take short term leave or a daily pass must receive a travel permit from the Immigration Service before stepping outside the project boundaries. On that date, however, a directive was issued by the Immigration Service authorizing parolees to leave the project temporarily for periods not to exceed ten days without such a permit. In such cases the El Paso Immigration Service was notified by teletype of
Defense Plant Clearance.
The policy of setting up a special involved procedure for the clearance of Japanese-Americans to work in war plants was evolved with great pains and elaborate plans which were never put into practice. Many reams of application forms published by the War Department were sent to the project for use of evacuees who wished to become eligible for work in war plants. (white forms for citizens; yellow ones for aliens.) These forms, according to the accompanying instructions were to be filled out in septuplicate by the evacuee at the project, and then transmitted to the District Relocation Officer in the city where the applicant thought he would prefer to be employed. The Relocation Officer would then seek an employer who would be willing to hire the evacuee in question “sight unseen.” If such an unusual employer could be found, correspondence between the Relocation Officer and the center would ensue until the evacuee had agreed to accept the employment at the terms offered. Then the written offer, plus the evacuee's application forms would be transmitted to the Provost Marshal of the appropriate service command, who might or might not be located in the same locality, and the Provost Marshal, keeping in mind his grave responsibilities to the national security, would deliberate upon the matter for months. Consequently, the application blanks which arrived at the center were not publicized, by mutual consent of the field Relocation Officers and the project Relocation Division.
PMGO clearance for employment at the Tooele Ordnance Depot and the Seabrook Farms will be discussed in a later section of this report.
Eastern Defense Command Clearance.
Up until the end of 1943 hardly anyone had relocated to the Western Defense Command from Gila because so relatively few people had been issued clearance by the Army's Joint Board. On December 14, 1943, the Director wrote a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War advising him that unless a person was known to have been denied clearance by the Joint Board he would not be denied leave when his destination was known to be in one of the states bordering the Atlantic Ocean. Although this action was very helpful, it by no means eliminated the restrictions of the EDC altogether. So long as a person or any member of his family had not received Joint Board clearance there was the fear that such clearance might subsequently be denied, which would involve the family in complications if they had already relocated to the EDC. Furthermore, those persons whose names had never appeared on either Joint Board list (258a or 258b) could not be issued leave to the EDC until a teletype had been sent and a reply received from Washington WRA certifying that they were still not ineligible for EDC residence. Although this constituted merely a record check which theoretically could have been completed in 24 hours, the Washington leave files were apparently in such an unfortunate condition in the first half of 1944 that it frequently took weeks to get a satisfactory reply to this type of inquiry.
A notable example of the embarrassment caused by this situation was afforded when the Satomi family made application to relocate to New York City. The family consisted of the father, who was not a parolee and had a clear leave record, the young
Another talented young lady whose father was interned and whose brother and sisters had all joined her in answering the loyalty questions in the negative, received an opportunity to win a scholarship which would enable her to complete her nurse's training in a Rochester, New York, hospital. She immediately applied for clearance and was given her first hearing in June, 1944. After several rehearings and considerable correspondence between the project and Washington she finally received clearance from the Director. Because of her dubious leave record, however, it was considered certain that she would never be approved by the Joint Board for residence in the EDC. Consequently she applied for leave grants and transportation to Cleveland, Ohio, where many Gilans were relocating at that time. Upon arrival in Cleveland she stopped--presumably--long enough to mail a change of address card and buy a railroad ticket to Rochester, where she enrolled in nursing school and continued her course.
The Joint Board, which never had set any speed records, ground to a slow halt and passed out of existence in midyear, 1944. Thereafter the Eastern Defense Command area and the Southern Defense Command coastal zone, which had previously been in the same category, did not present any special barriers to relocators until after December 17, 1944, when the Army revived their “sacred territory” status for a brief period.
Chapter 3
Relations with Field Relocation Offices
Job Offer Placement.
Although four or five hostels had already been opened and the groundwork had been laid for what later became known as the Community Invitation plan, the Gila Outside Employment Office, as it was known during the Employment Division days, continued to operate for the most part on a job placement basis throughout 1943. Despite the obvious drawbacks of this system, it had become the standard operating procedure and it was exceedingly difficult to introduce a change. Although the evacuees complained that the types of jobs they were getting at the project through the field Relocation Offices were sub-standard, and that many people found better jobs on their own initiative after relocating than the WRA offices were able to offer them, nevertheless almost all persons still at the center who were considering relocation demanded specific job offers before deciding upon a departure date and destination. As late as January 8, 1944, a lively meeting of the Relocation Planning Commission was dominated by several members who expressed ardently the viewpoint that in advocating that evacuees relocate without having accepted a specific job offer before leaving the project the WRA was resorting to thinly veiled hypocrisy in order to find a plausible excuse for shirking its responsibility of finding jobs for relocators. Moreover, this viewpoint was apparently subscribed to by the entire membership
On the other hand, the official line of the Project administration was, in some ways, opposed to the introduction of the Community Invitation plan of relocation. This inner conflict came to a head in the leave clearance procedure. For months several of the chairman of project screening committees had operated on the assumption that it was their duty, not only to prevent saboteurs from leaving but also to oversee the work of the Outside Employment office. Consequently, questions such as “where are you going?” “Whom are you going to live with?” and “What kind of a job do you have?” had become commonplace, and specific, positive answers were expected. At first, when evacuees answered that they had no specific job but would seek one when they arrived at their destination, or that they had no address where they would live but that the Relocation Officer had guaranteed to provide them temporary housing upon arrival, and then they would seek their own quarters, the committee was mildly shocked at the slipshod manner in which the Relocation office had handled the case, and referred the person back to them for the development ofa more concrete plan. Reorientation was a slow and
After January 1, 1944, the Relocation advisers completely shifted their emphasis from job placement to an endeavor to encourage all evacuees to relocate on hospitality invitations instead. Even in cases where negotiations were undertaken by correspondence with prospective employers from the project the relocators were parsuaded not to make a binding commitment,nor to expect one from the employer,but rather to allow the final decision on both sides to depend upon the results of a personal interview upon arrival. The issuance of a blanket invitation from the Chicago district office gave this type of counseling an appreciable boost. When Cleveland and other districts followed suit the Community Invitation plan became the accepted mode of relocation.
Hostels.
The hostels also were a great boon to relocation at this time, and provided the most important impetus for the shift in job placement and housing from the project to the field. Although there were six hostels operating in Chicago, Cleveland, Des Moines,Cincinnati, Minneapolis and Detroit at the beginning of 1944, the bulk of Gila hostel applications were fortthe Chicago, Cleveland and Minneapolis hostels. When the Brooklyn Hostel opened in May, 1944, it also became a popular destination for Gilans relocating to the Best coast, although it never equalled the Cleveland Hostel. During the first year that the Cleveland Hostel was in operation approximately one-third of its guests were former residents of this project. Interest in the opening of the Brooklyn Hostel was heightened by the fact that the first
When the hostels were first established they devised a complex, multi-paged form to be used for an application. This inconvenient form was soon replaced, however, by a short usable blank which contained only ebsolutely essential information and which had only to be submitted in one copy. All hostel applications were typed out in the Relocation offices, signed by the applicant and the Relocation Adviser,and mailed directly to the Hostel Director. Confirmation of reservations was ordinarily received by teletype sent over the WRA line by the district Relocation Office. The Cleveland Hostel also sent a form letter to the evacuee concerned welcoming him to the hostel and giving him preliminary instructions. Usually hostel reservations were made by the hostels to allow arrival any time within a specified one-week or ten-day period so that it was not necessary to request a new reservation if the relocator's arrival was several days off schedule.
The main drawback to the hostels was that it was usually necessary to make reservations long in advance in the more
It was also a minor handicap that the Brethren Hostel in Chicago closed in April, 1944, leaving that city without a hostel at a time when relocation was on the upswing and a large number of people were planning to resettle in Chicago or vicinity. Although the Chicago WRA did a great deal to substitute makeshift temporary housing arrangements, none of them was ever able to provide the prospective relocator at the center the feeling of security afforded by the hostels. Furthermore, the center residents interpreted the closing of the Chicago Hostel at an inopportune time as an indication that Chicago was becoming dangerously saturated from a relocation viewpoint, and that the WRA was taking steps to discourage further settlement in that city. Rumors even circulated charging that as a result of a stabbing incident involving Nisei youths and Filipino sailors and other unsavory evants, community sentiment in Chicago was turning sour and the city would be “closed” after the manner of Salt Lake City and Denver.
Generally speaking, the hostel directors were held in very
In November, 1945, a hostel committee was established at the instigation of the Relocation Division. This Committee was composed of six evacuees and six appointed staff members not directly connected with the Relocation Office. All of them were people who had a large circle of contacts among the resident population and who were geuinely interested in relocation. Although the members were authorized to approve hostel applications, their main purpose was to assist in distributing information regarding hostels. They were advised of all new developments concerning hostels and were called together for informal meetings whenever hostel directors or other persons who had personal information regarding hostels visited the project.
Job Offer Digests.
The semi-monthly job offer digests, or field office bulletics as they were later more appropriately called, were also very helpful in promoting voluntary relocation on the Community Invitation plan. The first such supplement arrived from the Chicago Area Office in February, 1944. Only 150 copies were sent to the project, so an additional 3000 were mimeographed at the center and distributed to every family in camp.
Correspondence with Field Relocation Offices
In 1943 all of the correspondence with field offices was carried on through teletype or brief letters and concerned people who were leaving to accept specific jobs which had been referred previously by the Relocation Officer. Early in 1944 the practice of sending detailed relocation summaries was inaugurated. These summaries were prepared only in the case of persons or families who had special relocation problems or of people who lacked the selfconfidence to strike out on their own by going to a hostel or accepting a community invitation. They were prepared only for persons who were in actual contact with the Relocation Adviser and who had expressed definite, positive, voluntary interest in relocation. Copies of these summaries were sent to as many district offices as the evacuee was interested in. In one case as many as eight copies of the same summary were sent out. In general, the response to these summaries was not gratifying. In fully one-half to two-thirds of the cases no response whatsoever
After a number of these life-summaries were experimented with it was concluded that relocation officers werenot yet in a position, or in the mood to tackle, special cases. Where family men were interested in relocation they were advised to leave their dependents behind in the center and come out and look around. Later in 1944 several of the more successful relocation officers reversed themselves on this subject and deplored the fact that family men were leaving their families in the center and allowing the family ties to weaken, or in some instances acquiring new ties which tugged in opposite directions. By this time the pattern was set, however, and it was impossible to reverse the trend. When family heads were urged to take their wives and children with them when they relocated they replied, “Look at Mr. Yamada. He went out a year ago and hasn't called for his wife yet. If he can't find a place for them in all that time I couldn't possibly find one if they are with me before I even have a job.
In 1943 and the first half of 1944, relocation officers
Except for the detailed summaries mentioned above, which were sent out in letter form, most of the communications with Relocation Officers regarding individual relocation plans were carried out by teletype. In addition, we started in April, 1944, to send daily letters to each district officer advising him of the names of persons who had signed to leave for his district,and their proposed departure dates. Copies of these persons' employment cards were enclosed, and,as the counseling program progressed, copies of the basic family face sheet, the relocation outlook form and the family planning discussion were also included whenever available. In September, 1944, when the advising and interviewing staff had been enlarged, these summaries were amplified to the extent that an individual transmittal letter was forwarded for each relocator which contained all data and impressions gained by the adviser as a result of his contacts with the individual.
On the whole, although it was possible to observe various degrees of competence and aggressiveness demonstrated by the various relocation officers in their relationships with the project, the vast majority of the field offices demonstrated a cooperative spirit and a wish to help in accomplishing our mutual objective. Some were limited in their capabilities or handicapped by a lack of knowledge of project problems and evacuee attitudes, some others brought forth matters in which an honest difference of opinion existed between them and the center, but
In the case of the Salt Lake City, it is felt that the “feuding spirit” demonstrated by the office was something that the Area Supervisor had infused his subordinates with as a result of the peculiar situation which existed in that area and the resultant inverted conception which he had acquired of his job. It is believed unlikely that this belligerence was directed solely at this project but rather that it was an expression of the normal temperament of the persons concerned which manifested itself in dealings with all project personnel. The main difficulties arose over the differences in interpretation of Rex Lee's Memorandum of August 23, 1943 (written when Lee was Area Supervisor) which was designed to curtail relocation to Northern Utah. The Salt Lake officials in 1944 regarded this as a sacrosanct document which must be preserved inviolate at all costs Consequently, they viewed themselves primarily as law enforcement officers and project relocation officers as the potential law breakers.
Although Lee's Memorandum was accepted and conscinetiously executed at the project with due respect for the reasoning which had prompted the decision to “close” this area, as it must to all such policy matters, anoccasional case arose where human welfare decreed that in all justice exception should be made. For example, in January, 1944, a young lady appeared at the Relocation Office and asked for leave for herself and her two children in order that
Later in the summer of 1944 the Salt Lake Area Supervisor, in a characteristic blast, charged that the project had encouraged a great number of evacuees to relocate to Logandale, Nevada, using this destination merely as a stopover for actual relocation to the Salt Lake area. A check of our statistical records revealed that two families had gone to Logandale from this project, both with the advance approval of the District Relocation Officer in Spanish Forks, Utah, who had jurisdiction over that territory. Further investigation showed that one of these families had moved to Grand Junction, Colorado, and the other was satisfactorily adjusted to the environment of Logandale. Thereafter no special effort was made to appease the Salt Lake Office.
The reasons for our poor working relationship with the
Field Office Paratroopers.
*. “Paratrooper” is a generic term used to categorize persons who descended upon the project, frequently unannounced and liable to arrive at any time of the day, week or year, though much more prevalent in the pleasant winter months, whose real reason for appearing was unknown but who avowed that their sole purpose was “to help you out in any, way that I can.”
Because it is impossible to generalize about paratroopers without doing an injustice to some to whom the particular generalization is not applicable, brief individual comments will be made regarding the various individual field officers who visited Gilla
- John Penery. This young man was brimming over with enthusiasm and energy throughout his visit in December, 1943. He called in evacuee clerical workers with tireless fervor and extolled the virtues of Washington, D.C., in glowing terms. On the subject of North Carolina, however, he outdid himself. Through his own efforts he called a meeting of evacuees which was very well attended, particularly by farmers from the Santa Maria-Guadalupe area. It was regrettable that his enthusiasm far outstretched his factual information. An appreciable number of the older evacuees were sold on the plan to establish a large soale farming enterprise in North Carolina. They signed up and were only awaiting the goahead signal from Mr. Penery after he had returned to Washington and ironed out the minor details. After Penery's departure the interested evacuees called at the Relocation Office at frequent intervals for many weeks asking if Mr. Penery's wire had come in yet. No word was received. After about three months' waiting and a number of teletypes to Washington, Mr. Penery's superior replied briefly that it had been found necessary to abandon the North Carolina project for an indefinite period of time.
- Elmer Isaksen. Mr. Isaksen visited the project for nearly a month in January and February of 1944. Since he spent a longer
time than most paratroopers, he had a better opportunity to become acquainted with project operations. Unfortunately, however,
the Arizona winter climate did not agree with him and he found it necessary to spend a large proportion of his time confined
to his room. His physical discomfort also discolored his mental outlook as he became impatient with the slow progress of the
relocation program and hypercritical of the evacuees and their attitudes toward
― 132 ―the war, relocation and life at the center. He was helpful in writing several articles on midwest farming and in accompanying the Relocation Program Officer in meeting with evacuee and staff groups to discuss relocation. - Robert Cronin. This gentleman's ideas, attitudes and plan of action were completely unfathomable during his visit to Gila. He spent very little time in the Relocation Office and did not take the Relocation staff into his confidences. He spent considerable time with the Farm Management staff and talked to evacuee farm workers out in the fields. As a result of these efforts he interested one of the farm leaders in a group employment offer in Delaware which led to the relocation of five family heads and produced a great deal of nationwide publicity for the relocation program. While Mr. Cronin was at the project two Nisei brothers of mature age and sound experience decided to accept a job in a Baltimore garage which had been forwarded through Mr. Cronin's office. After they had signed their leave papers the Relocation Adviser suggested that they see Mr. Cronin before departing in order to obtain detailed information and advice regarding their resettlement in his area. After seeing Mr. Cronin they returned to the Adviser and asked to cancel their departure because Mr. Cronin had told them so many discouraging things about Baltimore that they felt it was unwise to relocate there. It was only with considerable difficulty that they were persuaded to follow through with their original plans. After discussing this matter with Mr. C. the Relocation Program Officer was still at a loss to understand his method of operation as a Relocation Officer.
- The Relocation Team. The members of the Relocation Team who visited the project in February, 1944, were Harold Fistere, Robert
Cullum and Dr. P.A.Webber. Leo Simmons, Relocation Officer, from St.Louis, and Oscar Buttedahl were the advance agents for
the team. The members of the team differed from ordinary paratroopers in that their arrival was known well in advance and
the program and purposes of their visit were well known and widely advertized. Furthermore, they had planned more than enough
activity to keep themselves busy during their brief visit. They were the most experienced Relocation officers in WRA at that
time and were well equipped to describe the situation in the field areas of the Eastern U.S. All were better-than-average
speakers.
Cullum was patient and sincere, Fistere was dynamic and forceful on the platform, but Dr. Webber “stols the show” insofar as the evacuees were concerned. The obvious source of Dr.Webber's popularity lay in the fact that he could speak fluent Japanese. There was a strong feeling on the part of the staff, however, that he won the plaudits of the Issei residents more through his subject matter than his language ability. Since he had spent a large portion of his life in Japan and apparently had a deep nostalgia for Japan, his viewpoint was closely akin to that of the Issei. Thus he was personally accepted as a kindred spirit. It is questionable, however, whether this personal rapport served any useful purpose insofar as the relocation program was concerned. Since his talks stressed Japanese culture and played down the WRA program, he was the feature attraction of the team. By comparison with Webber, Cullum and Fistere, who concentrated upon the future
― 134 ―of the evacuees in America rather than their past in Asia, looked like high pressure,paid propagandists of the hypocritical U.S. government, whose words could be largely discounted. Substance was added to this viewpoint by the action of the Project Director at Poston who asked that Dr.Webber be dropped from the team when they visited that project after leaving Gila. - Robert Dolins. Mr. Dolins arrived, unheralded, during the time that the team was still at the center. He was the first of the relocation paratroopers who would be unmistakably classified as the intellectual or “brain truster” type. Since this characteristic placed him in a category diametrically opposed to that of the Project Director, and since he had been the last of a great swarm of winter paratroopers, he was laboring under a very severe handicap. By way of illustration, when he first arrived on the project he was escorted into the Project Director's office and introduced to a member of the Relocation staff. The Project Director took ample time to complete the business which had been interrupted by the intrusion, then, without rising from his desk, he looked up, measured Mr. Dolins slowly from head to foot, scowled perceptibly, and said, “Well, what are you here for?”
- Dorothy G.Barber. Mrs. Barber differed from the other paratroopers in that she got her first taste of WRA at Gila. She profited
from having come to the project with a minimum of preconceived notions and a maximum of interest in becoming acquainted with
the problems of relocation and a willingness to undertake any type of assignment suggested as part of her orientation process.
She was the only paratrooper who visited the project during the
― 135 ―time that the counseling program was in progress who could be persuaded to undertake a few interviews herself. This experience proved a bit harsh and disillusioning to her, but her courage in continuing the ordeal was commendable. - George Graff. Mr. Graff possessed a missionary's crusading zeal in preaching relocation and a professional school teacher's innocence in evaluating and counteracting the cynicism and resignation of the project residents at the time of his visit in November and December, 1944. These qualities, plus a bleak lack of interest on the part of the evacuees toward the area which he represented, made his experience at Gila resemble the hypothetical irresistible force meeting the immovable object.
Trips by Relocation Program Officer.
The Relocation Program Officer made two trips to the field during 1944, which enabled him to learn at first hand the opportunities, problems and peculiarities of a large number of the relocation offices in the Central, Eastern and Southern regions, and to become acquainted with the relocation officers in charge and observe them operating in their own back yard.
The meeting of the Relocation Program Officers and Area Supervisors for a four-day conference in Chicago in April, 1944, was the occasion for the first trip. In addition to the Chicago conference he visited Des Moines, Kansas City and Cleveland on this trip. The conference was considered well worthwhile because it provided an opportunity to observe both similarities and dissimilarities in project Relocation Division operating procedures and also to meet the people who for the most part had, therefofore
The contacts made with the operating officials of the WRA, hostels, cooperating agencias and relocated evacuees in Chicago, Cleveland and Des Moines were also stimulating. They were particularly valuable because they added a new dimension to the experience of the Relocation Program Officer. It is believed that the project Relocation personnel were susceptible to a one-sidedness complementary to that observed inthe field relocation officers who visited the center. A trip of this nature did a great deal to bring the whole program into proper perspective.
The second field trip, made in November, 1944, took in more territory over a greater period of time and provided a closer contact with the operating personnel in the field. The Program Officer was away from the project for five weeks. These of these were spent in the New York district office. The remainder of the time was divided between Philadelphia, Seabrook Farms, Washington, Savannah and New Orleans.
Chapter 4. Evacuee Organizations
Although the Butte Community Council had set up a Relocation Committee in April, 1943, that body had never functioned as an active group. When the Relocation Division was set up one of the first steps taken by the Relocation Program Officer was to reactivate this group and to institute the Gila River Relocation Planning Commission. Although those members of the old committee who remained at the center were appointed as the nucleus of the new Commission,there was no administrative relationship between the Commission and the Community Councils. The majority of the members of the original Commission also served as either Councilmen or Block Managers, however.
The first formal meeting of the Commission was held on December 31, 1943. Members from both camps met in a single body. The total membership numbered approximately thirty men. William Ishizu was elected acting secretary and presided over the Commission meetings until his relocation to Portland, Oregon, in April, 1944. A Relocation Coordination Assistant was appointed to serve with the Relocation Program Officer to report to the Commission at its regular meetings and to undertake various assignments as directed by the Commission. The Commission met alternately in Butte and Canal. Meetings were hold weekly on Saturday, but special meetings were called whenever occasion demanded. On March 14, 1944, separate meetings were called when-
The first few meetings of the Commission were devoted to discussion of the proposed All-Center Conference. The evacuee representatives at the Heart Mountain Project had suggested to the Director that a meeting of delegates from the nine relocation projects be called to discuss relocation problems and proposals. The Director in turn wired all the projects asking for their reactions to this plan. A tentative date for the meeting was set in February and the Commission was requested to submit a proposed agenda for the Conference to the Director. The Gila Commission debated ways and means before taking up the agenda. Most of the members expresse keen disappointment and some loss of interest in the conference when the Director made it clear that all traveling and incidental expenses of the delegates must be borne by the evacuees. Committees were appointed to consider this problem and to meet with Council and Block Manager groups before reaching a decision. Each camp considered this question separately. Butte decided to petition the Director to reconsider and authorize expenditure of WRA funds to finance the meeting, with the ultimatum that if he refused to do so Butte would submit written agenda of topics for discussion but would not send delegates. Canal made a similar appeal for financial assistance, but assured us that if such assistance were not available the community would raise sufficient funds from its own resources to send a delegate. Thus the matter stood when the
The thinking that went into the composition of the proposed agenda concentrated mainly on the thems that a successful relocation program was impossible unless more government money wa made available to assist relocators through the initial read justment period. Various schemes were advanced which would increase the leave grants by indirect means. One was that one year's Congressional appropriation be pro-rated according to the evacuee population of the projects and made available to each resident in the form of cash rather than in WRA services. This proposal was designed to anticipate the WRA argument that grants could not be materially raised without Congressional action. another idea was that WRA guarantee subsistence expenses (room, board, clothing) for a period of three months, if needed. This proposal was made because the evacuees had no confidence in the assurances that Social Security Board or local Welfare funds would be available to relocators who had financial difficulties during the initial read justment period. Another suggestion was that WRA set up institutions similar to the hostels that would offer food and shelter on a temporary basis, without charge if necessary. Former independent farmers and business men advocated the establishment of credit unions or other financing agencies under the aegis of WRA which would offer loans to evacuees without requiring collateral. The suggestion that WRA provide funds for short term leave trips to investigate relocation opportunities was also advanced. Unlimited freight allowances for relocators were asked. Matters recommended for consideration which did not involve new
During the early months of 1944 the membership of the Commission was expanded so as to make it a more representative body. Prominent project organizations and activities such as the Farm, the Co-op, the Community Activities, the Buddhist and Christian Church groups and the mess supervisors were asked to appoint delegates to the Commission. Evacuee members of the Commission also nominated individual residents for membership. Minutes were kept of the weekly meetings and members who were absent for three or more consecutive meetings without a valid reason were dropped from membership. Publicity material prepared by the Relocation Coordination Assistant was distributed in the name of the Commission. A survey of evacuee attitudes toward relocation was conducted by the secretary of the Commission and the Coordination Assistant in the spring of 1944. Members of the project staff such as the Project Director, the Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Management, the Evacuee Property Officer, the Community Analyst and others were invited as guest speakers at Commission meetings to discuss aspects of their work affecting relocation. Visitors to the center also appeared at Commission meetings. Although membership decreased during the summer and autumn of 1944, and meetings were not held regularly during these busy seasons
Black Managers.
Until late in 1944, the Relocation Division staff did very little work with the Block Managers' groups. Although the Block Managers did hold weekly meetings, they were not regarded as a bona fide community organization until relatively late in the program when they had taken over some of the leadership functions previously assumed by other bodies. Furthermore, most of the progressive Block Managers were members of the Relocation Planning Commission. In Canal the secretary of the Commission was Central Block Manager throughout the existence of the Commission, and in Butte the first secretary of the Commission was also Central Block Manager. Succeeding central block managers in Butte were also active Commission members. Community Councils. Although individual members of the Community Councils were frequently very cooperative with various phases of the relocation program, the Councils themselves were of little or no value. The Butte Council was virtually gagged and handcuffed by internal bickerings and petty jealousies (no chairman of the Butte Council was ever reelected to a six-month term); hence it was impotent to initiate or follow through on any positive, constructive program. The Canal Council was better organized, but was effectively contolled by its most irreconcilable members.
Assistant Block Manager Plan.
In January, 1944, the Relocation Program Officer first broached the subject of Assistant Block
Chapter 5
Relationships with Members of the Project Staff.
Efforts on the part of the Relocation Division to organize the project staff for united action on behalf of relocation were unsuccessful. The first attempt to organize a staff Relocation Committee was made in December, 1943. Althoigh several meetings were held, the committee was never active and never exercised any leadership in promoting relocation. Consequently, the Relocation Program Officer decided that he could get more help from the staff if he enlisted their aid individually or section by section rather than by attempting to set up an overall staff committee. Since the Project Director's bi-weekly staff meetings provided the Relocation Program Officer ample opportunity to relay relocation information to the staff, the staff Relocation Committee was not necessary as a means of disseminating information.
At various times during the early part of 1944 the Relocation Program Officer met with small groups, such as the Butte Grammar School teachers, the Canal PTA, the farm supervisors, the mess supervisors and others. All division and section heads contacted were cooperative in calling these meetings, Most of these groups contained both Caucasians and evacuees, though by this time the majority of supervisors and professional people were appointed staff members. Some of the more tender-hearted staff members, who confused sentimentality with sincere sympathy,
Chapter 6
Distribution of Information
During this period the distribution of relocation information at the project fell entirely within the sphere of the Relocation Division. The Reports Office considered relocation information as propaganda and hence wasooutside its legitimate field of operations.
Relations with the Gila News-Courier.
The News-Courier clung valiantly to its claim to being a rightful member of the free press of America. Although it accepted all articles or material submitted to it by the Relocation Division, it did so with the feeling that such data presented only one side of an argument which was vitally important to the residents, and that the newspaper, as the only organ of public information in the community, was duty-bound to present both sides. Actually, however, this policy was, on the whole, felpful rather than harmful to the relocation program. In the first place, the early editors of the News-Courier were intelligent and courageous young men from West coast colleges who were sincerely in favor of relocation as an alternative to segregated life in a camp, and who wrote frequent outspoken editorials exhorting their fellow Nisei--such diatribes were not ordinarily addressed to Issei--to leave the project. In the second place, although the News-Courier was tending theoretically toward a policy of neutrality, in which equal space would be given to the pros and cons of relocation, actually there was never a time when the pro-relocation material
The Relocator News Sheet.
From October 7, 1943, until January, 1944, the Relocator News Sheet was prepared weekly in the Relocation Office and distributed with the News-Courier. This sheet was done entirely in English and appeared with the Tuesday issue of the newspaper. The editing, composing and steincil cutting were performed by the Relocation staff, and the mimeographing and distribution were handled by the News-Courier staff. The Editor of the News-Courier was opposed to the Relocator News Sheet, for he regarded it as a usurpation of part of the newspaper's rightful domain, and charged that the Relocation staff was withholding news from the regular issues f of the News-Courier in order to prepare a
Circulation of Job Offers.
Every issue of the News-Courier carried a column entitled “Pick and Choose” which contained job offers selected and written up by the Relocation Adviser from the Job Offer Digests and the individual job descriptions forwarded from the field Relocation offices. The evacuee Relocation Interviewer prepared a similar job offer list for the Japanese section of the News-Courier. Usually six to eight separate job offers were included in each column. Exceptional job offers, such as those which provided family housing, group employment opportunities, or other unusual or outstanding features, were written up by the Relocation Adviser in the form of a 100-300 word article and submitted to the News-Courier.
In December, 1943, the Employment Card File (WRA-12) was re-
*. Codes were assigned in accordance with the United States Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Part I, Definitions of Titles.
Resettlement Bulletin.
From time to time throughout the development of the relocation program evidence was brought to the attention of the Relocation Division that, despite coverage in the News-Courier and circulation through other media, various important items of information on relocation matters were not known or understood by large segments of the population. For example, the leave regulations governing such matters as trial leave or exploratory trips to investigate group relocation opportunities were not clear to a majority of residents. On the other hand, completely false ideas were reported through the amazing project “grapevine,” and generally accredited. For example, it was widely believed that all persons who left the center on indefinite leave signed a statement renouncing all rights to press, at any future date, claims for indemnities from the government for losses sustained as a result of evacuation. In an effort to counteract some of this ignorance and misinformation, the Relocation Division began to issue a mimeographed sheet called the Resettlement Bulletin. Its main function was to reiterate some of the relocation data that had previously been announced and to explain those matters which were not generally understood by the residents. The Bulletin came out at irregular intervals in English and was distributed on a center-wide basis, independent of the camp newspaper.
Japanese Relocation Supplement.
In the spring of 1944 the Relocation Planning commission again appraised the information program and reported that there was not enough material being circulated in the Japanese language. Consequently, when the Relocation Coordination Assistant was drafted into military service in April,
*. We were amused on more than one occasion to observe the pride which all educated Issei seemed to have in their language ability. On one occasion we asked a very scholarly Issei gentleman to translate a document of general interest for publication in Japanese. When he had completed the work and turned in the finished product it was shown to the Idsei Relocation Interviewer in Canal, who was very interested in the document. He professed greatshock at the ineptitude shown by the person who had done the translation and exclaimed that it would never do to reproduce the material in its present inexact form. Therefore, with the help of a cultured Issei lady who had completed a course in one of the prominent Japanese universities but had not been awarded a degree because, she said, the Japanese did not believe it proper to recognize the professional accomplishments of women, he set to work and assiduously rewrote the translation. When their finished product was sent to the mimeographing office to be duplicated the Issei gentleman in charge of the unit refused to put out the work until he had a chance to rewrite the copy, because, he pointed out, the translation was done in an obscure Japanese form which would be unintelligible to the majority of center residents. When the paper was finally published and distributed both of the scholars who had worked on the original and the intermediate versions were outraged at the discovery that some untutored individual had been permitted to mangle their handiwork.
Relocation Bulletin Boards.
In January, 1944, the relocation Program Officer was able to have a 12' by 4' bulletin board installed on the wall at the junction of the two corridors of the Butte Administration Building outside the Project Director's office. Although some of the staff members were mildly piqued because they felt that this space should be used for appointed staff bulletins, the board was always reserved for Relocation use, and newspaper articles, pictures from the Denver photographic unit, job offers and other publicity material were posted on the board weekly. hortly thereafter a similar board was erected in the Canal Administration Building.
Relocation Libraries.
arly in 1944 the Relocation libraries were remodeled. New shelves were built in both camps to provide ample space for reading material. Fashionable factory-made furniture of the type provided in the appointed staff apartments replaced the drab unpainted project-made furniture. A large piece of plate glass was purchased so that relocation photographs could be displayed advantageously on the table top of the library. Colorful maps were tacked on the walls. The libraries subscribed to such newspapers as the New York Times, Chicago Sun, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Detroit Free Press, Minneapolis Star-Journal, the St. Louis Post Dispctah and others. Despite all these embellishments, we regard the Relocation libraries as perhaps the least successful of all the projects undertaken for the purpose of stimulating interest in voluntary relocation. Little attention was paid to the newspapers except by youngsters who read the comic sections and by staff members who were interested in their
Distribution of Informational Material from Washington and the Field Relocation Offices.
Until 1945 all relocation publications from Washington or the Field were distributed at the project through the Relocation Division. Usually field office publications arrived in quantities of from 100 to 300. Such pamphlets were distributed among the residents who, it was felt, were most likely to read them and to pass on the information covered. For this purpose a list of about 300 persons was made up as the permanent distribution list. This list contained the block managers, councilmen, supervisory employees (most $19 workers, ministers and several other well known residents. Material from Washington, such as the booklets, “When You Leave the Relocation Center” and “Civilian Living in War Time” were distributed at the weekly meetings which were conducted by the Leave Officer or the Relocation Advisers to give departure advice to those who were scheduled to leave during the following week. After these meetings ware discontinued in April, 1944, these booklets were passed out in the Leave Office when the relocators picked up their indefinite leave cards.
In November, 1944, the Canal High School art class designed and reproduced some very handsome folders to be used for the distribution of field offic bulletins among the various offices and activities of the center. Each folder bore the name of a relocation area and the various cities within that area where district relocation officers were stationed. About twenty-five sets of these folders were placed in various centers of activity about the project. Each month copies of the latest editions of the field bulletins were posted in each of these folders.
Chapter 7.
Transportation, Leave Regulations and Miscellaneous Matters. Trial Indefinite Leave.
Trial Leave was instituted by Manual Instructions issued in February, 1944. The Trial Leave idea was initiated by the evacuee groups at the projects who had complained that the straight indefinite leave was too final. Trial leave was intended primarily for the benefit of family men so that they could be guaranteed the privilege of returning to their families at the anf of their trial period. This new type of leave aroused very little interest when it was first introduced at Gila. It is believed that the main reason for this apathy was the fact that persons leaving on trial leave received no grant or transportation expsnese. Although they were eligible for reimbursement to the full extent of these grants in the event that they voluntarily converted their status from trial to indefinite leave within seven months after relocating, most evacuees felt that the proverbial bird in the hand was worth two in the bush. Another disadvantage of trial leave was that it restricted the evacuee a great deal more than indefinite leave. Before leaving on trial leave he must sign an agreement in quadruplicate shating that he would not move or change jobs during his trial period without first securing the approval of the District Delocation Officer. These restrictions and formalities made many evacuees suspicious of the new type of leave. This wariness was the characteristic reaction of the residents to all innovations in WRA procedure. Even though a particular change such as the trial
The most common use to which trial leave was put during the first months of its existence was as a lever for young people who were unable to get parental consent for relocation to pry themselves loose from the family ties. Possibly some of the issei labored under the mistaken impression that persons on trial leave were obliged to return to the center at the end of their trial period in the same manner that persons on seasonal leave came back at the end of the season. Although these young people were not strictly eligible for trial leave since they were not family heads, in some cases where it was apparent that they would not be able to relocate otherwise, concessions were made on this point. Most of the people who left the center on trial leave either converted with out returning to the center or returned for a short time at the end of their trial period and then left on indefinite leave.
When the recruiting for Geabrook Farms got under way in August and September of 1944, the number of persons leaving on trial leave increased enormously. This acceleration occurred because Mr. Geabrook offered, as an added inducement, to pay the traveling expenses of any workers and their families who came to Geabrook Farms on trial leave. He also agreed to pay the return expenses for those who wanted to return to the center after six months' employment. This unique system was popular because it combined the advantages of trial and regular indefinite
Seasonal - eave.
Late in 1945 when the leave policy for the following year was being considered in Washington, some thought was given to the proposal that seasonal leave be abolished. This proposal, which seemed redical at the time, was not adopted but instead a compromise was evolved in which trial leave was devised as a partial antidote to seasonal leave, and the seasonal leave procedure was modified somewhat, with primary responsibility for its operation being traneferred from the WRA to the War Food Administration. In the light of subsequent events it can be conclusively stated that the relocation program at Gila River would have benefited greatly if seasonal leave had been completely abolished at the end of the 1943 season. Even when considered from the viewpoint of the overall national interest it is doubted that the few seasonal workers recruited from this project made a large enough contribution to the wartime agricultural program to compensate for the disadvantages of the seasonal leave recruitment to the WRA program. The most prominent complaints which we registered against the seasonal leave program of 1944 were:
- The most experiences of most evacuees on seasonal leave gave them a distorted and unfavorable viewpoint regarding life outside a relocation center.
- The WFA procedure was so complex as to be virtually unworkable. Procedures were so complicated that one felt they must have
been drawn up by a battery of Philadelphia lawyers, all with different ideas about how the job should be done. In addition
to confusing and frustrating everyone concerned, this maze of legality stacked the cards heavily in favor of the sugar
― 158 ―companies and other big farm operators. While these companies hire expensive lawyers of their own to keep up with the WRA procedure and to file the proper forms in January for workers needed in June or October, the small farmer who applied to his county agent for a few workers whom he needed immediately was effectively bypassed. These small farmers, usually Japanese themselves, were the only employers who ever offered seasonal workers from the project an opportunity to make permanent relocation connections while on seasonal leave. - There was never any permanent WRA official stationed in Arizona who would accept responsibility for the program at the Arizona centers. Instead, a recruiter would fly down from Idaho and spend a few days at each center painting rosy pictures and making grandiose promises to the residents. When the evacuees found that the picture was actually drab and the promises were empty the WRA man had long since departed, so they held the WRA Relocatiom staff responsible. Correspondence with the WFA was of no avail; no matter where you addressed your appeal you were always either ignored completely or referred to another official located in another city. As late as October, 1945, evacuees were calling at the project Relocation Office and complaining that they had never received the expense money which was due them as a result of their seasonal leave in 1944.
- A seasonal leave philosophy was clearly developing among certain evacuees. There were some who had taken seasonal leave for
three successive seasons and were no nearer to the development of a concrete family relocation plan than they had
― 159 ―been on the day that they arrived at the center. Seasonal leave for them was an ideal outlet for procrastination.
Short Term Leave.
Most short term leaves taken before the post-exclusion period began were of negligible value to relocation. Since the project was located so far from the centers of relocation such as Chicago, Cleveland and New York, very few people ever applied for short term leave in orderto visit these areas. Most short term leave destinations were in Utah, Colorado or Arizona, where relocation was forbidden or discouraged, or to other relocation centers. In the late summer of 1944 the traffic between Gila and Poston was especially heavy. Main reasons for this inter-project travel were (a) to get a change of scenery and renew old acquaintances, (b) to fish in the Colorado River, and (c) to attend social events such as weddings,funerals and marriage negotiations. Consequently, when the Relocation Program Officer, Assistant Relocation Program Officer and Leave Officer from Poston visited Gila in October, 1944, a plan was worked out whereby short term applications were to be scrutinized before approval.
Group Leave Exploratory Trips.
In the spring of 1944 a new Washington manual release authorized the issuances of government transportation requests to cover the round-trip coach fares for any duly selected representative of a group of three or more families who were interested in relocating as a group. Although this was another novelty which had been originally suggested by evacuee groups, it was greeted with no interest when translated into the regulations. The reaction of the evacuee groups to
Pullman Accommodations.
The decision of the Director to suthorize the travel of certain classes of relocators such as aged or ill persons, pregnant women and parents with small babies, by Pullman at government expense provided one instance of a new service which the evacuees were not slow in accepting. During March, April and May the staff of the Relocation Division spent a disproportionate share of its time in arranging Pullman reservations. Although the agents of the Santa Fe Railroad were always courteous they were by no means sympathetic with the policy of providing Pullman reservations, which were in great demand, especially in the spring when so many winter visitors were going home, for evacuated Japanese. Consequently, it was necessary to call them almost daily and to visit their offices in Phoenix once or twice a week. Because our staff was small at this time and trips to Phoenix were time-consuming, the Relocation Coordination Assistant was assigned the task of processing and doing followup work on Pullman requests. After he had made several trips to Phoenix, however, it was found that relations between him and the ticket agent were strained, so it was necessary for the
Southern Pacific Special Coaches.
The Pullamn problem was finally solved by the chartering of special coaches. By virtue of the accidental location of the project in relation to the boundaries of the evacuated zone, eastbound relocators were never permitted to travel on the most convenient railroad line. Instead of boarding a Southern Pacific train at Chandler (23 miles from the project) and traveling directly to Chicago, without transfers or layovers, in a total elapsed time of 52 hours, they had to be transported into Phoenix (45 miles from the project) to catch a Santa Fe spur line train which took them to Ashfork, Arizona, where they had to wait overnight--and sometimes well into the next day--for a main line train which reached Chicago 76 to 84 hours after they left the project. It was necessary to put up with the inferior service because the Southern Pacific route veered slightly to the south about 100 miles east of the project and thereby transgressed that portion of the barren Arizona desert near Tucson which, unfortunately, lay within the boundaries of the evacuated zone. No evacuee could ride the Southern Pacific without being liable to penalty unless he had obtained a military permit from the Western Defense Command authorizing his trip. Furthermore, all such permits required that the evacuee be accompanied by a predesignated Caucasian escort.
Although several letters had been written to Washington WRA explaining this anomalous situation and requesting that
Relocation of Juveniles.
During the summer and autumn of 1944 several boys under eighteen years of age applied for indefinite leave. Since these lads planned to leave their families when they relocated, they came within the provisions of Administrative Notice No. 130, dated July 28, 1944. This instruction, apparently written hurriedly as a stopgap measure, was very unclear and subject to a variety of interpretations. Regrettably, it was not super-
Applications for Return to Evacuated Area.
In the late summer of 1944 it was announced that the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command was accepting applications from evacuees for permission to return to their homes. In September the Los Angeles newspapers, which were always more widely read by the residents than newspapers from any other section of the country, featured prominently the story of a young lady from Granada who had been permitted to return to California and enroll at the pasadena Junior College. The Friends of the American Way and the American Friends Service Committee were also taking active steps to promote the return of the evacuees. As a result, center residents began to revive their own yearning for return to their old communities. Since the forms required by the WDC were complicated, and the instructions were exacting (if they were not followed to the letter, the applications were returned), the Relocation Division offered its services in helping prepare applications. Fingerprints and photographs were required as well as written applications. Consequently, at the time the exclusion orders were lifted, approximately 75 such applications had been submitted. No final action had been taken on any of
Applications for Release from Parole.
In midsummer, 1844, the report was circulated that other projects were taking action to get residents who were alien parolees from Department of Justice Detention Camps released from their parolee status. An investigation indicated that the Community Management Division at Manzanar had volunteered to submit applications on behalf of parolees to the head of the Enemy Alien Control Unit of the Department of Justice, but that they had received no specific instructions on this matter. In cases where parolees were anxious to be removed from their parolee status in order to escape undue embarrassment and inconvenience upon relocating, the Relocation Division under-took to write letters of appeal for them. These letters were written on plain bond paper and were prepared for the signature of the evacuee. They were generally of considerable length and gave an exhaustive account of the applicant's oersonal history. Probably about twenty-five parolees sought assistance in writing these letters. So far as is known only three of these men were released from their parole whilex still residents of the center, but it is believed that most of those who relocated were released soon after resettlement. The Department of Justice was again operating on its theory that Relocation projects were a form of internment and that there was no need to release anyone from his parole so long as he remained an inmate.
Reception of Jerome Residents.
In the latter part of June,1944, over 2000 residents of the Jerome Relocation Center were trans-
Office Organization and Procedures of the Relocation Division.
On January 1, 1944, there were only four appointed staff members of the Relocation Division: the Acting Relocation Program Officer, two Relocation Advisers and the Leave Officer. Because of the Relocation Program Officer's trip, the Leave Officer's siege of
In the Leave Office the evacuees also accepted a great deal of personal responsibility during this period. In fact, there were four or five young ladies who had worked in the Leave Office so long and had played such an important part in its continuous operation that they developed something of a prima donna or “career service” attitude. They formed such a hard-shelled clique that newcomers to the Leave Office, be they Japanese or Caucasians, were subjected to a rigorous and uncomfortable isolation period during which they were apt to find themselves socially and spiritually isolated from their fellow workers until they had passed probation. Nevertheless, they were conscientious and intelligent and took great pride in getting their jobs done.
In the Butte Relocation Office there was never the same
Filing System.
In February, 1944 an evacuee clerical worker was assigned to work on setting up a file of family folders. One manilla folder tabbed with the name and center address of the family head and containing a typed sheat with all information regarding the family which could be gleaned from the quarterly census roster of residents was the minimum basis for this file. Thereafter all incoming and outgoing correspondence, or dopies thereof, which concerned individual residents or families was
In addition to the family folders, the employment card file, previously described, and a separate correspondence file were maintained in the Relocation Office, and a set of leave files on individuals was maintained in the Leave Office on all leave clearance cases.
Coordination between Camps.
Although the relocation advisers in each of the two camps theoretically performed identical functions, this was never the case in actual operation. All incoming mail was delivered to the Relocation Program Officer who referred all routine relocation correspondence to the Butte adviser. He in turn sorted it out and forwarded the Canal mail through project channels to the Canal office. All outgoing correspondence on Canal cases was prepared by the Butte Adviser from memoranda written in Canal usually by the evacuee interviewer. When the new Adviser entered on duty in Canal in July, 1944, she took over the job of preparing the Canal teletypes and letters. All outgoing correspondence was signed by the Relocation Program Officer except that addressed to the Director, which was signed by the Project Director. All reports, information activities and job offer cataloguing was handled in the Butte Relocation Office. On the other hand, the Canal Adviser had some functions such as collecting visitors' board charges and signing outgoing and incoming passes, which, in Butte, were handled entirely by the Leave Office.
Changes in Physical Setup of Relocation Division Offices.
In 1943 the Outside Employment Office was located in a separate warehouse, two buildings removed from warehouse 69-8-, which housed the Employment Office and the Leave Office. On January 1, 1944, the Employment Office finally moved out of 69-8 and te Relocation Adviser and his associates moved in. The Leave Office crew occupied the north half of the building, the Leave Officer and the Relocation Program Officer occupied adjoining partitioned offices in the middle of the building, about 10' by 10' square, and the Relocation Adviser, his staff and the relocation library and waiting room occupied the southern half of the building. The Canal Relocation Office occupied about one-fourth of the large main room of the Canal Administration Building and was partitioned from the other offices working in the building only by a single wooden rail.
Some criticism was directed at the relocation offices particularly by those who classified themselves as “trained experts, because the relocation interviews were conducted freely and informally in open buildings instead of behind closed doors on an “appointment only” basis. The Relocation Division did not accredit this criticism because it was felt that during this period of voluntary relocation the most difficult job of the staff was to “sell” or promote relocation on the basis of goodwill, friendliness and a sincere interest in the future of the evacuees. The most imposing barrier to the establishment of rapport with the evacuees, which was necessary if this type of program were to succeed, was the chasm which existed universally at a relocation project between Japanese and Caucasians as such. Undoubtadly, this unnatural
In November, 1944, the Butte offices were expended. The Leave Office moved into the adjacent warehouse 69-9, which it shared with the statistics section, and the Relocation Office took over the entire building, 69-6.
Chapter 8.
Special Aids to Relocation
In addition to the numerous measures taken by members of the WRA organization in order to stimulate relocation there was a number of noteworthy contributions made by individuals and organizations not officially connected with the government.
Paratroopers from Cooperating Agencies.
It is believed that all those who fall into this category were motivated primarily by a desire to lend a helping hand to a people for whom they had great sympathy. As a result, all were helpful in that they provided a lift to evacuee morale and a proof to the residents that there were people in the outside world who were interested in the welfare of the evacuees. Some were able to accomplish even more.
- Ralph Smeltzer appeared in December, 1943, with an invitation for all residents to come to the Chicago Brethren Hostel. He was earnest and businesslike in manner and seemed sincerely desirous of doing everything he possibly could to help get the job done as soon as possible. His visit was brief, but he met with the Hostel Committee, the Planning Commission, the Council and other groups, and spoke briefly to the crowd at the weekly showing of the camp movies.
- Robertson Fort was also a Hostel Director, although his hostel, which had been sponsored by the Friends in Chicago, had closed
when he visited the center in February, 1944. He stayed at the project for a nearly a month and worked diligently
― 172 ―as an emissary of goodwill. He was cordially accepted by a large number of the families at Gila because of his friendly, easy-going manner, and his previous acquaintance with many of their relatives and friends who had relocated to Chicago. - Tom Bodine visited Gila for a week in April, 1944, and accomplished a great deal in such a short time. Since, as a field representative of the National Student Relocation Council, he was concerned only with the placement of evacuee students in colleges and universities he spent the bulk of his time at the high schools interviewing individual students and speaking to classes and assemblies.
- Haruo Ishimaru also visited the center under the sponsorship of the National Student Relocation Council. He was a Nisei college student who had relocated from Canal in 1942 to Yankton College in South Dakota where he had earned an enviable scholastic and extra-curricular record. He also devoted his time, although in a more leisurely and informal manner, to contacts with the students and recent graduates of the project high schools.
- Bishop Reifsnider dropped in at the project so frequently that he became quite a familiar figure. Although he was professionally
interested in members of his particular flook, he was personally a broadminded humanitarian gentleman who was particularly
interested in the Japanese because of the many years he had spent in Japan and the fact that he could converse freely with
the older people in their native tongue. Despite his balanced viewpoint, however, he gave evidence of losing patience with
those residents who insisted that they intended to remain in the center as public
― 173 ―charges as long as they possibly could. It is reported that he was talking to one Issei lady regarding the relative merits of relocation and continued life in the project, and this lady repeatedly asked questions which began, “But what is the government going to do for me if...” After patiently fending off several such questions with reassuring answers he terminated the interview by demanding, “My dear lady, what are you planning to do for the government?” - Esther Rhoads, of the Pasadena Chapter of the American Friends Service Committee, also visited the center on several occasions. Most of her earlier visits were short stopovers to see personal friends whom she had known before evacuation. She did keep us current on the activities of the hostels and the American Friends Service Committee in the East, however. In the late summer of 1944 she paid us a more purposeful visit with several associates from the newly organized Friends of the American Way. During this visit she and her fellow workers contacted all the former residents of Pasadena whom they could find and discussed with them the possibility of returning to California. This activity gave rise prematurely to the rumor that the coast would soon be reopened to the evacuees. It also led many of the residents to believe seriously that only those who had lived in Pasadena would be permitted to return.
Special Job Opportunities.
There were several unusual or outstanding relocation opportunities offered to the evacuees during this period, of which the following are the most notable:
- Camp Savage (later moved to Fort Snelling). In December
― 174 ―1943, Captain Rusch and two Nisei sergeants from Camp Savage visited Gila on a recruiting tour seeking applicants for voluntary enlistment in the Military Intelligence Service language school at Camp Savage. Captain Rusch was the featured attraction at a mass meeting which was very well attended. The residents received him with great interest because he had lived in Japan for many years and was arrested, interned and repatriated from Japan on one of the exchange trips. Incidentally, considering his experiences and his status as a U. S. Army officer, his comments regarding the Japanese people were very mild and liberal. Vevertheless, the recruitment efforts were not successful. Only one man applied, and he was unable to pass the entrance requirements. - Federal Intelligence Agencies. At various times throughout this period representatives of the Office of Strategic Services,
the Navy language school at Boulder, Colorado, the Federal Communications Commission, the Foreign Broadcasts Intelligence
Service and the Office of War Information sent recruiters or written job offers to the center in an effort to fill civilian
positions for translators, interpreters and writers. Some of these jobs were available to aliens as well as citizens. Some
were in the continental U.S., and some were overseas. Most of them offered a starting salary of $2600 per year, base pay.
Although intensive recruiting was done on the offers, and they were relatively attractive (from a Caucasian's viewpoint, at
any rate), there were only about thirty-five center residents who accepted appointments to this type of job in the entire
history of the center. There were two important reasons for this low score: (1) In October, 1943, a military
― 175 ―officer visited the center and did a very thorough job of canvassing all the residents who could qualify for this type of work. He was very persuasive in inducing them to apply for a position eith his agency and promised them that he would get in touch with them each individually within two weeks after returning to his home base. Noneof them ever heard from him thereafter. Consequently, it was exceedingly difficult to approach any of these men regarding language jobs aith the government after that experience. (2) The application procedures were so cumbersome and tedious that many applicants lost interest in the jobs before they ever received any response from the agency concerned. Ordinarily the waiting period ran into months. - Shotwell Candy Company. This Chicago concern sent a Nisei recruiter to the center to hire new workers for its plant. Although the recruiter was personally acquainted with a large number of families, many of whom he undoubtedly encouraged to relocate to the Middle West, he was not conspicuously successful in signing up workers for his own plant. Best reason for this was that wages were below standard.
- 4. Yamamoto Group Farming Enterprise. George Yamamoto and his hearty little band (four Issei, one Nisei) probably went through
the most hectic and widely publicized experiences of any evacuees in the whole WRA relocation program. George was an Issei
who spoke English, and knew how to get along with American people. He had been a successful farmer in California. When Robert
Cronin, the Baltimore Relocation Officer, visited the project early in 1944, he told George about a truck farmer in Rehoboth
Beach,
― 176 ―Delaware, who reputedly had good land and room for a number of experienced Japanese farmers. George determined to go out and make a deal with this man and then call for some of his friends who were willing to follow him. Shortly after George's departure the Associated Press ran a story about his forced departure from Rehoboth Beach. This report, which was carried in the Phoenix newspapers, was the occasion for considerable stir and alarm at the center because a great number of people were interested in the Yamamoto venture. As was almost invariably the case in those days when an incident was reported in the newspapers, the Relocation Officers in the field took no action to apprize the project of the true facts. Consequently, the rumor gained momentum for several days until Yamamoto himself wired his family and associates that all was well, and that he had discovered a deal in New Jersey better than the one in Delaware. He urged his friends to join him immediately as he needed their help in order to get the crops planted on time. Five men applied for leave to join him in Great Meadows, New Jersey, and after one was disqualified because he lacked the proper leave clearance, four left for New Jersey. On the day that they left a wire arrived from George telling them to delay their departure temporarily. It was too late, however, and when the men got off the train in Great Meadows a violent storm of controversy had already broken over their heads. For a complete account of the details see the New York and New Jersey daily newspapers for the week of April 9, 1944. Throughout this stage of the episode we were again in the position of Will Rogers--all we knew was what we
― 177 ―read in the newspapers. Finally, Yamamoto again pulled up stakes and moved to a different farm. This time his venture was more permanent. The five men spent the season working as share-croppers for a Newtown, Pennsylvania, farmer. At the end of the year, despite their late start, they had netted $600 each. George returned to Gila in November,proud of his experiences (he had been featured in Time, Life and numerous other national magazines, and had received several hundred friendly letters of encouragement, some even containing cash or job offers, from various parts of North America and England), enthusiastic about East coast truck farming opportunities--(Quote: “More better than California. I sure gone go back to that Kowalick place--Great Meadows--soon as war blow over.”)--and confident of the future. He returned to Newtown with his family of seven early in 1945. The rest of his crew stayed in the East, some moving over to Seabrook in the fall. - Seabrook Farms. This offer was first opened to Japanese in February, 1944. At this time the Eastern Defense Command leave
clearance procedure was in full swing and there was no response. In July, Seabrook sent his Personnel Officer to the project
to recruit workers. This man was aided in his efforts by two of the Jerome transferees who had visited Seabrook Farms on an
inspection trip at Seabrook's expense while they were still at Jerome. Although the recruiter was inclined to be a high pressure
artist, he had a bluff and blustery manner which appealed to some of the resident leaders. Therefore, on August 3 a small
contingent of Gilans left for Seabrook. All went out on trial leave status with their travel paid by Seabrook. Included in
this group were
― 178 ―two Butte block managers and a councilman, all of whom had been very vocally and vociferously anti-WRA and anti-relocation up to the time they left the center.The day after these men arrived at Seabrook they wired back to the center that everything was better than advertized and that they were returning to camp to tell everybody all about it. They came back immediately at Seabrook expense (it is not known whether there was any other financial arrangement. Presumably they were on the Seabrook pay roll during the time they were at Gila.) These men worked diligently for over a month and were successful in encouraging over 300 residents to go to Seabrook. Thus almost every week from the first of August until the tenth of September a Seabrook special coach was possible. Seabrook maintained an account at the local bank in Chandler, which the Relocation Program Officer was authorized to draw upon to pay the expenses of persons leaving on trial leave. Most of the persons who went to Seabrook were Issei and their immediate family members. Hence, the recruitment was extraordinarily successful, despite minor criticisms, from the*. It frequently happened that a man who had been outspokenly opposed to relocation,in all his public utterances,would come into the Relocation Office, and, without previous warning,fill out his leave papers and relocate suddenly. Usually, if queried about his radical change of heart, he would reply vaguely that he had received a letter from a friend which had caused him to change his outlook. Ordinarily, he would also request that his name be omitted from the Gila News-Courier column on departures.
― 179 ―viewpoints of the evacuees, the employer and the project. We were not handicapped, as some projects were, by a group of young single men who went to Seabrook in the hope of escaping the draft and then became dissatisfied because of the unexciting existence so near to the big cities. - Tooele Ordnance Depot. This offer appeared to have everything that could be desired--good and plentiful family housing adequate
wages, desirable locality in a Western state close to a large center of Japanese-American population, and a guarantee of community
sentiment backed by the United States Army. Nevertheless, the offer never excited much interest on the part of center residents.
Although the army officer in charge of expediting recruitment for Tooele accused Gila of lagging in their placement of workers
at Tooele, it is believed that an examination of the Tooele statistics will show that none of the centers were ever able to
get a “Tooele boom” under way. Tooele maximum quotas never were filled, and a large percentage of those who went to Tooele
were people who had relocated unsuccessfully to other areas, particularly in the Northwest, or who were frankly striving to
escape the draft. It is believed that the main reasons that made it impossible to stimulate general interest in Tooele on
the part of project residents were as follows:
- a. Applicants were all subject to a very strict pre-employment security clearance check. Even though it could be legitimatel
explained that non-Japanese workers were also subject to a security check (actually the check for non-evacuee applicants in
most instandes wasnot nearly so thorough and could be accomplished in a
― 180 ―leisurely routine manner after the applicant had entered on duty) the evacuees were always leary of any jobs which required such clearance. Some were fearful of the embarrassment of being idsapproved, some regarded it as another form of discrimination, and some were merely staggered by the additional red tape involved. The intelligence clearance at Tooele was exceptionally severe. Men who had never been on doubtful lists before were sometimes disapproved. Also several men who were highly regarded by various evacuee groups were denied clearance for employment at Tooele. Although these men were in most cases probably unworthy of clearance their disapproval threw a wet blanket on Tooele recruitment. - b. Tooele recruitment was restricted to workers who were willing to take their families with them at the time they left the
center. No trial leaves were permitted. After two years of relocation, those who were left at the center were especaally cautious
and timorous either by nature or because they had more difficult problems. Few were willing to strike out boldly and break
all ties with the security of the center in one grand gesture as this proviso required. Furthermore, this unprecedented procedure
obviously devised with WRA connivance, was regarded by the residents as a trick. One particular oase arose which unfortunately
served to accentuate this drawback. The chairman of the Butte Council, who was not lacking in courage but had a large family
and was completely insolvent financially, present his problem to one of the high-ranking military men who was visiting the
project on behalf of Tooele, and was advised sub rosa by this gentleman that an exception could be made in his case. He proceeded
on this
― 181 ―basis to make out his leave papers and prepare for departure. When we advised Tooele of the date of his arrival they wired back that he was not acceptable without his family. This turn of events brought a bitter reaction from his and a great deal of sympathy from other residents. - c. The Basic philosophies of the Army and the evacuees toward Tooele--and, as the underlying factor toward evacuation--were in conflict. Reducing the matter to simple terms, the Army which had been the prime movers in the evacuation, felt that in offering Tooele employment to the evacuees they were making a grand and noble gesture to show that all evacuees who were not considered pro-axis were completely absolved from any stigma which had been the origina cause of their evacuation. When they extended the Tooele offer to Issei, apparently after much deliberation and discussion and some difference of opinion, they fairly glowed with the self-righteous feeling that they had gone more than half way in atoning for any inconvenience caysed to individual evacuees by incarceration without due process. The evacuees, on the other hand, instinctively gelt that they were being tossed a meagre crumb to compensste for a severe beating, and their pride dictated that they decline it. This failure to accept the olive branch was regarded as supreme ingratitude by the Army officials who further theorized that failure to accept employment at Tooele implied that the evacuation was completely justified, critics to the contrary notwithstanding.
- d. The Tooele recruitment was ill-timed. It came on the heels of the Seabrook recruitment which had drained off many of the
people who might otherwise be attracted to Tooele. It also came at the end of the summer when the fall decline in relocation
― 182 ―was about to set in. During both years of voluntary relocation, the rate of leaves took a nosedive as soon as the hot weather ended, which is ordinarily around the first of October. Since virtually every other section of the country suffers by comparison with Southern Arizona in the winter time, the evacuees, who were always unduly conscious of the climate, found it an easy matter to make up their minds to “relocate next spring.” As a third factor in the timing, the recruitment proceeded simultaneously with the development--at a much more rapid rate--of rumors about the impending removal of the exclusion orders. This provided another handy rationalization for waiting. In fact, some evacuees actually applied for employment at Tooele merely to see if they could gain clearance, operating on the supposition that if they were cleared for Tooele they would be able to obtain clearance for return to the evacuated area when it was reopened. - e. The success of the Tooele effort depended largely upon the reaction of the Issei. Although many of the Issei were uninterested
solely because of one or more of the many reasons listed above, there undoubtedly were some who were opposed to working for
the Army, solely on the basis of principle. There were some who were covertly sympathetic to the war effort of the Japanese
Emperor, and, while not moved to the point where they would risk personal welfare and security to the extent of actively supporting
the Japanese cause, they were by no means interested in helping to thwart it. It is believed, however, that the majority of
Issei took the attitude that as enemy aliens in an adopted country which never had, and probably never would, accept them
as citizens,
― 183 ―their position should be that of the absolute neutral. Hence they forbade themselves to take any action which would either support or oppose the U.S. war effort.*. The attitude of many Issei toward the war was expressed in formal or informal interviews with Relocation Advisers was curious in several respects. Insofar as the outcome was concerned they seemed never to have considered the possibility that anything worse than a negotiated peace or stalemet could befall Japan. This viewpoint was maintained until 1945 when discussion of the war came to be more or less an indelicate subject so far as Issei were concerned. Regardless of their viewpoint on the outcome, however, it always appeared inconceivable to any Issei that the postwar government of Japan could differ radically from the pre-war government. They couldn't help but be convinced that their actions during the war would be judged by people of a viewpoint similar to that of those in power during the war and pre-war years. Hence if they said or did anything during the war that would cause them to be classified as pro-American by this nationalistic group of Japan, they would be prohibited from visiting Japan or having property or any other ties with Japan at any future date.
- a. Applicants were all subject to a very strict pre-employment security clearance check. Even though it could be legitimatel
explained that non-Japanese workers were also subject to a security check (actually the check for non-evacuee applicants in
most instandes wasnot nearly so thorough and could be accomplished in a
- 7. Stanford University. In the fall of 1944 Stanford University initiated a program of language instruction for Army officers
preparing for occupation duty in Japanese-speaking countries. There had previously been similar programs at other universities,
such as Michigan, Harvard, Chicago, Pennsylvania and Minnesota, as well as the language jobs with federal agencies
― 184 ―mentioned above, but this was the first public offer mad to residents of a relocation project by a well known institution located in the evacuated area. Although there was a great deal of excitement generated by this offer, only four residents of the project actually accepted the job. The main reason that there were not more successful candidates from Gila was that there were relatively few Nisei left on the project who were capable of passing both the security and the technical requirements.
Selective Service.
On January 20, 1944, the announcement was made that male American citizens of Japanese ancestry, who had previously been “frozen” in Selective Service classification 4-C (enemy alien), would henceforth be subject to reclassification to 1-A and induction. This announcement was regarded as a bomb-shell, both in suddenness and impact. The immediate reaction was that the reinstitution of the draft would be a great deterrent to relocation. Actually, just the opposite was true. Although some people did cancel or postpone relocation because of the draft, many more were goaded into earlier relocation. This was particularly true of the draft-age men who relocated, either in the hope that they could wangle a deferment or because they wanted to have their last fling as civilians, taking advantage of the WRA travel grants which they would lose if they were inducted from Gila. In some cases the relocation of dependents of draft-age men was also stimulated, on the one hand because some men wanted their families settled before they went into service, and on the other hand because some men wished to enhance their chances for a deferment by having their family
The mechanics of the draft get under way at Gila on February 25, 1944, when the first physical examinations were held for selectees. Those who passed this examination were inducted into the Enlisted Reserve Corps in a week or ten days and called to active duty about two weeks later. This procedure was repeated at more or less regular intervals with men being inducted at an average rate of from forty to fifty per month. 604 men were inducted into the Army through Selective Service channels and 84 enlisted for voluntary induction, making a total of 688 men who entered the armed service from this project. So far as is known, there was no organized resistance to Selective Service and no attempts to violate the Selective Service laws. There were no conscientious objectors andno one who failed to answer any draft calls. There were several confusing incidents, such as calls for induction being issued to persons who had been denied clearance to leave the center, but in all cases these matters were cleared up before complications set in.
Throughout the operation of the draft at Gila, Selective Service matters were handled by the Leave Officer who worked with the officer in charge of the Phoenix Induction Station. Although one assistant adviser position was set up, with the intention of assuming responsibility for Selective Service matters, and a person was appointed to fill it, this person was never capable of
Social Security Board.
Although several bulletins had been issued during this period announcing that help was available through funds administered by the Social Security Board for enemy aliens an other persons who were in financial need as a result of restrictive measures taken by the government in the prosecution of the war, this program was of no use to us in allaying the evacuees' fear of emergency financial needs after relocating, because we completely lacked specific information to prove that the program actaally worked and to show how it worked. There had been so many announcements which had given rise to false hopes on the part of the evacuees (e.g., Farm Security Administration and Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans) that the Social Security Board's aid could not be taken seriously until it was definitely known that their plans were being implemented by concrete action. (After being clipped by several boomerangs of this nature, members of the relocation staff learned to adopt an extremely conservative “wait-and-see” attitude before inaugurating information campaigns in behalf of new programs designed to promote relocation.)
It was not until November, 1944, that we received the first informational bulletin which gave concrete information regarding the operation of the Social Security Board's resettlement assistance in specific instances. This bulletin was prepared by the New York Area Office and consisted of ten or twelve abbreviated case histories giving the essential facts in the cases of evacuees who had been helped through periods of
Chapter 9.
Counseling Program
The Counseling Program was probably the biggest “white elephant” in the entire relocation program. Viewing it in retrospect, we can see only two achievments which can be accredited to it: 1. It provided a means whereby new workers might be tested and given practical experience in relocation work, which, as a matter of fact, stood them in good stead when the post-exclusion program got under way; and (2) it served gradually to open the eyes of some of the key Washington officials to important facts which they had failed to grasp previously because the actual facts were not completely consistent with what their excellent training in the social sciences (including statistics, if you please) had led them to believe they should have been. Although the misconceptions held by the various individual members of the Washington staff, which may have indirectly contributed to the uselessness of the counseling program, were too numerous--and in some cases too obscure--to discuss here, some of the common ones, which at one time or another must have enjoyed majority support since an attempt was made to foist them off on the project in written or oral directives, are worthy of consideration as horrible examples to any future administrator who might be tempted to plan a similar program. The fundamental premise upon which Washington planning of the counseling program was constructed was that if
Granted the two statements in the above paragraph reek with over-simplification, bias and relative irrelevance, viewed from the vantage point of an intelligent impartial observer, they represent the crux of a bitter argument, which, begun in washington, delayed the start of the counseling program for from four to six months, and,continued on the project, prevented it from achieving even a slight degree of effectiveness.
When originally conceived, the counseling program was to be placed under the direction of the head Counsalor and executed by his staff. Thus it would be entirely a function of the project Welfare Section. After several months' search, however, it was impossible to find available persons who had gone to the proper schools of social work and taken the proper courses for the proper length of time so as to be able to fill the Junior
For the first few months the counseling program operated under more or less unified command as a function of the Welfare Division. But this was too good to last. Soon the Washington Relocation Division began peppering the Relocation Program Officer with letters asking him why he didn't take this action or that action with regard to the counseling program or the relocation interviewers (payroll title of the counselors). Furthermore, complications arose on the project. The main bone of contention
Another dispute was waged over the purposes of the program. The more socially conscious interviewers felt that the program was designed primarily to build evacuee morale and to allow them in their interviews to release their repressed complexes and phobias, and to express freely resentments and restrained emotions. On the
Nor was the confusion unsnarled to any extent when Washington paratroopers visited the project. One very charming lady from Washington who visited the project on several occasions for the avowed purpose of giving technical direction to the counseling program--she had gone to the right schools and taken the right courses--found herself hopelessly involved in some of the entangling details of the program during a joint meeting which she had magnanimously called “to see if I can help you with any of your little problems.” After she had been rudely confronted with several of the disturbing “little problems” of a practical nature which she found, to her utter amazement, could not be resolved by quoting section and paragraph from the ingenious manual, or avoided by reminding her of an anecdote--(sample starter: “Oh, I simply must tell you all.
Another difference of opinion came up over the amount of time to be spent on each interview. One of the early instructions from Washington suggested that every family and individual in camp be interviewed in three months. In order to accomplish this goal at Gila,with three interviewers working fulltime, it would have been necessary for each interviewer to interview twelve or more persons per day. Yet the experts insisted that it was impossible to achieve the desired results through accepted case work methods if more than four interviews a day were scheduled. Finally it was decided to schedule six interviews per day for the fulltime Relocation workers and four per day to the fulltime Welfare workers.
Finally, on September 1, 1944, responsibility for the actual direction and operation of the counseling program was
The mere mechanical problems, which apparently were deemed unworthy of consideration by the master planners of Washington, also posed an all-but-insurmountable obstacle, particularly in the later days of the counseling program. The project Personnel Office was (1) unable and (2) unwilling to recruit any evacuee
All publicity campaigns to the contrary notwithstanding, the evacuees always regarded the counseling program as, at best, an unnecessary nuisance, and, at worst, an unscrupulous invasion of an individual's privacy and freedom for the sole purpose of coercing him into action detrimental to his own welfare. This attitude in its less aggressive form was typified by one of the young typists in the Relocation Office who innocently asked her supervisor. “When are those people going to come to our house to ask us why we haven't relocated?” The Canal block managers were actively opposed to the counseling program. Many of the central block managers refused to cooperate with the counselors. This action was a severe
For a more detailed account of the technical aspects of the counseling program as worked out at Gila we quote as follows from a report dated August 1, 1944, written by the Junior Counselor (later Relocation Adviser) who was most intimately connected with the program at the project. Copies of pertinent forms used are also included.
The counseling program has now been in operation for four months, and, although the scheduling of interviews has not been consistent, we have covered approximately 1,000 families. The family planning discussions were started the latter part of March with the Head Counselor, the Assistant Counselor and the Junior Counselor, each devoting part time to this work. By the middle part of April two regular fulltime counselors were added to the staff, and by the last of April another person was added. This gave us three fulltime counselors, each being scheduled for four interviews per day five days per week. During the early part of May the services of another worker were secured, and for nearly two months we were able to schedule our regular for interviews per day for four workers. (One of our counselors was on loan to the Relocation Division for two weeks during this period of time.) The counseling positions, however, were to expire as of June 30, and it was
During the past four months, we have had three complete sets of clerical people. Our evacuee clerical staff consists of four persons and all four people have been replaced three different times. We have one fulltime appointed secretary, and this position has just been filled for the third time. At present, we are training our second set of interpreters. It is obvious, of course, that our constantly changing personnel does not permit us to move ahead as fast as we had hoped. However, the counseling program is gathering momentum as it moves along.
Our appointment letter (see copy attached) has been revised four times. We change it from time to time to keep it up-to-date, and to avoid the appearance of a stereotyped notice. Each letter is typed individually, and is stamped with the Project Director's signature. This gives the letter a personal
A notice of scheduled interviews is sent in advance to each Division or Section Head to advise him of the appointments scheduled for his employees. (See copy attached) If for any reason the absence of his employee at that particular time will jeopardize his work, a different appointment is made. We realize, as well as any section on the project, that the absence of a key employee, even for part of a day,is annoying. However, the cooperation of the various sections is a factor that could be improved. The efficient operation of every section and every division is becoming an increasingly difficult task, and it is a natural tendency for responsible persons to make every effort to retain capable workers. Many evacuees are reluctant to leave the project not because they would not like to go but because they feel that they are indispensable.
Just to give you, briefly, an idea of the physical setup, I should like to explain that we have a master card file with essential information concerning every family that has ever been interviewed. This is a 3 by 5 card file, arranged alphabetically. As a cross reference, we have a case register in which we record all identifying information. This is arranged numerically and case numbers are assigned from this register.
The case folder file is arranged according to the disposition of each case. One drawer is used for those cases referred to the Relocation Division. This includes cases for followup work as well as for immediate placement. The second drawer is used for those cases being held for Welfare followup
- Refer to Relocation Division.
- Active Welfare file.
- Inactive file.
We intend at some future time to review those cases in the inactive file as well as those in the active Welfare file.
The constant attention that must be given the mechanics of operation, particularly with regard to the clerical duties, should not be underestimated. Procedures have been worked out to keep an even flow of work and to dovetail the various functions. Since most of the clerical work is preliminary to the home call, it would be an easy matter to overwork the clerical staff for the first two or three days of the week and then have them sitting around with nothing to do the balance of the week.
A constant check must be made to see that the appointment letters and the divisional letters are out far enough in advance to allow the family to make plans, to allow them to refuse the interview if they want to, and to allow the Division Head to make an employment adjustment.
Care must be taken not to schedule the same family twice
The physical setup of Gila, that is, the fact that there are two separate camps, not only makes for greater possibility of error but also increases the total volume of clerical work and responsibility.
Attached are copies of instructions to clerical workers which will show the necessary steps followed in assigning cases.
We are also attaching a copy of the outline followed for a family planning discussion. The paragraph on property has now been enlarged, that is, if the family indicates that their only desire is to return to California, we try to find out exacelt what it is that they have to return to. Do they own real property? What is it, and where is it? Do they have equipment and tools,&c.? Do they have a definite job offer or just friends in California? On the other hand, if they wish to make their home other than California, we try to encourage them to make definite arrangements regarding their property before they leave. All matters concerning property are referred to the Evacuee Property Officer.
In order to obtain statistics that might be of value, we have conducted our discussions according to groups or specific classifications. This procedure required more time and care in the matter of selection, but it has been worthwhile in many respects. The following breakdown will give you an idea of the groups already covered.
- Group I
- Cases where one or more members of the family have already relocated:
- Favorable: 62
- Unfavorable: 73
- Total Cases Reviewed: 135
- Group II
- Random sampling--pulled every 5th card in population file and scheduled this family for interview:
- Favorable: 79
- Unfavorable: 126
- Total cases reviewed: 205
- Group III
- Cases where two or more members of this family are now employed within the center:
- Favorable: 211
- Unfavorable: 392
- Total cases reviewed: 603
- Total families covered to date:
- Favorable: 352
- Unfavorable: 591
- 943
Group IV will be started as of August 1. This group will consist antirely of families whose names are suggested to us by the Relocation Division.
It will be noted that the figures in Group I have been changed since my original report. This is because families originally counted as favorable have now become unfavorable. In Group I 46% of the total families interviewed were favorable to
It is my personal opinion that the percentage interested in relocation will become smaller and smaller until finally we reach a point where relocation will be at a standstill. The fact that Group I was a more “relocation-minded” group, and therefore the percentage higher, may be true; but it is obvious that we have skimmed off the cream and will soon be scraping the bottom of the barrel.
In my estimation there will be approximately 25% of the families now in Camp who will never relocate. This includes families where relocation is an impossibility as well as those families who have greater security in Camp than they have ever had before. My guess would be that approximately 900 families will remain in the Center as long as permitted. (Of course, there may be one or two children who will relocate out of these families occasionally.) The following list of impossible situations might be of interest.
- Father drafted--mother pregnant--small children
- Old men--poor health--no English--no skill. (Some plan to return to Japan after the war.)
- Just no plans: Immaterial whether they return to California or not. No future--lack of desire.
- Intent to remain in the Center until the end of the war. (Some to wait for California--some don't know or care.)
- Retired before evacuation. Have some resources but do not know where to go after the war.
- Parents elderly--sending children to college, using resources available and feel children's education most important at present.
― 203 ― - Lost former business or savings during evacuation and are too old to start all over again.
- The only wage-earner is in the Army.
Statistics were compiled to indicate the relative importance of the various obstacles, and it is true in every group that old age and poor health was the most outstanding deterrent.
- Old age, poor health: 521
- Fear of outside: 320
- Language handicap: 250
- Draft: 168
- Plans depend on others: 153
- Lack of financial resources: 135
We are attaching a copy of the logging form used by the counselors. This is submitted to me at the end of each week and covers the total number of families interviewed during the week. It should be noted that the principal breakdown is the favorable and unfavorable. The obstacles may include cases listed as favorable as well as unfavorable. It is a compliation of all factors given as obstacles to relocation, and it should be remembered that each case is not necessarily recorded under only one obstacle. For example, a man's plan may depend on his children but in addition, he may be afraid that he will not be able to find adequate housing; or a man may be sceptical about finding a job on the outside,and,if he does find one, he may be afraid that he will lose it after the war. This one case would be recorded in two places. Most duplications will be found under “Fear of the Outside.”
We have broken down the unfavorable group into the following:
- Waiting for California: 198
- Want to stay here: 168
- No plan: 73
- Refused the interview: 57
- On stop list: 49
- Want to return to Japan (Hance not asked for repatriation: 39
There are very few duplications in the breakdown of the foregoing group. Most cases are unfavorable for one principal reason, and very seldom do the reasons overlap.
An explanation of item 4, however, might be in order. This does not mean that 57 families refused to have us call on them. The majority of these 57 families have aither telephoned the office or left word with the rece tionist that they are not interested in relocation right now and that we need not call. An explanation is always given that we are interested in their plans regardless of whether they intend to relocate or not. We make every effort to obtain more specific information but sometimes it is quite impossible. I should like to add here that there has never been one instance of discourtesy toward a counselor. We have always been received graciously and affably. We, in turn, respect the family's decision regardless of whether or not we agree that it is best. The refinement of the Japanese people has laways been evident during our experience in the counseling program.
Memo: L.N. Bennett to Jukichi Teniguchi
(Sample)
War Relocation Authority
Gila River Project
Rivers, Arizona
August 1, 1944
Mr. Jukichi Teniguchi
72-13-B
Rivers, Arizona
In our world today, everyone is thinking of the future in terms of immediate and post-wat plans. Therefore, it seems important for families to start thinking of the future no.
In order to assist in planning, and to offer whatever service might be desired, you and your family are invited to participate in the next group of discussions. It will be deeply appreciated if you will be at home next Monday, August 7. Mr. John Bryce will call at your home at 9:00 a.m., if convenient for you.
Your immediate supervisor has been notified that you may be absent from work at the above time. The enclosed slips will be signed by the counselor and should be given to your foreman.
It is understood that these discussions are purely voluntary on your part, and if you are unable to be at home at this time or if you do not desire this service, please notify the Welfare Office.
We hope to be of assistance in planning for the future of Center residents, and it will be very helpful for us to know and understand your difficulties. Your frank discussion will be appreciated.
Yours truly,
Project Director
To All Division Heads:
In accordance with Mr. Bennett's instructions, we are attaching counseling appointment slips for workers in your department.
If for any reason their absence at this time will jeopardize the efficiency of your department, please let us know.
Thank you for your cooperation.
(Sample of Counseling Appointment slip)
Division
Name is to be
Excused from work without payroll deduction on Date. An appointment was kept with.
Procedure Followed for Scheduled Counseling Interview
- Select families to be interviewed.
- Check against 3 x 5 card file to see if interviewed before.
- Type three (3) copies of lits. (Lists according to counselor)
- Assign case numbers.
- (a) Original used to enter names in register
- (b) Duplicate used to make up folder and two (2) 3 x 5 cards
- (c) Triplicate used for clearance.
- (1) Repatriation file
- (2) Welfare file
- (3) Stop List - (Canal & Butte)
- List returned to me after clearance (Will note when no letter is to be written)
- Clearance list checked against original and duplicate lists.
- Clearance list to Mr. Hayashi and Mr. Hasegawa
- (a) Obtain Individual Record from Statistics
- (b) Fill in Forms #329
- File one (1) 3 x 5 card; hold second 3 x 5 card for disposition for Relocation Division.
- Duplicate list used for appointment letters.
- Type division head letters.
- (a) Attach appointment slips.
- Keep original list for our files.
- Clearance list and folders to Counselors.
- Home calls made and then dictated.
- (a) Two carbon copies made of each case for Relocation Division.
- THREE (3) Copies #329 and #340 are typed from original.
- (a) Original stays in our folder (ink copy)
- (b) THREE (3) typed copies forwarded to Relocation Division.
- (1) Attached are TWO (2) copies of case record and ONE (1) 3 x 5 card (complete)
- (a-1) Relocation sends duplicate #329 and #340 to Statistics
- (a-2) Relocation sends triplicate to Relocation Officer
― 208 ―
- (1) Attached are TWO (2) copies of case record and ONE (1) 3 x 5 card (complete)
- Disposition of case written on 3 X 5 cards.
- File Case Record.
Fasako
-
Fasako
- Select families to be interviewed.
- (a) Families with two or more employable members
- (b) Take four (4) cases per day - 5 days per week for each Counselor.
- (c) Canal folders already here
- Check against 3 X 5 card file to see if already interviewed.
- (a) If so - select another family.
- Type three (3) copies of list
- (a) Type according to Counselor.
- Assign case numbers
- (a) Always check last number in Register
- Use original copy of list to enter number in Register.
- Give duplicate list to Terry.
- Give triplicate list to Shiz. (Clearance List)
- File one (1) 3 X 5 card in our file. Hold second 3 X 5 card for Relocation Division.
- (a) Disposition must be recorded on cards
- Record information from clearance list on original and duplicate list.
- Keep original copy of list for permanent file.
Shiz
-
Shiz
- 1. Clear Counselor's lists. (Triplicate copy) Check against -
- Repatriate file
- Welfare file
- Stop List (Canal and Butte)
- 2. Return list to me.
Mr. Hayashi and Mr. Hasagawa
-
Mr. Hayashi and Mr. Hasagawa
- Use clearance list to obtain Individual Records from Statistics.
- Complete as much of form 329 as possible.
- Give list and #329 to Terry.
Terry
-
Terry
- Make folder and two (2) 3 X 5 cards for each family
- (a) Use duplicate copy of list
- Arrange list and folders with ink copy of #329 for counselors.
- Give the two (2) 3 X 5 cards to Fusako.
- Help Grace type appointment letters and Division Head letters.
- Type three (3) copies of #329 and #340's from ink copy.
Grace
-
Grace
- Type appointment letters.
- Type letters to Division Heads
- (a) Attach appointment slips
- Give list - folder - filled in #329 - blank #340 and copy of letter to Counselor.
- Help Terry type 329's and 340's.
- Record disposition of case on 3 X 5 card (our card and Relocation's)
- Give me Relocation's cards (3X5)
- File folder.
Monday
-
Monday
- Selection of families
- Checked for previous interview
- Lists made up
Tuesday
-
Tuesday
- Lists cleared
Wednesday & Thursday
-
Wednesday & Thursday
- Letters written
- All letters out and in the mail by Thursday night
Friday
-
Friday
- Lists and folders to Counselors.
Canal
-
Canal
- Mrs. Peddy
- Submit list of people to be interviewed giving name of family head and names of all dependents. Also give family address and family number and where each individual is employed. (We will obtain this information when you are unable to get it.)
- FOR US TO DO
- Clear list over 3X5 card file.
- Check against stop list.
- Make case folders and two 3 X 5 cards.
- Issue case number and enter in Register.
- Write both letters.
- (a) To individual family
- (b) To Division Heads.
- Route list and folders to Counselors in Canal.
- Canal Clerical Worker
- Prepare Form 329 from Statistical Records.
- Head up Form 340.
- Return list, folder and one ink copy of 329 and 340 to Counselors.
- Counselors
- Make Home Call.
- Make corrections and additions to 329.
- Complete Form 340.
- Dictate case.
- Clerical Worker
- Type three copies of every case History.
- Type three copies of Form 329 and three copies of Form 340
- Note in record “Two Copies of Case Record and three copies of Forms 329 and 340 sent to Relocation Division.”
- Forward everything to Butte camp.
- Here
- Note disposition of case on both 3 X 5 cards.
- Make three copies of Transmittal for copy of record, 329's and 340's to Relocation.
- (a) Attach 3 X 5 cards.
Family Planning Discussion
-
Family Planning Discussion
- Date
- Name
- Case No.
- Conditions of Interview
- Brief statement regarding the general conditions of the interview--i.e. the acceptance of counselor--which member of family acted as spokesman or did several participate. Was an interpreter used? Did the person interviewed speak good English or poor English General attitude during interview.
- Social History
- Family composition (briefly)--give age range of children--arrival in U.S. from Japan, &c. Mention any family members who have relocated. Their position and where, &c. Employment before and since evacuation. All other general information.
- Health
- Property
- Evacuees Plan for the Future
- Summary
-
- Obstacles
- Positive Factors
- Diagnosis
- Use one of three recommendations.
- Refer to Relocation Division
- Hold in Welfare Active File
- Inactive File.
- Two copies of case record and three copies of forms 329 and 340 forwarded to the Relocation Division.
- Counselor's Name.
Sample Survey Form
Survey Compiled from ____ Interviews
Date_____
Interviewer____
- Favorable
- Ready for Placement
- To Relocation For Followup
- Welfare Followup
- Held in Welfare Files--Plans Maturing Without Need of Further Counseling
- Obstacles
- Old Age & Poor Health
- Fear of "Outside"
- Adjustment too difficult
- Fear Discrimination
- Adequate Housing Unavailable
- Unable to Support Family
- Inability to Secure Job
- May Lose Job After War
- Occurrence of Illness or Accident
- Weather
- Unknown Farming Conditions
- Knows Only One Occupation
- Total
- Draft
- Plans Depend on:
- Children
- Family Head
- Total
- Language Handicap
- Lack of Financial Reserve or Capital
- Waiting for Leave Clearance
- No Wage Earner
- Family Health Problem
- Reschedule
- Unfavorable
- No Plan
- Definitely Out
- California
- Japan
- Stay Here
- Other
- Total
- Not Interviewed
- Not Home
- Refused Interview
- Applies for Repatriation
- Stop List
- Total
Chapter 10
Conclusion
The voluntary relocation program came to a standstill on October 26, 1944, when the last special train left for the East. After that date the rate of relocation swept downward until it approached zero. In some weeks of November and December the number of people who were eating and sleeping within the confines of the center actually increased rather than decreased. The ratio of births to deaths was always three to one, and there were as many or more people returning to the center tha there were relocating.
Readmissions.
For statistical purposes the Project Director very neatly obviated this upward trend in the population figures by drastically restricting the readmission of visitors to resident status. This action did not mean, however, that any evacuee was actually prevented from entering the center when he appeared at the gate. It merely meant that most people who reentered the project after October, 1944, were classified as visitors in the statistical records for the duration of their stay at the center. Although visits were technically limited by the regulations to not more than thirty days, no one was ever physically evicted. As a result, some visitors stayed for as long as eighteen months. On one westbound train as many as twenty-one resettlers got off in Chandler to visit at Gila over the holidays in 1944. It is probably conservative tom estimate that there were 300 or more visitors on the project on January 1, 1945.
Prior to October, 1944, it had been the policy of the Project
In November, 1944, the Project Director set up a complicated procedure for scrutinizing all readmission applications. Each applicant was required to be interviewed by a welfare counselor who wrote a detailed report. Then the report and the applicant appeared before a committee which passed judgment upon the application and made their recommendation to the Project Director, who handed down the final decision. This procedure was so cumbersome that it delayed all the applications that were pending at the time it was instituted for so long that the Post-Exclusion Handbook, which prohibited further reinduction, was in force before final action had been taken on any of these applications.
Anticipation of the Opening of California.
Throughout 1944 there were events and rumors, some of which have already been mentioned, which foreshadowed the lifting of the exclusion orders. As the fateful day approached the anticipation became keener. It is doubted if there was ever any action taken or report made by any government officials, regardless of what precautions might have been taken to shroud it in the deepest secrecy, which did not
Rumors about the opening of the West coast popped up at frequent intervals. In June they were particularly rife. Then they subsided for the time being. After the Project Directors' Conference in October it was commonly reported that the announcement would be made as soon after the election as political decency would permit. Details of this conference were circulated via the project grapevine soon after the conference was adjourned.
Finis.
December 17, 1944, marked the end of an era for the relocation program. What would have happened if the voluntary relocation program had continued for another year or two, or for an indefinite period, will always remain a matter for speculation. Many people on the project were convinced that there was a definite end-point to voluntary relocation which had been nearly reached in 1944. (See, for example, the reports of the Community Analyst. This gentleman, who formed very pronounced opinions on most subjects, despite his frequent innocent protestations that he was a scientific man interested only in recording facts, predicted as late as June 1, 1945, that there was a hard shell of from 4000 to 6000 residents who were “unrelocatable.”) Such opinions were based upon so many
Part V
Post-Exclusion Program
Chapter 1
Inertia
Dec.17,1944--April 30,1945
During the fall of 1944 there was some covert staff discussion anent possible center closings and the reopening of the restricted West coast areas. When the Project Director had returned from a conference with Mr. Myer on this subject a limited number of key members of the staff was called in to contribute their personal opinions. The Relocation Program Officer and Chief of Community Management were in agreement on the necessity of closing the centers but differed in the timing of the announcement. The former thought that the restricted localities should be opened for about 60 to 90 days before any announcement were made about the closing of centers, because he felt that a dual shock of this nature would have a deleterious effect on the liquidation program. As more of the staff members learned of the contemplated program it became evident that the majority did not believe that the entire evacuee population could be relocated. In the first place, while relocation had not been tested in California or other coastal states, there was evidence of strained feelings vocally and editorially, sometimes rising to high pitch, which certainly made it difficult to get optimistic. In the second place, from a matter of observation, it was easy to see that there were too many old people in camp to get them all out. There were too many old bachelors and too many welfare cases.
It was about the first of November when the Relocation
When the announcement came on December 17 there was a wave of expectancy among the staff members and several, particularly in one section, foresaw the most dire results occurring when the old and disabled realized the implications of the new post-exclusion program. However, there seemed to be more alarm in the minds of the staff than in the residential blocks. It was as though the evacuees were being obdurate and would not let on that they had heard about the biggest news story since they arrived here during the latter part of 1942. They appeared to be far more concerned with the prospects of a New Year's Day celebration and the preparation of rice cakes and saki. It was this air of complacency, always preliminary to this period of festivity, that seemed so uninterrupted to the ordinary staff member, and hence so disturbing. There might be a period of reckoning but twelve months from then seemed an interminable time.
Relocation had arrived at an impasse. Only thirteen persons went out on terminal leave during the two weeks after the exclusion orders had been rescinded. Leaves were naturally at low ebb at this
Administrative Notice 158 announced a new set of perspectives for the post-exclusion program. It disclaimed any authority over leave clearance which now became the responsibility of the Army; it indicated a limited service for evacuees who wanted to return to the West coast; it stipulated a new visiting policy which would eliminate visits except where projects and relocation offices were in agreement that such visiting was prompted by a desire to do some family relocation planning; it clarified how the new grant policy would affect those who accepted indefinite leave before December 17, and who now were eligible for transportation back to their old homes in California; and it clarified points on the shipment of evacuee property, return to Alaska and Hawaii and the like. This administrative notice, along with the post-exclusion bulletins, issued from time to time, became biblical material for the entire staff at our center. Every section was concerned since they were now alerted to the necessity of diminishing their operations and it was highly important that these reductions in activities be forcefully brought to the attention of the evacuees. It was rather hard, however, to impress anyone that we were in earnest when we continued to plant crops on our project farm during the month of January:
The WRA was now through with its own stop ledger and leave clearance program. The Army now determined eligibility for leave, and soon evacuees learned about the White List (or W-10) which listed the individuals who were free to return to
The Relocation and Community Management Divisions by this time built up a formidable leadership among evacuee organizations to cope with problems of closing. The block managers had begun to exert the most influence in project as well as outside problems, and, while the councils were bedraggled by their usual lethargy, they were beginning to take some interest that was not altogether negative. The future of the Relocation Planning Commission seemed uncertain, and immediately after December 17 met to consider its future now that relocation was to become involuntary. It preferred to remain in an advisory position as much as possible because it feared that its recommendations might lead to negative
It was necessary at this time to fuse these evacuee organizations into a small but compact unit called a coordinating committee. Its composition included the two central block managers, two members of the Relocation Planning Commission and the executive committees of the respective councils. The first responsibilityesf this newly created committee was to understand fully the new program and to attempt to clarify its implications to the membership of these three organizations. The composite of this evacuee coordinating committee was created for key personnel of the staff which included the Project Director, Reports Officer, Attorney and Assistant Director of the Administrative Management Division. The Program Officer and the Chief of Community Management were members of both the staff and evacuee coordinating committees.
One of the early decisions arrived at was to orient all block managers, councilmen and members of the Relocation Planning Commission about the provisions of the post-exclusion program before any literature was disseminated directly to the blocks. The pamphlets which had been prepared were not actually distributed to the individual barracks until after three weeks following the original announcement of center closing. In fact, there were hundreds of these pamphlets which lay untouched in the central block manager's office for several weeks. When they finally were passed out the reaction among the Issei was so negligible that Mr. Kubo, of the Planning Commission, may have been correct in his evaluation at a session of the Committee on American Principles and Fair Play convention in San Francisco, about the
The coordinating committees met several times a week to make sure that our leadership was coping with the evacuee state of mind whether there be restlessness or lethargy. We had made much ado about preparing a mimeograph sheet of questions and answers. The leaders were prodded to make sure that all oral questions were written down so that the administration could assemble the answers either by perusal of Administrative Notice No. 158 or by finding out from Washington. It puzzles many of us that the written questions failed to materialize except in isolated offices, where outstanding evacuees prepared a few lists more out of curiosity than honest inquiry. We were, perhaps, lulled into a sense of security wherei we gauged the effectiveness of leadership by the calm of the communities. What actually happened was that relatively few understood the new directives thoroughly even as late as the month of May. The People were not generally awakened until the round table discussions were completed during, the forepart of June. This will be discussed in a later chapter.
Nearly all the evacuees were watching the developments in California and quite a number had actually been laying plans
Those who were planning relocation to California were, in nearly all cases, those who owned farm properties, or wealthy persons who were able to get possession of their houses. Canal residents stemming largely from Fresno and nearby hamlets had been able to cancel vineyard leases in December in sufficient number to make it possible to return in considerable force. In Butta a nucleus of vineyard men, under the forceful leadership of Fred Wakita, was planning to take up residence again at their old homesteads at Florin, near Sacramento, California.
As time went on, however, the obstacles seemed to become greater. A sordid spectacle of incidents, involving several families from Gila, was taking place where the hoodlums were shooting at houses and missing youngsters by a matter of inches, and homes intended for living were being burned down under peculiar circumstances. In the case of the Kakutani shooting the rumors sprang from the facts that there had been a shotgun shooting to tall tales about hospitalizing the family and finally ending in
The prospects, too, of disposing of their farm products looked bleak. Buyers and commission men had made up their minds that they could keep out the returning evacuees if their produce could not find a ready market. The teamster unions were rumored in many localities to have made resolutions unfavorable to the evacuees. It was questionable if they would be able to get necessary gasoline allowances for tractor use, and if oil companies would sell after the ration board had allowed a quota. Perhaps the ordinary necessities such as groceries, clothing and household utensils would be difficult to get, for had not an influential business man in Fresno placed an unsavory advertisement in the Fresno Bee at this time indicating that he neither wanted their patronage nor considered the evacuees fit subjects to live in this country. Everyone knew that it was impossible to get insurance on their automobiles or their houses, and, in view of the unexplained fires, that certainly was a decided handicap. And old friends were writing to the residents of all projects that it was unwise at the present moment to think about returning.
The yeoman efforts of the central block managers and certain outstanding managers were chiefly responsible for maintaining a
The block managers in Butte met every Tuesday morning at 9 o'clock. The Program Officer and the Chief of Community Management usually spent an hour and a half at each meeting to explain all the new regulations and to get their reactions. While at this period of the relocation program the majority of managers were unable to speak or understand fluent English, the Central Block Manager was adept in translation, so all topics were fully understood. It was important that all information be given to block residents without bias, and in this respect it can be said that about half of the managers could be relied on. When one considers the gradual
It was necessary at this time to provide the people with information which was reliable and honestly reported. Very frequently the outside Japanese papers caused us great concern. They were quoted as saying: “Centers should close. Closing them is another thing.” The problem of counteracting such publicity was expertly handled both in editorial and news columns of the Gila News Courier. It was not an easy job to print the gist of all new policies, unpopular as they might be, and in the end produce a paper which was anxiously awaited at the regular distribution periods. When the Relocation Office was able to get the services of a highly educated Nisei who was capable of preparing a Japanese section, the Reports Officer was able to secure enough paper to allow a special supplement which was distributed on the regular publishing days. This was a great boon to the program in that articles appearing in this supplement were commentaries on WRA policies and an interpretation of outside reactions.
We had hoped that, shortly after the announcement of the center closure program, the communities would be as uninhibited from restraints as possible in order to have people sense a new freedom, although they were technically incarcerated. It was
The terminal leaves during January, February and March indicated that the great majority of people were thinking about California only as their relocation destinations. Of the 715 leaves issued during this period, 339 had returned there. The figures at that time did not indicate the proporionats interest in a California return since the conditions were not too agreeable to speculate about returning there. The West coast relocation
There was, perhaps, less inertia among the population than in the staff in conceding that the centers could be emptied by the end of the year. It became a common mental exercise to divide the remaining population by the number of weeks left in the year and then remark that it seemed like an impossible job in view of the fact that we had scarcely ever maintained a departure flow beyond 75 per week. It was common to overhear humorous wagers that the residue of the camp would be from three to six thousand persons at the end of the year. If the program had progressed at a faster pace the expressions of attitude on the staff would not have had such a deleterious effect. As it happened, the
The old staff relocation committee was, therefore, reorganized on the 10th of January so as to include two assistant directors of the Community and Administrative Management Divisions Superintendent of Education, Reports Officer, Agricultural Chief, Project Engineer, Evacuee Property Officer, Welfare Supervisor, Assistant Personnel Officer, Principal of the Canal High School, Liaison Officer, Canal, Project Steward, Community Activities Supervisor, Medical Social Worker and the Social Analyst. This committee usually met every two weeks for a period of six months, or oftener if members of the Washington staff or relocation officers happened to arrive between regular meetings with worthwhile messages. The most compelling reason for bringing this group together, other than trying to keep the staff leaders current on procedures and policies, was to impress everyone with the fact that the staff must be convinced that the centers were going to close and that none of them would remain open for more than 12 months. If this could be accomplished this organizational effort would be exceedingly worthwhile. As a matter of fact, this group added considerable force to the program, and every member without exception became an integral part in accomplishing our ends. Quite a few set up bulletin boards in their various sections and were amenable to special orientation meetings to be held under the direction of the Program Officer. These special meetings in sections or units (as in the case of the Education Section) did much to enlighten the staff members about the program; other-
While the assistance from organizations, whether staff or evacuee, are very important, their contributions pale into insignificance if the relocation staff is not able or qualified. This was decidedly true at the beginning of the post-exclusion program when the responsibilities of our offices were far more expansive than before. During the years of 1943 and 1944 we tried through efforts of salesmanship to promote family relocation because that ultimately was the answer to our final problem of liquidating the center. However, our problems had hitherto been small. If families for one reason or another could not relocate they could stay in the center without fear of being ousted. If several members of a family able to earn a living were on the outside the remaining members could reside at the center and need not pay for their subsistence, and in many cases were able to get the customary clothing allowances or project Welfare aid. This condition had often been a deterrent to getting the antire family out because it allowed the family head to earn a good wage on the outside with little expenses to himself, and thereby made it possible to lay up a considerable nest egg. In one case a husband was able to save about three thousand dollars during a two-year
At the beginning of the year the personnel charts allowed the following positions to the Relocation Division: Relocation Program Officer, Assistant Relocation Program Officer, two Relocation Advisers, one Leave Officer, five Assistant Relocation Advisers and one Secretary. All these allocated positions were filled save one Assistant Relocation Adviser and that of the Secretary. On the 15th of January the Director approved the establishment of four additional CAF-7 Assistant Relocation
The Program Officer concerned himself mainly with the broad phases of developing the program through intensive contacts with evacuee leadership primarily and with members of the staff. At this time over half of his time was devoted to this type of activity. The duties of the Assistant Relocation Program Officer, who was in acting capacity until the middle of the year, consisted in directing a relocation office in Butte and one in Canal, and developing effective counseling techniques as well as acquainting the population with outside conditions through interviewing programs and mimeograph bulletins. Directly under him were two relocation advisers, one in Canal and another in Butte, who were immediately responsible for the interviewing and counseling efforts of the Assistant Relocation Advisers. Both the Program Officer and his assistant spent a goodly portion of their time in Canal on the broader phases, but the office was regularly staffed with one Relocation Adviser and one Assistant Relocation Adviser who worked out evacuee plans and then sent the residents on with cover sheets to the Leave Office in the Butte community.
We preferred to recruit our own applicants for the new openings and in nearly all cases were able to fill them from members of our project staff. In most instances they came as transfers from the Education Section and worked out as a whole very satisfactorily. Almost invariably, any proffered assistance from the washington office in the matter of recruitment was rejected since we preferred to hire personalities of known qualities who were acquainted with the innate problems of the Japanese-Americans.
When the people came into the offices, whether by request or on their own volition they did not generally care whom they talked to during the initial interview, and few of the Issei were concerned if they failed to see the same Assistant Relocation Adviser on subsequent visits. This was not always true of the Nisei, since they were more apt to show preferences if they had become attached to a certain adviser, although this attitude was not nearly as pronounced as it had been during the two previous years. At that time our staff had not been increased to the extent that we were able to divide the camps into districts and assign specific loads to each person. At this time, for instance, in Butte, two Assistant Relocation Advisers were assisting in the formulation of evacuee plans, and another was trying to complete a back log of 600 initial counseling interviews. Shortly after that, two other Assistant Advisers were added to the staff. One was detailed to assist the Leave Officer in matters pertainingto transportation and general supervision of the evacuee force, and another was assigned to the task of briefing job offers for the paper and compssing news stories on subjects of interest which pertained to relocation. A weekly average of about 260 interviews took place during the first three months, involving generally about 1000 individuals if family members were counted.
At a mement when we were attempting to encourage family
The more sincere residents had been worried about getting funds to begin life again, but this group, along with those who were perplexed by other problems such as choosing between the East and West, or whether to go to the country or cities, were in the minority. The majority seemed in the throes of an inertia that at times was quite frightening to the relocation staff. They did not want the center to close during the war nor did they think that such a program could be accomplished. Some of the pro-Japanese leaders worked on various themes such as indemnities for evacuation losses before departing from the center, and the old assembly center informational bulletins, which apparently Director Eisenhower, had issued, to the effect that the relocation centers would be their homes during the period of war. In addition to these factors they pointed out the disappointing relocation flow from the centers and the immense problem of creating housing for all
The progress in attitudes seemed to have come to an impasse when Director Myer announced his intention to visit our center during the first week in March. Schools were still in session, and there was much clamor for a commitment to resume them in the coming fall; cruel receptions were taking place, mostly in the Fresno area, where Gila had been first to send an appreciable number of resettlers; and farm employment on the coast was not in demand as it would be later on in June and July. There did not seem to be a solitary ray of sunlight in the bleak California picture. Those who had returned were in nearly all cases property owners who considered their houses to be homes despite the callousness of a community or a neighbor. In all the gloom that pervaded the scens we did have letters from relocatees who conveyed the impression that many had spoken kind words and had gone out of their way to provide some warmth in their return, but we were not entirely sure that the overall conditions were too favorable. While we had letters which were heartening,we learned at the same time that others from the same writer were circulating in his old block dealing with prejudices that he had to endure in his old locality. Where fatalities could conceivably have occurred--as in the case of the Kakutani family, with several small children--there did not seem to be much incentive for other families to follow at the moment. Everyone was hoping for some change which would add a note of optimism to the prospects of again living in California. It might be that the county sheriffs had declared in unison that
When the Director spoke at mass meetings, joint sessions of the councils and block managers, meetings held by other organizations such as the Relocation Planning Commission, the people hoped that he could insinuate a few rays of hope. The appointed staff, on the other hand, felt that the greatest contribution the Director could make was to reemphasize the fact of center closure. All people at the center, including the staff personnel, had fallen into a pessimistic state of mind which needed some jolting. Mr. Myer made a masterly appearance, and, in deference to the leader who had accepted the frontal attacks against them,as a whole they displayed an outward show of acquiescence. Many fine characteristios were attributed to their leader who had calmly but forcefully told them that their paths in the future were bound to be rocky. Unfortunately, there were lots of generalizations, and some of the leaders had failed to detect much elaboration in his five points as reasons for closing the center about the resettlement assistance which had been the main topic of the visitor from the Washington Relocation Division. In a meeting with the Relocation Planning Commission the
The Project Director, fortunately, conceived the idea at this time that there should be some first hand information secured by a key member of the staff about California. He detailed the Program Officer to investigate conditions as he saw fit. This could include a tour of all offices in the state as well as making inquiries emong the people as to attitudes and employment possibilities.
On arriving at Los Angeles, the Program Officer discovered that there existed only one district office in the southern California area, the one in Los Angeles. A relocation officer had been picked for the Santa Barbara district, but office space had not been found. The same was true for the Santa Ana district,
The scene at Guadalupe and Santa Maria, California, was ominous even to an employee of the WRA. First, only a few leaders, principally in church circles, were making a half-hearted rebittal of all the unkind machinations of the produce men who had literally purloined the huge vegetable holdings of former evacuee residents, and unsavory politicians who would stoop to use racial prejudice to fulfill their ambitions. Secondly, there seemed to be an organized resistance among growers, shippers and business men to keep all evacuees out, irrespective of the price. The newspaper editor, apparently a rabid imposter, sought to foster the prestige of his paper by printing the unfavorable publicity given the Tule Lake Center, and carried his prejudices so far that he would not defile his prestige by sitting at the same dinner table as Carey McWilliams. Whenever one inquired in these localities, the answer was always the same: “We don't want them back!” On the road to Fresno, the Program Officer considered it improbable that a score of people would return during wartime to their old homes. Again, he wondered, if given a chance to return relatively unmolested, would they once more seek to create a dynasty in vegetable production and marketing, which was so powerful that the Caucasians had literally
Unlike the prospects at Guadalupe, those at Fresno had been far broghter from the beginning. Evacuees had, in most cases, held on to their vineyards and farms. The vineyards might be small, but the price of the raisin grapes had risen almost to the point of being prohibitive. One year's yield could compensate for five previous years of toil. Laborers who had taken over for rent acreages owned by the evacuees, suddenly found themselves rich. In some instances the actual rent amounted to the payment of taxes and leases in certain quarters for the “duration of the war” at ridiculously low figures.
There was a shooting incident in a nearby village wile the Program Officer was there. He talked to an evacuee couple one morning who had driven to the Relocation Office after having been refused service in all the food stores at Caruthers. While calling at many evacuee homes he found that a considerable number of merchants were being rude and were refusing various types of service. Would there be an outlet for their agricultural produce, when harvest came around, in the face of declarations among marketing associations that they would not handle their stuff? These were some of the conditions that were found which would be difficult to portray honestly to the majority of Canal residents who had pre-evacuation origins in the Fresno area.
The Stockton locale differed somewhat from that of Fresno or Guadalupe. We had about 250 residents who were among the less Americanized type of evacuee, similar to those who came from the
The communities around Sacramento such as Auburn, Marysville, Winters, Suisun and Vacaville, had been such hotbeds of organized anti-Japanese feeling that no one had returned to take up residence again. The Relocation Officers at Sacramento were not enthused about an early return. It was almost a fad to belong to one of the anti-Japanese protection leagues, and, unfortunately, the calibre of former residents was not of the kind to soften the prejudices which had been strengthened for a period of three and one-half years. The Relocation Officers were frank in their belief that evacuees from this area were faring much better in a relocation center than they had ever lived in some of these towns. Several hundred of both Butte and Canal residents were now waiting for a nod from such influential employers such as Mangeles and Robbins.
The whole panorama of California relocation could not be properly appraised by the Program Officer since he had not been acquainted with the extent of assimilation and treatment accorded
The report on California was given to the block managers and Relocation Planning Commission when the Program Officer returned. In addition, two speeches were delivered under the suspices of the Adult Education Section, in both communities, which concluded a series of nine lectures or forums on the most important geographical areas in the country. Topics used for these meetings were such as: job possibilities, housing availability (including hostels) and rents, sentiment, resume of evacuee placements already made, types of industries and agriculture, racial composition, success of relocated evacuees, school facilities, working arrangements with welfare
It was quite evident that the Washington office had great faith in what relocation officers could accomplish at a project
Mr. James Jennings, of the Salt Lake City office, came to Gila twice during the first few months of the year to bolster the failing Tooele Ordnance Depot recruitment. The Washington office had panned us before the post-exclusion program about our inferior showing in sending residents to the depot. When we countered that the families who would normally relocate to Tooele had gone to Seabrook in a movement that far exceeded that of any other center, it did not seem to be the satisfactory answer to the Washington office. Few of the able-bodied Nisei were left, and Issei capable of this manual work were too often influenced by the pro-Japanese philosophy pervading the camp,which did not condone any effort to asist the war production of this country. An interesting sidelight was this, that while the relocation officer buoyantly related the possibilities at Tooele, an evacuee assistant, who normally worked in the personnel department at Tooele, frankly told the residents that only select family combinations could make a living there, such
The Boston office detailed Roland Barnard to the project for a period of four weeks in order to entice farm families, mainly, in accepting agricultural opportunities. Relatively few had ever considered the New England area, so when Mr.Barnare was able to recruit only one single young man our offices were not surprised. While he applied himself, perhaps, more diligently than was ordinarily true of relocation officers, his repertoire of offers lacked financial inducements, and housing was not usually matched well with the offers.
From time to time Texas seemed to have an appeal for the prospective relocatees, in the main because of its vegetable-producing areas near Houston, and in the Rio Grande Valley. A number of farmers during the past two years had moved to Texas to discover that the climate and rainfall has strong similarities to those characteristic of California valleys. The sentiment had been adverse for many years in certain counties such as Hidalgo, in the Rio Grande region, so actually the interest largely centered in the Houston locale. When Homer Hill, Relocation Officer in charge of the state of Texas, attempted to coax our residents to resettle there, he met with a fine response, but it developed that he, too, had a brief case, none too full, of offers which were good for couples alone. The large families again were excluded, and the old story repeated itself: opportunities are plentiful but housing is desperate. However, in deference to Mr. Hill, we can sincerely say that he did not narrow his efforts to the state of Texas. He had sufficient vision to see that his efforts, or those of any
The arrival of Gordon Berryman, Relocation Officer from New York City, created a momentary stir among relatives of those already resettled in the environs of New York City. The actual result, however, were disappointing, despite the fact that he stayed with us for a period of four weeks. New York had had small appeal, in former years, so far as Gila residents were concerned because of its comparative wage scale and lack of defense activities. Again, the number of offers for the large families, which were after all our essential problems, were relatively few; and so few people saw any attraction in what New York offered.
Several of the large operators had been interested in projects large enough to promote some group relocation. A few farmers from Guadalupe had become interested in a 2000-scre tract at Yuma, Arizona, and also in the O'Neill opportunity near Fresno, California, which could easily support one hundred families on an acreage of 5000 acres. When these opportunities did not develop, some of the group relocation promoters sought to give prestige to the offer submitted by the Wilson Plantation northeast of Little Rock, Arkansas. A former council chairman and shoemaker by trade performed a herculean task in translating all data about Wilson's offer, only to find that there wasx more talk than genuine interest. Another former chairman visited the plantation twice, and seemed to have worked out a favorable plan for those who wanted to relocate on this offer. After several meetings, however, there was much murmuring about the clause that a certain amount of cotton had to be grown, and the fact that
Throughout the early months of the year we relied a great deal on a number of prominent Issei to tell us how rapidly we should push the people in relocation, and just what factors we should accentuate. For instance, was it wise to cut out community activities immediately? Was it using good judgment to try and impress the people that the center was closing by consolidating several mess halls and thereby put a number out of work? Should passes to Phoenix for shopping purposes be curtailed or restricted to the point where only those with definite relocation plans would be eligible? Should not the welfare rolls be re-evaluated to see who could be lopped off, particularly those who were not interested in relocation anyway? Fortunately, we elected to listen to our leaders who had played a healthy and prominent part in whatever we had done in the past. Their counsel was this: anticipate your reduction in activities, employment or other facilities, repeat their connotation often in meetings and inthe
It occurred to us on the relocation staff that Washington-sponsored theories seemed to be conceived with the idea that if the project would put them into practice our program would develop in direct ration to their application. At one time great stress had been laid on the counseling program leading us to believe that the success of voluntary relocation hinged on how effectively we had conducted it. Great hopes had been held for council-sponsored relocation planning commissions, but in the end few
It appeared for a long time that WRA was going to do nothing tabgible about creating housing. When spokesmen from the Washington office or representatives from the field offices were questioned on this point they handled the problem as one of the exemplary riddles which could be solved by the individualism and aggressiveness of a race which had done extraordinarily well in making adjustments. This was a difficult situation for the Program Officer in meetings of block managers. The leaders of this group who were very friendly towards the Relocation Division twitted us good naturedly about this defect in the program, whereas those who leaned toward the Japanese culture gave long harangues in the Japanese language which served to get everyone off key. Fortunately, the Americanized leaders saved the day and made the appearances of nearly all staff members a pleasant affair.
A member of the staff who had at one time been the head of
Discussions among groups coming from the same locality contributed quite a lot to the entire program. While such discussions did not ordinarily lead to a pooling of interests whereby large numbers could go back to an evacuated area under a definite leadership, they served to leave an imprint on the minds of those who engaged in such talks. The first group to undertake relocation as a unit was that of Florin, a town five miles out of Sacramento. About 27 people returned during February to Florin under the guidance of Fred Wakita despite the fact that a person
The population graphs of all centers at this time disclosed that there were almost as many aliens as citizens, whereas in the beginning they had accounted for only one-third of the population. And when one considers that the vast majority of citizens were under nineteen years of age one can readily see what impact the philosophy of the Issei was having on the camps. During the early days there may have been a short period when the Niseis prevailed in contacts with the administration, and we were lulled into believing that it was more expeditious to rely on Nisei leadership than Nisei leaders However, that period was short lived,and alien leadership asserted itself long before the Director permitted Isseis to hold the elective office of a councilman. The successful administrator on the project whose normal work embodied contacts with evacuses began to build up leadership fences shortly after the Army registration. The Issei never relinquished control of camp philosophy after that.
Issei leadership as such was not necessarily unfavorable. It could be directed in many instances to take the form of good cooperation. As it applied to the large group of bachelors who had
Shortly after the exclusion orders were abolished there were several hundred visitors in camp whose visiting privileges were radically changed when the post-exclusion was put into effect. Although visitors normally stayed only for limited periods and then returned to Chicago, Cleveland or some other large resettlement community, there were a few who made flagrant use of the ill-defined procedures governing them to stay on month after month. The Leave Officer was now detailed to interview all the non-residents and within a short time we were able to arrange for nearly all their departures. The key staff members were delighted with the new policies on visitors and proceeded to enforce them quite rigidly, and they were able to gain the support
When a visitor was admitted whether under the old or new regulations he usually complained about the reception at the gate. Time after time a block manager or councilman would register a
Part V
Post-Exclusion Program
Chapter 2
Determinants that Turned the Tide
May 1, 1945--June 17,1945
We realized the necessity for revitalizing our program during March and April but were not sure just how we should proceed. The Director's visit had given us a momentary buoyancy; however, his message began to wear thin in the blocks as well as in the administration offices. Meanwhile, as there appeared need for re-evaluation, the Relocation Division was vastly improving its relationship with evacuee leaders, and the Chief of Community Management and the Program Officer continued their efforts at educating the population mainly through leadership.
When the Washington Chief of Community Management evaluated our program during the last of April it was soon evident that he was concerned about our method of handling the program. We lacked the optimism, he intimated, to get the program under way. We were too concerned about what would happen to a small nucleus who took the attitude of squatter's sovereignty and refused to move. We were psychologically out on the wrong foot in that instead of hoping that some of the problems such as housing and dealing with recalcitrants would be taken care of in due time we were fretting about the lack of directives from Washington to enforce the relocation flow. It appeared to be his contention that the pessimism inthe appointed staff ranks largely accounted for the inferior showing in relocation statistics. We were in last place and, therefore, rather vulnerable to any criticism which might be
1. Center-wide Round Table Discussions.
When the Program Officer sought to find out if the block managers were honest in their efforts to disseminate the information which we were trying to get over, he found the results to be mixed. Some managers were almost religious in their attempts to display pamphlets or to discuss important factors in block meetings, while others were guilty of gross non-interest; and when one scrutinized relocation statistics in each block it was easy to see how a good relocation flow correlated with block managers' performances. One day, while the program Officer was making the rounds of the block managers, he stopped to have a chat with the manager of block 31, who was more or less notorious as a recalcitrant. When the topic came up as to whether all residents in his block were thoroughly conversant with all the implications of the program, he said, abruptly, “Why don't you come up and hold a block meeting?” The Project Director and Chief of Community Management thought that the experiment had merit. When the central block managers and council chairman of Butte, together with our chief translator and interpreter, also acquiesced, we advertised a meeting for interested persons in the block.
There were to be no speeches, nor would we allow any harangues against the basic policies. We were there to answer any of their questions as simply as possible, and all discussions should follow an impromptu pattern so as to give everyone an uninhibited desire to question as he liked. This round table discussion was held in a mess hall, with the Program Officer, Chief of Community Management and the three evacuee leaders sitting at a mess table facing about forty residents, mostly Issei, at about four other tables. After the block manager of 31 had made a vociferous introduction, which the interpreter considered all right, the room became quist except for smoking pipes being tapped against tin cans used for ash trays. It was an elderly audience, seemingly of men who did not appear to be able to earn a living for a complete family. But they were attentive and within ten minutes the first of a series of questions was raised.
Was the WRA in earnest when it proclaimed December 31 as the last day that the center would be open? What would happen to those who either could not move because of handicaps or who refused to because of attitudes? Would relocatees going back to old communities or anywhere on the coast be allowed resettlement assistance in the face of angry denunciations by certain supervisor boards? How could the assisting agencies provide adequate help in allowing certain peoples materials in building homes? What was WRA doing to combat all the vengeance of arsonists, race-baiters, undemocratic business men and blighters of the press? Could an evacuee returning to his vineyard be reasonably certain that his produce would be purchased at prevailing prices? Would Japanese-
When we left the mess hall that night, after 2½ hours of discussion, we were in a quandary. In the first place, had we been too frank in admitting the shortcomings of the WRA program? Secondly, would this type of discussion add fuel to the resistance movement by restating a policy which was admittedly limited? We had our answer the next morning when the consensus of opinion looked with favor on additional meetings of this sort.
Plans were immediately drawn up for twelve additional discussions in Butte. Harry Nishimura, chairman of the council, and Harold Asami, central block manager, both from Butte, encouraged us to draw the attention of the whole community to this activity. It was dedidedly important to get them under way in Butte before Canal's needs were considered because of the relative apathy that existed in Butte towards anything that savored of relocation. In
2. Appointment of Relocation Block Assistants.
There had been indications that other centers had used paid block representatives to promote relocation during the latter part of 1943 and in 1944. This had intrigued the Relocation Division enought to request the Project Director, on August 9, 1944. to consider the creation of block assistant jobs so that the block residents would be currently informed about all procedures and pertinent data mainly as these applied to fostering good relocation attitudes. But at that time the center was beset with labor troubles which made it inadvisable to create new openings when all sections were getting evacuee reduction notices.
However, the idea blossomed out again during the early months of 1945 at several of the Relocation Planning Commission meetings, and also among block managers who ordinarily looked with favor on the notion since it would give them an assistant to run errands and to distribute the mail. An elaborate job description was written which made them responsible to the Relocation Division. They were to be assigned to a district with one of
In addition to performing a limited number of block clerk tasks these assistants were mainly responsible for the distribution and display of post-exclusion information such resettlement assistance pamphlets, field bulletins, special mimeographed job offers or any other data which needed dissemination. Their contacts among administrative personnel included all welfare counselors, relocation advisers and the Reports Officer. Each assistant learned to look to the same person in relocation and welfare for guidance. Since there were approximately eight blocks to every district it amounted to this, that eight assistants were under the immediate supervision of an assistant relocation adviser and a junior welfare counselor with whom they met regularly once a week. The entire body assembled on Thursday mornings to consider agenda prepared by the Relocation Division while the Reports Officer, Head Counselor, Evacuee Property Officer and the Community Management Chief made an attempt to appear at least once every two weeks. The Program Officer presided at these meetings in Butte, while Canal group meetings were handled by his assistant.
These block assistants became, almost without exception, the best-informed people in the block. The Reports Officer provided them with all available materials which they posted and distributed, and the Relocation Division issued an informational handbook on relocation expressly for their use. In a very short time they were far more familiar with the aims and mechanisms of the program than the majority of councilmen, and had even exceeded
3. Formulation of Districts for Advising.
We instituted four geographical districts in Butte and three in Canal during the middle of May for assignment to as many assistant relocation advisers who would from then on be responsible for all counseling among people who resided within those areas. This had been suggested by Mr. Derrickson,of the Washington office, during his first visit to Gila in March. At that time the Program Officer was lukewarm towards the idea because our limited staffx would be unable to
When this innovation was put into effect it acted as a morale booster in our office force. It made the assistant advisers lords of their own bailiwicks, and gave them enough responsibilities to measure the effectiveness of their own work. It gave them ample opportunities to understand the composition of a block. If residents had their origins mostly from the Santa Maria or Guadalupe area one type of counseling would be adaptable; on the other hand, if they had been evacuated from Los Angeles iy would be well to be armed with information to refute the argumentof not being able to relocate because of the housing shortage. And, aside from what it meant to our division, there was a certain psychological factor involved as it applied to the residents. They would become inured to one type of salesmanship or counseling, which would not be the case if they saw several advisers before arriving at a final relocation plan. They would listen to one presentation of WRA methods, although in the same office there were as many interpretations as people employed.
It was often a problem to get a concurrence of techniques on counseling. Aside from weekly, and often daily, staffa meetings, relocation memoranda were issued within the division similar to those composed by the Relocation Department in Washington. These applied to topics of immediate interest to the project and
Before the districting idea was placed into effect over half of the Issei wanted to talk matters over with Issei advisers who had been in our Butte and Canal offices for an extended period. They reason they preferred them was mainly because of the language handicap. When they had departed by the first of June all prospective relocatees were routed to definite advisers who called in an interpreter to assist in the discussions. Summary sheets on all families had been prepared during the past few months which denoted at a glance inside a family folder
4. Evacuee Property Placed in Relocation Division.
It was important to have several sections work as integral parts in the total program. Welfare had been in the orbit of the Relocation Division for some time, and had progressively succumbed to the practical view-points held by members of the relocation staff. Relationships with the hospital staff had been very cordial, and, through the efforts of the Medical Social Worker, a decidedly cooperative arrangement was in effect. The Evacuee Property Officer had formerly been a member of the Program Officer's staff in the old Employment and Housing days, so when the Property Section was placed within the framework of the Relocation Division the transfer was accomplished ina friendly manner. There was an immediate understanding on certain types of counseling which referred to
Within a short time the functions of the Evacuee Property Office became fused with those of relocation. All correspondence was prepared for the signature of the Program Officer,and the staff meetings included the members of this section as well as those from the Leave Section. Had there not been an extraordinarily good relationship between the Program Officer and the Evacuee Property Officer, it is questionable if a transfer at such a late date in the program could have accomplished the desired good. Under ordinary circumstances each section head was jealous of his prerogatives and seldom was in a humor to brook much interference, much less incorporation into a larger section or division. That meant a certain loss of face in the minds of the evacuees which any
5. Publicity Arrangements and the Reports Office.
The visit of Reports Officer Bankson, of the Washington office, in April, led to the culmination of a fine working agreement between the Relocation and Reports offices. Washington had assumed, and rightly so, that the materials for the program were not always utilized in the most effective way. The responsibility for distribution of most of the data was with our division. Although we never allowed any of the materials to collect dust or be consigned as waste, we came to the point of considering the data with less devotion than should have occurred. Our patience had worn to the point, at least before California was reopened, in literally peddling the stuff within the blocks only to discover that less than 10% of the residents hver made an attempt to read it. Only a few block managers ever made a whole-hearted attempt to get information into the blocks. When one visited their offices shortly after a fine publication had been turned over for their use, it was discouraging to note that it had been tucked away in an inaccessible shelf or brushed aside where no one could find it.
In addition to channelizing all printed materials to the Reports Office, it was also decided to route all job offers, farm
It was a measure of relief for our division to release these responsibilities. It saved not only the time of one person assigned to perform that type of work but directed our energies toward the main job of counseling and gaining acceptance of the program. The team work as a resultant of our planning became a model of cooperation, and we want to emphasize the important part played by the Reports Office in this matter.
6. Resettlement assistance at Project Level.
We had been led to believe that resettlement assistance would be distributed by the welfare agencies in all localities to those who needed assistance in befitting households, with furniture and other facilities. In February, the head of the liaison section of the Relocation Division had forecast the manual which the Social
An immense amount of explanation went into this new policy. The coordinating committee met a number of times,while block managers, planning commission members and councilmen also had a number of discussions. The councilmen especially considered the change as not too favorable to their cause. While it might afford a greater number of eligibles some assistance, the help was so
None of the old line organizations generated enough enthusiasm about the new program to be of much benefit to the people. The newly created block clerks did the lion's share in making the presentation. Not only did they learn to understand the intricate schedules that went into a determination but they sought to carry an explanation directly to the residents, or often, as the case might be, took the applicants by the hand down to the Welfare Office.
Nearly all of our troubles seemed to stem from the deductions that had to be made, such as cash on hand, funds in the savings bank, income anticipated from WRA cash advances and allowances, income expected from properties and values of personal property. Now the largest family of fourteen would simply not be eligible for more than the family of six provided they had identical resources. Cases where families like the one in block 55 went out and secured a seven hundred dollar resettlement assistance grant in the southwest part of Michigan would not be repeated. The average family would now get about $100 in this kind of assistance. Of course, this was more than the average family had been receiving if it returned to California, but somehow this type of reasoning had a flat tone and people were more prone to wonder who had disturbed the equanimity of the hen who had up to now been laying the golden eggs.
The Relocation Division visualized a large amount of oriticism which would be heaped upon it if this program was to
Thirty days after this aid was made available at the project we had dispensed funds in an amount less than five thousand dollars. Slthough it was never intended for more than 10% of the total population, we were at first dubious about locating enough applicants to receive the money which was available. There was slightly more than a hundred thousand allocated for resettlement assistance scheduled to last during the entire program. If these funds happened to be dispensed entirely at the half-way mark it simply meant that those leaving after that time would in nearly all instances only receive their transportation and relocation grant amount to twenty-five dollars. Just how Washington expected
7. Other Factors.
It has always been our feeling that more of the propulsion behind a program of relocation should have originated with the more prominent evacuee leaders. The Christian churches had been alert to this condition, and, as a result, had detailed a number of evacuee Christian ministers who came periodically to the projects. For the most part these representatives were men of impeccable character who were genuinely interested in creating an attitude sufficiently amenable to understand the underlying reasons why WRA was making an effort to close the camps. Some of these, like the Rev. Mr. Yuasa, enjoyed international reputations in Christian circles but failed to acknowledge their limitations when they arrived at a project. In an atmosphere where over three-fourths of the residents held to the tenets of the Buddhist Church one must expect a decidedly mixed reaction. The Japanese-American race was as a whole dubious about Western civilization religions, and hence
A Reverend Mr. Kyoguku, high dignitary in the Buddhist Church, who had resided at the Topaz center, created a mild sensation at Gila when he conducted a series of meetings about the middle of May, ostensibly for the creation of a number of Buddhist hostels in Fresno, San Francisco, Sacramento and other places. His main purpose was to stir the minds of the Issei beyond the impasse they were driveling in, to appeal to their sense of judgment in throwing off any Japanese mental trappings that they might have and to make themselves acceptable to total American living. He said firmly that all residents had had sufficient time to choose between America and Japan, and he presumed that those who had chosen the latter were either in Tule Lake or in some other camp
The majority of leaders had hoped that the disloyal group would be whisked out of camp so as not to interfere with the orderly processes of relocation. What the disloyal consisted of was not altogether clear although in their minds the meaning went beyond the fellow who had been tabbed by the Army and currently was on the stop list. They were disturbed about that part of the population who were Japanese in thought but perfectly free to leave the center. As a whole that nucleus was an obstacle to good planning and its members were often vociferous in stating that they would have to be ejected before they turned to other living space. A few of the leaders secretly hoped that the known disloyal would be lumped with the recalcitrants and in the end taken out for deportation to Japan. On about the first of June a leader reported his experiences in the East to the block managers and inferred that he had talked to the washington chieftains on matters which included the dissident element. In the midst of his commentary he disclosed his own sentiments. He thought that the ones tabbed as disloyal by the Army could be lumped with the others of pro-Japanese feeling and taken out of the center by the Justice Department. This would be a way out for the WRA to close the camps and obviate the problem as to what to do with the element which refused to move under normal persuasion techniques. Now he was merely injecting his own
Relocation Officer Erik Thomsen, of the Santa Barbara office, came to the project in June in an attempt to interest former residents of Santa Barbara, Ventura and San Luis Obispo counties in relocation prospects. A group meeting was scheduled for him which included principally those who had been evacuated from the towns of Santa Barbara and Guadalupe. The interest that developed was far out of proportion to what this relocation officer had to offer. Oratory at this stage may have had some effect in convincing some that they should choose some locality to which to relocate, but the simplest remedy in moving people would have been to show them farm opportunities where they could earn a simple living. Hundreds of people were still residing in the center who wanted to return to the locale of their former homes near Guadalupe and Santa Maria but they failed
The field relocation officers invariably came in for a large amount of criticism from evacuees who returned from short term leaves or who listened to the experiences of those who had attempted relocation in the various localities. To a large extent we tried to attribute such criticims to malcontents and politicians. When the charge was definite enough to warrant correspondence we made an effort to find out the complete facts. A situation arose that was very difficult to handle. We took stock of our methods to determine if we were honest in evaluating what a relocation officer could perform for a relocatee while the offices in the field cautioned us not to assume that they could perform services usually dispensed in law offices, realty companies or service agencies. In the end we learned to know personalities rather than offices. While they may have been guided by relatively the same basic policies the personality complex of a relocation officer determined our esteem of the office, and generally the functions that we could anticipate. In our minds Relocation Officer James Edmiston, of the San Jose office, towered far above the considerations we held about the others.
After the dismissal of school several of the teachers were detailed to our division where three of them were placed after a short period of orientation into assistant relocation adviser jobs, and others were assigned in the Leave Office and Ration Department to replace clerical workers among evacuees who seemed to relocate
The relocation staff was convinced that the center could be closed on schedule, aside from the implications of the Canal closing, provided we were able to deal firmly with a small nucleus of resisters. The vast amount of groundwork which had gone into the program during the last six weeks seemed to have vastly altered the entire prospectus. It was rather chilling to look at the weekly report on June 9 covering the Net Absences on Leave by Center which disclosed that we resettled a mere 42 people while other centers were resettling far more--Heart Mountain, for instance, was sending out a record total of 312. We recognized, however, that a turning point had been reached by the volume of our sign-ups for future departures. The attitudes of resistance in the blocks seemed to have spent themselves, and the more solid leaders acquiesoed in our belief that the job could be effected within the announced time limits. The planning among evacuees also appeared to be much more realistic now, and as the farm operations were being curtailed and school activities closed the evidences of coming closure were material as well as psychological in scope. Whereas our population estimates having to do with budgetary needs on the 26th of April visualized a residue of 4899 people on the first of October, we were far more optimistic on the 26th of June when we estimated for the Finance Officer that the population would be down to 3000. Actually the population was reduced to 2610:
Chapter 3
Canal Closing Program.
June,18, 1945--Sept.28, 1945
With the announcement of the program for closing Canal the post-exclusion program finally shifted into high gear. Important events took place in rapid fire sequence. On January 2, 1945, the population of Canal was 3294. Despite a relatively favorable movement during the winter and spring months, spear-headed by returning property owners from Central California, the population on June 18 was 2648. On September 28 the last resident left Canal. The highlights of the intervening period will be reported below through liberal use of correspondence and reports which were written as the program developed.
June 18. Seven-page teletype announcing closing of Gila's Canal Camp and Poston's Camps 2 and 3 by October 1 arrives, signed by Director. Wire gives reasons for this action: (1) housing easier during summer months; (2) transportation difficulties will grow as time goes on; (3) jobs more plentiful during summer, WRA staff better prepared to assist evacuees now than at end of program; (4) group opportunities on Pacific coast available if large numbers of evacuees willing to accept them; and (5) Congress demanding early end to WRA and threatening out in appropriation. Wire asked for suggestions regarding best means of closing Canal and also for recommended closing date for Butte.
This announcement was a bombshell. No one expected it.
June 20. Initial plans of the RelocationDivision to cope with the Canal closing program set forth in memorandum from Assistant Relocation Program Officer to Relocation Program Officer as follows:-
June 20, 1945
Memorandum To: William Huso, Relocation Program Officer
Subject: The Closing of Canal.
Since the attention of all evacuees at this center and other centers, and all appointed personnel at the various
I. In answering Mr. Myer's teletype, it is suggested that the following recommendations be made: (1) Mr. Myer should be requested to make a public, written statement to the effect that all relocatable persons in Canal must relocate by October 1, and that none of them will be transferred to Butte or to any other WRA camp. If he makes any exceptions, such as hardship cases, he should be pressed for an accurate definition of such categories. (2) Frequent statements should be made over Mr. Myer's signature to emphasize various factors of the Post-Exclusion Program which are well known to us but which have not been universally accepted by the center residents, for example: The fact that persons who have made application for repatriation but who are on the Army Cleared List will be required to relocate without distinction. Also, frequent public statements should be made by the Director to reiterate in various ways the general theme that the centers must close on schedule; that the time to relocate is now; that there is no turning back, &c.,&c. (3) Detailed information should be teletyped or airmailed to the project regarding the obstacles faced by WRA in its relationship with Congress. The facts that the Congress is almost unanimously opposed to the continuation of the relocation projects; that they are generally unfriendly to the WRA program; and that they are in no frame of mind to make emergency appropriations in the event that relocatable evacuees refuse to relocate should be drummed into the minds of remaining residents. All possible steps should be taken to dispel the common idea that the center closing program is merely a temporary obsession of Mr. Myer's which can be reversed at any time he so chooses. (4) Any special relocation officers who are available for temporary details in locating housing, trouble-shooting in difficult situations, such as priorities, licenses, economic discrimination, &c., should be assigned to work in the Central Valley of California where the majority of Canal residents will probably choose to relocate. (5) All field relocation officers should be instructed to give priority attention to Canal correspondence; possibly a coding such as SPC--Special Priority Canal--could be used on teletypes.
(6) Since one of the most acute handicaps which we can anticipate as the closing program progresses will be the difficult, if not the impossible, obtaining of competent evacuee interpreters to help in the interviews with Japanese-speaking persons, and since this phase of our operations will assume an ever larger proportion of our task, it might be wise to recommend consideration of the appointment of one Assistant Relocation Adviser who speaks fluent Japanese. This person could be either a Caucasian, or if no qualified Caucasian can be found, a middle-aged Nisei. (7) The Canal Relocation Office should be given a top priority in filling its needs for personnel and equipment so that the program will not run into any bottlenecks insofar as the mechanical details are concerned.
II. Reorganization of Canal Relocation Office. (1) It is recommended that two experienced workers now on duty in the Butte office should be assigned to Canal until October 1. This will give the Canal office six fulltime experienced appointed staff members who will be assigned as follows: (a) One person to act as Officer-in-Charge who will be directly responsible to you for the supervision of the entire program in Canal. (b) Two persons who will remain in the Canal Administration Building fulltime to handle counter business such as cover sheets, contacts with Leave Office and Evacuee Property, &c., and to supervise the evacuee workers. (c) three persons who will work in the community on a district basis. (2) Each of the three district workers would be assigned an equal number of blocks; their first task being to make a survey of their districts, the general purpose of which would be to answer the question in the case of each family, “What has to be done to relocate this family by October 1?” (3) If the cooperation of the block managers can be obtained, this survey can probably be done most readily by making definite appointments for each assistant adviser concerned in the various blocks in his district. On this day the adviser would spend his time in the block manager's office and interview systematically each family head in the block. Arrangements would be made in advance so that all block residents would be excused from their project jobs on the day that the adviser was working in their block until the completion of the interview. By a definite deadline, which is hopefully set at August 1, this survey should be completed and all Canal residents should be categorized as follows: (a) Those who are making their own relocation plans on a sound basis and will be able to relocate without special assistance by October 1. (b) Those who are willing to relocate but are unable to do so unless WRA is able to help them overcome certain real obstacles (this cetegory would include the unemployables who will
June 22. Project Director approves Relocation Division plan and signs letter which is mimeographed and distributed to all residents of Canal. Special explanatory letter transmitting copies of the mimeographed letter is sent to the Chairman of the Canal Community Council and to the Canal Central Block Manager. Copies of both these letters are reproduced below-
June 22, 1945
Memorandum To: All Canal Residents
Subject: Closing Canal
Canal must be closed in the next 99 days. This is the biggest job we have ever had to do, but it must--and it will--be done, on time.
As the first step in closing Canal, I have directed three members of the Relocation Division, Miss Butler, Mrs. Hart and Mrs. Reed, to visit each block in Canal and talk with every family head to find out what the family's relocation plans are and to advise them what assistance they can get from WRA in arranging their departure. A schedule will be set up and your block manager will notify you of the dates when the Adviser will be in your block. Insofar as possible, appointments will be made to suit the convenience of the residents, but all interviewing appointments must be kept. Wherever necessary, project workers will be excused from work in order to appear for their interviews.
Do not delay or postpone your own relocation plans. Time is short. If you have made your own relocation plans, do not wait for the Advisers to come to your block. Go to the Relocation Office in the Canal Administration Building now, and see Mrs. Peddy or Miss Mayhan.
Relocation opportunities are better now than they ever will again be. Do not be fooled by people who tell you that if you wait you will get more money to relocate. Mr. Myer has made it very clear that Congress has no intention of increasing any WRA grants.
I have requested the Relocation Division and the Welfare Section to do everything possible to help the Canal people in getting ready to leave. I have no doubt that we can and will work together to get the job done by October 1. We have no alternative.
Project Director.
June 23, 1945
Memorandum To: Canal Central Block Manager and Chairman of Canal Community Council
Subject: Program for Closing Canal.
Enclosed is a copy of a letter which is being sent to all residents of Canal.
In order to assist in the final three months of the Canal relocation program I have detailed Mr. Hart and Mrs. Reed to work in Canal until October 1. Their first job will be to help Miss Butler and Mrs. Hart in interviewing all Canal family heads who have not yet contacted the Canal Relocation Office. Mrs. Peddy will continue to be in charge of the office in the Canal Administration Building, and Miss Mayhan and Miss Hagan will assist her in taking care of residents who call at the office.
I have asked Mr. Hart to contact you personally and discuss this program in detail. We shall greatly appreciate your suggestions and cooperation in carrying out this program. Although the job we have set before us is a big one, I am sure we can get it done with a minimum of difficulty if we will all pull together.
Project Director
June 23. Relocation Program Officer announces reorganiza-of Canal office. Canal Administrative Officer cooperates by providing Relocation Office with additional space consisting of roughly one-half of the Canal Administration Building, and the Principal of the Canal High School also helps by detailing a member of his staff to work as an Assistant Relocation Adviser
June 25. New organizational setup in Canal Relocation Office began actual operation. One assistant adviser,who had been in charge of a district in Butte,was transferred to Canal. One high school teacher, who had also served as Student Relocation Adviser for the past two years and was exceptionally well acquainted with the community, was detailed (later transferred) as Assistant Relocation Adviser. Of the four other advisers, two had been working in Canal for over a year--one as high school teacher and relocation adviser, and one as relocationinterviewer (counselor in old counseling program) and assistant relocation adviser, and the other two were relatively newly appointed workers. Thus the appointed staff of the Canal office was increased from two to seven people between April 25 and June 25. The Assistant Relocation Program Officer was put in charge of the Canal program and moved his office to Canal.
The operating procedure for the Canal Relocation Office was described in the following outline, a copy of which was given to and discussed with each worker on this date:-
II. Job Descriptions.
-
II. Job Descriptions.
- A. Peddy
- Supervise office.
- a. Read and distribute incoming correspondence. All job offers, bulletins, Administrative notices, Manual and Handbook releases pertaining to relocation, correspondence of general interest, and any other incoming material concerning general relocation information should be circulated and initialed before being returned to Peddy for filing.
- b. Read and initial (on the pink cc) all outgoing correspondence. (Outgoing summary letters should be simplified.)
- c. Orient, instruct and supervise assistant advisers assigned to office.
- d. Supervise all evacuee office workers. All clerical and stenographic assignments should be cleared through Peddy.
- Assume direct responsibility for advising (correspondence, cover sheets, short term leave, &c.) for one district.
- Be responsible for library and assist or advise Miss Hokensen in maintaining bulletin board and performing other informational functions in Canal.
- Any of above duties may be delegated as Mrs.Peddy sees fit.
- Send daily memo to Gertrude Smith.
- Make weekly interviewing report to Huso.
- Liaison with Leave Office on terminal departures, short term leaves, leave clearance cases, &c.
- Liaison with Evacuee Property.
- Liaison with Welfare on Resettlement Assistance and other special problems.
- Office supply (requisitions, &c.)
- Liaison with Personnel regarding evacuee replacements.
- Supervise office.
- B. Hagan and Mayhan (Office Advisers).
- Under Mrs Peddy's supervision, be responsible for all “counter business” (that is, people who call at the office voluntarily or upon referral by the district advisers to investigate job offers or other relocation opportunities, make out cover sheets, handle short term applications, parolee and excludee letters, routine inquiries, &c) of one district each.
- Perform special duties at Mrs. Peddy's request.
- Keep daily interviewing records listing names, addresses, and brief descriptions of results of interview for use of district advisers.
- Make weekly interviewing report to Mrs.Peddy.
- Consult corresponding district advisers regarding cases which they have referred to the office.
- Maintain complete, up-to-date family file on each family in the district. All interviews, changes in family composition, leave clearance status, welfare dependency status, and any other pertinent information should be promptly recorded.
- Prepare correspondence and do follow-up work on all active cases. Correspondence should be concise though complete, using wires and forms wherever possible to attain greater speed and simplicity. Follow-up should be persistent. In most cases a follow-up wire should be sent when wires aren't answered within 3 days and letters within 5-10 days. If follow-up wires don't bring satisfactory results, Peddy or Eart should be asked to place phone calls. Airmail letters should be used instead of plain postage, whenever they can possibly expedite relocation.
- Follow-up work should also be done with evacuees who are carried as part of the Active case load of the office advisers. If evacuee does not respond to 2nd or 3rd call-in notice, case should be referred to district advisers for follow-up in the block.
- Office advisers will, for the time being at least, not be required to call in any people in their districts except those in their Active files. This eliminates call-ins for visitors, &c.
― 292 ― - C. Butler, F.Hart, Reed (District Advisers).
- First and most important task is to impress each family head with the fact that Canal is going to close by October 1.
- As first step, interviews will be held in each block manager's office, during which every family head in the block will be
interviewed except the following:
- a. Welfare Dependency cases.
- b. Families who are making active relocation plans with the office advisers.
- Preparations for block interviews.
- a. Inactive family file should be broken down by district and further by blocks. All family folders should be filed in the Inactive file unless the family (not one or two individuals) is known by the office advisers to be working on a definite relocation plan.
- b. Special note should be made of Welfare Dependency.
- c. Contacts should be made with the block manager, district coordination and block clerk within two days before the block is scheduled for interviewing to make sure that the block manager's office will be available and set up satisfactorily, that one of the three (or a combination of the three) will be available to interpret, that everybody in the block is notified to be on hand, and that special appointments are made for persons, such as mess hall workers, who are free only at certain times.
- The Interviews.
- a. Should be as much privacy as possible.
- b. Although interviewer should not be stereotyped or hurried in manner, interviews should click along, as only two days will be allotted for each block with one free day in between to review interview notes and to make arrangements for the next block's interviews. Block clerks should direct traffic, seeing that nobody has to wait long time to have his interview and also that there is not a long delay between interviews.
- c. As a result of the interviews all families should be classified into one of the following categories.
- Those who are planning relocation but whose departure is being delayed until they get a particular job offer,or they can gain possession of their home in California, or until a relocated family member calls them, &c. Such families should be transferred to the Active case file of the corresponding office adviser. The family head should be given a route slip addressed to the office adviser with a brief note of introduction. One carbon copy of this note should be retained by the district adviser as a memo and all families who fall in this category should be discussed as soon as possible with the office adviser who will handle the case thereafter, conducting all correspondence and doing all the follow-up work.
- Those whose relocation is hampered by their leave clearance. Segregees who have not appealed for a change of status and have no intention or desire to do so, should be placed in a special category and ignored thereafter. Segregees who wish to appeal their status,or who have already done so, and excludees who wish to return to California should be referred to the office adviser who will do everything in her power, including assistance with correspondence, follow-up with Cozzens, checking with Freeland, &c., to see to it that the leave status is cleared up and the relocation plans are concluded.
- Those who appear susceptible or agreeable to relocation, but whose problems are exceptionally difficult, such as those with
a large number of dependent children or unemployable adults. First, the district adviser should consult the Welfare Section
to determine whether the family is likely to be eligible for continuing welfare assistance. If so, the family should be transferred
to the Welfare Section and classified as a dependency case. If not, the family should be referred to the office adviser who
will pre-
― 294 ―pare a complete, detailed relocation summary and airmail it to the field relocation officer in the area of the family's preference. The adviser should counsel the family regarding areas where they are most likely to be placed successfully. If the family insists upon choosing an area where their chances are relatively nil, a duplicate of the summary whould be sent to the area which the adviser considers most likely to be favorable. - Those who are apathetic, petulant, passively or aggressively resistant to relocation and the center closing program. These families are the special province of the distriot adviser. They will tax each adviser's skill, ingenuity,patience and perseverance to the utmost. Each adviser will inevitably have to work out her own personal approach to each individual case. I believe in most cases we can catch more flies with sugar than with vinegar. In all cases, however, we must be firm in reiterating our basic theme that the camp is going to close on Oct. 1, WRA is going to close all camps by Jan. 2, there will be no more schools in any relocation centors, and there will be no one in Canal moving to Butte except in extreme hardship cases where every effort has been made to develop a relocating plan and failure has not been the fault of the individual concerned. The advisers should give considerable thought to the answers which they plan to give to the stock statements they can expect to hear from this group such as “I'm going to stay until the camp closes.” “I have too many children to go out.” The government put us here, let them take care of us,” &c. It should also be brought to the attention of these people that the questions facing them now is not whether or not they are going to relocate but, rather, whether they are going to select their own relocation situation, or whether they want it to be picked out for them.
- Those who may be classed as legitimate hardship cases. No one should be classed in this category until every effort hasplace him satisfactorily has failed. For the time being,at least, we should assume that there is no such thing as an insoluble hardship case.
― 293 ― - III. Miscellaneous.
- a. All outgoing correspondence to field offices should be designated as a Canal Case. Wires should have the words “Canal Case” added to the and of the body of the wire, and letters should use the following close. “THIS IS A CANAL CASE. WE SHALL APPRECIATE YOUR SPECIAL ATTENTION.”
June 26. The project Director answered the Director's teletype of June 16. This letter included (1) request for help from Washington to ensure meeting transportation needs (actually such help was never needed); (2) suggestion that evacuated property be shipped to the West coast by van rather than by rail; (3) request for authorization to move obstructionists in Canal to Butte at the discretion of the Project Director (this idea, as all others contained in the letter,was advanced in a staff meeting where all project divisions and sections were represented. It did not have the support of the Relocation Division.); (4) recommendation that center residents be required to accept reasonable job offers if they had not devised any alternative relocation plan, and that the Project Director be authorized to set arbitrary departure dates for those who refused to accept such offers (this proposal was advanced by the Relocation Division); (5) recommendation that all persons engaged in the promotion of Japanese-style community activities be removed from the evacuee payroll (there was one school of thought on the staff that felt very strongly that the best way to stimulate relocation was to curtail project activities and conveniences); (6) request for additional information regarding the care of dependent persons after they left the center; (7) request for prompt action to remove the segregees from the center and to clear up the leave status of all those who remained; (8) request for authorization to close evacuee mess halls whenever the Project Director saw fit to do so; and (9) the selection of November 30 as the most appropriate closing date for the Butte Camp. The latter point elicited by far the greatest
June 28. The Canal Community Council sent a letter to the Director setting forth a number of suggestions which they stated they deemed necessary to be fulfilled if the closing program were to be successfully carried through. Although most of these suggestions were known to be “impossible,” the letter was couched in mild and ingratiating language and could not be considered either a violent protest or a series of demands. Most of the suggestions were ones which had been turned down before; hence the letter did not excite as much interest in the community as similar letters had. Although the leaders of the Community Council in Canal had always been regarded as extreme anti-administration forces, they always took the position--in dealing with appointed staff members, at any rate--that the closing order was an inevitable part of the whole evacuation process and that they were assuming the responsibility of doing everything in their power to see to it that it was carried out in the most efficient and humane manner possible.
July 2. First block interviews held in three blocks. Everything went off smoothly. 100% voluntary attendance.
July 5. First shipment of evacuee freight left center
Project Director Issues
Statement on Closing.
A statement was issued yesterday by L.H.Bennett, Project Director, in order to clear up some of the questions which residents have raised regarding the closing of Canal on October 1, and the closing of Butte shortly thereafter. The following points were covered:
- WRA cannot issue any type of grant to pay the expenses of short term leave trips, except for persons who have been chosen by three or more families to make an exploratory trip outside the evacuated area on behalf of the entire group. A family head who wishes to investigate a particular relocation opportunity before relocating his entire family, and who does not have enough money to pay his own expenses on short term leave should apply for terminal leave so that he will get his transportation and leave grants. Then when he is ready to call his family he may return to the center as a visitor for up to 30 days. So long as his family accompanies him when he finally leaves, he will not be charged for room and board during the visit.
- Canal families who own property in California must relocate by October 1, even though they are unable to gain possession of their property until after October 1. Such property owners will not be moved to Butte.
- Under no circumstances will any Canal person who is capable of working in an outside job be moved to Butte on October 1. The Reports Division and the Relocation Division will do everything possible to call to the attention of Canal residents any specific job offers which might help solve their relocation problems. The primary responsibility for finding particular jobs and housing opportunities rests with each individual family, however, and not with the government.
- No Canal family will be moved to Butte because any member of the family is considered important to the project operations in his or her present job. Relocation is the most important job facing every center resident.
- Persons who now wish to return to Japan must relocate when their camp closes,just the same as any other residents, unless they are on the Army segregee lists.
- Deportees are also eligible for relocation in practically all cases, and must complete their relocation plans before their camp closes. Before relocating, deportees must secure travel permits from the Immigration Service. Application for these permits should be made at either the Butte or Canal relocation offices.
- All Canal residents who have not contacted the Canal Welfare Section, but who feel that they will need continuing assistance from the government, must contact the Canal Welfare Office as soon as possible. Arrangements should be completed on all of these cases by August 1.
Project Director Bennett concludes:
“The WRA appropriation from the Congress is insufficient to prolong the existence of Gila beyond the closing dates. Those who relocate early will profit from our funds. Later relocators may find so much of the appropriation has been used for subsistence that reduction in all kinds of assistance may become necessary My advice is to plan now.”
July 12. Teletype from Director gives closing schedule for all other WRA centers. Accompanying comment includes admirably unequivocal statements such as “Never once have we found an individual or family relocation problem which we considered insoluble. We do not expect to meet such problems....Those who advise the residents to hang back or tell them that their problems are insolvable, therefore, are doing a most serious disservios. They are not only ignoring WRA's past record or relocation assistance but are actually working against the welfare of the people whom they pre-
July 14. Report of Relocation activities, including results of block interviewing program, is prepared. Text as follows:
July 14, 1945
Airmail
Dillon S.Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, 25, D.C.
In compliance with your request that reports regarding the progress of our program for closing Canal be submitted to you on the first and the fifteenth of every month, the following report is made covering the period from June 25 to July 13, inclusive.
1. Relocation Division Organization. The Canal Relocation Office was reorganized and placed under the supervision of the Assistant Relocation Program Officer. Mrs. Reed, Assistant Relocation Adviser, was detailed from the Butte Office to work in Canal until the camp is closed, and Miss Hagan, who has been a teacher in the Canal High School and Canal Student Relocation Adviser for nearly three years, has been detailed to the Relocation Division to act as an Assistant Relocation Adviser.
The Canal camp is divided into three distriots, two of which have six blocks each, and the third has five blocks. Teams of two Advisers are assigned
2. Interviewing Program. The program of interviewing the inactive cases is being conducted on a block by block basis with the interviews taking place in the blocks, usually in the Block Manager's office. The initial announcement of the program was made in a mimeographed letter signed by the Project Director which was distributed to every apartment in Canal. (See copy attached.) Advance copies of this form letter were sent, with explanatory letters of transmittal, to the Central Block-Manager and the Chairman of the Community Council. During the week of June 25 the three meetings held with the District Relocation Coordinators and the Assistant Block Managers were devotedtto explanation and discussion of the program. In addition, each Block Manager was visited personally at his home or office by the Assistant Relocation Program Officer and the Adviser who was to conduct the interviews in that block. In all of these meetings the Block Managers asked questions, made suggestions and volunteered their cooperation.
A schedule was set up which would allow an average of two days for each block. In addition, each interviewer was allowed a day and a half a week (in most cases, Wednesday and Saturday morning) to prepare for her next block or to do any immediate follow-up work which might be indicated on cases in the block which had just
For each block the interviewer makes a list of the family heads who are to be interviewed, including all those who are not lcassified as either Active Relocation cases or Welfare Dependency cases. Several days before the interviews are schedules the interviewer visits the Blook Manager and the Assistant Block Manager and gives them a copy of the list. They in turn contact each person on the list notifying him of the time he is to appear for his interview. In some blocks definite times are set for each person's interview, usually spaced about twenty minutes apart. In other blocks the persons to be interviewed are merely told to remain in the block on a certain day and then called in by the Assistant Block Manager when the time for their interview arrives. In either event the interviewer sends each person to be interviewed a written reminder of his interview appointment. Sample copies of the two forms used for these notices are attached. All persons who hold project jobs are advised that they may be excused from work in order to attend these interviews. The Project Director has sent memoranda to all Division and Section heads advising them that workers are to be excused for this purpose whenever necessary.
3. Evacuee Reactions to Block Interviewing. To date the interviews have been completed in twelve of the seventeen inhabited blocks in Canal. Without exception the mechanics of the procedure have worked much more smoothly than was anticipated. No one has failed to keep his interview appointment. The Block Managers and Assistant Block Managers have been very diligent in performing their functions in an efficient manner. In several cases the Block Managers voluntarily absented themselves from the regularly scheduled Block Managers' meeting in order to assist with the interviews. One Assistant Block Manager postponed her own short term leave for several days--despite the protests of the Adviser--in order to be present when her block was being interviewed. In most blocks the Block Manager remained in his office to assist the interviewer in interpreting, while the Assistant Block Manager acted as receptionist and saw to it that there was a steady, orderly flow of persons to be interviewed. In several blocks there was a tendency upon the part of the Block Manager to take the interviewer away from the Adviser by talking in Japanese to persons who are capable of conversing in English, or by answering rather than interpreting questions asked by the Adviser. In two blocks the
4. Analysis of Results of Block Interviews. At the conclusion of each block's interviews the interviewing records are reviewed by the Adviser and the Assistant Program Officer. Each case is classified into one of the following five categories:
- Group I. Those who appear to be developing effective relocation plans on their own initiative, and in all probability will leave before October 1 with a minimum of assistance or encouragement from WRA.
- Group II. Leave clearance cases, including segregees who do not wishto change their status, Segregees who wish to be cleared, and excludees who have applied for a change of status and intend to relocate in California if cleared.
- Group III. Those who maintain that they cannot relocate until certain peculiar problems are solved, or that they will relocate only to a particular locality or under particular employment of other conditions.
- Group IV. Those who refuse to recognize that relocation by October 1 is imperative and insist that they intend to remain in the Center indefinitely.
- Group V. Those who claim that their age or physical condition makes it impossible to relocate successfully without some type of continuing financial assistance. All such cases are referred to the Welfare Section for further investigation.
Attached are tables giving the numerical break-
Over one third of the families interviewed fell in Group I. These included people who have relocated friends or relatives who can be expected to assist them, people who own property in California which they can return to, and employable people without many dependents who can locatesatisfactory relocation opportunities without special assistance. Although some of these people will prefer to remain in the center for several more weeks, and many of them will require routine followup work on the part of the Relocation Division, it is not believed that any of them present any obstacle to the camp-closing program.
Leave clearance problems are present in only a small percentage of cases. Segregees were interviewed solely for the purpose of determining whether or not they wish to appeal for a change of status. Those who wish to retain their segregee status were not questioned further, but most of them were very vociferous and outspoken and tried to launch into an argument or hanangue before the interview could be terminated. Because they are so vocal in expressing their views it is believed that they undoubtedly exercise an influence upon certain elements in their blocks which is vastly out of proportion to their strength in numbers. The closing program would be strengthened materially if these persons were removed immediately. In this connection it would also be helpful if the policy concerning the future of segregees' relatives were announced. In one instance an elderly man stated that he was making no relocation plans because he planned to go to Tule Lake with his nephew who is a segregee. In another family a 20-year old boy is a segregee but his parents are on the cleared list. The number of excludees who are delaying their relocation plans until they learn whether they will be cleared to return to California is smaller than expected. It was noted, however, that in several cases persons who have been on the excludee lists for months had taken their first steps to obtain a hearing within the week immediately preceding the interview. A list of the names of Canal residents who have appealed their leave clearance status will be sent to Mr. Cozzens' office as soon as the block interviews are completed.
Those who were classified in Group III included many who state they are interested only in group
Fortunately Group IV is relatively small. This group includes some families who have men in service and feel that it is unfair to force them to relocate before their men return, some large families and others who are frightened at the thought of having to
Group V, which is very small, consists of those, not currently classified by the Welfare Section as Dependency cases, who maintain that they are too aged, ill or infirm to accept steady gainful employment outside a relocation center, and that they have no other resources which will provide them subsistence.
5. Evacuee Rumors and Opinions. As a byproduct of the block interviews, the following rumors and opinions which were expressed by evacuees are recorded:
- a. Since WRA cannot provide housing for Welfare cases on the West Coast, all such persons will be moved to Manzanar where a permanent hospital and old people's home will be operated by the government.
- b. When WRA is liquidated the Army or State Department will operate camps for Issei who do not want to relocate because the government is required to provide shelter for enemy nationals under the terms of the Geneva Convention.
- c. Evacuee school children who do not relocate will be sent by school bus to neighboring communities to attend public schools.
- d. People who stay till the last will get larger leave grants.
- e. People who want to repatriate will be sent to Tule Lake.
- f. The Fresno WRA office is of no use to returness in that area. (It is believed that this opinion is prevalent for several reasons: First, the rate of turnover is excessive. One resident reports that he visited the office three times while on one short term leave, and each time he found a different officer in charge. Naturally all were considered inexperienced. Second, a large proportion of the Canal residents expect to relocate in the Fresno District, and they are impatient because they do not believe that decisive steps have been taken to counteract anti-Japanese activity and sentiment. Third, stories have been circulated--and undoubtedly enlarged upon--regarding unhappy relationships which are said to have existed between an evacuee staff member, who was formerly a Canal resident, and her fellow workers.)
6. Prognostication. The vast majority of Canal residents are resigned to the fact that the camp is closing and they are making their plans accordingly. This is true even in the case of many of those who insist that they won't relocate or that the camp can't close when they are talking to appointed staff members. The announcement of a schedule for the closing of other centers will have a beneficial effect. The rate of departures will probably average 100 to 150 a week from now until August 15. Thereafter it will increase at an accelerating rate until the statistical peak is passed in the middle or latter part of September.
Sincerely,
Project Director.
July 14. Director replies to letter from Canal Community Council, answering each suggestion, point by point, in a very satisfactory manner. Letter concludes with: “I trust that we
The Council reproduced the Director's letter on its own initiative and circulated it around the camp. Shortly thereafter the Chairman of the Council and his closest associate both made unofficial public statements that there would be over 1000 residents remaining in Canal on October 1.
July 17. Director replies to Project Director's letter of June 26. Quotation: “You are authorized when you find that particular evacuees are obstructing relocation to order those people to pack their belongings and to leave the center on terminal departure on a date set by you.” Although this statement was never publicized nor invoked it was hailed as a clear indication that, on this program, Washington intended to back up the project 100% by giving them authority to back up their orders.
July 19. First Greyhound bus leaves Gila River. This was a significant event in that it marked the virtual end of our transportation worries. (The only serious transportation worries we had after that date were (1) when the Greyhound system went on strike for 19 days in October, and (2) when we had to arrange large numbers of Pullman reservations for Welfare Dependency cases.)
July 20. Block interviews completed.
July 21. Letter addressed to the Assistant Director in San Francisco giving the names, addresses, family numbers and leave status of 35 excludees and segregees residing in Canal who had signified their desire to return to the evacuated area. No pressure was put on the excludees to relocate if they preferred to go back to California because it was felt that it would be contrary to the Director's philosophy as expressed before the exclusion orders were lifted to force anyone to leave a relocation center before he was authorized to return to his pre-evacuation residence. It was also anticipated that these leave matters would be satisfactorily cleared up before the closing date. Although the Assistant Director was able to expedite hearings on several cases, in most instances he was helpless to hurry the military. The
July 23. Leave Office took over entire building 59-9, in effort to increase efficiency of operations. When the rate of departures increased in Canal the evacuee leaders became extremely critical of the Leave Office because they felt that the Leave Office was causing relocators undue inconvenience. (This criticism was, from one viewpoint, an encouraging sign because some of the leaders who previously were irreconcilably opposed to anyone's relocating now advocated measures that would expedite relocation.) Canal people were more citical of the Leave Office procedures because they had to travel to Butte in a GI truck in order to be processed. If they didn't finish the first time they had to make two or more trips. In some cases it took Canal relocators a day and a half to get through the Leave Office. Evacuees in Canal used to joke, “You wouldn't believe the WRA is trying to get rid of you when you go through that Leave Office.” A large part of this criticism, though justified from the evacuee point of view, was unavoidable because of the rapid relocation of the experienced evacuee personnel upon whom the Leave Office had strongly relied, and the inability of the Personnel Office to recruit capable replacements, either Japanese or Caucasian. Enlarging the office did help noticeably to speed up the processing.
July 25. Canal Community Council volunteered to sponsor series of evening meetings to discuss matters concerning relocation. Relocation Division invited to assist in presenting material. Wire was sent to ten Relocation Officers in Central and Eastern states asking them to forward up-to-date resettlement information concerning their area directly to Chairman of the Community Council. Some responded, but when meetings actually got under way it was found that there was so much interest in rationing that the entire meeting could be profitably devoted to this subject. Four such meetings were held early in August with the relocation adviser and one of the assistant advisers from the Canal Office leading the discussions. The council did a good job of publicizing these meetings, arranging schedules, reserving space and providing an interpreter and a chairman for each meeting.
Rationing proved to be, to the residents, a lively topic. Many questions were asked, and the subject was considered in infinite detail. There had been considerable misunderstanding and criticism on the part of the evacuees, particularly regarding the manner in which the ration books were “tailored.” Although the workers in the Ration Office were, of course, complying sorupulously with the OPA regulations, the rumor was circulated that they were “knocking off” points at the expense of the relocators. This misunderstanding arose because some recent resettlers had written back to friends at the center telling them that they had found that their friends on the outside frequently had a number of valid ration stamps in their books, but those from Gila did not have these stamps because they had been removed at the center.
July 27. Comprehensive summaries sent to Relocation Officers in Los Angeles, Fresno, Stockton, Sacramento and San Jose giving them the names, ages, occupational background, locality preference and other pertinent factors regarding all Canal residents who seemed likely, on the basis of information garnered during the block interviews, to be returning to those regions. The Fresno lists alone ran to fourteen pages.
August 1. Second progress report made to the Director as follows:
August 1, 1945
AIRMAIL
Dillon S.Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington 25, D.C.
Submitted herewith is the second semi-monthly report on the progress of our program to close Canal. This report covers the period from July 14 to July 29 inclusive.
Interviewing Program. The program of interviewing persons whose current relocation plans were not previously known to the Relocation Division was completed on July 19. The results of the interviews in the five blocks which were not included in our previous report are tabulated on the enclosed tables. Although three of the five blocks interviewed in the last week of the program appeared to contain a relatively high percentage of people who are thinking positively regarding their own relocation plans, it is impossible to know whether this fact indicates a trend or an accidental circumstance.
As a result of their experiences in the Interviewing program, the members of the Canal Relocation staff are agreed upon the following general conclusions:
- a. Most Canal residents have accepted the fact--though in many cases with considerable reluctance--that the Camp is going to close.
- b. Virtually no one believes that the WRA schools will reopen on the Project this fall, as many of the skepties insisted several
months ago. These family heads who still insist that they are not going to relocate now use the argument, “Security is more
important than education,” when asked what they propose to do about their children's schooling. This is a viewpoint which
is not shared by the younger generation, however. In several cases, teen age children objected strenuously when one of their
parents made a statement of this
― 313 ―nature, insisting that they were going to see to it themselves that their education was continued, regardless of what their parents do. - c. No organized opposition to the center closing program has formed as yet. The Canal Community Council leaders are adhering
strictly, to an official policy of cooperation with the closing order, although insisting still that the closing order is
WRA policy, not the people's program, and that the primary responsibility for relocation rests with the WRA and not with the
residents themselves. They maintain further that it will be impossible to relocate all the people on schedule and estimate
that there will be 1000 people in Canal on October 1. It is interesting to note, however, that the same men who are now making
this prediction are the ones who argued six months ago that no more than 2% of the people in Canal (at that time) would relocate.
On the other hand.... - d. It is apparent that a very large percentage of the residents do not wish to relocate and are clinging tenaciously to the hope that something will happen to extend the life of the camp. This is true even of a large number of those who are classified in Group I. The attitudes and rationalizations adopted by such people vary a great deal from person to person. Many apathetically state that they have no relocation plans and are making none. Some assert that they are loyal to Japan, hence relocation is unthinkable. One such man, who is not on the segregee list, is known to have written to the Western Defense Command giving his views on the international situation and suggesting that he be reclassified. Others claim that as a matter of principle they will resist relocation until they are properly recompensed for losses inflicted upon them at the time of evacuation. One man said, “When I entered the Assembly Center the Army forced me to sell my fine car. For three years I have been watching Caucasians drive it around the Center. Now I will not relocate until it is returned to me.”
- e. The vast majority of residents are firm in their refusal to consider any except a few localities, all within the state
of California, as acceptable places for relocation. This fact is disturbing because of the continued dearth of satisfactory
job offers from California. Although your teletype of June 18, announcing the date for closing Canal, states, “Recently we
have been offered many fine group relocation opportunities...
― 314 ―on the Pacific Coast,” and the Northern California Resettlement News, dated July 12, announces, “large agricultural operators, most of whom supply quarters for workers, continue to offer job opportunities...” we have not received any group employment offers for farm families from California offices in the past two months. Furthermore, the reports we have received from the District offices in California during the past two weeks do not offer much encouragement for the large scale relocation of farm families during the next 60 days. For example, from San Jose, “Jobs available but housing desperate,” from Sacramento, “All the large farm and cannery operators have contracts with the WPA for Mexican labor for the remainder of 1945,” from Visalia, “Cannot place any Japanese farm laborers here; there is a surplus of labor,” from Los Angeles, “No farm offers for referral to the Centers. Domestic jobs available only to experienced single people and childless couples,” and from Monterey, “No housing.”
Relocation Office Organization. With the completion of the block interviews the Advisers will continue to operate with teams of two in each of the three districts. The Relocation Adviser will devote a larger proportion of her time to supervisory functions than to family interviewing now that she is able to turn most of her counseling duties over to Assistant Advisers. The advisers who conducted the block interviews have set up card files in which they have classified all the families in their district into one or more of the following categories:
- a. Leave clearance cases. These include segregees who want to be cleared and excludees who want toreturn to California. On July 21 an airmail letter was sent to Mr. Cozzens requesting that steps be taken to expedite action on these cases.
- b. Persons whose resettlement plans are awaiting action by relocated members. In such cases letters are being written to the District Relocation Officers in the areas where the relocated members are living with the request that followup work be undertaken in the field.
- c. Persons who have advised us that they are making their own relocation plans and desire no help from WRA. “Call-in dates” are assigned to these persons, at which time inquiry will be made regarding the progress of their plans.
- d. Persons who are interested in obtaining relocation opportunities in particular areas. Summaries are being sent to the appropriate District Relocation Officer. In the case of the people who wish to relocate in the Fresno, Sacramento, Stockton, Los Angeles and San Jose districts, this information has been condensed into tabular form and submitted to the Relocation Officers. More detailed information will be forwarded in individual letters on the families concerned.
- e. Persons who are seeking particular types of jobs or relocation situations. Each district maintains an up-to-date job offer file from the daily mimeographed sheets supplied by the Reports Office. As new job offers come in, the cardfiles are checked and persons who might qualify for a particular opening are called in for an interview.
- f. Persons who appear to need financial assistance. Such cases are referred to the Welfare Section where they will be called into the office and advised what type and amount of assistance they will be eligible for upon relocation. Since the Canal Welfare Section completed preparation of all of their dependency summaries on July 20, they are now in a position to devote a larger proportion of their time to this type of work.
Accurate records are being kept of all contacts with family heads. If any Canal residents have not relocated by October 1, it will not be because they have not been offered every available assistance by the project staff.
Sincerely,
Project Director.
August 3. Advance copy of Administrative Notice Number 289 reaches the project. Accompanying transmittal letter states, “We should like, however, to announce the quota system to evacuees simultaneously with the announcement of a new program for temporary housing on the West Coast. Final details of the latter announcement are now being worked out and should
August 4. Special announcement, prepared by Canal Relocation Office, mimeographed and distributed to every apartment in Canal by the Reports Office, announcing the arrival during the coming week of the Personnel Director of Seabrook Farms. Seabrook had adbised us that they were setting aside 50 family housing units for occupancy by Gila people. It was decided to publicize this offer widely and thoroughly in Canal as a means of counteracting the hesitance to relocate brought about by the housing shortage. The announcement read as follows:
Relocation Opportunities
IF you are finding it difficult to relocate your family BECAUSE you cannot find decent comfortable housing, or BECAUSE you are afriad of community sentiment, or BECAUSE you are low on funds and cannot afford to finance your own farm or business or home, or
IF you are anxious to get your children in modern friendly schools where you can be sure they will be well treated by both teachers and fellow students, or
IF you want to relocate in a community where 1000 other evacuees have already resettled and been living successfully for over a year,
THEN it will be wise for you to consider SEABROOK FARMS as a possible answer to your relocation difficulties.
MR. HERBERT LETTS, one of the managers of SEABROOK FARMS, will be in CANAL next Tuesday August 7.
IF you are interested in learning more about the relocation opportunities offered at SEABROOK FARMS, contact your Block Manager or Assistant Block Manager immediately and ask them to make an appointment for you to meet Mr. Letts, or come to the Relocation Office in the Canal Ad Building on Tuesday.
YOU do not have to be a skilled worker or farmer to get a job at SEABROOK FARMS.
EVERYONE in the family who wishes to work can get a job. 50 modern family style apartments, completely furnished, including stove and ice-box, will be reserved until September 1 for RIVERS FAMILIES who have not yet found a place to relocate because of the housing shortage.
August 6. The initial reactions of the Canal Relocation staff to the Administrative Notice 289 were recorded in the following memorandum from the Assistant Relocation Program Officer to the Relocation Program Officer:
August 6, 1945
Memorandum To: William Huso Relocation Program Officer
Subject: Provisions of Administrative Notice 289 as Applied to Canal Closing Program.
In order to put into effect the provisions of Administrative Notice 289 in Canal it will be necessary to establish departure quotas for the period from August 20 to September 30. It is suggested that the following quotas be established:
It is realized that the quotas set for the first two weeks are proportionately low. Since August 20 is only two weeks away, however, it is doubted whether it will be possible to assign departure dates during that week to any except those who will have voluntarily signed up to relocate during the week. It is also believed that it is advisable to start slowly in this matter of establishing quotas because it is our belief that as soon as the evacuees are advised of the terms of Administrative Notice 289 the majority of them will set their own departure dates. For this reason
Although it will be necessary for administrative reasons to interview the residents on a block by block basis to inquire regarding their departure dates, it is not believed that departure dates should be assigned on a block basis--that is, one block leaving one week, another block another week, &c. Instead, it is suggested that a policy be established which will provide for the assigning of priorities to various types of families and individuals. For example, the following categories are suggested as bases for assigning departure dates:
- Dependency cases who have been accepted by their respective counties. Since Mr. Myer's letter indicates that the housing problem will be solved, there appears to be no reason why the majority of these persons cannot be assigned early departure dates as soon as the Project is notified of their acceptance.
- Medical cases. In an instance where individuals or families have been postponing relocation because of the physical condition of one of their members the hospital should be consulted immediately and should render a decision regarding the person's ability to travel. This is specially true in the case of expectants mothers. There are several Canal families who have told Relocation Advisers that they will postpone relocation until after the birth of their child. In some cases the child is not expected until after October 1, and the date of departure should be assigned in accordance with the doctor's recommendations. Those families who have hospitalized members will also fall into this category.
- Families with school-age children. The majority of these families should be assigned departure dates before September 15 in order that all evacues children may be enrolled in outside schools at the beginning of the term or as soon thereafter as possible.
-
Families who are developing their own relocation plans but whose departure is delayed for valid reason. It is believed that such families should be given as much freedom as possible in selecting their own departure dates. Such
families include those who are awaiting the return of a relocated member; those who own homes in California and are waiting
for tenants to leave; those who are awaiting seasonal jobs, &c. Every effort will
― 319 ―be made, of course, to require persons in this category to set a date for departure which falls before October 1. - Families who have no relocation plans. Such persons should be assigned arbitrary departure dates selected by the Administration to coincide with the schedule of outgoing transportation. Before this can be done, however, it will be necessary for the Project Director to set up a complete procedure for implementing and carrying out the provisions of paragraph 6. Before we tell a recalcitrant evacuee that he must leave on a certain date we must be sure that we will be able to enforce this ruling in the event of passive resistance.
- Single men. It is not believed that it will be necessary to devote a great deal of attention to single men. Most of them will make their own plans and set departure dates before October 1.
A certain amount of difficulty may be anticipated from some of the persons who are not on the Army Cleared List. It is likely that some excludees will refuse to select a destination outside the evacuated area. It is also quite probable that some persons on the Excludee or Cleared List will insist that they are loyal to Japan and should be sent to Tule Lake. It is not expected that a large number of residents will follow this course of action. Since the number will be small, it is recommended that excludees who insist that they wish to return to California and who have applied to the Western Defense Command for a hearing be permitted to remain in the Center until a decision is reached on their appeal. In the case of those who claim loyalty to Japan in an effort to avoid relocation, it is believed that we should carefully record their statements and forward the reports to Mr. Myer for a decision before any action is taken on our part.
As indicated above, it is believed that the best method of obtaining the information required from the evacuees is to interview all residents in their respective blocks following the procedure used in the recent block interviews. Before this program is carried out, however, it is believed that very thorough steps should be taken to inform and to explain to all residents the meaning of Administrative Notice No. 289 and its various implications. It will probably be advisable to conduct a series of district mass meetings for this purpose. If this is done it will allow a certain cooling off period so that the Advisers will not have to engage in an argument or listen to an involved harangue on the evils of evacuation at every interview.
It is impossible to determine how much pressure will have to be exerted in the block interviews until we learn the complete details of the WRA Coast housing program which is to be announced at the same time as the Administrative Notice is released. If there is an adequate number of family housing units available in the Fresno, Sacramento, Stockton, Los Angeles and San Jose areas we feel that it will be possible to persuade most residents to complete their relocation plans without exerting undue pressure.
Assistant Relocation
Program Officer.
August 7. Seabrook representative and Relocation Officer from Newark, New Jersey, arrived. The Assistant Relocation Program Officer and the three district advisers spent three days with these men canvassing the camp on a block by block basis. First every block manager was visited in his block, and the various residents of his block who had not been known, according to the advisers' records, to have developed mature relocation plans were discussed as possible recruits for Seabrook Farms. On succeeding days followup work was done in the blocks with the block managers--all of whom were very cooperative--and with potential applicants. Available housing and favorable sentiment were stressed. Although the visitors complained that we were merciless in dragging them around in the Arizona August heat, they cooperated cheerfully and worked in a manner that could be set up as a model for all paratroopers. Although only about twenty persons actually relocated to Seabrook as a result of these efforts, it is believed that they were successful in
August 9. Meeting was held in Canal to announce the existence of Administrative Notice 289 to the block managers, assistant block managers and councilmen. The entire notice was read in both English and Japanese. Although some of the audience appeared to be stunned, there was no violent reaction. The general attituds was, “Well, I guess they mean business.” Very few questions were raised, although there was some discussion of how this would affect the excludees. The meeting adjourned shortly after the Notice had been read. That night, in touring the camp, it was noticed that well attended mass meetings were being held in virtually every block in Canal.
August 13. Box situation becomes increasingly acute. For the past six months the Engineering Section had been having great difficulty in getting relocators' freight packed, crated and loaded so that freight shipments could be kept current with departures. Gradually they had been falling farther and farther behind until the point had been reached where they were slowing up relocation. The Relocation Office felt that it would have been unwise to try to speed up the prevailing rate of relocation until this problem had been solved.
The system for boxing and orating evacuee property had been devised in January, and had provided very complete and
August 14. War in Japan ended. No outward signs of either jubilation or sorrow noted on the project. This historic event felt to have very beneficial effect upon closing program, however. Arguments which had been previously employed to oppose relocation such as “Eisenhower said relocation projects were to be evacuees'
August 15 and 16. Two-day holiday to celebrate V-J Day came at a time when three buses were scheduled to leave on each day. No evacuees worked, and few Caucasians. Freight situation in Canal became hopelessly bogged down by this loss of time. Buses left on schedule, however.
August 17. New Project Director took action to dissolve property bottle-neck. Assistant Project Director advised Canal Council and block managers that henceforth lumber and nails would be delivered to evacuees and they would be required to make their own boxes and do their own crating. This announcement was gracefully accepted by the council who regarded it as a loss of face for the administration since this change had been suggested by the council a month previously and been rejected by the old Project Director. Although this action relieved the situation somewhat, it by no means solved the problem. There was enough backlog to keep the crew busy for several weeks, and by this time their staff was unable to keep abreast of the lumber delivery, pickup and loading work.
August 18. Project Director signed and Reports Office distributed mimeographed letter to every resident of Canal notifying them that they were subject to being scheduled for involuntary departure if they did not set voluntary departure
August 18, 1945
Memorandum To: The Residents of Canal
Subject: Scheduling of Terminal Departures
Arrangements have been made to obtain transportation for all Canal residents to relocate between now and October 1. It will be necessary, however, for residents to schedule their departures in a gradual, orderly manner in order to avoid overcrowding the trains and buses in a way that will greatly inconvenience the travellers.
In order that this may be done in the easiest possible way, I am asking each Canal resident who has not already done so to visit the Canal Relocation Office immediately and set his departure date and destination. Seats on trains and buses will be assigned on a “first come, first served” basis from now until September 1.
Because of the excellent record of the Canal community in the past, I am confident that all Canal residents will have set their departure dates and visited the Canal Relocation Office to fill out their leave forms and papers by September 1. If this is done by everyone, it will not be necessary for me to assign an arbitrary departure date for any Canal family after September 1, as Mr. Myer has instructed me to do in Administrative Notice No. 289. If any resident is unable to notify the Relocation Office of his departure date before September 1, it will be my duty to set a departure date for such persons. In any such cases three days notice will be given the person concerned to prepare for leaving.
This memorandum serves as the required 14 days advance notice for planning provided for in Administrative Notice No. 289, and each and every resident of
Project Director
August 20. Voluntary signups for relocation hit record high during preceding week, largely because of misinterpretation of Administrative Notice 289 which had been circulated by some of the block leaders who had attended the meeting of August 9. Many people had been given the mistaken impression that,since August 20 was exactly six weeks before the closing date, it would be necessary for them to sign up for their leave before that date if they did not wish to be scheduled for involuntary departure.
August 24. Assistant Relocation Program Officer visited each block manager to distribute copies of Rex Lee's teletype of August 23, announcing that a limited number of FPHA housing units would be available in Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego. Actually there was little specific interest in this opportunity upon the part of Canal families--there was much more in Butte--but it is believed that the offer had some morale building value in that it convinced residents that steps were finally being taken to meet the housing shortage, and therefore the life of the camp would not be extended on that account as some had hoped. It should be borne in mind that all of the Canal people had to make their
August 27. Sacramento Bee carried a front page spread, including pictures, describing a fire which swept the Oriental section of Walnut Grove, California, during the preceding weekend. About 200 residents of Canal who had been evacuated from Walnut Grove and who had among them some of the most backward, dissident and unpliable people in camp, including the Acting Chairman of the Community Council, who was a troublesome, over-emotional agitator, had finally decided to return, and the first contingent was scheduled to leave on August 29. Now they didn't know what to do. The Assistant Relocation Program Officer called the Sacramento Relocation Officer and got a detailed account of what had actually happened. The facts were discouraging, but not nearly so lurid as the account given in the newspaper. The Relocation Officer urged that they follow through with their plans. A short impromptu meeting was held immediately with the leaders of this group. These men were advised to decide to either (1) go through with their original plans and return to Walnut Grove without further ado, or (2) abandon all thought of ever returning there and make immediate plans to go to some other section of the country. That night a private meeting of all members of this group was held and their problem was thrashed out from all angles.
August 29. All of the Walnut Grove people left on schedule.
September 4. Evacuee property situation again became critical. Caucasian Supervisor of pickup crew threatened to quit if he was not given relief. Crisis was averted when Washington finally authorized the recruitment of appointed laborers. Indian workers were hired from nearby Pima Agency. Three Caucasian appointed staff workers were detailed from other sections to assist in pickup and loading.
September 5. Army announced lifting of all individual exclusion orders. This section eliminated the most formidable remaining obstacle to the closing of Canal. Some of the people affected were prepared for the change and made immediate relocation plans. Some were shocked and disgruntled because they had counted heavily on being transferred to Tule Lake and thus avoiding the burden of relocation. All had been called into the Relocation Office and notified by the adviser of their new status and offeredx assistance of the Division.
September 6. Canal Welfare Office turned over all dependency cases to the Relocation Office on the grounds that the latter was better equipped to handle the relocation of those whose residence had been verified. It is our judgment that this was a wise decision which could have been made profitably earlier in the program. Throughout the closing program the Canal Welfare Office had been laboring under heavy strain, registering the constant complaint that it was not adequately equipped to do the job assigned to it. Although it is believed that the degree of cooperation practised between Welfare and Relocation was the highest possible in such a situation, it is felt, nevertheless,
Each assistant adviser took over the dependency cases in her district and called in these persons to complete relocation plans and set departure dates.
September 9. Immigration Officers picked up two young men in Canal and six in Butte and escorted them to Santa Fe Internment Camp. All had renounced their United States citizenship. The departure of these men reduced the Stop List in Canal to three men who were on the Immigration Service deportee list.
September 10. Assistant advisers sent teletypes to California relocation officers having charge of the various localities where those persons lived before evacuation who had not yet set departure dates. Such wires included names, com-
September 13. Fresno Relocation Officer was the first to reply to the teletypes regarding temporary housing for persons to be scheduled for involuntary departure. Oakland Relocation Officer also wired that he could accept one family of six and provide temporary housing at the hostel. (After this family arrived in Oakland the Relocation Officer was apparently totally unprepared to handle him and had not been expecting him, for he called the project long distance and remonstrated violently with us for sending such a family without giving him any advance warning.When we pulled the file and read him the correspondence on the case, including one teletype bearing his own signature, which authorized the family's departure, he was taken aback and his outburst of righteous wrath at the project subsided considerably.)
As soon as the relocation officers' wires confirming their
Rivers, Arizona
September 13, 1945
Mr. Goichi Kodama
25-10-D
Rivers, Arizona
In accordance with Administrative Notice 289, your departure date has been set for September 18. Transportation for you and your family has been arranged on the Santa Fe railroad on that date. If you are unable to make your own housing arrangements upon arrival, you may stay at the Fresno Hostel, where room has been reserved for you.
You are also given a cover sheet made out for your family. If you wish to get your leave grant, you must take this cover sheet to 69-8, the Butte Leave Office, and apply for your grant immediately.
I have asked that lumber be delivered to you so that you can pack and crate your property if you wish. If you want any property to be shipped by the government, it will be necessary for you to see Mrs. Reed in the Canal Ad Bldg immediately and fill out the proper ferms.
I have placed upon the Internal Security Section the responsibility for seeing to it that your departure is carried out as scheduled.
Project Director
September 14. About half of the men who had received scheduling letters protested bitterly. Most of them went first to their adviser in the Canal Relocation Office, then to the Assistant Relocation Program Officer in Canal. Getting no satisfaction from either of these sources- -and in most cases being somewhat subdued by reference to past statements and actions as recorded in the Relocation files or recalled by the adviser from the block interviews- -they went to Butte and protested to the Relocation Program Officer, who was also unreceptive to their arguments and pleas, and, for a final showdown to the Project Director. The Project Director handled these interviews masterfully in a firm yet kindly manner. In all but one case he was successful in bringing the evacues to follow the wishes of the Project Director as expressed in the scheduling letter, and these interviews ended on a friendly note with a smile and a handshake. One man only refused to capitulate and stubbornly left the office after a conversation which is freely quoted as follows:
Evacuee: “I want to go to Tule Lake.”
Director: “There will be no transfers to Tule Lake. The war is over. Plans are under way to close Tule Lake just as the relocation centers are being closed.”
Evacuee: “But I don't want to live in country like United
Director: “In that case the wisest thing for you to do is to relocate to California some where near the big ports and get the best job you can and save as much money as you can so that by the time steamship service between the United States and Japan is resumed you will be able to buy tickets for yourself and your family and go back to Japan. That is the only way I know that you can get back to Japan now that the war is over.”
Evacuee: “Than I am going to protest to the Spanish Consul”.
Director: The Spanish Consul used to be the only person who could relay messages from people in the United States to the government of Japan. Now that the war is over it is no longer necessary to go through the Spanish Consul. You can write directly to the head of the Japanese government. Douglas MacArthur is the name of the man in charge.
September 15. Scheduling of the forty people mentioned above convinced the remaining residents of the community that the camp was undoubtedly going to close on the appointed date. No more scheduling was necessary and no quota system was ever set up. All the residents with the exception of the forty who were scheduled selected their own departure dates and destinations.
September 20. The last of the scheduled families departed
Another gentleman whose family was scheduled to leave had been a very close associate of the Relocation Division. He was a friendly and polite Issei who had at one time served as Relocation Coordinator for a short time. He was polite, friendly and intelligent. The Assistant Relocation Program Officer visited him
Sept. 10, 1945
26-12-8
Rivers, Arizona
Mr. Heart
c/o WRA
I promised with you for come and tell you about relocation.
Pray, Mr. Heart, here are few reasons that I don't wanted to go out of here.
Reason one. I don't wanted relocate before I see a formal peace negosiation for this war.
Reason two. I had my fourth appalation and its results are still not good yet, so there are no hop to make living with 4 of us after I got out of here.
Reason three. My father and mother-in-law are very much worry about my condition and if I go out of here, there is only one place in this world its my father-in-laws house, K.Matsuoka, Fowler, California. But coming September 14th the one of thir relation is going out of here and they are 3 in a family and they are live together, the house is nice and neat and with two bedroom house, so there is no chance for me yet to go out.
With all this reason and yet the W.R.A. still
I thank you very much,
Yours sincerely,
When he finally left he apologized profusely for all the trouble which he insisted that he had caused the office.
September 27. Ninety persons relocated from Canal, including forty-seven who went to Alvarado, California. These latter people were all planning to live in quarters owned by another Canal evacuee who had only reoccupied them two weeks previously.Although the Oakland Relocation Officer pronounced the buildings unfit for use as a hostel, the people concerned insisted that they wanted to go there anyway and that they would make satisfactory arrangements. Over half of these people had been classified as Welfare dependency cases at the project because of old age, illness, large families,&c.
Also leaving on this date were two families of seven persons each who were the last Canal people to return to Los Angeles. Although there were relatively few Los Angeles people in Canal at the beginning of the program, these people were the slowest to relocate. During the last week before Canal closed it was necessary to telephone the Los Angeles WRA office every day to determine what kind of housing would be provided for those people who were leaving that night. This was during the period that the Director had teletyped all the projects to suspend relocation of center residents to Los Angeles temporarily. The Los Angeles WRA office had overlooked the fact that the Canal Camp and Poston Units I and
September 28. Last evacuee left Canal on evening Greyhound. Last bus load included the largest family in camp--fourteen people--who were going to live in an old fruit packing shed owned by another evacuee who had relocated from his block earlier in the month to Vacaville, California. Earlier in the day the last of the 84 Canal “failures” were moved to Butte. The following wire was prepared for transmittal to the director to announce the closing of Canal:-
Rivers, Arizona
September 28, 1945
Dillon S.Myer
Director, War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D.C.
The last evacuee boarded the Greyhound at 7:30 tonight and our Canal Camp is now officially closed.
All of the 5,097 persons who were residents of Canal at the peak of its population have now left Gila River with the exception of 84 who have been moved to Butte in the last two weeks. These 84 include 26 persons who were moved because of medical considerations or hardships, 25 unattached persons who are classified as Welfare Dependency cases but whose residence in California counties has not been verified, 2 Welfare Dependency cases where residence has been verified but the county in question (Tulare) refuses to accept any financial responsibility for returnees, 4 persons who have been alarted since July 16 for return to their home in Hawaii, 19 persons comprising two families who were not scheduled because neither the Oakland District Office nor the Northern California Area Office were able to find temporary housing, 1 man who is awaiting clearance from the Immigration Service, 2 Welfare cases where housing is not available in the county of residence, and 5 persons who were scheduled to leave Before October 1 but are unable to do so until Fullman accommodations can be secured.
We are grateful to the Field Relocation Offices and all others who helped in this closing program.
Project Director.
Chapter 4
Epilogue
Sept. 29, 1945--Nov.10, 1945
We were able to find out in the denouement of the Canal Camp that, given aid in welfare cases and enough housing for those who clamored for it, the relocation Division would not have to be in doubt as to how the camp could be close. Nearly a hundred people had moved to Butte because the outside relocation officers had failed to provide some temporary housing and had not made necessary arrangements with welfare agencies to absorb our cases who needed hospitalization and financial aid. When on the first of October we had failed to hear further on the grandiose housing schemes which the Deputy Director had intimated around the first of September would come in time to assist Canal closing the Project Director decided that the Program Officer and Chief of Community Management should find out what the situation was in Los Angeles.
We found that the Los Angeles area office was making a race against time to get a temporary housing unit equipped on time at the Lomita Air Strip. The shief steward was in the throes of preparing a mess hall and considerable bustling was in progress to get the Army buildings partitioned into rooms far smaller than the evacuees had been used to at a relocation center. We were jolted when we found that none of the Lomita housing had been plotted for Gila but was mainly set aside for Granada and Manzanar. Inquiring discrestly as to where the temporary housing for our center would
The Program officer also spent two days at the Santa Barbara office. It was quite clear at this time that the vast majority of people who had been evacuated from Santa Barbara, Santa Maria and Guadalupe would not return save the welfare cases who did not have much of a choice. This, of course, was not too displeasing to the office which months ago had clamored for pioneers to break the way in a region reputed to be the toughest in all California only to cringe now lest we send too many there. In all fairness to them, however, it must be admitted that housing was almost non-existent and the farming groups north of Santa Barbara were as united as fists of a boxer against the return of any evacuees. It was too late now to visualize much of an influx into this area of evacuees who could normally make their own way if they were given some type of housing. What we sought to impress at this time was the need to make preparations for those whose futures would necessarily have to be entrusted to the welfare people of these counties: hospital cases and old people. And we sought to accentuate the fact that these people must come back in an orderly way; we were in no mood to acquiesce in having them return during the week that our Butte community was scheduled to close.
Our plan in closing Butte as conceived a number of weeks before the first of October had visualized the relocation of almost every person by November 1, excepting people needing welfare assistance and Hawaiians waiting to return to the islands. At that time we thought that housing of some nature would certainly be available and that somehow our dwindling resettlement assistance funds would be replenished. It was foolhardy to believe that our plan would operate unless these two factors were favorable.
When the Program Officer returned to the project on the 8th of October there seemed to be dismay in several quarters because the terminal departures had slumped from 636 to 279. This was understandable when one considered that now there was but one source for terminal leaves, and we were not able to press relocation counseling since we had not been allotted any temporary housing. However, many of the evacuees were taking advantage of our dilemma which forced us to adjust our planning. We thereupon decided that a number should be scheduled involuntarily for departure within three or four days.
Shortly after this decision was made we had a teletype from the Relocation Supervisor of Los Angeles allowing us temporary housing for fifty people which might be either Lomita housing, trailers in Long Beach or hostel arrangements. Ordinarily such a housing opportunity would have been frowned at in evacuee quarters but lately they had been duped so many times that they accepted it without murmur even though they would not know until they arrived in Los Angeles whether it would be one type of housing or the other. For families with small children the outlook was none
About forty people were picked for scheduling who had been so adamant that our conscience was not unduly pricked. However, there were some local complications. For instance, a parolee had been chosen who at first refused with great emphasis to sign a travel request which had to be sent to the El Paso office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. One of the assistant advisers had chosen a newly appointed block manager which resulted in a number of pressures to cancel that designation. A man reportedly syphilitic was also in the group. In the end the parolee became friendly and placed his signature and thumbprint on the application; other block managers gave up a timid protest; and it developed that the man with syphilis was in an inactive stage. They departed without any fuss on the 12th and 13th, and we sincerely hoped that not a single additional person would have to be scheduled against his will.
We had always adhored the word “scheduling,” largely perhaps because there were continual references to making out schedules of departures. In the latter part of July an instruction had been sent out to the project asking that we obviate general counseling and get down to the business of dates and destinations. We were to have a system of schedules by the first of September on all the remaining residents. On the surface the plan looked like a tailor-made remedy for all the indecisiveness one usually runs up against when dealing with human plans in a place as restricted as a relocation center.
At this time we had developed a highly personalized contact with the evacuees. Each assistant adviser had his district, which, incidentally, was limited to four blocks on October 1, and he gradually learned to know fairly well the planning of every family. Call-ins were sent and when they failed the adviser would inevitably pay a personal visit to the family at the domicile. While an honest attempt was made to determine on or about the first of September where the residents were eventually going, we got only a partial answer. Residents usually toyed with several plans that might be, by and large, ephemeral, but to pin them down as a total population when the question of housing had neither been resolved nor plans laid too concretely as to how they were to be solved, was not too practical. When Administrative Notice 289 came along on the first of August it was not used as a weapon to extract departure dates and probable destinations but was confined as a means to prod a small nucleus who made a habit of deferring their plans.
When the Greyhound discontinued service during the strike which commenced on the 6th of October, it seemed as though fate was again frustrating us in completing a job. We had provided a convenience that was unmatched in transporting the evacuees. Buses arrived at the project to take the relocatees directly to Los Angeles or to Fresno or other destinations if sufficient pay loads could be arranged. Those who went beyond Los Angeles left the project with the comforting feeling that blocked seats had been provided for their use that normally would not be promised to an ordinary civilian.
Meanwhile as we waited for the Greyhound to resume its
The effect of a decision made in the Relocation Supervisor's Office in Los Angeles to allow us temporary housing beginning the 24th of October came as a welcome balm. We were to receive a minimum housing allocation which would be sufficient to house fifty people every day for a period of at least six days. We had advised Robertson that our total Los Angeles needs would not exceed 350, and the total we intimated might be less if some definite commitment were made immediately that would reassure the people at the center that WRA was not spoofing on housing arrangements that had been talked about for many months.
On the 12th of October a discouraging happening took place on the project level. The Relocation Division was at that time given a certain quota to fill for three weeks, beginning the 21st of the month. A minimum of 500 was expected for the first week, 700 for the next and about 600 or the balance of the population
At the time we were admonished that these totals must be reached we were encouraged to schedule if necessary to meet these goals. The coordinator vociferously advocated scheduling as he had been prone to do for the last two months, and reminded us about the parting words of the former Butte Council Chairman who had reportedly said, “The reason I am getting out is that I don't want to be around when a thousand people are scheduled.” When these developments were reported back to the relocation staff the vigor of their usual optimism seemed to have faded and they accepted the decision as an affront to their abilities.
The Program Officer and his staff were determined that there should be no more scheduling, so they busied themselves with legitimate methods to augment the flow of the first week. The Assistant Program Officer was assigned to convince the 75 persons already signed up to go to Brentwood, California, on a large scale farm offer that they should leave a week earlier after the leader had acquiesced to the deal and the employer had given his consent. All the assistant advisers re-checked the planning of their families to find out where early departures would not seriously inconvenience the prospective relocatees. Every member of the staff had accepted the challenge and were equally determined that the program should be completed with the minimum distress to the families or individuals, and,moreover,they had come to a decision that the Relocation
The relocation officers in all district offices reacted magnificently to our welfare needs. Los Angeles largely absorbed the cases which were shipped on our first Pullman car, while the northern districts took care of the bulk of our second car. The first left Phoenix on the 4th of November, the second on the 8th. The old men whom we had worried about for months, and whom even the council had given serious thought to, were in the main sent to the Fresno office, where they were farmed out to the outlying hamlets. In all there were about 50 of these man who left the project in a group.
Unfortinately, the relocatees who left after September 28 were not allowed any resettlement assistance, although for some time thereafter applicants were making requests and hoping that the WRA would be able to honor them. It was natural that a great number of large families, ill equipped to make a normal living on the outside, should be among those last to leave. When these people left on buses amid the farewells of those in no better circumstances it was difficult to appease one's conscience about their futures, although we had cautioned then ever since the first of June that these funds would probably run out because we had no equitable means of distributing this assistance. It was our hope
Except in isolated instances, our housing needs were concentrated in the Los Angeles area, during the last six weeks of relocation. The offer of the San Francisco office to provide us from 30 to 40 units on October 9 for people who desired to return to Solano county had arrived too late to assist us in closing the Canal community where the Solano people had lived. Fortunately, those returning to Fresno had a sufficient number of friends to assist then and the hostels there somehow managed to take additional families. Once the Los Angeles area was open for temporary housing the actual needs suddenly dropped and the earlier estimate of housing needs for 350 people dropped to an actual provision for 195 persons. The manner in which this housing arrangement was accomplished deserves high praise for the Relocation upervisor in Los Angeles, who dealt with us honestly and fairly. The only part we played in the bargain was to avaluate daily our hossing needs and to avoid asking for assistance that would eventually be exorbitant.
At noon on the 9th of November we had relocated all residents excepting our Hawaiians who had been clamoring to leave for several weeks. The female renunciants had departed with their families during the morning of November 8 for Crystal City, Texas, to join in most cases husbands who had been incarcerated several weeks previously. When the Hawaiian residents, 148 in number, took leave at 7 p.m., November 10th, for the Santa Ana air base where the WRA had provided temporary housing until sailing facilities were available,
Title: Gila River: A History of Relocation at the Gila River Relocation Center
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