Carton 67, Folder 1784
Tucker, James Dunkin
1953-1956
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 67, Folder 1785
Tucker, Nelson
1948-1958
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 67, Folder 1787
Turkington, Edward
1946-1948
Carton 67, Folders 1789-1790
Tuve, John
1956
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 67, Folder 1791
Tworek, John
1951-1952
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 68, Folder 1795
Van Emery, Mildred
1936-1948
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 68, Folder 1802
Viesselman, Mark A.
1954-1955
Carton 68, Folder 1804
Villa, Spencer
1952-1953
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 68, Folders 1808-1809
Wadman, William
1954-1955
Carton 68, Folder 1810
Wahlen, Charles
1962
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 68, Folder 1812
Walker, Michael
1964-1965
Carton 68, Folder 1813
Wallace, Francis
1952-1954
Carton 68, Folder 1814
Wallace, Randolph
1956-1957
Carton 68, Folder 1815
Wallace, Thomas
1969-1970
Carton 68, Folder 1817
Wasserman, Alvin
1968-1969
Carton 68, Folders 1818-1819
Carton 68, Folder 1820
Webster, Lucille
1955-1956
Carton 68, Folders 1821-1822
Wells, Wesley R.
1953-1954
Carton 68, Folder 1824
Werner, Edgar A.
1956-1964
Cartons 68-69, Folders 1825-1827
Westbrook, Eloise
1969-1970
Carton 69, Folder 1828
Whelan, William
1951
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1830
White, Esther
1951-1957
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1831
White, Evelyn
1959
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1832
White, Robert
1947-1949
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1833
Whitney, Anita
circa 1935-1939
Carton 69, Folder 1836
Wiley, John
1951-1953
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1839
Williams, John
1954-1956
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1841
Williams, Sidney
1954-1957
Carton 69, Folder 1842
Williams, Wilbert
1953
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1845
Wilson, Stanley
1950-1953
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1846
Wing, George
1952-1953
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1848
Winston, Scymner
1953
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1850
Wolk, Samuel
1949-1953
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1851
Wollter, Peter
1951-1952
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1853
Woo, Ann and Kathryn
1964-1969
Carton 69, Folder 1857
Wyman, Rose
1949
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Carton 69, Folder 1862
Yeatrakas, Nick
1944-1948
Carton 69, Folder 1865
Ying, Agnes and Shih-Tseng
1946-1963
Carton 69, Folder 1867
Youngsblood, Delbert
1944
Carton 69, Folder 1871
Zimmerman, Herbert W.
1943-1946
Access Restriction
RESTRICTED
Miscellaneous case files
1942-1969
Box 169, Folder 22
Belmont - Cutshall
1945-1969
Box 169, Folder 24
Glaser - Harman
1964-1968
Box 169, Folder 25
Imagawa - Korematsu
1945-1946
Box 169, Folder 26
Lafferty - Lundquist
1955-1967
Box 169, Folder 31
Schuyten - Wells
1953-1954
1974-1993
Physical Description: 42.5 linear
feet33 record storage cartons and 3 legal
document boxes
General
This subseries is comprised of legal case files dating from 1974 to 1993 that the
ACLU-NC Legal Department released to CHS in March 2011. They have been reviewed by an
ACLU-NC paralegal and restrictions have been noted at the individual file level.
Gomes v. Observer Publishing Company, et al.
1974-1983
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented father and son Ad Fried and Michael Fried of the
Friday Observer, a weekly newspaper. Editor Ad Fried published an editorial written
by his son Michael on the front page of the February 6-12, 1974 issue of the paper
which openly critized the San Leandro police. Officer George Gomes, who had recently
cited Michael Fried for a parking violation, was targeted specifically, and photos
of him were published which suggested improper conduct. George Gomes sued the
Observer for libel, alleging that he requested that a retraction be printed. No
retraction was printed, and Gomes sought damages of over $200,000. The editorial in
question critized the San Leandro police for "excessive use of force during arrests
for minor violations," and argued that "some young officers should show greater
respect for the public." The editorial also stated that "officers are not immune
from violating the law, just because they're on duty."
The California Court of Appeals established that Fried's article was protected by
the First Amendment, and Gomes, as a police officer, should be considered a public
official. They wrote, "We find persuasive the following discussion of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp.:...The abuse
of a patrolman's office can have great potentiality for social harm; hence, public
discussion and public criticism directed towards the performance of that office
cannot constitutionally be inhibited by threat of prosecution under State libel
laws."
Box 131, Folders 1-2
Reporter's transcript on appeal, Volume I
1980
Box 131, Folders 3-4
Reporter's transcript on appeal, Volume II
1980
Box 131, Folders 5-6
Reporter's transcript on appeal, Volume III
1980
Box 131, Folders 7-8
Clerk's transcript on appeal, Volume I
1980 May 13
Box 131, Folders 9-10
Clerk's transcript on appeal, Volume II
1980 May 13
Box 131, Folders 11-12
Clerk's transcript on appeal, Volume III
1980 May 13
Box 131, Folders 13-15
Clerk's transcript on appeal, Volume IV
1980 May 13
Box 131, Folders 16-17
Clerk's transcript on appeal, Volume V
1980 May 13
Box 164, Folder 30
Correspondence - Court of Appeal
1980-1983
Scope and Contents
Folder is restricted until 2063 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 164, Folder 31
Costs
1983
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2063 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 164, Folder 32
Superior Court pleadings
1980
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2060 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Davenport et al. v. Vasquez et al.
1979-1988
Scope and Contents
This case considers at length the rights of prisoners, and examines the issue of
denial of benefits from Inmate Welfare Funds to Death Row inmates. The ACLU
represented a Death Row inmate at San Quentin prison named John G. Davenport, who
represented others similarly situated. This was also a taxpayer lawsuit objecting to
the misuse of public money in California prisons. Milton Estes, M.D. stepped forward
as a named taxpayer. The suit was brought against the warden of San Quentin, Daniel
B. Vasquez, as well as against James Rowland, then-Director of the California
Department of Corrections. This case, which was lengthy and including assistance
from legal scholars such as Eric Neisser - then, a Visiting Assistant Professor of
Law at Stanford University. He wrote "After a preliminary investigation of the
matter, including meeting with a number of men on the Row, I have concluded that the
operation of the Fund with regard to condemned prisoners is a serious problem and a
violation of both their statutory and constitutional rights."
The case examines the different treatment of Death Row inmates from other inmates,
in particular the fact that, though (like all prisoners) they contribute to the
fund, they are denied many of the benefits given to others, such as library
privileges and group movie screenings, as well as possible work in the canteen,
hobby shop, and banquet jobs (which would earn them money that they would then be
denied). Neisser points to an usual exception regarding the sale of inmate art work,
which he notes are one of the only ways that a Death Row inmate can make money. He
argued that the prison should either allow Death Row inmates access to the Fund, or
stop taking money from them.
The prison enacted many obstructionist tactics over the course of the case,
undoubtedly in the hope that the prisoners in question would be executed before the
case was resolved. However, the case brought a great deal of attention and
media-driven scrutiny to the issue of prisoners' rights and of prison expenditures
in general. For example, it was found that a Fresno prison had used money from the
Inmate Welfare Fund to purchase paints and supplies for the prison - a clear and
unequivocal violation of the rights of the prisoners at that institution. As usual
here is the issue of prisoner rehabilitation, the supposed purpose of all prisons.
Nevertheless in a "Proposed Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Adjudication of Issues and Granting Defendants' Cross-Motion For Summary
Adjudication," the court writes: "...the Court finds that no material facts are in
dispute and that the surcharges imposed upon the condemned inmates at San Quentin
are valid, and do not violate Penal Code section 5006 or the equal protection and
due process clauses of the United States Constitution."
Box 132, Folders 1-3
Background docs
1979-1984
Box 163, Folders 1-2
Correspondence I
1983-1984
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2063 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
2 folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163).
Box 163, Folders 3-4
Correspondence II
1984
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2063 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
2 folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163).
Box 163, Folder 5-6
Correspondence III
1983-1985
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2063 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
2 folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163).
Box 163, Folders 7-8
Correspondence IV
1984-1988
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2063 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
3 folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163).
Box 132, Folders 8-10
Master pleadings III
1988-1989
Abourezk v. Reagan, City of New York v. Shultz, Cronin v.
Shultz
1982-1988
Scope and Contents
These three cases, consolidated on appeal, concern the denial of non-immigrant
Visas to non-Americans who wished to visit the United States in response to
invitations from U.S. citizens and residents to attend meetings or address audiences
here, such as an invitation extended to Italian peace activist Nino Pasti by nuclear
disarmament groups in Cronin v. Shultz in 1982. City of New York v. Shultz, in 1983,
concerns invitations to two Cuban women, Olga Finlay and Leonor Rodriguez Lezcano,
who were invited by the Commission on the Status of Women as well as various women's
studies programs to speak about the status of women and family law in Cuba. Abourezk
v. Reagan, also in 1983, deals with an invitation to Tomas Borge, the Interior
Minister of Nicaragua, from a diverse group of United States citizens — including
members of Congress, university professors, journalists, and religious leaders. The
plaintiffs argued that the denial of these Visas exceeded the State Department's
authority under subsection (27) and violated their First Amendment rights to engage
in dialogue with these individuals.
These cases consider at length the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, and the
provision (Section 1329) which states: "[t]he district courts . . . shall have
jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the provisions
of this subchapter [of the Immigration Act]." The State Department cites, as reason
for their denials of these Visas, "the continuing status of these aliens [sic] as
members of organizations or governments hostile to the United States." The case
closely examines subsection (27), which delineates the types of Visa denials that
are sanctioned, including "an alien [sic] who might engage in conspiratorial
activity against the United States while in the country; an alien [sic] who is known
to be a member of a terrorist organization; an alien [sic] who is associated with a
criminal organization; and an alien [sic] official who engaged in physical brutality
while in power or was associated with a regime that did so." Finally, the court
considers an example in which "the mere entry of the alien [sic] would prejudice
foreign policy objectives," which would seem to grant the State Department broad
authority to interpret this as they wish. The court also considers subsection (28)
which "was enacted by a Congress that wished to exclude, as a general rule, all
members of whatever level of participation in any communist, anarchist, or
totalitarian organization." They also write: "The distinction is real and important
between a generalized congressional distrust of communist ideology and organizations
and a specific Executive concern over admitting a particular person associated with
a foreign government that the Executive considers in some respects adversarial to
ours."
The case considers at length the McGovern Amendment, which applies only to the
former. Considering such important and weighty issues as the limits of Executive
authority and the legacy of Cold War practices, the case concludes that, "The
majority's opinion is a cautious one: major issues presented in this litigation are
left for subsequent resolution." The court cites Supreme Court precedent which "has
repeatedly upheld the legitimacy of broad and discretionary Executive power." The
court worries about further "judicial incursion into the United States' conduct of
its foreign affairs."
Box 132, Folders 11-13
Discovery docs from Dept. of Justice
1983-1986
Box 132, Folder 14
Legal research I
1982-1987
Box 132, Folder 15
Legislation II, visa reform
1983
Box 132, Folder 16
Other litigation
1982-1983
Box 163, Folder 10, Box 166, Folder 1
Correspondence I
1983-1984
Conditions Governing Access
One folder is restricted until 2063 because it contains attorney-client
privileged information, and has been separated from materials. Another folder has
been separated from materials and is permanently closed because it contains highly
confidential information.
General
1 folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163). Another folder in
Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
Box 132, Folder 18
Master pleadings
1983-1984
Box 132, Folder 19
Master pleadings I (Supreme Court and Court of Appeals)
1986-1988
Box 132, Folders 20-21
Master pleadings, Volume I
1983-1984
Box 133, Folders 1-3
Master pleadings, Volume II
1986
Box 133, Folder 4
Master pleadings, Volume III
1988
Box 133, Folder 5
District court pleadings
1988
Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda
1987-1989
Scope and Contents
In this case, Sebago, Inc, the publisher of The Spectator, a tabloid which
describes itself as "California's Weekly Sex News Review," is represented by the
ACLU in its case against the City of Alameda. The case concerns a 1977 Alameda
ordinance which allows "specified adult entertainment activities" only within
certain zoning districts, and not within 500 feet of any area zoned for residential
use, or within 1000 feet of the same type of adult entertainment activity. The
ordinance defines adult entertainment activity as ""an adult book store [sic], adult
motion picture theater, peep show, massage parlor, adult cabaret, pool or billiard
establishment, or amusement hall."
The lawsuit was occasioned by a 1986 letter from an Alameda citizen to the mayor
and city council members of Alameda which complained about the selling of The
Spectator on newsracks on city streets, and requested that the city prohibit such
sales. The city responded by amending the existing 1977 ordinance.
The Spectator challenged the constitutionality of the Alameda ordinance and sought
injunctive and declaratory relief. The city filed a cross complaint that the
ordinance was valid. The court denied the city's motion and granted Sebago's motion,
declaring the ordinance unconstitutional in that it "infringes upon the freedom of
the press in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 2, of the California Constitution." The court
prohibited the city from enforcing the ordinance and ordered the city to pay
attorney's fees in the amount of $45,000.
Box 133, Folders 8-10
Court papers, Volume I
1987
Box 133, Folders 11-13
Court papers, Volume II
1987-1988
Box 133, Folders 14-15
Court papers, Volume III
1989
Box 133, Folder 19
Legal research/cases
1987-1988
United States of America [Davis] v. City and County of San Francisco
[firefighters]
1987-1988
Scope and Contents
In 1988, a group of female and minority [sic] plaintiffs filed suit against the San
Francisco Fire Department (SFFD), challenging their hiring and promotional practices
as discriminatory and winning. While most of these issues were resolved in earlier
lawsuits, this case deals with contested attorney's fees, as well as the amount of
backpay due to six black firefighters who the court ordered to be retroactively
promoted to lieutenant in light of prior confirmed discrimination. The City deemed
both the amount of attorney's fees as well as backpay as excessive.
In the "Factual Background" summary, the court notes: "The SFFD has long been
subject to suits alleging discrimination in its hiring and promotion of
firefighters. In 1970, when only four of the Department's eighteen hundred
firefighters were black, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People filed suit in federal district court challenging the validity of the
entry-level hiring test used by the Department." Later, a group of black
firefighters argued that the test used to determine promotions at SFFD discriminated
on the basis of race. Tests used in hiring were also called into question, and, in
1986, the City of San Francisco declared that it would no longer defend the validity
of these tests.
The result of this earlier suit was a decree, which "provides that of the
firefighters hired over its seven year lifespan, at least nineteen percent should be
Asian, ten percent should be black, and eleven percent should be Hispanic.
Altogether, fifty-five percent of the firefighters hired are to be members of a
minority group, and ten percent of the firefighters hired are to be female." It also
provides for specific recruitment efforts geared at women and minorities [sic].
These cases navigated the complex bureaucracy of the City of San Francisco, and this
particular case the award of interest on backpay was provided, while the resolution
of the attorney's fees issue is to detailed and complex to summarize here.
Box 163, Folder 11
Correspondence I
1987-1988
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2063 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
1 folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163)
Box 134, Folders 1-3
Master pleadings, Volume I
1987-1988
Box 134, Folders 4-6
Master pleadings, Volume II
1987
Box 134, Folders 7-9
Master pleadings, Volume III
1987
Box 134, Folder 10-11
Master pleadings, Volume IV
1987-1988
Underwood v. Campoy
1987-1988
Scope and Contents
This case concerns the civil liberties of Henry Lee Underwood, a black prisoner at
Folsom Sate Prison, who, in 1978, underwent a disciplinary hearing over the course
of which he "was charged with having written a threatening letter to an official of
the California Community Release Board." Joe Campoy is the Associate Warden of
Custody at Folsom and was a member of the disciplinary committee which heard
Underwood's case. The lawsuit was brought against him and several others employed by
Folsom Prison in a supervisory capacity. During the hearing, Underwood pled "not
guilty" and alleged that he was denied the opportunity to "present exculpatory
evidence." He also admitted to writing the letter, but endied any "violent physical
or forceful intentions." He was found guilty by the committee and "received ten days
isolation from the disciplinary committee." However, "...approximately twenty-four
hours later he appeared before the Institutional Classification Committee and was
given an additional nine months of segregation as a result of the findings of the
disciplinary committee." He sought "declaratory relief as well as seeking $100,000
compensatory damages and $150,000 punitive damages from the defendants." The
evidence that Underwood wished to present was a letter from Congressman Ron Dellums
offering advice and sympathy. The Ninth Circuit court, in 1981, "vacated this
court's earlier judgement dismissing plaintiff's action" and ordered the court to
consider the Dellums letter and "determine the value of his first amendment
claims."
Box 134, Folder 12
List of working files
1983-1988
Box 163, Folders 12-14
Correspondence I
1983-1988
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2063 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
3 folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163).
Box 134, Folder 15-17
Master pleadings, Volume I
1983-1984
Box 134, Folders 18-19
Master pleadings, Volume II
1984
Box 134, Folders 20-22
Master pleadings, Volume III
1985-1986
Box 134, Folders 23-25
Master pleadings, Volume IV
1987-1988
Box 163, Folders 15-16
Pleadings / Pre-ACLU rep
1978-1983
Scope and Contents
Folders are restricted until 2063 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
Two folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163).
AFL-CIO v. Eu
1984
Scope and Contents
This case concerns an initiative "to compel the California Legislature, on penalty
of loss of salary, to apply to Congress to convene a constitutional convention for
the limited and singular purpose of proposing an amendment to the United States
Constitution requiring a balanced federal budget." It sought a writ of mandate to
prevent Secretary of State Eu from taking any action, including the expenditure of
public funds, to place a proposed Balanced Federal Budget Statutory Initiative on
the November 1984 ballot. The case was brought to trial by those opposed to the
initiative, including AFL-CIO.
The court, in response to the proposed initiative, writes: "We have concluded that
the initiative, to the extent that it applies for a constitutional convention or
requires the Legislature to do so, does not conform to article V of the United
States Constitution." Article V, they write, "envisions legislators free to vote
their best judgment, responsible to their constituents through the electoral
process, not puppet legislators coerced or compelled by loss of salary or otherwise
to vote in favor of a proposal they may believe unwise." They also write that the
initiative "exceeds the scope of the initiative power under the controlling
provisions of the California constitution." Furthermore, they write, the initiative
"is not a public opinion poll. It is a method of enacting legislation, and if the
proposed measure does not enact legislation, or if it seeks to compel legislative
action which the electorate has no power to compel, it should not be on the
ballot."
Box 163, Folder 17
Master pleadings (#8)
1984
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2059 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
1 folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box (Box 163).
Aguilar v. People of the State of California
1980
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented Michael David Aguilar, who received two
citations for "cruising," which was prohibited in the Los Gatos central business
district. The Los Gatos ordinance defined "cruising" as "driving a motor vehicle on
a highway (1) for the sake of driving, without immediate destination, (2) at random,
but on the lookout for possible developments, or (3) for the purposes of (a)
sightseeing repeatedly in the same area, and (b) while driving with the purpose of
socializing with other motorists or pedestrians."
Because the cruising ordinance was an attempt to regulate the behavior of
individual drivers, and because local regulation of a matter addressed in the
Vehicle Code was only allowable when "regulating or prohibiting processions or
assemblages on the highways," the citations issued to Aguilar were found to be in
violation of the Vehicle Code and were reversed.
Box 135, Folders 7-9
Master pleadings II
1980-1981
Box 163, Folder 18
Correspondence
1980-1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2055 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
1 folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163).
Box 135, Folders 10-13
Alcaraz v. Block
1982-1984
Scope and Contents
This case concerns the implementation of five children's food programs in the state
of California, including the school lunch program, the summer food service program
(Summer Program), and the child care food program (Care Program). The ACLU
represented the plaintiffs, including Tomas Alcaraz, of Latino Unidos Para Mejor
Education (Lupme), as well as Robert Losoya and Jose Luis Ladesma of the Welfare
Recipients League of Santa Clara County, who challenged the necessity of collecting
recipients' social security numbers in the statewide administration of these
programs. Specifically, the appeals concern challenges to section 803 of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA). The defendants in the case included John
R. Block, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Robert Leard,
Administrator of USDA's Food and Nutrition Service.
The Alcaraz plaintiffs sued the Secretary, challenging the lack of regulations
implementing the SSN requirement in 1981-82, and the regulations ultimately
enforced, as violating the APA, the Privacy Act, the Freedom of Information Act. The
plaintiffs also argued that the collection of social security numbers for
income-verification and eligibility purposes discriminated against undocumented
immigrants.
The district court concluded that the Department's regulations concerning the
Summer Program did not violate the APA, but that the administration of the Care
Program did. Thus, the decision was affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
Box 135, Folders 14-15
Alexander v. Eu
1980
Scope and Contents
To quote pleadings: "The present litigation presents three main issues of statutory
and constitutional import bearing on the nomination process for independent
candidates in the State of California." Petitioners Kendra C. Alexander and Albert
J. Lima on behalf of Gus Hall (former leader of the Communist Party USA) and Angela
Davis (a black radical activist), candidates for President of the United States, and
Vice President, respectively, brought a lawsuit against California Secretary of
State and Chief Elections Officer, March Fong Eu, in order to have Hall and Davis's
names placed on the ballot for the November 4, 1980 election. The case is a time
sensitive one, and the ACLU requested an "urgency allocation," in order to have the
names placed on the ballot in time for the election. They alleged voter suppression,
and point to obstructionist techniques like a late notification (a little over one
week before ballot printing) that Hall's and Davis's names would not be placed on
the ballot.
The assert that the petitioners had well over the required number of signatures
needed to place these names on the ballot, and that all of the nomination paperwork
had been filed. They note that Registrars and County Clerks of several counties
reported disqualifying signatures, which place the number of qualifying signatures
below the number needed. They call this action "erroneous and arbitrary" and note
that, due to the timing, the voters have "no other remedy available" and challenged
Election Code requirements regarding the mailing and printing of ballots.
Though the outcome of the case isn't available in the papers provided, it would
seem that the ACLU lost the case, as Hall appeared on the ballot as a write-in
candidate.
Tom v. City and County of San Francisco
1980-1983
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented Alson Tom, a 23 year old man who was stopped for
speeding, and then informed that there was a bench warrant out for this arrest. Tom
arrested by a Town of Hillsborough, CA police officer, and spent a night in jail,
with bail set at $500. In fact, he had been arrested as a result of a computer error
in the San Francisco Police Department database (the Police Information Network, or
P.I.N. System), which failed to recall the warrant, which had been cancelled over
one year prior to the arrest. Tom sued the San Francisco Chief of Police Cornelius
P. Murphy, as well as the City and County of San Francisco. He also sued the town of
Hillsborough and the Chief of Police there, William A. Key.
Tom had also been to court in San Francisco, and the failure to cancel the bench
warrant seems to be the result of a miscommunication about Tom's presence in court
that day. Though it is unclear whether the error resides with the San Francisco
court's failure to communicate the warrant cancellation to the police department, or
with the police department itself (or the "computer," as they allege), Tom was
clearly the victim of an unfair arrest. Similar errors were found in the Los Angeles
County Police Department's database, which resulted in several arrests of people
with "common names."
Box 163, Folder 19-20
Correspondence
1980-1983
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2058 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information.
General
2 folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163).
Alternatives for California Women, Inc. v. Contra Costa County et al.
1979-1983
Scope and Contents
The ACLU represents here Alternatives for California Women (ACW), which is a "a
non-profit California corporation formed to promote the social welfare by supporting
issues and activities that provide residential, employment, therapeutic, legal and
medical alternatives for battered women and their children." This case concerns a
city ordinance which, in 1978, prohibited "soliciting" between the hours of 7 pm and
8 am. ACW, which was attempting to distribute information about its services as well
as solicit donations through door-to-door canvassing, challenged the
constitutionality of this ordinance. The ordinance was amended to include the
language "between sunset and sunrise," and the case considered the ordinance as
amended.
Their grounds for challenging the ordinance are as follows: 1. that the ordinance
is unconstitutional because it delineates a "content-based discrimination between
categories of speech" by distinguishing between categories of speech which merely
convey information, and categories of speech which both convey information and
request or solicit funds, and 2. that the ordinance infringes on the First
Amendments rights of residents to receive communications from ACW. The court agreed
on both counts, declaring the ordinance unconstitutional.
Box 135, Folders 19-21
Master pleadings I
1979-1983
Box 135, Folder 23, Box 163, Folder 21
Correspondence
1979-1983
Conditions Governing Access
A document has been restricted until 2058 because it contains attorney-client
privileged information, and have been separated from materials.
General
1 folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 1 (Box 163).
People of the State of California v. Teresinski
1978
Scope and Contents
The ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of Robert Joseph Teresinski, who had
conducted an armed robbery of a Dixon, California 7-Eleven in Yolo County, but whose
car was stopped by an Officer Rocha at 2 am under the assumption that he was a minor
(he was not) and was violating Dixon's 10 pm curfew. Rocha conducted an unauthorized
search of the car and found a can of beer, a loaded gun, and stolen bills. He
conducted an illegal arrest, took mug shots, and asked the Woodland 7-Eleven clerk
(Cady) to identify the robbers. The clerk, shown a photograph of Teresinski,
identified him, and later identified him in person in court.
However, due to the illegal nature of the car search and the unlawful arrest,
pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, the defendant moved "to suppress both the
physical evidence seized and the identification testimony of Cady, basing his motion
primarily on the testimony of Cady and Officer Rocha at the preliminary hearing."
Evidence was suppressed, meaning that there was no admissible evidence to convict
Teresinski. However, the court decided that there was no need to suppress Cady's
testimony, which "rests upon his independent memory of the robbery."
Therefore, the court writes: "...we hold that the superior court correctly
suppressed both the physical evidence seized at the time of the illegal detention
and the testimonial evidence that Cady, the robbery victim, identified defendant's
photograph the morning after the robbery. The court erred, however, in suppressing
Cady's testimony identifying defendant at the preliminary hearing. Since that
testimony was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that defendant
committed the charged robbery, the court also erred in dismissing the action against
defendant."
Box 136, Folder 1
Amicus brief
June 16, 1978
In Re: Petition for Naturalization of Charles Peter Duncan v. United States
of America
1978-1983
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented Charles Peter Duncan, a native of England who
applied for U.S. citizenship and was denied on the basis of his refusal to answer
questions "dealing with prior criminal activity, membership in organizations, belief
in Communism, and moral character." Duncan was an oceanographer who applied for
citizenship first in Virginia, and was denied, and then reapplied upon moving to San
Francisco in 1979. He objected to the questions based on the belief that they
violated his First Amendment rights. Rather than appeal his case, Duncan chose to
reapply for citizenship in another state. On the basis that Duncan had already
litigated similar issues in the Virginia case, and that he had been apprised of the
consequences of his refusal to answer the above questions, his appeal was denied.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit writes,"The Government's brief asks
this Court to assume that naturalization may be withheld for failure to answer ANY
questions posed by the Government, regardless of whether or not those questions
violate the Fifth and First Amendments."
Box 164, Folder 2
Application materials
1980-1982
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2058 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
1 folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 136, Folder 2
Opening brief and reply briefs
1978-1983
Box 136, Folder 3
Excerpt of record, notice of appeal
1982-1983
Box 136, Folder 4
Witness testimonies, final report
1981-1982
People of the State of California v. Amman
1980
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of Jo Ellen Amman, as well
as 33 others, who were charged with violating an Oakland ordinance (Municipal Code
section 3-17.02) designed to regulate "loitering for the purpose of engaging in
prostitution." The People of the State of California's argument rests heavily on
regressive statements such as: "The prostitute manifests intent in a variety of
silent, provocative ways -- by grooming, by coif, by walk, by glance, by gesture, by
frequenting certain places, even just by standing." An important distinction in this
case is the fact that the ordinance does not regulate sexual activity per se, just
the acts that lead up to it, and its "impact" on a neighborhood.
The ACLU argues that this ordinance is "impermissibly vague and overbroad." They
write: "What the ordinance really appears to address is evil intentions," also
noting that "...evil intentions per se cannot be criminalized." It points out that
many of the signals used by sex workers and also used by pamphleteers and
leafletters garnering support for a political cause. They also argue that the
ordinance violates a sex worker's rights against self-incrimination.
The outcome of the case isn't evident from the materials provided.
Box 136, Folders 5-6
Master pleadings appeal
1980
In Re: Arias and Bolton on Habeas Corpus
1984-1986
Scope and Contents
The ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of petitioner Barbaro Escobedo Arias as
well as several other wards of the Youth Authority (YA) at the Karl Holton School,
Northern California Youth Center. The case concerns the question of whether the
installation of surveillance equipment (specifically bugging) in the chapel complex
of the Youth Authority facility violates the religious freedom and privacy rights of
the youths who reside there. The case also questions whether the microphones violate
the clergy-penitent communications privilege and whether they would have a "chilling
effect" on the expression of religion, or on the private conversations between wards
and the chaplain. Arias had participated in programs offered by the chapel, which
included "(1) worship, (2) music and art, (3) bible studies, (4) prayers and
auricular confessions, (5) individual spiritual counselling, and (6) group
counselling."
The monitoring devices in question are those placed in the chapel during a 1982
measure to improve security at the facility. Ronald R. Lowry, chief of the YA
Facilities Planning Bureau, explained the purpose of the surveillance devices in an
affidavit. He explained that a decibel-level threshold is set for each channel, and
that a warning light would become illuminated when the volume exceeded that
threshold. The warning light would then activate the control room speaker, which
would allow those in the room to listen to the sounds in the specified location. The
determination of the threshold levels is left to the discretion of control room
personnel. The YA argued that "the electronic sound surveillance in the chapel is
the means least intrusive of religious exercise."
The court disagreed. While acknowledging that "[i]nstitutional security and the
protection of staff in penal institutions are a paramount consideration [,]" the
court writes that "the record discloses no effort by the YA to design a security
system that could accommodate the special privacy needs of wards' religious
practices." They also write that "the record shows no effort by the YA to explore
security options other than beepers and sound monitoring—measures which might be
less intrusive upon religious practices within the chapel." They conclude that the
presence of the microphones in the chapel, do, in fact, violate the rights of the
petitioners.
Box 136, Folders 7-8
Master pleadings
1984-1986
People of the State of California v. Avalon Memorial Hospital
1980-1981
Scope and Contents
Here, the ACLU represented Avalon Memorial Hospital, owned by Dr. Edward C. Allred,
which refused to enforce provisions of the Fetal Death Registration Act, believing
it to be in violation of the California Constitution and the patients' right to
privacy. The hospital explained its stance when the Department of Heath Services of
Los Angeles County attempted to enforce the Act, and a criminal complaint was filed
against the hospital. The Fetal Death Registration Act required recording fetal
death information about fetuses which had advanced beyond the twentieth week of
pregnancy (approximately the midpoint of a pregnancy), and were terminated, either
through stillbirth or abortion. The Act (Section 10175 of the Heath and Safety Code)
also stipulated recording "the cause of fetal death, the race and occupation of the
prospective parents, and the address and portions of the medical history of the
prospective mother" and made them permanent public record.
The Court concluded that the Act violated the right to privacy guaranteed by
Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution, and the charges against Avalon
Memorial Hospital were dismissed.
Box 136, Folders 10-12, Box 166, Folder 2
Master pleadings
1980-1981
Conditions Governing Access
Materials from folder 13 have been removed are permanently restricted because
they contain sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
People of the State of California v. Ralph Ginzburg, et al.
1977-1978
Scope and Contents
This case was brought by Evelle J. Younger, California Attorney General, on behalf
of the public interest of the people of the State of California. It is brought
against a fraudulent New York City-based media company called "Avant Garde Media,
Inc.", which makes and distributes Webster's Dictionaries, encyclopedias, as well as
publishing a biweekly magazine called "Moneysworth." They do business in California.
They were charged with "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices in
violation of Civil Code section 3369," including charging above market value for
goods, failing to deliver them, and misrepresenting these goods. They also promised
a bonus of erotic drawings by Picasso free to all subscribers, which they failed to
deliver.
The People sought a preliminary injunction requiring the company to deliver the
merchandise, refund the customers, and generally requiring them to abide by fair and
reasonable business practices. The People were successful.
Box 136, Folders 15-16
Master pleadings
1977-1978
Box 164, Folder 1
Correspondence
1977-1978
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2053 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Bailey v. Loggins
1977-1982
Scope and Contents
On April 28, 1977, Artie Bailey, an inmate at Soledad prison and editor of that
prison's newspaper, the Star News, and the Prisoner's Union, as a subscriber to that
newsletter, filed suit against the Department of Corrections, and Otis Loggins as
superintendent. The Star News is an inmate newspaper, which is financed out of the
Inmate Welfare Fund, not by taxpayer money. The paper contains articles promoting
the interests of various prison groups, as well as articles critical of prison
administration.
The lawsuit concerned two articles written in September of 1976 by inmate Willie
Brandt, which concerned two lectures given at Soledad, one by Professor Amundson of
the Institute of Industrial Relations at the University of California, and another
by Ms. Lytle, deputy legal affairs secretary to the Governor. The articles were
approved for publication by editor Bailey and by civilian journalism instructor
Estin. The articles were rejected for publication by Associate Superintendent
Dobreff, who was in charge of supervising the newspaper's content, as well as by the
acting superintendent and his staff.
In compliance with the grievance procedures at the prison, editor Bailey filed an
appeal and requested that the authorities grant permission to publish the articles,
and that the Department of Corrections establish guidelines to govern the control of
newspaper content. During the trial, the prison administration dropped their
objection to the publication of the articles, and thus the case became about the
power of the administration to reject articles for publication in the Star News, and
the process for appealing that decision. The trial court sought to address those
issues, and required the Department of Corrections to adopt new regulations.
After a careful examination of the content of the Star News, the court wrote, "The
issue before us...is whether a prison newspaper intended to serve and serving as a
limited forum for prisoner expression enjoys any protection under the First
Amendment or correlative California provisions." The court rejects censorship of the
inmate paper, except for articles which "could reasonably be deemed a threat to the
security of the institution or which describe the making of a weapon, explosive,
poison, or destructive device." They also write, "...although the department retains
greater powers to regulate and censor then would be appropriate outside the prison
walls, it does not have total or arbitrary power."
Box 136, Folders 16-17
Master pleadings
1977-1982
Box 136, Folder 18
Notes, press, correspondence
1979-1982
Barrett v. Neal
1978-1983
Scope and Contents
This 1978 case, referred to internally at the ACLU as the "Scott's Creek Voters
Case," concerns evicted residents of Santa Cruz County, precinct 3002. The County
Clerk and Registrar of Voters challenged their voter registration status and struck
their names from election petitions, saying that they were not "domiciled" in
precinct 3002. The plaintiffs wanted to vote in the June 6, 1978 election, and
believed that they were being discriminated against and that they were being denied
equal protection under both the California Constitution and the 14th Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. They sought to have their right to vote reinstated, as well
as an award of attorney's fees, due to the substantial benefit that would be
conferred on a large class of persons if the case was won. Indeed, much of the case
dealt with this issue of attorney's fees. The ACLU argued in favor of rewarding them
under the Voting Rights Act of 1975. They also question whether "domicile for voting
purposes can be challenged on the basis of an eviction alone," particularly if the
evicted parties intended, or hoped, to continue to live there.
The outcome of this case is not known.
Becker v. Gathman
1980
Scope and Contents
This case concerns Phillip Becker, a child with Down's Syndrome, whose parents,
Warren and Patricia Becker, denied him a life-prolonging heart surgery, and then
defended their right to do so in court. Phillip's heart defect was discovered prior
to a routine oral surgery. The Beckers, who had Phillip institutionalized for most
of his life, worried that Phillip would outlive them and become "a burden" to his
two brothers. A physician hired by the Beckers to examine Phillip wrote that he led
"a life I consider devoid of those qualities which give it human dignity."
The ACLU represented Phillip Becker, who, as those who worked with him at the John
Rouleau Children's Center in San Jose, was actually "on the high end of the spectrum
for Down's Syndrome" and who, they stated, was happy and capable of dressing himself
and helping out with household chores. However, several courts upheld the right of
the Beckers to make this decision.
Over the course of court proceedings, the Beckers relationship with their son came
under full scrutiny. A motion was made by Herbert and Patricia Heath, who came to
know Phillip while he was institutionalized, to adopt Phillip. Judge William
Fernandez of the Superior Court granted them this right, stating "No true parent can
watch a child's life slowly ebbing,'' he said and...not cry out 'Oh, Lord, let the
child live.'"
Box 136, Folder 21
Master pleadings, press, correspondence
1980
People of the State of California v. Blair
1979
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented defendant Robert G. Blair, who was appealing his
conviction for the murders of Alan and Renate Wellman on December 14, 1975 at their
home in Los Angeles. Blair was a narcotics dealer and Wellman was his occasional
cocaine supplier. Wellman had previously also testified against Blair in court
regarding a stolen treasury bill that Wellman had received as payment from
Blair.
The primary issue in this case is whether evidence obtained without warrants and
subpoenas was admissible in court, and whether the same verdict would have been
reached without said evidence. The informally obtained evidence included Blair's
credit card applications, charges and financial information (under the name "Robert
Bartee," an alias). It also included information provided by a hotel employee about
calls made from Blair's hotel room, including one to the victim's house, as well as
telephone records of an associate of Blair's in Philadelphia. This information was
used to track Blair's whereabouts on the days leading up to and following the
murders.
The court decided that the same conviction would have been made even without the
incorrectly obtained evidence, and the judgement was affirmed.
Box 137, Folder 4
Master pleadings, correspondence, notes
1979
Bobb v. Municipal Court of California, Monterey County
1982-1983
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented Carolyn Bobb, a bankruptcy lawyer who, on
January 26, 1982, was held in contempt of court during voir dire questioning
(preliminary questioning of a witness or juror by a judge) by a trial judge for jury
duty. Bobb refused to answer questions about whether or not she had a husband,
arguing that such a line of questioning was sexist, since male jurors were not asked
the same questions. Bobb spent a day in jail for her refusal to answer these
questions, and, on appeal, was found to be improperly held in contempt of court. The
court "found no compelling state interest for posing certain questions to female
jurors, but not to male jurors" and found that forcing Bobb to answer these
questions denied her equal protection under the law.
Box 137, Folders 5-6
Master pleadings I
1982-1983
Brannon v. Van de Kamp; People of the State of California v.
Brannon
1984-1986
Scope and Contents
The ACLU represented Barbara Brannon, Dale Buscher, Jacqueline Cabasso, Richard
Ceisler, Dorothy Headley, Marie Lyndon, Susan Moon, Eveanne Pearson, Laurel Prager,
Ellen Rosenau, and Ronald Serviss, who were arrested, along with 1,000 other people,
in June of 1983 for participating in a non-violent protest outside of the Livermore
Nuclear Weapons Laboratory. The demonstration occurred after an announcement that
cruise missles were to be deployed in Western Europe, and the protestors believed
that direct action was necessary "to prevent the arms race from spiraling into a
nuclear war." They were accused of "willfully and maliciously obstructing a
roadway," but the protestors maintained that their attempts to block entrance to the
laboratory were not malicious.
The ACLU argued that the "malice" requirement of Article 647 of the Penal Code was
being ignored with increasing frequency in the protest context and had come to be
used as a "general street sweeping device."
Box 137, Folders 10-11
Brannon v. Van de Kamp: Pleadings I
1985-1986
Box 137, Folders 12-15
People of the State of California v. Brannon: Pleadings
1984
Box 137, Folder 16
People of the State of California v. Brannon: Correspondence
1984-1985
Britt v. Police Commission
1983-1984
Scope and Contents
This taxpayer lawsuit, brought by citizens and residents of San Francisco (such as
Harry Britt) against the Police Commission of the City and County of San Francisco
"challenges the Police Commission's compliance with the San Francisco Charter in
seeking appropriations for the San Francisco Police Department's recently
established Office of Citizen Complaints." It also "requests a binding declaration
of law which will require the Chief of Police, the Commission, the Mayor, and the
Controller to follow correct rules of law in connection with their duties regarding
fiscal aspects of the Office of Citizen Complaints." The Office of Citizen
Complaints is "charged with the responsibility to investigate police misconduct and
improper performance of police duties."
The outcome of the case could not quickly be deduced from the materials provided.
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Myers; CDRR v. Rank; CDRR
v. Cory; CDRR v. Unruth; CDRR v. Kizer; Pearl v. Huff
1977-1991
Scope and Contents
In this landmark 1981 case, the ACLU fought and won a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of provisions in the California Constitution in the 1978, 1979,
and 1980 budget acts that limit Medi-Cal funding for abortions. The suite of
lawsuits began before the 1978 budget provision could take effect. CDRR sued
Beverlee A. Myers, Director of the State Department of Health Services, to prohibit
her from enforcing the restrictions. They resulted primarily in discriminatory
treatment of poor women who chose to have abortions, and whose medical expenses were
not covered. The medical costs of childbirth were covered. The ACLU argued that this
policy is a violation of each woman's right to privacy, as guaranteed by the
California Constitution.
The court writes: "...this case does not turn on the morality or immorality of
abortion." Instead, they clarify: "...the constitutional question before us does not
involve a weighing of the value of abortion as against childbirth, but instead
concerns the protection of either procreative choice from discriminatory
governmental treatment." They also question the right of the state, within the
boundaries of a program designed to provide medical services to the poor, to dictate
or proscribe medical choices "the state does not favor and does not wish to
support." They also note, quite simply, "the cost of an abortion is much less than
the cost of maternity care and delivery." The court also admits that the case does
seem to turn on an issue that is still not at rest - "protecting the potential life
of a fetus," in their language.
In their decision, the court writes: "By virtue of the explicit protection afforded
an individual's inalienable right of privacy by article I, section 1 of the
California Constitution…the decision whether to bear a child or to have an abortion
is so private and so intimate that each woman in this state — rich or poor — is
guaranteed the constitutional right to make that decision as an individual,
uncoerced by governmental intrusion."
Box 138, Folder 1
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Myers; CDRR v. Cory;
CDRR v. Unruh: Oral argument; notes
1980
Box 138, Folders 2-3, Box 164, Folder 3, Box 166, Folder 3
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Myers:
Correspondence
1978-1980
Conditions Governing Access
One folder is restricted until 2059 because it contains attorney-client
privileged information, and has been separated from materials. One folder is
permanently restricted.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164). One folder in
Permanently Restricted box (Box 166).
Box 138, Folders 4-5, Box 164, Folder 4
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Unruh: Correspondence
II
1980-1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2061 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 138, Folders 7-8, Box 164, Folder 5
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Rank: Correspondence
III
1981-1988
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2064 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 138, Folder 8
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Myers & Cory &
Unruth: Pleadings
1980
Box 138, Folder 9
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): List of ACLU
briefs
circa 1978-1988
Box 138, Folder 10
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): CDRR IV, Clients and
attorneys
1982-1985
Box 138, Folder 11
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Superior Court:
Costs
1979-1980
Box 138, Folder 12
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): CDRR XIII, 1990
litigation notes
1990
Box 138, Folders 13
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): Fees and
costs
1986-1989
Box 138, Folders 14-15
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer:
Correspondence
1988-1991
Box 138, Folder 16
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): Fees and
costs
1987-1989
Box 138, Folder 17
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): CDRR X -- To do; Atty.
work file VI - 015
1987
Box 138, Folder 18
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): CDRR X -- Scope of
coverage; Atty. work file VII - 016
1977-1987
Box 138, Folder 19
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): CDRR litigation;
client/counsel; mailing lists, I-90
1986
Box 138, Folder 20
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): CDRR X -- Atty. work
notes 021
circa 1977-1991
Box 138, Folder 21
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): Attorney work
file
1989
Box 138, Folder 22
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): File folder on empirical
information
1986-1989
Box 138, Folder 23
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): Address lists; abortion
funding people
1984-1987
Box 138, Folder 24
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): Single subject rule;
general research
circa 1977-1991
Box 138, Folder 25
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): CDRR X -- Separation of
powers; opinions in related cases, I-36
1981-1987
Box 138, Folder 26
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer: Research
1987
Box 138, Folder 27
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): Press, I-610
1983-1987
Box 138, Folder 28
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): Press, 601
1989
Box 138, Folder 29
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer: Amicus briefs
1987
Box 138, Folder 30
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer: Draft
answer
circa 1987
Box 139, Folder 1
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR): Opn. in previous
case
1987
Box 139, Folders 2-3
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer: Extra
copies
1984-1989
Box 139, Folders 4-5
Pearl v. Huff: Court papers I; Attorney fees I
1989
Box 139, Folder 6
Pearl v. Huff: Correspondence
1989
Box 139, Folder 4
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer: Petition for
write of mandate; petitions for review
1987-1988
Box 139, Folder 8
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer: Attorney notes;
research; response to petition for transfer
1987-1988
Box 139, Folder 9
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer: Answer to
petition for review/work file
1987-1988
Box 139, Folder 10
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer: Review --
notes
November 1988
Box 139, Folder 11
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer: Answer to
review; MCC notes
January 1988
Box 139, Folder 12
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights (CDRR) v. Kizer: Legal research;
memo-I-301
1987
People of the State of California v. Chapman; People of the State of
California v. Smith
1981-1984
General
These cases, particularly the Chapman case which is the focus of the materials
here, ask the question: "May the police, acting without a search warrant, obtain
from a telephone company the name and address of an unlisted telephone subscriber
when they suspect the telephone may be used for an unlawful activity?" (here,
illegal offtrack betting). Defendants Oris Lee Chapman and Margaret L. Mc Gee were
both charged with conspiracy to commit bookmaking. Bets on horses were placed
through a phone number, and callers either paid off their debts or received winnings
from Chapman. A woman who had lost thousands of dollars on betting called the
police, giving them the phone number used to place bets. The matter was investigated
by the police, who informed the telephone company that they were conducting a felony
investigation. This case examines whether the defendants right to privacy was
invaded by this action, and whether the evidence obtained was the result of an
"unlawful search and seizure" and, as such, is inadmissible in court as evidence.
The outcome of the trial is not clear from the materials provided.
Box 139, Folder 13
People of the State of California v. Chapman: Correspondence
1982-1983
Box 139, Folder 14
People of the State of California v. Chapman: Attorney notes
1982-1983
Box 139, Folders 15-16
People of the State of California v. Chapman: Master
pleadings
1982-1984
Box 139, Folders 17-18
People of the State of California v. Chapman: Briefs of amicus curiae
1981-1982
Box 139, Folder 19
People of the State of California v. Chapman: Answers to amici
curiae
1981-1984
Box 139, Folder 20
People of the State of California v. Smith: Supplemental
brief
1982
Chavez v. City of Fremont
1981-1985
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented Richard Chavez, who on May 5, 1981, was stopped
outside of a pizza parlor in Fremont, CA, on suspicion of being a public
exhibitionist, based on a police composite that an Officer Berinski had seen.
Berinski was the man who questioned Chavez and who eventually performed the arrest.
He called for assistance, and asked Chavez if he could search his car. Chavez
consented, and Berinski found jogging clothes, which he believed to be the clothing
of the man in the composite. They then photographed him without his consent, and
distributed the photo within the Fremont Police Department, as well as to "persons
unknown to Mr. Chavez."
The ACLU argued that Chavez had been search and questioned without probable cause,
and that he had been "detained for an unreasonable amount of time, culminating in
his arrest." They alleged "loss of liberty, false arrest, humiliation and
degradation, loss of reputation, invasion of personal security and privacy," and
"emotional distress." They sought an award of attorney's fees, which they received.
Box 139, Folders 21-22, Box 164, Folder 6
Pleadings I
1982-1984
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2062 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 139, Folder 23, Box 164, Folder 7
Correspondence
1981-1985
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2062 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 139, Folder 25
Outlines, working memos; BASF Police Review Committee
1983
Children's Rights Group v. San Francisco Redevelopment Agency
1981-1984
Scope and Contents
This 1984 case concerns the First Amendment rights of tenants in San Francisco to
hang banners, flags, and signs on leased or rented property. Tenants and plaintiffs
Children's Rights Group is a "nonprofit corporation that provides special programs,
services, and referrals for children and their families." They had hung a banner
that read "Children's Campaign for Peace Without Fear" outside one of their office
windows. San Francisco Redevelopment Agency is a government agency that manages and
leases properties that they own. They objected to the banner and sent employees to
cut it down.
The ACLU argued that abridgement of free speech was unconstitutional, and that the
cutting down of the banner also violated due process. The sought to reinstate the
plaintiffs right to hang banners from their business, and argued that the Agency's
policy, as stated in their rental agreement, against banners and flags "is
unconstitutional and therefore void and unenforceable..." They sought damages and
attorney's fees for the plaintiffs. The court agreed with the ACLU, and ordered the
Agency to abridge its policies.
Box 139, Folder 28
Master pleadings
1981-1984
Cohen v. City and County of San Francisco
1981-1987
Scope and Contents
Here, the ACLU represented appellants Cohen, a taxpayer in San Francisco, and Low,
an attorney practicing in San Francisco, who challenged a recently-enacted city
ordinance designed to regulate escort services in the city. The ordinance imposes a
permit or license requirement upon escort services, which both the Mayor of San
Francisco and the city's Chief of Police claim are usually "fronts for
prostitution." An "escort service" is "[a]ny business, agency or person who, for a
fee, commission, hire, reward or profit, furnishes or offers to furnish names of
persons, or who may accompany other persons to or about social affairs,
entertainments or places of amusement, or who may consort with others about any
place of public resort or within any private quarters." The ordinance also
stipulates that both clients and employees must be at least 18 years of age, and
that all escort services must keep a register "containing the identity of all
employees and the 'true' identity, address, hours of employment, including location
and place, of each patron. This register is then 'subject to inspection' by the
police and health departments.
The issues raised by the appellants concern the constitutionality of the ordinance,
and whether it violates the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. They
also question whether the ordinance violates the right to privacy guaranteed under
article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution, and wonder whether the
ordinance is preempted by state law.
In considering this case, the court writes, "It is also well-settled that this
state has adopted a general scheme for the regulation of the criminal aspects of
sexual conduct, and thus, the state has occupied that field to the exclusion of all
local regulation." They also write that "the ordinance in the present case is
clearly one that 'was designed and is enforced as a law against prostitution where
prostitution is difficult to prove.' The ordinance, they argue, is not simply
designed to regulate businesses within its jurisdiction, but implicitly expands the
reach of police investigative powers. They also write: "This local ordinance
undermines the statewide uniformity of the statutory regulation of sexual conduct.
Such action at the local level leads to uncertainty and confusion. We therefore
hold the ordinance void."
Box 140, Folders 1-2
Master Pleadings File I
1981-1982
Box 140, Folders 3-4
Master Pleadings File II
1982-1985
Box 140, Folders 5-6
Master pleadings File III
1985-1986
Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unified School District
1981-1991
Scope and Contents
In this 1980 case, the ACLU represented Christopher T., a San Francisco child with
a history of emotional and behavioral problems as a result of a tumultuous family
life. He was experiencing "emotional difficulties, poor peer-relations, absenteeism
and tardiness," and was in need of a specialized educational program, as his current
school was not meeting his needs. At the time of the trial, he was in the custody of
his maternal grandmother, and was in therapy with a licensed clinical worker named
Ms. Fromm. The court notes: "Both Christopher's grandmother and Ms. Fromm felt that
Christopher needed residential placement, which the district refused to recommend,
and so Mrs. Howard, on Christopher's behalf, requested a state hearing to resolve
the dispute. (Educ.Code, § 56501.)"
A residential placement was recommended to provide a stable environment for
Christopher and respite from conflicts at home, but it was much debated by experts
whether this was an appropriate course of action for a child with Christopher's
difficulties. The court concluded that this residential placement was appropriate
and necessary for Christopher, and also adjudicated that it was not appropriate for
state or social services providing these placements to require payment from parents
or relinquishment of custody as a result of residential placement.
Box 140, Folders 8-9
Master pleading file I
1980-1981
Box 140, Folders 10-11
Master pleading file II
1981
Conditions Governing Access
Materials from folders 10 and 11 have been removed and are permanently restricted
because they contain sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box.
Box 140, Folders 12-13, Box 166, Folders 4-5
Master pleading file III
1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are permanently restricted because they contain sensitive
information.
General
Two folders in Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
Box 140, Folders 14-15, Box 164, Folder 8
Master pleading file IV
1981-1984
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2061 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164)
Box 140, Folders 16-17
Master pleading file V
1984-1985
Box 140, Folders 18-19
Master pleading file VI
1985-1986
Box 141, Folders 1-4
Master pleading file VII
1988
Box 141, Folders 6-7
Extra copies of master pleadings
1988
Box 164, Folder 9
Related cases (Eastman v. Mt. Diablo Unified School District)
1991
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2071 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Adolph Coors Co. et al. v. Howard Wallace et al.
1981-1988
General
Master pleadings files I-III were not included when records were transferred from
ACLU-NC.
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented Howard Wallace, of the gay and lesbian group
Solidarity. Solidarity defended itself against inquiries regarding the names of its
members, its sources of financial support, and the scope of its activities following
the cancellation of a contract between Coors brewery and KQED, a public television
station in San Francisco. Coors had volunteered to sponsor one day of a three day
"teleauction" to raise funds and public support for KQED. Coors claims that Wallace
met with KQED leadership privately to dissuade them from working with Coors, and
sought damages in the amount of $13,000 for lost promotional and advertising
opportunities. Wallace, a member of Solidarity and the head of the Northern
California Boycott Committee (which exists to exert pressure on plaintiffs to modify
their political positions) asserts that his only connection to Coors and KQED is a
Solidarity flier with a "Boycott Coors" message printed on the back, and Wallace's
membership in Solidarity.
Over the course of the lawsuit, in which interrogatories were filed seeking
information about Solidarity, the organization objected to answering certain
questions that it felt "chilled" its freedom of political expression. Solidarity
proposed to answer modified versions of the original questions - a proposal that
Coors rejected. Solidarity also expressed a desire that this information only be
shared with the parties involved and their counsel.
The judge ordered that Solidarity answer the modified questions, that the
information only be shared with the parties involved in the lawsuit, and argued that
Solidarity's claim to constitutional privilege was not justified. The judge also
ordered Solidarity to pay penalties in the amount of $6291.
Box 141, Folder 8, Box 164, Folder 9
Correspondence
1981-1985
Conditions Governing Access
One folder of correspondence has been restricted until 2064 because it contains
attorney-client privileged information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 141, Folders 9-10
Master pleading file IV
1982-1983
Box 141, Folders 11-12
Master pleading file V
1983
Box 141, Folders 13-14
Master pleading file VI
1983
Box 141, Folders 16-17, Box 142, Folder 1
Master pleading file VII
1983
Box 142, Folders 2-3
Master pleading file VIII
1983-1984
Box 142, Folders 5-6
Master pleading file IX
1984
Box 142, Folders 7-8
Master pleading file X
1985
De Ronde v. Regents of the University of California
1975-1981
Scope and Contents
This case concerns Glen De Ronde, a white male who was denied admission to the King
Hall, the School of Law at the University of California, Davis in 1975, and chose to
challenge the constitutionality of the consideration of "ethnic minority status" in
the admissions process. De Ronde "sought mandamus in the Yolo County Superior Court
against the Regents of the University of California and the Dean of King Hall...to
compel his admission to King Hall and to recover damages for his exclusion." The
ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of the University of California.
The court found that, given the criteria used to select students for admission to
the law school, De Ronde would have been denied admission irregardless of any
consideration of race. The court upheld the constitutionality of admissions
decisions where race was given equal weight to other factors such as leadership
ability or exceptional academic achievement, and held up as an example the
admissions process at Harvard University, where "the weight attributed to a
particular quality may vary from year to year depending upon the 'mix' both of the
student body and the applicants for the incoming class." The court noted that
nothing in any previous Supreme Court judgements prohibits such a practice, which
was conceived of in good faith and for educational purposes, and that the practice
violates neither the federal Constitution nor the California Constitution.
Box 142, Folders 10-12
Master pleadings I
1975-1980
Box 142, Folder 13
Master pleadings II
1980-1981
Box 142, Folder 14
Extra copies; ACLU amicus briefs
1980
In Re: Dement and Razo, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1980-1984
Scope and Contents
Ronnie Dement and Jessie Aldo Razo are wards of the California Youth Authority,
held at the Karl Holton School, Northern California Center in Stockton, California.
The school houses male wards between the ages of 16-22. The boys argued that their
privacy was invaded by the presence of female guards as supervisors and observers in
the shower and bathroom areas. They also argued that the presence of female guards
served no "rehabilitative purpose," and that the boys' right to privacy outweighs
"any purported right to equal employment opportunity." The trial court's order
"notes not order that women be barred from any job classification. It merely orders
that women not be assigned as observers in the central observation post. It merely
prevents women from supervising the shower and latrine areas."
The ACLU submitted an amicus brief, along with Equal Rights Advocates, Inc., Women
in Criminal Justice-North, and The Association of Black Correctional Workers,
questioning "whether the state has a duty to safeguard the privacy interests of the
wards of California's Youth Authority facilities without invading the equal
employment rights of the female correctional staff." The court, contemplating such
solutions as "modesty panels" in the shower areas, agreed with Dement and Razo.
Box 142, Folders 16-17
Master pleadings I
1980-1981
Box 142, Folder 18
Master pleadings II
1981-1984
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) v. Bohemian
Club
1981-1986
Scope and Contents
This case, in which the ACLU represented the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing (DFEH) challenged a decision made by an administrative law judge which
stated that male gender is a "bona-fide occupational qualification" at the Bohemian
Club. The Bohemian Club, which was founded in 1872 and which admits only men, was
charged with violating the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for its refusal to
hire women into certain roles. The Club, which operates two locations - one in San
Francisco and one in Monte Rio, California (the "Bohemian Grove"), employs men in
managerial, clerical, craft, food preparation and service, cleaning and personal
service positions. Women are only employed in positions (such as accounting and
administrative roles, in the print shop, or as room cleaners or food servers) that
don't require their presence at Club functions.
The Club contended that, as a nonprofit private entity, it was not subject to the
antidiscrimination provisions of FEHA. The Fair Employment and Housing Act was
public policy provision intended "to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity
of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or
abridgement on account of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age." The Club
asserted that, by being forced to hire women, the court would be violating their
freedom of association, as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
The court, which sided with FEHA, wrote that "Even were we to assume...that the
members' associational rights would somehow be constricted by the Club's forced
hiring of women, we think such infringement would be justified by the State's
compelling interest in eradicating employment discrimination."
Box 143, Folder 2
"Privacy Rights of the Bohemian Club Members" student paper
1984
Box 143, Folder 7
Pre-hearing and post-hearing briefs
1981-1986
Diaz v. Watts
1981-1987
Scope and Contents
This case, like the earlier, ACLU-represented case Bailey v. Loggins, concerns
inmates at a California prison and their freedom of speech rights as they pertain to
a inmate-edited, taxpayer-funded prison newspaper. The case challenges prison
regulation of said newspaper, as enforced by the superintendent of the prison, the
director of the Department, and others, and as established in Bailey v. Loggins.
Victor Diaz and Eric Martin were two former inmates at the California Medical
Facility at Vacaville (CMF) and editors of the prison newspaper, the Vacavalley Star
(or the Star). They were challenging prison regulations as enforced by Hal Watts,
Acting Superintendent of the prison. The case was filed in 1981 and concerns
censorship disputes in 1980. The regulations cited here in Bailey v. Loggins state:
"...provided generally that the newspaper should conform to good journalistic
standards, be designed to appeal to all inmates, and avoid material offensive to
racial, religious, or political groups .... [T]he guidelines prohibited the use of
the newspaper to attack administration rules or policy, or to assert any grievance.
They also banned the assumption of an editorial position on pending legislation, the
attempt to elect or defeat any official, or an attack upon existing governmental
policy." Diaz and Martin challenged the interpretation of these standards as overly
broad, or vague.
The court spends a great deal of time debating the "valid penological objectives"
reason for censorship, and writes that critics of the argument have failed to
consider the meaning of the term "penological." They write: "'Penology,' the root of
the word 'penological,' is a branch of criminology dealing with prison management
and treatment of offenders, especially with regard to their rehabilitation." They
prioritize the protection of the public, and consider prisoners a "special case" and
prison a unique environment with its own rules and needs.
The court affirms the original judgement, and conclude: "The regulations under
consideration constitute a reasonable attempt on the part of the Department to
implement a prison newspaper program to enhance the rehabilitation of inmates
through training and education which may offer them hope, but at least will occupy
their time in a constructive manner--clearly a valid penological objective which
will contribute to both the security of the institution and the protection of
society."
Box 164, Folders 10-11
Correspondence I
1981-1982
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2062 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 164, Folders 12-13
Correspondence II
1983-1984
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2064 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
Two folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 164, Folder 14
Correspondence III
1985-1986
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2066 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 143, Folders 8-10
Master pleading file I
1981-1982
Box 143, Folders 11-13, Box 166, Folder 6
Master pleading file II
1982-1983
Conditions Governing Access
Folder has been permanently restricted because it contains sensitive
information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
Box 143, Folders 14-16
Master pleading file III
1983
Box 143, Folders 17-18
Master pleading file IV
1983-1984
Box 143, Folder 19
Master pleading file V
1984-1985
Box 143, Folder 20
Correspondence; Extra copies
1986-1987
Doe v. Coppock
1979-1980
Scope and Contents
This case concerns a raid on Ward 93 of San Francisco General Hospital by the San
Mateo and San Francisco Police Departments early in 1979. SF General operates, in
conjunction with the University of California, a Levo Alpha Acetyl Methodol
(L.A.A.M.), or "methadone" research program, which maintains strict confidentiality
of participants, so as to encourage participation in the program - hence the
plaintiff name of "Doe." At the time of the raid, the program had 35 participants,
all of whom believed that their participation in the program was, and would remain,
confidential. Defendant J.L. Coppock is the Chief of Police of the City of San
Mateo, and is responsible for the conduct of his police force.
The raid was preceded by a phone call to Ward 39 by a member of the Police who
wished to investigate recent murders in the city of San Mateo, and requested
confidential information about white male L.A.A.M. participants. An employee of the
Hospital informed the officer that information was confidential. The police then
obtained a search warrant for this information and, without the participation of the
Hospital or any advance notice, proceeded to collect information about the patients
in the methadone program. Over the course of this action, they also placed Dr. David
Deitch, the Chief of Substance Abuse Service of SF General, in detention for asking
that they wait for a hospital administrator to authorize the search. The plaintiffs
allege that several members of the police force had knowledge of "federal statutes
and regulations protecting the confidentiality of patient records in federally
assisted drug abuse programs.
The ACLU argued that the seizure of this information could have a "chilling effect"
on future methadone program participation. The court, in their judgement, agreed
that the privacy and confidentiality of medical patients is of paramount importance,
and requested that all information seized be returned to the Hospital. In the
interest of the social benefit that these drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs
offer, the court requested that the Police disseminate information about search
warrants related to drug and alcohol abuse rehabilitation to their staff to ensure
that such a raid would not happen again in the future.
Box 144, Folder 1, Box 164, Folder 15
Correspondence
1979-1980
Conditions Governing Access
Some correspondence is restricted until 2060 because it contains attorney-client
privileged information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 144, Folder 2
Master pleadings
1979-1980
Doe v. Naylor
1979-1981
Scope and Contents
Here, the ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of former anonymous patients ("Jane
Doe"s) of a fraudulent psychotherapist named James Edward Yates, M.D. The patients
were requesting the return of certain documents, concerning them and their
psychiatric relationship with Yates, obtained via search warrant pursuant to an
investigation of Yates by the California Department of Justice (one of whose members
is the named James Naylor) and the Medi-Cal Fraud Unit staff. The ACLU wished to
prohibit the use of these confidential documents in court by Yates, as well as
prohibit any use of this extremely private information in court. The return of the
documents to Yates would also preclude any legal action brought against him by
former patients, as Yates would have in his possession the documents necessary for
proof.
Yates had been accused of offering to pay his female Medi-Cal patients $20 to have
sex with his male non-Medi-Cal patients, as well as "fraudulently billing Medi-Cal
for 50-minute individual psychotherapy sessions while actually rendering shorter
sessions of group therapy, usually with unlicensed therapists instead of Dr. Yates."
The ACLU wrote "The ACLU is deeply troubled by the accelerating encroachment on
personal privacy presented by law enforcement techniques, including search warrants
for the purposes of obtaining information protected by constitutional and statutory
restrictions." The outcome of this case is not known from the available materials.
Box 144, Folders 4-5
Master pleadings
1979-1981
Box 144, Folder 6
Yates v. Superior Court - Petitions for Writ of Mandate,
Prohibition
1980-1981
In re: Barnhart; Franchise Tax Board (FTB) v. Barnhart
1977-1986
Scope and Contents
In this 1980 case, the ACLU litigated on behalf of its own lobbyists, who received
an administrative subpoena from the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) for records kept in
connection with their work as lobbyists. The records of Brent Barnhart, Charles C.
Marson and Mary Willans-Izett were requested and included material such as bank
statements, invoices, and other accounting materials, appointment books, employment
contracts, and any correspondence with other lobbyists, or state entities such as
the Fair Political Practices Commission, Secretary of State, or Attorney General.
The lobbyists refusal to comply with the subpoena eventually resulted in this
lawsuit.
The case examines issues such as the appeal-ability of subpoenas, and considers at
length the Political Reform Act initiative of 1974. This act mandates that lobbyist
activities should be regulated and their finances disclosed. The case also questions
whether the Franchise Tax Board as an entity has the power to issue subpoenas, and
finds that it gets this power from statutes that predate the Political Reform Act by
30 years. The court writes: "...although the Political Reform Act does not itself
confer subpoena power on the FTB, it adds to the matters which are under the
jurisdiction of the FTB and it increases the FTB's investigative arena." They
conclude: "The order compelling compliance with the challenged subpoenas is vacated
and the cause is remanded for reevaluation of the permissible scope of the subpoenas
in light of Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal. 3d
33."
Box 144, Folder 7, Box 164, Folder 16, Box 166, Folder 7
In re: Barnhart: Correspondence
1976-1979
Conditions Governing Access
Folder removed because it contains sensitive information. Another folder removed
because it contains attorney-client privileged information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166). One folder in
Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 144, Folder 8
In re: Barnhart: Master pleading file
1977-1983
Box 144, Folder 9
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) v. Barnhart: Correspondence and
notes
1977-1982
Box 144, Folder 10
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) v. Barnhart: Master pleadings file I
1976-1977
Box 144, Folder 11
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) v. Barnhart: Master pleadings/appeal file I
[1]
1977-1979
Box 144, Folder 12
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) v. Barnhart: Master pleading/appeal file I
[2]
1977-1979
Box 144, Folder 13
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) v. Barnhart: Master pleading/appeal file I
[3]
1977-1979
Box 144, Folder 14
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) v. Barnhart: Master pleading/appeal file
II
1979
Box 144, Folder 15
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) v. Barnhart: Reports to the State of California
Fair Political Practices Commission
1979
Franklet v. United States of America
1983-1985
Scope and Contents
Franklet v. United State concerns a tax return filed by Sharon Franklet and groups
together seven other related cases, wherein the plaintiffs, with the support of the
ACLU, object on moral, ethical, or religious grounds to the use of their money as
taxpayers to support the U.S. military. As stipulated by the tax code, each of the
plaintiffs was assessed a penalty of $500 for filing what the I.R.S. refers to as a
"frivolous" tax return (many plaintiffs also objected to the use and interpretation
of the word "frivolous"). Then - also, as stipulated by tax code - each paid 15%, or
$75, in order to demand a refund and abatement from the I.R.S., which the I.R.S.
then denied for each applicant.
The plaintiffs argued that the penalties attempted to restrict their 1. right to
petition the government for redress of grievances, 2. free exercise of religion, and
3. freedom of expression. They also challenged this specific portion of the tax code
on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, and argued that they had been denied due
process. All of the arguments were dismissed and denied, with the court siding with
the United States in all eight cases. The court quoted a recent Supreme Court
judgement which stated, "The tax system could not function if denominations were
allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that
violates their religious belief."
Box 144, Folder 16, Box 164, Folder 17
Correspondence
1984-1985
Conditions Governing Access
Some materials have been separated and are restricted until 2063 because they
contain attorney-client privileged information.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 144, Folders 17-18
Pleadings -- USDC (trial level)
1983-1984
Box 144, Folders 19-21
Pleadings -- 9th circuit C/A -- Appeal
1984
Box 144, Folder 22, Box 145, Folders 1-2, Box 164, Folder 18
Pleadings II
1984-1985
Conditions Governing Access
Some materials have been separated and are restricted until 2065 because they
contain attorney-client privileged information.
General
One folder Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Franklin v. Stanford
1971-1985
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented H. Bruce Franklin, who was dismissed from his
position as a tenured Associate Professor of English at Stanford University for
leading a campus wide protest of the Vietnam War on February 10, 1971. During this
protest, Franklin urged students to shut down the Computation Center on campus,
which was running a war simulation. There was also a prior incident, on January 11,
1971, in which the plaintiff "participated in disruptive conduct" which prevented
scheduled speaker Henry Cabot Lodge from speaking at a public program on campus. The
events which culminated in Franklin's dismissal were comprised of four separate
incidents, three of which took place over the course of February 10th.
Franklin argued that his conduct was protected by the First Amendment and that the
University regulations which permitted his dismissal were unconstitutionally vague.
Franklin sought reinstatement, declaratory relief, back pay and damages.
The court upheld Franklin's dismissal, arguing that "The imposition of one's cause
or point of view by coercion upon those of different persuasion is totally
inconsistent with a university's process and function," and that Franklin recklessly
urged students to disobey the police and risk their futures as well as potential
personal injury.
Box 164, Folders 19-21
Correspondence I
1971-1974
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2054 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
Three folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 164, Folder 22-23
Correspondence II
1975-1979
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2059 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
Three folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 164, Folder 24-25
Correspondence III
1980-1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folders are restricted until 2061 because they contain attorney-client privileged
information, and have been separated from materials.
General
Two folders in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 164, Folder 26
Correspondence IV
1981-1985
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2065 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 164, Folder 27
Settlement file
1979
General
Folder is restricted until 2059 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 164, Folder 28
Colorado suit - correspondence
1974-1979
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2059 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Fort Help Methadone Maintenance Program v. Municipal Court of the
Berkeley-Albany Judicial District
1983-1984
Scope and Contents
This case, much like Doe v. Coppock, also deals with improper police procedure in a
methadone clinic raid in Berkeley. The ACLU represented Fort Help Methadone Clinic
in alleging "1. improper police procedure a. in obtaining a search warrant, b. in
serving search warrant, 2. Excessive force" against the City of Berkeley Police
Department and related entities. Specifically named were an Officer Cataleta and an
Inspector Bierce. The also violated "the special requirements mandated by State and
Federal Law" required of privileged medical records in seizing these documents,
which violated the constitutional right to privacy of Fort Help clinic users. It is
alleged "that Officer Cataleta did not properly identify himself as a police officer
during the early portion of the search, since he was in plain clothes, and testimony
suggested he did not present his badge when requested to do so." Officers were also
accused of bodily pinning the arms of clinic staff, most of whom were women.
The court's judgement in this case is not evident from the materials provided.
Box 164, Folder 29
Correspondence
1983-1984
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2064 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
People of the State of California v. Gomez, et al.
1981-1984
Scope and Contents
The ACLU filed an amicus curiae brief in this lawsuit which concerns the picketing
and invasion of the Planned Parenthood of Contra Costa's Walnut Creek clinic by a
group of protestors who identified themselves as Catholics United for Life - an
anti-abortion group. The protestors were waiting when the clinic opened at 8 am and
disrupted operations until 10 am that day, May 16, 1981. Because the clinic had
prior experience with harassment, it kept its doors locked. The protestors gained
entry to the clinic by falsely claiming that a woman was in need of a pregnancy
test, and proceeded to occupy examination and surgical rooms, refusing to leave.
Around 10 am, they were arrested, and charged with eight counts of trespass and
three counts of battery (a picket had allegedly hit a clinic employee).
In September 1981, the defendants claimed that it was necessary to their cases to
subpoena all Planned Parenthood medical and financial records. It was at this point
that the ACLU stepped in. The defendants based their defense on the idea that any
actions taken (including storming the abortion clinic and assaulting its staff) are
justified to prevent the so-called "murder" of abortion. The ACLU argued that the
use of this "necessity" defense transforms a simple criminal prosecution into a
full-blown probe of the legality and morality of abortion, and claims that a
criminal act is justified to interfere with the exercise of a constitutional right.
The cases also sought to reopen issues closed by Roe v. Wade, namely the definition
of what constitutes "life."
The protestors conviction was upheld by the court, and a transfer to the Court of
Appeals was denied. Each protestor was required to either pay $1,000, or spend ten
days in jail.
Box 164, Folder 33
Correspondence
1981-1983
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2063 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 147, Folders 20-21, Box 166, Folder 8
Master pleading
1981-1984
Conditions Governing Access
Folder removed because it contains sensitive information.
Haddad v. Newman
1980-1981
Scope and Contents
The ACLU, along with the NAACP, filed an amicus brief on behalf of the defendants
in the case against Louis Haddad, a recalled City Councilman in Seaside, California.
Haddad "asserts various courses of action against large numbers of people concerning
alleged irregularities and statements made during the course of the recall
election." One of these such actions involved "either doing, conspiring to do, or
concealing acts of circulating recall petitions before legally permissable,"
changing dates on recall petitions, and falsifying signatures on these petitions.
Complicating this issue is the fact that Haddad, who is white, is regarded by the
black community as a racist. Haddad filed suit against 77 defendants accused of
falsifying petitions to keep him out of office, including several black churches and
their ministers, as well as "almost every politically active black person in
Seaside." The case brought up issues of legal representation, and points out that
only those with immense financial resources are able to file suits such as this.
Many worried over the potential chilling effects that this case might have on the
exercise of political opinions and free speech. Haddad sought general damages in the
amount of one million dollars and punitive damages in the amount of five million
dollars, as well as attorney's fees. The outcomes of the case is not known.
Box 147, Folder 22
Master pleadings, attorney notes
1980-1981
Harris and Ruden v. Superior Court; Okun v. Superior Court
1980-1982
General
Here, the ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioners Erwin Okun,
Joanne Ruden, and Betty H. Harris against Beverly Hills real estate developers Maple
Properties. The lawsuit was begun in September of 1979 and concerns a 1977 land
purchase by Maple Properties of 10 acres of property in Beverly Hills, with the
intent to build condominiums. The property adjoined city owned parcels of land, and
the developer had discussed with the city the possibility of a mutually beneficial
land exchange, so that each would own contiguous parcels of land. Following this
exchange, Maple Properties would build condominiums on all of the available land.
The plaintiffs, opposed to the construction of these luxury condominiums,
circulated a petition to place the ordinance allowing construction on the ballot,
which the electorate then rejected. The defendants accuse the plaintiffs of
deliberate sabotage, as well as libel and slander. The cause of these accusations
was a letter written to the Los Angeles Times by Harris and various others, and
published on January 28, 1979. The letter alleges that the plaintiff "...had (a)
conspired for a period of years with Councilman Stone to cause the City to abandon
its water well system in order to make the water treatment plant obsolete and allow
[plaintiff] to acquire the property on which the water treatment plant was located
for [plaintiff's] private gain and (b) conspired to commit, and did commit, the
crimes of bribery and corruption."
The court, rejecting the defendants claims, writes that the letter is merely
opinion and not necessarily libelous. They write: "An essential element of libel ...
is that the publication in question must contain a false statement of fact. ... This
requirement ... is constitutionally based." They also write that "the First
Amendment protects even sharp attacks on the character, motives, or moral
qualifications of "a public officer or ... an active participant in a labor
dispute." They conclude: "The implication that he and other council members were
motivated by selfish interest rather than the public good is well within the bounds
of protected political debate."
Box 148, Folders 1-4
Master pleadings
1980-1982
Harris v. Pulley; People of the State of California v. Harris; People of
the State of California v. Jackson
1978-1984
Scope and Contents
In this case, petitioner Robert Alton Harris "appeals from the denial of his
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of his
convictions for two counts of murder and the sentence of death under California's
1977 capital sentencing law." The case was brought against San Quentin warden A.
Pulley. In this Supreme Court case, Harris challenged the Eight Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1791, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment,"
as well as excessive bail or fines. Capital punishment was then (and is still,
though a moratorium was issued in March 2019) legal in California, and exceptions to
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause are sometimes made in murder cases.
Harris sought specifically to have his punishment reviewed and proportionally
compared with the sentences of others who had committed similar crimes. The court
decided that the Eight Amendment does not require this review "as an invariable rule
in every case" by the state appellate court. Harris, despite many appeals and a long
fight with much support from law students and the ACLU, was eventually executed by
the State of California in 1992. He was the first person to be executed in
California since 1967.
Box 148, Folder 5
Harris v. Pulley; People of the State of California v. Harris: Attorney
notes, correspondence
1982
Box 148, Folders 6-10
Harris v. Pulley: Master pleadings
1982-1984
Box 148, Folder 11
People of the State of California v. Harris; People of the State of
California v. Jackson: Briefs
1978-1980
Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army
1978-1981
Scope and Contents
This case concerns Army Lieutenant Joseph G. Hatheway, Jr., who was accused of
performing sodomy on another Army officer, and, per Article 125 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. s 925 (1976), which criminalizes "unnatural carnal
copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex," was dishonorably
discharged from his post. Hatheway offered to prove that the Army only prosecuted
cases of homosexual sodomy, despite the fact that he was aware of instances of
heterosexual sodomy, but was informed that this fact would have little impact on his
case. He also argued that the sodomy clause has religious origins and that
homosexual acts, in and of themselves, are not harmful. The ACLU represented
Hatheway, who sought "a declaration that his conviction was invalid, and an order
that he be given an honorable discharge and all pay and benefits denied because of
his conviction." He also alleged that the court-martial proceedings violated his
rights to due process and equal protection under the law.
The judge upheld the Army's prohibition of homosexual acts, arguing that "'doubts
concerning a homosexual officer's ability to command the respect and trust of the
personnel he or she commands' supported the Navy's regulation," and that " those who
engage in homosexual acts severely compromise the government's ability to maintain"
a strong military force. The Court also wrote that " the First Amendment is applied
uniquely in a military setting. The need for discipline and order justify
limitations on individual speech and conduct that would violate the First Amendment
in a civilian setting." They also wrote that "in a military setting the
proscriptions of Article 125 have a legitimate secular purpose and effect." The
Court upheld the initial judgement of the Military Judge, which permitted Hatheway's
dishonorable discharge.
Box 148, Folders 13-15
Master pleading file I
1979-1980
Box 148, Folders 16-17
Master pleading file II
1980-1981
Hiatt, et al. v. City of Berkeley, et al.
1979-1982
Scope and Contents
This case, much like United States of America [Davis] v. City and County of San
Francisco [firefighters], concerns an allegation of discriminatory hiring practices
in a fire department - here, the City of Berkeley. It considers the issue of a
proportional racial hiring quota, based on the percentages of each of population in
the City of Berkeley, and proposes hiring according to such a quota to ensure equal
opportunity for promotion to populations underrrepresented in fire department
leadership. The question here is whether a government entity with, allegedly, "no
prior history of discrimination" (as affirmed by both an affirmative action officer,
as well as a current and former Fire Chief) should be required to participate in
such a quota system (called, in Berkeley, AAP, or Affirmative Action Program and
adopted in 1972). The constitutionality of AAP is challenged in this case, in which
plaintiff Rayford R. Hiatt (presumably a white man, but this information is not
included in the case summary) alleges racial discrimination due to the fact that a
candidate from an underrrepresented group was promoted instead of him, despite his
higher score on an examination (the use of which as a promotional tool runs contrary
to the mandate of AAP).
While acknowledging that both the Fourteenth Amendment and the equal protection
clause of the California Constitution, in their words, "accord any person the equal
protection of the laws in plain and unequivocal language and without qualification,
it is well settled that different classifications of citizens, including
classification by race, are not per se illegal, much less unconstitutional."
However, the court is unsympathetic to the needs of these underrepresented
populations, and differentiates between racial and sexual representation. The court
invokes title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). They
write: "By its simple reading, title VII proscribes employment discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex or national origin in unconditional language and
without any qualification (42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)). Addressing the very problem
that is before us, section 703, subdivision (j), of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C. § 2000e–2(j)), provides in equally clear and explicit terms that racial
preferences are not required to be granted to any employee or group of employees on
account of racial imbalance either."
After lengthy consideration, the court writes: "The judgment, insofar as it fails
to make an award of attorney fees to respondents, is reversed, with directions to
the trial court to reconsider appellants' motion for attorney fees in light of Code
of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and to enter judgment for any attorney fees to
which it finds appellants entitled. Those portions of the judgment enjoining that
part of paragraph III of AAP pertaining to the use of written tests, and the whole
of paragraph V of AAP regarding employment list qualifying categories are reversed.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed."
Box 148, Folder 18, Box 164, Folder 34
Correspondence
1982
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2062 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Hinman, et al. v. Department of Personnel Administration, et al.
1984-1985
Scope and Contents
This case, brought by plaintiffs Hinman and Advocates for Gay and Lesbian State
Employees against the Department of Personnel Administration, questions the
exclusion of same sex couples from dental benefits as proscribed by the State
Employees Dental Care Act. They question the manner in which the Act classifies
family members, particularly spouses, and assert that this classification itself is
discriminatory, since same sex couples were not allowed to marry in the state of
California in 1985. They allege that this classification and its administration
violate the equal protection clause of the California Constitution.
The case concerns plaintiff Hinman, a worker at the Employment Development Program
and his partner of 12 years, who, in 1981, he attempted to enroll in his dental
plan, and who was later deleted from the plan by DPA. The case states: "Hinman and
Beatty own their home together, place their assets in a joint bank account, share
the common necessities of life, and are each other's primary beneficiaries in their
wills and life insurance policies. Hinman and Beatty have entered into a covenant
of mutual economic support and would marry if they were not prohibited from doing so
by state law."
However, the court decides that, in pursuing the DPA's classification system, the
plaintiffs erred. The DPA distinguishes between married and unmarried employees. The
court advises: " As we have discussed, that distinction is rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose, the state's interest in promoting marriage. As counsel
for DPA correctly points out, plaintiffs' real quarrel is with the California
Legislature if they wish to legitimize the status of a homosexual partner.
Plaintiffs may achieve the reform they seek here only by attacking Civil Code
section 4100, which defines marriage to be a civil contract 'between a man and a
woman.' We cannot change that law here."
Box 149, Folders 2-4
Master pleadings
1984-1985
Honig, et al. v. City and County of San Francisco, et al.
1984-1985
Scope and Contents
In this case, both a "taxpayers' suit and an individual action," San Francisco
taxpayers Lisa Honig and Nancy L. Davis brought suit against the City and County of
San Francisco, as well as its Sheriff and Commander of the Hall of Justice Jail
Facility. Those effected by the lawsuit included Benton D. Burt, who was
representing himself in court, and Susan Hoffman, his legal assistant. It sought to
end the practice at the San Francisco Hall of Justice of "arbitrarily precluding
confidential in-person visits between 'pre-trial detainees' (a phrase...used to
refer to detainees awaiting trial or sentencing) who are representing themselves in
the criminal actions against them and their court appointed 'legal runners and
paralegal assistants.'" These assistants are often court appointed. The current
practice at the time of this case was to only allow detainees representing
themselves in court to meet with their assistants in a room in which they were
separated by a glass partition, which made the exchange of legal documents
difficult, and requires that they be reviewed by a Deputy Sheriff. The people
meeting may only speak to each other by telephone. The complaint argues:
"Confidential communications between a pretrial detainee and his legal
representative thus cannot be effectuated in the visiting area."
In response, the court ordered that the Sheriff "shall extend to Ms. Hoffman all
rights and privileges regarding confidentiality and access to the defendant, as
would be extended to any defense counsel representing an inmate housed in the county
jail." They also ordered that Ms. Hoffman should be paid for her services.
Box 149, Folders 5-6
Master pleadings I
1984-1985
Box 149, Folder 7, Box 164, Folders 35-36
Correspondence
1984-1985
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2065 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164). Filed alongside Honig,
et al. v. City and County of San Francisco, et al. is a misfiled case, Holbrook v.
Powers, which contains attorney notes, correspondence, and master pleadings. It
can be found in Box 149, Folder 8, and also has a folder in Attorney-Client
Privilege box 2 (Box 164, Folder 7).
People of the State of California v. Hugel
1980-1982
Scope and Contents
In this case, Paul Garrett Hugel, the plaintiff, was charged with violating a City
of Santa Cruz Municipal Ordinance against selling "goods, wares, and merchandise" on
the street when he placed a backpack upon which were displayed magazines for sale,
without a permit. Hugel "sought declaratory relief, and an injunction against
enforcement of the ordinance on the ground that it was unconstitutional."
The case asks several questions including: 1. Do the terms "goods, wares, and
merchandise" apply to printed matter? 2. Is the ordinance in question unclear or
overbroad? Lawyers for the plaintiff write: "We conclude that the ordinance, if
applied to printed material, would inhibit the exercise of freedom of speech and the
press, and would be constitutionally overbroad." The court agreed with Hugel and the
ACLU, and deemed the ordinance unconstitutional. The City of Santa Cruz was also
ordered to return the magazines, which they had confiscated, to Hugel.
Box 149, Folder 9
Correspondence; attorney notes
1980-1982
Box 149, Folders 10-12
Master pleadings
1980-1982
Runkle v. Medaphis Inc.
1993
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU supported Robert Runkle, who was employed as a bill
collector by Medaphis, Inc (a Georgia-based company doing business in California)
starting in October of 1986. His duties included "telephone bill collecting, mailing
itemized statements to customers, and keeping records of his own accounts." He
excelled at his job, and his performance was commended.
Runkle was an openly gay, HIV positive man, who experienced harassment and
discrimination because of these qualities. He experienced "persistent and egregious
harassment and discrimination," including being denied winnings in an "intra-office
productivity contest." Coworkers used slurs in his presence, and he was not allowed
to receive personal phone calls at work from his partner, while his heterosexual
coworkers were allowed to do so. When he informed his supervisor that he was HIV
positive, he was told to keep this information to himself, and, at one point, he was
denied a promotion because of his HIV positive status. At one point, a coworker
brought a handgun to the office and threatened to kill Runkle. The harassment
escalated over the course of many years, becoming more and more hateful, until
September 22, 1992, when the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement.
He alleged thirteen counts of workplace abuses, including "sexual orientation
discrimination", "hostile work environment harassment," "disability discrimination,"
and "negligent supervision." The court ruled in support of Mr. Runkle, stating that
his "privacy protections are no less robust simply because his sexual life reflects
something other than a heterosexual orientation." They also write, in reference to
the California Worker's Compensation Act (WCA), which the defendants attempted to
use in their argument: "In order to rule that WCA exclusivity applies to the
above-referenced causes of action, the court must find that such outrageous
harassment is a 'normal part of the employment relationship.' Plaintiff submits that
this simply must not be the case."
Box 149, Folders 13-16
Court papers 201A, Volume IA
1993
Box 149, Folders 17-19
Court papers 201, Volume I
1993
Hull v. Cason
1977-1981
Scope and Contents
The ACLU submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiffs in this 1980 Supreme
Court case which considers, again, the mechanics of affirmative action. Once again,
the discriminatory employment zone under considerations is city firefighters - in
this case, in the City of Oakland. The court writes: "The superior court had
adjudged, among other things, that "[i]n order to ameliorate the effects of past
racial discrimination, [the City of Oakland's] appointment of fire fighters . . .
shall [for 5 years] be at the rate of at least two racial minorities [sic] for each
Caucasian. . . ." (And see pp. 357-358, infra.) They also note that, though most
would agree that affirmative action of some sort is needed, the calculations
involved are often a point of much debate.
The case also considers the "Equal Protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title VII, all of which seek to ameliorate
discriminatory hiring practices. It considers "good faith" efforts by city entities
to improve their "shameful" histories, and asks whether these efforts are enough.
The question the effects of employment examinations and their "racially disparate
impacts." Invoking the "racially disproportionate impact" on white applicants of the
Equal Protection clause, the court writes: "Under this authority the City had
committed neither Civil Rights Act, nor Fourteenth Amendment, violation in respect
of the claim of racially discriminatory impact of its fire fighter employment tests,
examinations, and other employment criteria." Reversing the judgement, the court
also write: "the superior court will bear in mind that the purpose of the City's
fire department is the protection of the lives and property of its people; it is not
to furnish jobs for persons found to be unsuited for that task. If such deficiencies
are found, and as long as the City shall act in good faith and without intent or
purpose to discriminate on racial grounds, affirmative relief of the sort here
applied by the judgment will be improper."
Box 150, Folders 2-4
Master pleading file I
1977-1979
Box 150, Folders 5-6
Master pleading file II
1980-1981
People of the State of California v. Ghafari; Ghafari v. Municipal Court
for the City and Council of San Francisco; Majd v. Municipal Court for the City and
Council of San Francisco; People of the State of California v. Majd; Ghafari and
Majd v. Municipal Court for the City and Council of San Francisco ("Iranian student
cases")
1976-1979
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented two Iranian students, Farzad Ghafari and
Homayoon Majd, who were exercising their right to protest outside of the Iranian
Consulate in San Francisco in 1976. The two students, both Iranian nationals and
members of the Iranian Students Association (I.S.A.), were both vigorously opposed
the Iranian government at the time. However, they obscured their identities while
protesting by placing leaflets between their glasses and their faces. They were
arrested for violating s arrested for violating Penal Code section 650a, This 1923
statute makes it a misdemeanor "to appear on any street or highway, or in other
public places or any place open to view by the general public, with his face
partially or completely concealed by means of a mask or other regalia or
paraphernalia, with intent thereby to conceal his identity." The wearing of fun or
playful masks "in good faith" is not prohibited. The court finds this statute
overbroad and void for vagueness, in addition to denying equal protection.
Of this concealment, the court writes, "...they are fearful that if their identity
became known as I.S.A. members and demonstrators, retaliatory measures of an
unpleasant nature may be taken against them here and against their relatives in Iran
by agents of the Iranian government." The court, defending the students rights to
"freedom of speech, peaceful assembly and free association" as being at the very
center of a democratic society. The People, as defendants, erroneously claim that
the students were about the "sack" the Embassy, which is untrue.
The court, which exonerates the students, discounts the idea that the mere presence
of masked people in public will necessarily lead to violence and state: "If, in a
given situation, those fears prove justified, narrowly drawn statutes exist to
protect legitimate state interests." The court protects anonymous appearances in
public where these appearances concern the exercising of First Amendment rights.
Box 150, Folders 7-8
People of the State of California v. Ghafari: Master pleading file
I
1976-1979
Box 150, Folders 9-10
Ghafari v. Municipal Court for the City and County of San Francisco; Majd
v. Municipal Court for the City and County of San Francisco: Consolidated appeal -
pleadings
Box 150, Folders 11-12
People of the State of California v. Majd: Master pleading I
1977-1979
Box 150, Folders 13-14
Ghafari and Majd v. Municipal Court for the City and County of San
Francisco: Master pleadings (Writ of Prohibition)
1977
Box 150, Folders 15-16
People of the State of California v. Jackson
1980
Scope and Contents
This case concerns a death penalty verdict for Lloyd Earl Jackson, and is
significant for being the first time a death sentence was affirmed by justices since
1967, and the death penalty's reinstatement in California in 1977. The ACLU
represented Jackson, who was described by the press as a "impoverished,
illiterate...black youth." He was appealing his death sentence following a
conviction of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of burglary committed
in Long Beach in 1977. He also sought a writ of habeas corpus, based on his belief
that he was ineffectively represented by his trial counsel (a court-appointed public
defender).
Jackson was convicted of the robbery and murder of two elderly women, and the
sexual assault of one of those women. In an extended argument which considered
numerous factors, such as the adequacy of trial counsel and the admissibility of
certain evidence such as photos of the victims and statements made by the Jackson to
the police, in addition to, significantly, also considering the constitutionality of
the 1977 Death Penalty Legislation, the court decided to uphold the death penalty
verdict. They wrote, "Defendant received a fair trial."
It is also worth noting that, since his 1977 death sentence, a federal appeals
court ordered a retrial in 2008, the result of which was Jackson being resentenced
to death in 2010. In October of 2015, the California Supreme Court appointed counsel
to represent Jackson on direct appeal.
Box 150, Folder 17
Research and miscellaneous
1980
Box 150, Folder 18
Due process, death penalty
1980
Kershaw v. City of Berkeley
1981-1985
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of the award of attorney's
fees. Here, Anthony P. Kershaw and other residents of the City of Berkeley, alleged
an improper use of their tax money, which was deposited in a General Fund. The
specific situation that the case discusses concerns a Rent Board budget deficit of
$68,000, which was taken out of the general fund as a "loan" to be paid back.
However, it had none of the ordinary features of a loan. It is also in violation of
Sections 6f(17) and 6n of the Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause
Ordinance (the "Rent Ordinance"), which "prohibits financing the reasonable and
necessary expenses of the Rent Board with money from the General Fund," and which
was passed in June of 1980.
The plaintiffs allege that this improper use of money from the General Fund would
make curtail other necessary City services, such as "health, welfare, library and
other vital community services." They also point out that, as the money taken out of
the General Fund was unable to earn interest, "plaintiffs will suffer further injury
in the form of increased taxes, reduced services, or a foregone reduction of future
taxes as a result of the unavailability of this additional money."
The issue that the ACLU weighed in on was whether the case served a large enough
group of people so as to qualify for the award of attorney's fees for the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs won their case against the City, and the court ordered
that the money be returned to the General Fund, and also that attorney's fees be
awarded.
Box 150, Folder 19
Reporter's transcript on appeal
1983
Box 150, Folder 21, Box 164, Folder 38
Correspondence
1981-1985
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2063 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
People of the State of California v. Kraft
1979-1981
Scope and Contents
Here, the ACLU represented plaintiff and lawyer Eleanor Kraft in yet another case
of abuse of power by police officers. Kraft, a practicing lawyer since 1961, was
consulting with clients Marion Wayne Odell and Arlene Bennett in their home,
following a civil court appearance that day. Ten police officers, armed and not
wearing uniforms, entered the house, terrifying Kraft and her clients. Kraft yelled
at the police officers ("a very excited loud yell") and demanded to see the warrant,
which they did have. The officers later alleged that she "delayed or obstructed the
officers in the discharge of their duties." Much was made of Kraft's yelling, which
was her only alleged "interference," and she was eventually arrested. An officer
pointed a gun at her, but she felt confused by their lack of uniforms and the fact
that they did not immediately present the warrant upon entering. The People argued
that Kraft had no right to ask to see the warrant. She asserted that their actions
were not related to a discharge of their duty, and requested the exclusion of
certain evidence.
Probably as a result of Kraft's knowledge of the law, the case dragged on and a
retrial was necessary. The outcome of the case is not obvious from the materials
provided.
Box 151, Folders 1-2
Master pleadings I - retrial
1979-1980
Box 151, Folder 3
Master pleadings - appeal
1979
Box 151, Folder 4
Research; attorney notes
circa 1979-1980
Box 151, Folder 5, Box 164, Folder 39
Correspondence
1979-1980
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2060 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
Box 151, Folder 6
Correspondence - retrial
1980
Box 151, Folder 7
Briefs; correspondence
1980-1981
People of the State of California v. Kramas
1981
Scope and Contents
This case, which went all the way to the Supreme Court, upheld the
constitutionality of surprise and warrantless inspections of mines and quarries,
presumably for safety reasons. Joe Kramas, the defendant, was President of
Sigmanetics, Inc. in Concord, CA, and was concerned with "certain provisions of the
Fire Code which afford right of entry to private property for the purpose of fire
safety inspection by authorized fire department personnel." Refusal of entry would
result in a misdemeanor citation, and Kramas wanted to see provisions of the Code
relating to right of entry repealed. The People argued that warrantless inspections
"violated the Fourth Amendment's provisions against unreasonable search and
seizure." The Court, in their decision, argued that these inspections were necessary
to protect "the lives and health of mine employees," and that "the absence of
advance notice was essential to effectiveness of the inspection program."
Box 151, Folder 8, Box 164, Folder 40
Administrative search
1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2061 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 2 (Box 164).
KRON-TV and Dann v. Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States
Department of Justice
1985-1986
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented Jonathan Dann and his employer, news outlet
KRON-TV, which filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for FBI agency
records concerning Samathana Smith for a special news report titled "Government
Spying" (for which Dann was the producer). Samantha Smith was a 10 year old American
girl who, in 1982, had written a letter to then-Soviet leader Yuri Andropov
inquiring about the possibility of nuclear war between the United States and Russia.
In a show of goodwill, Andropov invited Smith and her parents to tour the Soviet
Union, which was highly publicized, and after which a press conference was held.
Dann's FOIA request was denied, and this case argues that the 11 pages on Samantha
Smith are being "improperly held by defendants." The plaintiffs sought expedited
release of said records by the FBI, as well as recompense for attorneys fees. The
plaintiffs also questioned whether "agency personnel acted arbitrarily or
capriciously with respect to withholding the records requested."
Master pleadings; correspondence; press
1985-1986
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented Jonathan Dann and his employer, news outlet
KRON-TV, which filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for FBI agency
records concerning Samathana Smith for a special news report titled "Government
Spying" (for which Dann was the producer). Samantha Smith was a 10 year old
American girl who, in 1982, had written a letter to then-Soviet leader Yuri
Andropov inquiring about the possibility of nuclear war between the United States
and Russia. In a show of goodwill, Andropov invited Smith and her parents to tour
the Soviet Union, which was highly publicized, and after which a press conference
was held.
Dann's FOIA request was denied, and this case argues that the 11 pages on
Samantha Smith are being "improperly held by defendants." The plaintiffs sought
expedited release of said records by the FBI, as well as recompense for attorneys
fees. The plaintiffs also questioned whether "agency personnel acted arbitrarily
or capriciously with respect to withholding the records requested."
Libertarian Party v. Murphy
1982-1984
Scope and Contents
In this case, in which the ACLU represented plaintiffs Libertarian Party of San
Francisco, the Libertarian Party sued the San Francisco Police Department, including
Chief of Police Cornelius P. Murphy, for conducting what they alleged to be a
retaliatory raid on the Libertarian Party bookstore in October of 1981, and for
arresting everyone on the premises at the time of the raid, including bookstore
patrons.
Plaintiffs allege that the reason for the raid was a petition circulated by the
Libertarian Party in 1979 to place a measure on the ballot to eliminate the San
Francisco Police Department's Vice Crimes Division. Though the measure was defeated
in the election, it caused great debate about the practices of the Vice Crimes
division and focused public attention on the division and its members.
The police officers who conducted the raid exploited the presence of a business
with the same address located adjacent to Libertarian Books and Periodicals ("Mail
Central," a private mail pick-up and message answering service) from which one of
the police officers had, earlier that day, purchased $50 worth of marijuana. The
search warrant and the subsequent affidavit signed by Officer LaRocca in support of
the warrant did not distinguish between the premises of Mail Central and the larger
premises of Libertarian Books and Periodicals, which the plaintiffs argue was
strategic.
The plaintiffs report that the bookstore was ransacked and that "defendants
intentionally and maliciously pulled books and periodicals from shelves, overturned
file cabinets, and shuffled papers." The police officers also "confiscated and
destroyed party membership lists, files, photos, printing equipment, and books."
Plaintiffs argue that such tactics were commonplace in the Vice Crimes division, and
that defendants such as Murphy, Eimil, and Philpott knew of such behavior and failed
to appropriately supervise or limit this behavior, and are therefore complicit.
Plaintiffs argue that the above behavior violated their First and Fourth Amendment
rights and that the October 6, 1981 raid was "intentionally and maliciously executed
for purposes of retaliation, intimidation and retribution against plaintiffs'
exercise of constitutional rights."
The Libertarian Party, by way of compromise, offered, by way of letter, to settle
the case for $60,000, plus costs and attorneys fees. The offer was good for one
month, and no response was ever received. Additionally, the plaintiffs intended to
pursue vigorously claims for punitive damages against members of the police
department.
Box 151, Folder 11, Box 166, Folder 9
Correspondence
1982-1984
Conditions Governing Access
Folder removed because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
Box 151, Folder 12
Jury instructions
circa 1982-1984
Box 151, Folders 22-23, Box 165, Folder 1, Box 166, Folder 10
Pleadings IV
1983-1984
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2064 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials. Another folder is restricted
because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165). Another folder in
Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
Box 151, Folder 24
Extra copies of pleadings
1983-1984
Manning v. Municipal Court, Alameda County, Oakland-Piedmont Judicial
District
1981-1982
Scope and Contents
The ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of Gail Manning who appealed her
conviction of a violation of section 316 of the Penal Code, in which, according to
such code, she "did willfully and unlawfully keep a house used for the purpose of
assignation or prostitution, and did let rooms, apartments, or tenements, knowing
that it [sic] was to be used for the purpose of assignation or prostitution." She
asserted that this language, written in 1872 and amended once between 1873-1874, was
"overbroad and void for vagueness." The court agreed. However, the court decided
that prostitution, in any language, is not legal and therefore the entire statute
could not be dismissed.
The court writes: "The purported appeal from the order denying plaintiff's motion
to strike the district attorney's return is dismissed. The order denying the
petition for writ of mandate/prohibition is reversed, and the trial court is
directed to issue a writ of mandate compelling defendant municipal court to sustain
the demurrer to the complaint which charges plaintiff with violating section
316."
Box 152, Folder 2
Master pleading
1981-1982
Maria de Lourdes P. v. Riles
1985
Scope and Contents
The ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of Maria P., who in April of 1975 was a
seven-year-old child who, through her mother as legal guardian and with support from
taxpayers Arthur Torres (an Assemblyman) and Richard Alatorre, filed suit against
Wilson Riles, then Superintendent of Schools for the State of California, the El
Centro Elementary School District, and its Board of Trustees. The plaintiffs issued
a three-part complaint, which sought 1. to prevent Maria from being denied admission
to school as a result of her noncitizen immigration status, 2. to prevent the school
district from reporting her immigration status to the Board of Supervisors and to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as was required by then Education Code
section 6957, and 3. to prevent the State Superintendent of Schools from
implementing Education Code section 6957 throughout the state.
On April 25, 1975, the court issued a temporary restraining order against the
defendants, prohibiting them from reporting the names and addresses of noncitizen
immigrant children to the INS. The school argued that it had never refused Maria
admission, and that it was not in the practice of reporting children to federal or
state authorities. However, they admitted that if, at any point, they received these
instructions that they would honor them.
On September 16, 1975, the court issued a preliminary injunction that "found that
Education Code section 6957 was in conflict with the federal Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 and was therefore void under the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution." Defendant Riles was prohibited from reporting the
identities of noncitizen immigrant children, and was also instructed to "issue
written instructions to every school district within the state prohibiting each from
disclosing to federal authorities" the identities of these children. Riles failed to
comply with this order by issuing a memorandum advising the district to decide for
themselves whether they were obligated to comply with section 6957 "as currently
written."
As a result, another hearing was held to determine whether Riles had complied with
the terms of the injunction. Following the hearing, Riles was ordered to issue
another memorandum "requiring the local districts to abide by the court's order and
not release any identifying information to federal authorities." Riles complied.
Marketello, et al. v. Neal, et al.
1978
Scope and Contents
In this case, plaintiffs Thomas Marketello, James A. Bonar, Phil E. Kirkland, and
the Santa Cruz County Peace Officers Association filed suit against Richard C. Neal,
Clerk of the County of Santa Cruz, as well as other, including the Board of
Supervisors of the County of Santa Cruz. It concerns a petition filed in 1978 by the
Committee Against Legalized Militarism, also known as the Anti-SWAT initiative,
which would prohibit "law enforcement use of automatic weapons and participation in
military or paramilitary operations or training." The second initiative under
consideration was the Law Enforcement Review Commission Initiative, which would
establish a citizen review board to audit county law enforcement. The matter before
the court was a request for injunction to restrain the County Clerk and Board of
Supervisors from submitting two initiative measures to vote at the June 6, 1978
election. The taxpayers allege that putting these initiatives up to a vote would
result in "a useless expenditure and waste of public funds."
The court writes that "the initiative procedure should only be cut short where the
invalidity of the proposed measure is clear beyond a doubt." It decided that it
would put both initiatives on the ballot and let the voters decide. Both initiatives
were defeated in the election.
Box 152, Folder 6
Master pleadings - Court of Appeal
1978
Box 152, Folder 7
Master pleadings - Supreme Court
1978
People of the State of California v. Owen
1984-1986
Scope and Contents
In this extensive early 1980s case, the ACLU submitted an amicus brief in support
of a large class action lawsuit in which the People of the State of California,
including the City of San Francisco Attorney, George Agnost, as well as Mervyn
Silverman, the Director of Public Health, brought a lawsuit against the owners and
operators of city bathhouses, such as Ima Jean Owen and several others who operated
San Francisco bathhouses such as the Academy, the Animals, the Boot Camp, and the
Club Baths of San Francisco. Also under threat of closure were gay bookstores
throughout the city.
This particular case happened almost concurrently with the ACLU's 1986 assertion
that "civil liberties policies need to be developed in response to the AIDS crisis."
A 1984 internal document notes an effort by the City of San Francisco to regulate or
spy on bathhouse behavior "threatens unwarranted infringement of protected privacy,
associational and liberty interests even when it is thought to be demanded by
considerations of 'public health necessity.'" San Francisco was the first city to
ask these questions. Over the course of the case, much research was conducted and
many scientific experts testified and debated the impact of bathhouses on the spread
of AIDS. In a letter to Silverman, an ACLU staff attorney informed him that the
ACLU's policy "requires the staff to carefully scrutinize any government effort
designed to combat AIDS which would regulate, restrict, or prohibit consensual
sexual behavior among gay men, including those sexual activities thought to be
associated with the spread of AIDS..." She goes on to state that such action must be
"justified by a 'compelling government interest which cannot be achieved by any less
restrictive alternative.'" An important component of the ACLU's argument was that
these acts happen in private, where "such conduct will not be observed by people who
are likely to find it offensive." They requested access to any information that the
city had used in coming to the conclusion that bathhouses helped spread the AIDS
virus. Silverman had also conducted a campaign to educate gay men about high risk
sexual behavior and the spread of AIDS.
These case files also contain related files concerning a similar case in New York
City. A scholar notes: "As reported by the CDC, by March 11, 1985, there were a
reported 3088 cases in New York, versus 1030 cases in San Francisco, the city only
second to New York hit hardest by the epidemic." The virus was little understood,
and greatly feared, and much of the debate is colored by this lack of understanding.
At one point, the city attempted to hire private investigators to spy on bathhouse
activity, which the ACLU argued is a clear violation of the Constitutional right to
privacy. It also, as staff attorney Maggie Crosby notes, "raises equal protection
issues." She also writes: "The City may also close the bathhouses by revoking their
licenses through Section 2616 of the Police Code" which requires a police permit for
operating bathhouses. She grants that "Generally, states and local governments have
broad authority, under their police powers, to establish regulations to protect the
health of their citizens." However, she also writes: "the application of the
quarantine laws to the bathhouses presents a rather unique situation." She notes is
disproportionate impact on the gay community, with regard to equal protection laws,
and notes that there is little legal precedent for the current situation. Many
activists spoke out against the closures, and many interesting histories and legal
analyses of this case have been written.
Box 152, Folders 11-15
Pleadings prior to amicus
1984
Box 152, Folders 16-18
New York pleadings I
1985
Box 152, Folders 19-20, Box 153, Folder 1
New York pleadings II
1985
Box 153, Folders 2-3
Gay bathhouses - research, press
1984
Piña v. Carmel Unified School District of Monterey County, et al.
1978-1981
Scope and Contents
Here, the ACLU represented Charles V. Piña, a school bus driver employed by the
Carmel Unified School District from 1967 to 1974. The lawsuit was filed against the
Board of Trustees of the Carmel Unified School District, the District
superintendent, and the Board of Education of the State of California. Piña was a
baptized member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which requires the observance
of the Sabbath on the seventh day of the week as one of its core religious tenets.
The observance of this day, which began after sundown on Friday, meant that Piña was
unable to drive the bus during this time - a restriction that the school complied
with and made accommodations for until November of 1974, when the plaintiff was
required to drive the bus after sundown because no replacement driver could be found
and despite "the extreme distress this caused him and his family since he was
breaking a sacred and absolute religious law, according to his beliefs." Piña had
previously been assured by his supervisor that there would be no difficulty in
finding him a replacement for his Friday evening shifts.
After asserting, again, that he was unavailable to drive these shifts, Piña, who
was unable to read, had two letters read to him and was told to sign one of them.
One letter promised that he would drive irregardless of the hours, and the other was
a letter of resignation, which he was coerced into signing, because of the above
circumstances. The complaint states: "Maintenance of a pattern and practice of
discrimination on the basis of religion as demonstrated by defendants' coercive acts
in securing Plaintiff's resignation, are in violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States." The plaintiff sought both preliminary and permanent
injunctions requiring that he be restored to his prior position with "full seniority
and salary and with appropriate seniority and salary increments," as well as
requiring that another driver be assigned during the Friday sundown period, and
preventing further discrimination on the basis of his religion. Additionally, he
sought to have the above behavior declared illegal.
The court, in a judgement dated September 1, 1981, complied with nearly all of
these requests, finding evidence of discriminatory practices by the Carmel Unified
School District, and awarded Piña back pay in the sum of $32,106.89. Pursuant to
obtaining all necessary licenses and certificates needed to perform his job, Piña
was also to be reinstated to his former position. Attorneys fees in the amount of
$25, 593.80 were also awarded.
Box 153, Folder 4, Box 165, Folder 2
Correspondence
1978-1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2062 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Box 153, Folders 5-6
Master pleadings I
1978-1979
Box 153, Folders 9-11
Master pleadings III
1980
Box 153, Folders 19-20, Box 154, Folder 1
Master pleading VII
1980-1981
Box 154, Folders 2-4
Master pleading VIII
1981
Pittsburgh Unified School District v. California School Employee
Association (CSEA)
1981-1985
Scope and Contents
This case concerns a contract negotiation between California School Employees
Association (CSEA), as represented by its union, CSEA Local 44, and the Pittsburgh
Unified School District in November of 1980, as well as actions taken by Pittsburgh
Unified in to curtail the rights of CSEA members to picket and distribute leaflets
about the labor dispute outside the offices of Pittsburgh Unified board members in
March of 1981.
CSEA rallied support from its individual members after a stalled contract
negotiation between CSEA and Pittsburgh Unified, which had lasted 12 negotiating
sessions and then stalled. As is often the case in such situations, CSEA sought to
publicize the labor dispute, mobilize its membership, and encourage attendance at
District board of governors meetings. CSEA described its activity as a "Public
Information Picket," and did not block entry to or exit from the board members'
private business offices, which are located in a busy thoroughfare in the center of
the city of Pittsburgh. On the third day of the picket, Pittsburgh Unified filed a
complaint with the Contra Costa County Superior Court, seeking injunctive relief and
damages in the amount of one million dollars. The district sought a temporary
restraining order and the prohibition of picketing outside of board members'
offices. Judge David A. Dolgin complied, but then, after a hearing, dissolved the
temporary restraining order "on the sole ground that the school district itself is
not a proper party to enforce the personal rights of individual Board members." CSEA
was advised to limit its activities to leafletting.
CSEA reportedly only hadn't out leaflets to people who expressed interest, and the
names of relevant board members were printed on them. According to a CSEA member,
the purpose was "[t]o draw attention from the public to the fact that these are
Board members and [that] they can be contacted." Another temporary restraining order
was sought, and appellants filed a declaration of prejudice against previous judge
Dolgin. He was replaced by Judge Richard Arneson, who refused to issue the
restraining order.
CSEA and Pittsburgh unified reached an agreement prior to a negotiating session in
April of 1981, wherein CSEA agreed to cease picketing and leafletting activities and
the school District agreed not to seek preliminary injunction. However, in May of
1981, the preliminary injunction was granted by yet another judge (Cooney), and the
appellants appealed this decision.
In response, the court wrote, "...the dissemination of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion
that is guaranteed by the Constitution." They also write: "Moreover, where, as here,
the picketing or leafletting takes place in a public place, it is entitled to
greater protection than might otherwise be true." Of the board members, they write:
"Public office is no place for the thin-skinned" and decry the use of an injunction,
writing that "the granting of temporary injunctions in labor disputes usually has
the effect of determining and terminating the entire controversy." Furthermore, they
write, "the intensity of public concern regarding the costs and quality of public
education" means that "speech or speech-related activities focusing upon this
subject are entitled to a high level of protection under the free speech clause of
the First Amendment." The judgement was reversed and the demand for declaratory
relief and damages was denied.
Box 154, Folders 9-11
Master pleadings II
1981-1982
Box 154, Folders 12-13
Master pleadings III
1982-1985
Polzkill v. City of Pacific Grove
1982-1983
Scope and Contents
Here, the ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of members of the Pacific Grove
Property Rights Committee, who were being sued by plaintiff Robert Polzkill.
Polzkill alleged that the defendants improperly filed an initiative ("Measure B") to
be placed on the ballot, and sought to have it removed. In fact, the initiative was
mistakenly - due to a misunderstanding - filed with the County office, when it
should have been filed with the City. Due to the misunderstanding, the initiative
was filed one day after the deadline for filing. Polzkill also sued the City of
Pacific Grove and the Registrar of Voters for Monterey County, and sought to have
Measure B removed from the ballot.
The initiative in question would limit the density (number of dwelling units per
acre) allowed for residential condominiums, as well as timeshares, by way of a
zoning ordinance. The case was seen, by attorney for the defendants Michael A.
Manlin, as one of many attempts by a wealthy developer to limit the Constitutional
freedoms of voters by threatening them with an expensive lawsuit. The court sided
with the City of Pacific Grove and the ballot measure was upheld.
Box 154, Folder 15, Box 165, Folder 3
Correspondence
1982-1983
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2063 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Box 154, Folder 16
Master pleadings
1982-1983
People of the State of California v. Pompa-Ortiz
1980
Scope and Contents
The ACLU submitted an amicus brief on behalf of appellant Ramon Pompa-Ortiz, who
was convicted of "rape by force or violence," and who was denied his statutory right
to a public preliminary examination under Penal Code section 995. Ostensibly, the
reason for the private hearing was because of the sensitive nature of the victim's
testimony, though the prosecutor did not offer a reason for the request, and the
judge granted it over the defendant's objection. The defendant is allowed the right
to choose a closed or open trial and "may rightfully insist on a public hearing not
only to insure fairness but to attract potential witnesses or supporters." Such a
decision could render a verdict reversible on appeal if it caused prejudice against
the defendant over the course of the trial. However, the court found "no showing of
prejudice," and affirmed the judgement.
Box 154, Folder 17
Amicus brief; correspondence; press; attorney notes
1980
Preston v. Brown [U.S.]
1987
Scope and Contents
This case, which is permanently restricted because it contains sensitive
information, concerns a man employed by the Army who had his access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information ("SCI") revoked in 1979. He was debriefed by his employer
and physically removed from the facility where he had worked for 12 years at a job
which required SCI access. He was not told why his access was revoked, and was not
able to respond. The plaintiff later learned that his access was revoked because of
private homosexual conduct, as well as the disclosure of that conduct to his
ex-spouse and friends. The Army believed that these behaviors indicated a lack of
discretion, and considered this grounds for dismissal from this post.
The plaintiff alleged economic loss and psychological humiliation, and settled with
the Army for a sum of money which cannot be disclosed. The Army had violated its own
policy, which does not allow revocation of SCI access due to private homosexual
conduct. It had also failed to follow proper procedure when dismissing him from his
post. The Army was directed to "amend existing regulations, to make the provisions
of the adverse action procedures pertaining to SCI access." The SCI revocation was
expunged from the plaintiff's record, and plaintiff was eligible for future
considerations of SCI access "without regard to the prior erroneous determination."
Box 166, Folder 12
Correspondence
1987
Conditions Governing Access
Folder has been removed and is permanently restricted because it contains
sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
Price v. Civil Service Commission of Sacramento
1977-1979
Scope and Contents
Like several other cases in this series, Price v. Sacramento County Civil Service
Commission considers race-based hiring quotas. This case, from 1978, concerns Rule
710, which the Civil Service Commission of Sacramento County adopted in order to
remedy "whenever necessary" an imbalance in county agencies. Following hearings, it
was found that certain racial categories were underrrepresented among attorneys in
the Sacramento County District Attorney's office. This was allegedly the result of
"unintentionally discriminatory practices, including 'unvalidated' oral examinations
and insufficient recruitment efforts." The office was urged to make appointments to
the entry level classification on an alternating 2:1 ratio until the percentage of
nonwhite appointees reached 8 percent. The lawsuit was filed by John M. Price, the
Sacramento County DA, who sought to have the quota repealed.
In their conclusion, the court again makes the argument made elsewhere in these
case files that quota systems are themselves discriminatory. In their argument, they
make the notable observation that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which originated in
the House of Representatives, initially faced opposition because of "the fear that
it would impose on unions and employers a federally administered racial quota
system." Of Title VII, they argue that "Contrary to the seeming letter of section
703(a)(2), it classifies individuals in a way depriving Caucasian males of
eligibility..." They also write: "The action of the Sacramento County Civil Service
Commission oversteps that objective and establishes a barrier to the employment of
majority applicants which violates that objective." The quota system was overturned.
Box 154, Folders 19-20
Master pleading file
1977-1978
Ramey v. Gain
1979
Scope and Contents
Here, the ACLU represented the plaintiffs, consisting of residents of the City and
County of San Francisco, including Drucilla S. Ramey, who challenged both the
legality and the enforcement of San Francisco ordinance (section 20 of the San
Francisco Municipal Police Code, enacted in 1977) which "forbids persons to obstruct
sidewalks and other public places or stand in doorways without a property owner's
consent." The plaintiffs also challenge what they call "a persistent pattern of bad
faith enforcement" by San Francisco police officers, represented by defendant
Charles R. Gain, Chief of Police, "whose acts are encouraged and condoned by higher
officials." Through the enforcement of this ordinance, police officers practice
"harassment and punishment of suspects without due process of law." They ordinance
came to be known as "sit-lie," and has come to be associated with the harassment of
the homeless. "Substantial numbers of persons are arrested...under the guise of
section 20 for conduct and status which is entirely innocent and beyond the power of
defendants lawfully to inhibit, restrain, or control," as the Complaint for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief notes. Section 20 violations, in 1979, cost $250.
The plaintiffs charge the ordinance with being unconstitutional under the First,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Presumably, this lawsuit
was not successful, as this ordinance was still in effect in 2013, when infractions
peaked at 1,011.
Box 154, Folder 21
Master pleading file
1979
Ramo v. Department of the Navy
1975-1985
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented plaintiff Alan Ramo, who, in April of 1976 filed
a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for release of information about him
held by both the FBI and the Naval Intelligence Service (NIS). The defendants allege
that they collected this information for reasons of "internal and military
security." Plaintiff alleges that these actions constitute general surveillance.
Information released to the plaintiff included excisions, which these agencies
assert was to protect others named in the documents. Over the two years following
the start of the case, the agencies claim that they released more information as it
was uncovered, though they also began to release some of the information that had
been excised. Concerning the validity of these excisions, the agencies invoked
invoked section 552(b) (7) (C) and (D). These sections "exempt from the statute's
disclosure requirements investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes
that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and that would
disclose the identity of a confidential source," though the plaintiff alleges that
these provisions were improperly relied upon.
Numerous facets of the case were examined, with the most hotly contested one being
the reason for the collection of information about the plaintiff. The court found
that "the NIS did have the authority to investigate plaintiff and his associates."
They also found that "the FBI had a law enforcement purpose when it investigated
plaintiff."
In 1979, the court granted a motion for partial consideration, specifically
concerning the FBI's "see reference" documents, and advised the plaintiff to file a
supplemental request for this information, with which the FBI complied.
Box 165, Folder 4, Box 166, Folder 11
Correspondence
1975-1985
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2065 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials. Some materials have been
removed from attorney-client privilege folder and are permanently restricted.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165). One folder in
Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
Box 154, Folders 22-23
Master pleadings I
1976-1977
Box 154, Folder 24, Box 155, Folder 1
Master pleadings II
1977-1979
Box 155, Folders 2-4
Master pleadings III
1979-1980
Box 155, Folders 5-6
Master pleadings IV
1980-1982
Robbins Amendment (Prop 1): Kerri, et al. and National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. State of California, et al.; Arnaudo v. Eu;
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. State of
California; Crawford, et al. v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles;
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. San
Bernardino
1978-1981
Scope and Contents
These influential and historic cases, taken together, address the still-unresolved
(at the time) issue of school segregation, and whether efforts should be taken to
eliminate this segregation. In San Bernardino v. NAACP, the court acknowledges that
racial segregation exists within the San Bernardino school district, and that the
district is constitutionally obligated to attempt to alleviate this segregation. It
also admits that the same court "...relying upon statutory and administrative
provisions that have since been repealed -- utilized an improper 'racial balance'
standard in determining which schools within the district are unconstitutionally
segregated" and determined that this standard needed to be revised.
Between 1966-1972, the San Bernardino school district (which was, demographically,
around 62 % white) had, it was determined, taken steps to alleviate segregation and
had been somewhat successful. It was questioned whether this improved situation was
actually because of the district's efforts. For example, the district had not
implemented mandatory busing, which the NAACP objected to. They also requested that
the district not only eliminate segregation, but "racial imbalance."
Also in question were sections 5002 and 5003 of the education code, which
Proposition 21 sought to repeal. The court writes: "Section 5002 replaced this
administrative policy statement with a legislative declaration of policy directing
responsible public officials to "prevent and eliminate racial and ethnic imbalance
in pupil enrollment" (italics added) and declaring that "[t]he prevention and
elimination of such imbalance shall be given high priority in all decisions relating
to school sites, school attendance areas, and school attendance practices." fn. 12
Section 5003, in turn, provided, inter alia, that "a racial or ethnic imbalance is
indicated in a school if the percentage of pupils of one or more racial or ethnic
groups differs significantly from the districtwide percentage." (Ed. Code, § 5003,
subd. (c).) Finally, an administrative regulation promulgated under the authority of
section [17 Cal. 3d 321] 5003, subdivision (e) defined a racially or ethnically
imbalanced school more specifically as one in which "the percentage of pupils of one
or more racial or ethnic groups differs by more than 15 percentage points from that
in all the schools in the district." (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 5, former § 14021,
subd. (c).)"
The court concludes: "...except insofar as it defines 'desegregation' with
reference to a racial balance concept, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed
and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion." The Crawford
case also included here proved useful in establishing precedent, and a review of
that case would be necessary to understanding San Bernardino in its entirety. The
"Robbins Amendment" (Prop. 1) was a 1979 ballot measure to end all mandatory busing
and reassignment in Los Angeles, and the measure passed by more than a 2/3rds vote.
This amendment stated that the school districts were not mandated to "exceed the
guarantees" of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Box 155, Folder 7
Kerri, et al. and National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) v. State of California, et al.: Master pleadings
1979
Box 155, Folders 8-9
Arnaudo v. Eu: Master pleadings
1979
Box 155, Folders 10-11
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v.
State of California: Master pleadings; attorney notes
1979-1981
Crawford, et al. v. Board of Education of the City of Los
Angeles
1979-1981
Box 155, Folder 15
Correspondence; attorney notes
1979-1981
Box 155, Folders 16-17, Box 156, Folders 1-4
Master pleadings
1980-1981
Box 156, Folder 5
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. San
Bernardino: Correspondence; Master pleadings
1980
People v. Rodriguez
1980-1982
Scope and Contents
The ACLU filed an amicus brief in this case, which concerns the warrant
requirements of the state and federal constitutions and the question of whether
these requirements permit police searches "into areas ordinarily private from
government scrutiny" without consent of the person being searched, excepting
extenuating circumstances which make a search warrant impossible. More specifically,
they tackled the question of "the automobile exception," and the "inherent mobility
of vehicles which frequently made it impracticable to obtain a search warrant
without the sacrifice of other significant governmental interests."
The Valdez case concerns an arrest made and contraband seized as a result of a
warrantless search of an automobile. The contraband seized was in a paper bag,
inside the trunk of the car. The case here concerns the specifics of whether this
warrantless search violates certain clauses of the "automobile exception," including
the "luggage rule" (items inside of closed containers can't be searched) and the
"plain view rule" (objectionable items must be in plain view in order to justify a
search). They argue: "There simply is no "automobile exception" to the Fourth
Amendment existing apart from the exigent circumstances and plain view rules
discussed above." The outcome of the case is not available in the documents
provided.
Box 156, Folder 6
Correspondence; amicus briefs
1980-1982
Roman v. City of Richmond; Guillory v. City of Richmond; Roman and Guillory
v. City of Richmond
1980-1988
Scope and Contents
In these high profile cases, the ACLU assisted in representing the survivors (Linda
Roman and Wilbert Guillory) of two young black men, Johnny Roman, 22 years old, and
Michael Guillory, 25 years old, killed by police officers in Richmond, California.
The consolidated lawsuits "alleged that each man had been deprived of life without
due process of law in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
Defendants in the suit were the city of Richmond, two police officers, and two
police officials. The two police officers named were Samuel Dudkiewicz and Clinton
Mitchell. Mitchell was involved in the death of Johnny Roman, and Dudkiewicz was
involved in the deaths of both men. According to the New York Times, "Nearly 48
percent of Richmond's population is black; 39.7 percent is white. But only about 20
percent of the 161-member police force is black." The officers allege threat of
immediate bodily harm as the reason for the shootings.
The court found that these killings were a part of a pattern of misconduct by the
Richmond Police Department, and were two of six killings of black men that occurred
between 1980 and 1983. The court writes: "There was a significant amount of
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, of an informal policy, or formal or
informal custom, that encouraged and authorized violence and brutality by Richmond
police officers against black residents of Richmond." The court also found
supervisory officers complicit, writing: "There was substantial evidence presented
at trial that there was a custom encouraging, approving, and ignoring the use of
excessive force by police officers in Richmond." Reporting on the cases, a New York
Times article from 1983 reported: "The suit charged that the city had failed to deal
correctly with a 'deviant cult' of violence-prone officers, nicknamed the 'cowboys,'
whose night patrols were the source of many allegations of police misconduct." They
also wrote that "presented dozens of witnesses who testified to incidents of police
misconduct or brutality."
Following a four month trial, the court awarded damages in the amount of 1.5
million dollars against Clinton Mitchell, Samuel Dudkiewicz, Leo Garfield and the
City of Richmond (the police officers and supervisory officials named in the
lawsuit). In support of their verdict, the court named "a custom or policy" of
brutality against the black residents of Richmond, as well as "assorted evidentiary
errors" made by the police, among other reasons. The Times wrote that "a Federal
jury said it was sending a message to that city to change its ways."
Box 156, Folder 8
Roman v. City of Berkeley: USDC -- Roman pleadings I
1980-1982
Guillory v. City of Berkeley
1980-1982
Box 156, Folder 9
USDC -- Guillory pleadings I
1980-1982
Box 156, Folder 10
USDC -- Guillory pleadings II
1980-1982
Roman and Guillory v. City of Richmond
1983-1988
Box 156, Folder 7, Box 165, Folder 5, Box 166, Folder 13
Correspondence
1983-1988
Conditions Governing Access
One folder is restricted until 2063 because it contains attorney-client
privileged information, and has been separated from materials. Another folder is
permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165). One folder in
Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
Box 156, Folder 11
USDC Proceedings -- Pleadings I
1980-1983
Box 156, Folders 12-14
USDC Proceedings -- Pleadings II
1983-1985
Box 156, Folders 15-16
9th Circuit Court of Appeals -- Pleadings I
1983-1985
Rush v. Obledo
1983-1985
Scope and Contents
The ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of Kathleen Rush, Eleanor Fraser and San
Mateo County Daycare Association. Rush, in 1981, operated a licensed family day care
home and an association of licensed family day care providers, sought an injunction
against a California state statute that permitted warrantless inspections of home
daycare facilities. Rush alleged that the statute was unconstitutional inasmuch as
it violated the Fourth Amendment.
The court, in response, writes: "Because the state has a vital governmental
interest in the protection of children which is furthered by warrantless
inspections, and because family day care homes are pervasively regulated and all
providers are required by statute to be alerted to this pervasive regulation, we
hold that properly limited warrantless inspections of family day care homes do not
offend the Fourth Amendment." However, they also find the current statutes
overbroad, "allowing inspections which are unnecessary for the furtherance of state
interests, and thus invalid under the Fourth Amendment as general searches." Thus,
the original judgement of the district court was reversed in part, affirmed in part.
Box 156, Folder 18
Correspondence; amicus brief
1983-1985
Box 156, Folders 19-20
Master pleadings file
1984-1985
Salmeron v. Gover
1980-1982
Scope and Contents
This case description leaves out the names of the people involved, as it concerns
the Witness Protection Program. It concerns a late 1970s administrative error on the
part of the Witness Protection Program which resulted in the violation of California
Penal Code Section 278. As a result, children were entered into the program without
the knowledge of their father - also their legal guardian. The family in question is
made up of divorced parents, and much of the confusion concerns very specific,
time-sensitive questions of custody. The ACLU represented the father, who sought the
return of his children.
Due to the sensitive nature of these materials, all of the available materials
associated with this case are restricted until 2062.
Box 165, Folder 8
Correspondence
1980-1982
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2062 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Box 165, Folder 6
Master pleadings
1981-1982
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2062 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Western Shelter Management Company v. Associated Renters of 1855 Petaluma
Hill Road (Santa Rosa Renters Libel Suit)
1979-1981
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented a group of Santa Rosa renters who, in 1981,
chose to vigorously protest "rent increases of 80% to as much as 140%" enacted by
the plaintiffs, including Bruce Moore, Carroll Moore, Sandra Sanford, Peter Sanford,
and Pasquale K. Ragonizzi Foundation, doing business as a company called Western
Shelter Management Company. To protest the rent increase, renters organized a strike
and posted fliers in English and Spanish on and around the property, advising others
to not rent from Bruce Moore, the owner. The property, located at 1855 Petaluma Hill
Road, comprised of forty cabins and duplexes and occupied, according to the renters,
by those who are "mostly low income, students, and the elderly." The renters allege
unsafe and unsanitary living conditions, which is confirmed by a Sonoma County
Building Inspection document. The rent strike resulted in eviction notices for the
tenants, as well as a lawsuit.
The landlord, Bruce Moore, alleged libel and tortious interference ("intentional
interference with contractual relations, in the common law of torts, occurs when one
person intentionally damages someone else's contractual or business relationships
with a third party causing economic harm") and sought damages in the amount of
$50,000 against "the defendants and each of them."
Though the case correspondence doesn't have information about the verdict, ACLU
Staff Counsel Maggie Crosby wrote to another lawyer, "The situation...is a cause
celebre in Sonoma - big articles in the local newspapers about people battling the
slumlord."
Box 157, Folder 1, Box 165, Folder 7
Correspondence
1979-1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2062 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Saylor v. Murphy
1980-1983
Scope and Contents
Here, the ACLU represented taxpayers Doyle James Saylor and Ana B. Patten, who
sought to have Section 675(b) of the San Francisco Municipal Police Code, which
"broadly proscribes the posting of signs on 'property owned or controlled by the
City and County of San Francisco'" declared unconstitutional. Section 675(b)
excludes "Christmas decorations, signs or banners of non-profit merchant groups, and
signs promoting a parade or cultural event." The ACLU calls this "preferential
treatment of freedom of expression" and argue that it violates the Fist Amendment,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and certain provisions of
the California Constitution.
The sign in question pertained to a controversial proposition on the June 1980
ballot which was referred to as the "Tax the Corporations" Proposition. The ACLU
argued that this prohibition is undoubtedly, according to the California Supreme
Court, a form of expression protected by the First Amendment.
In response, the court writes: "Defendants alleged sign posting has been declared
unlawful because of the message conveyed by the sign." While their freedom of
expression is constitutionally protected, the court argues that it has no
jurisdiction to try an offense charged under such a statute under Penal Code Section
1004(1).
Attorney's fees
1982-1983
Box 157, Folder 3, Box 165, Folder 9
Correspondence
1980-1983
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2060 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Box 157, Folder 4, Box 165, Folder 10
Pleadings I
1980-1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2061 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Serrano v. Unruh
1981
Scope and Contents
This case concerns an issue in which the ACLU most certainly had a stake, which is
the issue of attorneys' fees, and the fact that the "Code of Civil Procedure...does
not permit a court to award attorneys' for time expended in litigating issues
related to the award of fees." This appears to have been a debated issue within the
legal community, in particular among public interest attorneys such as those at the
ACLU. At the heart of this case is the question of whether the "central purpose" of
fee awards is to reimburse attorneys for time spent on fee litigation, or whether
the purpose is to reimburse attorneys for time spent on public issue litigation.
As stated by ACLU staff counsel Amitai Schwartz, the effect that this issue has on
organizations like the ACLU is of the possibility of attorneys' fees being diluted
by an aggressive defendant. It seems to leave the fee settlement to the discretion
of the judge. Serrano v. Unruh examines the issue as a result of "a constitutional
challenge to the financing system for California public schools, and a subsequent
appeal seeking attorneys' fees for the 'school financing' lawsuit." It is the third
in a series of Serrano lawsuits, the first beginning in 1976, and the judgement
distinguishes this cases from the proceeding cases by noting, "Unlike their
representation of the public interest in Serrano II, however, respondents pursued
their own interests in Serrano III." The court decided that the "attorney-fee order
regarding Serrano III must be reversed 'for want of the pivotal element of
predominant public interest.'"
Central Valley Chapter of 7th Step Foundation Inc., et al. v.
Younger
1977-1982
Scope and Contents
This taxpayer lawsuit, filed by the Central Valley Chapter of 7th Step Foundation,
a nonprofit dedicated to assisting ex-offenders with employment issues, concerns the
constitutionality of distributing arrest records to public employers and licensing
entities. The lawsuit was filed against James R. Rasmussen, the Assistant Director
of the Identification and Information Branch of the California Department of
Justice, and Evelle Younger, the Attorney General of the State of California. The
complaint was filed by residents of the City of Oakland proceeding under anonymous
surnames, who feel that they had faced employment discrimination because of prior
arrests, some of which did not even result in a conviction. The lawsuit also notes
that "the rate of arrests or detentions not resulting in convictions for black
persons and for poor persons exceeds the rate of such arrests or detentions for
Caucasian persons and for persons with income above the official government poverty
threshold." A taxpayer objects to the expenditure of public funds as "illegal and
unconstitutional." The appellants argue that deletion of arrest information would
impose "only a slight burden" would be imposed upon respondents.
In reviewing the case, the court establishes that "various dissemination policies
of defendants violate plaintiffs' right to privacy under the California
Constitution." Addressing the component of the case which is concerned with the $25
fee associated with an individual's review of their own arrest record, the court
declares that a refusal to provide local agencies with fee waiver forms is lawful,
lest a non-indigent person claim indigence. "Proof of indigence" is also required of
the individual, which the court also upholds.
Box 157, Folder 7
Master pleadings
1977-1979
Shields v. Household Finance Corporation
1976-1980
Scope and Contents
This case concerns Peggy Shields, employed as a clerk-typist by the Household
Finance Corporation (HFC), a Delaware-based lending institution. Shields began
working for HFC's Alameda, California office in February 1971. She was promoted to
assistant manager and transferred to HFC's Oakland office, with increasing
responsibility, assuming the duties of her manager when her manager was not present.
She received positive performance reviews, but her employment was terminated. She
was "informed and believes" that her termination was because of a common-law
marriage, which was prohibited by company policy, which also forbade "the hiring of
persons having such arrangements." Shields, with the ACLU's support, brought a
lawsuit against HFC's Board of Directors, and sought damages in the amount of
$500,000 based on what they argue are discriminatory practices, based on marital
status. They argued that HFC's practices violated the California Fair Employment
Practices Act, as well as her right to privacy, guaranteed by the California
Constitution.
The Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, filed by the plaintiff in 1976,
writes: "In adopting this policy in the name of HFC and enforcing it through the
corporation's agents, the directors have caused the corporation to act beyond the
scope of its lawfully endowed powers, both express and implied." The plaintiff
sought to be reinstated to her former position with full seniority and benefits, and
to prevent further discriminatory practices from being enacted by the HFC.
In December 1980, a settlement was reached. Shields was awarded a monetary sum, and
the HFC was directed to communicate to all employees that such discriminatory
behavior was prohibited in the future, and that any manager that violated this
policy would be "subject to disciplinary action, including possible termination." An
ACLU staff attorney stated: "I believe that in settling the case, we have won a
victory not only for the privacy of Peggy Shields, but for all employees in private
industry in California."
Box 165, Folder 11
Correspondence
1977
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2057 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege Box 3 (Box 165).
Box 157, Folders 13-14, Box 166, Folder 14
#3
1979-1980
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
Box 157, Folders 15-16, Box 166, Folder 15
#4
1976-1980
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
In Re: Gregory Skiba; People of the State of California v. Gregory Joseph
S.
1979-1981
Scope and Contents
This 1979 case, for which the ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of the
defendant, Gregory Joseph Skiba (last name excluded in paperwork, since he was a
minor at the time the detainment), a 15 year old Orinda boy charged with "malicious
mischief," by his next door neighbor. This neighbor, who had a history of complaints
against the boy, called the police. The police officer, Deputy Flores, entered the
boy's yard in order to question him about his actions (ringing his neighbors
doorbell, hiding, and throwing a mudball). The ACLU writes "We submit that the
detention of Gregory Skiba in the setting presented by this case -- that is in his
yard on suspicion of throwing a mudball -- is impermissible because the gravity of
the concerns furthered by the detention are simply outweighed by the personal
privacy interests of the householder. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment and Article
I, Section 13 of the California Constitution forbid the intrusion under the
circumstances."
The ACLU argued that Flores had overstepped the boundaries of his duty as a police
officer and had invaded the boy's privacy by entering his yard and questioning him.
They write, "...an officer is under no duty to make an illegal entry or seizure."
The plaintiffs argued that the boy had violated Penal Code section 148 (obstructing
a police officer), but the ACLU point out that no obstruction is possible if the
officer is acting illegally. This seemingly benign case dragged on over the course
of many appeals, and the outcome is not known from the materials here.
Smith v. State Personnel Board
1981-1984
Scope and Contents
This case concerns Sherry Smith, who was employed as a Psychiatric Social Worker at
Sonoma State Hospital (SSH) in 1978. She was placed on administrative leave in
November 1980, and subsequently fired in early 1981, presumably because of having
filed civil rights complaints through local, State, and Federal channels on behalf
of her clients. Smith, whose express duties involved advocating for Hospital
residents, and whose job functions in this role "include the responsibility to
ensure that residents' rights aren't violated, to assist the Interdisciplinary Team
regarding compliance with regulations" and "to ensure that the family, guardian, and
Regional Centers are kept informed of the client's progress," believed that the
firing was retaliatory. SSH administration notes that punitive actions were taken
against Smith because of "excessive activities related to her concerns over alleged
regulatory deficiencies in educational services provided to Hospital clients." It is
presumed that Smith was fired for creating excessive paperwork with her criticism of
SSH's services.
Smith had positive working relationships with her colleagues who, in 1980, signed a
petition in support of her. Other social workers feared that their ability to do
their jobs was being hindered by the retaliatory action taken against Smith
(otherwise known in legal circles as a "chilling effect"). Smith continued "to
allege that the punitive actions taken against her are in retaliation for protected
activity in furtherance of clients' civil rights." In response, SSH claims Smith was
"excessive in her advocacy duties." SSH characterized Smith's actions as
unprofessional and lacking in judgement, claims that were "not supported by OCR
interviews with other social workers or by any evidence of tangible adverse effects
on the Hospital's operations."
The ACLU represented Smith, who also alleges that she was denied due process.
Unfortunately, the outcome of the case is not known.
Box 157, Folder 20, Box 166, Folders 16-17
Correspondence I
1981-1982
Conditions Governing Access
Two folders are permanently restricted because they contains sensitive
information.
General
Two folders in Permanently Restricted box 1 (Box 166).
Box 165, Folder 12, Box 167, Folder 1
Correspondence II
1983-1984
Conditions Governing Access
One folder is restricted until 2063 because it contains attorney-client
privileged information, and has been separated from materials. Another folder is
permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165). Another folder in
Permanently Restricted box 2 (Box 167).
Box 167, Folder 2
Confidential reports
1982
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 2 (Box 167).
Sundance v. Municipal Court, Los Angeles
1983-1987
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU takes on California's "drunk in public" statute (Pen. Code,
§ 647, subd. (f) fn. 1) on numerous Eighth Amendment and due process grounds, in
particular its enforcement in Los Angeles County. The lawsuit was filed by four who
had been cited under this statute, as well as one taxpayer. They cite statistics
that show that, excluding traffic arrests, "drunk in public arrests" are the second
highest volume crime in the country. For example: "In 1975, the year in which the
complaint in this case was filed, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) made
50,595 section 647(f) arrests. These arrests constituted 32.1 percent of the LAPD's
total misdemeanor arrests for that year." They also note that many, or most, of
these arrests happen during a "sweep" of areas like Skid Row (a blocks-long homeless
encampment near downtown Los Angeles), and because of the high volume of arrests,
the police have developed expedited procedures for "drunk in public" arrests that
exclude procedures like sobriety tests. They detail the inhumane conditions in which
the arrested are transported and then kept in while in jail. The plaintiffs "seek an
order enjoining enforcement of section 647(f) in light of many alleged
constitutional abuses attendant upon enforcement of the statute in Los Angeles
County. They also seek an order mandating referral of all public inebriates to civil
detoxification centers in lieu of criminal prosecution." They argued that this
enforcement of this statute violates the "cruel and unusual punishment" clauses of
both the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution. They also argue that
diverting the arrested to civil detoxification centers is "cheaper and more
effective" than prosecution.
The court, in response, writes: "Although section 647(f) is a valid penal statute,
plaintiffs urge this court to override the legislative judgment and effectively
decriminalize public intoxication on the ground that civil detoxification is cheaper
and more effective than prosecution of public inebriates. This court declines to
intrude so far into the legislative prerogative." They suggest that the case should
be returned to a lower court for reconsideration ("remanded") "for a determination
whether County defendants should be enjoined from incarcerating section 647(f)
arrestees in prearraignment jail facilities that do not offer medical screening and
monitoring by trained personnel."
Box 158, Folders 2-3
Sundance briefs
1983-1987
Tavernetti v. Superior Court of San Diego County
1977-1978
Scope and Contents
This case questions the right of law enforcement to issue a warrant for an arrest
based on an intercepted phone call, as heard by the telephone company's employee.
This employee, Joseph Maco, had been in the process of repairing and
"troubleshooting" telephone line malfunctions for the Pacific Telephone Company when
he happened to cut into a conversation that was discussing a drug deal. He then
relayed this information to the Escondido Police. The question the court sought to
answer here was weather this action violated either federal or state laws with
regards to wiretapping and eavesdropping.
Following the warrant, a search was conducted and the Police found "a quantity of
capsules, seeds, 'green vegetable matter,' and other evidence." The defendants were
then charged with marijuana possession, cultivation, and possession of other
controlled substances.
The court questioned whether Maco had acted illegally in tapping the line, and
whether is the right of the telephone company, as a public utility, " to insure that
its systems are not used to facilitate criminal activity." Another core question is
whether this action violated the defendants' right to privacy. The court cites
"unambiguous language of section 631 and the clearly expressed purpose of the
Legislature in enacting the Invasion of Privacy Act." In particular, they are
interested in subdivision (a) of section 361, which proscribes criminal penalties
for: " intentional wiretapping, wilfully attempting to learn the contents or meaning
of a communication in transit over a wire, and attempting to use or communicate
information obtained as a result of engaging in either of the previous two
activities." The court decided that, due to a violation of subdivision (a), the
warrant never should have been issued and the evidence obtained via the illegal wire
tap was inadmissible in court.
Tinsley v. State of California, et al.
1976-1983
Scope and Contents
In this 1979 lawsuit, the ACLU represented parents of elementary school students
within the boundaries of Sequoia Union High School District and in Palo Alto Unified
School District who wanted to the schools to submit to the court "a reasonably
feasible plan" to "eliminate or alleviate" racially segregated schools within these
districts. This consisted of eight elementary school districts. 18 petitioners were
willing to add their names to the lawsuit, on behalf of 21 children, most of whom
resided in either San Mateo or Santa Clara county.
The parents' petition states: "For at least five years past and continuing to the
present, racially segregated schools exist in the respondent school districts. Out
of a total of approximately thirteen thousand students attending elementary schools
within the boundaries of the SEQUOIA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, approximately ten
thousand non-minority [sic] students attend schools which are predominantly
non-minority [sic] and approximately three thousand minority [sic] students attend
schools which are predominantly minority [sic]. (P) A comparable situation exists in
the Palo Alto Unified School District. Thus both non-minority[sic] and minority
[sic] students are racially isolated and deprived of an integrated educational
experience." They proposed a proportional racial quota system. Also at issue here is
the question of intentional or unintentional school segregation, and its impact on
students. California also mandates the "alleviation or elimination" of segregation
where it exists. The court quotes another case, which stated: "The right to an equal
opportunity for education and the harmful consequences of segregation require that
school boards take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial
imbalance in schools regardless of its cause." Also relevant is the fact "that the
state has the power, although it may delegate it locally, to form, dissolve, and
transfer territory among school districts without the necessity of local elections."
They also question the appropriateness of judicial intervention in this process, if
"alleviation of racial imbalance" could not be achieved through other means. They
seek "reasonably feasible steps" to eliminate these barriers to integrated learning.
This complex case reversed the judgement of the trial court, and requested that the
parents add their childrens' names as petitioners.
Box 158, Folders 8-11
Pleading file I
1977-1981
Box 158, Folders 12-15
Pleading file II
1976-1983
Torrey v. County of Alameda
1979-1984
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented Franklin Torrey, a 21 year old male transgender
prisoner who was raped by other male prisoners while en route to court in Oakland on
the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center (where Torrey was an inmate) bus. The Santa
Rita facility is chiefly used "for the pretrial detention of persons accused of
felonies and misdemeanors and also for the incarceration of misdemeanants." Torrey
was in prison for petty theft. There were prison guards present while the rape took
place, and it is alleged that they did nothing to stop the assault. He sued the City
of Alameda and those entities responsible for the negligence which allowed the
attack to take place, and the ACLU was notified by Torrey's mother Yvonne, who
sought justice.
The complaint for damages writes that: "Defendants Houchins, Alameda County, and
the Board of Supervisors...were aware of the pattern of violence and sexual assault
among prisoners and of the existence of inadequate inmate security at Santa Rita"
since as early as 1975 (the assault took place in 1978). The argument states that
the County and Board of Supervisors "acted with conscious and deliberate
indifference to the safety and welfare of Santa Rita prisoners..." Torrey had also
been identified as someone at a particularly high risk for attack, though little had
been done to protect him, besides segregating him from other prisoners. The causes
of action were "Deprivation of Civil Rights," as well as "Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress" by guards Hillman and Schalk. Additionally were "Assault and
Battery" and "Negligence." Torrey also sought damages for emotional distress as a
result of the incident.
Unfortunately, the outcome of the trial is not obvious from the documents provided
here.
Box 165, Folder 12, Box 167, Folder 3
Correspondence and notes
1979-1980
Conditions Governing Access
One folder is restricted until 2059 because it contains attorney-client
privileged information, and has been separated from materials. Another folder is
permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165). One folder in
Permanently Restricted box 2 (Box 167).
Box 159, Folders 10-11, Box 167, Folder 4
Pleadings IV
1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 2 (Box 167).
Box 159, Folders 12-13, Box 167, Folder 5
Pleadings V
1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 2 (Box 167).
Box 159, Folders 14-15, Box 167, Folder 6
Pleadings VI
1981
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 2 (Box 167).
Tucker v. State Athletic Commission of California
1977-1982
Scope and Contents
This case is about discrimination on the basis of sex among female boxers in
California. Prior to 1976, professional boxing was limited to men. Plaintiff Shirley
Tucker (nicknamed "Zebra Girl") of Santa Rosa was one of a small number of licensed
professional female boxers in the state. She wished to challenge the Athletic
Commission's rule against male-female boxing matches, as well as the related SAC
rule that "limits all fights between female boxers to four rounds." Tucker argued
that this rule "seriously restricts her income, because four round fights are not
favored by promoters, and the fees for such fights are considerably smaller than for
ten round fights." The ACLU argued that this rule was unconstitutional on two
counts: 1. it denied Tucker equal protection, and 2. it also denied her due process.
They write: "A female boxer's right to pursue her chosen profession free from
arbitrary governmental interference is protected by the due process clause."
The ACLU appeared before the Athletic Commission board in Los Angeles to argue on
Tucker's behalf. The board, lead by Don Fraser, Executive Officer, expressed doubt
but agreed that they would allow mixed-gender fighting after observing "interested
fighters during sparring sessions before approving a mixed bout."
Box 159, Folder 19, Box 165, Folder 14
Correspondence I
1977-1979
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2059 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Box 159, Folder 20, Box 165, Folder 15
Correspondence II
1982
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2062 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Box 159, Folder 21
Minutes, research
1979-1982
In re: Fred Bradshaw Turner
1976-1977
Scope and Contents
This case concerns the conservatorship of a Frederick Bradshaw Turner III in 1976.
Conservatorships are means by which the state takes control of a person who is
otherwise unable to care for themself, for various reasons. They usually require a
unanimous jury vote, they expire after one year, and they are the means by which the
State frequently deals with homeless people.
The case state notes that he "...appeals from a judgment declaring him to be
gravely disabled within the meaning of section 5350 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code and appointing the Public Guardian of San Mateo County to act as the
conservator of his person and estate." It also states: "Under the provisions of
section 5361 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, a conservatorship automatically
terminates at the end of one year following its creation unless the conservator
petitions for a one-year extension and the court grants same." In Turner's case, for
unknown reasons, the jury requirement was waived, and only 9 of 12 jurors were
needed to prove that Turner was "gravely disabled" and in need of care.
The ACLU represented Turner, who argued that his rights were violated when he was
placed into the conservatorship. The case states: "He contends that the requirements
of a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and a nonunanimous verdict violate his
rights of due process and equal protection of the laws." He also argues that
"gravely disabled" is unconstitutionally vague, and overbroad, which the court
disagrees with. He contends that the two medical experts consulted did not have
sufficient knowledge of his situation, which was outweighed by the testimony of
three non-experts who decided that he was, in fact, "gravely disabled."
Box 159, Folder 22
Correspondence; Master pleadings
1976-1977
UC Regents v. UC Divestment Coalition
1986
Scope and Contents
This case concerns a UC Berkeley-based movement, echoed by other college campuses
across the United States in the late 1970s, to encourage university divestment in
corporate interests that support apartheid government in South Africa. Specifically,
the UC Divestment Coalition was comprised of a diverse group of organizations across
the campus in order to assist with coordinating anti-apartheid and divestment work
across the entire UC system ("UC Regents"). Beginning in 1984, defendants (the UC
Divestment Coalition) organized peaceful protests to publicize the fact that the
University of California had 2.4 billion dollars in South Africa-linked investments
- an inordinate amount, compared to other colleges, they argued. A preliminary
statement reads: "Defendants believe that the university has abdicated its role as a
moral leader inasmuch as it persists in its financial support for the current South
African regime." The ACLU represented the UC Divestment Coalition in their lawsuit
against the governing body of the UC system, the UC Regents.
After a series of protestor arrests on the Berkeley campus, the UC Divestment
Coalition organized another protest on November 6, 1985, and refused to leave until
Chancellor Heyman met with them. Also present were "legal observers" from the ACLU,
who were there to ensure that protestors rights were not violated, and who were some
of the first to be arrested. At a follow up protest on March 31, 1986, demonstrators
constructed a symbolic "shantytown" in front of Berkeley's administrative offices.
Mid-protest, the university then sought a temporary restraining order against the
protestors, enjoining (preventing) them from constructing anything (such as a
shanty) whose placement might constitute a "fire hazard." As the protests escalated,
the university amassed a large police presence at the protests. The ACLU writes:
"The paramount interest of the police was to break up the peaceful demonstration,
not prevent any fire hazards. The fire hazard served as the pretext."
At this event, "scores of students and demonstrators were injured by the police. At
least two members of the press, with their credentials clearly displayed, were
beaten by the police." The university issued bans on 89 students (named as "Does"
1-89) and faculty, which prevented them from setting foot on campus, and failed to
properly notify them when these bans were lifted. It is the ban issue that the ACLU
seized on in their defense, arguing that the bans violated Penal Code section 626.4
(banning statute), and also the constitutional right to due process. The retaliation
and intimidation that the bans communicated were also at issue. They also argue that
the singling out of legal advisors and lawyers constitutes harassment of the
students that they represent, as well as of the legal advisors and lawyers
themselves. They also singled out a police officer named Hammett, who was
particularly violent, and who needed to be restrained by his peers.
The outcome of this case is not known. In 1986, caving to social pressure, the UC
system agreed to a policy of phased full divestment from companies doing business in
South Africa, to be completed by 1990.
Van Atta v. Scott
1976-1979
Scope and Contents
In this case, Gerald N. Van Atta, Jr. sued the Donald M. Scott, Chief of Police of
the City and County of San Francisco. The issue here was "whether the trial court
was correct when it held that the pretrial release and detention system employed by
the City and County of San Francisco violates the due process clauses of the state
and federal Constitutions." It considers "own recognizance release," (OR) which the
court notes is the "poor person's alternative to bail," as those without the funds,
or access to funds, to post bail are more likely to remain in jail. There is
dedicated staff for the OR project, and they use a point system (based on residence,
family, and employment) to determine the likelihood of the detainees appearance in
future court proceedings. The court notes, "...the presumption is against OR release
and the detainee bears the burden of showing that his application is meritorious."
The decision rests solely on the discretion of the judge. The issue here is also the
assumption that, if the detainee were released prior to a trial, that they would
flee.
The court writes: "Plaintiffs contend, and the trial court held, that due process
requires both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of proof to be borne
by the prosecution at the OR hearing." They also note: "If an adverse ruling is made
at the OR hearing, the detainee's loss of liberty is total." It also considers
placing the burden of proof on the prosecution instead of the judge, as well as the
issue of the cost of these amendments to current procedure.
In conclusion, the court decides: "...(1) the prosecution must bear the burden of
producing evidence of the detainee's record of non-appearance at prior court
hearings and of the severity of sentence the detainee faces; (2) the detainee should
bear the burden of producing evidence of community ties; (3) the prosecution must
bear the burden of proof concerning the detainee's likelihood of appearing at future
court proceedings; and (4) the court is not constitutionally required to issue a
statement of reasons when OR release is denied."
Box 160, Folders 6-7
Master pleadings #1
1973-1977
Box 160, Folders 9-11
Master pleadings #3
1978-1979
People of the State of California v. Vail, et al.
1980-1981
Scope and Contents
This case concerns allegations of consumer fraud brought against Wanda Vail, also
known as Wanda Smith, by the People of California. Vail "is the owner and publisher
of a political newspaper known as 'The Republican,' a private publication devoted to
the discussion of political issues and causes for the avowed purpose of advancing
partisan Republican interests and the election of Republican candidates." In 1979,
the Alameda County DA brought suit against Vail, "alleging unfair competition and
false and misleading advertising." Vail employed a number of telephone sales
representatives, who followed a script.
The core of the complaint against Vail was that she was deliberately deceiving
potential customers into believing that they contributions would directly benefit
the Republican party, when in fact they were benefiting Vail. Vail attempted to
argue that her constitutional right to privacy was being violated, but the court
wrote that, since this privacy was based on false pretences, her point was moot.
Though the People brought a number of accusations against Vail, the only crime she
was found guilty of was consumer fraud. She was instructed to give refunds to the
defrauded, and their identities were withheld from her.
Box 160, Folders 13-15
Master pleading file #1
1980
Box 160, Folders 16-17
Master pleading file #2
1980-1981
Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent
1982-1983
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU submitted an amicus brief on behalf of a group called
"Taxpayers for Vincent," who had posted signs on utility poles in Los Angeles in
support of a candidate for election to Los Angeles City Council. Section 28.04 of
the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits the posting of signs on public property.
Abiding by Section 28.04, city employees removed the signs from public property.
Taxpayers for Vincent alleged that the city ordinance restricted their First
Amendment rights to free speech. The city justified this ordinance as being
necessary in "preventing visual clutter, minimizing traffic hazards, and preventing
interference with the intended use of public property." This case, which went all
the way to the Supreme Court, weighed the free speech needs of the defendants
against the city's interests.
Dissenting judges write: "Because the Court's lenient approach towards the
restriction of speech for reasons of aesthetics threatens seriously to undermine the
protections of the First Amendment, I dissent."
Box 161, Folders 1-2
Briefs; pleadings; correspondence
1982-1983
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors
1984-1985
Scope and Contents
The ACLU submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the National Association for
Radiation Survivors and others similarly situated. The lawsuit was brought against
Harry N. Walters, Administrator of the Veterans Administration, and challenged the
"statute forbidding lawyers from charging more than $10 for representing a veteran
seeking service-connected death and disability (SCDD) benefits from the Veterans
Administration (VA)." The effect of this statute is to preclude veterans from
retaining counsel (whose costs usually far exceed $10) in connection with disability
claim disputes. In their brief, the ACLU writes "...the government envisions a
benefits determination process in which the individual veteran has no genuine
opportunity to influence or challenge the premises of official decision-making."
They also argue that this exclusion of lawyers from the claims process violates due
process.
The outcome of this case is not known from the materials provided.
Box 161, Folder 3
Amicus briefs; correspondence
1984-1985
Weintraub v. Worrell
1978-1979
Scope and Contents
In this 1979 case, lawyer David Weintraub accused his former employer (The Legal
Clinic of Worrell, Martelle, Pappas, and Mullin) of unlawful discharge from his
position. He argued that his discharge was based solely on his political activities
and affiliations, and this violated California Labor Code Sections 1101 and 1102.
The political activities in question involve Weintraub's membership in the National
Lawyers Guild (NLG) - "a nationwide organization of 6,000 lawyers, law students, and
legal workers" that "promotes human rights and the needs of people over property
interests." The court notes: "In particular, this has meant organizational efforts
to safeguard and extend the rights of workers, minorities, women, and the poor."
They engage in litigation at the federal, state, and local levels. The plaintiff was
a member of the Bay Area chapter of NLG. He was a member of the Labor Committee that
"focused on legal remedies and strategies to workers involved in labor
disputes..."
Before being offered the job from which he was eventually discharged, Weintraub
openly discussed his interests and values, and was open about his membership in NLG.
He was later pulled aside and privately questioned about his membership in NLG by a
law firm partner. Days later, he was discharged from a position that he had only
occupied briefly. He alleged that his firing was "in bad faith, malicious, and
without just cause or excuse," and sought damages and declaratory relief. The
outcome of this case is not obvious from the materials provided.
Box 167, Folder 7
Correspondence
1979
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 2 (Box 167).
Box 161, Folder 6
Chin v. AT&T (NY case)
1978-1979
Welfare Education and Legal Assistance Center, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors
of Santa Cruz
1978
Scope and Contents
The ACLU here represented the Welfare Education and Legal Assistance Center, Inc.
("WELAC"), a nonprofit, and advocated for their "fundamental constitutional right to
peaceably distribute welfare related materials in the welfare waiting rooms of the
County of Santa Cruz Department of Social Services." The defendant is the Board of
Supervisors, which is responsible for administering Santa Cruz county's state and
local social services programs. WELAC, which was organized in 1972 for the sole
purpose of providing assistance and representation to welfare applicants and
recipients "in administrative and legal actions involving the County and State
Departments of Social Welfare."
On August 8, 1978, the defendant passed a resolution restricting the types of
materials distributed in Social Service waiting rooms to those "printed by the
County and approved by the County." Despite the protests of Board member Gary
Patton, who understood that this resolution restricted free speech within County
buildings, the resolution went into effect later that same year. A WELAC
representative hoped to distribute a pamphlet titled "Do Welfare Recipients Have
Constitutional Rights?" and was denied. In their complaint, the ACLU argued that the
resolution and policy "violates Article 1, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution of
the State of California and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution as
they create an unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise by the Plaintiff of
the press and speech rights set out therein." They also argued that the resolutions
limits the constitutionally protected right to freedom of expression, as stated in
42 U.S.C. 1983. They also sought attorney's fees.
The court agreed with the ACLU that the policy and resolution violated Welfare
applicants and recipients constitutional rights. The decision regarding attorney's
fees is unknown.
Wilson v. Superior Court
1983
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU submitted an amicus brief in support of Clerow (Flip)
Wilson, a black American comedian popular in the 1970s, who challenged the
constitutionality of admission into evidence contraband seized from him upon his
arrival at Los Angeles airport. The contraband in question was $1000 worth of
"cocaine and hashish." In particular, his lawyers questioned article I, section
28(d) (the "Truth-in-evidence" provision), which they asserted was unconstitutional.
To summarize its effects, the LA Times wrote that section 28(d) would "...eliminate
exclusionary rules that bar admission at trial of evidence resulting from unlawful
searches and seizures, forced confessions, illegal wiretapping and other grounds."
The outcome of this case is not known from the amicus briefs provided.
Box 161, Folder 8
Master pleadings; correspondence
1983
Women's Committee for Responsible Government, et al. v. Aved, et al.
1980-1986
Scope and Contents
In this early 1980s case, Women's Committee for Responsible Government, an
anti-abortion group, and five individual taxpayers sued the Office of Family
Planning (OFP), and Barbara Aved, as Chief of the Office of Family Planning - a
state agency. Also sued were Beverly Myers, Director of the State Department of
Heath Services, and the Department of Education. The issue that was debated in this
case was "whether OFP exceeded its statutory authority and violated constitutional
guidelines by providing funding for certain sex education materials." Also contested
was the spending of public money on these sex education materials. A court document
notes: "OFP is statutorily authorized to fund contracts for two different types of
programs, one relating to education and information, the other relating to clinical
services." In 1977-1978, OFP awarded a contract to Planned Parenthood of Santa Cruz
County to develop a sex education manual for use in schools by teachers. Another
manual ("a peer manual") was in development. The manual, by its own description,
"...concerns itself only briefly with philosophical considerations and not at all
with political considerations."
The Committee alleged that these manuals violate "general public policy by
encouraging teenage sexual activity and specifically the policy expressed in Civil
Code section 261.5" ('the statutory rape' provision). The court disagreed. They also
noted that there is nothing in either of the manuals that could be "construed as
encouraging sexual activity." The Committee also argues that the manuals violate the
First Amendment by encouraging a particular viewpoint, which they call "secular
humanism." The court writes: "We find this claim meritless." In a puzzling
conclusion, they also write: "Throughout the Teacher's Guide and Peer Manual,
teachers and peer educators are cautioned to present all sides of an issue. For
example, as previously noted, the viewpoint that homosexuality is sinful is to be
presented, and the many views on abortion are recognized."
Box 161, Folders 10-13
Master pleadings
1980-1983
Box 161, Folder 14
Attorney notes
circa 1980-1983
Gay Men's Chorus of Los Angeles v. American Choral Directors Association,
Inc. (ACDA)
1985-1986
Scope and Contents
In this case, the ACLU represented the Gay Men's Chorus of Los Angeles in their
lawsuit against the American Choral Directors Association (ACDA). The Gay Men's
Chorus challenged ACDA's decision to require the Chorus to remove the word "gay"
from their name as a condition of their performance at ACDA's Western Division
Convention in San Jose. GMCLA had been an active, dues-paying institutional member
of ACDA, and would also be paying to attend the convention. Additionally, they had
been chosen to perform via a "blind" audition tape, in which the name of the
organization auditioning to perform was withheld from the reviewers. ACDA stated
that its purpose in excising the word "gay" was to "avoid entanglement in issues
relating to political, social, sexual or religious preference that are controversial
and/or personal in nature."
GMCLA sought an injunction allowing them to perform at the convention and to keep
the word "gay" in their name. They also sought to have the actions of ACDA declared
unlawful, and pursued damages as well as attorney's fees. They were successful, and,
as a result, were ACDA's Executive Committee "agreed to recommend and support at its
next Board of Directors meeting the adoption of a nation-wide policy which would
permit gay and lesbian groups to perform at ACDA functions using their full
name."
Box 165, Folder 16
Correspondence
1985-1986
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2066 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Box 161, Folder 16
Master pleadings
1985-1986
Box 167, Folder 8
Settlement agreement - original
1986
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 2 (Box 167).
Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz
1977-1985
Scope and Contents
In this case, an eight year old girl named Victoria Isbister, in 1977, brought a
class action lawsuit against the Boy's Club of Santa Cruz, CA for discriminating
against her and others like her on the basis of sex, by excluding them from using
the Club. The Boy's Club is "unique in northern Santa Cruz County in the range and
low cost of the recreational facilities and programs it provides under one roof. No
single program or facility open to girls offers a similar range of activities at
similar cost." With the ACLU's support, she argued that the Club's policies violated
the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51), which "guarantees every person in
California 'full and equal' access to 'all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever.' The question that the court considered here is whether the Club is one
of the 'business establishments' covered by the Act. The Club was established by a
trust which involved no gender-related restrictions. However, the donors wished to
restrict membership to boys in order to "combat delinquency." The court writes,
however, "... delinquency affects substantial numbers of girls."
The court concluded that the Club is, in fact, covered by the Unruh Act, and
justify this conclusion by writing: "There is no substantial evidence on this record
that the Club's programs, services, and facilities are unsuitable for girls, or that
inclusion of both sexes in these programs would diminish their value or
effectiveness. Nor is there proof that female memberships would cause serious and
permanent danger to the Club's funding or its relationship with its national
organization." A judge delivered this opinion: "Perhaps the violation would be
clearer if the Boys' Club of Santa Cruz had discriminated on the basis of race, not
sex. But that lack of clarity is not the fault of the language of the statute.
Instead, the difficulty is the long and well-ingrained tradition of women's
dependency which even today causes statutory recognition of the equality of women to
have a strange and unreal ring to it."
Box 161, Folder 17, Box 165, Folder 17
Correspondence
1979-1983
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is restricted until 2063 because it contains attorney-client privileged
information, and has been separated from materials.
General
One folder in Attorney-Client Privilege box 3 (Box 165).
Box 161, Folders 18-20, Box 167, Folder 9
Master pleadings I
1979
Conditions Governing Access
Folder is permanently restricted because it contains sensitive information.
General
One folder in Permanently Restricted box 2 (Box 167).
Box 162, Folders 1-3
Master pleadings II
1979-1980
Box 162, Folders 4-6
Master pleadings III
1980-1981
Box 162, Folders 7-8
Master pleadings IV
1981-1983
Box 162, Folder 12
Master pleadings VI
1983-1985
Box 162, Folders 13-15
Gay Boy Scouts case - L.A. - Master pleadings
1977-1983
Scrapbooks
1923-1959
Physical Description: 13.0
boxes
Scope and Contents
This series comprises 43 scrapbooks of newspapers clippings about civil liberties
issues created by the ACLU-NC between the years 1923 and 1959. The first 27 volumes in
the series are arranged in chronological order and contain newspaper clippings
documenting a wide assortment of civil liberties issues. The remaining subject volumes
(volumes 28-43) include scrapbooks about the San Francisco general strike; ILWU leader
Harry Bridges; racial discrimination; and the treatment of Japanese Americans during
World War II.
Carton 70, Volume 1
1934 August-1935 February
Carton 70, Volume 3
1935 August-1936 February
Carton 71, Volume 8
1936 October-1937 January
Carton 72, Volume 11
1937 September-1938 January
Carton 73, Volume 15
1938 October-1939 January
Carton 74, Volume 20
1939 December-1940 February
Carton 75, Volume 24
1940 October-1941 February
Carton 76, Volume 27
1941 November-1942 February
Carton 78, Volume 32
1943 October-1944 January
Carton 80, Volume 38
San Francisco General Strike
1934
Carton 80, Volume 39
Labor and civil liberties
1934-1959
Carton 81, Volume 40
Civil liberties
1925-1940
Carton 81, Volume 41
Aliens/Immigration Naturalization Services
1923-1941
Miscellaneous ephemera and legal material
1919-1972
Box 168, Folders 3-4
Assembly bills, Senate bills, House bills, and Assembly Constitutional
Amendments
1919-1955
Box 169, Folder 32
Amicus briefs and reports
1944-1966
Box 169, Folders 33-34
Pamphlets and ephemera
1938-1972
Box 169, Folder 35
Correspondence, press releases, and memos
1936-1969
Box 169, Folder 36
Other publications (magazines, newspapers, newsletters)
1919-1965
No online items
