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## Rural Evacuation and Economic Effects

The rural Japanese in and around Los Angeles county were for the most part engaged in truck farming. Farms were small and those holdings which were large were subleased and broken into many smaller parts. The chief market for their goods was the Los Angeles produce market and the Los Angeles Flower market. Losses in property and merchandise occurred to the Japanese both on the land and in the market. It is necessary to call an actual urban establishment, rural, namely the produce market, because of the important tie it does have with the farmers' merchandise.

Out of 250 doors in the Los Angeles produce market, 120 were owned by Japanese. By May 6 there were only two vacancies due to the evacuation of the Japanese. The absorption has been due almost solely to the expansion of old firms in the market. Nevertheless, the evacuation greatly affected the produce market. Inexperienced produce handlers have been substituted for the Japanese who left. In leaving and liquidating their holdings, the Japanese had very serious losses. A large part of the loss was in goodwill. The Federal Reserve Bank helped in the liquidation of the business but was as in other urban property not entirely effective. A great deal of the blame may be laid on the Japanese who failed to appeal to the FRB either out of ignorance or fear of dealing with the federal authorities. One loss in connection with the Los Angeles Produce Marketing Organization shows the type of loss which might be expected during these transferences. On a \$65,000 ranch near El Centro was a mortgage of \$9000 and a \$3000 loan from the Los Angeles Produce Marketing Organization. When the Japanese was taken the Produce Organization stated suit. Their claim was to have been paid off by the delivery of the Japanese's tomatoes to the Produce Market. However, the Marketing Organization was during the evacuation



changed from Japanese to White management and was badly upset so that when the tomatoes arrived many were allowed to spoil. The proceeds would not then cover the \$3000 loan. The case was settled, although the Japanese lost this year's entire crop which would have netted him between two and three thousand dollars.

The Japanese were able through their expert knowledge of truck farming to control prices in many of the vegetables. This is thought to be true in Los Angeles and surrounding produce markets in the case of lettuce and celery. Since the evacuation the same control has been lost not only to the Japanese but to the Market because of inexperience in marketing these vegetables. A case similar to the above may be seen in the marketing of tomatoes. Shortly after the evacuation the produce merchants sent representatives to the Cochella Valley. These representatives told the new operators of the Japanese evacuated land that there was a serious shortage of tomatoes in the Los Angeles market. They advised them to pick as much as possible, and as a result the farmers picked green and overripe tomatoes and sent them to the market. The wholesale market thus found that they could sell this large quantity at a very low price. They forced the tomatoes on the retailers. The public found that it was buying poor food and the growers found that they were getting a low price for their crops. The only ones profiting were the merchants who had temporarily gotten a stir in the market. This type of loss cannot be evaluated in dollars but is perhaps of even more consequence if prolonged. In the first place, the Japanese farmer loss through evacuation was felt in two places--the grower and the produce seller. In the second place, the new farmer and new seller are experiencing loss because unaccustomed in dealing with



certain markets they cannot space delivery in order to maintain and control price. They lose by "dumping" which is purely unintentional. In the third place, the consuming public stands to lose by this disruption of the market by paying higher prices and getting bad quality merchandise and also by having seasons shortened for certain vegetables. The combined effect makes for a loss to the public which at a time when all resources are needed and should be used wisely is doubly felt.

The biggest loss in the evacuation of the Japanese occurred in the matter of farm and crop loss. Again this type of loss, unlike the urban losses cannot be just measured in what the property was sold for as against its actual value. When loss of arable land and crops occur it means a loss to the consuming public as well as to the owner. This loss unless made up cannot be minimized. It is not as simple to make up a loss of this sort due to the fact that it takes special skill, time, and capital to plant and harvest a crop from the land. Whereas, in an urban loss the loss occurring to the Japanese may be large it may not hit the consumer if the merchandise and property is taken over by another person. This is not true in farming unless the new operator is skilled and "lucky" in the timing of the crop.

In the Los Angeles area rural holdings of the Japanese were very small, one 1,500 acre truck farm was held under lease by 290 Japanese farmers. According to Harold J. Ryan, Commissioner of Agriculture, Los Angeles County the distribution of Japanese farmers pre-evacuation ran as follows:

Number of farms:	
Native-born operators	629
Foreign-born operators	573
Total	1,202



Native born operators	farms	757
Foreign-born operators	"	634
Total	"	1,391

## Acreage Farmed

Native-born operators	land-acres	15,153
Foreign-born operators	"	10,892
Total		26,045

There were in Los Angeles County approximately 2,000 farm properties including ornamental-plant nurseries operated by persons of Japanese lineage. This figure is developed from a farm survey conducted in January 1942 by inspectors of the county agricultural commissioner's office and other sources as follows:

Vegetable farms (including berries and alfalfa)	1,391
Cut-flower farms	90
Others (including some livestock)	57
Total	1,538
Livestock farms	82
Estimated number of those not included in survey	50
Nurseries listed by agric. Comm. office under Japanese names	408
	<hr/> 2,078

"Exclusive of cut flowers and livestock farms and nurseries 26,045 acres of land were farmed by Japanese. The vegetable and berry crop acreage grown in 1941 on this land totals 36,250 acres, more than one crop per year being farmed on part of the ground. " 1.

According to these estimates the average farm held by the Japanese in Los Angeles county was about 20 acres in size. The value was in the crops. It appears that the soil and climate, plus the work and ingenuity of the Japanese allowed for more than one harvest crop per year, raising the value of the land. According to the Final report of the Agricultural Coordinators office around 3/4 of the Japanese vegetable farms were under lease. In the case of leases transferred from Japanese to non-Japanese, of 860 Japanese leases 584 non-Japanese took over the leases. The

1. The entire statistical summary above was taken from Ryan's testimony before the Tolan Co. in Los Angeles. See Hearings.



difference in number of leasees would indicate that in the future the average size of the vegetable holding will be larger.

According to Raoy Mason, Office of Agricultural Commissioner of Los Angeles County, vegetable greenhouses were transferred with some loss to Japanese. Most greenhouses were owned by Japanese outright, not leased. They were, in the main, transferred to white operators for the duration only--almost no sales and very few definite time-period leases. Mason believes there will be a further loss, this time to the white, since he took over on a shoestring in most instances and only because of the imminence of a cash crop. Besides this loss, the fact that the land is leased only for the duration will not make for the best care in the world and so there may well be a loss to the Japanese due to bad care of the land in his absence.

According to the FSA field agent's report in the Los Angeles County, almost all lands were transferred to new operators by lease. The average lease calls for \$22 per acre or thereabouts. This is somewhat lower than the Japanese had paid. Two large farms, formerly operated by many Japanese are now run by many Mexicans and Chinese under the same arrangement. The farms are the Carson and Domingues. A white overseer dictates crops to the 50 or more tenants on these ranches of from 1,000 to 2,000 acres. Whites have taken over small separate units and operate them. The acreage of these as opposed to the large ones is about equal. Therefore, the number of whites taking over is about equal to the number of Mexicans and Chinese and the acreage is also equal.

There was evidently some loss to the Japanese in the transfer of farm equipment, although statistics and cases on this are lacking. One case which is reported is that of S. Iwihara,



lessee on the Carson Ranch, Domingus Hill. Iwihara paid \$1,000 for a second-hand Caterpillar-tractor in September, 1941. By April he had paid \$475 on it. This was a conditional sales contract. He lost his entire equity in it. Furthermore his crop of celery had cost him \$800 including labor and he was forced to sell at \$225.

The losses which come to the attention of the FSA were mainly in the civil control stations in the territory of Los Angeles. It was mainly in these small out of town stations that the Japanese farmers of Los Angeles and nearby counties registered. The most accurate method of counting loss on farm transfer is by enumerating loss as reported to each civil control station.

NORTH HOLLYWOOD : A case was reported concerning 7 acres of young-berries, lima beans, and cabbage. This farm had purportedly been taken over some time before the evacuation. The Japanese by time of registration had not received anything for his crop and asked the FSA to look into the case. The FSA went to the farm and found that the berries were the only crop that could be salvaged. The others had been allowed to rot. The owner had sold the berries to the Frozen Fruit Co. of Los Angeles. The owner had failed to have the Japanese who leased from him reimbursed. He had intended to keep the proceeds, from all appearances. For the FSA to do anything they had to appeal for the money which required contact with the Japanese, not the one who lost the crop, in whose name the lease stood. Rather than make this contact the Japanese operator decided to drop the whole thing, taking the loss. The FSA with no authorization could do nothing.



The loss here was not only to the Japanese but to the consumer.

Another case reported to this station concerned a nursery. The buyers of the Japanese property told that they had found some equipment missing--some trays had been stolen. These trays were sold to the Morningside Nursery in Los Angeles, but the manager of this organization reported that when he went for the trays, they had almost all been taken away. He refused to pay for more than a small portion of the total number which he originally agree to take from the Japanese. Several stories were told of the disappearance of the trays. The FSA decided to leave the case alone provided the Morningside paid for the trays they admit they took. The Japanese at Manzanar said he did not have the trays. The Japanese lost his payment, the manager lost the trays and the FSA could not tell whom to believe so loss to someone occurred in this transfer.

#### MONTEREY PARK:

The FSA representative at this station gave this case to our interviewer as a typical case of farm transference in southern California: Ebihara leased a small farm---seven acres---from the city of Monterey Park and an adjacent piece of land of seven acres from a private party. On the Monterey Park land was a city water



reservoir and a pump. Early in February the citizenry and city fathers got nervous about having a Japanese so near to the water equipment. They therefore canceled the lease and forced Ebihara out on March 1. Ebihara had his house on the city-owned land and was forced to move into Boyle Heights in Los Angeles. He was given the right to harvest the crops on these lands---about five acres of berries and broccoli. Soon after moving with his family to Boyle Heights he slipped and broke three ribs and couldn't work. In the meantime the city of Monterey Park leased their acres to two defense workers who wanted to farm it. The other seven acres, on which the berries grew, were separated from their land by an irrigation canal, so they didn't realize the berries were Ebihara's. The broccoli had already gone to seed, and the berries were stolen when the two defense workers got there. Ebihara appealed to the FSA. The FSA decided he had been unfortunate but had no rights in the matter. The defense workers got nothing out of Ebihara's crops his house was condemned, Monterey Park would do nothing for him and Ebihara's net worth at time of evacuation was \$15, the price of an old truck.

Another case occurred in the FSA field office of Monterey Park. The I. W. Hellman estate owned a 325-acre ranch leased to about twenty Japanese. The difficulty of collecting rentals, etc. led them to ask N. Baba, one of the larger lessees, to form a company to pay entire rental, subleasing to the Japanese. This was done about two years ago. The association was called "Associated Vegetable and Flower Growers Association". Baba paid \$15 per acre to Hellman and charged the other Japanese \$20, \$25, and \$30 per acre. When the evacuation was ordered, Zeke and Frank Seminario, feed dealers of Monetebello, made a deal with Baba to take over



all of the vegetables, but flower growers were left out of the negotiations. The Seminarios allowed the Japanese flower merchants to stay on until evacuation to market their crops. Finally, I. Karaiya, one of the larger flower growers appealed to the FSA. He had managed to sell some of his flowers, but very valuable flowers and roots, etc. remained, nine acres of rare flowers included. The Japanese had sent several new or prospective tenants out to look at his holdings, but Seminario had scared them off. The FSA finally got \$350 from Seminario for the Japanese, although Seminario had tried to stop the check. Undoubtedly Baba had some private deal with Seminario, but wouldn't admit it. One of the flower growers got \$85 for a \$1,500 crop of flowers. The Japanese flower growers refused to blame anything on Baba and insisted that it was Seminario who was to blame.

#### PASADENA:

Originally, there were some 120 farm properties operated by Japanese in this area, but at the civil control station only 50 registered as farmers. It is believed the remainder evacuated voluntarily some time ago. The FSA believed that they mainly went to Utah. Because of the inefficiency of the field agent in the Pasadena FSA office there were some exceedingly unsatisfactory transfers. The FSA civil control representative had up to the time of the evacuation been unable to contact the regular FSA field agent. The field agent had made no effort to advise and guide the Japanese and as a result, according to the Civil Control station FSA representative there are many pitiful cases on record in Pasadena.

Hoyo Umoso operated a farm under lease at 1808 Raquel Road, El Monte. (This place was included in the Pasadena evacuation). It was a twenty-five acre tomato farm. Last year its gross income



was \$12,000 with a net income of between \$5,000 and \$6,000. The crop due to be harvested in August was sold back to the landowner for \$525. The FSA did nothing for the Japanese as the contract was made prior to registration as as stated above the field agent did nothing to contact the Japanese in this area.

E. D. Taylor of Pasadena attempted to buy a nursery at 4920 Oak Grove Drive from a Japanese. The Japanese said that the carnation crop and equipment was worth \$1,000. Taylor said he had no use for the carnations as he planned to raise Bella Donna. He therefore agreed to pay the Japanese only \$50 for the nursery. The Japanese wanted to go in and sell off the carnation crop but Taylor refused, although he did not plan to sell it himself. The FSA civil control representative attempted to get Taylor to allow the Japanese to sell his crop but Taylor refused. The deal was complete.

E. Manchester Boddy of the Los Angeles News ~~is~~ leased several large nurseries in Pasadena area. A nursery in Burbank which grossed \$5000 in April of this year, he leased for \$100 per month for a three-year period, reaping the harvest. The FSA did not contact him.

HUNTINTON BEACH:

According to Rev. Julius A. Goldwater, a white Buddhist priest in Los Angeles there was a very bad case of transference at Huntington Beach. The case concerns a Japanese who had to sell an eight-acre farm, his home and a store that had cost him a year ago \$1000 for \$1000, when the crop on the farm was alone worth \$500 plus his home which he had build. This story is completely unsubstantiated.

~~WILMINGTON~~ Torrance

TORRANCE: (containing evacuation station for Gardena, Torrance,

Lauredale, Wilmington, San Pedro, Long Beach, and Sawtelle)



The records for the farms of Gardena, Laredale, and Ingelswood show that these farms were fairly large, five to twenty-five acres apiece. Many of the new operators taking over these farms are Chinese. Much is taken over on a share basis: for the harvest of crops up to August 1942 the new operators are getting 50%. Most of the equipment was sold, but a large quantity was privately stored. This storage has made for a shortage of farm equipment. Even if it was not stored the equipment was sold separately so that the new operators do not have in all cases the equipment they need to farm the land. The FSA was doing its best to alleviate this difficulty. In this area there was substantial loss. In Gardena three acres of youngberries, one acre of cabbage and one acre of brocolli belonging to Maosuke Katayama was abandoned. The crop was lost and the tools were sold for junk. He had only twenty-four hours in which to get out so simply left. (It is uncertain to me whether he was evacuated or internned. The latter seems more likely since he would have had more time than 24 hours if evacuated. VG)

Also in Gardena, Ike Harimo had twenty-two acres on the O. T. Johnson Estate. Evidently the Japanese was buying on a contract because the loss reported is several thousand dollars. The entire equipment was lost. In this case looting was mentioned as a cause.

In Wilmington, also registered in the Torrance FSA files, a case of a three-acre nursery belonging to Mrs. Shinno was reported. The nursery carried an excellent crop of stock, carnations, and other flowers. Mrs. Shinno usually sold \$500 or more in carnations alone on Mother's and Memorial Days. She had paid her lease up to Sept. 1 on land owned by the Watson Realty Co. of Wilmington. When the evacuation came, she sold out the entire stock and equipment to a Long Beach nurseryman for \$250, \$150 in cash, and \$100 in monthly



installments. The sale was made before Mother's Day at which time the new owner harvested and sold the carnations for around \$500. The nurseries in this district suffered badly for at least three nurseries were abandoned according to a white florist in Wilmington.

One very rank case was brought to the attention of the FSA representative in Wilmington. The case was reported by Emil Menveg, a real estate operator in this town. A Japanese farmer had ten acres of celery---all ready to be harvested at time of evacuation. He asked \$4000 for it. He could get no bids from anyone except a Jew from Los Angeles who offered him 10cents per crate. The Japanese refused to sell since it costs at least 10 cents to pick and crate it. The Japanese was offered a flat \$2500 according to the story as told by S. C. Mellier of the California Bank, San Pedro. The Japanese was evacuated and left full power of attorney in the hands of ~~me~~ Menveg. Menveg was offered \$1750 but asked for \$2750 so there was no deal. On April 28, Menveg asked Meillier of the California Bank for help. Mellier who had already bought ten acres of celery and had a work crew took it over with no agreement as to distribution of profit. By this time, one-half for five acres had gone to seed. The remainder yeilded 5700 crates. The last cut of the celery was on May 20. The net profit after labor water, crates etc. was \$3569.59 according to Mellier. The Crown Produce of Company of Los Angeles had offered \$1750 for the crop. Mellier gave the \$1750 to the Japanese plus the half of the difference between \$3569.59 or \$906.24 minus 121.26, charges against the farm before evacuation. The bank gave Menveg an even \$2600. Menveg deposited \$100 and sent \$2500 to the Japanese. If the



Japanese had allowed Mellier to take over on an assignment basis before he was evacuated, he would not have lost the five acres of celery, according to Mellier. On top of this loss, the price of celery after devacuation dropped from \$1.90 to \$1.10 down to 40 to 50 cents a crate, due to the dumping by new operators. Three weeks later the price rose to \$2.60 per crate. The loss was all-around. Loss to the Japanese, loss to the new operators and loss to the consumers. This case is probably exaggerated by the bank man in order to prove his point, that he should have been asked to take over in the first place. But the main point that the new operators lost as well as the Japanese seems to be substantiated by reports from the field agents all over the southern part of the state. The celery situation was exaggerated due to the inexperience of the new people in handling its marketing.

In San Pedro only one farm was abandoned, of any size (FSA field agent reports). This was a twenty acre farm of celery and cabbage. The reason was that the Japanese owner was quite wealthy and demanded an exorbitant rent. The whole crop was lost.

In this area the new operators are principally whites, Filipinos and some Mexicans. They may very well stand to lose some money due to their inexperience. In a few cases the FSA said they paid more than the value of the property. In the San Pedro office the FSA granted three or four loans to new operators to buy up the land which were in excess of the value of the property. One loan was reported twice the value of the property. This may be blamed on the FSA's inexperience in judging the value of truck farms.

One farm in this area ---seventy-five-acres---was taken over by



three Long Beach high school teachers. The football coach, who is one of the teachers in the enterprise, is utilizing his football team as labor on the farm.

An interesting loss was reported by the FSA in the Long Beach area. Robert. S. Moore of the Moore Supply Co. bought up all the Japanese water line pipe he could at an average price of seven cents per foot (FSA said from three to five cents a foot) The average price of this pipe, second hand, is nine cents per foot according to Moore. The pipe was used by the Japanese for irrigation. The pipe is not in good condition so Moore will not be making a lot of money from the purchase. The loss is rather to the new operators. The farms are without irrigation facilities now. The new operators will have to buy new pipe. Moore may sell back to them. The Japanese did not lose by the deal since they sold their farms to new operators, but the new operators and the vegetable market will suffer.

#### COVINA

The reports from this area are poor. One case as told by a cashier in the Covina First National Bank is illustrative of the Federal Reserve inefficiency. Two Japanese brothers owned a \$8800 equity in a \$13,000 ranch. They gave power of attorney to the holder of the trust deed (\$4200). The Federal Reserve Bank representative approved this. The First National Bank talked to the representative and asked them to reconsider and disallow it. The Federal Reserve representative refused. In this case the First national Bank considers it a very bad policy to give so much power to the creditor because the creditor is not too trustworthy. Unlike other banks the report here is that Japanese deposits have increased.



This increase has been inspite of the fact that of 40,000 loans to the Japanese at the time of evacuation all but around 50 had been paid back. The indication is not clear. The capital was received from sale of property and was put into the bank, but in almost all cases of mortgages the loan was paid back.

#### POMONA

In this area there were registered 125 farms, all of which were truck. All were transferred with no crop loss. The main crops were lettuce, cabbage, and strawberries. The new operators are about one-half whites, one-fourth Mexican, and one-fourth Chinese. The Japanese came out quite well according to the FSA field agent in Pomona. Sixty days before the evacuation the FSA began to foster transference. They made six loans to new operators. The FSA oversaw the sale price on both land and crops and was satisfied that it was fair to both the Japanese and the new operator.

#### RIVERSIDE

As in Pomona the FSA began early and thereby arranged for all property to be transferred before evacuation. The average size of the farms in this area was twenty acres but the dispersion was great. One case of a high profit made on a transfer came to the attention of the FSA in this area. The Liberty Groves Co. took over one large (500 acre) ranch for \$12,000 from a Japanese. If the crop is good the Co. will net about \$10,000 on it, a very high profit for a \$12,000 investment.

In this area a great deal of loss occurred to the Japanese in the disposal of farming equipment. The FRB did not want to store it so it was sold at heavy losses.

All new operators in Riverside are white.



## REDLANDS:

The report on this area comes from the FSA representative who was in charge of both Riverside and Redlands. The difference between these two areas was quite apparent. Riverside grows onions and the Japanese farms were fairly small. Redlands farms grow citrus and the holdings of the Japanese were large ranches. Every single Japanese holding in Redlands was transferred to one of the large citrus houses (ie, Sunkist, Blue Goose, etc.) who operate them on a commission. They act merely as managers for the Japanese. This according to both the Japanese and the FSA constituted a very fine arrangement. It indicated however a further concentration of the market of citrus fruits. The efficiency of the concentration is not to be questioned, but its benefit to the consumer in being able to control price is a questionable matter.

## Livestock Losses in Los Angeles County

Besides the number of losses occurring in the transfer of Japanese farms there were a great many cases of such loss in livestock and chicken transference. In Los Angeles County the Japanese operated 38 chicken ranches which totalled about 212,000 chickens with 151,292 producing hens. Most of these ranches were leased by the Japanese but a few were owned. According to the County Livestock Inspector leases and sales have occurred in all 38 cases with not too great a loss to the Japanese. The producing hens is 90% of its former number. All the new operators are white with but one exception, a Chinese. The larger ranches have been taken over by the large organizations such as the Globe Milling Co, Gardena Milling Co. and the Taylor Milling Co. In almost all



cases the plant and stock were disposed of together. In case of lease a time basis was stated, not a "for the duration" plan. In only one case was a manager hired and put in charge of the ranch.

The same general characteristics of transfer occurred in the case of hog ranches. Almost all of the large hog ranches in L. A. County were owned or operated by Japanese. All of the ranches were large with none under 1,000 head. Three were leased, one was owned. The total hogs were 6,700 or over 10 per cent of the total hogs in Los Angeles County, all garbage fed. All the ranches were transferred to J. Marion Wright for management. No loss occurred.

#### Summary of Loss to the Japanese

In Los Angeles county and surrounding areas there seemed to have occurred in the main three types of transference:

1. In which the farm was leased by the Japanese the owner found a new lessee. The crop of the Japanese was sold either to the new operator or to an outside company.
2. In which the farm was owned by the Japanese and was sold outright or by chance the equity was lost. If sold the crop went with the sale.
3. In which the farm was owned by the Japanese and the Japanese either placed power of attorney in some one whom he trusted or else hired on a share or cash basis a manager, for the duration.

The number of cases occurring seem to be in the general order of the above list. Most of the truck farms were leased and so reverted to the owner who found a new lessee. Most of the large farms were owned or an equity in them was owned. Some cases of the loss of an equity are reported. Some cases of the transfer of property by sale are reported. A few cases of No. 3 type of transference are reported, notably in the citrus fruit and stock ranches. In all three types the Japanese stood to lose by the transference. The least loss occasioned seems to be in the case of Number 3.



The greatest number and amount of loss occurred, if our reports are correct, in the case of transference of the Number 1. type. If this type of inference is correct it is also proper to say that the rich lost the least while the poor lost the most. This also may be true if viewed from the type of person transferring under type one and type three. The Japanese who leased a small plot of land was the poor, ignorant peasant type. He did not often appeal to any government agency for help and when crop loss occurred he suffered it unless it by chance was reported. In the case of type number 3, the owner of a large citrus ranch, whether Japanese or white, is probably quite well off financially and is well known to the big men in the business. He knew what to do and to whom to go and therefore he was able to arrange for a very profitable deal.

Although the number of cases and type of cases reported herein may not be representative of the field if we assume they are the above reasoning would seem to hold with very few exceptions from out of the cases at our disposal.

#### Summary of Loss to the New Operator

The new operator again falls into classes:

1. A new lessee who has or has not taken over the crop
2. A new owner who has taken the crop (usual case)
3. A new manager-operator for the Japanese.

The first two types of operators stood to lose by about the same amount, mainly in crops. The skill of the new operators determined what amount he would lose on the current crop. The type of crop he plants for the next year will determine his future loss. In the case of a new owner the loss may be greater in that he can't move off at the end of the year unless he finds a buyer. The lessee



may take a loss on the present crop and either not take another year's lease or else change the crop.

The loss by "dumping" due to inexperience seems to be the most serious for the new operator. The price fluctuated and was too low at the time of the greatest harvest because of his inexperience in holding up price.

The manager-operator seems to be chosen by the Japanese from out of the type of people well-acquainted with the type of agriculture in which his farm is engaged. The manager loses if on a share basis and he is unable to keep up the crop and the market as the Japanese did. If the manager is on a cash basis he loses nothing. This seems to be the safest arrangement all-around.

#### Summary of Loss to the Community

Always a difficult thing to judge this loss become even more complicated because of the war economy of the present. That vegetable prices are high, that there seem to be short seasons to certain fruits, that some vegetables are poor is apparent but how much of this is due to the evacuation and how much is due to the bidding up of prices between the government and the public is not apparent. Obviously, some large loss occurred to the consumer when crops were lost. Many crops are reported lost due to the evacuation. The poor marketing practices of the new operators caused price fluctuations and poor quality. This was due to the evacuation. Probably the loss was large but should not be overstated since it occurred in limited areas, in limited amounts, and in only certain vegetables. To be more specific: a loss occurred in the case of celery, tomatoes and onions because of bad harvesting and marketing. A loss occurred in the case of strawberries due to



evacuation occurring at the peak of the strawberry harvest. Other fruits and vegetables were affected but not as greatly as these. Since none of these goods are essentials to a diet and may be substituted for the loss can be minimized.

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A further economic consequence of the Japanese evacuation seems to be a shortage in agricultural labor. This if at all an important item might well be claimed to be the greatest of the economic losses as a result of the evacuation.

According to the testimony of Harold J. Ryan, Commissioner of Agriculture for Los Angeles County, before the Tolan Committee: "Labor used on the vegetable and berry farms, according to the farmers interviewed, totaled 73,631 man-months per year. Of this total 44,098 man-months were home labor supplied by the families or persons living on the farms. Labor hired from the outside amounted to 29,533 man-months. ... A total of perhaps 60,000 man-month's labor is Japanese."

When the evacuation became a reality this amount of labor had to be substituted for. The reports from various sections of the southern California area indicate that a labor shortage is certain but that in many cases substitutes are being found.

INDIO: According to Theodore Lane of the State Dept. of Employment here the Coachella Valley has an acute labor shortage developing but feels that this is due principally to the industrial drain rather than evacuation.

POMONA: According to the FSA representative the farm labor situation there was likely to be acute this year, but the strain will only be temporary because the whites who are taking over the



Japanese farms will switch from truck to field crops for the next harvest. Field crops can be harvested by machine and do not take hand or stoop labor.

RIVERSIDE: All the new operators are whites and again there is likely to be a farm labor shortage for the current harvest of onions. However, the plan is to switch to hay and possible tomatoes. Hay can be harvested by machine so will minimize the strain.

#### LOS ANGELES COUNTY

Labor for greenhouses will probably be very short since Japanese women formerly did this work. Mexicans, knowing that greenhouses were leased because of the cash crop involved, are demanding higher wages. But, white operators must get twice as much for greenhouse crops as Japanese because a white family will not not work for the family for not wages. One case of trained Mexican female labor being utilized is reported.

According to Carey McWilliams, Chief of the Department of Industrial Relations, , Division of Immigration and Housing, there was in the latter part of April about 6,500 unemployed Mexican farmers in the area of Los Angeles. This, of course, could not take care of the agricultural needs of the state but might help in the southern Californian harvest. Gus Hawkins (Negro assemblyman from Los Angeles) favored the import of negroes from the deep south to replace the Japanese. Under Hawkins was organized a committee to select negro families to take over evacuated farms. To what extent this plan was successful is unknown at the present writing. McWilliams was in accord with Hawkins, believing that the importation of negroes would alleviate the labor shortage. Dr. Mills of the FSA also agreed.



However, there is some disagreement as to the advisability of importing negroes. W. R. Newport, Property Management Director of the W. Ross Campbell Co. does not believe it wise. This organization is for the management of both rural and urban properties. The company had a very hard time finding new tenants for the properties which they care for. They felt that there were too few Chinese and Filipinos to take over the farms vacated, and the Mexicans were worse than no tenants at all. Newport said that supervised labor, such as with Mexicans might work well. He does not feel that Mexicans could make independent operators. He believes that importing the negroes would be a mistake because they are not acquainted with the problems which have to be met in California agriculture.

Further aggravating the labor shortage, according to Stuart Walsh, Research Administrator of the Kenny Committee, is the determined effort on the part of the Mexicans, the Filipinos, and the Negroes to get out of the agricultural labor group. They are in some way successful since many are and have been hired by defense plants in the Los Angeles area. The Mexicans are no longer willing to come in from Mexico, since there has been a quickening of industrialization in their own country. Also the reforms of Cardenas have done a lot for the Mexican farmer, and he is not so willing to leave home as he was formerly.

An attempt by many agencies has been made to recruit high school boys. The use of high school boys has worked out very well in some parts, notably in the San Fernando Valley where the shortage was expected to be most acute. If cooperation can be obtained from the school authorities this pool might be drawn upon



for unskilled farm labor. Any noticeable shortage will occur in August and September when the biggest crops are harvested and when the schools reopen taking away this source of labor.

According to the Teamster's Union in Los Angeles the shortage in truck drivers for the produce industry has been avoided. The evacuation of the Japanese was thought to mean the end to this union, but Japanese teamsters have been replaced by whites without difficulty.

Whether the evacuation left a gap in farm labor is hard to determine. If it did the effects have as yet not been felt and may not be. Only if the amount of recruited labor does not fill this gap will it become important. However, as has been pointed out time and again by all FSA officials the big gap in farm labor is due to the migration to defense industries. This percentage is no doubt much larger than the percentage loss from evacuation. The evacuation might be looked upon as the straw that may or may not break the camel's back. The farm labor situation has steadily become more acute as industry has expanded. The evacuation came at a time when all available farm labor was needed. Certain groups have attempted to fill in where the Japanese were, but it is apparent that no source is filling in where the defense industries drew from.

It would seem to be an overestimation to call the Japanese evacuation the cause for the farm labor shortage (if and when it does exist). This was merely a small contributory cause, although had it not occurred it might have been utilized to fill further the gap caused by the drain to the city.



SUMMARY REPORT ON FARMERS' ATTITUDE:  
San Joaquin County, California

Part I. Description of the County

The unusual nature of San Joaquin County's agricultural position makes it necessary to present some of the special features which influence the results of the whole farmer-attitude study. Agriculture in the county is highly diversified, there is intense specialization of farming, the per-acre costs are high, and the total value of products very great. To exemplify the diversification, the Agricultural Crop Report, published by the San Joaquin County Agricultural Department, lists 19 fruit and nut crops, 18 field crops, 19 vegetable crops, 18 seed crops, and 7 different types of stock. Such diversity reflects both excellent and variegated soils and the equitable climate. The high cash value of crops can perhaps best be expressed with one figure--56 million dollars total crop value for 1941. Sixteen separate products were given a gross value of over 1 million dollars each. Of these the most important are alfalfa, fresh grapes, asparagus, and beef cattle. Tomatoes, sugar beets, and dairy products all fall in this class. Though San Joaquin County is highly diversified, the individual farmer tends to specialize in one or a few crops. Tomato growers, for instance, insist that it takes years of experience to be a successful tomato farmer. There is a type of "migrant" or mobile farmer living in the city and renting whatever acreages he finds suitable for his special crop. Farming in the county requires high capital investments. Land rentals are high and the land is capitalized at a good figure. Costs are further increased by the need for irrigation water, sometimes surface and sometimes pumped, and by the high cost of field labor.

The diversity of crops is paralleled by a diversity in population. Many ethnic stocks are represented in the county; and our interviews included a number with Japanese, Portuguese, and Italian, many of whom are aliens. Filipinos, Hindus, and many European immigrants might have been included, though they are more rarely operators. Local officials point to this diversification of ethnic stocks as a source of differing opinions within the farm population. Another source of such disunity comes from the great variation in size of farm enterprises. Interviews were taken with operators owning tracts of less than 10 acres and with the operator of a 6,000-acre intensive farm. While rarely are there farm operators who are in that third of the Nation who are poorly housed and fed, the degree of variation between the poorest and the richest is nevertheless great. In other words, the social problems to be found in San Joaquin County are not those of the impoverished South or the marginal farmer. Most farmers expect and usually have a good middle-class level of living; and though some of the minority groups do not display a high standard of living, they are not necessarily in poor economic circumstances. This brief introductory statement is an essential part of the description of the county and is necessary in order that special problems can be understood.



1. As has just been stated, farmers as a whole in this county are well off and have been for many years, though there have been periods during which the fruit farmers and some of the dry farmers have had a difficult time. The war has improved their situation and the farmers are "on the up-grade."

2. San Joaquin County contains a city with 54,000 inhabitants and lies adjacent to a great metropolitan area. For these reasons, the countryside will not be greatly affected by local industrial developments. The universal increase in employment applies here and has reduced unemployment greatly, draining off that large body of reserve labor which has always been considered essential to intensive crop production. The little defense activity that is taking place in the county cannot be said to have affected the attitude of the farmers covered in this survey.

Last year's heavy rain in this area was harmful to the fruit crops and prevented large acreages from being planted in barley. Therefore, producers of these two commodities may have had their attitudes affected by the weather to some extent. Weather conditions are considered a possible hardship for the coming year.

3. It is difficult to determine the degree to which industrial employment has drawn off the population from the San Joaquin farms, but this is an important factor to the supply of farm labor. Yet one farmer reports a former employee, now working in war industry, who will return to the farm whenever there is a job available. A few farm operators interviewed have been engaged in part-time industrial employment resulting directly from the present defense expansion, and some have left farming for urban employment. Though good employment is available, farming is a profitable business in this area.

4. San Joaquin has been called a Farm Bureau county, although the Grange is active especially in the southeastern portion. The Associated Farmers is an organization which embraces fewer operators but is of considerable influence as a pressure group upon farmer opinion. It might be said, however, that membership in organizations rarely seems to be effective in determining farmers' attitudes. The press and the radio are the universal sources of news and as such are more influential than direct contacts in organization meetings.

5. At present the sign-ups for the AAA program in 1942 is some 10 to 15 percent higher than it was at this time last year. These data were obtained from the secretary of the AAA in San Joaquin County, for no marked increase in participation appeared in the schedule. By and large, the farmers appeared to be rather indifferent, when not hostile, to the whole agricultural adjustment program. Frequently they would say "it is wrong to pay a farmer for doing what he should anyway." Stockmen objected to plowing under cover crops when there is a feed



shortage. Similarly, a production-goal sign-up carried on last fall met with only indifferent success. Meetings were held for the purpose of getting farmers to sign up on production goals. An official reports that "very little interest was shown and the results were generally unsatisfactory." In order to make up the deficiency for voluntary participation, an intensive campaign was inaugurated and a farm-to-farm canvass made. A good coverage was thus obtained, but at the present time the farmers in our sample are almost completely unaware of having signed any statement for increase of production. They practically never know what their own production goals are and consistently confuse the production goal with the allotment program. The farmer generally remains unaware of the Government's desire to increase production. The tomato growers are an exception to this, but their awareness comes rather from the cannery agents' pressures than from governmental representatives.



## Part II. Outlook

1. The major shifts in production in the county appear to be as follows: (a) Increase in tomatoes, which largely replace beans or utilize land formerly in hay or pasture. Tomato farms are often operated by tenants who pick up suitable tracts wherever they are found. (b) Sugar beets, largely because acreage restrictions have been removed. (c) Barley increased considerably this year, but last year's crop was below normal as a result of late rains which prevented planting. Feed shortages have been a special inducement.

Several crops in turn have decreased; (a) Farmers have shifted away from beans; tomatoes are competing against them favorably; and last year's crop is not selling very well. The shift would have been greater except for fear of labor shortage, there being a large differential in the amount required. (b) The shift is away from wheat into barley and rice on account of governmental restrictions on wheat. (c) There is a decrease in dairy cows, according to this sample and other evidence, despite the fact that an increase in milk production has been predicted.

2. The primary reason for shifting into tomatoes has been favorable prices and especially the assurance of these prices in the Government contract schedule. The sugar beet increase resulted largely from the withdrawal of governmental restrictions. High feed prices have been a major factor in the shift to barley.

Certain more general reasons also exist. A number of farmers gave patriotic causes for their changed production, though these are almost always in conjunction with anticipated profits. One dairy farmer, for instance, said he was increasing because the Government wants him to; but actually his entire change had involved more efficient utilization of resources and did not actually increase production (see schedule 32). Farm management practices, such as rotation of crops, or shifts to crops that would spread the labor demand over a longer period, have both been effective. Again it might be said that the pressure of sugar and canning companies for greater production of beets and tomatoes has increased acreages in these commodities.

3. Rarely, if ever, were production increases spontaneously stated. Little concern about production goals or little recognition of commodities needed by the Government appears in the schedules. The schedule question on what was needed by the Government characteristically brought an indefinite response, such as "We hear a lot about a need for tomatoes."

4. There can be no doubt that the major obstacle to increase production in this county is the fear or the actuality for labor shortage. In response to the question on problems, one farmer said,



"Labor, that's all." Another farmer, however, was able to say, "It may be only a scare." Sixteen farmers gave labor shortage as an immediate response to the question on probable hardships. Costs are a second obstacle, but the major cost mentioned is high wages. The price of feed is an obstacle to the dairyman. Actual shortages are important only in the grain and bean enterprises where supplies of sacks are inadequate. Grains have been characteristically handled in sacks, and the materials necessary to transfer to bulk handling may also be scarce. A number of farmers mentioned difficulties in marketing, having in mind inadequate railroad facilities and the loss of foreign markets. It is significant that weather is a more frequent source of disquiet in the farmers' minds than either credit or commodity prices.

5. The California farmer must by March not only have quite definite plans but of necessity must already have acted upon them. Most plans are made early in the season and planting had been started at the time the schedules were taken. Occasionally the farmer has not yet decided what to do with remnant acres, but the choice is always between two comparable commodities. If labor proves short, large-scale operators may <sup>not plant</sup> ~~also~~ their tomatoes or <sup>beets</sup> ~~beets~~ under and plant beans instead, taking the loss on the original investment rather than the risk of failure to harvest.

6. Obviously, such preparations as are necessary for shifts in commodities have already been made. Changes have also been made in the dairy industry, as well. These changes include more efficient use of machinery, closer feeding, and herd improvement. Other commodity shifts require few changes in the farm enterprise.

7. It might be said that, on the whole, farmers appear optimistic about the financial prices this year, always with the ever-present feeling that they may not be able to harvest their crop due to labor shortage. The proportion of optimistic to pessimistic answers in the sample was three to one. Most of those who did not look favorably to the future had some individual reason, in terms of their own farm enterprise. It might be said that the characteristic response to the question was "In what way do you mean?" and that further probing elicited "Prices will be up and so will costs--guess I will be a little better off," or simply "DK."

Large operators and the non-Japanese ~~owner~~ appear to be better off. The Japanese are, of course, in a bad situation. The orchard and vineyard operators apparently feel the nonessential quality of their products and are worried about markets and shipping.



### Part III. Credit Arrangements

San Joaquin County is not an area of marginal farmers. Many are wealthy and most are well off and have good credit standing at private banks. Credit is not, therefore, one of the major problems. There are certain characteristic types of money advancements made by the processors of the commodity grown and frequently written into the contract between the processor and the farmer.

1. Farmers do not appear to be planning to borrow more money for their farm operations this year than they have in the past. It is probably true that farmers who have greatly expanded their operations, such as some of the tomato farmers, have a proportionate increase in credit needs.

2. Government credit to the amount of about 2 million dollars was advanced last year, yet private finance is much the more usual form. Government credit may be considered important, however, to that small proportion of farmers who need it, and it seems to be adequate. A frequent form of credit is furnished by processors and very much by chain or local private banks. The corporate farms get their credit from the bank at a straight 4 percent interest.

3. The only group with a serious credit problem is the Japanese. Their highly special problem was expressed by one of the interviewees (see schedule 46) who said, "If I run out of capital and can't farm, under what will I be suspected, sabotage?" The obvious reason for the lack of credit is that the creditors fear the Japanese will be evacuated and their crops lost. Though undoubtedly arrangements will be made for taking over these farms, it is very probable that yields will be affected by the change of operators, since tomato production requires certain special knowledge. One Japanese pointed out that his store credit had been withdrawn and he was dependent upon this for his operations, and furthermore that the cannery had withdrawn its contracted credit. Since the Japanese operate about 20 percent of the canning-tomato acreage, this problem is of sufficient importance that special and immediate attention should be given it.

4. As has already been stated in other contexts, credit is not a major obstacle to production. There is the exception noted above, and there are a few marginal farmers who present a social rather than an economic problem, for their total production is but a very small proportion of the county's.

5. Small operators frequently express reluctance to increase their credit. This is more characteristic of the fruit and dairy farmers, and of the older operators. On the other hand, there are many enterprises set up on a credit basis. It is possible to operate



a farm enterprise as an entrepreneur utilizing borrowed money and rented land and perhaps even contracting out some of the labor. There is sufficient private capital willing to handle such operations.

6. Many farmers do not like Government credit because of the excessive control; yet, obviously a lax system would receive an equal amount of censure. Such criticism may simply reflect the general prejudice against governmental agencies which compete with private enterprise. Another important criticism effective in this area of highly commercialized and large-scale farming is that not sufficiently large quantities may be borrowed. The farmer in this area takes high capital risks in the hope of high returns, and private banks are willing to back him.



#### Part IV. Labor Situation

Labor is the key problem in the agricultural area of which San Joaquin County is characteristic. This problem may be either a fear of shortage or a real shortage, but in either case it will affect the total production in the county. At the present time it is fear that is crucial, for fear of production has kept many farmers from planting tomatoes and sugar beets which have high labor requirements. However, the latter, and probably the former, have been planted in sufficiently large quantities to utilize full plant capacity. It is quite true that at the present time there is much less labor available than there has been for the past 10 years or more. On the other hand, there are very few cases where operators have not been able to get the workers they want, though they have had to pay high prices for that labor. Milker wages are now good, yet it is possible for a farm operator to complain that wages for field work have risen from 25 to 35 cents.

The shortage may be of two kinds: Shortage of skilled workers (milkers, and tractor operators) or numerical shortage (harvest labor). It may be noted that the farmers who hire the skilled labor and are requiring them now, such as dairy men, made fewer primary responses indicating labor as a problem. It is still a moot problem with specialists in the field as to whether there will be a shortage of harvest hands, though farmers are very concerned about this item and have held many discussions on it, usually ending with a recommendation that labor be imported either from Mexico or the South. A few Negroes already have been imported. Whether this shortage of labor is real or not, the solution is the same. It is necessary for an emergency labor force to be organized and so publicized as to allay farmer fears of shortages. And, yet, it must be so constructed that this organization does not compete directly with the professional farmhand but only fills the gaps where labor is actually not available. Such labor forces will have to come from school children, impounded aliens, or the like.

It is the interviewers' opinion that this is a most important single item for that area of which San Joaquin County is typical.

1. The interviewers have the impression that 99 percent of the farmers spontaneously brought up the labor situation immediately and a count shows that two-thirds of them did so in answer to the second question on the schedule. The dairy and dry farmers showed the least frequency in this primary response.

2. There are several causes of labor shortages. The first is the draining of machine operators away from the farm into defense industries where wages are higher. This has caused considerable bitterness and there is much farmer criticism of the defense program and its inefficiencies and high wages.



The draft is a less important cause for labor shortage, but its effects certain groups more harshly than others. In the southeastern part of the county and in a contiguous area extending throughout much of Stanislaus County, there are many operators of small dairies, for the most part, producing condensery milk. These farmers, unlike the majority in the county, operate family-type farms. They are largely Portuguese, but there are some Scandinavian, Spanish, and Italian farmers in this group. In these cases the sons are frequently key men in the operation of the farm, taking over much of the management because the parents do not speak English. Serious difficulties have resulted from irresponsible drafting into the Army of these sons.

The third cause for labor shortage is the evacuation of the Japanese which has not yet happened in this "B" area, but which will have affected other counties and will probably affect San Joaquin in the near future. Again, the Filipinos who furnish much of the stoop labor have been drawn in disproportionately large numbers to defense industries. From 3,000 to 5,000 Filipinos are thus employed and a large proportion have been regularly engaged in crop harvesting in this county.

A highly specialized problem resulting from the Filipino-Japanese antagonism may cause difficulties in the tomato harvest, even if sufficient labor exists in the area. Undoubtedly some machinery can be set up to care for this situation when and if it arises.

Off-farm employment of farm operators has been reported in a few instances, but this is not a serious factor in the curtailment of labor supply.

3. No replacement of farm hands by women and children in the family has been noted. Family labor is frequently utilized on certain types of farms, especially the small dairies operated by minority groups. While the problem appeared less frequently in the San Joaquin County sample, in general these minority groups do not like to utilize women. The status implications of women doing field work is undoubtedly a major factor in this attitude. Note for instance the Japanese statement, "I don't like for the woman to work, it is too much like slavery." Adjustments for labor depletion are more apt to be made by a change in crop rather than by supplanting it with family labor.



Part V. Gardens

1. None. Farmers gave increased consumption and dietary considerations as their reasons for planting enlarged gardens. However, there was little discussion of any campaign to improve rural diets, and few seem aware of the Government's activities in this regard.

2. In the majority of cases, gardens have been increased for patriotic reasons and because of price anticipations; while, as stated above, increased consumption has been a frequent reason. Fear of vegetable shortages has been an effective reason, also. Some farmers seem to be planning to increase the variety of vegetables; but, in general, statements on this question were vague.

3. California has long been known as an area in which home gardens were relatively rare. This is most probably a reflection of the high level of living and the strong competition for the use of the farmers' time. Time, as a matter of fact, was most frequently given as the reason for not increasing home gardens. Lack of suitable land or available water was frequently expressed, while many farmers considered the cost of the home garden to be greater than the cost of the same produce purchased on the market. In the words of one interviewee in this highly specialized area, "I'd leave that to the gardeners, they're specialists in the field."

4. Farmers do not very frequently preserve vegetables in this area, but about one-third indicated they would increase their canning this year. Neither shortage of seed, tools, or canning supplies was mentioned as an obstacle to home gardens, and home gardens were not planted for the purpose of supplementing income through marketing.

5. The Farm Advisor's office has carried on a fairly extensive campaign for home gardens through circularization and special demonstrations, and through farm-center meetings and 4-H Club projects. None of the farmers interviewed referred directly to this campaign though a number of farmers would say, "My wife is putting in a Victory garden." No suggestions of importance were made as to what the Government might do to induce the farmers to raise more of their own food. They generally responded to the applicable question with "Encouragement is good, but the Government should not force the farmer to have a garden."



Part VI. Milk

1. There is a general expectancy that the milk production of the county will be increased, but the interviews do not substantiate this. The number of dairy cows has decreased by well over 10 percent, though more farmers claim an increased production than do the contrary. It might be said in this context that our sample is inadequate for a positive answer.

2. Patriotism and price are the greatest factors in getting an increase in milk production, and the two had best be viewed conjointly. For instance, schedule 32 presents the case of a farmer who states flatly that he is increasing only because the Government wants greater production; but the adjustments in his enterprise indicate that he is merely obtaining more efficient operation from a profit standpoint, and has not yet increased production at all.

3. No characteristic shift in the nature of the dairy enterprise appears in the schedule, unless it is stricter culling of herds and reducing the number of "boarders." Labor shortage and high wages have required some streamlining of the dairy operation.

4. As in all the obstacles to greater production, labor shortage or the fear of labor shortage comes first. Feed prices are very high at the present time, which is best indicated by the fact that some farmers have sold their herd and are now merely farming alfalfa. Plant capacity and proper farm organization in terms of the relationship between acreage and stock is an obstacle to increased production, especially where feed prices are high.

5. Many farmers are buying feed especially at this season of the year and are feeding concentrates, but not much commercial-mixed feed seems to be bought.

6. No changes whatsoever in the marketing of milk were indicated in the schedule.

7. Most farmers feel that the price will be good for "prices are already up." Some fear is being expressed that the price of condensery milk will soon be reduced, and this may prove to be an obstacle to production in the immediate future. Costs of feed and labor are considered to be equally increased, and the farmer does not think he is getting much of the price advance. This depends upon the amount of feed he grows and the amount of labor he performs.

8. There appears to be very little awareness of the Government program for increasing milk production though, when specifically asked, farmers would recognize Government purchases as effective on milk prices. They are apt, however, to consider the price rise as a normal result of war expansion.



Some farmers have suggested that better prices should be established by the Government, and one farmer suggested that cover crops should be used for pasture rather than to be plowed under.

9. There was a repeated complaint that there is too much spread between consumer's and producer's prices; that there is "too much middleman."



## VII. Canning Tomatoes

1. Again, labor fear. Many operators who could handle tomatoes instead of beans and who would be glad to in view of the price situation and the assurance of these good prices are not doing it because they fear the harvest situation. Statements of this kind came from small operators as well as the president of a large corporate farm. A few small acreages may be kept out of production because of scarcity of small plants. This may in part be due to miscalculation, but is probably the direct result of the frosts which killed some plants in the cold frames.

2. The anxiety about labor has already been a fairly serious obstacle to production, as has just been indicated. Whether there will actually be a drastic labor shortage cannot now be determined, but it is certainly a threat to meeting production goals. Tomatoes are a highly perishable crop and must have first priority in any allocation of farm labor. Shortage of tomato plants is not a serious item. There is some fear that canners have overcontracted which may have kept a few acres out of production. As a matter of fact, it may be that the canners will prove a real bottleneck in getting the tomatoes from the producer to the consumer.

3. Contracts appear to be no problem. There is a general satisfaction with the price and terms of the contracts. It appears that a larger proportion of the farmers do not have contracts this year, but this is probably a form of gambling on changed market conditions and is not the result of inability to get contracts.

The frequent complaint was registered that the canners have caused serious losses to the producer by causing him to wait to deliver his products for as long as 24 to 36 hours, through making him wait for boxes and possibly through unfair grading of his produce. Losses resulting from these practices in both tomatoes and labor time can result in serious losses of tomatoes, and steps should be taken to overcome this difficulty, not only out of fairness to the farmer but for the purpose of increasing production.

4. ~~No~~ changes in production practices for tomatoes were reported, except that there may be some use of sulphur spray to destroy silver mite which was a serious pest last year.

5. The tomato operators are quite aware of the Government's program to increase tomato production because they have been repeatedly contacted and so advised by the canner agents. There has been much publicity and many meetings on the problem to bring it home to the growers. Farmers who might grow small acreages of tomatoes, but who have not been, are less aware of these programs.



6. The tomato growers seem to have a better understanding of the Government's assistance than the milk producers do, probably for the reasons just given. In general, they feel that last year's program was helpful but are pleased with the changes made this year. They are not clear on the matter of contract price in relation to distance from market.

7. The most usual request of the Government in the tomato production situation is for some assurance that labor be made available at a fair price. Again they are anxious to have unfair cannery practices stopped.

8. Under this item it might be well to state that the cannery-tomato sample is made up largely of either Japanese or noncitizens and that, therefore, fewer criticisms of Government programs were found than might have been the case in a more normal sample.

The Japanese operators present a special problem in the tomato-growing situation. In other special statements and throughout this report we have indicated special problems to which they are subjected. It may be well to summarize them here. The major difficulties are (a) evacuation, (b) curtailment of credit, and (c) availability of labor. As a source of labor they will also be missed. These difficulties, if not alleviated in some way, may cause serious losses in tomatoes and in other commodities. An estimated 20 percent of the tomato acreage is operated by Japanese and they are important as managers or as labor to other acres.

March 15, 1942.





# HOTEL TIOGA

MERCED · CALIFORNIA

*The Gateway to Yosemite*

5/10/42  
afternoon

Interview with Mr. Momberg

We drove out to <sup>Livingston</sup> ~~Lindsay~~ - about 25 miles from Merced - to Mr. Momberg's office. The FSA was trying to locate six Japanese farmers whose farm deals were not completed on their records\*. Momberg knows the country and the Japanese well.

He showed us a copy of a letter received by him from Calif. Fruit Growers wanting him to give them the stuff from the farms he takes over to sell. He said he wasn't getting tied up with that outfit - Casey. Told of a few farmer dealings he'd had with Casey and Kono.

Questions asked:

1. How did you happen to take over all this land?

He answered that he had a \$5000 yr. job with Calif. Lands Co. and when  
\* See FSA Functions



it became apparent that the J's were going to be evacuated, his friend Lawyer Griswald had asked him to take over as manager of the land. Griswald holds Power of Att. in a great many of the cases. Mosher accepted. He takes the farm & the chattel for which at harvest time he gets a salary (?) and 1% of net, 3% of gross receipts.  $\frac{1}{2}$ ¢ per acre

2. Do you think farm labor shortage will result from this evacuation & how will it effect the price of crops? He said that right now he had 5 Mexicans waiting to be taken out to pick strawberries on an evacuee's farm. He said he was offering \$.20 a crate for the picking, but the laborers wanted \$.35. He said if they have to pay hi wages to labor it will be hard on the farmers, especially in crops where there has been a price fixed. He said they can't fix truck crop prices - so expects them to rise and more to be produced of them.

3. Who are you getting to stay on these farms as operators.

Mostly local people. A lot of people here have come back from industrial jobs & want to buy the land.





# HOTEL TIOGA

MERCED · CALIFORNIA

## The Gateway to Yosemite

2.

Monberg  
Cont.

4. Will any Mexicans take ~~some~~ <sup>any</sup> of the farms?  
Yes, mostly Mexs who live around the Valley. [At that time there were 3 young Mex. boys waiting to see M. about ~~buying~~ <sup>operating</sup> some of the land.]
5. Have you heard of the idea of importing negroes and what do you think of it?  
we don't want them! <sup>(Emphatic)</sup> There will be too much trouble. There aren't any govt camps in the Valley here to take care of them so we'd have a mess on our hands.
6. In your deal of taking over as Manager of the Jap. farms, are you alone or is it a cooperative idea -?  
No, I'm the sole manager of these farms & will pick what operators I think will work the land best.
7. What do you do with the machinery -?  
I will split it up & put it where it's needed - on a cooperative basis. What I can't use, I'll store & have a mechanic take care of it.  
(This latter refers mostly to trucks &



cars left on the farms by the Japs. ]

8. You're not leasing or buying any of the land?

No, I'm manager - and Power of attorney rests with a lawyer.

9. Do the Japs. still hold ownership, pay the mortgage etc?

Yes. And they'll have the land in good condition when they get back.

### Personal Reaction:

A graduate of Cal, now middle-aged, intelligent, industrious, and the type of good-natured person one feels trusting toward. No doubt he will make money on this managing, but it's far the best deal for the Japs. And they must realize it as witnessed by nearly 75% here signing with Momberg. He did not go to them - they each came & asked him to manage (both Momberg & the

Japs. interviewed by the FSA said this) The Japs. have known & dealt with him for a long time & they trust him. When I mentioned their trust, he said "They're good people and I've known most of them a long time. We trust each other."



Block 26, Building 14  
Poston, Arizona  
August 25, 1942

Miss Virginia Galbraith  
207 Giannini Hall  
University of California  
Berkeley, California

Dear Miss Galbraith:

Thank you for your letter of August 19th. Your information regarding work on the outside is very helpful, and I am sure that if any of our people should be able to leave camp for work, they will appreciate your suggestions.

As to the Japanese marketing organizations of Imperial Valley, I am setting forth names of the produce companies which were being operated by them as of the 1941 season.

Associations (run on cooperative system):

South Imperial Valley Growers Cooperative Assn., Inc.--approx. 50 members.  
Growers of lettuce, squash, tomatoes, and melons. Squash was marketed in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Oakland markets in truck shipments. The bulk of the other products were loaded on railroad cars and shipped to eastern markets, very little being shipped to the California markets.

Holtville Farmers Association--approx. 20 members.  
Growers of squash, tomatoes, and melons. Same type of marketing facilities as above association.

Niland Growers Association--approx. 30 members.  
Tomatoes shipping organization, shipping mainly to eastern markets.

Others:

Salinas Valley Vegetable Exchange (American and Japanese partnership firm) Main office in Salinas. Raised large acreage of lettuce in the Imperial Valley, shipping to eastern markets.

Nakamoto Bros. (3 brothers)--Growers of lettuce and melons, shipping mainly to the Los Angeles markets.



2.

Golden Valley Produce Company (individual firm, financing about seven small farmers in addition to own acreage) Growers of lettuce, tomatoes, squash, and melons, shipping to eastern markets mostly.

Standard Produce Company (partnership, financing about 25 small farmers, in addition to own acreage) Squash, tomatoes, and melons, shipping to California markets.

Mt. Signal Produce Company (individual firm) mostly shipping to California markets.

Russo Bros. (American firm, financing about 25 small Japanese farmers) shipping mainly to eastern markets.

Besides the above, there were about 28 - 30 working as foremen for various American produce houses, and the balance of the Japanese farmers were independent or partly being financed by the produce markets of Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Oakland.

I hope that this information will answer your questions on the Japanese marketing organizations of Imperial Valley. I shall be glad to answer to the best of my knowledge any other questions you may have regarding our people.

Yes, the weather in Poston is very hot, but just recently, it has been getting a little cooler. Having lived mostly in the coastal area, I never dreamed that I would ever spend a whole summer in a heat such as we are experiencing here. I have heard, though, that this dry, hot climate is good for many different kinds of illnesses, and when one becomes accustomed to this weather, it is not too uncomfortable.

Again, may I express my appreciation for the interest you are taking in the problems of our people.

Sincerely yours,

*Kay Nishimura*  
Kay Nishimura



Nishimura data

CENSUS OF JAPANESE DESCENT  
IN IMPERIAL VALLEY

	<u>Brawley</u>	<u>El Centro</u>	<u>Total</u>
Reported (No. FAMILIES)	177	178	355
Christian	51	62	113
Buddhist	59	102	161
None	51	30	81
Alien Males	160	157	317
Alien Females	94	103	197
Citizen Males	210	318	528
Citizen Females	222	288	510
Citizen males, 17 & under	101	159	260
Citizen females, 17 & under	131	150	281
Citizen males, 18 & over	109	159	268
Citizen females, 18 & over	91	138	229
Passenger cars	115	140	255
Title clear	80	104	184
Trucks	58	83	141
Title clear	60	68	128
Sick persons	13	21	34
Evacuation with group	137	165	302
Undecided	15	23	38
Evacuation not with group	9	6	15
Eligible voters	122	157	279

This data compiled as of April 1, 1942

Imperial County Citizens Welfare Committee



Harry Horton + Knot -

In Small's office

Yoshita

Reginald I. Knot, Atty - El Centro  
Bhaskar Bldg

LIST OF AMOUNTS OWED TO SOUTH IMPERIAL VALLEY  
VEGETABLE GROWERS COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, DIRECTLY OR  
INDIRECTLY, FOR LOANS TO GROWERS:

Choko

S. Kawano,	\$ 250.00, with interest at 7% from Nov. 10, 1941, due to Bank of America.
S. Koike,	\$ 150.00, with interest at 7% from Nov. 10, 1941, due to Bank of America.
T. Nakahara,	\$ 255.00, with interest at 7% from Nov. 10, 1941, due to Bank of America.
F. Nakamura,	\$ 200.00, with interest at 7% from Nov. 10, 1941, due to Bank of America.
Tom Okutsu,	\$ 150.00, with interest at 7% from Nov. 12, 1941, due to Bank of America.
R. Tsubouchi,	\$ 50.00, with interest at 7% from Nov. 10, 1941, due to Bank of America.
J. Yamada,	\$ 50.00, with interest at 7% from Nov. 10, 1941, due to Bank of America.
M. Fujiwara,	\$1269.43, due to George Nakamoto.
M. Tijizawa,	\$729.67, due to George Nakamoto.
G. Nishida,	\$610.55, due to George Nakamoto.
<del>Not a part</del> X S. Miyahara,	\$160.50, due to George Nakamoto. <sup>not</sup>
Pa M. Yamada,	\$1,013.85, due to Association.
S. Koike,	\$646.59, " " "
T. Nakahara,	\$771.51, " " "
J. Yoshida,	\$842.44, " " "
<del>Not an</del> X M. Mori,	\$373.26, " " "
Pa T. Yamada,	\$232.35, " " "
X C. Nishikawa,	\$134.50, " " "
M. Tajii,	\$134.37, " " "

Not an  
farm  
in California  
4/14

C?



	Y. Tanaka	\$1.09,	due to Association	
no accused by charter	X S. O. Nakamura	\$300.92	" " "	Sam? Inamura?
	George Shimamoto	\$ 2.13	" " "	
	R. Tsubouchi	\$ 50.00	" " "	
	S. Matsumoto	\$ 4.00	" " "	
	F. Nakamura	\$552.00	" " "	
	M. Masukane	\$192.00	" " "	
	G. Nishida	\$ 72.00	" " "	
	B. Kosugi	\$215.23	" " "	
	K. Yoshimura	\$ 2.31	" " "	
	N. Ito	\$ 8.26	" " "	
	M. Uchida	\$ 6.18	" " "	
	D. Niino	\$906.98	" " "	
	T. Kodama	\$ 3.00	" " "	
	X S. S. Nakamura	\$ 20.99	" " "	Sam? Sugma
	T. Sakaue	\$ 3.00	" " "	
	R. Mariano	\$ 3.00	" " "	
	X J. Seki	\$633.56	" " "	300.00 PA. ? Inma? owes Kuro is John's wife.
	T. Nishikawa	\$ 3.00	" " "	
	X S. Miyahara	\$ 160.63	" " "	
	R. Kawanami (K. Matsumoto)	\$17.88	" " "	
	T. Sasai	\$ 36.70	" " "	
	T. Hamano	\$922.09	" " "	
	S. Kato	\$235.43	" " "	
	X Y. Morinaga	\$341.00	" " "	
	K. Tsuchiyama	\$ 1.00	" " "	
	X K. Niizawa	\$ 2.70	" " "	
	F. Tsuji	\$341.86	" " "	
	Geo. Hashizaki (T. Kubotera)	\$725.88	" " "	
	Y. Takagaki	\$ 1.00	due " "	
	X S. Tokuyasu	\$ 4.00	" " "	
	S. Kikutake	\$1127.17	" " "	

no lie  
manages  
no mortgage  
not a clear  
does not  
own corp.



Y. Hamada	\$839.05	due to Association
<i>Ad</i> <del>X</del> T. Okimoto	\$ 34.47	" " "
F. Yamashita	\$ 91.63	" " "
S. Tajii	\$220.00	" " "
I. Okutsu	\$663.25	" " "
Mitoji Fujizawa	\$ 1.00	" " "
S. Koroda	\$ 1.00	" " "
K. Kawashima	\$232.18	" " "
K. Yamato	\$ 69.03	" " "
Chas. Freedman	\$ 12.00	" " "
K. Taniguchi	\$ 69.60	" " "

*Ad* Chisaki 382,39

*Ad 700  
in acct*

Kubotera

*C. Freeman*

Yom Okutsu

D. Nino

J + M. Yamada

S. Kikutake

K. Kawashima

Rozor S Koike

Heads picked up by F.B.I. - Really a coop  
which sublet crops & furnished credit.  
Coop. ~~now~~ took 5¢ per crate & built up  
ld reserve. - Acreage taken over by  
~~Chas. Freedman~~ Chas. Freedman on fair terms.



Nishimura sata

LAND FARMED BY JAPANESE  
IN IMPERIAL COUNTY

<u>Product</u>	<u>Acreage</u>	<u>Estimated Investment</u>
Tomato	1612	\$349,735.00
Squash	471	80,702.00
Melon	2747	188,650.00
Flax	435	32,200.00
Alfalfa	517	24,370.00
Onion	115	14,875.00
Cucumber	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,575.00
Strawberry	21	11,800.00
Pepper	47 $\frac{1}{2}$	9,325.00
Watermelon	140	1,700.00
Garlic	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,700.00
Carrots	125	14,900.00
Cabbage	118	3,425.00
Sugar Beet	180	18,000.00
Asparagus	102	7,500.00
Peas	1	200.00
Eggplants	19	3,500.00
Corn	31	440.00
Gladiola Bulbs	3	6,000.00
Barley	296	6,000.00
Pasture	<u>101</u>	<u>200.00</u>
Total	7104 $\frac{1}{2}$	\$779,797.00

29 Japanese were employed by American  
produce firms as foremen supervising approxi-  
mately 3227 acres.



# Jap operated farms in Imperial Valley

Lettuce	1660 acres.
Quintaro	2150 "
Tomatoes	1327
Squash.	398
Onions	82
Pepper	28
Flax	525
Cabbage.	347
Egg Plant.	18
Cucumbers	17
Alfalfa	360
Wheat	10
Barley.	480
Milo.	150
Rice	<u>470</u>
	8022 Acres.

Total acreage listed on registrations - 10,018

From Office of Agricultural Commission  
of Imperial Valley, B. A. Harrigan



IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT  
CROP SURVEY, MARCH, 1942

<u>FIELD CROPS</u>	<u>ACRES</u>
Alfalfa	115 836
Barley	52 520
Oats	2 859
Wheat	4 967
Bermuda (Includes Pasture)	4 276
Flax	106 071
Sugar Beets	8 401
Clover	2 201
Vetch	92
Miscellaneous*	16
 TOTAL	 297 239

\*Includes fenugreek, canary grass,  
prairie grass, and Indian corn.

<u>GARDEN CROPS</u>	<u>ACRES</u>
Lettuce	20 504
Cantaloupes	13 492
Honeydews	1 042
Honeyballs	938
Peas	9 025
Carrots	6 856
Tomatoes	4 611
Watermelons	5 280
Cabbage	1 901
Squash	1 243
Spinach	12
Broccoli	591
Garlic	76
Peppers	48
Onions	149
Sweet Corn	76
Gladiolus	30
Endive	79
Mustard Greens	201
Miscellaneous Garden**	317
 TOTAL	 66 471

\*\*Includes cucumbers, eggplant, beets,  
Jap melons, chicory, beans, romaine,  
and Chinese vegetables.

<u>PERMANENT CROPS</u>	<u>ACRES</u>
Asparagus	379
Tangerines	241
Dates	230
Grapes	867
Pecans	439
Lemons	64
Grapefruit	3 950
Strawberries	26
Oranges	820
Shade Trees	35
Mixed Fruit	14
Blackberries	1
Nursery	3
Bamboo	1
Olives	2
Limes	2
Pomegranates	2
 TOTAL	 7 076

TOTAL ACRES CROPPED	370 786
LESS DOUBLE CROPPED	7 804
NET AREA CROPPED	362 982
PLOWED, NOT CROPPED	21 634
TOTAL AREA FARMED	384 616
ACREAGE NOT FARMED	70 685
TOTAL AREA	455 301
TOTAL AREA OF DISTRICT	612 658

Number of Farms Reported	4 645
Farmed by Owners (45%)	2 088
Farmed by Tenants (55%)	2 557
Average Area - 98 Acres	

Imperial, California  
April 1, 1942

W. E. HARTZOG, Supt.  
Water Distribution and  
Drainage Construction



Table 12

## Corporations Formed to Operate Japanese Farms with WFA Loans

<u>Name of Corporation</u>	<u>Amounts</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Acreage</u>	<u>Placer Co</u>
Cal. Fruit Farms, Inc.	\$ 148,471.27	✓ 20	✓ 756	906
Wash. Farm Management, Inc.	60,540.00	36 5	500	
Cal. Northern Farms, Inc.	98,077.38	✓ 20	✓ 910	596
Cal. Loomis Agencies, Inc.	61,934.80	✓ 12	500 524	559
Cal. California Fruit Cannery, Inc.	37,711.00	✓ 1	✓ 150	
Cal. California Fruit Cannery, Inc.	38,510.50	✓ 1	✓ 155	
Cal. Placer Orchards, Inc. ✓	87,756.67	✓ 13	595 600	632
Cal. Placer Farms, Inc. ✓	23,000.00	18 14	524 460	449
Ingalls Gardens, Inc.	20,523.00	4	166	
Wash. Western Farm & Produce, Inc.	32,107.00	✓ 33	✓ 473	
Cal. Deciduous Farm Lands, Inc.	224,750.00 9,355.55 \$617,987.17	59 1 124	29 4,723	742 989
To Kay Inc		13	440	
Florin Farms Inc	76,000	39	1,000	
		267		

Source: Final Report of the Participation of FSA in the Evacuation Program of the WCCA, Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command & Fourth Army.

Covering the Period May 15 1942 through May 31, 1942

Laurence I. Hews Jr. Region IX 30 Van Ness Avenue, S.F.

(Pencilled figures & notes are not from the Report they come from other sources in WRA files 700 & 700.1)



# Farms operated by corporations

## Placer county

loan	corp	Acres			Nb		Total
		owned	rented	Total	owned	rented	
\$148,471 <sup>27</sup> / <sub>100</sub>	Fruit Farms	20	5	25	906	218	1124
150,000 <sup>90</sup> / <sub>100</sub>	Deciduous Farms	12	9	21	989	698	1687
61,934 <sup>80</sup> / <sub>100</sub>	Roome's Agency	13	0	13	559	-	559
87,756 <sup>67</sup> / <sub>100</sub>	Placer orchards	12	1	13	632	40	672
23,000 <sup>90</sup> / <sub>100</sub>	Placer Farms	14	4	18	449	165	614
980	Northern Farms	13	2	15	596	89	685
					4151	2260	6061

## Sacto, Yolo, S. J., Solano

Deciduous Farms	38	742
Northern Farms	5	300
ToKay Inc	13	440
Flavin Farms	39	1,000
Cal Fruit Co	2	305
		8,843

## Washington

38 973  
240

Close to \$1,000,000 + 10,000 acres