

I. Purposes of investigation

- A. Our purpose was to determine the motives underlying the demand for the evacuation of the Japanese from the West Coast.
- B. To attain this purpose we made a quantitative content analysis of the reports of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, which was sent to the West Coast by the House of Representatives to hold hearings regarding evacuation. This Committee was under the Chairmanship of Congressman John H. Tolan of California. The Tolan reports were used because they were believed to present a good cross-section of public opinion. They afford an adequate sample of the attitudes towards evacuation held on the West Coast, because the witnesses included people from different geographical areas on the Coast and from different positions in government and business.

II. Method of counting

- A. We used a modified Lasswellian technique of content analysis. The unit of counting was the sentence, and the sentences ~~were~~ classified according to the category under which they fell. These categories were made up of the twelve principal arguments in favor of evacuation and of the twelve principal arguments against evacuation. We attempted to make these arguments as mutually exclusive as possible.
- B. We have used the term argument to mean a definite reason for holding a certain viewpoint pro or con mass evacuation. In determining which sentences were to fall under the various categories or arguments, we adopted a rule of selection which differentiated the so-called declaration and presentation of each argument. The declaration was defined as that part of the argument which expressly stated the point of view of the witness. The presentation included the substantiation or proof of the declaration and also such information as the witness himself seemed to consider important and relevant. In our classification, we included all sentences which formed a part of the declaration and/or the presentation. We also classified those sentences which were answers to questions asked by the members of the Tolan Committee, considering such sentences as falling under the category suggested by the question, although the questions and other remarks of the Committee members were not classified. Sentences giving a forthright statement of a point of view, such as "I am in favor of mass evacuation", were excluded unless reasons were given for the expressed attitude.
- C. The method outlined above was adopted because it was believed to be the most suitable and accurate for our purposes. We used the sentence as our unit of measurement because the material was too lengthy for counting words, and the sentence method was more accurate than counting lines or paragraphs. We realize that this method has disadvantages, but in using this particular type of material for our purpose it seemed most expedient to use the sentence

as the basic unit. The chief disadvantages are that sentences may have differences in emphasis and also may contain two or more arguments.

- D. In classifying the arguments for and against evacuation, we included only those testimonies which expressed a definite point of view. Witnesses who discussed purely administrative aspects of the question were therefore omitted. Also, all Japanese testimonies were excluded because they were thought to be too biased. In the testimonies that were classified, we numbered each sentence, and those which belonged to particular arguments were listed under the proper categories. In case a sentence was a part of two or more arguments, we weighted these parts equally. For example, a sentence containing three arguments would be listed under three categories, having a value of .33 in each case, since the total value of each sentence was 1.00.

Project: An analysis of the arguments for and against the mass evacuation of Japanese from the West Coast as contained in the hearings of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives investigating National Defense Migration.

I. The Tolan Committee hearings are good samples to use for analyzing the arguments.

- A. Records of the Tolan Committee show that they tried to get widespread representation, i.e. farmers, businessmen, professional people, representatives of patriotic organizations and government officials on the city, county, state and federal level were interviewed.
- B. The Tolan Committee tried to get both the pro and con of the evacuation question, though they were largely unsuccessful on the con side.
- C. The Tolan Committee hearings by bringing together arguments of all shades from people of all sorts constitute the most convenient method of analyzing the arguments.
- D. Hearings were held in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland and Seattle, thus permitting a geographical cross-section of opinion.

II. Technique of analysis.

- A. A modified Laswellian technique of content analysis will be used. Therefore the first task will be to study the literature of Lasswell and Lasswell's students.
- B. Unlike most of the Lasswellian studies, which are interested in content as such, our interest will be much more restricted. That is, we will be interested specifically in the arguments in regard to evacuation.
- C. Our tabulations will fall into the following tentative categories:
 1. The crudest classification is on the basis of who testified.
 - a. Individuals speaking for themselves
 - b. Spokesmen for patriotic organizations
 - c. Spokesmen for business organizations
 - d. University professors
 - e. Officials of local, county, state and federal governments
 - f. Spokesmen for church organizations
 - g. Japanese themselves
 - h. Comments of Congressmen themselves
 2. Classification by arguments for evacuation.
 - a. Racial argument against the Japanese
 - 1) Impossibility of distinguishing between loyal and disloyal Japanese
 - 2) Some Japanese are loyal, but it is impossible to deny that there are disloyal elements.
 - 3) No Japanese has ever given information about other Japanese.
 - b. Military necessity argument
 - 1) Existence of Japanese in the danger zone would facilitate attack.
 - 2) Argument of concerted sabotage
 - 3) Japanese dispersed themselves geographically into strategic areas on the coast.

- 4) Intent of Japanese consulate through language schools to maintain Japanese loyalty.
- 5) Japanese knew about attack on Pearl Harbor in advance.
- c. Economic arguments
 - 1) Japanese are economically unimportant.
 - 2) Resentment against cheap Japanese labor and Japanese ownership of land.
- d. Argument that everyone would feel safer with Japanese evacuation.
- e. Totalitarian democratic argument: fight Fascism with Fascism.
- f. Religious argument: that Buddhism and Shintoism are nationalistic.
- g. Evacuation will be inconvenient but there will be no injustices.
- h. Humanitarian argument: Japanese themselves must be protected.
- i. The patriotic contribution of the Japanese is to accept evacuation due to the above arguments.
3. Classification by arguments against evacuation.
 - a. No reason to make race a distinguishing mark of loyalty.
 - b. Evacuation is unconstitutional.
 - c. Evacuation is non-Democratic and un-American: should not fight Fascism with Fascism.
 - d. Evacuation is un-Christian.
 - e. Evacuation is being urged by selfish economic and patriotic pressure groups.
 - f. There is no military necessity.
 - (g. There is a counter-argument for almost every argument for evacuation.)
- D. The main problem is one of methodology; that is, according to what unit of measurement should the arguments be classified. Lasswell suggests several alternative units of measurement (square inches, lines, words, sentences, etc.) We will select the most meaningful unit for our purposes after experimentation.
- E. The classification of arguments, as outlined above, is tentative. The list is both incomplete and faulty in regard to the criteria of mutual exclusiveness. Before the tabulations are made, the categories will be greatly refined.
- F. By cross-tabulation our studies will show:
 1. The relative weight given to various arguments by those urging evacuation.
 2. The arguments that were used by various vocational, professional and special interest groups.
 3. The degree to which geographical location affected arguments.
 4. Other classifications will become apparent as the work progresses.
 5. These facts will also become clear in regard to the arguments against evacuation.

III. Integration with other aspects of the Evacuation-Resettlement Study.

- A. By relating the results of our study to other analyses being carried on, it will be possible to determine:
 1. The relation of the quantitative data to a qualitative evaluation of arguments.

2. The effects of various pressure group approaches on various classes of people in various geographical areas.
3. The effect, if any, of the arguments used at the Tolan Committee Hearings on the subsequent action of Congressmen and the subsequent activities of pressure groups.

The purpose of our study was to determine the relative emphasis given to various arguments in the public demand for the mass evacuation of the Japanese from the West Coast. As a means of attaining this purpose, a quantitative content analysis of the reports of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration was made. This Committee was sent to the West Coast by the House of Representatives to hold hearings regarding evacuation. It was under the Chairmanship of Congressman John H. Tolan of California. The Tolan Committee reports were used for our study because they were believed to present a good sample of all the arguments used to further evacuation. The records of the Committee show that an effort was made to get widespread representation; farmers, businessmen, professional people, representatives of patriotic organizations and government officials on the city, county, state and federal levels were interviewed. Hearings were held in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland and Seattle, thus presenting a geographical cross-section of opinion. An attempt was also made to get both the pro and con of the evacuation question, though the records show that the great majority of the witnesses advocated evacuation.

In making our content analysis of the Tolan Committee reports, a modified ~~technique~~ ^{of the sort originated by Prof. Harold D. Lasswell^(a)} technique was used. Unlike most of the Lasswellian studies, which are interested in content as such, we were interested specifically in the arguments in regard to evacuation. The unit of counting was the sentence, and the sentences were classified according to the category under which they fell. These categories were made up of the twelve principal

~~of the Pacific Ocean Quarterly~~

arguments in favor of evacuation and of the twelve principal arguments against evacuation. We attempted to make these arguments as mutually exclusive as possible.

We have used the term "argument" to mean a definite reason for holding a certain viewpoint pro or con mass evacuation. To determine which sentences were to fall under the various categories or arguments, we adopted a rule of selection which differentiated the so-called contention and evidence of each argument. The contention was defined as that part of the argument which expressly stated the point of view of the witness. The evidence included the substantiation or proof of the contention and also such information as the witness himself seemed to consider important and relevant. The evidence could therefore consist of a series of declarative statements, rhetorical questions, statistical charts or maps, or any other material offered in support of the contention. The contention was in some cases found to stand alone, but more often it preceded, succeeded, or was merged with the evidence. In such cases, every sentence that included part of the contention or the evidence was classified as part of the argument. Charts and maps were excluded, since they obviously were not suitable for a tabulation on the basis of sentence-units. Letters, resolutions, and such exhibits which were offered as part of the evidence were also excluded unless they were addressed specifically to the Tolson Committee. Forthright recommendations or statements pro or con evacuation, such as "I am in favor of evacuation", were not classified unless they were immediately accompanied by arguments giving the reasons for the point of view expressed. As an example of our method, the testimony of Attorney-General Earl Warren of

(b)

California may be offered. Mr. Warren presented maps as part of the evidence to prove his contention that the Japanese were located in strategic areas in California and were therefore dangerous to the defense of the West Coast. His contention and the part of the evidence given orally to the Tolan Committee were classified as an argument, but the maps were not classified.

The method outlined above was adopted because it was believed to be the most suitable and accurate for our purposes. We used the sentence as our unit of measurement because the material was too lengthy for counting words, and the sentence method was more accurate than counting lines or paragraphs. We realize that this method has disadvantages, but in using this particular type of material for our purpose it seemed most expedient to use the sentence as the basic unit. The chief disadvantages are that sentences may have differences in emphasis and also may contain two or more arguments.

In classifying the arguments for and against evacuation, we included only those testimonies which expressed a definite point of view. Witnesses who discussed purely administrative aspects of the question were therefore omitted. Also, all Japanese testimonies were excluded, ~~because they were thought to be too biased.~~ In the testimonies that were classified, we numbered each sentence, and those which belonged to particular arguments were listed under the proper categories. In case a sentence was a part of two or more arguments, we weighted these parts equally. For example, a sentence containing three arguments would be listed under three categories, having a value of .33 in each case, since the total value of each sentence was 1.00. After careful

reading had revealed the contention of a certain passage or part of one witness's testimony, we ordinarily classified the contention and all the supporting evidence as part of the appropriate argument. In some cases where the evidence was used to support two contentions, the sentences that made up the evidence and contentions were classified under the two arguments indicated by the two contentions. In this case, each sentence would have a value of .5 under each of the two categories. Very often the evidence included one or more sentences or parts of sentences that appeared to belong to arguments other than the one indicated by the evidence and contention as a whole; in such instances, the sentences in question were listed under all arguments suggested by their content, with each being given an equal value and the total in all cases being one.

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After a preliminary study of the reports of the Tolan Committee, it was found that the arguments used most widely could be divided into twelve main categories. These categories were defined in a way that was believed to make them as mutually exclusive as possible. In the brief outline that follows, it should be noted that in general the first seven arguments are the ones that most vehemently urge evacuation. The remaining six arguments are more in the nature of justifications for evacuation. This distinction is not absolute and is not valid in all cases, since there were witnesses who presented one of the latter arguments as their main contention. However, the distinction was found to hold true in most cases. It should also be noted that the sixth category, the argument for evacuation that was based on the fear of fifth column activities from a strictly military point of view, was found to be indistinguishable from the fifth category where the term "fifth column" was more loosely used. For this reason, all sentences speaking of fifth column activity were classified under argument five, and the sixth argument was dropped completely when the final results were tabulated. A brief outline of the thirteen arguments and their subdivisions follows:

I. Racial Argument. The belief that all Japanese must be considered as a unit and that it is impossible to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal because of their physiognomy (they all look alike) and their mentality (the "Oriental Mind" or "Oriental Mask").

II. Cultural Argument. The theory that the Japanese in America tend to cling to Japanese customs, and that this results in unconscious indoctrination with the

ideology of Japan.

III. Deliberate Indoctrination Argument. The belief that the Japanese Government, its agents in the United States, or pro-Japanese elements in the United States, deliberately carried on a program of indoctrination, through coercion and/or financial aid to the cultural and other institutions of the Japanese in America.

IV. Location and Distribution in America

A. Location of the Japanese in strategic areas in the United States, brought about intentionally by the Japanese government or its agents.

B. Strategic distribution of the Japanese which was unintentional but which nevertheless is a danger to the defense of the United States.

V. Actual or Potential Sabotage, Espionage and Fifth Column (loosely used). The fear that the disloyal Japanese in America are saboteurs, spies, and fifth columnists.

VI. Fifth column argument. "Fifth column" is used here in the military sense, the meaning being that an organized group will spring up at the point of attack and help those attacking or attempting an actual invasion.

VII. Approval of the Japanese role in the war. The belief that the Japanese in America either definitely approve of an aid, or at least do not disapprove of the aggressive policies of Japan.

indent → VII A. The contention that no Japanese has ever given information about another (subversive) Japanese, show-

ing that they approve of subversive activities on the part of other Japanese in America.

VIII. Economic arguments

- A. The arguments that are in general based on the belief that the Japanese are not essential to our economy, or even that they are detrimental to it.
- B. Evacuation justified by the belief that the Japanese can be employed in useful productive work where they are relocated.

IX. Humanitarian arguments.

- A. The belief that evacuation would be the most humane policy towards the Japanese ~~and other Orientals, due~~ *due* to the likelihood of vigilantism ~~or race riots, and~~ ~~confusion of the Japanese with other Orientals.~~
- B. Evacuation justified by the argument that the program will be administered humanely.

X. Public Morale Argument. The fact that the people on the West Coast would feel safer, and that therefore morale would be better if the Japanese were evacuated.

XI. Appeal to Patriotism. The arguments that are in the nature of an appeal to the patriotism of the Japanese in America, stating in general that all patriotic Japanese should want to evacuate to help the defense effort.

XII. Necessity of Adopting Military or Totalitarian Methods
The arguments in this category assert the principle of "fight Fascism with Fascism", or in other words the idea that a democracy should disregard legal barriers

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if expedient in time of war.

XIII. Miscellaneous arguments

- A. Appeal to authority. That is, appeals to the authority and knowledge of General deWitt, law enforcement officials, etc., used to prove a contention.
- B. The theory that the sensitivity of the Americans to the danger of the Japanese in the United States has been dulled by pro-Japanese propaganda.

General + most important
grant. That is ~~the~~ results.

Argument I - The Racial Argument. The racial argument consisted of the belief that the citizen and alien Japanese should be considered as a unit, since it is impossible to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Japanese because of their peculiar physiogomy and mentality. This argument was ~~as a~~ great deal, and was very often found in connection with the fifth column or sabotage argument. In many cases it expressed a definite feeling of race prejudice towards the Japanese. For example, Mr. Stuart R. Ward, of Menlo Park, California, ~~of the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco~~ stated in comparing the Japanese with the Chinese that the "Japanese are not now nor ever have been liked, understood or trusted."^① He also said that the reports he had received from men who had dealt with the Japanese over the years stated "that there's no such thing as having a friendship with a Japanese after one ceased to be of use to the Japanese."^② Mr. Ward's ^{attitude to the} ~~claim~~ ^{attitude} that Japanese, in his own words, was "I totally distrust them."^③ He stated that he believed he knew no Japanese whom he felt he could trust "as to friendship this statement would be approved by all but a tiny minority of sentimental and highly idealistic people here on the coast."^④ and he warned other minorities that they should not try to defend the Japanese because the Japanese were "by all odds generally regarded as the most largely disloyal of all our groups."^⑤ Usually, however, the witnesses were willing to admit that the majority, or at least a great many, of the Japanese in this country were loyal to America. Such people advocated evacuation because it was impossible to tell the loyal from the disloyal. Governor Olson of California stated that "we would be naive indeed if we did not recognize that there is also a large part..... of the Japanese population who are distinctly in sympathy with Japan",^⑥ and later added that the

Stuart Ward - vol. 29; (1) p. 11261
(2) p. 11261
(3) p. 11262
(4) p. 11261

Olson - vol. 31: (5) p. 11631
(6) p. 11634
(7) p. 11634

Riley - vol. 30 - (8) p. 11304
(9) p. 11304

Milliken - vol. 30 - (10) p. 11405

Sprangler - vol. 30: (11) p. 11421
(12) p. 11421

Smith - vol. 29: (13) p. 11108
(14) p. 11108

Japanese should be considered as a group even though the Italians and German ^{aliens} were treated as individuals because of "the difficulty of telling who is who among the Japanese." ⁽⁶⁾ He said, "I believe the FBI would have more difficulty ascertaining who was a saboteur or fifth columnist among the Japanese population than they would among the Italian or the German." ⁽⁷⁾ Mr. Earl Riley, Mayor of Portland, Oregon, gave as his opinion that ~~he felt that~~ 50 percent or more of the second generation Japanese were loyal, but added, "I do not think anyone is in a position to ferret out the fifty percent", and that ^{he} ~~he~~ wouldn't take a chance with one". ⁽⁸⁾ Mr. Earl Milliken, Mayor of Seattle, Washington, also stated that he thought it was "utterly impossible" to separate the few disloyal citizens from the majority who were loyal to the United States. ⁽⁹⁾ Mr. J. W. Spangler, ^(a) Vice-President of the Seattle First National Bank, and ^(b) Verne Smith, Chief of Police of Alameda, California, both spoke of the difficulty of understanding the Japanese. Spangler, for example, stated that he had "found it exceedingly difficult to divine the Oriental", adding that by this he meant that "apparently their mental processes may not be identical with our own." ⁽¹¹⁾ This fact ~~and that fact~~ that the Japanese preserved a "group identity" as the Italians and Germans did not, were his reasons for treating the Japanese differently than the other ~~of enemy aliens. Also, Mr. [unclear] Chief of Police of the city of Alameda,~~ ^(German + Italian enemy aliens, Chief of Police of the city of Alameda) two groups. ⁽¹²⁾ Verne Smith ~~said that~~ ^{added} "there is a common meeting ground between ~~the~~ ^{our} minds of alien Italians and Germans, and ~~our own~~, there is "no particular common meeting ground for the oriental and occidental mind", and ⁽¹³⁾ that he had found it "practically impossible to obtain information, to obtain true impressions of the Japanese." ⁽¹⁴⁾

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Argument I.

This argument constituted 6.91% of the total arguments tabulated,⁽¹⁾ and was used by 17 of the 32 men testifying.⁽²⁾ Considering the total arguments, therefore, it was not a major one, nor was it outstanding in any of the three states. It was relatively more important in Washington, as there it accounted for 9.66% of the arguments, and was only 7.83% of the Oregon arguments, and 5.57% of the California arguments.⁽³⁾

In general,
/ the racial argument appealed about equally to government officials and to witnesses having no connection with government. Of the total argument, the government officials contributed 44.49%, and the non-government men contributed slightly more (55.51%).⁽⁴⁾ However, of the total argument of the government officials, the racial argument constituted only 5.04%, whereas it accounted for 9.84% of the total arguments of others.⁽⁵⁾

In further breaking down the argument by states, we found that this argument was more important to the total arguments of government officials in Washington (11.19%)⁽⁶⁾ and Oregon (9.34%)⁽⁷⁾, than to those in California (3.04%)⁽⁸⁾. However, to the non-government witnesses, this argument had greater appeal in California (12.16%)⁽⁹⁾ than in Washington (8.5%)⁽¹⁰⁾ and Oregon (6.76%)⁽¹¹⁾.

From the analysis of the argument in California, it is apparent that it was more important to the Northern California witnesses (for it constituted 7.55% of their total argument) than to those in Southern California, where it figured as only 1.22%.⁽¹²⁾ Here, the racial argument was used only by government officials. Of their total argument it constituted 1.42%.⁽¹³⁾

The non-government witnesses of Northern California contributed the greater part (60.53%) of ~~the racial argument~~ to the total California racial argument, while the Northern California government officials contributed

a little more than one-half that amount (or 34.52%). The remainder of the argument (4.93%) was contributed by the government officials of Southern California. ~~P~~ (11)

1. Chart II.
2. Chart XVI.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart ~~XVIII, XX, XXI.~~
7. Chart XIX.
8. Chart XXII.
9. Table XXIII.

7. Chart XX
8. Chart XVIII
9. Chart XIX
10. " XXII
11. Table XXIII

W

Jones
Fouke
Warren
word

II. Cultural argument. Several witnesses believed that because the Japanese in America tend to cling to Japanese customs, they have been unconsciously indoctrinated with the ideology of Japan. This cultural argument has several aspects. On the question of religion, it was asserted that not only Shintoism but also Buddhism was nationalistic in character. ^{Mr.} Ronald E. Jones, Oregon State Senator, stated that the "Buddhist religion is looked on as a national Japanese custom", and that "even among the children, there isn't much social mixing between the Buddhist and the Christian children." ⁽¹⁶⁾ As for the Shintoists, Mr. R. H. Fouke, of the California Joint Immigration Committee in San Francisco, stated that Japanese loyalty is justly questionable since the Emperor of Japan is ^{also} the head of the Church, ~~too~~ and "all Japanese who profess the religion of which he is the leader naturally have that particular religious obligation". ⁽¹⁷⁾ ~~educational aspect of this argument~~ The influence of the Japanese language schools in America was also emphasized by several witnesses, including Attorney-General Earl Warren of California. ~~Mr. Warren, in fact, stated that the Japanese culture and customs, which made it impossible to understand the Japanese, a. This culture was inculcated through the language schools, the religious affiliations, and, especially by means of the Kibei practice. (b) This system, by which the Japanese sent their children to be educated in Japan, was condemned by several witnesses as one of the chief causes of the disloyalty of the Japanese. Mr. Warren's testimony includes the statement that "The children of those people have been sent to Japan for their education, either in whole or in part, and while over there they are indoctrinated with the idea of Japanese imperialism. They receive their religious~~

stand
in fact

This alien culture was
were

said

- (15) - Jones - Vol. 30: p. 11314
(16) - " " " p. 11314
(17) R. H. Fouke - Vol. 29: p. 11071
(18) E. Warren - Vol. 29: p. 11014
(19) " " " p. 11015
(20) R. H. Fouke - Vol. 29: p. 11069
(21) S. Ward - Vol. 29: p. 11264

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instruction which ties up their religion with their Emperor, and they come back here imbued with the ideas and policies of Imperial Japan." ⁽¹⁸⁾ He later added that many Japanese born in the United

States "can hardly speak the English language" because they had been educated in Japan and have returned here "thoroughly Jap-

anese." ⁽¹⁹⁾ The language schools and language newspapers were also condemned as anti-American by ^{California's Attorney General} The maintenance of the Japanese

language itself ~~in the United States~~ was thought to be a strong ^{bind, tying Japanese Americans to their fathers' country.} cultural tie. ~~The danger of the dual citizenship held by many~~ ^{Cal. insert "L"}

Japanese-Americans was brought out by several witnesses, because it showed the adherence of these Japanese to Japanese nationalism. ✓

Mr. Robert H. Fouke, of the California Joint Immigration Committee, called attention to this question, ^{for} ~~which~~ ^{it} he said, was "really the

basic ⁽²⁰⁾ problem we have now". He stated that only about one third of the Japanese-Americans renounced their Japanese citizenship,

the remainder retaining a legal tie with Japan. ^(a) Mr. Stuart

Ward asserted that he believed "persons of Japanese ancestry cannot safely be treated as American citizens until at least three generations have been reared in this country. It takes that long

to get a group of nationals who believe in both emperor and ancestor worship, and who are most rigidly bound down by family ties, to really break loose and become Americans." ⁽²¹⁾

Argument II.

The cultural argument accounted for 2.62% of the total arguments,⁽¹⁾ and was used in five testimonies.⁽²⁾ It was relatively more important in California (where it was 3.88% of the total in that state) than in Oregon (1.06%) or Washington (0.32%), although in in general it had little appeal.⁽³⁾

Of this argument, government officials contributed by far the greater part (80.73%).⁽⁴⁾ Of their total, however, the cultural argument constituted only 3.47%.⁽⁵⁾ Non-government witnesses used the argument very little: it was only 1.29% of their total.⁽⁶⁾ No government officials used the argument in Washington, and to those in California it was relatively more important than to those in Oregon, for it constituted 4.44% of the total arguments of California government officials,⁽⁷⁾ and only 2.55% of the totals of Oregon officials.⁽⁸⁾ Of the total arguments of non-government witnesses in California, this argument was 2.42%,⁽⁹⁾ while it was 0.56% in Washington,⁽⁸⁾ and was not used at all by non-government men in Oregon.

In breaking down the argument as used in California, we found that it was not used in the southern part of the state, and that of the total Northern California argument, it constituted 5.53%.⁽⁹⁾ It is interesting to note that of the total argument there, the government officials contributed 82.68%, while the others contributed the remaining 17.32%.⁽¹⁰⁾

1. Chart II.
2. Chart XVI.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XVIII.
7. Chart XX.
8. Chart XXI.
9. Chart XIX.
10. Table XXIII.

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III. Deliberate Indoctrination Argument. Many witnesses stated their belief that the Japanese Government, through its agents in the United States or through pro-Japanese elements in the United States, had carried on a program of deliberate indoctrination of Japanese living in America. This indoctrination was brought about through encouragement, coercion, and financial aid to the cultural and other institutions of these Japanese. The cultural arguments ^{listed} ~~falling~~ under the second category fall under this category if the indoctrination was deliberate. The language school, language newspapers, religion, dual citizenship and other cultural institutions of the Japanese thus may be termed instruments of ^{either} unconscious or deliberate indoctrination, depending on whether or not they were promoted with the aim of furthering the interests of Japan. ^{for example,} The Japanese Consuls were accused of functioning as propaganda and espionage agents, through which their home government could work in its attempt to maintain and increase allegiance to Japan. ^{stated} Attorney-General Warren ~~brought out the fact~~ that "there are a large number of Japanese organizations in America covering every branch of life." "There are agricultural, commercial, educational, social, religious, and patriotic associations in every Japanese community. Almost every Japanese in the State is included in one or more of these organizations." The actions of individual Japanese have been in the past very largely controlled by the organizations to which they belong. ^{Mr. Warren} Furthermore, ^{asserted} ~~he~~ ~~claimed that~~ these organizations were all very closely integrated, and that ^{they were} ~~the type of organization was one which was~~ ideally adapted for a plan of mass sabotage. ^(a) He believed it was quite conceivable that if the leadership ~~of the main Japanese organizations~~

Begin
Insert "F"

- 22 - Warren - vol. 29: p. 10975
 23 - " " " " p. 10975
 24 - " " " " p. 10975
 25 - " " " " p. 10975
 26 - " " " " p. 10978
 27 - " " " " p. 10980
 28 - Fouke - vol. 29: p. 11071
 29 - Lysons - vol. 30: p. 11588
 30 - Freeman - vol. 30: p. 11536
 31 - " " " " p. 11538
 32 - Olson - vol. 31: p. 11636
 33 - " " " " p. 11637

fell into the wrong hands, some of them "could be utilized for carrying on a program of sabotage and fifth-column activity". (23)

~~Further more,~~ Items in the Japanese newspapers show that "there has been a close relationship between Japanese associations in California and parent or governmental organizations in Japan". (24) Mr. Warren gave several examples of these organizations, showing their integrated structure. (a) He referred to various incidents where the associations had sent financial or material support to Japan, and (b) stated that they had engaged "in promoting loyalty to Japan and the Japanese Emperor in the hearts of all Japanese in California." (25)

The Japanese Association of America, at the top of the integrated organizational structure in Northern California, sponsored the Kibei Shimin movement, according to Mr. Warren. (a) It also sought to encourage American-born Japanese in Japan to return to America. (26) Financial aid was given, and a successful publicity campaign was carried out. (a) Newspaper items were cited to prove this statement. (b)

Mr. Warren concluded this topic by stating that "the significance of these integrated Japanese associations lies in the fact that through them it is possible for those at the head to exercise control over the conduct of other Japanese throughout the state". (27)

Start "b" in text 11
Robert of San Francisco
Mr. Fouke also spoke of "the Japanese indoctrination of American-born Japanese" in the Japanese language-schools. (a) California. The schools were ~~able to bring in~~ ^{impeded} Japanese Buddhist teachers, and the Japanese in California were encouraged to form "a little Japan" in the farming areas, where they had "their own language, schools, and churches". (28)

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Mr. Fred H. Lysons, a Seattle Lawyer, brought out the fact that Japanese law imposes Japanese citizenship on Japanese ~~here~~ ^{Americans}, and declared that the Japanese in the United States are "schooled and

(92) trained to the conviction that their government is of divinity." He cited an instance where, in 1914, the Japanese conquest of China was referred to as "Japan's divine mission". (29) Mr. Miller Freeman, a Seattle publisher, presented a statement which ~~was~~ is an excellent example of this "deliberate indoctrination" argument. (30) He condemned the loyal Japanese for not closing ~~the~~ ^{their} language schools, "the sole functions of these schools being to train the children up to owe their allegiance to Japan", and for not discontinuing Japanese-language newspapers when nearly all alien and citizen Japanese read English. (30) As Mr. Warren, Mr. Freeman asserted that Japanese organizations in the United States had been active in promoting aid and allegiance to Japan. (u) He ~~even~~ declared that the Japan Society "has had prominent officials of the United States government as directors and members," and that it should be disbanded, since it ~~is~~ ^{was} believed to be a fifth-column organization. (31) Governor Olson of California also accused the language-schools of teaching the Japanese students allegiance to Japan, and asserted that "through the consulates of the Japanese there have been fifth-column activities insisting that the entire Japanese population really belonged to Japan." (32) He felt that the "schools have been conducted through the aid and abetment of the Japanese consulates". (33)

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① This argument constituted 7.39% of the total arguments tabulated, ② and appeared in six testimonies. ③ It was not used in Oregon, but was of some importance in California, where it accounted for 9.53% of the totals. The use of the argument in Washington was only 5.4% of Washington totals. ④

Of the total arguments based on deliberate indoctrination, the greater part (79.25%) was contributed by government officials, and 20.75% by non-government witnesses. ⑤ Considering the total arguments of government officials and non-government men discretely, it is apparent that this argument was of more significance to the former, as it constituted 9.59% of their total arguments, as against 3.93% of the total arguments of the others. ⑥

We found that the argument as used by government officials in California constituted 12.99% of their total arguments, ⑦ while it was not used at all by government officials in either of the other two states. On the other hand, while no non-government men in Oregon used it, we found that this argument as used by the corresponding group in Washington figured (relatively) most significantly in that state, for it accounted for 9.43% of the total there, ⑧ and only 0.49% of the California totals of this group. ⑨

Deliberate indoctrination was not argued in Southern California. However, it was important to the Northern California witnesses, for, as used by them, it constituted 13.59% of their total arguments. ⑩ Of this, the government officials contributed all but a fraction (98.56% as against 1.44% contributed by others.) ⑪

1. Chart II.
2. Chart XVI.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XVIII.
7. Chart XXI.

8. Chart XIX.
9. Table XXIII.

6

IV. Location and Distribution Argument. Some witnesses stated before the Tolson Committee that they believed it necessary to evacuate the Japanese from the strategic areas in which they were located. Some maintained that the Japanese had settled in such areas by design, and others, implying that this had happened purely by accident, only asserted that since they were in areas where they could possibly cause damage, they should be evacuated. To differentiate between the "intentional" and "unintentional" strategic location arguments, two sub-categories were created for Argument IV.

IVA. The intentional strategic location argument consists of the belief that the location of the Japanese in strategic areas in the United States was brought about deliberately by the Japanese government or its agents for the purpose of aiding the aggressive policies of Japan. In connection with this theory, the Japanese were accused of fraudulent immigration, deliberate internal migration to strategic areas, and of accepting financial aid from the Japanese government for these purposes. Mr. Miller Freeman, ~~the Seattle publisher,~~ stated that "study will show that the Japanese government as a part of its ambitious program of colonization of North and South America, and as a preliminary to conquest, planted its immigrants in the United States by the combined use of fraud, collusion, political and military force, and over the most intense and sustained opposition of the various States of the Pacific Coast and the Territory of Hawaii." Mr. Freeman cited a passage from the book, "The History of the Hawaiian People", by Professor W. D. Alexander, which ~~also~~ accused the Japanese of extensive fraud and of evasion of the immigration

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"H"

- (34) - Freeman - Vol 30: p. 11537
 (35) - " " " p. 11537
 (36) - " " " p. 11538
 (37) - " " " p. 11539
 (38) - Traveli - Vol 29: ~~p. 11539~~ p. 11062
 (39) - Warren - Vol 29: p. 10973
 (40) - " " " p. 10994
 (41) - " " " p. 10974
 (42) - " " " p. 10974
 (44) Underwood - Vol 30: p. 11316
 (43) Warren - Vol 29: p. 11017

laws. ^(a) He retraced the history of Japanese immigration to the United States and to Hawaii, showing by what steps Japan "accomplished the miraculous feat of permanently planting 300,000 of her people in this country, quadrupling it since the gentlemen's agreement was entered into in 1907." ⁽³⁵⁾ He asserted that we had been "deceived twice into thinking Japanese immigration stopped - once in 1907 and ~~again~~ ⁽³⁶⁾ in 1942". Mr. Freeman ~~went on to reveal~~ ⁽³⁷⁾ ~~the ways in which the Japanese thus settled in America had aided Japan,~~ ^(a) and asserted that the immigrants had been assisted by "fifth-column organizations, such as the Japan society." ⁽³⁷⁾ Mr. Wendell G. Travoli, ~~of the Tulare County Citizens Committee, California,~~ emphasized the dangers anticipated as a result of the location of the Japanese rather than their ~~"fraudulent"~~ ^(b) immigration. ~~Mr. Travoli~~ ^{He} spoke of the vital power lines and facilities near which the Japanese in Tulare County lived, and of the ease with which ^(a) the lines could be damaged by these Japanese. He asserted that the Japanese had acquired more and more land in proximity to ~~these~~ power lines, accusing them of receiving aid from Japan or its agents for this purpose. ^(b) He said, "During the hard times when good, hard-working white people went broke in the Orosi community, the Japanese did not", ~~and~~ ^{and} "We gathered from that that they must have had aid from the outside. How else they could have made it nobody in that community could figure out. The white people went broke and they didn't. They have acquired more land continuously." ⁽³⁸⁾

^{on +} Attorney-General Warren of California emphasized this argument more than any other witness. He presented maps of California counties to the Committee, these maps "showing all lands owned, occupied, or controlled by the Japanese, including American-born

Japanese as well as Japanese aliens". His statement regarding the maps was: "An inspection of these maps shows a disturbing situation. It shows that along the coast from Marin County to the Mexican border virtually every important strategic location and installation has one or more Japanese in its immediate vicinity."

Though he admitted that in some cases this was undoubtedly mere coincidence, he added, "but it would seem equally beyond doubt that the presence of others is not coincidence." As an example, he described the situation in Santa Barbara County, where the entrance to Camp Cook was "flanked with Japanese property." He said, "It is impossible to move a single man or a piece of equipment in or out of Camp Cook without having it pass under the scrutiny of numerous Japanese. I have been informed that the destruction of the bridges along the road to Camp Cook would effectually bottle up that establishment for an indefinite time, exit to the south being impossible because of extremely high mountains and to the north because of a number of washes with vertical banks 50 to 60 feet deep. There are numerous Japanese close to these bridges. Immediately north of Camp Cook is a stretch of open beach ideally suited for landing purposes, extending for 15 or 20 miles, on which almost the only inhabitants are Japanese."

Mr. Warren gave other similar examples, showing the proximity of the Japanese to utilities, airfields, bridges, oil fields, and power lines, and the complete absence of them in areas, such as the Santa Ynez Valley, which are agriculturally productive but

which contain no strategic installations. (a) Mr. Warren later said with reference to the fact that after certain air bases were established, the Japanese began to farm nearby land, "you can hardly grow a jackrabbit in some of the places where they presume to be carrying on farming operations close to an Army bombing base."

Argument IV A.

This argument was used by only three men,⁽¹⁾ and constituted 7.55% of the total arguments.⁽²⁾ It was not used on Oregon, but was of some importance to the total Washington arguments as it constituted 11.57% of these, while it accounted for 7.13% of the California total.⁽³⁾

The argument appealed almost equally to government officials and non-government witnesses, the former contributing 51.32% and the latter, 48.68%.⁽⁴⁾ Of the total arguments of government officials, the argument amounted to 6.35%, but it was more important to the total arguments of non-government witnesses, as it accounted for 9.43% of these.⁽⁵⁾ Nevertheless, in California, it had relatively greater appeal to the government officials than to the others, for it constituted 8.6% of the total arguments of the former, and only 3.30% of the totals of non-government witnesses.⁽⁶⁾ No government officials in Washington used this argument, but it is worthy of note that other witnesses in that state used it as 20.24% of their arguments.⁽⁷⁾

~~The~~ Intentional strategic location was not argued in Southern California, but of the total Northern California arguments, it constituted 8.86%.⁽⁸⁾ Contributions to this argument in California were made by the government officials of Northern California (87.15%), and by Wendell Travoli (12.85%) who represented the Tulare County Citizen's Committee.⁽⁹⁾

1. Chart XVI.
2. Chart II.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XVIII.
7. Chart XXI.
8. Chart XIX.
9. Table XXIII.

7.55
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(h)
 IVB. The unintentional strategic location argument, stating that the Japanese had by accident settled down or acquired land in or near strategic areas, was used very rarely before the Tolan Committee. Most of those who stressed the potential danger resulting from strategic location accused the Japanese of deliberately settling in such areas. ^{Resume} ^{"H"} ^{the Japanese were located strategically for disposal purposes, but he was in the Astoria waterfront} ^{Mr. Walter W. Underwood, Secretary of the Astoria Chamber of Commerce in Astoria, Oregon, was very alarmed over the location of the Japanese on the Astoria waterfront, but he made no charges that} ^{formerly employed in the canneries.} ^(a) ^(b) ^(c) ^(d) ^{He was also alarmed over the possibility that the city, canneries and docks could be burned very easily.} ^(a)

It is very obvious that there are signal systems within that community now, because every time we have a blackout, we find blinking lights, and they move from time to time. Also, Mr. Underwood explained "We have had our city burned twice. It is a very easy city to burn in view of the fact that it is located as it is; it is a string community along the waterfront, and one man very easily could start a fire. (and later) We have absolutely inadequate equipment

Argument IV B.

This argument played a very minor part in the tabulation, as it was used by only two men⁽¹⁾ and constituted only 0.29% of the total units classified.⁽²⁾ It was not used in California, and accounted for only 0.53% of the Oregon totals, and 0.85% of the Washington totals.⁽³⁾

Government officials accounted for four-fifths of the argument.⁽⁴⁾ In spite of this, it is apparent that the significance of the argument is almost negligible, since it accounted for only 0.37% of the total arguments of government officials, and for only 0.15% of the totals of non-government witnesses.⁽⁵⁾ Oregon government officials did not use this argument, but it accounted for 1.99% of the arguments of government officials in Washington.⁽⁶⁾ Non-government witnesses in Washington did not argue^(unintentional) intentional strategic location,⁽⁷⁾ but the corresponding group in Oregon used it as 0.9% of their totals.

1. Chart XVI.
2. Chart II.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XXI.
7. Chart XX.

V. Actual or Potential Sabotage, Espionage, and Fifth Column Argument. Into this category fell all the arguments for evacuation that consisted of the fear of sabotage, espionage, or fifth-column activity. As was noted above, Argument VI, where the term fifth column was used in the strictly military sense of an organized group ready to aid invaders, was not found in any of the Tolan reports, or at any rate it was never expressed in a way that made it distinct from the definition of the fifth category. For this reason, any mention of "fifth column" was classified under Argument V and Argument VI was dropped completely when the final tabulations were made. ^aNturally, the fear of sabotage or fifth-column activity was the fundamental cause of the clamor for evacuation. Thus, every argument was ultimately based upon it, and in a sense the other arguments may be regarded as secondary in character. However, very often the witnesses did not speak of sabotage or fifth column at all, or did not speak of it in connection with the other arguments they advanced. Since our analysis of the Tolan Reports was quantitative in nature, we were justified only in classifying those sentences under Argument V which specifically dealt with sabotage, fifth column or espionage. Hence, our tabulation may appear to overlook the importance of these factors, but if our method is considered, it will be seen that this was not the case, and that our analysis by its very nature was limited to a quantitative tabulation of sentences and words used, and could not as such take into ^{consideration} ~~regard~~ any implications lying behind the actual words spoken by the witnesses.

Argument V has many different aspects and variations. The most widely used was that of the very general fear of sabotage to

- (45) Warren - vol. 29: p. 11010
- (46) Grandeli - vol. 29: 11064
- (47) Warren - vol. 29: p. 10975
- (48) Warren - vol. 29: p. 10980
- (49) " " p. 11011
- (50) " " p. 11012
- (51) Milliken - vol. 30: p. 11262
- (52) Ward - vol. 29: p. 11262
- (53) " " p. 11263
- (54) Taylor - vol. 30 - p. 11384
- (55) Lysons - vol. 30 - p. 11588
- (56) Ward - vol. 29 - p. 11262
- (57) Milliken - vol. 30 - p. 11405
- (58) Ward - vol. 29 - : p. 11261
- (59) Underwood: vol. 30 - p. 11316

defense industries, public utilities, and vital war materials which might occur if there were disloyal Japanese left on the Coast. Attorney-General Warren, for example, spoke of the fact that California presented, perhaps, "the most likely objective in the nation for such activities." ⁴² He ~~based this~~ ^{on} ~~gave as his reasons for this~~ belief the size and number of naval and military establishments in the State, its geographical position with relation to the enemy, ^{its} ~~the~~ many war industries, ^{and its} ~~the~~ susceptibility to fire sabotage due to climate, forests, and building construction. Mr. J. F. Hassler, City Manager of Oakland, ~~California~~, and Mr. C. R. Schwanenberg, City Manager of Alameda, ~~California~~, spoke of the danger of sabotage to the defense plants and the military and naval bases. They ^{with Mr. Warren} ~~and Mr. [redacted]~~ agreed that the local law-enforcement authorities could not handle ^{the} ~~this~~ tremendous problem in view of the fact that there were so many aliens ^{because of the number of} ~~living in~~ ^{living in} strategic locations where they could do the most harm. Mr. Wendell Travoli of ^{California} ~~Tulare County~~ ^a was also alarmed at the possibility of sabotage to the power lines in his county, near which Japanese were located, ^(a) and at the tremendous fire hazard existing in Tulare County where there ^{was} ~~is~~ "the most valuable timber in ~~the~~ whole world". ⁽⁴⁶⁾ The roads leading to these trees are never guarded, and Mr. Travoli said that "Japanese fellows go up and down those roads as they please." ^(a) ~~In Oregon and Washington, too, there was evidently a great deal of alarm over potential sabotage.~~ ^(a) ~~Mr. Robert Bridges of the Valley Protective Association, Auburn, Washington, spoke of the possible danger to vital power lines and plants, water mains, defense industries, railroads, and coal mines in Washington.~~ ^(b) Governor Arthur B.

"A"

"A" (omit)

Langlie of Washington also was worried over the canals, dams, agricultural production, forests, and industrial plants of his State. Mr. Palmer Hoyt, publisher of the Portland Oregonian, discussed the strategic value of the Oregon timber and the disastrous effects that ~~fires~~^{would} have upon it. Mr. J. E. Klahre of Hood River, Oregon, spoke of the opportunities that Japanese ~~left in the Hood River Valley~~^{in the Hood River Valley} would have for committing acts of sabotage. All of these men, and other witnesses, ~~also~~ felt that their particular state or the West Coast as a whole could be free from acts of sabotage only if all Japanese ~~were removed from the coastal areas.~~^{- Americans} ~~They usually either implied or stated explicitly that they believed it would be impossible to discover which of the Japanese were disloyal, and that because this was impossible or impracticable due to the need for immediate action, they believed that all Japanese should be evacuated, citizens and aliens alike.~~

An important variation of the sabotage and fifth-column argument was ~~given by Attorney General Warren, whose main thesis was that of "concerted sabotage".~~^{the Attorney General} ~~Mr. Warren, and also a number of other witnesses, believed that there would be an organized wave of mass sabotage all along the Coast, which would occur when ordered by Japan.~~^{as well as} ~~In his discussion of the integrated structure of Japanese organizations in the United States, Mr. Warren stated,~~^{on the West would occur it was said:}

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"This organizational machinery, reaching as it does into every phase of Japanese life and exercising real control over the actions and conduct of most of the Japanese in the State, is a type of organization that is ideally adapted to carrying out a plan for mass sabotage." ^{(47) (And later)} Later, he said, "..... it is quite evident that it would be extremely easy for those at the top to direct the Japanese throughout the State and wherever located in a widespread

"A" (cont.)

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simultaneous campaign of sabotage that would carry the most serious consequences." ⁽⁴⁸⁾ ~~California's Attorney General declared,~~ In connection with his statements regarding California as the most likely target for sabotage and fifth-column activities, he said, "A wave of organized sabotage in California, accompanied by an actual air raid or even by a prolonged black-out could not only be more destructive to life and property but could result in retarding the entire war effort of this Nation far more than the treacherous bombing of Pearl Harbor." ⁽⁴⁹⁾ ~~His~~ INSERT

explanation of the fact that no sabotage had so far occurred was the following: "Unfortunately, however, many of our people and some of our authorities and, I am afraid, many of our people in other parts of the country are of the opinion that because we have had no sabotage and no fifth column activities in this state since the beginning of the war, that means that none have been planned for us. But I take the view that that is the most ominous sign in our whole situation. It convinces me more than perhaps any other factor that the sabotage that we are to get, the fifth column activities that we are to get, are timed just like Pearl Harbor was timed and just like the invasion of France, and of Denmark, and of Norway, and all of those other countries." Later he added, "If there were sporadic sabotage at this time or if there had been for the last two months, the people of California or the Federal authorities would be on the alert to such an extent that they could not possibly have any real ^{fifth-} ~~first~~ column activities when the M-day comes." ⁽⁵⁰⁾ ~~Mayor Millikin of Seattle, Washington, agreed~~ ^{also} with Mr. Warren, ^{affirming,} as is evident in his statement that "There hasn't been any sabotage because it has been ordered withheld by Tokyo," 51

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and Mr. Stuart Ward, ~~of the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco,~~ ^{Mento Park, California} stated

expressed the same

his ~~viewpoint~~ when he said; "My own apprehension is that we are going to face on the Pacific coast another 'Pearl Harbor Day.' (52) I would anticipate there would be no cases of Japanese sabotage until the proper time comes. At that time I would fear Japanese-- and American-Japanese-- residents all ^{over} ~~the~~ the coast would be instrumental in destruction of our bridges, water systems, railroads, military facilities, and otherwise endeavoring to weaken our resistance against a Japanese air and/or naval attack. I do not -- in fact, I cannot conscientiously do otherwise -- than anticipate that large numbers of our Japanese-Americans would be involved in traitorous activities". (53) (Later, he added, "As the war goes on, and if a major attack is made on California, I believe acts of sabotage would become innumerable all over the coast; also that if and when a Japanese invading party took over California the resident Japanese, would, to say the least, not be inconvenienced." (53))

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pm < The fear of an attack on the continental United States similar to the attack on Pearl Harbor, as was seen in Mr. Ward's and Mr. Warren's testimonies, was also quite prevalent among other witnesses. Pearl Harbor was often referred to as a proof of the treacherous and disloyal activities of Japanese residents both there and in the United States, and the acts of saboteurs and fifth-columnists there were frequently mentioned. Mr. Ward, for example, spoke of the arrowhead marks in the sugar cane field at Pearl Harbor, the trucks obstructing the highways, and the Honolulu and Oregon State School rings found on dead Japanese aviators. (a) Mr. W. J. Johnson, Captain of Police in Berkeley, California, also referred to Pearl Harbor as a good indication as to what might happen here, saying that, as in Pearl Harbor, any

(b1)
sabotage would come coincident with the attack.

[Those who feared sabotage by no means confined their fears to the Japanese alien group.]
The theories as to whether the alien or American-born Japanese were most dangerous to the safety of the United States were

generally agreed that ~~the non-aliens were the more~~ disloyal. Mr.

Robert Taylor, Chairman of the Oregon Agricultural War Board, read a statement of the Multnomah County Labor Committee which contained the following sentence: "It appears to be our unanimous opinion that there is more danger with a nonalien than there is with the alien, and the percentage of nonaliens who are trustworthy is al-

most nil." ⁵⁴ Mr. F. H. Lysons, Seattle, Lawyer, *voiced substantial agreement with this viewpoint*, ~~agreed with this~~

~~sentiment, stating that~~, "Our safety cannot be assured without complete removal of the Japanese from any opportunity for fifth-column activities. The greatest danger in this respect is the native-born, because of their knowledge of our language, habits, and practices, and consequent advantages in the employment, to our damage, of their eyes, ears, and tongues." ⁵⁵ Mr. Ward gave ~~as~~

his opinion, ~~that~~ "I feel no conviction whatever that the simple accident of birth on American soil, surrounded as it usually is by tremendous racial, family, and group pressures, has made American citizens of these young people." ⁵⁶ He quoted Mr. Saburo Kido, president of the Japanese-American Citizens League, which he

had accused of disloyalty, as saying, "Well, if you don't treat us better here in the United States, you can't blame some of us if we become fifth columnists." ^(a) *Mayor* Mr. Earl Millikin, Mayor of Seattle,

gave a slightly different opinion ~~when he stated that~~, "It is the element that may have come in, say, in the last three or four years, since the attack of Japan upon China, of individuals sent here for espionage purposes by the Japanese Government in the last three or four years that should be regarded as dangerous." ⁵⁷

34 32

As was stated above, nearly all the arguments are based on Argument I. For example,

The Japanese organizations were nearly always accused of fifth column activity when they were mentioned. Mr. Warren, Mr. Ward and Mr. Freeman ^{give} outstanding examples of ^{this. ~~these~~ ~~accusations.~~} ~~Argument IV also~~. The strategic location argument is also ^{is} directly connected with the fear of sabotage and fifth-column activity. In fact, ~~nearly all the arguments are based upon it, as was stated before.~~ Constantly, the difficulty of distinguishing between loyal and disloyal Japanese caused a desire for evacuation that probably would not have been present if the saboteurs and fifth-columnists could have been discovered. In concluding the discussion of Argument V, it might prove interesting to note several less common variations of the main thesis.

^{Three direct allegations to prove sabotage and espionage activities were presented &}
(1) Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles discussed at some length ~~the~~

^{pre-war} attempts ^{made} by the Japanese consul to ^(a.) get information concerning the ~~entire~~ water system of Los Angeles. He stated that after this attempt ^{had been} ~~was~~ made, ^{and defeated,} several Japanese ^{Americans} had entered the offices of the city government in departments where they could get all the vital information in regard to the city services and public utilities. (2) Mr. ~~Stuart~~ Ward asserted that he had heard from

reliable sources "that certain Japanese farmers getting their tractors, etc., repaired, instead of leaving broken metal parts with the dealer, now demand spare parts be returned to them. I suggest it would be highly interesting to send a counter-espionage agent disguised as a junkman to the homes of some of these Japanese farmers to attempt to buy up this scrap metal. I strongly suspect it would be found their object in reclaiming these parts is not to save money but rather to hinder American's war effort by taking vital metals out of circulation." (3) ⁵⁸ Mr. Walter Underwood of Astoria, ^{Oregon,} talking of the situation in his city, said, "We also discovered

two days ago, twenty sticks of dynamite under Tenth and Bond Streets, wrapped up in newspaper; so we know that those Japanese know that they are going to be searched. They have had plenty of time to cache any materials that they have for sabotage in their preparations." ⁽²⁹⁾ ~~There are many other aspects and variations to this argument that cannot be mentioned here. Of course, it is natural that this would be the prime motive behind evacuation, and it should be remembered that nearly all the other arguments are ultimately founded upon this fear of sabotage, espionage, and fifth-column activities.~~

Argument V.

Since this argument has been pointed out as essentially basic to the others, it is not surprising that it should constitute such a large percentage of the total arguments (19.36%)⁽¹⁾. Furthermore, the danger of sabotage and fifth column activity was expressly voiced by twenty-four of the thirty-two witnesses.⁽²⁾ The argument was relatively far more important in considering the total Oregon argument (of which it constituted 41.34%) than in the totals of California and Washington.. However, it is of significance in these latter, for it accounts for 15.18% of the California totals, and 20.2% of Washington totals.⁽³⁾

The contributions of government officials and non-government witnesses to this argument was almost equal, as the former contributed 49.04% and the latter, 50.96%.⁽⁴⁾ However, the argument was relatively more significant to the non-government witnesses (for it accounted for 25.3% of their total arguments), than to the government officials, who used it as 15.57% of their totals.⁽⁵⁾ Nevertheless, the argument is obviously important for both of these groups.

In further analyzing the argument, we found that it was more important to the government officials in Washington (constituting 30.1% of their totals)⁽⁶⁾, than to those in Oregon (16.35%)⁽⁷⁾, or in California (11.77%)⁽⁸⁾. However, in considering the total arguments of non-government witnesses in each state, we found that the argument was relatively more predominant in Oregon (59.01%)⁽⁹⁾ than in California (24.04%)⁽⁸⁾, or Washington (12.79%)⁽⁶⁾. Its share in the total arguments of government officials in Oregon is smaller than its rather overwhelming percentage of the totals of non-government men in that state (59.01%)⁽⁹⁾, but is still significant (16.35%)⁽⁷⁾. Also the California non-government witnesses seemed to consider

it far more important (24.04%) to their total arguments than did the government officials^{these}, of whose totals the argument constituted 11.77%.⁽⁸⁾ However, the relative importance of the argument reverses its position in Washington, where we found its share in the total arguments of the government officials (30.1%) to be much greater than that in the totals of other witnesses (12.79%) in that state.⁽⁶⁾ In all of these totals, however, the argument plays a significant part.

In breaking down the argument as used in California, we found that of the total Northern California arguments, it constituted 12.37%, and 8.5% of the Southern California totals.⁽⁹⁾ All Southern California witnesses who used the argument were government officials. Of their totals, the argument accounted for 9.91%.⁽¹⁰⁾ Northern California government officials contributed the largest share (43.36%) of the total sabotage argument in California, with the testimony of Wendell Travoli of the Tulare County Citizen's Committee also furnishing a large percentage (30.18%).⁽¹¹⁾ Smaller, but significant, contributions were made by the non-government witnesses in Northern California (13.78%), and by the government officials in Southern California (12.68%).⁽¹¹⁾

1. Chart II.
2. Chart XVI.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XXI.
7. Chart XX.
8. Chart XVIII.
9. Chart XIX.
10. Chart XXII.
11. Table XXIII.

Many witnesses used

Vii. Approval of Japanese aggression argument. ~~The argument~~ that the Japanese in America either definitely approve of and aid ~~or else do not dis-~~
~~approve of the aggressive policies of Japan~~ ^{or else do not disapprove of them.} ~~was used by many of the witnesses.~~
This argument is closely connected with argument V, since it is obvious that aid to the policies of Japan by Japanese in America would in most cases take the form of sabotage, fifth column and espionage activities. Several people believed that the Japanese organizations in the United States carried on or were ready to commit such disloyal acts. The language schools, religion, dual-citizenship, and Japanese language newspapers were also presented as evidence of the fact that the sympathies of Japanese in America lay with their mother country. Argument VII was made up very largely of statements dealing with the approval of and aid to the Japanese war lords, and the fact that the Japanese here knew about Pearl Harbor in advance. A different aspect of this category was given by those witnesses who claimed that the impossibility of obtaining information from Japanese ~~for~~ about the subversive activities of other Japanese was a proof that they sympathized with the policies of Japan. To distinguish this particular variation of the general Argument VII, category VIIA was created.

Examples of Argument VII are easily found. ^{INSERT "E" Start} Mayor Bowron ~~of Los Angeles~~ spoke of his belief that the Japanese in the United States knew about Pearl Harbor in advance. ^{→ stated:} In this regard, he said, "As I look back on some events after the 7th of December, I am quite convinced that there was a large number of the Japanese population here locally who knew what was coming. They were setting themselves, adjusting the scene for the outbreak of war between this country and Japan. I think that they somewhat over-played their hand." ⁽⁶⁰⁾ In speaking of the Japanese organizations, he added, "For approximately a year before ~~the~~ December 7 last, representatives of various ^[Japanese-American] organizations were very much in evidence. They apparently went out of their way to demonstrate their American patriotism in numerous ways." ⁽⁶¹⁾ ~~He felt that this was a further proof~~

INDENT

- (60) Bowron - vol. 31 - : p. 11644
(61) " " " p. 11644
(62) Freeman - vol 30: p. 11536
(63) " " : p. 11538
(64) " " ~~p. 11538~~
p. 11540
(65) Ward - vol. 29: p. 11260
(66) " " " p. 11260
(67) " " " p. 11261
(68) " " " p. 11261
(69) Schanenberg - vol. 29: p. 11111
(70) Warren - vol. 29: p. 11015
(71) Ward - vol 29: p. 11260
(72) Ward - vol 29: p. 11263
(73) Lysons - vol 30: p. 11588

86

City Manager Schwannenberg was more specific in his charge;

~~of their disloyalty to America.~~ Mr. Miller Freeman of Seattle condemned the

American born Japanese who, though supposedly "strongly organized for proclaimed

patriotic purposes", had "taken no stand against the aggressions of Japan in the

Orient over the past ten years." Mr. Freeman also described at some length the

activities of the Japan Society which "by economic and political pressure" had

been "of powerful help to Japan". He said, "Only two years ago Japan under-

took a drive to prevent abrogation of our trade treaty, which automatically

stopped shipments of war materials to that country. This campaign was conducted

through the Japanese Embassy and local Japanese consuls. They lined up the people

with whom they had business or other connections and got them to oppose such

abrogation. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ He later added, "The drive was undertaken here, and it was through

the office of the Japanese consul and Mitsubishi ^(Mitsubishi) and Co., and supported by

some of our more representative citizens who have business relations with them." ⁽⁴⁾

~~He asserted that men high in public office had been employed for such purposes,~~

~~mentioning Attorney General Wickersham of the Taft Administration as one of these~~

~~men. Mr. Stuart R. Ward, ^(a) of ^{of Menlo Park, California,} San Francisco gave outstanding examples in connection~~

~~with approval of Japanese policies. He spoke of a radio program which he had~~

~~conducted on the subject "How loyal are our Japanese-American Citizens", saying~~

~~that he and various listeners felt that at this time "there was hardly a trace~~

~~or convincing patriotism or loyalty in anything my five guests said". The guests~~

~~were, according to Mr. Ward, the five leading Japanese-American citizens. Mr.~~

~~Ward continued with the statement, "I do not know of any Japanese who has made~~

~~forthright criticism of the course of Japan in China, right up to the minute~~

~~war was declared, until they felt their own personal safety was threatened."~~

~~My own impression is that they heartily approve of it and are secretly happy~~

~~about the whole situation." ⁽⁶⁶⁾ As an example, ^{of this "secret" happiness, Mr. Ward} he described the case of a Japanese~~

~~woman who was in a Palo Alto hospital having a baby shortly before Pearl Harbor~~

~~was attacked. "The nurse had said that this woman lay in bed with her heavy~~

~~glasses reading the newspapers and chuckling and laughing out loud to herself~~

certain golf course in California where they make reservations for Sunday golf playing, it is frequented by a large number of Japanese who hold reservations for every Sunday morning. Some of these Japanese, part of them at least, are American citizens. On the morning of December 7 there wasn't a Japanese that showed up on that golf course to claim his reservation and play golf that morning. Now, you can draw your own conclusions, but that is a fact. (Val 29, P. 1011)

Were the Japanese to invade the Pacific Coast tomorrow I do not think they would execute, or even put in jail, a baker's dozen of the thousands of Japanese and Japanese-Americans living on this coast" (87) 38

(67) concluded: over the situation. Mr. Ward's ~~conclusions~~ was that "Although few Japanese are as unguarded as this woman, my own impression, frankly based upon intangibles, is that this reflects pretty well the feeling of most of our residents of Japanese birth, as well as our so-called Japanese American citizens." Mr. C. R. Schwanenberg of Alameda, California, gave an interesting example of Japanese disloyalty when he spoke of a certain California golf course where many Japanese, some of them American citizens, hold reservations for every Sunday morning. Mr. Schwanenberg stated, "On the morning of ~~the~~ December 7 there wasn't a Japanese that showed up on that golf course to claim his reservation and play golf that morning." (69)

Attorney-General Warren quoted ~~on items~~ from the Japanese-American News to prove that the Japanese were conscious of and interested in the welfare of military figures in Japan. ~~He~~ ^{He} ~~referred to an Admiral in the Japanese Navy,~~ ^{On the latter point, the story} ~~and said that his relatives heard from him in detail about Japan.~~ ^{the passage quoted} ~~It closed with the sentence:~~ "However, having been entrusted with great national responsibility, we pray from a distance that he will live completely free from accident." (a.)

→ contained an interview with an American woman whose cousin was an Admiral in the Japanese navy. It quoted this lady: "Seich is a good man and we did not think he would go to the front."

This argument appeared in ⁽¹⁾eight testimonies and constituted only 4.96% of the total units classified. ⁽²⁾It was also a minor argument in the totals of the three states, as it was 5.96% of the California totals, and only 3.69% of Oregon arguments, and 3.16% of Washington arguments. ⁽³⁾

The contribution of government officials to this argument was twice that of non-government witnesses, as the former accounted for 66.22% and the latter, 33.78%. ⁽⁴⁾ However, the argument had an almost equal share in the total arguments of these two groups, and did not figure very significantly, as it was 5.38% of the totals of government officials, and 4.3% of the arguments of non-government witnesses. ⁽⁵⁾ Considering these two groups in each state, it appears that this argument was relatively more important to the government officials in Oregon where it constituted 8.92% of their total, ⁽⁶⁾ than to those in California (where it constituted 6.4% of their total. ⁽⁷⁾) It was not used at all by government officials in Washington. (The argument figured almost equally in the totals of non-government men in California (4.79%) ⁽⁸⁾ and Washington (5.52%) ⁽⁹⁾, but was not used by those testifying in Oregon.

The analysis of the argument as used in California shows that it was a little more important to Northern California witnesses (who used it as 6.99% of their total) than to those in Southern California, where it was only 4.66% of the total. ⁽¹⁰⁾ It was almost equally important to the arguments of government and non-government witnesses, respectively, in Southern California, as it constituted 3.77% of the totals of the former, and 3.5% of the latter's totals. ⁽¹⁰⁾

1. Chart XVI.
2. Chart II.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.

6. Chart XX.
7. Chart XVIII.
8. Chart XXI.
9. Chart XIX.
10. Chart XXII.

Start - "Insert 1"

Argument VII A. There ~~were~~ also a large number of ~~examples of~~ witnesses who felt that the lack of information concerning subversive activities given by Japanese residents in the United States was proof of their disloyalty. [Attorney General Warren ~~declared~~ ^{recently} stated that he had discussed the alien problem with about 40 district attorneys and about 40 sheriffs of California and that, when asked if they had ever known of any Japanese citizen or alien giving information on subversive activities, their answer was "Unanimously that no such information had ever been given to them." (70) Mr. Verne Smith, ^(a) Chief of Police of Alameda, ^{California,} and Mr. W. J. Johnson, ^{California,} Captain of Police of Berkeley, also said that this was the case. ^(quoted) Mr. Stuart R. Ward ^{to the effect} spoke of Mr. Saburo Kido, president of the Japanese-American citizens League, who had said that "he did not know of one instance where a Japanese-American citizen has given any information to our counter-espionage services on disloyal activities on the part of any members of the Japanese Community." (71) ^{Mr. Ward} He later added that he was sure the F. B. I. had found itself "partially baffled by the noncooperative attitude of both Japanese and Japanese-Americans on this coast." (72) ^{Fred H. attorneys} Mr. Lyons, ^{of} Seattle, also stated, "Abundantly confirming the disloyalty of the native-born Japanese is that neither at Pearl Harbor nor at any place within the mainland have they disclosed information (necessarily within their knowledge) of such activities." (73)

6. But in the main, I think you are right in saying that the lack of information is largely due to the fact that the Japanese-American citizens League, which is the only organization of its kind in the country, has not been able to get the necessary cooperation from the Japanese-American community.

Argument VII A.

This argument was a very minor one, constituting only 1.49% of the totals,⁽¹⁾ and appearing in only five of the testimonies.⁽²⁾ It was not used by witnesses in Oregon, and was of little importance to Washington testimonies in which it constituted only 0.21% of the totals. It was slightly more important to California total arguments, but even here it accounted for only 2.29%.⁽³⁾

The greater part of this argument (76.92%) was contributed by government officials, and 23.08% by other witnesses.⁽⁴⁾ The argument was of little significance to either group however, for it was only 1.87% of the totals of government officials and 0.88% of the arguments of non-government men.⁽⁵⁾ It was not used by government officials in either Oregon or Washington, and constituted only 2.54% of the totals of this group in California,⁽⁶⁾ where it was used only by residents of the northern part of the state. Non-government witnesses in California used it less, relatively, than did the government officials, for of the totals of the former, this argument constituted only 1.65%.⁽⁶⁾ No non-government witnesses used it in Oregon, and of the totals of this group in Washington, the argument amounted to a mere 0.37%.⁽⁷⁾ It was slightly more important to the witnesses in Northern California than to any other group, since here it accounted for 3.27% of the totals,⁽⁸⁾ but even here it is obviously weak.

1. Chart II.
2. Chart XVI.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XVIII.
7. Chart XXI.
8. Chart XIX.

VIII. Economic Argument. The economic arguments fall into two classes, and consequently two subcategories were created for Argument VIII. Category VIIIA consists of those economic arguments based upon the belief that the Japanese are not essential to our ~~economy~~ ^{and} or that they are detrimental to it. Category VIIIB deals with the fact that the Japanese can be employed in useful productive work if they are evacuated, and that in this way evacuation will not be a complete financial and economic loss to the nation and to the demands of our defense effort. Both classes of economic arguments are essentially justifications of evacuation, unless, as was seldom the case, the Japanese were accused of being actually detrimental to the economy of the Western States.

VIIIA. The general economic argument consisting of the belief that the Japanese are not essential to our economy has many different aspects. Some witnesses declared that there would be absolutely no loss in production or in labor supply if the Japanese were evacuated; others believed there would be a certain amount of loss of production, shortage of labor supply, or lack of foodstuffs ordinarily produced by the Japanese, but that after a brief transitional period, the situation would be adjusted and back to normal. Still others admitted that the loss of production possibly could not be entirely replaced, but their attitude was that military necessity came first and that the public would be willing to endure any hardships along this line if the defense effort was furthered in this way. A few witnesses asserted that the presence of the Japanese had created an unhealthy economic condition, increasing the competition for white farmers, and that evacuation would enable the white men to be successful. Some of the main variations and examples of Argument VIIIA are given below.

① Olson

② Warren

③ Benson

④ Taylor

Langie of Wash

Spayler

Travels

Bridges

Ryan

Rosera

W. T. C.

McDonogh

Stichel

Landman

Lyons

Governor Olson's attitude was typical of many of the witnesses. With regard to agriculture, Mr. Olson stated that there would be some labor problems, arising out of the fact that the Japanese "are engaged in the so-called "squat labor", or "stoop labor", necessary for picking vegetables. (74) White people will not do this kind of work, and Mr. Olson said that there would be difficulty in this connection. However, he concluded by saying with regard to the land the Japanese would leave that "....it is inevitable that we will get the land worked. I think it can be worked profitably in the course of time. I think it is going to take some adjustment and some time, and perhaps some loss of crops in the meantime." (75) Attorney General Warren presented as exhibits copies of a number of letters from agricultural associations and organizations in California, which also were "of the opinion that the removal of the Japanese from California would have an appreciable but not a serious effect on California agriculture." (76) Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles admitted that around the city there was a great deal of truck gardening, and that evacuation would "quite seriously affect that vegetable supply" for the area. He went on to say that plans were being made to get experienced people to take over these farms and continue production. (77) Mr. Robert Taylor, Chairman of the Oregon Agricultural War Board, presented a similar point of view when he read a statement from the Multnomah County Labor Committee, saying this group believed that if the Japanese could be moved out soon, other farmers could be placed on the land and "possibly 75 percent of the normal production could be secured." (78) Mr. Taylor, as many other witnesses, stressed the need for immediate action, since the planting season was approaching and the Japanese were not planting because of their uncertain future. (79) Governor Langlie of Washington seemed quite certain that there would be a drop

in food production, but he expressed the hope that labor would be available and that the Victory Garden campaign would contribute too, so that the ~~drop~~ ^{decrease} would not be too great. Mr. J. W. Spangler, of the Seattle First National Bank, spoke of two fields in which the Japanese had been engaged to a large extent. In the first, the hotel business, he was sure that there would be no ⁸⁰ ~~problem~~ ⁸¹ since defense workers needed rooms and since nonforeign operators could take over the hotels. However, in agriculture, he anticipated a considerable loss unless the Japanese were immediately told what was to become of them; if they were to be evacuated, the evacuation should take place immediately so that others could begin planting. Mr. Spangler thought that it would not be difficult to find operators for this land unless the evacuation was poorly managed.

A number of witnesses spoke at some length about the sources of agricultural labor which would be available even if the Japanese were evacuated. Some of these admitted that there would probably be a minor shortage of certain foodstuffs, but they were confident that labor could be found and that these shortages would not create any major hardships. Others seemed to think that the importance of the problem had been exaggerated and that a plentiful labor supply could be obtained so that there would be no shortages. Attorney General Warren of California expressed this viewpoint when he said of evacuation: "There has been a lot of talk of how it would disturb the agricultural situation in the state to move the Japanese. I think that is a very debatable question and I think that the records of the Department of Agriculture of the Government will show that it is not as great a problem as it is generally supposed to be. We have seen some very fantastic figures as to what part Japanese labor

plays in California agriculture." Mr. Warren said that there were many large scale Japanese operators in the state, and that they employed Filipinos, Mexicans, and even white people who would be able to work just as well for white farmers. Mr. Wendell Travoli of Tulare County also felt that the difficulty of the situation had been exaggerated, saying, "It is not nearly as critical as some people make believe it is." Mr. Travoli spoke of the supply of Mexican labor that was available, saying that many of them had been working for the Japanese. His final suggestion concerning the labor situation was: "The California labor situation, if we need migratory labor, can be helped by loyal Mexicans." Mr. Robert Bridges of Auburn, Washington, asserted that he didn't believe there would be a shortage because they had always had surpluses in the past and a lot of the agricultural products had had to be plowed under. Mr. Bridges believed that "There are many white growers who would take hold - some of whom own that land now - and operate the farms if the Japanese were not there." Mr. Fred Fueker, representing the American Legion, mentioned the C.C.C., certain people on relief, and the Filipinos, as possible sources of labor, suggesting the establishment of an agricultural institution organized in a way similar to the C.C.C. Mr. H. J. Ryan, Los Angeles County Commissioner of Agriculture, admitted that some of the Japanese operated land which could not be profitably farmed by white people, but said, "I wouldn't say that it is true that a great deal cannot be." Mr. Ryan spoke of the increase in machine farming among the Japanese, saying that the American farmer "could compete successfully on the same basis." He also said, "There is unquestionably a large source of agricultural labor supply here that hasn't been tapped yet", which he said was made up of school children, women, and certain other people. He believed that there

were a number of Okies who would be "competent to go into farming on their own", and also suggested the formation of Boy Scout and other groups of children for agricultural labor. His office had had offers from certain women's groups "offering to organize labor battalions of women" too. The testimonies of Mr. W. S. Rosecrans, and Mr. H. B. Miller brought in the anticipation of some shortages in specialty crops but not in staple foodstuffs. Mr. Miller, Manager of the Agricultural Department of the Los Angeles ~~County~~ Chamber of Commerce, said that "the effect, as near as can be estimated, will probably be a shortage of what you might call certain relish crops, ~~such~~ such as green onions and table beets and parsley..... The essential supplies of the more important vegetable crops such as lettuce, tomatoes, cauliflower and cabbage, will not be appreciably shorted insofar as this market is concerned".

Mr. Miller also added that Los Angeles depended not only upon the local area, but shipped in produce from other areas where it was grown by American farmers. Mr. Rosecrans, Agricultural Co-ordinator of the Los Angeles County Defense Council, felt as Mr. Miller did about the shortage of staple crops, saying, "I think we are apt to have a pretty good supply, perhaps ^{of} not everything the housewife wants, but a pretty good variety of things raised." Mr. Rosecrans also said that the anticipated shortage would come at a time when there would be large supplies of vegetables in other parts of the country, and that these could be imported to California. Mr. Rosecrans believed that although there would probably be a shortage of ~~stop~~ labor, there were a number of sources of labor that would be available. He mentioned the unemployed, the Mexicans, and the Negroes, who might require some training but who would be obtainable. He was sure that there were a lot of people who had the necessary know-

ledge, however. For example, he said that there were many nonresident owners who usually rented to the Japanese and who had "considerable knowledge of what should be done." ⁹⁷ Mr. G. M. McDonough, Supervisor in Los Angeles County, spoke of the WPA project which had trained people in agriculture who were available for work at present, and of the Negro population of Los Angeles County, which had offered to replace the Japanese. ⁹⁸ Mr. McDonough said, "I don't think we would be very much short of labor", but he admitted that in many cases some sort of a training program would be necessary. Captain W. M. Cunningham, of the United States Employment Service, gave the figure on the amount of Japanese working in industry and agriculture. ⁹⁹ He said that it was the crop of "radishes and small vegetables" that would be affected and that would be hard to replace because it used stoop labor. With regard to mass crops, he said, "I see no serious labor shortage due to the evacuation of the Japanese or the other aliens." ¹⁰⁰ He added that there was "no reason in the world" why the Mexicans and ~~F~~ilipinos who did "the bulk of the work" even in the stoop labor field could not work ~~for~~ white operators as well as for the Japanese. ¹⁰¹ Mr. H. L. Strobel, a Monterey County farmer, definitely felt that the extent of the anticipated shortage had been ~~greatly~~ ¹⁰² exaggerated. Mr. Strobel's statement was: "I believe the American farmers, or the farmers of California, are entirely capable, and with the land now occupied by the Japanese, will produce in just as large a quantity the vegetables that have been formerly produced by the Japanese in our farming areas."

Mr. Strobel, as several other witnesses, brought in the fact that the Filipinos would no longer work for the Japanese, but that they would, of course, work for white operators. Mr. Strobel said that "some of these Filipino organizations have gone on record that they will no longer work for Japanese or on Japanese-controlled

acreages, which makes it almost impossible for some of these Japanese to continue their occupation and the production of vegetables and other crops on the land that they now occupy." (103) Attorney General War-

ren of California also said that, "the Filipinos and the Mexicans have resolved that they will not harvest crops for the Japanese." (104)

Mr. W. Underwood, of the Astoria Chamber of Commerce, Astoria, Washington, stated that the Chinese had refused to work in the canneries with the Japanese, and that the lumber camps could not employ Japanese because the laborers there wouldn't work with them either. (105) Mr. Underwood concluded by saying, "They are public charges. They know they are, and they, themselves, would like to be removed to some point where they can safely find employment and ~~and~~ earn a living. The longer they stay here in these bunkhouses the more sullen they become, ^{and} the more apt they are to become fifth columnists."

Since the economic arguments are almost all justifications of evacuation, it was to be expected that some witnesses would say that if it was a case of military necessity the Japanese should be evacuated regardless of any comparatively minor hardships ^{this} ~~it~~ might cause. Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles, for example, said with regard to the anticipated shortage of vegetables, "I think our people will be glad to adjust themselves to wartime conditions." (106) Mr. Wendell Travoli of Tulare County gave a typical "military necessity should come first" statement when he said, "what the vegetable industry of Tulare does wouldn't be a drop in the bucket compared to a disastrous fire through our foothills." (107) "There were other witnesses who expressed this idea in similar fashion.

The people who accused the Japanese of being unfair competitors and detrimental to our economy were relatively few, but they do deserve mention, particularly since they presented the only economic arguments that weren't pure justifications. Mr. Robert Taylor,

Chairman of the Oregon Agricultural War Board, read the following statement from the Multnomah County Labor Committee: "Our commercial vegetable production and marketing was developed by white growers, who were later forced out of business by the Japanese growers operating on a lower standard of living. Many of these growers are still in the community and can produce vegetables when Japanese competition is removed." (108) Mr. F. H. Lysons, Seattle Lawyer, was the most bitter against the Japanese agriculturists. He said with regard to the shortage of truck gardeners ~~here~~ due to evacuation: "We had such gardeners before the Japanese came, which Japanese standards of living and working conditions - long day and night hours by families and women and children - eliminated this competition. This has brought an unhealthy economic condition. No greater service can be rendered the country than to restore this former condition. This truck gardening condition is one wedge of Japan's program of conquest - her nationals abroad to acquire monopoly control of essential industries and occupations. With the accomplishment of this program, American industry will be crippled beyond recovery and our labor, including agriculture, will be reduced to choice between unemployment and degradation to Asiatic standards of living and working conditions." 109

Argument VIII A.

This argument was used extensively in the testimonies, as it accounted for 21.21% of the total units classified. ⁽¹⁾ Its predominance is also indicated by the fact that it was used by twenty of the thirty-two witnesses. ⁽²⁾

The economic argument was more important, relatively, to Washington witnesses (where it constituted 26.94% of their total) than to the totals of the other two states. However, in both California and Oregon, the use of the argument was extremely significant, for it amounted to 20.37% of total California arguments, and 11.87% of Oregon totals. ⁽³⁾

Government officials contributed more than did other witnesses to the total economic argument, for the former group accounted for 58.57%, while the latter accounted for 41.43%. ⁽⁴⁾ However, the argument was relatively of slightly greater importance to the totals of non-government witnesses. For of these, it constituted 22.54%, while of the totals of government officials, it was 20.37%. ⁽⁵⁾

Considering the total arguments of government officials in each state, respectively, it appears that to these groups the economic argument is of almost equal importance. Of the totals of this group in California, the argument accounted for 20.93%, ⁽⁶⁾ while in Oregon it constituted 19.75%, ⁽⁷⁾ and in Washington, 18.41%. ⁽⁸⁾ However, in comparing the relative importance of this argument to the non-government officials in each state respectively, we did not find such relatively equal weight. The argument was of considerable importance to this group in Washington (where it constituted 33.34% of the arguments), ⁽⁹⁾ and of some importance to the corresponding group in California, where it accounted for 18.92% of the totals. ⁽¹⁰⁾ It was ~~only~~ 6.31% of the totals of this group in Oregon. ⁽¹¹⁾

It is also significant to compare the relative importance of

VIII A.

this argument to the totals of government officials and other witnesses in each of the states. This argument had almost equal weight in the totals of the two groups in California (20.93% and 18.92% respectively,⁶) but in Oregon it was far more important to the government officials (of whose total it constituted 19.75%), than to the other witnesses, who used it as 6.31% of their total.⁷ On the other hand, it was twice as significant to non-government men in Washington as it was to the government officials there, for it constituted 33.34% and 18.41% of their arguments, respectively.⁸

Another significant comparison lies in the analysis of the use of the economic argument in California. It constituted only 7.1% of the total arguments in Northern California, but was 61.54% of the Southern California totals.⁹ In breaking down this result in Southern California, we found that the argument had almost twice as much weight in the totals of the government officials (here it constituted 66.04%) as it had with the other witnesses, of whose total arguments it accounted for 34.3%.¹⁰ It is significant that here, too, the percentages are exceedingly high.

We found also that the government officials in Southern California contributed 62.97% of the total economic argument in California, and that the government officials in Northern California contributed slightly less (11.24%) than the other witnesses there (13.19%). Non-government men in Southern California contributed 5.4%, and Wendell Travoli of the Tulare County Citizens Committee accounted for 7.2%.¹¹

1. Chart II.

2. Chart XVI.

3. Chart XVII.

4. Table XXIV.

5. Table XXV.

6. Chart XVIII.

7. Chart XX.

8. Chart XXI.

9. Chart XIX.

10. Chart XXII.

11. Table XXIII.

VIIIB. The fact that the Japanese could be employed in useful productive work ^{in relocation areas} ~~where they were relocated after evacuation~~ was given as a further justification for their removal from the West Coast. All of the witnesses ~~who~~ who used this argument stated it in essentially the same way. A few examples may be mentioned. Governor Olson of California said ".... the effort will be made to place them in various parts of the United States, or the Western States and Central States, where they can be employed in useful productive work." (110) He later added, "I certainly would oppose, unless as a last resort and an absolute military necessity, a concentration and idleness of these people at public expense as prisoners of war." (111) Mr. Robert Taylor, of the Oregon Agricultural War Board, said that they should be moved into an area "where they can continue their production." (112) His attitude was: "If they can help us win this war, so much the better; we need this production." Mr. J. K. Carson, of the American Legion in Oregon, stated that this organization's viewpoint was that the Japanese should be placed in custody where areas could be provided in which they might work. (113) Mayor Riley of Portland also felt that "they should be put to productive labor of some character, and be properly remunerated for it, so that they would be making a contribution to our defense problem." (114) ~~Mr. H. L. Strobel~~, a farmer of Monterey County, California, thought that if there were areas within the State of California acceptable to the military authorities to which they could be evacuated, this should be done. (115) He felt that "if these people were maintained in these particular localities, their services could be utilized under proper supervision." It was the unanimous opinion of all those who offered their viewpoints or who were asked questions by Committee members as to what was to be done with the Japanese after they were evacuated, that they should be employed in useful productive work if possible.

Argument VIII B.

This argument constituted only 2.38% of the total units classified,⁽¹⁾ and was used by nine witnesses.⁽²⁾ It did not appear in any Washington testimonies, and was found to have greater weight, relatively, in Oregon (where it accounted for 8.97% of the total arguments) than in California, where it constituted only 2.26% of the totals.⁽³⁾

The The respective contributions of government officials and other witnesses to this argument are almost equal, for government officials accounted for 48.01%, while the others contributed 51.99%.⁽⁴⁾ It was relatively more important to the total arguments of non-government witnesses (3.17%) than to the totals of government officials (1.87%).⁽⁵⁾ The argument constituted 1.01% of the totals of government officials in California,⁽⁶⁾ and 15.29% of the totals of the corresponding group in Oregon.⁽⁷⁾ The difference in the importance of the argument to these two groups is especially noteworthy since the argument was not used by government officials in Washington. The argument has relatively equal weight in the totals of non-government witnesses in California and Oregon (5.5%⁽⁸⁾ and 4.5%⁽⁹⁾ respectively.)

The argument was more important to Southern California witnesses, who used it as 5.8% of their total, than to those in Northern California, where it was only 1.22% of the totals.⁽⁸⁾ In the analysis of this argument as used in Southern California, it is significant that it constituted as much as 32.38% of the total arguments of non-government witnesses, while it was only 1.42% of the totals of government officials there.⁽⁹⁾

1. Chart II.
2. Chart XVI.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XVIII.
7. Chart XX.
8. Chart XIX.
9. Chart XXII.

2621
2.38
23.59

66.54
5.8%
67.24

IX. Humanitarian Argument. The humanitarian argument has several variations which fall into two main categories. For this reason, sub-arguments IXA and IXB were created under argument IX. The aspects of the question included in Argument IXA are those which deal with the probable danger to the Japanese ~~and to other Orientals~~ if ~~the Japanese~~ ^{they} are allowed to remain on the Coast. This danger would arise out of vigilantism on the part of the other residents of the coastal areas, who might take the law into their own hands if occasion arose. ~~There would be~~ ~~The danger to other Orientals would be because~~ ~~most people cannot distinguish between them and the Japanese.~~ Argument IXB in general states that the evacuation will be administered humanely, and it is definitely in the nature of a justification for evacuation.

IXA. The humanitarian argument, as stated above, grows out of the fear of vigilante activities. ^(of Cal. form) Attorney-General Warren, in ^{expressed} speaking of the need for immediate Government organization and supervision of evacuation, ^{similar fears. He pointed out} brought up the fact that the Japanese could not be left to roam about as they wished, ^{because} He felt that this would lead to "race riots and prejudice and hysteria and excesses of all kind." ⁽¹¹⁶⁾ He said that there had already been some evidence of this, ^{and urged immediate Federal action:} By way of urging Government action, Mr. Warren then said: "My own belief concerning vigilantism is that the people do not engage in vigilante activities so long as they believe that their Government through its agencies is taking care of their most serious problem. But when they get the idea that their problems are not understood, when their Government is not doing for them the things that they believe should be done, they start taking the law into their own hands." ⁽¹¹⁷⁾ ^{of California} Governor Olson ^{of the danger of vigilanteism:} also spoke of this, saying that "... too many people will conclude that every Japanese is a fifth columnist,

Legion in both Oregon and Washington approved similar ideas.

(118)

no matter what may be in his heart....." He then added, "I say if the conflict was brought here to these shores, I would feel sorry for any Japanese loyalist inside because I am just afraid that he would suffer even if he were innocent." ^{Representatives of the American} Mr. Fred Fueker, ^{Department Adjutant} representing the American Legion in Washington, said in this regard, "It would seem to me that these people (the Japanese) would welcome an evacuation, in case there should be any token air raids or shellings of this coast, which in all probability, there will be, from what has gone before. We feel that those people will be endangered in being here, and it is for their own public safety because of similar instances that have arisen." ^{Oregon Department Commander} Mr. J. K. Carson presented a similar

(119)

^{viewpoint held by the Oregon Department of the American Legion. Two listed three reasons in support of the Oregon Leg.'s stand for evacuation; two were of the reasons the Legion posts in Oregon wanted the Japanese interned were due to an humanitarian attitude.} ⁽¹²⁰⁾ "Innocent ones would

not be under suspicion or likely to be attacked in case trouble ensues"; ^{b)} ~~and~~ "If justified or not, any of our citizens should take summary action against any of these nationals in a time of emotion and stress, that might be used as a basis for reprisals against our own nationals who were unfortunate enough to be in the hands of the Japanese." ^{a)} Mr. Robert Bridges, of the Valley Protective Association,

^{in Auburn, Washington, mentioned the case of a Japanese man who had come to him very much} ^{cited a} ^{perturbed about the idea that if something happens} ^{in our district, they will blame it onto the Japanese and they will immediately} ^{in their district it would probably be blamed on the Japanese, and} ^{pick on those people." (121)} Mr. Bridges also read into the record a ^{resolution} ^{for this reason he thought evacuation might be a good thing.} ^{Mr.}

Smith Troy, Attorney General of Washington, said, "During the past several weeks, there has been a growing concern among all prosecutors about the possibilities of mob violence. I have information from some of the prosecuting attorneys that in some of their localities there is talk of creating vigilante committees." ⁽¹²²⁾ He contin-

of the Protective Association which he represented, one sentence of this resolution reading: "... We believe that the rising tide of feeling among our people will make it unsafe to leave the Japanese here and in view of the fact that any action on our part would only invite reprisal against Americans in Japan, therefore be it resolved ..."

ued by saying that this movement might increase "if, for instance, there is some tremendous disaster or loss to our armed forces on the part of the Japanese or on the part of some of the other alien enemy countries; or if casualty lists were to be published revealing that quite a few of the sons of people of our States have been wounded or killed. Feeling might run higher than it is now, and it might result in an outbreak of violence." ¹²³ Mr. J. W. Spangler, Vice-President of the Seattle ~~First~~ National Bank, ^{in the several other} also feared "group or mob action". ~~He said~~ "..... the American people are somewhat emotional, and it is conceivable that under the stress and strain of war incidents, that action might not always be controlled." ⁽¹²⁴⁾ ~~There were several other witnesses who expressed similar sentiments, using this argument as a secondary argument to support their main contentions.~~

Argument IX A.

The humanitarian argument was used by thirteen witnesses⁽¹⁾ and constituted 4.99% of the total units classified.⁽²⁾ In considering the total arguments in each state discretely, we found that this argument was more important in Washington (where it constituted 11.82% of the total arguments) than in Oregon (where it was 7.39% of the totals) or in California (1.63% of totals.)⁽³⁾

Government officials contributed the greater part (63.67%) of the humanitarian argument, while other witnesses contributed 36.33%.⁽⁴⁾ However, the argument had almost equal weight in the totals of government officials and others, respectively, for it constituted 5.19% of the former, and 4.66% of the latter.⁽⁵⁾ It was of little importance to the totals of the government officials in California and Oregon, where it constituted 2.22%⁽⁶⁾ and 3.19%⁽⁷⁾ respectively, but had considerable weight (17.66%)⁽⁸⁾ in the total arguments of Washington government officials. Considering the total arguments of non-government witnesses in each state, we found that the humanitarian argument had only a small share (0.11%) in the totals of this group in California,⁽⁹⁾ while it constituted 7.45%⁽¹⁰⁾ of the Washington totals, and 10.36% of the Oregon totals.⁽¹¹⁾ The most significant differences here are those between the relative weights of this argument in the totals of government officials and other witnesses, respectively, in both Oregon and Washington. Of the totals of Oregon government officials, as we have pointed out above, this argument accounted for 3.19%, while it had greater weight (10.36%) in the totals of the non-government group in that state.⁽¹²⁾ The reverse was true of Washington, where the argument was 17.66% of the totals of government officials there, and only 7.45% of the arguments of the non-government group.⁽¹³⁾

The share of this argument in the totals of both Northern and Southern California arguments was small, being 2.26% and 0.2% respec-

tively. ⁽⁹⁾ No non-government witnesses in Southern California used this argument, and of the totals of the Southern California government officials, the argument accounted for only 0,24%. ⁽¹⁰⁾

1. Chart XVI.
2. Chart II.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XVIII.
7. Chart XX.
8. Chart XXI.
9. Chart XIX.
10. Chart XXII.

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Argument IXB. The humanitarian argument dealing with the treatment of the Japanese after evacuation was almost entirely an administrative aspect of the question. Like Argument VIIIB, it was essentially a justification for the internment of the Japanese. Very often it was asserted that the property rights of the Japanese would be protected and that they would be treated humanely. A few witnesses used it in a slightly different manner, saying that it would be more humane to evacuate citizens as well as aliens because in this way family life would remain intact. In this latter sense, the humanitarian argument was a justification for the removal of citizens as well as aliens, rather than for evacuation in general.

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 Governor Olson spoke at some length on this question. His attitude was: "I think if we can arrive at an understanding of the situation, and get cooperation on the part of everybody, the people to be moved out of the military area, as well as everyone else, we can give it solved and have those removed who should be moved out of the military areas without any injustice to anyone. There will be inconvenience, yes. The people will be called upon to make sacrifices and there will be inconveniences, but no injustices."
125
He later said, "It is hard to believe some of the stories you hear about them (the Japanese) selling at distressed prices. They don't need to sell. They don't need to sell at all. Their property can be protected and their property will be protected. The only distress under which they would sell would be the need of cash to move on and I think they can be assisted in all such matters."
126
 Governor Olson felt that evacuation should not be confined only to the alien population, since this would leave children and the aged people on the coast. Referring to this, he said, "They probably would not want to be left by their relatives. They would possibly want to go

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Indict Japanese, that we would be glad to assist them in placing them in contact with prospective former because we think they are entitled to considerate treatment and could get whatever can be gotten for them.

I think the family separation would be an impractical thing. ⁽²¹⁾ Attorney General Warren

believed that there should be a definite resettlement program because without it, evacuation "is not only going to entail hardship on the people who are told to move but it is going to entail hardship on every community to which they go." ⁽²⁸⁾ He ~~also~~ ^{further} said, "I don't believe

that people should be permitted to exploit even our enemy aliens. I think there should be some Federal agency that would supervise those matters to see that no one is taken advantage of by designing people." ⁽²⁹⁾

W.S. Mr. Rosecrans, of the Los Angeles County Defense Council, discussed the need of a custodian for the goods and property rights of the Japanese, saying, "We don't think it is fair for the Japanese to have

INDEX to throw everything up and dispose of the lands at a sacrifice. We want to see something done. We want to do everything we can do but we are stymied until the Government appoints a custodian to act in this connection so that the person who comes on knows that he has a right to deal. That is the key to it." ⁽³⁰⁾ Mr. *Harold J.* Ryan, ~~of the~~ Los

Angeles County Commissioner of Agriculture, hoped there would be a custodian to protect the equity rights and property rights of the Japanese so that they would go ahead with their farming operations. ⁽³¹⁾

9 Mr. J. K. Carson, of the Oregon Department of the American Legion, said, "Let me repeat I haven't found any sentiment among the members of the Legion that they want to do acts of cruelty or anything by way of retribution. They want our people to be safe and secure, and they are not asking that things be done in a retaliatory manner, or through spite or vengeance or ill feeling." ⁽³²⁾ ~~These examples give a~~

~~good picture of the general feeling that the Japanese should be treated humanely, and that their rights should be protected. All of the witnesses that expressed their opinion on this matter felt this way.~~

91 *witnesses saw injustices in the mass movement but*
~~Some of them also believed that it would be possible to set~~
thought later real location could be made at
~~up some method of investigating the Japanese who were interned and~~
on later date
~~of releasing the ones whose loyalty was proved. In this way, they~~
~~thought that any injustice done to loyal Japanese--American citizens~~
~~could be rectified.~~ Mr. J. F. Hassler, City Manager of Oakland,
California, expressed *this* ~~their~~ attitude in a typical way, ~~when he~~
~~said,~~ "Certainly when they have left the area each case could be
decided on its merits and those who are proved to be loyal could
return to their homes." ¹³³ *And* Mr. Smith Troy, Attorney General of Washington,
said, "I am in favor of moving the aliens out ~~for~~ our protection
from sabotage." Then after close scrutiny and investigation, those
useful and loyal citizen Japanese could be, through some licensing
form, or some other method, brought back into the territory here
¹³⁴
where we could use them."

Argument IX B.

This argument figured somewhat significantly as it was used by eighteen witnesses,⁽¹⁾ and accounted for 5.6% of the total units classified.⁽²⁾ It was relatively more important to the witnesses in California, (for here it figured as 8.05%) than to those in Oregon (of whose ^{arguments} ~~total~~, it was 2.02%) or in Washington (where it was only 1.35%).⁽³⁾

The greater part (72.28%) of this argument was contributed by government officials, while other witnesses accounted for the remaining 27.72%.⁽⁴⁾ Of the total arguments of government officials, the argument accounted for 6.63%, while it was only 3.98% of the totals of non-government witnesses.⁽⁵⁾ In considering the total arguments of California government officials and other witnesses discretely, we found that the argument had almost equal weight (8.18% and 7.7% respectively.)⁽⁶⁾ This share in the totals in California was considerably greater than that in the totals of these two groups, respectively, in both Washington and Oregon. The discrepancies between the percentages in these two states is slight: the only noteworthy difference being that the argument was relatively a little more important to government officials in Washington (where it accounted for 2.74% of the totals) than to other witnesses in that state, who used the argument as only 0.31% of their total.⁽⁷⁾ This difference was reversed in Oregon, where the government officials used the argument as only 1.06% of their total, and other witnesses used it as 2.7% of their total.⁽⁸⁾

We found that this argument was relatively more important to Southern California witnesses (who used it as 13.49% of their total) than to those in Northern California where it figured as 6.86%.⁽⁹⁾ Further analysis showed that in Southern California the argument constituted 14.15% of the total arguments of government officials

there, while it accounted for 9.52% of the totals of non-government witnesses. (10)

1. Chart XVI.
2. Chart II.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XVIII.
7. Chart XXI.
8. Chart XX.
9. Chart XIX.
10. Chart XXII.

X. Public Morale argument. This argument consists of the belief that the people on the West Coast would feel safer if the Japanese were evacuated, and that therefore their morale would be improved. It was used the least of any of the twelve pro-evacuation arguments, having as it did a total count of only three units when the final tabulation was taken. Perhaps the reason that it appeared so seldom was that it was so obvious a conclusion to make regarding evacuation. Every witness who discussed the danger of fifth column activity or sabotage urged evacuation because he felt that it would remove this danger, and such witnesses undoubtedly felt that the people on the Coast would feel safer and hence that their morale would be better when evacuation took place. However, since the great majority did not actually say this, the public morale argument appears very seldom. Governor Olson of California used it with regard to his suggestion of evacuating the Japanese east of California, saying "..... if that were done, everyone would feel much safer about the alien and the Japanese population.....".¹³⁵

Mr. Warren also brought up the question of morale when he was speaking of vigilantism. He believed that if the Government did what the people expected - that is, evacuated the Japanese - there would be no public alarm, disorder, or vigilantism, because the people would feel secure and would not think it necessary to take the law into their own hands.¹³⁶

Argument X.

We found that this argument played a very minor role in our classification, for it constituted only 0.27% of the total arguments⁽¹⁾ and was used by only three witnesses.⁽²⁾ It was not used at all in Washington, and of the total California arguments it accounted for only 0.18% of the totals, while in Oregon it accounted for 0.53% of the totals.⁽³⁾

Government officials contributed two-thirds of the argument.⁽⁴⁾ Of the total arguments of this group, this argument constituted only 0.19%, and was relatively equal in importance to the other group, of whose totals the argument accounted for 0.15%.⁽⁵⁾ The very small share of this argument is further exhibited by the fact that it constituted only 0.25% of the total arguments of government officials in California,⁽⁶⁾ and that it accounted for only 0.9% of the totals of non-government witnesses in Oregon.⁽⁷⁾ It was not used by government officials in Oregon or Washington, nor by non-government men in California or Washington. It accounted for a mere 0.26% of the total Northern California arguments, and was not used in Southern California testimonies.⁽⁸⁾

1. Chart II.
2. Chart XVI.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XVIII.
7. Chart XX.
8. Chart XIX.

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Hassler
Schwanenberg
Olson

Argument XI. Appeal to Patriotism. The arguments in the nature of an appeal to the patriotism of the Japanese people fall into this category. In general, they state that the Japanese, if they are loyal Americans, should accept evacuation as their patriotic duty to the United States. The testimony of Mr. Robert H. Fouke, representing the California Joint Immigration Committee, ~~may be offered as an example.~~ Mr. Fouke said, "But in connection with this whole program, while we must recognize and remember we are at war; that the welfare of the Nation is paramount; and that people who are loyal, including Japanese or Italians or Germans, as the case might be, may best show their loyalty by acquiescing and assisting in carrying out these things so as to minimize the suspicion or the assertions that they are not loyal being made against them. They, in that way, will be best serving our country even if they are not called into the armed forces to serve." ^(Olson Committee, Part 29, p. 11072) 137 Mr. J. F. Hassler, City Manager of Oakland, California, expressed the same attitude ~~when he said,~~ "..... I feel that the loyal Japanese and the loyal aliens could better show their loyalty to this country by leaving the area at the request of the Federal Government." ^(Ibid., p. 11094.) 138 Mr. C. R. Schwanenberg, City Manager of Alameda, ~~also said in this regard,~~ ^{assented} "If he is a good American citizen he should be glad to do it." ^(Ibid., p. 11116) 139 Governor Olson of California ^{believed} ~~stated~~ that the Japanese were ready to accept evacuation and to cooperate voluntarily ⁱⁿ with any plan suggested. ¹⁴⁰ ~~He~~ ^{program} ~~said:~~ "Recently, following a conference with General DeWitt on the subject, and Mr. Clark, of the Department of Justice, I called into the Governor's office representatives of the Japanese-American population, professional men, businessmen, farmers, and publishers, and talked the situation over with them just as we are talking of it now. And I think practically all of those representatives were in good

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faith when they said whatever program is decided upon with regard to the removal of the entire Japanese population from any area in California, or from the State, they would follow. In fact, they were willing. I asked them if they wouldn't be willing to take a leadership in it, to show it was participated in by the Japanese-American citizens themselves, for their own protection as well as proof of their loyalty to a program which would be very helpful in the entire war and defense situation. They all stated that they would be willing to do it; to propagandize it; to take the leadership in it; and participate in programs for removal, and many submitted various programs, by way of suggestion, of voluntary evacuation for all of the adult Japanese population in the military areas." ¹⁴⁴ (Tolan Committee, Part 31, p. 11631)

Comment in Appeal to Patrons to come

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This argument was used by seven witnesses,⁽¹⁾ and constituted only 0.94% of the total units classified.⁽²⁾ Its share in the total arguments of each state was also very minor: constituting 1.28% of California totals, 0.26% of Oregon totals, and 0.43% of Washington totals.⁽³⁾

Government officials contributed 84.85% of the total units of this argument, while other witnesses contributed the remaining 15.15%.⁽⁴⁾ That this argument figured little in our classification is shown by the fact that it accounted for only 1.31% of the total arguments of government officials, and was only 0.37% of the totals of the other witnesses.⁽⁵⁾ No government officials in Oregon or Washington used this argument, but of the totals of this group in California, it accounted for 1.78%.⁽⁶⁾ On the other hand, it constituted 0.45% of the totals of non-government witnesses in Oregon,⁽⁷⁾ and 0.75% of the totals of this group in Washington,⁽⁸⁾ but was not used by any California witnesses outside the government sphere.

1. Chart XVI.
2. Chart II.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XVIII.
7. Chart XX.
8. Chart XXI.

XII. The necessity of adopting military or totalitarian methods. The arguments in this category assert the principle of "fight Fascism with Fascism", or in other words the idea that a democracy should disregard legal barriers if expedient in time of war. Several witnesses said that the civil authorities were not adequate to cope with the situation, or that there was not enough time for them to act. They therefore advocated immediate action by the military authorities. This argument was used a great deal, and the different aspects of it are listed below.

Attorney General Warren of California used Argument XII far more than any other witness, and passages from his testimony will therefore afford the best examples of it. Mr. Warren believed that the problem was both a Federal and a military problem. He said, "We believe that all of the decisions in that regard must be made by the military command that is charged with the security of this area. I am convinced that the fifth-column activities of our enemy call for the participation of people who are in fact American citizens, and that if we are to deal realistically with the problem we must realize that we will be obliged in time of stress to deal with subversive elements of our own citizenry." He went on to say, "If that be true, it creates almost an impossible situation for the civil authorities because the civil authorities cannot take protective measures against people of that character. We may suspect their loyalty. We may even have some evidence, or, perhaps, substantial evidence of their disloyalty. But until we have the whole pattern of the enemy plan, until we are able to go into court and beyond the exclusion of a reasonable doubt establish the guilt of those elements among our American citizens, there is no way that civil government can cope with the situation." Since the procedures of civil government were

too slow, Mr. Warren advocated immediate military measures, feeling that "any delay in the adoption of the necessary protective measures is to invite disaster." ¹⁴³ He later added that the civil authorities were inadequate also because they had been instructed not to investigate subversive activities, and therefore, knowing little about them, they were not in a position to take the responsibility. ¹⁴⁴ With reference to the question of civil rights, Mr. Warren said, "I believe, sir, ~~that~~ that in time of war every citizen must give up some of his normal rights. I believe that no good citizen should object to it. I do believe, however, that it should be done by proper authority and not by sporadic action on the part of agencies that do not function according to the law. That is the reason that I believe that this is a military problem and not a problem in civil government." ¹⁴⁵

Mr. Stuart Ward, of Mentlo Park, California, ~~the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco,~~ expressed ~~this quite general~~ viewpoint with somewhat more feeling than the other witnesses. He said, "Much though I would like to feel otherwise, I believe Japanese and Japanese-Americans alike should immediately be placed in concentration camps and without a moment's warning. I do not believe moving them back from the coast would be adequate. I realize this means heavy cost and injustice to a considerable number of the 140,000 such residents in the United States. On the other hand, I think the record of Pearl Harbor, the information I believe to be in the hands of our counter-espionage ^u agents, and the ^g general public attitude toward the Japanese, all indicate that what is likely to be a life-and-death struggle for the ~~possession~~ ^{possession} or the Pacific coast seaboard would justify such action for duration of the war. (I am one of those who considers an all-out attempted Japanese coastal invasion entirely possible.) If anyone knows how to separate the sheep from the goats on this deal I have never talked to him. None of our three counter-espionage agencies has (until

recently at least) been given sufficient funds or personnel to do anything like an adequate job. Now, there isn't time." ¹⁴⁶ Mr R. H. Fouke, of the California Joint Immigration Committee in San Francisco, said that he believed the military authorities should be entrusted with authority to establish combat areas where "no person, ^{be they} citizens or aliens, would be permitted unless it has been first established that their presence there was desirable or not inimical to the welfare of the country." ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ Mr. C. R. Schwanenberg, City Manager of Alameda, California, said, "The whole situation is very vulnerable, and steps should be taken to remove immediately all enemy aliens and all American citizens whose loyalty can in any way be questioned. We are at war and we can't afford in this area to take any chances." ¹⁴⁸

Mr. H. L. Strobel, farmer of Monterey County, California, said that the judgement of the military authorities should not be questioned, and that the fact that minor hardships might occur should not be a determining factor. ¹⁴⁹ He said, "Many inconveniences are being visited upon our own citizens. So I do not feel at this time it works any great hardship upon a group of aliens to have their activities supervised, and in the interest of ~~the~~ safety of our own country have them removed from one point to another." Mr. F. H. Lysons, Seattle Lawyer, expressed the same attitude when he said, "No greater contribution to the finality of Japan's war success can be made than to handle the question before this committee on the basis of preventing financial loss and personal inconvenience and hardship. If we get out of this war without widely spread inconvenience and hardship, and even suffering, we will emerge from it at the losing end." ¹⁵⁰

Governor A. B. Langlie of Washington also thought this should be the case, and that the problem should not be decided on the basis of

convenience. He said that the factor of safety with regard to power plants, industries, and the like, should be given first consideration.¹⁵¹ Mr. Earl C. Craig, representing the John Dewey Forum in Los Angeles, was another witness who said that, for the present at least, "..... the committee should do their duty without regard to any considerations other than national¹⁵² safety." Mr. H. B. Miller, of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, also said that the Army ".... should be the determining body as to the areas from which their movement should take place, and should be the ones to decide the areas where they should be resettled. Military considerations¹⁵³ should govern entirely....."

Argument XII.

We found that sixteen witnesses advocated military control and the use of totalitarian methods,⁽¹⁾ and that this argument accounted for a relatively large part⁽²⁾ of the total units classified. In comparing the relative weights of the argument in each state, we found that it was roughly twice as important in California (where it constituted 13.99% of the total arguments) as in Washington (where it accounted for 6.82% of the totals) or in Oregon (where it accounted for 6.59% of the totals).⁽³⁾

It is significant that it was the government officials who contributed the greatest part (70.92%) of this argument, while the other witnesses accounted for the remaining 29.08%.⁽⁴⁾ We also noted that the argument constituted 13.09% of the total arguments of government officials, while it was of less importance to the other witnesses, of whose total argument it accounted for 8.41%.⁽⁵⁾ In considering the relative importance of this argument to the totals of government officials and non-government witnesses, respectively, in each state, it appeared that the argument had almost equal weight in the total arguments⁽⁶⁾ of government officials in Washington and California (14.93%⁽⁷⁾ and 13.49%⁽⁷⁾ respectively). It accounted for 4.46%⁽⁸⁾ of the totals of this group in Oregon. On the other hand, it constituted 15.29% of the arguments of non-government men in California,⁽⁷⁾ 8.11% of the totals of the corresponding group in Oregon,⁽⁸⁾ and only 0.75% of the totals of this group in Washington.⁽⁶⁾

The figures given above show that in California this argument was of almost equal relative importance to both government officials and to other witnesses,⁽⁷⁾ while Oregon government officials showed approximately one-half the interest in this argument that was indicated by non-government witnesses in that state.⁽⁸⁾ The discrepancy in the relative importance of the argument to the two

XII.

groups in Washington is striking, not only because ~~is~~ here the argument is more emphasized by government officials than by others (the reverse was true in Oregon), but also because the argument was only 0.75% of the totals of non-government witnesses, while it constituted 14.93% of the totals of government officials in that state. ⁽⁶⁾

In breaking down the argument in California, we found that it figured as 18.99% of the Northern California totals, and only as 2.97% of the totals of Southern California witnesses. ⁽⁹⁾ We also noted that the argument was relatively far less important to government officials there (for it constituted 1.65% of their totals) than to the non-government witnesses, of whose totals this argument accounted for 10.95%. ⁽¹⁰⁾

In the analysis of the sources of this argument as used in California, it appeared that the Northern California government officials contributed the greatest amount (67.36%), and that the other witnesses in that region contributed 24.84%. The remainder was contributed by Southern California government officials and non-government witnesses, the former accounting for 2.29%, and the latter, 2.51%. ⁽¹¹⁾

1. Chart XVI.
2. Chart II.
3. Chart XVII.
4. Table XXIV.
5. Table XXV.
6. Chart XXI.
7. Chart XVIII.
8. Chart XX.
9. Chart XIX.
10. Chart XXII.
11. Table XXIII.

XIII. Miscellaneous Arguments. There are two arguments falling under the miscellaneous category. ~~2~~

XIIIA. Appeal to authority. This category is not precisely an argument, since the sentences falling under it were used as further evidence in support of various contentions. They consisted of appeals to certain military and civil authorities for this purpose. Warren
Troy
Olson
Attorney General Warren used this appeal to authority more than any other witnesses. He presented letters to the Tolan Committee which were answers to questions he had asked the sheriffs, district attorneys, ^{and} chiefs of police in the larger cities of the state. These letters were offered as further proof of his contention that there was

"grave and immediate danger of sabotage and fifth-column activity from the Japanese population and that their removal at once from the vicinity of vital establishments and areas is imperative in order to eliminate such danger." ¹⁵⁴ Mr. Warren also presented letters from

agricultural organizations in the State which supported his opinion that "... the removal of the Japanese from California would have an appreciable but not a serious effect upon California agriculture." ¹⁵⁵

He brought in appeals to authority in connection with Argument VIIA ¹⁵⁶

also. Attorney General Smith Troy of Washington appealed to the authority of the prosecuting attorneys of the Washington counties when discussing the possibilities of vigilantism. ¹⁵⁷ Governor Olson of

California said with regard to the agricultural situation that the California director of agriculture thought that the land could be ¹⁵⁸ farmed. Such appeals to authority were used in other cases in the

same manner.

Argument XIII A.

This argument was 2.31% of the total units classified,^① and was used by ~~sixteen~~ witnesses.^② It was more important to Oregon than to the other two states, for of the total arguments in the former state, it constituted 7.92%, while it accounted for only 1.79% of California totals, and only 1.28% of Washington totals.^③

Nearly the entire argument was contributed by government officials, who accounted for 98.75% of its total units.^④ We found ^{it was} that/only slightly more important to the government officials in general than to the other witnesses, however, when we compared the relative weight of the argument in the totals of these two groups. Of the total arguments of government officials, it constituted 3.7%, and was only 0.18% of the totals of non-government witnesses.^⑤ Considering the ^{totals of the} government officials in each state, we found that the argument accounted for only a small part of the arguments of this group in California and in Washington, (2.35% and 2.99% respectively),^⑥ but that it constituted 19.11%^⑦ of the totals of government officials in Oregon. The argument was very insignificant to non-government witnesses, as shown by the fact that it was not used by this group in either Oregon or Washington, and by its minor share (0.33%) in the totals of non-government witnesses in California.^⑧

1. Chart II
2. Chart XVI
3. Chart XVII
4. Table XXIV
5. Table XXV
6. Chart XVIII
7. Chart XXI
8. Chart XX

Our analysis of the Tohàn Committee Reports produced some outstanding results. As was to be expected, the fifth-column and sabotage argument ranked very high in importance relative to the other arguments. It is significant to note, however, that the economic argument appeared even more, and was, in fact, the most ^{widely} ~~widely~~ used of all. The relative importance of these two arguments to the total arguments and to each other may be explained. Argument V, the fifth-column argument, as has been ^{expressed} ~~said~~ before, ~~was~~ the fundamental motive lying behind the general clamor for evacuation. The fear of the Japanese was of course based upon the probability that they, or at least some of them, were disloyal, and that therefore they would be likely to act as saboteurs, espionage agents, and fifth-columnists. This general argument had many variations, and was closely connected with most of the other arguments. For example, the difficulty of distinguishing between loyal and disloyal Japanese, the location of the Japanese in strategic areas, the indoctrination of the Japanese with the ideology of Japan, and their approval of the aggressive policies of Japan were closely related to the danger of subversive activity. Since we formed separate categories for these aspects of the problem, many sentences were classified under arguments other than Argument V, though they were in fact based upon it and implied it strongly. Hence, our tabulation may appear to minimize the importance of the sabotage and fifth-column argument, but this was not actually the case. It should be noted that Argument IVA, dealing with intentional location of the Japanese in strategic areas, was even more closely connected with Argument V than ^{were} the other arguments. It was used a great deal, and it is significant that the intentional distribution of the Japanese was emphasized far more than their unintentional location in important areas.

But it
is true!

The explanation for the wide use of Argument VIIIA lies in the fact that the witnesses seemed to believe that the strongest argument against evacuation was the possibility that the removal of the Japanese would disrupt the economy of the Western States. Many of the witnesses who advocated evacuation therefore spoke at great length to refute this argument, saying that the Japanese were not essential to our economy. Their testimonies may be regarded as secondary arguments, or as justifications for evacuation. Only when the Japanese were accused of being detrimental to the Western economy did the economic argument form a true motive for evacuation, and this was done comparatively few times. Another reason that the economic argument formed such a large percentage of the total arguments was that the Tolan Committee evidently considered the economic situation to be the chief objection to evacuation also. Many of the witnesses were people whose field was agriculture, either from the production or the governmental side, and these witnesses naturally discussed the economic question at great length. Moreover, a great number of the questions asked by the Committee members dealt with the agricultural aspect of evacuation, and the statements prompted by these questions fell into the VIIIA argument.

Argument XII, urging military or totalitarian action, was found to be third in relative importance when the percentages of each argument were considered.^① The reason for this may lie in the fact that many witnesses thought that the legality of ^{the} evacuation of Japanese-American citizens would be questioned. Argument XII generally consisted of statements to the effect that in wartime drastic measures were necessary, and that civil procedures were inadequate and were also too slow. The danger of fifth-column activity or sabotage undoubtedly led the witnesses to say that immediate mili-

tary control of the situation was the most expedient thing to do. It may be seen that Argument XII is also a secondary argument or a justification of evacuation since it was used to refute any idea that the legal aspects of evacuation should be a determining factor.

A number of the arguments consisted of statements used as proof of the disloyalty of the Japanese. Arguments I, II, III, and VII were of this type and emphasized a feeling of allegiance to Japan rather than actual subversive activity in the physical or material sense. Argument I, the racial argument, included the belief that the Japanese were more loyal to Japan than to the United States because of their racial background. Arguments VI and III dealt with the cultural aspects of disloyalty, saying that either the tendency of the Japanese to cling to the customs of their mother country or their deliberate indoctrination by Japanese agents through cultural and other institutions had made them disloyal to the United States. Argument VII consisted of statements that brought out further proof of their allegiance to Japan and their sympathy with its policies. When these totals are combined, it is seen that the general question of loyalty to Japan played a greater part than is indicated when the arguments are considered separately.

Arguments IXA and IXB, while they both deal with the humanitarian aspects of evacuation, are really very different in character. Argument IXA consists of the fear that the Japanese might become the victims of vigilante action, and as such it can be interpreted as either a primary contention or argument for evacuation, or as a secondary argument used to support another one thought to be more important by the witness using it. Before the Tolan Committee all of the witnesses who used it, used it in connection with other argument. Argument IXB is very distinct from Argument IXA, since IXB

deals with treatment of the Japanese after they are evacuated. It is almost purely an administrative aspect of the evacuation problem and is essentially a justification for it.

① Chart II

In order to analyze the arguments more extensively, we broke down our classification by states and by witnesses. If the states are considered separately, it will be noted at once that ^{the number of} ~~the~~ witnesses from California far exceeded those from Oregon and Washington. Since our sample was made up of the testimonies presenting a definite point of view, we included the testimonies of 17 witnesses ⁽¹⁾ from California, 7 from Oregon, and 8 from Washington. This explains the discrepancy between the number of units of the total ⁽²⁾ arguments in the three states. Since there were more California testimonies classified than Washington or Oregon, it is more significant to discuss the arguments in terms of percentages than in terms of units.

In California, the most important arguments used were the economic argument (VIII A), the sabotage and fifth column argument, and the military ~~necessity~~ ^(XII) ⁽³⁾ argument. Of these, the economic argument was the most outstanding, and the other two were of about equal importance. As the number of witnesses in California was greater than in Washington and Oregon, we isolated the California totals and attempted to analyze the arguments further. We found that the economic argument was of such outstanding importance to the ⁽⁴⁾ testimonies of Southern California witnesses, that it is reasonable to conclude that the predominance of this argument in California is due to its emphasis by this group. As shown in the analysis of the economic argument, we found that the greatest responsibility for this argument actually lay with the Southern California government officials. ⁽⁵⁾ For Northern California witnesses, the ^{military} ~~argument of~~ ~~military necessity~~ had the greatest appeal, although it is not markedly outstanding in the totals. ⁽⁶⁾ For Washington witnesses, argument VIII A held the greatest appeal, as in California. However, as

has been pointed out, it was comparatively even more important in Washington than in California. Another difference between the relative significance of the arguments in the two states is to be seen in the fact that while the fifth-column argument is ~~the~~ second in ~~importance in both states,~~ ~~most important argument to Washington, as in California,~~ it is ~~rather than the military argument (as in California)~~ the humanitarian argument (IXA), which holds third place in Washington. Oregon witnesses, on the other hand, emphasized the danger of sabotage and fifth column activity more than anything else, and this argument constitutes a far greater share in the totals of this state than do the major arguments (VIIIA) in California and Washington. ~~The economic~~ ~~argument VIIIA~~ holds second place in Oregon testimonies, but is far less significant than ~~the fifth-column~~ ~~argument~~ in that state.

Chart XXV shows the relative importance of each argument to the totals of government officials (on federal, state, and municipal levels) and to other witnesses, whom we have loosely designated as "Professional men" or "non-government witnesses".

It is interesting to note that the major arguments of government officials hold the same relative positions as in the total arguments of California witnesses. Here, the economic argument is the most important, with the fifth-column and military ~~necessity~~ arguments constituting a large share of the totals, and the argument of deliberate indoctrination holding fourth place. ⁽⁷⁾ However, for the non-government witnesses, the largest category was the fear of sabotage and espionage, with the economic argument a close second. The appeal of ~~arguments~~ the racial argument, the intentional strategic location argument, and the military argument was approximately the same for this group, but they are far less significant than the two major arguments.

In California testimonies, the government officials used the

economic argument the most, with the military, deliberate indoc-
trination, and fifth column argument, constituting significant shares
of the totals. ⁽⁸⁾ However, the non-government witnesses in California
considered the fifth column category of prime importance. The econ-
omic argument was secondary here, with the racial and military argu-
ments also of some significance to this group. ~~*****~~

~~In~~ In analyzing the totals of government officials and profess-
ional men in Southern California, ⁽⁹⁾ we found, as has been noted, that
the economic argument was of great importance to the government
officials. It was also the major argument of the non-government
~~*****~~ witnesses in that area, but it was relatively only
about one half as important to them as it was to the other group.
Argument VIIIB, the economic argument justifying evacuation, was
almost as significant to the non-government witnesses as the main
economic argument, VIIIA.

The analysis of the arguments as used by government officials
and professional men in Oregon ⁽¹⁰⁾ shows that to the latter group the
fifth column argument was of outstanding importance. This probably
explains its predominance in the total Oregon testimonies. Other
arguments were only of minor significance to the non-government
witnesses. To the government officials, the economic argument had
the greatest appeal, although its predominance is far less than
that of the fifth column argument in the other group. The appeal
to authority argument was almost equally significant, with the
fifth column and economic justification arguments (V and VIIIB)
of slightly less importance.

~~Washington*professional*men*exhibited*a*depar~~

In Washington, the economic argument (VIIIA) was relatively
more important ~~than*it*was~~ to the non-government witnesses than

(11)

it was to the corresponding groups in the other two states. A large share of these witnesses totals also fell under the category of intentional strategic location. While the government officials of Oregon and California had argued economic stability (VIII A) more than anything else, the corresponding group in Washington have the greatest emphasis to the fear of sabotage and fifth column activity. Somewhat less important to them, while yet constituting significant shares of the totals, were the economic (VIII A) ^{and} humanitarian (IX A) arguments ~~and~~ and the argument of military necessity (XII). They also considered the racial category as of some importance.

1. Chart XVI
2. Charts III, IV, and V.
3. Chart XVII
4. Chart XIX
5. Chart XII
6. Chart XVII
7. Chart XXV
8. Chart XVIII
9. Chart XXII
10. Chart XX
11. Chart XXI

OUR TOTAL SAMPLE INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:

Bowron, Hon. Fletcher, mayor of the city of Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California - vol. 31, p. 11640

Bridges, Robert, representative, Valley Protective Association, Auburn, Washington - Vol. 30, p. 11520

Carson, Joseph K., Jr., state commander, Oregon Department of American Legion, 1010 Bedell Building, Portland, Oregon - vol. 30, p. 11325

Craig, Earl C., representing the John Dewey Forum, 214 South Hill Street, Los Angeles, California - vol. 31, p. 11811

Cunningham, Capt. W. N., Industrial Department, United States Employment Service, Los Angeles, California - Vol. 31, p. 11739

Freeman, Miller, publisher, Seattle, Washington - vol. 30, p. 11536

Fueker, Fred M., State adjutant of the American Legion, Seattle, Washington - vol. 30, p. 11434

Fouke, Robert H., attorney representing the California Joint Immigration Committee, Russ Building, San Francisco, California - vol. 29, p. 11068

Hassler, John F., city manager, Oakland, California - vol. 29, p. 11094

Hoyt, Palmer, publisher, Portland Oregonian, Portland, Oregon - vol. 30, p. 11332

Johnson, W. J., captain of police, Berkeley, California - vol. 29, p. 11108

Jones, Hon. Ronald E., State senator, Brooks, Oregon - vol. 30, p. 11312

Klahre, J. E., Hood River, Oregon - vol. 30, p. 11329

Langlie, Hon. Arthur B., Governor, State of Washington, Olympia,
Washington - vol. 30, p. 11397

Lysons, Fred H., Lawyer, Seattle, Washington - vol. 30, p. 11589

McDonough, Gordon M., supervisor, county of Los Angeles, Los
Angeles, California - vol. 31, p. 11678

Miller, Howard B., manager, agricultural department, Los Angeles
Chamber of Commerce, Los Angeles, California - vol. 31,
p. 11678

Millikin, Hon. Earl, mayor, Seattle, Washington - vol. 30, p. 11404

Olson, Hon. Culbert L., Governor of the State of California,
Sacramento, California - vol. 31, p. 11629

Riley, Hon. Earl, mayor, city of Portland, Portland, Oregon -
vol. 30, p. 11301

Rosecrans, W. S., agricultural coordinator, Los Angeles County
Defense Council, Los Angeles, California - vol. 31, p. 11678

Ryan, Harold J., commissioner of agriculture of Los Angeles
County, 524 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California -
vol. 31, p. 11671

Schwanenberg, C. R., city manager, Alameda, California - vol. 29,
p. 11107

Smith, Verne, chief of police, Alameda, California - vol. 29,
p. 11108

Spangler, J. W., vice president, Seattle First National Bank,
Seattle, Washington - vol. 30, p. 11417

Strobel, H. L., farmer, Monterey County, California - vol. 29,
p. 11087

Taylor, Robert, chairman, Oregon agricultural war board, Oregon
State College, Corvallis, Oregon - vol. 30, p. 11380

Travoli, Wendell G., representing the Tulare County Citizens
Committee, Tulare County, Orosi, California - vol. 29,
p. 11061

Troy, Smith, attorney general, State of Washington - vol. 30,
p. 11499

Underwood, Walter W., secretary, Astoria Chamber of Commerce,
Astoria, Oregon - vol. 30, p. 11316

Ward, Stuart R., 1035 Tehema Avenue, Menlo Park, California -
vol. 29, p. 11260

Warren, Earl, attorney general of the State of California, San
Francisco, California - vol. 29, p. 1097 3

WITNESS LISTED ACCORDING TO THE STATES IN WHICH THEY LIVE:

California:

Northern California:

Robert H. Fouke

W. J. Johnson

John F. Hassler

Culbert L. Olson

C. R. Schwanenberg

Verne Smith

H. L. Strobel

Stuart R. Ward

Earl Warren

Southern California:

Fletcher Bowron

Earl C. Craig

W. N. Cunningham

Gordon M. McDonough

H. B. Miller

W. S. Rosecrans

Harold J. Ryan

Wendell G. Travoli cannot be included in either Northern or Southern California, since he lives in Tulare County

Oregon:

Joseph K. Carson, Jr.

Palmer Hoyt

Ronald E. Jones

J. E. Klahre

Earl Riley

Robert Taylor

Walter W. Underwood

Washington:

Robert Bridges

Miller Freeman

Fred M. Fueker

Arthur B. Langlie

Fred H. Lysons

Earl Millikin

J. W. Spangler

Smith Troy

WITNESSES LISTED ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION:

Government OfficialsNorthern California:

Robert H. Fouke
 John F. Hassler ✓
 W. J. Johnson
 Culbert L. Olson *h*
 C. R. Schwanenberg
 Verne Smith
 Earl Warren *h*

Southern California:

W. S. Rosecrans
 H. F. Ryan
 W. H. Cunningham
 Fletcher Bowron
 Gordon M. McDonough

Interior of California:Oregon:

Ronald E. Jones
 Earl Riley
 Robert Taylor

Washington:

Arthur B. Langlie
 Earl Millikin
 Smith Troy

Non-Government Witnesses

H. L. Strobel
 Stuart R. Ward

H. B. Miller
 Earl C. Craig

Wendell G. Travoli

Joseph K. Carson

Palmer Hoyt

J. E. Klahre

Walter W. Underwood

Robert Bridges
 Miller Freeman

Fred M. Fueker

Fred H. Lysons

J. W. Spangler

$\frac{154}{904} = \frac{18}{1000}$ $\frac{1000}{1000}$ $\frac{1000}{1000}$

connected

87

TOTAL NUMBER OF UNITS USED IN EACH ARGUMENT -

✓ CHART I.

TOTAL: 1750.43

I -	120.99	VIII B	41.66
II	46.83	IX A	87.33 93.33
III	129.33 139.33	IX B	97.99
IV A	132.16	X	3.0
IV B	5.0	XI	16.5
V	338.82 341.82	XII	198.16 ✓
VII	86.83	XIII A	40.0 25.5
VII A	26.0 27.5	XIII B	10.0 ✓
VIII A	371.33 399.33		
	386.33		
	399.33		

ARGUMENTS AS PER CENT OF TOTAL -

✓ CHART II

I	6.91 %	VIII B	2.38 %
II	2.67 %	IX A	4.99 % 5.33 ✓
III	7.39 % 7.96	IX B	5.60 %
IV A	7.55 %	X	.27 %
IV B	.29 %	XI	.94 %
V	19.50 % 19.52	XII	11.32 %
VII	4.96 %	XIII A	2.31 % 1.44
VII A	4.49 % 1.57	XIII B	.57 %
VIII A	21.21 %		
	22.81 ✓		

496
117
6.33

NUMBER OF UNITS OF EACH ARGUMENT IN EACH STATE -

ARGUMENTS -	✓ CHART III CALIFORNIA -	✓ CHART IV OREGON -	✓ CHART V WASHINGTON -
I	60.83	14.83	45.33
✓ II	43.33	2.0	1.5
✓ III	114.00	—	25.33
IV A	77.83	—	54.33
IV B	—	1.0	4.0
✓ V	168.66	78.33	94.83
VII	65.00	7.0	14.83
✓ VII A	26.50	—	1.0
✓ VII B	222.33 235.33	244.5 37.5	126.5
VIII B	24.66	17.0	—
IX A	17.83	14.0	61.5 61.5
✓ IX B	87.83 ✓	3.83	6.33
X	2.00	1.0	—
XI	14.00	.50	2.0
XII	153.66	12.50	32.0
XIII	—	—	—
XIV	—	—	—
TOTAL IN EACH STATE -	1091.46	189.49	469.48

1091.46
- 189.49

875
+ 1500.43

2375.89
- 189.49

2186.40

11.87
79.

190.79

11.82
225

1310

9.53
179

11.32

9.53
92

10.45


$$\begin{array}{r} +2 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} +1 \\ \hline \end{array} 0$$

$$\begin{array}{r} -1 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} -2 \\ \hline \end{array}$$


CHART III - Number of units of each argument used in California



TOTAL: 1091.46

CHART IV -


Number of units of each argument used in Oregon



Total: 204.49

CHART V - Number of units of each argument used in Washington

ASSOCIATED STUDENTS' STORE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA



Total: 469.48

93
I.

CHART II - Arguments as per cent. of total.






CHART I - Total Number of Units Used in Each Argument-



Each argument used in California as percent of total California arguments


94 VI.

CHART VI.



Arguments Used in Oregon as percent. of total Oregon Arguments

CHART VII




conceded

Percentages:

7.83 1.06 0.0 0.0 .53 41.34 3.69 0.0 11.87 8.97 7.39 2.02 .53 .26 6.59 7.92 0.0

Arguments used in Washington as percent. of total Washington arguments-
 CHART VIII.




✓ CHART IX (REFER TO CHART I.)

PERCENTAGE OF EACH TOTAL ARGUMENT USED BY EACH STATE

	CALIFORNIA	OREGON	WASHINGTON
I	50.28%	12.26%	37.46%
II	92.36%	4.36%	3.27%
III	80.4%	-	19.59%
IV A	58.89%	-	41.10%
IV B	-	20.9%	80.9%
V	48.89%	23.12%	27.99%
VII	74.86%	8.06%	17.08%
VII A	96.15%	-	3.85%
VIII A	59.87%	6.06%	34.07%
VIII B	59.19%	40.81%	-
IX A	20.42%	16.03%	63.55%
IX B	89.63%	3.91%	6.46%
X	66.66%	33.33%	-
XI	84.85%	3.03%	12.12%
XII	44.43%	6.34%	16.23%
XIII A	48.15%	37.04%	14.81%
XIII B	100%	-	-

CHART IX - Percent. of each total argument used by each state.



Percentages. - CHART IX.

For relative amount of each argument presented by each state, see CHART I.

- 99
- ✓ CHART X - No. & So. California total arguments compared.
 - ✓ CHART XI - Total Arguments of California Gov't. Officials and Professional Men.
 - ✓ CHART XII - Total Arguments of Northern and Southern California Gov't Officials and Professional Men, and W. Travoli.

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ARGUMENTS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO WHO TESTIFIED

	(7) NORTHERN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	(2) NORTHERN CALIFORNIA PROFESSIONAL MEN	(5) SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	(2) SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PROFESSIONAL MEN
I	21.00	36.83	3.0	-
II	35.00	4.33	-	-
III	102.5	1.5	-	-
IV A	67.83	-	-	-
IV B	-	-	-	-
V	71.83	22.83	21.0	-
VII	42.5	11.0	8.0	3.5
VII A	20.0	5.0	-	-
VIII A	25.0	29.33	140.0	12.0
VIII B	5.0	4.33	3.0	11.33
IX A	17.0	.33	.5	-
IX B	34.5	18.0	30.0	3.33
X	2.0	-	-	-
XI	11.0	-	3.0	-
XII	102.83	42.5	3.5	3.83
XIII A	18.5	-	-	1.0
XIII B	-	10.0	-	-
TOTALS:	576.49	188.98	212.00	34.99

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA: TOTAL ARGUMENTS: 765.47

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: TOTAL ARGUMENTS: 246.99

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS: TOTAL
ARGUMENTS: 788.49

CALIFORNIA PROFESSIONAL MEN: TOTAL
ARGUMENTS: 223.97

(W. Travoli, Tulare County Citizens Committee:)

IX A - 10

II - 50

$223.97 + 79 = \underline{302.97}$

XIII A - 16

XIII B - 1

IX B - 2

79

CHART X - Totals at Northern and Southern California Arguments -
(Traveli omitted.)

Region: Northern California - 765.47
(9 testified) — Southern California - 246.99 —
(7 testified) —

Total Arguments: 1011

Key: — (teal line) —
— (pink line) —




CHART XI - Total Arguments of California Gov't Officials and Professional Men.
(Travel included)





CHART XII - Total Arguments at Northern + Southern California Govt Officials and Professional Men -
W. Travoli included (Professional - Tulare County.)

Northern California: Govt Officials (1) - —
Professional men (2) - —
Southern California: Govt Officials - (5) - —
Professional Men (2) - —
Wendell Travoli - —



For Totals, see reference sheet.


✓ CHART XIII.

UNITS OF EACH ARGUMENT USED BY CALIFORNIA
LOCAL AND STATE OFFICIALS

	(8) CALIFORNIA CITY AND COUNTY OFFICIALS	(3) CALIFORNIA STATE OFFICIALS
I	13.5	10.5
II	-	35.0
III	-	102.5
IV A	-	67.83
IV B	-	-
V	50.5	42.33
VI	12.0	38.5
VII A	14.5	5.5
VIII A	100.0	25.0
VIII B	3.0	5.0
IX A	.5	17.0
IX B	31.0	33.5
X	-	2.0
XI	4.5	9.5
XII	19.5	86.83
XIII A	-	18.5
XIII B	-	-
TOTALS:	249.0	499.49

CHART XIII - Units of each argument used by California local and state officials

	Totals	Key
City and County (Local) Officials (8)	249	—
State Officials	(13) 499.49	—




✓ CHART XIV -

OREGON TOTAL ARGUMENTS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO WHO TESTIFIED

	OREGON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	OREGON PROFESSIONAL MEN
I	7.33	7.5
II	2.0	
III		
IV A		
IV B		1.0
V	12.83	65.5
VII	7.0	
VII A		
VIII A	15.5	7.0
VIII B	12.0	5.0
IX A	2.5	11.5
IX B	.83	3.0
X		1.0
XI		.5
XII	3.5	9.0
XIII A	15.0	-
XIII B		-
TOTALS:	78.49	111.00

(Total Orig. Arguments = 189.49)

CHART XIV - Total Arguments of Oregon Government Officials and Professional Men.



✓ CHART XV:

WASHINGTON TOTAL ARGUMENTS CLASSIFIED
ACCORDING TO WHO TESTIFIED

	WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	WASHINGTON PROFESSIONAL MEN
--	------------------------------------	--------------------------------

I

22.5

22.83

II

1.5

III

25.33

IV A

54.33

IV B

4.0

V

60.5

34.33

VI

14.83

VII A

1.0

VIII A

37.0

89.5

VIII B

-

IX A

35.5

20.0

IX B

5.5

.83

X

2.3

XI

2.0

XII

30.0

2.0

XIII A

6.0

XIII B

TOTALS:

201.0

268.48


Total Wash. Arguments = 469.48

CHART XV. Total Arguments of Washington Government Officials and Professional Men.

Totals: Key:

Govt Officials (3) - 201.0

Prof. men (5) - 268.48



✓ CHART XVI:

TOTAL NUMBER OF MEN USING EACH ARGUMENT.

I. - 17

II. - 5

III. - 6

IVA. - 3

IVB. - 2

V. - 24

VII. - 8

VIIA. - 5

VIII A. - 20

VIII B. - 9

IX A. - 13

IX B. - 18

X. - 3

XI. - 7

XII. - 16


XIII A. - 6

XIII B. - 1

TOTAL : 163.0

32 MEN TESTIFIED.

CHART XVI: Total number of men using each argument.
32 men testified - using the 17 arguments 163 Times.




✓ CHART XVII:

EACH ARGUMENT AS PERCENT OF TOTAL ARGUMENTS
IN EACH STATE -

	✓ CHART VI CALIFORNIA -	✓ CHART VII OREGON -	✓ CHART VIII WASHINGTON -
ARGUMENTS-			
I	5.57%	7.83%	9.66% ✓
II	3.96%	1.06%	.32%
Subst III	4.53% 10.44	—	5.40%
IV A	7.13%	—	11.57% ✓
IV B	—	.53%	.85%
V	15.45%	41.34%	20.20%
VII	5.96%	3.69%	3.16%
VII A	2.29% 2.43	—	.21%
VIII A	20.37% 21.56	19.79 11.87%	26.94%
VIII B	2.26% 23.82	8.97% 28.76	—
IX A	1.63%	7.39%	13.10% ✓
IX B	8.05%	2.02%	1.35%
X	.18%	.53%	—
XI	1.28%	.26%	.43%
XII	13.99% 14.08	6.59% ✓	6.82%
XIII A	1.79% ✓	7.92%	1.28% ✓
XIII B	4.2%	—	—

85.28

CHART XVII: Each argument as Percent. of total Arguments in Each State.
See Charts VI, VII, VIII.




For exact percentage Totals, see reference sheet.

✓ CHART XVIII:

PERCENTAGES OF EACH ARGUMENT USED BY GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND BY PROFESSIONAL MEN IN CALIFORNIA
(Travel included)

	GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	PROFESSIONAL MEN
I	3.04%	12.16%
II	4.44%	2.42%
III	12.99%	.49%
IV A	8.60%	3.30%
IV B	—	—
V	11.77%	24.04%
VII	6.40%	4.79%
VII A	2.54%	1.65%
VII B	20.93%	18.92%
VIII B	1.01%	5.50%
IX A	2.22%	.11%
IX B	8.18%	7.70%
X	.25%	—
XI	1.78%	—
XII	13.49%	15.29%
XIII A	2.35%	.33%
XIII B	—	3.30%
TOTAL ARGUMENTS:	788.49	302.97

CHART XVIII: Each argument as Percentage of total Arguments of California Government Officials and Professional men respectively.



✓ CHART XIX:

PERCENTAGE OF NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
ARGUMENTS USED BY NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA WITNESSES.

	NORTHERN CALIFORNIA No			SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA No		
I	7.55%	49.33	16.20	1.21% 1.22%	3	
II						
III	5.53%	28.33	9.30	—		
IV	13.59%	9.50	3.12	—		
IVA	8.86%			—		
IVB	—			—		
V	12.37%	53.33	17.52	8.50%	21.00	
VII	6.99%	30.50	10.02	4.66%	11.5	
VIIA	3.27%			—		
VIII	7.10%	46.66	15.32	61.54%	166.33	
VIIIB	1.22%			5.80%		
IXA	2.26%	1.33	1.10	.20%	15	
IXB	6.86%	16.00	5.25	13.49%	33.33	
X	.26%			—		
XI	1.44%	2.50	.82	1.22%	3.00	
XII	18.99%	68.00	22.33	2.97%	8.33	
XIIA	2.42%	304.48		.40%	246.99	
XIIIB	1.31%	99.98		—		

CHART XIX: Arguments of Northern and Southern California Witnesses as Percent. of Total Northern and Southern California arguments.





CHART XX:

PERCENTAGE OF EACH ARGUMENT USED BY
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND BY PROFESSIONAL
MEN IN OREGON.

	GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	PROFESSIONAL MEN
I	9.34%	6.76%
II	2.55%	—
III	—	—
IV A	—	—
IV B	—	.90%
V	16.35%	59.01%
VII	8.92%	—
VII A	—	—
VIII A	19.75%	6.31%
VIII B	15.29%	4.50%
IX A	3.19%	10.36%
IX B	1.06%	2.70%
X	—	.90%
XI	—	.45%
XII	4.46%	8.11%
XIII A	19.11%	—
XIII B	—	—
TOTAL UNITS USED BY:	78.49	111.0

CHART IX: Each argument as Percentage of total arguments of Oregon Government Officials and Professional Men



✓ CHART XXI:

PERCENTAGE OF EACH ARGUMENT USED BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN IN WASHINGTON.

	GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	PROFESSIONAL MEN
I	11.19%	8.50%
II	—	.56%
III	—	9.43%
IV A	—	20.24%
IV B	1.99%	—
V	30.10%	12.49%
VII	—	5.52%
VII A	—	.37%
VII A	18.41%	33.34%
VII B	—	—
IX A	17.66%	7.45%
IX B	2.74%	.31%
X	—	—
XI	—	.75%
XII	14.93%	.75%
XIII A	2.99%	—
XIII B	—	—
Total Arguments:	201.0	268.48

CHART XXI: Each argument as percent of total arguments of Washington Gov't Officials and Professional men.




CHART XXII.

ARGUMENTS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN AS PERCENT. OF THEIR
TOTAL ARGUMENTS, RESPECTIVELY.

	GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (5)	PROFESSIONAL MEN (2)
I.	1.42%	—
II.	—	—
III.	—	—
IV A.	—	—
IV B.	—	—
V.	9.91%	—
VII.	3.77%	3.50%
VII A.	—	—
VIII A.	66.04%	34.30%
VIII B.	1.42%	32.38%
IX A.	.24%	—
IX B.	14.15%	9.52%
X.	—	—
XI.	1.42%	—
XII.	1.65%	10.95%
XIII A.	—	2.86%
XIII B.	—	—

CHART XXII - Arguments of Southern California Government Officials and Professional men as percent of their total arguments, respectively.




TABLE XXII

PERCENT OF EACH TOTAL CALIFORNIA ARGUMENT CONTRIBUTED
By RESIDENTS OF NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA.

(Only most significant arguments included)

	Northern California Government Officials	Northern California Professional Men	Southern California Government Officials	Southern California Professional Men	W. Trudetti
(222.33) I	34.52%	60.55%	4.93%	-	-
II	82.68%	17.32%	-	-	-
(104.0) III	98.56%	1.44%	-	-	-
IV A	87.15%	-	-	-	12.85%
V	43.36%	13.78%	12.68%	-	30.18%
VII A	80%	20%	-	-	-
VIII A	11.24%	13.19%	62.97%	5.40%	7.20%
IX A					
(152.66) XII	67.36%	27.84%	2.29%	2.51%	-

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:

1. FOLKE - CHAIR. JOINT IMMIGRATION COMMITTEE
2. V. SMITH - ALAMEDA COUNTY CHIEF OF POLICE
3. ~~C. OLSON - GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA~~
4. J. H. HASSLER - OAKLAND CITY MANAGER
5. C. R. SCHWANNENBERG - ALAMEDA CITY MANAGER
6. W. J. JOHNSON - BERKELEY CAPTAIN OF POLICE
7. F. WHIRREN - ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA PROFESSIONAL MEN:

1. S. WARD - COMMONWEALTH CLUB
2. H. STROBEL - FARMER, MONTEREY COUNTY

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:

1. W. S. ROSECRANS - L.A. COUNTY DEFENSE COUNCIL
2. H. J. RYAN - COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE, L.A. COUNTY
3. W. H. CUNNINGHAM - U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERVICE
4. BOWRON - MAYOR OF L.A.
5. G. Mc DONOUGH - SUPERVISOR, COUNTY OF L.A.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PROFESSIONAL MEN:

1. H. B. MILLER - L.A. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
2. F. C. PRAIG - JOHN DEWEY FORUM, L.A.


WENDELL TRAVOLI - TULARE COUNTY CITIZEN'S COMMITTEE

TABLE XXIV.

CONTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS + NON-
GOV'T OFFICIALS TO EACH ARGUMENT.

	West Coast Gov't Officials	West Coast non- Gov't - Officials
I	44.49%	55.51%
II	80.73%	19.27%
III	79.25%	20.75%
IV A	51.32%	48.68%
IV B	80.0%	20.0%
V	49.04%	50.96%
VII	66.22%	33.78%
VII A	76.92%	23.08%
VIII A	58.57%	41.43%
VIII B	48.01%	51.99%
IX A	63.67%	36.33%
IX B	72.28%	27.72%
X	66.67%	33.33%
XI	84.85%	15.15%
XII	70.92%	29.08%
XIII A	98.75%	1.25%
XIII B	0.0%	100%

CHART XXIV. Contribution of Government Officials and Non-Government Witnesses to each argument.



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XXIV

TABLE XXV

ARGUMENTS AS PERCENT. OF TOTAL ARGUMENTS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OTHERS, RESPECTIVELY.

	<u>Gov't OFFICIALS</u>	<u>OTHERS</u>
<u>I</u>	5.04%	9.84%
<u>II</u>	3.47%	1.29%
<u>III</u>	9.59%	3.93%
<u>IV A</u>	6.35%	9.43%
<u>IV B</u>	.37%	.16%
<u>V</u>	15.57%	25.30%
<u>VII</u>	5.38%	4.30%
<u>VII A</u>	1.87%	.88%
<u>VII A</u>	20.37%	22.54%
<u>VIII B</u>	1.87%	3.17%
<u>IX A</u>	5.19%	4.66%
<u>IX B</u>	6.63%	3.98%
<u>X</u>	.19%	.15%
<u>XI</u>	1.31%	.37%
<u>XII</u>	13.09%	8.41%
<u>XIII A</u>	3.70%	.18%
<u>XIII B</u>	0.0%	1.47%

CHART XXV. Each argument as percent. of Total arguments of Government Officials and Other Witnesses, respectively.

