

T a n a k a

Manzanar (8) Addenda 1/27/43

QUESTIONS (Grodzins Letter 1/21/43)

Japanese Relocation Papers
Bancroft Library

1. Page 3: T h e n e w s p a p e r D o h o

"Doho" was published in Los Angeles by a U.S.-born, Japan-educated, anti-fascist editor, Shuji Fujii. Tabloid format, with mastheads in both English and Japanese, "Doho" came out in four, six, and occasionally eight-page copies, although at times it appeared with two pages. Normally it "published every Friday". When its finances were admittedly lean, it "published Tri-Monthly." In its earlier days, it came out monthly.

(Exactly when it was born, I do not know; however it came into prominence of a dubious nature among the Japanese of Southern California in '38 and '39, as I recall, in connection with labor union strikes among Mexican field workers on Japanese farms, later in the organizing of an A.F. of L. union at the Los Angeles downtown wholesale terminals, and still later in an apparently unsuccessful attempt to unionize Japanese restaurant and cafe workers).

Its "staff": Throughout its history, "Doho" appears to have been largely a one-man affair. Shuji Fujii was its publisher, editor, reporter, typesetter, composer, circulation manager, booster & promoter. When Fujii married Miss Kikue Ukai, a talented writer of Northern California, his wife became a member of the "staff", writing stories, captions, headlines, even doing the make-up. Fujii had several correspondents in Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle, notably individuals (Japanese)

active in labor union activity. Karl Yoneda, C.I.O. longshoreman of San Francisco (whose name figures in the Manzanar pre-riot developments) was the Bay City correspondent for "Doho" and an occasional contributor of signed articles. James Oda, a fruit stand clerk in Los Angeles, a Kibei, and known best among the Japanese in Southern California as a labor union "agitator" and therefore an "aka" (note: the quotes) was another supporter of "Doho" and writer of articles. (Oda's name also figures in Manzanar pre-riot developments; he was on the Japanese section of the Free Press, is now, like Yoneda, a soldier in the U.S. Army, in training at Camp Savage, Minnesota.) Another close follower of Fujii who appears to have served in the role of the editor's man Friday was a kibei of Los Angeles, George Ban, allegedly the blacksheep son of a travelling Christian minister, so the word went in the Japanese community. In this connection, it might be recorded that when editor Fujii was taken into temporary custody by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on December 8, 1941 (the day after Pearl Harbor), he was accompanied into the tank of Lincoln Heights jail by George Ban.

"Doho's Policies": The newspaper's English masthead carried the banner-- "D O H O --For Equality, Peace and Progress"-- and in the "ears"--"Only Nisei Vernacular in the U.S." and "A Paper with Progressive Principles". In local issues, "Doho" was primarily what may accurately be described as pro-labor union. To understand the significance of this position, one has to take into account the traditional paternalism and anti-organized-labor attitude generally existing among the older Japanese who comprised the employer class.

"Doho" in this respect was more than a newspaper. It was the personal organ of Shuji Fujii, used as an instrument to further his labor organizing campaigns. Whole issues, for instance, would be devoted to attacking wages, hours and working conditions in the Three Star Produce Company, a chain of some 45 retail fruit and vegetable stores headquartered in Los Angeles and employing some 300 ^{Japanese} workers. In 1938 (the records will have to be checked for the exact year), when the employees of the three downtown Los Angeles wholesale markets (7th Street, 8th Street, 9th Street Terminals) were organized by the American Federation of Labor, Shuji Fujii and "Doho" were conspicuous by their constant presence. Fujii occupied a publicity post in the early union which was formed; but within a few months he had been ousted. In his wake, in every part of the wholesale terminal went the charge, "Oh, he's just a Communist!" This sentiment seems to have been echoed by employers who had centered a considerable degree of their resentment over the turn of affairs on personalities as well as by fellow union organizers who had successfully nosed Fujii out of coveted positions of control in the new set-up.

There followed in "Doho" a series of articles and editorials attacking A.F.L. local 630, Produce Drivers and Employees' Union. The attacks were largely personal in nature or of the type exposing what editor S Fujii considered incompetency in office or mismanagement of union affairs; there never was any attack against unionism per se. For instance, in the September 1, 1941 edition, the following excerpt:

"...Conflicts and antagonisms between the two union (A.F.L. 630) officials

have been in the offing for some time, according to a nisei informant. It was brought to a head when Owen (Lee Owen, president of the union) allegedly asked for a raise of salary to \$125 a week (yes, \$125 a week) and suggested an increase of monthly dues from the present \$2 to \$2.50. Lopez objected; the matter was dropped..."

While there was seldom a favorable word for A.F.L. 630, other union groups among the Japanese received lengthy and more encouraging coverage. In the same edition of "Doho":

"According to officials of the newly organized Oriental Restaurant Employees Association of Los Angeles, the membership drive is making excellent headway.

"Since the union declared that until a membership of 200 is obtained, negotiations for a contract will not be started, the representative stated that 'those who are sitting on the fence are now joining.'

"Until lately many of the workers held the opportunistic view that they would join as soon as negotiations started. They wanted the benefits of the union contract without signing up at the start, fearing that the union would be in no position to negotiate without a substantial membership behind it. The union needs all support, both material and moral, and should get it.

"Officials pointed out that three years ago Fred Tayama, owner of the U.S. Cafes, 'recognized' the union, displayed the union house card, but stalled a year.

"When Local 646, Oriental local of the culinary workers union, pressed him for a showdown by putting a picket line around his cafes, Tayama started litigation against the union. He went so far as to threaten a picket with physical harm, and eventually succeeded in breaking up the local.

"Experiences like this show that even if a contract is signed, it will be a

mere piece of paper--meaningless and worthless--without a union backed by a majority of employees men and women who have the faith and vision to stick.

"We can talk turkey to employers only when we have that majority signed up; we estimate that number to be 200.

"Therefore', he concluded 'our goal is a membership of 200. This is the surest way to victory."

In the October 5, 1941, edition, there is reference to another union which commanded considerable space coverage in the publication:

"Local 770 in big drive; 1510 warned

"Local 770, Retail Food Clerks, AFL, has won since April, an annual increased income of \$600,000 and the 8-hour day for its 5000 members.

"The local, backed by a \$30,000 kitty for organizational purposes, has set the goal for 10,000 members.

"At its last meeting, a member is said to have queried, "What will be done about the Japanese markets if such a contract is signed?"

"One of the Local's officers, according to our informant, replied, "At present all the Japanese stores are in the AFL local. But if the Japanese employers should gain control of this Local 1510 and chisel on their contract, then we'll see about taking over the Japanese local."

"Such an opinion on the part of a dual AFL local is considered highly significant in view of

certain opinions expressed by
Japanese fruitstand employees
favoring a merging of Local
770 and Local 1510."

"Doho's" policies on the international front were anti-fascist, anti-militarist Japan, and some charged, pro-Russian Communist. The latter description is debatable, the former two are not. From the outset of his publication, Fujii denounced, criticized, exposed to ridicule and abhorrence what he described as "ruthless Japanese militarist aggression," and the "exploitation of the Japanese masses." He condemned Japan's invasion of North China and the subsequent China campaign; he wrote editorials and articles on the conditions of poverty-stricken Japanese farmers.

(These policies were in strange contrast to the established daily Japanese language newspapers in Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle. They were in marked contrast with the thinking generally of the Japanese ^{- speaking} population. *note: Maton - This statement needs to be amplified, it will be in later paper on vernacular ~~new~~ newspapers, T.T.)*

"Doho" was labelled a "misfit" or dismissed with the comment, "Aka" (Red).

Shuji Fujii, to the writer's personal knowledge, never made Communism a public issue in his publication; he neither denied nor affirmed that he was a Communist. In 1939, when the writer put the question to editor Fujii, the reply was: "I do not at present belong to the Young Communist League." He did not say he ever had or had never belonged, but indicated he was not interested in discussing such matters.

"Doho", however, did pack all its weight into walloping

personalities among the Japanese community who, to editor Fujii's way of thinking, represented either (1) labor-exploiting greedy capitalists or (2) fascist Japanese militarism. Two typical examples:

In the June 1, 1941 edition, under the column heading, "A Nisei Speaks--By Shuji Fujii", the following:

"Not only Nazi but Japanese 'fifth columnists also are being hunted down by the U.S. government, or so it appears.

G- MAN HUNTS KANCHI

"Shunsei Kanchi (alias Toshi Miyajima), fascist-minded, Hitler-admiring former reporter on San Francisco's 'Japanese-American' daily, is being sought, it is reported lately, by G-men. There is a possibility that he may be organizing a Japanese-American branch of Col. Kingoro Hashimoto's Youth Party of Japan.

"A government official visited 'swanky' Miyako hotel, in the heart of Li'l Tokyo, where Kanchi allegedly resides.

"The government man asked for Kanchi's whereabouts, and searched all over, high and low, all in vain!

"Later, Kanchi was advised by a certain elderly downtown business man that it would be wiser to surrender himself to the Immigration Office. His employment as a reporter was, it seems, a violation of the immigration laws, since he entered the United States as a 'student.'

"At the local Immigration Office, so the story goes, he was told that there was no knowledge of his being sought by that agency.

"Bewildered, now Kanchi cannot but conclude that since it's clearly not the Immigration people, it must be the FBI.

"LETTER TO FRIDAY

May 29, 1941

"Mr. Dan Gillmor, Pres.
Friday, Inc.
114 E. 32nd Street

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New York City, N.Y.
My dear Mr. Gillmor:

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"My. John Spivak's articles on the two recent issues of your magazine 'Friday' interested me very much inasmuch as they disclosed certain activities among Japanese espionage agents in the U.S.

"I for one am in favor of rooting them out immediately, as their workings are inimical, not only to America, but to the majority of the Japanese people in this country.

"The mere presence of this handful of agents constantly menaces the welfare of 99% who are hard-working, law-abiding, innocent people.

"Under the present-day war hysteria, that threatens to throw American democracy overboard, I believe it urgent on one hand to root out fascist agents and followers, and on the other to advance democracy.

"Therefore I think it would be most fitting for your magazine to avoid a one-sided presentation of Japanese problems, and that in the near future you will ~~avoid~~ publish some facts about the contribution made by the Japanese to American industries, agriculture, and to democracy in general.

"I am sure that a fairer presentation and treatment of Japanese problems in America will promote greater understanding and aid in ~~discarding~~ future suspicion of us.

"Yours very truly
Shuji Fujii, Editor."

Despite similarity in names, Shuji Fujii, publisher and editor of "Doho", and Sei Fujii, publisher and editor of the Japan-California Daily News, were bitter personal and professional enemies. Sei Fujii, a former legal interpreter and business investor who in the early thirties/founded his Japan-California Daily News, employed
(1931--I believe)

a staff of approximately 35 persons, published a full sized 8-page daily, operated (he said privately) on a budget of between \$6000 and \$7000 a month. Shuji Fujii's publication enterprise figured around \$100 a month, it was estimated. Sei Fujii held Shuji Fujii in proportionate disregard. Nevertheless, the "feud" between ~~mierespeie-~~ microscopic "Doho" and the Japan-California Daily, 2nd largest Japanese language paper in Southern California, was noteworthy. For instance, in the December 26, 1941 edition of "Doho"--under the heading:

"DOHO CHALLENGES YOU? MR. SEI FUJII :

"Mr. Sei 'Double-faced' (self-styled Uncle) Fujii's Japan California daily (Kashu Mainichi familiarly known as the Kamai) is out again after its temporary blackout of the past two weeks.

"This first full-sized issue on re-appearance contained neither editorial nor public recognition of its misleadership and misguidance of Japanese communities in the past. The Kamai, from first to last was a consistent supporter of the pro-military, pro-fascist cliques of Japan. As such, a great deal of the grief and sorrow and confusion now rife among resident Japanese can be laid to its doors.

SEI FUJII THE BRAZEN

"It is as clear as daylight, as plain as the tip of your nose, that the shameless, brazen Kamai is trying to ignore all of the evil it broadcast in pre-war days.

"Is it not about time that all loyal American Japanese took stock of the situation and severed any and all relations with such a double-dealing, two-faced publication as the Kamai?

"Can any loyal American-Japanese rightly continue to support or work for a publication that carried such policies as Sei Fujii's Kamai advocated? Particularly in view of the fact that he has never openly taken cognizance

of his misleadership and so far has not come out openly for America and denounced Japan's treacherous attack upon our United States?

BOYCOTT THE KAMAI

"All financial support--subscriptions, advertisements and contributions--should be immediately withdrawn and a general boycott of the Kamai should be launched. It should be done now, at once.... if only for the sake of demonstrating our loyalty to the United States.

" KAMAI BASELY LIBELS DOHO

"A few days before the war, the Kamai carried a base, vile and utterly unfounded article calling DOHO a 'blackmailer', and 'Informer'.

"Since that time DOHO learns that many Kamai readers have accepted these vicious lies at face value.

PUT UP OR SHUT UP MR SEI FUJII!

"DOHO demands that Mr. Sei Fujii and the Kamai produce definite proof and evidence that DOHO did blackmail innocent and loyal American Japanese! . . . that DOHO blackmailed anyone! or in any way acted as an 'informer'! Mr. Sei Fujii and the Kamai bring forth their proofs.

DOHO CHALLENGES YOU, MR. SEI FUJII!

"DOHO hereby challenges Mr. Fujii or his representatives to publicly debate this issue and is more than willing to let the Japanese public judge from the real facts whether DOHO or Mr. Sei Fujii is right! DOHO has never made charges wildly drawn from the air, but has consistently given dates and sources. Let Mr. Sei Fujii and his Kamai meet us in open debate!"

A post script to the Shuji Fujii vs. Sei Fujii feud might be written to include the statement that an American citizen the former/is currently with the Office of War Information in New York City, the latter, an alien enemy, is in detention

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in a federal internment camp.

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Doho's circulation: Like its publication date, finances, and temperature, Doho's circulation fluctuated & varied. Editor Fujii at one time claimed "1000 readers" but it was never made clear whether that included families of subscribers or the total number of subscribers. At its peak, the publication probably had less than 1000 subscribers. Doho's finances were admittedly dependent upon: (1) subscriptions (2) "Oriental Night" programs where money was raised through dancing, entertainment, booths, etc (3) occasional picnics or beach parties or weenie bakes (4) donations from friends and synpathizers. A story once went the round that the Communist Party was underwriting the paper, but this rumor was never confirmed.

--More to Kum---

T a n a k a
Manzanar (19) Addenda 1/30/43

QUESTIONS (Grodzins letter 1/21/43)

2. Page 32 - Manzanar Citizens Federation

The Manzanar Citizens Federation lived briefly through August, September; ailing in October, it died fitfully in November, deserted, unmourned, forgotten. Any hope held by some of its die-hard supporters for a re-birth within the Center was undoubtedly stamped out and crushed in the December 6 riot.

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As a planned effort on the part of individuals associated with Groups 1 and 2 (page 120) to get together, burying old hatchets, "and work for the common cause of Americanism" as one of the organizers stated its aims, the Citizens Federation's first meeting probably represented the high-water mark of cooperative effort by these factions.

The idea for the Citizens Federation in Manzanar evidently had been brewing in the minds of J.A.C.L. leaders from the outset of the Center. Fred Tayama, serving as chairman of informal weekly meetings of J.A.C.L. members and supporters in the early days after evacuation, frequently brought the subject up for discussion. The question: "Should we begin to organize now?" was invariably answered with: "Not yet, let's wait a little longer until community sentiment is a little more favorable."

By late July, it was felt by these J.A.C.L. ers that further delay should not be permitted, "let's get organized." Ostensible support of the Free Press was secured. Planning for the body was carried on at a series of half a dozen meetings in which the principal participants were as follows: Fred Tayama, Karl Yoneda,

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Joe Masaoka, Koji Ariyoshi, Togo Tanaka, Martin Tanaka (not related), Henry Fukuhara, Tom Imai, John Aono, Clarence Morimoto, James Oda, Hiroshi Neeno, Tad Uyeno.

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At these planning meetings, several decisions were reached: (1) Membership in the Citizens Federation, like the J.A.C.L., would be limited to American citizens (2) the name of the organization was decided on as "Manzanar Citizens Federation" because the "J.A.C.L. name invited too much criticism". In reality this was more a concession to Group 2 which controlled the Free Press. (3) the program of the Manzanar Citizens Federation was to further the welfare of United States citizen, primarily by placing all such persons in war effort, either through outside relocation, recruiting of Nisei young men into the U.S. Army, or through establishment of defense industries within Manzanar.

The first meeting of the Citizens Federation, held in mess hall 15, and open to the public, was attended by an overflow audience. Chairman of the meeting was Koji Ariyoshi, secretary was Joe Masaoka. Fred Tayama, who had presided at the planning meetings, volunteered to "stay in the background because my presence up front will probably hurt the movement." This fact, however, was publicly disclosed at the first meeting when secretary Joe Masaoka, read the minutes of that ~~meet~~ planning meeting, disclosing all the preliminary discussions which had taken place. Outspoken critic and personal enemy of Tayama, Joseph Y. Kurihara, stood up at the meeting and made the statement: "I move that Mr. Fred Tayama be made ineligible to hold any office in this new organization." This was the first of a series of public

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attacks against Tayama in connection with the Manzanar Citizens Federation.

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Speakers, and therefore (in the Manzanar public mind), responsible heads and instigators of the movement, were: Koji Ariyoshi, chairman; Hiroshi Neeno, "What the Citizens Federation Can do for improving labor conditions"; Joe Masaoka, "Training Nisei Youth for Leadership through the Manzanar Citizens Federation"; Karl Yoneda, "Our Part in the War Effort", and Togo Tanaka, "Post-War Aims".

The meeting was a milestone in that from it dates the above-surface appearance of the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group (Group 3). (Unfortunately, my files are packed and I have no record of the exact date of this meeting; it seems to me that it was in mid-August. More on this later.--TT)

Following the speakers, an open forum was held. The audience was invited to ask questions of the Chairman. Most frequent forum participant was Joseph Y. Kurihara; second most frequent forum participant was Tokutaro Nishimura Slocum. Their exchange of statements was heated, vociferous, sarcastic; for a while, it appeared as if the meeting had resolved into a debate and name-calling session between these two individuals. From notes taken during that evening, the following "conversations" ensued:

Kurihara--"Mr. Chairman, I move that the proposed constitution for the Manzanar Citizens Federation be changed; after all we're all of us in the same boat, makes no difference whether you are citizens and some Issei are not. The fact is, we are all Japanese. I am proud that I am 100% per cent Japanese. The blood of Japanese Yamato Damashii is in my veins, and I am very

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proud of it, I want you to know. We should not be in here discriminating against the Issei just because they are not citizens of the United States; they are not citizens of the United States because this country saw fit to deny it to them; just as this country is treating us American citizens like dirt, like enemy aliens when we are supposed to be 100% Americans. Therefore, I move, before this organizing body, that the name of this club be changed to Manzanar Japanese Welfare Association and not Manzanar Citizens Federation."

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Slocum--"Mr. Chairman, if I may, sir, I wish to, that is I beg to differ from what Joe Kurihara has just said. We must realize that we are a nation at war; we are in a great war, the greatest in our history. We may feel that injustice has been committed against us, but this is a real test for us all, it is a challenge to us to have faith and to believe in our country. I am of the Japanese race, yes; because we are born that way, we have no choice in that matter; but I am proud that I am a 100% American. I think we should all be proud of our American citizenship. This is not a Japanese Welfare Association we want; it should be, as you good gentlemen who planned this meeting intended it to be, the Manzanar Citizens Federation."

Kurihara--"Mr. Chairman, I've just heard Mr. Slocum. I want you to ask him a question. If he is 100% American, as he waves the flag and claims he is, I challenge him to walk outside those ~~watchtowers which~~ boundary lines and just see if he doesn't get shot. Huh! 100% American, that's a hot one, if I may say so. When we were ripped out of our homes, our businesses, had everything we ever worked for destroyed overnight by this

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unjust treatment, it proved just how much United States citizenship is worth. As for me, I'll give it back any time the government wants it. I don't want it; it's not worth a damn and Mr. Slocum knows it. What's he doing here, then, if he's a 100% American; yes, why are you here, Mr. Slocum?"

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Slocum-- (shouting) "I am here because my commander-in-chief, the President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, ordered me to come here--just as he did all loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry. We should cooperate with the Army, they told us, and like good soldiers, we did! So there,
Mr. Kurihara--

Kurihara-- (addressing Slocum, instead of the chair)--"Well, I want you to know that I once followed the orders of the commander-in-chief of the United States of America. He was President Woodrow Wilson. We fought then to make the world safe for democracy. You know, Mr. Slocum, that I served with honor on the battlefields of France for what I thought was my country, the United States. I wore the uniform of the United States Army; I pledged allegiance to her flag; I received an honorable discharge. I have always tried to conduct myself as a law-abiding citizen of this country. I have tried to advise our young people that this is their country; that they must be loyal to her in any crisis. I feel that I have done my part, discharged my duties. But what has the government of the United States done? It had treated me as if I were a criminal; I have to be put behind barbed wires; there are armed guards thrown around us, we are shot if we dare exercise our American constitutional rights as free citizens of a so-called free democracy.

I had the confidence of a naval intelligence officer in San Diego who would have testified to my loyalty; I tried to ask for treatment as an individual when the Army decided to evacuate all persons of Japanese blood. They said no. Well, they've made me realize that after all, it's blood that counts, nothing else. It makes no difference that a man has died a thousand deaths for his country on blood-soaked battlefields in a terrible war and come back to live as a citizen of his community. No, they said, the only thing, Joe Kurihara, that counts is that by the accident of birth, you are of the Japanese race. So get the hell behind those bars. Am I bitter? Well, you people here judge for yourself. All I'm telling you is that we are washed up in this country. We are all of the Japanese race and blood; the Japanese people, our fellows Japanese, are our only hope; there is none in this country where the white man will try to put on his own special brand of 'democracy', a white democracy. The people of Manzanar can decide for themselves whether or not what I say is not justified. The people of America can decide, for all I care about them..."

Slocum--"Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt Mr. Kurihara: What he is saying is outright dangerous and subversive in this great hour of our emergency. Look here, Joe Kurihara, I've fought in bigger and better battles than you ever saw. I was sergeant-major in the same outfit as Sergeant Alvin York. ¶ Yes-siree, we were buddies. I was the only Oriental sergeant-major in the whole A.E.F. I fought in battles and was wounded. I won distinction and honors; I too was honorably discharged. When You were a citizen of the United States already when you wore the

uniform of Uncle Sam. I was an alien Japanese, born in Japan. I fought another battle after that last war; I fought to win American citizenship for all Oriental veterans who had served in the Army; I won that battle for justice and democracy. I didn't like evacuation personally any more than you do, for what it has done to so many who are real, loyal, red-blooded Americans. But I'm still good enough a soldier to take orders without challenging them, make sacrifices under fire, and have faith in our great President. I say we are in this war for real democracy and that our only hope, as descendants of the Japanese race, is to pitch in and do our wholehearted bit for America. The trouble with the Nisei up to now is that they've depended too much and have been influenced too much by their fathers. That goes for you too, Mr. Kurihara!" (At this point,

Slocum was soundly booed and hissed by partisans in the audience who were evidently supporters of Kurihara; from this meeting on, Slocum required constant police protection whenever he attended public gatherings).

The Chairman, Koji Ariyoshi, stopped the debate as it was growing more and more heated, admonishing the two to "cut out the personal name-calling."

Further opposition to the Manzanar Citizens Federation was voiced by a George Akahoshi, secretary to the head of the Community Services Division (Thomas M. Temple), who said: "I see no good reason why the Citizens Federation membership should be limited to United States citizens only; after all, we are in here with our parents, and they too share a common interest. If this organization is to be truly representative of the people of Manzanar, it should not have any such discriminatory provision in its organization."

The first meeting of the proposed Citizens Federation indicated that, if there were many supporters of the movement outside the original sponsors, they kept quiet and inarticulate at the session. On the other hand, the opposition to the proposed federation, was outspoken, loud, and quite set against it.

Chairman Koji Ariyoshi's chairmanship was confirmed by a vote, taken through show of hands. He immediately began appointment of committees to organize the Federation.

The meeting ended in an atmosphere of tension, animosity, mutterings.

Opposition to the Manzanar Citizens Federation was quick to be voiced by the Block Leaders Council. (At that time, chairman of the Block Leaders Council was Ted Akahoshi). Rumors about the individuals sponsoring the organizing meeting were soon current. These rumors took the form of letters received in other relocation and (at that time) assembly centers purporting to tell of the deaths by violence of each of the individuals connected with the Federation. These individuals were frequently embarrassed by letters from friends inquiring as to the health or condition of so-and-so-who-is-reported-dead.

Some of the original sponsors of the Federation abandoned the movement after the first meeting.

The Center's Documentary historians, Joe Masaoka and Togo Tanaka, who had both consented to be speakers on the first program, decided that "this thing's going to interfere with our documentary work, make us more enemies than we can handle; it's a pain in the neck, so let's pull our necks in and stay home from all meetings." Hiroshi Neeno~~n~~, also a speaker on the first

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meeting program, was in addition a block leader of block 32; this position brought him in direct contact with the block leaders; he damned the Citizens Federation with faint praise, more or less, also dropped out of the picture as an active supporter.

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The Federation, however, lived on through the next two months, conducted elections throughout the Center, naming three representatives from each block, all of them citizens. This was facilitated through the Block Leaders Council which was brought around to a compromise measure of forming a "Junior Block Council" under auspices of the Federation. The nature of the Federation, its organization, and its purposes, thus underwent a transformation through this period; its original sponsors had either dropped out or assumed minor positions.

Sho Onodera succeeded Koji Ariyoshi as chairman when the latter went out on beet furlough to the Idaho fields.

In all its history, the Federation held less than half a dozen public meetings, twice as many private committee sessions.

(For a chronological history of the Federation, refer to the Manzanar Free Press. It should be borne in mind that the Free Press editorials seldom, if ever, reflected the degree of intensity of feeling in the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group against the Citizens Federation).

--More to Kum--

T a n a k a
Manzanar (28) Addenda 1/31/43

QUESTIONS (Grodzins Letter 1/21/43)

3. Page 42: T h e C a m o u f l a g e F a c t o r y
("Initial troubles")

From the outset of its brief and stormy history, the camouflage net project at Manzanar was beset with difficulties. Its introduction was received with comparatively little enthusiasm by evacuees, despite efforts to give it a "build-up" by administrative officials. From the first day of a camp-wide campaign by the then Project Director Roy Nash to recruit the necessary number of workers, criticism was heard against the "dictatorial" attitude and methods of "Mr. Nash."

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On June 18, 1942, the Documentary Historians of Manzanar reported:

"After muddling through the first week, the camouflage net project received a needed shot in the arm June 17.

"An emergency block leaders' meeting, called by Director Roy Nash, gave recognition to the fact that Manzanar's first war industry was falling far behind schedule, and decided to:

"(1) Meet the labor shortage in the net sheds by recruiting citizens from other projects, since most employables have been in other jobs. (In effect, giving A-1 priority to the net factory project.)

"(2) Conduct, through the block leadership, a thorough canvass of the Center for popular support of the project, impressing residents with the vital importance of filling the Army's requirements. (Success means War Dept. support for other projects).

"Attending the meeting--Henry Tsurutani, former attorney, Los Angeles, now block 18 leader: 'Since only citizens are eligible, and since there is a shortage, we should remove them from over-staffed projects and give them jobs in the net factory, with assurances of 'skilled' rating. We should also freeze positions opening up, saving previous jobs for citizens to return to after

camouflage net work is completed.'

"Captain Les Wallendorf,
U. S. Army, Western Defense Command: 'This
net project is the result of letters sent
General De Witt asking that residents of this
Center be allowed to work on defense projects.
Through representations of certain officials,
camouflage net projects were diverted here.
There is an urgency that they be produced on
schedule calling for 225,000 in six months,
allocated among the various centers.

"Ted Akahoshi, former
secretary of the Los Angeles Wholesale Com-
mission Merchants Association, now Chairman
of the Block leaders: 'Morale has dropped and
this project hasn't lived up to expectations
so far because at first the workers were prom-
ised union wages if they would volunteer to
come here. Then they were promised W.P.A. wages
of \$50 to \$94 a month. They never got either.
Now the scale has been set at \$12, \$16 and \$19, and
up until now there has been no evidence they'd
receive any pay at all. On the other hand, sol-
diers' pay has been raised from \$21, to \$42 and now
\$50.'

"Karl Yoneda, former San
Francisco longshoreman and labor leader, C.I.O.,
now block leader: 'I'll do my best to canvass
my block. As for myself I can assure you this
one thing, gentlemen. I will have my wife with-
draw from her library job and see that she starts
work tomorrow at the net factory.'

"J.A. Forney, U.S. Engineer-
ing Department, construction supervisor: 'Let's
get our first shift started first (when some
block leaders in their enthusiasm suggested getting
two shifts working). It looks like now we'll
get our difficulties straightened out.'

"Director Roy Nash: 'Is there
any truth to the rumor that the bogging down of
this project is deliberate sabotage?' (There
was vigorous denial, shaking of heads, surprise
among the block leaders)

Four days later, the project, to all surface
indications, was well on its way. Whereas there had been
less than 100 workers on the project at the time of the
foregoing meeting, there was now a total personnel roll

of 314 workers producing 80 nets daily. The June 22 project report stated: "The new management is optimistic about securing 1000 workers in the next 10 days". (This goal was not achieved). Beneath the surface, however, discontent & trouble, later to explode periodically were already brewing. The following conversation, recorded in the Center documentation, was fairly typical:

Two workers (both Nisei) were talking (Young men, ages 21 & 25)--

"Say, this is peon labor; we ought to be paid defense wages."

"Yeah, some contractor sure must be making money out of us."

"Did you know what that guy who brings water to us says?"

"You mean that Hakuji?" (Caucasian)

"Yeah. He asked me how much we were being paid. I told him about 12 bucks a month and our room and board. You know what he says then?"

"What?"

"He gives out a horse laugh and says: 'Why, you suckers, I'm getting 12 bucks a day!'"

Even in these early weeks of the Camouflage net project, dormant opposition on the ground that it was "war work" aimed against Japan was rumored quietly among the Japanese-speaking population. Outcropping of rumors that work on the nets was accompanied by a "tuberculosis hazard" soon followed. Several Nisei workers admitted that pressure in various forms had been exerted to make them quit their jobs. In addition to these troubles, the net factory invariably attracted the hoodlum element in the camp, both as employees and hangers-on. Within a few weeks of the project's opening, soldiers were called out to quell a minor

Manzanar (31) Addenda

disturbance which was hushed up, given no publicity.

--More to Kum --

4. Page 53: K i y o s h i H i g a s h i

Japanese Relocation Papers
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(A score of young men attempted to instigate a strike, threatened other workers)

T a n a k a
Manzamar (32) Addenda

QUESTIONS (Grodzins Letter 1/21/43)

Japanese Relocation Papers
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4. Page 53. K i y o s h i H i g a s h i

Kiyoshi Higashi's role in the Manzanar riot of December 6, highlighted by the fact that he not only survived the disturbance within the Center but retained his position as Chief of Internal Security, contradicts the general observation in the report that "members of Group I were evacuated for their protection to Death Valley". Higashi was second in prominence in the J.A.C.L. only to Fred Tayama; he preceded Tayama as Chairman of the Southern District J.A.C.L. in pre-war days. He was associated with Tayama in the Pacific Service Bureau in pre-evacuation days. He and his wife and their pet dog lived with the Tayamas in Los Angeles for several weeks before they evacuated together to Manzanar. At the Center, the Higashis and Tayamas shared their barrack room, first in block 6, later in enlarged quarters (when space was more equally distributed according to number in family) in block 28.

More than Tayama, however, Higashi was close to the Terminal Island "group" centered on Block 9. Higashi, several years before teaming up in business with Tayama, had covered the Fish Harbor as an insurance agent; he knew practically all of the fishermen and their families personally. His brothers were fishermen at Terminal Island; these brothers lived with him and with his wife in the barrack shared with the Tayamas. While there was some animosity among Terminal Islanders against the "J.A.C.L." as an organization, there was comparatively little--if any--against Higashi personally. In other words, he "belonged". With the younger men of the Terminal Islanders, Higashi was popular because of his interest in their athletic activities. As treasurer of the J.A.C.L. in Terminal Is-

Manzanar (33) Addenda

land, he had turned over a large sum of money for sports equipment at Manzanar for the Fish Harbor teams.

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Thoghugh Chief of Internal Security and therefore head of a police force of over 80 men, Higashi frequently admitted quite frankly that "I'm depending on the Terminal Island guys to back me up in a pinch." Long years of personal relationship with them gave him reason for this confidence. Some outspoken critics of obstreperous Terminal Islanders were wont to blame Higashi for "undue leniency" toward offenders from that group.

Higashi himself was often threatened anonymously and indirectly, but "never by an Terminal Islanders", he once remarked. When he served on the Commission for Self-Government, along with the other 16 members, he received an anonymous letter of warning from the "Blood Brothers Corps."

Although he accompanied Fred Tayama to the Salt Lake City conference of the Japanese American Citizens League in November and returned with Tayama, curiously enough, most of the rumors in the Center blaming the J.A.C.L. for passing a resolution asking voluntary enlistment for nisei into the U.S. Army were centered around and aimed against Tayama.

On the night of the riot, Dec. 6, almost at the same time the crowd was milling around the hospital seeking Tayama's blood, a portion of the mob broke into the Higashi-Tayama quarters on block 28. The Higashi's side of the barrack was reduced to shambles; furniture was smashed, books were torn, pictures torn from the wall, clothing stolen; the Tayama side was left almost untouched. Why this was so, no one seems to have any explanation, least of all Tayama or Higashi. Before the mob arrived at his barrack, Higashi had taken refuge with his entire family (wife, brothers, parents)

Manzanar (34) Addenda

Japanese Relocation Papers
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in Block 9, solidly Terminal Islanders. There he is said to have immediately organized squads of husky ex-fishermen into armed battalions (armed with clubs, kitchen utensils, whatever was handy). Estimates place the number of able-bodied men ready to fight under the "Terminal Island" banner between 400 and 800. The mobs which roamed the center the night of Dec. 6 remained at a respectful distance from Block 9, according to all versions of the incident now in my hands. A meeting of mob leaders took place in that mess hall (block 9) following their second dispersal from mess hall 1 shortly after the shooting. There the kitchen workers of No. 9, represented by their chef and foreman, made it clear that they would not participate in any "general strike" of the mess halls on Monday. Their attitude seems to have been: "We'll feed the whole center if we have to but we're not going to put a noose around our own necks, and around the necks of our women and children by refusing to cook our own food." Whether Higashi's influence was being made felt there or not has not been determined, but the fact remains that he was on the scene there from early in the evening.

Why the Terminal Islanders protected Higashi can be explained only in terms of their personal loyalty to him; however, it is significant in this connection that Higashi was known to be working on a mass relocation program for "my boys." Through the J.A.C.L. and various contacts he is known to have, Higashi has been seeking to undertake a fairly large scale fishing project in the Great Lakes Region to secure relocation and outside employment for the ex-Terminal Islanders. Asked shortly before the riot why he and his wife had not applied for clearance and relocation, he said: "I've got a responsibility to the Terminal Islanders; they're depending on me to get this Great

Manzanar (35) Addenda

Lakes Project going, and I'm going to see it through."

Japanese Relocation Papers
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One of Higashi's lesser known (to those outside Terminal Island) contacts was the former chief of Naval Intelligence for Los Angeles and San Pedro, with whom Higashi was known to have maintained correspondence throughout the evacuation and months at Manzanar. This officer was reported by Higashi once to have sought approval from higher-ups in Washington, D.C. for a proposal that a Navy destroyer or submarine be manned by Nisei fishermen of Terminal Island, with this officer in charge. "We'd show the Navy how to fight the Japs," was his asserted comment. This man's influence on the younger, though obstreperous hell-raising element among the ex-fishermen of Terminal Island, had made an impression that was apparently deep, according to Higashi who seems to have anticipated the Dec. 6 riot. "The Terminal Islanders may be rough guys and raise trouble, but in a pinch, they'll come through; you wait and see," Higashi was often heard to remark. (Note: I find there is not enough material in the files still uncrated to do a ~~copy~~ character sketch on Higashi; it will have to await our arrival in Chicago. Regarding the Manzanar report to the J.A.C.L. conference by Higashi--pages 1-7 Addenda--please bear in mind that this report ~~was~~ appears to be the work largely of Chief of Police Commissioners Willard Schmidt, formerly of the Berkeley Police; the language, style--even some typical Schmidt expressions--all bear the Schmidt label. They are not Higashi's, although he undoubtedly had a hand in the preparation)

*Higashi present address is still Manzanar,
California.)*

5. Page 54. T h o s e w h o w e r e s h o t

I have no information of a reliable nature at all on one of the two men who died in the shooting; I only know his surname was Kanazawa. On James Ito, the 17-year-old boy of block 4, who was shot to death, I have only the account of Mrs. Elaine Black Yoneda, resident of Block 4 and a neighbor of the Ito family:

"They said he was such a good boy. It's just a terrible mistake and shame that troublemaking agitators like Ueno and Kurihara should live and this innocent boy Jimmy Ito should die. His sister who is married, is a close neighbor of mine. I went to see her and all she could say was: 'I guess we'll just have to figure that we've given another boy to the service.' A brother of Jimmy's is in the United States Army; he'll probably go to Manzanar for the funeral. The mother was just shocked and could say nothing; her grief was overcoming. Jimmy was on his way to work when he was attracted by the crowd near the station and went down there; he got the bullets just as he edged his way into the crowd." (Note: It

should be recorded here that Mrs. Yoneda made this statement less than half an hour after her arrival at the military barracks shortly after the riot. She was highly excited and nervous.)

6. Page 58 A c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t A k a h o s h i

Fred Tayama's accusations against Akahoshi, charging the latter with harboring "subversive views" were based on what Tayama declared had been a series of conversations between the two at Manzanar. On one or two of the occasions, Frederick Ogura, block leader of block 1, was also present, Tayama charged. Shortly after one of the conversations, Tayama, in the presence of several J.A.C.L.-ers, made out what he said was an almost verbatim record of the conversa-

tion. In it, Akahoshi is alleged to have said that he favored Japan's winning the war, that he was confident of Japanese victory, that most of the generals in Japan were of his, Akahoshi's age, and not of Tayama's age (the inference being that Tayama should respect Akahoshi's age qualifications for leadership of the Manzanar population, which leadership he then held as Chairman of the Block Leaders' Council). Tayama, in making the transcript of the conversation told J.A.C.L.-ers that he would keep the record and would be prepared to send it on to federal investigative agencies if Akahoshi's actions confirmed his speech. On a later occasion, Tayama said that he had sent the report on. (Note: I believe a copy of that report may be in the files which have been crated.--TT)

Whether Tayama was "in the habit of making such accusations" (as is asked in your list of questions) I do not feel qualified to give an opinion at this stage. It is my belief that there is a tendency among J.A.C.L. officeholders--not the majority, but a few of them--to set themselves up as judges of their fellow Nisei's "Americanism". The Issei's loyalty or disloyalty also comes in for unsolicited appraisal by this small group; some say Tayama belonged to this class, others say he did not. I do not know definitely. In the feud with Akahoshi, I cannot help but feel that he was motivated to a large extent by personal reasons--personal dislike possibly.

Ted Akahoshi is an alien Japanese, in his fifties, a former resident of Los Angeles where he was secretary of the Produce Market Commission Merchants Association. He is said to be a graduate of Stanford University, is proficient in reading, writing, and speaking in both English and Japanese, although his English bears a slight trace of accent. He evacuated to Manzanar with the volunteer group. His son George, (age about 20, a Nisei) who saw his father off from

See Charlie's
Case
on
Son George

the Maryknoll Catholic Mission on South Hewitt Street in Los Angeles, said to me at that time: "My old man's gone on to Manzanar; he figures that he might as well get behind the barbed wires early, what with the F.B.I. swooping down on everybody at any time; he's going to beat them to the punch." Young George had been active in the United Citizens Federation, of which I served briefly as chairman; the group had been born out of recognized widespread antagonism toward the J.A.C.L. in the pre-evacuation months; George Akahoshi was quite intensely anti-J.A.C.L. and, for purposes of discussion in this study, can be classified in Group 2. He evacuated to Manzanar soon afterwards and became the secretary to the head of the Services division under W.C.F.A., Mervin Kidwell. When the W.R.A. took over in June, and Thomas M. Temple succeeded to the head of the Community Services Division, enlarged in its duties and functions, A George Akahoshi was retained as secretary. For a while, both Akahoshis, father and son, were considered as two key individuals in controlling positions by evacuees at Manzanar.

Japanese Relocation Papers
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When the riot broke out Dec. 6, Ted Akahoshi had long since retired from his activities as Chairman of the Block leaders' Council. Rumors were to the effect that he had been successfully intimidated by the "Blood Brothers." Others said that he was "sick and tired of the whole mess". Still others charged that "he's showing his true colors now by getting into the background and raising trouble; he's behind the Blood brothers." Whatever the truth may have been, it was a fact that Akahoshi was assisting in the nursery school among the children of the Village (orphanage at Manzanar). On the night of the riot, it was reported in military barracks that the Akahoshis, father and son, had requested military protection; they feared their lives were in danger, it was said. At the time, however, it appears

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that Lieutenant Conklin (this might be misspelled) who was in charge of sending soldiers to pick up individuals considered to be in danger, had been consulting Fred Tayama and Tokie Slocum about names on the list. Policeman Jack Shimatsu was also being consulted; policeman George Hayakawa was volunteering his opinion. No others were consulted at the time, I recall the Akahoshi name coming up for consideration; there was almost unanimous vote (it was unanimous with Tayama, Slocum, Shimatsu, Hayakawa) that the Akahoshis belonged elsewhere "but not with us." When my opinion was asked by Slocum, I replied that I was in favor of having anyone who was in danger of his life brought to the military barracks for protection; I did not, however, believe the Akahoshis were in danger but was not given the opportunity to express that viewpoint; the decision apparently had already been made not to bring them to the military camp. The next report we received there before being brought to Death Valley was that "Ted Akahoshi has been arrested with the agitators." Following our arrival here at Death Valley, subsequent reports said that the Akahoshis were to be removed to another Center, either Gila River or Poston.

Japanese Relocation Papers
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--More to Kum--

T a n a k a
Manzanar (40) Addenda 1/4/43

QUESTIONS (Grodzins Letter 1/21/43)

11. Page 14 . J.A.C.L.-er's i m p r e s s i o n s o n
t h e o p p o s i t i o n g r o u p s

The J.A.C.L. attitude toward the "opposition" groups in the pre-evacuation period was much the same as it is today: one of willingness to cooperate and unite on common aims but a firm refusal to countenance methods and tactics not approved by the J.A.C.L. leadership.

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Personality conflicts, stemming from business and social rivalries, no doubt played an important role in inspiring these "opposition" groups (such as was the case of Fred Tayama in Los Angeles). It is also true that the average J.A.C.L.-er, confident in the strength of his organization, looked upon most of these "opposition" groups as upstarts seeking a place in the sun already occupied by the Japanese American Citizens League. This attitude brought criticism, deserved or not, upon the J.A.C.L. name time and again by organizations looking for citizen leadership in pre-evacuation months.

For instance, one of the largest groups, from standpoint of paid-up, active membership, in Los Angeles was the Retail Produce Workers (Fruit & Vegetable Workers) Union, Local No. 1510, affiliate of the American Federation of Labor. In January, 1942, it had a membership of approximately 1,000 fruit stand employees; its secretary-treasurer and guiding head, Bob Sato, in that month told me: "We're in favor of a new organization to take the place of the J.A.C.L. We don't trust the J.A.C.L. cabinet. My boys are dead set against any of our money being spent with the J.A.C.L. We want a bigger and more reliable Nisei leadership."

This sentiment, in those pre-evacuation months in Los Angeles,

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was echoed, though more mildly, by the California Young Buddhists League, a statewide body of several thousand ^{U.S.} citizens of the Buddhist faith, whose president, Carl Sato, ^(no relation to Bob Sato) of Los Angeles, ~~was~~ accepted office in the United Citizens Federation, which developed into an anti-J.A.C.L. body up to the time of evacuation.

Japanese Relocation Papers
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While latent opposition to the J.A.C.L., growing out of personality conflicts and rivalries, contributed to the growth of anti-J.A.C.L. feeling, the height of anti-J.A.C.L. feeling appears to have been reached several weeks before General John De Witt, commanding officer of the Western Defense Command, issued the first exclusion order on March 2. This was in mid-February. The J.A.C.L., in closer contact with rapidly developing decisions in official quarters, through January and February had stoutly opposed any mass evacuation, then being proposed in the press, on the radio (particularly by such commentators as John B. Hughes), and by California officialdom (notably Mayor Fletcher Bowron of Los Angeles, Governor Culbert Olson). By mid-February, however, the J.A.C.L. leadership suddenly appears to have resigned itself to the inevitable--convinced that nothing the J.A.C.L. or the combined resources of the Japanese population could do would stem the tide of public opinion demanding mass evacuation.

The Japanese American Citizens League in February of 1942 came out openly, publicly, and uncompromisingly in favor of "cooperating with the Army and our President. Let us evacuate en masse outside the designated combat zone. We are at war, this is no time for quibbling."

This message was brought to Los Angeles by the National Secretary of the J.A.C.L. (Mike Masaoka) and delivered convincingly before a mass meeting of the United Citizens Federation at the Maryknoll Catholic auditorium. The consternation and confusion that followed ~~was~~ ^{was} evidently only a prelude to the wide split between the J.A.C.L.

and the heretofore scattered "opposition" groups which suddenly found themselves united in their denunciation of what they termed "weak-kneed J.A.C.L. leadership." The reference was made to what was then commonly supposed the failure of the J.A.C.L. to stand firm in its opposition to mass evacuation of citizens as well as aliens. It should be noted here that the J.A.C.L. leadership, on the other hand, had reached its decision out of an unshakeable conviction that mass evacuation was inevitable and that the only salvation for the Nisei lay in "sacrifice temporarily of our rights and privileges in order that we may share in the larger victory ahead."

Japanese Relocation Papers
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In Los Angeles, one of the larger vested interests among Japanese business men ^{was} ~~were~~ centered in the downtown wholesale market terminals. (Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Street Markets). Anti-J.A.C.L. sentiment was particularly strong in these quarters. Both the Issei employer class, with an estimated aggregate of ~~\$100~~ ^{over} a million dollars holdings in one of the three markets alone, and the ^{Nisei} employee class, represented by what was known as the Junior Produce Club (whose executive secretary San Minami accepted treasurership of the anti-J.A.C.L. United Citizens Federation) were outspoken in their criticism of the J.A.C.L. stand. For some time there was disbelief that total, mass evacuation would take place. Many of the Commission Merchants in the markets, for instance, operated their businesses through loans to farmers in the agricultural districts of Norther, Central and Southern California. These loans were repaid at the end of the season. The J.A.C.L. stand on evacuation, cutting off, in their estimation, almost any hope of continued opposition--and therefore hope--for preventing evacuation, meant in almost every case, financial loss.

In Southern California, anti-J.A.C.L. sentiment was probably more intense among the market business interests than anywhere else; in

Manzanar (43) Addenda

this connection, it should be noted that the entire (Nearly all) market population, employer and employee groups, evacuated to the Manzanar relocation center. A tally of the block managers in November showed that ex-market interests comprised the largest single classification.

Japanese Relocation Papers
Bancroft Library

The attitude of J.A.C.L. national leadership toward the growing anti-J.A.C.L. sentiment appears to have been one of ~~great~~ patience and "we-can-take the criticism, but time will justify our stand." Refusing to take the defensive attitude of having to explain itself, the J.A.C.L. appears to have concentrated its energies toward relocation of the evacuee population.

To the critics who denounced and torpedoed the J.A.C.L. position favoring evacuation, the Citizens League attitude appears to have been: "We know everyone is taking a loss, financially, and otherwise; yet the interests who clamor the most now, who scream and criticize us the most, are the very selfsame selfish interests who up to today have never raised a peep about civic affairs or any affairs outside their own moneygrubbing; we say this not in a sense of criticism. We only want the Japanese population, at least that part of it which is truly loyal to America, to awaken to the larger problems of a nation at war; we will be called upon to sacrifice, yes. We have surrendered that we may participate in the larger victory ahead."

That such statements were a little above the average thinking of the Nisei soon became apparent. ~~He~~ The articulate opposition groups showed little evidence they understood--or wanted to understand.

How effective such opposition groups have been and continue to be, can probably best be gauged by the record of what has already happened since evacuation, both in and outside the relocation

Manzanar (44) Addenda

centers. There is an undercurrent anti-J.A.C.L. feeling, varying only in intensity, in all the War Relocation Centers throughout the United States.

Japanese Relocation Papers
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O u t s i d e the internment centers (Note: if the word 'internment' is actually as well as technically incorrect, please correct me; I slip occasionally though my intention is to write 'relocation'--TT)

there is also anti-J.A.C.L. sentiment. For instance, the bi-language Japanese newspaper, "Rocky Nippon", published in Denver, Colorado, appears to be anti-J.A.C.L. in its policies. In its Monday, January 4, 1943, edition, it carried, in its Japanese section, an account of the Manzanar rioting. (Copy is attached to this addenda; it speaks for itself--TT). In the English Section, there is a lengthy column in letter form by a Jimmie Omura, reviving the criticism against the J.A.C.L. for its stand on evacuation. (It also is attached.)

Manzanar (45) Addenda

T a n a k a

2/1/43

From the ENGLISH SECTION of the "Rocky Nippon", published at
Denver, Colorado, in both English & Japanese
Volume X, Number 1 Monday, January 4, 1943
Page 1, columns 1-2

Japanese Relocation Papers
Bancroft Library

"P i n g e o n - H o l e M u s i n g s"
By Jimmie Omura

"Dear Friend:

"It is not often that I can find the opportunity of writing to you in these confused days, and it is only by a sacrifice of valuable time that I take the occasion to acquaint you with the events that have touched my life, and left their indelible impressions.

"You may justly wonder why, after these months of silence, I have broken the spell. Perhaps I hear the skeleton of 1942 rattling in the closet, and as this great eventful year fades into history, be impelled to reminisce on the great and trivial events that have occurred and made our lives a living shamble.

"How many of us thought before that bloody Sunday, December 7, 1941, that the terribleness of war would enter our very homes and touch us with ^{its} macabre wand? Surely, few of us did. How chagrined we were and indignant, yes, at news of the treacherous attack on our military outpost at Pearl Harbor?

"The die had been cast. Wave of public indignation, whipped up by pressure groups, drew us into its web and engulfed us, and we felt ourselves hopeless, though by the inviolable doctrines of our own beloved federal Constitution, we were citizens and entitled to the same protection and consideration bestowed upon fellow citizens of other derivations.

"I can remember vividly that day in late March that we were

forced to flee from San Francisco. It was 11 a.m. on the 29th, when only 13 hours away from the military deadline for voluntary evacuation. The day and night before we had spent in feverish packing for the journey ahead of us. The sun was out brightly and the Sabbath quiet prevailed. Except for the anxiety which hastened us, and the motive behind our departure, one would not have thought that war had already touched our lives.

Japanese Relocation Papers
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"To me--as I faced the long journey to my new home in Denver--the fruitlessness of our efforts in the critical days of the Great Evacuation caused a foreboding sadness. The memory of how I had appeared in working attire before the august body of the Tolan Congressional Investigating Committee to testify crossed my thoughts. I was the only person from the Japanese communities to stand firm and steadfast against the arbitrary removal inland of the 75,000 nisei. I felt alone then, as I did during all those critical days, while I was waging the battle for the preservation of constitutional liberties of the American born.

"If ever you have an opportunity to read the Tolan Committee's San Francisco hearings, you will find my testimony beginning on page 11229. But I would like to direct your attention to this particular sentence: 'I am strongly opposed to the mass evacuation of American-born Japanese.' Those incisive words have been incorporated in the Tolan reports, and to this very day I firmly believe that the whole idea of the evacuation was entirely wrong...that a travesty on justice has been committed.

"Further along in the Tolan report, you will find this passage: 'Are we to be condemned merely on the basis of our racial origin? Is citizenship such a light and transient thing that that which is our inalienable right in normal times can be torn from us

Manganar (47) Aldenda

-3-

in times of war? We in America are intensely proud of our individual rights and willing, I am sure, to defend those rights with our very lives. I venture to say that the great majority of Nisei Americans, too, will do the same against any aggressor nation-- though that nation be Japan. Citizenship to us is no small heritage; it is a very precious and jealous right!

Japanese Relocation Papers
Bancroft Library

"There were many people among my own society who felt that I was rash to employ such strong language. They felt that I was being too critical of the army. That night, preceding the establishment of military areas on the west coast, the Capital Writers Mobilization of America were assembled in the studio of Isamu Noguchi, and there again I was challenged on my strong use of words. Too critical of the army? There is no organization or individual who could not stand some criticism.

"But my exhortations fell on empty ears. The national office of the J.A.C.L. held a mock community meeting. The Bay Region Council of Unity, a vain idea that I sponsored, became a mere tool of the J.A.C.L. The Coordinating Committee of the San Francisco Japanese Y.M.C.A. was hardly more effective. I watched various organizations that had originally been critical of the national J.A.C.L. policy jumping on the bandwagon, and I felt defeated.

"You have perhaps wondered why I have been so strongly opposed to the J.A.C.L. I am convinced that the National officers let the nisei down. They were too eager to 'yes' the army. They did not fight for the rights of the U.S.-born. Instead of looking at the evacuation from a broader standpoint, the J.A.C.L. leaders

Manzumar (48) Addenda

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attempted to profit on the distress of U.S. Japanese as individuals and as an organization. It was first J.A.C.L., and second the cause. If you doubt me, study the ~~unnum-~~ innumerable facets of the evacuation. I have a whole volume of it for your use.

Japanese Relocation Papers
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"I thought of these things as I journeyed down the Central Valley route to Bakersfield, on over the Tehacahpi pass, through the desert wastes of the Mojave, and across the barren plains of northern Arizona and New Mexico. Bitter, indeed, were my thoughts.

"But greater disappointments were yet to come. We were not welcomed when we arrived in Denver. Colorado Japanese did not want us. They were concerned with the safety of their own little hides, and resented our coming.

"Those who preceded me there, where I was among the last arrivals there, told tales of evacuees standing in long lines in the cold of March weather, uncertain as to what to do and where to go. Small children tugged at mothers' coats, crying their hunger. The Colorado Japanese, I am told, remained indifferent in the face of this pitiful sight. I have heard this story recounted many times, not alone by my own racial people, but by the Anglo-Americans I have since come to know. Certainly, so many different people would have no object in lying.

"Today the task which we assumed--the continued representation of the rights of the United States Japanese and their relocation in gainful and fruitful employment--is a herculean problem; and though I am not in any affluent financial condition, I am committed to this work. Perhaps, the Evacuee Placement Bureau will

Manzanar (49) Addenda

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drain me of every red cent I possess; but until that last cent is spent, this work will be carried on, and even afterwards.

Japanese Relocation Papers
Bancroft Library

"I have perhaps bored you with this long letter, but I thought that you should know something of the problems which we Americans, though racially Japanese, are undergoing and how some of us feel today. We only pray and hope that some day, and may that day be soon--you people of Anglo-American strain will believe in us and accord us the rightful consideration which is our due."

Very sincerely yours

J-----"

More to Kum

(Japanese section
article will follow)

T.T.

T a n a k a
Manzamar (50) Addenda 2/4/43

QUESTIONS: Grodzins letter 1/21/43

(Continued) 11. Page 14

Following is the Romaji translation of the Japanese section article appearing in the "Rocky Nippo", published in Denver, Colorado, issue of Monday, January 4, 1943, Japanese section, page 4, column 4: (The English translation follows immediately)--

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This center's riot incident a very regrettable
To senta no boodoo jiken wa makoto ni kanshin

no itaridesu ga shimbun ya radio nite ayamari tutayerarete
imasukara sani shinsoo ^{wo} oshirase itashimasu. Ima to senta wa
kaigenreika ni arimashite subeteno tegami no hatuju denshin den-
wa homonsha wa genkin sarete imasu kara ima kono tegami ^w kai-
temo ifu token dekiruka wakarimasen. Jikenno okoriwa nagai
aida mayekara Rafushimonkyokai Kaicho Fred Tayama. Higashi
Kiyoshi Dai ichiji taisen ni san ^{ka} shite shiminken shoyu no
Nishimura Slocum Rafu Shimpo eibunkisha Tanaka Togo sonota
mada takusan arimasuga kono yonin wa inuno atamakabu toshite
nagai aida chumokuno matoto natte itamonodesuga. Saru ituka
no ban junih bakari Tayamano apaato ye oshikakete saikunno
rusuni sanzan naguritukete hikiagemashita. Keisatu ^s dewa sono
banno uchi ni junisanin no mono kengisha toshite kenkyo shi-
mashita ga mina kitaku ^{wo} yurusarete tada hitori ueno to iyuu
otoko wo yokuriyu shitanode kono Ueno to iyuu otokowa hijihoo
no kokotukan de goshochino tohori ^{ts} Satowa hitorimaye ishukanni
hachi ounsus haikyus sarubekimono wo biyoinni iriyotoka shoni-
in ni okurutoka shoyuseizosho ye okurutoko riyu ^{wo} tukete hitori
maye hichi ounsus shika haikyus shinakata node.

Sore wo zenki ueno oyobi tano ichinino mono ga
hakininto narite shohomen wo chosa shi. To senta no mesu horu

Manzanar (51) Addenda

no hedono Winchester narumonoto sentano fukushacho Campbell
narumoto ^{no} kyobonite sato tosei irai to Manzanar Nipponjin ichi
mannin no atamakazu kara hitori atari ichi ounsuzutsu no sato
wo yoriyoshiteita jiji ^{ts} otashikamete ipponi FBI ni kaiken
^{wo} moshikondari fukushacho to hizazume ~~dandan~~ ^{Kaidan} no kekka imamadeno
ichi ounsuzutsu no sato wa sokoni hokanshite aruto iyu shomeisho
wo totte hikiagetanode

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Sore irai ueno wa tokyokukara niramarete itamono
rashiku, konotabino jikenga okoruya dai ichibani kenkyu sarete
sonomama yokuriyu saretamono desu.

Akete muika zairyumin yori rokuning ^{no} koshoinno
dashite ueno no sokuji shakuho wo dampan surukotoni shimashita.
Koshoin ga ~~dandan~~ ^{Kaidan} suru aida shigosenno gunshu ^u ga oshikakeru
ipponi tokyoku kagra seigan shita mono to miyete guntan ⁱ wa kikanju
wo tazusayete keikai suruto iyu mono monoshi kokei deshita ga
sore wa hiru no koto demo ari gunshu ^u mo jichayo shite itano
wo nanimo tsuraburu wa okoranakataho desu.

Kosho no kekka wa (ueno wa sono toki sudeni koko-
yori ^{shi} ^(six) kusumairu ^{wo} saru Independence to iyuu machi no goku ye
utsusarete imashita.) Gogo sanjimadeni Ueno ^{wo} tosentani tsure-
modosu to iyuu yakusokude hikiage mashita. Tsuremodoshita ijiyo
toozen shakuhoosarerumono to omotte orimashita ga sonna yosu
wa sarani naku gogo rokuji sarani dai nikai me no koshoni ^s atumatta
gunshu wa hanbun wa Tayamano biyoinno hoye hanbun wa koshoinni
shita gatte keisatsu ye oshikaketa. Biyoin ye oshikaketa gunshu
wa Tayama ^{wo} dase to kuchi guchi ni sakebi mashitaga sono uchi
ichimai no kangofu ga arawarete Tayama wa taiin shite kitakushita
mune wo tsugemashita. Sore yuke to gunshu wa Tayamano apaata

Manzamar (52) Addenda

ye oshikakemashita ga apaato niwa daremo orazu nakaye haiite
mireba rippana kigu wo irete oiru hiita wo futatsu mademo suyete
kete makotoni zeitakuna sumai de atta sodesu. Kangofu ni ippai
kuwasareta gunshu wa tadachini biyoin ye hikikayeshita ga sono
toki wa ~~sudeni~~ ^{sudeni} buso seru heishi ni yotte torikakomareta
anburansu (ambulance) ye imashimo burankettoni ~~tatsumareta~~ ^{tsutsumareta}
ningen wo tanka ni nosete katsugikomou tokorode atta. Gunshu
wa 'zama miro Tayama' 'oboyete ore Tayama' nado to tada nonoshiru
nomide. Yagatte anburansu wa yamino nakaye kiyete shimatta.

Tsugiwa Sl6cum ye oshikakeyo to dotto oshikakemashita
ga kokomo tokisudeni osoku, kare no apaato wa buse seru guntai
ni yotte torimakare chikayoru kotomo dekizu sono uchi ichidaino
mishin ga kuruya inaya heishi to tomoni sorenū tobimote koremo
yamino nakayete shimatta.

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Iyoiyo gekko shita gunshu wa taugi tsugini Higashi
Tanaka kaku apaato ye oshikakemashita ga mina kazewo kuratte
nigeta atodeshiata.

Ippo keisatsu ye mukatta gunshu wa sono tokisudeni
keisatsu wo torikakonda busoseru heishi to niramiai no sugata
ni narimashita. Konotoki gunshu wa otonashiku shinshiteki no
taido totteoreba keishite konotabi fushoji wa okoranatta
nomi narazu. Iyuri ni kaiketsu saretakamo shiremasen. Kanashikana
gunshu wa mutosei oe musekinin de muchi de kuwafuruni toki ga
yorudesu. Yajino naka kara heishi ni mukatte toseki suru mono
ga arawarete heishino saidono ~~chu~~ ^{chu} koku mo kikazu naho toseki
seshi tame ~~sairiudan~~ ^{sairiudan} wo nage tsukerarete odorite nigeru tokoro
wo atokara happo sarete ichimei no sokushisha to kumei no jukeisha-
sha to ~~shis~~ dashimashita. nJiken wa tadachini gunno te ni utsuri

gunshu wa bo^oto to iyuu omei wo kiserare rokumei no koshoin
wa booto shidosha to shite kitaku wo yurusabezu sonomama kensoku
senta wa sokuji kaigenreika ni atte subete no shukai wa kinshi
sare shins^o no hatsuju homonsha kinshi koshoin wo okuridasu
tokiniwa moshi kono koshoga fuseikoni owatta tokiniwa senta ni
okeru subete no kikane wa sutoraiki wo kekko suruto iyuu yakusoku
ni natte imashita ga iza jikko to naruto hantaisha ga arawarete
kuwazuni orenaito ka kodomowa dosurutoka haku^oyakuna riyu wo
tsukete hantai surumon^oga kachi wo shimete kekkyoku tano kikan wa ~~o~~
sutoraiki wo shite orimasu ga shokudo dake wa aite orimasu. Fu-
maretemo tatakaretemo kutte saye oreba gaman suruto iyuu renchuga
oiinodesu. Nasake nai kotodesu. Koshoin ni ta^oishitewa ka^oyuseishu
no yoni tatematsu te okinagara kayete konai to kerorito wasureta
yona kaho wo shite imasu.

Giseisha no izoku ni taishite dojo no yasuuri wo shite
yagatte wa kayeru no kaho ni mizu wo kaketa yona shasha to shita
kaho shite kurafu koto bakari shuch^u shite imasu.

Jushoshano uchi ichimai sh^oikyo kajitsurai inu oyobi
karerano kazoku wo zokusoku shokanshite sentano juukinto kakuri
shite imasu sono kazu shichi hachijuumei. Tokyoku wa hogonotame
to moshite imasu Okagede wareware wa aremo inu de attaka koremo
inu de attakato atarashiku shirukoto ga dekimasu.

Senta tokyoku fukushacho Campbell himen wo happyo.

Washington yori W.R.A. fukushocho shucho senta no
kos^ojoiin to kaiken jiken^o shinso nitsuki shimbun oyobi radionnite
ayamari tsutayeraretaru Pearl Harbor ishuki ni banzai wo sakebitsu
to boodo wo okoshita to iyuu jijitsu mukon wo shufu yori radio wo
tsujite zenkokuni hososurukoto wo yakusoku Spain riyoji shucho

Manzanar (54) Addenda
jikenno shinso wo cho^{sasuru} -30-
7

(Note - The writer of this article is anonymous; judging from the grammatical errors and poor construction in Japanese, the writer is not very well versed in writing; his education is adjudged to be about grammar school level).

THE TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

Japanese Relocation Papers
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This Center's (Manzanar is mentioned in the headline only) riot incident was very unfortunate as the newspapers and radio issued distorted versions. In the following the truth will be revealed. At the present time this Center is under martial law, and all correspondence as well as the sending and receiving of telegrams and telephone calls and visitors are prohibited. Because of this, at the present, even though this letter is written, it cannot be known when it will be received.

The beginning of the incident can be traced back a long time, ~~during which~~ ^T the former president of the Los Angeles J.A.C.L. Fred Tayama and also Kiyoshi Higashi; a veteran of the First World War who acquired his citizenship, Nishimura Slocum; Rafu Shimpo English newspaperman Togo Tanaka, and in addition many others, but these four were the main leaders of the 'inu' (stooge, spy, stoolpigeons are the nearest English equivalents).

For a long time these four were the central targets in this Center. On the night of the 5th (December), about ten men broke into the apartment of Tayama during the absence of his wife, and without pulling punches, beat him, then withdrew.

That night the police picked up twelve or thirteen suspects (Note: the word for 'picked up' here is 'kengisha toshite kenkyo shimashita' which implies they were falsely accused)

but all of them were released to return home except one man by the name of Ueno who was held. This man Ueno was known by reputation to be a man of very firm character and unselfish. Sugar should be rationed eight ounces per person per week, but using the hospital needs, the amount sent to the Children's

Manzanar (55) Addenda

Village, and the amount needed for the shoyu manufacturing plant as excuses, they distributed only seven ounces per

person. Note: (The sequence here may appear vague, but the translation is literal; exactly who 'they' in the line above 'They distributed only seven ounces' also is not clear in the original Japanese).

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On this sugar matter, this man Ueno and one or two others were the originators of an investigation which was thorough. The head of this Center's mess halls, a Winchester, and the assistant project director of this center, a Campbell, in conspiracy together, after the sugar was rationed to the 10,000 Japanese of Manzanar were taking out one ounce per person aside; the truth of this was confirmed; it was requested on one hand that a meeting by the FBI be held and a meeting directly with the assistant director; the result of the meeting showed that the one ounce of sugar taken out was being kept aside, a document was received to prove this; negotiators withdrew.

After this incident, it seems this man ^(Ueno) was blacklisted by the Administration, and when this incident occurred, he was the first to be picked up and not released at all.

On the next day, the 6th, six negotiators from the people were elected to seek the immediate release of Ueno.

While the negotiators were in meeting, four or five thousand in a crowd (Note: the Japanese word is 'gunshu' which is different from 'boto'--a mob)

milled around; the administration seems to have asked for ~~them~~ and soldiers carrying machine guns ^{who} came out to guard; this was during the daytime and the crowd tried to keep out of trouble, and no trouble arose at all.

The results of the negotiations were: (Ueno at this time had been taken to a jail in a place six miles from this place--Independence). It was agreed that Ueno would be returned

by 3 p.m. It was believed that he would be completely released when he was brought back, but there was nothing to this at all. At 6 p.m. at the second gathering for negotiations, half of the crowd went in the direction of the hospital where Tayama was, while half followed the negotiators to the police station. The crowd that milled around at the hospital shouted loudly in unison 'Turn over Tayama'. At this time ~~a~~^{one} nurse appeared and told them that Tayama had been released and had been sent home. The crowd rushed to Tayama's apartment, but at the apartment they found no one there. ~~3~~ When they went in, they saw luxurious furniture; even two heaters were installed, and indeed it was extravagant living there, so they say. Fooled by the nurse, the crowd immediately ~~turned~~ turned back again for the hospital, but by this time there were already fully armed guards surrounding the place; and just then an ambulance arrived; someone wrapped in a blanket was being carried on a stretcher, it seems. The crowd shouted loudly, "We'll get you Tayama (Zama miro Tayama) and "Don't forget, Tayama" (Oboyete ore Tayama), all the while reviling this person. Then the ambulance disappeared in the dark.

Next the crowd pushed on ~~and~~ suddenly to the apartment of Slocum but here again they were too late; his apartment was surrounded by fully armed guards, and they didn't even have a chance to get near; then one automobile approached, and the soldiers and maybe someone else jumped on, and this too disappeared in the dark.

In a frenzied excitement, the crowd then went from Higashi to Tanaka, to the next and next apartment, but each

Manzanar (57) Addenda

time ~~they~~ they arrived after everyone had disappeared like the wind.

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On the other hand, the crowd that had gone toward the police station at this time found that the fully armed guards were there; it became a spectacle of both sides staring at each other. At this time, if the crowd had taken a gentlemanly attitude, this unfortunate incident could have been avoided. Maybe there would even have been an opportunity for a settlement.

(Note: this passage implies a possible release of Ueno, according to the translator)

It is regrettable that the crowd at this time was irresponsible and ignorant; on top of this, it was night time. Amidst the jeering of the soldiers, some even threw rocks at them, and it appears that from the soldiers' side there were warnings; they didn't listen, and in addition they threw more stones; because of this, tear gas was thrown. As the crowd was frightened and began running, shots were fired. One died and nine were injured, some seriously, some lightly. The incident was instantly in army hands, and the crowd was given the bad name of mob. The six negotiators were called mob leaders, and instead of being released, ~~they~~ they were thereupon arrested. The Center was immediately placed under martial law, and all gatherings were prohibited; it was announced that visitors were also prohibited. At the time the negotiators were sent out, it was agreed that in the event the negotiations were unsuccessful, the whole working system of the Center would go under a strike. But when it came to carrying this out, opposition appeared. We can't live without eating, or what should we do about the children and such other poor excuses were offered by those opposing the strike and these oppositionists won out eventually, and at present while

Manzanar (58) Addenda

the rest of the working departments are on strike, the mess halls only are all open. There are many fellows who say even if we are stepped on, even if we are beaten, so long as we are able to eat we'll bear up under whatever may happen. It is a very sad state of affairs. While there was a lot of ~~high sounding~~ talk about the negotiators in the beginning, when they didn't come back, it seems everyone forgot about them, so they give that appearance.

Japanese Relocation Papers
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The families of these men who made the sacrifice get cheap sympathy after this affair. It's just as if you threw cold water on a frog's face, much the people who think only about being able to eat, care about them! One more died from serious injuries afterwards. The families of the 'inu' one by one began to be called out of the Center, and at the present time these number between 70 and 80. The Administration announces that it is for their protection, but we the people wonder what the reason for their going too is, and people are saying, so they were 'inu' and those people were 'inu' too, or at least we are finding this all out just now.

It was announced by the Center administration that assistant project director Campbell resigned.

From Washington's W.R.A. the deputy director met with the negotiators representing the whole center. The truth of the incident was not revealed in the press and radio, except the rumor that the incident was a first year celebration of Pearl Harbor. But it was agreed that the truth would be broadcast from the capital to the entire nation. The Spanish consul is investigating the truth of the incident.

Addenda
Manzanar (1-a) Tanaka

Chicago, Illinois 3/1/43

Copied

Answers to Questions
Grodzins letter 1/21/43

No. 12-- Page 59: Reaction of the community when the WCCA left and WRA took over. It should be remembered here that the change in administrations had little direct meaning to the majority of evacuees. The comparatively few who had made contacts and acquaintances with departmental heads expressed disappointment; they said: "Just when we get to know and understand our officials, they have to leave us." Among evacuee administrative employees, a farewell dance was held honoring the departing Project Director, Clayton Triggs; the Assistant director, Harry Black; Service director, Mervin Kidwell, and several others. War Relocation Authority officially supplanted Wartime Civil Control Administration on June 1, 1942. The new director, Roy Nash, arrived at Manzanar a week earlier; in the fire-break adjoining Block 8, he made his first public speech. In it he outlined his own background in the Indian Service and made a significant promise: "The area extending from the camp grounds boundary to the foot of the High Sierra will be opened to you people so you will no longer have to feel confined and cramped within the limited space of the Center." This word spread throughout Manzanar quickly. Aside from anticipation of the new freedom and expectations of a more "liberal policy", interest in the change of administration was not particularly conspicuous. Despite the personal popularity of Clayton Triggs as project director, W.C.C.A. was not popular in the minds of the evacuees generally. Physical conditions and facilities at the relocation center in March, April, and May were crude and undeveloped; food was frequently bad and the subject of constant griping; linoleum

Addenda
Manzamar (2-a) Tanaka

flooring had not been laid, barracks were still to be insulated. Promises were being made constantly, and broken as often; or, as harried administrators put it, they remain unfulfilled "because of the war emergency." While it may be debatable whether a large portion of the evacuee population was actively interested in the change to the WRA, the reaction generally was more favorable than not. Comment typical at the time: "The W.R.A. is more independent from army control than the W.C.C.A.; we'll get a break." "The W.R.A. being a civilian agency, is more liberal. Didn't you hear what the new director, Roy Nash, said?" "Maybe we'll get our plasterboard and linoleum flooring now." "There should be enough milk for the children in the mess halls, shouldn't there, now with it known that this is to be a permanent relocation center and not an assembly center."

No. 13 -- Page 59: Tayama himself acknowledged the unpopularity and stigma apparently attached to his name shortly after his arrival at the Center in April. By June, that unpopularity had grown, rather than diminished. Upon his arrival at Manzamar, he found himself snubbed by administrative officials whose ears had been reached by the anti-J.A.C.L. group weeks earlier. He remained unemployed for several weeks. "Everywhere I go," he said at an informal J.A.C.L. meeting in May, "they're jealous that I'll take their jobs away or something. Did you ever see anything so petty in your life?" There is no doubt that pre-evacuation rivalries had carried over. Tayama's unpopularity, however, was further intensified as the result of his break with Ted Akahoshi, then chairman of the Block Leaders' Council.

No. 14 -- Page 62: Tanaka and Tayama were first appointed to serve on their respective commissions: Tanaka to the Commission on Self

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Manzanar (3-a) Tanaka

Government, Tayama to the Manzanar Work Corp Assembly. These appointments were later confirmed by an election. In Tanaka's case, he was elected by the residents of Block 36-0 (on which he lived) as one among three representatives. In Tayama's case, he was elected by the workers in his department. Both cases paralleled each other in that both Tanaka and Tayama became chairmen of their respective bodies as the result of the resignations of their predecessors. When Henry Tsurutani, legal adviser for the center, resigned as Chairman of the Commission on Self-government to go out on sugar beet furlough, Tanaka, as vice-chairman, succeeded to the chairmanship. When Hiroshi Neeno, a block leader of block 32, resigned as Chairman of the Manzanar Work Corps Assembly to sign up for sugar beet work, Fred Tayama was elected by the assembly as his successor.

No. 15--Page 65--Kurihara's prognostications of the riot. The story was widespread throughout the camp among evacuees at least a month before the final outbreak. In September (this date will have to be checked when my files arrive--TT) a Frank Kuwahara, evacuee from San Fernando, California, to the Poston Relocation Center, and then head of the proposed guayule rubber project at the Arizona camp, visited Manzanar with Professor Robert Emerson of the California Institute of Technology. At that time, Kuwahara paid a personal visit to Tanaka. Among other things, he said: "I've just been over visiting with Joe Kurihara, and he says that one of these days they're going to get a list of fellows here who have been acting as agents for the F.B.I. He says that you're one of them he's going to get, and I told him he was wrong, that I had known you for several years and would stake my life on it that you were all right; I don't know about Fred Tayama, but

Addenda
Manzanar (4-a) Tanaka

I told him to strike your name off the list."

In November, when the volunteers left for enlistment and training at Camp Savage, Minnesota, one of the newly-inducted U.S. soldiers, Koji Ariyoshi, told documentary historian Joe Masaoka that he had been approached shortly before his departure by Joe Kurihara. Ariyoshi reported that Kurihara had said: "The riot we're going to pull off here at Manzanar will be a hundred times worse than the Poston riot; you wait and see!"

No. 16 -- Page 69: There are several versions of the expression; those most frequently heard were:

"Beikoku seifu no yuukoto wa shinyo nai."

"Beikoku seifu no happyo wa uso happyaku."

"Nani shinyo ga aruka? Beikoku seifu!" (derisive)

No. 17-- Administrative personnel.

Roy Nash was the second project director. His administration was everything but successful. He openly admitted to his assistant director, Ned Campbell (according to Campbell) that he "couldn't understand these people; they keep harping on the fact I have been an Indian administrator as if they resented it." He began his administration with a well-delivered public speech, an effectively written editorial in the Manzanar Free Press; and he won the reputation as a gallant partner on the dance floor at the increasing number of social functions blossoming in the dust of Manzanar. Despite all this, however, he was unpopular almost from the beginning. His fellow administrators who worked under him said he was "officious and hard to approach". The block leaders who

Addenda
Manzanar (5-a) Tanaka

consulted with him on evacuee resident manners described him almost unanimously as "dictatorial, high-handed, irritable." He was sharp of tongue, according to evacuee office workers; furthermore, he was handicapped by defective hearing, leading to many misunderstandings. In June and July he built up a relationship with those immediately around him that was far from a favorable reflection upon his popularity. Robert Brown, then Assistant in Charge of Project Reports, and the public relations man for the center, accompanied Roy Nash on a trip to Idaho in July. The purpose of the trip was to make arrangements in connection with Manzanar's first group of volunteer sugar beet workers. Returning from that trip, Brown commented: "Nash is a queer duck; he's one man you just can't get close to. I went on that trip just to become acquainted better with him so that we could work on some of these problems with better understanding. I've ended up just about where I started. He's a blank and a question mark." A reporter on the Manzanar Free Press recalled this experience: He had gone to Roy Nash's office on the first day of W.R.A. administration, and had said: "I've come to congratulate you, Mr. Nash, on the very fine speech you made in the firebreak recently, and to wish you success. I should like to have an interview with you whenever you are not busy." The reply from Nash is said to have been: "Well, can't you see I'm busy now? Come back in 1945; I'll have time then." An accumulation of unpleasant personal experiences with some evacuees, on the other hand, was balanced by pleasant relationships with others. Members of the medical staff, for instance, said: "Mr. Nash certainly has been working hard to get us our facilities; we've got to hand it to him; he's been very nice to us too." While this balance existed in his relations with evacuees, there was no such equilibrium in his

Addenda
Manzanar (6-a) Tanaka

relations with the public officials and people of Inyo County. He succeeded unwittingly in antagonizing George Savage, editor of the Lone Pine Independent and the Bishop newspaper; he referred to Savage as "a hicktown country editor" and disparaged the local citizenry in his private conversations, so the word among administrative officials went. Editor and Publisher Savage attacked W.R.A. in general and Roy Nash in particular, almost at every turn. He reached an influential statewide group through the Newspaper Publishers Association of which he was a leading member. The ordinary federal vs. local clash of interests arising out of a situation such as the Manzanar project created was further intensified by the personality factors: George Savage vs. Roy Nash. While these developments were growing, Roy Nash had his hands full within the Center as growing dissatisfactions over conditions tended toward unrest and disturbance among evacuees. In the first summer strikes in the camouflage net factory, Director Nash pulled a boner in the handling of a delicate situation. The strike and interruptions had thrown production completely off schedule. The job of administrators was to get the factory reopened and running in proper order. Pressure was on from the U.S. Engineering Department and the Army. Roy Nash took to the microphone and platform; addressing a gathering of camouflage workers, he began his speech: "San Francisco has just been bombed by enemy Japanese planes; the destruction and deaths resulting from the bombing were far greater than expected, due to the lack of camouflage nets. (at this point, many in the audience, shocked to hear the news, departed, and presumably to spread the news, failing to hear what followed). This is only an imaginary headline article, but it COULD happen, and the

blame for it could very well rest upon the shoulders of you who fail to turn out these nets." The Director's flair for the dramatic was apparently not well-timed. His appeal was a dud; it drew practically no willing response; on the contrary, it aroused new antagonisms and resentments. "What does that guy think we are? Handing us a line like that!" was a typical comment. His speech was the subject of center-wide discussion for weeks afterward. The camouflage strike muddled along, corrected itself in spite of the Director's efforts, rather than because of them, in the opinion of evacuees generally. The housing situation reached its critical peak in July and August, and Roy Nash was the frequent object of verbal torpedoing by overcrowded evacuees. The capacity load of 10,000 persons had been passed. It was not uncommon to find three families, comprising twelve or thirteen persons, occupying a single room, 20 feet by 20 feet, without partitions or even sheets between cots to give privacy. Promises of alleviation through opening of new blocks and emptying of barracks on block 1 could not, or at least were not, fulfilled 'on schedule'. Roy Nash was blamed. Talk soon spread among the hoodlum element of the Center that "the Director makes a good target for rotten tomatoes when he's up there making those fancy speeches." The word apparently reached the Director's office. Roy Nash quit making speeches within the center. When he suddenly resigned, without previous warning or notice to evacuees, and accepted the position with the Board of Economic Warfare in Washington, D.C., Roy Nash left Manzanar quietly, almost unnoticed. He said farewell to two persons, one of them an evacuee, another an administrative official. His parting was in marked contrast to the fanfare of his entry.

Addenda
Manzanar

(8-a) Tanaka

The temporary directors who 'filled in' after Roy Nash were: (1) Harvey Coverley, a former San Francisco investment broker, a graduate of Hollywood High School and Stanford University, a resident of Sasalito (spelling should be checked--TT) and the Regional Director of the Community Services Division for the War Relocation Authority. A man in his late forties and of apparently liberal persuasion, Coverley remained at Manzanar long enough to supervise the work of the Commission on Self Government set up by Roy Nash, to conduct W.R.A. Director Dillon Myer on a tour of the camp, to receive reports of the first rumblings of disorder and violence. His contact with residents at large was chiefly in connection with the work of the Commission on Self Government. He addressed a meeting of block managers and representatives; he answered questions in precise, clipped English, was meticulously correct in his manners, a gentleman in appearance, cordial and open in his willingness to discuss matters with evacuees. But he was not as direct and forthright as some residents demanded he be. The question was raised at a meeting: "Suppose we don't want this Charter for Self-Government? Suppose we vote it down because we think this is a prison camp and any self-government is a joke? Then what?" Coverley's reply was not completely understood: "It is the policy of the War Relocation Authority, and as the acting director here I have the authority vested in me, to make it clear to you all that it is not the intention of the United States government to force anything upon you people that you do not want. We feel, however, that self-government will permit you to exercise a rightful voice in the affairs of your own community; therefore, it has been decided to permit you to draw up your own charter and to elect your own representatives."

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(9-a) Tanaka

The interrogator came back: "But I'm asking you, suppose we vote down this Charter that your Commission on Self Government has drawn up? That would mean we don't want any Self Government."

Coverley: "If this Charter is voted down, then I will consider it my duty to appoint another Commission; or set up a procedure whereby the people can elect their own representatives to serve on the Commission. They can then draw up another Charter or amend this one.

No, voting down this Charter would not necessarily mean that the people are against Self Government. It could mean they do not approve of the Charter in its present form and would like to draw up another one."

Evacuee Interrogator: "But if we don't want a Charter, if we don't want any self-government, and you still insist on us having one, then you're just cramming it down our throats, aren't you?"

Coverley: "It is not the intention of the War Relocation Authority to cram anything down anyone's throat. This policy on self government is the product of months of study and consultation by the heads of the government agency entrusted with your welfare, and you may be assured that nothing of the sort ~~if~~ is contemplated."

Harvey Coverley never brought his family to live with him at Manzanar. He was never considered by evacuees as a permanent director, but rather it was known and expected that he would be merely a temporary head. In his last week at Manzanar, he was still wrestling with the problem of growing opposition to the Charter on Self Government. One day he commented to the Chairman of the Commission on Self Government: "Have you heard the latest one? Some of the opponents are against our Charter because they claim that Japan is going to win the war. And if they vote for the Charter, it will be used by the United States government as propaganda showing how well the Japanese were treated

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in these camps. They think then that they will be punished by the Japanese government. On the other hand, if they refuse to vote for the Charter and have it 'crammed down their throats', then they can see, 'we were against it but were forced to accept it.' Isn't that interesting? The only thing they don't know is that Japan isn't going to win the war."

Harvey Coverely was neither unpopular nor popular in the sense that he had numerous enemies or loyal friends among the evacuees. His personality was unlike Roy Nash; he was not extreme, rather he was a 'middle of the roader'. He was more accessible than Director Nash, although he also required appointments in advance. (The first Director under WCCA, Clayton Triggs, never required appointments in advance, anyone apparently could walk into his office any time and be fairly well assured of an audience.)

(2) Dr. Solon Kimball

--More to Kum@--

Addenda

Manzanar

(11-a)

Tanaka

Chicago, Illinois 3/2/43

Answers to Questions

Grodzins letter 1/21/43

No. 17-- Administrative personnel (continued)

(2) Dr. Solon Kimball--as an administrative official from the San Francisco Regional Office of War Relocation Authority, Dr. Solon Kimball had been known as head of the self-government section prior to his succeeding Harvey Coverley as Acting Project Director. He had visited Manzanar several times, on each occasion to lay the groundwork for the drafting of a Charter and the formation of Center self-government. It was apparently considered a logical step to have him take over direction of Center affairs at a time when the self-government Charter was scheduled to come up for a community-wide vote. A scholar and gentleman, Dr. Kimball was highly regarded by the comparatively few evacuees with whom he came into contact during his brief tenure. He did not stay long, however, and was succeeded in late November by Ralph Merritt, whose appointment culminated an extended fight between local interests and Washington-sent appointees. The local interests had finally placed their man in the Project Director's chair.

(3) Ralph Merritt-- Manzanar's internal troubles which first began to stew under WCCA's Clayton Triggs, gather steam under Roy Nash, continue to boil during the brief interlude filled by Harvey Coverley and Solon Kimball, finally spilled over shortly after Ralph Merritt's appointment as Project Director of Manzanar. Up to the time of the riot, Ralph Merritt had made a commendable impression upon the block managers of the Center. The word went around the camp that he was a "man of character and integrity." The older Japanese appeared to respect him more than the two immediate predecessors; in the first place,

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Merritt's age and gray hairs commanded issei attention and respect. A man of persuasive manners, he appears to have convinced the block leaders of his sincerity in looking out for the welfare of evacuees. However, he was handicapped by being new to the job at a critical time and depended almost entirely for guidance and advice upon the man who had played a large role in his appointment, Robert Brown, Assistant in Charge of Project Reports, a 'local man', resident of Bishop, admittedly ambitious politically. Merritt also is handicapped by poor health.

(4) Ned Campbell was Assistant Project Director at the time of the riot. A man in his thirties, imposing physically, bluff of appearance and manners, he was not generally regarded with respect, either by the Issei or the Nisei. He had the reputation for being a "smooth talker", although "he doesn't always make sense." Ned Campbell had friends among the evacuees, but he had more enemies. His efforts to smooth out the camouflage net factory troubles brought a round of evacuee criticism about his head; his standing at Manzanar was not enhanced by his speaking appearances in these difficulties. Curiously enough, both the J.A.C.L. faction and the anti-J.A.C.L. (Yamaguchi-Ueno-Kurihara) group appeared to share a mutual dislike of Campbell. The feeling of the former was based, not only on an accumulation of personal experiences, but upon the several incidents in which Campbell, in a bid for popularity among the older generation, promised them "protection from the guys who think they're F.B.I. agents in camp here." At a number of meetings in the first months of his administration at Manzanar, Campbell roundly denounced the citizen J.A.C.L. element for "waving the flag too damned much." At one interview with an ardent J.A.C.L. supporter, Campbell said: "You guys wear your patriotism on your sleeve too much. The sooner you realize that you boys haven't a ghost of a chance on the outside today,

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the quicker you'll all settle down with the older generation and work more closely together. You're all in the same boat. Just because you're citizens doesn't mean you're any better. If any of you fellows are spies or stooges for the F.B.I., you might as well get the idea out of your head. The W.R.A. is running things here." Subsequently, however, in September and October, Campbell appears to have changed his views and seems to have come into closer harmony with the J.A.C.L. group. He dismissed as "an interesting case", the growing threats of Joseph Kurihara, with whom he sympathized. Regarding Kurihara, Campbell said to the Documentary Historians in September: "Hell, if you guys were Joe Kurihara, I'll bet you'd feel just the same way as he does. I know I would. After he's served his country in a war, well, he's got some justice in his griping about his predicament today. It's just as if you'd saved me from getting killed in a street fight and I'd rewarded you by kicking you in the gutter." Campbell lived in the Center with his wife and baby, but he often admitted that he had other interests than being Assistant Project Director. He said he had filed for a number of additional civil service positions for which he was preparing himself. He frequently gave indications that he was either not too certain of his tenure at Manzanar or was anxious to move on to better things. At one time, as he was preparing to go out on a week-end hunting trip with two Army Air Force officers, he commented: "Hell, who knows, maybe I'll be getting a commission in the Army soon."

When the riot broke, Campbell and Joe Winchester, chief steward, became the two Caucasian administrative scapegoats of the mob. The lives of both, like the death and black list individuals, were in danger and required military protection. While Winchester shared the spotlight with Campbell, the main force of anti-administration

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sentiment among evacuees appears to have been directed against Campbell, who resigned his position within a few days. Winchester stayed on. Deserved or not, the blame for the riot, in the minds of evacuees after December 6, appears to be centered largely on Campbell and Winchester. The following letter, written by an evacuee (whose identity is unknown to me; but the receiver of the letter is known and reliable) is typical of Manzanar sentiment:

"Dear Mr.-----

"Here's taking it for granted that you enjoyed the Holiday Season. Also, I wish to thank you for the nice Christmas card. When this hectic war ends, I would someday like to meet your friend W----- and some of your other Indian friends. I hope that day comes soon. For the quicker this war ends, the better off we should all be.

"I guess that you have been told of the true picture of what happened here in Manzanar last month. The newspapers were not correctly informed of what happened and its causes. To put it briefly, there was the main object of stamping out chiseling on Food Shortages. There was a couple of Caucasian officials who were taking food that rightfully was destined to go to the mess halls in the center. I get my story from good authority that these men would take 50# of sugar 50# to 75# of meat, etc at one time, and the kitchen cooks were trying to put an end to this chiseling, as it was taking food out of the evacuees' mouths. And Heaven only knows that what we get on the whole isn't too much. In typical 'story book' fashion, one of these Caucasian officials had one of the spokesmen jailed on false pretenses of his being a 'rabble rouser'. Well, this naturally irked his compatriots to going down to the Police Station and demanding his release. There was a bit of misunderstanding and the M.P.'s were called out to keep peace and order. Tense moments those must have been, and tear gas bombs were released, and manyb innocent bystanders were shot. Two were killed as a result of this unfortunate incident. Many of my friends who were there tell me that to Begin with, there wasn't any need of calling the army in. And secondly, that there wasn't any provocation for firing upon the crowd.

"The events that followed were more or less personal grudges between the evacuees. And as a result of

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(15-a)

Tanaka

mob psychology, many innocent people were put
in a very unfavorable light, for the present
and for the future..."

--more to kum--

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Manzanar

(16-a)

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Chicago, Illinois 3/3/43

(5) Joseph Winchester was a pioneer arrival among the Manzanar administrative staff. Like public relations director Bob Brown, he had been placed on the staff under W.C.C.A. and the Center's first Project Director, Clayton Triggs. He did not start out as Chief Steward. He succeeded to the job after several predecessors had involved themselves in administrative squabbles which were anything but conducive to evacuee regard for Manzanar officials. Just before he became Chief Steward, the mess division had been in a turmoil as the result of the presence of two chief stewards, one man a hold-over from the W.C.C.A., the other sent down from the San Francisco Regional office; at least this was the story which went the rounds of evacueeworkers in the division who admitted they were confused by the situation. Rumors of "food chiseling" were already ~~being~~ being heard; the veracity of these reports, however, was never upheld in any of the check-ups made by the documentary historians. Winchester's involvement in the Dec. 6 riot can be traced largely to his relationships with Harry Yoshio Ueno on one hand and with Thomas G. Tayama (brother of Fred Tayama) on the other. Winchester held Ueno in rather low esteem. "The guy's a troublemaker sure as the day is long; on top of that he's pro-Japan," Winchester described Ueno. On the other hand, Winchester appointed Tom Tayama as his right hand man, regarded him highly. Tom Tayama had succeeded his brother Fred as proprietor of the U.S. Cafe chain in Los Angeles, ^{before war,} was experienced in business, knew the ropes of food distribution for the mess halls, ^{at Manzanar} Furthermore, he knew how to get along with administrative officials; his political persuasions, nationally and internationally, paralleled those of his older brother Fred. The picture ^{of Winchester's role in the riot build-up} was complicated also by the fact that another Tayama brother, older than Tom, but younger than Fred, was chef of mess hall 24. Ueno repeatedly raised the charge that favoritism

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was being played by Tom Tayama in the distribution of food, particularly meat and sugar; mess hall 24 was alleged to be getting more than its share. The charge was not only denied, but figures, based on official tallies of diners, were brought out to disprove the accusations which nevertheless persisted. The Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi faction, working through the mess hall union (which, incidentally, never received administration recognition) had instigated, at the time of the riot, a movement to oust Tom Tayama from his job as Assistant Steward and Harry Tayama from his job as chef of mess hall 24. Heartened by the demonstrations of followers in the week preceding the riot (at various meetings held throughout the center), the group was rumored also to be planning to 'get Joe Winchester fired'.

(6) Robert Brown, as of this date (3/3/43) is Acting Project Director of Manzanar. When Project Director Ralph Merritt is sufficiently recovered from illness and a more recent appendectomy to be active, Brown resumes his post of Acting Assistant Project Director. His influence in directing administration of the center is probably unequalled. He started out as public relations director, a job secured through his contact with Tom Clark, civilian coordinator of alien enemy control unit, Western Defense Command, early in 1942. Prior to the appointment, he had been secretary of the Inyo-Mono Association, a tourist trade promotion undertaken by the two counties; he was also a free lance magazine contributor, a former press agent and orchestra player, and a one-time high school English teacher. Married, father of two children, Brown is a resident of Bishop and indulged in the local politics of Owens Valley. From the outset of the Manzanar project, he served as the spearhead of the efforts to place local men into federal jobs opened up by the camp. These efforts came into con-

flict immediately with the early tendency toward placing appointees from Washington or the San Francisco Regional Office into administrative jobs. When the W.C.C.A. first took over the job at the opening of the camp, a Citizens Committee of Owens Valley was formed, at the invitation of the Army and Tom Clark's office to bring about cooperation between local and federal interests and to create understanding throughout the valley of the necessity for such cooperation. Chairman of that Committee was Ralph Merritt. Robert Brown was also on that committee, as was George Savage. That these local leaders anticipated a reasonable share of political plums, either in the form of patronage or jobs in some cases, increased business in other cases, was openly acknowledged in all quarters. Roy Nash's inability to win over the support of Robert Brown inevitably found its repercussions in the antagonism against Nash and the W.R.A. voiced by editor George Savage. Brown commuted the 35 miles between his home in Bishop and the Manzanar Center daily; he kept his fingers on the pulse of public opinion and community sentiment of the Valley; he was constantly active in building and cementing contacts with Washington and San Francisco Regional officers of War Relocation Authority. To those who worked for and with him, he was in the habit occasionally of intimating that one day he would be in the driver's seat, or much closer by than presently. It was a favorite expression of his to say: "Now if I were running things here, it would be done this way...."

Brown's relations with evacuees themselves were limited to the department which he supervised: Office of Reports and Publications. The total personnel numbered around 45. As the original sponsor of the first relocation center newspaper, the Manzanar Free Press, Brown was responsible for the activities of the camp's newsgathering staff; he was also the immediate superior of the two Manzanar Documentary Historians. Through

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Manzanar (19-a) Tanaka

these evacuee workers, he kept himself informed generally of conditions, problems, sentiments among residents. He was comparatively little known, almost unknown, among the larger portion of the older generation at Manzanar--until after the December 6 riot when he suddenly shot up into the position of Acting Project Director.

Among the small group of evacuees who knew him, having worked under him, Brown was one of any number of things; to some he was a hard-working young public relations director anxious to see that the "Nisei got a fair break"; to others he was "just a job-hunting politician who's out to look after Number One, himself"; to still others he was "a reactionary Republican chamber of commerce mouthpiece who promoted a job that's too big for him"; to still others he was "a nice guy who will look out for you if you're his friend". These were comments generally heard among the English-speaking younger generation in discussing various project officials. Beyond such expressions, however, Brown, prior to December 6, 1942, was a minor official whom few people except the workers on the Manzanar Free Press took notice of.

--More to kum--

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Manzanar (20-a) Tanaka 3/4/43 Chicago, Illinois

Answers to Questions
Grodzins letter 1/21/43

No. 18 -- The Caucasian 'splits'. The administrative feuds at Manzanar were fairly common knowledge among evacuees. They were based on a mixture of personality clashes and differences of opinion regarding an as yet undefined policy. From the outset, there appears to have been marked contrasts in the thinking among administrators as to whether the Manzanar Relocation Center was to be a prison camp, temporary segregation mill, or quasi-permanent 'model community' born out of wartime emergency conditions. Out of these differing concepts grew contradictory decisions in every day administration. Added to these was the ever-present fight for control and power, a fight intensified by the fact that duties and jurisdictions of administrative officials were not clearly defined from above. Thus Manzanar had the spectacle of a personnel and employment officer entering into lively dispute with the community services head as to who should run the center's medical unit; they had both received overlapping instructions. Such minor disputes were frequent and understood quite readily by the English-speaking younger generation evacuees without disrupting routine activities; to the older Japanese-speaking generation, however, such conflicts tended to build up the picture of a corrupt and graft-seeking 'white' administration victimizing helpless Japanese. The 'color line' was, no doubt, drawn much more sharply and vividly in the minds of the Issei, and Caucasian splits, with charges and counter-charges flying through the center, only

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Manzanar (21-a) Tanaka

contributed to the general breakdown of respect for the heads of that administration. Thus it was, that by December 6 when the riot blossomed into large-scale demonstrations, the handful of individuals on the 'death and black lists' were universally regarded as 'pro-administration' or 'stooges'. One of the more interesting earlier splits was the feud carried on between Project Director Roy Nash and Chief of Police Kenneth Horton. Nash was a man in his fifties, Horton in his thirties. Nash was a federal appointee (a 'Washington man'), Horton was a native of Bishop (a 'local man'). Nash came to Manzanar when the War Relocation Authority took over on June 1. Horton had been entrenched in his job from the beginning of the project under the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Physically and temperamentally, the two men were diam^{et}etric opposites. Horton was large of build, tall of stature, a six-footer weighing over 200 pounds. Nash was short, about five feet four inches, and slight. It was the common topic of conversation among evacuee policemen working under Horton that "the Chief refers to Nash as the 'midget'". This apparently was meant in a derisive sort of way. Temperamentally, Horton was comparatively slow, good natured, plodding. Nash was inclined to be quick, sharp, impatient. What went on at the early meetings between the two men may never be known, but it was soon known and confirmed that Chief of Police Kenneth Horton was conspicuously omitted from the list of administrators summoned ~~to~~ the regular staff meetings. Arrests made by his patrolmen were summarily taken out of the jurisdiction of the police and placed in the hands of the community services division. In numerous smaller details, the police department was being ignored and side-stepped to the extent that one day Horton commented to the documentary historians: "We might just

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Manzanar (22-a) Tanaka

as well abolish the police station and the whole department. As a matter of fact, that's what I think that guy Nash is trying to do, or at least get me out of this job. What good is it going to do if one of my men go out and arrest a hoodlum only to have the troublemaker turned loose and mollycoddled by the community services division? On top of that, we've asked for, and been promised uniforms, badges, clubs, even horses for some of our patrolmen. But what's come of it, nothing, absolutely nothing!"

On the other hand, Roy Nash had nothing to say about Kenneth Horton, at least publicly. He remained non-committal, inaccessible. 'No comment' he remarked. His actions, however, spoke for him. It was not long before Kenneth Horton was no longer Chief of the Manzanar department of Internal Security. His assistant chief also went out with him.

A much milder feud, hardly approaching the Nash-Horton clash in either intensity or openness to public view, was the relationship existing between Ned Campbell, assistant project director, and Thomas M; Temple, chief of the community services division. Ideologically, the two men were not so far apart; they both subscribed to the similar political philosophies, both had democratic concepts of equality of treatment for evacuees. But each differed in procedure and the manner in which the War Relocation Authority program was to be executed. It was shop talk among evacuee office workers that the feeling expressed over the line between the office of Community Services in barrack 3 of block 1 and the Assistant Project Director's office in the Administration building was everything but cordial. When the new Administrative offices were ready for occupancy, the Community Services Division, second only to the Mess division in number of employees, was

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noticeably left out of the new building. Space had been allocated by the Assistant Project Director's office. Of the two men, there is no room for doubt that Thomas Temple was held in high regard by evacuees generally, whereas Ned Campbell was not. Temple had a loyal following in his department. Campbell had succeeded in antagonizing more evacuees than anyone else in the administrative personnel with the exception of Roy Nash. It is possible also that Campbell regarded Temple with no little apprehension in view of the fact the latter was the logical successor to his office; Temple had the highest civil service rating of any staff member after the Project Director and his Assistant. Thus, when the December 6 riot cost Campbell his job at Manzanar, the Campbell-Temple feud overnight became a Bob Brown-Temple duel. It was the old Federal vs. Local interests clash all over again. Campbell had 'played along' with the Owens Valley bigwigs; he had gone out of his way to soothe Lone Pine editor George Savage; he had, as he expressed it, 'soft-soaped' Bishop Rotarians, hobnobbed with Valley merchants, utilized public relations man Bob Brown to the extent of going to bat for Brown's \$200 plus monthly 'expense' account for the latter's gasoline bill, most of which was for Brown's daily commuting between the Center and Bishop. Nevertheless, he suddenly found himself nosed out of his job shortly after Dec. 6; he was none too happy over it. Bob Brown, with his old-time friend and 'boss' Ralph Merritt in the Director's office, was sitting squarely in the driver's seat. The important administrative decision pending was the selection of an Assistant Project Director. Thomas Temple was considered the most likely candidate, both among Caucasian administrative staff members and evacuees. What was not known was that, while no public announcement had

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been made, the appointment of Bob Brown as Acting Assistant Project Director had ^{already} been made. ~~even~~ Feeling between Bob Brown and Thomas Temple, even before the December 6 riot, was certainly not one of mutual admiration. On the contrary, Brown was inclined to look upon Temple as 'a social experimenter whose feet aren't on the ground.' The unflattering evaluation was returned, in measure, by Temple's regard for Brown as 'something of an upstart politician with little scruples and even less manners.' When the December 6 riot broke, Thomas Temple was enroute to Manzanar after a trip to New York. He got back to the Center in time to learn that Ned Campbell had been eased out of his post. He was aware that he was in line for the job though he stated he was not expecting to be appointed. It developed that he was the only administrative staff member with sufficiently high enough civil service rating to receive the appointment. He returned to Manzanar to discover that his secretary had been taken away from his office, most of his staff members transferred to other departments. He sat around for two days twiddling his thumb, sitting at his telephone in a deserted office; finally went over to his bungalow quarters in the administration residential barracks. Suddenly, at a staff meeting presided over by Mr. Merritt, he was astounded one afternoon to hear the Project Director announce that "Thomas Temple has resigned as head of the community services division." The word went through the Center that "Tempuru-san" was resigning. A petition circulated among evacuees, in the midst of the subsiding tension after the riot, to have him retained. In a sense, it was a petition similar to the one that had been collected with over 5000 signatures to retain Kenneth Horton in the previous months of the Horton-Nash feud. It did about as much good in preventing the discharge of Temple. "Resign? my eye! They fired me! kicked me out! A lot of funny shenanigans went

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Manzanar (25-a) Tanaka

on first. One of these days, you'll be hearing a Lone Pine boom about 'Bob Brown for Congress!' You just watch and see," Temple said privately on a brief visit to the Death Valley camp in one of his last official duties before leaving Manzanar. He volunteered some other comments on the situation then current: "The local rah rah boys have finally saddled themselves. They've got big signs up in Lone Pine: 'Help Run the Jap Camp' They're picking up barflies and street characters to take jobs in the Center. They're kicking out the evacuees from administration jobs, or at least from all the key positions so the Center won't be paralyzed again by any strike. The point is, however, they've been able to promote a lot of local patronage--you know, political plum jobs. That's going to finally set things right with the local interests. The pity is the victims and losers every time will be the people inside of Manzanar."

--more to kum--

TO BE TYPED
4/14/43

Addenda

Manzanar (26-a) Tanaka 4/10/43 Chicago

19. Caucasian-Japanese relations

From March through December, 1942, the issue of Caucasian-Japanese relations, from the viewpoint of evacuees, was an increasingly delicate subject. It was the focal point of internal controversy, even though it could not easily be seen on the surface--to an outsider. To evacuees of both generations, an intense degree of race consciousness had been impressed as a result of the mass evacuation.

From the outset, administrative regulations served to confirm, in the evacuee mind, the drawing of racial lines. One of the first things called to attention of early arrivals at Manzanar was the "White section" in the mess hall of block 1. In April and May, 1942, it became common talk among evacuees that "W.C.C.A. officials eat steak and potatoes while we get beans and rice in the same mess hall; they get waited on, we line up; hell, it wouldn't be so bad, but we're sitting side by side with only an aisle in between us. Sure, we wouldn't mind having to pay two-bits for a steak dinner; we'd rather have steak and pay for it rather than get this slop for nothing." (Conversation taken from a letter sent by an evacuee from Manzanar in April of 1942).

This talk became widespread enough for reports to reach administrative ears. It even reached the ear of Congressman Leland Ford (16th Congressional District, Southern California, defeated in 1942 by Will Rogers, Jr.) who visited

Manzanar during this period and was shortly heard from through Associated Press and United Press articles from Washington, D.C. criticizing this phase of the camp administration.

When War Relocation Authority administration supplanted the W.C.C.A., an announcement was issued to the camp stating that administrative officials eating in mess hall 1 would be served "the same food" as evacuees ate. It was subsequently announced that an "Administration Mess Hall" would be opened shortly where Caucasian personnel would eat.

Concurrently with this "race color" incident, evacuees, particularly the citizens, began to take notice of the construction of the Administrative living quarters on the south side of the camp. The area was being dotted with a dozen new barracks which were painted cream-colored, insulated, with double flooring, regulation walls, conventional doors (in contrast to the makeshift barn-like doors of the evacuee barracks), furnished with bath room (shower) kitchen. The fact that administrative personnel was required to pay rental apparently made no difference. Evacuees walking past the Administration area would point on the one hand, to the trim, cream-colored barracks flanked by green lawns, and on the other hand, to the black tar-paper covered barracks surrounded by dusty pathways and say: "See, if this isn't a race war, then what better example could you find than this contrast? White man lives in comparative luxury

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Manzanar (26-2a) Tanaka 4/10/43 Manzanar

while yellow man lives like this!"

Restrictions on travel outside the barbed wire confines also had the effect of emphasizing the racial aspects of the situation. The implied inferiority position in which evacuees considered themselves placed was confirmed on each occasion a crew of evacuee workers, the garbage disposal or boiler crew, for example, had to drive outside the camp area. As one young man stated: "I don't see why in the heck we can't even be trusted to go to the dump ourselves. Why the old guy that accompanies us as a chaperone is drunk half the time, he's about one-tenth as intelligent as the average nisei; it's just because he happens to be white that makes him more trustworthy; for cripes sakes, maybe the Japanese militarists have got something when they say they're fighting a race war."

In this atmosphere, evacuees who retained their Caucasian contacts, entertaining and receiving occasional Caucasian visitors who drove to the center from Los Angeles, Lone Pine, Santa Barbara and other areas along the coast, were comparatively few. Caucasian visits reached a peak at Manzanar in June, July and August of 1942. While Caucasian faces were not unfamiliar in the blocks within the center (they were most commonly seen in block 1 and around the administration area), an evacuee who had Caucasian visitors as often as once a week, was soon the subject of conversation among his Japanese neighbors. A certain degree of curiosity, not unmingled with some suspicion, was bound to arise.

At the outset, there were half a dozen mixed marriages (Caucasian-Japanese) at Manzanar. As military regulations changed and these marriages in cases where there were children were considered eligible cases for return to west coast homes, the presence of Caucasians living within the camp became a rarity.

When the schools opened, Caucasian-Japanese contacts were given a better opportunity to be placed on a friendlier plane. Nevertheless, administrative instructions to faculty members cautioned them against "fraternizing" with evacuees.

Among administrative officials, there seemed to be differences of opinion regarding what constituted "fraternizing." The group represented by Thomas M. Temple, then head of the Community Services Division, quietly ignored the administrative order; a constant stream of evacuees visited the Temple barrack in the administrative area.

When Ralph and Marry Smeltzer, both teachers in the school, were appointed by Temple to take charge of the Young Men's Association barrack on block 36 and live in that barrack, there was some surprise registered among several of the administrative personnel. "That's fraternizing! That's living with the evacuees", a cry went up. The idea of the Smeltzers, Caucasians, sharing the same type of living quarters, sharing the mess hall meals with evacuees, made a considerable impression upon residents of block 36. "They are real Christians; they are showing by example that they have our welfare at heart," was the common concensus.

Privately, however, the Smeltzers admitted that they had been the target of some criticism for "fraternizing". The Smeltzers did not remain at Manzanar very long after the disturbance of December 6 and the subsequent removal of Thomas Temple. In March, 1943, Mary Smeltzer arrived in Chicago, having resigned her teaching job at Manzanar, to open the Bethany (Church of the Brethren) Seminary hostel for evacuees being released on relocation. In April, 1943, her husband joined her, bringing from Manzanar several evacuees who had been placed in midwest jobs.

20. Pages 78 & 79

Examples of announcements which the block managers denounced and the Free Press praised:

(1) Shortly after the "kibei" meeting (held on a Friday), the then Project Director Roy Nash issued a bulletin declaring that henceforth all meetings would be conducted in English or, if in Japanese, with the presence of an interpreter. The "kibei" meetings was denounced by Nash as "disgraceful". The Free Press in an editorial commended Roy Nash for his stand and stressed the importance of respecting the administrative regulations. The block managers, most of whom spoke Japanese primarily, privately excoriated the new regulation; some even made it plain at their block meetings that it was "unfair."

(2) When the proposal for the Community co-operative store was first introduced, a series of editorials and releases in the "Free Press" made an appeal for community

support. The advantages of co-operative enterprises were explained at length by the Free Press. The Project announcements on the plans were praised. "This will be an opportunity for residents to not only save money, but to gain the valuable experience of cooperatives which may be of useful service in our post-war reconstruction," the Free Press said. Block managers, ostensibly in agreement on the need of lower prices in the canteen and department store, however soon succumbed to the vociferous protests and oppositions incurred in the various block meetings. Soon, several block managers were overheard agreeing: "This is just another plot on the part of the White man to impoverish us further; why should we have to pay to have our shoes repaired? When is the government going to give us clothing which was promised to us? If we have the stores open, then it means we will have to buy with our own money the things which the government should be furnishing us. We ought to vote against the co-operatives. We don't need them. This is no place for such foolish luxuries. This is a jail, and in a jail we aren't required to buy the necessities of life."

(3) Another outstanding example was the announcement on the plan for community self-government. The Free Press from the outset praised it. The block managers from the outset denounced it.

21. Page 86 : If one of the agreements reached at the first meeting between leaders of the mob and Project Director Ralph

Merritt was that there would be no further mass meetings, such an agreement was apparently not known to residents of the center. There is no record of any public announcements conveying such a message being made to the gathered residents. It is likely that the leaders with whom Merritt allegedly made such an agreement never made the announcement. The exact reason for the second meeting in firebreak 22 may be difficult to ascertain; it is probable that feeling ran high following the summoning of armed military guards at the time of the first descent upon the police station and the administrative area that people naturally continued to mill about and congregate. It is also apparent, from the evidence on hand, that the negotiating leaders were not unanimously agreed upon conditions reached with Merritt in the first meeting. Ueno had not yet been released, armed guards had been called out, and that was intimidation, wasn't it? so the word went about. It is also possible that the meeting was called in outright breach of confidence by the mob leaders.

22. Page 89: From the numerous eye-witness accounts of the events of Dec. 6, 1942, which I have been able to gather in conversations with ~~ev~~ relocated evacuees in Chicago during the past month (March), it becomes more and more evident that the mob split in the firebreak at block 22, one part proceeding toward the jail, the other to the hospital, both at the same time. I was not there at the moment and, of course, would not know definitely; but second-hand accounts indicate that such was the case.

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23. Page 96: My verbatim accounts-- Since 1936 when I began newspaper work, I have always made it a practise to carry with me a small notebook pad and pencil. At public meetings & lectures, I jot notes in longhand (I don't know shorthand but can cover a lot despite it). Conversations for reporting (in newspaper work) I always took down within a few minutes after termination. During the conversation I have made it a practise to make mental notes of any speech peculiarities or mannerisms, and to memorize certain portions of the conversation if they were considered of importance. At times, I have interrupted to request permission to write down a statement because I wanted to make an exact record.

24. Page 104: Hayakawa's statement that Merritt was within the police station during part of the evening meeting is confirmed by the then Police Investigator Jack Shimatsu who was in the station during the entire rioting. Shimatsu observed: "Merritt was no longer in charge of the proceedings after the military was summoned. Captain Hall was in complete charge; he was doing all the order-giving. But Merritt was around for quite a while."

25. Page 105 Sam Tateishi--

---More to kum---

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25. page 105 Sam Tateishi

The only material on this party which I have should be evaluated as second hand. It is largely hearsay common throughout block 23, Manzanar, during August, September, October and November, 1942. Tateishi was a block leader, then block manager of No. 23. A former resident of West Los Angeles where he was a gardener before evacuation, he was generally said to be a United States citizen, educated in Japan, (i.e. a kibe). He is a man in his middle thirties, married, father of one or two youngsters. He became prominent in his block during the early elections for leaders.

Physically, Tateishi was very unimpressive. He stood about five feet tall; slight of build, he weighed around 105 pounds; his hair was thinning in front and around the sides; some disparaging descriptions were current around his block: "There goes little billiard ball." Intellectually no one appeared to regard him as a giant either. He possessed, however, the faculty of standing successfully in the middle. Where strong personalities clashed and matched wits for some prize, it was usually Sam Tateishi who came up with the bone. He likewise appears to have had some gift of speech--in the Japanese tongue. Although he may not have effectively swayed large numbers of people, he seemed to be at his best in small mess hall gatherings of 100 persons or so. He was fairly well regarded among the older generation men--those who could

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speak only Japanese and hardly no English; Tateishi's English was below average for a Nisei.

Tateishi cut no ice with the younger generation English-speaking men of his own age. He quickly antagonized such individuals on his own block; he also lost no opportunity to "ride" such individuals when they attended block meetings by his sarcastic references to what he termed "our valuable, oh so valuable American citizenship."

A Japanese American Citizens League partisan at Manzanar, who lived on block 23, observed in October, 1942: "I never did trust that guy Tateishi; now he's out hobnobbing with Yamaguchi and Ueno. Something smells, if you ask me. Tateishi was never vocal in anything; he was one of those sneaky guys who opposed the J.A.C.L. before Pearl Harbor. After war, he came around to the League and wanted to know what he could do push the cause of Americanism. Huh! did some of us have a laugh. He was always a busy body snooping around. Young fellows resented him because he and his wife were always hatching up new matches; they seemed to think it was their God-given mission to be baishakunin"(Japanese marriage brokers or match makers).

The older men who were the mainstays of the Yamaguchi-Ueno-Kurihara group seemed to accept Tateishi as one of their number; he was to them one of the "strong" nisei who had the "guts and courage" to "stand up to the Administration and tell them where to get off instead of kowtowing all the time like the young Nisei."

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26. The Mess Hall Workers Union

The Manzanar mess hall workers union, from the standpoint of the role it played in the riot of December 6, was intended from the outset of its organization to become an instrument for internal control of the center by its organizers.

Aims of the union, as represented to the people within the barbed wire enclosure of Manzanar, were admirable and commendable. "We, the Japanese of Manzanar, should look after our own welfare; we who work in the mess halls have an important and responsible job; we should aim to safeguard our welfare by encouraging better conditions, better food for our families and children. We must be on guard to see that we are allotted our rightful share of food. We must have organization to have this done. We want your support in the mess hall workers union." (From a speech in Japanese made by Harry Yoshio Ueno to workers in mess hall 22 where initial steps were taken to form a union).

The union itself was associated from the outset with Harry Ueno and the group of men who surrounded him in the agitation of December 6. Ueno was a junior cook in mess hall 22, but he had ideas.

He felt, he said, that mess hall workers could not expect fair treatment from the Administration, in the matter of getting sufficient ration of food, unless they were organized. He had no sympathy and less confidence in the Fair Employment Practises (Work Corps Assembly) to represent mess hall workers. He also had his eye on the 1600 workers in the mess halls, con-

26. the mess hall workers union

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stituting the largest work division in the center.

Ueno also said privately: "Control the kitchens and you control Manzanar; feed the right people and win supporters to our beliefs. Starve the stoolpigeons; spit in the food of the pro-America saps; but treat our friends right and we'll have more friends. The best way to prove that we have the interests of the people at heart is to be able to treat them right--through their stomachs."

In contacting Caucasian administrative officers, however, organizers of the mess hall workers union employed a different line of approach. Ueno himself was not held with either sympathy or friendliness by Joseph Winchester, chief steward. However, other members of the organizing group, including several cooks and assistant cooks who were on speaking terms with Winchester, were apparently used to get across the idea: "We feel that if the Japanese themselves organized their own union, you would have better efficiency in the running of things. The purpose of the union is to permit you, the Caucasian administrators to be able to run things more smoothly. After all, we are not children; we are adults and we are perfectly able to manage and run things ourselves if you will give us free enough hands."

The technique of organization was a demonstration of energy and determination on the part of the organizers. Every chief cook and foreman (each mess hall had one of each) in all the blocks was initially contacted,

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in almost every case by Ueno himself. Evident care was taken to instill in the minds of each cook the seeds of suspicion: "Joe Winchester and Ned Campbell were seen loading sacks of sugar and a side of beef in their car from the warehouse the other night. Have you been getting all your requisitions?" It was not difficult to play upon the unpopularity of certain Caucasian staff members, to drop subtle hints there, to let slip intimations of thievery by administrative officials here.

This process of laying the groundwork for receptivity to the "unselfish, courageous young man who is willing to sacrifice himself so that the people of Manzanar can be properly fed" covered a period of approximately eight weeks. Then meetings were held in each of the mess halls--after lengthy informal discussions had been going on each day among small groups.

As Administrative officials, suspicious of the motives of the organizers and placing no confidence in the men themselves, refused to acknowledge the union as a bona fide group, Ueno and his associates played upon this opposition as evidence of Caucasian "monkey business"; they're stealing our food and because we want to find out about it, they don't want us to organize. Opposition beget opposition. In Mid-November, a representative of the mess hall workers union called at the office of the Manzanar Free Press and asked for use of the Free Press mimeograph machine to print a bulletin. This was refused; the organizers managed to get their bulletin mimeographed sub-rosa anyway.

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To the majority of the 1600 mess hall workers, the appeal made by the organizers was both powerful and moving. There was nonopen criticism of the union from within. There was a tendency to look with contempt upon the few evacuees in the mess hall division who appeared to have sided with Chief Steward Joe Winchester in refusing to recognize the union. By the time of the December 6 riot, there was little doubt where the sympathy of the mess hall workers union lay; there were differences of opinion, of course, as to the advisability of calling a mess hall workers strike on behalf of Ueno and others who had been jailed. But even those cooks and workers who succeeded in keeping the mess halls open "to feed our women and children", made no secret of the fact they felt some injustice had been done to evacuees by a Caucasian administration whose hands were probably "not clean."

27.-- Page 64 Commission on Self-Government

One of the last official acts of former Project Director Roy Nash before he left Manzanar was to select 17 residents to the "Manzanar Commission on Self-Government." These persons were named after a list of about 100 had been gathered by administrative officers and submitted to Nash. A few weeks after the announcement, Nash suddenly left Manzanar. The Commission of 17 persons met at the Town Hall, with Harvey Coverley, acting Project Director, to issue instructions drawn up by W.R.A. in Washington. Henry Tsurutani, lawyer and head of the evacuee legal department, was named

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chairman; Togo Tanaka, documentary historian, was named vice-chairman; Roy Takeno, assistant public relations director, secretary. The majority of commissioners were citizens; there were half a dozen non-citizens; curiously enough, there were no representatives of the "kibei" elements, a point brought to center attention in short order through a series of rumors reflecting unfavorable community sentiment over the method of selection. "That's a joke, it's supposed to be democratic self-government, yet look how they picked the commissioners!"

Acting Project Director Harvey Coverley stayed at Manzanar only long enough to attend half a dozen commission meetings at which details of the proposed Constitution or City Charter for Manzanar was drawn up. This work was largely technical in nature and required little contact with community sentiment, although all along there were being published in the Manzanar Free Press articles extolling the virtues of the proposed Charter. In one of the final Commission meetings, Coverley brought War Relocation Authority director Dillon Myer, who was visiting the Center that day, to sit in on the session of the group at the Town Hall. A vote was taken by the chairman on the completed draft of the Charter. It was unanimously for adoption. The parting remarks of the Chairman: "Each of us on the Commission, by his vote here in meeting has signified his willingness to be individually as well as collectively responsible for this document. It means also that each is personally responsible to accept the burden of being the target for the torpedoing that is likely to now ensue."

Coverley did not remain at Manzanar long enough to

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witness the torpedoing. That remained for the next Acting Project Director, Dr. Solon Kimball, who had fathered the idea of community self-government for the various centers.

It was Dr. Kimball who "honorably discharged" the commission after it was unanimously agreed by both commissioners and administrative heads that the usefulness of the Commission had ceased--with the drawing up of the Charter. It was the original plan to have the Commission vote itself out of existence AFTER the community had voted the Charter into existence as the official document by which the "City of Manzanar" would be governed. Opposition against numerous provisions within the Charter sprang up; notably, the non-citizen elements bitterly denounced the discrimination against them in permitting only citizens to become members of the governing legislative Council.

The proposed election to adopt or reject the Charter never was held.

In the meantime, the Commission muddled along, not too certain of its success, not sure of its continued usefulness.

At this time, each of the 17 members of the Commission received a note in Japanese, delivered through the mails, and signed by "the Blood Brothers Corps." While no actual violence was threatened by the notes, it was implied.

At a Commission meeting following initial receipt of these anonymous letters, the group, led by the non-citizen members, decided to dissolve itself in the form of a n

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"honorable discharge" which Dr. Kimball was requested to draw up and address to the Commission. This was done, and the Commission ceased to exist formally, although it remained quite indelibly in the ~~miasa~~ minds of the Yamaguchi-Ueno-Kurihara group.

28. Page 63 Opposition to Cooperatives

Outstanding opposition to the cooperatives at Manzanar was expressed in the block meetings. It should be kept in mind that block meetings were attended almost entirely by the Japanese-speaking, older, men of the center. It was predominantly non-citizen. It was almost entirely male. It was largely Japanese-speaking.

At best, opposition to the cooperatives did not constitute majority sentiment; it was usually the well-organized vocal 10 or 15 per cent.

The group associated with pro-axis political persuasions ~~was~~ was notably most vociferous at Manzanar in opposing the cooperatives.

Exclusive of this group were other individuals who nursed genuine concern over the continued ~~impoverishment~~ impoverishment of the population and the continued failure of the government to provide certain of the needs which had been promised evacuees, such as clothing, shoes, and even haircuts. (These ^{in many cases were} promises had never been definitely made by responsible ^{which} government agencies but had been repeated so often that evacuees had come to expect them)

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A small percentage of the opposition was composed of the "perpetual agin'ers", disgruntled, disillusioned individuals within the Center who lost no opportunity to voice their disillusionment through opposition to anything favored by constituted authority.

Prevalent arguments against the cooperatives during the months before the co-op was finally instituted:

"We don't need the canteen and dry goods stores; the luxuries they sell there are not necessary; they just make our young people spend more money."

"If the dry goods store is operated, then the government won't furnish us with clothing and many of the things they said they would; we ought to vote against the thing."

"Why should we operate a community shoe repair shop under the disguise of a cooperative? The government put us here; now make the government pay for our shoes."

"This is just another plot to make us poorer. We'll spend and spend and spend and when the war is over we'll have nothing left, let's vote against the cooperatives."

"Prices at the dry goods store have been sky high. Why I used to be in the grocery business. Ammonia was 10 cents a bottle. I sent my daughter to get a bottle yesterdayl they charged 25 cents. If that isn't highway robbery. I'm against the cooperatives." (The man had to have explained to him that since outbreak of war, ammonia costs had risen to that level, even on the outside.)

As may be seen from the foregoing, the opposition to the cooperatives was directed, not against the idea of cooperatives, but against the canteens and dry goods store as they were then being operated, against the government in general, against conditions having nothing or little to do with the question at hand. --(To be concluded next installment)--

29. Page 73-- The Judicial Committee

The exact role, function, and authority of the Judicial Committee were never quite clear in the minds of the people of Manzanar. Under Project Director Roy Nash, a board of "leading citizens" of the center was appointed to sit as a jury, more or less, in hearing cases of both civil and "criminal" nature. Its duties and jurisdiction were never distinctly established, either in writing or by practise. Penalty was meted out in the case of young hoodlums brought to "trial" before the Committee by order of the Project Director. The constant changing of the personnel of the Committee may be attributed to the changing administrations, the undefined and somewhat vague position it occupied, and also to the fact that its members were made comparatively easy targets of threats and intimidation from the 'gangster' element within the camp. Under the new proposed Community Council plan of government which was to have been set up, the Judiciary, designed to supplant the Judicial Committee, was empowered with certain specific penalizing powers. The charter which was to have set up the Community Council was never adopted.

30. The "Sugar Deal"

The sugar deal becomes important in relation to the intra-camp appeal made by the rioters on December 6. The accusation circulated throughout Manzanar on that day by the Kurihara-Ueno-Yamaguchi group that "Ned Campbell and Joe Winchester have been stealing our sugar" was an effective leverage

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in neutralizing pro-Administration sentiment and winning pro-Ueno adherents. For several weeks prior to the outbreak of the riot, small meetings had been organized and held in the mess halls. It was common knowledge throughout all 36 mess halls that the ration allotment on sugar was 8 ounces per person per week. Mess hall deliveries during October and November of 1942 were reported to have been based on a 7-ounces per person per week. This was in effect, it was announced by Chief Steward Winchester, to build up a surplus needed for use in the hospital, children's village.

The surplus was being stored in one of the food warehouses. The rumor had been circulated throughout camp that "Ned Campbell was seen loading sacks of sugar in his car from the warehouse at night." The truth of the rumor was never established; as a matter of fact, its source was traced to discussions in which Yoshio Ueno was chief ringleader.

One of the first public issues raised by the newly formed Mess Hall Workers Union, and one which it thoroughly exploited was the sugar situation. Ueno, along with five or six close followers, paid numerous calls on Winchester and Campbell, demanding that the full allotment of 8 ounces of sugar be distributed to the mess halls.

Additional rumors soon cropped up. "Meat is also being stolen."

In October, a Mr. Sasaki, block leader of 35, who was employed in the Steward's office, was suddenly removed from Manzanar on short notice. He was sent with his family to another relocation center. The Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group pointed to this sudden removal and said: "Sasaki knew

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too much about the sugar steal." Actually, however, close neighbors of the Sasakis said that cause of the removal was fear by the administration that domestic and marital difficulties in which the Sasakis were known to be embroiled might flare into another tragedy similar to the murder-suicide the previous month on the same block. The Sasaki case was similar, it was pointed out, in that it was an incipient "triangle." The best solution would be to remove the couple to more favorable surroundings in another camp.

Whatever the truth or falsity of the numerous rumors and charges that flew about the camp regarding the "sugar deal", it was pretty well implanted in the minds of the majority of older persons at Manzanar that "food is being taken from the evacuees by the Caucasian administrators." This may be a testimony to the successful propaganda of the Ueno-Yamaguchi-Kurihara group, or it may be the logical thing to expect under conditions existing within the confines of barbed wires and watchtowers.

Consequently, when the December 6 riot flared into violence, it was not difficult for Ueno's followers to sell the Manzanar residents on the line: "Harry Ueno is being made the goat; he is being falsely accused of the attack on Fred Tayama. The administration is using this as an excuse to get rid of him because he had the courage to stand up and tell them the truth."

The added fact that Tom G. Tayama, a younger brother of Fred Tayama, was the chief assistant steward under Joseph Winchester contributed to the personal elements which complicated

the general riot picture. Tom Tayama was also on the ration board which determined the amounts to be allotted to each of the mess halls. Ueno, in the midst of the charges over sugar, instigated a movement to have Tayama ousted from his position. "I don't trust Tom Tayama any more than I do his brother Fred," Ueno told his own block 22 mess hall fellow workers, and thus began openly to agitate for his removal. When Tom Tayama defended the Administration and the truth of the statements issued by Joseph Winchester regarding the need for building up the sugar surplus to feed the children of the orphanage as well as to meet hospital supplies, Ueno instantly raised the cry, "White man's stooge!" (Kettoh no inu).

El. Issei planning board

There was no Issei planning board as such at Manzanar up to the time of the riot. However, the block leaders council, later renamed the Block Managers Council, was for all practical purposes, an Issei planning board. The fact alone that the spoken language at most of the meetings was Japanese, is a fair indication of the dominance of the older first generation residents.

Also, as events developed through October and November, and it became evident that the likelihood of relocation was becoming brighter, the Issei assumed the status of "permanent residents for the duration" within the centers. By contrast, the younger second generation began thinking more in terms of resettlement, of "getting out of this place". This meant that more intense and lively interest in political and other

affairs centered around the Issei. In a sense "invisible government" existed in the form of the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi faction; it was rule, more or less, by coercion and intimidation. It was commonly accepted by the more sober-thinking elders that to take a particular position on some issues, particularly on such questions as enlistment in the United States Army by the nisei, was to invite threats of death and assault. For an issei to defend the position of the American-born Japanese as loyal citizens of the United States was an open invitation to be assaulted. Few issei, particularly those with families, cared to take such a risk. Thus, the majority of substantial, generally peace-loving and law-abiding elements were terrorized by the likelihood of hoodlum assaults. Furthermore, they accepted it. There was a feeling and sense of frustration and futility because it was generally believed that the Caucasian administration would not protect such individuals against attack from within the camp. Furthermore, ideologically, incentive to resist the arguments of the Ueno-Yamaguchi, Kurihara group does not, and never will, flourish behind confinement of machine-gunned watchtowers.

32. Tanaka

Personal grudges, a large accumulation of them, played a considerable part in the singling out of individuals within Manzanar for places on the "death" and "black" list of the December 6 riot. Togo Tanaka was on the "death list" for a number of reasons. Probably chief among them, as was the case with others on the same list, was that he too was suspected in the

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minds of Ueno, Kurihara, and Yamaguchi as being an "inu", an informer for the FBI. Some rumors said he was a paid agent of the FBI; this belief was substantiated, it was rumored by his work under the guise of "documentary historian" for the War Relocation Authority.

Tanaka's pre-evacuation record also followed him into the Manzanar Center. His testimony before the Tolan Congressional Committee and also statements made under subpoenae and oath before the Tenney (Little Dies) State Committee had created for him an unsavory reputation among those who disagreed with his point of view. Confinement of citizens of Japanese ancestry behind barbed wires had deprived him of weight in his arguments that American-born should always regard themselves as part of the United States. His point of view was subject to derisive comment within Manzanar from the outset.

Tanaka was never employed by the F.B.I.; he was never an informer for the F.B.I. within the center; he made no effort to conceal his willingness to cooperate with any and all governmental agencies in matters of national security; but he avoided deliberately creating the impression, as was the case with Tokutaro Slocum, that he had connections with the F.B.I. He had personal acquaintances among the agents of the Los Angeles F.B.I. and friends made through newspaper work. Files of the newspaper which he edited were voluntarily submitted to the Los Angeles Federal Bureau of Investigation as one of the lastest pre-evacuation acts of the Los Angeles Japanese Daily News.

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Because he personally abhorred witch-hunting, he volunteered the opinion, when asked, that F.B.I. periodic visits into a barbed-wire-enclosed camp and smooth-running internal administration could not be reconciled. Either one or the other would have to be sacrificed.

This attitude, however, he did not publicize or make known within the center.

Tanaka had no openly hostile enemies on his block. (36) Rumors were, however, that several families in the Terminal Island block blamed him personally for the internment of fathers of the families. The rumors were never investigated because they were, to him, so obviously remote and fantastic. Tanaka had two personal enemies in Joe Kurihara and Harry Ueno. He himself had not considered them as enemies nor looked upon them as potential attackers until after several visits to his barrack on block 36 had been made by these two individuals. On several of the occasions, these two men were accompanied by a third man of unusual appearance, bare of feet, his hair cut extremely short, his pants rolled up to his knees--Hoitsu Tsuji,

On one occasion, Ueno and Kurihara admitted that they had been out to "get" Tanaka and had missed him by the narrowest margin. "A lucky star was watching you that night, Tanaka," they told him.

The visit ended, however, with the shaking of hands all around. "We agree with your point of view, Tanaka; after all, we've got to respect each other's right to differ, and even if we don't think you're doing the right thing by misleading these young people, we appreciate your attitude and your willingness

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to talk with us so frankly." Kurihara said. A few weeks later he was reading off Tanaka's name from the platform of block 22 on a "death list". Rioters surged around Tanaka's barrack shortly afterwards.

29. Page 73--The Judicial Committee

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which the Sasaki were known to be embroiled might flare into another tragedy similar to the murder-suicide the previous month on the same block. The Sasaki case was similar, it was pointed out, in that it was an incipient "triangle." The best solution would be to remove the couple to more favorable surroundings in another camp.

Whatever the truth or falsity of the numerous rumors and charges that flew about the camp regarding the "sugar deal," it was pretty well implanted in the minds of the majority of older persons at Manzanar that "food is being taken from the evacuees by the Caucasian administrators." This may be a testimony ~~of~~ to the successful propaganda of the Ueno-Yamaguchi-Kurihara group, or it may be the logical thing to expect under conditions existing within the confines of barbed wires and watchtowers.

Consequently, when the December 6 riot flared into violence, it was not difficult for Ueno's followers to sell the Manzanar residents on the line: "Harry Ueno is being made the goat; he is being falsely accused of the attack on Fred Tayama. The administration is using this as an excuse to get rid of him because he had the courage to stand up and tell them the truth."

The added fact that Tom G. Tayama, a younger brother of Fred Tayama, was the chief assistant steward under Joseph Winchester contributed to the personal elements which complicated the general riot picture. Tom Tayama was also on the ration board which determined the amounts to be allotted to each of the mess halls. Ueno, in the midst of the charges over sugar, instigated a movement to have Tayama ousted from his position. "I don't trust Tom Tayama any more than I

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do his brother Fred," Ueno told his own block 22 mess hall fellow workers, and thus began openly to agitate for his removal. When Tom Tayama defended the Administration and the truth of the statements issued by Joseph Winchester regarding the need for building up the sugar surplus to feed the children of the orphanage as well as to meet hospital supplies, Ueno instantly raised the cry, "White man's stooge!" (Kettoh no inu).

31. Issei planning board

There was no Issei planning board as such at Manzanar up to the time of the riot. However, the block leaders council, later renamed the Block Managers Council, was for all practical purposes, an Issei planning board. The fact alone that the spoken language at most of the meetings was Japanese, is a fair indication of the dominance of the older first generation residents.

Also, as events developed through October and November, and it became evident that the likelihood of relocation was becoming brighter, the Issei assumed the status of "permanent residents for the duration" within the centers. By contrast, the younger second generation began thinking more in terms of resettlement, of "getting out of this place". This meant that more intense and lively interest in political and other affairs centered around the Issei. In a sense "invisible government" existed in the form of the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi faction; it was rule, more or less, by coercion and intimidation. It was commonly accepted by the more sober-thinking elders that to take a particular position on some issues, particularly

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on such questions as enlistment in the United States Army by the nisei, was to invite threats of death and assault. For an issei to defend the position of the American-born Japanese as loyal citizens of the United States was an open invitation to be assaulted. Few issei, particularly those with families, cared to take such a risk. Thus, the majority of substantial, generally peace-loving and law-abiding elements were terrorized by the likelihood of hoodlum assaults. Furthermore, they accepted it. There was a feeling and sense of frustration and futility because it was generally believed that the Caucasian administration would not protect such individuals against attack from within the camp. Furthermore, ideologically, incentive to resist the arguments of the Ueno-Yamaguchi-Kurihara group does not, and never will, flourish behind confinement of machine-gunned watchtowers.

32. Tanaka

Personal grudges, a large accumulation of them, played a considerable part in the singling out of individuals within Manzanar for places on the "death" and "black" list of the December 6 riot. Togo Tanaka was on the "death list" for a number of reasons. Probably chief among them, as was the case with others on the same list, was that he too was suspected in the minds of Ueno, Kurihara, and Yamaguchi as being an "inu", an informer for the FBI. Some rumors said he was a paid agent of the FBI; this belief was substantiated, it was rumored by his work under the guise of "documentary historian" for the War Relocation Authority.

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Tanaka's pre-evacuation record also followed him into the Manzanar Center. His testimony before the Tolan Congressional Committee and also statements made under subpoenae and oath before the Tenney (Little Dies) State Committee had created for him an unsavory reputation among those who disagreed with his point of view. Confinement of citizens of Japanese ancestry behind barbed wires had deprived him of weight in his arguments that American-born should always regard themselves as part of the United States. His point of view was subject to derisive comment within Manzanar from the outset.

Tanaka was never employed by the F.B.I.; he was never an informer for the F.B.I. within the center; he made no effort to conceal his willingness to cooperate with any and all governmental agencies in matters of national security; but he avoided deliberately creating the impression, as was the case with Tokutaro Slocum, that he had connections with the F.B.I. He had personal acquaintance among the agents of the Los Angeles F.B.I. and friends made through newspaper work. Files of the newspaper which he edited were voluntarily submitted to the Los Angeles Federal Bureau of investigation as one of the last pre-evacuation acts of the Los Angeles Japanese Daily News.

Because he personally abhorred witch-hunting, he volunteered the opinion, when asked, that F.B.I. periodic visits into a barbed-wire-enclosed camp and smooth-running internal administration could not be reconciled. Either one or the other would have to be sacrificed.

This attitude, however, he did not publicize or make known within the center.

Tanaka had no openly hostile enemies on his block. (36) Rumors were, however, that several families in the Terminal Island block blamed him personally for the internment of fathers of the families. The rumors were never investigated because they were, to him, so obviously remote and fantastic. Tanaka had two personal enemies in Joe Kurihara and Harry Ueno. He himself had not considered them as enemies nor looked upon them as potential attackers until after several visits to his barrack on block 36 had been made by these two individuals. On several of the occasions, these two men were accompanied by a third man of unusual appearance, bare of feet, his hair cut extremely short, his pants rolled up to his knees--Hoitsu Tsuji.

On one occasion, Ueno and Kurihara admitted that they had been out to "get" Tanaka and had missed him by the narrowest margin. "A lucky star was watching you that night, Tanaka," they told him.

The visit ended, however, with the shaking of hands all around. "We agree with your point of view, Tanaka; after all, we've got to respect each other's right to differ, and even if we don't think you're doing the right thing by misleading these young people, we appreciate your attitude and your willingness to talk with us so frankly." Kurihara said. A few weeks later he was reading off Tanaka's name from the platform of block 22 on a "death list." Rioters surged around Tanaka's barrack shortly afterwards.