

6.12 General  
Chandler Committee  
February

NOTES ON THE CHANDLER HEARINGS AT GILA

Spencer-Kikuchi  
April 20, 1943

Included with this report is a copy of the verbatim minutes of the Chandler hearing which took place on the Gila project on March 8, 1943. Senator Chandler was appointed to head a Senate Sub-Committee for the purposes of investigating the aims of the War Relocation Authority and the administration by this civilian agency of the relocation centers in which some 110,000 Japanese have been interned. This investigation was not, as stated by the press, for the purpose of investigating charges of "pampering" of the Japanese evacuees. On the contrary, it made no attempt either to condemn or to approve. It was to ascertain just what was being done by the War Relocation Authority in its administration and in its planned program of resettlement. The national director of the WRA, Mr. Dillon S. Myer, had come out with the policy of the resettlement program. The Senate Committee wished to examine the justification for this and the advisability of it. Much had been made of the negative answers to questions #27 and 28 of the military questionnaire form and the loyalty of the majority of Japanese evacuees to the United States was in serious question. The Chandler investigations took place immediately following the registration program. Thus, taken in a broad consideration, the Chandler Committee had the following purposes:

1. To examine the policies of the War Relocation Authority.
2. To check on the loyalty of the Japanese-Americans.
3. To justify the program of resettlement.

It was not until the hearings were completed and the Senate had apparently given its approval of the War Relocation Authority's administration, that the movement for all-out resettlement began.



To the legislative departments, therefore, it appears that the work of the WRA is justified and that the Japanese may now, with full congressional approval, resettle themselves, after having given indication of their loyalty by affirmative answers to the significant questions of the registration form. No consideration, of course, is given as to why questions #27 and 28 were answered in the negative. All those who have done so, however, are barred from resettlement and it appears that these will eventually be segregated. The questionnaire is significant in that on its strength alone, the process of the isolation of so-called disloyal elements will be begun. Following senatorial approval, the red-tape involved in getting leave clearances, furloughs, etc. was slashed. At the present, it is possible for any evacuee to leave the center if he has a place to go and will not become a public charge provided that he has professed to this country a feeling of loyalty. The approval of the project director is sufficient to grant such a leave. And so it appears that the work of the Chandler sub-committee was not in vain nor was it an idle political investigation.

In all fairness to the committee it must be said that the investigators made every attempt to elicit useful information regarding the projects and their management, taking into consideration factors relative to the three purposes mentioned above. The minutes which follow will, in the opinion of the writers, show this clearly. At Gila, Senator Chandler was unable to be present, although he did appear at the subsequent hearings at Phoenix. These meetings at Phoenix were for the purpose of entering into some of the legal matters relative to the relation of evacuees with the military, the lifting of the military zone



boundaries, etc. On the project itself, the hearings concerned directly the project affairs, administration, and population. Chandler's assistant on the sub-committee, Mr. G. W. Malone, special consultant to the committee, conducted the hearings in Bennett's office. A number of project officials were called to testify relative to their duties and the scope of their respective departments.

W. C. Sawyer, Education Superintendent, was called first and outlined the school system. Following this, he was asked about the registration program and his answers are given in each case. Malone's questions were observed by Colonel Scobey, of the office of the Secretary of War, who, it will be noted, was visiting the project at the same time as the committee and was sitting in on the hearings as well. Scobey's concern was with the disloyal element and the follow-up of the registration program. Firman Brown, the project engineer, and Hoffman, the head of Community Services followed Sawyer in testifying in regard to the loyalty question. Sawyer, Brown and Hoffman having thus provided a general background for the committee to understand the workings of the camp, attention was directed by Malone to the question of loyalty and the reasons for negative answers to questions #27 and 28 of the military registration form. In order to shed some light on the reasons for negative answers, parents of young men and boys who had made their own choice in answering 'no' and 'no' were called in to discuss their relation to the answering of these questions by their sons. The confusion of the two questions, the purpose of them, and the effect of them on the registrants is rather clearly demonstrated by the answers to Malone's and Scobey's questions given by the Issei called to



testify.

Other Issei were called, then Issei representatives and Nisei spokesmen. The attempt was made to elicit information regarding the loyalty of the group in each case. The material given here in the questions and answers is pretty much self-explanatory. Hikida as representative of the Issei group, expresses, in the opinion of the writers, the view shared by most of the liberal Issei leaders of the community. Those Issei who have emerged as willing to cooperate with the administration are for the most part helpful to the staff and to the war effort of the United States. The group here is not typical of Issei feeling. Hikida and Okuno should be known to the readers. Yahanda is central block manager for Canal Camp, Sasaki his aide. In the Nisei group, Harry Miyake is Central Block Manager for Butte, Nakamura, the young Nisei editor of the Gila News Courier, while the others are leading Nisei from various departments on the evacuee administrative staff. It is interesting to note that Dr. Earle Yusa, a Nisei dentist of quite outspoken pro-Japan sympathies did not testify.

It must be admitted that the information given in the report of the hearings is extremely valuable in obtaining an understanding of the center and the population in it. The staff personalities are also pretty significantly described, showing their respective attitudes to the evacuees as a whole. For the most part, the testimony of the staff members is clear and objective and a great deal of significant information is to be obtained from the verbal reports of such men as Sawyer, Rogers, and the others who describe in some detail the workings of their respective departments. In Bennett's testimony, however, the



full bombastic force of his stilted personality makes itself apparent. He purports himself to be able to understand the evacuees and the Japanese generally. He states that he is the first project director appointed permanently. Neither of these statements is true. E. R. Smith was a permanent director and Bennett knows nothing of what goes on in the community. His approval and agreement of Terry's testimony indicates the extent to which he depends on Terry for his administrative policies. Bennett's stand on the subject of loyalty and disloyalty and his ability to see no further than these issues comes out clearly.

~~XXXXXXXX~~ Together with the testimonies of the individuals governing the center and the residents of the center, there is appended a good deal of supplementary data which was submitted to the Chandler Committee to ~~augment~~ the testimonies given. This material has considerable value and has been used by the writers to supplement the discussions of the administrative departments concerned. In the opinion of the writers this material is most worth while and give a good picture of the administrative-evacuee interrelationship as well as pertinent data on the loyalty question.

The Senate hearings were not too significant from the point of view of the project residents. Few knew that an investigation was being carried on although the newspaper carried a brief item. This information is submitted with this report in order to further augment it and to shed more light on the subject at hand.



LIST OF WITNESSES

Called for Examination by  
Mr. Malone

W. C. (Tom) Sawyer, Superintendent of Education

Firman H. Brown, Deputy Project Director

Luther T. Hoffman, Chief of Community Services

PARENTS OF YOUNG MEN WHO ANSWERED "NO"

Mr. Tetsuo Komai  
Mr. Kinhachi Shibuya

YOUNG MEN 17 TO 38 YRS. WHO VOLUNTEERED  
AND PARENTS

Mr. & Mrs. Y. Kondo  
Akiko Mayeda  
Tamejiro Hiraoka

REPRESENTATIVE ISSEI

Shotaro Hikida  
Teizo Yahanda

REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS

Harry Miyake  
Jim Nakamura  
Ken Utsunomiya

David A. Rogers, Chief of Agriculture Division

James Hendrick Terry, Project Attorney

L. H. Bennett, Project Director



HEARING CONDUCTED FOR SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,  
UNITED STATES SENATE, 78TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, ON S. 444 BY MR. GEORGE W.  
MALONE, SPECIAL CONSULTANT TO THE COMMITTEE, AT GILA RIVER WAR RELOCATION  
CENTER ON MARCH 8, 1943.

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The hearing was held in the office of Project Director Leroy H. Bennett  
at 2:30 P.M., Mr. Malone presiding. Present with Mr. Malone was Colonel William  
P. Scobey of the General Staff, Executive for the Assistant Secretary of War  
Mr. McCloy. Various members of the administrative staff of the Gila River War  
Relocation Center were present from time to time during the hearing.

STATEMENT BY MR. MALONE:

Senator Chandler, who is Chairman of the Sub-Committee to investigate the  
WRA centers, was unable to be here and was very sorry that he was called down  
to Tucson and asked me as Special Counsel to the Committee to review the work  
of the camps and get what information I could for the benefit of the Committee.  
No other members of the committee are here. It has been impossible for them to  
come at this time. It's a very busy session of Congress. Colonel Scobey is  
here who is in charge of the registration for the Army and I have asked him to  
sit in the hearing and ask any questions that he might care to.

MR. W. C. (TOM) SAWYER, Superintendant of Education of the Center, was  
called as the first witness.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q Now there are several things we want to cover and Mr. Sawyer is here of  
the educational department. Tom, I think you know what the committee  
would be interested in. You're entirely familiar with the procedure. You  
are in charge of the schools here, I understand, the educational system?  
A That's right.



Q And if you'd just tell us the story of what you are doing and the facilities you have and the staff that you have under your direction and what you're trying to do, and if you care to, what you'd like to do if the opportunity offered, just go ahead in your own words, if you will.

A We have a school system here from the first to the twelfth grade, inclusive, which enrolls about 3,150 students, about equally divided between high school and elementary school. This is unusual; to have so many in the upper grades; and it's due to the fact that the numbers of students apparently decreased down to about seven years of age and then begin to increase. I understand that the reason for this is the fact that when picture brides were no longer permitted to enter the country there was a period of break in paternity until second generation families were raised so it gives you a declining birth rate which shows up now in the school population. We have a staff of some 80 civil service appointed personnel and in the grades one to twelve are using about 60 evacuees. We have nine evacuee teachers and the others are used as assistants. We haven't as many evacuee teachers as some of the other centers so we're having to use evacuee assistants and we have secured from the State Teachers College at Tempe a teacher's trainer to work with the assistant teachers so that they're getting very much the same type of assistance that student teachers would receive in college. They have one hour classes with this teacher trainer three mornings a week and then spend a half day Saturday with him for instruction purposes. He then assists with the supervision and direction of teachers and in that way we make good teachers of them.

Q Where do most of your teachers come from?

A Most of our teachers - our teachers are about 50% in-state and out-of-state. The out-of-state teachers come from the midwest almost entirely.

Q Kansas, Nebraska?

A Kansas, Nebraska, Texas and Oklahoma. I think our teaching staff as far as the Caucasian teaching staff is concerned, is about the equivalent of the teaching staff in the normal Arizona school, just as good or better than the normal Arizona school but we're terribly short on equipment. We have now enough textbooks to go around, but we have practically no laboratory equipment.

Q Does that handicap your standing, the school's rating?

A It does handicap the standing of our schools, unless we can get in very soon the equipment to satisfy the minimum requirements.

Q Then your high school graduates would not be eligible for college credits?

A That is correct. The two things we have been short of and which we must have are laboratory equipment and a minimum number of library reference books. The latter are on order and are beginning to roll in. The laboratory equipment is hard to get because of priorities. Furniture for the schools has been made entirely on the project.

Q By the way, if you would describe the equipment that you have and the school rooms and something about the cost of the buildings and furnishings.

A All school rooms are in the various barrack apartments.



Q The regular barracks?

A We have no specially constructed school rooms. We enlarged the regular barrack rooms for classrooms. We utilize the laundry room and the ironing room in the block for science laboratories. We utilize the mess hall for home economics classes and for some art work. Aside from that we have no equipment except books and tables in the science, home economics and cultural classes. In the industrial arts classes we have secured a small amount of light equipment and some NYA equipment and supplies and are hoping to have more. We're conducting industrial arts work in woodwork and in leather craft.

Q Did you say how many students you had?

A I said we had about 3,150 in grades one to twelve.

Q And then does that include all the grades you have?

A No, we have a nursery school program below that and an adult school program above that which programs are conducted entirely with evacuee assistants.

Q And what number would that run?

A We have approximately 500 nursery school students and our adult school enrollment will number nineteen hundred. Adult school enrollment has increased greatly since we started putting in our national defense training program last January. In this program we are giving refresher and training courses in dairying, poultry raising, woodwork and kindred subjects.

Q I think that is sufficient along that line. Now I want to ask you some other questions for the benefit of the record. How long have you been here?

A I've been here since the 22nd of July.

Q What time did most of the people get here?

A They began moving in on the 20th of July.

Q You have been here practically the entire life of the camp?

A That is true except for the fact that we reported in Sacaton.

Q My point is you have had an opportunity to familiarize yourself with the people and their efforts and insofar as it is possible what they think about. We have been perturbed at the number of American-born who have answered no to the loyalty question. We want to be sure, if possible, that they understand the implications and the consequences of the answer. Do you think they do thoroughly understand what it means in this country to say that they are disloyal to the country?

A I rather doubt it, Mr. Malone, because they are still asking questions about it.

Q What is in their mind, do you think?

A Well, there are two groups of people here still asking questions. One



group, the Kibei, as far as I can determine.....

Q Define the Kibei.

A The Kibei are those who are born in the United States but have received a large portion of their education in Japan.

Q They are citizens but have been educated in Japan?

A Right, and a great many of them are concerned with getting out of military service in any way, shape or form.

Q What percentage would that run of all of the American-born citizens?

A I don't know.

Q Go ahead.

A Those persons to a large extent seem to be conscientious objectors who are slackers in every way, shape or form. A lot of them lived over there and would still be over there in school if there hadn't been a war. They left Japan to avoid military service.

Q What consideration do you think they deserve at our hands?

A Not as much and certainly no more than our C.O.'s get.

Q Now, then, the other citizens born here, educated here and perhaps never been away from the country except maybe for a trip. What do you consider the reason for the rather alarming number of those boys answering no to the question?

A Some of them because they had been intimidated and questioned by these Kibei who for the most part are rather smart people, and some of them because they had been intimidated by others who were not only disloyal but because they are just so darn disgusted and confused they don't know what to do. In a way I think it's a protest. I think in some cases it's a protest and they don't realize the implications.

Q You understand what would happen to you or I if we answered we were disloyal to this country?

A I know what would happen if we demonstrated it in any way.

Q Do you know what would happen to the Colonel or any of those boys with a uniform on if they said they were disloyal to this country?

A Definitely.

Q Do you consider that they deserve any more consideration than we do?

A No, sir; definitely not. I'm not sure though that if you or I merely said we were disloyal anything would happen to us right away.

Q We would be under inspection right away without any question.



- A There's no question about that. These persons demonstrate their disloyalty a little more easily than you or I would. We could go out and say we were disloyal and that wouldn't be any occasion for doing anything to us.
- Q Except probably put you under suspicion.
- A They would probably watch us from there on.
- Q This is war again and it's twice in our lifetime. And first, do you consider the move by the army here of registering these people and getting their intent as a matter of record and trying to see who would volunteer, enter the army a move in the right direction?
- A Definitely, but I'm not so sure it has moved far enough in the right direction.
- Q How far would you go?
- A I would draft these people in the service just as they are drafted on the outside.
- Q You would determine the loyal and take them if they were?
- A Definitely; I think you're making some special concession to them when you don't.
- Q That they're not entitled to?
- A Right.
- Q What would you do with the remainder? Do you agree with what I think, a consensus of opinion of the men who are considering this question, that there should be a definite division now, a determination among the men and women who are left, of their loyalty and disloyalty?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q What would you do with the loyal ones?
- A I haven't definitely made up my mind except I would see that they were relocated as rapidly as possible. I'm not so sure I would just turn them loose right now.
- Q When you say relocated, do you mean probably a minimum of supervision determined to be necessary by the FBI or the Army and allowed to work, go about getting jobs?
- A By relocation I mean I think they should be put out into those portions of the United States where they can assist in the war effort and live a normal life without danger to themselves by reason of the reaction of the community, and I don't think that can be done by turning them out and telling them to find the jobs. After they are out I think some agency should know at least where they are.
- Q That would be for two reasons, according to your theory; that would be for their own protection and for the protection of the United States for anyone who might slip through claiming to be loyal?



A That's right.

Q That, of course, would be another question; that is, the conduct of the supervision would have to be worked out, is that your idea?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you have a definite solution of what to do with disloyal people?

A I'm not so sure that I have any solution of that at the present time. I think it's quite a problem, a bigger one than I first thought it was.

Q It would be a pretty sure thing you never could let them out from any definite supervision, continuous supervision?

A That's correct. One thing I'm very sure of -- I wouldn't weigh the Army down with the supervision of those persons at a time when it has a war to fight.

Q Do you think there should be more supervision than there is now over the disloyal ones?

A I think they should have less privileges than they have now.

Q Less privileges; and perhaps when they are all definitely disloyal you would have to have vast supervision to take care of anything that might happen. Now I can see that if that happens, if we take into the Army the ones who go, and the ones are put out, men definitely loyal that you had determined, and then you have the definitely disloyal, you would have then another group of old people, too old to work, too young to work, too young to go into the Army or too old, what would you do with them?

A I imagine you're going to get a lot of those in the disloyal group.

Q You might have some that are loyal; what would you do with them? That would be just an old and young person problem to be worked out?

A That's correct. Something to be worked out until they could all be taken care of elsewhere or again assimilated into the United States.

Q After we've done all this -- let's assume it has to be thought out by someone. I know the committee is going to do it. Suppose the committee does this, what would be the desirability of the WRA as we know it now?

A Well, I don't know -- this thing ought to be busted up as soon as they get the problem solved.

Q Do you have any questions, Colonel Scobey?

COLONEL SCOBEEY:

Q Apparently most of the conversation concerns the Nisei class. The aliens haven't been exactly drawn upon. Would you give the aliens who are found to be loyal or at least not known to be disloyal and have expressed loyalty, would you give them an opportunity to go out and work in war industries?

A A lot of those aliens have sons in the Army now. I believe that some of these aliens are just as loyal and would like to assist in this thing just



as much as some of the citizens.

MR. MALONE:

Tom, I certainly appreciate your help in this thing and I'm happy to meet you again and know you're over here.

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FIRMAN H. BROWN, Deputy Director, was called as a witness.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q Mr. Brown, I know the Senator regrets very much that he was unable to stay here and review the camp as I have tried and I want to say for your information that the committee is very interested in this camp and wants to find out what ought to be done. The matters have been precipitated by a bill introduced in Congress to turn the camp back to the Army. The authors of the bill are very frank about it. Senator Wallgren from Washington and Senator Holman from Oregon introduced the bill mostly to bring it to a head and determine what should be done. So they sent us out to get the facts and see what you're doing, what your ideas are and what you're trying to do, and I would appreciate it if you would just go ahead in your own way and explain for the benefit of the record what in your opinion are the objectives and what you're trying to do and how it is operating, in your opinion whether it's satisfactory.

A A great amount of preparation in our thinking was attempted before we received any evacuees in the project. Most of the thought that we gave prior to their coming here has been thrown overboard. Much of our thought in the stages of the receipt of the evacuees has changed. I believe that a great many of us were pleasantly surprised in the cross-section of the evacuees that are in this community. I have never been to another community so I don't know anything about the other evacuees. I think that the most disappointing factor, to me anyway, has been within the last two months when the question of loyalty and disloyalty has come up. We had a great many plans and a great deal of planning in progress that has been altered by the attitude of the people -- mostly in the last two months. I'm thinking primarily now of the physical things around the camp. We hoped that we would get a good construction crew going right down the line. In the first place, before the registration came in, we began to realize that we wouldn't get the things done as soon or in the way that we had originally planned. That probably can be analyzed -- and it is my own analysis of that section -- these people, primarily, are not construction men so we had to revise downward our scale of production and rate of production. Then when registration came along, it seemed as if the continual discussion that is necessary in the Japanese mind to settle any question has further lowered that scale of production and rate of production. As far as the reaction from a social viewpoint, my social analysis is very shallow and I am not competent to give you any information on that.

Q I didn't expect that, Mr. Brown. I don't think either one of us can solve the social complex of different races, and I don't think that the committee is trying to do that. I think they're trying to find the immediate solution that would point open the way to a solution. What they have to do now is to make a decision as to what definitely to do with loyal and disloyal



people without taking away any privileges of citizenship and without giving undue privileges to people who don't deserve them. I think that's the immediate thing. What supervision and how it is to be done. I'm very much interested in your reaction and that is what I want to get from you because you have lived and worked with them. If you don't have any reactions on it it would be pretty hard for me to get them.

A My attitude is still not pessimistic. I'm still optimistic.

Q How do you mean?

A I believe that if it's in the cards for the relocation center to go on as is I think we'll eventually get some better kind of cooperation and get a whole lot more done than we have in the past.

Q Let me ask you this. The reason I'm asking these questions is that I have a very definite reason. I have been with the committee for two years in various capacities and I know how their minds work and when they dodge a question -- and they have dodged them at times, if they think someone else is going to do it -- but if they finally take it up, they go through with it and do the best they can and do something definite. I know they will be interested in your reaction as to whether you think the Army has made a forward step in this registration and permitting American citizens among the Japanese to join the Army.

A I definitely do. I think it is the only thing that should be done.

Q Do you think they ought to go? They have now asked for volunteers. They have not opened the draft. Do you think they should the same as any other American citizen?

A I think so.

Q And then make some determination of loyalty and send back the ones they couldn't trust?

A Yes.

Q The ones that definitely answer "no" to the loyalty question -- what do you think should be done with them?

A I think they should be treated as conscientious objectors and anything else we might be able to prove beyond that.

Q In other words, they've complicated their own problem so that they must definitely be under strict surveillance from now on?

A No, sir.

Q What do you think we should do with the ones that are definitely determined to be loyal and are able to work. I might say when I say determined to be loyal, determined by some proper form of the government if it is the FBI or the Army. When they're satisfied of the loyalty of the men and women able to work, what would you do with them?

A I think they should be given the same privileges as American citizens on the outside assuming that they are loyal.



- Q Granted that there probably would be a chance of some disloyal ones deliberately claiming to be loyal, they might be taking some chance. Would you say that there should be some checking system continually to determine where they are -- some main supervision to know where they are all the time, at least for a period, through a trial period?
- A I don't know. It seems to me the first determination will carry it through. In other words, I don't know how that first determination will be made, but I'd assume it would determine whether a man is loyal or isn't loyal. Therefore, I don't believe that there should be any further surveillance.
- Q Until they have committed some overt act?
- A That's right.

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LUTHER T. HOFFMAN, Chief of Community Services was next called as a witness.

BY MR. MALONE:

- Q Well, you've heard the questions and answers and know what we're trying to get at. The committee's intensely earnest in this matter. They want to get the right answer. They don't want to go to see any place, but I'm sure I'm speaking for the committee that they are determined to make a determination in the matter. If you would just go ahead and give us your ideas and reactions I would appreciate it.
- A With particular reference to --
- Q With particular reference to the objectives, in the first place, and the outcome that you think has attended the work of the WRA centers, and what the future holds. Where is it pointed?
- A As the present time, it would seem that we are at a crossroad, pointed one way for those whose loyalty is unquestioned. That should be an open road. Then, when the opposite determination can be made, and there are those who are definitely disloyal, this latter group should be separated or "segregated." For them, it would seem to be a closed road with no turning back.
- Q You agree that this determination should be made now?
- A Yes, I do.
- Q You agree that the Army is making a forward step in giving them an opportunity to volunteer?
- A Yes, sir. I would say in connection with that -- I believe there's another step that needs to be made in order to get the full-hearted support of the people who have answered "yes." They should be given the same opportunity for induction and enlistment in the military service as any other citizens; that is, by selective service or whatever else is entailed. Certain of the evacuees are waiting to see what's going to be done. They're very much unsettled, somewhat confused and many of them, I think an increasing number, are becoming pessimistic about the future here in the United States. They



are influenced by newspapers and public opinion the same as we are and perhaps more so.

Q Don't you think that we find a lot of fine folks in the newspaper and sometimes we agree with them and sometimes we don't. Are they abusing the Japanese any more than some citizens who hold office?

A I don't think so, except we have to recognize their rather deep sensitiveness to that sort of thing, deeper feeling perhaps than might be true of the other group you speak of. I don't think there's any particular resentment against the newspapers, but rather fear and they feel apprehensive about what the public reaction is on the outside.

Q Do you believe that the Japanese in this camp, this center, understand the implications of their answer when they answer the loyalty question. Do they understand that it will affect probably their whole future? Do they understand how we treat our own citizens who are disloyal and make any demonstration or are they allowing minor things to effect their decision in that regard?

A I would say first that I think they pretty well understand the consequences of their answers and what's involved, but I also want to add that I think their decision has been influenced greatly by a number of factors. Their answers represent an emotional response as well as an intellectual one, and are not based on reason alone. In other words, it is a response conditioned by the evacuation and relocation process.

Q Do you think the response would have been different if it had been put forward earlier?

A Yes, I do. I also think the response would have been different and still have been a reliable index of loyalty and disloyalty if question 28 had been worded differently.

Q How?

A By putting the question clearly on the basis of loyalty to the United States or to Japan as a nation. The reference to the Emperor was interpreted by many as not being a fair test of loyalty or disloyalty as it then involved a question of religion. In speaking on the basis of what reports have been made to me, with no personal judgment involved, I'm simply saying that a number of factors entered into their final decision. Personally, I have told them that it is not up to them to argue or attempt to bargain with the Army any more than any other United States citizen would or could. They should think it over carefully and decide in their own minds where their real loyalty lies, and answer "yes" or "no" to questions 27 and 28 on that basis.

Q Of course, I'm only talking like you are. My own reactions would be that if they're loyal in every other way except for the emperor, they'd still be disloyal.

A Yes, I agree that there should be no qualification to loyalty. But you were asking whether it might be different if there had been other questions, or put at a different time, or in a different manner.



Q I understand, without knowing much about Japanese history, that the emperor is, in the last analysis, "it," and I assume for that reason it was judged that the emperor had to come into that question.

A Yes, I'm sure that particular question was given a great deal of consideration. There is no doubt but that many wanted to ride the fence as long as they could and tried in every way possible to avoid a clear-cut yes or no answer as to their loyalty to the United States.

Q I think they made a mistake, because if I'm asked the same question and I'm loyal to Japan, I would say I think the President is a fine fellow but I'm going to fight for the emperor and make it very plain.

A That's only one of the many factors that motivated their answers.

Q What do you think must be done with these people who definitely answered the question of loyalty in the negative and the ones that are known to be disloyal?

A I think, in the first place, they must be separated from those who are loyal. I don't think we can have a peaceful center or peaceful operation here until that is done. No doubt, this loyalty questionnaire is the best means of making that separation. I think it meets with the agreement of both groups and should be done as quickly as possible.

BY COLONEL SCOBEE:

Q Do you feel that some of the aliens have loyalty to this country although they have qualified their answer to the loyalty question, because they having no citizenship were given a little bit different question from the citizens; that's correct, I believe?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you believe that those aliens in some instances have loyalty equivalent to the citizens who have expressed loyalty?

A I think that many aliens are just as loyal as those citizens who have answered "yes" on the military registration although they should so state it. I happen to know some of them quite well, and believe that if they answered "yes" to the modified question 28, we can so believe them.

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TETSUO KOMAI, TOYOSABURO KATAYAMA, and KINHACHI SHIBUYA, Issei parents of military registrants, were next called as witnesses and Tetsuo Komai was first interrogated.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q Mr. Komai, you understand what we're trying to do. I asked Mr. Bennett to invite you to come in and visit with me because I understand that you have



a son here of military age and in the registration when they asked whether or not he was loyal to the United States, he answered, "no".

A Yes, I know he did.

Q I am interested in why he did that. We are troubled that a considerable number of the young people who were born in this country and are citizens just as I am upon being asked whether they are loyal to this country we find that they are not. They've been educated in the schools and have all the advantages we could possibly give them and I wanted to be sure they understood and you understood what the implications might be in that answer. In other words, the consequences finally. Would you give me -- just tell me in your own words why?

A Yes, I will. Well, when the war broke I was working in Gardena and I'll make it clear from my standpoint. You see, this whole situation is just to me as if I'm watching the quarrel between mother and father. You see, I lived 30 years in this country and I left my old country when I was 21 and still I can't wipe off that memory of my own country. When the war broke out, my kid's opinion is very much against Japan. Now, here's a funny thing that happened. I've been in the movie game for the last 25 years so I'm just going my own way, doing whatever I pleased, and I let other people alone and they let me alone, so when the war broke out my kids were against Japan so I and my wife didn't discuss a bit of war in front of my children. I have three kids -- a boy and two girls. The boy is 17 and the girls, 14 and 12; and I went my own quiet way when this thing came out, I talked with my boy to decide this very vital problem. Still, I told him, now you're in a tough spot in a sort of way, so whatever your conscience tells you, do it. I have been doing that. Lots of times I have been wrong. I started out as a civil engineer, now I end up as a hired hand. Doing what I feel, that's the way I live; so I told my boy, if you feel and if you think before you decide, if you feel this way why then all right, it's okay with me. So that 's the whole situation.

Q Did you put it on a basis at all of loyalty to you or that he might not be quite loyal to you if he was loyal to the United States?

A It's quite all right to me.

Q I don't believe you understood me. Did you tell the boy or let him think that if he said "yes" to the loyalty question that he was loyal to the United States it would be a reflection on you, hurt you at all?

A No. You see, his attitude toward this war: We left Los Angeles, moved to Gardena. We were living in Los Angeles and after we moved into Gardena, my boy was not a happy-go-lucky sort of lad. Then we moved into the country. He settled down. He was ready to go. Getting kind of serious. Now all that is on account of the war and the influences and the environment here is changing him. I have to kind of watch him and I told him, watch your comrades, watch your friends in this camp, go out with the good ones. The influence was changing him and the consequences was his answer.

Q The influences changed him against the United States?

A I hate to say that, but it seems that's the case.



Q Well, I think your answer is very clear. Let me ask you, you're a father. How old are you?

A I'm 49 next April.

Q Your boy is your first interest -- your family -- and you want whatever would be good for him?

A Yes.

Q Now I want to be sure that you understand and that he would understand that when he makes an answer such as he did that it is a very vital decision and that if he is loyal to Japan and wants to go back to Japan sometime that, perhaps, he has made the right answer, no doubt of it. But if he wants to stay in the United States and wants to live here and be a respected citizen after the war is over, and it will be over some day sometime, that he has put voluntarily something on his record that perhaps can never be erased. He made a decision that in my personal opinion -- I'm not speaking for the committee -- they have made no decision -- but I believe he has influenced his whole life and I want to see if you understood that thoroughly and if he understands that after the war is over, suppose he comes to me for a job or tries to go into business and goes to a bank to borrow money and his record shows that he said definitely he is disloyal to the United States, it will never be erased. Then again there are many people in the United States who are bitter against those people, but there are also many people who are fair. There are more people who are fair, and want to see you have a fair deal whatever it's determined to be. Now, when the war is over, if a great majority of your people, most of your people have cooperated in every way, helped in every way they can, my personal opinion would be you'd have very little to worry about, but, on the other hand, if the record shows that most of you had been disloyal and had given trouble, that is, not open trouble, but not assisting us in any way, then the great majority like Colonel Scobey and myself who had no personal interest in it one way or another except to be fair, you can see for yourself that would give us very little reason to be for you, do you see? There are 25 Legionnaires that were in the other war down here and the Colonel and myself found them this morning and visited with them. We like them. Why do we go find those people and speak to them and know them by name and would be glad to see them any place any time? The reason is because they fought with us side by side in the other war. They might walk up to the Colonel any time any place in his office in Washington or to me and say I'm in trouble, I need help, we'd try to get them help if they were not too far in the wrong because they have fought for this country, shown their loyalty in an emergency. Now, on the other hand, if they had answered the question that they were disloyal, I think I can speak for the Colonel and all such people that were in the other war, we wouldn't have anything to do with them. We're just typical citizens of the United States, no better, no worse, and if your boy as a typical example, like all born citizens of this country, wants to mingle with the citizens of the country following this trouble, what I'm trying to say to you is that he has made a very vital and far-reaching decision in regard to his own future. Do you understand that?

A I understand that. I don't want to say anything about it. You see, I'm 48 and I've had my days. He is 17; he has a future. So I've lived my own life. I wanted him to decide for himself. Maybe he is too young to decide this vital question regarding his future life but still when I left my country I was 20 and I followed my own conscience, feeling, liking.



Q Then do you feel that whatever decision he makes as far as you're concerned that's the final decision?

A Yes.

BY COLONEL SCOBEY:

Q Have you asked for repatriation?

A Yes.

Q Do you expect to go back to Japan?

A No.

Q You said you want to be repatriated. That means to go back to Japan.

A I didn't put any application for repatriation and when I moved into this camp I was given a letter asking if I wanted to repatriate. My answer was "no". Then I had a letter that my name was on the list from the request of the Japanese government to be exchanged and asking if I wanted to go back or not. My answer was "no".

Q Does your son want to be ex-patriated? Does he want to go back to Japan to live?

A Yes, I suppose so. I told him it is no matter which way you turn, you have a lot of hardship.

Q You wish to stay here?

A I do.

Q Did your son have any property in California in his name?

A No.

Q Does he associate with the Kibei?

A Not many, I don't know. I know a few boys who have come around to my house. I don't know where outside of my house.

Q Did they talk to him about this? Did the Kibei talk to him about this?

A I don't know. They were discussing it very much but I didn't butt in. I often heard, but most of the opinions isn't a precise opinion of them. It is an impression I had. I don't go fight, but I don't mind doing all kinds of defense work and all that.

Q Who said that?

A That's a general impression. In other words, "no" on 27 and "yes" on 28. That's the impression I had. The government doesn't take no on one and yes on the other because it's so contradictory. They don't mind going out in defense work, but they don't want to go out and fight others.



Q If they were in Japan, don't you think they'd go out and fight?

A They'd be drafted.

Q They would be drafted right now?

A Yes.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q If he were drafted right now, would he go without any difficulty?

A He'd have no alternative.

BY COLONEL SCOBEE:

Q You've heard these Kibei talk to him, have you?

A Yes.

Q Who do you think is going to win the war -- Japan or the United States?

A I don't know. It's a hard question.

Q What do the Kibei say?

A Even among the Kibei some of them are for this country and some for the old country. It's quite a hard question.

Q Who do they say is going to win, Japan or the United States?

A Some of them think Japan and some of them think America.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q Do I understand he answered the question 28 "yes"?

A This is the way those kids were saying. They don't want to go out and fight with Japan, but they'll do all they can to participate, to do their share for this country. But unfortunately, the government doesn't take one answer "no" and "yes" on the other. It was either "yes" or "no" but they had to put in "no."

BY COLONEL SCOBEE:

Q Are you a Shintoist?

A My father was a Buddhist. I don't know what I am.

Q Is your boy a Buddhist?

A He attends the Christian Sunday School.

Q Is he a conscientious objector?

A That is a hard question. He is a peaceful sort of kind, but a conscientious objector -- all right, he has a tendency toward that.



Q Does he expect to receive the same treatment as a citizen that answered the loyalty question "yes" when he has answered "no"?

A I suppose not.

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Kinhachi Shibuya was next interrogated.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q You have just heard the last part of our discussion. We're in just a friendly discussion trying to find out why a good many of our young American citizens answered the question of loyalty to the United States in the negative, that is, answered "no". We're troubled about that because the committee that I represent today of the United States Senate is trying earnestly to find the solution of your problem. They know you have always had a problem in this country and all the war has done is to precipitate it, to bring it to the open right at once so that something had to be done. I understand that you have a son that answered the loyalty question in the negative, and from you, from his father -- I'm a father myself -- I want to talk to you to find out just what is in the boy's mind, why he answered "no" and if he thoroughly understands the implications, the consequences of such an answer as to the future treatment and his future in this country. Would you speak clearly as you can so the reporter can get it?

A I didn't give him instruction. I don't know how he answered this question, whether "yes" or "no". He is on his own position. I know he has quite a few friends. He's a school boy and is always popular in school. He is 17.

Q You would say that perhaps the majority of his associates were not loyal so they influenced him?

A I don't know. It looks to me -- I don't know his position.

Q If that is true, that would indicate that quite a large number of the young people in their discussions are not loyal to the United States, would it not?

A I believe so. Some of them I believe, yes.

Q Would he want to go back to Japan? He has never been to Japan?

A No.

Q Would he want to be sent back to Japan?

A I don't think so. As far as I know.

Q I want to explain a little further to you. We're both old enough to know what we want to do. And I want particularly to understand myself before I try to report back to my Chairman, if I could, if the fathers and mothers of these boys who answered "no" and the boy himself understands what might be the consequences or implications of his answer. Now, you understand that if the Colonel should say he was disloyal to the United States, they would courtmartial him. You know that if I said I was disloyal to the



United States, they could do anything with me and probably would. So, certainly, they wouldn't treat your son any better than they would treat me in the long run. Therefore, I wanted to be sure that you understood what the future might hold for him, that whatever he says now is on his record, can never be erased unless he erases it now. It will be too late if it goes in, and if in 10 years from now he tried to get into business or get a job and it's definitely on his record that he was disloyal in an emergency, most people, perhaps, would not have much to do with him. Now the Colonel never comes to this camp without looking up some of those Legionnaires in your camp, and I will always look them up. We do that because they went in to the war with us the last time, fought side by side. Their loyalty was unquestioned and is unquestioned now. In other words, regardless of what little embarrassments might happen here and there they're our friends and we consider them so. All I'm interested in and nothing further is to understand if your boy knows that and if you know it. You do understand it?

A Yes.

BY COLONEL SCOBEE:

Q Have you asked for repatriation, Mr. Shibuya?

A No.

Q What position were you in before?

A Shipper in Sacramento. I lived in Sacramento 28 years.

Q What are your loyalties to this country or to Japan? What is your feeling?

A My personal feeling -- of course, I'm a citizen of Japan.

Q What are your feelings about it? If you're a citizen of Japan you must have certain feelings you wouldn't hesitate to confess.

A Naturally, being a citizen of Japan I'm in favor of Japan. I'm a citizen of Japan, a national of Japan.

Q You have been in this country and have been well treated while you were here?

A Yes.

Q Do you expect to stay here after the war?

A Yes.

Q Have you signed one of these questionnaires?

A Not yet.

Q Are you a Shintoist? What religion are you?

A No. Christian, Presbyterian.

Q Do you feel that Japan is going to win this war?

A I don't know. I couldn't say.



Q Who do you hope wins it?

A I can't say.

Q You don't want to answer that?

A No.

Q Do you think that if Japan wins it you will be a big man here and you would occupy a very special position in this country?

A No, I don't think so.

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No testimony was taken from Toyosaburo Katayama.  
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MR. and MRS. AKIKO MAYEDA, Y. KONDO, SOKICHI ICHIKAWA, and TAMEJIRO HIRAOKA were then called as witnesses. Mr. Kondo was then first interrogated.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q We want to talk to you because we have heard that your sons have volunteered for service in the United States Army. We are very proud of them and we know you must be. I want to discuss it with you for a few minutes because we are troubled because so many of the American-born citizens answered "no" to the question. I want to ask you why you think so many answered "no" to the question. Why do you think they did it?

A I don't know. Most of the boys come from Japan and they are quite interested in Japan.

Q You mean the young boys born here are interested in Japan?

A After the war they may go back to Japan. They don't know anything about Japan. They were born in this country. It is quite different.

Q Your boys want to stay in this country and want to enjoy the privileges here and they are willing to take the hardships along with the good in order to do so?

A That is right. Maybe some other reason for the "no" but I don't know exactly.

Q Do you think that the boys who are American born understand what the consequences of their answer might be? Do they understand the result of answering "no"?

A Captain Thompson answered them, and I think they understood.

Q You think that when they answer "no" it is because they are interested in Japan and want to go back after the war?



A It is just a question of understanding it.

Q The Colonel and I know several of the boys who fought in the last war and they are just like your boy will be after the war. The Colonel looks up the boys who served then, he likes them and they like him. You want to stay in this country and be loyal to this country? You want to stay here and not go back to Japan and you the parents of these boys want to do anything they ask you to do in an emergency.

A Yes.

Q From my viewpoint, your boys having volunteered to go into the Army and fight for his country, his position is like mine, and I feel, rightly or wrongly, that you have a definite interest in that boy and a definite interest in this country and that you would do anything to see this country succeed. Am I right?

A That is correct.

Q However, many of these boys who volunteered might be Buddhist in their religion?

A A good many of them. Most of the boys don't talk anything to us because they are scared. We cannot tell how many boys are Christian.

Q We expect to provide for the Buddhist boys. We don't think the Buddhist religion will keep him from being loyal. He can be a Buddhist and still be loyal?

A Yes.

Q Are you a Buddhist or Christian?

A I am a Christian.

Q What about Shinto?

A It is a little different. It's old and has been in Japan quite a while. Shinto is a part of the nature of the Japanese.

Q A kind of ancestry worship?

A Yes.

Q How long have you been here?

A Since 1905. (38 years.)

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Mr. Mayeda was then interrogated.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q How long have you lived here?



A 38 years.

Q How long has your wife been here?"

A 34 years.

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Mr. Ichikawa was then interrogated.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q How long have you been here?

A Since February 22, 1934.

Q You have a definite interest in the welfare of this country?

A Yes.

Q You have no interest back in Japan?

A I have nothing. They left religion back in Japan but no interest.

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Mr. Hiraoka was next interrogated.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q How long have you been here?

A Since 1904. About 25 years I change my feeling. This is my country. Many visits in Japan. There is a change in feeling. I have seven children in this country. Mr son is 30 years old. I start him to Christian Sunday School when he is four years old. When he is small he sings "Jesus Loves Me This I Know". I got second son who volunteer. I go to congregation in Christian Church, two my children in Methodist Church. My home in Fresno. We got duty anyway and that is all my question.

Q Where did he say he lived?

A In Fresno.

Q How old are you?

A 69.

Q Let me ask you a question you might want to answer and you might not. We are not talking in camp here as our time is too short but we are trying to get information that will help you. What proportion do you think feel as you do in this camp? Do both men and women feel as you do about this country?



Mr. Kondo: Hard to tell.

Q Half of them?

Mr. Kondo: Three-quarters, I think. All have given out that they would stand with this country through anything and would want to stay here. Those who have relations in Japan might want to go back to Japan. Most don't care about going back if they don't have any relations back in Japan.

BY COLONEL SCOBEE:

There is only one thought that I had. You can do a great deal because you are loyal to this country. I want to thank you for coming, and I want to congratulate you.

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SHOTARO HIKIDA, YOTARO OKUNO, MR. HAYASHI, BLOCK MANAGER (63), TEIZO YAHANDA and FRANK SASAKI were next called as witnesses.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q I represent Senator Chandler, who was unable to be here, who is chairman of a sub-committee to determine how you are getting along. Do you all talk English? Do you understand me?

A Yes.

Q Would you like to have one person speak for the group?

Mr. Hikida was designated.

Q Now, Mr. Hikida, I would like to have from your group some idea of your problem, of your reaction to the way our government has tried to handle your problem, the progress that has been made and the things you are doing now in trying to get the boys to volunteer and what you think should be done. In your own words give us some of your ideas.

A First, in regard to the conditions of this relocation center. In my estimation, I believe most of the evacuee, both Issei and Nisei are, I am quite sure, that they are most satisfied with the facilities, the treatment, food and so forth. Now, in regard to this volunteer enlistment from the Nisei. I believe that it was a wonderful opportunity for the younger generation because at the time of the outbreak of the war and thereafter these Nisei have been accused of being disloyal to the United States. We realize that a great opportunity have come to the Nisei to prove that they are not disloyal to this country and that they should take this opportunity to volunteer and the Nisei are really 100% loyal to the United States. I, myself, thought so and I thought there would be a great number who would volunteer and I thought there would be no single people who would answer "no" to the questions 27 and 28. When that question came it was a great surprise to me that there are some people who say "no". It was a great astonishment to me and I felt it was unfortunate for the future of the Nisei as it was an opportunity to promise their faith in the United States for



the future. Some of the reasons from my observation for the motive behind answering "no". Of course, there were several reasons as far as I gathered through my contact with the different boys. One reason is that some of the Nisei must have lost their confidence in the future, their confidence in the United States because of the antagonistic feeling against Japanese. They were not able to live happily because of the fact that they have had some very difficult experiences. I have thought it a very wicked way to decide. They should not feel that way but they should see vision of the future of their status in the United States. But some of the people don't feel that way.

Q If it continues, you will feel the same way?

A Yes. Up to the outbreak of war, the attitude of Nisei, as well as other persons, to the United States was perfect. When selective service act went in and the Japanese young men were drafted, Japanese people gave parties to the selectees and to the volunteers -- gave them a big send-off. They were simply proud to go into the Army of the United States and I never can forget when our Ambassador Nomura arrived in San Francisco, he spoke at one of the welcome parties and in his speech he said, "You people, both Issei as well as parents, you have come to this country and you were born in this country and your country is not Japan and you must give your life to the United States". That speech spread through the Japanese throughout the West Coast as a motto for the boys. That was about 1940, and the feeling and morale of the Japanese was so great. The feeling is not so well but we must do our best to the United States. When this registration came a few weeks ago, I was astonished to find so much change. It may be the way they have been treated. It may be the forced evacuation that made so much change in morale. I, myself, do not feel bad about being put in a relocation center but some of the young people do.

Q You thought it was necessary and you were not against it?

A Yes.

Q It was intended that when the opportunity was offered as it is now, to determine who was for the United States and who was against it. Now, let me ask you, do you think the boys who answered "no" understood the implications of that answer and what it meant to their future?

A I am afraid that some did not understand. We all know there was a little pressure from the pressure group that was taken in since.

Q Among your own. Those that were taken in a few weeks ago? You think that had some influence?

A I think so. The change in our lives, loss of our property, and feeling in California was a big shock to everybody and the change of living had a great deal to do with it.

Q Now let me say this. The question of loyalty and disloyalty to a country is much bigger than property. When the last war came, I was in the engineering business. I had a partner but one day we locked the place up and volunteered. Americans are like that. They raise no objection when selective service comes along. We sometimes do have a conscientious objector, but he is out-



side the pale. Whenever one is disloyal he is outside the pale and whenever there is one we have a way of dealing with that, but when an American citizen definitely says he is not loyal to this country, he has changed his whole future in this country. For example, you have some legionnaires in this camp who fought in the last war. The Colonel never comes to this camp without looking up some of the Legionnaires. So when a young man makes a decision that he will not fight for the country, he is disloyal instead of being loyal. You can see he has changed his whole future in this country. Instead of coming back and people being proud of him, he stays here and I don't know what will become of him. I wonder if they understood and their parents understood.

A I am afraid some of them didn't. Another thing we must take into consideration is the fact that since evacuation selective service was somewhat changed and a good many of the second generation young men thought, that is, they had a doubt as to whether their citizenship had anything to do with them. They were in doubt.

Q Which was wrong?

A They thought at the outbreak of the war they were not treated as other aliens were.

Q But they were citizens?

A Even though they were citizens they were put into centers while Germans and Italians were not.

Q That has been done and we can't help that now. You understand you had a greater racial problem. I take it that you are all loyal to this country.

A We are.

Mr. Yahanda: We came here and most of us have lived here thirty or forty years and we owe everything to this country and we don't owe Japan anything.

Q Do you have a son?

A I have a son who just registered the other day. He put in "yes" of his own accord. He answered freely.

Q Did he volunteer?

A No, he just became of age.

Q Take the boys who answered "yes" to the loyalty question. What would be the reaction if draft applied just as it does to other Americans? Would they go freely?

A I think so. If this draft had come just after we came into relocation centers and assembly centers, this trouble could have been avoided, but this lapse of a long time made them think nothing would ever come to them.

Q In other words, if we had made it an emergency and started to separate loyal from disloyal, it would have been a much simpler proposition?



A We all believe that.

Q You were all born in Japan but you are loyal now and you would do anything to help the United States?

A Yes.

Q That is all. I just wanted to discuss it with you this way.

Mr. Yahanda: In the last world war I was a Freshman in Berkeley and a professor in military science advised us to volunteer and when we came back to the student club we talked it up to the other students. After much talk we finally took a vote. Some of the older members who had just come from Japan were against it. The younger men wanted to join the American forces but when we took the vote we were voted out by pressure. Three of us are graduates of Berkeley.

Q I think you can do a lot by telling people the seriousness of the problem. The United States would not do anything for me if I were disloyal. You can do much for them. It is my opinion their answer will follow them all their lives.

A We will do our best.

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HARRY MIYAKE, JAMES NAKAMURA, KEIZO ISHIZU, KEN UTSUNOMIYA, DR. EARL YUSA, citizens of Japanese ancestry were next called as witnesses. Harry Miyake was interrogated for the group.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q I have asked you boys to come in as representative leaders of the younger people. You were all born in the United States, weren't you?

A That's right.

Q You're citizens. I'm talking to you as one citizen to another and as leaders and understanding this country and perhaps understanding your people who maybe have other points of view. It isn't necessary to ask questions of all of you. Would you rather just one of you would answer my questions and which one would rather I'd talk to? I'm coming to you as a representative of the Senate Military Affairs Committee. Senator Chandler, who is Chairman, and had to go on to Tuscon, was here last night and couldn't stay and he regrets very much he was not able to stay and see all of you. Now, this question -- of course, you understand that you have always had a racial problem. I live in Nevada, You know something about California. Not many of your people are in Nevada. Therefore, when the war came along it merely precipitated the question, made it necessary for something to be done, at least our President thought so and he did the best he could and it's done and the thing is to do the best we can. In our country we're always for him whether he's right or whether he is wrong, and I know you are. The question now that confronts the committee brought to a head by virtue of the introduction of a bill to turn the relocation centers back to the Army



makes it necessary for this committee to make a decision. Then their decision would go before the United States Congress and whatever action they took would be what would be done. Now, two Senators, Senator Wallgren of Washington and Holman of Oregon, have introduced the bill and are very frank in stating they did it to bring the question to a head; in other words, to determine the future of the people who are in these camps. Many people feel that the citizens, the loyal citizens, should not be subjected to constant association with people who are not loyal and they do understand that there are many people in your camps that are not loyal. They understand, too, there are many people here who have ability to do things and they are not able to do those things here. Therefore, if they can determine who those people are and give them satisfactory opportunities and not endanger this country, I'm sure -- while I'm not speaking for the committee -- they have made no decision -- I know they feel that way about it so in talking to you I know I'm talking to representatives of citizens of the Japanese people. The Committee is very much disturbed because we are unable to understand any citizen of this country who would answer the loyalty question in the negative when he thoroughly understands what the implications of the question might be; in other words, it might effect his future. So, I would like for you in just your own words to tell me for the benefit of the record -- that's necessary so I can take it back and the committee can review it as a representative statement -- your reaction to the whole problem, that is, what it is, and how you're getting along and what you think the future should hold for the people here. In other words, has the Army made a move in the right direction by opening the gate for volunteers and should they go further than that and apply the draft law the same as any other American citizen; should they then determine the loyal from the disloyal and, if so, what should they do with the loyal people and what should they do with the definitely disloyal. If you just take your time and tell me. We're interested in your opinion, definitely interested.

- A I'll answer from the point where the army had started to open up the voluntary movement, army enlistment. The first reaction as far as the majority of the citizens are concerned, the feeling the citizen had is why go ahead to voluntary enlistment after they had been reclassified into 4-C and rejected in the draft. In other words, as far as the army was concerned, in the past up to evacuation why they were certainly discriminated and why should the army go ahead and ask for voluntary enlistment. That's our first reaction when we were thrown open for the army. Now the citizens, when they were given the reason why the army had opened up this voluntary enlistment, a good many have taken that they can forget the additional reclassification of the person, but there are some groups, you might say the younger group, who have no future thinking but they are always being led by their parents or led by their mental feeling of the hard discrimination they had to go through is the one that can't see the future and said "no". Those who have really thought of their future, I'm sure, have changed their mind. That's in regard to the army. Now, for the solution as far as the people who have answered "no". At the present time, I think they have been given plenty of opportunity to think this matter over very carefully; regardless of whether we give them additional time, I don't think we can change very many of them. That's something we want to do to help them, but I don't think we can do anything with it. For those who have answered "no" definitely, something must be done as far as we loyal citizens who are sacrificing our lives and future for this country should be definitely protected and given that credit, while those who have answered "no" I'm sure they realize the situation, they have no country to go to other than Japan. Whether they'll be accepted or not, that's something they're taking a chance. As for the loyal ones, we're taking a chance of being



accepted in the American community. They have accepted the chance of being accepted by the Japanese community. So it is a 50-50 proposition as far as the chances are concerned. Now, in regard to this resettlement. Just because you're a loyal citizen, it's going to be awfully hard to ask everyone to resettle. How you're going to do it, I don't know, but consider my case as an example. I'm married, have five children, the oldest is 17, the youngest is 2. Now, certainly, the future is dark if I should be forced to go out or resettle under the present condition with rationing and this and that. I think the living is going to be tough. That's from my personal point of view. For those single or a couple or a couple with just a child, I think it's very interesting to go out and pioneer. Before evacuation, I've been dealing in farm produce and depending on various seasons or various crops such as cauliflower, lettuce. Many times, the Eastern group such as Virginia or Long Island has been producing that stuff which will compete with the California product and break the eastern market and many times we felt we should go down to those places and make a thorough investigation. There might be a better place than California. But with the present situation, I can feel the same way as originally, I don't know. That's my feeling. As far as the army, up to this time I think they have been very fair. I have no feeling other than they're being fair to us.

Q I think that's one of the most intelligent statements I have heard, and I think you understand thoroughly the problem as we try to; with gas rationing and travel rationing and everything, it would be hard to go, it would be hard to do that. Of course, it would. Those questions though, those bridges will have to be crossed one at a time as you come to them. The question immediately confronting this committee is first whether perhaps the army ought to go further and let the draft apply as it does to all other American citizens. Do you believe it should?

A Yes, I believe we should be given the same opportunity as the outsiders.

Q You're given an opportunity, just like I felt it was an opportunity to go in the other war and will probably go in this one before it's over. Do you think there would be a wholehearted response to such a ruling. In other words, do you think there would be no objection to it? They would all come in as American citizens?

A Definitely so. Some of these "no's" will be in the draft age already. If they're taken, fine. I think they'll change their mind. Definitely with the "yes" boys. We are really on the spot, thinking of our parents, thinking of our parent's relatives in Japan. Had we volunteered and proved our loyalty through volunteer basis, then the parent in Japan after the war or after everything is all set, why his or her boy has volunteered to fight us, but if the picture is different, his boy has been drafted, we have no alternative, and that's why personally I forgot to mention that I objected on the point of voluntary enlistment basis. I objected badly until we were proved what the Army was after.

Q They're really starting in now. The next step then would be whether or not the determination should now be made as to who is loyal and who is disloyal and separate them. What is your feeling?

A I think, separate; they should be separated.



Q In other words, you wouldn't give your people who said they were disloyal, you wouldn't advocate giving them any greater privileges than they would give our own people on the outside. If I said I was disloyal, I could expect no further privileges. Then can your people?

A They can't expect any more. If they had plenty of time to think it over, their minds should be made up by now.

Q Then there is a definite disloyal number and those should be segregated and guarded in accordance with the judgment of whatever unit of the government that might be placed over them?

A That's right.

Q The definitely loyal then -- and when I say that, the loyal to be determined by the proper unit of the government whatever it is -- what do you think should be offered them?

A I think that we have gone through quite a hardship. We have lost practically everything we had. In fact, a good many of us were in a position, had built our homes and all our savings were invested in the home. When they were evacuated, what little savings they had and some of them had sold their property, but the time was so short that we couldn't realize enough and our savings are practically gone. A good many of us is just on the limb as far as financial conditions are concerned, and if we are to be relocated definitely, I think the government should help those who are able to relocate, to help them financially.

Q Suppose this segregation here were to take place and the definitely disloyal were removed to a camp where they could be guarded adequately, whatever that's determined to be, and the definitely loyal ones -- some time were taken in reviewing the situation and allowing them to get relocated. How would that be?

A I think it should be. I don't think we can jump to resettlement immediately. Those who could will be those who are single or married with a child, with some financial means. Regardless, I think those going through the hardship of resettling, I think there should be some place where they can rely in case of any emergency. Now suppose you go to say Long Island and investigate over there and take the family over there and get settled. We have lots of opportunity. We have to live in a fear in our mind, but now I don't know how we'd be accepted on the outside. We may go into a grocery store and he'll say, "no, I don't think I'll sell you any sugar."

Q I can see your point and I think you have made yourself very clear. In other words, you think the draft should apply equally to all citizens. You think there should be a definite segregation of the loyal from the disloyal and the definitely disloyal should be treated like any disloyal citizen?

A That's right.

Q And you think the others, the ones that are definitely loyal and by reason of age or disability cannot go into the army should be given some time, an opportunity to place themselves?

A That's right.



James Nakamura: There's one thing, however, in going through the process of evacuation back in the past. These people went through a tremendous amount and you can see there's no hard and fast line you can draw. You ask a person to answer "yes" or "no" to a loyalty question and not knowing how things are elsewhere, they think maybe they have a chance in Japan or something like that. They think they won't meet this race prejudice and they answer "no". They actually don't know what conditions exist in Japan. I'm talking from a humanitarian viewpoint, not a practical viewpoint. Those people didn't know what went on in their mind because they can't compare the two. Certain pressure groups existed here in camp and from their own emotion they went through. I know quite a few people who left their mothers and fathers back there simply because they were old and couldn't take them with them and all of those things. The whole thing culminated in the answer "no". If once they got a taste of what it would be like, I think they'd think otherwise. Well, maybe things like that shouldn't be brought up because now we're in an emergency.

Q I thank your view -- naturally all of you are definitely loyal and ready to go or do anything. You're simply trying to be fair to your people. Of course, in any country a person who enjoys its privileges and it's citizenship, the primary thing is to be willing to protect the country and these people have been raised here and you might find an American boy a little bit mixed up on everything except who he is for. He knows who he is for when the tug is tightened. And that's what I meant when I asked if you thought they really understood the implications of the question.

A Yes, I don't believe that they did.

Q That's about the only thing in which you disagree with your friend?

A Take, for instance, the people in the occupied countries in Europe -- Czechoslovakia and Poland under Hitler -- they're obeyed. The situation is different but those people have felt they were disowned by the United States when they were evacuated because they didn't thoroughly understand just exactly what the things were that made this thing a reality and they are still confused on the issue. That's the way I feel about it. I can see the issues clearly. I think I can see the practical side of the matter, but that's how I think they feel.

Ken Utsunomiya: I offer this as a matter of information and record and not as an alibi or excuse for those people who answered "no". When these people were asked to answer that question they were given sufficient time to study the matter, but you will find that a majority of those cases, those who answered "no", were those young men 17, 18, 19, and 20, who had not gone through any very great hardships of life back home or faced the problems of life and their parents were not too clearly posted upon this question of loyalty. In many instances, these parents had a great deal of influence over their children, and I personally believe that some of these boys who answered "no" are just as good Americans as anyone of us here, but through the influence of their parents who didn't know what the future was going to be in this country and who thought there would be no future and had every reason to go back to Japan or were planning to go back and naturally take the family, and the feeling between themselves and their children of young age was such that they wanted those kids to go back with them. If you answer "yes" on this loyalty question, they felt that the expectation of going back was less and therefore they probably advised the children to answer "no". If that's a decision which they made, I don't believe they should be given any chance at all because they have answered "no", but I make this



statement as a matter of record to show you what influences there were in getting such a high percentage of "no's"; and another thing is that if these parents answered them, that the percentage would probably be higher for "yes" because they would have by that time been properly posted on things, and when they answer their own question, being loyal and law-abiding residents of this country, most of them are going to answer "yes", and if they answered "yes", naturally, they felt they would be protected in the future in this country and would advise their young children to answer "yes" on their loyalty question.

BY MR. MALONE:

I am glad that you made that point clear. There's one other point I want to ask. You understand I was not familiar with these relocation centers until a few weeks ago when we started to investigate them. I have a growing feeling that quite a few people may have felt that these centers were not such a bad place to live and that regardless of their answer, they would be allowed to stay here. I have a growing feeling that a certain number, perhaps, felt that. Now, if they did -- that's my opinion -- they're mistaken. And at the same time, as you said, they made that decision after they thoroughly understood it, and there is nothing the committee can do about it. But, and again I'm not speaking for the committee, I know they are trying to find the answer of how to treat men like you as against men who are definitely disloyal. They don't want to keep you here definitely together. So, I think if you agree with the statements that have been made, I think that's all.

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DAVID A. ROGERS, Chief of Agricultural Division was next called as a witness.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q First, I'd be interested -- I know the committee would be interested in having your reaction as to the move recently made by the Army to allow the boys of the proper age and physical qualifications to volunteer and become a part of this thing and also your reaction, if you have one, as to whether or not the determination should be made as to loyalty and disloyalty and then, further than that, what should be done with the disloyal and loyal, if you have an idea in that regard, if you have a definite feeling along that line, and, of course, primarily I want to get from you just what you're doing in the agricultural line here, your acreage and production, and what you think can be done actually. So in your own words, just go ahead.

A Mr. Brown and I were two of the first ones on the job. We started out on one of the fields and we asked for volunteers to go out there which they did and from there spread on through. We weren't active but a very short time until some of these boys asked me what we were going to do with the vegetables and I told them we were going to consume them here in camp, and they were very much in favor of producing food for the Army. I'm carrying this on from the agricultural standpoint entirely. And I believe in the beginning they would have liked very much if they could have helped that type of production, but we were told to continue producing food for ourselves and these other relocation centers. I believe they would have been much more enthusiastic if we would have been allowed to produce for the Army which we are perfectly capable of doing. In no instance have I become aware of any particular disloyalty as far as the government or anything of that sort is concerned.



Among the boys we have on the farm I understand possibly there is some. Probably there are one or two instances that were called to my attention, but indirectly. But I would say the entire group out there is, especially in the beginning, entirely loyal to what we are trying to do and they were making every effort to prove themselves as capable of being citizens and living in this country. I brought a little production program and record here. By the end of this fiscal year, which takes the latter three-quarter, we will have produced something on the order of 15,900,000 pounds of vegetables and other produce. I'm always interested in whether we're saving the government money in carrying on our program. Are we on top of this thing, and I feel definitely that we are saving the government money in carrying on our program. We probably have as much as \$70 to \$90 an acre in these crops and I don't think it will be out of the way to say that the crop could be valued at from three to four hundred per acre, probably more in some cases and less in other cases. Therefore, we easily and conservatively have produced one-half million dollars worth of stuff by the end of this fiscal year. The market is with us, the vegetables are high. The Army must buy it anyway at a tremendous cost. Our acreage -- we've produced about 1300 acres of vegetables possibly, but we double-crop. As soon as we'd take one thing off the land, we'd put something back in. The basic acreage would be about 788 acres. The area on the big farm which approximates 7,000 acres -- to be exact 6,975 acres. The remainder is in feed for livestock and in alfalfa. We're allowed four acre feet of water and then we purchase the additional  $\frac{1}{2}$  acre foot if it's available in the dam.

Q What is your arrangement? What does it cost you per acre?

A Our rental is \$20. We pay \$3.60 for the four acre feet. On top of the rental we pay for water.

Q Is that only for the land or for all of it?

A We're assessed for the 7,000 acres.

Q At \$20 an acre?

A That will be the rental.

Q Is it the rental you pay whether you use it or not?

A We pay the rental whether we use it or not. We're using everything. On top of the rental we pay the water and the water is costing us \$3.60 for four acre feet. We buy an additional  $\frac{1}{2}$  acre foot for fifty cents.

Q Why that difference?

A That's one of the concessions of the irrigation project.

Q It seems like a very high price unless you use most of the land. You pay \$20 an acre for the 7,000 acres as a rule flat and \$3.60 for four acre feet in addition to that when you use it?

A We're assessed that whether we use it or not. For the whole 7,000.

Q And then if you do need another  $\frac{1}{2}$  acre foot, the half acre foot is fifty cents?



- A Yes, we have under lease or proposed lease or available for lease, 15,000 acres.
- Q But you would pay the rental on that only as you took it over?
- A Yes, we did feel it was possibly a little high in the beginning, but land in the valley is renting for \$25, \$35 an acre depending on the lease.
- Q Is four acre feet sufficient for the irrigation?
- A It is with care; that's one of our big problems. We have hired a man here, an excellent man, to take care of the water. He has Japanese men under him.
- Q Did I understand you to say that 700 acres is the maximum you've had under cultivation to date?
- A Say 788; that is vegetable land. The remainder is in other crops. Well, for example, we've plowed up approximately 1500 acres which we'll put into cotton, flax and barley and maize. Those will be our crops. Our maize is 490 acres.
- Q Do I understand that you have other crops besides vegetables -- vegetables about 7000 acres -- that all of the 7,000 are under cultivation?
- A Yes, definitely. A large portion of the remainder which amounts to around 5,000 acres -- that's considered pasture.
- Q What do you get for that?
- A We're getting various fees. 11¢ for cows and bulls a head per day.
- Q What is the actual grazing?
- A Year long. Of course, we shift from pasture to pasture. The fee varies from 5 to 11 cents. Of course, we're anticipating a tremendous livestock program. We have purchased 720 head of Mexican steer as you saw in the pasture; we're buying dairy cattle. We'll graze hogs on the alfalfa; we will put up hay for dairy cattle; we're making all our hay and we'll have a tremendous number of chickens and grow a lot of our feed here on the project, and we'll grow a lot of feed to eliminate the expense next year of buying expensive feed. That is pretty well what we are doing, the program in general.
- Q You have 7,000 acres that's available for good vegetable crops or any kind of crop?
- A The larger part of it is good vegetable land; it's all good cotton land.
- Q With the help you have available and if you went in for mass production, do you feel that this project could be made quite an asset for the federal government in this emergency of crop production?
- A Very definitely.



Q I understand, I think, the Mexican steer costs about \$50 apiece on the average?

A Yes.

Q What did they weigh when you got them?

A They didn't weigh very much; oh, I would say between five and six hundred pounds.

Q What would they weigh after you had them here say 10 months or a year?

A Oh, they'll weigh 800 to a thousand pounds. They vary tremendously -- we have big ones and little ones.

Q What would they be worth a pound then coming off your pasture?

A They would be worth -- we could sell them tomorrow for 12¢ as is; we paid 10¢ I believe.

BY MR. TERRY:

Q You have only had them a month?

A We made two cents on the deal the first crack out of the bag.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q What do the gilts weigh?

A They'll average 410 pounds; if we bought breeding stock in California, they would cost for ordinary animals 25¢ a pound.

Q Are you keeping yourself in a position both with your livestock and your farming operations and your investments, do you feel you're in a position so that if you changed the operation at any given time it can be turned over to other people and that you'd get out on your investments?

A From the very beginning I insisted on a cost accounting section and we know what we have in the business. We know what we produced. We know the equipment we have and our investment.

Q What is your investment in the farm business?

A I'm sorry I don't know.

Q Don't worry about it now, but if you have an approximate amount you might fill it in the record and send it back. Do you have anything further you want to say?

A No, sir.

Q You have tractors and all farming equipment that is necessary?

A That's right.



Q And you find the Japanese are good truck farmers and good enough in other ways so that you can train them and get the work necessary?

A That's right. I would like to go back to your original point about equipment. If we entered such a program as you mentioned like getting down to business, we'd need certain facilities; we'd need a packing shed, icing facilities and storing facilities.

Q You do now have large refrigerating plants where you store?

Mr. Bennett: Only for our own daily use.

Mr. Rogers: We would work more efficiently if we did have these facilities and it is imperative that we do have them. We've been harvesting in gunny sacks; that's quite remarkable.

Q You're not allowed to sell anything outside the project except to another project?

A We've never sold a pound off the project.

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JAMES HENDRICK TERRY, Project Attorney, was next called as a witness.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q Mr. Terry, I know the Committee would be interested in your point of view on the several things you've heard discussed not only as to what the future of the project should be if it should remain as it is, but would be interested in your idea as to whether it should be turned over to the Army as has been suggested by the bill. I know they'll also be interested in what you think the program of the center should be if it is to continue, whether, for example, the Army should continue to try to get enlistments and whether they should go further with the draft, whether the loyal and disloyal should be segregated and, if so, what course should be pursued and followed to a logical conclusion as to how long these camps would have to be operated in order to develop the question to some kind of determination.

A I have given a good deal of thought to those questions. I should like, if I may, first to give you an idea of the sort of work I do and what opportunity I have for contacts and observations. It might help in answering the question. I am the only appointed lawyer on the project and my duties include attending to and advising in connection with all of the legal work pertaining to the government operations of the project, all the government contracts, all the government legal problems of every sort. In addition to that, I am also responsible for all of the legal problems affecting the community as a whole, that is to say, the governmental problems of the internal government of the community, the organization of stores, consumer cooperative, the preparation of all contracts relating to the operation of private enterprises such as the camouflage net factory, dealing with all kinds of labor problems that may arise in that connection, the prospective organization of a credit union to furnish banking facilities and of similar community activities. In addition to that, I am also responsible for assisting



and counselling the evacuees in connection with all of their individual legal problems. As you know, many of them left substantial properties and property problems, leases, other active and effective legal instruments in California or the state from which they were evacuated, and questions are constantly arising about those legal matters. They have problems of all kinds, social security and unemployment insurance claims. They have their own individual insurance problems due in some instances to the reduced incomes which they are now receiving, and then there are a great number of personal and domestic problems of all kinds that are brought to me. As a result, I see literally hundreds of evacuees in my office every week and many of them are very willing to confide in me on their various personal problems. I have found that as far as observance of rules and regulations of the project and observance of the law generally is concerned, these are very law-abiding people. There have been few instances of offense even of misdemeanor class, and there has been only one serious crime committed on the project which was a marital triangle case, a homicide. In my own work in my office I have been assisted by three evacuee lawyers, all members of the California bar. Two of those lawyers have volunteered in the armed services and did so immediately, as soon as the opportunity was afforded. The third lawyer, whom I believe to be equally loyal, did not volunteer but takes the position that he is only deferring his hoped-for service in the armed forces because of the fact that he and his wife are expecting their first child within a couple of months. He hopes to remain here until that event takes place. I believe that you spoke to the father of one of my lawyers this afternoon.

If the relocation centers, judging by my experience in this center, should be continued as they now are in all respects, which I would by no means advocate, I feel that a very much stronger investigative system should be set up and that such investigative system should work even more closely than has been the past experience with other investigative agencies such as the FBI and the Army and Navy intelligence systems because I believe the primary problem of these centers which differentiates them from other American communities is the existence here by reason of birth and racial background of a number of people -- the number I cannot estimate, people who are either actively disloyal to the United States, definitely pro-Japanese or passively disloyal to the United States. I would not like to see the present situation in this center maintained as it now is with the same population because I do not believe that it is fair from an over-all broad point of view either to the people of the United States as a whole not to take the utmost precaution against any possible contingencies which might arise from the activities of disloyal people, and, in the second place, I believe it is also unfair to the loyal citizens here to be hampered in any way in their loyalty or to have a shadow cast upon them by reason of the existence in these centers of a disloyal element. The answer, obviously, to me is that there should be a separation of the loyal from the disloyal and that such separation should be undertaken at once and that it should be as fair as possible. I might interject that I do not believe that there is any security problem as far as the people in the surrounding communities in Arizona are concerned even as matters now are. I believe that the loyal people here plus the administrative staff plus the military police unit system as it is is adequate to cope with any situation which might arise as far as danger to the surrounding inhabitants is concerned.

The more difficult and perhaps important problem is how to separate the loyal from the disloyal. I would answer that -- and I would point out again



that this is my own personal opinion based upon my own personal views and is not intended to reflect the views of any organization, including the Authority by which I am employed -- I would say that my personal view is that in the first place, all aliens or citizens against whom evidence can now or could in the future be adduced by further investigation of subversive activities of any nature, threats of violence against loyal citizens with respect to their loyalty, interference with military registration or the draft, any form of sabotage or espionage, all activities of that character, should be referred to the United States Attorney, the local United States Attorney for prosecution and that the full facilities of this Authority together with the FBI and any other investigating agencies should work in the fullest cooperation in assisting in such prosecution. The aliens, in the second place, as to whom no sufficient evidence for prosecution can be adduced but who are suspected on reasonable grounds of active or dangerous disloyalty or pro-Japanese sentiment, should, in my opinion, be interned in regular internment camps maintained by the Department of Justice, the Alien Enemy Control Unit under supervision of the Army, and arrangements have been made, I am informed, that internees will be accepted on that basis without further hearings before Alien Enemy Boards upon the recommendation of the WRA Project Directors. I think that that course is wise and should be followed in all such cases. Unfortunately, that does not take care of the citizens, including a large number of Kibei who are educated abroad and have pro-Japanese sentiments, who are not admissible to internment camps and against whom perhaps no adequate evidence sufficient for prosecution could be adduced. Those people, it seems to me, should be segregated in a segregation camp or camps. I shall tell you in a moment how I think these should be set up and handled. In addition to that category, I believe also that all persons who are now applying for repatriation should be put in such segregation camps. All persons who are undesirable aliens who have come to this country illegally and are now subject to deportation should be put in such camps. The families of internees should be carefully scrutinized and I think it will probably appear that a substantial number of such families should also be put in such camps. A substantial number of those who have indicated disloyalty to the United States in the military registration should be no doubt sent to such camps although I'm not prepared to admit that all of those who so answered are necessarily disloyal. I believe that a review of those cases insofar as possible should be made by individual investigation insofar as it can reasonably be carried out and that such persons should be put in those camps. I'm not prepared to recommend, for instance, drafting any such persons into the armed forces merely because there is some basis for the opinion that many of those so answered the question to evade military service and because they're slackers. I would rather err on the side of keeping such people out of the Army. I would not send these people to segregation camps as individuals. That is a matter of compromise which I feel we are forced to make. I feel that we have the choice of sending these people separated from their families or sending their families with them. I feel that the importance of keeping family units, family groups together and the unhealthy situations and difficult social problems which will result from broken families are so serious that I would favor sending families together insofar as it's possible to do that. That will, unfortunately, result, if such program were to be carried out, in sending to segregation centers a number of children of American citizenship who are potentially loyal and good citizens. The problem then arises when such camps have been established as to who should run them. I have given thought to that and I have also talked to representatives of the Army and the Department



of Justice, the Alien Enemy Control Unit on that very subject, and it is my opinion, based in part upon those talks, that both the Army and the Department of Justice feel that they are not well-equipped to deal with many of the social problems that might arise in such a place. Such segregation, as I think you have indicated, would have to be more or less upon a group basis. It could not be on an individual basis. However, in classifying and segregating the disloyal on a basis of groups, it may be that we would be taking in such groups some few people who are either, for instance, straddlers or persons who are definitely on the side of loyal citizenship although it did not appear to us because we didn't have an adequate opportunity to examine each case individually. I believe we should not cast out loyal citizens if we can possibly avoid it and then we will have the problem, at any rate, after the war of dealing with citizens whom, it may be, it will not be possible to deport. We're purely speculating when we decide what's going to be done with such persons but where a good citizen can be made, I believe the opportunity should be offered him so far as possible. As between the three agencies, the Army, the Department of Justice and the WRA, I would say that such segregation camps could probably best be managed under existing circumstances by the WRA because of that factor, because of the fact that it has some experience in dealing with these people which is, in my opinion, necessary and it has better background and equipment to deal with the children and the potentially good citizens who might be found there.

Q You're talking now of the men and women in families that would be interned?

A Be put in segregation camps.

Q Whatever you call them?

A I'm drawing a distinction between an internment camp such as now maintained by the Department of Justice and these segregation camps where we could send people we cannot send to internment camps or we cannot prosecute because of the facts.

Q That might include older people who by reason of age are not able to make a living but might be loyal too?

A I should like to deal with those people separately. What I am now trying to point out is I feel of the three agencies that the WRA is perhaps in the best position to deal with segregated camps and the segregation centers should be managed and operated first in very close liason with the Department of Justice and the Army. The military guard of such centers should be very much more secure than it is at the present.

Q You would leave the internment centers with the Department of Justice?

A Yes. The people in internment centers do not work. They are in the same class as prisoners of war. The internment centers are only open to aliens. They could not take care of our Kibei problem at all, and the Department of Justice has indicated that they are not a bit anxious to take on any greater social problem than they now have in the internment centers. It's perhaps possible that such segregation centers could be operated under some kind of joint control by the Army, Department of Justice and the WRA but I do believe that insofar as the citizens' children are concerned, who we hope may grow up to be



good American citizens, a contribution could be made in that regard by operation by the WRA. I would, therefore, put all of the suspected disloyal persons, citizens and aliens, who are not acceptable in internment camps into the segregation camps to be operated by the WRA in close conjunction with the Army and the Department of Justice.

Q You have your volunteers to the Army and through the operation of the draft board you get the other young men citizens in the Army, and then the internment section; what percentage do you estimate that it would leave for whatever agency was chosen to supervise the remaining ones?

A It is hardly possible to answer that question categorically. I would say that most of the loyal male citizens of military age, who are physically fit would be and should be drafted as speedily as possible. Most other loyal citizens and their families should be relocated in accordance with the intensive program now in progress and should be resettled in presumable permanent jobs throughout the country. Some of the aliens would go to internment camps and some aliens and disloyal citizens would be prosecuted. The percentage remaining would therefore depend largely upon the number it would be found necessary to segregate and upon the success of the resettlement program.

Q And that would proceed in the usual manner anyway?

A That will proceed and I think will proceed rapidly. When the loyal persons are removed to remunerative jobs through the United States, I would favor insofar as it can possibly be done having their families and parents, if possible, to join them either immediately or at the earliest opportunity provided the family can be sustained and not become a public charge in the community where they're living. There will remain some few loyal people who, I presume, cannot be relocated on that basis, some older people and some very young people. Those I would keep in the most self-sustaining relocation center possible under the present administration with the hope that gradually as opportunities permit places can be found for them as well throughout the United States with the idea of gradually diminishing the operations of the WRA as at present considered until there are no persons loyal to the United States in relocation centers. The so-called segregation centers which I want to differentiate from internment centers because internment is now existing program of the Department of Justice for enemy aliens and prisoners of war as well and are entirely different and apart from our relocation centers -- segregation centers are those who are not eligible for internment.

Q Segregation centers would in fact be the relocation centers?

A In the last analysis they would contain the only people necessarily kept for the duration of the war.

Q And the determination then made as to what should be done with them?

A I believe they should be granted no leave except in the case of children of proven loyalty who have attained majority, are of working age and ought to go out, but I believe those should be permitted to go out if their loyalty is satisfactory. The determination as to what should be done about the disloyal would doubtless have to be made after the war is over.



- Q Coming back to my question, from your experience in the camps would you say that if that were immediately attempted and carried through after a few months, after a reasonable period, about what percentage do you think would be retained in the camps and could the camps then be consolidated to a point where there would be much fewer camps?
- A I would think that with the progress of the relocation program and the draft before the end of the year, the number of camps should be reduced by about 50%.
- Q If that consolidation were made perhaps and some camps abolished?
- A Right.
- Q And the remaining camps retained in the most advantageous locations?
- A Right.

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LEROY H. BENNETT, Project Director, was called as a witness.

BY MR. BENNETT:

I entered the employ of the WRA as Regional Production Manager in July 1942 and as such visited the centers of Manzanar, Gila, Tule, to establish various types of manufacturing and prepared the manufacturing programs for all other centers up to December 1st. While engaged in that work, I had a great opportunity to observe the attitude of the people both staff and evacuees and was of the opinion that in general they were loyal and industrious. They were particularly anxious to engage in productive activities which would reduce the operating cost of the centers and also the manufacturing activities which would provide more income for them and a training in skills of value to them after the war. The difference in the attitudes of the centers was dependent partly upon the location from which the people were evacuated, the miscellaneous way in which they were assembled in block groups and the attitude of the local administrative staff toward them. When the relocation program was originally announced, all manufacturing industry with the exception of war industry was discontinued because it was believed that persons who were engaged in industry within the centers would relocate particularly if they were earning extra money. This created a considerable change in attitude in certain centers and a very great change in the problems of operating the centers. I came to Gila as Director on December 9, 1942, and was first Director appointed, the previous Directors having been in temporary status. Almost immediately I secured a reasonable respect from the evacuees and because of that had an excellent opportunity to study the problems in the center prior to the registration program. I was also fortunate in inheriting an especially excellent staff consisting principally of very practical and well-trained persons. The testimony of the members of my staff to which I have listened is generally in accord with my own opinions. The testimony of Mr. Terry follows very closely the ideas which I have developed principally since the beginning of registration and I subscribe to them but would like to make a few additions. Being a business man, I am particularly



interested in three phases of relocation: (1) the safety of the United States and the persons who might be injured by disloyal Japanese; (2) the operation of the WRA with the greatest economy; and (3) the final placement of the Japanese-American people to the best advantage from the standpoint of the American citizens as a whole, speaking as an individual and not as a Government employee. Without question the disloyal aliens should be segregated and placed in the custody of the Department of Justice. Their presence in the centers can only increase the difficulties of the loyal Japanese-Americans. Therefore, they should be removed as quickly as possible. The disloyal citizens such as the majority of the Kibei and the American-born who have answered "no" to the loyalty question and who, after review, are judged disloyal, together with the repatriates should be placed in some separate center operated by the War Relocation Authority. The families should accompany the men and this center which should be operated on a much more restricted basis than has been the general policy in the now existing centers. The disloyal should be required to work and to produce as much of their own living cost as possible. Their privileges should be limited and in general they should be treated as any conscientious objectors. Work, occupying their time and minds, will reduce the possibility of disorder as well as reduce the cost of their keep.

BY MR. MALONE:

Q Right on that point, Mr. Bennett, do you think that some of the people that have answered "no" to the loyalty question might have had that in mind that they would be allowed to sit in the WRA centers and be taken care of?

A Some of them. In my opinion, the many Kibei were slackers in Japan and are slackers in the United States. That is, the American-born educated in Japan and by that I do not mean some of those termed as Kibei who lived perhaps a few years in Japan as children.

Q Do you think that that might be just a working out of their plan to leave them here and be taken good care of, fed well, during the war?

A Many of them have already applied for repatriation. Yes, I do think so -- we feel that way. On the other hand, in my opinion, it would be better to put them somewhere and make them work than it would be to put them in a concentration camp and not make them work. They should be treated severely.

Q Wouldn't it be possible to reform and change the entire principle and not have them work as you suggest but take away their liberties to the extent to what amounted to a concentration camp?

A Possibly, their liberties should be greatly restricted. I thought I mentioned that.

Q In other words, it would mean then, while retaining the WRA centers technically, it would mean an entirely different relocation center?

A That's right, entirely different.

Q Run differently, supervised differently and guarded differently?

A That's right, entirely different.



- Q You didn't mean to indicate that they should continue in any manner the way they're run now?
- A No, more severely. The older people, particularly from the rural areas, will be very difficult to relocate in middle western states because they do not speak English and are too settled in their ways to, I believe, be easily established with strangers.
- Q How long do you think, Mr. Bennett, it would require, assuming such a segregation as you suggest were to be made and when all of the aliens who were determined to be disloyal were to be put immediately into concentration camps and the Army eligibles were to go into the Army, how long do you think, with this change of policy, that it would require to remove the great majority of those who are able and willing to go out and work and make their living under any such supervision that might be determined to be necessary, and how many do you think you might have left? What percentage do you think you might have left after this changed supervision that you mentioned, after a few months -- that is, a reasonable time?
- A That would be very difficult to estimate accurately. I would say this, that the total of the disloyal persons in this center out of 13,000 population would be probably not more than 2,000.
- Q That would be the ones who would be in internment camps?
- A No, I mean that -- I'm speaking now of disloyal citizens, Kibei and Nisei plus the aliens.
- Q You're speaking now of the disloyal ones that would be retained in the camp under strict supervision and be required to work?
- A Yes. About 2,000 would be the limit. With their families it might increase. If you figured that the average family was three it might go to 3,000. Kibei have small or no families.
- Q In other words, instead of 13,000 you'd have 3,000?
- A I'd have 10,000 left. I wouldn't have over 3,000 removed because they were disloyal. To make it clearer, we have 900 Kibei. If they, averaged three to the family, that would be 2,700. We have a few more of the Nisei who are disloyal, probably 200 with few families. Then we have the repatriates. If we classify them in, that would run it up some. The maximum would be 500 repatriates including families. I would say 3,000 would be as many as I'd take out that we could claim in this group, leaving us 10,000, that were to go to this particular WRA center which was set up for the disloyal. The disloyal aliens, probably the number wouldn't be very high -- my highest estimate of total persons including all members of the families is 3,500, leaving 10,000 to be relocated in other states or kept here.
- Q How many of them do you think after a few months -- a reasonable time -- would be relocated? How many of that 10,000?
- A If we relocate 3,000 of them, we would have done a big job. I still think that's a very high figure.



Q You then, roughly, would have 7,000 or about half?

A About one-half would be left here.

Q You would have to keep them some place during the period of the war?

A They might go out slowly from that point on but you're speaking now of what can be done in a few months. How fast they can go out is entirely dependent on how fast we can find jobs for them.

Q Assuming then that all the other camps, 106,000, would average like this, some better, some worse, you might end up under your system with approximately 50,000 after a few months that could be consolidated into about half the camps you now have or such amount as may be left after sending out what would go?

A And the camps should be the ones in the free areas and not nearly self-sustaining centers for the reason that it's much easier to move a person out on relocation from a free area camp or center because it requires less effort to get them out -- as proven at Granada.

Q When you change the entire type of camp, different segregation, different kind of people, wouldn't that largely change the qualifications of the people necessary to supervise these camps? Wouldn't you have to change about 90 per cent of the personnel supervising the administration?

A I wouldn't say so. I would say if you had a practical staff, which I believe most of the centers have, you would have to make changes such as to greatly increase your internal security -- issue more restrictive orders, perhaps use stronger fence.

Q And your internal security? I doubt the need for more than one company. The other operation of the centers I don't think would be very different. These people would not stir up trouble. I don't believe you'd have any more trouble if they were under severe control than you have now. Japanese have generally expected to be told what to do.

Q I see your point of view and that's exactly what I wanted to get on the record. I'll call your attention further to what had been running in my mind and we may be playing into the hands of the group, if there is such a group, that answered the question of loyalty "no" to bring about such conditions so they would stay there and not have to fight for their country and be just free to go when the war was over and pursue their own way.

A My belief is this, that when this war is finally over these disloyal people won't stay here.

Q I hope you're right.

A If they go back to Japan when the war is over, Japan will be very different. Now just because a lot of these people are disloyal doesn't necessarily mean they're troublemakers insofar as the center operation is concerned.

Q I understand that. I don't fear that. But I want to ask you another question. When you finally get down to a disloyal group, largely assuming after these months passed you have most of the men and women outside who are loyal



and perhaps, as Mr. Terry suggested, they take some of their parents when they go along and they're able to support them, wouldn't you have it largely down to this last group that would consist of disloyal slackers, conscientious objectors and a residue that are not desirable in anybody's country?

A That's right.

Q What would be the disadvantage of turning those over to the Army?

A The only reason not to turn them over to the Army would be that it's taken us nine months to know something about them. It would take the Army nine months to know as much as we do and until you know something about these people, they're difficult to handle. I would say that our experience would be worth considerable. That would be the only reason, except for the plants and operating plans we have established since WRA was organized.

Q Pursuing it further, what I think -- while I have very little to do with the final disposition -- when you get it down to that irreducible minimum when there's something the matter with all of them, disloyal, conscientious objectors, slackers or something, all of which are undesirable from our point of view, suppose then you simply put them in barracks and house them and give them the food that is necessary, very plain and with no special treatment, not abuse them, but they're closely guarded and not try to do anything else with them.

A Well, that seems a waste of manpower when we have such a shortage and they could sustain themselves.

Q I'm still not talking about those people -- you were thinking ahead -- they would be well-fed, well-housed, and well-taken care of and afterwards they would be turned loose and go their ways.

A You would still have just as many people to deal with even if you took their privileges away. It seems to me that they could produce something.

Q Except that you'd cut away all the extraneous material and we'll have what we have and we'll have them until the end of the war.

A I would say that would be the opinion of someone who had studied the problem more than I had.

Q I don't say that's my opinion. I don't know what the committee will do, but I wanted to develop that to the logical conclusion.

BY MR. TERRY:

If you could make an absolutely infallible separation between loyal and disloyal persons such as slackers, conscientious objectors, passively pro-Japanese people, I would be entirely in favor of turning such a group over to the Army or Department of Justice control to be treated as internees or prisoners of war, but I don't believe that any such absolute segregation is possible. I believe that families of such people should be permitted to live with them and that the families might consist of wives and children who are American citizens or are perfectly capable of being good and loyal



American citizens and that that loyalty should be fostered and not stepped on.

BY MR. BENNETT:

I did not have an opportunity to finish what I was going to say. In addition to those older people who will be hard to relocate we have the very high percentage of children under 17 years of age who must be cared for until their parents relocate or until they become of age so that they can work. Then we have in addition a large number of people who are unable to work because of age or because of illness such as tuberculosis and so forth. Therefore, no matter how much effort is put on relocation, you're still going to have a lot of people left who are not particularly disloyal, but they're also not suitable for relocation, and those people should be kept in centers that are the nearest self-supporting because many of them could contribute something to maintaining themselves. As a tax payer, I am interested in doing this job as economically as possible and ending it when the war is over.

The attached labeled information is included in the testimony in accordance with Mr. Malone's request.

\* \* \* \* \*



David Rogers' testimony:

I am submitting the following data on vegetables shipped from Gila. This does not include vegetables consumed by residents of the project. I also include the forecast of crops for the 1943 season.

| Crop            | Acre No. | Yield Per Acre lbs. | Total Production lbs. | Harvest Period        | Amt. Consumed During Harvest | Stored  | Period    |
|-----------------|----------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|---------|-----------|
| Chinese Cabbage | 32       | 10,000              | 320,000               | Oct-Feb<br>Apr-May    | 320,000                      |         |           |
| Beets, Table    | 44       | 12,000              | 528,000               | Oct-May               | 110,000                      |         |           |
| Broccoli        | 26       | 4,500               | 117,000               | Dec-Mar               | 110,000                      |         |           |
| Cabbage         | 138      | 16,000              | 2,208,000             | Dec-May               | 440,000                      |         |           |
| *Cantaloupe     | 28       | 10,000              | 280,000               | June-July             | 280,000                      |         |           |
| Carrots         | 99       | 12,000              | 1,188,000             | Nov-May               | 330,000                      |         |           |
| Cauliflower     | 43       | 10,000              | 430,000               | Dec-Mar               | 110,000                      |         |           |
| Celery          | 14½      | 5,000               | 72,500                | May                   | 72,500                       |         |           |
| Corn, Sweet     | 11       | 6,000               | 66,000                | May-Sept              | 66,000                       |         |           |
| Cucumbers       | 24       | 20,000              | 480,000               | Apr-May<br>Oct-Nov    | 110,000                      |         |           |
| Daikon          | 54       | 16,000              | 564,000               | Oct-June              | 250,000                      |         |           |
| Egg Plant       | 11       | 14,000              | 154,000               | May-June              | 154,000                      |         |           |
| Garlic          | 1½       | 8,000               | 12,000                | May                   | 1,500                        | 5,500   | 11 months |
| *Honey Dew      | 27       | 10,000              | 270,000               | July-Aug              | 270,000                      |         |           |
| Horse Beans     | 11       | 8,000               | 88,000                | Apr-May               | 88,000                       |         |           |
| Lettuce         | 160½     | 10,000              | 1,605,000             | Nov-Apr               | 220,000                      |         |           |
| Onions, Green   | 14       | 3,000               | 42,000                | Nov-Dec<br>Mar-June   | 42,000                       |         |           |
| Onions, Dry     | 44       | 10,000              | 440,000               | May-June              | 150,000                      | 125,000 | 2 months  |
| Parsley         | 1        | 6,000               | 6,000                 | 12 months             | 6,000                        |         |           |
| *Peanuts        | 25       | 1,000               | 25,000                | Sept-Oct              | 12,500                       | 12,500  | 10 months |
| Peas, Green     | 64       | 3,000               | 192,000               | Oct-Nov<br>Mar-Apr    | 192,000                      |         |           |
| Peas, China     | ½        | 800                 | 400                   | April                 | 400                          |         |           |
| Potatoes        | 40       | 7,000               | 280,000               | May-June              | 28,600                       |         |           |
| Spinach         | 57       | 2,000               | 114,000               | Nov-May               | 110,000                      |         |           |
| Squash          | 55       | 9,000               | 495,000               | Oct-Nov<br>May-June   | 110,000                      |         |           |
| Strawberries    | 15       | 3,200               | 48,000                | Apr-May               | 48,000                       |         |           |
| Swiss Chard     | 9        | 10,000              | 90,000                | Oct-Nov<br>Apr-May    | 90,000                       |         |           |
| *Tomatoes       | 83       | 16,000              | 1,328,000             | June-July<br>November | 385,000                      |         |           |
| Turnips         | 37½      | 20,000              | 750,000               | Oct-May               | 110,000                      |         |           |
| Watermelon      | 125      | 20,000              | 2,500,000             | July-Aug              | 2,500,000                    |         |           |
| *Bell Pepper    | 10       | 6,000               | 60,000                | June-July             | 60,000                       |         |           |
| Miscellaneous   | 20       | ?                   | ?                     |                       |                              |         |           |
| Beans, String   | 6½       | 6,000               | 39,000                | Apr-May               | 39,000                       |         |           |
| *Sweet Potatoes | 40       | 20,000              | 800,000               | Aug-Nov               | 200,000                      | 200,000 | 3 months  |
| Endives         | 6        | 3,600               | 21,600                | April                 | 21,600                       |         |           |
| Radish, Red     | 3        | 2,200               | 28,600                | Sept-June             | 28,600                       |         |           |
|                 | 1,390    |                     | 15,642,100            |                       | 7,316,100                    | 343,000 |           |

\*These vegetables are grown during fiscal year 1943 and harvested during fiscal year 1944.



## Exhibit I

PROPOSED CROP PRODUCTION PROGRAM  
Fiscal Year 1943

## VEGETABLE CROPS

| Crop            | Acre No. | Yield Per Acre lbs. | Total Production lbs. | Harvest Period        | Amt. Consumed During Harvest | Amount Stored | Storage Period |
|-----------------|----------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| Chinese Cabbage | 32       | 10,000              | 320,000               | Oct-Feb<br>Apr-May    | 320,000                      |               |                |
| Beets, Table    | 44       | 12,000              | 528,000               | Oct-May               | 110,000                      |               |                |
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| Daikon          | 54       | 16,000              | 564,000               | Oct-June              | 250,000                      |               |                |
| Egg Plant       | 11       | 14,000              | 154,000               | May-June              | 154,000                      |               |                |
| Garlic          | 1½       | 8,000               | 12,000                | May                   | 1,500                        | 5,500         | 11 months      |
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| Lettuce         | 160½     | 10,000              | 1,605,000             | Nov-Apr               | 220,000                      |               |                |
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| Onions, Dry     | 44       | 10,000              | 440,000               | May-June              | 150,000                      | 125,000       | 2 months       |
| Parsley         | 1        | 6,000               | 6,000                 | 12 months             | 6,000                        |               |                |
| *Peanuts        | 25       | 1,000               | 25,000                | Sept-Oct              | 12,500                       | 12,500        | 10 months      |
| Peas, Green     | 64       | 3,000               | 192,000               | Oct-Nov<br>Mar-Apr    | 192,000                      |               |                |
| Peas, China     | ½        | 800                 | 400                   | April                 | 400                          |               |                |
| Potatoes        | 40       | 7,000               | 280,000               | May-June              | 28,600                       |               |                |
| Spinach         | 57       | 2,000               | 114,000               | Nov-May               | 110,000                      |               |                |
| Squash          | 55       | 9,000               | 495,000               | Oct-Nov<br>May-June   | 110,000                      |               |                |
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| *Tomatoes       | 83       | 16,000              | 1,328,000             | June-July<br>November | 385,000                      |               |                |
| Turnips         | 37½      | 20,000              | 750,000               | Oct-May               | 110,000                      |               |                |
| Watermelon      | 125      | 20,000              | 2,500,000             | July-Aug              | 2,500,000                    |               |                |
| *Bell Pepper    | 10       | 6,000               | 60,000                | June-July             | 60,000                       |               |                |
| Miscellaneous   | 20       | ?                   | ?                     |                       |                              |               |                |
| Beans, String   | 6½       | 6,000               | 39,000                | Apr-May               | 39,000                       |               |                |
| *Net Potatoes   | 40       | 20,000              | 800,000               | Aug-Nov               | 200,000                      | 200,000       | 3 months       |
| Endives         | 6        | 3,600               | 21,600                | April                 | 21,600                       |               |                |
| Radish, Red     | 3        | 2,200               | 28,600                | Sept-June             | 28,600                       |               |                |
|                 | 1,390    |                     | 15,642,100            |                       | 7,316,100                    | 343,000       |                |

\*These vegetables are grown during fiscal year 1943 and harvested during fiscal year 1944.



## Exhibit I

PROPOSED PRODUCTION PROGRAM  
Fiscal Year 1943

## WAR CROPS

| Crop                   | Acres<br>No. | Yield Per<br>Acre<br>lbs. | Total Produc-<br>tion | Harvest<br>Period | Amount Con-<br>sumed During<br>Harvest | Amount<br>Stored | Storage<br>Period |
|------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--|------------------|-------------------|
| Flax, Seed             | 66           | 1,400                     | 92,400                | June              | (For outside market)                   |                  |                   |
| Castor Beans           | 40           | ?                         |                       | Oct-Nov           | (For outside market)                   |                  |                   |
| Cotton,<br>Long Staple | 40           | 1,125<br>(lint & seed)    | 45,000                | Oct-Dec           | (For outside market)                   |                  |                   |
|                        | <u>146</u>   |                           | <u>137,400</u>        |                   |  |                  |                   |

## LIVESTOCK GRAIN &amp; PASTURE

|                     |              |                |                  |           |                      |  |  |
|---------------------|--------------|----------------|------------------|-----------|----------------------|--|--|
| Barley              | 285          | 2,000          | 570,000          | June      | 570,000              |  |  |
| Maize               | 490          | 4,250          | 2,082,500        | Nov-Dec   | 2,082,500            |  |  |
| Alfalfa, Hay        | 480          | 10,000         | 4,800,000        | Apr-Nov   | 4,800,000            |  |  |
| Alfalfa,<br>Pasture | 1,514        | 600#<br>(beef) | 908,400          | 12 months |                      |  |  |
| Alfalfa,<br>Pasture | 2,851        |                |                  | May-Nov   | (For Custom Pasture) |  |  |
|                     | <u>5,620</u> |                | <u>8,360,900</u> |           | <u>7,452,500</u>     |  |  |

## LIVESTOCK

From July 1, 1942 to June 31, 1943

| Livestock      | Head | Yield Per<br>Head | Total Pro-<br>duction | Harvest<br>Period | Amount Consumed<br>During Harvest |
|----------------|------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Hogs           | 150  | 170 lbs.          |                       |                   |                                   |
| Beef Cattle    | 720  | 450 lbs.          |                       |                   |                                   |
| Dairy Cattle   | 15   | 150 gal.          | 1,800                 | Feb-June          | 18,000                            |
| Laying Hens    |      |                   |                       |                   |                                   |
| Poultry (meat) |      | 1½ lbs.           |                       |                   |                                   |



Exhibit I

KINDS AND AMOUNTS OF VEGETABLES NEEDED  
(In addition to those produced on area)

Fiscal Year 1943

| Vegetables     | Amount Needed in Pounds |         |        |        |
|----------------|-------------------------|---------|--------|--------|
|                | March                   | April   | May    | June   |
| Beets, Table   | 15,750                  |         |        |        |
| Cabbage        |                         |         |        | 69,000 |
| Carrots        |                         |         |        | 14,000 |
| Cauliflower    | 12,375                  | 12,375  |        | 6,000  |
| Celery         | 23,850                  | 24,600  |        | 26,500 |
| Cucumbers      | 900                     |         |        | 50,000 |
| Egg Plants     | 10,500                  | 10,500  |        |        |
| Garlic         | 600                     | 360     |        |        |
| Lettuce        |                         |         | 28,200 | 28,200 |
| Onions, dry    | 42,900                  | 28,900  |        |        |
| Potatoes       | 130,950                 | 130,700 |        |        |
| Squash         | 5,250                   | 5,250   |        |        |
| Tomatoes       | 12,150                  | 12,150  |        |        |
| Bell Pepper    | 7,300                   | 6,450   |        |        |
| Sweet Potatoes |                         |         | 15,000 |        |



## Exhibit II

## PROPOSED CROP PRODUCTION PROGRAM

Fiscal Year 1944

## VEGETABLE CROPS

| Crop            | Acre No.            | Yield Per Acre lbs. | Total Production lbs. | Harvest Period           | Amount Consumed During Harvest | Amount Stored | Storage Period |
|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| Chinese Cabbage | 32                  | 10,000              | 320,000               | Oct-Feb<br>Apr., May     | 320,000                        |               |                |
| Beets, Table    | 44                  | 12,000              | 528,000               | Oct., May                | 110,000                        |               |                |
| Broccoli        | 66                  | 4,500               | 297,000               | Dec.-Mar.                | 110,000                        |               |                |
| Cabbage         | 140                 | 16,000              | 224,000               | Dec - May                | 440,000                        |               |                |
| Cantaloupe      | 28                  | 10,000              | 280,000               | June, July               | 280,000                        |               |                |
| Carrots         | 100                 | 12,000              | 1,200,000             | Nov-May                  | 330,000                        |               |                |
| Cauliflower     | 30                  | 10,000              | 300,000               | Dec-Mar                  | 110,000                        |               |                |
| Celery          | 10                  | 5,000               | 50,000                | May                      | 72,500                         |               |                |
| Corn, sweet     | 11                  | 6,000               | 66,000                | May-Sept                 | 66,000                         |               |                |
| Cucumbers       | 24                  | 20,000              | 480,000               | Apr., May<br>Oct., Nov.  | 110,000                        |               |                |
| Daikon          | 54                  | 16,000              | 564,000               | Oct-June                 | 250,000                        |               |                |
| Egg Plant       | 11                  | 14,000              | 154,000               | May, June                | 154,000                        |               |                |
| Garlic          | 4                   | 8,000               | 32,000                | May                      | 500                            | 5,500         | 11 months      |
| Honeydew        | 27                  | 10,000              | 270,000               | July, Aug                | 270,000                        |               |                |
| Horse Beans     | 11                  | 8,000               | 88,000                | Apr., May                | 88,000                         |               |                |
| Lettuce         | 80                  | 10,000              | 800,000               | Nov-Apr                  | 220,000                        |               |                |
| Onions, green   | 14                  | 3,000               | 42,000                | Nov., Dec<br>Mar-June    | 42,000                         |               |                |
| Onions, dry     | 44                  | 10,000              | 440,000               | May, June                | 320,000                        | 220,000       | 2 months       |
| Parsley         | 1                   | 6,000               | 6,000                 | 12 months                | 6,000                          |               |                |
| Peanuts         | 100                 | 1,000               | 100,000               | Sept., Oct               | 20,000                         | 8,000         | 10 months      |
| Peas, green     | 100                 | 3,000               | 300,000               | Oct., Nov.<br>Mar., Apr. | 192,000                        |               |                |
| Peas, China     | 1                   | 800                 | 800                   | April                    | 800                            |               |                |
| Potatoes        | 60                  | 7,000               | 420,000               | May, June                | 280,000                        | 140,000       | 1 month        |
| Radish, red     | 13                  | 2,200               | 28,600                | Sept-June                | 28,600                         |               |                |
| Spinach         | 57                  | 2,000               | 114,000               | Nov-May                  | 110,000                        |               |                |
| Squash          | 55                  | 9,000               | 495,000               | Oct-Nov<br>May-June      | 110,000                        |               |                |
| Strawberries    | 15                  | 6,400               | 96,000                | April-May                | 96,000                         |               |                |
| Swiss Chard     | 9                   | 10,000              | 90,000                | Oct-Nov<br>April-May     | 90,000                         |               |                |
| Tomatoes        | 83                  | 16,000              | 1,328,000             | June-July<br>November    | 385,000                        |               |                |
| Turnips         | 37 $\frac{1}{2}$    | 20,000              | 750,000               | Oct-May                  | 110,000                        |               |                |
| Watermelon      | 125                 | 20,000              | 2,500,000             | July-Aug                 | 2,500,000                      |               |                |
| Bell Pepper     | 10                  | 6,000               | 60,000                | June-July                | 60,000                         |               |                |
| Beans, String   | 10                  | 6,000               | 60,000                | April-May                | 60,000                         |               |                |
| •scellaneous    | 20                  | ?                   | ?                     | ?                        |                                |               |                |
| Sweet Potatoes  | 40                  | 20,000              | 800,000               | Aug-Nov                  | 400,000                        | 400,000       | 3 months       |
|                 | 1,466 $\frac{1}{2}$ |                     | 12,763,400            |                          | 7,641,400                      | 845,500       |                |



## Exhibit II

PROPOSED CROP PRODUCTION PROGRAM  
Fiscal Year 1944

## WAR CROPS

| Crop                   | Acres<br>No. | Yield Per<br>Acre<br>lbs. | Total Produc-<br>tion | Harvest<br>Period | Amount Con-<br>sumed During<br>Harvest | Amount<br>Stored | Storage<br>Period |
|------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--|------------------|-------------------|
| Flax, Seed             | 66           | 1,400                     | 92,400                | June              | (for outside market)                   |                  |                   |
| Castor Beans           | 40           | ?                         |                       | Oct-Nov           | (for outside market)                   |                  |                   |
| Cotton,<br>Long Staple | 40           | 1,125<br>(Lint & Seed)    | 45,000                | Oct-Dec           | (for outside market)                   |                  |                   |
|                        |              |                           | 137,400               |                   |  |                  |                   |

## LIVESTOCK GRAIN &amp; PASTURE

|              |       |        |            |           |                             |  |  |
|--------------|-------|--------|------------|-----------|-----------------------------|--|--|
| Barley       | 1,000 | 2,000  | 2,000,000  | June      | 2,000,000                   |  |  |
| Maize        | 500   | 4,250  | 2,225,000  | Nov-Dec   |                             |  |  |
| Alfalfa, Hay | 500   | 10,000 | 5,000,000  | Apr-Nov   | 5,000,000                   |  |  |
| Alfalfa      | 1,500 | 600#   | 900,000    | 12 months | (for beef consumed on area) |  |  |
| Pasture      |       | (beef) | (beef)     |           |                             |  |  |
| Alfalfa      | 2,851 |        |            | May-Nov   | (for Custom Pasture)        |  |  |
|              |       |        | 10,125,000 |           | 7,000,000                   |  |  |

## LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION

| Livestock      | Head  | Yield Per<br>Head | Total Produc-<br>tion | Production<br>Period | Amount Consumed<br>During Harvest |
|----------------|-------|-------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Hogs           | 4,000 | 170 lbs.          | 680,000 lbs.          | 12 months            | 680,000                           |
| Beef Cattle    | 2,000 | 450 lbs.          | 900,000 lbs.          | 12 months            | 900,000                           |
| Dairy Cattle   | 300   | 900 gal.          | 270,000 gal.          | 12 months            | 270,000                           |
| Laying Hens    | 6,000 | 150 eggs          | 900,000 eggs          | Oct-June             | 900,000                           |
| Poultry (meat) | 8,900 | 1½ meat           | 13,850 lbs.           | July<br>Dec. Jan.    | 13,850                            |



## Exhibit II

KINDS AND AMOUNTS OF VEGETABLES NEEDED  
(In addition to those produced on area)

Fiscal Year 1944

| Vegetables      | Amount Needed in Pounds |         |         |         |         |         |
|-----------------|-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|                 | July                    | Aug.    | Sept.   | Oct.    | Nov.    | Dec.    |
| Chinese Cabbage | 30,000                  | 30,000  | 30,000  |         |         |         |
| Cabbage         | 30,000                  | 30,000  | 30,000  | 30,000  | 30,000  |         |
| Carrots         | 14,000                  | 14,000  | 14,000  | 14,000  |         |         |
| Cauliflower     | 6,000                   | 6,000   | 6,000   | 6,000   | 6,000   |         |
| Celery          | 26,500                  | 26,500  | 26,500  | 26,500  | 26,500  | 26,500  |
| Cucumbers       | 50,000                  | 50,000  | 50,000  |         |         |         |
| Egg Plant       | 24,000                  | 24,000  | 24,000  |         |         |         |
| Honeydew        |                         |         | 112,000 | 56,000  |         |         |
| Lettuce         | 32,400                  | 32,400  | 32,400  | 32,400  |         |         |
| Onions, green   | 1,200                   | 1,200   | 1,200   | 1,200   | 1,200   | 1,200   |
| Onions, dry     |                         |         | 40,000  | 40,000  | 40,000  | 40,000  |
| Peas, green     | 24,000                  | 24,000  | 24,000  |         |         |         |
| Potatoes        |                         | 140,000 | 140,000 | 140,000 | 140,000 | 140,000 |
| Spinach         | 6,000                   | 6,000   | 6,000   |         |         |         |
| Tomatoes        |                         | 80,000  | 80,000  | 80,000  |         |         |
| Watermelons     |                         |         | 60,000  | 60,000  |         |         |
| Bell Pepper     |                         | 8,000   | 8,000   | 8,000   | 8,000   |         |
| Sweet Potatoes  | 12,000                  |         |         |         |         |         |



Exhibit II

KINDS AND AMOUNTS OF VEGETABLES NEEDED  
(In addition to those produced on area)

Fiscal Year 1944

| Vegetables      | Amount Needed in Pounds |         |         |         |        |        |
|-----------------|-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|--------|--------|
|                 | Jan.                    | Feb.    | March   | April   | May    | June   |
| Chinese Cabbage |                         |         |         |         | 30,000 |        |
| Cabbage         |                         |         |         |         | 14,000 | 14,000 |
| Carrots         |                         |         |         |         | 6,000  | 6,000  |
| Cauliflower     |                         |         | 6,000   | 6,000   | 6,000  | 6,000  |
| Celery          | 26,500                  | 26,500  | 26,500  | 26,500  |        | 26,500 |
| Cucumbers       |                         |         |         |         |        | 50,000 |
| Egg Plant       |                         |         |         |         |        |        |
| Lettuce         |                         |         |         |         | 32,400 | 32,400 |
| Onions, green   | 1,200                   | 1,200   |         |         |        | 1,200  |
| Onions, dry     | 40,000                  | 40,000  | 40,000  | 40,000  |        |        |
| Peas, green     |                         |         |         |         |        |        |
| Potatoes        | 140,000                 | 140,000 | 140,000 | 140,000 |        |        |
| Spinach         |                         |         |         |         |        | 6,000  |
| Tomatoes        |                         |         |         |         |        |        |
| Watermelons     |                         |         |         |         |        |        |
| Bell Pepper     |                         |         |         |         |        |        |
| Sweet Potatoes  |                         | 12,000  | 12,000  | 12,000  | 12,000 | 12,000 |



L. H. Bennett's testimony:

Project

Gila River

On February 28, 1943, the total population of Gila River Relocation Center was 13,301, of these 6,336 were employed, and, this does not include evacuee school teachers. I had you a list indicating the number employed in each activity.

| SECTION OR DIVISION            | : EMPLOYED | : \$12.00 | : Male | : Female | : Male | : Female | : Male | : Female |
|--------------------------------|------------|-----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|
| 1. Project Administration      | : 221      | :         | :      | :        | 68     | 77       | 48     | 28       |
| 2. Employment & Housing        | : 532      | :         | :      | :        | 185    | 255      | 79     | 13       |
| *3. Industrial Work            | :          | :         | :      | :        | :      | :        | :      | :        |
| 4. Building Construction       | : 314      | :         | :      | :        | 229    | 7        | 77     | 1        |
| 5. Building Maintenance        | :          | :         | :      | :        | :      | :        | :      | :        |
| 6. Grounds Maintenance         | : 99       | :         | :      | :        | 91     | :        | 8      | :        |
| 7. Public Utilities            | : 16       | :         | :      | :        | 12     | :        | 4      | :        |
| 8. Transportation & Motor      | : 155      | :         | :      | :        | 128    | 5        | 21     | 1        |
| 9. Warehousing                 | : 26       | :         | :      | :        | 12     | 3        | 11     | :        |
| 10. Mess Operations            | : 2515     | :         | :      | :        | 1224   | 957      | 318    | 16       |
| 11. Agriculture                | : 946      | :         | :      | :        | 704    | 102      | 137    | 3        |
| 12. Land Subjugation           | :          | :         | :      | :        | :      | :        | :      | :        |
| 13. Health & Sanitation        | : 384      | :         | :      | :        | 92     | 234      | 40     | 18       |
| 14. Police                     | : 108      | :         | :      | :        | 84     | 1        | 20     | 3        |
| 15. Fire Protection            | : 65       | :         | :      | :        | 55     | :        | 10     | :        |
| 16. Education                  | : 255      | :         | :      | :        | 64     | 37       | 50     | 104      |
| 17. Community Administration   | :          | :         | :      | :        | :      | :        | :      | :        |
| 18. Community Enterprise       | : 277      | :         | :      | :        | 117    | 125      | 30     | 5        |
| 19. Other Community Activities | : 159      | :         | :      | :        | 67     | 31       | 30     | 31       |
| TOTAL PROJECT EMPLOYMENT       | : 6,072    | :         | :      | :        | 3,132  | 1,834    | 883    | 223      |
| * Camouflage                   | : 515      | :         | :      | :        | 400    | 115      | :      | :        |
| GRAND TOTAL                    | : 6,587    | :         | :      | :        | 3,532  | 1,949    | 883    | 223      |

\* Item 3 is considered to be a private Employment and is not included in the TOTAL PROJECT EMPLOYMENT.

Made by signed, William Huso  
Acting Housing & Employment  
Chief

Date March 3, 1943



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Project Gila River  
Month Ending February 28, 1943

B. PROJECT EMPLOYMENT BY DIVISIONS OR SECTIONS  
CASH ADVANCE CLASSIFICATION BY SEX

(replies as of last day of month)

| SECTION OR DIVISION            | TOTAL<br>EMPLOYED | CASH ADVANCE CLASSIFICATION |        |         |        |         |        |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|
|                                |                   | \$12.00                     |        | \$16.00 |        | \$19.00 |        |
|                                |                   | Male                        | Female | Male    | Female | Male    | Female |
| 1. Project Administration      | 221               | :                           | :      | 68      | 77     | 48      | 28     |
| 2. Employment & Housing        | 532               | :                           | :      | 185     | 255    | 79      | 13     |
| *3. Industrial Work            | :                 | :                           | :      | :       | :      | :       | :      |
| 4. Building Construction       | 314               | :                           | :      | 229     | 7      | 77      | 1      |
| 5. Building Maintenance        | :                 | :                           | :      | :       | :      | :       | :      |
| 6. Grounds Maintenance         | 99                | :                           | :      | 91      | :      | 8       | :      |
| 7. Public Utilities            | 16                | :                           | :      | 12      | :      | 4       | :      |
| 8. Transportation & Motor      | 155               | :                           | :      | 128     | 5      | 21      | 1      |
| 9. Warehousing                 | 26                | :                           | :      | 12      | 3      | 11      | :      |
| 10. Mess Operations            | 2515              | :                           | :      | 1224    | 957    | 318     | 16     |
| 11. Agriculture                | 946               | :                           | :      | 704     | 102    | 137     | 3      |
| 12. Land Subjugation           | :                 | :                           | :      | :       | :      | :       | :      |
| 13. Health & Sanitation        | 384               | :                           | :      | 92      | 234    | 40      | 18     |
| 14. Ellice                     | 108               | :                           | :      | 84      | 1      | 20      | 3      |
| 15. Fire Protection            | 65                | :                           | :      | 55      | :      | 10      | :      |
| 16. Education                  | 255               | :                           | :      | 64      | 37     | 50      | 104    |
| 17. Community Administration   | :                 | :                           | :      | :       | :      | :       | :      |
| 18. Community Enterprise       | 277               | :                           | :      | 117     | 125    | 30      | 5      |
| 19. Other Community Activities | 159               | :                           | :      | 67      | 31     | 30      | 31     |
| TOTAL PROJECT EMPLOYMENT       | 6,072             | :                           | :      | 3,132   | 1,834  | 883     | 223    |
| * Camouflage                   | 515               | :                           | :      | 400     | 115    | :       | :      |
| GRAND TOTAL                    | 6,587             | :                           | :      | 3,532   | 1,949  | 883     | 223    |

\* Item 3 is considered to be a private  
Employment and is not included in the  
TOTAL PROJECT EMPLOYMENT.

Made by signed, William Huso  
Acting Housing & Employment  
Chief

Date March 3, 1943



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Project Gila River  
Month Ending February 28, 1943  
Month Day Year

MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT FROM PROJECTS  
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION  
(all replies as of last day of month)

A. SUMMARY

|   | <u>Total</u> | <u>Male</u> | <u>Female</u> |
|---|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| 1. Total number of resident of Project<br>(including those absent on temporary<br>furlough) | 13,301       | 7,269       | 6,032         |
| 2. Number employed on Project but not<br>paid by W.R.A. (Camouflage)                        | 515          | 400         | 115           |
| 3. Number in private employment off Project<br>but living on Project                        | ---          | ---         | ---           |
| 4. Number away from Project on Group Employ-<br>ment furloughs                              | 8            | 5           | 3             |
| 5. Number of school-students in part-time<br>W.R.A. employment                              | 279          | 205         | 74            |
| 6. Number in Labor Force not employed<br>(those registered for work but not working)        | 370          | 159         | 211           |
| 7. Number employed by W.R.A. in Project work<br>(See Part B)                                | 6,072        | 4,015       | 2,057         |
| * 8. (TOTAL IN LABOR FORCE)   | 6,965        | 4,579       | 2,386         |
| 9. Number not in Labor Force<br>(Difference between #1 and #8)                              | 6,336        | 2,690       | 3,646         |

\* "TOTAL IN LABOR FORCE" does not include addition of Item 5 since this figure is al-  
ready considered as a part of Item 7.

MADE BY signed, William Huso  
Acting Housing and Employment  
Chief

DATE March 3, 1943



L. H. Bennett's testimony:

Senator Chandler requested the three opinions as to reasons for "no" answers to be included in my testimony.

#### 1. PROTEST

This negation is a formal protest against the removal from their homes on the west coast to assembly centers and there to relocation centers which has resulted in loss of property, loss of social standing, loss of livelihood, loss of face because of being classes in same group as enemy aliens, discriminations not forced on other races such as Germans and Italians by special removal and discrimination against Japanese American soldiers during last 15 months by their releases and change in draft classification. They are protesting that this registration does not guarantee full citizenship status and protection after the war.

#### 2. PRO-JAPANESE SENTIMENT

Although most of those whose answers are negative to question No. 23 are of the Kibei group, there are others of the Nisei who feel an attachment to Japan and the Emperor because of the instruction and association with their parents or associations. Many of the Nisei feel that their hurts sustained during evacuation and since are too deep not to place such blame directly on the United States Government and at the same time thinking more kindly towards Japan assuming without reasonable ground that no other country would have treated citizenship on the basis save countries such as Germany. Often times, we feel that the considerable number of Kibei and Nisei are riding two horses, playing the possibilities of eventual defeats of either this country and Japan, hoping to ride the crests of victory with the victorious. So much of this pro-Japanese feeling is generated with the notion that this government will not do much about such disloyalty, at least not order them back to Japan permanently.

#### 3. FEAR

Fear is being engendered by certain individuals among those registering to the extent that their lives as well as their immediate familie's are in danger by affirmative answers. This is evidenced by veiled threats and those coming out in the open. Mothers are often told that if their sons either answer "yes" or have intentions to volunteer, that the lives of the whole family cannot be safeguarded. If a Japanese boy leaves for the army he often feels a certain fear that his parents or immediate family cannot be safeguarded. If a Japanese boy leaves for the army, he often feels a certain fear that his parents or immediate family may not be as well protected as they might be. This fear, too, is attached to the possibility of volunteers not having been treated as well as other citizens in the Army; that the special combat units may be sent into action by officers with little regard to the understanding of the Japanese American situation. Also, there seems to be a deep-rooted feeling that public sentiment will not keep pace with any efforts and actions for distinguishment by this combat unit in order to feel more kindly toward them after the war. In other words, that this is a trap to entice the young men to service with no strong feeling on the part of the War Relocation Authority or the Army to take steps to enlighten the American people as to the actual efforts made by the Japanese Americans in this war effort.

#### 4. OTHER INFLUENCES

Due to tradition, the eldest son of a family feels complete responsibility for the parents and because of this feeling, does not want to break family ties



Report of War Relocation Staff Members on Loyalty Question:

Activating factors behind negative answers to question No. 28 generally falls in four categories which are listed below in what we consider their relevant importance:

1. PROTEST

This negation is a formal protest against the removal from their homes on the west coast to assembly centers and there to relocation centers which has resulted in loss of property, loss of social standing, loss of livelihood, loss of face because of being classes in same group as enemy aliens, discriminations not forced on other races such as Germans and Italians by special removal and discrimination against Japanese American soldiers during last 15 months by their releases and change in draft classification. They are protesting that this registration does not guarantee full citizenship status and protection after the war.

2. PRO-JAPANESE SENTIMENT

Although most of those whose answers are negative to question No. 28 are of the Kibei group, there are others of the Nisei who feel an attachment to Japan and the Emperor because of the instruction and association with their parents or associations. Many of the Nisei feel that their hurts sustained during evacuation and since are too deep not to place such blame directly on the United States Government and at the same time thinking more kindly towards Japan assuming without reasonable ground that no other country would have treated citizenship on the basis save countries such as Germany. Often times, we feel that the considerable number of Kibei and Nisei are riding two horses, playing the possibilities of eventual defeats of either this country and Japan, hoping to ride the crests of victory with the victorious. So much of this pro-Japanese feeling is generated with the notion that this government will not do much about such disloyalty, at least not order them back to Japan permanently.

3. FEAR

Fear is being engendered by certain individuals among those registering to the extent that their lives as well as their immediate families are in danger by affirmative answers. This is evidenced by veiled threats and those coming out in the open. Mothers are often told that if their sons either answer "yes" or have intentions to volunteer, that the lives of the whole family cannot be safeguarded. If a Japanese boy leaves for the army he often feels a certain fear that his parents or immediate family cannot be safeguarded. If a Japanese boy leaves for the army, he often feels a certain fear that his parents or immediate family may not be as well protected as they might be. This fear, too, is attached to the possibility of volunteers not having been treated as well as other citizens in the Army; that the special combat units may be sent into action by officers with little regard to the understanding of the Japanese American situation. Also, there seems to be a deep-rooted feeling that public sentiment will not keep pace with any efforts and actions for distinguishment by this combat unit in order to feel more kindly toward them after the war. In other words, that this is a trap to entice the young men to service with no strong feeling on the part of the War Relocation Authority or the Army to take steps to enlighten the American people as to the actual efforts made by the Japanese Americans in this war effort.

4. OTHER INFLUENCES

Due to tradition, the eldest son of a family feels complete responsibility for the parents and because of this feeling, does not want to break family ties

K 8.46



-2-

and leave the parents unless there is a definite understanding that they will be cared for while he is away and allowed to remain in the United States after the war. Arguments that "yes" answers to question No. 27 means immediate induction or at least availability for Army service. Answering "no" to this question has been argumentatively interpreted as immediate necessity for repatriation in order to avoid military service. Feeling by some persons that they do not want to fight for any country and under any circumstances are just plain slackers and is another influence.



Report on Loyalty Question from an Anonymous Nisei:

Through my personal observation of evacuee residents including present military registrants and their parents, during past two weeks, I listed below some of the reasons which seem to be the motive in answering negatively to the question 28 of the military registration.

1. Mass evacuation of Nisei and extremely keen feeling against the treatment which these Nisei received since the outbreak of the war.
2. Classification of American-born Japanese in class 4, under selective service law.
3. Calling citizens of Japanese ancestry as saboteurs, fifth columnists, etc. and constant appearance of newspaper articles on above charges without a single proof, particularly during first few months following Pearl Harbor attack.
4. Non-effectiveness of citizenship rights of Nisei in the United States.

It was so surprising to this observer that feeling as above were so high during past two weeks since the start of the registration. I do not know whether such feeling was the expression of their original feeling deeply rooted in their heart or the result of influence by others than themselves. Such feeling is so keen that some of Nisei do not see the opposite view such as necessity of mass evacuation, or the benefit of their expression of loyalty, which will act as disapproval of alleged disloyalty, in the future.

5. Some Nisei lost their confidence in their future as American citizens in the United States, presuming that they will always be under handicap, socially, as well as racially under the restriction of civil rights.
6. Their willingness to give up the citizenship and accompany their parents and go to Japan where they feel their opportunities are plentiful than in the United States.
7. Through the influence of their parents who still have such feeling that disobeying to the emperor of Japan means act of disapproval of ancestry worship. They feel that they have done terrible offense of their eternal teaching of ancestry worship. That words in question 28 relating to emperor of Japan, seems to have annoyed them very much and that feeling must have influenced even Nisei.
8. Keen feeling against white Americans transplanted in their hearts since the war because of expression of American public through newspapers and radios, of extreme hatred of Japanese. This feeling must have been stimulated by mass concentration of Japanese in camp.
9. Misunderstanding on the part of some registrants that answering "yes" on question 27 means agreement to serve in the armed forces of the United States even other than regular draft which might mean voluntary enlistment. Mr. Terry's instruction was not accepted as authoritative instruction. They further misunderstood that forming of Japanese combat unit means placing such Japanese unit on the most dangerous combat duties and, therefore, answering "yes" means immediate or future result of death.



10. Concentration of these Nisei in this war-emergency period of war, in such as enemy alien concentration camps, resulted in their less conscious of duty, patriotism, heroism, to the nation at war neither to American nor to Japan. (General breakdown).

11. Their present condition drove them into despair. Some people do not think deeply.

12. Lack of guiding principle in the community. Former leaders of community are now in internment camps. They were responsible in making and forming constructive public opinion. It is unfortunate that most of them are taken away since the outbreak of the war. I feel that America made a greatest mistake not making thorough investigation of their characters and degree of their so-called "dangerous enemy aliens." Their presence in the community would have been a great advantage to the United States.

13. Minds of younger registrants are premature and entirely dependent upon parents; their future, too, they are dependent of their parents.

14. Older Nisei with family are afraid of being taken away from family.

15. Some feel very keenly the possible feeling of American toward Japanese in this country and, therefore, they feel that their future in America is absolutely shut out.



K8.46

# Reasons for Disloyalty Registrations:

I have personally interviewed over 700 of the Japanese-American citizens who have foresworn their allegiance to the United States. The majority of them are Kibei.

## Their reasons:

- |               |   |
|---------------|---|
| Approx.<br>5% | 1. Do not believe that public opinion in the United States will ever permit the assimilation of Orientals.  |
| 15%           | 2. Pacifist group does not want to bear arms for either the United States, Japan, or any other country. This group left Japan to avoid war service against China.   |
| 10%           | 3. Believe Japan will win the war.  |
| 20%           | 4. Elder sons with parents in Japan, or whose parents with whom to return there, are bound by family tradition to provide for their parents and be governed by their wishes regardless of their own age for martial responsibilities. Parents first and country second. |
| 10%           | 5. Fear of losing inheritance rights to property in Japan.  |
| 10%           | 6. Those who believe they will escape the United States draft and will be permitted to remain here after the war on the same basis as Issei have always enjoyed.  |
| 10%           | 7. Those who suspect that this registration is all a bluff and that no action will ever be taken to intern, draft, or deport them.  |
| 10%           | 8. Nisei who are soreheads over evacuation; segregation in the Army (special combat group). Their attitude: to hell with everything.  |
| 10%           | 9. Nisei whose parents or relatives are now held in internment camps and whom they believe are guiltless. Their attitude: take my parents out of jail and I will volunteer right now and fight to the finish.   |
| 100%          |   |

/s/ Norman B. Thompson  
Capt. OMP  
Commanding



Most Issei who are not heir to the father's property, as it is customary in Japan, and their parents were not sufficiently well-to-do to give them higher education in Japan; so they decided to come to the United States to earn enough to enable them to give their children an education; they didn't have, special occupational abilities; so they followed the agricultural occupation. When children came to them, the parents sent them back to Japan to educate them, which education the parents themselves had been previously denied. So that their children might become a premier, banker, or a big businessman.

Those Issei who were very successful in farming acquired considerable sum of money. The children came back to this country after they received their education in Japan. At the same time, the parents were sending their money to Japan to acquire real and other property in Japan for their future economic security. Consequently, many of what wealth they accumulated, the parents have money stored up in Japan. They feel that after the war is over, they can return to Japan with their children and spend their old age in the peace and security which comes from the property they accumulated.

Moreover, their idea is that they can send their children, if they wish, to the conquered territories such as Java, Sumatra, and Burma, to exploit the relatively new frontiers. When they say "yes" to questions 27 and 28, when the war is over, the Japanese Government will find out their disloyalty to Japan and the parents think their property will be confiscated and their children will lose all opportunity and they and their children will be on the black list in Japan. They (Issei) feel they are not thinking but nothing but future economic security which is found on the property which they stored in Japan. So this is man's innate behavior rather than rational behavior.

The reason why Manzanar and Poston had better showing than this Center is that this Center is composed of most of the farmer group than those other centers; on the other hand, people in Manzanar and Poston consist of town people and town people mostly engaged in small business and barely make a living so that they did not have money to send their children back to Japan to educate, and the children attended school in this country and associated more with American people so they followed the American way of life.



L. H. Bennett's testimony:

Mr. Malone, will you please accept this as part of the record for the statement on Internal Security as presented by our Chief of Internal Security, William E. Williamson.

Int. Sec.

March 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: L. H. Bennett, Project Director

SUBJECT: Report on Internal Security

The Division of Internal Security is headed by one Caucasian Chief of Police assisted by two Associate Chiefs of Police. Since this community consists of two camps separated by a distance of approximately five miles, two separate and fairly autonomous police organizations necessarily were created. Lack of transportation and communication facilities has prevented any high degree of centralization and integration.

The Chief of Internal Security maintains offices in Butte Community, and exercises an over-all supervision of the police organizations in both communities. An Associate Chief is assigned to administrative responsibility for each respective police organization.

The organizational lines are similar for both police organizations. At the top of the organizational pyramid is the Associate Chief of Police, responsible directly to the Chief of Police in Butte Community. Each Associate Chief is assisted by a staff, consisting of captain, lieutenants, sergeants, and police officers all of whom are evacuees. The majority of the evacuee personnel is employed in the Patrol Division, while the balance is distributed throughout the Crime Prevention and Traffic Divisions. Three shifts are maintained in order to give twenty-four hour coverage. Shifts alternate every month, and in this fashion, police officers are able to familiarize themselves with police conditions on a twenty-four hour basis.

The majority of police officers at Rivers are United States citizens and the average age is thirty-two years. Majority are high school graduates, and a large number possess university training. Some of the more valuable police officers have had post-graduate training in law, social work, and in other professional fields. Unfortunately, none of the police officers presently employed have had previous police experience prior to evacuation. This lack of experience is gradually being offset by a vigorous training program which will be described hereunder. The Issei members of the Division of Internal Security, although constituting a small minority, have proven to be a highly useful part of our organization, particularly in the field of public relations.

The training program currently being carried out consists of two phases, the first being a series of lectures on police administration, and the second phase being individual instruction given by experienced Caucasian police officers. The following courses of instructions have been given via the lecture method: police records, patrol procedure, laws of



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM  
Gila River Project  
Rivers, Arizona

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arrest, evidence, public relations, juvenile delinquency problems, traffic regulations and enforcement, rules and regulations, surveillance, criminal investigation, report writing, and other similar subjects. Follow-up work on these lectures by means of individual conferences with Associate Chiefs of Police have brought forth highly satisfactory results to date.

Shortages in certain types of materials have prevented the Internal Security Division from receiving the type of equipment necessary to do a first-rate job of police administration. All patrol work must necessarily be done on foot inasmuch as there is a shortage of vehicular transportation. Inexpensive uniforms have been purchased which make for ready identification. Communication devices are non-existent and thus hamper our work considerably. Finger print equipment has been ordered and it is hoped that this will be available within the near future. Eight horses and equipment therefore were purchased several months ago, and a border patrol has been set up to prevent both ingress and egress by unauthorized persons.

The crime rate at Rivers has been consistently low in comparison to other communities containing populations of approximately 14,000 people. To date, arrests have been made for the following offenses:

|                             |   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Gambling.....               | 7 |
| Assaults.....               | 3 |
| Murder.....                 | 1 |
| Forgery.....                | 1 |
| Introduction of liquor..... | 3 |
| Thefts.....                 | 1 |

Sentences for gambling have run anywhere from probation to twenty-one days in the Pinal County Jail at Florence. Convictions for assault have carried sentences averaging three weeks in the County Jail. Arrests for introduction of liquor have been referred to outside law enforcement agencies, inasmuch as the principals involved were not evacuee personnel. The great majority of crimes committed at Rivers have been misdemeanors and successful dispositions of these cases have been made in most instances by placing the responsible parties on probation to certain community organizations or individuals.

The one capital crime committed at Rivers arose out of a domestic disturbance, and had no political or subversive relationships. This case will be brought up for trial sometimes in April, 1943, in Pinal County, Arizona.

Juvenile delinquency is a problem at Rivers, just as it is in all communities. It is hoped that the construction of recreation facilities plus the organization of groups making profitable use of leisure time will bring about a satisfactory decrease in the rate of juvenile delinquency. Although comparison figures are lacking, it is the opinion of the Caucasian staff members of the Division of Internal Security, all of whom have had several years of police experience that the rate of juvenile delinquency in this community is very small in comparison with the rate for the average community of this size.



To date, the Administration of this Relocation Center has not called upon the services of the Military Police for the settlement of any type of altercation or disturbance. There recently has been removed from this community a small, but very active, group of pro-Axis sympathizers. There has been a noticeable decline in tension since this removal was made, and manifestations of a greatly improved morale in the community are noticed everywhere. This group of pro-Axis adherents was never allowed to organize fully, or to engage in any activities which may have precipitated a riot or similar disturbance. The Administration at all times was able to anticipate the moves of this group, and to take the necessary preventive measures. Removals were effected quietly and without incident a few weeks ago after complete evidence establishing jeopardy to internal security was secured.

The only incident of any importance which took place on this Project occurred on November 30, 1942, at which time a prominent Nisei was beaten by an Issei, allegedly for unfulfilled promises made by the victim. Considerable feeling was aroused at this time, but an orderly, public trial of the responsible party took place in the presence of the Project Director. A finding of guilty was given and the responsible party was sentenced to thirty days in the County Jail. Although members of the pro-Axis group supported the defendant in this case, all groups and individuals accepted the verdict of the Project Director without incident. At the trial, information was introduced reflecting that the victim in instant case was highly unpopular with the older people in the community because he had allegedly promised clothing allowances at a time that he held a responsible position at the Turlock Assembly Center. Because these alleged promises were not fulfilled, said victim was subsequently assaulted on November 30, 1942. This incident did not become a political issue, however, and no additional beatings or disturbances followed after the defendant was remanded over to the custody of the sheriff of Pinal County.

The residents of this community, on the whole, have proven themselves to be loyal, industrious, and cooperative with the Administration. They have committed a series of crimes, the total number, however, being relatively small when compared with the normal crime rate. The great majority of people on this Project have proven themselves to be loyal to the United States, and have expressed a desire to take a more active part in the current war effort.

Respectfully submitted,

W. E. Williamson  
Director of Internal Security



L. H. Bennett's testimony:

The average cost of food for the last three months at the Gila River Relocation Project has been \$0.354 per person per day.

In reply, refer to:  
Mess and Supply

March 8, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: L. H. Bennett, Project Director

SUBJECT: Food Costs

In reply to your requests for information concerning food costs at the Gila River Project, the latest figures taken from the period November 13, 1942 to February 12, 1943 show that the average cost per day per person is \$.354.

The cost per capita will decrease as more produce is furnished by the Agricultural Division and as dairy products, milk and meats are produced on the Project.

I trust that the above information is in good order.

/s/ Harold E. Keadle

Harold E. Keadle  
Chief Project Steward



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM  
GILA RIVER PROJECT  
RIVERS, ARIZONA

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Harold E. Keadle  
Chief Project Steward



## REPORT ON COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

by Hugo W. Wolter  
Chief of Community Activities Services

March 11, 1943

The Community Activities Section includes the whole range of formal and informal associations in which the residents take part. In general, these activities are initiated by the residents themselves and are under their direction. The Community Activities Section serves to facilitate and coordinate such activities in order to avoid confusion and duplication. The C.A.S. serves both as a Public Recreational Department and as a Coordinating Council.

C.A.S. urges participation in group organization and government. Its basic function is education, introducing activity such skills, abilities, and attitudes which will be useful in resettlement. The organization of its clubs and general structure provides for participation in democratic procedures and government, and is coordinated with the total work program as a supplementary vocational training effort.

The Section operates in direct contact with evacuee organizations at the Center through a council composed of representatives of the various clubs and associations, representatives of the blocks (housing units composed of squares of army barracks) and representatives of evacuees and members of the administrative staff. All organizations are required to submit their charters and the names of officers and members to the Section for approval and recognition. All organizations are established in accordance with democratic principles as respects structure and procedure. The council has an executive committee of five and various other committees. The organizations include national affiliates of Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts of America, the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, Federated Women's Clubs and others. There are also community libraries, toy and game loans, athletic clubs and teams, children's playgrounds, classes in various skills and numerous cultural clubs with particular reference to music, art, drama, literature, and the like. In addition, the Section co-operates in the planning of church, educational and health programs.

The evacuee staff averages in number approximately 140. It is supervised by one administrative appointee in each of the two communities. There are also numerous unpaid volunteers who assist in the Section's activities as club leaders, team captains, group leaders, and so forth. At present, there are 55 active clubs in the Center, 62 basketball teams, 32 hardball teams and a large number of other athletic teams and activity groups.

The financing of programs and purchase of equipment are accomplished largely by the groups themselves through entertainment events. Some initial equipment was supplied by the War Relocation Authority to the education and activities program jointly. Some additional equipment has been received in the form of donations.



## STATEMENT RE HEALTH DATA

Prepared by Jack C. Sleath, M.D.  
Chief Medical Officer

The health of the Project residents is under the direction of one appointed personnel officer, the Chief Medical Officer. He has the responsibility for organizing the program for providing general medical care to the Project residents, organization and operation of hospital facilities, and has complete charge of all aspects of sanitation and public health of the entire project.

The Project is divided into two communities, the Canal Community with a population of about 5,000 and the Butte Community of about 8,500. A small infirmary building with a capacity of 20 beds with a dispensary building is located in the Canal Community. The main hospital with a capacity of 200 beds and a dispensary building is located in Butte Community. Minor work is done in the hospitals of both communities, but all major procedures are done in the main hospital in Butte. The general medical and surgical, dental, optometry services are provided in both communities. Pharmacy, X-ray, and laboratory facilities are also available.

The sanitation of the Project is carried out by a Sanitation Corps operating through both communities. School Health Program, Home Nursing Services, and Baby Formula Department are also in operation. Other departments included in the Health Division are Property, Procurement, Cost Accounting Unit, Record, Hospital Maintenance, Warehousing, Custodial, Receptionists, Ambulance Corps, and Dietetics. All of the foregoing departments are operated entirely by evacuees with the exception of the Chief Medical Officer and eleven registered and practical nurses.

At the present time an average of 126 cases are hospitalized daily. About 26% of all hospitalized cases are tuberculosis. The remaining cases are divided into approximately 15% surgical and 59% medical. The outpatient departments average about 6,000 treatments a month.

The professional and technical staff includes twelve evacuee doctors, thirteen dentists, two bacteriologists, two optometrists, one optician, seven pharmacists, and sixteen registered nurses, six laboratory technicians of all types, three dieticians, one public health nurse. The remaining personnel is made up of evacuees who have been trained to do their particular duties following their arrival at the Project. Combined hospital facility employees total about 350.

Besides providing health services to the evacuee residents limited medical service is also given to the 319th Military Police Unit stationed adjacent to the Project. Ambulance service is also provided for this unit. Health facilities are also provided when needed to the appointed personnel working in the other divisions of the Project.



The Health Division besides providing necessary care to the residents also conducts a program of health education through the Project newspaper and by health education films and lectures by the doctors and nurses to school teachers and forum groups. Statistics are being gathered at this Project of a research nature in conjunction with the study of the disease, *Coccidioides immitis* (Valley Fever). This disease is endemic in this area, is quite prevalent here, and very little is known about the disease by the medical profession as a whole. Ateempt is being made to further our knowledge of this subject.

The whole health program is handicapped mainly by lack of certain necessary equipment to carry out the necessary work. Necessary initial equipment was delayed in arriving at the Project, and it had been impossible to replace these intitial shortages due to the increasing difficulty in the procuring of these articles. Deficiencies in necessary items essential for the protection of public health of the community plus the breakdown of sewage lines, water pumps, and other community essentials have considerably menaced the public health of the Project since its inception. Further difficulty is expected in the provision of health facilities at the Project due to the increasing number of essential hospital workers who are leaving the Project for relocation and Army enlistment. Hospital personnel being of a specially trained and technical variety cannot be replaced from Project sources and is almost impossible to procure from outside sources.

Fortunately, to date no major epidemics or medical catastrophies have occurred.



PROJECT STATISTICS

March 5, 1943

LAND

|       |          | <u>Area</u>        | <u>Rate</u> | <u>Annual Rental</u> |
|-------|----------|--------------------|-------------|----------------------|
|       | Parcel A | 6977 acres         | 20.00       | \$139,540.00         |
|       | " B      | 8850 "             | Undeveloped |                      |
| Butte | " B-1    | 850 "              | 1.00        | 850.00               |
| Canal | " C      | 446 "              | 1.00        | 446.00               |
|       |          | <hr/> 17,123 acres |             | <hr/> \$140,836.00   |

WATER

\$3.60 for 4 acre feet of water per annum.

\$1.00 for each additional acre foot of water per annum.

Present allotment 4 acre feet per annum at the point of storage.

ROADS

50 miles to maintain

17 miles from railhead-freight road to construct

BUILDING

- 4 Quadruplex apts. finished
- 2 Dormitories
- 5 Barrack type dormitories
- 15 Quadruples to build with 6, about 30% complete

School building program revised to use of barracks for everything but high school and gymnasium.

Priorities received for:

- Staff Housing
- Schools
- Dairy
- Automotive Repair Shop
- Carpenter, electrical, plumbing shop
- Chicken Project
- Hog Project
- Bakery



IRRIGATION

|                 |                         |
|-----------------|-------------------------|
| Undeveloped     | 8850 acres not approved |
| Camp Irrigation | " "                     |

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES

Camouflage  
Ship model factory being set up



Sewage Disposal

The removal and treatment of the sewage from each one of the two camps is handled by a separate sewage disposal plant located approximately  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile from the limits of the camps.

The two plants are almost alike and each one consists of a clarifier having a capacity of 90,215 gallons, a digester having a capacity of 212,649 gallons, effluent chlorination plant and sludge drying beds.

Approximately 500,000 gallons of sewage per day are treated by the Butte plant and 350,000 gallons per day by the Canal plant.

The clear effluent from the clarifier is used for irrigation of subjugated lands intended for the cultivation of castor beans.



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
GILA RIVER PROJECT

UTILITIES

John C. Doucha  
Senior Engineer

March 11, 1943

Electric Light and Power

The electric light and power is supplied by the U.S. Indian Irrigation Service, Coolidge, Arizona, from their Sacaton sub-station.

The power is brought to the project at 2200V and is transformed in single steps from this voltage directly to the various utilities through transformers operating on 440V, 220V and 110V, and located as close as possible to the objects or utilities they serve.

Domestic Water Supply

The domestic water for Camp #1 and #2 is supplied from two wells, situated within a mile of the respective camps they serve. These wells are 400 feet deep, cased with 14" pipe, the full depth of the well and can deliver up to 1,000 gallons per hour if pumped from the 210 feet level.

Two stand-by wells, one for each camp, and located within 1,000 feet of the two operating wells, have been drilled to a depth of 400 feet and cased with 16" pipe. The pumping equipment for these two wells is expected in the near future and as soon as it is received, these wells will be put into operation, alternating with wells now in service.

Since the water supplied by all these wells has a high flourine content (7.5 to 9.0 parts per M.M.), 90 activitated bone filters will be installed at the drinking water outlets to reduce the fluorine content from 9 parts to 0.9 parts per M.M., which concentration is considered as a maximum that would not produce mettled enamel on human teeth. Bacteriological treatment of the water is effected by means of automatic chlorinating plants at each well. A concentration of approximately 0.5 parts of chlorine gas per M.M. is required to remove all objectionable bacteria in this case.

The following table gives the average daily consumption of water in gallons during the several months these plants have been in operation:

|                | <u>Canal Camp</u> | <u>Butte Camp</u> |
|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| November 1942  | 519,000           | 744,850           |
| December 1942  | 441,000           | 760,000           |
| January 1943   | 505,000           | 853,000           |
| February 1943  | 568,000           | 863,000           |
| March, to date | 656,000           | 849,000           |