

Seg

JAN 2 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

I have some comments to offer on the segregation proposal recently laid before you. My comments may be divided into two sections: (1) who would be segregated under the plan, and (2) the method proposed to be employed.

Who Would Be Segregated

The proposal would segregate (1) those who have applied for repatriation or expatriation, (2) parolees, (3) evacuees having an evaluated interior security police record, (4) evacuees listed and evaluated as potentially dangerous, and (5) families of family heads segregated. I want to discuss these one by one.

Applicants for Repatriation. These, I believe, should be segregated even though we lack evidence to indicate they were at present a source of trouble. They have expressed a choice in favor of the Japanese way of life, and this fact absolves WRA from including them in any Americanization or morale improvement program and precludes them from participating in private relocation. Although they might not actively work against WRA's policies, certainly they cannot be expected to accept them and, therefore, would necessarily act as a detriment to their successful application. However, my segregation program for this group would be entirely separate from the other phases of the segregation program. Commitments to Japan, the applicants, and the State Department have been made which necessitate this.

Evacuees Having Evaluated Interior Security Records. "Evaluated" is the key word here. I judge that such evaluation would be based on the nature of the offense. It may be assumed that ordinary misdemeanors or crimes, such as the normal community experiences, would not serve as a basis for segregation. With careful "evaluation" I agree to the inclusion of this group.

Parolees. The fact that a man is a parolee should not of itself justify segregation. Perhaps a large majority of this group should be

FILE COPY

segregated. Certainly those whose records are clouded, or who have soured as a result of their detention, should be segregated. But as we know large numbers were picked up as a safety measure December a year ago because they occupied positions of leadership. Therefore, since we cannot afford to pursue arbitrary methods, we are faced with the necessity of going through a process of selection.

Evacuees Listed and Evaluated as Potentially Dangerous. Yes, I agree to the inclusion of this group, assuming emphasis on the word "evaluated".

Families of Family Heads Segregated. Only if the families wish to accompany the head.

To the groups suggested, I would include a sixth: the old bachelor aliens who have never become Americanized; but, here again, not all bachelor aliens arbitrarily.

From my remarks thus far, it should have become apparent that my exceptions to the proposal are based upon my old disagreement with the original proposal to segregate "kibei" families. Segregation is bound to "smear" a man's reputation, just as evacuation helped to smear the reputations of the Japanese American population as a whole.

help from the Army and other agencies in carrying out the mechanics of movement, and preparation for it, but the policy has got to be his policy, carried out under his administrative responsibility.

Deputy Director

EMRowalt:VHC
1-2-48

FILE COPY

Segue

January 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT: WCCA Segregation Proposal

~~I have carefully read the WCCA Segregation Proposal and have the following observations and comments to offer.~~

-2-

Turning now to more detailed observations, the proposal early concludes that recent incidents at Poston, Tule Lake, and Mansanar emphasize the need for segregation, and that the inevitable consequences of inaction, will be (1) increased necessity of using troops to maintain order, and (2) the loss of a useful manpower reservoir.

-3-

The proposal completely overlooks not only the so-called Kibei, a category long touted as supposedly responsible for trouble, but also the criminal-gangster element, as a basis of difficulty somewhat separate from the pro-Axis angle. True, many of the criminal-gangster group may have police records, possibly in assembly centers, possibly in Los Angeles Police files, or elsewhere, but whether that record is such that a judicial weighing of the evidence would lead to a conviction is something that seems not to be contemplated.

3. Examination of evidence from every available source, with adequate protection to sources, leading to presentation of good cases which either an existing judicial process under Federal, State, or local Government, or a process to be prescribed by WRA can evaluate for guilt or innocence.
4. Sentences deriving from such judicial processes to be enforced without fear, favor, or compromise.
5. Offer to individuals who desire to transfer to another camp for reasons of personal safety the opportunity to do so quietly and without publicity. Assuming Manzanar to contain the largest proportion of trouble makers, this process applied to Manzanar would, by a residual process, become a trouble makers' camp which would require tight administration.

B. R. Stauber

B. R. Stauber
Relocation Planning Officer

BRStauber:ABC

The present situation is certainly a critical point in the whole WRA program. I believe we must lay down some basic principles to serve as a touchstone for proposed solutions of our present difficulties. I offer the following:

1. The method of meeting the present problems must be consistent with American principles. This means absolute maximum regard to rights of citizens consistent with National safety and maintenance of order.
2. Aliens can be removed without undue difficulty through existing procedures. Even aliens, however, are entitled to a considered, judicial weighing of the evidence, rather than a processing wholly in the hands of police officials.
3. Children, particularly in the impressionable ages, must be protected from un-American and from criminal associations.
4. Decent, law-abiding persons -- whether American citizens or Japanese Nationals, are entitled to personal safety and residence in a peaceful community.

In seeking to solve one problem, the proposal completely overlooks collateral problems that are inextricably interwoven and of equal or greater importance. The value of American citizenship has already doubtless suffered in the minds of many citizen-evacuees as a result of the evacuation. A "second evacuation" involving citizens would doubtless ruin whatever confidence now remains in their minds, and would thus probably impair substantially similar confidence in the minds of many non-evacuees who value democratic ideals. The proposal contemplates that children under 15 would go to the segregee camp if their parent desired to go with the segregee. Probably most of such children would be American citizens, and children under 15 years of age are in their most impressionable years. Children raised in a segregee camp as proposed would be fit for nothing except to be shipped to Japan at the end of the war.

Moreover, the original evacuation was inaugurated because there was presumably no time to separate the guilty from the innocent. We have always assumed that had there been time to make such a segregation, the mass evacuation would never have taken place. To establish a new evacuation again on an empirical or a priori classification would be a public confession of failure.

As a practical program I suggest:

1. A police force, evacuee or otherwise, adequate to maintain order, and to protect the persons and property of law-abiding people.
2. Specification of crimes, misdemeanors, etc., and arrangements for judicial processing and punishment appropriate to each category. Assaults can be punished under existing statutes; similarly, conspiracy to sabotage or disrupt governmental operations should be punishable under law or regulation of WRA.

plans for movement are carefully thought out, seem well organized and complete, and follow strictly the experience of the WCCA in its earlier program. If we want to move in this direction, the proposal offers a tailor-made, streamlined way of doing it. The operating mechanism proposed is so similar to the existing WCCA setup that it is impossible to suppress the suspicion that the similarity is not altogether accidental. However, the need of setting up such an elaborate organization is not clear. The same result could be secured by straight forward cooperation on an all out basis.

My reaction, after studying the matter carefully, is that ^{if} WRA accepts this type of segregation proposal, WRA as an organization with a program is through.

CONFIDENTIAL

Jan. 5, 1943

Captain Ellis M. Zacharias
Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Captain Zacharias:

Confirming our recent conversations I want to express in writing my appreciation of your visit and your offer of help in discovering disloyal individuals in our relocation centers and safeguarding the public interest in segregating or otherwise dealing with them. The list of suspected individuals in your own files, which you offered to furnish, will be of great assistance to us.

We would appreciate also receiving from you any analyses or studies which your office has made of various Japanese group activities or organizations. The importance of such organizations both as focal points of disturbance or as nuclei for educational program is of course apparent.

From time to time we will be submitting to you additional names of individuals whose activities at the centers raise doubts as to their pro-American sympathies. Your check of these people in your files will be very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ D. S. Myer

Director

CONFIDENTIAL

January 7, 1943

Mr. D. S. Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

This is in reply to your confidential letter of December 24th in which you ask certain questions concerning segregation of the Japanese in centers. The points in question were given thorough consideration by a committee created for this purpose composed of Acting Assistant Director Robert L. Brown, Project Attorney Robert Throckmorton, Chief of Internal Security John Gilkey, and myself.

Our conclusions are:

1. The word "disloyal" is difficult to define. Certainly there are many elements among the evacuees who are disloyal to the Administration. The term used in your second paragraph, "Wilfully obstructing the program of the Authority", is in our estimation a better term to use. We are slowly unraveling enough background material on these disloyal and disruptive elements to know who they are. This will be covered in paragraph #4.

From the standpoint of orderly operation of the center and the protection of the national interests, it is our recommendation that those Japanese whose actions within the center obstruct the program of the Authority, or break the peace, or disrupt the tranquility of the residents, be segregated.

2. There were a number of individuals in Manzanar agitating for disloyalty and wilfully obstructing the program of the Authority prior to the incident of December 6. Many of these are now in custody. Lists of these people now in custody are attached. Since the disturbance such activity has stopped. However, we believe that as time progresses other individuals will come to the fore and their names will be sent to you from time to time.

3. If the policy of segregation is carried out, it will have a salutary effect in Manzanar if it is done judiciously. There must be no mistake in those segregated. There must be no martyrs created. The majority of the people here we feel sure, because they wish to live in peace, would like to see all those who disrupt the peace removed.

We do not believe that removal of these individuals would result in retaliatory acts against certain center residents or in disorderly demonstrations. If it did, the internal security force is not at present equipped to cope with such a development. Mobs and riots cannot be controlled by the Japanese police force. Neither can they be controlled by a small caucasian force. In this respect the military is now the only force available on the project to preserve order.

4. If segregation were decided upon we would recommend the removal both of certain groups and categories within the center and certain individuals. At Manzanar we believe one great source of difficulty lies in a portion of the kibeis who are strongly anti-administration and anti-American. Specifically, we feel they are young men who have lived in Japan for five years or more, who are single, who may have identified themselves with a "gang", who do not live with their parents, who speak little or no English, who have returned to the United States since 1936, or who have applied for repatriation. These should be thoroughly investigated and removed in most instances.

At Manzanar we also have approximately 500 bachelor issei who are grouped together in two blocks. Most of these men have no ties to hold them to America. We feel sure that they are behind much of the pro-Japanese sentiment in the center. These should be segregated. There are more bachelors scattered throughout the center but in nearly every instance these men have become a part of the community life. They have attached themselves to families and children within their blocks and as near as we can discover are not openly disloyal or disruptive. It is our opinion that these should not be segregated as a group.

All those who have applied for repatriation should be segregated.

Besides these categories there are a number of individuals who appear as troublemakers, who in our estimation should be removed along with the others. Joe Kurihara, the leader of the mob of December 6th, was such an individual. Although Kurihara was a bachelor, an American citizen, a member of the American Legion, fought in the last war and was wounded, yet he was outspoken against the United States, would tell officials to their faces that he hoped Japan would win the war and intended to cause as much trouble as he could for any administration that was a party to depriving him of his American citizenship. There are undoubtedly a number of individuals in this center who feel as Mr. Kurihara felt and it is our opinion that they will appear as time progresses in the ordinary functioning of this center. When they appear there should be another center to which they could be transferred where all residents think the same way.

There has been considerable discussion in our committee, between staff members and with Mr. Fryer on the advisability of having two camps to which we might send people segregated

from this center. One place might be for those who were merely pro-Japanese and not particularly vicious, another place for a few individuals who were known as trouble makers, outspoken Japanese patriots and others who may have committed acts of vandalism. It is our final conclusion that two removal camps would be unnecessary. Men who have actually committed a crime could be taken care of by the courts.

All other people would fall into the category of those who were obstructing the program of the Authority.

In addition to those to be segregated for disloyal and disruptive activities, it is our feeling that at Manzanar, at least, there is a group of Japanese who are out of their element geographically and because of this are very unhappy. We speak of those people here who are from Bainbridge Island in Washington. They number 275. All of their friends and relatives from other portions of Washington and Oregon are at Minidoka. At Manzanar they have lived apart from the other Japanese and have been quite outspoken in their dislike of them. We feel that they should be removed to Minidoka and as a matter of National policy it would be well to review to see that people from one geographical area are relocated in like geographical areas.

5. Evidence and records of charges of disloyalty and disruptive activity at Manzanar have been forwarded to Washington to the attention of the Director by Project Attorney Throckmorton.

It should be borne in mind that prior to this time we were instructed not to have an intelligence service on the project. We kept no records of individuals who were trouble makers, outside of police records of offenders who had been arrested. The reports office went to some pains not to include specific names in reports. The FBI which has done all of the investigation work at the project does not have records which are available to us.

It is our opinion that if we went to trial with any of these people in custody we could not get qualified Japanese witnesses. A few of our caucasian personnel might testify. All evidence has been derived from interviews with suspects, staff members, and a few Japanese.

There is urgent necessity for an efficient intelligence system within the center in our estimation. Such a system could be a part of the regular office of reports, augmented by the social welfare section and the internal police. Regular information channeled through these departments could be combined and sifted by an individual or by several individuals sitting as a committee. Pertinent information needed for the segregation of disturbing elements could then be obtained.

R. P. Merritt, Jan. 7, 1943

-4-

6. The selection of a segregation committee from the staff on projects is, of course, a matter of individual selection. Individuals should be those who have had a wide background of experience in human relations and in living; they must be wise, just, and of mature judgment. Normally, these individuals would be found among the heads of divisions and sections on the project. The selection of these men should be a duty of the Project Director.

7. If the program of segregation is carried out with dignity and authority based on sound reasoning, we believe that we will get a great deal of help from the thoughtful leaders of this community. The evacuees must be made to understand that this is their problem as much or more than it is one belonging to the Federal Government.

8. We strongly recommend the removal of families with those who are segregated. It is the humanitarian thing to do; it will be an aid to the legal aspect of relocation in that it will be more a relocation than internment; and it will not leave families in the center to become martyrs or to be source of trouble to the administration.

9. We feel that those removed to a separate center because they were disloyal or disturbing elements should not receive any of the benefits given to evacuees generally. A procedure should be established which would safeguard these people from mistakes of segregating committees but they should be denied all special privileges.

Sincerely,

Ralph P. Merritt
Project Director

AIR MAIL
CONFIDENTIAL

January 7, 1943

Mr. D. S. Myer
Director, War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
17th and Eye Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

I am not positive that you wanted me to answer your confidential letter to all Project Directors of December 24. Nevertheless, I will attempt to give you some of my ideas and answers concerning your questions.

1. a. If the term "disloyal elements" can be expanded to include troublemakers and agitators, the answer is definitely yes.

b. The segregation of this type of individuals is absolutely necessary for the orderly operation of any project.

2. There are, in my belief, certain individuals in each Center who are continually agitating for disloyalty and, through such agitation, obstructing the program not only of the Authority but are obstructing the willingness of loyal individuals in each Center and causing either work stoppages, slowdowns, or wasteful practices on the Projects. A complete list of these individuals is practically impossible to secure as only a small number of individuals who are working in this manner are out in the open where the administration has an opportunity to know who they may be. Further, loyal persons on the Project hesitate to release names of individuals under present conditions in the fear that they may become known and that action by the disloyal group would be taken against them. Such lists could be prepared from time to time if it were possible to take rather rapid action on segregating such people after the lists were prepared.

3. If a policy of segregating disloyal and obstructive individuals were adopted, it is my belief that the reaction on the Center would be all for the good provided that the persons who were to be segregated were only given sufficient notice to permit them to pack their belongings and be immediately removed from the Center. My feeling is that they should not be given 24 hours notice but that they should be moved the day they are notified so that no time should be given them to stir up more agitation in the community. It is my feeling that if these elements were removed in small groups from time to time the leaders of the community would immediately see what WRA had in mind and sufficient support would be given to the Internal Security force so that care could be taken of practically any problem.

4. If segregation were decided upon, I would definitely recommend the following groups or categories for segregation:

a. All those who have applied for repatriation.

b. All issei bachelors, with the exception of those whom the Project Director may recommend to remain on the Project. I believe the Project Director should be given this authority as there are some bachelors who are very valuable to the administration.

c. All issei married couples without children, extending the same exception as provided in item b.

d. All troublemakers in the issei and kibe group, or we might place it as all issei or kibe except those whom the Project Director may recommend to remain on the Project. I believe it would be better to remove other issei or kibe troublemakers recommended by the Project Director as that group will be much smaller than the number that will remain. If such a procedure were established, I believe we would find a relatively small number in the latter category and would immediately leave within a Project those persons who were willing to work with the administration for the Project and those who have been willing to promote harmonious relations among all concerned.

5. In answer to this question, as already stated, it is difficult to secure good evidence against persons as long as those who give evidence feel there is a possibility of their remaining in the Center. Proper witnesses may talk with WRA employees, but if they were called to testify would conveniently forget that they had ever discussed such a subject with us for fear that they would be severely beaten by the minority group on the Project.

6. The segregation committee on each Project would, I believe, vary; but, in general, my recommendation would be that the Chief of Internal Security, Chief of Community Services, and one other staff member working the largest number of evacuees be assigned as members of the segregation committee.

7. The leaders of the community will, in an undercover manner through the staff, be very helpful in carrying out a segregation program. If they were named to a committee and openly branded as members of such a segregation committee, I doubt if they would serve; and I think they would suffer serious consequences by being in such a position. More help can be gained by the Project Director and his staff through confidence men on the Project rather than through openly established committees while such a program is in progress.

8. There is at present from 10 to 25 or 30 very disloyal people on practically every Project. These persons, I believe, should be removed immediately. With reference to the larger segregation program, it is my thought that families should

R.B.Cozzens, Jan. 7, 1943

-3-

probably be removed with those who are to be segregated. If the program, as recommended, is considered, one Center could be selected. First, all repatriats could be kept in that one center. Second, a hundred or more repatriats from a Center could be sent to this selected Center and this selected Center could send back to the other Center all loyal persons. This procedure could continue until all repatriats were segregated. Then exactly the same procedure could be followed for bachelors and others until all disloyal people were in one Center and other Centers supplied with loyal people. In this way families could be moved at the same time that segregation takes place.

9. It is my belief that once a Center was established as a segregation Center that all persons moved to this area should be denied indefinite leave until their cases could be thoroughly checked; and, if it were found that they had been moved unjustly, then I would think they should be sent to a Relocation Center before being given the benefits of indefinite leave. I believe all mail in such a Center should be censored, that all packages should be checked carefully for contraband, and that the administration should definitely run the Project with a firm but fair hand.

These few comments are furnished for your information, and I hope they will be of some help. They are based upon my experience and discussions with large numbers of people of Japanese ancestry at Gila ~~and~~ and other Projects, and further on my knowledge of Japanese people in general through my long years of association with them. The entire 100,000 evacuees now in WRA Relocation Centers will, I believe, if this or some similar segregation procedure is put in operation, give WRA administration their loyal support. Work on each Project will be increased and WRA will be respected by all the loyal evacuees and will certainly gain, in my estimation, enormous support from the American public as a whole.

Very truly yours,

R. B. Cozzens
Field Assistant Director

CONFIDENTIAL

January 8, 1943

To: The Director

Subject: Segregation Plan Prepared by the Western Defense Command, and Submitted to you for your Consideration by Mr. McCloy

I believe this Segregation Plan is thoroughly bad. The entire procedure proposes to treat the evacuees as though they were so many blocks of wood, with complete disregard of the rights and liberties, not to mention the fears and sensibilities, they share with other human beings.

If this plan were applied as proposed, I believe it would create widespread consternation and terror among the evacuees. I should hate to be present in one of our relocation centers on the "X-Date" that this plan provides for.

I cannot refrain from saying that this document is much more compatible with the Nazi psychology of our enemies than with the democratic psychology we are fighting for.

Further, I have the most serious doubts as to the Plan's constitutionality, if applied to citizens of the United States. I can amplify this last point, if you wish me to do so.

I suggest the following for your consideration in preparing your letter to Mr. McCloy:

1. In the whole of the Plan, only two paragraphs attempt to state why this kind of segregation is thought necessary. These are the first two paragraphs on page 2 of Part I. These two paragraphs consist merely of sweeping statements; not an iota of evidence is supplied or referred to. On the basis of my own association with WRA, I don't believe the assertions made in these two paragraphs are true.

2. The proposal for the "X-Date" is apparently born out of a feeling that arrangements must be made in advance to prevent widespread violence and upheaval when the plan is discovered by the evacuees. The fact that such elaborate precautions are necessary seems to me to cast considerable doubt on the wisdom of the proposal. Nor can I believe that even such elaborate precautions will be adequate. You can't outrage 110,000 people in this manner and then hold them in check with bayonets after all the months in which WRA has given them assurances that we recognize their rights as human beings, and the full rights of two-thirds of them as citizens of the United States.

3. The proposal for the appointment of a Director of Segregation, and the whole scheme of the Plan, call for joint administration of the segregation program by the Army and WRA. Only after the initial segregation is completed is it assumed that WRA will alone carry on such supplemental segregation as may later prove necessary.

The President established the War Relocation Authority to administer the relocation program, after he had already provided that the evacuation program was to be administered by the Army. Obviously he felt that a civilian agency was the appropriate agency to administer the program after evacuation itself had been completed.

I know of no reason why the Authority should ignore this obvious purpose of the President and call upon the Army to reassume so large a part of the administrative responsibility for relocation activities.

4. On page 1 of Part III, the Plan indicates the classes of people to be segregated.

The first class includes all who have indicated a desire to accept repatriation. There is considerable reason to believe that many of the evacuees who expressed such a desire did so in the first flush of anger and resentment over evacuation. Many have changed their minds. There is almost no evidence in the case of most of these that they are exercising an undesirable influence in the centers or are making trouble for anybody.

The second group includes all aliens paroled from detention or internment camps. We have been informed by high officers among those administering the alien enemy program that many persons of Japanese ancestry were interned at the beginning of the war unjustifiably, and that many of these have since been paroled to relocation centers. Some of these people may, in fact, be trouble-makers in our centers. Probably some of them should be segregated -- but if so, only under a totally different program and procedure for segregation. I have outlined such a possible program in my memorandum to you of January 7. In that memorandum I have also discussed the reasons why repatriates should not be placed in any segregation center set aside for aggravated trouble-makers.

The next group mentioned are evacuees "having an evaluated interior security police record during assembly center or relocation center residence". For the reasons I have stated in my memorandum I have also discussed the reasons why repatriates should not be placed in any segregation center set aside for aggravated trouble-makers.

The next group mentioned are evacuees "having an evaluated interior security police record during assembly center or relocation center residence". For the reasons I have stated in my memorandum to you of January 7, I believe that many members of such a group may very well need to be segregated -- but certainly not under such procedures as are proposed in the present Segregation Plan.

The next group are those who are listed and evaluated by the Intelligence Service as "potentially dangerous". The phrase "potentially dangerous" is one that needs to be used with caution. I suspect that the author of the present Segregation Plan could easily become "potentially dangerous" to the internal security of the United States if he and his family were made the victims of precisely the Segregation Plan that he has here suggested for more than 60,000 of his fellow citizens.

If we do a good job of administering our relocation centers some of the "potentially dangerous" may lose that potential and become good Americans. Some others may become actually dangerous and can then be dealt with on that basis.

The final group includes members of immediate families of those to be segregated.

5. The plan contemplates suspension on X-Date of any activities that use space that may be needed for housing segregated evacuees, or the evacuees who are to be moved out of Poston to make room for the segregated evacuees. This suspension, coupled with the recommended suspension of all other activities that may in any way interfere with military control of the projects on X-Date and thereafter until the segregation is completed, would mean a suspension of everything that makes the relocation center an approach toward a normal community. If this Plan were put into effect, it seems clear to me that on and after X-Date the relocation centers will become concentration camps.

6. This is a minor point, but I ought to call it to your attention. Paragraph 20 on page 3 of Part III says that the Director of WRA will need to delegate to the Director of Segregation the powers conferred upon him "under paragraphs 2 (e) and (f) and 6, Executive Order No. 9102". In the first place, this apparently refers to paragraph 3 (e) and (f), rather than 2. In the second place, paragraph 3 (e) and (f) and 6 deal with the authority to delegate powers. To accomplish the purpose suggested by the Plan, the Director of WRA would have to delegate nearly all of the other powers conferred upon him in the Order, and not just those referred to in paragraph 3 (e) and (f) and 6. The same legal mistake is made in the draft of a proposed letter for the signature of the Director of WRA addressed to the Director of Segregation included in "incl.4".

merely

Western Defense segregation plan.

-4-

I believe we need to take very seriously the fact that this Segregation Plan has been prepared and submitted. It is true that Mr. McCloy, in his covering letter, states that he is forwarding the Plan to you merely "with the thought that you might find it of help in formulating your segregation procedure". It is my guess that Mr. McCloy will also disapprove of the plan. May I call special attention, however, to the last page in this Plan, which is a copy of a letter from General DeWitt to Mr. McCloy in which General DeWitt refers to a letter on this subject that he has sent to the Chief of Staff. This Segregation Plan is probably, therefore, being considered by others than Mr. McCloy, and you may want to bring your reaction to their attention as well.

Solicitor

P. Glick

Rowell FS
January 8, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority
FROM: Jos. H. Smart, Field Assistant Director, War Relocation Authority
SUBJECT: The Army's Segregation Plan

I have examined the segregation plan submitted to you by Mr. McCloy, December 30, 1942, and present my comments regarding it.

The following is quoted from the first two introductory paragraphs of the plan, parts of which I have underlined.

"Experience has established that within each of these Centers a number of evacuees are militantly pro-Axis in their sympathies and actions. The identity of all of these persons is not yet known. At first the active members of this group were relatively few. Due to a combination of circumstances they have been able to develop an expanding program of alienation, intimidation and obstruction. Unless segregation of this discordant element is accomplished immediately complete alienation will ensue. The inevitable results of complete alienation are manifest. The most tangible and immediate results are (1) increasing necessity for use of troops in maintaining order, and (2) loss of a useful war manpower reservoir.

"The recent incidents occurring at the Tule Lake, Colorado River and Manzanar War Relocation Projects serve to emphasize the immediate need for segregation and point to the inevitable consequences of inaction."

In recent weeks you have requested Project Directors and appropriate members of their staffs to carefully examine the Project

situations in which internal government, internal security and need for segregation are involved. Reports from several of the Projects have now been received.

You also asked me as Field Assistant Director to visit the four projects in my area, Minidoka, Central Utah, Heart Mountain and Granada, and give you my recommendations regarding these matters.

A similar request was made of the other Field Assistant Directors and a report has been received from Mr. Whitaker, particularly with regards to segregation, covering the Rohwer and Jerome projects.

I have also examined voluminous reports regarding the Manzanar and Poston incidents. From these reports and data, reflecting the mature judgment of those representative of the War Relocation Authority who are intimately familiar with the detailed operation of the Centers and who are in the best position to know regarding the need for segregation, we are justified in reaching the following conclusions:

1. The statements, "Experience has established that within each of these Centers a number of evacuees are militantly pro-Axis in their sympathies and action," and, "Due to a combination of circumstances they have been able to develop an expanding program of alienation, intimidation and obstruction, and, "Unless segregation of this discordant element is accomplished immediately complete alienation would ensue," and, that there is "Increasing necessity for use of troops in maintaining order," simply are not true.

Neither is it true that lack of general segregation would result in "loss of a useful war manpower reservoir" because your present policy for outside employment and in making best use of manpower which remains in the Centers is a direct and workable plan for manpower mobilization and is not affected by the segregation question.

2. There is no conclusive evidence that the incidents at Manzanar, Poston, and I believe Tule Lake were incited by pro-Axis leaders or that their causes were ideological or political. On the contrary, it is clear that these incidents arose from dissatisfaction with conditions of evacuation, from resentment of evacuees against certain War Relocation Authority policies or lack of policy or action in certain fields, or administrative ineptitude.

Some of this dissatisfaction was no doubt well founded and some reflects adversely upon our project administration. However, most of it was due to the impossibility of moving faster in certain phases of our work and most of the legitimate causes of dissatisfaction have been removed or are in the process of being removed by actions already initiated by you.

It is true that dissatisfaction and resentment which have been more or less widespread have resulted in mass demonstrations and out of these a few rabble-rousers have emerged and some of these have been unmasked as pro-Japanese sympathizers. I believe everyone agrees that these latter as they become identified as subversive should be removed from the Relocation Centers, but in proportion to the total population, such known persons are very few indeed. There is no reason to believe that the removal of any persons, regardless of their political opinions or loyalty, would obviate dissatisfaction or incidents in the future. These symptoms of social or economic unrest are common in our country, resulting in labor strikes, personal attacks or occasional mob violence, and we have developed better ways than mass segregation of meeting them.

3. In only one case, at Manzanar, has it been necessary to call in the military force to restore or maintain order. The results were not reassuring, and the unauthorized and unordered firing upon a gathering by the soldiers, result-

ing in the death of two persons and the wounding of several more, was probably unnecessary and indefensible.

4. Reports of investigations by the Office of Naval Intelligence and by the Army indicate that some of their investigations are unreliable and conclusions unwarranted. A notable example is a report of the police situation at Heart Mountain which reported as facts things which were not true, incidents which did not occur, and reached conclusions and resulted in recommendations not justified by the known or readily ascertainable facts.
5. It is also apparent that ill-advised and ill-informed statements and reports from some of our own employees which were apparently based on emotional bias of the individuals who made them have contributed to the confusion regarding conditions in the Centers, and have added to the demand for segregation by persons of limited information, experience and judgment. An example of this is a report of Morris James on the situation at Poston which contains conclusions of the causes of the Poston incident not supported

by the evidence and radically at variance with the causes reported by the Project Director and joined in by Mr. James himself, and as appraised by the responsible leaders of the evacuee community. It is one of the most heartening experiences in our program that the latter, in the face of strong pressure and emotional stress, assumed a courageous and statesmanlike attitude and provided genuine leadership in time of crisis.

6. Obviously we should have a positive segregation policy directed against repatriates, individuals who engage in subversive activities and perhaps some individuals whose culture and interests are essentially Japanese, and who are incapable of being absorbed into American society. You have already taken steps to work out such a segregation policy.

Obviously, also, we must have a well conceived and workable policy regarding internal security and law enforcement and this also, you are well on the way to achieving. The internal government policies on the whole seem sound and workable and the weaknesses in this are now being evaluated and corrected.

It appears, therefore, that the premise upon which the Army's segregation plan was based is a mistaken one and the plan itself, therefore, needs little further consideration. Even if large scale segregation were necessary, however, certain elements in the plan seem ill-advised and certain others are wholly repugnant to American ideals and subversive of the aims for which the present war is being fought. Still others seem calculated to inhibit or subvert the processes of Americanization of the older American-Japanese and destroy the faith in and love for democracy which is strong in their American children. Certain other provisions raise serious questions of administering the evacuee program. There follows comment on a few of the plan's provisions:

1. During the period of segregation all normal project activities would be practically suspended with resulting confusion and widespread resentment.
2. All persons on leave would be recalled, which seems inconsistent with the author's concern over manpower utilization.
3. Dependent children of 15 or under are required to be segregated with designated parents. This would result in sure and speedy alienation of their American ways and beliefs, and would retard the complete Americanization of the citizen-

Japanese by at least a generation.

Segregation would include all parolees from detention or deterrent camps, although these have been passed upon by the Department of Justice as being innocent of wrong or worthy of genuine parole. It would also include all evacuees having a police record in the assembly or relocation Centers although many such cases no doubt involved only juvenile delinquency, infraction of rules or violation of laws which can probably be handled through the Civil Courts as in any normal community.

4. The administration of the segregation plan envisions the abrogation of a very large portion of the responsibilities of the Director of the War Relocation Authority as provided by Executive Order 9102, and turns this authority over to the Army. It also proposes that the Army shall perform its functions under the terms of 9066. This is, of course, a legal question but it seems to me that the Army would have no such powers under the latter order and the suggestion that you should relinquish the authority granted you by the President seems at the least a very remarkable one. It is also observed that in the event the Director of Segregation is a civilian,

it is the purpose of the Army that actual authority be exercised by his Deputy who would be an Army officer, since the following is contained in Section 3, Paragraph 19, Page 3 of the plan:

"If the Director of Segregation is a civilian, he will exercise this command through a military officer assigned by the War Department to the Central Control Office as Chief Deputy."

Also, at the project level, while the Project Control Officer is designated by the Director of Segregation, it is provided that "as to military security aspects necessary to the successful accomplishment of the segregation plan, the Project Control Officer will be guided by the instructions of the Project Military Commander." The latter could, of course take the position that any phase of the processes were related to "military security aspects," and thus assume complete control of the segregation.

I believe that the Relocation Center should be administered with firmness and that violators of law should be handled vigorously and promptly. I believe also that agitators against the United States and subversive individuals when identified should be quietly but promptly removed to a separate center, pending determination as to whether they

should be turned over to the Department of Justice, violators of the law, particularly relating to violence, should be punished in the Courts without, I believe, the exercise of any administrative discretion.

It is naive to think that there are no disloyal or that there can be no trouble in any Center: but it is fantastic to suggest that the threat of trouble will be removed or any problems solved by the mass segregation of a large and arbitrarily selected list of people such as was attached to the plan. The purpose outlined and the method devised smacks too much of the Nazimway and my stomach is not strong enough for it.

Perhaps the most amazing element in this situation is that the Army, with its concern over internal security, has provided us with a list of 5,647 presumably dangerous persons worthy of segregation but to this date has not referred to us the information and files regarding them so that we could be on guard and order our internal security program accordingly.

CONFIDENTIAL

January 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Dear Dillon:

You will remember that I asked Tom Cooley of Ed Ennis' Unit in the Justice Department to confirm in writing their indication that they will be willing to accept in detention centers alien evacuees whom we may wish to segregate. I am attaching a letter addressed to me by Mr. Ennis, dated December 31, giving that confirmation.

I don't believe the letter needs any reply, unless you want to add something to the arrangements.

Sincerely,

/s/ P.M.G.

Philip M. Glick
Solicitor

December 31, 1942

*Justice Dept
Alien Enemy Control Unit*

Mr. Philip M. Glick
Solicitor
War Relocation Authority
Room 726 Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Glick:

This will confirm your telephone conversation of December 30, 1942 with Mr. Cooley of this Unit, in which it was stated that upon receipt of memoranda from you describing the conduct of certain alien enemies in your Relocation centers who are thought to be pro-Japanese and trouble makers, we will consider the cases and, where such action is indicated, issue regular Presidential Warrants for their apprehension. These warrants will be transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in due course and apprehensions will be made at the Relocation Centers in such manner as may be determined by the Bureau Agents or your local representatives. It is presently contemplated that these subjects will be held in custody by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, although this plan is subject to change in the event that it seem preferable to utilize the usual Army internment centers.

The above procedure will apply at present only to males. The problem of handling family groups is being necessarily postponed until such time as the family camps are ready for occupancy.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Edward L. Ennis

Director

1943
F-5

Memorandum for Project Directors

Subject: Segregation Policy

The purpose of this memorandum is to announce a policy of segregation for those residents of relocation centers who prefer to cast their future lot with the fortunes of Japan, and to outline the first steps in the segregation program.

1. Designation of the Segregation Center

Tule Lake Relocation Center in northern California is designated as the Segregation Center.

2. Hearings to be held for persons assigned to Segregation Center

Except for those residents of relocation centers who have applied formally for repatriation or expatriation, and have not withdrawn their applications prior to the announcement of the segregation policy, persons considered for segregation shall be interviewed by designated members of the project staffs prior to determining whether they are to be assigned to the segregation center. The procedure outlined in Administrative Instruction ____ shall be used to determine which persons are to be segregated.

3. Persons to be considered for segregation

Persons considered for residence in the segregation center shall be selected from the following groups:

- a. Applicants for repatriation and expatriation
- b. Those who have intelligence agency or WBA records indicating subversive intentions or activity
- c. Those who answered "no" to question 28 on registration forms
- d. Those who refused to register during the registration period ending March 11, 1943
- e. Those who qualified their answers to question 28
- f. Those who have consistently but not openly resisted cooperating

with the government program, and who, after investigation, are found to resist because of pro-Japan convictions.

4. Relation of Segregation Center to Leupp Center

The segregation program herein announced is not to be considered a substitute for the center for incorrigible troublemakers at Leupp, Arizona. Leupp Center shall continue in operation as a center for those who, under the policy and procedures laid down in Administrative Instruction ____, qualify for isolated detention. The facilities at Leupp will be available to the director of the segregation center for detention of troublemakers.

5. Priorities of movement to the Segregation Center

Priorities shall be established for effectuating movements to the segregation center:

- a. Priority by classification of people. Those who have applied for repatriation and expatriation shall be the first persons moved to the segregation center. The next groups shall be made up of those with pro-Japanese records in intelligence agency or WRA files and bachelor Kibei who answered "no" to question 23.
- b. Priority by projects. The first movements to the segregation center shall be from Granada, Minidoka, Jerome, Heart Mountain, and the Central Utah projects. Not until the applicants for repatriation and expatriation have been removed from the projects listed above shall arrangements be made for movements from Manzanar, Poston, Gila, and Rohwer, unless the directors of these projects specifically request higher priority because of a developing situation indicating earlier action is necessary to maintaining good project administration.

c. Repatriates on lists ____ and ____, some of whom may sail on the Gripsholm in the near future, should remain at their present projects until the repatriation program clarifies.

6. Releasing space at Tule Lake

In order to release space at the Tule Lake Center to care for the first movements into the center, it will be necessary for other projects to arrange to accommodate those who must be removed from that center. On the basis of space records in the Washington office, there are sufficient accommodations at Tule Lake to care for 953 persons, allowing 110 square feet per person. On the same basis there is space for the following number of persons at:

Central Utah	781
Granada	1137
Heart Mountain	106
Jerome	239
Minidoka	<u>723</u>
Total	2986

Allowing for 50% shrinkage because of the preponderance of single people in departures for relocation, these five projects should be able to accommodate in apartments 1500 people from Tule Lake. After arrangements have been completed to move this number of people from Tule Lake, movements into Tule Lake may begin.

7. Announcement of future use of Tule Lake as Segregation Center

When the Authority is ready to announce the segregation program to the evacuees, residents at Tule Lake who are not among the groups to be considered for segregation shall be notified that they must prepare to leave the project. They may go either on

indefinite leave or select a project of preference from among the following projects: Minidoka, Granada, Jerome, Rohwer, Heart Mountain and Central Utah.

8. Special relocation program for Tule Lake departures

A special program shall be developed by the Employment Division to help with the relocation of as many as possible of the group that must leave, to take care of those people who may not wish to go to another center. This program will be announced when Tule Lake's future status as a segregation center is announced to the residents.

9. Effectuating the transfers

- a. Planning and arranging of transfers, except for transportation, shall be handled by the Relocation Planning Division of the Washington Office.
- b. Transportation arrangements shall be handled by the Transportation Division of the San Francisco Office.
- c. The War Department shall be requested to provide Military escort (1) for those groups moving to the segregation center and (2) to the boundary of the evacuated area for those groups moving from the segregation center.

COBY

1. Total persons answering non-affirmatively to question 28 (Form 504-A), refusing to register, requesting repatriation - and their immediate families

2. Housing facilities

	(1)		(2)										
	Total non-		Housing										
	aff.	Total	Total	Sq.ft.	Capacities			Available housing				Sq. ft.	
	ref. to reg.	repat-	sq. ft.	one	6100	6105	6110	Popula-	6100	6105	6110	one	
	repat. &	riates	housing	person	sq. ft.	sq. ft.	sq. ft.	tion	sq.ft.	sq.ft.	sq.ft.	person	
	immediate			1-7-43	per	per	per	5-29-43				5-29-43	
	families			person	person	person	person						
Total	19,635	6,320	11,245,480	102.7	112,434	107,077	102,212	98,571	13,963	8,526	3,641	114.1	
Central													
Utah	1,992	655	920,490	109.3	9,205	8,768	8,368	7,587	1,618	1,179	781	121.3	
Colorado													
River	1,516	647	1,741,920	98.9	17,419	16,590	15,836	15,985	1,434	606	-	149	109.0
Gila													
River	2,158	752	1,327,960	98.8	13,230	12,647	12,072	12,597	632	50	-	525	106.4
Granada	156	80	825,920	107.3	8,289	7,866	7,508	6,371	1,638	1,495	1,137	129.6	
Heart													
Mountains	1,345	637	1,095,840	99.3	10,958	10,433	9,962	9,856	1,102	577	108	111.2	
Jerome	2,057	1,508	908,480	109.9	9,085	8,652	8,259	8,020	1,065	632	239	113.3	
Manzanar	2,858	358	935,600	95.3	9,356	8,910	8,505	8,700	656	210	-195	107.5	
Winidoka	1,100	317	941,200	98.2	9,412	8,984	8,566	7,833	1,579	1,131	723	120.2	
Rohwer	1,061	623	925,440	109.6	9,254	8,814	8,413	7,842	1,412	972	571	113.0	
Tulelake	5,592	483	1,620,640	107.3	16,206	15,435	14,733	13,780	2,426	1,655	953	117.6	

CONFIDENTIAL

Let. from H.L. Stafford, Director, Hunt, Idaho to D. S. Myer

February 9, 1943

Mr. D. S. Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

The registration program for clearance and for voluntary induction in the army has been inaugurated on the Project, and we felt that you might be interested in some of our preliminary comments.

Immediately upon the return from Denver of our staff members, the Project Director called together an advisory group of the older, more acceptable individuals to discuss with them the objectives of the program. They expressed considerable doubt as to the wisdom of the segregated unit, and raised numerous questions as to the kinds of security which could be developed for their people as a result of enlistment in the army, especially in the light of previous history of discrimination and bad faith which has existed. However, after extensive discussion, there was an expression on the part of this group that they would be willing to assume responsibility for the successful completion of this registration and voluntary enlistment, and would heartily endorse the methods and the objective. Beginning immediately, they assumed responsibility for promoting the registration and answering possible objections which might arise on the Project. A series of meetings was organized, and the general philosophy of enlistment discussed in these forums. On the whole, we are impressed with the favorable response.

Immediately upon return of the Employment Officer from the conference in Washington, the administrative details were worked out, and a crew of interviewers put to work.

Beginning Sunday, February 7, a series of meetings are being held with the Project Director and the commanding officer of the army team, presenting the official announcement and general discussion of the program. On Monday, February 8, registration was begun in Blocks 1 and 2 on the Project. Our schedule at this time calls for approximately 18 working days to clear up the registration. This may, however, need revision in the light of our experience as the registration progresses.

To date, we anticipate no major obstacles in successfully carrying out this program.

We are impressed in our discussions, that one of the most frequently-raised problems has been the failure on the part of the government to take necessary steps to benefit individuals who are in the army, or the parents of individuals who have already enlisted. It seems to us that wherever possible, as a manifestation of the government's good will, that certain problems should have immediate attention through the War Relocation Authority by the proper authorities.

The first relates to the possibility of securing release or hearing on releases from internment or parolee status of those individuals who have sons already enlisted in the armed forces. Two such cases have already come to our attention. Mr. Seichi Hara who has one son who enlisted before the war began, and another son who enlisted from this Project and is now at Camp Savage, Minnesota, is still held on this Project on a parolee status.

Mr. Setsujiro Uno, we understand, has been held in Camp Livingstone, Louisiana, pending a hearing which he is apparently unable to secure. He also has a son in the army. The question is frequently raised that if the government intends to give special recognition to individuals who contribute members of their families to the armed forces, an advance indication of that evidence of good faith would assist materially in breaking down the barrier to voluntary enlistment.

It may be suggested that a status of friendly alien be given to those parents who have sons in the armed forces, as a manifestation of good faith.

A recent request from the commanding officer of the Military Police for the installation of search lights and phones and the manning of the guard towers, indicate that this group is contemplating that at an early time, they will carry out the orders of their headquarters. It would seem to us extremely unfortunate if such an implication of disloyalty and possible danger should occur simultaneously with our efforts to induct men voluntarily into the armed services. Certainly, such action evidencing distrust would bolster the arguments that no status is achieved, nor any additional benefits accrue to the parents or relatives of the boys in the armed forces, and we urge you to call this matter to the attention of the War Department.

One other point we feel should be called to your attention; namely, the matter of alien property laws, which are at present in the process of being strengthened in several states, notably, Washington and Utah. It appears that in these two states, at least, political action is occurring, tending to either establish or strengthen the prohibition against aliens holding property. Many of the older people on this Project feel that if their sons volunteer in the army, they are, in fact, sending their sons to fight for a principle which will, in turn, make it impossible for them to exist, in that if their sons who now hold the property should die, the parents could not inherit and would therefore suffer a severe hardship. We are quite aware of State rights in this matter, but are convinced that the War Department could point out to the various states that in light of the disunity and insecurity which these actions are causing, they are affecting

our total war effort, and as such, the states themselves might be encouraged to discontinue such legislation.

We have raised some of the objections which the residents on the Project have raised with us in the hope of securing action.

Will you take whatever action you see fit on these matters, and we, in turn, will currently report and post you on developments on this program on the Project.

Sincerely,

/s/ H. L. Stafford
Project Director

AIRMAIL

CONFIDENTIAL

Feb. 25, 1943

Mr. Harry L. Stafford
Project Director
Minidoka Relocation Center
Hunt, Idaho

Dear Mr. Stafford:

As requested in your letter of February 10, we are enclosing the names of Minidoka residents appearing on the segregation lists submitted by Gen. DeWitt and on the Class "A" list submitted by the Navy Department. The Navy is preparing a Class "B" list, and names of Minidoka residents appearing on this list will be sent you later.

The FBI reports on parolees are being sent to you as promptly as possible. Due to the press of other work it has been difficult to complete duplication of the reports.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ D. S. Myer

Director

RESTRICTED

March 5, 1943

To: The Director

Subject: Another note on Segregation

I have a feeling that we are very close now to making a decision on the segregation problem, and that I may be able to help it along by a brief summary of some recent developments. Hence this memo.

It seems to me that there are four significant points of view represented among the key people in the Authority. I shall not use names to identify the advocates of these points of view, because it is preferable to let everybody speak for himself. I would say that the four major points of view are about as follows:

① 1. At least one key member of the staff believes that we need no segregation of any kind whatever, and that we do not even need a place such as Moab or Leuppe for segregation of serious trouble-makers. The only step in this direction that he believes we should take is that we should offer all those who have asked for repatriation or expatriation an opportunity voluntarily to move to a separate place with their families, and that Leuppe might be converted into that place. Only repatriates and expatriates who volunteer for such residence would then be moved; no one would be moved to make room for them. No repatriate or expatriate would be moved who didn't want to move. The staff member who takes this position believes, also, that if we adhere to the present policies on isolation of serious trouble-makers, the procedure should be amended to include a hearing before the trouble-maker is isolated.

③ 2. A second point of view, which is held, to my knowledge, by at least three staff members, takes the position that we should segregate serious trouble-makers in some such place as Leuppe or in a unit at one of the present centers. These people feel that no other type of segregation should be undertaken. They are opposed to enforced mass segregation whether of repatriates, parolees, indoctrinated kibel, or those who have answered "no" to question 28 in the military registration. The advocates of this point of view accept, therefore, the present confidential unnumbered Administrative Instruction on this subject. They have, however, two reservations about it, and would like to see changes made in the Instruction to take care of these reservations. First, certainly Moab, and probably also Leuppe, are inappropriate places for the segregation center for trouble-makers -- merely because they are not large enough to accommodate the families of the trouble-makers who may wish to accompany them on a purely voluntary basis. They feel that these serious trouble-makers are such merely because of the special conditions of life in a relocation center and are not

necessarily criminal types, and therefore that there is nothing unfair to the families and children of these people to permit them to accompany them on a voluntary basis. Secondly, they feel that if the segregation center for trouble-makers is to be considered an "isolation" center, and families are not to be permitted to accompany the segregates, then this kind of a center becomes a special kind of jail or penal colony, and if that is to be true of this center, then a hearing should be given to the segregates before decision is made to segregate them.

3. A third point of view accepts completely the present confidential unnumbered administrative Instruction on the subject, and says that serious trouble-makers should be isolated to Moab or Leuppe under existing procedures. It takes the position that families should not be permitted to accompany these segregates because it is unfair to the families and the children. It also favors calling the center an isolation center and regards the place as a special kind of jail, but does not advocate a hearing because holding hearings in these cases will be very unsettling in the centers. This point of view agrees with the two points of view stated above in not advocating any other kind of segregation than isolation of the serious trouble-makers.

4. A fourth point of view is shared by at least two key staff members. This point of view accepts the present confidential unnumbered Administrative Instruction on the isolation of serious trouble-makers. It advocates, however, that in addition to that policy, we establish the policy of separating the pro-Japanese among the evacuees from the pro-Americans. It regards the pro-Japanese as being made up of those who have asked for repatriation or expatriation, those who have answered "no" to question 28 in the current registration, and such others as may fall within this class on the basis of individual investigation. This point of view recognizes that the number to be moved will be many thousand, but believes that we should designate certain centers for each group and proceed to make the necessary moves.

So much has already been written on this subject, and we have had so many discussions, that I know I don't need to summarize any of the pros and cons on any of these four points of view. May I say that I stand with the second point of view stated above. I believe we should terminate Moab as soon as possible. I believe that the families of the serious trouble-makers who are segregated should be given an opportunity to join them. The segregated center should not be considered a penal colony. I regard this type of segregation as being merely an administrative mechanism for skimming off the worst of our law and order enforcement problems and dealing with them in a special way. I would, however, apply the same policies to the center for trouble-makers as to the other centers, with the single possible exception that we may need to adjust the structure of community evacuee government to fit such a center. If we do not permit families to join the segregated trouble-makers, and if we are to continue to call

that center an isolation center, then I believe we should work out some method of granting a hearing to those who are to be placed in the trouble-maker center. I am not contending that a hearing is legally necessary in such a case; I am merely stating that I believe we ought to provide a hearing to meet what is sure to be demanded by the evacuees. Since such segregation to such an isolation center, is, in some sense, a "penalty", I believe it is desirable to provide a hearing in these cases. Since obviously the requirement that we hold hearings at the centers before persons are segregated will be very unsettling, we could provide that the hearing is to be held at the segregation center after removal thereto. If the board approves the Project Director's recommendation, the segregatee can remain at the isolation center. If the board disapproves, the segregatee should be given an opportunity to move to some relocation center other than the one from which he was moved.

You will recall that the decision to call this center an isolation center was made after I had reviewed the proposed Instruction. I would have given you a memorandum on the subject before initialing the Instruction if I had known of the proposal to change the designation. The present Instruction indicates that decision will later be made as to whether families are to be permitted to accompany the segregates if they want to do so.

One final point: if the final decision made is in accord with any of the first three points of view summarized above, I believe we should promptly begin the preparation of a statement indicating why we do not propose to segregate all those who answer "no" to question 28. Nearly everybody who hears about those negative answers promptly assumes that mass segregation is required. That will be the assumption of the newspapers and the assumption of the Senate Military Affairs Committee. If we are not to take that action, we must be prepared with a cogent summary of our reasons.

I understand that we shall know the final results of the registration shortly after March 10. If I may make a further suggestion it would be that you call together a small group of the key staff members for staff discussion of this problem as soon as the final figures are available, looking toward an early decision -- unless your decision has already been made.

Solicitor

CONFIDENTIAL

Mar. 12, 1943

Mr. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

From time to time we have discussed whether it would be desirable to segregate the disloyal from the loyal at relocation centers. As you know, I have approved of the purposes of those who have advocated segregation, even though I have not always agreed with the several methods and plans that have been proposed. I have also held the opinion that segregation is but a partial answer to our problem even though the benefits are as great as the advocates anticipate.

It is my judgment that the objective of a program of segregation should be to remove the restrictions from those who are cleared by the segregation process and thereby restore fully to the loyal group those rights which are enjoyed by the rest of the public. Restrictions were placed upon the group as a whole because it contained disloyal elements. Remove the disloyal elements and the need for restrictions disappears.

Most of the plans advocated thus far have been based in too large part on certain assumptions. For example, it has been assumed that certain categories of people -- Kibei, aliens, old bachelors, parolees, repatriates, to name a few -- contain the dangerous elements, although few people seem to agree on the same set of categories. We now know from preliminary analysis of the results of registration, that segregation on a categorical basis would not have accomplished the purposes hoped for. We would have picked up most of the undesirables, no doubt; but along with them we would have picked up many loyal people while leaving behind some disloyal among the Nisei. However, the results of the registration at last give us a basis for forming judgments as to an individual person's loyalty that may be reasonably sound.

As you know from our many conversations, it is my considered opinion that segregation of the disloyal without offering complete compensatory benefits to the loyal would result in something very close to disaster. All evacuees, loyal as well as disloyal would look upon such action as tightening of governmental restrictions upon a whole racial group; and so would the public. It could serve only to intensify those anxieties and fears which have led steadily to deterioration of the faith of the evacuees in America. How far this deterioration has gone is perhaps indicated in a comparison of registration figures in Hawaii and in relocation centers. It is time to take positive steps to reverse an obvious trend.

Segregation, D. S. Myer

-2-

I am attaching a copy of a letter which I am sending to Secretary Stimson and which in your absence I have discussed briefly with Colonel Scobey.. The plan I call "C" represents my ideas of a kind of a policy the War Department and the War Relocation Authority must jointly pursue if we are to meet with any sort of success in rehabilitating the Japanese-Americans who have been in the government's custody for almost a year.

The carrying out of Plan C would require the closest kind of collaboration between the War Department, the War Relocation Authority, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Department of Justice. The War Relocation Authority is quite willing to leave it to the War Department, ONI, and the Justice Department, including the FBI, to determine who should be segregated and placed under closer surveillance in internment camps and who should be permitted free movement, or restricted movement, as outlined in Plan C. We should, of course, offer every possible assistance. Perhaps the board established to clear citizens for war work in relation to the registration program would be the proper body to handle this assignment.

As I visualize the operation of the plan, two kinds of centers would be required after segregation has been completed: One kind for people of questionable loyalty who must be held for the duration of the war with Japan; another kind for those who, though cleared by the screening process, cannot immediately relocate but should. It would be my hope that only a few of this second kind of center would be necessary after a little while. I would recommend that the first kind of center be operated either by the War Department or the Department of Justice.

The program envisioned in Plan C will take some little time to develop. In the interim period it will be necessary for the War Relocation Authority to continue its small scale program of segregating known trouble makers and subversives in order that relocation center administration may continue on somewhat of an even keel as we look forward to a more positive program.

Recently you offered to provide to us (1) a list of the subversives who were discovered during residence in assembly centers, with dockets, (2) a list of trouble makers in assembly centers, with dockets, and (3) a list of G-2 cases, with dockets. You have furnished us the lists but not with the dockets on these categories of people. It would be very helpful if these dockets could be furnished us. Among these cases there must be many who should be removed from the relocation centers while the program contemplated in Plan C is getting under way.

Meanwhile, we are arranging for the use of the Indian Service boarding school at Leupp, Arizona, as an isolation center. The CCC Camp at Moab is now full.

Sincerely,

/s/ D. S. Myer

Director

CONFIDENTIAL
AIRMAIL

Seq
PS
April 26, 1943

Philip M. Glick, Solicitor
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
17th and Eye Streets, N. W.

Washington, D. C.

Dear Phil:

I have been thinking about Plan C. It certainly has obvious advantages and it makes one feel that WRA, in presenting it, is attempting to do everything possible to right what may perhaps have been some wrongs. Incidentally, I think the method of presentation is admirable.

But I think one underlying assumption, on which to a great extent all of Plan C is based, ought to have further consideration. That assumption is that the danger of invasion has receded.

Now I recognize that whether the danger of invasion has increased or has receded is primarily for the determination of the Army rather than WRA. Nevertheless, the Army, if it comes to the conclusion that such danger has lessened, will do so as a result of having been prodded to it by WRA. Then if an invasion should occur, not only will the Army be subjected to vicious criticism, but so will WRA; and it is fair to assume that if such a thing happens WRA's influence with the Army will thereby be reduced to zero. It will thereafter be practically impossible for WRA to get support or cooperation from the Army for anything. In addition, WRA and the Army together will be thoroughly discredited in the eyes of Congress and the public.

You and I are admittedly not military experts. Therefore we ought not to delve into military matters. But to the extent that only common sense and good judgment are involved, we may properly have opinions and reach conclusions concerning the non-military phases of problems which are primarily military in nature. That far, any of us may justifiably go. We are not professional diplomats either--but that ought not to prevent us from coming to a fairly trustworthy decision as to whether or not the Pope will make a peace move. We are not radio experts--but that should not prevent us from coming to a fairly trustworthy decision as to whether or not Japan will propagandize in Central America via the radio. In the same way, one does not need to be a military expert in order for the following to be considered valid possibilities:

The United States will be bombing Japan again.

The United States will be bombing Japan more frequently

as time goes on.

Japan will be attempting^{to}/work out retaliatory methods.

Airplanes have been vastly improved in design since the beginning of the war, and they are now far more powerful, have far greater fuel capacity, and are capable of far greater speed and longer range.

Further improvements are being made and will continue to be made in airplane construction.

The Japanese people will demand retaliation against the United States.

Japan will make every attempt to bomb United States territory, kill United States civilians, destroy United States objectives.

There is every probability that the United States will gradually become more and more successful against Japan.

As that process continues Japan will find it necessary to take greater risks and try more dangerous and bolder tactics.

Attempts will be made to land Japanese saboteurs; suicide squads will attack United States objectives; some of the members of those squads, instead of being killed, will land safely.

I don't think that anyone who has lived through the last two or three years will be willing to brand any of the foregoing as fantastic or even as anything to be disregarded as a very practical possibility. And if that is so, how much has the situation changed? How much safer are we today than we were the day after December 7, 1941--irrespective of how safe we were six months ago?

Finally, if the foregoing has any validity at all, how safe is Plan C? And how safe will the evacuees be under Plan C?

I realize that Plan C has been pulled and tugged along over such a distance that it will be hard for anyone who has assisted in that process to stop and review the whole situation objectively, anew, and doubly hard for such a one to reverse himself. Yet any administrator, it seems to me, always has the obligation of reconsidering a situation in the light of changed circumstances, and taking an entirely different tack if the changed circumstances call for it.

Plan C is attractive partially because of its boldness; but by the same token, it certainly seems today to be fraught with risk--risk which could endanger the whole structure of WRA, the acceptability to the Army of future proposals by WRA, and even the confidence of the people in the wisdom and dependability of the Army officials, if any substantial part of the foregoing statements come true.

Edgar Bernhard

-3-

If one needs to think twice on most things, as I think you will agree one does, one needs to think six times about Plan C. And the basic assumption on which Plan C appears to have been built, that the risk of invasion has now receded, being unacceptable to me--so is Plan C.

Sincerely,

/s/ Edgar

Edgar Bernhard
Principal Attorney

CONFIDENTIAL

June 10, 1943

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

In your note of May 31 you inquire whether recommendation of Secretary Stimson in regard to aline Japanese is being considered now. I assume that you have in mind some recommendations that I made to Secretary Stimson in my letter of March 11. The matter is under consideration, but Secretary Stimson feels, however, that the next step in our program should be the starting of the segregation process in which we would separate people who are requesting repatriation and who wish to be Japanese rather than Americans, into centers separate from those who wish to live in the United States. Now that we have reduced the population in the 10 centers, I think we will be in a position to start this separation within the next few weeks. It certainly does not look feasible at the moment to suggest any immediate moves in regard to returning evacuees to the West Coast area from which they were evacuated. However, the matter of reestablishment of Selective Service procedures as it relates to those of military age of Japanese ancestry is now under consideration, and in my judgment is urgent. This is probably one of the keystones in the whole problem of re-establishment of citizenship rights for the group of Japanese-American citizens and it is an important element in the whole relocation program.

I discussed this phase of the problem with Mr. McCloy during the past week and again urged that Selective Service procedure be re-established for all eligible American citizens of Japanese ancestry at the earliest possible date.

Sincerely,

/s/ D. S. Myer
Director

May 31, 1943

Dear Mr. Myer:

I would appreciate your letting me know if Secretary Stimson's recommendation on the alien Japanese is being considered now?

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Eleanor Roosevelt

June 24, 43 FS

Mr. John J. McCloy

Attention: Colonel Wm. P. Scobey

June 25, 1943

Dear Mr. McCloy:

For your information I wish to present the four major reasons we have selected Tule Lake for a segregation center. (1)

~~From~~ Our analysis ^{indicates} ~~it would seem~~ that some 15,000 to 16,000 people will be involved in the segregation program when the job is completed. We do not wish to use two centers for the purpose of segregation and, therefore, our choice is limited to ^{our centers of largest capacity. These are} Tule Lake, Poston, and Gila River. There are excellent reasons at this time for not using a center in Arizona for this purpose. Public feeling in that State against Japanese Americans is rising to a new pitch and it would be unwise to provide new fuel to those persons who are now stirring up trouble.

Of the 15,000 to 16,000 people to be considered for segregation, approximately one-third are now residents at Tule Lake Center. Choice of this center ~~therefore~~ lessens greatly the administrative problem involved ^{effectuating the} ~~in double moves~~ ^{which are necessary in order} necessary to make space available for segregation purposes.

Since the segregation center will be in use for the duration of the war, we must have facilities there to provide work opportunities. The agricultural layout at Tule Lake offers our best outlet for employment ⁱⁿ other than ~~the~~ housekeeping work. ^{program} many of the upstate group, for example, have an agricultural background.

Lastly, Tule Lake is not well situated for purposes of relocation. Our success with ^{individual} relocation has been ^{much} greater ^{from} in those ^{centers} areas lying to the East of the evacuated zones where the ^{public} atmosphere is more friendly to the evacuees and ~~there is no need to provide military escorts.~~ ^{for these persons who leave the center} By the process of elimination it would seem from the point of view of the War Relocation Authority that there really is no alternative to Tule Lake as a possible site for a segregation center ^{if we are to utilize only those now} ~~considering the facilities~~ available to us.

Sincerely yours, Director

D. S. Myers

Summed the residents with
such tight restrictions.

Segregation File

July 9, 1943

To: John H. Provinse

From: Solon T. Kimball

The Committee which you asked to review present policy in terms of its applicability to the segregation center has examined the Administrative Instruction and prepared a list of questions to which thought should be given. We have included questions on such subjects as health, education, subsistence, not because we believe any change will be made in the present policy but because we believe that during the process of interviewing, those who will go to segregation centers will ask questions on these subjects. It is our belief that if definite answers can be given that, for example, the same quality and quantity of food will be supplied to the segregation center, it will do much to alleviate insecurity. Administrative Instructions not mentioned were of a routine character and would apply. The questions which we believe need to be considered by the Committee working on segregation follow: We have offered recommendations to many questions.

Administrative Instruction No. 8. - Will there be a project newspaper and if so will it consist of an English edition with Japanese translation or a Japanese language newspaper with or without English translation? If the latter will there be censorship and what circulation outside the center will be permitted? Will there be a public relations program and reports officer?

Recommendation - We believe this Instruction should be revised to permit issuance of a Japanese newspaper and to provide means to determine the contents. We would recommend no circulation outside the center of the Japanese section. Reports officer will be concerned primarily with documentation and public relations.

Administrative Instruction No. 10 - If changes are made in Administrative Instruction No. 27 comparable changes will need to be made in this Instruction.

Administrative Instruction No. 14. - Will there be an agricultural program and if so will production be for the exclusive use of the center or may surpluses be shipped elsewhere? What will be the effect of shipping excess production from other centers to this center? What additional security measures will be needed for those who work on farm land or other projects outside the center area? Will it be necessary for armed guards to accompany such work groups?

Recommendation - If feasible, there should be an agricultural program and the present Instruction apply in toto.

Administrative Instruction No. 17. - If the basic organization is changed and functions added or deleted the present cost accounting system will need to be modified and should be examined in that light.

Administrative Instruction No. 22. - Shall present leave regulations apply to this center. What difference if any will be made between aliens and citizens and between those who are in the segregation center as the result of their desire to accompany relatives and not because of request for repatriation, expatriation or negative answer to question 28? Specifically, will there be opportunities for individuals to continue higher education, to take seasonal employment, to permanently relocate and to visit other centers for legitimate purposes.

Recommendation - Certainly, for those who have voluntarily entered the segregation center there should be no change of leave regulations.

Administrative Instruction No. 23 - Will the present educational program continue? If so will policy be modified to permit Japanese

language school after regular hours? Will evacuee teachers continue to be employed in the schools?

Recommendation - The educational program should continue as now organized. Evacuee teachers will be used if properly qualified to meet administrative standards. Japanese language schools should be permitted after school hours and conducted with expense to the government.

Administrative Instruction No. 26. - Will cooperative consumer enterprises continue? If not what arrangements will be made to supply the essentials? Can segregees continue to order from mail houses?

Recommendation - Recognizing all the difficulties, consumer cooperatives seem most desirable.

Administrative Instruction No. 27. - (1) Will employment continue to be voluntary?

(2) What rates of compensation shall apply?

(3) Should employment programs provide for training and advancement?

(4) What is the status of the Fair Practices Committee, the Merit Rating Board and the order of merit?

(5) Shall employment compensation continue?

(6) Shall clothing allowances remain the same?

(7) Will policy governing work outside the center continue?

Recommendations - (1) Yes

(2) The same as present

(3) Yes

(4) Some procedure for adjustment of labor grievances is needed.

(5) Yes

(6) Yes

(7) Yes

Administrative Instruction No. 28. - Will the exercise of absentee voting rights continue to be given "wide publicity"?

Recommendation - No.

Administrative Instruction No. 32. - Will the present religious policy continue?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 33. - Will the same food regulations apply here as at other centers, specifically in regard to quantity and quality?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction 34. - Will the present policy on Community Government continue and if not what type of formalized administration - segregation relations will be established?

Recommendation - An Instruction should be issued providing for the establishment of a representative advisory council.

Administrative Instruction No. 35. - Will public assistance grants and clothing allowances remain the same?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 43. - Will the same visiting regulations apply, specifically can soldiers visit relatives and friends and can evacuees from other centers visit?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 44 - Will there be an industrial enterprises program?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 45. - Are we going to allow citizens who are children of segregationists to go out on indefinite leave and will we give assistance grants? What policy will be followed in regard to families of soldiers?

Recommendation - Yes - same as present.

Administrative Instruction No. 46. - Will segregees be given the right to visit relatives in other centers who are sick or for the purpose of attending funerals? Will WRA pay expenses?

Recommendation - Yes. Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 49. - What policy will govern the entrance voluntarily of persons into a segregation center to reside with relatives or friends subsequent to the original segregation?

Recommendation - Present policy adequate.

Administrative Instruction No. 52. - Will adequate legal service for segregees continue to apply?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 54. - Will the health program continue as now organized?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 55. - Will the Federal Social Security Act apply?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 56. - Will the documentation program continue?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 57. - What modifications will be necessary in project reporting?

Administrative Instruction No. 58. - What security measures are necessary for segregees permitted to travel?

Administrative Instruction No. 73. - Will a supervised Community Activities program continue? Present policy emphasizes American-type activities. Can the emphasis now be placed on Japanese-type activities?

Recommendation - The present Community Activities program should continue with the removal of restrains on voluntary

Japanese-type activities.

Administrative Instruction No. 77. - Will the WRA continue to assist segregees and others with property problems?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 78. - Will policy on storage and transportation of goods continue?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 79. - Will compensation for injury, etc., apply?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administration Instruction No. 83. - (1) Will a WRA organized and directed segregee police system be established?

(2) If not will internal security problems be met through employment of additional officers or will the Army assume responsibility for both internal and external security?

Recommendation - (1) No.

(2) Employment of additional police officers.

Administrative Instruction No. 85. - If provision for a Judicial Commission is withdrawn will the Project Director exercise disciplinary authority? In the terms of the new conditions what new offenses should be defined such as contraband? What instructions will be issued to the Project Director to guide him in the handling of crime or security problems to ensure that he contacts the proper Federal or State agency having jurisdiction?

Administrative Instruction No. 87.- Will the present policy on vocational training continue to have applicability especially for those who are American citizens?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 94. - Will present policy on work clothing continue?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 95. - Will the same procedure for sending troublemakers to Leupp continue?

Administrative Instruction No. 96. - Will we recognize our responsibility to American citizens in relocation guidance?

Recommendation - Yes.

Administrative Instruction No. 97. - Will it be necessary to prepare an additional list of prohibited contraband articles?

General:

In addition to the questions which arise concerning present policy there are also other questions which will need to be decided. It may be necessary to issue Administrative Instructions covering several such points. The Committee listed the following points:

1. Will there be censorship of incoming and outgoing mail?
2. Will there be construction of a prisoner-of-war fence around the exterior boundaries of the inhabited area?
3. Will movement be restricted to the center or permitted within the area?
4. Will the present administrative organization continue and will the same people who are now at the center to be selected as a segregation center be employed for operating the segregation center?
5. What additional forms will be needed and which ones will be discontinued?
- 6/ What will be the relations of the Spanish Consul?
7. Will Shinto practices be permitted?

8/5/43
Office of the Director

JUL 14 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Segregation

Memorandum for All Project Directors:

A teletype was sent to you yesterday announcing the meeting to be held at Denver, Colorado, July 26 and 27, to discuss the program and procedures of segregation. It was requested that project directors, assistant directors in charge of community management, project attorneys, and project reports officers, plan to attend the meeting. The place of the meeting in Denver will be announced later.

Tule Lake Relocation Center has been designated as the segregation center.

Actual movements to the Tule Lake Center, and the transfer (from the Tule Lake Center) of the persons eligible for leave and not to be segregated, will commence in September, and probably extend well into October. Final schedules have not been set as yet. Representatives from the field have been called in to assist the Washington staff in developing plans, schedules, and procedures. This work is under way at the present time. However, since the military authorities, the railroads, and possibly others are participating in the movements, outside agreements must be made before the plan is complete. When the plan is agreed upon, it must go forward on schedule when actual operations begin.

The War Department has agreed to take full responsibility for handling the movements of the evacuees from center to center. Their responsibility will begin when the evacuees are placed on the trains and will end when the evacuees reach their new center of residence.

An Administrative Instruction is now ready to be issued, and an operations handbook is in preparation. The following suggestions, however, are some things that you should start to work on immediately, because such interviewing and paper work as may be necessary should be completed by August 20, except for Tule Lake. (Tule Lake September 10.) The plan is to segregate without hearing, the persons mentioned in paragraph numbered 1, below and, after hearing, the disloyal among the persons mentioned in paragraph numbered 2, below. Subsequently, we shall segregate all others who are denied leave clearance.

1. Reconcile as quickly as possible the project records of repatriates and expatriates (who have not retracted their request prior to July 1, 1943) with the Washington record and determine definitely, in accordance with Administrative Instruction 65, the desires of any members of families who

FILE COPY

65.430

may be listed as requesting repatriation on the basis of the statement of the head of the family instead of their own request. The status of minor members of the family should not stand on the statement of the head of the family alone. A check list of repatriates will be mailed in a few days.

2. Prepare to interview all those who gave a "no" answer to question 28 on the registration, or refused to register, or left blank the answer to that question, and did not change their answer to an unqualified "yes" prior to July 1, 1943. The purposes of these interviews will be to determine that the person really expresses loyalty to Japan rather than to the United States. An outline of procedure for conducting the interviews is being prepared.
3. Order and have on hand lumber and other materials necessary for crating the household effects (both in storage or in the evacuee barracks) for those persons or families who are to be transferred from your project.
4. Your records regarding housing locations should be checked and brought to complete accuracy. If need be, you may find it desirable to prohibit any evacuee moving between barrack locations after August 1 or 15. You may find it desirable or necessary to have the block managers or others conduct a housing survey by blocks. You will have to know on September 1 the exact location of all persons who are to be moved to the Tule Lake Center -- or to other relocation centers from the Tule Lake Center.
5. A review should be made of the individual record files of all repatriates, expatriates, and the persons mentioned in paragraph numbered 2, above. These files should be brought into current condition and be made easily available on short notice. They should contain all pertinent and known information regarding the individual and his family. Individual and collective data forms, such as the Family Record Cards, the Forms WRA 26, the registration forms, earnings records, leave and compensatory time records, etc., should be current and available in such a way that they can be quickly obtained for transmittal to another location.
6. The housing situation at Heart Mountain, Granada, Central Utah, Minidoka, Jerome and Rohwer must be reviewed with the object in mind of accommodating the greatest possible number of persons. Where barracks are being released at these projects because schools are completed, these barracks should be conditioned for evacuee residence. Likewise any barracks, warehouses or other buildings not now being used for an essential function, should be conditioned for evacuee residence. Plans for these six projects should contemplate housing a number that will approximate the highest number of evacuees that have ever been in residence.

FILE COPY

In all of this moving, there is certain to be confusion. But if we are fully prepared when the time for action arrives, the amount of the confusion should be considerably less. It is appreciated that the adjustments required by this program will be very great, and it will be essential to work closely with the representatives of the evacuees and give them the fullest information available so that the greatest possible degree of co-operation will be forthcoming from the residents of your center.

Sincerely,

D. S. Myer
Director

cc: Mr. Pitts
Mr. Cozens
Mr. Whitaker
Mr. Collier, Washington
Mr. Collier, Chicago

EMRowalt:slg
7-14-43

*{ suggestions of Elsie, Stanley,
Barbara & Barrows included.*

SLR

FILE COPY

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington

July 15, 1943

Office of the Director

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum for All Project Directors:

Attached is an advance copy of the Administrative Instruction on segregation. In sending this to you, I wish to make several comments which I think are extremely pertinent to the success of the program.

Many difficult social problems are bound to arise in connection with the carrying out of the segregation program. It would be impossible to foresee all of them but a few may be mentioned here.

Explanation of the Nature of the Segregation Program. The persons to be segregated consist of people who prefer to be Japanese; that is, those who favor Japan in the present war and who wish to go to Japan now or when the war is over. Because of this, they are to be segregated from persons who look to the United States as their country and their home. The segregation center is very definitely not a punishment center, nor is it a place for trouble-makers. Leupp is our isolation center for those purposes.

It is most important that the function of the segregation center be made clear to both segregees and non-segregees. Residents of the centers are much more likely to cooperate with the program when they understand its nature and it is made clear to them that the program is in no sense a punitive measure.

Time for Farewells. It is essential that adequate time be allowed all segregees for such social matters as parting calls and farewell parties. Such parting formalities are most important to Japanese, and a recognition of their social value will do much to reduce the social shock of large-scale segregation.

Use of Evacuee Leadership. In making arrangement for segregation, including interviews, the services of leaders among the repatriates should be enlisted. The use of such leadership will go far in making segregation a voluntary movement.

Problems of non-Segregees. In addition to the welfare problems of broken families, there is likely to be a considerable amount of resentment of the whole process by non-segregees unless they have a fair idea of the nature of the program. Care must be made not to let any blame for segregation fall on evacuee leaders, translators or go-betweens of the non-segregree population.

Problems Concerning Incoming People from the Proposed Segregation Center. In the course of the past year, the residents of each center have developed a social solidarity and local pride. Furthermore, they often have derogatory opinions of residents of other centers. For these reasons we may expect antagonism to be shown toward the newcomers. Special efforts should be made to overcome local prejudices in regard to the new arrivals.

Special Problems of the Segregation Center. The segregation center itself presents some special problems. The most important, and potentially the most serious, is that of the non-segregates who must be moved out of the center. These are the people who have retained faith in America even after evacuation, even after registration. The prospect of the segregation of their friends and a long train trip in hot coaches, under military guard, could easily be the last straw. For some, registration was "too much"; for many, another move may be "too much". For these reasons great care must be taken to explain to the people the whys and wherefores of segregation, and of course the alternative of voluntary relocation outside a relocation center should be stressed. Even more than with the other groups the active cooperation of leaders among the non-segregate group must be enlisted to make the move acceptable and, if possible, desirable, as a means of gaining a better future for themselves and for their children.

The project director of the proposed segregation center should be prepared for some opposition to the idea of moving on the part of these people. To physically force them to move would be to turn them into potential segregates and so defeat the whole purpose of the segregation program. If a crisis arises, the project director should do all in his power to gain the assistance of evacuee leadership. The services of the Community Analyst might prove useful in this situation.

A Note on Information. In addition to the regular channels of newspaper publicity and announcements through block managers, certain other means of communication should be used.

1. An official statement of the aims and procedures of segregation should be written in English and in Japanese and signed by the project director. Copies of this signed official document should be posted prominently in each block dining hall by the block manager. Such an authoritative statement will carry more weight than a newspaper announcement. It is also more uniform and reliable than trusting to the varying versions that will be given by block managers in their oral announcements. Suggested material for this use will be made available to project directors at the time of the Denver Conference.
2. Provision should be made to check back and make sure that ordinary residents really have heard or read and correctly understood the announcements. Special efforts should be made to track down and refute rumors concerning the program.
3. Exact information on the nature of the segregation center and how it will differ from the other relocation centers should be given. Also the distinction between the segregation center and Leupp should be made clear.
4. Especial care should be taken to ensure a uniform understanding of all aspects of the segregation program, not only by the top administrative staff at the project, but also by all other staff members, especially the school teachers.

Sincerely,

/s/ D. S. Myer

Director

Attachment

AIR MAIL

July 20, 1943

Mr. Elmer L. Shirrell
Relocation Supervisor
226 West Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, Illinois

*Also:
Vernon Kennedy
Kansas City, Missouri*

Dear Mr. Shirrell:

In preparation for the segregation program due to start in September it is necessary to get as much information to evacuees interested in relocation as possible. As soon as the segregation center has been announced you will probably be asked to focus all your job offers to that center giving priority over all other centers.

Our plans call for Harold James of this office to be in charge on the segregation center of the relocation team composed of representatives of each of the main relocation offices. He will arrive there early in August.

In order to conduct an intensive educational campaign it will be necessary to provide the relocation team and the project newspapers with specific information regarding relocation opportunities in various parts of the country. I would suggest, therefore, that you prepare a series of concise articles on employment opportunities in your area, keeping in mind the type of people whom we will have to relocate. Use the Fule Lake occupational classification summary as a guide in pointing your stories for specific groups.

For example, it would seem to me that you would have a series of at least three agricultural stories as follows:

- (1) Truck farmers
- (2) Poultry
- (3) Green houses and nurseries.

In addition to the stories you prepare for use in the project newspapers you may find it desirable to list certain additional points for guidance of the team members. In other words, listing points would not be general newspaper stories. In addition to these agriculture items, you will undoubtedly want to prepare similar articles outlining relocation possibilities in various communities or employment in specific industries.

FILE COPY


- 2 -

I would like to discuss this with you on Friday, July 25. I will be in Chicago that day.

Very truly yours,

Donald R. Sabin
Assistant Chief
Employment Division

DRSabin:mg



FILE COPY

75
Jul. 16, 1943

Brig. Gen. B. M. Bryan
Provost Marshal General
War Department Was
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Bryan:

In accordance with your request when Colonel Erle M. Wilson, Liaison Officer, Mr. E. M. Rowalt, Deputy Director, and Mr. M. E. Pitts, Field Assistant Director, visited you recently, there will be set forth in this letter a few suggestions which have come to our attention in planning the movements of persons of Japanese ancestry from one relocation center to another to accomplish segregation.

There is attached a rough draft of a Manual of Evacuee Operations which the War Relocation Authority has been working on for its use in these transfer operations. Most of the material was prepared from the viewpoint that WRA would carry the entire responsibility. The Manual will be rewritten, however, in accordance with our present understanding with the War Department; namely, that the Army will assume full responsibility for all train operations.

The War Relocation Authority will assemble the evacuees for each train trip and see that the entrainment is complete. The Army will assume responsibility at the point of departure and will have complete authority during the trip until the point of destination is reached. This will include provisions for mess operations, feeding, medical care, and the furnishing of all supplies, with the exceptions noted in this letter.

Your attention is directed to Section VIII of the Manual, headed "Train Operations," and Exhibit XI, regarding feeding operations. These two sections cover the planning that the War Relocation Authority

had done up to the time the more satisfactory arrangement was made with the Army. It is thought that you might possibly obtain some suggestions from this material. Also in Section VII, "Plan of Operation," beginning on page 43 and continuing through page 49, there are certain suggestions regarding the responsibility of the project medical directors and the train doctor.

In the initial movement of the evacuees from the Assembly Centers to the Relocation Centers, the U. S. Public Health Service, cooperating with the Western Defense Command, handled the medical requirements. Generally speaking these medical requirements were about as follows: For each train, one doctor and a minimum of two nurses (at least one female) for a train with a normal number of sick persons and children. Persons who were ill or infirm, but not too ill or too infirm to travel were provided with tourist sleeping accommodations. Sleeping accommodations were provided for persons of 65 years of age, and over, who appeared infirm, women with young babies up to age 18 months, and women in the period of pregnancy beyond three months. In certain other cases where recovery was under way, the evacuees were moved at the time of the assembly center movements, but it is not the War Relocation Authority's intention to move these people until they are well. In the instance of women advanced in the period of pregnancy, those beyond six months will be requested to remain ⁱⁿ the center until two months after the baby is born. The medical director for the War Relocation Authority will advise the project medical directors of the criteria to be followed in determining what persons will require sleeping accommodations and each such person will receive a certificate from the project medical director stating that he or she should have sleeping accommodations.

The Washington office of the War Relocation Authority will advise you not less than ten days in advance of the number of such sleeping accommodations to be required for each specific trip. A general overall estimate will be made as of August 25.

The movement of entire families of necessity brings up the question of infant feeding, and each project medical director of a center where the train originates will prepare and deliver to the train doctor a list of all infants on that particular trip who should receive special formulas of one kind or another, such as SMA, Dextro-maltose, etc., so that the train doctor and the nurses will be adequately informed as to the requirements of each child for that particular trip. If it is so requested, the War Relocation Authority will also provide the supplies ~~required~~ of these special formulas and baby foods for each trip. The project medical director will also supply the train doctor with specific facts about each case of infirmity on each specific train trip.

A suggestion which might be found of help in train operations in regard to infant feeding would be to organize in each car two or three car-mothers who might work under the general direction of the nurses in helping prepare the baby formulas, and in taking care of routine items which are always present in the care of infants. It is believed that you will find the women most willing to cooperate in such a manner. It will be necessary to keep hot water in the kitchen cars or diners at all times in order to prepare mixed formulas or to provide warm water for upset stomachs.

It is our understanding that the Army and the War Department will provide all first aid supplies and equipment necessary, with the exception of those which specifically apply to the care of women and infants. In other words, it is our understanding that the normal requirements of iodine, bandages, laxatives, and such simple drugs and medicines as would be required for an emergency will be provided by the Army. Such items of equipment as may be required for persons who are in the tourist sleeping accommodations, or require special drugs, will be supplied by the War Relocation Authority at the center at the point of origin of the trip. In other words, bed pans, baby bottles, special medicines required by particular individuals, and things of that nature will be provided by the War Relocation Authority. If the Army wishes to provide some equipment and supplies which this letter indicates the War Relocation Authority can supply, we should be advised at an early date because planning operations must, of necessity, start immediately for some of the trips.

In regard to the mess operations, it is our understanding that the Army may call upon each train load for five or ten evacuees to assist in the mess operations. The Army will provide all food, all mess sergeants and cooks, all utilities, all equipment, make all arrangements for kitchen cars, and provisioning of the kitchen cars, and the War Relocation Authority will not be called upon to provide anything in regard to normal feeding operations. The rations should include milk to drink for children, oranges that can be juiced for infants, and vegetables such as beets, spinach, peas, etc., that can be pureed en route after cooking. Attention is called to the fact that there

will be a large number of children on the train and if provisions could be made whereby an apple, an orange, or a piece of chocolate might be obtained between meals during the long runs, it would be of considerable assistance in helping maintain the uneasy and unsettled nerves of youngsters who won't understand what is going on.

In regard to the handling of the evacuees en route, it would be appreciated if the War Relocation Authority could be advised at an early date whether or not those persons coming from Tule Lake to the other relocation centers will be permitted to detrain at periodic intervals when the train stops for servicing, in order to stretch their legs and get a breath of fresh air. We would recommend such a procedure after leaving the restricted area in the Western Defense Command.

It is presumed that each train guard commander will announce on the train certain rules and regulations that fit the specific movement. We should appreciate being supplied with some information as to the general requirements of these regulations for the purpose of acquainting the evacuees with them before entrainment and in that way perhaps make your guard operations better understood.

✓ The War Relocation Authority will have on each trip a representative of the Director who will act in a liaison capacity with the train guard commander. Each such representative of the Director will be informed that the Army is in complete charge of the operation. This representative will cooperate with the military train guard commander and render such assistance as he can.

At the time of entrainment, the project director at the dispatching center will provide the train guard commander with a route list of persons on that specific trip. In the "Remarks" column space is provided

for noting items which might be relevant during the course of the trip. Important medical facts should be entered in that space. At the point of destination the train guard commander will turn over the route list to the receiving project director.

The War Relocation Authority has, of course, complete confidence in the military authorities and knows that no unnecessary restrictions will be imposed. Attention is directed to the fact that the moving of women and children, particularly children of young ages, requires a different set of regulations from that which would ordinarily be present if only mature male prisoners of war were being moved.

The War Relocation Authority is calling a meeting of all project directors in Denver on July 26 and 27, to work out final details in regard to procedure for determining what persons are to be segregated and tentative schedules of movements.

The manual material, exhibits, and **schedules** given you to date are but examples and rough guides. Shortly after August 1 you will be provided with copies of our plans of operation which will be made as nearly complete at that time as possible. It will be approximately September 1 before the number of persons to be moved into the segregation center, and from the segregation center will be definitely known.

In planning the train operations, Tule Lake, the segregation center, is, of course, the bottleneck; and we do not see how more than about one train per day can be handled at Tule Lake. Two trains per day may be handled if one train comes in early and leaves later in the day, but a trainless day should be provided either before or after each two-train day.

- Preliminary discussions have been carried on with Mr. A. H. Cass, of the Association of American Railroads, and with Lt. Col. Morris of the Army Transport Corps, as well as with Mr. J. W. Stevenson of the Office of Defense Transportation. They will be familiar with the generalities of our former plan for transfers. Mr. Cass has been informed, however, of the change of plans and that the Army will requisition the equipment and pay for the transportation.

Because of the unavoidable delays in the past two weeks, the War Relocation Authority is suggesting September 10 as the date to begin transfer operations. When these once begin, they should continue regularly until the movement has been completed.

Because of changes recently determined upon in our processing procedures, the estimated numbers shown on the schedules and exhibit material which you have are in excess by several thousand of those who will be actually moved during September and October. A rough estimate at the present date indicates that the movement now contemplated will be between 30 to 35 train loads.

Shortly after the first of August there will be designated by the War Relocation Authority one person who will carry on contacts with your office and with the War Relocation Authority centers so as to coordinate all train movements and details relating to these movements. An operation of this nature will of necessity require considerable cooperation on the part of both the War Relocation Authority and the Army. We shall endeavor to coordinate our activities in such a manner as to facilitate that cooperation. As soon as fuller and more definite information is available, you will be advised.

Sincerely,

/s/ D. S. Myer

Director

Letter from Dillon Myer
Sept. 2, 1943

Mr. Ralph P. Merritt
Manzanar, California

Dear Mr. Merritt:

In his letter of August 19 to the Solicitor, Mr. Saks asked whether authority would be granted to project directors to refuse transfer of segregants to Tule Lake in two types of cases - one involving aged parents whose children do not want to go to Tule Lake but who will do so if the parents must go; and the other involving families in which one young and immature member is a segregant, and the remaining members of the family group similarly do not wish to go to Tule Lake but will do so if the segregant goes. In his answering teletype of August 25, which was prepared after a consultation with my office, the Solicitor stated that exceptions to segregation in hardship cases were to be considered in Washington on an individual basis rather than on the basis of hypothetical cases or general types of cases.

The reason for close control of this policy on the Washington level is this: we have set up certain standards governing the segregation of evacuees; presumptions of disloyalty attach to persons in certain categories. Leaving segregants such as Mr. Saks described - segregants who are presumably disloyal - behind in the relocation centers involves a delicate balance of individual and family welfare on the one hand against the considerations which motivated the whole segregation program on the other. We feel that we must move cautiously and surely in granting exceptions.

I trust that you will feel free to submit some individual cases of the types Mr. Saks describes if you feel in your own mind that the hardship involved warrants the granting of exceptions. At the same time you might indicate the number of similar cases involved and the variance in the factual situations presented by them. Your recommendations will receive careful consideration.

Sincerely yours,

D. S. Myer

Wash. Files 65.430
Segregation

TT. from Stafford to Myer
Aug. 13, 1943

PAGE 11 OF SEGREGATION MANUAL STATES PROJECT DIRECTOR SHALL DETERMINE WHETHER PERSONS IN CATEGORY 2 ARE LOYAL TO JAPAN AND APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE THEM FOR SEGREGATION ACCORDINGLY. PAGE 6 OF PRINTED PAMPHLET ON SEGREGATION DISTRIBUTED TO EVACUEES STATES THAT THOSE WHO SIGN STATEMENT OF LOYALTY WILL BE RECLASSIFIED IN GROUP #. WE HAVE six individuals who signed LOYALTY STATEMENT BUT WHOSE INTERVIEWS INDICATE THEIR LOYALTY ~~WKKK~~ IS WITH JAPAN. THEY STATE THEY CHANGED ANSWER SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO TO TULE LAKE AND THAT THEY PLAN TO RETURN TO JAPAN AND WERE EVASIVE ON QUESTIONS THAT WOULD INDICATE LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES. WHAT DISPOSITION SHOULD BE MADE OF THESE CASES QUESTION. SHOULD LOYALTY STATEMENT BE ~~ACCEPTED~~ ACCEPTED IF INTERVIEW INDICATES GOOD FAITH OF STATEMENT IS QUESTIONABLE QUESTION.

TT. from Rowalt to Stafford
August 14, 1943

REURTEL AUGUST 13. IF PROJECT DIRECTOR BELIEVE THAT PERSONS IN GROUP 2 ARE LOYAL TO JAPAN AND DISLOYAL TO THE UNITED STATES THEY SHOULD BE SEGREGATED. PROJECT DIRECTOR MUST MAKE THE FINAL DECISION. IF A PERSON IS IN GROUP 2 BECAUSE HE GAVE A NEGATIVE ANSWER TO QUESTION 28 AND DID NOT CHANGE HIS ANSWER PRIOR TO JULY 25 AND IF THAT PERSON NOW EXPRESSES A DESIRE TO CHANGE HIS ANSWER AND SIGN A LOYALTY STATEMENT, PROJECT DIRECTOR MUST EVALUATE THE FACTS AND DETERMINE WHETHER THE PERSON'S LOYALTIES STILL LIE WITH JAPAN. IF THEY DO, HE SHOULD BE SEGREGATED NOT* WITHSTANDING HIS DESIRE TO SIGN THE LOYALTY STATEMENT. A CHANGE OF ANSWER TO QUESTION 28 AFTER JULY 15 SHOULD NOT PREVENT SEGREGATION IF PROJECT DIRECTOR BELIEVES THE CHANGE IS NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH. PLEASE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT A PERSON WHO CHANGED HIS ANSWER TO QUESTION 28 PRIOR TO JULY 15 IS IN GROUP 3 AND MUST BE GIVEN A LEAVE CLEARANCE HEARING RATHER THAN A SEGREGATION HEARING. THESE PERSONS WILL NOT BE SEGREGATED UNLESS THEY ARE DENIED LEAVE CLEARANCE BY THE DIRECTOR.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

October 23, 1943

To Project Directors:

The experience we have had in administering the segregation program and bringing it to a successful conclusion is something which we must apply in solving the remaining problems which the War Relocation Authority and the evacuees face. This report summarizes some of the most important lessons to be learned from our experience with segregation. It points out the difference in our handling of the registration and the segregation programs, and shows that we learned much from the former which we were able to apply in the latter. One of the important points made is that the participation of representative evacuee groups in the segregation program played a major part in its smooth and successful execution. This ought not to be forgotten. I believe that this brief analysis will be helpful in our thinking and planning for problems, such as resettlement, which lie ahead.

Heland Barnow

Acting Director

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
431 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO 5, CALIFORNIA

RT Robinson

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

APR 19 1944

RTA

Transportation

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building, 17th & Eye St., N.W.
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Segregation Program

Exhibit XX has been drawn up by the Transportation Section, to substitute for and to integrate the sections and items concerned with the handling of evacuee personal property, as they are at present outlined and described in Exhibit XIX and in the Manual and supplements thereto. A copy of this Exhibit is attached.

The suggestions contained in the Exhibit XX will be used for the Third Segregation Program, and for the Jerome Project closing in June, except for the movement from Jerome to Rohwer. For this last phase of the transfer a supplement is in preparation, and this will be furnished you as soon as it is completed.

We have communicated with both the Minidoka and Gila River projects, offering them a choice of dates on which it will be possible to move their transferees to Tule Lake. We have requested of them besides a confirmation of date, a breakdown of their groups into full and half-fares and infants, as well as advice on the number, if any, of pullman reservations needed. Upon receipt of their replies we will order rail equipment, arrange for meals enroute and for military permits and escorts. It has been recommended to Mr. Stafford that he move his contingent by rail because of the long haul involved, the possibility of infants and elderly persons in the group, and the other difficulties attendant on a motor transfer.

We propose sending R. A. Walling, Transportation Supervisor at Los Angeles, on April 21 to Jerome and Rohwer to act under the Project Directors as the special representative of the Transportation Division during both the Third Segregation Program and for the subsequent closing of Jerome.

We found in previous movements, particularly at Tule Lake and Manzanar, that when we employed professional loaders under the guidance of Transportation Division representatives, we not only averaged approximately 10,000 pounds more freight per car, but that many causes for possible damage to the property which is being transported were

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Russell T. Robinson

461 MARKET STREET
SAN FRANCISCO 5, CALIFORNIA

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

(Handwritten initials)

Mr. E. B. Whitaker
Project Director
Jerome Relocation Center
War Relocation Authority
Denson, Arkansas

APR 19 1944

Dear Mr. Whitaker:

In keeping with the request of the Director, we will provide you with Exhibit XX suggesting an orderly and uniform method for handling the baggage and household effects of the evacuees under the third segregation program, and for the closing of Jerome. This Exhibit XX has been drawn up to substitute for, and to integrate the sections and items concerned with evacuee property, and its handling, as they are at present described in Exhibit XIX and in the Manual and supplements thereto.

The Director suggested in his letter of April 7th that a representative of the Transportation Section be assigned to Jerome and Rohwer to act under your jurisdiction and that of Mr. Johnson at Rohwer to work out the details involved in handling and moving evacuee property. For this purpose we have delegated Mr. R. A. Walling, Transportation Supervisor at Los Angeles, to assist at both Jerome and Rohwer. A copy of the instructions given to Mr. Walling are attached hereto for your attention.

Mr. Walling will leave Los Angeles for Jerome on April 21st and will bring with him a copy of Exhibit XX as well as a copy of our coastal drayage contract forms. Exhibit XX and supplements thereto are being mimeographed at present and copies will be forwarded to you within the next few days.

We are hopeful that the suggestions made by ourselves will meet with your approval. We will appreciate any comments you care to make which you feel will improve the recommended arrangements. This letter is intended as much for Mr. Johnson at Rohwer as for yourself, and a copy of it is being sent to him.

Sincerely,

Attachment

E. B. Cozens
Assistant Director

cc: Dillon S. Myer
Ray D. Johnston
Russell T. Robinson ✓
S. A. Dunsey

also eliminated. We are, therefore, giving Mr. Walling a copy of our drayage contract form (which is used by the Transportation Section on the Coast for the work in pick-ups and for some attendant warehousing activities connected with forwarding or storing evacuee personal property). This form is to be used by the Project Directors at Jerome and Rohwer to implement, through proper channels, contracts with drayage companies at Little Rock, for assistance in their work.

We propose sending Mr. J. H. Porter, of the Transportation Section at San Francisco, to Granada on April 25, and Mr. H. M. Simons, Transportation Supervisor in Northern California, to Heart Mountain by May 1. Both of these men are being sent to assist in the Third Segregation Program. They will also assist the Project Directors in helping the concerned projects make arrangements for the arrival of evacuee property after the closing of Jerome, but will not, however, wait over for this last movement.

Exhibit XX contains a freight schedule for the Third Segregation Program, which takes into account the estimated amount of property to be moved, the equipment and personnel as well as facilities available at the concerned projects, and the ability of Tule Lake to receive carload shipments without danger of congestion and embargoes.

The other matters referred to in your letter of April 7 are being answered separately. Copies of Exhibit XX, as soon as completed, will be forwarded to all projects concerned.

R. B. Cozzens
Assistant Director

gad/er

4/18/44

cc: S.A.D.

Mr. Robinson ✓