

impossible

W.D.

*1943 ?
1944*

February 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

The Secretary of War directs that you dispatch a telegram to the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah, substantially as follows:

"The Secretary of War directs that you temporarily increase the strength of the 320th MP escort guard company by one repeat one officer and fifty repeat fifty men so that upon request of the project director Tule Lake Relocation Center, Tule Lake, California, a military guard may be established at Camp FWS-3 formerly Biological Survey Camp BF-3, Tule Lake, California. While there is no assurance that the WRA will require this guard, it is desired that the Army be prepared to execute the plan."

William P. Scobey
Colonel, G. S.
Executive

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Memorandum

*This is 1st reference
to segregation*

To: M. S. Eisenhower, Director

Date: 6/5/42

From: Commander K. D. Ringle

Subject: The procedure for segregation of potentially dangerous persons of the Japanese race.

The basic criterion for any such segregation must be a determination on the basis of logic and reason as to whether certain persons or classes of persons should logically be considered potentially dangerous to the internal peace and security of the United States, or to the war effort of the United States. Two such classifications seem apparent. The first are those aliens born in Japan who have retained sufficient of their Japanese ideology and patriotism so that they are in spirit loyal citizens of the Japanese Empire. The second - who may well be children of the first - are those American citizens of Japanese ancestry who have spend sufficient time during their formative years in Japan so that they are in all probability citizens of the Japanese Empire in spirit in spite of their legal American citizenship. It is believed that these two classes once segregated should hold the status of enemy internees. They should be physically separated from the balance of the Japanese and Japanese descendant population; should be guarded both for the protection of the United States and for their own physical protection; should not be allowed employment in private industry or membership in the War Relocation Work Corps; and at the first

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opportunity or at the conclusion of the present war be deported to Japan, and their status as legal residents of United States or as citizens of the United States should be cancelled.

As concrete suggestions as to how such a segregation could be determined and effectively carried out, the following is submitted:

1. Publish openly and genuinely the fact that any person desiring to announce himself as a loyal citizen of Japan may do so without fear or prejudice irrespective of whether or not he holds American citizenship. Solemnly assure such people upon the word of the Government of the United States that they will be accorded the legal status of internees; that if they so desire and opportunity presents they will be exchanged during the period of hostilities for American citizens held by the Japanese Government. Further, assure them in writing, if desirable, that as soon as possible after the conclusion of hostilities they will, unless sooner exchanged, be repatriated to Japan by the United States Government.

2. By a process of registration within assembly and relocation centers, determine the identity, together with the identity of parents, of spouses and dependents of all American citizens of Japanese ancestry who have spent three years or more in Japan since the age of thirteen. If seems desirable or necessary, these lists may be checked against the records of the Federal investigative services including the records kept by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. This second category will include those citizens of Japanese ancestry who in all probability may be considered as potentially dangerous. Parents or guardians of such

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persons are included for the reason that it was these parents or guardians who sent the children originally to Japan to be so educated and so indoctrinated that they are to all intentions and purposes citizens of Japan and subjects of the Emperor thereof. It is in this category that the greatest exercise of judgment must be used. It is in this category that a reversal of the commonly accepted legal procedure must be exercised for according to basic premise it is this category of persons who for the best interests of the United States must be considered guilty unless proven innocent. It is suggested that at each assembly or relocation center boards for the review of such cases be set up. These boards should consist of representatives of the military service, of the Department of Justice, and of the War Relocation Authority. These boards are in no way to be confused with or identified with "loyalty boards" but are to be set up for the express purpose of deciding on the basis of logic and reason and in view of the circumstances in each case as to whether or not the individual is to be considered in the class of potentially dangerous. It is further suggested that these boards can be guided by the following principles:

(a) Family shall not be divided except at their own wish.

(b) Giving due consideration to the predominant position held by the male in Japanese society, the classification of the male should be the primary deciding factor. By this is meant that if a kibel male is married to a nisei female, the family should in all probability be classified as kibel. If the reverse is true and a kibel female is the wife of

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a nisei male, the family should in all probability be considered nisei and therefore not dangerous.

(c) Children below the age of seventeen shall take the classification of the parent or guardian. Children seventeen years of age or above shall be judged on their own merits and given the choice as to whether or not they will accompany the parent or guardian.

Once the above classification has been made, if the facilities of the assembly or relocation center permit, these persons and their families should be segregated and kept separate from the remainder of the evacuees pending the final removal to special internee centers. At this time, their exact status should be carefully explained to them and to the balance of the evacuees and they should then be given the opportunity to file application for a change of classification if they so desire. It is here that the status of guilty until proven innocent is really exercised. It is here that the internee is given the opportunity to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not potentially dangerous. His application for change of status with such supporting facts, statements, and references should again be carefully considered by the reviewing board who should be aided in their review of the case by an investigation into the applicant's background, employment, schooling, references, etc., by the Federal investigative services such as the Military and Naval Intelligence Services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Due consideration should at this time be given by the board to entire family history and background. For example, if there were three sons in the family, only one of whom falls in the kibel class, and the parents have not made repeated voyages to Japan in recent years or have not

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made contributions to Japanese war chest or are not themselves members of suspect organizations, and finally, if the classification of this person as non-dangerous is acceptable to members of the loyal nisei group, this person and his family might well be classed as non-dangerous. The ultimate decision in all cases must, however, be left to the entire discretion of the review board.

The segregation of the alien is more difficult than is the case with the citizen. The lines of classification of potential danger are not so clearly drawn. In general, however, the following should suffice:

(a) Persons who have made repeated voyages to Japan within the last ten years.

(b) Officials of Japanese nationalistic organizations, such as the Japanese Associations, the Japanese Navy League, the Military Virtue Society, the Military Service Men's League, and the like. A list of such associations, with a statement as to whether mere membership in any one is sufficient grounds for suspicion, or whether only the officers are so classified can easily be obtained from Military or Naval Intelligence or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(c) Aliens or in many cases citizens whom the services mentioned above would classify as potentially dangerous.

(d) Parents of kibel.

(e) Any alien who has entered the United States since 1933.

This provision will include students, trade treaty aliens, priests or ministers of religion, and the like. The date 1933 is suggested since

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it was about that time that the Japanese government really embarked on a program of propaganda and nationalistic expansion and aggrandizement, and can with considerable justice be accused of "spotting" agents and representatives in peaceful countries.

The one difficulty with the above procedure is that it requires the original data to be assembled from a variety of sources and offices, and cannot be even approximately obtained from registration. An alternative course of procedure which is perfectly legal due to the status of enemy aliens, is to declare all aliens suspect, and proceed from there through the medium of the review boards as specified in the case of the kibel above. This may be more expeditious in the long run, for it is felt that the review boards can very rapidly classify many if not most of the aliens as non-dangerous by inquiries on the spot. For instance, parents of many if not most of the loyal nisei who have never been out of the country would almost automatically be classed as non-dangerous. The remainder, consisting of those concerning whom there was any doubt whatever in the minds of the boards, could be subject to the more searching method outlined for the kibel.

It may well be that this first classification does not turn out to be sufficiently accurate. Allowance must be made for the fact that some of those originally classified as non-dangerous should be so classified. This would have to be determined by intelligence information gained in the nisei projects. Often the nisei themselves will be the first to so classify a person. Provision must then be made for a review of such

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cases by the board as previously described; the action of the board being final. The possibility of such a reclassification should act as a very strong deterrent upon persons in the nisei projects.

The possibility and desirability of utilizing the advise of members of the loyal nisei group should not be overlooked. They as a group are after all to be judged on the basis of the reputation of the group, and therefore should have some voice in deciding who should be members of the group.

As has been mentioned before, the members of the suspect group should NOT be eligible for enlistment in the work corps. The work corps will in this manner be made to appear more desirable and the service record and discharge will, therefore, carry much more weight. Membership therein will, therefore, serve as some guarantee that the individual was not classed as suspect.

CONFIDENTIAL

US Army

August 23, 1942

WDC
Segu

SUBJECT: Separation of Kibei from Nisei

TO: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, War Department

1. Substantial numbers of persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States have been educated and indoctrinated in Japan during their formative years. While the Japanese word "Kibei" includes any Japanese who has returned to Japan from another country, as used in this letter it is intended to designate that group of American-born Japanese who fall in the class described in the first sentence hereof.

2. The evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast (the west half of Washington and Oregon, all of California and the south half of Arizona) has brought approximately 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry under federal supervision. Of these approximately 70,000 remain in Army hands and 40,000 have been transferred by the Army to War Relocation Authority, an independent civilian agency. There are approximately 127,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States. This means that roughly 17,000 (exclusive of the relatively few in internment camps and in the Army) are not under direct supervision. An estimate based on an examination of the San Pedro (Los Angeles) Port of Entry figures, showing the traffic of Japanese persons in and out of that port, indicates that between one-third and one-quarter of all American-born Japanese fall within the Kibei classification. American-born Japanese number approximately two-thirds of the total Japanese in the United States. This means there are nearly 85,000 American-born, and of these between 20,000 and 30,000 are Kibei. Establishing the proportion of total Japanese both in and out of direct supervision, the conclusion is reached that roughly one-fifth of the Kibei are not under federal supervision. In summary then, based on available figures, there are between 20,000 and 30,000 Kibei in the United States. Of these, on the basis of the roughest estimate, between 4,000 and 6,000 are

not under supervision.

3. Most American-born Japanese are dual citizens. It is legally possible for a dual citizen to forfeit one of the two citizenships he possesses by action showing an election. American-born Japanese who fall within the Kibei classification have, by their action, indicated an intention to bear allegiance to the emperor of Japan. If this proposition can be established, the persons within this classification become enemy aliens, subject to internment.

4. The co-mingling of Kibei indoctrinated in Japan with Nisei is dangerous and tends further to alienate all Nisei by constant exposure to Japanese indoctrination. The presence of substantial numbers of Kibei at large in the interior is a danger to national security. Their presence also renders less tenable the position of Nisei, among whom are doubtless large numbers with a strong desire to be loyal and to demonstrate their loyalty.

5. It is believed feasible to segregate Kibei from Nisei on the basis of the definition indicated in the opening paragraph of this letter, through the following means:

- a. A survey of Immigration and Naturalization Service Port of Entry records, to determine the identity, age and length of stay in Japan of all American-born persons who have been to Japan and returned to the United States. This would be a clerical task.
- b. The use of information obtainable from cooperative Nisei, such information to be applied to the list developed by the survey proposed above. To accomplish this would require the cooperation of War Relocation Authority, into whose custody the Army will have transferred, by October 31, 1942, the remaining Japanese now in its hands.

6. Accordingly, I recommend that the War Department direct the accomplishment of a project designed to accomplish:

- a. Determination of the identity of Kibei through use of appropriate methods along the lines herein suggested.
- b. The separation of all such Kibei under federal supervision from Nisei.
- c. The forfeiture through appropriate legal processes or means of the U. S. citizenship of all such Kibei, to be undertaken in collaboration with the Department of Justice, and their internment for the duration of the war with a view to their repatriation as rapidly as opportunity affords. The proposal to intern would embrace all Kibei, whether or not presently under federal supervision.

/s/ J. E. DeWITT

J. L. DeWITT

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

U.S. War Dept.
Fourth Army Command

8 September 1942

WDC
Seq

SUBJECT: Separation of Kibei from Nisei

TO: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. With reference to my letter August 23, 1942, File 014.31 on the above subject.

2. There is attached three copies of a report of an alien resident of the War Relocation Authority (an independent civilian agency) camp at Manzanar, California, which clearly show a dangerous trend in disloyalty among center residents there, especially the Kibei. The 12th Naval District evaluates the source as reliable and this headquarters estimates the information as reliable and credible.

3. The necessary comingling of all classes of Japanese in accomplishing their evacuation from the Pacific Coast has exposed the second generation Japanese to the danger of complete and irreconcilable alienation by the Japanese indoctrinated "Kibei." The latter, Japanese born in the United States but educated in Japan, are persistently undermining the second generation American educated Japanese, or "Nisei," who are largely American in outlook and education. One method of attack is achieved by pointing out the present comingling of all persons of Japanese ancestry on the same basis and without separation or distinction, regardless of background.

4. The recommendations contained in my letter quoted in Par. 1 above are reiterated and emphasized and the early separation of "Kibei" and "Issei," or alien Japanese, from "Nisei" and the adoption of appropriate steps for the eventual repatriation of segments of the former two classes, is urgently recommended.

J. L. DeWitt
Lt. Gen., U.S.A.
Commanding

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*H. S. Army US War Dept
Fourth Army Command*

October 5, 1942

Seg

SUBJECT: Retention of Japanese Evacuees in War Relocation Projects

TO: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. By the first of November this headquarters will have completed the transfer to the jurisdiction of War Relocation Authority at interior Relocation Projects of approximately 108,000 persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated by the Army from the Pacific Coastal frontier in satisfaction of impelling military necessity. Persons of Japanese ancestry within continental United States now fall into two general groups, namely (a) those under complete Federal supervision now in assembly or relocation centers referred to herein as "evacuees"; and (b) those who are at large, not under Federal supervision or control, referred to herein as "exempt".

2. The relation of all persons of Japanese ancestry within continental United States to the national war effort has not been fully determined. Consideration should now be given to the development of a sound national policy, implemented by adequate organization designed to so define this relation. This definition should insure that these groups will be integrated into the national war effort with maximum overall benefit. With the non-military aspects of this relationship the War Department is not directly concerned.

3. (a) With the removal of Japanese persons from the Pacific Coastal frontier, essentially as a counter-fifth column move, the danger of action in concert by this group along that frontier with a view to impairment of the war effort has been removed.

(b) The development and imposition of appropriate restrictions on dangerous elements among all Japanese whether of the evacuee or exempt classes has not been achieved. While under Army jurisdiction, during the assembly center phase of the evacuation, this was accomplished in part by universal close supervision of the evacuee group.

Having reached the relocation phase of evacuation, the Army no longer exercises interior control over evacuees as jurisdiction is passing from the Army to the War Relocation Authority. Moreover, the problem of imposing appropriate restrictions on segments of the exempt class has never been met.

(c) With reference to the evacuee class there are two vital considerations:

(1) The separation of the more potentially dangerous elements from the remainder (see the two previous communications from this headquarters on that subject, copies inclosed); and

(2) The development of a technique and plan of operation to acquire maximum data about the Japanese as a race with a view to furthering the conduct of actual and psychological warfare against the enemy.

(4. Pending the attainment of these objectives I recommend that the War Department undertake to provide for the retention of the evacuee class in relocation centers as a measure of urgent military necessity.

J. L. DE WITT

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

Commanding

2 incls.

1. Letter dated Aug. 23, 1942 from J. L. DeWitt to Chief of Staff
2. Letter dated Sept. 8, 1942, from J. L. DeWitt to Chief of staff

CONFIDENTIAL

October 7, 1942

Mr. Philip M. Glick
Solicitor
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Phil:

Thanks for your kind letter of September 12, but there were really no grounds for your concern. Your view of how segregation should be accomplished is unquestionably right from the standpoint of justice to the individual. I have been watching the pro-America groups in the Centers fight a losing battle, and have been so concerned to see the official weight of WRA thrown on their side that I have been willing to see segregation by groups, even at the cost of doing an injustice to some people.

However, there is plenty of room for difference of opinion, and I can readily appreciate how you could maintain a different view. It was a good argument, and I hope we may have more of them.

Sincerely,

;s; Davis McEntire

Davis McEntire

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SEGREGATION FILES

US War Dept.
Fourth Army Command

October 9, 1942

SUBJECT: Separation of Kibei from Nisei

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

1. With reference to my letters, dated August 23, 1942, and September 8, 1942, both subject as above, and letter dated October 2, 1942, subject, "Retention of Japanese Evacuees in War Relocation Projects," there is enclosed herewith a report of the Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles, California, dated September 13, 1942, pertaining to certain Japanese at the Manzanar Relocation Project.

2. The attached report is comprehensive. Unquestionably, the rumors attributed to the speakers, if true, are seditious. It discloses that the meeting was one of protest against the social-economic-political position of the evacuees as well as a criticism of the management. The Japanese who made the remarks undoubtedly have been seditious at heart for an extended period, and the meeting furnished an opportunity for the more articulate and less timorous to vent their thoughts.

3. Reports from qualified observers state that the Japanese morale at the Relocation Projects is rapidly deteriorating. The situation, if true, appears to be briefly as follows:

- a. The younger Nisei have exhausted their personal funds and are rapidly becoming dependent upon their elders for monetary allowances. The older Nisei attain a greater family control over their children than was their control prior to evacuation. They are taking advantage of this situation to argue to their children that as Americans they have no rights and must look to Japan for relief from their present situation. The Nisei are said to be despairing of their future.
- b. In the meantime, the Kibei claim to be occupying a very superior position. They assert that if the United States wins the war, they, the Kibei, who alone know Japan, its language and customs, must be at least the minor officials or key personnel in a military government of Japan by the United States. If Japan should win, the Kibei will be the governing officials in this country. According to this theory, the Kibei cannot possibly lose. They need only bide their time. Their attitude is said to be galling to the Nisei.

4. The foregoing facts, if true, indicate the necessity for early action in the segregation of the presumptively good Japanese from the essentially bad Japanese. To leave them together much longer is bound to atrophy what loyalty some of the Japanese (Number unknown) may have had to this country, and perhaps to make them perpetually pro-Japanese. The recommendations contained in my letters of August 23, 1942, September 8, 1942, and October 2, 1942, above referred to, are reiterated.

J. L. DEWitt
Lt. Gen. U.S.A.

Commanding

October 9, 1942

SUBJECT: Separation of Kibei from Nisei

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

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J. L. DEWitt
Lt. Gen. U.S.A.

Commanding

October 30, 1942

US Army

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Dear Mr. Myer:

Dr. Dedrick came in to see me just prior to his return to the West Coast. He has, as you know, been in charge of the Statistical Division of the WCCA and I think you know him rather well. He pictured to me a process of which I had already heard from several sources and which rather alarms me. The substance of his conclusions is that unless a more stringent internal control of the evacuees is exercised, or until a segregation policy is put into effect, there is not only a constant danger that incidents will arise in the Relocation Centers which will finally result in serious disorders, but of a progressive deterioration of the morale of the loyal elements.

The War Department has to be interested in any development which may eventually require the employment of troops; but apart from that unwelcome consideration, the condition, if it exists, constitutes an increasing obstacle to the prompt rehabilitation of the Japanese. Dr. Dedrick, through evidence which comes to him in a number of different forms, is convinced that the influence of the pro-Japanese evacuees is being exerted more and more against the Nisei and the other Japanese whose sympathies lie with this country. The physical proximity in concentrated groups of the parents, who are almost invariably Japanese born, is beginning to have its influence on the younger generation, an influence which before their removal was being dissipated as a result of the association of the younger Japanese with the Caucasians. In some of the camps the Kibei, the parolees and the Issei, combined, seem to be exerting heavy pressure on the Nisei and the others who are well-disposed toward America. The limited restraints which have been

imposed on the Nisei's liberty are sufficient in and of themselves to make the situation difficult, without the more sinister influences. His only solution is segregation, and prompt segregation, because during every week that goes by more of the good applies are being contaminated. He points out that if this tendency is permitted to continue, the problem of rehabilitation will become much more difficult; and if there are ugly incidents in the camps, the job of convincing the American people that the Japanese can be trusted and permitted to distribute themselves throughout the country will be made infinitely greater.

There have been incidents reported by the Caucasian employees of contractors of the theft of metal pipes and appliances, the smuggling of contraband, and other things which indicate that some violence may occur.

I have asked him to talk with Colonel Bendetsen and if it is their view, from the evidence that we have, that these tendencies are apparent, to set the evidence down in the form of a report which I can pass on to you for your more careful consideration. In the meantime, however, since Dr. Dedrick seemed to be so concerned over the matter, I thought it wise to pass his views on to you so that you might be giving the matter some thought.

I am aware that segregation involves substantial complications and it may present construction problems, but I wonder whether arrangements could not be made fairly readily to deal at once with the parolees and the repatriates.

Sincerely,

/s/ J. H. McCloy

Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director

CONFIDENTIAL

SEGREGATION

August 23, 1942 - General DeWitt recommends separation of kibeI from nisei. Defines kibeI as those "educated and indoctrinated in Japan during their formative years" and urges use of port of entry records and nisei informers in determining these. (This essentially the Ringle plan.)

September 9, 1942 - General DeWitt sends Yamasaki report to Chief of Staff and "reiterates and emphasizes" earlier recommendations for the early separation of kibeI and issei from the nisei and asks for repatriation of the two classes.

October 5, 1942 - General DeWitt recommends:

- a) Segregation of the dangerous elements
- b) Technique and plan for procuring data for conduct of actual and psychological warfare.

To achieve these ends recommends the retention of evacuee class in relocation centers "as a measure of urgent military necessity."

October 9, 1942 - General DeWitt comments on kibeI meeting report from Manzanar, urging segregation and stating that morale is deteriorating on relocation centers because: a) nisei becoming economically more dependent on their parents; b) kibeI boasts of becoming Japanese officials in U.S. when Japan wins the war.

October 19, 1942 - General DeWitt recommends against further construction by Army of any buildings on Relocation Centers, whether reimbursable or not. If buildings were used for purposes for which built would now have room for 7,000- 17,000 more evacuees.

October 30, 1942 - McCloy to Myer reporting conversation with Dedrick. Urges early consideration of segregation and "wonders whether arrangements could not be made fairly readily to deal at once with the parolees and the repatriates."

Note - The non-citizen report from Manzanar is the report of Tom Yamasaki, intellectual but intelligent. Dr. Kneier and I spent most of an afternoon with him and Karl Yoneda at Manzanar discussing segregation and related problems. This was before the paper was written but the discussion helped to crystallize my own feelings that some positive measures concerning segregation should be taken. Redfield also talked with Yamasaki later, after which conversation he changed his opinion from pro-segregation to anti- except for repatriates.

Since I have argued for segregation more strongly perhaps than others in W.R.A., I am in agreement with the ends sought both in Gen. DeWitt's and McCloy's letters. I think Gen. DeWitt shows poor grace in his present urgent demand on W.R.A. for solution, and by resort to logic or dialectics one can demolish him pretty easily. Yamasaki's paper, which Gen. DeWitt transmits as a supporting document, lays the groundwork for such demolition. Its second paragraph opens on "the Logic mistake" of urgency of evacuation and military expediency. Is this mistake to be rectified by another action taken as hastily and on the same grounds of expediency? The

Memo for files

Confidential

loyal or near loyal nisei on the relocation centers are much less amenable to pro-Axis influences because of the proximity of a few agitators among them than they are because of the original action which negated their citizenship expectations and subsequent actions which hem them in and curtail them much beyond what appears reasonably necessary to win the war. It is probably not mere accident that Yamasaki's strong impressions and convincing report were formulated at Manzanar, the only relocation area which inherited completely the assembly center background of "close supervision". The Japanizing Gen. DeWitt complains of began not in the relocation centers, as he now rather obliquely suggests, but when he ordered the evacuation, and it has been intensified in the assembly centers and in those relocation centers inside the Western Defense Command where the Army still sees fit to censor, inspect, and control movement.

If and when Col. Bendetsen and Dr. Dedrick collect their information for their report on disloyal activities and Japanization, I strongly urge they be required to visit and report as objectively as they can their observations on relocation centers outside the Western Defense Command and particularly outside of Manzanar. I doubt if any responsible WCCA officials has ever visited a relocation center outside of California.

Most of the above is merely contentious and beside the point. The important thing to consider is whether we want segregation - we have studied it enough that we do not need to feel pushed into it by Gen. DeWitt or Army pressure, and we have already declared for separation out of repatriates and parolees. I do not think our resettlement program will proceed rapidly enough to achieve all that must be done, and I doubt if any educational program can of itself overcome the present resurgence of Japanese culture and values on the projects without eliminating some of the leaders most responsible for the anti-American talk and activity. I think we should begin at once to find a separate place for repatriates, for parolees, and for those others whose activities clearly demonstrate they are interested in sabotaging the war effort. Beyond this, I think the allegiance of the niseis and the loyal kibeis and isseis will be achieved not by closer supervision and restriction, but by sympathetic action taken to reinstate them in the American economy and way of life from which they have so suddenly been cut off. The recapture of Manila would also probably help morale and allegiance.

John H. Provinse

MEMORANDUM

Segreg -

November 3, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

To: Dillon S. Myer, Director
From: Leland Barrows

The attached file of correspondence from the War Department raises substantially two issues: (1) Further construction by the Army on Relocation Centers and (2) Segregation.

CONSTRUCTION

With regard to the first of these points, we obviously have to complete our own survey of barracks' utilization before we can comment finally on General DeWitt's letter of October 19. The General acknowledges that if housing assignments give proper regard to family groups, we have space for only 9,000 additional evacuees. He uses "optimum use" obviously to mean maximum crowding, and on that basis he says there should be space for 17,000 evacuees. Both figures disregard the fact that a good many barracks are being used for schools, churches, and administrative offices and quarters, uses which are obviously essential to the operation of the project and to the welfare of the community.

It is even a moot question whether the Army has provided all the construction agreed to in Section 5, page 3, of the Memorandum of Agreement between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority. This section provides:

"This essential construction will include all facilities necessary to provide the minimum essentials of living, viz., shelter, hospital, mess, sanitary facilities, administration building, housing for relocation staff, post office, store houses, essential refrigeration equipment, and military police housing."

In no case, for example, has the Army's initial construction included sufficient housing for the relocation staff, and I believe it is safe to say that in no place has sufficient provision been made for administrative offices (although it might be argued that the agreement provides for construction of only a single building).

If, without additional construction of some kind, the Hawaiian evacuees are shipped to our present centers, I believe our survey will indicate that it will be necessary to discontinue schools and dispossess administrative personnel, particularly teachers, who are now living in barracks. While our Memorandum of Agreement with the War Department describes schools as "refinements", I doubt that the War Department would like publicly to take responsibility for forcing the discontinuance of schools in centers.

In view of General DeWitt's attitude, I suggest that we ask the War Department to procure the supplies and equipment necessary for the construction of schools and administrative quarters which have been authorized recently by the W.P.B. If we can complete the construction of such buildings in time, we should be able to release enough barracks space to take care of the Hawaiian evacuees. Personally, I would like to leave the Army out of all further construction, but would like very much to have active cooperation from the Corps of Engineers in procuring necessary construction materials. (Incidentally, I think we are receiving such cooperation in a number of places, including San Francisco.) It would actually be better for us to secure the schools and administrative quarters we have planned than to secure additional barracks construction. Therefore, I would rather secure some commitments from the War Department in Washington as to the purchase of construction materials than try to argue with General DeWitt about building more barracks. This is all dependent, of course, upon the information developed by our own survey of barracks utilization.

Segregation

On the general question of segregation and the determination of whether, when, and how it shall be initiated, I think we must argue that it cannot be separated from all the other social and psychological aspects of the "relocation, maintenance, and supervision" of the evacuee population. I think we should flatly oppose the specific suggestion that all evacuees be held in Relocation Centers until a program of segregation has been completed.

General DeWitt's several proposals on this subject nowhere include a sound formula or guide to the selection of dangerous, pro-Axis or un-American evacuees. The long report from the anonymous block leader at Manzanar, which is evidently presented in support of General DeWitt's recommendations, is typical of the contradictions and confusions which are involved in the question of segregation. A large part of the document, for example, points to the Issei as dangerous, yet the author is himself presumably an Issei, and he mentions that there are other Issei who are loyal and who should be given what I suppose might be called "honorary citizenship" when the segregation program is initiated. He also points to the Kibei, and in that respect he is in agreement with a number of observers, but both he and General DeWitt are careful to qualify their complaint about the Kibei by indicating they mean only those individuals who have been indoctrinated with a pro-Japanese point of view. In fact, a careful reading of all these documents indicates that sound administration of a program of segregation would require the examination of individuals through the medium of loyalty boards or some other administrative device competent to separate the good from the bad.

Both the report on Doctor Dedrick's conversation with Assistant Secretary McCloy and the document from Manzanar indicate the necessity of evaluating gossip, rumor, complaints, letters, and even reports of a formal character as thoroughly and scientifically as possible. We already have built up enough of a file of documents from Relocation Centers to support a variety of positions with regard to handling the evacuees. We know, for example, that the trouble at Manzanar arose from a complex of conditions and not merely from the insidious work

of the pro-Axis members of the community. The block leader's report sent in by General DeWitt undoubtedly throws light on the situation but it must be read in relation to a great deal of other evidence which we are in a better position to accumulate and evaluate than is the Army.

At best, segregation is a negative approach to the problems outlined in these documents. If we are to retain the full loyalty of those evacuees who, as General DeWitt says, have "a strong desire to be loyal and to demonstrate their loyalty", we must take a much more positive stand. We must provide decent family housing (not merely "optimum" housing which disregards family groups); we must provide adequate schools; a reasonable opportunity for religious worship and community activities; and most important of all, for the permanent return of loyal evacuees to normal life. If we do these positive things, I doubt that segregation of any, except those who desire repatriation, would be necessary. If we do not do these positive things, I think there is grave danger that further moving of people from Center to Center on an arbitrary basis (and remember that any segregation such as has been proposed will involve breaking up families and severing of community ties of all kinds) will embitter the entire population almost beyond hope. People and communities are too complex to be disposed of on any such simple categorical basis as "Issei", "Nisei", and "Kibei". Really, the only segregation I favor is that arising through the release of loyal evacuees from Centers.

LELAND BARROWS

Attachments
LBarrows:OD

CONFIDENTIAL

November 6, 1942

To: The Director

From: Philip M. Glick

Subject: A Reexamination of the Proposal to Establish a
Separate Center for Segregated Evacuees

It has occurred to me several times during the last few weeks that recent developments put a new light on a question we have been discussing for some time -- the proposal to segregate certain evacuees.

You will remember that the original proposal, as outlined by Commander Ringle, called for segregation of the kibe and of certain other defined groups. I don't need to recall here our reasons for not following that recommendation. The principal reason was that we nearly all felt it was unfair to condemn people by categories in the absence of evidence in individual cases. Personally I still feel that way, very strongly.

Segregation of individuals, on the basis of evidence available in the individual case, was felt to be impractical because we had neither the time nor the facilities for making the necessary investigations to accumulate the necessary evidence.

Since the foregoing decisions were made the leave regulations have been published and the administrative instruction to implement the leave regulations is now being mimeographed. Under the leave regulations we shall secure, on the application for leave and in the project investigation record, considerable information for indefinite leave we shall be checking each applicant with the Department of Justice. That Department will check not only the records of FBI but also the records of Military and Naval Intelligence.

Still further, the Administrative Instruction on the leave regulations provides for securing advance leave clearance for all evacuees as rapidly as possible. Under the advance leave clearance procedure we shall be checking with the Department of Justice all evacuees, even before they have asked for indefinite leave. It is perfectly possible, therefore, that within the next few months we shall know specifically the names of the individual evacuees to whom we shall want to deny an indefinite leave if applied for, on the ground that free movement of the evacuee throughout the United States will endanger internal security.

When we deny an evacuee an indefinite leave or an advance leave clearance, we shall be stating for the record that we believe the particular evacuee is dangerous to the internal

Center for Segregated Evacuees

-2-

security of the United States. It seems to me
evitably raise the question whether he isn't

~~_____~~ I want to raise the question, therefore, whether the action that we shall take in denying indefinite leave or advance leave clearance to any evacuee will not inevitably suggest the necessity for establishing a separate place where such persons can live and work. (1)

[I want to raise the further question whether we should not try to get the Army to agree to administer the special center to be set aside for such segregated evacuees. I don't believe there will be a large number of evacuees that will fall in this group, and it would certainly simplify our administrative problem if we did not have to provide a separate center for them and did not have to determine what modifications in our administrative policies and procedures will be needed for administration of such a center. (2)

There is also a legal reason for asking the Army to administer the center for segregated evacuees. In the case of the aliens we shall not have much litigation trouble for those who are denied indefinite leave or advance leave clearance. In the case of the citizens, however, we shall be in this dilemma. If the evidence is very strong it will presumably lead to a reference of the case to the United States Attorney for the institution of a criminal prosecution. If the evidence falls short of justifying such a prosecution, it would seem that we shall necessarily have a rather weak case for justifying continued detention. The courts will, however, be much more reluctant to upset such continued detention where it is exercised by the Army than where it is exercised by a civilian agency.

Consider, for example, the case of the five or six evacuees who made speeches at the kibel meeting at Manzanar a few months ago. The Justice Department may very well indicate strongly that it believes indefinite leave should be denied to those speakers, or to some of them. In my opinion, however, it will not be easy to win a case for continued detention merely on the basis of that evidence. It will be easier if the Army is doing the detaining.

Center for Segregated Evacuees

-3-

There is further point to which I should like to call attention. If we can announce that we have completed an individual examination of all the evacuees and have segregated all those that are dangerous to internal security, I should think we would greatly improve the willingness of the public to accept the evacuees to whom we are willing to give indefinite leave. This will be the overwhelming majority. A short time thereafter we may even be able to dispense entirely with military police protection -- at least for the six relocation centers other than Tule Lake, Manzanar, Gila River, and Colorado River. We can even ask for the revocation of the proclamations establishing these six relocation centers as military areas and completely terminate all military jurisdiction over these areas. As evacuees leave the centers we could first close the four centers in Military Area No. 1 and move the evacuees to the remaining centers. We will then be in a position in which we can make the relocation centers genuinely normal American communities. Evacuees would then have the alternative of cooperating willingly with the activities being carried on in the relocation centers or of moving away if they didn't like those activities. We shall then really be able to say: "If you don't like living and working here under these conditions, you are free to go".

3

Solicitor

November 20, 1942

Mr. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I want to take this opportunity to comment on the suggestion of segregating the undesirables now in relocation centers from the other evacuees -- a question raised in recent memoranda from Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt and in your conversations with Dr. Dedrick of Wartime Civil Control Administration.

In one sense, segregation is already getting under way under our new indefinite leave program which became effective on October 1. As it looks now, a steadily increasing number of evacuees with clean records will be leaving the relocation centers in the months ahead to take their places in the economic life of the country in interior areas where they will again be exposed to the Americanizing influences largely lacking in relocation centers. In a second sense, a certain though inadequate degree of segregation was accomplished through the internment of suspected aliens immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Unquestionably, however, there is remaining in the centers a group of indeterminate size whose sympathies are clearly with Japan. There are the applicants for repatriation, for example, who, though they do not now appear to be a particular source of trouble, have made their choice and should be segregated from the others. This we hope to accomplish, provided facilities can be obtained and a practical program can be worked out.

We are of the opinion that, except for the applicants for repatriation, segregation should be undertaken on the basis of the individual records of the evacuees -- records in the possession of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the other intelligence services, and our own internal security officers. Some months ago we considered seriously a proposal to segregate arbitrarily those whose schooling in their impressionable years was taken in Japan. We have abandoned this idea in favor of approaching the problem on a basis of individual records even though a large program of segregation should appear to be desirable as we gain more experience.

I am inclined to believe, however, that segregation on a large scale will not become necessary. As the leave program becomes more widely understood and moves into full swing, I feel confident that many of the tensions and anxieties which are evident in relocation centers will gradually ease and perhaps be largely eliminated. I do not mean, of course, that we may expect the disloyal suddenly to turn loyal, but that we may expect, through our leave policy and program, to create an atmosphere much less favorable to the activities and influences of those who are pro-Japan in their thoughts.

I am returning to you General DeWitt's memoranda.

Sincerely,

E. M. Rowalt

Acting Director

Enclosure

Mr. John J. McCloy ✓
Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I appreciate your note of November 18 attaching a clipping with comments by John C. Bennett, which was given to Secretary Stimson by J. Franklin Carter.

As you know, I am in full sympathy with the point of view presented by Mr. Bennett, and we are moving just as fast as we can toward the relocation of people outside the centers who we feel are loyal. We are formulating a program of segregation of disloyal people and agitators, but I must say this phase of it is not so simple in view of the fact that the real agitators are not easy to locate.

Thanks again for sending along this item.

Sincerely,

D. S. Myer

Director

DSMyer:VHC
12-14-42

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Confidential

Dec. 15, 1942

Mr. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

In reply to your letter of November 25 regarding the segregation of Japanese evacuees, I would like to request that General DeWitt submit to me the evidence he has concerning the Kibei elements who are intimidating the loyal elements in several centers and, specifically, names of Kibei and any tangible information that will assist us in identifying agitators of any type, whether they be Kibei or not.

In the meantime I would like to request that the War Department assign from one to three well-qualified people to inspect a location at Alexandria, Louisiana, in cooperation with one or two people from the War Relocation Authority, having in mind its suitability for housing evacuees. I particularly want to know how much critical materials will be required, how quickly this place can be put into condition, how it should best be handled, and if there are possibilities for expanding the buildings for additional barracks without enlarging the central facilities, such as plumbing, sewer lines, etc.

Also, I would like very much the assistance of the War Department in locating two or three CCC camps for temporary use, if needed, in the interim period. I have talked with Colonel Scobey about this matter and have asked Colonel Wilson of our office to work with him in trying to locate camp sites.

Sincerely,

/s/ D. S. Myer

Director

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December 15, 1942

My dear Mr. McCloy:

I am inclosing for your information a copy of the letter I have this day dispatched to the Chief of Staff, with inclosures.

In order to successfully accomplish segregation I am convinced that it requires immediate action; that it cannot be deferred pending the construction of additional facilities; that therefore it requires simultaneous execution, central authority and adequate security measures.

Sincerely yours,

J. L. DeWITT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Honorable John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Incl. 1
Ltr. of 12/15/42 to Chief of Staff

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December 30, 1942

Dear Mr. Myer:

Having some appreciation of the difficulties you face in segregating the bad Japanese from the good, I am forwarding the enclosed segregation plan prepared at my request by General DeWitt's Headquarters with the thought that you might find it of help in formulating your segregation procedure. You will note that this plan does not call for the construction of additional facilities. Moreover, it contains a list of some 5600 undesirables who might form the nucleus of the initial segregation.

As a premature disclosure of this or any other segregation plan would be almost certain to have an unfortunate effect in your centers, care should be taken to keep its circulation to a minimum.

Sincerely,

John J. McCloy

Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director
War Relocation Authority
Washington, D. C.

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S E G R E G A T I O N P L A N

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I

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific coastal frontier has resulted in the assembly at ten relocation projects in seven States of approximately 110,000 Japanese. These relocation projects have populations and are located as follows:

<u>RELOCATION PROJECT</u>		<u>PROJECT POPULATION</u>	
<u>Name</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>November 3*</u>	<u>Assigned**</u>
Central Utah	Utah	7,694	8,223
Colorado River	Arizona	17,092	17,391
Gila River	Arizona	13,237	13,391
Granada	Colorado	6,350	7,554
Heart Mountain	Wyoming	9,808	10,954
Jerome	Arkansas	7,660	7,674
Manzanar	California	9,099	10,801
Minidoka	Idaho	7,580	9,467
Rohwer	Arkansas	8,240	8,232
Tule Lake	California	14,445	14,965
TOTAL.....		101,250	108,433
Persons on furlough ***			1,548
TOTAL.....			109,981

* Last Project population report received by WCCA

** Assigned population is the sum of direct evacuation to WRA Projects plus all major transfer movements initiated by the WCCA. Inter-Project transfers by WRA not included.

*** Persons who were released from Assembly Centers on furlough to WRA., i.e., beet field workers, students, etc., without specific Project destination.

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Experience has established that within each of these centers a number of evacuees are militantly pro-Axis in their sympathies and actions. The identity of all of these persons is not yet known. At first the active members of this group were relatively few. Due to a combination of circumstances they have been able to develop an expanding program of alienation, intimidation and obstruction. Unless segregation of this discordant element is accomplished immediately complete alienation will ensue. The inevitable results of complete alienation are manifest. The most tangible and immediate results are (1) increasing necessity for use of troops in maintaining order, and (2) loss of a useful war manpower reservoir.

The recent incidents occurring at the Tule Lake, Colorado River and Manzanar War Relocation Projects serve to emphasize the immediate need for segregation and point to the inevitable consequences of inaction.

The successful accomplishment of a segregation program requires detailed advance planning, coordination and simultaneous execution in all projects. Of prime necessity is the establishment of suitable security measures in order to insure against probable rioting and consequent bloodshed. This in turn will compel the temporary suspension of certain normal project operations in order that the paramount objective can be accommodated.

The urgency of the situation is such that the construction of additional facilities for the establishment of a segregee camp would too long delay initiation of the program. Hence the segregation plan must be so designed as to permit its execution through the use of existing relocation project facilities.

II

LIST OF DEFINITIONS

1. Segregation Plan. The Segregation Plan prescribes the method for the transfer of all relocation center residents whose names appear on the Segregee List to the Segregee Camp. It consists of four basic elements;

- a. The designation of all segregees now resident in each relocation center by name.
- b. The establishment of Parker as the Segregee Camp.
- c. The evacuation to other relocation centers of all non-segregees at Parker.
- d. The transfer to Parker of all segregees.

2. Parker. The term Parker designates the Colorado River War Relocation Project Units 2 and 3, each having an evacuee capacity of 5,000 or an aggregate of 10,000. It does not include Unit Number 1. Parker is the Segregee Camp.

3. Designee List. The Designee List is a specific list by relocation projects containing the name of each evacuee designated for segregation to Parker. It comprises the names of those persons described in Section III, 3, below. The Designee List is attached to this plan as Annex I and will be furnished simultaneously to each Project Control Officer prior to X Date by the Director of Segregation.

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4. Segregee List. The Segregee List is a list by relocation projects specifying all evacuees who are to be transferred from any given relocation project to Parker. It will include not only all designees but also all eligible persons who elect to accompany heads of families who are designees. Project Control Officers will initiate the preparation of project Segregee Lists on X Date using the Designee List as a basis. It will be forwarded in quadruplicate to the Central Control Office.

5. Eligible Persons. Eligible Persons are those members of the immediate families of designees who are family heads and who have the privilege of making an election whether or not to accompany a segregee family head to the Segregee Camp. The remaining members of the immediate family of a segregee family head have no election and will ordinarily accompany a segregee family head irrespective of their desires.

a. Family Head. A designee will be considered a Family Head only when he (or she) is married, widowed, or divorced, and has a spouse and/or children in the project. Single persons, and all persons who are voluntarily separated from their spouse and/or children prior to evacuation or internment will not be considered Family Heads.

b. Immediate Family. The immediate family includes the spouse, all unmarried or unemancipated children and dependent parents. For the purpose of determining eligibility to make an election, the Immediate Family includes the spouse, any unmarried or unemancipated children 16 years of age or over, and dependent parents. A child can be a natural child, an adopted child, a foster child or a ward. Where the mother has an election (viz., where she is not a designee), all children 15 years of age or under, who are not designees, are bound by her election. An Eligible Person is entitled to make an election as to whether or not he will accompany a designee Family Head to Parker.

6. Segregee Party. The Segregee Party is that group of Segregees destined for Parker from any other relocation project. All Segregee Parties will initiate at projects other than Parker. All segregees at Parker will remain there.

7. Evacuee Party. An Evacuee Party is a group of evacuees destined from Parker to any other relocation center, comprising evacuees other than segregees. All Evacuee Parties will originate at Parker.

8. Evacuee Party List. The Evacuee Party List is a list of the names of all persons who are to be evacuated from Parker to other relocation projects. Evacuee Party Lists by project of destination will be prepared at the Central Control Office on the basis of the Parker Block Census. The Evacuee Party Lists will be prepared in quadruplicate. These lists will be prepared separately by the project destination of each Evacuee Party concerned, subdivided into Train Units (viz., not in excess of 500 persons). Their disposition will be as follows: (The Central Control Office will forward one to the project director concerned in each case at destination for his advance information. The remaining three will be forwarded to the Project Control Officer at Parker for disposition by him as Train Unit receipts between himself, the Train Commander and the Project Control Officer at destination.)

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9. Transfer Order. A Transfer Order is an order directing that a specific Segregee Party be moved from another center to Parker, or that an Evacuee Party be moved from Parker to another center.

10. Block Census. The Block Census is a list compiled by an enumeration on a given date of the population of each residential apartment block at Parker. The Block Census will show the names of each resident within the block with the head of each family and the age, sex and relationship (to the head) of each family member indicated. The Block Census will be subdivided into family housing units. It will also show the apartment space occupied by each family. Members of each family who may be temporarily absent on furlough, such as those engaged in sugar beet labor or those at school and for whom space is reserved will be included, but the absence from the family will be noted. The Block Census will be forwarded in triplicate to the Central ~~Office~~ Control Office.

11. Housing Survey. The Housing Survey is a report from each project (other than Parker, but including Colorado River War Relocation Project Unit No. 1) of the unoccupied apartment space which will exist at each project following the transfer to Parker of the Segregee Party. The Housing Survey will show the number and capacity of each vacant apartment. In the case of bachelor apartments or dormitories it will show all available space in that category. In this connection the Segregation Plan will require, wherever necessary, the suspension of certain project activities for the purpose of developing additional apartment space. The Housing Survey prepared and submitted by each project will show separately the evacuee apartment space used for other than evacuee residential purposes, including those apartments occupied by Caucasian personnel. In each case the specific use will be indicated. The Housing Survey will be initiated by each Project Control Officer on X Date. It will be forwarded to the Central Control Office in triplicate.

12. X Date. X Date is the date and hour prescribed by the Director of Segregation on which the Segregation Plan is placed in operation and on which the following events will occur at each project:

- a. Establishment of Military Control.
- b. Stoppage of all communications (other than those approved as essential for segregation operations), including mail, both incoming and outgoing. (Incoming mail on hand at this hour will be distributed).
- c. Suspension of all leaves, furloughs and visiting privileges.
- d. Suspension of all project activities carried on beyond the limits of the project center proper (the center proper is the living area), and such other activities carried on within the center proper as are not required for the maintenance of health and sanitation where their suspension is necessary to establish complete security and to assure Military Control.
- e. The initiation by the Project Control Officer of the preparation of the Segregee List and the Housing Survey.
- f. Preparation of the Block Census at Parker.

13. Train Unit. Each Evacuee Party and each Segregee Party will comprise one or more Train Units. Train Units will be numbered by the Central Control Office consecutively from one, without duplication. Each Train Unit will consist of that section of an Evacuee or Segregee Party which is transported on one train. Normally a Train Unit will

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never exceed five hundred and where practicable will not be less than three hundred.

14. Project Control Officer. The Project Control Officer is designated for each project by the Director of Segregation. He will have full authority over and full responsibility for all project segregation operations other than those aspects of project segregation operations relating to local military control. The senior military officer present at each project during military control will be guided in his actions by the recommendations of the Project Control Officer. Neither the Project Control Officer nor the senior Military officer present may depart from the Segregation Plan without authority from the Director of Segregation. He will keep the project military commander fully advised of the situation. As to military security aspects necessary to the successful accomplishment of the Segregation Plan, the Project Control Officer will be guided by the instructions of the project military commander.

15. Military Control. Military Control is the establishment of complete military policing within each project center. It includes the military policing of all communication facilities, all project utilities, and other vital installations. It also includes the application of any other security measures necessary to the successful accomplishment of the Segregation Plan at each project. It will be initiated simultaneously at all projects on X Date. During Military Control the project military commander will maintain the closest liaison with the Project Control Officer and will keep him informed of the situation.

16. Director of Segregation. The Director of Segregation will be selected jointly by the Secretary of War and the Director, War Relocation Authority. He will have complete authority over all segregation operations including the project military control aspects of segregation operations. If he is a military officer he will be responsible to the Secretary of War. If he is a civilian officer he will be responsible to the Director, War Relocation Authority. In the latter case, his Chief Deputy, who is also selected jointly by the Secretary of War and the Director, War Relocation Authority, will be a military officer. The Director of Segregation is authorized to take whatever steps are necessary to insure the successful accomplishment of the segregation program.

17. Central Control Office. The Central Control Office is established by the Director of Segregation. It is the agency through which he directs all segregation operations. It will be staffed by such numbers of military and civilian personnel as may be necessary to assure successful accomplishment of the segregation program and will be financed from appropriations made available to the Director by action of the Secretary of War and the Director, War Relocation Authority.

III
PLAN OF SEGREGATION

The Segregation Plan contemplates the following steps:

1. That until the initiation of the program at each project on a specified date and time (X Date) absolute secrecy must be maintained.
2. That a Segregate Camp be established in Unit/s 2 and 3 of the

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Colorado River War Relocation Project.

3. That the following Relocation Center residents be segregated and placed in that camp:

a. All evacuees who have indicated their desire to accept repatriation or expatriation to Japan.

b. All parolees (aliens paroled from detention or internment camps) now resident in relocation centers.

c. All evacuees having an evaluated interior security police record during assembly center or relocation center residence. *

d. All evacuees who are listed and evaluated by the Intelligence Services as potentially dangerous and who are not included in the above mentioned categories.

e. Members of the immediate families of listed segregees in groups b, c, and d above where the listed segregee is a family head. Only those eligible family members who elect to accompany the family head will be included.

4. That a Director of Segregation be appointed.

5. That a Central Control Office be established.

6. That Project Control Officers be appointed.

7. That all Project Control Officers and Military Police Commanders at each project be assembled for a conference and instructed in their duties by the Director of Segregation in advance of initiation of Segregation operations.

8. That a Designee List by projects of designated segregees be transmitted to each Project Control Officer.

9. That Project Control Officers develop Segregate Lists.

10. That A Block Census be taken at Parker.

11. That a Housing Survey be made in all projects.

12. That certain project activities presently occupying evacuee housing space be suspended wherever necessary to provide additional apartment space.

13. That during the period of segregation operations certain security measures be established within each project by the military commander, viz., Military Control.

14. That Evacuee Party Lists be prepared by the Central Control Office.

15. That the Central Control Office develop Train Unit schedules and issue Transfer Orders.

16. That all non-segregates (Evacuee Parties) be evacuated from Parker to other projects and that all segregates (Segregate Parties) now in other projects be transferred to Parker.

17. That military escort and U. S. Public Health Service medical escort be provided for all Train Units augmented where necessary by evacuee medical staff.

18. That adequate priorities be accorded the Director of Segregation to insure the availability of sufficient transportation and supplies.

* The War Relocation Authority interior security police records are not now available - to be furnished by War Relocation Authority or added to the Segregate Lists by Project Control Officers at project level.

19. That in connection with military security aspects of projects segregation operations, the Director of Segregation be granted command authority over project military commanders. If the Director of Segregation is a civilian he will exercise this command through a military officer assigned by the War Department to the Central Control Office, as Chief Deputy.

20. That the Secretary of War and the Director of War Relocation Authority, severally, delegate to the Director of Segregation their powers and authority under certain provisions of Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, and Executive Order No. 9102, dated March 13, 1942, respectively, viz., in the case of the Secretary of War, paragraphs 3 and 4 of Executive Order No. 9066, and in the case of the Director, War Relocation Authority, under paragraphs 2 (e) and (f) and 6, Executive Order No. 9102.

21. That the plan will be completed; the Director of Segregation relieved; and the Central Control Office dissolved when the initial segregation contemplated by the Segregate List referred to above has been accomplished. Thereafter the responsibility for all further segregation will revert to the Director, War Relocation Authority.

IV ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Director of Segregation. The Director of Segregation will have complete control of and be responsible for the successful conduct of the segregation program under the authority granted to him by the Secretary of War and the Director, War Relocation Authority, in his letter of appointment, and within the limitation of funds provided for this purpose. His responsibilities and powers will be as defined in the above mentioned letter of appointment. If he is a military officer he will be responsible to the Secretary of War. If he is a civilian officer he will be responsible to the Director, War Relocation Authority. In the latter case his Chief Deputy, who will also be selected jointly by the Secretary of War and the Director, War Relocation Authority, will be a military officer responsible to him.

The Director of Segregation will develop additional apartment space at projects other than Parker by directing the suspension of those projects activities which are occupying facilities originally intended for use as evacuee apartment space. He will base his directives in this regard on the Housing Survey. Immediately upon completion of the Evacuee Party List in the Central Control Office, the Director of Segregation will cause the Train Unit schedule and the corresponding Transfer Orders to be prepared, published and distributed for the information of all concerned.

The Director of Segregation will establish in the Central Control Office a Director of Information, whose function it will be to prepare for issuance appropriate public information releases comprising factual statements of the operation. The first release will be issued on X Date. No agency or official will be authorized to issue any public statements concerning the segregation program other than the Director of Segregation.

2. Project Control Officer. Project Control Officers are appointed by the Director of Segregation. There will be one at each project. At Colorado River War Relocation Project there will be two: one at Unit 1 and one at Parker. During the segregation program, these officers will be responsible for and have complete authority over all phases of segregation operations at the project level. The entire project staff will be subject to his direction and control during this period. If the Project Control Officer is not also the Project Director, the latter will be under his supervision. All project activities, including procurement, supply and administration, will be carried on through normal channels, except as the Project Control Officer (by authority of the Director of Segregation) may from time to time otherwise direct. He will maintain the closest liaison with the military commander and in all matters pertaining to the security aspects of segregation operations, will be guided by the instructions of the military commander.

In addition to such other responsibilities as may be imposed upon him by the Director of Segregation, each Project Control Officer at projects other than Parker, on and after X Date, will become responsible for the following:

- a. Preparation of the Segregee List.
- b. Accomplishment of the Housing Survey.
- c. Preparation of the Project Segregee Party for entrainment with all impediments.
- d. Preparation of the project to receive the Evacuee Party assigned to his project.
- e. On receipt of information as to the size of the Evacuee Party assigned to his project, the immediate communication to the Director of Segregation of data as to any necessary additional supplies and equipment required for the reception and residence of the party.
- f. Forwarding to the Central Control Office medical certificates furnished by U. S. Public Health Service Project Medical Liaison Officers covering the Segregees or Evacuees in each project who will require Pullman accommodations, medical care or special diet. The Segregee Party List and the Block Census forms (see Annexes III and IV) include instructions in this regard.
- g. Acquisition of train kits to accompany each Train Unit departing from his project. Train kits include necessary medical equipment and any other special items for care of women and children en route. The composition of these kits will be as prescribed by the Director of Segregation on recommendation of the U. S. Public Health Service.

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- h. The suspension of all project activities necessary (1) to assure complete security; (2) to establish military control; and (3) to provide such additional evacuee housing space as the Director of Segregation may prescribe.

The Project Control Officer at Parker, on and after X Date, in addition to such other responsibilities as may be imposed upon him by the Director of Segregation, will become responsible for the accomplishment of all activities listed above, other than those set forth in c and d above. In addition he will be responsible for:

- a. A Block Census.
- b. Preparation of each Evacuee Party for entrainment, with all impediments.
- c. Preparation of Parker to receive Segregate Parties transferred from other projects on the schedule prescribed by the Director of Segregation.

Each Project Control Officer will appoint a Transportation Officer whose duty it will be to procure the necessary bus and truck equipment essential for moving Train Unit parties from the project concerned to the railhead, together with their impedimenta, for loading according to schedule.

Where questions arise concerning whether an individual is or is not an eligible person Project Control Officers will place a strict construction on the definition and resolve against eligibility as the emphasis is placed on the segregation of persons whose names appear on the Designee List. In this connection, it will be noted that certain members of the immediate family of Designee family heads have no election and may be subject to compulsory segregation (see Section II, 5). This class of persons is restricted to children, 15 years of age or under. A liberal construction of the definition "Eligible Persons" will result in increasing the number of persons who may be subjected to pressure by Designees. This is not desirable. The minimum reasonable time will be accorded eligible persons in which to make a decision. Persons who fail to make an election within this period will forfeit their right to an election. Once an election has been made it may not be changed.

3. Project Military Commander. Each Project Military Commander will be responsible for the establishment of Military Control from and after X Date at each project. Specifically, Military Control will include, but will not be limited to, the following:

- a. The stoppage of all incoming and outgoing communications including mail, other than those communications made necessary for the operation of the project and the accomplishment of segregation. In this regard, the Project Military Commander and the Project Control Officer will consult with each other, but the decision of the Project Control Officer will be final at the project. Incoming mail on hand on X Date may be delivered.
- b. The suspension of all leaves, furloughs, releases, project visiting and relocation activities.
- c. Maintenance of the closest liaison with the Project Control Officer. In the establishment of military control measures, the Project Military Commander will be guided by the recommendations of the Project Control Officer.

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4. The Commanding General, Services of Supply, War Department. On request of the Director of Segregation, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, War Department, will take the appropriate action to secure necessary transportation priorities to guarantee the scheduled execution of the segregation plan. Due to limited housing space, it is essential that the reciprocating exchanges between projects of Evacuee and Segregate Parties be accomplished according to schedule.

The Commanding General, Services of Supply, will also appropriately instruct the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands concerned to provide the necessary military escorts for each Train Unit as requested by the Director of Segregation. In this connection, he will authorize direct communication between the Director of Segregation and the Service Commanders concerned.

The Commanding General, Services of Supply, will also issue appropriate instructions to the Commanding Officers of the various depots located near the several relocation projects to respond to the requests of the Director of Segregation for any necessary individual barrack equipment (cots, mattresses, blankets, etc.) required for the successful accomplishment of the plan. It is contemplated that this equipment will be returned as soon as an inter-project exchange of such equipment can be accomplished. The Commanding General, Services of Supply, will authorize direct communication between the depot commanders and the Director of Segregation. He will also provide for the issuance of an appropriate priority to the Director of Segregation for this purpose.

To the extent indicated in the letter of authority from the Secretary of War to the Director of Segregation, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, will make all arrangements necessary for the allotment of funds in an appropriated status to the Director of Segregation for expenditure by the Director in the accomplishment of the Segregation Plan.

The Commanding General, Services of Supply, will also assign fiscal and accounting officers to the Director of Segregation.

The Commanding General, Services of Supply, will also assign transportation officers to the Director of Segregation, whose function will be the preparation and development of transportation schedules and the procurement of transportation through the Western Military Bureau, as directed.

5. The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, War Department. In coordination with the Commanding General, Services of Supply, the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, will make available any necessary military personnel which the Service Commanders may be unable to provide, for Train ~~XXXXXX~~ Unit Military escorts.

6. Commanding Generals, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Service Commands. The Commanding General of the Service Commands concerned will provide military escorts for each Train Unit on request of the Director of Segregation. These escorts will be furnished so as to meet the Train Unit schedules. The Commanding Officer of each escort party will act as the Train Commanding Officer. He will be instructed in his duties by the Project Control Officer and will be responsible for the safe conduct of each Train Unit from point of origin to destination. He will give and obtain appropriate receipts. Aboard the train he will coordinate his activities with the Chief of the Medical Escort provided by the U. S. Public Health Service. So far as it is consistent with the maintenance of the security of the Train Unit Party, he will

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provide within the limits of practicability for the comfort of the party. In view of the heavy responsibilities imposed on them in escorting Train Units, the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands concerned will provide for the selection of Train Commanders possessed of mature judgment and experience.

7. The U. S. Public Health Service. The U. S. Public Health Service, through the Senior Surgeons of the various Districts concerned, will provide necessary medical escort for each Train Unit. A U. S. Public Health Service Officer will be assigned to maintain close liaison with each Project Control Officer. The Project Medical Officer thus assigned will be responsible for the issuance of certificates of necessity to cover all those members of each Train Unit who require Pullman accommodations, viz., the aged, the ill and mothers with babes in arms or small children.

Due to the experience gained in the evacuation along the Pacific Coast and the transfer of evacuees from assembly centers to relocation centers, it is contemplated that the Senior Surgeon, District No. 5, U. S. Public Health Service, will coordinate these activities. Direct communication between the Director of Segregation and the Senior Surgeons of the Districts concerned will be authorized by the Surgeon General, U. S. Public Health Service.

The composition of trainkits will be as recommended by the U. S. Public Health Service. Project Medical Officers will requisition the necessary train kits through Project Control Officers.

Wherever necessary, Project Medical Officers will call on the Project Control Officer for augmentation of the medical escort by evacuee medical personnel.

ANNEX I LIST OF DETAINEES

Summary Tabulation

Name of Project	Total Detainees
Central Utah.....	437
Colorado River.....	1,118
Gila River.....	853
Granada.....	292
Heart Mountain.....	507
Jerome.....	294
Manzanar.....	690
Minidoka.....	641
Rohwer.....	412
Tule Lake.....	403
All Projects.....	5,647

Interior security cases of the War Relocation Authority have not been included in this list. The segregation plan contemplates that these will be added by the Control Officer at the project level. All parolees whose names do not appear on the list because they were released subsequent to the compilation of this list, or because a definite project address was not immediately available, will be added to the designee list.

Symbols Used in "Classification" Column

Repatriation.....R	WCCA Subversive.....S
Parolee.....P	WCCA Police.....Gr
Army Intelligence...G-2	