

Rosalie Hankey
August 22, 1943

THREATENED STRIKE OVER REDUCTION IN MESS STAFF

The first really serious trouble over the reduction in employment occurred on the evening of August 19 when Butte Camp was suddenly brought to a high pitch of excitement over a disagreement between the mess-hall supervisors and the Manager of Mess-Hall operations, Mr. Keadle. Although trouble had been brewing since the 17 the first hint that action was imminent came from a conversation with a group of Nisei, who were humorously discussing the prospect of coming starvation. Their information, which proved to be quite correct, was that the difficulty had arisen out of another cut in the mess-hall crews. The mess supervisors had resented the suddenness of the demand and were recommending that the cut be postponed till October 13, when the segregees will leave for Tule Lake. Then with the reduced population, the mess cut would not cause so much hardship. But Keadle, having strict instructions from Washington, was forced to abide by them. A three hour meeting had been held the afternoon of the 19th; the mess supervisors, Bennett, and Keadle were present. No agreement was reached. Keadle said that the cut must go into effect immediately, and the mess supervisors could follow orders or turn in their keys. That evening after dinner ^{several} ~~many~~ turned in their keys. It was said that the people of Block 54 had not even been served dinner. They had to make out as best they could with a little bread and rice. People were seen leaving the mess halls with several loaves of bread under their arms. Mess employees advised them that they might not be fed tomorrow and they did not have to be told twice. As Mr. Currie passed the mess office he observed a mess supervisor thrusting his keys into the very unwilling hands of Mr. Keadle, declaiming loudly: "I have been here since seven o'clock. Here are the keys!" Conjectures as to whether they would get breakfast or not monopolized much of the evacuee conversation that evening. Block meetings were held in many of the mess halls. In one, I was informed, the people decided not to appoint volunteers to do the cooking, since such action would offend the legitimate crew, but instead send a committee to Bennett demanding that he assume the

1. One informant says five supervisors turned in keys.

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responsibility of appointing a new crew. Petitions against the proposed out ~~were~~ ^{had} evidently ~~being~~ ^{been} circulated. One young man, a Nisei, remarked that he had already told his mother and father to sign nothing. "If you want to relocate, don't sign anything people bring around."

With the atmosphere of tension and uneasiness which existed in camp at this time, due to the impending segregation, it was obvious that an aggravation of this difficulty might have very serious consequences. It would seem that the administrative path of wisdom ought to have been directed away from any issues which might furnish a spark to set off any manifestations of open hostility. The great majority of the mess crews were applicants for repatriation. (Estimates range from 60 to 70 per cent with Wolter reported as saying 80 per cent. These individuals, inevitably bound for Tule Lake are reported by unsegregated evacuees as "not giving a darn what happens to the rest of the people in camp." Not influenced by the potential resettlers' necessity of making a good impression or rather avoiding the making of a bad impression on outside public opinion, they might be capable of causing a good deal of trouble. The administration's optimistic plans for wholesale relocation, once the segregation matter is cleared up, might be considerably jeopardized.

Realizing the importance this incident would assume I determined to get a correct sequence of the events which had led up to the difficulty and then discover, if possible, why the mess-supervisors had reacted as they did. To obtain a correct sequence of events was extraordinarily difficult because almost every evacuee (and some of my informants were intelligent, honest men) told a story which differed in some respects. By a comparison of reliable evacuees' statements, some of which are included at the back of this report, and the statements of several members of the administrative staff, I trust that I was able to gain a fairly accurate picture.

The three most important factors responsible for the trouble were firstly, the old and always unfortunate WRA policy of committing itself to a certain

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policy and then changing it. At the end of July the mess supervisors were assured by Keadle that there would be no more cuts in staff unless there was a reduction in the camp population: He purportedly qualified this unwise statement, but none of the mess supervisors recall the qualification.² Naturally, the supervisors having assured their staffs of this fact, did not welcome the prospect of informing them that they had been misinformed and that six to nine people would have to be terminated immediately--without even the customary ten days notice; secondly, the "attitude," the way in which the thing was done, was bitterly resented. Keadle, a fat, stupid, ill-mannered, ex-army quarter-master, was, to begin with, one of the most cordially despised men on the staff. When, after first committing what looked suspiciously like a breach of faith, he brusquely told the supervisors that "they could make the cut or turn in their keys and quit," ^{five} ~~they~~ waited only until the evening meal was over, then turned in their keys. It is not improbable that this rudeness was the chief cause of what Bennett termed, "the difficulty." It certainly received unanimous evacuee sympathy; thirdly, the rapidly approaching segregation may have had considerable influence. In some blocks the mess crews were composed almost entirely of potential segregants. They were indifferent to the amount of trouble their action might cause.

Tracing the course of events has been an extremely difficult task. The Caucasians involved either say nothing or, when they will talk, intentionally or unintentionally give incorrect information. The evacuees either have an axe to grind or are vague in many details.

² Even a Caucasian member of the Employment Division admits Keadle made this statement.

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Most of the following statements have been checked and sometimes re-checked either by Gordon Brown or myself.

On July 26 the Administration received a notification from Washington that according to the investigation made by a certain woman named Cahn the number of employed evacuees was to be considerably reduced. The Administration complied with the request to a certain extent: they made a cut August first, and announced that one or two more cuts would come. (Some divisions received three cuts and some division heads lumped their cuts into two. The Mess Division followed the latter procedure.) However, since the administration felt that it could not possibly function under the complete proposed cut (some divisions received no allotment whatever), they sent a statement to Washington in the middle of August, presenting their own estimate of an absolute minimum number of employees and asking that this number be accepted. Keadle's memorandum for the Mess Division is attached.

On August 1 the 2,400 members of the mess crew were cut to 2080, but two separate informants both reliable men, have told me they heard Keadle promise the supervisors in July that after the August 1 cut there would be no more cuts in personnel unless the population of the camp decreased. Gordon Brown says that if Keadle made this statement he is a fool, for Brown was present at a administrative meeting in July when the necessity for this current cut was fully explained. ~~It is~~ ^{I am fairly} certain that Mr. Keadle made the statement. It is possible he qualified it in a manner which made no impression.

The mess supervisors cooperated fully in the August 1 cut. There was a good deal of grumbling, for the members of mess crews have always considered themselves the hardest working group on the project. However, they took their enforced vacations with fair grace along with all the other terminated individuals.

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Several members of the administrative staff have informed me that Keadle must have known of the current September 1 out as early as July 26. Evidently he put the day of reckoning off as far as possible, perhaps afraid, as some evacuees have hinted, of facing the organized opposition of the mess supervisors. And opposition was growing. Whether Keadle knew it or not, petitions protesting any additional mess hall cuts were being circulated by certain of the mess supervisors. It was at this time (before August 17) that the evacuees conceived the idea of suggesting that the mess crews remain intact till October 13, when segregation was expected. It was pointed out that since so many mess crew members are going to Tule Lake, and the general camp population would be considerably reduced, the matter could be accomplished on October 13 with very little hardship to anyone. I do not know whether any of these ill fated petitions ever reached a member of the administration. I doubt if Bennet knows about them.

At this time most of the members of the administration were up to their ears in work making preparations for segregation. Keadle preserved his sphinx-like silence until August 17, when he sent out notices of another out to the mess supervisors. The implication as far as I can discover, was that these cuts would be effective as of September 1. (Keadle told Brown that he had sent out notices of the coming out on the 8th or 9th of August. In his official report Bennett stated that notice was sent on the 12. None of the large number of evacuees with whom Brown and I have spoken, recalls any such notice at this time. A reliable Caucasian member of the Employment Division says it was the 17th. Since Bennett told several other untruths in his report, one may conclude that both Bennett and Keadle are lying.

On the 18th, the day after the evacuees pay they received their first notification of the out a meeting to explain the need for the out was held in Block 51 in Butte; all of the division heads, Bennett, Wolter, Terry

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and the mess supervisors were present. Only Bennett, Wolter and Terry spoke. Bennett explained the necessity for the cuts, that Washington had allocated so much money and that individuals would either have to be terminated or work without pay. Terry made the suggestion that if the supervisors did not want to terminate anyone it might be possible for all to retain their jobs at reduced salary. ¹ It is reported that the supervisors "just sat there and said nothing." They were asked to speak out and give their opinions but none volunteered. Everyone was still under the impression that the cuts were to be effective Sept. 1. ³ The mess supervisors still had hopes of some compromise. The suggestion that some of the money from the camouflage factory fund be used to pay mess crew salaries was made.

The next morning, August 19, Keadle sent for each of the supervisors and told them that the cut would not go into effect September 1 but August 19. ⁴ Now the supervisors held a meeting among themselves and determined to resist the administrative action. They undoubtedly felt the strength of their group and hoped that by showing a united front they could coerce the administration to cancel the cut. They still had hopes that their suggestion that the cut be postponed until October 13, would be favorably received. There is no doubt that the nepotism, mentioned by Spence, which is so strong in some blocks was also a factor, ^{in this instance} as was the desire of the members of the mess to hold on to their comparatively easy jobs, even if they had to fight for them. On the afternoon of August 19th they met with Keadle and Bennett, and refused to accept the cut. Keadle pronounced his ultimatum in an unnecessarily objectionable manner and the fat was in the fire. As has already been described, the news spread with its usually uncanny speed. One mess crew prepared a makeshift

dinner. Other crews advised the people in the blocks to take home bread,

3. That is the people would be given 10 days notice and though terminated the 21st. would be paid to Sept 1st.

4. And no notice could be given. "It's not in the books" said Keadle, referring to the customary 10 days notice.

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still others decided not to enter the proposed strike. The more inflammable members of the Caucasian staff reacted in an amusing manner. One middle-aged lady wanted to know why "they didn't call in the soldiers." Another group sat on the lawn that evening and watched some army planes pass over the camp. They spread the news, based only on their personal powers of deduction, that the planes had come to "put fear of God into the evacuees." I went to bed and when Gordon Brown, who had just heard the news, tried to get me up, I put off the discussion of the "Mess mess" off till morning.

Some blocks held animated, well-attended meetings that night in an effort to work out a plausible plan of avoiding starvation without hurting too many persons' feelings. Block 63 is reported to have refused to appoint a volunteer crew in order to avoid injuring the mess crew, and decided to demand that the administration assume the responsibility of appointing a completely new crew. The Block Managers were in an uncomfortable position. The administration requested that they secure new mess staffs. They were responsible for seeing that the people in their blocks were fed, come what may. They did not wish to offend either the supervisors or the members of the mess crew. Besides they were annoyed and felt that they should have been forewarned. Here again, the administration was saddling them with an unpleasant responsibility--at the last possible minute.

Several long meetings to which I was not invited were held on Friday and on Saturday morning. Meanwhile the block populations were fed with varying attention. Some had to bring plates to the meals and take their food home. Some got poorly prepared food, and some ate quite as usual. By Saturday afternoon the matter was at least temporarily settled, and the news spread that the danger had passed. Curious to know how the administration had gained its point I interviewed Harry Miyake who had attended all the Friday

Saturday meetings, and Mr. Otani, assistant Central Block Manager of Butte. Twenty of the thirty-two supervisors had agreed to the out, eight had stated that they could not get on with the proposed out and that the administration should appoint new crews, and four were still undecided. In any case, the out was considered accepted and the idea of walkouts abandoned. According to his own account, Miyake begged the supervisors to accept the out and avoid trouble for the sake of women, children, sick people, and those people who were going to stay in camp. He pointed out that the attention of the public was riveted on the camps now that segregation was in process and the publicizing of this mess trouble would be exaggerated and inevitably interpreted against the Japanese, making matters increasingly difficult for individuals who cared to relocate. It is debatable if Miyake's speech was quite as important a factor as he assumes. From two block managers I learned that Wolter had made a very apologetic speech (at least so it was interpreted by the evacuees) and had explained how completely the administration's hands were tied by the Washington orders. He apologized for the suddenness of the order and any hardships it might cause.

It is amusing to note that had the supervisors remained adamant Miyake was prepared to bargain with them on the terms that they would accept the out if Keadle was dismissed. I had known that Keadle was disliked but I had not realized that he was so cordially despised. It is, of course, futile to surmise what might have happened had the controversy been carried to this point. It is not conceivable that Bennett would have given way to the evacuee dictation. It is far more likely that he would have taken advantage of the telephone call he said he received from Phoenix telling him that the news had come through that there was trouble in the camp and asking if they should notify the Military Police to send in the soldiers. How this news got to Phoenix Bennett professes not to know. Perhaps one of the worried

Caucasians phoned relatives of their impending doom. Or perhaps Bennett felt it wise to remind the evacuees of the presence of the soldiers.

The different response which various blocks made to this abortive strike was most interesting. Some mess-halls were completely unaffected, others received usual service at most meals and indifferent service at others. Whether this phenomena was closely connected with the percentage of potential segregees on the mess-hall staffs, I do not know. It is a logical suggestion.

The complete absence of trouble in block 61 was laid to the fact that "the people in this block are sensible and do what the block manager suggests," by one of the mess-hall employees. Several evacuees have remarked that the blocks which are heavily populated with segregees are those where trouble may be expected. "They don't care what happens. They're going out anyway."

Every informant ^{and many "evacuees in the street"} without exception remarked upon the fact that if this matter had been presented politely and with consideration, if an adequate explanation had been promptly made, the trouble would not have arisen. "It was the attitude they took! (the administration, Bennett and Keadle in particular). One intelligent man told me, "the people are getting less and less willing to follow sudden, forceful orders. If they are asked courteously to cooperate, they'll be all right. But it seems to me the tendency to get resentful and sullen when ordered about, is growing all the time."

The fact that there was no noticeable trouble at Canal camp is interesting. However, conditions at Canal are not quite so serene as might be supposed. On my last visit, August 23, I heard many complaints about the difficulty of working with these outs. Mess hall gossip had it that the people in Block 20 were disgusted because so many persons from their block were working in other mess-halls while their own was understaffed. All in

all, it was a confused picture of petty dissatisfaction. There was no indication that any action similar to that of Butte was to be anticipated. The Canal mess group is not supposed to have the "union" feeling existing at Butte.

The second avoidable cause of the difficulty was the dawdling "keep it dark till the last minute" policy followed by Keadle. Had he laid the foundation for the cut by frequent reminders and explanations instead of allowing the mess supervisors and crews to raise their hopes of forestalling the September cut, the resentment would not have risen so high. But anyone acquainted with Keadle will realize that if he does complete some intelligent act it is more ^{than} likely to be an accident.

For the telegram from Washington which necessitated the cut on April 19 instead of September 21, Keadle and Bennett cannot be blamed. But Keadle's rude attitude in explaining the matter might have led to serious trouble and perhaps to some of the internments of which Bennett is so fond, had not Wolter diplomatically smoothed out the difficulty.

It will be very interesting to observe how far Wolter's pacifying policy will carry him and what the eventual results will be. His considerate actions before and during the preparations for segregation have caused several evacuees to remark that if he doesn't watch out he'll be fired for being too ^{nice} ~~much~~ to the Japanese.

Bennett is leaving the 28th of August for a vacation of ten days or two weeks. Wolter has been left in charge of the as yet far from completely settled mess "mess". This is an intelligent action on the part of our Project Director.

It is my opinion that in the temporary solution of this matter the administration was fortunate beyond its deserts. A situation, which might have had serious and tragic consequences for many evacuees, arose out of

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Keadle's carelessness and lack of common courtesy. An ignoramus like the present Head of Mess Management has no place in his position. A soft considerate word, spoken in sufficient time will turn aside a great deal of evacuee wrath. Individuals who possess no spark of courtesy or diplomacy cannot possibly work successfully with the Japanese.

It will also be interesting to note whether the members of the administration will profit by this narrowly avoided difficulty. Tension and unrest will be at a high pitch until October 13 and may grow even higher. Constant watchfulness, slow, considerate administrative behavior, and a frequent dissemination of correct information are the only possible intelligent administrative policies.

These notes represent only a fraction of the persons interviewed. It may be easily understood that some evacuees will not speak at all if they have an idea that their remarks will be repeated.

The notes can, of course, give only a very bare picture of the views of some evacuees. Of more significance are the constant short remarks and the impressions gained by mixing with the people. It is by a comparison of the corroboration or conflicts in many interviews with both Caucasians and evacuees, and a careful weighing of the reliability of the informant and his opportunity to be familiar with what he is talking about that I base my report. Brown and I later compared notes and found that we agreed on all major points. He, through administrative contacts, was able to check points on which I had received conflicting information. On the whole, we found that the evacuees were telling the truth.

It was not possible to interview any mess supervisors. Nishino probably comes closest to giving their point of view. Miyake and the anonymous informant of August 25 are the most accurate.

MIURA**August 20, 1943

Talked to Miura, stating "that I knew I could get the truth from him."

Miura said that it was his understanding that the cut was to come by Sept. 1st. Then suddenly Keadle said they had to cut it down immediately. The mess superintendents said they couldn't do it. Miura implied that the mess superintendents felt sentimental about firing some of the waitresses and female dish washers.

The block managers have begged the supervisors and the employees to work as volunteers today and they'll have a meeting and settle the problem. If the block managers get volunteers from outside the mess hall staff, the staff is afraid they'll keep the volunteers on. The mess hall people will then get mad at the block managers; so they are in a hard position.

Miura added that the administration ought to have a planning board so that they could plan ahead for these matters sensibly.

BILL NISHINO**August 20, 1943 (Works in Huso's office and is frequently invited to Supervisor's club. Attempts to give supervisor's viewpoint.)

"The original 42 to 45 member staff of the mess halls has already been reduced to 40. Then it was again reduced to an average of around 34 to 38 people. At some time in July Keadle made a statement that there would be no further reduction unless the block population were reduced. In these previous reductions the supervisors had all cooperated fully. From an original staff of 2,359, the number had been reduced to 2,096.

"Now they have been told that they must make a reduction as soon as possible and cut the staff to an average of 29. (A statement appeared in the Gila News that the mess staffs must be reduced by Sept. 1.) The supervisors held a meeting at their club and all agreed they could not work with this reduced crew. The supervisors feel that since they relayed Keadle's statement that there would be no reduction to their crews, they will now lose the confidence of the crew if they try to impose this new reduction. I

think that's their key point. I was there when Keadle made this statement. But he couldn't really help it. He made it before the new allocation came in.

"Another thing, segregation is taking place now and they say, "Why have this big shakeup now when about 60 to 70 per cent of the crews are to be segregated. Only two or three out of the block supervisors are to be segregated and they don't want this trouble made for them. They changed the date on them too! They said originally Sept. 1, ^{now} not it is suddenly August 19--they aren't giving them any ten days notice."

HARRY MIYAKE**August 21, 1943

Yesterday the block managers had a meeting. The whole demonstration came from the presentation of the reduction on the number of workers. What happened is this: Mr. Keadle said that he had just got a Washington order that cut down the mess crew. What really caused the misunderstanding was the attitude he used. 'If you don't like it, quit.'

I think it is not the fault of the administration alone here. I think the Washington people who came and made the survey and the appropriation were not capable or didn't have enough information about all the division. One division was left out entirely.

Another thing the evacuees felt that if they showed determination through a written statement that they had unanimously resolved to stick together they could make the administration change its policy.

This reflects the WRA policy of changing its policy too often. There on top of this segregation has had some effect. In some mess halls as high as 70 per cent of the workers belong to the segregation group. And they really don't care how it will be settled. Again in the blocks, some blocks have a heavy percentage of people who are going to be segregated and they don't care to give any cooperation.

The budget ordered by Washington was insufficient and the administration has made their survey and asked for an increased budget. The cut will take place but they asked for 400 more workers from which the mess will get 130.

They had to hurry it up because they found they were in the red. Bennett called in the block managers, supervisors, and the Block Council Chairman and told them that even though they will be terminated they will be paid until September 1st. He said this Tuesday night. Then Thursday they called in the supervisors individually and told them that they couldn't pay up to September 1st. The people to be cut had to be terminated by the 19th.

Keadle now claims he didn't make a promise. The supervisors blamed Keadle. A few feel that Bennett is responsible too.

I met with the supervisors and the block managers yesterday and pleaded with the supervisors that if we have a work stoppage in the mess hall it will create a stoppage in the entire camp. The outside people is just waiting for such an occasion. They will not consider our reasons. So it is going to be headache in either case. We are licked as far as the labor problem is concerned. So today we voted and 20 supervisors said they would be willing to make the cut. Eight said they couldn't operate with the cut and that they will wait till a crew is organized, four were neutral.

I think the people are changing. More and more they are against orders. If they were asked, they would be ^{glad} glad to do it but when they are forced to do a thing, they are getting more and more obstinate.

They have even cancelled the old agreement that if a person is terminated they will be paid till the end of the month. In one or two blocks the people in the mess crews and the people in the blocks didn't have a good relationship. Some of the blocks think that this is a good thing and tried to kick all the crew out. Last night the supervisors explained the facts to a block meeting. I asked the block managers to request the supervisors and crew to remain at work for the sake of the women and children and the sick people.

If we get trouble it will come from those blocks where they are lot of people going to be segregated. I think three or four blocks may have trouble-- 66, 40, 39, and maybe 59.

MR. YAHANDA**August 23, 1943

This is the first serious trouble we have had since military registration. There are a few people who might be called trouble makers, dissatisfied persons, who always use this sort of thing to make trouble. At the bottom of this trouble is a dislike to hard labor and longer hours. A man whom I consider a block trouble maker said something to me, while in spite of his character, I think is very sensible. He said the whole trouble at the bottom is the desire of people who work in the mess halls to keep their easy jobs. Since they know it is easy they want to keep it. That is why they got together and organized a sort of union.

Keadle is afraid to face this unionized group. He put it off and put it off.

On the 17th at 8 o'clock in Block 51, all division heads met.³ Mr. Bennett, Wolter, and Terry were the only ones who spoke. That night Mr. Bennett explained about the allotment for the mess division. That they had only given so much, that the cut must be made, and if it was not made some people would have to get along without pay. Terry suggested that if they didn't want to cut the number they could divide the salary. All the other divisions were supposed to make 3 cuts in July, August, and September. The mess people didn't make the first cut.

In Camp I ~~I~~ we were willing to have the cut made if Keadle would announce who would be cut. The supervisors didn't want to take the responsibility of making the cut themselves and hurt the feelings of people with whom they had worked for years. Since so many are going to Tule Lake there is beginning to be a distinct lack of cooperation among the people in the camps. They say we can't think about these things. We are going away. When we had the

*Yahanda is mistaken. It was the 18th.

recent donations for the Sumo Club many people going to Tule Lake never donated. These Sumo donations are for the benefit of the community.

In Butte they had already passed around a paper saying that they would act together. A certain group of mess supervisors were behind this. A good many mess workers didn't know what they were signing. After the 17th, they brought this paper over to Canal.

I feel that the mess supervisors should not have been saddled with this responsibility. In a way I think the whole thing was a bluff. If the supervisors had had a good reason why didn't they complain on the 17th. They were asked again and again to speak out but no one said anything.

August 25, 1943 Notes--conversation with an evacuee in a very responsible position who wished name withheld.

Keadle actually made the statement (that there would be ^{no} more cuts.).

On the 18th a meeting was held explaining the need for termination.

On the 19th of August a memorandum was sent to the mess supervisors telling them to come to see Keadle. Here they were told that ~~the~~ persons out would have to be terminated as of the 19th.

A telegram had come in stating that they had only \$2300 instead of \$4000.

Five mess supervisors turned in their keys: the majority continued to work on a voluntary basis.

The petition was being circulated before the 17th.

The Block Managers were involved. The keys were to be turned over to the Block Managers by the supervisors so that the Block Managers could appoint a volunteer mess crew. The block managers had not even been asked to cooperate. They ~~at~~ it they should have been forewarned. Every block manager and supervisor was told in a different way.

Thursday many Block Managers called a meeting with Bennett to ask him where they stood.

Five mess halls did not serve breakfast on Thursday. There were three meetings on Thursday, a Block Manager Meeting, a supervisors meeting and a meeting of the Block Managers and the supervisors.

Now things have been smoothed out. Since Washington says things are final, 20 mess halls are going to try to operate under the quota, the rest are continuing on a voluntary basis.

Other divisions have been better educated in regard to this out. Most people thought the mess problem would settle itself--with segregation--but Gila is behind the other centers.

Heard or saw nothing of Internal Security.

On August 18, they were trying to solve the problem by getting some assistance from the camouflage fund. But before they could make a report on this meeting they were called in for the interviews of the morning of the 19th.

There was no notice of termination (10 days) which has always been given heretofore. Keadle says it is not on the books.

There is a tremendous feeling of instability in camp. I don't even know whether to start a garden.

Confidential Addenda:

Due to not entirely honest means a copy of Bennett's report on this mess difficulty fell into my hands. I promised I would keep it for my personal file only. However, I do not feel that I am breaking faith when I state that in its recital of events it is fantastic. It is full of careless errors and contains some deliberate falsehoods.

Bennett says the mess supervisors were notified of the out August 12. (Keadle, it will be remembered said August 8 or 9. This according to every evacuee contacted by Brown or myself is untrue. Bennett also says that he sent a letter to the Central Block Managers on August 17, asking for their cooperation. "No such request was made," said an evacuee in a responsible position. He asked that his name be withheld. The meeting of the Council, and the Mess Supervisors took place on the 18th. Bennett lists it as the 19th. Bennett says the mess supervisors turned in their keys at 10:30 on the 19th. He has the right day for a change, but I personally know that they were turned in several hours earlier.

He also states that early on the morning of the 20th, Internal Security Officials were detailed to the mess halls where trouble was anticipated. This is an out and out lie. Brown asked Graves innocently how many men were detailed and Graves replied he had detailed none. The patrols were doubled, but none were sent to any specific spot.

"For a time it looked as if we might have violence." says Mr. B. He is away off the beam here. Threat of violence limited its existence to the narrow confines of Mr. Bennett's brain. He closes with the comforting assurance to Mr. Myer that he has the names of some of these persons and they are being investigated by the F. B. I.

Mr. Bennett's report can best be described as a sad commentary on the intelligence of whoever is responsible for hiring the Project Director of the Gila Relocation Center. He has absolutely no conception of the reasons for the trouble and has made no attempt to understand the evacuee point of view. His mind is filled with visions of agitators and unreasonable, illogical "natives."

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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
GILA RIVER PROJECT
RIVERS, ARIZONA

Mess and Supply

August 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: L. H. Bennett, Project Director

SUBJECT: Minimum Personnel Requirements

Attached is a list showing the minimum number of employees necessary to maintain operations of the Mess Unit at the Gila River Relocation Center. The list has been carefully considered and all personnel not absolutely essential have been deleted.

In view of the fact that our warehouses are divided into two separate camps, thus necessitating the employment of two crews, I feel that 134 is the minimum number with which warehousing activities can be carried on.

I trust that you will find the attached list in good order and that it will meet with your approval.

Harold E. Keadle
Chief Project Steward

Attachment: 4791

(Later crossed out)
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR MEE ~~AND SUPPLY~~ EMPLOYEES

<u>Office</u>		<u>Storehouse</u>	
*Stenographer	1	*Warehouse Supervisors (Staples)	2
*Senior Cost Accountant	1	*Warehouse Supervisors (Produce)	2
*Senior Property Clerk	1	*Warehouse Supervisors (Meat)	2
Office Clerks	3	*Assistant Supervisors	2
Messenger	1	Warehouse Workers	28
Clerk-Typists	12	*Head Butchers	2
		Butchers	19
*Senior Stewards	3	Produce Workers	16
*Assistant Steward	1	*Ice and Milk Foremen	2
*Supr. of Kitchens	3	Ice and Milk Workers	20
*Head Rationers	2	*Bean Sprout Supervisor	1
Rationers	5	Bean Sprout Workers	4
*Head Timekeeper	1	Bread Men	2
Timekeepers	2	*Senior Inventory Clerks	2
		Inventory Clerks	3
Total Unit Overhead	<u>36</u>	Truck Dispatchers	2
		Seamstresses	3
		*Laundry Foreman	1
		Laundry Workers	18
		*Grease Trap Men	3
		Total Warehouse	<u>134</u>
<u>Mess Halls</u>			
*Supervisor	1		
*Chefs	2		
Cooks	4		
Cooks' Helpers	4		
Pabtry Clerks	2		
Timekeeper	1		
Waitresses	8		
Dishwashers	4		
Potwashers	2		
Janitor	1		
Total Each Mess Hall	<u>29</u> (average)		
48 Evacuee Mess Halls	<u>1392</u>		
2 Administrative Messes	<u>29</u>		
Total Mess Halls	<u>1421</u>		
		TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	<u>1591</u>

* Indicates \$19 positions.