


HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Saturday, Nov. 28, 1942

The creation of the Central Executive Committee which was to have final decisive powers pertaining to the internal order and welfare of the community was approved by the 72 delegates in a meeting of the City Planning Board in the afternoon. At that time the Executive Committee of that organization elected four Issei and four Nisei from among its members to constitute the Central Executive Committee (sometimes referred to as the Central Executive Board). The Issei elected were Nagai, Okamoto, Nakamura and Niiseki; and the Nisei, Andy Sugimoto, James Yahiro, Hidemi Ogawa and Smoot Katow. All members of this committee had to be eventually qualified by the Honor Court and could be recalled by a two-thirds majority vote of their respective councils. It was expected to work in close association with the project director at all times.

In the evening I visited the Kunitanis and as Mich was planning to attend the block meeting that night I tagged along and listened to Rev. Mitani, the Issei representative to the City Planning Board explain the new political set-up in Camp I to his block residents. Mitani's interpretation may be graphically summarized thus:



According to him the Central Executive Committee enjoyed an equal status with the project director and constituted the only channel of communication between the project director and the city council and vice versa. Thus all recommendations to the administration from the city council had to be first approved by the C.E.C. before reaching the project director and vice versa. The Issei and Nisei councils according to his scheme had equal status and would meet in joint sessions to discuss current problems except where WRA policies were concerned in which case the Nisei council would hold a separate session. When Mich raised the question whether the WRA recognized the existence of such an organization as the C.E.C. Mitani dogmatically replied that the WRA had nothing to say about the specific way in which Poston I should be run and that its sphere was restricted to problems concerning all relocation centers. Apparently the idea of the C.E.C. was to make it work this way but jealous forces soon began to rise in opposition and its powers were already challenged on Friday, Dec. 4.

Friday, Dec. 4, 1942

In my paper on the aftermath of the strike I mentioned that Mizushima, Issei representative from block 45 approached X on Wednesday, Dec. 2, and informed him that there was much dissatisfaction among certain delegates in the City Planning Board, notably Tsukamoto, Matsumoto, Kato, Hamagiwa and himself, who were planning to stage a coup d'etat in the next City Planning Board meeting to overthrow the C.E.C. I also reported that this group was successful in intimidating a large number of the

1. Consult WRA Administrative Instruction no. 34 at end of report.

delegates into not appearing at the meeting next day since it needed more time to reenforce its strength.

In the meeting on Dec. 4 in Ward 7 of the Hospital, the strategy of the coup d'etat group apparently was to so ostracize the Labor Relations Board that the Central Executive Committee which had appointed it would be compelled to resign. Hamagiwa, the Issei representative from block 28, started the fireworks by inquiring of the L.R.B. if the administrative policy was to decrease the number of people employed in the project. There was every indication toward such a move so he desired to know the attitude of the L.R.B. -- more specifically did the L.R.B. favor the decrease in personnel of judo, sumo, shibai, etc.? I mentioned in that report that K. Matsumoto, an Issei member of the L.R.B., claimed that its stand was to reshuffle jobs so that there would be a more equitable distribution of jobs as far as ability was concerned. Then I described how another coup d'etat member arose and accused the L.R.B. of not being a democratic institution since it had been appointed by the C.E.C. and not elected by the delegates and how Mitani attempted to refute his statement by maintaining that the C.E.C. which had appointed the L.R.B. had been elected by the Executive Committee which in turn had been elected by the 72 delegates who themselves had been elected by the residents of Camp I. I noted also that accusations flew back and forth for several hours in fiery Japanese until the L.R.B. in disgust offered to resign. Then the C.E.C. which felt responsible for its appointment believed that its integrity was being challenged so decided to resign also. But unfortunately for the coup d'etat group the Nisei

delegates intervened and with the aid of the remainder of the Issei representatives returned the C.E.C. and the L.R.B. to office with a large vote of confidence. At that time the delegates promised to support the C.E.C. and to cooperate in whatever it decided to do.

Dec. 12 - Dec. 17, 1942

On Dec. 12, 1942, the Central Executive Committee sent out invitations to the Issei members of the L.R.B. and the chairman and vice-chairman of the Issei Advisory Board to meet with that body to draw up a few proposals for the Spanish consul to transmit to the Japanese and the U.S. government. At that time Nagai, the most influential member of the C.E.C., proposed that the Japanese government send two hundred million dollars as a relief fund to the Issei directly after the war to be used for rehabilitation. As a result of the agitation against the proposal initiated by block 45 which spread to adjoining areas the C.E.C. was placed on trial in the Issei Advisory Board meeting held on Dec. 17 and compelled to retract the proposal. At that time (1) one of the most important Issei delegates (incidentally, also one of the four most influential yushi in Camp I) declared that it was the duty of the Issei advisors to point out the errors of the C.E.C. and to ask for corrections and that from then on they would not hesitate to criticize its policies. Nagai of the C.E.C. humbly accepted its degradation and replied that his committee would always be willing to cooperate with the Issei

1. Consult page 20 of my Spanish consul report.

advisors and that they should not hesitate to guide him. He ended his speech with: "I beg you to lead us with your ability." This incident indicates a complete change in the attitude of the Issei representatives toward the C.E.C. from that expressed in the City Planning Board meeting on Dec. 4, and marks the rise in power of the I.A.B. over the C.E.C.

Dec. 22, 1942

On this day the project director issued the following statement in the Press Bulletin clarifying the status of the Central Executive Committee:

TO THE RESIDENTS OF POSTON AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF:

The election of the Temporary Community Council of Unit I affords the opportunity to clarify some misunderstandings which have arisen regarding evacuee government.

(1) Only one official body is recognized by the administration under the War Relocation Authority rules. That body is the duly elected Community Council which is authorized to adopt and transmit directly to the Project Director for his action recommendations in matters affecting the welfare of the residents of Poston.

(2) On December 17, the Community Council of Unit I decided that the 36 Issei members of the Temporary Civic Planning Board would be continued as the Issei advisors to the Community Council except in cases where a written complaint is filed with the council by residents of the block.

(3) The Central Executive Committee has been retained by me as personal advisors in matters affecting Unit I and will continue to serve in that capacity.

W. Wade Head,
Project Director.

Dec. 20 -- Jan. 3, 1943

As the powers of the Central Executive Committee became more and more restricted it became desperate and began to search camp for some well-organized group to bolster its waning prestige. About this time a Kibei society was in the act of formation so the C.E.C., cognizant of the pro-Japanese sentiments of the Kibei,

turned to it as its saviour and attempted to make it a political clique to put pressure on pro-administrative groups. In this it failed because of the opposition of X and several other yushi but because of the importance of the Kibei meetings in revealing their position in Poston I am giving a detailed description of their activities in the following pages.

As the news of the JACL resolution concerning selective draft spread through camp there was a number of Nisei, especially Kibei, opposed to reclassification who felt that it⁽¹⁾ was vitally necessary to have some sort of an organized group to exert pressure on policy-making bodies, e.g. the Community Council, Issei Advisory Board, the Central Executive Committee, etc. Around Dec. 20, approximately twenty of them from the southwestern section of camp, including a few Jun-Nisei, met in Mess Hall 37 and discussed the formation of such an organization but did not accomplish much because they felt they were not representative of their blocks. Among those present were No. 15 and No. 16, the leaders behind the movement. It is reported that the Jun-Nisei were not favorably disposed toward such an organization but the reaction of the Kibei was expressed in one word -- action. They wanted a group of their own and "go to it".

Realizing that it was too big a task to form an organization embracing the entire camp No. 15 and 16 decided to begin with their quad (which covers blocks 37, 38, 43, 44). With the aid of

1. The term "Nisei" in my report refers to all persons of Japanese ancestry born in the U.S. "Nisei" includes "Kibei", one who has visited Japan, and "Jun-Nisei", one who has never set foot outside of the U.S. The literal translation of Jun-Nisei is "pure Nisei".

James Yahiro and Okamoto of the Central Executive Committee they contacted many Nisei without drawing any distinction between Kibei and Jun-Nisei. About 200 appeared at the quad meeting held in Mess Hall 37, among them a great number of Jun-Nisei. They attempted to sing and talk in Japanese. The Kibei were greatly moved at their attempts.

Shortly after this No. 15 and 16 especially with the encouragement of Okamoto and Yahiro started a movement toward an over-all organization in camp. No. 16 not only interviewed various young leaders in Camp I but also contacted the well-organized Kibei groups in Camps II and III which were strongly in favor of coordinating the aims of the three units, e.g. the establishing of a C.E.C. and similar organizations in Camps II and III, the toning down of Jun-Nisei influence, and presenting an united front against measures like the JACL resolution. Meanwhile Okamoto was primarily interested in forming such an organization to support the Central Executive Committee.

On the afternoon of January 3, 1943, no. 6 (6, 15 and 16 had been holding consultations frequently) contacted X and requested his presence as adviser at a Kibei meeting to be held in block 18 that evening. At that time he informed X that the C.E.C. had asked for the backing of the Kibei since it had been placed in a precarious position by the strong opposition from the Nisei council and the administration. X's reaction to this was that he did not object to the Kibei having social interests but strongly disapproved of their meddling in politics. Since he was entrusted with the solicitation of representatives from his quad he immediately notified the Kibei in those blocks of the

meeting and then consulted no. 17 on the matter of political affiliations with the C.E.C. No. 17's attitude was almost identical with that of X -- in fact somewhat stronger in declaring that if the C.E.C. had to receive support from "these kids" for their existence, it should resign. He moreover requested X to see to it that there would be no such "rotten relations".

X therefore visited no. 6 later in the afternoon and instructed him to contact no. 15 and 16 to sever political connection with the C.E.C. At that time he recounted the history of the C.E.C. to no. 6 -- how as a result of the coup d'etat staged by a few agitators on Dec. 4, the C.E.C. had been given a large vote of confidence by the councils and how as a result of the defeat of Nagai's proposal for two hundred million dollars in the Issei Advisory Board meeting on Dec. 17 it had suffered a severe drop in prestige. X also told him that because of the restriction of C.E.C. powers by the administration and because of non-sympathy from the Nisei council the C.E.C. had to turn to the populace for support. At that time no. 6 informed X that Okamoto was scheduled to act as chairman at the meeting. X objected to this on the ground that if that news spread through camp the entire Kibei organization would smell with political intrigue. No. 6 then contacted 15 and 16 and after repeating his conversation with X instructed them to go over to Okamoto's and request him not to mention anything political in his speech and to let a Kibei act as chairman. Okamoto was compelled to concede to this.

At the meeting held in block 18 at 8:00 P. M. approximately 50 Kibei were present. Blocks 3, 4, 6, 11, 14, 15, 16, 30,

21, 46, 53, 54, 60 were not represented. This in all probability was due to lack of information -- ~~many~~ blocks not being notified of the meeting until a late hour. In our block the announcement was made only at suppertime -- a bare hour and a half before the meeting. No. 15 acting as chairman opened the meeting by reciting the history of the Kibei organization up to this date and then introduced Okamoto as one of the sponsors. It is interesting to note at this point that the chairman purposely introduced him as "Mr. Okamoto of the Central Executive Committee" rather than "Mr. Okamoto representing the Central Executive Committee". His speech which I have translated as literally as possible may be summarized thus:

"I came to camp and was greatly perturbed by the number of Nisei who felt that their presence in camp was due to enemy alien status and who accused and resented their fathers and mothers. Their daily conduct and behavior conveyed a contemptuous air. This is a sad thing. After all these Nisei owe their existence to their fathers and mothers. I want them to appreciate the Issei. For that we must depend on the Kibei who are versed in Japanese culture and who at the same time can understand Nisei attitudes. It is your job to bridge the gap."

Okamoto's speech was ~~followed by~~ received rather coolly by the audience. He was followed by Andy Sugimoto, a Nisei member of the C.E.C., who also spoke in Japanese:

"There are two extremes in camp: one is the extremist -- the dyed-in-the-wool conservative, the other, the ultra-patriot. After the strike I was fully convinced that it was necessary to teach these ultra-patriots what real Japanese are like. Many Nisei over thirty who have never been to Japan began to think and say: "We have to fight for the Japanese people". They are now working with the sole intention of benefiting the Japanese people. However, there are many Nisei around twenty who are irresponsible in their thinking. These young people must be brought into line. I know that for this purpose they must learn the Japanese language and Japanese ways. And many of them are willing to learn, e.g. Smoot Katow, my colleague. In a meeting I attended with him he asked me the meaning of "kompon" when it was uttered several times in the course of the meeting. At

another meeting when he did not understand the speeches in Japanese he asked me to translate the minutes for him. That is the situation right now. That is where your service is of value".

All during the meeting Sugimoto, Okamoto, and Mas Kawashima, secretary of the C.E.C., exhibited a respectful air toward the Kibei. There was none of that cockiness so characteristic of Sugimoto in the presence of "ultra-patriots" that night.

The question of membership then arose. Some wanted to include Jun-Nisei in their group, others desired to make it a strictly Kibei organization. At this point no. 19 stood up and claimed that there were only 200 Kibei in camp and the number was too small to accomplish anything. He continued in Japanese:

"We must always have "the voice of the public" in order to carry on anything in this camp. We can't do anything without influential Jun-Nisei. There are fellows like Yahiro, who have never gone to Japan yet who have the same ideas as we do. We must include the Jun-Nisei."

This seemed to be the prevailing opinion. About this time someone inquired what the administration would say if the organization was restricted to Kibei. Someone retorted: "This is for the benefit of the administration so nothing is wrong." The question of whether to include women or not then came up. No. 19 again spoke: "We have to have them since all men follow them anyway. I'll bring at least twenty from the Sewing School next time. If we have women then we shall have a large attendance."

When the aims of the organization came up for discussion Okamoto proceeded to enumerate them as he had been consulted by no. 15 and 16 beforehand concerning this and was prepared to meet it. He listed the aims as follows:

1. To cultivate the Japanese language and Japanese culture.
Through this cultivation we can contribute to American civilization.

2. To maintain peace and harmony in camp.
3. To regain citizenship rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.
4. To study ways and means of rehabilitation to guide our parents after the war.

At this stage no. 19 interrupted from the floor that they did not wish to have any political affiliations. Okamoto and the rest of the C.E.C. delegates echoed: "Of course not". The chairman, no. 15, intervened: "How about a case like the JAFL resolution?" No. 19 replied: "There might be a dog here (Yoshioka, who is widely reputed to be a dog, was present) so we had better not say much but our real intentions are to Japanize the Jun-Nisei. Those things, however, we keep in our hearts". This answer did not appear to satisfy 15 and 16 who I later learned wanted a political organization exclusive of the C.E.C.

The question of whether to have a meeting of the camp as a whole or by quads came up next. The sponsors favored a meeting in each quad. No. 19, however, claimed this was not feasible since some quads, e.g. his own, were too indifferent toward the formation of such an organization. He proceeded to explain that in his block there was only one other Kibei and in the adjoining block there was none. "I don't have enough influence and we don't have any fellows like Yahiro to help me. For instance before the strike no Nisei spoke to me in the block although now in the morning they say, "Hello." That doesn't indicate any influence on my part. If I approach them and say, "Hey, we are going to have a club," they will say, "What the hell is this damn Kibei trying to do?" Since it was getting late he suggested that they call a ten minute recess to discuss the matter in round-table fashion. While this was going on the C.E.C. members sneaked out

of the building indicating that the meeting had not turned out the way they had anticipated.

During the short recess X had a consultation with 6, 15, 16 and 19. No. 16 showed him a complex political chart of the Kibei organization in Camp II and informed him that Camps II and III wanted to have a similar type started in Camp I. This was the first time X received an inkling as to their real desires. Since it was getting late it was suggested that they hold another meeting on Saturday, January 9, in Mess Hall 28 at 8:00 P.M.

On Monday, January 4, no. 6 and 16 visited X and notified him that a delegation of Kibei from Camp II had come to request them to start a similar organization in Camp I and also to consult him. X refused to see them advising 6 and 16 to inform them that they had not yet formed an organization so they could not commit themselves but that they would notify them after Saturday's meeting.

At the meeting held in Mess Hall 28 on Saturday evening approximately eighty Kibei were present including fifteen delegates from the other two camps. The Kibei from Camp II dominated the meeting. They wanted an exclusive Kibei group organized in Camp I which would yield considerable political power and which would exert pressure on Jun-Nisei. At one point they asked for a closed session since they desired to divulge their secrets. No. 19 immediately stood up and retorted: "You can't do that. Anything that goes on here will be known to the administration by tomorrow morning. For instance, the details of the last meeting were known to Mr. Head by Monday morning. The C.E.C. members had to explain and justify our last meeting." The

delegates from Camp II were therefore compelled to restrain themselves. The rest of the meeting was confined to the selection of a committee to frame the constitution. Interestingly enough the original sponsors were left out of this committee and were considerably upset. They were afraid that the organization might commit itself to one or the other side involved in the present crisis.

Tuesday, January 5, 1943

The same group that had attempted to overthrow the Central Executive Committee in the Civic Planning Board meeting on Dec. 4, 1942, called a secret session of the Issei Advisory Board in Sumo Headquarters in block 27 in the morning to stage another attack at the C.E.C. On this occasion they succeeded in passing a vote of non-confidence in the C.E.C. Mizushima, acting chairman, pretended that he wished to pacify the agitation. At this point Nishio, Issei advisor from block 3 (the stronghold of the C.E.C. since both Nagai and Andy Sugimoto reside there) requested that he be given the power to select eight koshoin (negotiators). Masukane, advisor from block 59, moved that Nishio be included in that group but he declined. He selected the following: Mizushima, Kato, Tsukamoto, Karakane, Hamagiwa, Kushiyama, Uchida, and one other -- all enemies of Nagai. These eight koshoin were empowered to contact the Issei members of the Central Executive Committee and advise them to resign voluntarily -- if not, the I.A.B. would compel them to resign by presenting the resolution containing the vote of non-confidence.

1. Nishio is reputed to be a friend of Mizushima and therefore in sympathy with the "agitators" but was probably afraid of the reaction of his block if he was included with them.
2. Advisor from block 60 -- not to be mistaken with the father of Isamu Uchida, who is a gushi of block 28. Incidentally, he was taken out

by the F. B. I. on Saturday along with O mori, chairman of the Emergency Council during the strike and has not yet returned.

Wednesday, January 6, 1943

The Central Executive Committee was apparently informed of what had occurred in the Issei Advisory Board meeting the day before since it is reported that it had a speech all prepared to defend itself in the joint session of the two councils in the afternoon. However, the meeting was so taken up with the discussion of the Powell plan and the selection of committees to meet others from Camps II and III to make over-all plans concerning it that there was no opportunity for the I.A.B. to challenge the C.E.C. Furthermore, I suspect a certain amount of reticence on the part of the "agitators" in accusing the C.E.C. in the presence of the Nisei council realizing how their plans had been frustrated by the Nisei in their last attempt. After the routine business was over it is claimed that Kato, chairman of the I.A.B., asked the Issei delegates if they wished to listen to the C.E.C. members since he had been informed that they had prepared something to say. At this point Nakamura of the C.E.C. interrupted: "Oh, that isn't necessary. The speech was prepared for the next joint session".

In the morning as I was conversing with Spicer in his office Leighton came in with Mas Kawashima and Smoot Katow of the C.E.C. who appeared ill at ease. I later learned that the two realizing their predicament had turned to Leighton for help since he is a ready listener and an influential person in the administration. Leighton at that moment was scheduled to leave for Los Angeles so had turned them over to Spicer. The latter thought that Mas Kawashima had a well-organized plan for indoctrinating the administration in favor of the C.E.C.

Thursday, January 7, 1943

According to X, Mizushima related to him that he had encountered Mas Kawashima in the morning and he had tried to intimidate him by telling him that there were dogs in the Issei Advisory Board and if they wished to pull a fast one over the C.E.C. it would be notified soon after. Then Mas cited the case of the I.A.B. proposing to make the C.E.C. an advisory body to Evans rather than to Head and how that information reached the C.E.C. within a few hours. Mizushima claimed that he replied: "So what?"

On this day the I.A.B. committee of eight called on the C.E.C. and advised them to resign voluntarily. They contacted only Nagai and one or two others (I am not certain as to the exact number) who promised to resign.

About this time also according to Spicer, Kato, chairman of the I.A.B., contacted Kennedy, Employment Chief, and wanted to know if the administration would like to see a pro-American C.E.C. in power. The psychology back of this move was that the "agitators" knew that the project director did not trust the C.E.C. (Head is convinced that Nagai is very pro-Japanese from the speech he delivered in block 37 on Dec. 13, 1942, favoring the two hundred million dollar proposal) and desired to ingratiate
(1)

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1. The attitude of the administration toward the C.E.C. may be briefly summarized thus:
 - a) The Indian Service clique feels the existence of the C.E.C. is beneficial since the Issei now have an official channel to voice their complaints.
 - b) The WRA faction consisting of Powell, Haas, Kennedy, etc. is opposed to the existence of the C.E.C. for various reasons:
 - Powell: believes the C.E.C. is a very pro-Japanese group and detrimental to the welfare of his "ultra-liberal" proteges.
 - Haas: feels existence of C.E.C. is against WRA regulations.
 - Kennedy: Feels C.E.C. might assume dictatorial powers and may become even more powerful than the Community Council.

themselves on the administration by putting up a pro-American front. According to X if Mizushima managed to slip into the C.E.C. he was planning to support the Powell plan, the development of agriculture and other things in line with (1) administrative policies.

Friday, January 8, 1943

The eight koshoin reported to the Issei Advisory Board that they had advised the Issei members of the C.E.C. to resign and they had complied with the request. At that time there was a little resentment on the part of some advisors who felt that the committee had overstepped its rights. Masukane, one of the most influential advisors, realized that they could not afford a quarrel among themselves at this time so assured the dissenters that the koshoin had acted within the powers given to the I.A.B. The advisors then proceeded to select a committee to choose new C.E.C. members. For this purpose they discussed two alternative plans:

1. to select all C.E.C. members from the community at large (only the Issei being involved of course).
2. to appoint one or two members from the I.A.B. and the rest from the community. All of the selectees, however, had to be confirmed by block votes.

1. Quoted from the Poston Chronicle, January 8, 1943:

"Dr. Powell Plans Confab for Poston"

Dr. John Powell of the Community Activities presented plans for a conference to be sponsored in Poston for the purpose of outlining a project program.

What would be brought up for discussion are the various things which can and must be accomplished within the next three months.

Four problems included in the suggestion were: the procurement and production of food; construction of adequate school buildings and housing; development of profitable industries and work in camouflage sheds; and public welfare.

According to my informant in Camp II he saw members of the C.E.C. in consultation all day with no. 26, leader of the anti-administration group in Camp II, in the block manager's office in block 211. It appears suspiciously as though the C.E.C. unable to procure support from Camp I organizations had to appeal to Camp II for help.

Saturday, Jan. 9, 1943

The I.A.B. committee handed over to the Issei members of the C.E.C. a demand for resignation in the afternoon. This contained the vote of non-confidence as well as the accusations later announced in the I.A.B. memorandum read in all mess halls by Issei representatives on Monday.

Sunday, Jan. 10, 1943

The Issei Advisory Board held a closed session in Sumo Headquarters at which time they distributed the following memorandum to each representative to read in his mess hall next day (I have tried to keep the translation as literal as possible):

REASONS FOR DEMANDING THE MASS RESIGNATION OF THE
ISSEI CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

1. They left untouched without doing anything for a month and a half the insulting statement toward Camp I Emergency Council delegates which was announced in the Press Bulletin of Nov. 24. On account of that Camps II and III to this day have
(1)
suspicion toward the new organization in Camp I. This statement was also reported in many outside newspapers. It brought suspicion and disgrace to all the Japanese. (Regarding this article if there is anyone who desires further information please consult the secretary of the Issei ~~Ad~~ City Council).
2. To this day, after a month and a half has passed since the new organization went into effect, there has been no official announcement from the Central Executive Committee to not only Camp I but also Camps II and III concerning the truth

1. Consult the "obnoxious" article on page 31.

of the incident and the framework of the new organization. Consequently there have been much misunderstanding and suspicion and the state of affairs is such that we cannot look upon it passively.

3. No announcement has been made as to what happened to Mr. Isamu Uchida after the incident. Despite the fact that the City Council desires settlement of the Uchida case no step has been taken toward this end.
4. Against the united will of the people the Central Executive Committee arbitrarily asked the Japanese government for two hundred million dollars as a post-war relief fund for the Issei. The City Council by a resolution demanded its retraction and the Central Executive Committee voiced ~~its~~ ^{its} acceptance. Several weeks have already passed but it has neither corrected the article which appeared in the Japanese edition of the center paper nor has retracted the articles which were reprinted from it in outside newspapers. This, indeed, is a great insult to the City Council and to the public at large.
5. The authority of the Central Executive Committee has been curtailed step by step by the administration yet it has not resisted it effectively. Furthermore, from the very beginning it has maintained a fact-concealing policy without consulting the City Council.

Everywhere there is a clamor that the Central Executive Committee ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~cannot~~ fulfill its duties since there has been a continuous stream of errors after the Central Executive Committee took office. So the question of whether we can trust it or not came up for discussion in the general meeting of the City Council held on the 5th and after due deliberation a vote of non-confidence was passed by a large majority. is incapable of

Although the City Council selected a committee to negotiate for the voluntary resignation of the Central Executive Committee members with good intentions they refused to accept it in the spirit in which it was offered and flatly refused to resign.

Thus since there was no other recourse, in accordance with the regulations publicized by the Central Executive Committee, we demanded the mass resignation of the Issei members of the Central Executive Committee and at the same time notified the administration of this fact.

January 10, 1943
Issei City Council
Kenji Kawabe, secretary.

Monday, Jan. 11, 1943

The C.E.C. in retaliation distributed the following answer to the I.A.B. memorandum setting forth its reasons for refusing the demand for resignation made by the I.A.B. (also a literal translation):

REASONS FOR REFUSING DEMAND FOR RESIGNATION BY THE
ADVISORY BOARD

At 3:00 P.M. on January 7, eight representatives of the Issei Advisory Board handed over a demand for resignation to the members of this committee. Although it was difficult at that time to understand their action, on the next day after seeing the manuscript containing the reasons for demand for resignation those five points can be reduced to two points: dereliction of duty and incompetence.

Incidentally, this committee is a privilege obtained by the Emergency Council which handled the solution of the November incident. The newly organized City Planning Board was based on the Emergency Council and was created for the purpose of setting up machinery for civic administration. The eight members were selected rigidly by the said board.

Since the formation of this committee on November 28, we have worked earnestly without a day's rest with just one objective -- to build a more habitable, serene, peaceful city of Boston which we promised Project Director Head at that time. We have progressed to this day without forgetting the fact that we begged for voluntary dispersal after we had reported to our 10,000 brothers assembled in that arena the promise to the administration on the final day.

A month and a half has already gone since the formation of this committee. We were taken by a surprise of all surprises when we received the demand for resignation from the Advisory Board at a time when we are trying ~~xxxxxxx~~ to attain step by step the first goal after fighting through many difficulties. We regret greatly to find many dubious points taken up by the Advisory Board when we investigate the real circumstances. Let us point out the significant facts as follows:

1. They refused the attendance of members of this committee at the Advisory Board meeting in which they passed the vote of non-confidence.

2. Why did they not ask for explanations from members of our committee if something was incomprehensible, vague or untrustworthy?

3. The ballots in the vote of non-confidence were without signatures.

4. They did not open the ballots in the meeting of the Advisory Board but in secret.

Those who hold political office must at least recognize political ethics. To this day they have not shown a cooperative attitude toward the work we have been doing. Moreover, they are unkind to demand resignation forcibly by balloting contrary to political ethics without well-meant questioning or without ascertaining its truth by mere arbitrary decision of their own. We regret that we are forced to conclude that this destructive action -- irrational and unintelligent -- is the action of our brothers in our present situation.

All our behavior must be just and aboveboard. When we examine those points we cannot accept them as the will of the Advisory Board as a whole because they are very vague indeed. We have no other recourse but to refuse this kind of proposal since it lacks justice and frankness, and it appears suspiciously to be the work of certain ambitious people.

However, in accordance with our initial convictions, we must do our utmost for the happiness and peace of the populace. We do not like to quarrel among our brothers. When we realize the predicament we are in at present we wonder what is next to come. When we think of this we shiver with dread. Therefore we are giving in an inch to them when we request a reconsideration by the Advisory Board. If they value true self-government and think of the welfare of our brothers, the Advisory Board should call another meeting and retract the unjust resolution. After that they should call a joint meeting of Issei and Nisei delegates and after cross-examining us C.E.C. members we want it settled by a just vote in public because it is most important at this time to ascertain the wish of the Nisei City Council regarding this even if it be the demand for resignation of Issei only since the Central Executive Committee is a joint committee of Issei and Nisei. We cannot do practical work wanted done by the public by absolutely neglecting the wish of the City Council. We herewith announce our contentions and humbly request the criticism of our loving brothers.

January 11, 1943
Central Executive Committee.

Tuesday, January 12, 1943

In the joint session of the two councils held in Sumo Headquarters in the afternoon the Issei section announced to the Nisei that they were forcing the C.E.C. to resign and needed their approval to satisfy Evans. At this point Fukuda, Nisei representative from block 3, accused the Issei of not having

taken the proper step in demanding the resignation of the C.E.C. -- that they should have consulted the Nisei Council before they presented the vote of non-confidence to that body. He was, however, quieted down by other members of the council. ⁺he chairman then appointed a committee of five Nisei consisting of Kurata, Nomura, Fukuda, Kozuma and himself to thoroughly investigate the matter.

In the evening a debate was held in block 28 between Nakamura of the C.E.C. and Mizushima, vice-chairman of the I.A.B. and leader of the opposing faction. It is reported that Hamagiwa, Issei advisor of that block, realized his unpopularity among the block residents and had sponsored the debate so that they could hear both sides of the case. The speeches apparently were elaborations of the two memoranda issued by the I.A.B. and the C.E.C. which I have already quoted.

Simultaneously in block 3, the home of Nagai^e and Sugimoto, a block meeting was being held with Nagai^a as main speaker. His chief argument was that the agitation was being sponsored by a few ambitious Issei advisors who wanted the C.E.C. job themselves. Finally support for the C.E.C. was placed on vote and passed. At that time Nishio, Issei advisor, refrained from voting which created much resentment among the block people who threatened to beat him.

Wednesday, Jan. 13, 1943

In the morning X was visited by Masukane, Issei advisor of block 59, who seemed greatly concerned with the situation. He explained to X that there was no prospect of the C.E.C. resigning -- that it was determined to stick it out. Such being the case he felt there was no other recourse ~~xxx~~ for

the Issei Advisory Board but to resign as a body. He, however, hoped that they could arrive at a compromise. X assured Masukane that eventually there would be a compromise since that was the wish of the Nisei committee investigating the matter.

In the morning while the two councils sat in joint session to discuss the camouflage project, the Nisei committee of five called in the I.A.B. committee of five and cross-examined them. At that time the Nisei delegates accused them of the following charges: (1) The I.A.B. did not take the proper procedure in demanding the resignation of the G.E.C., (2) The I.A.B. had no authority to demand the resignation of the C.E.C. The Issei members were indignant thinking that the Nisei committee was evading the issue on technical grounds. In the final analysis it appeared to them that the Nisei were supporting the G.E.C. They threatened that if the Nisei committee wished to support just four individuals in the face of I.A.B. opposition the I.A.B. would resign as a body. They were certain that there were at least 26 blocks in line with them and they could carry out the threat. (In a conversation with X later concerning this Mizushima burst out: "If the Nisei bastards want to fight and run the camp themselves, they don't need any advisors. We won't have any I.A.B. after our resignation. Let them run it -- see if they like it." He accused Nomura of outspokenness on technical grounds; accused Kozuma of being irrational and excitable. With reference to Fukuda who had challenged the Issei members to tell him what the I.A.B. had accomplished if they accused the G.E.C. of not having done anything during their term of office, Mizushima reported he had answered: "Well, we are doing a lot of work like listening to you guys discuss the camouflage project, etc.

That's our job." He ended hotly: "If the Nisei want to fight, they'll get it.")

The I.A.B. committee after much wrangling submitted to the following terms of arbitration:

1. Since permanent government is going to supersede the Temporary Community Council within a few ~~days~~ weeks it is unwise to change the personnel of the Central Executive Committee at the present time. If there is any grievance against the present members that should be voiced at the forthcoming elections.

2. No speeches, no posters, no announcements will be made by either side from now on. (C.E.C. members cancelled the meetings planned for the evening because of this).

In the afternoon the Nisei committee met the C.E.C. members and received their consent to act as arbitrators for them.

It is reported that blocks 37, 38, 43 and 44 refused to send their Issei delegates to the council meeting in the morning since the yushi of these blocks disapproved of the whole affair as "dirty politics". In some blocks it is claimed that even the (1) Nisei councilmen refused to participate arguing that: (1) The I.A.B. did not give a ~~fair~~ fair chance to the C.E.C. members to express themselves, and (2) The I.A.B. did not have the authority to demand the resignation of the C.E.C. without first consulting each block. In block 28 the resentment toward Hamagiwa increased although it had been reported otherwise by Mizushima as a result of the debate. (According to X Mizushima informed him that Hamagiwa had accosted him in the morning and had said jubilantly: "Boy, the block people sure showed confidence in me after your speech. I don't have to worry about my position now.") According to reports the block council met in the evening and decided to recall him. George Fujii, the Nisei representative of the block is said to have handed in his

1. The people in these blocks are predominantly from Kumamoto prefecture and wished to save Nakamura, former secretary of the Kumamoto Kenjinkai (Kumamoto Prefectural Society) of Southern California.

resignation in disgust.

Thursday, Jan. 14, 1943

After breakfast X and Mizushima carried on a lengthy conversation around the bonfire. Mizushima maintained that there was only one way to solve this difficulty: he wanted X to accompany him when he visited Evans to receive confirmation from him that the Uchida case had been for once and all dropped. X refused on the ground that Evans would not involve himself in such a matter at a time when the Nisei committee was doing its best to arbitrate. On second thought his reaction was: "What the hell, this guy is trying to sell his name by utilizing my ^finfluence on Evans." At that time he informed Mizushima that his agitation would be very unprofitable not only for his prestige but also for the welfare of the community. "There is a great deal of opposition to the activities of the I.^A.B. and you are more or less looked upon as a leader of this movement. It is best for your interests to bridge the gap between the I.A.B. and the C.E.C. Mizushima promised to work toward that end. While they were still conversing Niiseki of the C.E.C. strolled down the highway and Mizushima hailed him. The arguments became rather heated when Mizushima innocently remarked that the C.E.C. should have resigned without a struggle. This brought out a long harangue from Niiseki which may be summarized thus:

1. The C.E.C. did not have an opportunity to justify its stand. If the I.^A.B. representatives had any criticisms against the activities of the C.E.C. it was their duty to call the C.E.C. members before them and request explanations. Tuesday's meeting in which the vote of non-confidence was passed had been a closed session. (Mizushima denied this although he had previously mentioned to X that it had been a secret meeting.)

2. The I.A.B. announcement was posted without the C.E.C. being aware of the nature of the accusations.

3. Mizushima could not bring in the two hundred million dollar accusation in that paper because he himself had been a participant in that conference.

Mizushima appeared very much on the defensive while arguing with Niiseki. He kept on repeating, "You are exaggerating", "You are talking falsely", ^{Etc.} without presenting concrete facts to support his statements. Niiseki then openly accused Mizushima of being the leader of the opposing faction. He taunted: "We will give you a C.E.C. job. See if you can do any better. I bet you can't." Mizushima answered: "I don't think I can." When X encountered Niiseki later in the morning he assured him that in all probability the dispute would be settled amicably by late afternoon.

In the Issei Advisory Board meeting held in War 7 in the morning (the Nisei council walked out and continued its meeting outside) a strong sentiment against the C.E.C. was expressed by a few. Since their resolution demanding the resignation of the C.E.C. had not been accepted by that body or by the ⁺Temporary Community Council they advocated the resignation of the Issei council as a body.

Meanwhile the Nisei councilmen held a series of caucuses outside the Ward to listen to the reports of the committee that had negotiated with the warring factions. Fukuda first spoke and ^aclaimed that they had talked with the C.E.C. members in the

1. In order to explain that he was not an agitator Mizushima came out with the information during the day that Rev. Mitani was agitating behind Kato because he could not get into the C.E.C. (The C.E.C. has greater prestige in the eyes of the Japanese than the L.R.B.)

afternoon and after agreeing on two fundamental points -- that they were all Japanese here, and that they all wanted peace in Poston -- they had been empowered to arbitrate between that body and the I.A.B. The chairman interrupted at this point to say that a decision had to be made as to whether they wished to arbitrate or not and if so, how to do it. Kurata maintained that with permanent government about to be a reality soon it was a most inopportune time to be bickering among themselves and that an amicable settlement was necessary. He concluded: "We the council, have an obligation to fulfill in that we are to settle by arbitration in the most amicable way possible. We should go along as we are until the time for change has come under the circumstances of permanent self-government."

The only woman councilman then suggested that since both were fighting the C.E.C. as well as the I.A.B. should resign. This contribution was received with laughter by the group and someone replied: "No, we don't want that. Let'em stay in. We've got to have some kind of boards around here."

A discussion then arose as to the probable meaning of a clause in the minutes of the Civic Planning Board meeting of November 28 which reads that "the Central Executive Committee may be removed by a two-thirds vote of their respective councils". George Fujii believed that the removal could be accomplished by a two-thirds vote of the I.A.B. and a two-thirds vote of the Nisei council but that it could be carried out only after the Honor Court had recommended such action. Since there was no Honor Court in existence to pass judgment it was impossible to recall the C.E.C. Joe Nakai of the L.R.B. felt that the clause

could be either interpreted to mean a Nisei and an Issei council or the Civic Planning Board which created the C.E.C. Nomura interrupted at this point to say that that was beside the point. What really mattered was that Head had made it quite clear sometime ago that the Nisei council had nothing to do with the C.E.C. -- that the Nisei council had no right to say who should or should not be in the C.E.C. He further claimed that the clause did not refer to a Nisei or Issei council but simply to the City Planning Board (which is no longer in existence).

It was then decided that the present C.E.C. should remain in office until permanent self-government was set up. In addition there was to be no more speech making after the terms of arbitration had been accepted by both parties.

At noon Mizushima informed X over the dinner table that he had worked very hard to pacify the agitators and that in all probability they would reach an amicable understanding by evening as the session continued in the afternoon.

A little later X encountered Nomura, the Nisei representative of the block, in the latrine who warned him that there was much resentment against Mizushima in the southwestern section of camp because they felt he was agitating too much. People were already talking about the Bliss case and he had better watch his step. (1)
If he continued his agitation he would in all likelihood end up washing dishes like Albert Kaniya. X assured Nomura that (2)

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1. Mizushima is reputed to have aided Bliss, an unscrupulous Immigration official stationed in Los Angeles, around 1929 in extorting money from Japanese who had entered the country illegally. His reputation as a dog is therefore of long standing.
 2. The policy of block 45 is to place anyone in the block who has incurred the disfavor of camp residents in the kitchen to render him innocuous.

Mizushima would quiet down -- in fact he had quieted down considerably since he had first put pressure on him.

In the afternoon the Nisei committee met the entire Issei Advisory Board to secure permission to arbitrate for them. (Mizushima, Kato, Kushiya, etc. had discussed the matter with the Nisei committee the day before but not in an official capacity). The C.E.C. members were there in a body as they believed they were to be arbitrated together when summoned by Sugiyama, ~~the~~ chairman of the Nisei council. They were surprised to discover that the I.A. B. had not yet given the power to arbitrate to the Nisei committee. One Issei advisor then suggested that since both parties were present they should be arbitrated on the spot. But another protested: "We can't ask for arbitration first. Let the C.E.C. members ask for that first. If we ask from our side it will be degrading for the I.A.B." Nakamura of the C.E.C. got up at this point and remarked: "This sort of thing is like a mother-father fight and asking their children to act as arbitrators. Since it doesn't matter who asks first, we, like men, will ask for it first." Upon that the I.A.B. gave their consent and the C.E.C. left the meeting.

The question of what to do with the resolution demanding the resignation of the C.E.C. then came up for discussion. Nomura steadfastly maintained that as long as the two hundred million dollar clause was included in it the committee could not arbitrate because it was not a Nisei problem. Finally after much argument it was decided as follows: The resolution which had been delivered to the Nisei council in a sealed envelope would remain unopened. As long as it was destroyed without

being opened the Nisei council would theoretically not know the reasons for demanding the resignation of the C.E.C. After three hours of wrangling it was finally agreed that the I.A.B. would not resign temporarily and that they would accept the decision of the Nisei committee if it include the proviso that the C.E.C. work on the five demands contained in the resolution.

Sometime in the afternoon no. 12 called on X and wanted to know the reaction of his block as a whole. He appeared relieved when informed that the block favored a "no politics among ourselves" stand. He then cautioned X to chastize Mizushima since he was considered the agitator in his section of camp. X promised that he would consult a certain person in his block to discipline him. He assured no. 12 that Mizushima would not be reelected in the coming elections. At that time 12 reported that ~~the~~ people were talking of beating the following: Rev. Mitani, Mizushima, Karakane, Kato, Kushiya and Nishio. (Nishio because he refrained from voting at his block meeting to support the C.E.C. and because he is considered a friend of Mizushima). No. 12 also claimed that a delegation from Camp II had visited the southwestern yushi the night before to offer their services in arbitration but had been advised to wait a few days. As soon as 12 left, X visited no. 12 and obtained his promise to discipline Mizushima.

(1)

In the evening it is reported that Kawabe, secretary of the I.A.B., was admonished by the yushi of the Sumo and Judo departments

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1. The yushi feel they are responsible for the acts of their block residents.

to refrain from repeating the story that the C.E.C. had threatened the I.A.B. that they had the backing of these two departments. They maintained that the spread of such a story would discredit the integrity and the "non-involvement in politics" stand of these departments.

Friday, Jan. 15, 1943

The Issei Advisory Board reported to the Nisei committee that they accepted the terms of arbitration. Of the seven points involved, I have been able to secure only three:

1. Since neither the I.A.B. nor the C.E.C. is at fault, it is unnecessary for anyone to resign.

2. The I.A.B. should hereafter work in closer harmony with the C.E.C.

3. The C.E.C. should inform the public concerning the five points mentioned in the resolution of the I.A.B.

January 27, 1943

HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (con't)

Friday, Jan. 22, 1943

In a joint session of the Temporary Community Council and the Issei Advisory Board held in Sumo Headquarters in the afternoon the Central Executive Committee presented for approval a framework of its duties, powers and term of office. Included in its recommendations were the following:

1. The C.E.C. shall act as the sole medium of communication between the councils and the project director.
2. The C.E.C. shall have the right to "nominate, elect, appoint, or remove persons to or from key evacuee positions or other important position."
3. The term of office shall be for one year, half of its members holding office until June 30, the other half until Dec. 31.
4. The C.E.C. should be officially recognized by the F.C.C. and the I.A.B. as it has never been recognized by these bodies since its formation.

The Nisei council voiced a strong objection to the recommendations, particularly to the section pertaining to term of office. It argued that the F.C.C. was to dissolve shortly and could not create an office which would survive its lifetime. Furthermore it maintained that the clause needed revision since one could not logically claim a tenure of a year for those going out on June 30 when the C.E.C. was not in existence last July. The opposition from the I.A.B. was based on entirely different grounds -- that the C.E.C. demanded too much power. The arguments which flew back and forth between individual council members created ill-feeling and resentment on the part of the

C.E.C. Finally, Nakamura, an Issei member of the C.E.C., stood up and delivered a speech to the effect that the C.E.C. should no longer exist since the councils could not support it although he was convinced that it received the solid backing of the populace. The only recourse for its members therefore would be to resign in a body and present the facts to the public by calling mass meetings. The committee then read its resignation addressed to Mr. Head and stalked out of the room.

Saturday, Jan. 23, 1943

The formal resignation of the C.E.C. was handed in at 10:30 a.m. to Evans, Unit I administrator, in the absence of the project director who was then in a WRA conference in San Francisco. The reasons given for its resignation are reported to have been two-fold: (1) Non-cooperation from the administration, and (2) Destructive effect of some groups in camp.

According to Spicer during the last C.E.C. I.A.B. controversy Head had expressed the hope that the T.C.C. would pass a vote of confidence on the C.E.C. to "convince" certain elements in the administration that the representative body in camp was supporting it. At that time he also believed that it would be best to transfer the C.E.C. to Evans.

On this day it was reported that C.E.C. members had contacted several blocks to gain permission to hold meetings to air their grievances but had been received coldly, particularly in block 11 where the residents feared it might

create dissension in camp.

In the evening X encountered Nomura and was informed that he had advised Andy Sugimoto of the C.E.C. not to present the recommendations at Friday's meeting but to wait for a more opportune moment but he had not listened to him. After the meeting he had confronted Sugimoto and accused him: "What you guys tried to do was to shove confirmation down our throat. That's not the way to do business." Later when he encountered Smoot Katow, another C.E.C. member, he had said: "You shouldn't have resigned today." He had replied: "That wasn't the way we had planned." Nomura confessed to X that he did not know exactly what their strategy was but if C.E.C. members insisted on going around delivering speeches in different blocks the new constitution would not be ratified. He ended disgustedly, "Hell, I want to resign, too."

Incidentally, for a better understanding of the resignation of the C.E.C. I should mention that about a week ago Sugiyama, chairman of the T.C.C., appointed Hiroshi Amano and another Nisei councilman to meet with Evans along with two I.A.B. representatives, Kato and Mizushima, to discuss plans for the formation of "evacuee administrative officers". Evans informed the joint committee during the meeting that the administrative plan (the brain child of Head, Gelvin and Evans) called for the setting up of a Japanese head in each major department to supervise the work of evacuees in that department. Thus in the Agricultural Department Mathiesen, the Caucasian

chief, would not contact the evacuees directly but would confer with the Japanese head who in turn would supervise the evacuees employed in that department. Evans explained at that time that the administrative officials were too busy to take charge of direct supervision of the evacuees working in the project. Evans had earlier discussed such a plan with the C.E.C. The reactions of the two committees to the proposal are worthy of note. The C.E.C. felt that the administration was taking away duties and powers rightfully belonging to that body. The Issei committee approved of it heartily and apparently derived much pleasure in seeing the C.E.C. made more insignificant.

Sunday, January 24, 1943

There was much discussion in informed circles on this day as to the possible conflict between the C.E.C. and the committee appointed by the joint council to aid Evans in the formulation of plans for evacuee administration. It is reported that even Evans expressed some anxiety when approached on the subject by some councilmen. When Nomura encountered Evans in the morning the latter inquired whether he anticipated any conflict. Nomura replied confidently: "There won't be any conflict whatsoever because the committee is a legislative body to help you in the formation of the framework of this new system whereas the C.E.C. is a purely administrative body to carry out the plan when the plan is approved by the council."

In the evening in a conversation with X Nomura predicted that if the C.E.C. started to make speeches as it had threatened to do on Friday it would result in a campaign to elect its supporters to the T.C.C. and the I.A.B. He added: "That would mean a lot of politics from now on in camp." Mizushima's reaction to this is characteristic: "Well, they tried to threaten us. Let them go ahead. See if we're scared."

Monday, Jan. 25, 1943

The Labor Relations Board handed in its resignation at the joint session of the councils in the morning but it was not accepted.

It is reported that C.E.C. members were seen around camp airing their grievances to their supporters and condemning the administration and certain members of the I.A.B., notably Kato and Mizushima.

In the evening when Nomura met X he reported: "Yesterday the yushi of block 28 (i.e. Kinjo) came to me and said: 'Don't let the C.E.C. resign. We have to have them.' So I told him: 'You go to Nagai and tell him I want to see him tomorrow morning. I went there to see him this morning to tell him that they should retract their resignation but he was not in.'" At the same time he added sadly: "I worked hard during the last trouble but all my efforts were in vain."

Tuesday, Jan. 26, 1943

According to Spicer, the Labor Relations Board handed in its resignation to Evans in the morning since the joint council

had refused to recognize it the day before.

Wednesday, Jan. 27, 1943

Early in the afternoon Mizushima burst out to X: "Those damn C.E.C. guys are accusing me of being the leader of the agitators. I'm sick and tired of politics. One shouldn't play with politics. I'm not going to run next time no matter what anyone says."

After supper he again cornered X and related in a confidential tone: "A friend of mine came to offer his sympathy because he thought I had been taken out by the F.B.I. along with five others. It's funny that the C.E.C. was broadcasting the news about five hours before the F.B.I. removed Uchida and Omori from camp (this occurred on Jan. 23). It's funny that Nakamura and Nakachi said that the F.B.I. were coming in an airplane to take out the guys as fast as they could get hold of them. I didn't say anything to them at the time because I couldn't make sense of what they were talking about. Come to think about it now they sure smell." Several block residents who had loitered nearby to listen commented: "Same old stuff again. His position is shaky now so he's trying to defend himself by pretending that he too was to be taken. That's the trouble with that guy." X thought at the time: "This must be rationalization of his fear of being called a dog by camp residents."

Jan. 29, 1943

Shortly after Jan. 23 the joint council had appointed two committees to define clearly the duties, powers, and term

of office of the C.E.C. and the L.R.B. In the joint session of the councils held in Sumo Headquarters in the afternoon of Jan. 29 these committees submitted their plans for a new C.E.C. and L.R.B. which were accepted with minor changes by the joint council. At that time the I.A.B. elected M. Nagai and H. Nakachi as chairman for the C.E.C. and L.R.B. respectively, while the Nisei council elected Mas Kawashima and Smoot Katow as vice-chairman for the two bodies. It is interesting to note that although the chairman of the I.A.B. requested a show of hands during the election of chairman for the C.E.C. the Issei doggedly insisted on secret ballot. The election resulted in 15 votes for Nagai and only 12 for Kato, much to the surprise of the Kato-Mizushima faction who were certain they would emerge victorious. The returns indicate that the interviews rumored to have been held by Nagai with advisors of various blocks had been intended to court non-partisan advisors to his side. Mizushima's reaction to Nagai's election may be expressed in one word: "Disgusting." Since the I.A.B. had turned completely around and put in the old C.E.C. which it had been trying to oust for several weeks, Kato and Mizushima as chairman and vice-chairman of that body felt that it was their responsibility to resign. Mizushima later remarked to X: "We can't do work with guys like that. They are just a bunch of idiots. When I resign we don't have to have any election in our block. We don't need to send anyone to a group like that." Nomura's reaction was quite similar: "What the hell. If it was going to turn out this

1. Consult section under Feb. 4 for plans.

way I don't see for what purpose ^{we} went in to arbitrate between the I.A.B. and the C.E.C."

Saturday, Jan. 30, 1943

Nagai and Nakachi accepted the chairmanship of the C.E.C. and the L.R.B. respectively. Kawashima accepted the vice-chairmanship of the C.E.C. but Katow declined claiming: "I don't like politics."

Nomura remarked: "It's silly if Nagai puts the same group in. We aren't so much against Nagai as against the rest of the guys, especially Okamoto."

Thursday, Feb. 4, 1943

The following official confirmation of the forming of a new C.E.C. was distributed to block managers on this day:

We, the Temporary Community Council and the Advisory Board of Poston Unit I, in order to have harmonious, prompt and efficient execution of recommendations made by ourselves and approved by the Project Director realize the necessity of evacuee administrative body do hereby form

EXECUTIVE BOARD

Formation

Article I

Section 1. Executive Board shall be composed of eight committee members consisting of four Issei and four Nisei.

Section 2. The chairman shall be chosen by the Advisory Board and Vice-chairman shall be chosen by the Community Council. The Chairman shall appoint three Issei committee members and Vice-chairman shall appoint three Nisei committee members. All committee members must have the approval of joint (Advisory and Community) councils.

Section 3. Chairman of the Board shall be Issei and Vice-chairman shall be Nisei.

Section 4. In the event of resignation of Chairman or Vice-chairman the vacancy may be filled by Article I,

Section 2, and the newly elected Chairman or Vice-chairman may at his option change any and all respective members of the committee subject to approval of joint councils.

Section 5. When vacancy happen in committee members, it shall be filled as set forth in Article I, section 2.

Article II

Section 1. Term of office of Executive Board shall be for one year. Present members appointed to this board will be for life of this Temporary Community Council.

Section 2. Any member of the Executive Committee may be recalled by the two-third majority of the joint councils consisting of not less than two-third of the total members.

Article III Duties and Powers

Executive Board shall be the administrative organization of Unit I and shall have the following functions:

Section 1. Shall act as advisory to Project Director and Unit Administrator.

Section 2. Shall have the power to hold consultation with evacuee and department heads and block managers, execute any and all recommendations of the Community Council that are approved by the Project Director and Unit Administrator.

Section 3. Shall have the power to appoint or remove persons to or from important and key evacuee positions whose policy is detrimental to the community, with the approval of joint councils, Project Director, and Unit Administrator.

Section 4. Shall have the power to execute such other duties and functions as may be conferred upon it from time to time by the Project Director and Unit Administrator.

APPROVED BY:

/s/ W.Wade Head

W.Wade Head, Project Director.

/s/ John G. Evans

John G. Evans, Unit I Administrator.

Dated: February 4, 1943.

Saturday, Feb. 6, 1943

It is reported by various political leaders that both Nagai and Nakachi were actively on the lookout for non-partisan men with ability who had heretofore refrained from politics to fill positions on the C.E.C. and the L.R.B.

Rev. Mitani and Tazawa visited X in the morning to persuade him to accept a position either in the C.E.C. or L.R.B. At that time Mitani claimed that the C.E.C. was created during an emergency period when no one knew anyone so the selection of members was not sufficiently discriminating. Those elected believed that they were the most influential men in camp and proceeded to act dictatorially without consulting the Nisei council thereby incurring its resentment as well as that of the administration. In retaliation the Nisei council opposed every action of the C.E.C. so that it could not function efficiently. The root of the conflict according to Mitani was that so many Nisei are articulate and express their opinions to the administration while the Issei remain silent. Since the administration functions on the assumption that what it hears most frequently is the majority opinion in camp although in actuality it may be the opinion of a small minority, it has gained a false impression of camp. Since both Mr. Head and the Nisei council had finally recognized the C.E.C. and the L.R.B. he expected things to work out much more efficiently in the future.

In the afternoon Rev. Mitani revisited X this time accompanied by Nakachi to persuade him to join the L.R.B.

At that time Nakachi informed X that Nagai's first plan was to fill up the C.E.C. with former E.R.B. members excepting him since he was chairman and therefore indispensable, but he had objected since the functions of the E.R.B. would be retarded with entirely new men unfamiliar with their work. He had advised Nagai to select able men for his committee, let them do the dirty work and simply act as kantoku or supervisor over them. According to him Nagai seemed to be greatly in favor of that plan. Nakachi wanted X to replace Mitani on the L.R.B. since the latter was now chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Coop and would soon have to be released.

X was also approached twice by Nagai, once directly and *on* another occasion indirectly through Sakamoto, a prominent resident of block 45 and a personal friend, to induce X to join the C.E.C. In all of his interviews X gave the same reply: He had accepted a block manager's job only a few days before and could not defy social sanction in his block. Should he accept a position in the C.E.C. or the L.R.B. the residents would surmise that he was after a "big shot job" and did not care a hoot about the welfare of his block.

On this day it was also rumored that Nagai had hesitated to invite Mitani into the C.E.C. because as soon as the news leaked out that he was being considered a number of Nisei (presumably Nisei councilmen) approached Nagai and warned: "Mitani's job is preaching the gospel -- **not** the gospel of politics but the **gospel** of God."

Monday, Feb. 8, 1943

The joint council approved the appointment of Hiroshi Amano, vice-chairman of the T.C.C., and Frank Kawai, pre-strike councilman, to the C.E.C. in a meeting held in Mess Hall 32 in the afternoon. The appointment of K. Matsumoto to the C.E.C. and Rev. Mitani to the L.R.B. was also approved. At that time Tom Yanai, former L.R.B. member, was selected to replace Smoot Katow as vice-chairman of the L.R.B. (Smoot declined once, then reaccepted, then resigned).

According to Nomura, the C.E.C. will be run by Nagai and K. Matsumoto, and the L.R.B. by Nakachi and Mitani for some time since they are practising extreme caution in the selection of their committees.

Feb. 15, 1943