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CONFIDENTIAL

ARMY AND LEAVE CLEARANCE REGISTRATION

AT WAR RELOCATION CENTERS

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This general report on the registration of residents of War Relocation centers is written in an attempt to explain the crisis situations which accompanied the carrying out of registration and to give a background against which to interpret the registration results. The main value of the report is its guidance for future administrative action, stressed in the concluding section.

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ARMY AND LEAVE CLEARANCE REGISTRATION
AT WAR RELOCATION CENTERSI. PLANNING IN WASHINGTONA. Registration and WRA Policy1. The Combat Team

On January 28, 1943, Secretary of War Stimson announced that the War Department would soon create an All-Nisei Combat team to be composed of volunteer Japanese-Americans including many from relocation centers. This decision to induct Nisei into the army came as the result of much discussion and planning on the part both of WRA and of the War Department.

In connection with the call for volunteers, it was decided to conduct a special registration of male Nisei, 17 years of age and over, at all relocation centers, and to use the forms obtained as a basis for determining eligibility of volunteers for service in the combat team, for certifying individuals as eligible for work in defense industries, to facilitate WRA leave clearance and to facilitate the possible future drafting of Nisei. For this purpose, the War Department, in cooperation with WRA, devised a special four-page questionnaire, Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry (DSS Form 304A).

2. Leave Clearance Registration

The basic policy of WRA, resettlement outside relocation centers, although implemented in October, 1942, had been moving slowly because of various bottlenecks which had developed in the processing of leave clearance applications. Individuals who had succeeded in locating jobs were unable to take them because they had not been cleared for leave -- though in some cases they had made application weeks or even months before. Others, who had at first felt no desire to leave the centers were losing jobs because their tardy leave clearance applications could not be processed in time. In this situation, many evacuees who had planned to leave the centers were becoming discouraged, and others were coming to feel that the leave program held little hope for them. In fact, many evacuees doubted the sincerity of the whole resettlement program. In the meantime some of the pro-Japanese made use of this condition to try to undermine the faith of these Nisei in America.

One advantage of the army registration was that it provided an opportunity for a wholesale job of leave clearance for a large segment of the centers' population; and although the processing task was enormous, it promised to provide a large pool of Japanese-Americans who were eligible for immediate leave. In terms of the leave program, however, there was no rational basis for confining the wholesale clearance effort to the male citizens, so it was decided in WRA to conduct a registration of all persons 17 years old and older in the ten centers. A revision of the Application for Leave Clearance (WRA 126, REV.) was worked out for use in the registration of the other population groups in the centers, i.e., Nisei females 17 and over

and Issei males and females 17 and over. In this way it was hoped to break the clearance bottleneck and prepare the way for a really large-scale program of outside resettlement.

B. General Organization of Registration

To conduct the army registration and accept volunteers, the War Department organized ten teams consisting of a commissioned officer, two sergeants, and one Nisei technician or sergeant. The personnel of these teams was assembled in Washington and put through a short training course before proceeding to the centers. Simultaneously, a call was sent to the projects for a staff representative to come to Washington for a series of conferences on registration, while some other project officials, including project directors, were apprised of the program at regional meetings attended by the national director.

The project representatives sent to Washington discussed various possible plans for carrying out the registration program. Because of the wide differences between projects and project staff knowledge of local conditions, the detailed planning of the registration procedure at each center was made a joint responsibility of the Army Team Captain and the Project Director, who could utilize the advice of such staff members as he chose, including that of the man from his project who had been at the Washington meetings. General guidance was provided in a letter from the Acting Director of WRA in Washington ordering the registration, a WRA Administrative Instruction (No. 22 Rev., Suppl. 3), and in a set of General Instructions issued to the Army Team Captain. (See App. A). These documents were issued on February 1, four days after the Stimson announcement.

It was planned that the Army Teams should arrive at the projects on or shortly after February 6, and that the registration should begin on February 10 or a minimum of two days after the arrival of the Army Team. The letter ordering the registration also stressed its great importance and assigned it first priority at the project, authorizing the closing of the schools and such other departures from normal routine as might be deemed necessary.

C. Expected Outcome of Registration

WRA and War Department officials in Washington and the project representatives anticipated that registration would proceed with relatively little trouble and would easily produce the desired results. In having reopened the Army to Japanese Americans, they felt that a long step had been taken toward restoring full citizenship rights to the Nisei, and they anticipated that the announcement of the Nisei Combat Team would be welcome news to center residents. They recognized that the registration was going to be a tremendous task, demanding much of the energy of the project staffs, and in the orders issued to project directors, they made what seemed like adequate provisions for getting the work done.

That the registration did not receive as welcome a reception as expected at many centers was due primarily to three crucial weaknesses in the

planning done at Washington, which hindsight readily discovers:

1. The planning was not predicated on full understanding of the prevailing attitudes of the center residents. Since there was very little expectation of resistance to registration, no adequate provisions were made to meet it.
2. The plan gave too much responsibility and authority to project officials and Army Team members without sufficient directive definition of the limits within which the authority was to be exercised. Thus contradictory interpretations, and sometimes direct violations of instructions occurred, at several centers.
3. The plan, which was one of the most significant steps in WRA history, was not fully understood by many WRA employees both in Washington and at the centers. This was due in part to the secrecy which surrounded negotiations with the War Department, precluding advance preparation of the WRA staff, and in part to the fact that clearing leaves was a function of the employment division only; but principally it was due to the rapidity with which the program was put into operation following the Stimson announcement. No time was taken to prepare an effective educational campaign aimed at all WRA employees, many of whom never fully understood the significance of registration, especially the general leave clearance registration.

II. EVACUEE ATTITUDES, JANUARY 1943

A. Resentments Arising Out of Evacuation Experiences

In January 1943, the residents of relocation centers had been living away from their homes for nearly ten months. Urged to show patriotism and loyalty to the United States by evacuating the West Coast, Japanese Americans had cooperated fully with the authorities. They had had to move out hastily, to liquidate their properties and business, to store their household goods, to live under trying conditions, to move once, twice or more times.

Since evacuation, however, more and more of the Nisei had begun to think they had erred in submitting to the evacuation orders without protest and thus surrendering many of their rights as citizens. By January, general resentment of the loss of citizenship rights was present in the centers, finding expression in minor acts of violence against JACL leaders (who had strongly urged cooperation in evacuating) and in an extreme sensitivity about anything that seemed to threaten further or prolonged infringement of citizenship rights.

Evacuation experiences were often unpleasant and many individuals and groups nursed special - and understandable - grievances because of them. For example, former residents of Terminal Island, and other areas had seen relatives rushed off into internment shortly after Pearl Harbor without - as they saw it - any real justification. Others had seen their prosperous retail businesses virtually wiped out, or the fruits of years of agricultural work lost.

The assembly centers were the scenes of many unpleasant experiences: at some, families were housed in stables said still to contain evidences of their former use; hasty eating in crowded mess halls was especially hard on family groups; at some centers, arrangements made for the visits of friends were similar to those made for criminals in penal institutions. The early experiences in relocation centers were not much better. In the months since arrival at relocation centers, there had been ample time for reflection and for the comparison of experiences among the evacuees, and by January 1943 the population had had ten months in which to brood over them. It is notable that at Poston and Tule, where half the inhabitants had never been in an assembly center, their attitudes were much the same as in the other relocation centers.

B. Lack of Confidence in WPA and the Government Generally

Evacuation experiences not only shook the faith of many evacuees in the good intentions of the government, but also created widespread skepticism of official pronouncements.

At the time of evacuation many irresponsible and unauthorized statements had been made to Japanese Americans concerning the conditions they could expect to find both in assembly centers and in relocation centers. These statements created expectations which were not met, and the failure

of the government to fulfill these ill-founded expectations left many evacuees in an openly suspicious frame of mind and ready to look for a joker in any new policy statements. Because the War Relocation Authority was often not distinguished from other government agencies in evacuee thinking it was blamed by many for the actions of other government agencies in connection with evacuation.

This confusion of WRA and other Federal agencies is not the sole reason for the lack of evacuee confidence in WRA. Prior to movement out to relocation centers, a leaflet was distributed by WRA which contained certain questions and answers about relocation centers. The answers given were interpreted as promises by evacuees who later discovered that conditions were not as they had been pictured.* Various other misunderstandings had occurred in connection with WRA administration in relocation centers. For example, the leave program announced in October ran into many administrative difficulties and by January many evacuees believed the government did not really intend to carry out a large-scale resettlement program.

By and large, the attitudes of evacuees toward the WRA have been conditioned by their experiences with local relocation center administrations. At some projects the administration succeeded in winning the confidence of the evacuees and was felt by the majority of the residents to be fair-minded in performing its functions. At other centers the picture was different, specific conflicts having developed - in one project leading to fatal results - between residents and administration which had produced a further disillusionment of the people.

The Japanese Americans at many projects had arrived at centers which were not yet ready to receive them - lacking proper sewage disposal, hospital facilities, etc. At one center, the residents had seen the departure of one project director who had made it a point to keep in touch with them and the arrival of another who had in various ways shut himself off from contacts with evacuees, his behavior in contrast to that of his predecessor creating distrust and ill will.

* For example, in answer to question 2, "Should I sell or store my household goods?", evacuees were told to "keep in mind that you will be going to a war-duration relocation center" and that "as soon as you move to your war-duration home...the War Relocation Authority will have (certain household) goods brought to you." Relocation centers have turned out not to be "war-duration homes", and delivery of household goods was still awaited five months after the last West Coast evacuee arrived at his relocation center.

In answer to question 13, on education facilities, it was stated that one of the first jobs of the War Relocation Work Corps will be to build schools and school equipment, whereas actually in most centers special apartments for appointed personnel are being built before new school buildings.

C. Special Distrust of the Army

Of all government agencies, the Army was most thoroughly disliked and distrusted. Important among the reasons for this were the following:

1. Although evacuation was authorized in general terms by an executive order of the President, specific evacuation orders came from the headquarters of the Western Defense Command.
2. The evacuation was managed by an agency of the Western Defense Command - The Wartime Civil Control Administration - and the most unpleasant aspects of the relocation had been, therefore carried out by the Army.
3. The assembly centers were under close Army guard. Often searchings for contraband and use of searchlights at night were especially resented.
4. Some Japanese-Americans were released from service in the Army immediately following Pearl Harbor and the induction of all others was suspended. Nisei who remained in the Army were re-assigned to units in the Middle West.
5. The relocation centers were provided with a military police guard which patrolled the boundaries and controlled ingress and egress. This control was especially tight in the four centers located within the restricted area in California and Arizona, where any Japanese American leaving the center was required to secure a military pass and to be accompanied by a non-Japanese escort.
6. The Selective Service System had reclassified Japanese American registrants in 4C - the deferred category for aliens - and at the end of January formal notices of this classification were being received by some of the evacuees.

D. Insecurity and Apprehension Regarding Future Status in the United States.

The frequent moves and upsets in personal life and social groups incident to evacuation created in many a strong sense of insecurity. Most of the residents were deeply worried about their future status in the United States. This was particularly true of the Nisei, but it was true also of the Issei, who, because of their age, could not anticipate a successful rebuilding of the lives whose security had been destroyed by evacuation. The Issei were also worried on behalf of their children, and wanted nothing better than to be let alone at this point.

This apprehension over future status was constantly being renewed by adverse publicity in metropolitan newspapers circulating in the relocation centers. Although some favorable publicity also appeared, more prominent were such items as discussion of discriminatory land laws; demands that no Japanese be allowed to remain in the state following the war; efforts on the part of certain West Coast groups to disfranchise the Japanese or to prevent

their future return to California. (The most widely read papers in the centers are those from California.)

Moreover, these discriminatory efforts were not limited to discussion. The State of Arkansas passed a law forbidding the purchases or ownership of land by persons of Japanese ancestry; public pressures caused the WRA to discontinue the construction of elementary schools being constructed under contract at two centers.

E. Summary

In January, 1943, the residents of relocation centers felt that they had been discriminated against in the evacuation, that they had blundered in failing to protest it, that their future in the United States was being threatened from many quarters, that WRA and the government generally could not be trusted, and that the Army, in particular, was responsible for their present situation.

It was thus in an atmosphere of insecurity and suspicion that the Army and leave clearance registrations were conducted - a fact not adequately recognized until the registration was already in progress.

III. ORGANIZATION OF REGISTRATION PROGRAM AT RELOCATION CENTERS

A. Presentation to Evacuees

The means chosen to explain the registration programs to the residents of relocation centers varied widely. At all projects, the local newspaper was used and everywhere the text of the War Department message* was reprinted in full, but beyond this, treatment in the project papers was quite uneven.

The kinds of meetings arranged for the elucidation of the program also differed. At one project immediately following the Secretary of War's announcement, the project director consulted evacuee leaders on the best means of presenting the plans to the residents. On their suggestion, "trial balloon" meetings were held prior to the arrival of the Army Team, which served to make the administration aware in advance of reactions to registration and so to recognize the necessity for full explanation of the plan.

In contrast to this, the procedure at another project was for each Army Team member to visit one to three ward meetings on the evening of February 9, prior to the beginning of registration. After the War Department message had been read, audiences were informed that questions would be answered by the registrars who would be open for business the following day. This was the extent - aside from statements in the project paper - of organized preliminary explanation of the registration program to the residents of the center.

B. Mechanics of Registration

Projects varied in the mechanical provisions made for conducting the registration. In general, two patterns prevailed, the registration being carried on in each block separately or being organized in some central place, usually the school blocks. Arrangements varied as to timing also. At some projects the original plan called for simultaneous registration in all blocks, while in others registration was to be done by blocks over a period of several weeks.

Correlation of the Army and leave clearance registrations was differently arranged at different projects. At Granada the Army registration was carried on in the schools and was completed by February 13 before the leave clearance registration was begun; then the leave clearance registration was carried on later by a crew of registrars who moved from block to block. At Manzanar the Army and leave clearance registrations were conducted simultaneously in individual blocks, the leave clearance registration being completed by February 16, although the Army registration - since the Army Team had been established in a central place to accept answers to questions 27 and 28 (See Appendix A for the various forms of these questions) - continued for some time longer (until February 26). At Tule Lake the plan was to conduct both registrations simultaneously in individual blocks, but when this broke down because of the failure of the residents to register, the plan was changed and the registrars were established in the administrative area. At Rohwer, both registrations were conducted simultaneously by mobile teams moving from block to block for a period of three weeks. However, because

* This official explanation of the Combat Team is reproduced in Appendix A.

the program had been announced as voluntary, many did not register, and for the fourth week the registrars were established at a central location for a compulsory sign-up of those who had not yet registered.

C. Significance of Organizational Variation

The methods of presentation and of carrying out the two registrations were extremely diverse. This was a natural result of the failure to set minimum or uniform standards for registration procedures.

The wide diversity had some interesting results. For example, projects which rushed through their registrations and finished them up quickly were at something of a disadvantage because of the delayed reconstruction of question 28 for aliens. Combining the two registrations worked out well at some centers and badly at others, but undoubtedly it had the effect of complicating the issues raised by registration in the minds of evacuees.

At centers where registration was conducted block by block in a progressive sequence, blocks in which there was considerable resistance to registration were able to exert strong social pressure on residents who actually desired to sign up but were not prepared to face the strong disapproval of their neighbors. At several centers, opposition to registration developed, partly as a result of the social attitudes described above and partly perhaps because active pro-Japanese saw in the situation a good chance to get a hearing for some of their anti-American views.

IV. GENERAL EVACUEE REACTIONS

A. Initial Surprise and Crucial Issues

The first announcement of January 28 that the Army would form a Nisei Combat Team came as a decided surprise to many residents of relocation centers. First reactions were apparently not pronounced, but as time passed and as more and more residents became conscious of the - to them - about-face in Army policy indicated by this announcement, more and more questioning about its significance became evident. From what has been said in a preceding section (II) about evacuee attitudes toward the Army it can be appreciated that from the evacuee viewpoint the Combat Team represented a decided departure from past policy. The fact that previous Army policies had been strongly resented also helped produce some adverse reactions.

On February 4, a teletype inquiry regarding initial evacuee reactions was sent to all projects from WRA national headquarters. Almost without exception the responses to this telegram indicated that the segregated nature of the Combat Team was particularly resented. It was interpreted as a further instance of discrimination against Japanese-American citizens, and on some projects references to "Jim Crow" policies were made. (See Appendix B.)

As time passed and the Army Teams arrived and delivered the War Department's message at the various projects, the emotional tension over the discrimination issue and others raised by registration details increased at all projects. This was true of the centers in which the presentation of the registration plan was most clearly understood as well as of those in which the official presentation left doubt and misunderstanding in evacuees' minds. Probably the best general interpretation of this rising tide of emotional crisis is that the registration had precipitated all the suppressed resentments growing out of evacuation and relocation center experiences. Several issues of crucial importance to the lives of evacuees were raised by the registration in such a way that they could not be avoided, but on the contrary must be faced and resolved by every individual registrant.

These issues were four in number: (1) equal citizenship, (2) military service, (3) Issei status, and (4) loyalty.

1. Equal Citizenship

Equal Nisei citizenship was a matter of considerable disagreement among evacuees. There were some who argued that evacuation involved no irretrievable loss of citizenship rights and that therefore it was the Nisei's obligation to cooperate with the government in every way possible. Others felt, on the contrary, that evacuation was so serious a curtailment of their citizenship that it was hopeless for them to expect any satisfactory future in this country. The separate All-Nisei Combat Team became the symbol of further discrimination in the eyes of many who asked "Why, if we are to serve in the Army, can we not be inducted according to the same procedures as apply to all other citizens?" The draft classification of Nisei Selective Service registrants as 4C (the classification for aliens) seemed an indefensible

discrimination against them since no other American citizens, even those of German or Italian extraction, were thus classified. The form used in the Army registration, (DSS Form 304A) "Statement of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry", was unlike any Selective Service form presented to other groups of citizens. Moreover, many male Nisei argued that they had already registered for Selective Service and saw in the special registration for Japanese American citizens a further special discrimination.

In decisions reached by individuals and groups, therefore, the question as to whether discrimination against persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States was too great ever to be overcome was of primary importance.

2. Military Service

Since the Army registration involved a call for volunteers, all the many questionings which occur in any normal American community with a similar call for volunteers came up. But in addition, young men who for ten months had been barred from military service, and who had been confined behind barbed wire, were suddenly required to decide whether on their own volition they would enter the Army. They not only had not expected any such opportunity to occur, but found themselves totally unprepared to make a rational decision on the matter. Other special problems were involved in deciding whether to volunteer. Many Nisei felt great concern over the possible fate of their families and raised questions with the administration about what could be expected in the way of provision for them. Some Nisei became convinced by the simultaneous leave clearance registration that it was the intention of WRA to move their parents out of the centers as quickly as possible and they felt great concern over the readjustment difficulties they knew their parents would face in strange communities. Others wondered what would happen to family properties in West Coast states which had alien land laws if they themselves should volunteer and be killed in action. Since property was frequently held in their name and since aliens could not own land, they feared that their parents would stand to lose their West Coast real estate.

3. Issei Status

The alien group, in addition to its concern over Army registration for its sons, was forced by the general leave clearance registration to raise many questions about its own status in this country. The interpretation was made that a compulsory registration of aliens in relocation centers on forms headed "Application for Leave Clearance" meant ultimate removal from relocation centers. Most Issei had no intention of resettling outside the centers and indeed had not even seriously contemplated the possibility; now this possibility was forced upon them by registration.

The form of question 28 (See Appendix A) as originally presented to the Issei at most centers was one which they found virtually impossible to answer in the affirmative since it was one which compelled them to renounce allegiance to Japan and swear allegiance to the United States - a country in which they had been denied citizenship. While it is true that the revision of question 28 on the leave clearance form used by aliens clarified this situation, it is also true that at projects which were most prompt in organizing

their registration and had presented the question in its original form, the thinking of some of the Issei about their future in this country had already been greatly altered. For many of them the registration seemed to present a problem which had only two solutions: to accept discrimination against them by the United States for the sake of their children, or to reject the United States and to request repatriation to Japan. Thus as a result of registering the aliens and the male citizens at the same time, young men who were being asked to volunteer in the armed forces of the United States were living in homes with parents who were seriously considering whether they ought to select for themselves a future in the United States or a return to Japan.

4. Loyalty

The issue of loyalty was much more alive in the minds of appointed personnel at the projects than it was in the minds of evacuees who were registering. Some evacuees, it is true, regarded 28 as a loyalty question and felt that anyone who answered it with other than an unqualified "yes" was disloyal to the United States. Most Nisei, however, while they were concerned about equal citizenship, about the possible fate of their parents and about military service, did not regard question 28 as a loyalty question. This is clearly shown by the fact that at many projects some of the most clearly loyal and most thoroughly American of the Nisei wrote qualified answers to question 28 in which they attempted to explain that while their loyalty was actually unqualified they could not answer this particular question with an unqualified affirmative because they felt it necessary to defend their claim to citizenship status on a par with all other Americans. Some wondered how they could honestly forswear allegiance to a country and an emperor they had never had. On the other hand there were the truly pro-Japanese who answered "no" to 28, and some of doubtful loyalty who answered "yes" while telling others to answer "no" as a protest.

B. Misunderstanding and Confusion

Accompanying the emotional crisis of registration at all projects was an almost unbelievable amount of confusion and misunderstanding of the purposes of registration and even of the significance of various questions in the questionnaires. Confusion was most marked among the evacuees but it is important to recognize that it was also great among the appointed staffs at some projects. Even some Army Teams were by no means clear on all aspects of the registration, and the general background of evacuation and relocation. This inadequate understanding on the part of WRA project employees was an extremely important contributing factor in the confused understanding evacuees at most projects received of the registration.

Certain factors contributed to misunderstanding and confusion at virtually every project:

1. The combination of Army and leave clearance registration prevented the very important issues raised in the minds of evacuees by each registration from being considered separately and on their

own merits and prevented many from arriving at a satisfactory understanding of either procedure.

2. The aims of registration were never made clear to the residents of many centers. In part this was due to the poor reception accorded the War Department message because of underlying antipathy to the Army and suspicion of WRA's intentions. In part it was due to the absolute lack of any clear-cut and detailed policy statement explaining the general leave clearance registration. The relation between the leave clearance bottleneck in Washington and the general leave clearance registration was understood by very few, if any, evacuees during the first week or so of the registration.

3. Question 27 as it appeared on DSS Form 304A (See Appendix A) was felt by many evacuees to be a very tricky question indeed. It seemed to them that an unqualified "yes" to this question would mean immediate induction into the Army, whereas an unqualified "no" would mean a refusal to serve in the Army under any circumstances. Actually what many desired to indicate was that they were willing to serve if called through the regular Selective Service procedure but that they did not desire to volunteer. At some projects, Granada, for example, it was suggested that this question might be answered by the phrase - "Yes, if drafted", which provided a satisfactory solution to the dilemma although it departs from the original general instructions to Army Team Captains: "Male citizens who answer Questions 27 and 28 of DSS Form 304A in the affirmative will executeDSS Form 165," the Application for Voluntary Induction.

4. Undoubtedly the greatest confusion in the minds of evacuees arose as to the meaning and significance of question 28 (See Appendix A) - the famous "loyalty" question. For the aliens, this question in its original form was virtually unanswerable as has been suggested above. In the modified form sent out from Washington, which omits all references to allegiance, it was acceptable to most Issei. In the special modification devised at Manzanar, it differed very little in meaning from the original version and remained a question which relatively few Issei could answer affirmatively.

Some male Nisei felt that a negative answer to this question was required of them if they had answered question 27 in the negative because of the phrase regarding defense of the United States. Others sincerely believed that if they answered this question negatively they were duty bound to apply for expatriation or repatriation since they had virtually repudiated the United States. Many felt themselves unable to answer this question with an unqualified "yes" because of their feeling that their citizenship itself had been qualified by the evacuation and subsequent experiences.

5. At at least one project the question arose as to who had ordered registration. The Army Team arrived at this project with the expectation that a Selective Service order would be issued requiring the registration of male citizens of Japanese ancestry. At this project evacuees were threatened with drastic disciplinary action if they failed to comply with the non-existent Selective Service order. This occurred despite the fact that the General Instructions to Army Team Captains (See Appendix A) had specifically stated that "the accomplishment of the questionnaires is being ordered by the War Relocation Authority.....in the event of refusal to accomplish a questionnaire or part thereof no threats will be made.....". (See Section V.A. 1. below for details on this situation.)

6. At some projects there was confusion as to whether or not registration was compulsory, even though the Army Team instructions and the letter of February 1 from Mr. Rowalt to all project directors are both unequivocal on the point. Mr. Rowalt's letter stated "The registration will be compulsory except in the case of those who have requested repatriation." Yet in spite of this clear provision, registration was presented as voluntary at the two Arkansas projects, and was made compulsory there only after a long period of voluntary registration had failed to get desired results. This same confusion was also evident at one inter-mountain project where the director, asked what penalties existed for refusal to register, replied that he knew of none.

7. The relation between repatriation and registration was badly misunderstood at several projects. The sentence quoted above from Mr. Rowalt's letter exempts "those who have requested repatriation" from registering. This phrase "have requested repatriation" was by no means clear, and at Tule Lake and Jerome large numbers of people took the position that they wished to request repatriation and therefore would decline to register. Later clarification resolved the issue so far as technical requirements were concerned, but it did not remove the confusion in the minds of the evacuees.

V. CRISIS SITUATIONS AT SELECTED RELOCATION CENTERS

While the general reaction of evacuees to the registration program was similar in its main outlines at most of the projects, vastly different end results were produced because of variations in the local situation. Some of the conditioning factors were: past relations between evacuees and project administration; the situation of a project in the restricted zone of the Western Defense Command, in the South, or in the Inter-Mountain area; the methods used in presenting the program; the manner in which evacuee leadership was utilized or neglected; the divergent interpretations made of crucial aspects of registration. At nearly every center registration produced a crisis - that is, a situation which was regarded as of crisis importance by the administrative staff as well as by the evacuees. In general, crises centered around three main issues: refusals to register, reluctance to volunteer, and negative responses on question 28. Administrative handling of these crises varied and had widely different outcomes.

A. Refusal to Register

1. Tule Lake

a. Before February 21

At Tule Lake, registration was announced in the project paper and was explained at a joint session of the Community Council and the Planning Board on Tuesday morning, February 9th. That evening, the War Department's message was read at meetings in seven ward mess halls by three members of the Army Team who covered two or three meetings each. No presentation in Japanese was made because no translation was available.* Virtually no time was allowed for answering questions in these meetings and there was no general discussion. It was announced that registration would begin the following day in the block manager's office of each block, the school teachers acting as registrars. Members of the Army Team were established at three central offices to process the final questions - 27 and 28 - on the forms of male citizens. Evacuees were told to raise any questions when registering.

Few people registered on the tenth, and in the evening the block managers took the initiative in calling meetings of the people in their respective blocks. These were the first of many meetings, small and large, initiated by the evacuees themselves to discuss the registration in an effort to resolve the issues it presented.

Inadequately informed as to the purposes of registration, most residents of Tule Lake stayed away from the block manager's offices, only 403 registering during the first full week. Meanwhile, discussion of the issues of civil rights, the segregation of the Combat Team, possible compulsory

* The official translation from Washington was late in arriving. Even where it was available, project officials at some centers came to the conclusion on the basis of evacuee testimony that the translation was faulty. See Appendix B.

resettlement, repatriation, etc., went on, and attempts were made to get clarification on various phases of the program through questions submitted by block managers to the city council. A compilation of 150 questions was made by the council and presented to the project director at a meeting on the afternoon of February 13. (See Appendix C for sample questions). At this meeting, the director read the telegram ordering a revision of question 28 for aliens. No until the 15th, however, was a joint Council-Planning Board meeting held at which the project director answered 58 of the questions. At the same meeting, the Captain of the Army Team re-read the War Department message as an answer to the others, and urged a greater response. During this meeting, "it was apparent that the greatest distrust of these programs existed among some of those present". (Tule Lake Reports Officer, early April.) In this general situation of doubt and confusion, a number of pro-Japanese made attempts to further an existing resistance to registration.

On February 17, 347 evacuees applied for repatriation forms before noon, and 200 more were waiting to do so at 1:00 p.m. - a conspicuous and significant rise from the ten or twelve who had asked for such forms the first day after registration. Because of the large demand, issuance of repatriation forms was suspended.

On February 18, registration headquarters was moved into the administrative area and out of individual blocks; six blocks had been notified that they were to register there. In one block where considerable resistance was anticipated, Major S. L. A. Marshall, who had been sent by the War Department to aid in registration, and the project director visited the mess hall during the lunch period. The Major stated that since registration had been ordered by Selective Service, the 54 citizen men and boys of military age must register. The project director read the names of the men involved. At noon on the 19th, 35 had failed to register, and the mess hall was re-visited by the Major who made an even stronger statement, and the project director who called the roll of these who hadn't registered with no response from any of them. Although the project director urgently invited these men and boys to come into his office to discuss the problem with him, none of them appeared. That afternoon, however, a large group from the block arrived at the administration building with a letter signed by the non-registering young men which read as follows:

"We the undersigned do not wish to sign to Selective Service. But to repatriate we will sign any time. So until then there won't be any business."

Inasmuch as the Tulean Dispatch of February 9th had stated that all evacuees over 17 would be registered "except those who have applied for repatriation", these young men could not understand why repatriation forms were withheld from them.

Thus in many respects the presentation of registration was inadequate. The initial meetings raised a multitude of questions in the minds of evacuees, which, because these meetings were so brief, could not be answered immediately. When the questions were finally presented indirectly to the project director through the block managers and Community Council on

February 13 (when registration was in its fourth day), they remained unanswered for two more days until the 15th, when the project director gave short answers to the more important of them at a Council Planning staff meeting. Transmission of his answers to the people, of course, had to wait until Council and Planning Board members could relay them back.

Among the people, registration had aroused the usual reactions of protest against discrimination, fear of compulsory resettlement, etc., and many hundreds of them had seized upon the seeming alternative of applying for repatriation as an easier way out. Thus an ambiguous phrase in the WRA directive ordering registration became the focal point in the thinking of thousands of Tule Lake residents. Even when the male citizens of the first block approached in the new procedure were told that they must register, they believed that by asking for repatriation they could legitimately avoid registration. Not until February 20 - when the administration was already considering the arrest of the 34 for not registering - was there any clarification on this point. On that date it was explained in a special supplement in the project newspaper that citizens must register whether or not they applied for repatriation. According to this news story the project director had received this information the previous day.

a

Perhaps a more serious example of misinformation was the project director's belief that the Army registration was ordered by Selective Service. This was crucially important because it led the project director to decide on the arrest of the male citizens who had refused to register on the 18th. The misconception was shared by Major Marshall and apparently by the Army Team Captain in spite of the clear meaning of the February 1 General Instructions to Team Captains which mentions no Selective Service order; states that DSS Form 304A is really not a Selective Service form but a War Department form; and that "the accomplishment of the questionnaires is being ordered by the War Relocation Authority".

On Sunday, February 21, most of the citizens who had refused to register on the 18th were arrested by the Internal Security Chief, after their block had been surrounded by military police. The arrest occurred "without serious incident", (reports officer, early April) but a resentful crowd inside and outside the military cordon pelted the soldiers with sticks and dirt and shouted imprecations at them.*

b. After February 21

The arrests of the 21st, accomplished as they were with the aid of the military police, finally precipitated open conflict between the administration and the residents of the center. From that date until the conclusion of the registration arrests continued, opposition to registration was more and more thoroughly organized and was reinforced by beatings or threats of beatings

* Realizing the dangerous potentialities of the situation, it is reported that the Captain before entering the project gave careful instructions to his men not to fire unless actually knocked down.

of evacuees for cooperating with the administration.* Registration limped along leaving some three thousand still unregistered late in April.

This period was marked by persistent efforts of the administration to effect registration by force - a course of action to which they were irrevocably committed after the initial arrests and the open opposition which followed them. In spite of attempts early in this period at "reasoning with colonists" (reports officer, early April) in meetings addressed by the project director, Major Marshall, and the Army Team; and in spite of a dozen or more meetings held by the Community Council and the Planning Staff, little was accomplished in allaying the suspicion of the people and persuading them to register. By early March, relations between the administration and the two cooperative evacuee bodies were broken by the mass resignation of Council and Planning Staff precipitated by a disagreement as to methods of handling registration.

The people were so outraged at the continuing application of force that their civil rights protest became identified with a refusal to register. To register was to become a dog - read administration stooge - in the eyes of thousands of Tule Lake residents, including many friends and neighbors.

It is unfortunate that in the minds of the administration any resistance to registration was defined from the outset as "subversive". This administrative attitude, in conjunction with the misunderstanding about repatriation which existed until February 20 and stimulated residents to tie their fortunes to Japan, and with the presence of a few strongly pro-Japanese residents who took advantage of the crisis situation to agitate against registration, is probably responsible for causing many residents not to register or to give negative answers to question 28. The logic is simple: to resist registration is subversive, to be subversive is to be pro-Japanese. In the emotional heat of the moment, only black-and-white distinctions were easily made; and as a consequence, many Nisei who had started by wanting to assert their right to equal citizenship with other Americans, ended by identifying themselves as pro-Japanese.

2. Central Utah

The registration experience at Central Utah offers some interesting and instructive parallels and dissimilarities to that at Tule Lake. It was initiated with a much more thorough educational program which reached both the appointed staff and the center residents. Between February 6 and 12, there were seven large meetings, and a number of special conferences were held with evacuees for presentation of the War Department message and discussion of the registration program. Nevertheless, registration encountered many of the same obstacles.

* The first of the actual beatings, which were very few in number, occurred Monday evening, February 22, the day after the first arrests.

a. Alien Resistance

Before February 11, strenuous Issei objection to the original version of question 28 became known. In response to this and at the request of the block managers, the project director and the Army Team Captain agreed to the postponement of registration until the morning of the 13th. In the interim they transmitted the problem to Washington, and by the opening of registration were able to present the Washington revision of the question for the use of the Issei. This partly satisfied the Issei who now no longer felt that registration would make them "men without a country". Their resistance virtually disappeared the next week, following a meeting with the project director on Monday, the 15th, at which they discussed with him their many problems, including the fear of being forced to resettle against their will. This was the first time they had spoken so frankly to him and the experience served to purge many Issei resentments and thus, ultimately, to eliminate their resistance to registration.

b. Citizen Resistance

Meanwhile, many Nisei had become more and more convinced during the first week that the segregated Combat Team and other aspects of the registration constituted a further affront to them as citizens. The issue took the form of a demand from some citizens that the Nisei refuse to register until their civil rights were restored. On the afternoon of the 14th, a meeting of 33 specially chosen block representatives discussed this question for three hours, and finally agreed to draft a petition to the War Department requesting full restoration of civil rights. The meeting was attended by the project director - who had made it a practice to attend other meetings, and whose presence in no way inhibited the discussion - and by a few other WRA staff members. The Espionage Act was read to the meeting of block representatives prior to any commitment by the group, and at the same time, people were told they were free as individuals to say anything they cared to on the subject and that the Act referred only to organized interference with registration. In this way, any formal vote to refuse to register was forestalled.

Following the afternoon meeting, a committee of nine was selected which drafted a resolution to be sent to Washington. This committee discussed the form of the resolution with the project director and other WRA staff members from midnight until about 2:20, and accepted one modification of the document which the project director then agreed to send off by teletype. (See Appendix D for copy of the petition)

On Monday evening, February 15, the committee of nine came to inquire about the response to the petition and spent some time in discussing the registration with the Captain of the Army Team. Their special request now was for an acknowledgment of the petition they could show in their blocks - any serious demand that its terms be met prior to registering having abated. One member of the committee even assured the Captain of the Army Team that the committee hoped to get the whole camp behind the registration by Wednesday, a very different attitude than had been expressed by the Committee the preceding night.

During the week, responses to the petition arrived at the project from the War Department and from the National Director of WRA stating that only mutual confidence could bring the restoration of full civil rights, and urging the registration and the Combat Team as a first step in that direction. (See Appendix D) In reply, the committee of 33 block representatives presented a statement to the project director for transmission to Washington on February 19 in which they insisted strongly that they were motivated only by a desire to regain their citizenship rights, and concluded by saying, "we accept this registration as an indication of the government's good faith". (Full statement reproduced in Appendix D).

3. Force versus Discussion in Project Administration

The Central Utah presentation of the registration program was clear enough to give the residents of the center a much better understanding of the registration than the people of Tule Lake had received.^{1/} As a consequence the resistance from the residents was immediately centered on the major issues: Question 28 for aliens, and civil rights for citizens. Of primary importance is the fact that the project director, the Captain of the Army Team, and other staff members were constantly prepared to discuss the problems of registration with evacuees. The effects of the protracted conferences were two-fold: they provided a channel for the release of much evacuee resentment in talk rather than in oppositional action; and they acquainted the administration with the kinds of problems faced, thus permitting effective action to be taken. The combination of better information and administrative understanding also made it possible for the citizens who preferred accepting the Combat Team announcement at its face value as a step toward rehabilitation of citizenship to make their views known without interference. On Monday evening, the 15th, a group of young men and women called on the project director and protested the sending of the petition. The following day he transmitted their protest to Washington by telegram. (See Appendix D).

In striking contrast, the poorly informed residents of Tule Lake were not able to formulate their objections to registration so clearly, they were given no real opportunities to discuss the problems with administrators. In the early stages of registration, the administration answered resistance to registration with threats of force rather than with discussion and ameliorative action (e.g. revision on question 28 for aliens). The very different results of the registration^{2/} at the two projects must largely be attributed to these differences in administrative handling even when allowing for the

^{1/} In this connection it should be realized that the Central Utah Center is about half the size of Tule Lake; also that there has been no change of project directors in its history.

^{2/} For example: Central Utah was completely registered by March 1; Tule Lake had 3000 holdouts at the end of April; Central Utah had well over a hundred volunteers, Tule Lake - although nearly twice as large - had only 59.

opposition of a pro-Japanese minority at Tule. It is significant that such a minority also existed at Utah.

It should not be supposed, from the above discussion, that Central Utah solved all its problems. It was like Tule in having several hundred requests for repatriation,* and in having a fairly large proportion of negative responses on question 28, especially from male citizens.

B. Other Registration Crises

1. Reluctance to Volunteer - Minidoka

At Minidoka, the presentation of registration began with a series of four "trial balloon" meetings prior to the arrival of the Army Team, at which the Combat Team and the registration were discussed with the residents by the project director and other staff members. These meetings were held at the suggestion of a group of evacuees - mostly Issei - whose advice the project director had immediately sought.

Devoted mainly to discussion of the Combat Team, these preliminary meetings included rather strong appeals for volunteers, one made by an Issei. (See Appendix E). The usual objections to the segregated team emerged, as did concern over the future of the Issei should their sons enter the Army, and strong objection was raised to the implication that only by volunteering would loyalty be shown.

Five formal meetings with the Army Team Captain reading the War Department message followed by an hour or two of discussion, were held in various sections of the center on successive evenings, beginning February 7, the day before registration started.

With registration thus presented, the issue of whether or not to register never arose at Minidoka, but there was considerable reluctance to volunteer. However, at Minidoka, alone among the ten relocation centers, the initial presentation had been linked with a strong emotional appeal to show loyalty by volunteering. The usual evacuee reactions were encountered, but since explanation of the program was early and thorough, and since the preliminary meetings had stressed volunteering as a way of showing loyalty, it was on this issue that resistance was encountered.

From the outset, the administration was primarily concerned with the success of the volunteering aspect of the program and this major stress contributed to the glossing over of other difficulties. Since both Army and leave clearance registrations began on February 8, the Issei in the first blocks covered had to answer the original form of question 28. Although a number of them answered it in the negative, their resentment was expressed, not in refusal to register, but in pressure against their sons volunteering.

* Many of those were soon followed by requests for cancellation, however.

At the same time, administration policy in seeking Issei advice bore fruit in the activities of a number of Issei who publicly endorsed volunteering for the Combat Team.

The change in question 28 undoubtedly eased the Issei resistance, and at the same time, other steps were taken to promote volunteering.

Early in the second week of registration, it became apparent to the administration that an important reason for slowness to volunteer was the expectation that the draft would shortly be reinstated. Many male Nisei, quite willing to serve in the Army, preferred to wait for the draft partly because the draft seemed to promise service in a non-segregated Army unit. To counteract this tendency the administration took two steps: First, they made plain to the Nisei that reinstatement of the draft was not yet assured but would be contingent on the success of the voluntary induction; second, a more positive appeal was made "stating the fact that if the program does not succeed the far-reaching consequences will be laid to those who failed at this time to put the future of all Japanese-Americans ahead of their own interests." (Minidoka Report No. 42).

This stimulated volunteering to some extent, but not sufficiently to satisfy the administration, which organized a series of four additional recruiting meetings for male citizens beginning on February 24th. Each male citizen in the blocks covered by each meeting received "an individual invitation through the mail. In addition, the Boy Scout Drum and Bugle Corps paraded through the blocks to announce the meeting. The project director, the assistant project director, and boys who had volunteered were the principal speakers. The aims of the meeting were clear-cut.....It was pointed out that it was up to those eligible for military service to be the torch-bearers, regardless of the sacrifice involved, to insure the future rights of Japanese-Americans." (Minidoka Report No. 47) The meetings were well attended and contributed markedly to the increase in numbers of volunteers from 175 on February 25 to 288 on March 6.

It is also noteworthy that Minidoka had a smaller proportion of negative responses to question 28 from both male and female citizens than any other project except Granada. (Source: The Relocation Planning Office).

2. Negative Responses to Question 28 - Granada

At Granada, a marked departure from the usual procedure of conducting the Army and the leave clearance registrations simultaneously gave the administration a unique opportunity to assess early responses on the Army registration, which was completed in four days from February 10 to 13, before the leave clearance registration was started.

The Army registration had been presented to the residents in a series of hourly meetings, one for each two blocks on February 8 and 9. These meetings had by no means succeeded in clarifying all the questions raised by evacuees, whose reactions to the segregated Combat Team were like those of the residents in all centers, but they did constitute a much fuller presentation than some projects received. Because the leave clearance registration had been postponed until after the Army registration, the objections and

fears of the Issei concerning their own registration interfered less with the understanding of the program, probably, than at any other center. Discussion among the residents centered almost entirely on the Army registration (DSS Form 304A).

On Saturday, February 13, the Army registration was completed. When the results were tabulated, the administration learned that only thirty odd men had volunteered for the Combat Team, and that a few over a hundred of the male citizens had answered question 28 in the negative, or had qualified their answers to it. Since a much better showing had been expected this knowledge came as a profound shock.

The problem was discussed at a special staff meeting and was presented to a joint meeting of the old (temporary) and the new (permanent) Community Councils by the project director and several others of the appointed staff. They emphasized the fact that more than three times as many Nisei had said "no" to question 28 as had volunteered, expressed their disappointment at this result, and raised the question as to what might be done about it. Thus stimulated, the new Community Council decided to call three special mass meetings for male citizens at which to present these results and urge reconsideration. Members of the administration, the Army Team, the Community Council, and two volunteers addressed these three meetings which were held on February 19 and 20. Heavily stressed were authoritative interpretations of the possible answers to questions 27 and 28 and their significance, and the three-to-one ratio of "no's" to volunteers. In addition, a patriotic appeal for more volunteers was made by one of the appointed staff.

After these meetings, the Community Council through its representatives in each block or district, made personal contacts with the Nisei who had said "no" to question 28. Each was questioned as to his reasons for the "no", and for most registrants, it appeared that a misunderstanding of the meaning or full significance of the question was responsible.

The Granada crisis, as the administration saw it, was the unfavorable three-to-one ratio of negatives to volunteers. In meeting it, they began by presenting the problem to representative evacuee groups, who in turn took positive steps to alter the situation, calling on the administration for speakers and similar support. The effect of the mass meetings and the individual contacts with negative registrants was to clarify much of the confusion which had arisen in the minds of evacuees following the initial presentation, and to stimulate several score to change their negative answers on question 28. By the close of registration on March 10, there were fewer "no's" than there had originally been volunteers, more volunteers than there had originally been "no's", and the three-to-one ratio was better than reversed.

The leave clearance registration, partly because it did not start until after the emotional stresses which accompanied the Army registration had subsided somewhat, and partly because the late start permitted the use of the Washington revision of question 28 on the forms filled by the aliens from the outset, encountered no obstacles of any consequence and was completed early in March.

Recent summaries of the outcome of registration at Granada prepared in the Relocation Planning Division show that at this project the citizens, both male and female, were nearly unanimous in answering question 28 with an unqualified affirmative. In this respect, Granada surpassed all other centers. Aliens at Granada were also nearly unanimous in their unqualified affirmatives to question 28, the per cent of "yes's" being higher than at any other center save one.

3. Significance of Minidoka and Granada Experiences

The Granada experience, like that at Minidoka, illustrates (1) the value of careful preliminary education, supplemented by further discussion when misunderstanding persists, in the presentation of new policies or programs to the residents of relocation centers; (2) the prime importance of consultation with representative evacuee groups in the implementation of such programs. Differences between projects are so great that the differences in the outcome of the registration at these two projects as compared with others cannot by any means be attributed solely to greater administrative wisdom, but the administrative techniques employed to meet the crises faced at these two projects successfully resolved them to the satisfaction of the administrators principally because they were founded on an understanding of the evacuee point of view and because they involved the active participation of evacuees.

VI. NET RESULTS

A. Twelve Hundred Volunteers

The first and outstanding result of the registration was the volunteering of some 1200 Nisei males for service in the All-Nisei Combat Team. This group, plus the larger group who volunteered in Hawaii, was sufficiently large to assure the activation of the Team.

The volunteering of these young men in relocation centers is outstandingly important as a symbol of Nisei loyalty. Enlisting in the Army from behind wire fences, those volunteers have demonstrated their supreme devotion to the United States.

B. Tens of Thousands of Affirmed Allegiances

In answers to question 28 on DSS Form 304A and on WRA-126 Rev., some tens of thousands of citizens, both male and female, have indicated their willingness to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States. Considering the conditions under which the registration was conducted, these many affirmations of faith in the United States have a special significance. In terms of WRA policy, the many forms with affirmations on question 28 make possible the quick processing of leave clearances for most of these people, and thus advance the resettlement program tremendously.

Thousands of aliens in relocation centers have also answered question 28 affirmatively, thus signifying their willingness to abide by the laws of the United States and to refrain from sabotage or subversive activity. This pledge characterizes the Issei group as largely willing to forget discriminations and to remain law-abiding residents of the United States.

C. Several Thousand Negations on Question 28

1. Nisei

The more important negative answers on question 28 are those made by the Nisei, both because they are more numerous proportionally in this group than among the Issei and because the Nisei* are citizens, whereas the Issei* are aliens.

To understand these negative responses, it is necessary at the outset to recognize that a large number of Nisei negatives are from American citizens who are not disloyal to the country. While many of the "no's" are the answers of pro-Japanese individuals, it is also true that the "no's" and qualified answers on the questionnaires of many can be explained as:

- a. A protest against the loss of civil rights in evacuation or the segregation of the Combat Team.
- b. A concession to the will of parents who were forced by the registration to repudiate the United States and decided on a repatriated future for themselves. At several centers some

* With a few exceptions.

Nisei were influenced to give negative answers to question 28 by parents who could not conscientiously answer the same question (original form) "yes", and who, fearing segregation, urged their children not to break up the family by answering this question differently from themselves. In this connection the extreme youth of the Nisei is significant. Of the males who were required to register on DSS Form 304A, one-quarter were between the ages of 17 and 20, three-fifths were under 25, and less than 10 per cent were in their late thirties or forties.^{1/} This meant that the Nisei required to make the decisions called for by registration were, in many instances, teen aged kids scarcely mature enough to make such serious decisions against the advice of their parents.^{2/}

- c. Others of the Nisei who answered question 28 negatively simply misunderstood the question or the whole registration procedure and consequently did not make any meaningful decision when they wrote "no" on their questionnaires.

2. Issei

Negative responses from Issei may be accounted for principally in terms of their inability to answer "yes" to the original form of question 28, and of their fear that in signing an application for leave clearance they might be laying the groundwork for a forced resettlement. At Minidoka, for example, the majority of the 430 aliens whose answer to question 28 was not affirmative lived in the first 12 blocks registered - blocks in which the question presented was the original form. The rest of the aliens at Minidoka who were presented with the revised question 28 sent out from Washington, were overwhelmingly positive in their responses. At Manzanar, the substitute form of the question devised by the local project staff and used for all aliens was only a little less rigorous in its demands on the Issei than the original form.^{3/}

3. The Disloyal

Some of those who answered question 28 in the negative are, of course, disloyal. These include:

- a. Issei, who tend naturally to adhere to the country of their youth and to feel some pride in the accomplishments of Japan. The fact that alien Japanese have not been able to acquire citizenship in the United States partly accounts for this.

^{1/} Based on a special tabulation made in the Relocation Planning Division.

^{2/} It must not be thought that the Issei at all centers opposed either volunteering or affirmative answers on question 28 by their children. On the contrary, at some centers the Issei exerted very little negative influence on their children, and in at least one center Issei leadership was important in stimulating volunteering.

^{3/} A re-registration, using the Washington revision of the question, brought response of more than 95% "yes".

- b. Kibei, who because of their education in Japan have been more thoroughly indoctrinated with Japanese ideas and ideals than with American values. It must not be supposed, however, that every American-born Japanese who has visited Japan or gone to school there - even for several years - is disloyal to the United States. (As exemplified by men in training at Camp Savage.)
- c. Some Nisei who have never seen Japan are undoubtedly disloyal also. Among them are some who have grown up in social situations so "Japanesque" that they love Japanese ways too much to repudiate the country. Also included are some for whom the bitter experiences of evacuation and relocation have been so disillusioning that they no longer feel it possible to swear allegiance to the United States.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

A. Concerning Registration Returns*

1. No meaningful comparisons of evacuee responses on questions 27 or 28 can be made between projects. There were so many differences in the manner in which registration was presented to center residents, in the manner in which registration was conducted, in the methods used by the administration to deal with crisis situations, indeed in the kinds of crises which arose at various projects, that each relocation center must be considered as unique in its registration returns. For this reason similar responses on questionnaires from different projects simply do not have the same meaning and they should not be added together as though they did.

2. Evacuees who answered question 28 in the negative are not categorically disloyal. Any segregation of loyal Japanese-Americans from disloyal in this group must be made with extreme caution and can only be attempted on the basis of individual investigations which take fully into account the conditions under which the individual registered.

B. Concerning Administrative Procedures

1. The registration experience has demonstrated that there is a need for improved communication between Washington and relocation centers. It is quite evident that information failed to diffuse from Washington to the appointed staffs on the projects and that an even greater failure occurred at some projects in the diffusion of information from project staffs to evacuees.

2. More careful planning of WRA programs which have a major policy significance, as did registration, is definitely necessary. As a part of the planning of any major program, steps must be taken to assure coordination of the various divisions of WRA both in Washington and at the projects, and better coordination of Washington with the projects.

3. A better understanding of evacuee attitudes and problems is needed by those who plan WRA policies and by project staffs. It cannot be expected that the 150 appointed people at the projects can make over the 10,000 evacuees whose affairs they administer according to their own ideas; on the contrary, the success of their administration, as one project director recently pointed out, must depend on their adapting themselves to the 10,000 people for whose welfare they are responsible. Registration showed clearly that an administration which attempts to force its policies through without the understanding of the evacuees creates only conflict and discord and does not achieve the successful implementation of policy.

*

Tabulations of these returns, prepared in the Relocation Planning Division, are reproduced in Appendix F.

APPENDIX A

Announcements and Directives

1. War Department Press Release on Combat Team, Jan. 28, 1943
2. War Relocation Authority Director's Statement on
Combat Team
3. President Roosevelt's Letter to Secretary Stimson
Regarding Combat Team
4. General Instructions to Team Captains, Feb. 1, 1943
5. Mr. Rowalt's Letter to Project Directors, Feb. 1, 1943
6. Army Team Questions and Answers
7. War Department Statement to Japanese Americans
8. Two Versions of Question 27
9. Four Versions of Question 28

APPENDIX A

1. War Department Press Release on Combat Team, January 28, 1943

LOYAL AMERICANS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY
TO COMPOSE SPECIAL UNIT IN ARMY

The War Department announced today that plans have been completed for the admission of a substantial number of American citizens of Japanese ancestry to the Army of the United States.

This action was taken following study by the War Department of many earnest requests by loyal American citizens of Japanese extraction for the organization of a special unit of the Army in which they could have their share in the fight against the Nation's enemies.

The following statement was issued by the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War:

"It is the inherent right of every faithful citizen, regardless of ancestry, to bear arms in the Nation's battle. When obstacles to the free expression of that right are imposed by emergency considerations, those barriers should be removed as soon as humanly possible. Loyalty to country is a voice that must be heard, and I am glad that I am now able to give active proof that this basic American belief is not a casualty of war."

The War Department announced that the initial procedure in the formation of the unit authorized by the Secretary will be voluntary induction. Facilities for this will be nation-wide, including the Hawaiian Islands and the War Relocation centers in this country. No individual will be inducted if doubt exists as to his loyalty.

Upon induction the "Nisei", as American-born citizens of Japanese parentage are termed, will begin training as a Combat Team for service in an active theater. This Combat Team will include the customary elements of infantry, artillery, engineer, and medical personnel. No effort will be spared in developing it into an efficient well-rounded, hard-hitting unit.

The new unit will be trained separately from the battalion of Americans of Japanese extraction--originally a Hawaiian National Guard organization--which is already a component of the Army.

The War Department's action, it was announced, is part of a larger program which will enable all loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry to make their proper contribution toward winning the war--through employment in war production as well as military service.

APPENDIX A

2. War Relocation Authority Director's Statement on Combat Team

I find deep satisfaction in the announcement today by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson that a Combat Team composed of American citizens of Japanese ancestry is to be recruited by the United States Army for active service in a theater of war.

This announcement makes January 28, 1943, the most significant date of the last ten months for persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States.

Many have told me, in conversations and letters, of their desire for active service in the armed forces of this country. For many months I have been looking forward with them to the time when their desire might be realized.

All facilities of the War Relocation Authority, both at the relocation centers and in Washington, will immediately be placed at the disposal of the War Department to speed the formation of the Combat Team announced by Mr. Stimson.

Dillon S. Myer, WRA

APPENDIX A

3. President Roosevelt's Letter to Secretary Stimson Regarding
Combat Team

February 1, 1943

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The proposal of the War Department to organize a combat team consisting of loyal American citizens of Japanese descent has my full approval. The new combat team will add to the nearly five thousand loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry who are already serving in the armed forces of our country.

This is a natural and logical step toward the reinstitution of the Selective Service procedures which were temporarily disrupted by the evacuation from the West Coast.

No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry. The principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry. A good American is one who is loyal to this country and to our creed of liberty and democracy. Every loyal American citizen should be given the opportunity to serve this country wherever his skills will make the greatest contribution--whether it be in the ranks of our armed forces, war production, agriculture, government service, or other work essential to the war effort.

I am glad to observe that the War Department, the Navy Department, the War Manpower Commission, the Department of Justice, and the War Relocation Authority are collaborating in a program which will assure the opportunity for all loyal Americans, including Americans of Japanese ancestry, to serve their country at a time when the fullest and wisest use of our manpower is all-important to the war effort.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

APPENDIX A

4. General Instructions to Team Captains, February 1, 1943

1. Members of the Teams will not give newspaper interviews on any subject during their tour of duty at the relocation centers. This applies equally to the project newspapers within the relocation centers and the press of nearby communities or of communities enroute.

2. Where interviews are desirable in extension of the report of the activity of the Team within the center, they will be provided by the WRA project manager. However, it is considered advisable that such publicity material as is given out by the project manager for use in the center should be reviewed where possible by the Team Captain, so that its military content will be consistent with the interest and policy of the War Department.

3. No members of the Military Team will make any radio broadcasts while on this duty.

4. Where there are differences of opinion as to the procedure at the camps, the advice of the project manager is to be given full weight by military personnel. For example, the instruction given that the Team will be in the center for at least two days before proceeding with the mass meeting is a minimum instruction. If for any reason such as work schedules or bad weather the project manager believes that a longer wait is desirable, the Team will defer to his recommendations.

5. The personnel of the Teams are to be designated at all times as coming from the War Department, Washington, D. C., and are not to be identified in publicity or otherwise with the units wherein they served prior to being detached for this duty.

6. The relocation center address is to be delivered verbatim. Whether it is to be used in smaller group meetings following the mass meeting is a matter to be decided by the teams and the project manager in consultation.

7. If it is deemed desirable by the project manager to hold a preliminary meeting, for example, a meeting of the center council or of group leaders prior to the mass meeting for the purpose of discussing the plan in general terms and effecting better organization of the meeting, there is no objection to this procedure.

8. When questions are asked which are of a policy nature and the answers are not to be found within the "Questions and Answers" form, they may be referred by telephone or teletype to Captain John M. Hall, REpublic 6700, Extension 4207, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Room 4E836, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

General Instructions to Team Captains (cont.)

- a. This instruction applies to questions asked with respect to the Nisei.
- b. Questions with respect to the Issei are to be expedited by the personnel of WRA.

9. The project newspaper, and such other publicity means as the project manager suggests, are to be the means of apprising the center's population of the aim of the mission.

10. In case the Team Captain becomes ill enroute or before his duty is completed, notification will be given immediately to Captain John M. Hall. In case of the illness of any other member of the Team, the Team will carry on with its work.

11. What published use is to be made of the policy statement and the paper of Questions and Answers will be determined by consultation between the Team Captain and project manager. There is no official objection to the reproduction of either of these documents. The policy statement should be published as a whole. The questions may be used either as a whole or in part. No answer should be published, however, until the specific question has been publicly raised in the center or is specifically asked by the center newspaper.

12. Team Captains are expected to cooperate in the procuring of news and are authorized to clear all such information as they consider helpful to the undertaking through the War Relocation Authority project director and his publicity staff for release to the national press services. If, in the judgment of the Team Captain, the response to the questionnaires is so favorable at any time as to be newsworthy, such information may be released to the War Relocation Authority representative even though the completion of the questionnaires is a secret operation. The news originating at the centers, even when released at the instigation of the Team Captain, is to be credited to the War Relocation Authority and not to the War Department. However, in expediting news of the response to the questionnaire, it is proper for the War Relocation Authority to quote the Team Captain, as otherwise there would be no explanation of the release of news known only to military personnel.

13. Attention is drawn to the following statute:

"Espionage Act: seditious or disloyal acts or words. - Whoever,
When the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United

General Instructions to Team Captains (cont.)

States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both." (Sec. 3, Title I, Act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 219); 50 U.S.C. 33.)

It is felt that it should be undesirable to post this statute publicly, but that it should be conveyed to the people in some other less pointed way, such as by talks or conferences with the center leaders or block managers. It should not be used as a threat, but merely offered as a piece of pertinent information.

14. The accomplishment of the questionnaires is being ordered by War Relocation Authority. DSS Form 304A, although printed by Selective Service, is in reality a War Department form. In the event of refusal to accomplish a questionnaire or part thereof, no threats will be made, but the individual urged to comply for his own benefit. If this is unsuccessful, the matter shall be reported to the project director.

15. Many of the details surrounding the accomplishment of the questionnaires will necessarily have to be left for final determination by the Team Captain in consultation with the project director after arrival at the relocation center. Each center will present an individual problem, and the Team Captain should make every effort to arrive at the most effective solution. Matters left to final determination of the Team Captain include: (a) when the speech will be delivered or repeated; (b) the size of audiences; (c) talks to center leaders and block managers; (d) what groups shall accomplish the questionnaire together. However, the general policy shall be to avoid distinctive treatment of aliens and to handle male citizens of military age simultaneously with some other category or categories.

16. All individuals in the relocation centers who had reached seventeen years of age by February 1, 1943 will accomplish some form of questionnaire. Male citizens will execute DSS Form 304A in duplicate and WRA Form 126a in triplicate. Female citizens and all aliens will execute WRA Form 126 Revised in quadruplicate.

17. Questions 27 and 28 of DSS Form 304A will be executed in the presence of Team personnel only.

18. Male citizens who answer Questions 27 and 28 of DSS Form 304A in the affirmative will execute, in the presence of Team personnel only, DSS Form 165, and where the individual is not registered locally, DSS Form 154.

19. All questionnaires executed by citizens shall be checked for legibility and completeness by a member of the Team.

20. In each case where DSS Form 165 is executed, all pertinent papers will be immediately forwarded by the most expeditious means, by the Team Captain, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. The

General Instructions to Team Captains (cont.)

The pertinent papers are as follows: (a) DSS Form 304A in duplicate, (b) DSS Form 165 in duplicate, (c) DSS Form 154 in duplicate, (d) WRA Form 126a in duplicate, (e) WRA Form 26 in quadruplicate.

21. In cases involving female citizens and aliens, the pertinent papers will be forwarded as completed to the War Relocation Authority, 517 Barr Building, Washington, D. C. The pertinent papers are as follows: (a) WRA Form 126 Revised in triplicate, (b) WRA Form 26 in quadruplicate.

22. Reports. Team Captains will report by telephone, between 0900 and 1200 of the morning following the initial presentation of the prepared speech, to Captain J. M. Hall on the status of the program and render an opinion of the manner in which the speech was received. If an earlier report seems advisable, it should be made.

23. A brief daily report will be rendered in duplicate by air mail, to Captain John M. Hall, which will show the results of the previous day's activity as follows:

- (1) Number of volunteers for induction.
- (2) Number of 304A forms completed.
- (3) Number of Forms 126 Revised completed.
- (4) Remarks to include any other pertinent information.

24. In addition, Team Captains will retain appropriate data in order to render a final report to show percentage of completion of the questionnaires, at the time the Team leaves the project.

APPENDIX A

5. Mr. Rowalt's Letter to Project Directors, February 1, 1943

February 1, 1943

Mr. _____
Project Director
_____ Relocation Center

Dear Mr. _____:

You are already familiar with the War Department's announcement in Washington on Thursday of this week that a combat team of Americans of Japanese ancestry will be recruited by the United States Army for active service in a theatre of war.

This action is readily the most important development since the evacuation and relocation program was ordered almost a year ago. It is certain to affect all phases of WRA planning and in some respects, perhaps, our basic policies.

With this letter I am enclosing ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 22 (REVISED) which was prepared after conferences with the War Department and is in harmony with the War Department's procedures governing registration for Army service. These instructions are for use in (1) registering male American citizens of Japanese ancestry at our centers who have attained age 17 and (2) registering all other persons, male and female, regardless of citizenship, who have also attained age 17. The registration will be compulsory except in the case of those who have requested repatriation.

When it became known that the War Department would make this registration of draft-age Nisei men, we decided to include in the registration all other adults, age 17 or more, as a means of speeding up our clearance procedure and with the object of providing a pool of workers, available for placement by WRA and the Manpower Commission in private employment including placement with companies working on war contracts, a matter in which the War Department is especially interested.

We believe that you should stress in your speeches before groups during this registration period that in addition to the opportunity of serving in the Army some citizen evacuees will be certified by a special inter-departmental board, composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, WRA and FBI, as eligible for work in war plants.

Please make it clear that we are not going to force people to relocate when they do not want to be relocated. The mass registration is to be

Mr. Rowalt's Letter to Project Directors (cont.)

accompanied by a greatly speeded up clearance system both in the WRA offices and in the FBI; we are changing from a "retail" to a "wholesale" basis of clearance. The rate of clearance will be changed from a few dozen per day to hundreds per day, and by the end of May, according to our present work schedule developed in cooperation with the FBI, everyone will have been cleared or denied clearance.

Meanwhile, current requests for relocation should be sent to us as usual, even if this should mean some duplication.

The attached instructions set forth certain general procedures based on our conferences with the War Department. We are leaving the management of this program in your hands, knowing that the best way of handling it must depend on local situations. You will have to work out details with the Team of Army personnel which will reach your center shortly.

The Army Team to conduct the registration will include one commissioned officer, one sergeant of Japanese ancestry, and two other sergeants. The representative from your project who has been here in Washington will also be considered a member of the Team. As a part of our courtesy to the Army representatives, we are asking that you accord them the same rate at the administrative mess as our own employees. Also, we are requesting that arrangements be made to accommodate them in our own administrative quarters. They should not be quartered with the Military Police. In several instances, we have learned, the sergeant of Japanese ancestry has relatives or friends at the project. If accommodations are available there and he should choose to stay with them, we would appreciate it if you would make the necessary arrangements.

Just now I am more concerned with the general significance of this undertaking than with procedural details and I should like to give you our own view of the import of the War Department's decision.

Most of all, this decision represents the successful culmination over the past several months of our discussions with the War Department in which we have urged that loyal Nisei of draft-age be taken into the Army. The decision has now been made, and it is now our serious responsibility to co-operate in every way with the War Department's representatives in the speedy, successful execution of the registration which is the first step toward formation of the combat unit. At the same time, please keep in mind the importance of the opportunity here presented to expedite the relocation program through this mass registration.

The registration must be given No. 1 priority. All other activities should give way to it to the extent that this becomes necessary. If, for example, after your discussion with the Army representatives you feel that all or a part of the schools should be dismissed to provide necessary space and interviewers, you should proceed to do so. Our only word to you is to plan the entire program carefully to the end that we will render a valuable

Mr. Rowalt's Letter to Project Directors (cont.)

service both to the Army and to loyal American citizens who have pleaded for their chance to share in the fight against the Nation's enemies.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E. M. Rowalt

Acting Director

Enclosures

APPENDIX A

6. Army Team Questions and Answers

1. Where will we fight?

A. You will be employed wherever your government and the Army of the United States thinks you should be sent. No other promise than that can be given to an American soldier. However, it is not the intention to use you against the Japanese.

2. Is the formation of a Japanese-American Combat Team a type of segregation?

A. The organization of your men into a separate Combat Team is not segregation. It is the means of making the most effective use of your strength for the good of the national war effort and for the ultimate good of all Japanese-Americans. There will be other Japanese-Americans taken into the Army and they will be assigned in the same way as any other American soldier. The organization of a separate Japanese-American Combat Team has the distinct and very definite advantage and value of bringing the Japanese-American question to the attention of the American public and to establish their position as loyal American citizens.

3. What will happen to Japanese-Americans already in the military service?

A. Some will be assigned as cadres for the Combat Team. The others will continue in their present duties or be reassigned as the circumstances warrant.

4. Will our candidates be sent to the regular Officers' Candidate Schools, or will they train separately?

A. They will go in the same way, and be given the same training, as any other candidate.

5. What about the Japanese-Americans who already are reserve officers but have not been called into active service?

A. As they are needed, they will be called, provided they are deemed to be qualified for the work at hand. (It needs to be remembered, however, that there are many reserve officers in all groups which have not been called into active service.)

6. Will all Japanese-Americans in the Army be formed into the Combat Team?

A. No, they will not. The Combat Team is an exceptional organization. Others may be taken into the Army and will be given assignments on the same basis as other American soldiers.

Questions and Answers (cont.)

7. Will the Combat Team be officered by Americans of Japanese blood throughout?
- A. It is contemplated that at first, your regimental, battalion and company commanders will not be Japanese-Americans because of the lack of men who have had training and experience with the higher commands, but that your other company officers will be Japanese-Americans insofar as it is possible to supply those who have had the proper training. As Japanese-American officers prove themselves qualified for higher command, they will be advanced in grade.
8. Have the Japanese-Americans already in the military service been discriminated against?
- A. It has certainly never been the policy of the Army of the United States to countenance discrimination against American soldiers of any race. Where discrimination has occurred, it has been due to ignorance or stupidity on the part of individuals. An Army, in a period of great expansion, cannot take account of all the separate acts of its many individuals. The best corrective is to develop a line of policy which will show the individual what is wanted by his government. That is what is being done in this case. The present course is a direct rebuff to any who have discriminated against the American soldier who happens to be of Japanese blood and will go far toward curbing discrimination against you both in and out of the Army.
9. How will we be treated by other Americans?
- A. A partial answer already has been made to this question. There are many Americans who because of ignorance think of you as a "Jap" and nothing else. They are aroused against Japan, and they feel hostile toward you simply because you are of Japanese extraction. That is the kind of thing we are working against. No American is in a position to look with contempt or speak slightly of a man who is in the uniform of his country. Therefore, the steps now being taken are the surest way to counter discrimination not only now but after the war. Racial prejudices cannot be removed in a day but they can be reduced by good will and intelligent action over a period of time. The best antidote for prejudice against you will be your conduct and bearing.
10. What will happen to those who volunteer for service but are turned down for physical reasons? Will they be returned to the relocation centers?
- A. If the loyalty check shows that they have the interest of the United States at heart, they will be given the chance to work in the defense plants. The government cannot promise to find work for you. In some plants there is still prejudice against employing Americans of Japanese blood. But skilled workers are needed and the news of the formation

Questions and Answers (cont.)

of a Combat Team from among your number will do much to counteract the prejudice already referred to.

11. Besides service with infantry combat forces, can a Japanese-American qualify to become an American flier?

A. It is contemplated that if your willing response and loyal action assures the success of the present undertaking, the other forms of military service may be opened to you. For the present we are seeking volunteers for the Combat Team only.

12. Can I enlist under an assumed name to protect relatives in Japan?

A. If this fear is uppermost in your mind, it would be better not to volunteer at all but to wait and take your chance on being inducted later.

13. What will happen to me if I am captured?

A. That question cannot be answered, but it is assumed that since you are an American, you will be treated as any other American prisoner.

14. What will happen to our property?

A. There will be no change as a result of your entry into the military service. The services of the War Relocation Authority will continue to be at your disposal.

15. Why were all the Japanese-Americans classified as 4-C?

A. Because no clear-cut policy for utilizing your services in the Army had been adopted.

16. Why were some Japanese-Americans discharged?

A. Because no clear-cut policy for utilizing your services in the Army had been adopted.

17. How soon will we be inducted after volunteering?

A. From 30 to 60 days.

18. What provisions will be made for my wife and children?

A. The regular allowances for dependents will be paid them, the same as paid for any other soldier.

19. Will my family be permitted to return to the West Coast?

A. Not for the time being.

20. What happens to my father who is not a citizen of the United States?
- A. Like all other persons now in relocation centers, he may file an application for leave which will be acted upon by the War Relocation Authority. It is probably fair to say that his chances for favorable action will be better by reason of your going into the service.
21. Is my brother, who is not a citizen, eligible for induction in the Army?
- A. No, only citizens are to be inducted under this present action.
22. Will our dependents, part dependents and immediate families be permitted to leave relocation centers to move near or to our quarters? (must mean nearer to)
- A. They will be permitted to leave the relocation centers if they are approved for indefinite leave. Local conditions such as housing facilities will determine whether it is practical for them to live near you.
23. May we marry and bring our wives to or near the training centers?
- A. You may marry, of course, as may all soldiers, but local conditions such as housing facilities, will determine whether your wives can live near your training centers.
24. Where will we train?
- A. At regular Army posts in the United States. Present plans call for the activation of the American-Japanese Combat Team at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.
25. Will this program include American citizens of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii and outside relocation centers?
- A. Yes, a portion of the Combat Team is being made up of men now in Hawaii and in the United States outside of the relocation centers.
26. Will more than one Combat Team be formed if the number of volunteers is more than sufficient?
- A. The question has not been finally answered but it is a reasonable presumption that if this effort is successful other teams may be formed. However, statistics indicate that there are not enough of your people to form more than one Combat Team.
27. What will be done by WRA to look after the families of soldiers?
- A. The War Relocation Authority will make all families of soldiers special cases of project interest to the project director and his staff. This will mean health and protection to the families while they remain at the center, and in the event they wish to leave, priorities of employment and every possible assistance in relocation, including cash drafts when necessary.

Questions and Answers (cont.)

28. Will persons of Japanese ancestry be permitted to re-enter the evacuated areas?

A. No, not for the present.

29. How about Japanese-Americans outside relocation centers?

A. They can volunteer in just the same manner.

30. If I am wanted not for military service but for civilian work, how long will it be before I am granted indefinite leave under this program?

A. If your application is affirmed, as soon as you get a job. The War Relocation Authority and the United States Employment Service are developing job opportunities as quickly as possible.

31. If I am granted indefinite leave, may my wife, who is not a citizen, be granted leave?

A. She may file an application for leave under present War Relocation Authority regulations and if the application is approved, she will be granted leave.

32. Will my movements be free and unrestricted after my indefinite leave from the War Relocation Center?

A. Yes, except for present requirements by the War Relocation Authority.

33. Will I be permitted to travel throughout the United States.

A. Yes, except that return to the evacuated area will not be permitted except on the authorization of the Western Defense Command. Permits for temporary visits will be granted automatically to Japanese-American soldiers in uniform.

34. Will voluntary induction confer reinstatement privileges in employment held prior to evacuation?

A. An opinion of appropriate legal authorities is now being obtained to this question.

35. Is the Army program in substitution for War Relocation Authority's indefinite leave policy?

A. No, in addition.

36. Why is it intended not to use the Combat Team against the Japanese?

A. For general security reasons. Obviously, it would be hazardous to the Team itself and to the Army as a whole to use the Team against the Japanese since the danger of the enemy getting within or behind the

Questions and Answers (cont.)

lines in American uniforms would be a constant risk, hazardous not only to the operation but to every Japanese in the area.

37. Are Japanese-Americans to be permitted to join the Navy?

A. That matter is under consideration by the Navy at the present time.

38. Will Japanese-American women be considered for enrollment in the WAAC's?

A. Not at the present time. However, this matter is under consideration and a decision will be rendered at a later date.

39. How educated do the Nisei have to be to be acceptable for voluntary induction?

A. The same educational requirements as exist for all others inducted into the Army, i.e., the equivalent of a 4th grade education.

40. Will the United States Employment Service assist Japanese-Americans who have been granted indefinite leave to obtain jobs? Will any federal agency help to refinance businesses given up when the owners entered relocation centers?

A. Upon release from relocation centers, Japanese-Americans will be entitled to take advantage of the assistance of all federal agencies in the same manner as other American citizens.

41. Will those who were in the Army in non-commissioned or commissioned class be permitted to have assurance that they will be placed in grade?

A. The extent and nature of previous military service will be carefully considered and insofar as possible they will be returned to their former status.

42. Will men who have completed ROTC in schools and colleges with commissions and ratings be accepted in this Combat Team in rank?

A. Same answer as to previous question.

APPENDIX A

7. War Department Statement to Japanese Americans

We are here on a mission which will be made plain to you within the next few minutes. Some questionnaires are to be distributed among you and what is said here is by way of explaining what use the government intends to make of them.

Our mission is not an experiment but marks the radical extension and broadening of a policy which has always intended that ways should be found to return you to a normal way of life.

Presentations such as this one are being made simultaneously at all of the relocation centers over the United States. All citizens in this country who are of Japanese blood are being told the same things.

NOT CAMPAIGN

The effort is not a campaign or a drive but is an attempt to find a workable solution for the acute wartime problem of one portion of our population. Its fundamental purpose is to put your situation on a plane which is consistent with the dignity of American citizenship.

What is done is being done with the authority of the government of the United States and with the approval of the War Department. But whether it is to be successful will depend finally upon the voluntary acts of free American citizens.

SOLUTION SOUGHT

You may object that this - your life here - is not freedom. The circumstances were not of your own choosing, though it is true that the majority of you and of your families accepted the restrictions placed upon your life with little complaint and without deviating from loyalty to the United States.

The only answer which needs to be made to such an objection is that if there were not many millions of Americans who agree with your point of view we would not be here and this statement would not be made.

The present undertaking is of itself an acknowledgment that the best solution has not been found for you during the present war emergency in your relation to the United States, which is the country of your birth and of your residence.

TEMPORARY SACRIFICE

In any time of crisis, however, when national survival presents itself as the all-important issue, the best interests of the few must some-

CONFIDENTIAL

War Department Statement to Japanese-Americans (cont.)

times be temporarily sacrificed or disregarded for what seems the good of the many. The proof of a nation's good faith is to be found in whether it moves to restore full privileges at the earliest opportunity.

Admittedly this past year has been for you a period of considerable hardship and great anxiety. That was because war came to the United States and imposed extraordinary burdens upon all of its citizens. Our citizens everywhere feel these burdens increasingly.

Your own burdens have differed from those of the majority in our population in kind and in degree, bringing you perhaps greater anguish of mind. The decisions which led to your present situation were studied as carefully as the rush of events permitted, and in the interest of the national security as well as of your personal safety, the steps taken seemed wisest at the time. You are aware of the reasons for what was done.

Not all Japanese-Americans are loyal to their government. Not all members of any group of our population - even those whose ancestors came here hundreds of years ago - are fully loyal to their country.

FREE SOCIETY

That is so because ours is a free society permitting the individual often to choose in what measure he will contribute to the common good. In all groups there are individuals who will not accept any obligation to the land which gives them their opportunity. Wherever you may find them and whatever their blood may be they are the disloyal ones.

When war came between Japan and the United States, there were immediately two difficult problems for our government in connection with that part of its population which is of Japanese blood. The first was how to deal fairly with the loyal citizen who wishes only to serve this country. The second was how to protect this nation from the acts of those who are not loyal.

TWO OBLIGATIONS

It would have been a good thing if both of these obligations could have been met at one time. That was not possible because it has never been the practice of the United States to intrude into the privacy of its citizens and to keep track of all their movements and make a check of their loyalty.

Therefore, until a better way could be found, a general policy had to be followed which in the long run has no doubt tested severely the loyalty of those among you who wished only to serve the United States.

CONTINUING LOYALTY

Of that, the government has been aware, but one risk or the other

War Department Statement to Japanese-Americans (cont.)

had to be taken, and it seemed best to count upon the continuing loyalty of those whose hearts and minds were with this country rather than to accept the danger from the disloyal acts of those who were not so.

It is felt now that before any change is made and before you are asked to make any new decisions these words in explanation are owed to you.

ADDED STRENGTH

What is wanted by your government is that your strength shall be added to that of the rest of the nation in its present fight with its enemies and that ways shall be found to restore you as quickly as may be to your normal and rightful share in the present life and work of the people of the United States.

This does not mean a promise of any relief from worry and hardship, for these will continue for all of us until the war is won. But it does mean that such hardships as you are now experiencing will be gradually replaced by the same hardships which are now being experienced by other American families - the hardships of saying goodbye to family when you leave home to fight for the United States and the hardship of getting along without many things which Americans have always regarded as necessities.

CONVINCED OF LOYALTY

Americans of Japanese blood are wanted to fight for the United States like any other citizens. They are wanted for combat duty where they are fitted for combat duty and for war work where they are best suited for war work. They are wanted because the government and the Army are convinced of their loyalty. And they are wanted not less because of their ability as soldiers and as citizens doing useful work for the American community. You have superior qualifications for the kind of service in which it is intended to use you.

These are among the primary purposes of the questionnaire which is now to be distributed among you. Those who are willing and are loyal, of military age and physically fit, are being asked to volunteer for induction into the Army of the United States. Those who are loyal but for some reason are not qualified for military service - the young men and young women - will be given the opportunity to support the war effort by work on the home front.

MAJOR PURPOSE

The major purpose of what is being done here, however, is this: There are some individuals in this center whose ties with the Japanese Empire are such as to disqualify them for positions of trust in this country. This does not mean that they will not be treated humanely, but it does mean that it would be unwise for this government in this time of crisis to give them

War Department Statement to Japanese-Americans (cont.)

an opportunity to endanger the national security. Therefore, steps must be taken to determine those individuals in whom the United States can place full trust and confidence. The questionnaire is a means to that end.

Your government would not take these steps unless it intended to go further in restoring you to normal place in the life of the country, with the privileges and obligations of other American citizens. The invitation to the young men here to volunteer is simply a token of its good faith and further interest.

SELECTIVE SERVICE

As was the case with all other Americans of military age who were first given the chance to volunteer for service, and if they did not so volunteer were then inducted into the Army via the Selective Service, it is contemplated that in the normal process of building our Army, those among you who do not volunteer but are of the right age and physically fit will probably be taken into the military service in due time.

That is a part of sharing the lot of the general population of this country. You would not want that you would be treated differently than other Americans. Universal service is now the national policy and in the long run there is no better way to apportion our present military responsibilities.

COMBAT TEAM

However, the plan now being contemplated is that Americans of Japanese blood will be formed into their own combat team. You may want to know why it is being done this way. The reason is that if your strength were diffused through the Army of the United States - as has already been done with many other Americans of your blood - relatively little account would be taken of your action. You would be important only as manpower - nothing more. But united and working together, you would become a symbol of something greater than your individual selves, and the effect would be felt both in the United States and abroad. All other Americans would long remember what you had done for the country, and would be a living reproach to those who have been prejudiced against you because of your Japanese blood. Can it be doubted that this would mean a greatly improved relationship between you and all other parts of the American population in the post-war period? To the nations abroad, and especially to the peoples of the East, you would provide the measure of the solidarity of people who get together in the name of democracy.

SAME ADVANCEMENT

Accordingly, you will be given the same pay and the same chances for advancement as other American soldiers. As you prove yourself qualified for officership, you will be given training for commissioned service and the only limits which will be placed upon how many of you are advanced to commissioned grade will be determined by your own willingness and ability. It is recognized that in point of aptitude for military service by reason not

War Department Statement to Japanese-Americans (cont.)

only of your natural ability but of your education, many of you are suitable officer material.

STRAIGHTFORWARD PRESENTATION

It was believed that you would want a straightforward presentation of this new proposal by the government, and therefore the explanation of the plan behind the questionnaire has been made as simply as possible.

It is not necessary for me to appeal to the loyalty of those who are loyal.

If there are any questions in your minds with regard to the policy or to the questionnaire, we will try to answer them.

APPENDIX A

8. The Two Versions of Question 27.

(a) As asked of male citizens:

"Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?"

(b) As asked of female citizens and aliens:

"If the opportunity presents itself and you are found qualified, would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps or the WAAC?"

APPENDIX A

9. The Four Versions of Question 28.

- (a) As asked of male citizens in the Army registration:

"Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?"

- (b) As asked of female citizens and of aliens (prior to revision) in the leave clearance registration:

"Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?"

- (c) As asked all aliens in the original registration at Manzanar:

"Are you sympathetic to the United States and do you agree faithfully to defend the United States from any and all attack by foreign or domestic forces?"

- (d) As revised for aliens in Washington:

"Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?"

APPENDIX B

INITIAL REACTIONS TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF COMBAT TEAM

1. Early Evacuee Reactions
2. To Japanese Version of War
Department Statement

1. Early Evacuee Reactions

On February 4, a teletype message was sent from Washington to each of the relocation centers requesting a report on initial reactions of the residents to the announcement of the All-Nisei Combat Team.

Responses from nine center appear below:

Central Utah Relocation Center

Re teletype query, after general survey, would summarize evacuee reaction -- it is the general desire to prove loyalty by volunteering with following questions awaiting clarification:

1. Why is a separate combat unit necessary?
2. Will Allotment and Allowance Act apply to their dependents?

Charles F. Ernst, Project Director

Gila River Relocation Center

Urge telegraphic statement by you and McCloy clarifying reasons for separate Japanese-American battalion. Jim Crow charges being circulated here. Suggest you stress corps de elite. Excellent weapons, finest of training, and separate battalion as means of protecting identity of Japanese-Americans in combat action.

L. H. Bennett, Project Director

Granada Relocation Center

Reurtel February 4, the reaction of the Nisei to Stimson's speech is, on the whole, favorable although there has been noticed slight tendency to question the motive and the sincerity of the Army in their attempt to recruit the evacuees. The immediate response of the thinking majority was not one emotional outburst, but of quiet, serious discussion. The consensus of opinion was that voluntary enlistment of Nisei would create a very favorable impression with the general public and furthermore would greatly strengthen their position after the war. It may be mentioned that, among those who received the news favorably, there was complete absence of emotionalism or signs of ultra-patriotism. Instead there was cool rational reasoning as to the benefits to be derived from voluntary enlistment in the Army.

A feature of this late move which seems to disturb the minds of the Nisei is the one of segregating them apart from the regular combat units of other Americans. It evidently strikes the majority as being contradictory to the democratic spirit which should pervade all branches of the armed forces.

It is interesting to note that people of younger age, particularly those of the high school age, reveal less interest in the matter than those

Early Evacuee Reactions (cont.)

who have graduated from colleges and consequently who realize the implication of the event. There is a general tendency for the former to base completely their outlook on the happenings of the Pacific Coast and to overlook the possibilities belonging in the future. On the other hand, there is a tendency among the latter to view past events as "water under the bridge" and conduct themselves in a manner which would bring them recognition by the American public.

However, the response to join the Army may not be immediately forthcoming due to the fact that it will take some time for their minds to be reconditioned to this unexpected development. One must take into consideration the strong effect the evacuation and confinement has had on these people.

In summarizing, it can be said that the reaction was favorable. It would not be surprising if the majority applied for positions in defense industries rather than in the Army itself if one were to base his opinion on the action of the rest of the American people. Without an accurate survey, it is impossible to say what percentage of the eligible persons will enlist in the Army.

James G. Lindley, Project Director

Heart Mountain Relocation Center

Reactions of the evacuees regarding recent Army announcements are diverse. A few public words upon the integrity of the Japanese in America, especially the Nisei, by the President or some other high and respected official, will help considerably. A clear elucidation is still lacking on Nisei status. Lack of confidence in them seems to exist. Some received reclassification to 4C from their draft boards only yesterday. Even the count of the board indicated question as to their loyalty. This policy is inconsistent and demoralizing.

All volunteers should be considered loyal to the country.

Most of them question the feasibility of an All-Nisei Combat Unit, claiming they prefer fighting with other bloods and feel that post-war assimilation can be furthered in this way. However, a few feel that by such a unit, they can prove their worth as a group.

Many enlistees visiting the project relate some discrimination toward them even in the armed forces.

Many feel that all branches of the armed forces should be open to them; others want to know what guarantee the government can give them and their parents during the post-war era regarding protection from anti-Japanese legislation, particularly as proposed in California.

Early Evacuee Reactions (cont.)

Kibei and Issei wondering into what kind of scheme they are to be fitted. They feel too much emphasis is placed upon Nisei. Understand that numerous Kibei were discharged from the Army.

Majority of parents now apathetic or at least passive to the announcement. Changed attitude is direct and natural result of the evacuation. If the announcement were made prior to contemplation of evacuation, majority of the evacuees believe that an exceptionally high percentage of volunteers would have resulted with an equally high percentage of approval from their parents.

Far-sighted evacuees favor enlistment because they are concerned about post-war era.

Guy Robertson, Project Director

Jerome Relocation Center

After a week of discussions and unguided deliberation, evacuee reaction to the Army announcement still seems to center about the idea of segregation. Dissatisfaction over that feature of the announcement was practically unanimous for the first few hours, on the theory that it emphasized race difference, again put them in a minority group position, would supply cannon fodder to storm another beach-head, make it easier to watch the group. A discussion chairman cautioned that the minority voice its opinion. Friction already has grown between a boy who wants to volunteer and his parents. But during the past couple of days, evacuees here and there have recognized that public opinion is at stake and admitted pleasure over the Army's official recognition of loyalty among the Nisei group.

Charles R. Lynn, Reports Officer

Manzanar Relocation Center

Evacuee reaction to Army announcement generally passive. Significant that we have seen no mention of it coming back through daily reports from block manager offices. This means managers have instructed the clerks to make no mention of it. Vast majority are looking forward to agricultural or War Relocation for jobs and will not volunteer. Some young single boys openly state will not join because of treatment in past. Estimate 200 volunteers to be a top number.

Robert L. Brown, Acting Project Director

Minidoka Relocation Center

Expressions for gratification over Army recognition of Nisei are mingled with equally strong resentment of separate Army unit which is interpreted as segregation. Many young residents call it "Jim Crowism".

Early Evacuee Reactions (cont.)

Issei leaders applaud opportunity for citizens to demonstrate loyalty, and while they regret method Army is using, they feel that most important is that loyal Japanese-Americans are getting a chance to re-enter the American way of life. Coal-handling crews made up of boisterous, healthy young men were anxious to enlist as soon as announcement was made. Several eligibles I contacted reported parental objection of two-fold nature: Army service and fighting against Japan. Other eligibles seem more interested in war industry opportunity than in Army service. Majority seem to be happy over recognition and chance to leave the center but want to know more about Army plans before committing themselves. There is much speculation over results of induction program and employment program among all residents. Older ones non-committal.

Following is a quote from Irrigator editorial: "Our utterances have always been loaded to the limit with professions of faith and unequivocal loyalty--professions which mounted in frequency and intensity as we instinctively sensed the precariousness of our position after the shock of Pearl Harbor. The simple question now is: Are we to eat our words, or are we going to make them good?"

"It may be said that we have contributed enough already; that we have paid and suffered and sacrificed more than many other Americans, and that we are now being asked too much. But attachment and responsibilities to country and cause are not things to be sluffed off -- and we know it.

"If we are to clinch the case for ourselves, once and for all, and if we are to be embodied in the American grain so conclusively that we can never again be smeared and reviled by the bigots and the home fascists, there is no course for the eligible among us but to try like hell to get into the uniforms of Uncle Sam's fighting forces."

"What we face is the acid test. If we flunk it, we damn ourselves and our posterity."

John Bigelow, Reports Officer

Rohwer Relocation Center

Evacuees show little enthusiasm about Army announcement. Percentage of enlistments expected to be low. Have been very few inquiries concerning enlistment and little interest reported. Many consider separate units racial segregation, some are disillusioned by evacuation, and some fear for the future of families in centers. Believe attitude will change when program is thoroughly explained and its influence on public opinion better understood.

Ray D. Johnston, Project Director

Early Evacuee Reactions (cont.)

Tule Lake Relocation Center

Evacuee reaction varies, War Department announcement too sudden, evacuees not prepared. Small per cent of quota expected to volunteer due to bitterness over evacuation and to older Issei non-cooperative group. Typical comments: "Can't draft me, Government took away Nisei's civil liberties leaving us without citizenship." "Great chess game, Government makes all the moves." "I'll volunteer if my parents will let me." "Will volunteer if we won't be used as lackeys for other troops. I want to fight." "We wanted to enlist, and did. They said, 'No Japs wanted'. Now they want us. Why?" "JACL brought this about. Let them enlist, at least let JACL members set a precedent." On the whole, reaction unfavorable, however, compliance for most part expected.

Harvey M. Coverley, Project Director

2. To Japanese Version of War Department Statement

At least two projects, the Japanese translation of the War Department statement was severely criticized. At Heart Mountain, both grammar and phraseology were found awkward by an experienced translator. Similar criticisms came from Manzanar as the following telegram - received in Washington on February 9 - indicates:

We find translation English to Japanese of speech by Army re registration grammatically poor and ambiguous. Presented as such, it will lose its force. Japanese will laugh at it as we laugh at awkward English grammar and idiom by foreign born. We are revamping translation. Feel other centers should be warned of this. Translation crew, block managers and staff member, John McLaughlin, all concur these views. Telephone us for particulars if desired.

Robert L. Brown, Acting Project
Director

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONS REGARDING REGISTRATION

The following questions are selected from the hundred and fifty presented by the Community Council and the Planning Board to the Project Director at Tule Lake on February 13, 1943.* They are fairly typical, not only of the entire list, but of the kinds of questions which were raised at all relocation centers:

What necessitated the WRA to use the same form for the two groups of people who are of two entirely different categories--namely, female U.S. citizens and the enemy aliens?

What power and authority if any has the WRA to enforce on the people of Japanese nationality to apply for leave clearances if the WRA 126-Rev. is compulsory as stated in question 1? (Please quote the specific clause in the National and International legal document as to the origin of WRA authority.)

What does the phrase "unqualified allegiance to the United States of America" as stated in question 28 of WRA-126 Rev. mean specifically?

It seems that approximately seventy-five per cent of all these questions on Form 126 have been answered previously on the WRA census records, etc. Why should it be necessary to answer them again?

When signing the leave clearance papers, they asked us what part of the country we would like to go. Why is it that we are unable to go back to the Northwest after being cleared for leave? Is it wise to answer such questions on the questionnaire if no official word has been received regarding penalties for not answering or filling in such forms?

Issei husband and Nisei wife or vice versa. Must answer differently as to loyalty. In what right way may they answer together?

Mr. Coverley or the Army representatives stated today (2-10-43) that those Issei who do not care to apply for leave clearance as such may change the title of this particular application form to "Registration" when filling it out. However, the question which remains is: Since the questions to be answered remain unchanged, cannot this particular document still be considered an application for leave clearance in spite of the fact that the registrant intends it only to be a

* At Tule Lake, these questions were presented to the project director four days after the start of registration, and were left unanswered for yet another two days. Many of them were never answered.

"registration" and nothing more?

Does signing the clearance paper mean that the signee has to go out if and when there is a job on the outside?

If you sign the leave clearance form, does one have to go if later one decides he does not want to go?

Issei should not be forced to answer this question 28 since they are not permitted to become naturalized; they would become "men without a country".

Does the statement "back to normal" mean that you can go back to where you came from?

Will we ever be made to leave this camp against our wishes just because we sign this WRA-126 form?

Will the "cleared" aliens be given the status of "friendly aliens" or will they be categorically retained in the "enemy alien" classification?

Why is it that the Nisei are required to re-register?

Why is it that all Nisei in relocation centers be singled out to answer special questions in regard to our loyalty?

For those who do not want to resettle outside, what difference does it make if the paper is changed from leave clearance to just registration? If it is possible to just strike out the leave clearance part, what's the use of having the registration?

Spirit in which the message is interpreted to have been written is one of fair play toward all racial minorities and non-racial discriminations.

- a. Why is it that the Selective Service System has employed exclusively the form "Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry" in the inducting of the Japanese-American citizens?
- b. Does the Selective Service System employ likewise an exclusive form for the purpose of inducting Negroes and other racial minorities, such as the United States citizens of German and Italian ancestry?
- c. In the message it states as follows: "the proof of a nation's good faith is to be found in whether it moves to restore full privileges at the earliest opportunity." (Does the government guarantee to compensate for the great sacrifices both spiritual

Questions Regarding Registration (cont.)

and material which the Japanese-American citizens and their parents were compelled to make because of the forced evacuation?)

1. Does the government guarantee to compensate the properties lost by both the Japanese-American citizens and their parents?
2. Is the government determined to take a drastic step to curve "Anti-Japanese Agitation" and thereby create a healthy and favorable public opinion toward loyal Japanese-American in the United States?
- d. Does the American government allow the United States citizens of Japanese ancestry to volunteer for the Navy, Air Corps, or any other division of the United States Forces according to the volunteer's choice and to the same qualifications which American soldiers are subjected?

What privileges and rights will be granted Nisei and their parents providing that the Nisei applicant answers the question 27 and question 28 affirmative?

Is it a fact that this decision was reached by the War Department upon the recommendation of the JACL?

Can a Japanese soldier or civilian Nisei go back to California? If we can't go back, why should we go into the Army?

Why the sudden enlisting of Nisei boys after putting them behind fences as this camp?

What classification do persons with dependents in relocation camps have?

Are the dependents in relocation camps eligible for dependent allowances?

Has the Army told us definitely whether the Nisei will be inducted into the armed forces if they do not volunteer, and if so, when is this induction to take place?

When the sons are serving in the armed forces, why can't the parents return to their home place instead of keeping them in camp?

Will Japanese-American citizens drafted from this center for the armed forces of the U.S. through some channel of the Selective Service be put into the same or similar units as is contemplated for those who now volunteer?

Questions Regarding Registration (cont.)

If a person answers "yes" to question 27 and 28, does it mean that the person is volunteering immediately or rather does it mean that the person has volunteered?

What is the penalty for answering question 27 and 28 by "no"?

If you answer "no" to the No. 28 question, would it endanger your American citizenship?

Why is it that you want to take us back into the Army after rejecting some of us before?

Why do we have to answer question 28 if question 27 is answered correctly?

In regard to question 27, is this going to be for volunteering or drafting?

Will a man be considered disloyal if he answers "no" to question 27?

What is the present status of Japanese-Americans, especially of those classified as "4-C", and how would it be affected by the present Army "proposal"?

Is it possible to answer question 27 with a conditional "yes"?

If the majority of the Nisei object to the special Combat Unit of Japanese-Americans, would the Army change its plan and mingle the Nisei with the other Caucasians?

APPENDIX D

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO CENTRAL UTAH CRISIS

1. Resolution Drafted by Committee
of Nine, February 15, 1943
2. Response from Colonel Scobey
3. Response from War Relocation
Authority Director
4. Reply of Committee of Thirty-Three,
February 16, 1943
5. Statement of Other Residents of Topaz,
February 16, 1943

APPENDIX D

1. Resolution Drafted by the Committee of Nine, February 15, 1943

Resolution to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson

We, the citizens of the United States of America, residents of the Central Utah Relocation Project, Topaz, Utah, in order to perform our duties as loyal citizens of the United States and in order to uphold the principles of democracy as established in the Constitution of the United States, do hereby state that:

Whereas, we the citizens of the United States have been asked by our government to pledge our unqualified allegiance to this country

Whereas, we have accepted in good faith and in full cooperation the extraordinary orders of the United States Army

Whereas, we feel that we have given our fullest cooperation to this program of evacuation

Whereas, we have temporarily surrendered many of the rights and privileges of citizenship which we have heretofore enjoyed

Whereas, the government, through the Federal Reserve Bank, has promised us full protection from unscrupulous people at the time of evacuation

Whereas, we believe the Federal Reserve Bank has failed to protect the people

Whereas, we suffered losses of homes, properties, work, freedom of movement, separation from friends and all things we felt dear to us, without protest

Whereas, we wish to prevent in the future the mass evacuation or confining of citizens without trial

Whereas, we feel that there is only one class of citizenship in this country and a loyal citizen of one race should not be treated any different from another

Whereas, we believe that some of these things mentioned above constitute a violation of our civil rights and

Whereas, we believe sincerely and honestly in the principle of freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom of the press, and freedom of assemblage as embodied in the Constitution and its amendments,

Therefore, be it resolved:

1. That we ask Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson that after a thorough investigation by the Military Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal authorities, that persons that are cleared should have absolute freedom of movement and a choice of returning to their homes.

APPENDIX D

2. Response from Colonel Scobey

Charles F. Ernst
Delta, Utah

Please deliver the following message to the Japanese-Americans within your center: "The Secretary of War has directed that I reply to your Resolution of February 15. Public pronouncement has already been made by the President of the United States and by the Secretary of War. It is only by mutual confidence and cooperation that the loyal Japanese-Americans can be restored to their civil rights. The present program is not complete rehabilitation but it is the first step in that direction. The United States Government has evidenced its faith in the loyal Japanese-Americans by giving them the opportunity to serve their country. This is their opportunity to demonstrate to the American people that they have faith in America.

Scobey, Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX D

3. Response from War Relocation Authority Director

February 16, 1943

To: Charles F. Ernst

From: Dillon S. Myer

Subject: Regarding Resolutions Addressed to Secretary Stimson

The recent announcement by Secretary Stimson was made in good faith. The opportunity provided by this announcement is in my judgment the stepping stone to the attainment of those things outlined in the resolution provided the evacuees are willing to accept the Secretary's announcement and the subsequent statement by the President in good faith. The WRA has urged some such opportunity by which the good faith of the Japanese-Americans could be dramatized in such a manner that it might be brought quickly and clearly into the consciousness of the American public. This is not the time to quibble or bargain. This is the crucial test. It is the time for thoughtful consideration and decision. Secretary Stimson cannot give the answers to the resolution. That answer will be provided in a large measure by the evacuees of Topaz and the other relocation centers during this week and next. It is my hope and my belief that they will not fail this crucial test.

Dillon Myer

APPENDIX D

4. Reply of Committee of Thirty-Three, February 16, 1943

We, the Committee of Thirty-Three, having acted from the very beginning in accordance with the desires of the majority of the citizens residing in Topaz, Utah, do hereby make this statement:

1. That from the beginning we have been one in the opinion that we shall strive to regain that status to which we are entitled as citizens.
2. That we recognize there were many means which we could employ to achieve this particular end.
3. That our actions so far have been governed by the fact that certain means were deemed best by the majority to attain that common goal.
4. After due consideration of the course of events, it has become clear that our goal can be best attained through cooperation with the program of the government, which has as its purpose the return of our full status as citizens.
5. This conclusion is strengthened by the decision taken by the Committee of Sixty-Six, representing the Issei.
6. We believe, therefore, it is to the best interest of the citizens, as a step to attain our goal, that we accept this registration as an indication of the government's good faith.

5. Statement of Other Residents of Topaz, February 16, 1943:

We as certain residents of Topaz taking exception to the resolution presented to the Honorable Secretary of War Stimson as the expression of the majority wish to state the following: We feel that loyalty to our country is something to be expressed without reference to past grievances or wrong. We feel that in according us the right to the second article of the Bill of Rights, that it is the right of every man to bear arms in the defense of his country, the War Department has in good faith started the first step to restore us all rights as citizens of the United States. We feel that the issue of expressing our loyalty has been confused. We believe in fighting for our rights but we believe that fighting for our country and our ideals is the most important thing when our country is at war trying to uphold those ideals for which we stand. We shall register, we are loyal, we shall fight for the United States.

/s/ Other Residents of Topaz

APPENDIX E

TRANSLATION OF SPEECH DELIVERED BY AN ISSEI AT MINIDOKA

I am addressing you as an Issei. Last year the government allowed all of us in the assembly centers to make application for repatriation. Of the 110,000 evacuees in the different centers, the newspapers reported that there were less than 3,000 applicants. You can readily see, then, that 100,000 of our people intend to remain in the United States, regardless of the present conflict. Tonight we are considering the Japanese in America and not the Japanese nation. We are concerned with what will become of us in the United States.

The United States Army is now giving the Nisei the opportunity of volunteer enlistment in a combat unit. This action seems to me to be due to the fact that the American people are convinced that the evacuation of the American citizens was unnecessary. They are treating them as loyal American citizens.

We Issei formulated a plan years ago to educate our children as American citizens and we taught them to be loyal to this country as any other citizen. We based our decision in this matter on two fundamental thoughts: First, one's natural affection for the country in which he was born, and second, the moral code under which we, the Issei, were brought up.

Years ago, I was employed by the United States Department of Justice, to assist them in a seal poacher's case. I was sent to Valdez, Alaska, where I found twenty-two Japanese poachers under arrest. Among them there was a Caucasian man, whose name was Webb. He was born of British parents in Ogasawarajima, Japan, and had joined the crew of the schooner as a seal-hunter. One day, he said to me, "Some of my American friends have advised me to become an American citizen because I am eligible due to my parentage. But, Mr. Okajima, I cannot permit myself to take an oath against the country to which I was born and brought up." I thought then that it was the most natural thing for him to feel that way. I am sure, too, that every Nisei feels the same way toward this country.

There is another thing I want to say in regard to this. A friend of mine in San Francisco, whose eldest son was drafted in the United States Army some eight months before the declaration of war between the United States and Japan, wrote a letter to his friend, Admiral Goto, in Japan, mentioning this fact. The Admiral wrote back to this friend of mine, congratulating his son who was serving in the United States Army. He added that he sincerely hoped his son would fight gallantly for the United States and that he would achieve distinction in its service, thus bringing glory to the Japanese race. This is because of the code of ethics under which we have been educating our children, wholeheartedly, to be citizens of this country and to serve it faithfully.

Now, the Army wants our Nisei to volunteer for combat duty. I believe

Translation of Speech (cont.)

that what they do in regard to this will play an important part in the future of our people in this country.

A question was raised by someone in the audience, as to whether the government would guarantee the citizenship of the Nisei before they volunteered. I can say that is a very unnecessary question due to the fact that the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution plainly states that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." No one man, even the President of the United States, can deprive the Nisei of their citizenship. Is there any greater guarantee of the citizens of the United States, now and forever.

I want to call your attention to the fact that the American people, as a whole, are a truth-loving and truth-seeking people. Who are backing Hirabayashi, Korematsu and the other test cases? The American people. Did any one of us contribute anything, morally or otherwise, towards fighting for them? Mrs. Farquharson, who was here recently, said an American Army officer had sent a check for \$25.00 to the committee backing Hirabayashi.

Americans are not exceptions to the adage that "it is human to err and divine to forgive". But when they find they are mistaken, they have the courage to try to correct it. If they have made mistakes in the past, your children, as American citizens, should share the consequences of these mistakes. My advice to you is to forget the past and look to the future. Let the Nisei do their duty toward the country in which they were born and to which they have allegiance.

I know it is hard for you fathers and mothers to send your sons to the front. If you should want compensation for it, it is not measurable, for the wealth of the United States or the riches of the whole world would not be enough. But that is not the question. The principle involved is that since our children were born here, they belong here. Morally speaking, they do not belong to us, but to their country. I believe our attitude towards this principle will be extremely important for the future welfare and happiness of our own race in the United States. We should look to our own moral code in this matter. We have given our children to this country and we should regard them as such.

Let us act like brave men of our native country. Let us consider first and above all--the future of our children and their children's children and all the generations to come who will live in this country. Let us view this present situation from wider and larger perspectives.

APPENDIX F

REGISTRATION RETURNS

The registration results, as given in the following tables, were obtained from hand tallies of the DSS Form 304-A and the Form WRA 126 Rev. In Tables 1 and 2 of the Registration Returns, responses to question 28 are listed by relocation centers for the following groups: (1) male citizens, (2) female citizens, (3) male aliens, and (4) female aliens. However, it is important to note that the wording of this question was significantly different for the citizens and aliens. For the exact wording of the several forms of the question, see Appendix A.

In interpreting the results given in Tables 1 and 2, the following considerations should be kept in mind:

1. Responses to question 28 were obtained as a part of the registration program; hence they were subject to all the abnormal conditions and influences which existed during registration, stressed in the body of the report.
2. The wide variation in returns - from 48.9% affirmative answers among male citizens at Manzanar to 97.5% affirmatives among the same group at Granada - derives in part from the wide variations in the presentation of the question to evacuees in different centers. More generally, individual responses have been conditioned by at least four sorts of variation in presentation:
 - a. Variation in presentation and methods of registration among the ten relocation centers.
 - b. Variation in the interpretation of question 28 among the ten relocation centers.
 - c. Variation in the interpretation of question 28 among interviewers at a particular relocation center.
 - d. Variation in the interpretation of question 28 as registration progressed.
3. The tallies of the DSS 304-A and WRA 126 Rev. indicate the original responses to question 28. It is estimated that approximately 2000 changes of answer (non-affirmative to "yes") have been received to date. A detailed analysis of these changes of answer is not yet available.

Table 3 indicates the per cent of the persons answering "yes" and "no" respectively to question 28 who have (1) one or more family members in Japan, (2) three years' residence and two years' schooling in Japan

Registration Returns (cont.)

since 1934, (3) registered with the Japanese Consul to establish Japanese citizenship, (4) requested repatriation, (5) one or both parents interned, and (6) been convicted of criminal offenses. The first four factors may be significant with respect to "yes" and "no" answers; however, the last two show no significant differences.

The tables were prepared by the Relocation Planning Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

Registration Returns (cont.)

War Relocation Authority
Relocation Planning Division
June 19, 1943

Table 1. RESPONSES TO QUESTION 28 (Form 304-A) BY RELOCATION CENTER
Male Citizens of Japanese Ancestry, 17 Years of Age and Older

Relocation Center		Total Elig. to Register	Total Registered	Total Acct'd for	Yes	Non Affirm. Answers ^{1/}	No Reply	Yes	Non Affirm. Answers ^{1/}	No Reply
		Number	Number	Number	Number	Number	Number	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.
Central Hawaii		163	163	163	25	138	0	15.3	84.7	0.0
Utah	U.S.	1490	1490	1490	1026	464	0	68.9	31.1	0.0
Colorado River		3405	3405	3217 ^{2/}	2607	596	14	81.0	18.5	0.5
Gila River		2630	2588	2588 ^{3/}	1663	923	2	64.2	35.7	0.1
Granada Heart Mountain		1342	1342	1268 ^{2/}	1236	27	5	97.5	2.1	0.4
		1964	1963	1963	1609	253	101	82.0	12.9	5.1
Jerome	Hawaii	1592	1591	1584 ^{4/}	35	73	50	22.2	46.2	31.6
	U.S.			1237 ^{5/}	869	344	24	70.3	27.8	1.9
Manzanar		1909	1909	1885	921	960	4	48.9	50.9	0.2
Minidoka		1629	1603	1586	1540	24	22	97.1	1.5	1.4
Rohwer		1608	1608	1410 ^{5/}	1150	252	8	81.5	17.9	0.6
Tule Lake		2960	2330 ^{6/}	2320 ^{2/}	1527	791	2	65.8	34.1	0.1
Total		20,692	19,992	19,285	14,208	4,845	232	73.7	25.1	1.2

Footnotes: See next page.

Registration Returns (cont.) - Footnotes, Table 1

- 1/ Includes a few qualified answers.
- 2/ These figures are obtained from tallies made in Washington Offices.
- 3/ Tally in Washington of 1088 records added to Tally of 1414 made at Project.
- 4/ 491 tallied at Project, 894 in Washington.
- 5/ Of this total, 1263 were tallied at the Center; 147 were tallied in the Washington Office.
- 6/ This total was obtained from a report on the Tule Lake registration by John D. Cooke, Reports Officer.

Source: All figures, excluding footnoted exceptions were obtained from letters or wires sent from the Relocation Centers to the Washington Office. All figures are based on hand tallies of the Selective Service Form DSS 304-A.

Table 2. RESPONSES TO QUESTION 28 (Form WRA-126 Rev.) BY RELOCATION CENTER
Male and Female Aliens^{1/} and Female Citizens of Japanese Ancestry, 17 Years of Age and Older

Relocation Center	Sex & Nativity	Total Elig. to Regis.	Total Registered	Forms : Acct'd : For :	Number			Percent		
					Yes	Non- Affirm. ^{3/}	No Reply	Yes	Non- Affirm. ^{3/}	No Reply
Central Utah	Male Alien	1733	1733	1594	1584	8	2	99.3	0.6	0.1
	Fem. Alien	1200	1200	1200	1184	14	2	98.7	1.2	0.2
	Female Cit.	1444	1444	1190	694	387	109	58.3	32.5	9.2
Colorado River	Male Alien	3455	3455	3455	3429	11	15	99.2	0.3	0.4
	Fem. Alien	2400	2400	2364	2348	7	9	99.3	0.3	0.4
	Female Cit.	3168	3168	3168	3002	130	36	94.8	4.1	1.1
Gila River	Male Alien	2751	2750	2750	2748	2	0	99.9	0.1	0.0
	Fem. Alien	1381	1877	1877	1874	0	3	99.9	0.0	0.1
	Female Cit.	2394	2394	2394	2150	243	1	89.8	10.1	0.1
Granada	Male Alien	1236	1236	860	857	2	1	99.7	0.2	0.1
	Fem. Alien	887	887	621	619	0	2	99.7	0.0	0.3
	Female Cit.	1311	1311	868	856	1	11	98.6	0.1	1.3
Heart Mountain	Male Alien	2269	2269	2269	2244	8	17	98.9	0.3	0.8
	Fem. Alien	1519	1519	1519	1495	10	14	98.4	0.6	0.9
	Female Cit.	1844	1844	1844	1753	58	33	95.1	3.1	1.8
Jerome	Male Alien	1559	1558	1558	1318	236	4	84.6	15.1	0.3
	Fem. Alien	1079	1079	1079	893	185	1	82.8	17.1	0.1
	Female Cit.	1576	1576	1576	1263	286	27	80.1	18.2	1.7
Manzanar	Male Alien ^{2/}	2032	2032	2032	2008	24	0	98.8	1.2	0.0
	Fem. Alien ^{2/}	1297	1297	1260	1253	7	0	99.4	0.6	0.0
	Female Cit.	1632	1632	1632	901	646	85	55.2	39.6	5.2
Minidoka	Male Alien	2157	2157	2157	1897	65	195	87.9	3.0	9.0
	Fem. Alien	1683	1683	1683	1513	47	123	89.9	2.8	7.3
	Female Cit.	1459	1459	1459	1416	10	33	97.1	0.7	2.3

Relocation Center	Sex & Nativity	Total Elig. to Regis.	Total Registered	Forms Acct'd For	Number			Percent		
					Yes	Non- Affirm. ^{3/}	No Reply	Yes	Non- Affirm. ^{3/}	No Reply
Rohwer	Male Alien	1813	1813	1776	1760	10	6	99.1	0.6	0.3
	Fem. Alien	1051	1051	1051	1044	3	4	99.3	0.3	0.4
	Female Cit.	1419	1419	1321	1251	53	17	94.7	4.0	1.3
Tule Lake	Male Alien	3075	1844	1803	1787	9	7	99.1	0.5	0.4
	Fem. Alien	2016	1467	1430	1413	7	10	98.8	0.5	0.7
	Female Cit.	2783	2265	2051	1604	447	0	78.2	21.0	0.8
Total	Male Alien	22080	20847	20254	19632	375	247	96.9	1.9	1.2
	Fem. Alien	15013	14460	14084	13636	280	168	96.8	2.0	1.2
	Female Cit.	19030	18512	17503	14890	2261	352	85.1	12.9	2.0
GRAND TOTAL		56123	53819	51841	48158	2916	767	92.9	5.6	1.5

1/ Aliens answered the following revised form of Question 28:

"Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?"

2/ Revised figure. In previous registration aliens answered the following question:

"Are you sympathetic to the United States of America and do you faithfully agree to defend the United States from any or all attack by either foreign or domestic forces?"

Results of previous registration as follows:

	Forms Acct'd For	Yes	Yes Qualified	No	No Reply
Male Aliens	2059	860	463	710	26
Female Aliens	1297	518	214	412	153

3/ Includes Yes Qualified, No, and No Qualified responses.

Source: Hand tallies of Form WRA-126 (Rev.) made at the Relocation Centers; results sent to Washington by wire.

Table 3. COMPARISON OF YES AND NO ANSWERS TO QUESTION 28 (FORMS DSS 304-A AND WRA 126-REV.)

WITH RESPECT TO SIX FACTORS:

Male and Female Citizens of Japanese Ancestry, 17 Years of Age and Older

Center	Sex	Total Registered	Responses to Ques. 28			With Family Member in Japan		With 3 yrs. res. & 2 yrs. school in Japan since 1934		Regis. With Jap. Consul to Estab. Jap. Citizenship		Requested Repatriation		With one or Both Parents Interned		Convicted of criminal Offenses	
			Total	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
			(1)	(2)	(3)												
Cent	M	1653	1105	653	452	19.4	70.1	3.7	46.5	9.5	78.1	0.3	29.2	3.8	1.8	0.5	0.9
	F	1444	826	683	143	16.9	76.2	7.3	32.2	2.6	99.3	1.3	34.9	1.0	2.1	0.1	0.0
Colo	M	3405	3161	2591	570	21.1	45.8	4.8	21.2	7.9	41.9	0.7	13.9	5.6	4.7	0.2	0.4
	F	3168	3132	3002	130	19.2	0.0	5.4	0.0	8.8	2.3	0.4	2.3	3.1	0.0	0.1	0.0
Gila	M	2588	2499	1599	900	16.9	46.9	4.1	11.0	11.6	62.3	0.3	7.6	1.9	3.9	0.8	0.3
	F	2394	2393	2150	243	19.7	46.5	4.0	11.1	17.4	71.6	2.9	16.0	3.9	8.2	0.0	0.0
Gran	M	1342	1243	1222	21	26.8	--	7.4	--	5.5	--	0.9	--	3.3	--	0.5	--
	F	1311	857	856	1	13.3	--	9.8	--	4.8	--	0.4	--	2.9	--	0.0	--
HtMt	M	1963	1862	1609	253	20.3	47.0	2.6	12.6	8.9	65.2	2.3	4.3	2.1	2.4	0.4	0.0
	F	1844	1811	1753	58	20.7	--	4.6	--	8.2	--	2.4	--	2.4	--	0.0	--
Jero	M	1591	1255	895	360	19.3	30.6	8.5	34.2	8.3	29.7	0.3	2.2	2.1	1.4	0.6	0.6
	F	1576	1349	1063	286	19.1	21.1	7.3	2.4	8.8	11.5	0.9	3.1	5.7	1.4	0.1	0.0
Manz	M	1909	1799	821	978	24.0	43.6	4.6	24.6	7.4	43.3	0.1	6.6	2.4	2.1	1.1	0.4
	F	1632	1464	901	563	18.1	34.8	12.7	28.9	9.7	38.7	0.1	1.7	5.5	4.4	0.0	0.0
Mini	M	1603	1327	1297	30	24.7	--	8.4	--	9.8	--	1.4	--	5.6	--	0.8	--
	F	1459	1426	1416	10	17.9	--	6.5	--	11.0	--	2.9	--	6.6	--	0.0	--
Rohw	M	1608	1401	1150	251	36.0	61.0	9.0	35.1	10.5	40.6	0.5	7.6	3.6	3.2	0.7	0.4
	F	1419	1304	1251	53	18.8	--	14.1	--	1.8	--	0.2	--	2.4	--	0.0	--
Tule	M	2330	2268	1487	781	20.0	43.5	2.8	22.2	5.7	48.5	0.3	19.6	3.0	1.9	1.1	0.4
	F	2265	2035	1604	431	14.6	28.3	3.5	12.1	5.7	17.9	0.7	8.8	1.7	1.4	0.0	1.6
Total	M	19992	17920	13324	4596	22.5	47.6	5.4	24.4	8.5	51.6	0.8	11.9	3.5	2.8	0.6	0.4
	F	18512	16597	14679	1918	18.3	33.3	6.7	17.2	9.3	36.3	1.3	9.5	3.5	3.4	*	0.4
GRAND TOTAL		38504	34517	28003	6514	20.3	43.4	6.1	22.3	8.9	47.1	1.1	11.2	3.5	2.9	0.3	0.4

Footnotes: See next page.

(cont.)

--Indicates percent not computed since base is less than 100.

*Less than .05 percent.

- 1/ These figures represent only those persons whose records were included in this tally. The number of "yes" and "no" responses which totals 34517 in this table does not coincide with the total number of responses accounted for in Tables 1 and 2 for the citizen group since all of these records were not available for the tally of Table 3.
- 2/ The percents are calculated with respect to the total number of "yes" and "no" responses in cols. 3 and 4 respectively. For example, col. 5 indicates the percent of total number of persons responding "yes" to Question 28 who have family members in Japan; col. 6 indicates the percent of "no" responses who have family members in Japan.