

Liberty

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These barracks for evacuated Japanese at Poston, Arizona, were built and furnished hastily—they had to be. Upon arrival, the Japanese were given straw and ticks for mattresses.



THE TRUTH ABOUT JAP CAMPS

THE constitutional rights of American citizens of Japanese parentage have been, of necessity, curtailed in this war. How we handle this situation presents one of the gravest tests of the democracy we are fighting to preserve.

Never before in this country have American citizens been deprived, with the sanction of our government, of the rights we hold to be inalienable. And two thirds of the Japanese in this country are citizens of the United States. They were born on our soil. They have been educated in American schools. They speak the language of America. They grew up instructed in the belief that they were Americans, just as boys and girls whose parents were born in Ireland or Italy or Sweden are Americans. Yet a little over a year ago, in company with Japanese aliens, they were forcibly evacuated from their homes and herded into "relocation centers" prepared for them by the Army.

After a year, what has happened

There has been much to-do about the treatment accorded Japanese Americans in our Relocation Centers. Here are some facts.

BY MAXINE DAVIS

to these people? How are they being treated? What are they doing? How do they feel about this experience?

I went out to the relocation center at Poston, Arizona, to find the answers to these questions. I went with a bias; understand that at once. I went out with the American dream as a yardstick; with the conviction that America is a place where men may live in freedom, side by side without regard for race or color; with the belief in the traditional rights of minorities in this land. I

kept in mind the fact that war inevitably infringes upon the rights of each and every one of us, but that the infringement is common to us all. These citizens have suffered special hardships because of their parentage. How we treat them is a test of our credo.

Poston is about seventy miles from Needles, California. It is located on an Indian reservation. You reach it through Arizona desert country, cold in winter, hot in spring and summer. The empty desert spaces reach toward the mountains that rim the horizon.

There are no fences around Poston, but there might as well be. Guards are posted on the roads, and you must have a pass to enter or leave. The Japanese may not leave, as a rule, until they go for good.

Once on the reservation, you pass some irrigated land with vegetables growing on it. Then you see the barracks where the évacués live. You may think you have gotten into an

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Dr. Kido, evacuated to Poston, has to his credit a device for control of mosquitoes that spread sleeping sickness.

Another American-born professional man at the Poston Center, Dr. Richard H. Iwata, is shown instructing a nurse's aide class in anatomy.

Of these young welders in the Center's machine shop, one was a U. of C. undergraduate. The other was in high school.



THE TRUTH ABOUT JAP CAMPS

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Army camp by mistake, for the barracks were built according to Regular Army design and construction. True, they were built hastily of green lumber which split apart. The floor boards are not close together, and the Japanese use the spaces between them for ash trays. When the Army first came to make the camp, they used great bulldozers to clear the desert. The land is silt, so when dust storms come, the dust seeps through the crevices into the barracks—"Arizona fog," the évacués call it. But the quarters were needed urgently and this could not be helped. Gradually the évacués are getting linoleum for their floors.

The barracks are in blocks. The buildings have been divided into "apartments," and about 260 men, women, and children live in an average block. The "apartments" are rooms twenty by twenty-five feet in size, and families of from two to five or more occupy each of them. In each block there are two latrines, one for men, one for women; one laundry room, one ironing room. In each block there is a mess hall—for food is supplied by the government through the Army Quartermaster Corps and eating is communal—and a recreation hall. There are seventy-two blocks in the Poston center.

IT is not quite so grim now as it was in the beginning. The évacués, young and old, hearty and frail, had come from the moderate West Coast climate to this desert when the temperature was 120 degrees. The government had offered them their rooms, cots, straw with which to make mattresses, and Army blankets. They had no furniture. They needed soap, brooms, pails, everything. Most of them had to make furniture out of scraps of lumber left when the barracks were finished. After a while those who still had furniture at home got some of it moved here. Some got plywood from a mail-order house and partitioned their apartments. In some blocks the men secured air conditioners for the mess halls. The inevitable Japanese gardens began to bloom in window boxes and around the blocks and between them. Most of the comfort you see has been created by the Japanese themselves; it has not been donated by the government.

At best, this is not the lavish luxury in which many of us have heard that the War Relocation Authority has pillowed the Japanese. Except for the lack of privacy, it is, however, as much as many of them—especially the tenant farmers—had ever known. It is scarcely the way of life of the prosperous merchants and professional men in the group.

The water came into Poston on the Fourth of July a year ago. There is

enough for 1,200 acres. The Japanese planted mulberry trees around a sign reading, "Here on July 4 stood the pioneers of Poston," to commemorate the coming of the water. There is a swimming pool which is merely a wide place in the ditch. From the uproar in Congress, I had expected a marble pool with umbrella-shaded tables beside it and liveried waiters serving champagne. But it's only a ditch and there is no alcoholic beverages of any sort; they are not allowed in Poston. Indeed, there isn't even any soft drink or candy to be had, as a rule.

And recreation is whatever the people make for themselves. There is a library, a movie—admission one cent—and a traditional Japanese drama occasionally for the older folks. That's all.

But then, the évacués don't have much money to spend for anything. The highly trained earn nineteen dollars a month, the unskilled sixteen dollars, and apprentices twelve dollars. This rate was based on Army pay. So long as enlisted men in the Army received only twenty-one dol-

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A newspaper is a circulating library
with high blood pressure.

—"Bugs" Baer.

lars a month the Japanese were satisfied. When Army pay was increased to fifty dollars but theirs remained the same, they became resentful.

In addition to their pay, each adult of sixteen or over is granted three dollars and fifty cents a month clothing allowance, and every youngster from eight to sixteen is allowed three dollars a month.

The shop has a scanty stock—but not much less than is to be found in small poor rural communities. In it the évacués can buy thread and shoes, a few dresses and baby clothes, men's hats, shirts, and khaki trousers; and there are always paper flowers for weddings and funerals.

The Japanese have established a few community enterprises. They now operate barbershops, watch-repair shops, shoe-repair establishments, and beauty parlors. The shoe-repair shops do an enormous business, for Poston is big and the évacués are not allowed to have automobiles. The seven beauty parlors are the greatest success. You can get a shampoo and finger wave for forty-five cents and a permanent wave for from a dollar ninety-five to two fifty; but you must make your appointment thirty days in advance.

The War Relocation Authority, responsible for these évacués, has tried to preserve every right consistent with military necessity. The Japanese are assured freedom of worship. They are guaranteed freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Poston Chronicle is a mimeographed newspaper published

in the camp, partly in English, partly in Japanese. Open meetings are held, and discussion is in both English and Japanese. No restrictions on what may be printed or spoken have been laid down. Nor has the right of assembly been curtailed. These Japanese citizens have not been disenfranchised. They have the right to vote in their former residences by absentee ballot, and they have not failed, according to the available evidence, to exercise that right.

THE authorities have tried to establish actual self-government. A community council of second-generation Japanese, composed of representatives from each block, has been formed. It is not truly a success, because the Japanese are new to actual self-government and reluctant to assume any real responsibility or leadership. Also, they are young and accustomed to having their elders give orders. The old folk are Japanese-born aliens and, according to WRA regulations, are prohibited from holding office. To pull the Issei, the first generation, into the organization, an Issei advisory council was established. Promptly political factions which make Washington look politically placid arose. However, the experiment offers opportunity for political activity and experience which never existed for the Japanese before.

Work presents the worst problem, for WRA policy has shifted like a weather vane. There are 17,000 people at Poston now. Before any of them were permitted to leave for jobs elsewhere, there were 18,200. About half of them are farmers. Most of the others were employed in various service occupations for the Japanese communities on the West Coast.

There are 100,000 acres available for agriculture at Poston, but thus far only a small portion of the land has been irrigated. At first the plan was that the Japanese should farm the land and grow produce both for themselves and for sale. Then the WRA changed its mind and ruled that there should be only subsistence farming and that any agricultural workers who wanted to farm for a living might get jobs outside. Consequently only a relatively small amount of the land is farmed. The farmers don't work very hard, and although some have gone out to the beet fields and potato fields, many who might be highly productive in the present shortage of farm labor work only a few hours a day. The Japanese are not used to working big farms, and they don't like it. They will be fed whether they work hard or not, and they get neither extra food nor extra money, so why trouble too much? Therefore, while the land is productive and while nothing is spoiling for lack of attention, the superintendents are always worried for fear they will not have enough labor from day to day.

By WRA rules, the Japanese are

not allowed to earn more than the government allots them. Exception is made for work in a camouflage factory which has been established on the reservation by a private company. The Japanese who work there may keep 60 per cent of their earnings; the remaining 40 per cent must go into a community fund.

The government will not employ the Japanese. Roads are being built on the reservation, but no Japanese may have jobs on the roads. Outside labor is brought in.

THE net result of this policy is that good farm laborers work far less than they had ever worked before. The young people resent the fact that they cannot make an independent living and get married under relatively normal circumstances. (They do marry, of course. There is a "honeymoon cottage" at Poston where young couples may stay for two weeks. It is almost always occupied.) Only the women have a fine time. Wives and mothers who always before had raised their children, kept their homes, and done stoop labor on the farm, now go to classes, learn English, cooking, dietetics, sewing, flower arrangement, and generally have a whirl.

Free schools for children have been established. Medical care is available. There is a hospital so good that it is on the American Medical Association's list of registered hospitals. It is staffed chiefly by Japanese doctors and nurses from among the évacués. True, a genitourinary specialist is practicing general medicine, a lawyer is handling the vital statistics, and a Ph. D. in etymology is in charge of sanitation; but the service is good. The doctors do resent earning only nineteen dollars a month, for were they in the Army they would be commissioned.

Relatively few of those eligible for the Army have volunteered. Rightly or wrongly they maintain, "The draft is the privilege of American citizens. Why shouldn't we be drafted like every one else?" Told that they were offered a special privilege when granted the right to volunteer, they shake their solemn heads and repeat their statement.

Altogether, it is plain that, while the Japanese évacués at this fairly typical center have not been pampered, as many claim, neither have they been made to suffer any cruel or inhuman treatment. What, then, is their attitude? How do they feel about all this?

Well, they've had time to think. At first most of them understood the necessity for the evacuation, even though it was hastily and not too well done. They understood it was essential both for their own protection and for the national security. They realized that because a few out of their number were disloyal they must all suffer. They know that's the way of war.

Now they can leave, as some do, or they can stay on. Either way, their predominant emotion is fear. They are afraid to stay. Afraid they will stagnate. Afraid they will not have enough to eat. Afraid of the present and afraid of the future. What will happen to them if they get jobs outside in a hostile world? What will happen to them after the war if they have not established themselves and found a way to earn a normal living? They are afraid of communities where there are no other Japanese, and afraid to herd together for fear of violence.

The loyal Japanese citizens—and these comprise from 80 to 85 per cent, according to Milton Eisenhower, former WRA director—have never transferred their allegiance to Japan, but their faith in America has been shaken.

The old folk are also afraid. They have no desire to move. They want to stay in the centers until the war is over. Then they want to go back to California or Washington or Oregon.

Parents are afraid for the way their children will grow up. With no real homes, with community meals, they are losing control of their young people, who are developing bad manners and the habits of little toughs.

Professional men and women and merchants particularly worry about their futures. Will there ever again be Japanese communities? Will they be dispersed, and if so, how ever

can they make their living? For white people never go to a Japanese doctor or a Japanese lawyer.

These fears color the lives of all the évacués who are still in the center. They regard the future with trepidation and the present with resentment.

The present policy of the War Relocation Authority is to encourage the American-born to leave for jobs in areas where they are permitted to go by the Army. But the first-generation must stay. If the young people go, it means the break-up of families. Sons and daughters must leave their parents. Often the young father must leave his family behind him until he becomes established.

This policy is, nevertheless, a good one—the only answer to the problem of the American citizens of Japanese parentage.

For those who stay in the centers, however, the situation leaves much to be desired. There is no reality in the centers. They are like big WPA projects. There is not enough real work to do. There is no economic compulsion or economic advantage in work. There is nothing to do and nothing to buy, and no one will starve or freeze or go without a doctor if he sits all day with folded hands.

The most serious valid criticism of the situation at Poston is that the government policy is confusing. It fluctuates too much. It offers little that is definite. No one is sure what the rules will be tomorrow.

The second criticism is that the centers deprive the Japanese, American and foreign-born alike, of the right to work as men outside work, with the prevailing wage for the job they do. This is at the heart of much resentment.

FINALLY, there is little excuse for keeping the American-born in the center. The FBI has satisfied itself that it has combed out all who were disloyal and interned them elsewhere for the duration. The rest should be allowed to go where they please, subject only to restrictions in the interest of their security.

On the whole, our government, through the War Relocation Authority, is trying steadfastly and not too ineptly to preserve the Constitutional rights of these people. That they were uprooted was a misfortune of war. They are not treated at Poston as enemies or as aliens.

The camp is not so bad as it might be. It can be improved for the benefit of those who will remain until the last gun is fired, and to the advantage of all of us who might benefit from the honest labors of hard-working men and women.

In a moving, revealing article in next week's *Liberty*, a Japanese-American girl tells what a Relocation Center actually looks and feels like to those who have been compelled to leave their homes and live in one.



"I suppose you're going to pull that old one about forgetting your wallet!"

From
James Steiner
Boulder Colo

RAPs

(Reprinted from *The Kansas Magazine*, 1944)

Sharper Than the Sword

By MARGARET HENDERSON

MRS. Brown had done her part and much more of the war work of the home-front and had shared war's sacrifices cheerfully and bravely even when her son-in-law (her new and only son) left for the South Seas but two days after one of those hurried farewell weddings that are packed with more love and tears than most. But strangely one of the hardest things to take, it being a small thing after all, was the installing of a Japanese family next door. But here is Mrs. Brown's story as she herself told it.

The "place next door" had been a problem ever since the first year of the Big Depression when a good neighbor lost his home and it became a tenant property. In the years since then there had been a succession of renters each seemingly more untidy than the last and each leaving the place so down at the heels that in time it became the one stumbling block to our neighborhood effort at cooperative planning and came to be spoken of in our parleys as "the Jungle". A malignment of a jungle which to be sure is a tangle of growth but not one strewn with those evidences of civilization, tin cans and old broken furniture.

So, many tenants having come and mercifully having gone, it was not surprising that not a ripple of excitement was created at breakfast one morning last spring by the announcement: "Mrs. Ford says some new people are moving in her place next door." Nor even when this was followed with: "And she says the man was a banker!" Former tenants had been highly recommended too but with recommendations that didn't prove true. And points were not yet so restricted but that any family, banker, baker or candlestick maker, could acquire tin cans with which to mar the landscape. So we veered wearily from a

subject whose possibilities had long since been exhausted as had all hopes for the Jungle until the day when someone would come along and buy it for a home. But another tenant? We gave that, I remember, little thought.

But it was brought forcefully to mind a week after when, squinting for beetles on the line of roses that was our last line of defense against the Jungle, I looked up and saw a man despondently examining the back yard next door. "The new tenant." I thought, "And if he is planning a garden—and who isn't this year of Victory gardens?—no wonder he is despondent."

So, very cheerfully, I called, "Good morning!" and was amazed (and I confess angry) when he wheeled and I found myself looking into the slant eyes of a Nipponese. He bowed, one of those stiff, jack-knife bows straight out from the waist. In my surprise, I was not so readily courteous.

I stared.

He relieved my embarrassment by remarking: "You have a beautiful garden! Beautiful flowers! Beautiful! My wife, she is a gardener too. When she comes *we* will have a garden. But *this*" he looked around gloomily, then brightened. "But we will help her, the children and I. We will all garden."

"Where are they?" I asked timidly. "Your wife and children?"

"In the camp. But they will come soon, when their permit says. They will like it here, so much. In the camp, it is hot and all sand; no flowers, no water for gardens. My wife will want all the things you thin from your garden—you will be thinning?"—he hesitated, sensing my mental conflict:

Of course—we thinned *every* spring. And always we had a gardener's reluctance to throw away roots, progeny of the

plants we had reared and loved. And of course nothing would please us more than to see the Jungle transformed into a garden. But into a *Japanese* garden and *by* Japanese? I stammered something about its being such a nice morning that I planned to plant vegetables in the kitchen garden across the brook and across the brook I retired in haste and confusion, not to plant vegetables but to sit in the shrubbery and think it over.

We had known for some time that the Government was establishing a Japanese Language School in our midst and we were very proud of its personnel, students the highest in mental caliber, the pick from all the major universities, Phi Beta Kappas and honor students. These were assembled here for an intensive course in the most difficult of tongues, a very vital war measure and one too long delayed. But we had given little thought to the school's Faculty which we now found would of necessity be Japanese since the number of Caucasian Americans who could adequately teach the difficult Nipponese language was far too few, limited to a few missionaries, children of missionaries, and some few Professors of Oriental Language. But imagine this number in a school that must turn out some five to seven hundred thoroughly trained students every twelve to fifteen months, doing such intensive work that one teacher is essential for every four to seven students working as he does with his group many hours of the day, and often the night, six days a week. So Japanese were being brought in, indeed were already here. We began to see them everywhere. We stood in line with them at the market; three families had moved into the block south, the children were playing in the park and attending kindergarten always neatly and artistically dressed.

As a community problem it was solved from the beginning quickly and definitely. Our Government had admitted and even invited and evacuated Japanese to enter our State. There'd been little opposition to this. A large Camp was established from which workers were dismissed from time

to time as needed in beet-fields and orchards and from this camp and those in Utah and Arizona men of training or capacity were being selected to teach in our Language School. Only a few of these had been teachers; among those we met later were a minister (Baptist), an importer, a landscape architect and a wholesale commercial fertilizer merchant. Divers men of divers professions but all assembled here now but with one purpose—to give our Navy a working knowledge of the language of that people it had found it necessary to go out to subdue. The town was asked to cooperate in this very valuable war effort by accepting the admission of the Japanese Faculty and their families, and not only to accept them but to try to appreciate what they were doing and what it meant and might mean to them to be doing it. So much for the community. But what *I* had to think out that morning was: how am I to react to a Japanese family that has suddenly become my neighbor in this year of 1943? The problem had become a personal one.

But whatever our attitude was to be, none of us could deny a keen interest in our new neighbors.

The mother and children arrived one evening with much laughter and excited jabbering. There were two girls, eleven and nine, and a funny little boy, Satoshi, his American name plain Jimmie. The girls were pretty but all three children were very awkward in gait, one girl so badly gaited as to seem deformed. This bad gait we found to be quite common among the Japanese; the adults outgrow it more or less.

But the physical characteristic we found most unpleasant is their oblique, narrowed glance. Several times I found myself strangely resentful that I could not decide whether Satoshi was looking *at* me or quite away, an unpardonable resentment since a straight, open gaze is not peculiar to all races and little Satoshi's inability to look me straight in the eye was physical and not a mental or spiritual slant. But first impressions. . . .

In a few days the family was all out vigorously chopping weeds. Their Victory garden was in the making. But such a making; they were trying to spade with hoes in ground like tinpan alley! My gardening heart revolted and I called: "You can't do that; you must spade and spade *deep*! Then rake and—"

"Yes, we know," the father said quietly, "but we have no tools and they are hard to get."

"They *are*," I replied with my old inexplicable resentment. And added: "C'est la guerre. C'est la guerre damnable."

He looked at me, surprisingly straight and repeated: "Oui, Madame, c'est la guerre damnable. Mais, c'est aussi la guerre necessaire. We have been attacked."

I gasped and retired, a very poor second best from this first encounter; after all, why should I think a Japanese would not know his French?

For a while, pretending to sew, I watched from my window but what gardener even with a heart hard as the ground he was trying to dig could resist this picture of the Man With the Hoe? I got up, went out to my tool-corner, selected a sickle, two spades and a rake, hesitated, then (believe it or not) added my precious *dibble-hoe*, and carried them next door. The gratitude with which they were received was for much more than tools loaned. . . . When the Jungle became a garden which was in a miraculously short time, my sprayer and pruner too went visiting.

Then one day, seeing the children industriously digging dandelions with kitchen knives, we loaned them our weed-digger. But as I handed it to them I remembered with a certain grimness back to one day when I was digging in *my* lawn and our dear Chinese professor-friend came smiling across the grass.

"And what is my friend doing today?" he asked courteously.

"Your friend," I replied, "is digging plantain and having a good time! I'm fighting invaders"—I dug one out and threw it into the basket a bit savagely. "I

call them Japanese invaders. You know—aggressors."

He did know. His keen-cut face went dark.

He was a fine and kindly soul and to be with him was always to be mentally stimulated. He went back to Shanghai just in time to be caught in the invasion. The thought of him came to complicate our problem; Japanese were now fighting lawn-invaders in the yard next door!

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Weeks passed and instead of steering our garden visitors away from that part that bordered on the Jungle as formerly, we led them there now and pointed proudly to the development next door. Vegetables were planted in orderly rows and thinned with a conscience few gardeners can acquire. Seedlings were transplanted with great tenderness and covered with little night-caps so that they looked like rows of tiny maids going to their first communion. The mother spent many hours hovering over her plants and I sometimes thought I heard her talking to them; she must often have been lonely. We have seen her seated on a garden stool watching her growing things and getting up occasionally to straighten a plant. And once I watched her as she gently stroked a climbing cucumber vine, her hands like hovering brown butterflies, as though she were gently urging it on in its upward climb. By August Heavenly Blue Morning-glories were blooming over her back door and asters led tiny portulacas by the hand in a long marching line entirely around the house. She liked some flowers more than others. "I like the preemrose," she smiled, "and the baby-blue-eyes and white chreesanthemum." And often we saw the whole family walking through our garden looking at the borders, the father quiet and always thoughtful, the mother and children cooing at each flower.

So a sort of friendliness grew, but a friendliness founded only on a common garden interest and one that found its outlet up and down the path that through

courtesy they had left for us, a naive sort of invitation. A quaint friendship that began and ended at the back door. As yet we had not gone the front route, nor had they offered to. But one day Takako rang our bell. She came in and, a curious little figure all but lost in a big chair, explained her visit.

"We are collecting beads and jewelry," she said, showing her box. "We send them to our boys in the South Seas and they give them to the natives there to dig foxholes for our soldiers to hide in so they can fight the enemy."

"Who are the enemy?" I asked.

She looked at me wonderingly. "Why, the Japanese," she explained. I was glad to escape upstairs to look for beads for "our boys."

* * *

So the summer passed. The father bowed ceremoniously to us and went to his classes. Some of their possessions came and the mother called to me to see their photograph albums; the group of Japanese in the father's class at Berkeley, the uncle's department store and its branches in six or seven American cities, the dancing class and the music recitals whose little musicians are scattered now through the camps. But the pretty California home made her homesick, "Though," she said quickly: "I like it here." The big Department Store is being operated by Chinese now—"the mills of the Gods," I thought, "grind slowly but they grind exceeding small."

* * *

Then came a letter from our daughter's soldier-husband. From somewhere down below.

"Dear Mom:

The story you wrote of the Japanese you have there with you and of your Language School was most interesting. Now I'll tell you mine; I hope it too is interesting.

We were sent out one night to string some "comms" (communications) through an advance where there were still enemy nests a-plenty, nests as lousy as the black-birds' nests we used to rob when we were

kids. You remember telling me of your little Chinese student who said: "Nylon means Nerts, You Lousy Old Nipponese"? Well, those lousy Nips have a mean habit of calling out to us from foxholes or trees. Of course they always have the drop on us and whether we answer in English or keep mum they know we are Americans. Many a patrol would have given a lot if any one of them had only known a few words of Japanese (Jap jargon we call it.) We might have turned their dirty trick.

This particular night they were wanting communications strung up for enlarging a beachhead and a group of Marines was sent along. We expected trouble and, believe me, it came. We were slithering through a dense tangle of I don't know what; our school Botany we learned at home in the States doesn't help much to know the strange things that grow here. Suddenly we heard someone so close that he almost whispered: "Hello, Beel."

"An American," I whispered and was about to answer when an Ensign with the Marines put his hand over my mouth. "For God's sake," he muttered, "a hole of Japs! He's trying to trap us!"

It was a sure thing that as far as my Corps was concerned, they had already trapped us since none of us knew a word of Japanese; we were as surely their meat as though they had us lined up against a stone wall. We *could* fight it out to the death—I was on the point of giving an order to rush them when the Ensign suddenly gave a strange call, about the weirdest, strangest I ever heard. "The fool, he's done us in now!" I thought, and seized his arm. But he shook me off impatiently and began the glibbest jargon I ever heard a white man unload. Japanese, by God! And it took. The Japs answered in kind and the Ensign told us afterward that they said: 'Hail the Emperor' and told us where to hole in.

We did hole in and later we crept up and cleaned up on as savage and desperate a hole of rattlesnakes as we'd yet met up with, even out here in these jungles that are infested with them. I'll spare you the de-

tails, Mother, for they were far from pleasant but at that much more pleasant than if the Ensign had not known how to speak the Japanese Language and speak it *well* (for these Japs are not fools and never think it). Sometimes I think we made a bad mistake in thinking too long that they were. But the most amazing thing to me was what the Ensign told us after we had put our Communication through and were waiting for morning and the Marines in a warm, snug hole we dug in a bank.

He said he had learned Japanese there in —, think of it, there in the old home town and the old school! Boys, was I 'cited, as little Sis used to say! He took the first course, the one that broke the world's record; learned in nine months a tremendously difficult language never done before under three years. Said the need to know the Jap Language was most imperative in both the Army and Navy. When we got back to Base he showed us an American Magazine with an account of your school in it and, Mom, the fellows have nearly worn that magazine out. Could you send me another?


But the Ensign told us more. He said that those Japanese fellows there on the Faculty that are teaching their native language to their fellow-Americans are doing one of the finest, most important, and bravest things of this whole war in which believe me, Mother, many unbelievably brave things are doing. And not all out at the front; there are many things you all are doing back home that are brave too and that call for sacrifice, but nothing that has touched us more than what that Ensign told us of the work being done by those Japanese teachers. He said that they were happy in the classroom even though the work was gruelling for their students all respected and almost adored them. But that outside it was different. That they are doing a most valuable war-work is admitted and for that they are tolerated, but Ensign ——— claims they should be accepted as the fellow-citizens which they were before the war, for their record and

contribution as citizens, and for the patriotism that is outweighing blood and race with them. Our Ensign got a little warm. He says their contribution is unique and calls for something a bit more of a sacrifice than many of us are called on to make.

I remember, Mother, how kind you used to be to the Chinese students, letting them cook Chinese food in your kitchen, "cooking" tea for them, and comforting them on that important "tenth night of the tenth month" when they wanted to be home with their families. Couldn't you do this for some of those Japanese wives there? Ensign ——— says the men are too busy but that the women have lost their homes and they get pretty lonesome. Seems that they get invited to official things but they take these for what they are, a necessary courtesy. What they want is a human, friendly, neighborhood gesture. You know, one of your friendly, cozy, fireside teas. I told Ensign ——— you could do it. Gee, do I remember those teas! and if I get back for another, it's because of what your Japanese are doing there. Queer now, isn't it, that Japanese there in the old town saved me from Japs way out here! And never think they didn't. I don't want a closer shave than that. Funny, too, to be saved by the tongue; what's that about its being sharper than the sword? Seems this war will have to be fought by all sorts of things, an *all-out* war you know they call it. So language plays a part. And perhaps tea can too. And, Mom, don't turn down an empty cup for me but *drink her up!*"

Your loving son.

. . . . I laid down the letter and went to put on my best hat. As I went across the *front* lawn and up the *front* steps next door, I thought: "Yes, tea *can* play its part and *decency* too; there's been too little of that in the world of late. And it might be well to remember that old admonition of the Levites: And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex him; thou shalt love him as thyself."



A year ago these Utah fields were a mass of sagebrush. Thanks to Japanese Americans they are now acres of vegetables

Japanese Colony: Success Story

by GALEN M. FISHER

"Eight months of hardship come to sunlight," is Fred Wada's summary of the experience of his little band of Japanese Americans, following the Pacific Coast evacuation. This story of his patriotism, so simply told here, is warmly recommended to other loyal Americans.

"THE PEOPLE NOBODY WANTS" IS AN EASY CATCH PHRASE, but it gives a false idea of the feelings of many Californians about their evacuated Japanese neighbors. It certainly misrepresents the attitude of a growing proportion of the people in Wasatch County, Utah. In March, 1942, 130 Japanese Americans went to Wasatch County to settle on the George A. Fisher ranch at Keetley. Snow still lay in the gulleys and the ground was hard when they arrived, but within three months they had transformed the bare fields into a thriving truck garden. Their industry and friendliness, their cash payment for goods, their generous readiness to work overtime to meet the labor shortage on surrounding farms soon disarmed the suspicion of their neighbors. In ever-widening circles the word was spread that these citizen Japanese were "just like white folks" and ready to break their backs to win the war. A dynamic personality, Fred L. Wada, accounts for this success story.

When, two months after Pearl Harbor, the army ordered those of Japanese ancestry to leave the Pacific Coast, all were included—young and old, citizens and aliens alike. The deadline set by the army for "voluntary evacuation" was March 29. After that date, all had to go to

guarded assembly centers. Fred Wada, citizen and prosperous produce merchant of Oakland, decided to move out of California at once, and to help a company of his fellow Japanese Americans to go, too.

Born in Bellingham, Wash., thirty-four years ago, of Roman Catholic parents, Mr. Wada was orphaned at twelve. At fourteen he had to stop school and go to work. By the time he was twenty-seven, he was president of the East Bay Food Dealers Association.

Fred Wada's brother, Bill, volunteered in March, 1941; his second brother, Ben, was drafted in January, 1942, and is now a corporal. Fred Wada himself wanted to enlist, but he has a wife and three young children. He reasoned thus: the President calls for increased output of both food and munitions; Japanese Americans are not allowed to make munitions, but they can raise food. He decided to set out, as a patriotic task, to find unused land, form a corps of Americans of Japanese ancestry, and try to break all records at raising crops. The band would not wait to be rounded up by the army, becoming expensive wards of the government. They would go eastward of their own free will and break land like the early pioneers.

That was about February 10—just a year ago. Mr. Wada read in a newspaper that the farmers of Duchesne County, Utah, needed labor. He went at once to Salt Lake City. At first he met only rebuffs. Even some of the Japanese long resident in Utah threw cold water on his plan, fearing that to bring more Japanese into the state would arouse public hostility toward the established group as well as toward the newcomers. The secretary of the Utah Defense Council, after hearing Mr. Wada's story, suggested that he see David R. Trevithick, director of the State Department of Social Welfare.

At the state capitol, Mr. Wada received his first real encouragement. Mr. Trevithick and his associates were enthusiastic about the plan, and promised to support it, and the welfare director offered a letter of introduction to the commissioner of Duchesne County.

Mr. Wada rented a car and drove out Highway 40, which was piled high with snow on both sides. Thirty-nine miles from Salt Lake City, he stopped to see George A. Fisher, former executive secretary of the State Land Board, now a rancher, and "mayor" of the tiny village of Keetley. Mr. Fisher was interested in leasing his ranch; he also was interested in making possible a fresh start for a group of ousted Japanese Americans. He suggested that the colony establish itself on his land, but Mr. Wada had promised to meet with citizens of Duchesne and Uintah Counties, and he felt this conference must be held before any definite plans were made.

AT ROOSEVELT, THE COUNTY SEAT, HE FOUND 350 PEOPLE ASSEMBLED to hear him present his scheme, and to discuss it. His limited schooling had given him only an imperfect command of platform English; nevertheless, he told his story impressively. Because of the need for more food to help win the war, he urged that a group of "good Americans of Japanese stock" be encouraged to come with him from California and settle in Utah. All but a few of the proposed colonists, he explained, "are citizens and Christians." All, he added, were hard working, law abiding, eager to cooperate in community affairs. Finally, and very persuasively, he stated that the colonists would bring an average of \$1,500 for each man in cash or equipment, and promised that none would ever go on the relief rolls.

When the meeting was thrown open for discussion, the first man on his feet demanded, "What about the Japanese fifth columnists at Pearl Harbor?" At that time, the reports of sabotage by Japanese in Hawaii had not been officially denied by the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and by the Honolulu Chief of Police, as they were later. But Mr. Wada declared his own belief that those charges had been "cooked up by politicians and yellow journals," and added that certainly all of the people he hoped to lead to Utah were completely loyal to the United States.

A county surveyor from Ogden, who happened to be present, rose to say: "I lost two sons at Pearl Harbor, and every time I see a man of Japanese race I shiver; but after hearing your story, I'm ready to let a good many Japs from California come in here. We need them."

Another listener commented, "I'm a Legionnaire, and until I heard Mr. Wada, I was dead against any Japanese coming in here, but now I favor it."

Mr. Wada asked, "Would you be willing to wire that to Governor Maw?"

"Sure," the veteran replied.

A journalist in the audience was so impressed by the plan and by the personality of the man sponsoring it, that he telephoned the governor to urge that the Japanese colony be permitted to come into the state and settle there. At the close of the meeting, forty Utah farmers offered to let Mr. Wada lease or buy their ranches, ranging in size from 100 to 2,000 acres, as the site for the project.

AFTER THIS HOSPITABLE RECEPTION IN DUCHESNE COUNTY, Mr. Wada was tempted to settle there. There was one major drawback—it would be necessary to provide housing and other buildings on any of the available farms. He returned to Keetley for another conference with George A. Fisher. Together, the two men went over the Fisher ranch. There were 3,800 acres of good black loam, the bottom lands well suited to truck gardening, the hill slopes to raising hay and livestock. The necessary irrigation could be done at a low cost. The ranch included fifteen cottages and a large building, divided into ten apartments, all built some years earlier to house the working force of a nearby mine. The mine had curtailed operations, and for some time the dwellings had not been used except in the "dude ranch" season. Mr. Fisher offered a lease at two dollars an acre, including the buildings, and his own services as adviser to the new community.

Mr. Wada paid a \$500 binder at once, though the arrangement was to be considered tentative until Mr. Fisher had made his own inquiries as to the members of the proposed colony, and secured the necessary clearance from the army authorities.

The next step was to present the plan to Governor Maw. With Mr. Trevithick and Mr. Fisher, Fred Wada explained his project. The governor was impressed, but voiced the fear that, unwittingly, a disloyal individual might be included among the colonists. Said Mr. Wada, "Governor, if any of them make trouble or prove to be disloyal in any way to the United States, I'll be glad to face the firing squad." The governor finally stated that, while he could not allow any Japanese to settle near war industries, they could locate anywhere else in the state, "provided I can clear the matter with the county commissioners, and that the local inhabitants raise no serious objections." To Mr. Wada, this seemed a fair decision. On March 16, the governor conferred with the commissioners of twenty-nine counties. Of them all, only the commissioners of Duchesne and Uintah Counties were ready to welcome Japanese settlers. But two counties were enough for a start—Mr. Wada felt sure that, once his colony was under way, other Utah counties would be clamoring to have Japanese evacuees help meet their farm labor shortage.

Fred Wada's next task was to convince Mr. Fisher of the dependability of the proposed colonists. The farm owner was taken on a trip through three California counties, during which he had a chance to talk with many Caucasian Californians about their Japanese American neighbors. Thus the district attorney of San Benito county testified, "For the seven years I have been in this office, I never have had occasion to prosecute a single Japanese." The Oakland Community Chest executive told Mr. Fisher that Japanese, to his knowledge, never go on relief. At the end of the tour of inquiry, Mr. Fisher wired Governor Maw that he was fully satisfied. He gave Mr. Wada a year's lease, with an additional four years' option.

It was at this stage that the writer played a small part

in the story. Puzzled over the best way to organize the colony, Mr. Wada came to consult me. We talked for hours, considering and rejecting one scheme after another. I was impressed, as all who know him are, with Mr. Wada's high motives. The thought of personal profit never seemed to cross his mind. In fact, he said with unmistakable sincerity that he was ready to sink \$20,000 in the undertaking. My advice to him finally was to make the colony a non-profit cooperative enterprise, and this met his mind. The way was now clear for the plan to take on reality.

In a surprisingly short time, Mr. Wada enrolled one hundred and thirty picked associates. Forty-five of them were strong, mature men, more than half of them single. There were thirty married women, twenty single women, and thirty-five children. The husbands of six of the married women still were interned. Most of the men were farmers. There were nine graduates of agricultural colleges, three merchants, three auto mechanics, a carpenter, an electrician, a plumber, a barber, a registered pharmacist, four nurses, and four gardeners. All agreed to pool machinery and stocks and to contribute a stated amount for general expenses.

It was only three days before the March 29 deadline that the first party of twenty left California, but by April 1 the whole company reached Utah. Only one colonist failed to get out of California before the "freezing date." This man owned a valuable seeding machine, so complicated that no one else in his community could keep it in repair. The neighboring Caucasian farmers begged him

to stay until he finished seeding their fields. In loyalty to his friends he agreed to do so, even though he knew it meant going behind the barbed wire of an assembly center instead of leaving as a free man with the rest of the colonists. It was only after urgent appeals from many sources that he was allowed to leave for Keetley a month later. He contributed to the colony farm machinery valued at more than \$4,000.

The beginning of the colony meant incredibly hard work, early and late, seven days a week. By the fifteenth of June, when I paid my first visit to Keetley Farms, there were regular rows of strawberry and potato plants in a forty-acre field that had been cleared of fifty tons of stones and roots, and mountains of sagebrush. In addition, there were 110 acres of peas, lettuce, spinach, radishes, and cabbage. In the center of the little settlement, the young men had erected a sign. On both sides, they painted **FOOD FOR FREEDOM**. Above the sign fluttered the American flag.

The change in the community attitude toward the colony was gradual, but definite. For the first few nights, Mr. Fisher's son served as a voluntary patrolman, to make sure no harm befell the newcomers. Then a state patrolman was stationed at Keetley, "to keep order." But when he reported that he had nothing to do, he was withdrawn. Said Fred Wada, "We have not had one single unpleasant incident."

Many factors have served to bring about harmony between the evacuees and their Caucasian neighbors. The colony has had the interested backing of the officials of the nearby New Park Mine, (*Continued on page 58*)



In the strawberry patch, Wada, founder of the colony, talks things over with the superintendent of a neighboring mine

Cross workers have organized competitive leagues.

Supplementing the Red Cross recreation program overseas are the Red Cross clubs. With their easy-going atmosphere of informality they are rapidly recapturing the popularity of the Red Cross canteen of World War I. Already in operation in Iceland, Great Britain, Australia, and New Caledonia, they will be established elsewhere where need is indicated. Sightseeing tours, dances, jam sessions—in short, whatever entertainment the men desire—make up their flexible program. To the individual service man they offer information service, counseling on personal problems, game rooms, reading and lounging rooms, dining rooms, and sleeping accommodations. They are available as a center of the man's activities when he comes to town.

In some theaters of operation, the Red Cross is carrying on its recreation service through men and women in distant outposts. Always available in the midst of those recreation services are the personal services that link up the man with his family back home.

And for the disabled of this war, who are already flowing back into our hospitals in this country, the Red Cross is drawing upon its experiences of the first World War and the two decades since to assure an orderly and sympathetic treatment of the problems that arise. Before the disabled man is discharged, the Red Cross worker in the hospital assists in the filing of his disability claim. Before he leaves the hospital, the Red Cross worker communicates with the agencies for vocational rehabilitation and for employment, as well as with the man's home Red Cross chapter so that in his care at home, his vocational training, his readjustment into employment, he will be assisted not only by the established governmental agencies but also by the neighborly attention of the Red Cross Home Service worker.

HOME Service in chapters carries out its responsibility through four functions:

Communication and Information Service: Assistance with communications between service men and their families and inquiry in regard to their welfare; information concerning regulations and legislation affecting service and ex-service men and their dependents.

Reporting Service: Cooperation with the military and naval authorities by obtaining social history material required for medical treatment and by making reports on home conditions needed by commanding officers in deciding questions of discharge, furlough, or clemency.

Claims Service: Assistance to disabled ex-service men and their dependents and to dependents of deceased men in presenting claims for compensation and other government benefits.

Family Service: Financial aid for special needs not provided for from public funds and basic maintenance when public relief is not available; consultation and helpful activity directed toward meeting those family difficulties which do not require financial aid; referral service enabling the client to make use of the resources of other organizations providing services not within the Home Service program.

The functions of communication and information, reporting, and claims service are discharged by the Red Cross itself. There is clearance with other agencies for pertinent data available in records. These specialized services are available to clients of other agencies. The information and communication services are available directly to agencies in instances in which such assistance is needed.

The function of family service is discharged by Home

Service to the extent that any private agency can meet family needs. Clients eligible for public relief are referred to public welfare agencies, Home Service continuing with non-relief services or supplementary financial assistance when needed. Clients ineligible for public relief, or for whom public relief is not available, are considered the responsibility of Home Service. Home Service works jointly with other agencies offering specialized services (such as medical, psychiatric, vocational and child placement services), when combined services are necessary, or makes referrals to such agencies when their service rather than Home Service can meet the needs presented. Cases currently active with other private family agencies may remain with those agencies, or representatives of both agencies may confer on individual cases to determine which agency is to provide continuing family service.

TO clarify these functions and reach working understandings, the Red Cross has written agreements with the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services and the American Public Welfare Association; the United Service Organizations; the American Bar Association; the Navy Relief Society and Army Emergency Relief; the Family Welfare Association of America. In the policy statement governing the relationship of the American Red Cross and public welfare agencies, the ARC recognizes the responsibility of government for the relief of persons in need of basic maintenance, and the governmental agencies recognize that the Red Cross is the official agency for rendering service to the men in the armed forces and their families. It has become mutually recognized by governmental agencies and the Red Cross that similar agreements must be worked out on state and local levels in the interests of community planning and efficient operation of services.

Space limitations prevent a description herein of other Red Cross activities serving the armed forces, such as the enrollment of nurses for the Army and Navy Nurse Corps, the blood plasma program, the Inquiry Service and the variety of volunteer services. The program of Services to the Armed Forces is directed from Red Cross National Headquarters in Washington and from the four Area offices: in New York City; Alexandria, Va.; St. Louis, Mo.; and San Francisco, Calif. Abroad, headquarters offices are established in each of the theaters of operation and wherever task forces are located. The local unit of organization is the Red Cross chapter.

Staff expansion continues. The 3,500 members of the Service to the Armed Forces staff on August 1, 1942, will be increased to 4,500 or 5,000 or more, by June 30, 1943. Persons of many skills are needed—field directors with administrative ability, assistant field directors for Home Service, men and women recreation workers, medical and psychiatric social workers, club directors and their staffs, stenographers and administrative assistants, and persons experienced in handling government claims and benefits.

Red Cross Personnel Service, at National Headquarters and in the Area offices, recruits these workers. The personnel management and personnel training units of Services to the Armed Forces have been organized to aid in selection and training. Scholarship arrangements have been made with certain schools of social work for field work training of students in Home Service. It is hoped that later scholarship plans may be developed for the training of medical and psychiatric social workers. In-service training plans are in operation with provision for supervised field work.

For these positions the Red Cross seeks for its national staff and its chapters the best qualified workers available. Advisory committees from the medical and psychiatric social work fields are assisting in the development of plans for supplementing the inadequate supply of qualified persons. Similar arrangements must be made in other fields because of the shortage of available, qualified workers.

Generous offers from the American people in time, money, and other resources is one of the most heartening features in the Red Cross effort. But the expansion of the army and navy will continue to multiply human problems to be met now and after the war. The Red Cross's job of meeting such human needs is one phase of the total participation required for winning this total war.

Evacuation: American Style, Part II

By GEORGE D. NICKEL

Director of Social Relations, California Personal Finance Companies

AS this is written, a new chapter has begun in the fortunes of the Japanese evacuees, the majority of them American-born citizens. The first chapter took them from homes and communities in five western states, where many of them had spent their entire lives.

The exodus began in late March from a few key strategic military districts. These preliminary moves were the subject of my earlier article [Evacuation: American Style, *Survey Midmonthly*, April 1942]. The larger "wholesale" evacuations from Military Area No. 1 were completed in June. In two months 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were transferred to temporary assembly centers located on county fair grounds and swanky race tracks, where with amazing speed the U. S. Army had built living quarters, dining halls, showers, toilets, laundries, and recreation facilities. The unit at Santa Anita, designed to hold 20,000 persons, took exactly thirty-five days to develop from an army order to a complete center.

The passage of six months since the process began, affords an opportunity to appraise this initial chapter thoughtfully. But first, to get this intermediate period in perspective, it should be borne in mind that as rapidly as facilities are completed, families are being transferred from assembly centers to the new relocation centers, most of which are located outside the military zones. That is the beginning of the new chapter. In the relocation centers the army supplies basic housing and exterior protection in the form of military police. The administration of the centers is under the supervision of the War Relocation Authority. Ten or more such centers, federally owned or leased, are planned. They will be located in California, Arizona, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and Arkansas.

By September 20 eight relocation centers were occupied, although some had not received their full complement of evacuees. Two centers are in California at Manzanar and Tule Lake; two are in Arizona on the Colorado River Indian Reservation near Parker and the Gila River Indian Reservation near Phoenix; the states of Colorado, Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming have one center each.

Food, shelter, clothing and medical care are provided in assembly and relocation centers. In addition a social welfare program utilizing trained social workers is under way. For example, at Manzanar a home for dependent children has been formed from the three Japanese children's homes which were transferred to the center with staffs intact.

Other opportunities to utilize their special skills are provided for Japanese teachers, doctors, nurses, and social workers who work in the center schools, hospitals, and recreation units. The plan is to make each community as

nearly self-sufficient as possible. In addition, work contributing directly to the war effort is available to American citizens, such as the making of camouflage nets. Wages are paid in cash; \$12 per month for unskilled labor, \$16 for semi-skilled, and \$19 for skilled and professional workers.

Arrangements have been made to take advantage of work opportunities outside the relocation centers. Detailed requirements to protect the interest of the evacuees surround the plan, such as provisions for transportation, prevailing wages, adequate housing, protection by local authorities, the right to leave employment and return to the center at will. More than 1,700 persons have already left the relocation centers under these arrangements to take agricultural employment in Oregon, Idaho, and Montana.

NEVERTHELESS, JAPANESE EVACUEES, TWO THIRDS OF whom are American citizens, are by no stretch of the imagination being coddled or pampered. Privacy is at a minimum; accommodations are adequate but not elaborate; life is circumscribed and routinized, as it must be when large groups of people are rather closely confined.

Some persons maintain that the evacuation will retard the process of assimilation. Lack of opportunity to associate with other than Japanese people, constant use of the Japanese language, ample time to compare their own treatment with the treatment of persons of other "alien enemy" extraction, may cause disillusionment about America among the evacuees.

Others point out that, while the Japanese-Americans generally may have been good citizens, they have not always availed themselves of opportunities to become better known to and understood by their Caucasian fellow citizens. This may have been partly due to the fact that the older generation never felt they could achieve full acceptance, while the younger generation were discouraged at the rebuffs their advances received. Their present experience, however, may bring home to them the necessity of "selling themselves," and thus hasten the Americanization process.

Certainly the War Relocation Authority faces a most difficult assignment. Within the centers, the strength of the family unit must be preserved—a strength that over the years has kept Japanese families off relief and has almost completely prevented delinquency among their children. The strong belief in America that helps Japanese leaders to recognize this evacuation as their contribution to the war effort must be maintained. Professional and vocational skills must be preserved and improved.

In this new stage, social workers can assist. Already they have made a mark. At the civil control stations set up to help families prepare for evacuation, public agency workers humanized and individualized the mechanical process of registration and preparation for moving. Private agencies that have long worked with the Japanese provided a much needed haven—interpreting, bringing understanding to families and community groups, seeing that needed service and assistance be made known at the control stations.

Moreover, it will never be possible to measure quantitatively the influence exerted by social workers, individually and through their agencies and professional organizations, in shaping the evacuation program during the brief preliminary period of planning. For example, a set of principles and a complete plan for evacuation were formulated by a committee on wartime social services of the Puget Sound chapter of the American Association of Social Workers in cooperation with other social work and trade union groups. Distribution was widespread: to newspapers, to the Tolan Committee, to persons officially responsible for evacuation, to interested citizens and civic groups. This committee is now active in Seattle in organizing a citywide Central Committee on Minority Groups, drawing representation from all walks of life, with the objective of gathering and disseminating *accurate* information on minority group problems. In San Francisco, the Community Chest's committee on immigrant-serving agencies, made suggestions to authorities charged with planning the evacuation program. It is continuing to function, with the purpose of keeping intact the group of citizens who know and understand the Japanese. In Los Angeles, the Council of Social Agencies made a report to the Tolan Committee and prepared a public statement. The council's immigrant service committee continues to maintain an active interest in the problems of the Japanese evacuees. The Washington and California State Conferences of Social Work also took appropriate action.

WITH THIS PERSPECTIVE, LET US GO BACK TO THE TIME last spring when thousands of family units had to close up business and personal affairs. Automobiles, tractors, printing presses, boats, and personal effects were sold, leased, or stored. Arrangements were made to dispose of farms, hotels, restaurants, merchandise, and homes. Thousands of contractual obligations, investments, business and personal relationships were adjusted—all in a few weeks. From Los Angeles County alone, 30,000 Japanese engaged in business, agriculture, and fishing were evacuated.

Imagine the problems involved in terminating abruptly the affairs of one city of that size. Add to that the problems of hundreds of similar communities, ranging in size from less than a hundred to several thousand, scattered over California, Arizona, Washington, and Oregon. Then consider the work entailed in building new facilities, and finally the transportation problem itself, and some idea may be had of the enormity and complexity of this assignment.

There were no precedents to follow, no time for leisurely planning, no opportunity to recruit and train a special staff. Yet the evacuation was well-planned, orderly, and carried out on schedule. Mistakes there were, naturally—but in comparison to the enormity of the task and the brief time allowed by virtue of military orders, they were few.

My earlier article covering the preliminary evacuations from a few strategic military areas pointed to the need for advanced planning and the assumption of over-all responsibility by some one agency for the larger evacuations which were to come. The answer to this need turned out to be the Wartime Civil Control Administration, established under the direct supervision of the Civil Affairs Division of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, as the operating agency to carry out the evacuation process.

This new agency of government brought into active participation the Farm Security Administration for agricultural problems, the Federal Reserve Bank for business and property matters, and the Federal Security Agency for facilities, registration, and social welfare services. In addition, the Department of Justice handled legal problems, the WPA provided civilian personnel for key administrative positions within the temporary assembly centers, while other federal departments served as needed. Thus the skills, resources, and personnel of existing agencies were fully utilized.

KEY OPERATING UNIT IN THE EVACUATION PROCESS WAS the civil control station, one for each area with 1,000 to 1,500 persons to be evacuated. Each control station operated approximately one week, during which the entire registration of families in the area and subsequent transportation to reception centers was accomplished.

In developing the control station the Federal Security Agency assigned responsibility for providing physical equipment, administrative and clerical staff to the U. S. Employment Service; the responsibility for registration and social welfare services to the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board; and the responsibility for health and medical problems to the U. S. Public Health Service.

In turn, the Bureau of Public Assistance delegated the responsibility for program operation and for staffing social service positions to the State Department of Social Welfare and county welfare departments. All direct costs incidental to evacuation were met by the federal government directly or on a reimbursement basis. The result was a highly successful, practical demonstration of public welfare agency cooperation at three levels of government:

- Federal*—providing over-all supervision and liaison activity for social welfare phases of evacuation.
- State*—providing supervisory personnel for operations.
- County*—providing case workers.

The control station pattern was roughly as follows:

1. Over-all coordinating responsibility for control station operation rested in a representative of the U. S. Employment Service.
2. Two Federal Reserve Bank representatives were available to handle property and business problems.
3. Two Farm Security Administration staff members were on hand to consider agricultural problems.
4. U. S. Public Health doctors conducted necessary medical inspections.
5. The army assigned one representative to handle special requests and, while responsible for the program, made no effort to direct in detail the several agencies cooperating in control station operation.
6. Japanese volunteers acted as interpreters and clerks.

7. The bulk of the work, securing necessary information, instructions to evacuees, referral of family to proper resource for social welfare, health or business problems, answering questions, and final checking to see that all points had been covered, fell upon the social workers.

The social service staff of the control station usually consisted of six or eight case workers borrowed from the local county welfare department, plus one supervisor and two assistant supervisors on loan from the State Department of Social Welfare.

Administratively, each governmental unit represented at the station was responsible to the control station manager. Professionally, each person assigned was responsible to the administrative head of his division. The entire unit was under direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

PRIOR TO THE DAY ON WHICH EACH CONTROL STATION opened, exclusion orders were posted in prominent locations throughout the specified area. A similar printed order was made available to all families at the civil control station. The notices contained detailed instructions about evacuation, resources available to the families in need of help, and specific instructions as to when and where family representatives were to report for registration.

The first two days of control station operation were devoted to actual registration; the next three, to the handling of last minute business matters, social problems, and medical inspection. On the last two mornings of the week, families, together with luggage, assembled as instructed, to board trains or buses for transportation under army direction to reception centers or relocation areas.

Control stations were opened as rapidly as facilities at the assembly centers were completed. A total of 114 were operated in the four states affected. They were manned by more than 250 case workers borrowed from county welfare departments, fifty case workers from state welfare departments, twenty from the Federal Security Agency, and twenty from private agencies. Civil control stations operated simultaneously and workers were transferred between stations on short notice when the load at any station became heavier than anticipated, so that the evacuees were spared long periods of waiting in line.

Social workers at the control stations carried heavy responsibility. They secured full information for the record that subsequently traveled with the family, answered questions, gave complete instructions. They also referred families to the resources available for the health, social, and business problems which became apparent during the interview.

Few families requested any relief, despite the fact that since the beginning of the war incomes of Japanese-Americans have suffered through business liquidation and loss of employment. Japanese persons say, however, that even though little relief was accepted, the need for relief in many instances was acute. Social workers agree that this may have been true, though they made every effort to run down complaints, and to lay emphasis in the control station on the availability of assistance.

Private organizations, such as the International Institute and the American Friends Service Committee, extended some relief, partly from funds donated by the Japanese themselves. Probably several factors contributed to the evacuees' unwillingness to accept public assistance,

among them: an intense pride and self-dependence which has always been characteristic of the group; chagrin at being a public burden; the prevalent system of mutual assistance among families; the fear that accepting public aid might in some way lead to deportation.

Chief medical problems were measles and pregnancy, along with a normal amount of general illness. When the social workers encountered medical problems, they made appointments for the following day with U. S. Public Health doctors, who called at the homes when necessary. Persons too ill to be moved or requiring special treatment were hospitalized and later transferred to reception centers. County facilities, including ambulance service, were used.

Before the control stations began functioning, many families who saw the evacuation coming had already disposed of property and adjusted their financial affairs. At designated Wartime Civil Control Administration service offices established in advance of evacuation, Federal Reserve officials and social workers were available as counsellors. But, unfortunately, many Japanese families acted hastily and disposed of their properties at great sacrifice. At best, they were in a poor position to bargain, and the shortness of time was capitalized on by many purchasers. Some persons have commented that it might have helped had each sale been routinely subject to review by the Federal Reserve Bank instead of only as the Japanese expressed a desire for such review. But such rigid scrutiny might have been misconstrued by the Japanese themselves. Being American citizens, most of them preferred to make their own independent arrangements. At the control stations, major property problems centered about storage of furniture and sale or storage of automobiles. Furniture and personal effects were stored free in standard storage houses, automobiles in open lots subject to later disposition by the owners. In fact, it is now possible for evacuees to handle business affairs from the assembly centers and relocation areas with Federal Reserve Board representatives acting in liaison capacity.

IT WAS EVIDENT AT THE CONTROL STATIONS THAT STAFF and evacuees alike were determined to play their roles graciously. The prevalent air of informality and friendliness would never have revealed to the casual observer the difficult business being transacted. It belied the fact that the lady answering questions so patiently had lost a son in defense of Pearl Harbor, or that the man who was doing such a fine job as interpreter had lost a lifetime investment in a sacrifice sale of his hotel. The only telltale evidence was an occasional vocal tremor or a tear. At one station an army lieutenant overheard someone trying to make a deal with a Japanese for his automobile. Later he stepped up to the owner and said, "Listen, fellow, before you sell to that guy, go around and get some other offers."

Some criticism has been leveled at the necessity for evacuation, but almost no one criticized the actual evacuation process.

Said one observer: "Those who carried out the evacuation orders—army, social workers, Farm Security, Federal Reserve men—did their respective jobs with such consideration and fine spirit that it made you proud to be an American citizen."

Even the bus driver, scowling at a pile of luggage that seemed his lot to load, produced a smile and a cheery word when a group of Japanese boys appeared uninvited to do

the loading. A number of staff members who undertook their control station assignment with prejudice left with praise.

Occasionally a Japanese evacuee commented half apologetically about the authoritative attitude of the young girls and well-meaning ladies who did the interviewing. But a large number of letters subsequently received by welfare agencies, social workers, and others, expressed appreciation for "the fine way you treated us."

The evacuation assignment was a challenge to the participating social workers to utilize their skills in a vital wartime job. Agency pride as well as the excitement of competition were factors contributing to successful teamwork performance of workers from federal, state, county, and private agencies. Nor was it an easy assignment. Many workers faced the pressure of long hours of sustained interviewing, knowing that all the while unfinished business was accumulating on the regular jobs from which they had been temporarily released.

There were educational values, too. Field representatives, supervisors, case workers—federal, state, county, and private agency workers—were thrown together on an unprecedented common assignment. The situation created a friendly setting; this in turn was conducive to better understanding of the other person, his position and his problems.

There is evidence that this experience has helped county welfare departments to see their responsibilities as legally constituted welfare agencies broadening from their traditional relief-giving functions toward the assumption of full leadership in over-all community welfare concerns. Several county directors have designated certain staff members to keep informed on developments of any similar programs for which they may be assigned a measure of responsibility in the future, such as evacuation of civilians or aid to civilians in need as a result of war action.

In the new shift of Japanese-Americans from assembly centers to relocation centers, the need for active interest

on the part of Americans generally, social workers among them, is as real as ever. The man in the street who comments on Japanese criticism of relocation centers with, "Well, what do they expect anyway?" forgets that most of the evacuees are his fellow citizens, neither better nor worse than he. A recent newspaper report indicates that efforts to relax the degree of confinement at the centers are bringing forth strong protests from adjacent communities. Certain groups who, for selfish reasons, would like to see the Japanese barred from resuming their places as American citizens appear to be capitalizing on wartime feelings and racial prejudice to achieve their ends.

On the other hand, some individuals and groups, oversympathetic in their approach to the problem, encourage attitudes of self-pity among the evacuees. Incidentally, social workers can do a little self-policing by taking pains to avoid thinking and talking about these people in terms of their being "social problems."

Japanese leaders say that they want neither pity, nor to be considered as social problems, that those who are loyal do not mind the sacrifice they have been asked to make. What they want as American citizens in return for their contribution is an opportunity to share in post-war America even if that sharing should mean additional hardship for *all* rather than, as we hope, material and spiritual gains.

Strong groups made up of responsible citizens, guided by those who know and understand the Japanese, can work toward the sound handling of Japanese evacuees in the current and post-war period. But the quality and force of this leadership will be determined by the degree of objectivity with which the situation is viewed. There is no place either for prejudice or pity. Here is where social workers by the very definition of their profession can find ample opportunity to serve.

A third article in Mr. Nickel's series on the West Coast evacuations, scheduled for a forthcoming issue, will describe life in the relocation and assembly centers.

Social Agencies in the Defense Set-up

By JOANNA C. COLCORD

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EARLY last summer I set out on a tour to discover how effectively social agencies were taking part in civilian defense plans. The trip took me to a dozen or so communities on the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts and on the Mexican and Canadian borders. I cannot pretend to use it as the basis of an over-all report on the degree of participation between social agencies and civilian defense authorities all over these United States, but I should like to set down some observations made in the cities visited: Houston, Tex.; Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco, Calif.; Portland, Ore.; Bremerton, Seattle, and Tacoma, Wash.; Cleveland, Ohio; Buffalo, N. Y.; and Baltimore, Md.

In choosing border cities for my visits, I may have been unwise. The threat of attack may have preoccupied the authorities with programs of civilian protection to a greater extent than in the unvisited inland communities, and caused a certain obliviousness about the necessity for de-

veloping wartime community services. At all events, in most of the cities it seemed evident that air raid precautions had the center of the stage with the local defense councils proper; activities for men in service came next in appeal to the general populace; and few but those persons connected professionally or otherwise with the health, social, and educational agencies, felt a responsibility for community war services—for meeting the problems caused to their inhabitants by putting our cities into war production.

IN GENERAL, COMMUNITY WAR SERVICES WERE MOST completely developed where the group of agencies represented in the Council of Social Agencies had got busy in advance of the formation of a local defense council, setting up emergency committees upon the various areas where the social shoe was pinching, creating facilities for enlisting volunteers in the war-defense effort, and presenting every-

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FAMILIAL ADJUSTMENTS OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS TO RELOCATION: FIRST PHASE

LEONARD BLOOM

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The removal of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast and their establishment in relocation centers came at a crucial time in the history of this minority because the *nisei* were just gaining status and the inter-generational conflict was sharply defined. The stresses fell most heavily on the family which is the predominant Japanese institutional form. The chief adaptive adjustments were made within the family as an organization and by persons as family members.

THERE may never have been a problem which captured the attention of American sociologists more promptly, more completely, and more appropriately than the evacuation of the Japanese from the West Coast. In matters of topical interest there is always a danger that the necessities of empirical immediacy will blur equally pressing theoretical considerations, and this paper tries to steer between the Scylla of crass empiricism and the Charybdis of scholasticism.

The study is predicated on the assumption that methodologically the most suitable framework for the examination of Japanese adjustment is that of the family. Surely the family is the salient Japanese institutional form and the most pervasive system within the socio-cultural complex. Furthermore it is a crucial area of acculturation, inter-generational adjustment, and group solidarity.

Pragmatic considerations always condition the kind of research which is practicable (more so in sociology than in other sciences), and for that as well as for the reasons noted above the delimitation of the investigation to the field of the family was thought appropriate. This paper is to be regarded as the foundation and ground plan of a continuous study which will attempt to follow the Japanese-American familial adjustment through and beyond the war.¹ Thus the

series of dramatic crises to which the people are being subjected will eventually appear in some perspective. Anything less than a thorough-going effort at describing the sequence patterns is inadmissible.

First there is presented a brief description of the background to the problem: the main features of the native Japanese family, an indication of the character of the acculturation which took place in Hawaii and on the West Coast, and a summary of the factors conditioning familial adjustment prior to the war. Secondly, there is a partial report of a comparative analysis of all Japanese marriages, 1081 in number, occurring in Los Angeles County between May 1937 and December 1938, and between January 1941 and April 1942. Thirdly, there is offered a descriptive account of the adjustment to the evacuation of a sample of more than 100 Japanese-American families. The methods employed in gathering the last data are questionnaire, interview, and participant observation. The assistance of students of Japanese ancestry from this department was enlisted.

The hypothesis is offered for future rather than current testing that in terms of familial integration the adjustment will be found to be bi-polar in nature rather than modal.

The native Japanese family² of the latter

¹ A brief preliminary statement "Familial Problems and the Japanese Removal" appears in Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society 1942, *Research Studies*, State College of Washington, vol. XI, 1943, pp. 21-26.

² Generalizations on the native Japanese family are from various sources. Especially useful were: John F. Embree, *Suye Mura* (University of Chicago, 1939), *The Japanese* (Washington, Smithsonian Institution War Background Studies, 1943); Shidzue Ishimoto, *Facing Two Ways* (New York, Farrar

part of the last century, which is taken as our point of departure, was characterized by a strong solidarity expressed in "mutual helpfulness." It was patriarchal in form and colored throughout by the notion of male superiority and the correlative desirability of male children. In discussing creation folklore Embree gives the following mythological support for masculine supremacy. "Performing a special marriage ceremony Izanagi and Izanami followed each other around a heavenly august pillar, and she greeted him, 'Ah, what a fair and lovely youth.' He greeted her in return and they were married. But their first children were 'not good' and by divination it was found that there had been an error in the wedding ceremony. The man, not the woman, should have spoken first, So the whole ceremony was repeated with Izanagi opening the conversation. Thus male superiority was assured for all time."³ The father symbol (*koshu*) was an object of respect, even awe; the mother symbol was one to elicit warmth and affection, and maternal influence was dependent largely on affectional ties.

The individual, if it be appropriate to use the word, matured in a rôle system in which the dominant themes were filial piety, seniority (and more specifically respect for the aged), masculine superiority, and ancestor worship. The compulsive nature of deferential attitudes found linguistic expression in the use of honorifics (*keigo*) and in the emphasis placed upon verbal propriety in alluding to or addressing an elder.

Marriage was practically uniform and was effected by family action for purposes of familial continuity. Therefore, the rôle of the eldest male child was a prime concern of the family in terms of its organization as a primary group and of its ancestral ties. The

actual marriage was usually arranged by a "go-between" (*nakaudo*), and there was small place for independent mate choice. In order to insure continuity, families without male children commonly practiced adoption. If there were a daughter, the adoptee might be the daughter's husband (*yōshi*), thus assuring both ancestor worship and retention of properties by the in-group. The adoption practices were capable of convenient variations such as the adoption of one's younger brother (*junyōshi*). Because the family's stake was so great, a careful scrutiny would be made of the lineage or "blood" of the prospective in-laws. Tuberculosis, leprosy, inferior social status, or a prison record were regarded as disabilities.

Patently in such a system the family would be the chief agency for social control, and the extension of family concepts and kin relationships into industrial and national spheres suggests its vigor. Miyamoto in his useful monograph points out the functioning significance of this theme as follows: "It is not so important that they speak of their community or nation as if it were a family; what is really significant is that they act towards it in many ways as if it were a family."⁴

Various familial principles and symbols ramify through the whole national life. The government of the Tokugawa feudal period stressed the ethical principles of filial piety and loyalty to one's superiors.⁵ During school ceremonials there is read a charter of education from the throne which abjures "ye, our subjects be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious."⁶ Mrs. Ishimoto says of the Empress, "She was to them [school girls] a gracious mother, and indeed we called her 'The Mother of the Nation.'"⁷ Prior to the death of the Meiji Emperor Mutsuhito, "Papers reported

and Rinehart, 1935); Etsu I. Sugimoto, *A Daughter of the Samurai* (New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1925). For extended bibliography see the following: Hugh Borton, Serge Elisséeff, and Edwin O. Reischauer, *A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan in English, French, and German* (Washington, American Council of Learned Societies, 1940); *Catalogue of the K. B. S. Library* (Tokyo, Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, 1937).

³ Embree, *The Japanese*, p. 2.

⁴ Shotaro Frank Miyamoto, "Social Solidarity among the Japanese in Seattle," *University of Washington Publications in the Social Sciences*, XI, 2 (December 1939) p. 84.

⁵ Embree, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁶ Ishimoto *op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

that many men committed suicide in the hope that their ancestors would accept the offering of a private life as a substitute for that of His Majesty. . . .⁸ Upon the Emperor's death a year of deep mourning occurred and even marriages were postponed until the year was over. (With utter irrelevancy the writer suggests from his meagre insight that he does not concur in the reasoning behind the Doolittle policy of missing the Imperial Palace. The death of the Emperor would be an unparalleled blow to Japa-

bargaining position of the Japanese worker, especially women, depends in large part on the cultural practices deriving from filial patterns.

* * *

As in other populations which are denominated "minorities" the Japanese present a continuum of assimilation ranging from extreme traditionalism on the one hand, termed "Japanesey" by their own group, to the "haolified" or "Americanized" types on the other. Certain features, however, are




FIGURE 1. Age, Sex, and Nativity for Japanese-Americans of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, 1940

nese morale. Even a threat to his life might cause a cabinet crisis.)

Geisha may be adopted legally as daughters of the house. The mistress is termed mother, other geisha are called sisters and the strictures of filial duty operate as in the family. In the popular literature one of the standard themes is the struggle of the geisha against being prostituted by the foster mother.⁹ The feudal form of familism has been a chief factor in the retardation of labor reforms in Japan. The inferiority of the

worth reviewing. The period of Japanese immigration was brief and its termination abrupt. An examination of a population pyramid reveals a great preponderance of foreign-born males in the group over fifty years of age, a considerable preponderance of foreign-born females in the forty to fifty age groups, and an abrupt cleavage between the native- and foreign-born groups at the thirty to thirty-five level where the pyramid is quite narrow. This is suggestive, for it offers demographic support for culture conflict which would have the effect of canalizing along generational lines whatever struggle

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 286f.

arose. It lends a concrete group-formed reality to the "problem of the second generation," to the cultural hybrid, and to marginality which in most minorities is much less clearly defined.

Miyamoto¹⁰ periodizes the history of adjustment of the Japanese population in three intervals: The Frontier Period, The Settling Period, The Second Generation Period. The Frontier Period ended in 1907 with the Gentlemen's Agreement. During this time the immigrants nearly without exception planned to return to Japan. The Settling Period, from 1907 to 1924, saw ghetto formation, economic expansion, the leveling of sex ratios and family founding. The Second Generation Period beginning in 1924 found the people

with the emergence of the *sansei*, the third generation.

It is my opinion, considering the wide cultural gap and the tendency to segregated residence, that the assimilation of the *nisei* has been notably great. Indeed a good case might be made for the proposition that there is a greater culture distance between the *issei* and the *nisei* than between the *nisei* and their caucasoid contemporaries. Besides the home, the chief institutional agency for culture conservation was the Japanese language school. Thirty percent of our U.S. born cases failed to attend language school, and the mean was four years' attendance. The importance of such schooling might easily be over-rated, for the quality of instruction

TABLE I. JAPANESE POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS¹¹

Year	United States (Continental)	California			
	Population	Population	Sex Ratio (Males/100 females)	Percent Native- Born	Percent of Native-born over 21 years
1940	126,947	93,717	127.7	64.2	31.9
1930	138,834	97,456	137.6	50.3	7.1
1920	111,010	71,952	171.1	28.9	
1910	72,157	41,356	562.8	7.7	
1900	24,326	10,151	1735.6	1.4	

resigned to a life in America and orienting themselves to the rising *nisei*. To these must be added a fourth upon which we have just embarked. Perhaps it may be called the Period of Isolation, although a more dramatic term would be as suitable.

The chart shows the rapidity with which the native-born population came into numerical ascendancy. There should also be emphasized the very recent emergence of an adult native-born group to challenge the authority of the elders. Speaking of Seattle in the late thirties Miyamoto said: "... in the rising importance of the second generation we have the portent of a break from ... ancient collectivistic traditions ... the break will come suddenly."¹² How suddenly it came, and in what fashion! Not least important is the fact that the break coincided

was formal in character and varied with the training of the teacher.

Another conservative influence was the practice of visiting Japan. Because it is difficult just now to secure reliable information on this matter, I shall not essay any generalization beyond noting that the influence of such visits was mixed. Some youth, inept in Japanese and unused to old country ways, were pushed toward the American end of the culture continuum as they would not have been had they never visited Japan. What we need and what we do not have yet are data on age, duration, and frequency of the visits. The tendency to classify categorically as *kibei* all young people who have visited Japan is patently absurd. The term applies properly to persons who have been assimilated sufficiently to shift their cultural center of gravity to Japan, a process not accomplished in a few months.

In some instances the experiences of

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 64-66 *et passim*.

¹¹ From census data.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

visitors to Japan were little less than traumatic and the *nisei* look back on their sojourn with resentment and a strong awareness of their identity with American culture. Here is an example: "... she explained that it was impossible for her to remain longer in Japan, although she had had every intention of doing so. She had found herself at a peculiar disadvantage there, because, though she looked like a Japanese, she was unable to speak the language; and besides, her dress, language, everything about her, in fact, betrayed her American origin. The anomaly struck the Japanese public as something scandalous, almost uncanny. When she appeared on the streets, crowds followed her."¹³

From the standpoint of family behavior, one focus of adjustment and conflict is linguistic habit. The use of honorifics is essential to familial interaction, and requires a linguistic facility not often achieved by *nisei*. In noting this Yamamoto says "... anything except the correct usage may make for either rudeness or absurdity."¹⁴ Interpreting the language problem further she says, "There is a tendency for the first generation to think that their children are deliberately trying to forget the Japanese language. . . . The younger folks . . . shun contacts with the elders due to this Japanese language deficiency."¹⁵ According to our findings the language pattern of the average Japanese-American home is fairly clear-cut. Parents speak Japanese to each other, the children English to each other and a kind of pidgin Japanese to their parents. Girls, associating more with their linguistically conservative mothers, have a higher degree of Japanese proficiency than do boys.

The in-group security of the Japanese population has not been altered by intermarriage to any considerable extent, but courtship practices have proved more susceptible to change. The use of the go-between

has persisted in a large number of cases but in a formalistic rather than a functional sense. The *nakaudo* is likely to be secured after the fact, for the American ideology of independent mate choice has been accepted by the *nisei*. The dating complex and the notion of romantic love have also become part of the thoughtways of the young. Some aspects of the love pattern such as kissing, the public expression of emotion, free verbalization, social dancing, and the relatively high status of women are of course repugnant to the parental generation and provide areas of culture conflict.¹⁶ In the intensive association of camp life the culture forms are not only divergent but visible and the conflict tends to become overt.

On the other hand parents are no doubt more influential in determining mate choice than is customary among caucasoid Americans, and ancestral criteria of blood and status are significant. Many families undertake the traditional investigation of old-country backgrounds and before the war would send to Japan for a dossier on the suitor's family.

To turn to the particularities of intermarriage, Panunzio in his study for Los Angeles County covering the 1924-33 period found the Japanese intermarriage rate to be only 2.3 percent.¹⁷ Correct this figure for the evasions of the California law which forbids racial intermarriage with whites and our ignorance of out-of-state cases, and the real rate might well approach Adams' findings for Hawaii (1930-34) of 4.5 percent.¹⁸ Our 1941-42 data show six intermarriages, hardly more than one percent of the total. Although the number of cases is too small to warrant generalization, it is interesting that only one

¹³ Quoted from Robert E. Park, *The Survey*, May 1, 1926, p. 136, in E. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man* (New York, Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 104.

¹⁴ Misako Yamamoto in *Social Process in Hawaii*, IV (Sociology Club, University of Hawaii, 1938) p. 47.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Cf. R. H. Ross and E. H. Bogardus, "Four Types of Nisei Marriage Patterns," *Sociology and Social Research*, XXV (1940) pp. 63-65; and R. H. Ross and E. H. Bogardus, "Second-generation Race Relations Cycle: a Study in Issei-Nisei Relationships," *Sociology and Social Research*, XXIV (1940) pp. 357-363.

¹⁷ Constantine Panunzio, "Intermarriage in Los Angeles, 1924-33," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII, 5 (1942), pp. 693-695.

¹⁸ Romanzo Adams, *Racial Intermarriage in Hawaii* (New York, Macmillan, 1937), p. 344.

Chinese was involved whereas in Panunzio's cases seventeen of twenty-seven intermarriages were with Chinese, manifestly an expression of the penetration of global conflicts into the interstitial areas of Los Angeles.

In order to state objectively some of the effects of the war on Japanese adjustment, I should like to draw some data from a study to be published later of Japanese marriages contracted in Los Angeles County. The whole analysis covers the periods May 1937 through December 1938 and January 1941 through April 1942. For this discussion I shall use only the intervals May 1937 through April 1938 and May 1941 through April 1942. May through April was taken as the statistical year because the evacuation introduced a new situation. It will be inexpedient to offer the full statistical analysis here, but some generalizations may be made.

The dramatic increase in marriages in the second year over the first and in the war over the pre-war period may be explained only by the tensional system in which this minority operated. The latter figures are conservative in that the intervening period saw the introduction of a pre-marital medical examination requirement in California with the usual increase in out-of-state marriages. In turn, however, this factor is probably corrected by the age trend of the Japanese population.

TABLE 2. NUMBER OF JAPANESE MARRIAGES IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY BY MONTHS

Month	1937-1938	1941-1942
May	19	30
June	21	54
July	17	24
August	16	30
September	31	29
October	24	30
November	25	40
December	17	28
January	11	42
February	25	67
March	24	103
April	19	85
Total	249	562

Table 2 shows that in the first year there were 249 marriages; in the second there were

562. Of the latter 297 fell in the first four months of 1942.

In the seven months before the outbreak of war we have a population responding, as did the rest of the nation, to the pressure of anxiety, fear, and excitement, and marrying because of it. December shows a sharp drop-off which I had interpreted as a catatonic phase of inactivity, but comparative study makes such a point of view doubtful. The high point was reached early in April when 44 marriages were solemnized in a single week.

It is further interesting to note that those in the upper age group were also affected by this trend. Fifty-four persons over 40 years of age were married between January and April of 1942 compared with fifteen in the 1937-38 period. There is a high degree of co-residence reported in this group, probably indicating a wish to formalize common-law or foreign marriages.

After Pearl Harbor ten venerable marriage licenses were used whose average age was 41 months, and only two of which had been secured within a year. It is clear even from brief analysis that the Japanese were hurriedly entrenching themselves within the familial institution, cementing and formalizing old relationships, and precipitating new ones.

In the weeks before evacuation courtships that saw marriage as months or years away matured and were consummated, and casual meetings became serious affairs. The only way to insure being evacuated together was to marry. Parents were bedeviled into granting consent long before they had time for seemly investigation. The go-between (*nakado*) was busy indeed, but in the haste compromises were made with ceremonial observances that otherwise would not have been allowed. Haste further meant that expensive and elaborate weddings were dispensed with, and couples who were postponing marriage for financial reasons found the obstacle removed. In the assembly centers affluence would not count for much. As an excuse the evacuation worked both ways.

Before proceeding a word must be said on the character of my sources of information.

For the most part I have been dependent upon *nisei* trained in Western universities for direct information and for field assistance. My sampling is badly slanted wherever acculturational variables are paramount. The *nisei* who attended our universities were predominantly urban with a good deal of the cultural apparatus which that implies. They were more secure economically than the average Japanese-American. They were committed most thoroughly to the American way of life. Those who have collaborated as field assistants, *kibei* as well as *nisei*, were chosen because of their training in the social sciences, their facility in Japanese, or both. Later on it will be possible to make acknowledgment by name for their work and to assure them that if these studies make sense it is their fault.

If an enormously complicated set of relationships may be reduced to a few hunches, it is my opinion that the crises of war and evacuation resulted, at least temporarily, in an increase in familial interaction.

The policy of the Wartime Civil Control Administration of evacuating household groups as units reinforced the group stabilizing tendency, and family members who were not co-residents often returned home. There arose in a few minds the erroneous notion that evacuation by families was mandatory and so groups were re-formed that may have lost their functional character. If this notion seems improbable the reader must recall the flood of rumor in which the Japanese-Americans struggled at the time of evacuation, and indeed still do. The reestablishment of family groups was by no means universal, however. Some were restored after evacuation, and some still wait upon administrative action. In a later report I hope to include information on the matter of post-evacuation residential changes.

With their facility in English the elder children had a large rôle in making decisions. However, when it became apparent that no distinction was to be made between the *nisei* and their Japanese-born parents and when loyalty tensions arose, the American citizens lost status. The culture conflicts did not resolve. Indeed the marginality of

the *nisei* was thrown into high relief, but temporarily the social manifestations of strife were submerged by the necessity for collective action.

Another factor making for group stability was the practice of removing neighborhoods or organized groups together and housing them in the same areas in the assembly centers. Many of these groups had no previous existence but were organized to meet the emergency. Others were loosely integrated community groups which took on the special function and accepted outsiders.

The general circumstances surrounding the evacuation are well enough known so that they need not be recited here. The cumulative and confusing pressures may be appreciated from the following chronology:

- January 29, 1942. First Attorney-General's order establishing prohibited restricted zones on West Coast and regulating movement of enemy aliens. Subsequent orders on January 31, February 2, 4, 5, and 7.
- February 13. Letter to the President from Pacific Coast Congressional Delegation recommending evacuation from strategic areas of all persons of Japanese ancestry.
- February 19. Executive order authorizing designation of military areas from which any person might be excluded. Beginning of voluntary evacuation.
- February 21. Tolan Committee begins Pacific Coast hearings on enemy aliens and Japanese-Americans.
- March 2. Proclamation by General DeWitt designating Military Areas No. 1 (western half of the coastal states and southern Arizona) and No. 2 (remainder of four states).
- March 14. Wartime Civil Control Administration established under Western Defense Command to supervise evacuation.
- March 16. Work started on assembly center at Manzanar.
- March 18. War Relocation Authority created to relocate evacuated persons.
- March 19. Fourteen Western governors oppose settlement of Japanese evacuees in their states.
- March 23. One thousand voluntary evacuees from Los Angeles leave to prepare Manzanar center. All persons of Japanese ancestry ordered to evacuate Bainbridge Island near Seattle by March 30.
- March 27. Curfew for all persons of Japanese

ancestry in Military Area No. 1, requiring them to be at home between 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M., forbidding certain possessions, and restricting travel without permit to five miles from home.

March 29. Further voluntary evacuation from Military Area No. 1 prohibited.

March 30. Three thousand persons of Japanese ancestry ordered to evacuate Terminal Island in Los Angeles Harbor to Santa Anita Assembly Center by April 5.

June 2. Persons of Japanese ancestry forbidden to leave California part of Military Area No. 2 (eastern half of state) anticipatory to evacuation of this area.

June 3. Evacuation of 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1 completed.¹⁹

Here are the questions that were being asked: Would there be an evacuation? Would an exception be made of citizens? When would the evacuation come? What areas would be included? How much time would be allowed between notice and evacuation? What property might be taken? What property should be disposed of and how? Should an attempt be made to move inland before the curfew was established? (8,000 did move inland, of which more than half remained outside the centers.²⁰) For most of the population the questions were answered in a period of less than two weeks between the notice of the evacuation date for their area and their actual removal.

Another factor that increased the stress of family adjustment was the detention of more than 4,700 persons.²¹ Most of these were *issei* males, the most responsible segment of the community and those most practiced in making overt societal adjustments. Furthermore they comprised a disproportionately large number of family heads. The significance of the figure 4,700 becomes clear upon noting that there were over 23,000 family heads among the Japanese-Americans in the

four Western states (Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington). The capacity to adjust of any family would be damaged by the loss of its responsible head; the effect on the Japanese-American family with its heritage of patriarchal responsibility was often shattering. The statistical support for this statement lies in the fact that 45.6 percent of all *issei* in the four Western states were listed as family heads by the 1940 census, whereas 6.0 percent of *nisei* were so listed.

It is important to note that the condition was not merely a temporary one. By January 1943 about 1,400 detained persons had been placed in relocation centers with their families, 2,000 had been sent to internment camps where aliens defined as disloyal are incarcerated, and the remainder were still in detention camps awaiting hearing.²²

Although the residence plan in the relocation centers presumed the preservation of the family unit, the limitations of space required compromises with the plan. Detached individuals were housed with small family groups. The average size living quarters for a family of five is a single room 20 by 25 feet; for smaller families less space is allowed. Auditory privacy for individual or family is absent even when housed in separate units, for the necessarily flimsy construction keeps out no noises. The construction provided is known in military parlance as "theatre of operations" type of tar-paper covered barracks and is designed to last for five years. The *nisei* who had not the background of adjustment to the rather al fresco type of native Japanese residence are the most disturbed by living conditions.

The whole problem of the inability of the primary group to isolate itself was and is one of the commonest complaints. To the concern of their elders, childrens and adolescents became sexually sophisticated and voyeuristically oriented. Lovers became inhibited or defiant or both. The problem is a cultural as well as a personal one when one recalls Japanese conservatism about public demonstrations of affection. Here is an extract from a letter which states the confusion of a young

¹⁹ Abridged and adapted from War Relocation Authority, *First Quarterly Report* (March 18 to June 30, 1942) pp. 1-5.

²⁰ Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, Seventy-Eighth Congress, First Session, on S. 444. Washington: 1943, pp. 2-3.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²² *Loc. cit.*

newlywed. "Married life is no lark in camp when you're in love and don't mind if people know it. You want them to know it, but, of course, social pressure prevents. Seeing the same Japanese neighbors day in and day out while you pass by those gossiping groups of men and women makes you freeze up. In my own vicinity I rarely hold hands . . . but my conscience doesn't bother me when I'm away from home where I don't know the old people. I guess we can't blame the oldsters for making meaningless comments about those passing by, but pretty soon they become rumors, etc. All of this conservative behavior only because our parents didn't experience the same type of sex behavior during their prime. In fact, my parents have never seen us kissing except once at our wedding ceremony."

The most important influence on family integration was the loss of function and the absence of need for any kind of collective action. After the intensive collaboration of planning for removal, which knit the group so tightly together for a brief span, there suddenly were no decisions to be made, little work to do, and no household routine. The house-organizing plans were translated into barrack existence with community dining halls, laundries, and toilet facilities. No longer were there any common purposes or activities to provide functional ties and group meanings. The father's authority as head of the household lost much of its functional character, the age-hierarchy was all but destroyed, and group purposes disappeared. Nothing further from the Japanese plan of family organization could have been contrived.

Each member became a free agent, and small children detached themselves from parental supervision, returning to the home barracks perhaps only to sleep. Especially in the assembly centers the age group promptly became the organizing principle, and the clique became a predominant form of organization. Community activities such as religious observances, supervised recreation, education and work were arranged on age lines, thereby reinforcing the tendency. In the relocation centers the system of organized education

was the most effective time-filling device.

Almost all observers report that the elders are concerned about the decay in manners of the children. Perhaps the general tensions plus the frictions of barracks existence were responsible for the population becoming verbally less inhibited and more aggressive.

There has been a tendency a priori to interpret the breakup of the Japanese colonies in our cities as assimilative in character. In the very long run this may be true, but the immediate results have been quite the opposite. *Nisei* who never would have acquired any facility in Japanese are learning it. After the first adjustments of relocation, the cultural reënforcement that the *issei* received from each other made for reacculturation both of themselves and their children.

Because there are no horizons to the life space, and because there can be none, group-forming decisions are postponed. Having children, for an example, is regarded as extremely undesirable. There is a great deal of doubt as to the wisdom of contracting new marriages. It will be interesting to discover if this doubt is expressed in a low marriage rate.

In retrospect it is difficult to conceive how the population could have met the crisis as well as it did without its strongly integrating primary group forms. Initially at least the emergency yielded a further cohesion. At the end of 1942 two general sets of forces were observable. First a tendency of the *nisei* to withdraw from the familial group with its conservative Japanese cultural attributes, as evidenced by age group formations. The opportunity to move from the centers which has been afforded some persons, mostly *nisei*, reënforces and gives reality to the withdrawal. Second there are those who have tended increasingly to identify themselves with their parents and the parental culture (by no means necessarily with Japan). Partly this may be traced to the frustrations of camp life and the war effort. Partly it is due to their intensive association in small living quarters and their loss of status as a culturally emergent group. If policies and politics permit the tendency to withdraw promises to be ascendant.

We are pursuing the investigation in the following ways: (1) As nearly as possibly family histories are being kept up to date. It is planned to attempt to maintain such contacts beyond the war so that we shall have a set of adjustmental histories as complete as possible. Because our collaborators are assimilated and clearly loyal persons they are being relocated out of the centers and our task increases in difficulty. (2) Pre-evacuation and post-evacuation marriages are being studied from the comparative standpoint. (3) Mixed marriages are being investigated inasmuch as they illuminate such features as group definition, isolation,

and the like. (4) An attempt is being made to secure full histories of divorces. The divorce rate promises to be very high.

This paper has outlined the first steps in the analysis of a set of problems which in some respects are as close as sociological data ever get to being experimental. It has presented a brief summary of the backgrounds of Japanese-American families and their first adjustment to a situation unique in American history. In the most modest fashion it offers itself as an acknowledgment of a salient obligation of social scientists, the documentation of the present.

PRISONIZATION AND THE WRA CAMPS

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In analyzing the effects of relocation on Japanese-Americans, I have found it useful to apply Clemmer's concept of prisonization to yet another context. In this paper I should like to sketch out the problem in terms of a comparison and contrast of prison and "camp" life. Even at risk of belaboring the obvious, I wish to make it clear at the outset that no responsible official has referred to the camp residents as incarcerated criminals. The point taken here is that prisonization is a societal phenomenon, not a legalistic one, and the concept is applicable to situations where criminality is not a factor and indeed where legal considerations are in doubt.

Clemmer defines prisonization as the taking on of the culture of the penitentiary, which is facilitated by such factors as the length of sentence, plasticity and instability of personality, and lack of extra-prison contacts.¹ Prison life, deviating in important respects from the general culture, may have apprenticeship value for outside life only when behavior patterns are specifically appropriate to law-abiding or criminal existence. Although I am not quite certain that Clemmer would approve my interpretation, it seems not too great a violence to restrict the term prisonization to the deviant features. Otherwise, it must be made to include the totality of the socialization process as it goes on in prison and the term becomes logically useless.

The War Relocation Authority centers and their predecessors, the Wartime Civil Control Authority camps, are an ambiguous phenomenon as well as an anomalous event in the American scene. Throughout their history their administrations struggled without much success to evade the stigmatizing labels "prison" and "concentration camp." The words were employed indiscriminately both by persons who were interested in protecting the evacuees and were indignant at their treatment and by those who wished to call them bad names. This is one of the instances in which words of themselves are important, and the popular definition, although confused, has been markedly influenced by the terms. The facts are not generally known.

¹ Donald E. Clemmer, *The Prison Community* (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1940), pp. 298-304 *et passim*.

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Perhaps it is easiest to define the status of the camp residents by indicating where they fall in a wartime hierarchy of restricted populations. First are the prisoners of war seized in combat. Second are civilian internees, aliens of enemy nationality, who were apprehended by the F.B.I. and have been found guilty of acts against the national security or have been found dangerous to the national security by enemy-control hearing boards, or who await hearing. They are confined in internment camps administered by the Justice Department, not by the WRA. Third are the segregated group of Japanese aliens and Japanese-Americans who have signified loyalty to Japan or have expressed the wish to be deported to Japan in order to accompany relatives or for other reasons. This third group has been sequestered at the Tule Lake Relocation Center since the fall of 1943 and is presumed to include all disloyal elements from the other centers. They are, of course, not eligible for leave. Unfortunately, the Tule Lake Center is administered by the WRA, and the other centers are identified with it in the public press and mind. Fourth are the residents of the relocation centers, both alien and citizen. Fifth are former residents of the centers who, after "being cleared," have been released on indefinite leave, or for a prescribed period.²

The above set of facts lends itself to confusion and exploitation by those whose purpose is to identify the evacuees with the enemy. Another contribution to the cause of ambiguity was the Selective Service policy of classifying *nisei* as 4C, the designation for enemy aliens, a practice being changed only at this writing. These societal definitions found their reciprocals in the self-definitions of the evacuees and thus fostered prisonization.

The symbolic devices were reinforced by physical ones. Armed soldiers patrolled the camp boundaries, barbed wire fences were erected, and search lights illuminated the fence areas. The size of the camps was determined by the efficient use of military personnel, the theory being that a minimum guard unit could control a large camp as well as a small one.³ In turn, the size of the camps imposed a rigidity of organization and a degree of regimental control that would not have been necessary under more variable conditions. Military police are

²"Leave Regulations," *Second Quarterly Report*, War Relocation Authority (July 1-September 30, 1942), pp. 13-17.

³"Selecting the Relocation Sites," *First Quarterly Report*, War Relocation Authority (March 18-June 30, 1942), p. 7.

stationed outside the centers to control entry and exit. They enter the camps only under emergencies, such as the Manzanar "incident" of December 1942.

An important prisonizing influence is the pattern of doubt, rumor, and psychological insecurity which is probably inescapable. The WRA policy was literally extemporized, and especially in the early history of the organization it was in a state of flux. The most important single question is "How long shall we be here?" It is a question most convicts can answer with better assurance. Even now the evacuees are wondering if the camps will be maintained after the war, and a very few hope that they may be kept in operation for a brief period during which public opinion might become more temperate.

Because the evacuation was conducted on racial (that is, on caste) lines, the isolation of the population was more deeply felt than if only aliens had been removed. The camps themselves are crystallizations of caste structure with all "orientals" subordinate to all "Caucasians." Some members of the staff, of course, strive to ameliorate this situation, and in the early stages of camp growth the Caucasian staff shared the discomforts of the crude living conditions. Other staff members found ego-gratification in the status pattern.

Only passing reference can be made here to the breakdown of the instruments of folk control.⁴ The internment of many of the *issei* and the thrusting of responsibility for camp organization on inexperienced youth resulted in a damaging of previous forms of integration. Although family structure was badly strained, even its imperfect continuation was a buffer against prisonizing tendencies. It afforded a reminder of outside existence and some practice in normal activities. On the other hand, it now has a mixed influence and is responsible for over-caution when individuals consider going on leave.

The community activities are clearly non-prisonizing features. From the start, education was recognized to be essential, and the programs are usually adequate and sometimes excellent. The variety of offerings would do credit to much larger school systems. Allied with supervised recreation, the education plan has gone about as far as pos-

⁴These questions are touched upon in my two earlier articles: "Familial Problems and the Japanese Removal," *Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society* (1942), in *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, XI (1943), 21-26. "Familial Adjustment of Japanese-Americans to Relocation: First Phase," *American Sociological Review*, VIII (October, 1943), 551-60.

sible toward reducing the speed of prisonization among the young. But this is only relative, for after two years some youthful Japanese-Americans know nothing but camp life or remember very little else. Religious activity performs somewhat the same kind of function as the educational and recreational programs. In addition, it has been favorably received because the evacuees realize that, of organized bodies, the churches have given the most sympathetic support. Some religious behavior, however, is largely escapist, as is evidenced by the appearance of cultist groups.

The letter and the press are extraordinarily important features of life in the Centers. The correspondence which was exchanged between evacuees and their friends outside composes one of the great instances of mass logorhea in history. I would guess that it has now tapered off, and if so, we have a ready-made index of prisonization. Another tie with the outside is the metropolitan press of the Pacific Coast. With almost pathological curiosity the camp residents read the attacks upon them by, for example, the Hearst press. The evacuees, like other persons, are not above dramatizing themselves, and there is ample material in these sources. But the effect is more than a simple frivolous one, for each man is his own public opinion analyst and, lacking more objective information, he measures public sentiment by the size of newspaper headlines. In addition, each camp has its paper. It features news of its own relocation center and relocation problems. The *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, for instance, has a vigorous editorial policy to encourage applications for leave and shows a willingness to "fight back" at antagonistic newspapers. This policy has the effect of canalizing aggressions in such a way that individuals may find it easier to identify themselves with the main currents of life outside. It accomplishes this end best among the most overtly patriotic young *nisei*.

The complex of prisonizing and non-prisonizing influences is brought to the test level as the individuals face the prospect of leaving camp. The most clear-cut instance was the formation of a combat team of volunteers. Even though they were not eligible to be inducted under Selective Service at that time, they enlisted in considerable numbers, and their enlistment rate compares quite favorably with that of the general population. Their action was not uniformly approved; for instance, some persons thought that they were once more being treated as a special kind of American, one hundred and ten per cent Americans

who could not be drafted but must enlist. For the most part, however, the volunteers were seized upon as a device to identify the Japanese-American community with the war effort. The salutary influence was somewhat reduced by prolongation of the interval between volunteering and actual induction.

The cumulative effects of prisonization inhibit decision-making, and many obstacles have to be hurdled.⁵ There are the procedures of securing clearance, a tedious task at best. There are considerations of financial risk with the knowledge that the employment offered is not likely to be either attractive or remunerative. Because most of the individuals going out leave families in the camps, there are problems to be threshed out in family council, and the *issei* to be convinced or defied. Even at best, there are the small bereavements of departure. Those who go out on seasonal leave have the tensions cushioned by the groups in which they work. At least one observer mistrusts the holiday spirit of the seasonal work gangs.⁶

But for the solitary individual, after a year or two or more behind barbed wire, the "outside" is at once attractive and frightening. Unlike the convict, the Japanese-American is "visible," and his fears are often physical fears. The emphasis on the role of the camps as protection against a hostile people reinforces their reluctance to leave. It is impossible to estimate the amount of trained incompetence, but it is very probably one of the most important products of camp life and clearly the psychological correlative of prisonization. Most important of all is the task of breaking the camp habit systems and adjusting to an environment half new and half forgotten. An observation of a repatriate on the Gripsholm states the problem simply: "... everybody was feeling the way I was about reaching New York, too. Instead of being impatient and eager to get there, I was afraid. I was appalled at the prospect of diving into life again. I saw freedom ahead of me, days full of my own decisions, a continent to wander in without exit or entry permits and without permits to take my baggage, permits to own my baby. I was scared to death."⁷

Summarily, although the camps have not yet elaborated a sub-

⁵ See articles by John Kitasako in the *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, December 31, 1943, and January 15, 1944.

⁶ John Kitasako in the *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, January 22, 1944.

⁷ Emily Hahn, "Homeward," *The New Yorker*, XIX (December 25, 1943), p. 28.

culture analogous to that of the prison, they present a number of prisonizing features, such as the obscurity of the societal definition of the residents, their identification with the enemy through devices of caste, the indeterminate prospect, the physical restrictions and conditions of the environment, and the breakdown of control features of the folk culture. Influences counter-acting the above forces are organized education, recreation, the camp press and other community activities, military participation by their group, and ties with friends outside. The conflict of these influences becomes crucial when persons consider leaving camp and the family can play both prisonizing and non-prisonizing roles.

Ultimately the success of the administrators, agencies, and staffs will be measured in terms of the extent to which the prisonization of evacuees has been minimized. There is evidence that many members of the staffs appreciate the essential aspects of the problem. Defined as the situation is, total success is unthinkable.

To Dorothy
with regards
Leonard

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TRANSITIONAL ADJUSTMENTS OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN FAMILIES TO RELOCATION*

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IN THIS paper I shall sketch one time segment of an adjustment history. An earlier paper in the *Review*¹ surveyed the background of the problem and indicated the methodological and circumstantial justifications for orienting the study to an examination of the familial complex. The period to be discussed here begins with the establishment of the population in relocation centers which was completed on November 1, 1942, eleven months after Pearl Harbor and seven months after the evacuation began. It ends in January 1945 with the opening of the Pacific Coast to relocation. Subse-

quent events will merely be touched upon.

The data upon which this study is based are chiefly of two sorts. The first is a structural analysis of the records of 3000 families, one tenth of those registered at the time of evacuation. Seventy per cent of these family records were extensively supplemented in the field from the files of the War Relocation Authority, and provide the quantitative documentation. The main classifications are six structural categories of family units or individuals which are sub-classified by nativity (Table I). Quantitative judgments are made within this framework and the differential adjustments of each type have been analyzed. It is possible in a journal article only to point out the modal forms of adjustment. The second type of data comprises some one hundred histories of Japanese-American families equated with the structural types. Insights and the overtones of

*An expanded version of the paper read at the meeting of the American Sociological Society, Cleveland, March 1-3, 1946.

¹Leonard Bloom, "Familial Adjustments of Japanese-Americans to Relocation: First Phase," *American Sociological Review* 8 (October, 1943), 551-560.

TABLE I. STRUCTURAL CATEGORIES OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN FAMILIES

Family type ¹	Number ²	%
Total.....	2170	100.0
Individuals.....	442	20.4
Issei.....	302	13.9
Nisei.....	66	3.0
Kibei.....	74	3.4
Complete couples.....	245	11.3
Issei-Issei.....	110	5.1
Nisei-Nisei.....	61	2.8
Kibei-Kibei.....	18	0.8
Issei-Nisei.....	20	0.9
Issei-Kibei.....	11	0.5
Nisei-Kibei.....	25	1.2
Incomplete couples.....	224	10.3
Female absent.....	206	9.5
Male absent.....	18	0.8
Complete primary families.....	946	43.6
Issei parents.....	627	28.9
Nisei parents.....	68	3.1
Kibei parents.....	31	1.4
Issei-Nisei parents.....	97	4.5
Issei-Kibei parents.....	81	3.7
Nisei-Kibei parents.....	42	1.9
Incomplete primary families.....	285	13.2
Issei parents.....	86	4.0
Issei father—mother unknown.....	77	3.5
Issei mother—father unknown.....	122	5.6
Sibling groups.....	28	1.3

¹ Classified according to composition of the primary family group at the time of registration for evacuation. Extensions of the family and nonrelated members of the household have been ignored here to avoid excessive complication. Individuals were single persons living apart from parents. Couples were married persons without children in the household group. Primary families were married persons with children. Sibling groups had no parent present. Incomplete couples and incomplete primary families lacked one spouse in the household group due to death, divorce, residence in Japan or elsewhere, internment, etc.

Issei are first-generation, born in Japan; nisei are second-generation, born in the U. S.; kibei are second-generation, born in the U. S., but having at least 5 years of education in Japan before age 18. With incomplete couples and incomplete primary families, the generation of the absent spouse may be unknown.

adjustments and relationships are derived from these histories.

For the most part we shall be discussing a history of impacts and of reactions to those impacts. During a period of more than three years the population was working out a set of adjustments to an institutional environment.² Within the limits of the WRA plan some of the elements of free choice and some of the fictions of individual responsibility were maintained. Freedom was circumscribed, however, by guard towers and fences which were reinforced by elaborate administrative detail, so that even with the best of objectives and counseling the barriers to relocation would have been strong. Furthermore, the centers were isolated in geographical environments sharply contrasting with those the evacuees had known. Thus it was doubly difficult to reify a world outside of the camp in which one might live.

Authority, of course, was vested in the administration and all "Japanese" were subordinate to all "Caucasians." WRA recognized the invidious connotation of the term "Caucasian" and attempted to erase the implication of caste by requiring use of the official designation "Appointed Personnel." But the residents never ceased calling the A.P.'s *hakuji* (white people), for caste definitions have their reciprocals. The wages received by the evacuee workers were hardly more than token payments. The top wage of \$19 per month for professionals, many of whom were better qualified than A.P.'s, reinforced the status differentiation. The power system within which familial authority was

² Leonard Bloom, "Prisonization and the WRA Camps," *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1944, pp. 29-34 (*Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society* 1943).

² The original 10% random sample from the War-time Civil Control Administration's Social Data Registration form, which was filled out at the time of evacuation, totalled 3034 family groups. We were able to trace 2170 or 71.5% of these through War Relocation Authority records through January 1, 1945. A disproportionate number of the 28.5% unaccounted for were in Poston Relocation Center. In regard to relocation and segregation the omissions do not affect our interpretations.

exercised and familial adjustments were worked out was very constricted and there was ample cause for deflected aggression.

Within the institutionalized system a regression took place which retarded the acculturation of Japanese-Americans by a generation. Sansei (third-generation) children, who otherwise would have known little Japanese, now speak faulty Japanese. The younger nisei (second-generation), among the most ardent apprentices of American society, seriously felt the loss of the multitude of associations they would have had. The influence of the issei (first-generation) was greatly increased and they frequently displaced their children in caring for grandchildren.

Two factors reduced the effectiveness of adjustments to the outside: a retardation or reversal of the acculturation process, and the pattern of institutionalization.

I have commented elsewhere on the effect of barracks existence on interpersonal relationships and familial solidarity. Several of my informants, both issei and nisei, have suggested that the tensions initiated in crowded quarters underlie many subsequent separations and eventual divorces.

The problems with which the population was confronted made the whole history of relocation a continuous series of conferences, of choices, and of unresolved tensions. The most important of these pertained to the question of leaving the center. Seasonal leaves were a disorganizing influence for many families. As early as the harvest season of 1942, eight or nine thousand persons, predominantly males, left the centers temporarily for farm work.³ The motivations were chiefly financial; there was a strong appeal to patriotism; and the workers were afforded an escape from the torpor of center life. Like the cases of rationalized family desertion that are to be found among Army enlistments, it also provided a ruse for escaping maladjusted familial or other social situations. The unaccustomed mobility superimposed on the tensions of barracks life were

disruptive to the most highly integrated families. Unfortunately the available data on separations are unreliable. One can only venture the opinion that a considerable number of later divorces derive in part from seasonal or other leaves. The cleavage of distance would have the effect of structuring whatever alienation might exist so that the hazards to dual solidarity greatly increased. These separations are quite analogous to those characteristic of war, but were relatively far more numerous.

The pattern of cleavage may be illustrated by reference to case T-2, a nisei couple. They married in 1939, at which time the husband was 25 and the wife 19. He was a gardener in Los Angeles. A son was born in mid-1941. There was no history of marital discord and the union had the appearance of stability reinforced by the young son, although the marriage lacked the usual supporting conservatism of issei familial associations. The husband's parents and the wife's father had died and the wife did not associate closely with her mother. Soon after moving to the relocation center, the husband left camp to do agricultural labor, and for the next two and one-half years he repeatedly took seasonal leaves in order to work. While in camp he was occupied at various jobs, and it was clear that he took his financial responsibilities very seriously. Throughout this period his wife devoted herself to the care of their child, a solitary role which probably did not satisfy her ego needs. During one period in 1944 when her husband was on leave, she turned the care of her child over to her mother and accepted a job in the center. Her companionship with a working associate became the subject of gossip, and upon his return her husband demanded that she give up her work and the association. She refused to do this and the situation remained unresolved at the time the husband left camp for Los Angeles in the Spring of 1945. Instead of going to Los Angeles after he found work and housing, as they had planned, she deserted him and sued for divorce.

Like the seasonal leaves, leaves for educational purposes were initiated in the first

³WRA *Quarterly Report*, October 1-December 31, 1942, p. 10.

phase of evacuation. On the other hand, they were not disorganizing and presented, rather, an exaggeration of a customary form of adjustment. Before the war, *nisei*, although successful and well adjusted, formed enclaves within Pacific Coast colleges and universities. The chief difference in the wartime situation was that the students lived away from their parents. This is one of the atypical instances in which the effect of evacuation was to counteract segregative forces, however briefly.

In February 1943 enlistments of Japanese-Americans were accepted by the Army for a special combat team. Despite the fact that the enlistment was for an especially hazardous purpose and the normal Selective Service procedures were not operating, more than 1200 *nisei* volunteered.⁴ This was a remarkable record in view of the bitterness which pervaded the camps because of discriminatory patterns, and especially the resentment of those former members of the armed forces who had been discharged at the convenience of the government and the doubtful discretion of their commanding officers. Most of these enlistments were in opposition to parental attitudes, just as they were in the population in general. At the time there was no community reward for the parents of volunteers, so that their bereavement was not tempered by ego values. Unfortunately induction of volunteers was deferred several months and as a consequence tensions were heightened rather than diminished. Some time later when the men were acquitting themselves brilliantly in combat and Selective Service was in operation, parental pride and community support were greatly increased. Both of these were reinforced by a more favorable press which identified the continental *nisei*, who later formed the 442nd Combat Team, with the Hawaiian 100th Battalion.

The generalizations which have been made regarding volunteers are illustrated in case M-4. The *issei* father of the family was interned until mid-1944. Despite this fact his

eldest son volunteered in February 1943 and left for training two months later. His mother asserted with some pride that it was *bushido* (code of the warrior) for the boy to volunteer and neither she nor the boy felt that the father's internment should have been considered a deterrent. Any feelings of doubt that Mr. M. may have had were well repressed and rationalized. Mrs. M was the object of much criticism from her neighbors and friends, although the direct attacks were made chiefly by men. The women would congregate in the latrines and laundry room and talk to each other about her son in Mrs. M's hearing. But Mrs. M seemed to be the object of aggression rather than the boy. The women would wonder aloud why she had permitted her son to volunteer when Mr. M had been interned without reason. The tension was increased late in 1943 when a younger daughter volunteered for the WACs. Now not only had two members of the M family volunteered, but a daughter was behaving in an improper fashion. Mrs. M, who had been regularly attending religious meetings, stopped going in the face of the heightened criticism. She did actively defend her position, however, and argued with her friends even in public places, insisting that the spirit of *yamato damashi* (the Japanese spirit) required that a citizen loyally perform his duties. In the internment camp Mr. M also was harshly criticized. They told him that his daughter was a *jo-lo* (prostitute).

A clear test case for familial solidarity was the segregation of loyal from nominally disloyal Japanese-Americans which followed the ill-conceived Army Registration and Leave Clearance "loyalty" questionnaire. The problem lends itself to statistical analysis and for economy of space details are presented in tabular form (Table II). Of our sample units 15.5 per cent had some member segregated to Tule Lake. If we analyze the composition of this segregated portion, we find the strongest demonstration of familial solidarity. In 82 per cent of the cases of married couples without children in which segregation was involved, both partners were segregated. Similarly in 92 per cent of

⁴WRA *Semi-Annual Report*, January 1-June 30, 1943, p. 10.

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TABLE II. SUMMARY OF SEGREGATION BY STRUCTURAL CATEGORIES OF FAMILIES

Family type ¹	Families with at least one member segregated		Complete families segregated	
	Number	% of each type ²	Number	% of col. 1
Total.....	337	15.5	312	92.6
Individuals.....	75	17.0	74	98.7 ⁴
Issei.....	43	14.2	42	97.7
Nisei.....	2	3.0	2	100.0
Kibei.....	30	40.5	30	100.0
Complete couples.....	33	13.5	27	81.8
Issei-Issei.....	16	14.5	10	62.5
Nisei-Nisei.....	0	0.0	0	—
Kibei-Kibei.....	8	44.5	8	100.0
Issei-Nisei.....	0	0.0	0	—
Issei-Kibei.....	1	9.1	1	100.0
Nisei-Kibei.....	8	32.0	8	100.0
Incomplete couples.....	43	19.2	43	100.0
Female absent.....	40	19.4	40	100.0
Male absent.....	3	16.7	3	100.0
Complete primary families.....	145	15.3	134	92.4
Issei parents.....	96	15.3	85	88.5
Nisei parents.....	4	5.9	4	100.0
Kibei parents.....	17	54.9	17	100.0
Issei-Nisei parents.....	7	7.2	7	100.0
Issei-Kibei parents.....	14	17.3	14	100.0
Nisei-Kibei parents.....	7	16.7	7	100.0
Incomplete primary families.....	37	13.0	30	81.1
Issei parents.....	7	8.1	5	71.4
Issei father—mother unknown.....	15	19.5	13	86.6
Issei mother—father unknown.....	15	12.3	12	80.0
Sibling groups.....	4	14.3	4	100.0
Combined groups: ³				
Issei-Issei.....	119	14.5	100	84.0
Nisei-Nisei.....	4	3.1	4	100.0
Kibei-Kibei.....	25	51.0	25	100.0
Mixed nativity.....	37	13.4	37	100.0

¹ See footnote to Table I for explanation of categories.² See Table I for number of each type.³ Omitting individuals and cases where generation not known.⁴ Cases were classified according to structure at the time of evacuation. Structural changes in single person families, as when individuals married and when the spouse of incomplete couples returned from internment, account for percentages under 100% in column 4.

the cases of married couples with children, the complete unit was segregated. It is clear that the chief causative factor underlying this phenomenon is the Japanese evaluation of familial solidarity. Correlative with these findings is the movement of non-segregated cases out of Tule Lake. The family groups moved out as integral units, and complete families remained behind as segregants. As anticipated, the rate of segregation was highest among issei and kibe (U. S. born, educated in Japan) and very low among all categories of nisei. Only 3 per cent of the nisei units were segregated. This makes doubly significant the fact that nisei children permitted themselves to be segregated with their parents.

It should be pointed out in passing that the rate of segregation was highest at the Tule Lake center, which contributed almost 50 per cent of its total (September 1943) population. In no other center did the rate of segregation exceed 25 per cent.⁵ This illustrates the importance of the factor of inertia which more strongly conditioned the decisions of the evacuees than even the most powerful ideological considerations. It also demonstrates the tragic error which WRA made in using a populated center to house segregated persons.

Some of the factors operating in segregation may be illustrated by case K-2, a family of fairly well assimilated issei parents who had worked as domestics, a kibe son, and a younger nisei daughter. In this case the family's decisions derives from the answer made by the kibe son to the "loyalty" questionnaire. It is clear both in this case and in many others that the subsequent steps of alienation (responses to leave clearance board, segregation, request for expatriation or repatriation, and renunciation of American citizenship) were actually secondary decisions and that the real break was made in the responses, perhaps of only one family member, to the "loyalty" question-

naire. Sociologists, aware of the limitations of the most carefully constructed questionnaire for purely verbal manipulations, will find it impossible to justify its use in directing the life course of a hundred thousand people. In the K family only the kibe son refused to indicate loyalty to the United States. Having made himself vulnerable by his questionnaire response, he was subject to segregation when the program was initiated. It can be stated with assurance that had this factor not intervened, the rest of the family would not have gone to Tule Lake. The family decided, however, to accompany the son and volunteered to be segregated.

The other test situation for familial solidarity chosen concerns the process of selective relocation. The most important cleavage factor was the indefinite leave and a statistical summary of our findings is given in Table III. The indefinite leave became the central point of discussion and debate, not only for those who were seriously considering it, but for persons who decided early that they would remain in the camps until the end of the war or the closing of the centers, whichever was later. It was the subject of incessant debate and the source of a continuous flood of ugly rumors.

Nevertheless, by the beginning of August 1943 nearly 11,000 persons had left the camps on indefinite leave.⁶ These were chiefly nisei. The number on indefinite leave increased slowly so that by the end of 1944 about 35,000 had gone out,⁷ for the most part to the Midwest. This comprised about a third of the original population of the centers. About four-fifths of those on leave were nisei,⁸ compared with the proportion of two-thirds nisei in the general population. Of our cases 74 per cent of nisei individuals had relocated, compared with 36 per cent of kibe and less than 17 per cent of issei.

⁵ WRA, *Weekly Leaves by Centers*, No. 12, August 7, 1943. (Based on Weekly Telegraphic Reports from Centers).

⁷ WRA, *Weekly Leaves by Centers*, No. 85 (Revised), December 30, 1944.

⁸ WRA, *Semi-Annual Report*, July 1-December 31, 1944, p. 57.

⁶ WRA, *Semi-Annual Report* July 1-December 31, 1943, p. 35, and Western Defense Command, Civilian Affairs Division, Research Branch, *Tables* September 4, 1944.

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TABLE III. SUMMARY OF RELOCATION BY STRUCTURAL CATEGORIES OF FAMILIES

Family type ¹	Families with at least one member relocated by January 1, 1945		Complete families relocated by January 1, 1945	
	Number	% of each type ²	Number	% of col. 1
Total.....	950	43.8	419	44.1
Individuals.....	127	28.7	121	95.2 ³
Issei.....	51	16.9	49	96.1
Nisei.....	49	74.3	46	93.9
Kibei.....	27	36.5	26	96.3
Complete couples.....	90	36.8	68	75.5
Issei-Issei.....	16	14.5	12	75.0
Nisei-Nisei.....	44	72.1	31	70.4
Kibei-Kibei.....	4	22.2	3	75.0
Issei-Nisei.....	13	65.0	12	92.3
Issei-Kibei.....	3	27.3	3	100.0
Nisei-Kibei.....	10	40.0	7	70.0
Incomplete couples.....	40	17.9	39	97.5 ³
Female absent.....	36	17.5	35	97.2
Male absent.....	4	22.2	4	100.0
Complete primary families.....	504	53.3	136	27.0
Issei parents.....	379	60.5	69	18.2
Nisei parents.....	48	70.6	26	54.2
Kibei parents.....	5	16.1	3	60.0
Issei-Nisei parents.....	41	42.3	25	61.0
Issei-Kibei parents.....	12	14.8	4	33.3
Nisei-Kibei parents.....	19	45.2	9	47.4
Incomplete primary families.....	173	60.6	45	26.0
Issei parents.....	49	57.0	5	10.2
Issei father—mother unknown.....	45	58.4	13	28.9
Issei mother—father unknown.....	79	64.8	27	34.2
Sibling groups.....	16	57.1	10	62.5

¹ See footnote to Table I for explanation of categories.

² See Table I for number of each type.

³ Cases were classified according to structure at the time of evacuation. Structural changes in single person families, as when individuals married and when the absent spouse of incomplete couples returned from internment, account for percentages under 100% in column 4.

The relocation rate for nisei couples was correspondingly large. The same general phenomenon will be noted in the data on the relocation of complete units (Table III). Not until mid-August of 1945 did the total number of persons on leave exceed the num-

ber of those remaining in the centers.⁹ If we take into account the necessarily low relocation rate of nisei children the record becomes

⁹ WRA, *Net Absences on Leave by Center*, Weekly report No. 117, Week Ending August 11, 1945.

even more notable. A considerable part of this relocation was in tacit opposition to, if not in open defiance of, parental judgments. It is interesting that the Japanese family tradition of not relinquishing control over young women failed to affect materially the relocation rate of nisei girls. There was a tendency for married couples to venture relocation together, although for the sake of economy and to act as a scout, the husband frequently preceded the wife by a short period. For primary families the eldest child or the eldest male child most frequently acted as scout, a fact completely congruent with Japanese family attitudes. Almost no mothers went alone on indefinite leave, and almost invariably they were the last family members to leave the centers.

The following summary of the movements of one issei-nisei family concretely illustrates these generalizations. The W-1 family was a financially secure urban group established in a superior Japanese neighborhood. At the time of evacuation the issei father was a produce merchant in his late fifties, and the mother 10 years younger. The three nisei children, one girl and two boys, at that time were 21, 19 and 18 years old respectively. Only the daughter had attended college and the boys assisted the father when not in school. Shortly before evacuation the daughter married and the couple was evacuated with her parents. When the removal to relocation centers took place, however, they joined the husband's family rather than moving to the relocation center with her parental family. The sons left the centers on seasonal leave to do harvest work in Fall 1942. Both boys had a series of seasonal leaves, and in the Spring of 1943 the older relocated to Chicago. He was followed in the Fall by his younger brother. Meanwhile the daughter's husband left for Chicago in the Spring of 1943, and the daughter, now pregnant, secured a transfer to the camp in which her parents lived. Her child was born in the Fall of 1943 and the husband returned to camp for a short visit. The following Spring she joined her husband in Chicago where they lived until the Fall of 1945. Both of the brothers, unattached and without re-

sponsibilities, independently moved from job to job and place to place throughout their stay in the Midwest until in early 1945 the younger boy was inducted into the Army. The issei father left camp for the first time to take domestic work in an inter-mountain city in February 1945, and in June he was joined by his wife. They worked until the Fall when they returned to Los Angeles, and soon afterward their daughter and her family and the son not in the Army also returned. They re-established themselves in the home which they owned prior to evacuation.

Under the severe stresses involved in evacuation and relocation, there was no decline in the incidence of births. Through December 1944, 4601 births had been recorded at the centers,¹⁰ a number in excess of pre-war crude birth rates. The age-structure of the population is changing rapidly, and unfortunately the data which would enable us to calculate refined birth rates have not yet been released. In an earlier article¹¹ we pointed out the acceleration of marriages during the period of evacuation, and it is probable that the net gain for the population is greater than would have normally occurred. The increased number of young children made relocation correspondingly more difficult.

When relocation was independent of parental plans, it must be assumed that the separations were wholly a shedding of filial responsibility. In general those who made the break were willing to leave their families as long as they felt that security was being provided in the center, and many would have been satisfied to see the arrangement continue indefinitely. But anything which shattered that conviction brought the nisei back. The best example of this is the situation which attended the closing of the

¹⁰ WRA, *The Evacuated People: A Quantitative Description*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946, p. 138.

¹¹ Leonard Bloom, Ruth Riemer, and Carol Creedon, "Marriages of Japanese-Americans in Los Angeles County: A Statistical Study," *University of California Publications in Culture and Society* (1945) Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-24.

Jerome center in June 1944. When the news went out that the center was to close and its residents were to be redistributed among the other centers, many nisei on leave hurried back to assist their families. When other centers were closed, the WRA found it necessary to erect a scaffolding of rules to prevent incursions of persons on leave.¹² Visits of former residents were limited to cases of emergencies or to facilitate relocation. When the time table of closing dates was announced, the issei-nisei family groups that had been scattered began to draw themselves together again, a process which is still going on.

When the schedule of center closings was published in the summer of 1945—this was the end of voluntary relocation—half of the families, who had sent any members out were completely relocated.¹³ This is not to imply that the families had reconstituted themselves as units, but the evidence from our intensive histories is that the process was well under way. Families whose mem-

bers had been widely dispersed were making plans to rejoin each other, frequently in their pre-war localities.

Today the re-establishment of Japanese-American family units is still going on in the old ghetto areas of the Pacific Coast and some new ones in the Midwest. The circumstances of crowding are often far worse than in the centers, and the maladjustment is compounded by vicious exploitation, especially in-group exploitation by Japanese-Americans in regard to housing. Many families face disaster in their impoverished condition. The solidarity of the Japanese-American family has been well demonstrated during the last four years. However, the nisei are now assuming the heavy burden of an aged issei population and a larger number of sansei. As a consequence, the structural integration of the Japanese-American family may well turn out to be quite disorganizing. The integrative tendencies reduce the freedom of movement and the capacity for independent choice and aggressive action of many younger persons who otherwise might be expected to make the most effective adjustments.


¹² WRA, *Manual Release* No. 158, December 18, 1944, Section 150.1.10.

¹³ Based on our detailed analysis of relocation in four representative centers.

Harper 9
Feb 1944

TOKYO SINCE PEARL HARBOR

JOHN MORRIS



SUNDAY, the 7th of December, 1941, was much the same as any other Sunday in Tokyo. I had got up rather late, played over a few records before lunch, and spent the afternoon writing an article on Virginia Woolf. It was never published and is now, I believe, in the archives of the Japanese police.

My article was for *Japan News Week*, the American paper that had somehow managed to keep its independence right up to the outbreak of war.

For some months before the outbreak of war three or four of us who were working for the paper had been accustomed to meet every Sunday night at the house of Paul Rusch, an educational missionary who, in the course of years, had brought into being, almost entirely through his own efforts, what was probably one of the finest social service camps for boys in the world. This camp was well on the way toward completion when the war put an end to Paul's activities.

On the night of the 7th of December the group at Paul's home included W. R. Wills, the editor of *Japan News Week*; Phyllis Argall, the managing editor of the paper; Air-Commodore Bryant, the British air attaché; and myself. It was not often that we had a member of the diplomatic corps to give tone to our Sunday night parties. Besides, he brought other advantages. The petrol restriction, which had now made it almost impossible to get

a taxi late at night, did not apply to members of the Embassy; when they went out to dinner they traveled in their own private cars, and it had become more or less understood that before returning to their own houses they should first see home any fellow guests who did not share their privileges. As this happened to be an unusually wet night we were delighted to see Bryant's car standing in front of Paul's door. But of course we were glad to see Bryant for his own sake, and to hear the latest news from home. It was only when we happened to meet someone from the Embassy that we had a chance of hearing what was really happening; for, although it was in theory possible for Englishmen in Tokyo to go to the Embassy and collect a copy of the daily bulletin, in actual practice this was seldom done, as regular visits to the British Embassy placed even British subjects under grave police suspicion. In fact, after Japan entered the war a number of our nationals were arrested for the "offense" of having paid regular visits to their own embassy.

After dinner we all sat talking round the fire. Most of us had realized for some time that Japan's entry into the war was now inevitable, but no one thought the moment was yet at hand. I think if anyone had told us that, as we sat there enjoying our quiet chat, the Japanese fleet was already in position in front of Pearl Harbor, we should have laughed at the

idea. No one had received any hint that the crisis had been reached. We left Paul's house at about eleven o'clock, and Bryant, after seeing Wills and Phyllis Argall home, took me on in the direction of my house, which was not very far from his. As it was getting late and he had to be up early in the morning, I asked him to drop me at the crossroads near his own house. There, accordingly, he stopped the car and we sat in it, smoking a last cigarette, before I got out and walked home.

The streets were deserted; I cannot remember seeing a single soul on my way. And yet it later turned out that not only had the police known exactly who was dining at Paul's house that night, but that they had also kept an eye on Bryant and me talking in his car at the crossroads. No doubt I was shadowed all the way to my house, but such is the efficiency of the Japanese police that I was totally unaware of it. During the whole of my four years' stay in Japan I cannot recall a single occasion when I so much as suspected that I was being watched, and yet reports which I subsequently received made it clear that the police had kept an eye on me the whole time.

On the following morning I came down to breakfast as usual at about half-past eight. At this hour there was a daily broadcast of gramophone records, and I generally listened to it as I ate my breakfast. I switched on the radio, but instead of hearing a symphony I heard an announcer talking rapidly in Japanese. He seemed to be saying the same thing over and over again, so I thought I had better try to make out what it was all about. As far as I could understand, the announcer was saying that a state of war now existed between Japan and the United States. (The news of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor was not made public until about an hour later.) As I was not quite certain whether I had understood correctly I called in my cook and asked her if the news was true. "Yes," she said, "but go on with your breakfast or you'll be late for your work." I was uncertain what to do, so I thought first of all I would go and talk things over with Reuter's correspondent, Richard Tenelly,

who was my next-door neighbor. As soon as I had stepped out of my door, however, I noticed four or five policemen on guard outside Tenelly's. They told me their chief was inside and that I had better see him. He came down almost at once and I asked what I should do. "We have no orders to arrest you," he said, "so you had better carry on with your work as usual." I told him that I was due to give a lecture at ten, and he advised me to go away and deliver it. He refused to let me see Tenelly.

On arriving at the University I went straight to my classroom and set about delivering my lecture. There was nothing abnormal in the behavior of the students and we carried on as though nothing had happened. At the end of the lecture, however, I was told that I had better do no further teaching pending the receipt of instructions from the Department of Education.

In the meanwhile it occurred to me that I would do well to visit the Japanese Foreign Office in order to find out exactly what my position now was. I had originally gone to Japan under the aegis of the Foreign Office, and although the matter was never committed to writing it was understood that in the event of war I should be afforded what practically amounted to diplomatic immunity.

I found the office in a turmoil; indeed, the officials with whom I spoke seemed just as much surprised and stunned by the news as the ordinary man in the street. To-day it is widely believed that the sending of Mr. Kurusu to Washington with the ostensible purpose of making a last-minute attempt to prevent war was one of the most underhanded diplomatic actions ever committed, since the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor had already been made and the Japanese navy was actually moving into position while Mr. Kurusu's negotiations were still in progress. It is doubtful if the whole truth will ever be known, but when I call to memory my conversations with members of the Japanese Foreign Office on the morning of the 8th of December I am inclined to believe that the Japanese Government acted in good faith. I think it is not unlikely that the attack on Pearl Harbor was launched by

the armed forces without the previous sanction of the Government in Tokyo.*

II

WHEN I went back to my own house I found about eight policemen there. Everything was in disorder; my books were lying all over the floor, my clothes had been pulled out of the cupboards, the bedding was heaped in the middle of the room. And then they questioned me. "Had I a shortwave transmitter concealed in the house? Had I perhaps a machine gun, or at any rate a rifle?" No; I had none of these things; but not until they had made a thorough search of every nook and corner were they satisfied. They went through all my letters, examined my photographs, and took away with them a series of large X-ray negatives of my lungs. These I had kept by me for many years for the purpose of periodical comparisons. I never got them back. I was quite unable to convince the inspector that they were not in reality photographs of fortifications. They removed also some half-dozen of my books, all of them with red bindings, since in the minds of the Japanese police books in red covers are connected in some way with communism. To these were added a very large pile of newspapers, some a year old. Fortunately for me these papers were not consecutive, for, although I did not then know it, it had recently become a penal offense to possess a consecutive file of newspapers. Soon after the police departed, one of my students dropped in. "I've just seen a most extraordinary sight," he said. He then went on to describe how, as he was walking up to my house, he had passed a squad of policemen, each one staggering along under a weight of English newspapers.

* Since writing the above I have discovered that I am not alone in this belief. Otto D. Tolischus, former *New York Times* correspondent in Japan, writes as follows in *Tokyo Record* of the events of December 7, 1941: "I didn't then know that President Roosevelt had sent a personal message to the Emperor with a last appeal for peace. It had been delayed in transmission, presumably purposely, and it was not till midnight that Grew [Mr. Joseph C. Grew, American Ambassador to Japan] was able to present it to Togo [Mr. Shiginori Togo, Japanese Foreign Minister]. As Grew later told me, he was convinced that Togo himself did not know then that war was at hand."

After this preliminary investigation I was left more or less alone for a few days. Then the police again visited me. It appeared that they were not completely satisfied that the contents of my library were harmless and wanted to examine my books in greater detail. I wondered how they were going to do this, because it soon became apparent that none of them knew any English. They were expecting me to explain the contents of each one of my books to them. But when my patience (to say nothing of my Japanese) proved unequal to this task, they contented themselves with looking at the pictures in such books as were illustrated.

For the first few days there was an air of bewilderment about the people; nobody seemed quite to believe that Japan had actually entered the war. This feeling was heightened by the fact that, except for the blackout, conditions remained much the same as they had been, and after the first week even the blackout was reduced to no more than a partial dimming of lights.

Petrol for civilian purposes had been getting short for some time past; now it was practically unobtainable. Taxis almost disappeared from the streets for a while. They were being converted to run on charcoal. The busses too were given similar treatment, with the result that the service, which hitherto had been fairly efficient, rapidly deteriorated. Even high Japanese officials were forced to use charcoal-burning cars, the only petrol-driven ones now on the streets being those belonging to the various embassies and legations.

A system of rationing was introduced immediately. Ration books were issued to every householder, but the actual distribution of food was made by the "Neighborhood Association" of the street in which one lived. These Neighborhood Associations, which had been started a few years ago, had come to play an important part in Japanese social life. Their organization was based on the old village associations, to which the Japanese had long been accustomed. With the growth of modern cities they had tended to disappear, but the Japanese, who have a strongly developed sense of community

life, had revived them in a modern form. The associations provided a practical way of dealing with some of the unusual conditions produced by the war with China. And now they were given the responsibility of administering the rationing system and the local A.R.P. organization. As a householder I was of course a member of my local association, but I never attended any of its meetings, and had I done so it would, I imagine, have caused considerable embarrassment. My cook, however, used sometimes to attend on my behalf. She was, in fact, called to attend a special meeting very soon after the outbreak of war, the purpose of which was to discuss what precautions should be taken to deal with any foreign spies who might happen to be living in our street. Being at that time the only foreigner still at large, I took a personal interest in the outcome of these deliberations.

Not all rationed articles were distributed; some things, such as meat, fish, vegetables, and fruit, had to be fetched direct from the shops. This usually entailed waiting many hours in a queue, and if one was at the end of the line one often found nothing left to buy. Everybody was in theory entitled to a certain amount of meat and fish every week, but quite often none at all was on sale in the shops. This led to the report that even at the start of the war Japan was short of food. Actually there was no real food shortage; Japan grows sufficient rice to meet all her needs, and has an abundant supply of fish in home waters. Nobody likes living on an unchanging diet of fish and rice, but it should be realized that the Japanese have something of a genius for austerity.

That there appeared to be a shortage of food in Japan was due to various causes. In the first place, the extremely rigid price control which was imposed immediately upon the outbreak of war made farmers unwilling to send their produce into the cities. Lack of road transport, the result of petrol restrictions, was another important factor. Lack of petrol also accounted for the shortage of fish, for most of the fishing boats were petrol-driven. Certain imported foodstuffs of course disappeared completely from the

market. Chief among these was coffee, of which the Japanese are extremely fond. Its place was taken by a revolting ersatz liquid, made, I believe, from soya beans. Foreign wines and spirits also were difficult to obtain, although at the time I left Japan it was still possible to get hold of an occasional bottle of imported whisky. The price had risen to thirty dollars or more; such luxuries were obtainable only on the black market. There seemed, however, to be plenty of Japanese who were willing and able to pay this exorbitant price.

One of the effects of the rationing system was to cause those who could afford it to make an even more frequent use of restaurants. In these the price was controlled, the maximum price for luncheon being fixed at three yen (about ninety cents), and for dinner, at four yen; a cup of substitute coffee was included at both meals. No attempt was made to limit the number of dishes; in fact the number of courses remained much the same as it had been before the war. But the quality rapidly deteriorated. Beef, which in normal times is both plentiful and excellent in Japan, practically disappeared, its place on the menu being taken more often than not by whale meat, an edible but, to me at least, unpalatable substitute. But quite often there would be no meat of any sort available, even in the better restaurants, for days at a time. Many of these places had made extensive use of the black market at the beginning of the war and this had been discovered by the police, who, in revenge, now made it difficult for them to obtain even the supplies to which they were legally entitled.

One curious result of the run on the restaurants was that their patrons took their meals earlier and earlier, for unless one arrived at a restaurant betimes one found nothing left to eat. In ordinary times no eating-house ever closed before midnight; now they were shutting down by nine at the very latest. In order to make sure of obtaining a meal, people would arrive for lunch at eleven in the morning, and during my last few weeks in Japan I found it was necessary to arrive not later than five-thirty in the evening if I wanted to be sure of getting dinner. In

fact, there would often be very little left to eat even at this hour. It was becoming quite usual for people to dine at three o'clock in the afternoon.

There are in Tokyo large numbers of beer halls, which are much frequented by young men of the student class. In normal times these are open at all hours of the day and do not close before midnight. Japanese beer, for the manufacture of which hops used to be imported, is a very pleasant light drink of the lager variety, and one could spend a pleasantly idle evening chatting in one of these places, particularly in the summer, when the city is less crowded. Very shortly after Japan entered the war the supplies of beer became so restricted that the beer halls were forced by the government to remain closed during the day. They opened only at five o'clock, by which hour there would be a queue (often a couple of hundred yards long) in front of each. Many of them were completely sold out by seven, and the majority closed their doors, for lack of supplies, at nine.

During the first few months following the outbreak of the war there was very much more drunkenness than before, so much of it in fact that I had to give up visiting beer halls. In such places I was of course assumed to be a German, and it was embarrassing to be talked to by drunken strangers who took it for granted that one was rejoicing at the British reverses in the Far East.

In addition to the beer halls, there are literally thousands of small dives in Tokyo where drinks of various kinds can be obtained. Even in peacetime the quality of the liquor supplied in the more disreputable of these places was extremely suspect; but the wartime stuff sold in most of these smaller drinking dens was nothing less than methyl-alcohol. One of my own students drank a couple of glasses of this poison and then was seriously ill for several days and did not recover the full use of his mind for several weeks. This sort of thing, which is likely to increase as the war goes on, to say nothing of the bad, unnourishing food on which most Japanese are now forced to live, is bound in course of time to undermine the health of the rising generation.

III

EVEN before the war some attempts had been made to organize air raid precautions in Japan. Elaborate displays had been held about twice a year in order to give those taking part a chance of demonstrating their efficiency; but no one took these affairs very seriously.

While the Neighborhood Association had the duty of organizing A.R.P. locally, there was a central bureau which issued general instructions. The way in which these were interpreted often varied from street to street, depending upon the fancy of the president of the Neighborhood Association concerned. Up to the time I left there was not any full-time civil defense organization.

Every householder was required to keep a bucket of water on his doorstep, together with three or four small sacks filled with sand. These were intended for use in putting out fires, but actually they would have been quite ineffectual. The provision of ladders for each individual house was optional so long as a certain number were available in every street. The women of every household were required to equip themselves with the Japanese equivalent of slacks, loose baggy trousers worn over the ordinary kimono, and to don them immediately the alert was sounded. At this time too one member of the household, preferably the master himself, was supposed to stand on duty at the front door, there to await further instructions.

It might have been expected that in a city like Tokyo, where the majority of the houses are built of wood, a more efficient system of air raid precautions would have been instituted. That no serious effort has been made is, I believe, due to the fact that the greater part of the city is so inflammable that it is not humanly possible to protect it. The authorities are doubtless well aware that the present system has but a psychological value. They count on its reassuring the populace and mitigating the panic which any large-scale raid is bound to cause.

To the best of my belief there are no air raid shelters in Tokyo, except in the Emperor's Palace and the German Embassy. An underground railway does in-

deed exist, but it runs too near the surface for the stations to afford protection against even moderately heavy bombs. Its stations, moreover, would afford protection for only a few thousand people. It seems doubtful if any attempt will be made to remedy this state of affairs. Tokyo is not like London, where there are many solid buildings which afford reasonable protection against all but a direct hit. To protect the people of Tokyo adequately would mean providing shelters for the entire population of the city, that is to say for between six and seven million people, and this is not practicable.

Until quite recently it was thought unlikely that Japan's enemies could ever secure bases near enough to permit of the bombing of Tokyo or any other large cities in Japan. Or, at the worst, it was supposed that aerial attacks would be on so small a scale that they could be adequately dealt with by fighters. This was the view constantly put forward by the Japanese press, which quoted the military authorities as saying that Tokyo was unassailable from the air. The Army came in for a good deal of criticism, in consequence, when the Doolittle raid actually took place.

I happened to be in the Ginza, the main thoroughfare of Tokyo, at the time. The warning was sounded at about five minutes past twelve on Saturday, April 18, 1942. At first no one paid very much attention, most of us thinking that the siren was the ordinary midday signal which is sounded in the city every day. This signal had been discontinued on the outbreak of war, but I suppose we had only half-consciously realized that. Almost immediately afterward, American bombers appeared over the city, flying so low that their distinguishing marks were clearly visible. They appeared to be unopposed, although gunfire now became audible from the distant suburbs. This increased in intensity, particularly from the direction of Yokohama, and continued for several hours; nor was it until about half-past four in the afternoon that the "All Clear" was sounded. There was not the slightest sign of panic. The police halted the traffic, but nobody made any attempt to take shelter; the general sentiment was

one of bewildered interest, everybody wondering what was going to happen next. Pedestrians just stood about in groups; and then, as a realization of what was happening gradually dawned upon them, one heard people starting to criticize the army for having misled them.

That night there was a complete blackout, and we were ordered to keep our radios permanently switched on in case special instructions should be issued. Later on there was an order that in the event of the warning being sounded in the future, radios were to be immediately switched on and not turned off until the raid was over.

The evening papers gave only the bare news that a raid had taken place, but details were given in the late news broadcast. We were told that no damage had been done and that seven, possibly eight, of the American planes had been brought down. Although it was claimed that no casualties had occurred, there was a notice in the papers about one week later to the effect that the government intended to grant full compensation to all those who had suffered loss or injury in the raid.

By piecing together odd scraps of information it gradually became possible to find out what had really happened in Tokyo. It appears that several hundred people who were working in a factory were wounded. The petrol storage tank at Haneda airdrome, Tokyo's civil airport, was set on fire and continued to burn for several days following the raid. There was considerable damage to the military airdrome a short distance outside Tokyo, and several streets of houses in the vicinity of Waseda University were demolished. All this was reported to me personally by friends who actually witnessed it. The total damage done was doubtless much greater.

At about four o'clock in the morning on the day following the raid there was a further alarm in Tokyo, but nothing happened, and the "All Clear" was sounded about one hour later. Then on Sunday there was another alarm at eleven o'clock in the morning. Large numbers of Japanese fighters were visible in the sky, and some distant gunfire was to be heard; but again there were no incidents. The "All Clear" was sounded at about one-thirty,

and at two o'clock it was announced by radio that a large enemy force had attempted to approach the capital, but had been driven off before it was able to penetrate even the outer defenses. I believe that no attempt was made to raid Tokyo a second time, and that the whole affair was an imposture devised by the authorities to win back the confidence of the people. If so, it had some success, for I noticed that in my own street many of the older people seemed to gain courage on hearing that the raiders had been thwarted in an attempt to reach the city.

I believe that before this raid there was no defense against low-flying aircraft, but shortly afterward machine-gun posts were visible on many of the buildings in the central part of Tokyo. Barrage balloons also made their first appearance over the city, but I never saw more than six in the air at the same time. One of these was moored in the center of Hibiya Park. It was surrounded by a double fence of barbed wire and guarded by sentries with rifles and fixed bayonets who warned off anyone who attempted to approach the enclosure.

IV

IN ALL these months I had no means of finding out what had happened to my friends. During the first few days I had visited several of their houses, only to find the police in charge. They refused to give me any information and told me to keep away.

It appeared that all the British and American journalists were in jail, but that the majority of the teachers, missionaries, and business men had been interned either in Tokyo or Yokohama.

Strange though it may seem, I would myself much have preferred to be interned. Although no restrictions were placed upon my movements, and I was even permitted after a time to continue my lectures, I suffered from severe mental strain, as I felt sure it was merely a matter of time before I too should be arrested. Not that I was suffering from a guilty conscience; but so many people whom I knew to be perfectly harmless had been arrested that there seemed to be no reason why I should be left at liberty. Eventually I

reached the stage when I experienced a pang of dread every time my front door bell rang. "At last," I thought, "my moment has come!"

I must here say something of the attitude of my Japanese friends during this period. Not one ceased to visit me, and I even made a few new friends. Some of them went to great personal trouble to keep me supplied with food, and others denied themselves such luxuries as eggs in order that I should not go short. I shall never forget their kindness nor the risks they took; for in a country like Japan, with its vicious system of police spying, it requires considerable courage to pay regular visits to an enemy alien in wartime. Some of my friends would attempt to discuss events and did not disguise their dislike of the Japanese military party. I refused, however, to discuss this subject. Cynical though it may seem, I had always to consider the possibility that some among my friends were agents of the police, and that they had perhaps been ordered to keep up their intercourse with me on the chance that I might make some indiscreet remark which would serve as an excuse for my arrest. I did not of course really think that any friend of mine would so demean himself; but after even a short time in Japan one becomes suspicious; and I felt that I dare not take the slightest risk. I only hope that since my departure none of my friends has suffered for his constancy.

It is the custom in Japan to display the national flag on all occasions of public rejoicing. In peacetime it was no embarrassment to me to conform. After the declaration of war, however, the position was different; I did not feel that the fall of Hong Kong and Singapore, for instance, called for a display of rejoicing on my part, and my undecorated house brought upon me a certain amount of adverse criticism from my neighbors. Eventually, however, a compromise was reached; my cook agreed on my behalf that I should hoist the flag on occasions such as the Emperor's birthday, provided that I should not be expected to celebrate the Allied reverses, which at that time were occurring with depressing frequency. As for the pound of sugar and two bottles of beer which everyone was allowed to purchase in order

X's comment: "This statement is analogous to when the #39 agents were coming the Japanese Committee"

to mark the surrender of Singapore, I must confess that I gratefully accepted them.

I have said that for some little time after the outbreak of war there was little outward change in the life of the Japanese people. An accumulation of small changes, however, was taking place, and these gradually made the people conscious of the war. Most of these changes were concerned with amusement.

After the first week, for instance, a ban was placed upon American and English music, and more particularly upon all forms of jazz. This even extended to the withdrawal from the shops of all foreign gramophone records, not excluding German classical music if the conductor of the orchestra concerned happened not to be a citizen of one or other of the Axis countries. This ban fell heavily upon recordings made by Stokowski and Sir Thomas Beecham, but Toscanini and the many famous German conductors who had long since severed their connection with their own country escaped, their political views being apparently unknown to the Japanese police.

The ban on jazz music affected particularly the numerous little tea and coffee shops dotted about all over the city. When it was first enforced the gramophones in these places were silent, but only for a week or so. Thereafter the records were played, very softly at first; but the volume was soon increased, for the people began to realize that the police could not distinguish between, say, Duke Ellington and Mozart. Before I left Japan jazz had come back into its own and the gramophones were again going full blast.

As for films, all the American and English ones were immediately withdrawn from circulation, their place being taken by French and German films. Among the latter were many of the excellent pre-Hitler Ufa productions which (their directors being Jewish) are no longer shown in Germany itself. To me personally it was a great joy to see once again the early films made by René Clair, but by the time I left Japan most of these old films, which were not very numerous, were being shown for the third or fourth time. There were of course plenty of Japanese films, but the

urban audiences, having been brought up on foreign films, did not take to them very kindly. They were more popular, I believe, with less sophisticated people in the country districts.

The theater too received the attentions of the police. There were in Tokyo a number of small theaters which specialized in the production of Western plays in the Japanese language. And as English has always been the most widely known of foreign tongues, most of the plays produced were translations from the English. These theatrical companies were not actually disbanded, but conditions were now made so difficult for them that the players were forced to appear in plays of purely Japanese origin.

The Kabuki theater, presenting as it does traditional Japanese drama, suffered less change. The police were content with the elimination of all plays of a purely comic character and the complete suppression of those in which amorous adventures were represented. The menu now was one of unrelieved blood and thunder. Moreover, most of the plays were so edited as to be little more than exhortations to patriotism. The virtue of dying for one's betters, that is to say for one's country, was instilled to the exclusion of any other theme. All the ordinary aims, aspirations, and loves of human beings were excluded.

V

AFTER December 8th I had very little to do. I have already explained that as soon as things began to settle down I was permitted to continue with my lectures, but these occupied only a few hours every week. The Foreign Office continued to pay my salary but relieved me of all duties, so I had a great deal of time on my hands. It might have been an excellent opportunity to set down my ideas on paper, or at least to keep a diary. This, however, was impossible. It is not advisable, while actually in the country, to commit one's thoughts on Japan to paper, unless they happen to be entirely flattering; even in normal times the Japanese police surreptitiously make periodical examinations of the contents of all foreigners' houses.

And when the time came to leave it was forbidden to take any letters, manuscripts, or even a book out of the country, irrespective of the contents.

I used at first to spend many hours a day listening to records on my gramophone and reading. After a while I ceased to play the gramophone. I am affected more by music than by any other form of art, and during these months I reached a stage when the emotional effect of hearing great music was so overpowering that I could no longer bear it.

Nearly every afternoon I used to go to the Imperial Hotel, which still retained its vogue in spite of the fact that the food it now provided was about the worst in Tokyo. At teatime the place was usually crowded with Nazis, and it used to give me a peculiar pleasure to sit there and be glared at. For they knew of course exactly who I was, and it doubtless infuriated them to see me still at large. Incidentally, although Tokyo contained a considerable Italian colony, I never once saw Italians mixing with Germans except on public platforms, where they had of necessity to make a show of friendliness.

As for the relations between the Germans and the Japanese, the attitude of the ordinary people toward their German allies is well illustrated by an incident that occurred shortly before I left Tokyo. It was a pouring wet night and I was in the street looking for a taxi to take me home. I eventually found one, but the driver eyed me askance as a foreigner. After a little talk he seemed more friendly, but as I was about to open the door he demurred again. "Are you a German?" he asked. "No, certainly not," I replied. "An Italian, then, perhaps?" For a moment I considered passing myself off as an Italian in order to get a lift, and he, noticing my hesitation, inquired bluntly what my nationality was. "As a matter of fact," I said, "I'm English," to which he replied with a cheerful grin, "Oh, all right, hop in!"

It is not difficult to account for the dislike in which the Germans are held. Most of them are very arrogant and make no attempt to disguise their contempt for the Japanese. Moreover, few educated Japanese are ignorant of Hitler's published views on the peoples of Asia.

In official, but non-military, circles, it is the same story. Of recent years German advisers have been admitted into several government departments, and this has led to constant friction. The Nazi cannot advise; he can only dictate. And while the Japanese have always been willing to accept guidance from their various foreign advisers, dictation they will accept from nobody. At one time a couple of Germans were attached to the Tokyo Central Post Office. They had been planted there by the Embassy ostensibly for the purpose of examining the correspondence of German residents. It was not long, however, before they demanded access to the correspondence of all foreigners, and when this was refused they became so offensive that the Japanese officials insisted on their withdrawal.

In military circles the position is different. There is no doubt that the professional Japanese army officer has a high regard for the Germans, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that he has a great respect for the German army. After all, the Japanese army has been organized and trained on German lines and under the supervision of German experts. This does not necessarily mean that Japan's strategical plans have been worked out in close conjunction with Germany's. The Japanese were quick to note that the commencement of Hitler's retirement in Russia coincided with the day they themselves entered the war, and it is doubtful whether they have ever had any illusion about getting material assistance from Germany, no matter how things might turn out. There must obviously be a certain amount of co-operation between the general staffs of the two countries, but the Japanese are realists and are in this war for their own ends alone.

VI

DURING all these months it was difficult to find out what was really happening in Europe. At first, the Japanese did not actually suppress any of the major items of news, but the papers printed them in such a way that their significance could be properly understood only by one skilled at reading between the lines. In

course of time, however, one came to measure Allied successes almost entirely by the lack of news; if there was no mention of Libya for weeks at a time one guessed that things were going well there.

Our main source of information was the radio. The shortwave sets in the possession of the Allied embassies were of course confiscated upon the outbreak of war, but there were still some in operation in the various neutral embassies, and it was from these that we obtained bits of genuine information from time to time. I used to get them from an anti-Nazi German friend who gleaned them from one or other of the South American legations. Incidentally, although neutral embassies were permitted to retain their shortwave receivers, they were required by the Japanese government to give an undertaking not to disclose the news they heard, and warned particularly that on no pretext whatever should they listen to foreign-language broadcasts radiated from Japan to the outside world!

I have forgotten the exact date, but I think it was sometime in April, 1942, that I was summoned to the Foreign Office. When I went there I was introduced to the chief of the foreign section of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, for which I had done a certain amount of work before the war. He was extremely affable and talked on general matters for the first ten minutes; then he became less impersonal. He supposed that I must be finding it difficult to make both ends meet, and thought it might be possible to give me some employment as a broadcaster; how did I feel about it? I felt very strongly about it, and I'm afraid I lost my temper. "It seems to me," I said, "that you are asking me to become Japan's Lord Haw-Haw, or have I misunderstood the position?" My questioner was at first nonplussed, for in Japan it is not etiquette to come straight to the point. After hedging a little he was obliged to confess that this was in fact the idea, and he hoped that I would receive the suggestion favorably. I told him that I realized what the consequences of refusing his offer were likely to be, and that I accepted them. In view of the exceptional treatment afforded me I had remained, I said, strictly neutral, al-

though there was, of course, never any doubt where my sympathies lay. And while perfectly appreciating the circumstances in which I, an enemy alien, was placed, in no circumstances would I demean myself by broadcasting anti-British propaganda.

Having got this off my chest I stalked out of the room, fully expecting to be arrested, or at any rate interned, the following day. To my surprise, however, nothing further happened until about three weeks later, when I received a letter from the Broadcasting Corporation saying that if I would kindly submit full particulars of my past career they would be glad to consider me for employment. And there the matter ended. Actually, the outcome of this rather trivial incident is not so surprising as at first it seems. [Loyalty to one's country is something that every Japanese understands, and had I accepted their offer I think they would have despised me. By not taking any action against me when I refused, they admitted that my conduct was what they would have expected from one of their own people.] But the letter had to be sent me; it was a face-saving method of neatly closing the incident.

VII

THERE was still no news of a British evacuation. I used to go regularly to the Swiss Legation to inquire, but they were never very hopeful. It appeared that, not having been interned, I had but a slender chance of getting away. The evacuation ship, if it ever materialized, would be primarily for diplomats and their staffs. No one else had the slightest claim to be repatriated, and should there still be room after all the officials had been accommodated, civilians who had been jailed or interned would naturally be given first place.

In July the Swiss Legation had definite news that the British were going. My name was not on the list, but I was given to understand that there would be a second ship on which I could be certain of a place. Discouraged, I decided to go to the Foreign Office. I had not been there since refusing the broadcasting offer, and I was not expecting a very warm recep-

X's comment: "This will help in understanding the feeling of the Japanese towards those working at Borden or for the OWB, etc."

tion. My heart rose when I discovered, however, that the official in charge of repatriation arrangements was a man that I had at one time known well. He was anxious to do what he could to help me, but unfortunately the selection was not in his hands. The list had already been made out at the British Embassy, and he had no power to add my name to it.

Naturally I was bitterly disappointed, but at least I knew exactly how matters stood, and I made my arrangements to go away for the rest of the summer, for it was now unbearably hot in Tokyo. I sent in an application to the police and a few days later they telephoned to me. I supposed it was to tell me that my request had been granted, but it was not. Imagine my joy when they said that I was to sail with the diplomats in forty-eight hours' time, and that I must have my luggage ready for inspection by them and the customs officials by nine o'clock the following morning.

I was also told that I could take with me only clothing and certain specified household belongings. I worked all night, stripped to the waist, for the humidity was almost intolerable, and somehow managed to pack up my more essential things. The customs officials, together with several police inspectors, arrived at my house at about eleven o'clock in the morning, by which time I had somehow or other managed to get ready. But they made me unpack everything. Then they carefully examined each suitcase to see if I had concealed anything in the linings. Next they looked at every article I was proposing to take, examining my clothing piece by piece and checking it against the detailed list which they had ordered me to prepare. I had even been made to specify the exact number of handkerchiefs I was taking out of the country. My cameras and field glasses, which had been confiscated on the outbreak of war, were handed back to me, and I was allowed to pack them in one of the trunks. After this the customs authorities sealed all my boxes, and the police removed them. I was told that I should find them on the ship when I embarked the following day.

I had been up all night and was feeling

almost exhausted, but there was no time to rest, as I had been ordered to be ready at five-thirty the next morning. First I went to the bank, and not being allowed to take any money out of the country except a small traveling allowance, I transferred my balance to the account of a Japanese friend. This done, I spent the rest of the day saying good-by to as many of my Japanese friends as I could run to earth. My house, with the furniture, books, gramophone records, and so on, I did not attempt to dispose of; there was not time. By ten o'clock at night I had done everything that was possible in the way of clearing up my affairs and was just about to retire when a visitor was announced. It was the collector of income tax, who had apparently just received news of my imminent departure. It appeared that the tax was claimable for the whole of the financial year which at that date had only run a couple of months. But since I had already transferred my bank account, and was in possession of only the small amount of actual cash which the government had allowed me to keep back for the expenses of the journey, I could not pay. The collector saw this well enough, but like all his kind, he had no idea how to deal with a situation for which no provision was made in his regulations, and so it was nearly midnight before I could induce him to go away. As it was, I had to sign a paper making over my furniture to the income-tax authorities.

The police inspector arrived punctually at five-thirty the following morning, and together we set off. I had lived in the same small house for nearly four years and had grown very fond of it. It seemed all wrong to be leaving it almost furtively at dawn, and to have to abandon all my books and other treasured possessions. We walked slowly, and I turned for a last look as we came to the corner. My faithful old housekeeper was still standing at the gate, and as I waved for the last time she bowed low in ceremonial fashion.

VIII

THAT the Japanese will suffer defeat I cannot doubt; but I find it quite impossible to picture what shape that defeat

will take. The Japanese army, as the reader knows, now has complete control of the government. The army in fact is the government. Every branch of the national life—education, industry, commerce, even religion—all are now subject to its will.

That army is now committed to a plan of almost unlimited aggression. It must conquer or perish; there is no other alternative. And the people will be ready to support it to the end. The Germans cracked in 1918, and there is every reason for supposing that in due course they will crack again. But the psychology of the Japanese people is different, and I believe that they will never give in; they will go on lowering their standard of living if necessary until the daily ration is barely sufficient to support life, but the people will not crack. It is only by complete physical destruction of their men and their resources that they can be defeated; and until we are in a position to bring this about any talk of a Japanese collapse is merely a dangerous form of wishful thinking.

To this I have only to add that I believe it to be of the utmost importance for the war to be brought home to the people of Japan themselves. They know so little of what is happening in the world to-day that only when the war is actually brought to their homeland itself will they realize they are beaten. Nothing less than an occupation of the country will be necessary—not necessarily a very long one, but one long enough to make the fact of *our* victory and *their* defeat incontestable.

During the period of occupation the demilitarization should be commenced, and it is essential that it should continue until the warmaking power of Japan is destroyed. Only when this demilitarization is assured should Japan be given a place beside the peaceful and democratic nations of the world. This, then, should be the program: defeat, occupation, demilitarization, opportunity.

The period of occupation should be made to depend upon the ability of the Japanese to produce a new form of government, a government with liberal ideas that is willing and anxious to co-operate with the Allied Nations. I believe that

the nucleus of such a government already exists in Japan. The country has always possessed liberal-minded statesmen in sufficient quantity. But these men at the present time dare not voice their feelings; to do so would be to invite assassination, or, at the very least, imprisonment and torture.

The chief task of the army of occupation would be to ensure that the new government is afforded protection and help while it is reorganizing the administration of the country.

It will be important not to lose sight of the danger lest an occupation be continued too long, and thus bring odium upon the new government. It might well be found that the presence of foreign troops was making it harder and harder for the government to carry on. Nothing should be done to incur the grave risk of sowing the seeds for a war of revenge. It should be remembered that secret societies have always played a large part in Japanese political life. A great many of these have military backing, and many of their officials are retired military men. Every soldier is more or less forced to join one of them after he leaves the service, and after this war a very high proportion of the adult population of Japan will consist of soldiers who have lost their occupation. It is certain that the activities of these so-called "patriotic societies" will tremendously increase.

A great deal will depend upon the position of the Emperor. While it is true that he has always been held in great veneration by the people, his present almost divine status is of comparatively recent invention. This myth has been built up gradually by the army for its own ends. The naval and military leaders have always had direct access to the Emperor; it has been in their power to have all important decisions promulgated in his name by Imperial Rescripts. Those decisions are thus protected from all criticism, for an Imperial Rescript is looked upon as holy; it cannot even be criticized, let alone disobeyed.

Any attempt to discredit the Emperor would, in my opinion, be disastrous. What we must do is convince the Japanese people that their Emperor has been led

astray by his military advisers. If this could be successfully accomplished it would have the effect of discrediting the army, and would thus strengthen the position of the new government. The wholehearted co-operation of the Emperor would be indispensable.

To sum up, the goal of all our efforts will be to bring into being a peace-loving and contented Japan, an agreeable partner

in international politics, a country that will contribute to a single, unified world economy. So if we intend to demilitarize Japan and control her key imports, as it would seem we must, we shall have to find outlet for her economic energies. We must be careful not to injure the foundations of Japan's economic life; our task is to show her how to build a better structure upon them.

X on the article as a whole "The article is authentic and unbiased. There is no passage in it which seems superficial or untrue."

Inept — Not Apathetic

MANY of us in this country have found there is something very awkward about being a civilian in this war. We know it is a world-wide conflict, but the bombs don't drop on *us*. We know we should be doing something about it, but what? We are bewildered, and we fumble. Frequently our inept attempts at aiding the war effort embarrass us, and so we eschew them and, in the end, go on much as though there were no war in progress.

Take the Junior Woman's Club in a typical Midwestern suburb, for example. The young women who belong to it are about of a kind. Nearly all of them are either married to, or engaged to, servicemen. Most of them are living with their parents again because of the war. Their economic positions and social backgrounds are typically middle-class. A couple of years ago they decided to abandon their annual Christmas formal (which was *the* event of the season among the community's younger people) and to give a dance for servicemen. Probably all the girls envisioned servicemen much as the *Cosmopolitan* or *Redbook* artists envision them; but the soldiers whom the Army sent to this dance turned out to be mainly hardened veterans of many years' service, bald sergeants with wives and families. The girls did their best but the thing just didn't work out as they had intended. Then along came the Red Cross. Two of the girls bandaged each other for a night or two but they ended up by giggling a good deal, and—because they couldn't see that they were accomplishing much—they dropped the whole thing.

This winter the Club entertained, at a Christmas party, the orphans from a nearby orphanage, just as it had done for about fifteen years. Dances for servicemen have been abandoned. — John B. Martin

Chester Rowell

Much Hysteria About Japanese-Americans

There are certain in part personal reasons why I find myself in accord with the tactful and at the same time firm letter of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to the Downtown Association of San Francisco, officially confirming the policy of the War Department toward the question of the limited temporary leave of certain American soldiers of Japanese descent to attend to their affairs in California, and also of certain distress cases of mixed marriages in which one spouse is compelled to leave for other parts of the country while the other, for family reasons, must remain here.

For the same reasons, I find myself in personal disagreement with the attitude of certain California Congressmen and civic bodies in this question, to the extent that they vary from the War Department policy, as stated by Mr. McCloy, and even to the same extent with the milder and naturally much more intelligent statement of Governor Warren, accepting some of the conclusions of these objectors.

The personal part of the reason is that, some months ago, at his request, I gave my views to Assistant Secretary McCloy, in two long conversations in his office in Washington, and the policies I then earnestly urged were precisely those now officially announced by him as the position of the War Department. Naturally, Mr. McCloy then avoided an express official commitment, but I am frankly not surprised to find it confirmed now as the formal policy of the department.

Mr. McCloy is exceedingly considerate and tactful on all the personal aspects of the situation. The War Department had accepted the position of the military officers in charge that all persons of Japanese race should be physically evacuated from this military

district, regardless of citizenship or loyalty, and the Assistant Secretary renders high tribute, in which we all join, for the efficiency and consideration with which General DeWitt administered the evacuation. The administration of the camps is now in civilian hands, and the War Department gives no indication of yielding to the agitation to take over this responsibility or of altering the policy of carefully safeguarded releases of as many of these evacuees as is safely possible for private employment outside this military district wherever such Japanese are locally desired.

However, the department does insist that loyal American citizens of Japanese descent who have enlisted in the Army of the United States and are wearing its uniform shall be treated in the same way as American soldiers of German, Italian or Allied or Chinese descent. If there are civilians who raise the question of possible mob violence against such soldiers, the expectation is evidently that local and State authorities shall enforce order on their own citizens. But there is the clear implication that if it should be anywhere necessary for other American soldiers to protect these American soldiers, they will do so. There will, naturally, be no needless provocation to this situation by wholesale stationing or furloughing of these soldiers in excited localities.

So far as we have heard, there has been little or no indication of any such local excitement, in localities confronted with the actual situation. There were Japanese soldiers in uniform reported in Salinas, for instance, doubtless on what the Army authorities regarded as legitimate business. If there was any hostile reaction, there has been no word of it. Yet Salinas was once the seat of excitement, going to the length of

armed violence, on matters of labor, race and alleged Communist activities. But the point is that Salinas has learned by experience. It tried one sort of lawlessness against another form of lawlessness, and found them both evil. Now there is no more intelligent understanding anywhere of the just rights of all sides and of their common interest in the peace and prosperity of the community. The result, there and doubtless in most other enlightened American communities, is the use of common sense on problems admittedly as easily confused as this.

The agitation comes from the top. There is, for instance, a branch of the Dies committee in California ostensibly "investigating" possible Japanese sabotage, on "testimony" of which, so far, not one word would even be admitted or heard by any judicial or quasi-judicial body in existence. If there are any real situations calling for investigation, it should be conducted by persons of more rational mental processes.

Likewise there are agitations that are pure hysteria, ignoring the facts, the law and the constitution of the United States. There is the contention, already turned down unanimously by every Judge and court to which it was presented, that native-born citizens of Japanese ancestry are not citizens. There is the movement to deny them, after the war, the right constitutionally guaranteed to all other citizens, to live where they please. There is even the proposal to amend the constitution to nullify the citizenship of all persons of Japanese race, while retaining it for all others. And there is the assumption that, while Americans of German descent are in no wise responsible for the monstrosities of Hitler, those of Japanese race are responsible for the outrages of Tojo.

Hysterical nonsense, all!

Earl Martin
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ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF RELOCATION

WILLIAM S. HOPKINS

Stanford University

(8)
for Dorothy S. Thomas
from
Bill Hopkins

The term "relocation" is here used to mean a government program to provide the means and methods whereby a large body of individuals may be enabled to start their economic lives anew, often in different occupations and usually in different geographical areas. A most spectacular and comprehensive program of this sort is being conducted by the War Relocation Authority, an independent government agency established in March, 1942, by the President of the United States. The circumstances which led to its creation were unusual and may never be repeated, but many of the facts learned in its experience are of general application.

At the beginning of the war between the United States and Japan, there were some 107,000 persons of Japanese ancestry living in that part of the West Coast which was later designated as a "military" area. A few of these claimed the rights of dual citizenship, a larger group (most of the old people) were citizens of Japan, the largest group was composed of those entitled to American citizenship by virtue of their birth in this country. Acting under emergency powers, the military authority ordered the evacuation of all Japanese, including all American citizens of any Japanese ancestry. The Justice Department took the responsibility for the detention of those suspected of espionage or sabotage; the Army assumed the task of removing all of those not considered to be dangerous as individuals. Temporary assembly centers were established in which these people were concentrated pending permanent disposition. The War Relocation Authority was then created and charged with the duty of providing a dual relocation program: one phase which would provide social and economic relocation for the duration of the war; and one phase which would be concerned with the permanent re-establishment of evacuees in the post-war economy.

Certain characteristics of this situation are not likely to be duplicated in other relocation programs which may be

undertaken in the future. The people here involved were of a specified racial stock. Many were enemy aliens, the remainder bore the physical appearance of many aliens. They were a group which was highly unpopular with the general public, and under constant suspicion. An entire cross-section of a population was involved: rich and poor, educated and illiterate, professionals and the unskilled, saints and sinners.

Other characteristics, however, may be expected to recur in future relocation programs. These people, having been forced to leave their normal economic lives, were temporarily public charges who required financial assistance from the government. They were able and willing to work and wanted to be re-established on the road to economic security. They possessed a variety of skills and experiences. They were obliged to enter new areas and new climates, to learn new trades and crafts, to adapt themselves to new and unfamiliar surroundings.

Much has been written about them as a "Japanese problem," and I shall not here add to that literature. I shall rather devote my attention to those economic experiences of the program which may be expected to be common to all relocation efforts. It has been suggested that the government may be obliged to engage in other relocation programs in coming years. The exact nature of such potentialities cannot be forecast, but the possibilities include the relocation of demobilized soldiers after the peace, of indigent groups from submarginal economic areas, and of unemployed workers from decaying industrial centers. All of these arise out of causes which are partly economic, and their solution involves economic effects, the nature of which is partially revealed by WRA experience.

Relations to the Outside Economy

In every relocation program (including that of the WRA) the people to be relocated have undoubtedly been offering unwelcome competition to the more for-

tunately situated. This competition results in political pressure for its removal, and thus the government is inevitably drawn in. This fact must never be ignored: the relocation must relieve the competitive pressures which brought it about. Much of the traditional animosity toward the Japanese-Americans on the Pacific Coast is attributable to the fact that they were highly successful truck farmers and marketers and that they intruded seriously into the volume of business enjoyed by the native whites. The latter welcomed the evacuation for economic as well as military reasons and will undoubtedly resist a post-war return of the Japanese to their original homes. For this reason the WRA is planning permanent relocation of evacuees in widely scattered areas throughout the nation.

Even the temporary relocation during the war has been affected by this consideration. The WRA established Projects in desert and mountain spots, far from population centers. The residents were put to work at tasks necessary to their own subsistence and at a few other occupations, such as the manufacture of camouflage nets, in which they did not compete with outside industries.

Early in the program, sugar beet growers in the inter-mountain states called for the aid of Japanese labor. Under certain conditions, the WRA released work groups, totalling over 6000 persons at one time, to contract jobs in the beet fields. However, none was released to any county until after the local office of the United States Employment Service had certified that inadequate local labor was available. This plan proved so desirable that groups were eventually placed in non-agricultural employment such as section work for railroads in the Northwest. The success of these group employment contracts, however, is dependent upon the scarcity of labor resulting from the vast growth of war industries. The plan would probably prove unsuccessful in a period of widespread unemployment.

Although the WRA is established "for the duration of the war," the post-war problem of resettlement looms large in all its planning. As far as possible, evacuees should be given an opportunity to grow and to develop their skills and tal-

ents rather than to stagnate in pseudo-concentration camps. To this end considerable emphasis is placed on vocational training. It is futile, however, to train persons for jobs which they will never be eligible to hold. Certain trade unions will not be expected to permit Japanese to enter the crafts they control, and certain employing industries will exert an effective ban on them. Most of the jobs which will eventually be open to them are either at common labor levels, of the menial type, or in occupations where the workers are never seen by the public. Training programs, therefore, are designed to prepare evacuees for farm labor, including the care of livestock, for domestic service and child care, for work as chambermaids in hotels, for heavy work in laundries, and similar occupations. Throughout the entire program the avoidance of competitive disturbance is the guiding factor.

At the present time the WRA is releasing individuals of assumed loyalty and integrity to permanent jobs in those parts of the United States which are not "military areas." In the granting of leaves for such jobs, the same factor of present and potential competition is considered. In a peacetime relocation program it would undoubtedly be sound policy to encourage a rapid return of the colonists into normal economic life, not as parolees, but permanently. The characteristics which have led them into relocation could be overcome by vocational training, and by a process of infiltration they could be "fed into" the economy where and when their labor was needed. During the period of labor shortage this process could proceed swiftly. In the case of the Japanese-Americans, however, the characteristics which led them into relocation cannot be overcome. They look like Japanese and we are at war with Japan. Unless an unlikely shift in public opinion should occur, therefore, it is not probable that the WRA will succeed in permanently relocating more than a few thousand.

Undoubtedly a greater contribution to the war program is made by the group furloughs to work in sugar beets, etc. For many years the harvesting of much of America's agricultural crop has required the use of migratory labor. The sugar beet area of Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado and Utah is no exception.

The beets provide employment in varying numbers from April to December. There is not enough local labor to handle the work. Prior to the war, migrant Mexicans and dust-bowl-refugees did most of this work. Since Pearl Harbor, however, war industries have drawn off the surplus labor and the migrant farm workers have all but disappeared. Whereas military restrictions prevent the use of Japanese in the agriculture of the Coast, they may be, and are, so employed in the mountain states. They go out from the Project to the job, even though it may require them to live for months away from the Project, and return at the completion of the work. For the farmers the situation is ideal. Competent, industrious, and docile labor is available when needed, and disappears when the need is gone. For the government, also, the situation is satisfactory. The Japanese harvest a valuable crop which otherwise would have been lost, and while doing so are not requiring financial support from the government. Many of the Japanese like it because it removes them from the Projects which they feel are concentration camps. Others are not so enthusiastic because beet work is hard work, and they can live more easily on the Projects. Every encouragement, however, should be given to induce them to go out on these jobs. The work they can do is a military necessity in itself.

It is probable that the beet sugar industry will not decline materially in the post-war years. Many of the Japanese may become permanently attached to the industry and settled residents of the community. To the extent that this occurs, a temporary expedient becomes a permanent relocation, and no serious competition with outside labor will have occurred at any time in the process.

Internal Relations in WRA Projects

The ten temporary Projects established by the WRA are designed to become self-sufficient as soon as possible. All are on lands which had not been recently under cultivation, but are where the area is adequate, the soil is of good quality, and irrigation water is available. They range in size from 7,500 to 18,000 persons, and consisted at the beginning of little more than a vast and isolated acreage and a collection of temporary build-

ings of the army barracks type. Each is headed by a small staff of officials who represent the government interests. Except for these white executives, all positions are held by Japanese. The latter are thus obliged to fill nearly all jobs necessary to the operation of a small city. The divisional classifications on a typical Project include: project administration, construction and maintenance, public utilities, trucking and warehousing, mess operations, industry, agriculture, health and sanitation, internal police and fire departments, education, and community stores, canteens, and service shops. These provide occupation for approximately half of the total population. In divisions which are not yet self-sustaining, the WRA pays evacuee employees monthly wages of \$19 for professional and supervisory jobs, \$12 for apprentices, and \$16 for all others. All evacuees receive, as a right, their subsistence: food, housing, medical care, and education.

The central point in the economic operation of a project is the Employment Division. Here is a Placement Office which maintains complete files on the work experience, skills, and aptitudes of all working members of the community. All operating divisions secure all their labor from this office. It was early discovered that the use of the office must be mandatory. The practice of "hiring on the streets" led to confused pay-rolls, to personal discriminations, and to labor shortages in some divisions and labor surpluses in others. Project experience has been a dramatic and convincing demonstration of the benefits of mandatory and centralized hiring halls.

The Employment Officer is also responsible for the maintenance of good labor relations. Experience in this, also, has yielded conclusions of universal application. For example, several WRA officials, imbued perhaps with a paternalistic anxiety for the welfare of their charges, placed white foremen on most of the jobs. Several Projects were, for some time, overweighted with lower-ranking administrative officers, most of whom were engaged in supervisory tasks. The Japanese, however, included among their numbers a good many individuals of great skill and experience. Some had previously managed enterprises of greater magnitude than the entire Project. Lead-

ing merchants were assigned to clerkships in a camp canteen which was managed by a fourth-rate bureaucrat. Men who had served as directors of county-wide irrigation districts were put to pick-and-shovel work digging irrigation ditches under the direction of an inexperienced foreman. This led quickly to passive resistance and slow-downs, which in turn convinced the foremen that all Japanese were lazy. The vicious spiral continued with the foremen threatening coercive force, with the Japanese going on strike, and eventually with the development of rioting. It was soon evident that the only solution was the elimination of white foremen and of all white officials excepting the higher executives and their confidential assistants. The WRA had announced that the evacuees were colonists; that they were responsible for the creation of their own success in the Projects. It was only by rigid adherence to this doctrine that labor troubles were reduced. In relocation, too-evident paternalism is to be carefully avoided.

The same principle applies to all employment relations in the Project. In the natural course of events, disputes frequently arise on the job. To handle these the WRA established a system of Fair Labor Practice Committees. The members of these committees are usually seven in number, and are elected from the various occupational groups. The members elect their own Chairman who devotes full time to the job and is paid the professional wage by the WRA. All disputes go directly to the Committee. Its decisions can be appealed to the Project Director, but a great effort is made to secure a settlement by the Japanese-composed committee. In this way the complaints of employees are not directed against an impersonal and abstract government, but against a part of the community itself, which can settle them most advantageously to all. This "colonist-control" helps to build up the spirit of community enterprise.

It had been feared that the exceedingly low wage scale would deter evacuees from working at all. In isolated instances this proved to be the case for a short while. However, those who did not work found scanty opportunity for amusement and preferred work to bore-

dom. The most effective incentive, however, proved to be community self-interest. Wherever it became clear that work was essential to community well-being, the colonists themselves saw to it that the work was done. Idlers became the bearers of a strong social stigma and idleness became distinctly unusual. A relocation Project is a sufficiently well integrated economy that individual participation or non-participation quickly becomes evident. WRA experience shows instances of wealthy Japanese engaged at manual labor which brought in less in a month's wages than private investments were yielding in a week. Japanese physicians are practicing medicine for long hours at \$19 a month. The salary is of little interest to them; the opportunity to be of service is the only stimulant. This is an excellent demonstration of the willingness of people to work unstintingly for the common good when that good is plainly visible.

The Balance of External and Internal Policy

The policy of a Project with regard to the outside economy must be determined by governmental authority, whereas internal policy must remain largely in the hands of the colonists. Inevitably the two must conflict. Questions of vocational training and of the directions of industrial enterprise, for example, inevitably involve both considerations. Herein lies the area in which Project administrators must display the greatest skill. They must be able to solve their internal problems and at the same time be fully cognizant of economic developments outside the Project. Thus a technical competence in economics is essential, to which must be coupled skill in persuasion and leadership. If policy ignores the structure and changes of the national economy, the colonists will gradually be withdrawn from any possibility of subsequent return to normal life, and yet the relocation cannot successfully operate on a wholly paternalistic basis. Thus, relocation is a form of governmental activity which requires a capacity for long-time and large-scale planning. It may prove to be the nearest thing to a laboratory which the economic planners can hope to secure.

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in a relocation center

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"A delightful record of what was certainly one of the most undelightful incidents of the war."

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When the cold days came, the War Relocation Authority distributed G.I. clothes to all those employed, both women and men. It was welcome if peculiar apparel—warm pea jackets and army uniforms, sizes 38 and 44, apparently left over from the first World War.

From CITIZEN 13660 (actual size)

The artist

MINÉ OKUBO

Miné Okubo is an artist of exceptional talent. Her ability at the University of California, where she received both her A.B. and M.A. degrees in art, won for her a traveling fellowship for a year and a half of art study in Europe. She returned to California from Switzerland at the outbreak of the war and it was while she was at Topaz Relocation Center that her work as art editor of the center's home-spun magazine, *Trek*, attracted the attention of the art editors of *Fortune*. Cleared by government authorities, Miné came to New York at the invitation of *Fortune* to do illustrations for a special issue on Japan. She has worked here ever since.

Her drawings have appeared in subsequent issues of *Fortune* and in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, and examples of her work in water-color, tempera, and gouache have been exhibited in California, New York, and Paris, winning a number of prizes.

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Fascism, American Brand

"This is a white man's country," declared an attorney in Auburn, Calif., two days ago, as he defended three men accused of terrorism against an American-Japanese. And although two of the men had signed statements admitting their participation in gasoline-and-dynamite raids on the ranch of Sumio Doi and although the defense made no attempt to rebut testimony that the trio had tried to burn and blast the American-Japanese property, the jury said, "Not guilty."

("Nordic supremacy" was a phrase much favored by the Nazis.)

This same Auburn attorney cited Japanese atrocities as extenuating circumstances for acts of the two defendants.

(Do you remember how a house painter named Hitler ignored reason to blame the Jews for all the ills of his country?)

Last Sunday someone armed with a rifle fired five shots into two American-Japanese homes near Livingston, Calif., and a pair of Nisei soldiers sent a telegram to the secretary of the interior asking that their family be protected.

(Do you recall what the brown-shirts did in the ghettos of Europe?)

Not long ago an American Legion post in Hood River, Ore., erased from a World War I monument the names of the town's American-Japanese veterans. Finally, under protest, the post agreed to restore the names.

(In the Third Reich they burned the books and the music written by persons with Jewish names.)

When another American Legion post in Hollywood admitted an American-Japanese to membership, it was accused of "Communism" and "un-Americanism."

(The National Socialists made synonymous the words "Jewish," "Communist" and "unpatriotic.")

Last month near San Jose nine American-Japanese awoke in the early morning to find their gasoline-drenched frame home on fire. When they ran outside to fight the blaze, they had to dodge bullets fired from a moving automobile.

(If you were a member of a racial minority and lived in Munich, Nuernburg or Berlin, you never knew what would happen to you, except that it would be highly unpleasant.)

Are you still so sure that it can't happen here?—Patricia McGregor '47.

Letters From The People

Would Straighten Out Nation's Loves, Hates

Editor of The Bee—Sir: Meditation, now we love you, now we do not.

In 1756 we loved the British, hated the French and had a French and Indian War.

In 1776 we loved the French and hated the British and had a Revolutionary War.

In 1799 we hated the French and fought them at sea but in 1812 we loved the French and hated the British and fought them at sea in the War of 1812.

In 1900 we loved the Japanese and hated the Chinese in the Boxer Rebellion.

In 1914 we loved both British and French and hated the Germans and Austrians.

In 1917 we loved the Italians because they were our allies.

In 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia and so we hated the Italians.

In 1936 the Japanese despoiled China and we loved the poor Chinese.

In 1939 Russia invaded poor Finland and so we loved the Finns and hated the Russians.

In 1941 the Russians became our ally. We loved them and tried to hate the Finns.

In 1942 we hated the Italians. In 1943 they were on our side and we were trying hard to love them.

In 1943 we certainly hated the Japanese.

Would it not be a good thing to start making an honest effort to get our hates and loves straightened out and try to build a better world together?

It does not take brains to hate but it takes all you have got to love.

Tulare.

MRS. B. G.

THE SACRAMENTO BEE

THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1945

Feature Clip Series
No. 11

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FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA CLIP SHEET of October 20, 1942

JAPANESE EVACUATION WILL BE STUDIES

The evacuation of Japanese and Japanese-Americans from the Pacific Coast, and the economic, political and sociological consequences of this movement, are to be studied by the University of California. In announcing this, President Robert G. Sproul made it known that the Columbia Foundation is contributing \$20,000 a year for three years, the Giannini Foundation \$5,000, and the Rockefeller Foundation has given \$7,500 which it is hoped may be repeated for two years.

The study will be made by Dr. Dorothy S. Thomas, professor of rural sociology; Dr. Robert H. Lowie, professor of anthropology; Dr. Charles Aikin, a ssociate professor of political science; Dr. Milton Chernin, assistant professor of social welfare; Frank Kidner, lecturer in economics; and others who may be designated later.

"The objective of this three year study," said President Sproul, "will be to provide a factual basis for permanent settlement of the Japanese-American minority problem in this country, which war has aggravated, and at the same time to lay a foundation for possible settlement of equivalent problems in Europe which peace will leave unsettled. It is pointed out that this forced migration of a minority group presents opportunity for a case study which will be invaluable in meeting the larger problems of minority migrations in Europe, and that this study should be made now while it is possible.

"We hope that out of this study, which will result in a series of publications, there will come information which the University of California can offer to the world as another contribution to the successful solving of post-war problems."

Drugs?

NEWS STORIES FOR FLORENCE WEST

June 21, 1945

The Murahashi family, consisting of Mr. and Mrs. Murahashi and three boys, Roy, Oscar and Lawrence, were met at the Union Station on Tuesday, June 19, by a member of the WRA staff at Portland. The three boys were left in the WRA office while Mrs. Murahashi did some shopping in the City center for needed clothing for the children. Afterwards the WRA representative took the family to their home and Oscar, the oldest boy, was impatient at each delay on the way home. Mrs. Murahashi requested a stop be made at Fred Meyerson the east side that she might do some shopping for food, and Oscar accompanied her to hurry things along. The youngest boy, Roy, stayed in the car and was very excited about his return to Troutdale although he expressed some disappointment at being left behind while his mother went to the stores during the afternoon. He was extremely interested in everything that went on in the streets and continually associated incidents with things he remembered of his former life at Troutdale as compared with his life at Minidoka. When they reached the Murahashi home, Oscar and Roy piled out of the car and began running to the field and through the house. Mrs. Murahashi suggested that they help her unload the groceries from the car. Lawrence stopped his running about long enough to tell her that he was much too excited to work just then. Mr. Murahashi arrived a little later with certain furniture that he had stored in the WRA warehouse. When the WRA worker left the house the boys were still busy exploring the barn and each room in the house, racing in and out and up and down the stairs with unconcealed pleasure. Mrs. Murahashi was inspecting all of the shrubs.

Joe Hirota and his wife, Irene, and their five children arrived in Portland and were met at the depot by a member of the WRA staff. They were lodged temporarily from Saturday, June 9, until Monday, June 11, at the Hostel. They have now temporarily taken a three bedroom furnished apartment at Vanport. Mr. Hirota is employed as a member of the Federal Communications Service which is a Civil Service position. The Hirotas are delighted to be in Portland and are looking forward to securing an unfurnished dwelling under Federal Housing, for which they are applying.

The Citizens' Committee to Aid Relocation has invited their entire Committee and the relocatees in and around Portland to a house warming at the Hostel at 315 N.W. 16th Avenue, Portland, on Saturday, June 23, from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. The picture "Challenge to Democracy" in sound and color will be shown. Refreshments will be served and all persons who have been invited are anticipating a great deal of pleasure in meeting with the Japanese-Americans who are here, and the relocatees are anticipating seeing many persons from the Centers whom they have not had a chance as yet to meet since relocating.

Tsuyu Yuzuria arrived in Portland on June 21 and will be a visitor at Reiko Miura's home, the Magnolia Apartments, at 820 S.E. Third Avenue, Portland, until about the first of July. At that time she will be a house guest of the Hawley Kato family and will work in the berry fields at their home. Tsuyu plans to enter the University this fall.

Mrs. Oshino Uyeda and her two sons, Charles and Franklin, ar-

rived in Portland June 21 and were met at the depot by her son, Henry, whom she had not seen for several months. Henry is working at the Russian Warehouse and has been anticipating with a great deal of pleasure the return of his mother and brothers to this state. For the time being the Uyedas will be housed in the Hostel. Mrs. Uyeda plans to work temporarily in Portland and live in one of the Federal Housing Projects. A member of the WRA staff also met the Uyeda family and assisted Mrs. Uyeda with her bags and saw to it that she was comfortably established in the Hostel.

Arthur Ojiro Sasaki of Sherwood, Oregon, was in the WRA office recently and reported that he has been selling strawberries at the wholesale market regularly and has been selling his entire load. However, he has also delivered a supply of strawberries to the Kinoshita family who have reopened their market at 1100 N.E. Columbia Boulevard, Portland.

The Kinoshita family who opened their market at 1100 N.E., Columbia Boulevard, Portland, have been operating for nearly a month and are doing very well. They report that they have both their old customers and many new ones.

Mr. and Mrs. Jukichi Kawano, Miss Reiko Miura and Miss Lilly Kobayashi are among the recent new employees at the Russian Warehouse in Portland.

Marian Hara has accepted a position with a caucasian family, the head of which is on the Portland school board. She goes to work on Thursday, June 21, and she reported in the Portland office

to state that she feels she will be most happy there.

Dixon Miyauchi, his mother and father are employed at the P.S. Jackson home in Dunthorpe. Mr. Jackson is the editor and publisher of the Oregon Journal, the Portland evening newspaper.