

OFFICERS

Jack K. Wakayama, *Pres.*
Shigeo Soga, *1st Vice-Pres.*
Ralph C. Honda, *2nd Vice-Pres.*
Shiro Kashiwa, *Rec. Sec'y*
Charles H. Sakaguchi, *Corr. Sec'y*
Wallace S. Amioka, *Treas.*
Herman S. Hosoi, *Auditor*

DIRECTORS

Arthur Y. Akinaka
Ernest I. Furukawa
Lt. Yoshio Hasegawa
Eugene T. Ichinose
Dr. Barney N. Iwanaga
Uichi Kanayama
Masatoshi Katagiri
Mitsuyuki Kido
Dr. Robert A. Kimura
Dr. Robert S. Komenaka
Dr. John T. Kometani
Rev. Harry S. Komuro
Dr. James T. Kuninobu
Thomas S. Kurihara
Masaji Marumoto
Katsuro Miho
Stanley M. Miyamoto

1941



1942

HAWAIIAN-JAPANESE CIVIC ASS'N

P. O. BOX 2866
HONOLULU, HAWAII

Hawaii

DIRECTORS (Continued)

Robert K. Murakami
Wallace H. Otaguro
Dr. Shunzo Sakamaki
Judge Clarence Y. Shimamura
Wilfred C. Tsukiyama
Clifton H. Yamamoto

COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

Charity and Welfare:
Rev. Harry S. Komuro
Civic:
Mitsuyuki Kido
Finance:
Wallace S. Amioka
Legislative:
Katsuro Miho
Membership:
Howard K. Yoshino
Program:
Shiro Kashiwa
Publicity:
Thomas S. Kurihara
Public Relations:
Masatoshi Katagiri
Sports:
James J. Inouye

January 3, 1942

Dear Friend:

This is not an attempt to tell you what to do. I simply wish to share with you some of my ideas during this very critical period which is facing us all.

We have long professed our loyalty to the United States. The time has now come when our loyalty is being put to the supreme test. Not only the people of Hawaii but the whole nation is watching us. Let us accept the challenge to prove beyond all doubt that we are Americans and can do our share as Americans in a common cause. Needless to say, the manner in which we conduct ourselves and the contribution we make in this critical period will determine to a very large extent our relationship with the rest of the people of Hawaii, not only during this emergency, but after the war is all over.

I am sure you have all heard or read General Emmons' speech of Sunday, December 21. Personally, I was very much reassured by his fair and sympathetic attitude. It is now up to us to measure up to the challenge he has placed before the people of Hawaii when he said that "it is important that Hawaii prove that her traditional confidence in her cosmopolitan population has not been misplaced."

There is much that we can do individually and as a group.

1. Keep our chins up. Let's look at the total picture and not gripe about individual cases of discrimination.
2. Reassure our alien parents that they will not be mistreated by the constituted authorities so long as they conduct themselves according to law. In this connection we should interpret to them the statement regarding the government's policy toward internees which appeared in Sunday's Advertiser, December 21, 1941. We should also interpret to them General Emmons' speech of the same date.
3. Contribute to the Red Cross.
4. Continue our donation to the blood bank.
5. Volunteer our services to the Civilian Defense organizations if we have not done so yet.

6. Respond to any call for help which may come from other sources and which is intended to bolster our national defense.

7. Keep ourselves productively employed. Anyone who keeps himself deliberately unemployed should be considered a slacker during these times. If he cannot get employment in certain places, he should work where he can.

8. Call the attention of the proper agencies to specific cases of families who need help. In some instances, we can share what we have until the public agencies can come to their aid.

9. Stop repeating rumors.

10. Report to the F.B.I., any information we may discover concerning subversive activities. The sooner the community is convinced that it need have no fear of these activities, the better it will be for all concerned.

11. Continue our normal contacts with our friends of all races.

12. Be discreet in the use of language, mannerisms or wearing apparel which might be a source of misunderstanding, suspicion or irritation to others. In a time like this, there is no excuse for using the Japanese language when conversing with someone who understands English.

13. Volunteer in the armed forces. Why wait until we are drafted.

14. Assume Active and aggressive leadership in controlling the thoughts and activities of our alien parents and in directing their lives in conformity with the American way.

Let us be calm, realistic and determined. This is no time for discouragement. Let us pull together, cooperate in every way with the constituted authorities and with the rest of the community, and justify the confidence that our many friends in both public and private life have expressed in our devotion to this nation.

Sincerely yours,

Jack Wakayama

JACK K. WAKAYAMA, President
Hawaiian-Japanese Civic Association

This has been approved by the Public Relations Branch of the Army Intelligence, December 29th, 1941.

(Signed) K. J. Fielder, Col., G-2

POSTON, ARIZONA
January 26, 1943

Joseph R. Farrington
Delegate to Congress from Hawaii
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrington:

A few of us from Hawaii who are working in the Colorado River War Relocation Project at Poston, Arizona, have been concerned over the general attitude of the country toward American citizens of Japanese ancestry and their parents. The coming congressional investigation of war relocation centers may offer an opportunity to convince the people of our country that the unwarranted treatment accorded the citizens in relocation centers is more typical of the ideologies with which we are in conflict in the present war than it is of democracy. On Sunday, January 17th, three of us,--Dr. Miles Cary, Miss Nell Findley, and Dr. Arthur Harris,--discussed possible courses of direct action through which we could do our part. It was agreed that a letter to you would be the most effective means by which a group of "Hawaiians" could make their voices heard. The points for emphasis in such a letter were discussed and Arthur Harris was delegated to draft the epistle. You will find the results attached.

Other Hawaii residents on the project have been given an opportunity to read the letter and their signatures below indicate that they approve and concur in the thinking expressed. We hope you may be in a position to influence the investigating committees and the Congress in their deliberations and actions. Will it meet with your approval if we use the attached letter as an "open letter" for circulation to various individuals and organizations, and possibly for publication?

Our sincerest aloha,

A LETTER TO
THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. FARRINGTON
DELEGATE TO CONGRESS FROM THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII
WASHINGTON, D. C.

In view of the current proposals for a congressional investigation of conditions in War Relocation Centers it is imperative that a forthright statement be made of certain facts which might otherwise be neglected or overlooked. We have spent six months or more in one of these centers. On the basis of our experience we submit the following facts and statements of our position.

The press has reported the actions, recommendations, affirmations and demands of various organizations and individuals with reference to the status and treatment of people of Japanese ancestry in America. In the course of a congressional investigation it is inevitable that these same pressures and many others will be exerted on behalf of the points of view of their respective proponents. We shall present here the apparent major contentions of such pressures, point out the implications of the contentions for our national life, reveal relevant facts from this particular relocation center, and suggest what we consider to be an intelligent course of action in the interests of the welfare of our country.

1. The justification for evacuation and relocation of all people of Japanese ancestry living in certain restricted military zones in the western states of the United States has been dual,--military necessity and protection of these people from possible offensive vigilante action by other residents of those states.

No effort was ever made by any official information service of the government to counteract or correct anti-Japanese propaganda through rumor of sabotage by Japanese in Hawaii. There has been far too little effort to distinguish between the "Japs" of militaristic Japan and loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry. The effect upon the latter and upon a large part of the rest of our population has been deplorable. Indiscriminate hatred thus engendered was responsible for the situation which made evacuation for protection of our Japanese population seem advisable. That such unfair propaganda should be permitted without concern or control by our government was the first blow to the faith of our Americans of Japanese ancestry in our nation as a proponent of the democratic way of life. The contention of a nation of 130,000,000 people that it was impotent to protect a minority group of 100,000 of its population was not a position to instill confidence in any minority group of our country. Neither was it a move calculated to command the respect and confidence of Asiatic peoples in the democratic principles of which we profess to be defenders in the present world conflict.

It is our opinion that the Office of War Information should embark upon a comprehensive program to combat anti-Japanese-American propaganda by race egoists who cloak their fascist prejudices in wartime

patriotism. The program should work toward nation-wide acceptance of American citizens of Japanese ancestry and of alien Japanese parents with consistent records of industry, self dependence, law abiding conduct, and loyalty to our nation. The constitutional guarantees of the four freedoms make no racial distinctions. To permit such distinctions to be made against any one racial group is to threaten the validity of those guarantees for all racial minorities.

2. Resolutions have been passed by several western state conventions of the American Legion calling for the revocation of the American citizenship of all people of Japanese ancestry. The pressure of this sentiment has resulted in proposals or actual introduction of legislation in state legislatures or the national Congress. Some proposals would recognize the citizenship of those to whom citizenship has already been granted, but deny it to their descendants. Efforts are being made in a number of states to deny land ownership to those of Japanese ancestry. Legal barriers to interracial marriage between Japanese and Caucasians have also been erected.

The attitudes reflected in these various expressions and actions are almost exact parallels of the attitudes of Nazism toward the Jews. Can that which has been so bitterly condemned in Nazism be admirable in American democracy, or is this but an American brand of Nazism masquerading as patriotism?

Technically the Japanese Americans have already been labelled as alien by the 4C draft classification. Of all the discriminatory actions which have been taken, probably none has hurt so deeply the great majority of our young Americans of Japanese ancestry, and none has so rebuffed the first generation Japanese who had cast their lot wholly with America for the sake of their children. There is still time to save many of these young people and their parents for America, but action must be taken immediately. The 4C draft classification of these American citizens must be changed! Already the completely negative attitude which that wrong engenders is apparent. In Poston a ballot on the opening of the camouflage net factory has just been completed. The vote was approximately 3700 against to 3400 for the opening of the factory. On many of the opposing ballots the notation was written, "4C."

Is America so illiterate socially that she does not realize what she is doing to herself, to her prestige throughout the parts of the world inhabited by colored races, to her future and the future of all the peoples of the earth? Are we so naive as to think we can treat a minority group as we are treating the Americans of Japanese ancestry without drawing the lines for a future war in which the as yet untapped resources of Asia and her billion people will be pitted against our war depleted resources and a hundred and thirty million people?

Before evacuation our American citizens of Japanese ancestry believed in democracy and wanted to fight for it in spite of the limitations then placed upon their freedom and rights. By taking away what freedom and equality they enjoyed and placing them in camps where the total emphasis is upon the Japanese elements of their persons and lives,

we have abandoned them to fascist propoganda and robbed them of the incentive to resist fascist ideas. From an attitude of negativism toward America and toward democracy they will pass to one of bitterness, of undying hatred, even as you and I would under the same circumstances. If we then send them back to the orient, they will go as ambassadors of future conflict against democracy. If we right the wrongs which have been done, the same people will be the ambassadors of peace, understanding, good will, and cooperation between Asia and America in the post-war period. Our national government should take the lead in pointing out to the entire nation that the agitation for discrimination against our citizens of Japanese ancestry is un-American; that the agitators are traitors to the basic principles upon which our democratic social order was founded and built. Our government should admit that the draft classification of Japanese Americans was a hasty, unconsidered action taken under the stress of our emotional reactions following "Pearl Harbor." Frustrated in our desire to vent our wrath upon the Japanese nation, we turned upon a group of our own people and made them the "whipping boys" for the release of our pent up emotions. We can ill afford not to reconsider such action.

3. There is widespread sentiment in favor of confining for the duration of the war all people of Japanese extraction now in relocation centers. Even the most optimistic of those who favor a program of maximum re-relocation conclude that the majority of those in relocation centers must remain there for the duration, and probably for an indefinite period thereafter.

Poston confines approximately 18,000 people who but one year ago were independent efficient producers of essential foods, goods, and services for our nation. Their crime rate and public dependency rate were among the lowest of all comparable groups. Today, with the nation facing a serious shortage in production of foods, good, and services through the military depletion of our manpower, we have 18,000 people whose enforced lot it is to consume. In all centers almost 130,000 individuals have been singled out to play the role of consumers.

These people are in a hiatus between a past in which they were robbed of their accomplishments and a future devoid of opportunity. In Poston they are asked to make permanent improvements on a large potentially productive ~~area~~, yet they can have no share in fruition of their efforts and but a bare slum subsistence while they are building for the future of some other group. Their affairs are administered by an ever increasing body of government employees who are at best no more capable than the evacuees, and who are drawn here to add to the already ridiculously large and tragic debit in the nation's manpower. The present program is ~~making~~ every effort toward the making of 18,000 efficient producers into 18,000 wards of the government, and it is succeeding. The people of Poston are developing the attitudes and habits of wards. They are becoming actively demanding mendicants.

Poston evacuees are farmers, doctors, lawyers, mechanics, engineers, clerks, secretaries, and bookkeepers. They are a people mentally capable of rapid retraining for essential work. But they are a stagnant pool which should be transformed into a stream of power to help turn the

wheels of industry. They should be relocated in communities where they can contribute their services; where they can have their stake in America, a stake which all Americans so vitally need. If some are to be kept here they must be given that stake here. The voice of citizens in the governing of their own affairs must be restored to them; the incentive of future economic independence and security must be made possible through a share in the future which they create for this desert area. Only stupidity would seek to exploit these people through labor on almost a slave basis. It might be kinder to ape Hitler all the way and liquidate them with firing squads.

4. The stories of inhumane treatment of interned American citizens and American prisoners of war by the Japanese military have resulted in protests in this country that people in relocation centers should receive the same sort of treatment.

Little need be said in answer to this demand. Those in Japan for whose welfare we are concerned are "our people, our boys." Those in relocation centers are also "our people, our boys." We accepted them ~~legally~~ as such. We have extended to them the same constitutional ^{and} cultural origin is but incidental. Such differences are of the stuff which is America. No scientist would substantiate the contention that the peoples of the orient are different in a way which justifies excluding them from among those cultures that make up our nation. Even apart from the fact that the majority of Japanese in America are our citizens, no extent of bestiality on the part of our enemies can justify our descending to the same level.

5. Some well meaning leaders in our country are deploring the fact that American citizens of Japanese ancestry have been placed in relocation centers with alien and pro-axis Japanese. They advocate the separation of American citizens from the latter elements.

Unquestionably it is true that there are pro-axis sympathis^{ers}. Some of the most effective agents of the Japanese government may have been able to conceal their activities and sympathies so successfully that they were considered neutral and harmless. Through the discrimination, sacrifice, and circumstances of relocation it has been possible for such individuals to win the support of many who, under normal circumstances, would have remained strictly neutral or active supporters of the cause of the allied nations. Even now, however, the group of defections is comparatively small. The apprehension and removal of the leaders ~~and their active adherents~~ are essential, but not sufficient. ~~Such a course without a constructive program~~ along the lines suggested in the preceding paragraphs would only result in the necessity for a periodic and increasingly frequent removal of defective groups. To expect any other result would be to attribute to Japanese American the qualities of super-patriots.

We objected in the past to the "little Tokyo" settlements of the Japanese. To remedy matters we have set up "big Tokyo" settlements and have cut off all association with and participation in normal American life. For the great majority of the people in relocation centers this is the first time in their lives that their associa-

tions have been limited to their own race. From a situation in which they were successfully working out an identity with American culture and the American way of life independent of the domination of an alien culture, they have been forced into a situation dominated by the older adherents to that alien culture. So long as a future in America seemed possible for their children, the majority of alien parents of Japanese American citizens assented to the desirability and inevitability of the complete Americanization of their children. Now that the future for their children is obscure they would have them turn to the only culture which seems to hold out any hope to them, the culture of their origin.

Complete separation of aliens and citizens is impossible. Too many citizens are minors dependent upon alien parents. The restoration of civil and economic rights and of civil obligations would reassure these parents that their children have a future in America. They would then resist effectively the leadership of agitators who have no stake in this country and who would willingly destroy all Japanese in America if such destruction promised an advantage to the militarist regime in Japan.

In Poston there are alien Japanese who have remarked, "After living for thirty years in California thinking I was Japanese, I returned to Japan to discover that I had become American." There are in Poston wives of Japanese internees who have decided to forsake their husbands in order that their children may remain in American and have their chance as Americans. Families such as these belong in American communities, not in Japanese relocation camps. Separation of alien and citizens in camps is not a solution. Restoration of loyal families and individuals to normal American communities is a moral and national obligation.

6: Some of the demands for a congressional investigation of relocation centers are based upon the allegation that the evacuees in those centers are being pampered. It is said that rationing of food has not been applied; that they live in luxurious dwellings with a private bathtub for every family; that they are provided with fine clothing; that recreation facilities of every type are afforded; that every frill and fad of education mark the programs carried on in fine school buildings.

Subsistence purchases for the Poston communities are made six weeks in advance. When the population was being rapidly increased though the intake of additional evacuees this regulation resulted in serious inadequacies in the food provided. At the present time the same requirement may result in a delay in the application of new rationing regulations. Certainly no evacuee would ask that he be excepted from the application those regulations, and just as certainly he should expect that there will be no discrimination against him in the provision of a well balanced and adequate diet. The greatest need felt by these people is to be treated as the general population of the country is treated. The provision of food for Poston is an administrative responsibility in which the evacuees have no share. No extensive investigation would be required to determine to what extent food

rationing has been disregarded, but if there has been laxity, justice would require that no blame or censure be directed at the evacuee Americans and their families.

The evacuees are housed in unfinished, unlined ~~but~~ paper covered barracks. The floors have wide cracks between the bare boards. The furniture, with the exception of straw ticks or cheap mattresses, is that which could be provided by the people themselves. In rooms 20'x 25' as many as seven people in one, two, or three unrelated families are housed. The only plumbing facilities are showers and toilets in common latrines and common laundries for each block of fourteen barracks often containing more than 300 people. Here normal family life is supposed to be carried on, summer temperatures of 130° without coolers, and in freezing winter temperatures with inadequate heating facilities. Even these heating facilities were made available only in the last month.

For each block of fourteen 100' barracks there is a common mess hall and an unpartitioned barracks for recreation purposes. No public funds have been provided for recreation equipment. American movies are shown each week, providing some opportunity for contact with the outside world and for escape from the frustrations of camp life.

Not until the clothing resources of many families had been exhausted was any provision made for clothing the evacuees. This month an allotment of from \$2 to \$3.50 per person per month has been instituted.

In the three communities into which Poston is divided there are no school houses. In the two smaller communities containing less than half the population of Poston, schools are housed in vacant blocks of barracks. In Poston I, the largest community, there was no vacant block. Classes for elementary and high school pupils are held in the barracks intended as recreation halls. This means that classes are scattered over an area of one square mile; high school students must walk several miles daily between classes.

Schools opened on October 5th with no furniture, no books, no libraries, in Poston I with no partitions between classes in the same building, and with 80 trained teachers for almost 5000 pupils. Today there are partial partitions, chairs, tables made in Poston, blackboards painted on partitions, chalk, paper, maps, but our books are just being received. In our vocational classes there is almost no equipment and no place to install it when it is secured. Evacuees with some college training are working as apprentice teachers, outnumbering trained teachers more than two to one. These are the luxurious schools of Poston, provided for American children whose former school experience was in the finest schools which America offers. In the minds of the students who attend them and of their parents, they are one more indication that America intends to close the future to this segment of its people; they add one more example for the pro-axis sympathizers to point to as evidence that there is no choice between democracy and fascism for this group, but only between brands of fascism.

COPY

3571 Pahoa Ave.
January 31, 1943

About the first of the month John A. Balch, retired manager of the Mutual Telephone Company, who came to Hawaii from California in 1907, issued a pamphlet which got some publicity in the local papers, but the contents of which weren't analyzed. All the public learned was that Mr. Balch advocated the permanent deportation of 100,000 Japanese-Americans to the mainland. This proposal caused a certain flurry, as very few people knew whether it was an individual's idea or whether there might be some group pressure behind it. The military governor thereupon reiterated an earlier statement, that no mass evacuation was planned, was possible, or would take place; and things quieted down, altho letters are still coming in to the Star-Bulletin denouncing the scheme.

I read the pamphlet at the Library of Hawaii, but wasn't able to get a copy. (You probably can get one from Balch by writing to him.) It is as stupid a thing as has appeared here in years. Balch wrote to the Chamber of Commerce, to Nimitz, to Emmons (or Green, I forget which), and to Thoron in the Dept. of the Interior, outlining his ideas: that the Japanese-Americans are almost all unreliable, that they should be permanently deported and scattered in small settlements thruout the States, that steps should be taken to keep Japanese-Americans from buying real estate and from taking civil service posts--all this because "It is my contention that if the Japanese are left in their present numbers as the largest racial group in Hawaii the position of all other racial groups and that of their descendants will be jeopardized, and as these people gain even greater political and economic control we shall be forced out of our jobs and our homes." As he goes on, he makes it clear that the we whom he is worrying about are the Caucasians. To fill the gap left by the deportation he would have Puerto Ricans or Filipinos imported. He repeats most of the standard crap about the local Japanese. All the gentlemen to whom he wrote replied thanking him for his suggestions in a perfunctory way. Only H. J. McClatchy, head of one of the anti-Jap organizations in California, bent an attentive ear. Just why Balch had this pamphlet printed containing the cold-shouldering answers as well as his suggestions I do not know, unless there is something in the life of a Honolulu businessman that makes one peculiarly stupid.

Then, this past week, came the statements by the War Dept. and by General Emmons, calling for 1500 volunteers, and (that of Emmons) praising the local Japanese-American community. This has raised greatly the morale of the Japanese. It is expected that the 1500 quota will be greatly over-subscribed. (It's true that some of the Japanese young men feel that there should be no call for volunteers, that the J-A should be drafted on the same footing as anybody else.) If enough favorable publicity is given the volunteering, it should be very helpful for the whole J-A question.

I am rather doubtful, however, about the local Japanese giving it the

necessary follow-up. I've already expressed my opinion of the emergency committee and their ilk in my mimeographed letter, and in the past month I've had no reason to revise it.

February 22, 1942

Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons
Military Governor of Hawaii
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Dear Sir:

The following confidential suggestions are offered regarding the problem in connection with enemy aliens and their descendants in Hawaii. The problem seems to be involved in evacuation, with which my Committee is concerned.

Since concentration of all enemy aliens, dual citizens, and descendants of enemy aliens appears to be impracticable due to limited facilities and practical location for such extensive concentration camps, and due to the fact that a very large number of such persons would have to be transported without delay to the Mainland and out of the theatre of operations, it is recommended:

1. That all enemy aliens be immobilized when in the judgment of the Military Governor it is necessary. This immobilization should be within their own homes for males over 16 who live in the evacuation area of Honolulu, and in suitable segregated areas elsewhere in the Territory. For females and children, immobilization should be within their own homes or within homes or other centers to which they shall have been evacuated. Thereafter, as facilities permit, these people could be transported to the Mainland.

2. That the same treatment as is given enemy aliens be accorded to all "dual citizens" who are subject of and/or owe any allegiance to any enemy country, even though by birth they are also American citizens.

3. That other elements of the population; i.e. (a) Those who have not maintained a close cultural relationship with an enemy country, and those whose ancestors are not from an enemy alien country; (b) Those American citizens who are not in class (a) above and whose ancestors are of an enemy alien country; and (c) Those who are citizens of other countries than America but not of enemy alien countries, be treated as follows:

Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons - #2
February 22 1942

For above groups (a) and (b): The bona fide American citizens and American citizens (not dual citizens) whose ancestry is enemy alien, be given an opportunity to take a renewed oath of allegiance to the United States of America and of renunciation of any act whatsoever that would lend aid to, or comfort to, an enemy of the United States.

For above group (c): Citizens of countries other than America but not of an enemy country would be given an opportunity to take an oath of renunciation of any act whatsoever that would lend aid to, or comfort to, an enemy of the United States.

Persons making oath as above would also be required to produce at least two competent and satisfactory witnesses as to their character, integrity, past conduct, and believed intentions.

A reviewing authority of able persons, including experienced military officers, would interview the persons and their witnesses, and if the persons are adjudged worthy, would authorize such persons to acquire an approved photographic and numbered identification badge, and an identifying arm band that would be distinguished at a suitable distance. Such properly passed and identified persons could proceed about their necessary work. Persons not adjudged worthy would not receive such identification and would be immobilized.

The following advantages are inherent in the above plan:

1. The plan affords positive identification for the Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, and those part-Hawaiians who may be mistaken for a Japanese alien during immobilization.
2. It provides that all civilians entitled to liberty within the Theatre of Operations shall have been examined and classified for the safety of themselves and the Government.
3. It avoids classifying all persons with enemy alien ancestry as enemies, when doubtless some of these are in every respect loyal and cooperative citizens of the United States.

To conserve this loyalty is very important. It yields productive work and it avoids loss of an asset that has been acquired through years of organized American effort, in schools, by various American institutions, and by constitutional rights. To imperil this loyalty might add to existing dangers and result in rendering potentially cooperative persons bitter and vengeful.

Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons - #3
February 22, 1942

4. It avoids giving our enemy countries a very strong talking point to whip up an emotional frenzy against the United States. Such propaganda material may be worth several divisions of troops.

5. It retains the services of many people of enemy alien ancestry who may be needed to work as agents and observers among enemy aliens and subversive groups.

It is further suggested that persons (American Citizens) even of enemy alien ancestry, if adjudged worthy, be called into the armed forces of the United States and given battle service, as was done successfully during World War I. Such should result in a great increase in loyalty among persons so honored, and affect the interests of their parents and friends.

The following reported policy and teaching of Japanese Bushito may be of some significance:

It is said that when a Japanese family is without a son, it may adopt a son of another family. Should contention or even war arise between the two families thereafter, it is the duty of the adopted son to espouse the cause of his adopted family, even defending his adopted parents with his life, against his own natural parents.

The above teaching might be used to advantage in the present circumstances, as a logical and emotional appeal to many persons.

Yours very truly,

Frank E. Midkiff, Chairman
Evacuation Committee

FEM:K

Hawaii

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

COPY

~~MATSON LINE~~
From woman Hawaii
teacher in high school
married to Japanese
American wife

3571 Pahoa Ave.
Honolulu, T.H.
Sept. 12, 1942

.....I should say that the apprehension of the alien Japanese during the first months of the war has quieted down considerably. So far as one can see on the surface, social relations run along very much as they have always done here. At the same time, there has been a slow but progressive pushing out of nisei from various types of work connected with the war--on the Inter-Island boats, in the Pacific Naval Air Bases Contractors' yard where I worked last summer, etc. Probably the Japanese community, like all the other racial communities, is making more dollars than ever before in Island history, but it naturally rankles, even if one is earning twice what one did before, to see a Korean or a Chinese getting three or four times his normal salary, because he is racially acceptable and oneself is not. There is a lot of bitterness among the more thoughtful younger Japanese about discrimination against their people on racial lines. They don't talk much about California, but they haven't overlooked the lesson of it. At the same time, they are fairly hopeful--maybe even more than fairly so--of ultimate fair play. (That's my personal impression, remember). There is a feeling that if a Japanese-American and any other kind of American each commits any sort of offense that can be construed as affecting defense, the former will be punished more severely; but to what extent this idea is justified, I really don't know. Other nationalities realize that the Japanese don't get an even break. I heard a Chinese mechanic at Pearl Harbor on a bus growling about how some foreman was trying to run over him. "But they can't treat me like a f----- Japanese. I was working there before the war; I've got seniority. Now the Japanese, they've got them by the b-----."

There is certainly somewhat more tension between other nationalities and Japanese since the war began, and one occasionally hears Portuguese, in particular, shooting off their mouths. But my guess is that the tension is not very much greater. Probably the most significant cleavage is still between Haoles, who "catch the cream," and non-Haoles, who take the skim milk. There is a certain amount of racial discrimination against all non-whites, or at least all Orientals, in various social fields

~~NATSON LINE~~

and aspects of defense work that are in some way or other connected with the war; and this discrimination is talked about. One or two eating places are said not to serve non-whites; and the Negroes, both soldiers and war workers, have run into quite a bit of discrimination. The local folk seem to be taking to mainland mores in relations with the Negro. White defense workers are sometimes pretty snotty in their relations with the "Japs" and other more or less undifferentiated kinds of local scum; but on the other hand there is far more social intercourse between Haoles and other groups, of the same economic and social class, than before 1941. A Haole now is no longer necessarily somebody who lives apart from you because his pocket-book is much fatter.

There continues to be a great many marriages between war workers and local girls. I haven't access to statistics, but my impression from reading the Vital Statistics column regularly, is that the most numerous out-marriages are with Japanese girls, followed by Portuguese, Hawaiian, Chinese, and Korean. The Koreans have the greatest rate of Haole marriages, by far. White-local intermarriage seems to be falling off somewhat of late, perhaps in consequence of discouragement by the Army. I don't see many Schofield Barracks addresses in the marriage application lists any longer. A lot of these marriages are bound to be "for the duration"; I heard of one fellow who, contemplating marriage, first inquired carefully about the divorce laws. The Catholic church organ has come out against outmarriages, even to good Catholic soldier boys. But even if many of the marriages won't last long, they are a big assimilative force while they do last.

The nisei have organized groups to help in the war effort in various ways, particularly to cooperate with the Morale Division (Chas. Loomis, head) of the OCD. I rather feel, tho, that no very strong leadership is coming out of the nisei community yet. The fundamental weakness of the Japanese-American community was that it has always been so passively American. Probably it couldn't be anything else, being economically dependent on its elders and on the Big Five, neither of which approved of independence. But I have a feeling that if the younger Japanese had developed a few scrappers in the 1930's they wouldn't be so suspect today. Now, none of them dares speak up against any kind of discrimination or be very conspicuous in any way. One of our acquaintances recently from the mainland said that the war propoganda takes two main lines, both essentially negative: Keep your mouth shut, and Buy war bonds. If that is the essence of wartime Americanism, our nisei are just

~~MATSON LINE~~

what the propagandists want.

(The inclosed clipping will show you what sort of reception any Japanese would get who spoke up--only more so! I had sent in a bare, factual summary of the ACLU's action in the Wakayama case referred to above; I didn't even say what I thought of it, let alone the whole evacuation. Of course there is a personal animus of some kind back of this letter. Mr. Phillips is head of the Pacific Guano & Fertilizer Co.; otherwise I don't know him from Adam's off ox; but evidently something I have done in the past has trod on his corns.)

In the political field, there is a notable lack of Japanese candidates. No new ones are appearing, of course, and all the incumbents who aren't sure of reelection are not running again. Senator Abe and Rep. Sakakihara ("the half-pint Japanese with the ten-gallon hat"), both of Hilo, have been taken in custody by the military. Supervisor Frank Ishii of Hawaii was also held for some months, but then released. When he announced his intention of running for reelection, to vindicate himself, David Trask said that no Japanese should run for office in these times. Just the same, Ishii and two others on Hawaii, and three on Kauai, are running.

Union Labor is not getting a particularly good deal. Wages on defense jobs was frozen early in the war, but the price of foodstuffs has risen about 26% in the past year, and other things have gone up accordingly. Away back last March 31, the military governor ordered a six-day week on military projects, but the seven-day week is still normal for thousands of war workers. In general, on defense projects, there is no channel for the settlement collectively of any kind of grievances. Unions might as well not exist so far as their services being enlisted to improve morale and increase production are concerned. Several employers have deliberately taken the attitude that the Japanese bombs on December 7 burned up the Wagner Act in Hawaii, and refuse to abide by its provisions. The Military Government says the Wagner Act is still in force, but has done nothing to enforce it.

There is a general impression that the local business interests have an undue share of the ear of the military government. Certainly there exists no other group to contest that share, whether undue or not.

Over on Kauai the head of the (Japanese) Longshoremen's Union at Port Allen was thrown into jail by the officer in charge of the island, presumably because the plantation

~~WATSON LINE~~

people got the commandant's ear and persuaded him that Izuka was a dangerous Jap. As a matter of fact, Izuka was the only Japanese in the union who in the old days of neutrality would not contribute to Japanese war relief funds, and who really knew what the Sino-Japanese war was about. I'm glad to say that he was turned loose in due time, that is to say after several months of investigation.

One bright spot in the picture: the local of Electricians at the Hawaiian Electric are going ahead with an NLRB election next week, and are confident of winning collective bargaining rights.

As you know, a considerable number of Island Japanese soldiers were sent to camps in the States to continue their military training. I have heard conflicting accounts of the success of the experiment. The Japanese here felt pretty good over the news of the boys being sent to the mainland, for naturally no one wants to be inducted unless he is to be trusted to handle weapons in defense of the country drafting him. What was done about West Coast Japanese in the army? One report I have read says they were released from the army. Other reports are to the contrary.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

December 16, 1942

TO: The Director
SUBJECT: Hawaiian Report

Attached is my report on the Hawaiian evacuation, together with a memorandum prepared for me by Captain Blake.

/s/ Edwin G. Arnold
Edwin G. Arnold
Special Asst. to the Director

Attachments

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HAWAIIAN EVACUATION

No definite policy on the evacuation of individuals of Japanese descent in the Territory of Hawaii had been officially announced up to the time of my departure from Pearl Harbor on December 1, 1942. This has resulted in much unfortunate confusion, uncertainty, and worry among possible evacuees, as well as others. The morale of the Japanese and Japanese-Americans has been very low, although General Emmons' statement of November 5th did improve the situation. At that time he indicated that there would be no mass evacuation of Hawaii's Japanese and stated that only those not essential to the war effort would be moved to the Mainland. I urged very strongly that a definite policy be enunciated, and at the time of my departure Lt. Colonel Bicknell was working on a statement which he hoped to have approved. The existence of martial law explains why continued civilian pressure has not resulted in a clarification of the situation.

At present there are conflicting pressures from all directions, and I had conferences with representatives of many of these pressure groups. I believe the policy of those actually responsible for the evacuation program at the time of my visit may be stated as follows. During the next twelve months the maximum number of evacuees could be approximately 5,000; but I believe the actual number will be no more than 3,000, and probably much less than that. The maximum shipment will be 150 every two weeks, unless the Western Defense Command succeeds in having the minimum single shipment raised to 500. There are many reasons for such a small evacuation, but the most tangible one is the lack of transportation both between the Islands and the Mainland and between the Islands themselves. In addition to those who have requested repatriation the evacuees will consist of the following groups of individuals who are either non-productive or are potentially dangerous in the Islands but not dangerous on the Mainland: families of Japanese aliens interned on the Mainland whose parole is being requested, Japanese-American citizens and Japanese aliens interned in Hawaii and their families, Japanese-American citizen and Japanese alien fishermen and their families, and some Kibeis not held in detention. This is the policy which is being followed by the Contact Office of the Military Intelligence Division, which is responsible for selecting the evacuees. There is attached a memorandum from Captain Blake to Lt. Colonel Bicknell which describes these groups. I was assured by these two officers that no evacuees would be sent, other than repatriates, who would not be eligible for indefinite leave from our Centers. Colonel Fielder, Lt. Colonel Bicknell, and Captain Blake are now responsible for evacuation policy. As long as they are in control of the program, I believe the number of evacuees will be kept to a minimum and their selection will be excellently handled. The individual selection of evacuees is actually handled by Captain Blake, under the supervision of Lt. Colonel Bicknell, and I cannot speak too highly of these two men. The transfer of the evacuation program to certain other officers in the Military Intelligence Division might prove to be very unfortunate.

The policy of no large-scale evacuation could change very quickly as a consequence of a serious act of sabotage.

I had a very satisfactory conference with Lt. General Delos C. Emmons, Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department and Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii. He frankly stated that from the standpoint of military security all Japanese influence should be permanently removed from the Territory of Hawaii, but he admitted that this would be impossible for economic reasons. Lack of shipping, he believes, will probably limit the number of evacuees to 5000 during the next twelve months. After essential war construction has tapered off, the tempo of the evacuation can be increased if transportation is available. It is extremely important no Hawaiian Japanese be repatriated, at least for six months after they leave the Islands, nor should they be permitted to talk to other Japanese being repatriated, because **most** of the strategic and secret defense work in the Islands has been constructed by Japanese.

General Emmons indicated very strongly that the move that would be of the greatest assistance to the Hawaiian Japanese situation now would be permission for voluntary enlistment by Japanese-Americans in the United States Army, as well as induction through Selective Service.

I discussed the loyalty of the Japanese and Japanese-Americans with many individuals. Except for a small minority group the general opinion of responsible individuals, both civilian and military, seemed to be that from eighty to ninety percent will remain loyal unless Hawaii is invaded by the enemy. There is considerable difference of opinion as to what might happen in the event of an actual invasion. However, I received the impression that if the Islands should be invaded, the Hawaiian Japanese could be immobilized very quickly by means of a relatively small number of troops.

The Contact Office of the Military Intelligence Division, under the supervision of Lt. Colonel Bicknell, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have done excellent work. I was told that there has not been one act of sabotage by a Japanese-American citizen or Japanese alien before, on, or after December 7, 1941. This is one of the strongest arguments against any substantial evacuation.

There is considerable pressure, however, in the Islands for the evacuation of a large number of Japanese-American citizens and Japanese aliens. Civilians have received the definite impression from some Army officers that General Emmons is under considerable pressure from Washington to evacuate a large number of Japanese aliens and Japanese-Americans. From the standpoint of maximum naval and military security influential Navy and Army men argue that all Japanese influence should be removed from the Islands. It should be realized that there are approximately 160,000 individuals of Japanese extraction in the Islands, who constitute approximately 35% of the total population. Influential white Americans are worried over their increasing economic and political influence. These individuals fear that it may not be long before the Japanese-Americans will have economic and political control of the Territory of Hawaii. Men like J. A. Balch, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Mutual Telephone Company of Honolulu, and Angus Taylor, U. S. Attorney, feel that this is the time to rid the Islands permanently of this dangerous Japanese influence.

Because Japanese-Americans are not permitted to enlist, many are doing war work and earning high wages, and others are attending the University of Hawaii, which angers some of those residents whose sons are in the Army and Navy. Furthermore, some Japanese and Japanese-American business men, just like other business men, are profiteering out of the war; and this stirs up much antagonism. Japanese are thrifty, and it is charged that they are using their savings to purchase real estate and other property and thus gain an economic stranglehold, particularly on Honolulu. Some business men resent the efficient competition of Japanese and Japanese-Americans.

I was told by several reliable informants that the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce sent a representative to Honolulu to agitate for evacuation. I also gained the impression that the Western Defense Command has been urging very strongly that a substantial number of Japanese and Japanese-Americans be evacuated. Many young Army and Navy officers and their wives, who have not been in the Islands very long, show a definite prejudice against Japanese-Americans and advocate evacuation. This is also true of defense workers from the Mainland, who exhibit typical Mainland prejudices. I was told that some Chinese, Filipinos and other minority groups have been pressuring for evacuation, but I experienced no direct contact with such pressure. Shortly after Secretary Knix returned from Hawaii, he indicated that the Islands were a hotbed of Fifth Column activity, which report increased the agitation for mass evacuation although it was not substantiated by facts. I have seen a copy of a letter from influential white American in Honolulu to a naval officer in Washington, D. C., which seems to indicate that there is a substantial pressure group working to secure mass evacuation. There is also a movement on foot to import Puerto Ricans to replace evacuated Japanese and Japanese-Americans.

One often hears the remark that soldiers and sailors are very bitter over the fact that individuals of Japanese ~~and~~ extraction are permitted to live normally in Hawaii. At the time of censorship a confidential survey was made, I was told by a reliable informant, of 10,000 letters of service men, Ninety-eight and eight-tenths percent said nothing about the Japanese problem in Hawaii, one-half of the remainder were anti-Japanese, one-fourth non-committal, and one-fourth favorably disposed toward existing conditions.

I believe that a majority of the responsible and influential residents of the Islands are opposed to the evacuation of any Japanese or Japanese-Americans other than repatriates, families of internees, and the potentially dangerous, all of whom, according to the Military Intelligence Division, would not total more than approximately three thousand. Most of these individuals, including some Army and Navy officers, stated that the West Coast evacuation was a serious mistake. In this group opposed to a large-scale evacuation I would include Lt. Colonel Bicknell, who is in charge of the Contact Office of the Military Intelligence Division of the Hawaiian Department, and who, practically everybody admits, speaks with authority as the result of considerable experience with Hawaiian Japanese and Japanese-Americans. Captain Blake of Colonel Bicknell's office is another member of this group. I believe Captain Mayfield, in charge of the Office of Naval Intelligence in Honolulu, would be satisfied with an evacuation of approximately 5000. Mr. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who has an excellent reputation in the Territory of Hawaii, indicated that the evacuation of three to five thousand would take care of all the potentially dangerous and no mass evacuation would be needed. Obviously, organizations such as the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, the pineapple growers, and the Oahu Railway, who employ large numbers of Japanese and Japanese-Americans, are opposed to mass evacuation. They state that such an evacuation would mean the economic ruination of the Islands. Objective students of the situation,

such as Dr. Lind of the University of Hawaii, agree with this point of view. The majority of the older residents of the Islands, who have learned to live with and like the Hawaiian Japanese, are opposed to mass evacuation. The "intellectuals" of the universities and schools are practically all opposed to evacuation. Mr. King, the delegate from Hawaii to Congress, indicated to me that he believes that a substantial evacuation is unnecessary. I was told by Lt. Colonel Bicknell that Mr. Farrington, who is the owner and publisher of the Honolulu "Star Bulletin" and who is the new delegate-elect to Congress, is opposed to mass evacuation. A substantial number of the responsible residents in the Territory of Hawaii feel that a large-scale evacuation would be a sad demonstration of race prejudice.

The above description of existing pressures indicates why there will continue to be confusion, uncertainty, ill will, and fear until the situation is officially clarified.

The actual selection of evacuees is made by Captain Blake of the Contact Office of the Military Intelligence Division after a personal interview. Then the evacuees are processed under the supervision of Major Walker of the Military Governor's office, who personally discusses the evacuation procedure with each family. Each evacuee is given a thorough physical examination by a competent Army doctor, and those with contagious or infectious diseases are deferred until they have recovered. If there is any question of the evacuee's ability to make the trip, he is not evacuated. Captain Blake and Major Walker agreed that those with tuberculosis would be kept in Hawaii.

Lt. Lowry, who has had experience in the trust department of a local bank, is in charge of property and finance problems, and he works closely with Mr. Tree of the Office of Foreign Funds Control of the United States Treasury Department. He has a personal interview with each family. All property problems must be settled, either through sale, lease or granting power of attorney to private individuals, before the evacuee leaves, even if it means deferring the evacuation. The Military Governor's office takes no power of attorney. Apparently there are not many serious property problems, partially because of the type of evacuee and partially because there is a good sellers' market for practically anything in the Territory at present. When I was there, no provision had been made by Lt. Lowry to protect the evacuee's property interests after he has been evacuated, but Major Walker and Captain Blake promised to remedy this situation. The Farm Security Administration office in Hawaii has agreed to assist wherever needed but to date has been requested to do very little.

There is a personal interview with each evacuee by a representative of the Red Cross to discuss family affairs, the need for financial assistance, clothing requirements, and special diets. The Red Cross representative also makes recommendations for deferment of certain evacuees and recommends permission for older children of evacuated families to remain in Hawaii.

The evacuation procedure has been set up to process each case individually and could not possibly handle a mass evacuation.

No procedure has yet been set up on any of the islands except Oahu. It is possible that the Federal Security Agency will be requested to assist

in the outer islands.

There has been some pressure for mass evacuation and relocation somewhere on the Islands themselves. I don't believe this will be done; however, because of the great opposition to mass evacuation already described and because of the shortage of materials and guards. If lack of shipping prevents any substantial evacuation, there may be pressure, however, to set up a relocation center to take care of the potentially dangerous.

When Mr. Beasley of the Federal Security Agency was in Washington, he discussed a relocation program for individuals evacuated from strategic areas. At present this program is in a state of confusion. In the first place, the Army and Navy can't agree on which areas are to be evacuated; in the second place, many of the areas under consideration are very essential for the production of vegetables, of which there is a great shortage on Oahu; and in the third place, General Green, Executive Assistant to the Military Governor, indicated to me that there are no materials available for housing individuals evacuated from strategic areas. So there is a constant battle changing day by day. Lt. Colonel Bicknell of the Military Intelligence Division and Mr. Dillingham, Director of Food Production of the Office of the Military Governor, are doing their best to keep evacuation of these areas to an absolute minimum. At the time of my departure the situation seemed to be under control.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dec. 30, 1942

Mr. E. B. Whitaker
Assistant Field Director
War Relocation Authority
Little Rock, Arkansas

Dear Mr. Whitaker:

Attached is a copy of a confidential message received from General Emmons, dated December 29, 1942.

As indicated, 443 people sailed on December 28. I have made a request, in writing, that we not be required to accept any more of these people in our Relocation Centers until the policies are determined as to whether they are to be permitted indefinite leave the same as anyone else, and whether they may associate with others who may be leaving the Centers. If clarification of these policies is not made, I have asked that we not be required to accept them until a separate relocation center can be prepared for them.

Very truly yours,

/s/ D. S. Myer
Director

P. S. In the meantime Jerome should be prepared to receive the number of people involved, approximately between January 5 and 10, 1943.

DSM

December 31, 1942

Dear Mr. Myer:

Confirming my conversation this morning, the following information is furnished:

Mr. McCloy is in receipt today of a message from General Emmons in which he states that the 443 Japanese evacuees now en route to San Francisco are considered harmless and they may be permitted contacts with Japanese already in relocation centers. This information, I believe solves your problem as to the disposition of this particular shipment.

General Emmons further states that Japanese who are considered potentially dangerous will not be sent to the Mainland until the War Relocation Authority has been consulted in the matter.

Sincerely,

/s/ William E. Scobey

WILLIAM P. SCOBAY
Colonel, G. S.
Executive

Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building, Room 822
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

December 31, 1942

Dear Mr. Myer:

With reference to the evacuation of Japanese from Hawaii the following digest of a message sent to General Emmons is given for your information.

In the message to General Emmons, Mr. McCloy points out that General Emmons' requirement that the Hawaiian evacuees be isolated presents certain difficulties which are listed as follows:

1. That the restriction of evacuees when they arrive in the United States may have adverse reactions on their voluntary agreements to leave Hawaii and upon the local population in Hawaii.
2. That the isolation or virtual confinement of Japanese claiming citizenship presents legal complications.
3. That compliance with the requirements of isolation would introduce construction difficulties.
4. That isolation of Hawaiian Japanese would impose discriminations against them as compared with the Japanese on the mainland.

In citing these adverse factors the message continues with the request that General Emmons advise whether he desires to reconsider the entire evacuation program.

Sincerely,
/s/ William P. Scobey

copy

December 17, 1944

Dear folks:

A letter in place of a Christmas card--
A letter whose length, I vow,
Will have to make up for a long neglect--
I'm going to write you now!

Christmas here is like it was
In Bethlehem with Jesus
Not a bit of white snow here--
Snuffles none, nor sneezes.

Balmy winds and fleecy clouds
Mixed with playful breezes
Make the girlies all display
Pretty dimpled kneeses.

Trade winds brought to us today
Dripping rainy weather
Marks the season when we say--
Now, then, all together!

MERRY CHRISTMAS!

With the introduction I may say that I have arrived in Hawaii, and have worked here some three months. The climate is wonderful. It was warm when I first arrived in mid-September, around 85° in fact, but it was very comfortable. Since then the temperature has gone down to an average of about 70°, with a pre-dawn minimum of about 60°. The rain is reminiscent of the soft, warm, plashing puddles and down-pour of western Oregon, and seldom lasts more than a day at a time -- usually only a shower of a half hour or less. The house which we were assigned by the University, which built ten for new faculty members, is strongly reminiscent of the houses at Amache. The walls are of cane -- pressed sugar cane like the stuff the walls are built of at Amache, but thicker and lighter in color. The whole house, which includes two bedrooms about 10 x 12 feet, one living room about 14 x 17 feet, a bath room with shower but no tub, six by seven, a kitchen 8 x 10 feet, is a little larger than a two-room staff apt. at Amache, but is constructed a lot like it. We have a gas stove, and the furniture we fortunately were warned to ship here. Purchasing furniture here is like reaching Heaven with one's hands -- not for common mortals like me. Prices for all sorts of things are very high, and OPA controls are of much less effectiveness than in the mainland areas. This is especially true of rents. Food is about 35% higher than in San Francisco, and about 50% higher than in Colorado. After seeing the difference between rationed food-selling there, and unrationed sales here, I'm in favor of rationing to insure that the fellow or housewife who is fortunate enough to be present

when rare foods are unpacked the day after being received from the mainland doesn't get enough to satisfy even future needs while the less fortunate get no chance to have any.

All the furniture, dishes, and equipment came through in perfect order, thanks to the careful and thorough job of packing which Andy, Mr. Yuzawa, Mas, Yoshie, Mary, and Elizabeth did, to say nothing of the modest efforts of Jake and myself. Since crates and crating are rare here, I'm saving most of them until I know how long I'll be here. By the time you receive this letter, Elizabeth and Johnnie and Janice will probably be here, although they have not yet arrived. It has been a lonely time, without them, and I look forward with some eagerness to their arrival. At the same time, the experience has taught me some of the feelings of the internee and the serviceman who is separated from his family -- usually over a longer time.

My reactions are of considerable displeasure, emotional disturbance, and a tendency to dig harder into work than I otherwise would. Since my energy has not been great -- in fact quite inadequate -- this has resulted in continuous overwork on my part. The press of class routine, the preparation of new courses which I never taught this way before, and conferences with numerous students and other persons with whom I need to talk have taken my time constantly so that I have frequently been too tired to operate very effectively. I have managed to keep plugging away, however, and to arrive at some conclusions concerning the situation.

The Territory of Hawaii is the private preserve of a small group of economic royalists who have the redeeming feature of being close enough to the situation personally to make exploitation of the coarsest and crudest sort unpalatable to them. The fact that the Wagner Act does not apply to agricultural laborers, and hence furnishes no federal protection for the organization of agricultural laborers against the all-inclusive authority of the plantation owners and managers, and that labor organization of any effective sort is only a few years or even months old speak eloquently of the desire of the established controllers of the economy for continued control. The relatively low level of real wages and the relatively low standard of living among agricultural workers is also very noticeable (although compared with Puerto Rican wage standards, agricultural laborers receive a high wage here, in keeping with added transportation costs and monopoly price controls. The monopolistic practices and freeze-out devices practiced by such concerns as the Matson Navigation Co., are also well known. Paternalism prevails to the extent of trying to keep the laborers somewhat content with their lot, however, by such devices as a Filipino program sponsored by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Assn., (and before the war, a Japanese hour), by provision of company built and sponsored entertainment and civic services in some of the plantation communities, etc., the entire control is paternalistic, however, with power residing in the pater.

What I had heard concerning racial and ethnic cooperation here made me quite curious about it all. There is a tradition of cooperation which makes it bad form to admit discrimination openly, except in a few instances of very conspicuously prejudiced individuals and groups. In other words, there is a real effort to keep intact a "front" of equality and cooperation. I find some very peculiar facts which do not fit in with this tradition, although the tradition is much better in its influence than anything I have seen on the mainland in a general population. Thus, with the exception of one or two tok members, no oriental person or person of oriental ancestry is admitted as a member of a few exclusive clubs, although most clubs raise no questions whatever concerning ancestry and have very cosmopolitan memberships. No person of oriental ancestry can become an officer of any of the important organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club, etc. Native Hawaiians or part-Hawaiians, who are frequently related by blood to the "first families" among the whites, are usually accepted. With one exception, no Hawaiians of Japanese ancestry have run for public office since Dec. 7, 1941. Whether they resigned and abstained from politics to avoid rousing hostile feelings on the part of other ancestry groups, whether the military authorities asked them to do so, or insisted that they should resign or refuse to run, or whether a combination of voluntary and coercive factors tended to that result, I do not know. I think it was probably the latter. One man of Japanese ancestry ran for office and was handily elected in the primary. Many charges of bloc voting are leveled against the Chinese, who are making real money from the war trade and retail business, and stepping out in the field of real estate investment most conspicuously. I doubt that the charge is true, and more pertinent charges might be made against certain neighborhoods of whites for their "solid support" of "white" candidates. Nevertheless, it is true that in general race or ethnic lines are ignored in politics, and the economic royalists in particular are careful not to raise or permit to be raised any significant issues based on racial discrimination (although they have perfected the tactics of "divide and rule" by playing off ethnic groups against each other most expertly). At first, right after "the blitz" as people here refer to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the people of Japanese ancestry were quite reticent and withdrew quite a bit, especially since most of the Issei leaders had been interned. Gradually, however, they found that the hostility they feared did not materialize, and they resumed a great many of the activities which they had performed customarily.

Oddly enough, in contrast to the situation in California, here the Army command seems to have had most experience and wisdom in dealing with the problems involving the Americans of Japanese ancestry (AJAs), while the Navy has apparently acted with less efficiency and understanding. Nevertheless, the same inconsistent attitudes and decisions by varying offices and officers is easily discernible here as it is in California and in Washington, D.C. The contrasting treatment of the AJA's here and in California is certainly due to many things, but not the least of these, in my opinion, is the superior caliber and wider experience of the particular officers who happened to be in command of certain key functions here

over the corresponding officers in California -- and I feel sure that that applies to many ranks of officers from the commanding Lieutenant Generals on down. Most of the responsible Army personnel here had been here long enough to have come into effective and understanding contact with the tradition and practice of racial cooperation here, and hence recognized the opportunity of utilizing the cooperation of the AJA's rather than discounting such possibilities without a trial, as the Navy here has been inclined to do here, and as the Army did in California, Washington and Oregon.

The actual existence of a cooperative tradition and practice here is another very important factor, however, which made more likely the success of such an arrangement. Furthermore, the economic pressure of the leading citizens of the community were all against removing the AJA's, since that would have left many a plantation severely handicapped, and many another very essential service or establishment severely short of labor. The larger proportion of AJA's in the total population also had its weight, since in California the AJA's formed such a small part of the total that few people realized or cared whether they were there or not; here many people did, and most of all those who control the Islands' economy.

Don't think that the AJA's have no prejudice to buck, however. A few local racists have been on hand from the beginning, and many newly imported mainland workers and servicemen are far from cordial. Moreover, the inevitable friction between a staid, well-settled community and the individuals who compose a great inundating wave of humanity in a short space of time, with little or no preparation on the part of either the community or the newcomers, under conditions of war-time economy and scarcity, is to a large part responsible for the hostility which does occur. Where no friction is present, the newcomers soon lose their feeling that "Japs are Japs" or "Chinks are Chinks" when they note that they neither act nor are treated in conformance with such a philosophy. While many have a chance to catch the local spirit of cooperation, many others have prejudices confirmed by such practices on the part of shopkeepers of every kind of keeping the rate or choice merchandise for their regular, old customers, and selling the rest to the newcomers, or malihini. That, and just not knowing the way around, such as where busses stop to pick up passengers, etc., when shops close and open, account for a good deal of hard feeling. Frequently the resentment is formulated as a feeling against the "slant-eyed oriental", the "Jap", the "Chink," or the "yellow bastard" shopkeeper, bus-driver, or what-not, rather than against shopkeepers in general or bus-drivers as such. This may increase anti AJA feeling on the part of some war-workers and servicemen. On the other hand, I think the preponderance of experiences tend to make those prejudices and feelings of a "racist" nature less intense and less confidently held. Frequently such feelings are entirely dispelled, to the point that servicemen not only consort with girls of all ancestries, and

live with them in common-law marriage, but also marry them legitimately and honestly. What the mates of such marriages will do at the end of the war is still a problem. Most will result in the serviceman making Hawaii his post-war home; many will break-up, either before or after the bride returns to the mainland when their husbands are released from service. If they are not too closely congregated, or do not go to too many exceedingly hostile areas, I think they will get along quite well, for most of the girls are well Americanized. So are most of the Nisei here, boys as well as girls. One of the things which has made a pretty strong impression on both civilians and servicemen here is the casualty lists of Hawaiian servicemen. I do not know the exact percentage, but a close examination of the lists published in the newspapers here indicates that well over 80% of all casualties published were those of Americans of Japanese ancestry. The AJA's form a much smaller proportion of the total military age population than they do of the casualties. None the less, the Business Men's Training Corps for home defense refused to accept either AJA or Americans of Chinese or Filipino ancestry just after the blitz here, and at all times since. The AJA's had to form their own Varsity Victory Volunteers, and the Chinese and Filipino had to organize their own Home Defense Volunteers also. The refusal was based upon the allegation that all Asiatics would be subject to being mistaken for the enemy if an actual invasion occurred, so they would be likely to be shot if they were seen armed. I myself think that this was merely a rationalization, since people here know the various ethnic groups well enough to be able to identify local persons. I no other means had been available, lingual tests would have been possible. It certainly seems to have been true, however, that many servicemen had most precariously nervous triggerfingers for the first few days after the blitz, and that persons with Asiatic facial features were not the only ones in danger of over-zealous marksmen, whose inexperience and nervousness was quite understandable under the circumstances. Since that time, however, the exploits of the 100th Battalion and of the 442nd have become almost legendary. The impressiveness of seeing a hundred or so names of AJA's wounded, killed, or lost in action, with perhaps one or two Anglo-Saxon names, a few Chinese, and one or two Koreans, time after time, in the daily newspapers, is great. The publication of the many honors which the AJA's have won, and the notice of the award of the Purple Heart, DSC or other citation to the parents posthumously, has also had its influence on public opinion, even among the newcomers. Similarly, the memorial services held by Buddhist churches for the AJA's who died in action have had a slightly leavening and enlightening influence upon those who mistakenly thought that Buddhism was a nationalistically Japanese religion and institution. Withal, and in spite of many difficulties still to be met and overcome, I think the AJA's here will weather the storm. Two problems loom large, however.

The first of these is the refusal of the other ancestry groups to accept the cooperation of the AJA's, so that they are forced in some instances to establish their own civic and social organizations. The Army appointed an Emergency Service and Morale Committee of Nisei of unquestioned loyalty shortly after the blitz. These took the place of a well-integrated AJA community organization already existing, with cooperation being affected in some fields and not in others. So far as I can determine

some of the fields not yet covered by some cooperative understanding and practice are fairly vital to the ordinary run of social participation by the persons of Japanese ancestry in the Territory. As a result of this, and of some rather extreme measures urged by the Committee (on its own account, without, so far as I know, Army insistence), such as the destruction of Japanese art objects, the Emergency Service and Morale Committee is not popular in some strata of Japanese-American society here. Critics aver the need for more democratic selection of the committee members, so that they may be more representative of the Japanese-American community. The present members are charged with being more interested in their own prestige than the welfare of the Japanese Americans at large, etc. -- all the usual criticisms of leaders anywhere, sharpened with some real differences of opinion concerning such vital issues as the liquidation of real property held by the churches, language schools, and civic organizations which existed before the blitz. The committees feel it imperative to prevent the resumption of the language schools, for example, after the war. Yet some of the Buddhist ministers could hardly be supported in the smaller communities if they did not also receive pay for their services as language school teachers. Most of the churches and language schools are cooperating with the Committee, but it is difficult for some of them to do so and still see their way clear to operating as churches after the war is over, unless they receive some compensation for their investments in school property. Such compensation is not at present available, and probably will not be in the future. Consolidation of the smaller churches is indicated, but at present transportation difficulties stand in the way, and rural poverty will do the same even more effectively after the war.

The second main problem is population movement after the war. Will the AJA's from Hawaii come back here? Will many mainland AJA's come here to escape mainland prejudice in the Paradise of the Pacific? Will many prejudiced war workers and servicemen stay? What will happen to the tradition of racial cooperation -- especially in view of the strong prejudice everywhere apparent against Negro servicemen? These are some of the main problems still to be met. Veterans' rehabilitation, and absorption into the community, often with physical handicaps due to wounds which unfit them for their previous jobs, are others.

There is a great temptation, when others refuse to admit one, to get together with similarly rejected persons. Perhaps a general organization of non-whites will be the final answer to the snootiness of the exclusive clubs. The Chinese are at present making money hand over fist, buying expensive real estate at speculative prices, and otherwise expanding in importance and power. I suspect that they will soon begin organizing either Chinese chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club, etc. organizations, or general ones of this type open to all ancestries, but with non-exclusive constitutions to compete with the exclusive outfits. If and when they can become economically powerful enough to challenge to present community control, the last vestiges

of racist practices may be eliminated. Perhaps the present controllers will see the handwriting on the wall, and adjust themselves to the new conditions gracefully and with comparatively little loss. I doubt that they will be that wise, however, and I look for a rear-guard action which will be sufficiently bitter to leave a sediment of feeling in the community. The fact that every business firm of note in Honolulu has signed a contract with organized labor, and the CIO and PAC is strong in the Territory, means that absolute control by the economic royalists is broken, if it ever existed. I believe that such control will be lessened under the impact of labor organization, and the political power of the various ethnic groups in the Islands. So far politicians are either bought or threatened into agreement with the orders of the top boys. If and when effective constituent control is established, it would seem difficult for the present system to succeed. An instance is the suspension of John A. Owens, territorial American Federation of Labor Representative, from the Honolulu Central Labor Council when Owens announced without first consulting the Central Labor Council that he and the AFL would not sit in on the WLB substandard wage hearings. (Reported in the Honolulu Advertiser Dec. 16, p. 3.). Maybe the top boys think they know what they're doing, but I suspect they are making a rather bad mistake. If they paid as much attention to the development of sound and permanently mutual satisfactory relationships with their workers as they are with each other, they might get further in the long run. Perhaps they will do something about it. Certainly they are in favor of racial cooperation and a minimum of conflict between ethnic groups in the community, as a whole and thus demonstrate intelligently but they are just unrelentingly unintelligently trying to maintain the upper control group "for first families only." It will be interesting to see how they come out. I'm betting against them, if they persist in their present practices, simply because I'm sure that that isn't the effective way of getting people to cooperate with you to the extent of letting you exploit them. I suspect, moreover, that successful exploitation of the past and present variety, at least, will not survive long in the present situation. Some of the reactionary members of all ancestral groups work with them in the exploitive process at present, but I doubt that their fellows will tolerate such activities much longer. It certainly is an interesting process to watch, however, I suspect, moreover, that the future of the AJAs will depend quite a bit, and be influenced strongly, by the part they play in this process. We all know how conservative most Issei are; fortunately, many Nisei are much more openminded and alert to the change going on. Whether these young men will be able to guide the activities of the AJAs and their parents is a critical question. There are good chances for it, but also much opposition. So they may be unable to swing the community with them, even if they see the need for an adjustment to the changing control factors in the situation. If they avoid alienating the sympathies of the labor organization, and remain sufficiently valuable to the big boys to keep their support and sympathy, they'll be doing something. There is a possibility (and the strongest one) that they will both please and offend both parties, because of the divergence in beliefs and economic interests among the AJAs. Then it will be a tug of war between the traditional practice of forgetting race, and the possibility of using the AJAs as a football and scapegoat. I think it will be the first of these two. Goodby for now. I'll be looking for a letter from you.

As ever,

/s/ John A. Rademaker

NELSON PRINGLE

KNX-CBS NEWS ANALYST

October 5, 1942

7:45 - 8:00 A.M., P.W.T.

Perhaps your eyebrows went up this weekend when you read or heard that Hawaii's primary election on Saturday saw four Japanese nominated for public offices and one elected outright. Japanese taking part in politics in Hawaii? -- what are they thinking of in the Islands?-- you might have thought, if not remarked. And the answer is an interesting one to mainlanders who do not know the freedom and equality which the Hawaiian-born Japanese are being given in the Territory.

"American citizens of Oriental ancestry", they are officially called... loyal Americans of Japanese descent they have proved themselves... and the island people as a whole trust them. So does the United States Army, which still drafts the second-generation Japanese, and the Navy, which employs an ever-increasing number of Hawaiian-born Japanese at Pearl Harbor and on construction jobs elsewhere in the Islands. It has not been forgotten that many a Japanese surgeon answered the emergency call on December 7th, and worked for endless hours, saving the lives of their fellow Americans, nor that there were Japanese lads who manned more than one of the guns that poured bullets at the attackers on that fateful Sunday morning. As for the island residents...and I speak from knowledge gained during several years spent in Hawaii...the record in the past of the second and third generation Japanese, as Americans who took their place in the community, has set them apart from the generation which stemmed from Imperial Japan.

What became of these older generation Japanese? The Island intelligence forces moved swiftly last December, and there were few of the alien fifth columnists who were not seized and subsequently sent to mainland internment camps. The aliens who remained have been closely watched, and there have been no better guardians of the element which might contain individuals sympathetic to their homeland than the Nisei, the second generation Japanese.

In the months that have passed since December 7th, one story of sabotage has never ceased to circulate on the Mainland...although it soon died a natural death in the Islands. There was some evidence of fifth column activities, but the closed records of the army and navy have never revealed the exact extent of assistance given the attackers. But from Blake Clark, whom I knew as an instructor at the University of Hawaii, I've learned the true story of the most widely told tale of Japanese sabotage on December 7th.

The rumor persists to this day that Japanese blocked traffic on the road to Pearl Harbor that fateful Sunday forenoon. The three-lane highway had been a bottleneck for a couple of years; when Pearl Harbor was under attack it was a bedlam of racing ambulances, trucks, taxis, private and motor corps cars. By disrupting this traffic, Japanese could have severed a major artery of island defense. But there has never been any proof of such an attempt, all colorful stories notwithstanding. The rumor soon died in Hawaii. It was denied by hundreds of local people who used the road that day, and by service families who were evacuated from Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor over that highway. But despite the strict official injunction given all civilians brought to the coast...the injunction to tell only what they saw December 7th, and not repeat hearsay...there were many answers

given to the frequently posed question, "Did they really shoot the Japanese who blocked the road to Pearl Harbor?"

It was a navy captain who had been at Pearl Harbor who unwittingly gave this story of road-blocking its start in the mainland press. He was interviewed by newsmen in Washington, and related the following incident. He said he had jumped into his car in Manoa Valley, fully five miles from the highway to Pearl Harbor, and driving toward Honolulu he almost collided with a carload of Orientals. They were driving wildly and seemed excited. The captain gave this incidental recollection in answer to the newshawks' question, "Did you see any confusion?" He did not claim that the Orientals were Japanese or imply that they were sabotaging. But this part of his interview was picked up by several reporters, to the exclusion of the rest of his story, and given wide publicity as an example of Japanese sabotage. The captain said afterward that he was sorry he had ever mentioned the incident.

The story came back to Hawaii for checking by the G-men. But the chief agent of the F.B.I. in Hawaii declared, "There was not a single act of sabotage, either before December 7, during the day of the attack, or at any time since." Chief Gabrielson of the Honolulu police, onetime police official at Berkeley, confirmed this report with the comment that "if the Japs^{in Hawaii} had wanted to do damage, December 7th offered them a golden opportunity."

Where were the Japanese on that Sunday, if they were not sabotaging? Hundreds of them were actively helping defend the territory, as members of the Oahu Citizens' Defense Committee. Volunteer truck drivers, they rushed to assembly points, stripped their delivery trucks of their contents, inserted frames prepared to hold four stretchers, and went tearing out to Pearl Harbor to take the wounded to hospitals. Some

of those Japanese got there so promptly that their trucks were hit by flying shrapnel, or machine-gun bullets from road-strafting Jap planes. The presence of the Japanese drivers, and of their scarred and pock-marked trucks, undoubtedly gave rise to the rumor that guns had to be employed to clear the highway of Japs who were blocking the road to Pearl Harbor.

From: The Honolulu Star-Bulletin
March 23, 1943

Copy

DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY NECESSITY IN HAWAII

In time of war, the Army clearly has a constitutional duty to discharge for the protection of its people and country. Some of the action does not always follow orthodox democratic procedure but the spirit is democratic, the authority for the acts committed stems from democratic law, and the purpose is to protect democracy.

This explanation of the function of martial law in Hawaii was given by Col. Kendall J. Fielder, assistant chief of staff of G-2, Hawaiian department, in an address Friday at the University of Hawaii, during which he discussed democracy and military necessity in the Territory.

Remarking that the Axis regards our democratic system as decadent, partly because America is never too preoccupied even with a battle for her own survival to miss a good intramural slugfest at home, he declared that no one should be disturbed by criticism, even of a low or petty order, because that endangers the things we are fighting for. This is interpreted by the Axis as a sign of weakness, but is really nothing more than honest democratic disagreement.

* * * * *

"The professional Army officer," Col. Fielder said, "is just as appreciative of the high purposes and processes of a democracy as are members of the civilian community, and he believes in them fully as much." It is the duty of the military to protect the country, and military authority, through Congress, is the will of the people. Military necessity in Hawaii is action taken in carrying out obligations imposed by Congress on the Army. Nothing very drastic has been done here, however, though there have been certain summary and seemingly harsh innovations.

"Is a layman qualified to say whether or not barbed wire or a machine gun should be placed at a certain spot?" he asked. "I don't think so. There are times when we may appear to be too arbitrary, to be brushing democracy rudely aside...but such is not the intention." Declaring that our soldiers are not heilers of a dictator but men who have a stake in America, Col. Fielder briefly traced the steps leading to martial law after war began, enumerating the restrictions.

"Martial law existed side by side with and indeed within democratic structure," he said, "and while the change-over from peace to war is never beautiful to witness and the processes are never entirely orderly...the people have given splendid cooperation."

* * * * *

The problem in Hawaii, carefully considered, was the defense of a stronghold and the preparation of this bastion as a jumping-off place for the offensive. A minimum number of restrictions was imposed. Little restriction, he said, was placed on the press, censorship applying only to matters of security. The press was left free to comment and criticize when it chooses, and speak its free mind.

Compared with many parts of the Mainland, Hawaii has been well off, he continued. Infact, many benefits have accrued from military policy, because things have been done through military necessity that could not have been as readily achieved otherwise. A slum was cleared, hospital facilities were augmented, traffic was rigidly controlled, summary punishment of offenders reduced the crime rate.

"Certain restrictions were relaxed after we passed through the first critical months of the war," Col. Fielder, recalled. "More will probably be lifted later, but I assure you military vigilance has not relaxed. The enemy is strong enough to attempt a destructive raid on Hawaii, should be careful to take the risk that goes with any combat operation attempted over some 2,000 miles of ocean against a strongly-garrisoned citadel. Until his strength is materially reduced Oahu in particular must be constantly on the alert."

* * * * *

The intelligence officer spoke at some length on the race problem in Hawaii. He said the Army had removed for security reasons a minority of aliens and citizens considered dangerous, and is carefully watching---"and letting performance show us the way." This most crucial test is being passed by Hawaii's citizens and aliens of enemy races. Members of the Japanese race themselves constituted the Army's chief liaison with the Japanese community and were the most reliable check on its morale, needs and activities.

The shipping situation and labor shortage made it a matter of military necessity to keep most of the people of Japanese blood on the Island, he went on. But mass evacuation was never planned. Many of those who were "on the spot" proved their loyalty to America. There was no mawkish sentimentality or gullibility on the Army's part, for it regarded Japan and her people as a stubborn, hardy, despicable race of warrior zealots that must be crushed, but the question of Americans of Japanese blood was vastly different. It was felt that the Japanese element, iffunitied in purpose and action, was an asset to the community. Rejected and treated as potential enemies, they would constitute a burden and even a danger to security.

"The government's intelligence services here have not had an easy job," Col. Fielder declared. "Unfortunately, the official agencies have had to do much groundwork in Americanism, at this late date, that should have been accomplished years ago by the civilian community itself. All the responsibility for the language schools, the language press, the Japanese radio programs, the Japanese institutions and societies cannot be laid at the door of local Japanese themselves. Much of the inspiration for this imposing program of Japanism came from the Emperor's paid representative here. But much of it was made possible by an incredible attitude on the part of our native American community. We were largely interested in our own lives, our standard of living, the Territory's economy and definitely had a false sence of security. Hawaii is not unique in this respect. Unfortunately it is an American trait to be tolerant of potential enemies in time of peace--tolerant to the point of apathy. Thus it is difficult now for present government authorities in Hawaii to take too seriously criticism from some of these same citizens of the Army's alleged laxity in handling the local Japanese situation."

* * * * *

Paying high tribute to the Filipinos and Chinese who contributed so much to the war effort here, the colonel said his lengthy remarks on racial pro-

bleat were made because of

blems constituted one of the most complicated headaches to the military authorities after the war began, but democracy and military necessity proceeded hand in hand to solve it. He cited the call for volunteers in the Army among American-Japanese, declaring the response was the best manifestation of true Americanism.

"For the skeptics," he added, "let me say only that man seldom bluffs when there's a chance his bluff may be called by sending him to a distant battleground to risk and possibly lose his life."

Military necessity and democracy must continue harmoniously in Hawaii, Col. Fielder insisted. The first objective is to win the war, then free the lands dominated by aggression and disarm Japan and her Allies. That is a necessity in order that democracy may endure. Hawaii, with all its tranquil beauty and apparent complacency, will be a principal spearhead and offensive base from which the Pacific phase of the program will be achieved, he declared. Residents of the Islands will continue to contribute and cooperate and accept their responsibilities.

Hawaii's American-Japanese Army Corps will number 2,600 volunteers instead of the original 1,500, the military have decided...The quota was raised after a month of enthusiastic recruiting for combat service overseas... Two of Hawaii's distinguished soldiers recently made headlines on the same day: Gen. Emmons, our military governor, was awarded the DFC for his activities with the air force (especially a long Pacific flight through enemy war zones to confer with MacArthur); and General George Patton ("Old Blood and Guts"), who served with distinction in Hawaii some years ago, has been named commander of U. S. Troops on the Tunisian front...

*** * * * * * * * *

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

CA Files
Hawaiian Solotag

Excerpts from: I FLY FOR VENGEANCE

By Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson, U.S.N.,
In Collaboration with Boyden Sparkes

(Saturday Evening Post - Pages 9, 11, 37 and 40)
October 10, 1942

"You would damn well remember Pearl Harbor if you had seen the great naval base ablaze as we of Scouting Squadron 6 saw it from the air, skimming in ahead of our homeward-bound carrier. The shock was especially heavy for us because this was our first knowledge that the Japs had attacked on that morning of December seventh. We came upon it stone cold, each of us looking forward to a long leave that was due him.

"It wasn't that we pilots didn't sense the tension that gripped the Pacific. You could feel it everywhere, all the time. Certainly the mission from which we were returning had the flavor of impending action. We had been delivering a batch of twelve Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron 211 to Wake Island, where they were badly needed. On this cruise we had sailed from Pearl Harbor on November twenty-eighth under absolute war orders. Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., the commander of the Aircraft Battle Force, had given instructions that the secrecy of our mission was to be protected at all costs. We were to shoot down anything we saw in the sky and bomb anything we saw on the sea. In that way, there could be no leak to the Japs. There was no trouble at all."

"My main worry was to get out of the parachute tangle and on to Pearl Harbor to stand by for orders. As I got clear, a big red automobile van

Excerpts from: I FLY FOR VENGEANCE

By Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson, U. S. N.

In Collaboration with Boyden Sparkes

(Saturday Evening Post -pages 9, 11, 37 and 40)

appeared, headed toward Barber's Point. I flagged it and the driver stopped and got out. He was a Japanese, excited almost to incoherence.

"I yelled to him that he must turn around in a hurry and take me to Pearl Harbor. In good English he protested, with a show of white teeth, that he had to "pick up a friend down by the point."

"Listen, I can't waste a minute", I said. "You've got to take me to Pearl Harbor. Understand? I've commandeered your truck."

"I was striding toward him. He began to run. He scampered up into the cab and roared away before I could grab him. My .45 Colt automatic on this, my first day of war, was miles off at sea, aboard the carrier. I couldn't shoot him. So I cursed him, feeling pretty futile.

"This is guessing, but I suspect the assignment of that Jap in the red moving van was to pick up Japanese who had parachuted near Barber's Point - there were two or three, it later developed. It is also possible that he had been assigned to patrol the roads in the vicinity of Ewa Field and, sighting my parachute, had supposed it was Japanese. "

"As far as I was concerned, the war was going to have to wait until I had a coke. We stopped.

"There are hundreds of stores like it scattered over the Hawaiian Islands, shopping places for Jap and Filipino laborers of the cane and pineapple plantations.

Excerpts from: I FLY FOR VENGEANCE

By Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson, U. S. N.
In Collaboration with Boyden Sparkes

(Saturday Evening Post - pages 9, 11, 37 and 40)

"There was no door; the entire front end was open, draped with dried fish and with papayas stacked in mounds in a wide bin. There were thirty or forty Japanese women inside, with babies in their arms and bigger children clutching at their mothers' brownish, sacklike dresses. These straw-sandaled women were sorrowful and silent. But the kid in charge of the store, who was about nineteen, was looking up at the Jap planes and laughing. He turned a smirking grin on me.

"I asked for a coke twice before he moved. He fiddled around and half opened the lids of two chests, pretending he didn't have what I wanted. I looked in the first box. There, in plain sight, were several bottles. Scowling, I seized one, wrenched off the cap and I started out. He was just behind me at the front when I whirled on him and shook the bottle in his face.

"This one," I said, "is on the house."

"Lieutenant Commander Hopping came over from the command center and prepared to take off. He was going on a scouting flight himself to run down a report that Japanese troops transports had been sighted twenty miles off Barber's Point. The air was filled with false tips. Japs in the islands were sending out confusing messages from secret radio stations. We had several planes tuned up, so the generators would work, and had manned the radios. So we heard these messages on American frequencies; carriers sighted here, carriers sighted there, troop transports and carriers approaching this place, transports just off that point."

STATEMENTS REGARDING RUMORS OF SABOTAGE IN HAWAII

Rumors of sabotage by Japanese at Pearl Harbor are still being repeated and believed by reputable people in California.

Following are official statements from W. A. Gabrielson, Chief of Police of Honolulu, and Colonel Kendall J. Fielder of the Military Intelligence Headquarters. These statements were secured through Charles F. Loomis, Director of the Morale Section of the Hawaiian Military Government.

POLICE DEPARTMENT

City and County of Honolulu

May 12, 1943

1. The statement that Japanese trucks in Honolulu deliberately put out of commission several American airplanes is an absolute lie. The Military and Naval Intelligence services and the F.B.I. can verify that there were no Japanese trucks on any airfield, nor did any such trucks do any damage in Honolulu on December 7th.
2. There was no congregation of crowds, and the Army, Navy or Marine Corps was not called on to preserve order in the city. No American machine gunners cleared Honolulu streets of any Japanese before, on or after December 7th.
3. The statement that all over Honolulu had signs which read, "Here a Japanese, traitor was killed", is another absolute lie.
4. There was not one act of sabotage attempted by any Japanese or any other person during December 7th or thereafter.
5. The Japanese bombed Oahu twice: on December 7, 1941, and sometime during the latter part of 1942, when four bombs were dropped in the hills back of the city.
6. There was no dynamite planted by any Japanese or anyone else in or about Honolulu in December; and no civilian ever used a truck to pick up any dynamite.

While no acts of sabotage were committed, the Japanese did maintain an excellent system of espionage.

(Signed) W. A. Gabrielson, Chief of Police

(over)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence

17 May 1943

I was surprised to learn that some of the many Island rumors about the Hawaiian Islands during the first few days of the war are still prevalent on the mainland. They have been repeatedly denied by all authorities.

In connection with the six statements that Mr. F. enumerated in a letter to you, it can be positively stated that all are untrue. It is hardly worthwhile to refute them individually, but it might be of interest for you to know that the movie, "Air Force", was censored and the scenes about the misuse of the Japanese trucks and the Japanese snipers on Maui were deleted before the picture was permitted to be shown in Hawaii.

Having been in charge of military intelligence activities since June, 1941, I am in position to know what has happened. There have been no known acts of sabotage, espionage, or fifth column activities committed by the Japanese in Hawaii either on or subsequent to December 7, 1941,

(Signed) Kendall J. Fielder
Colonel, G. S. C., A.C. of S., G-2

POLICE DEPARTMENT
City and County of Honolulu
Honolulu, Hawaii

May 12, 1943

Memo to Mr. Charles F. Loomis:

Relative to the letter of Mr. Galen M. Fisher, addressed to you under date of April 30, I wish to comment with reference to the six statements which he submitted, as follows:

1. The statement that Japanese trucks in Honolulu deliberately put out of commission several American air planes is an absolute lie. The Military and Naval Intelligence services and the F.B.I. can verify that there were no Japanese trucks on any airfield, nor did any such trucks do any damage in Honolulu on December 7th.

2. There was no congregation of any crowds, and the Army, Navy or Marine Corps was not called on to preserve order in the city. No American machine gunners cleared Honolulu streets of any Japanese before, on or after December 7th.

3. The statement that all over Honolulu had signs which read, "Here a Japanese traitor was killed" is another absolute lie.

4. There was not one act of sabotage attempted by any Japanese or any other person during December 7th or thereafter.

5. The Japanese bombed Oahu Twice: on December 7, 1941, and sometime during the latter part of 1942, when four bombs were dropped in the hills back of the city.

6. There was no dynamite planted by any Japanese or anyone else in or about Honolulu in December; and no civilian ever used a truck to pick up any dynamite.

While no acts of sabotage were committed, the Japanese did maintain an excellent system of espionage.

(signature)

W. A. GABRIELSON
Chief of Police

WAG:DL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Military Intelligence
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Ref.:
312.11 PR/ID

17 May 1943

Mr. Charles F. Loomis
P. O. Box 459
Honolulu, T. H.

Dear Mr. Loomis:

I was surprised to learn that some of the many Island rumors about the Hawaiian Islands during the first few days of the war are still prevalent on the mainland. They have been repeatedly denied by all authorities.

In connection with the six statements that Mr. Fisher enumerated in a letter to you, it can be positively stated that all are untrue. It is hardly worthwhile to refute them individually but it might be of interest for you to know that the movie, "Air Force," was censored and the scenes about the misuse of the Japanese trucks and the Japanese snipers on Maui were deleted before the picture was permitted to be shown in Hawaii.

Having been in charge of military intelligence activities since June 1941 I am in position to know what has happened. There have been no known acts of sabotage, espionage or fifth column activities committed by the Japanese in Hawaii either on or subsequent to December 7, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

(signature)

KENDALL J. FIELDER
Colonel, G.S.C.
A.C. of S., G-2

Not for Publication - Confidential

COMMITTEE FOR THE PROMOTION OF NATIONAL UNITY

HONOLULU, HAWAII

How It Started

As the international scene grew steadily worse and particularly as the relations between the United States and Japan became more and more strained, the normal intercourse among the people of certain races in Hawaii grew correspondingly worse. There was evidence of a growing feeling of distrust, a rising tenseness which was unmistakable although there appeared no instances of race riots, brick throwing or wholesale dismissal from employment of people of Japanese ancestry. However, there were wild rumors coursing through certain circles in Honolulu (and doubtless in other sections of the Territory) to the effect that the haole firms were dismissing their Japanese employees, that the Army was in the process of constructing concentration camps for the internment of Japanese nationals as soon as the "inevitable" war between Japan and the United States began, that not a single American citizen of Japanese ancestry would be inducted into service, that every sampan in Hawaii was equipped with torpedoes and radios to assist the Japanese fleet, etc.

There was no factual basis for much of these rumors, nevertheless, a great number of people believed them and passed them on to others. This increased rather than decreased the tension. It seemed evident that this state of affairs, if allowed to grow unchecked, would tend to destroy the unique, though not perfect, inter-racial good-will which has been built up in Hawaii. Moreover, personal friendships would be destroyed, business would suffer, and civilian participation in the defense of these islands would be weakened. It was also evident that the way in which the people of all the races in Hawaii would live together after the emergency is over would depend a great deal on how they lived together during the emergency.

A group of people who realized these dangers and felt keenly the need to do something to offset them decided to get together to discuss the problem. The first meeting was held at the home of former Governor and Mrs. Walter F. Frear. Present were about 10 men representing three races (Haole, Chinese, and Japanese) and several walks of life (church, education, business, and engineering). Significant was the fact that a Christian leader of Chinese ancestry was one of those most responsible for bringing about this first meeting. This particular individual has, moreover, continued his active interest in the movement.

The initial meeting was followed by a second meeting at the home of the late Rev. John P. Erdman. Several additional men were present, all concerned with the same problem. To these meetings were invited men of all the major races in Hawaii, men who were well known in their respective racial, professional and business groups, young men who were just coming into positions of leadership as well as older folks firmly established, but all with a keen interest in wholesome human relationships and in the future of Hawaii.

Space does not permit a detailed record of the hours of discussion that took place at these meetings. Suffice to say that certain patterns of thought emerged from them. First, there were those who felt that the problem was not yet acute enough to warrant any concerted action. Second, there were those who, although they admitted that the problem was grave enough then and could steadily grow worse, felt that nothing much could be done about it by way of an organized movement or program. This group felt that the best that could be done was to

meet informally from time to time, retain their present friendships, and work quietly among their friends and associates to spread the gospel of inter-racial friendship and unity during the emergency and after it. Third, there were those who felt that time was short, that the crisis might break out at any moment, and that any effective piece of education would require concerted action. This group also felt that those in the community who were most concerned about the problem, such as those who were present at these preliminary meetings, were the ones who needed the lesson least, that the ones who needed the education and who were most likely to be the cause of difficulties were the very ones not present at these meetings, e.g., the uneducated masses, certain prejudiced racial and economic groups, and recent arrivals from the mainland.

Those in the third group decided to continue their efforts toward an active program of education. A meeting, to which was invited representatives from the Army and the F.B.I., was accordingly called. These two organizations were brought into the picture because it was felt that any program of education or action under the circumstances would be ineffective without the cooperation and ~~and~~ active participation of these organizations. Fortunately, the response from the men heading these organizations in Hawaii was both sympathetic and hearty. The Army was represented by Lt. Col. M. W. Marston, the then assistant chief of staff for military intelligence, and Lt. Col. George W. Bicknell, and the F.B.I. by the agent in charge of the Hawaii district, Mr. Robert L. Shivers.

Organization of a Steering Committee

Ways and means of carrying on the work were discussed. It was finally decided to set up a steering committee to organize and direct the program. Mr. Shivers was prevailed upon to accept the chairmanship of this committee and authorized to select its members. The committee was set up with Mr. Shivers as chairman; Col. Marston; Dr. Miles E. Cary, principal of McKinley high school; Theodore Trent, a young but well-known business executive and president of the Territorial Y.M.C.A.; Masatoshi Katagiri, a young junior executive in one of the local business firms and an active participant in civic affairs; Shigeo Yoshida, a supervisor of interne teachers; and Hung Wai Ching, secretary of University Y.M.C.A. and well known in educational, religious, and civic circles, as members. To the committee was later added Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder who succeeded Col. Marston as head of the Intelligence Dept.; Capt. I. H. Mayfield, head of the Navy Intelligence Dept.; and Dr. Frank Midkiff, an outstanding business executive and an officer in the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce.

Objectives of the Group

The objectives of the group were necessarily vague and uncrystallized at first. Today, however, after several months of study and operation, the steering committee sees the task much more clearly and is working on the following premises:

1. It is interested not only in the immediate problem of national defense as far as these islands are concerned, but also in the way the people of Hawaii are going to live together after the emergency is over. The latter is based on the assumption that if the people here of various races can continue to live together harmoniously during the emergency, trust each other, and cooperate even more closely than they have in the past, then a basis for a still better human relationship will have been established for the future. The contrary will be equally true.

2. As far as the immediate present is concerned, unity of purpose and action is absolutely necessary for a strong national defense. We cannot afford to have a divided citizenry--one race set against another, or one class against another. The people of Japanese ancestry, both citizens and aliens, compose about one-third of our population. Accepted and united in purpose and action, they are an asset to the community. Rejected and treated as potential enemies, they are a burden, even a danger, to our security.

To achieve this unity and to preserve the relatively fine human relationship which has so far prevailed in Hawaii, the people must:

1. Feel ~~the idea~~ that Hawaii has something unique and worthwhile to preserve in the way of human relationship.

2. Accept the idea that a united citizenry is essential to our national defense.

3. Have faith in the American way of life and be willing to protect it.

4. Place absolute reliance on our constituted authorities, confident that they will treat everyone with equal fairness and see to it that he is so treated by his fellow citizens, and that anyone acting in any way inimical to the general welfare will be promptly and severely dealt with. There is no need for and there must not be any vigilanteism on the part of any group.

5. Overcome fear--fear on the part of the nationals of those countries with which we might become involved in a war that they will be mistreated and persecuted, and fear on the part of the rest of the people that these particular aliens might actively assist our enemies.

6. Develop a sense of personal responsibility to do everything possible to make Hawaii and the entire nation strong militarily and otherwise. This includes the aliens who must accept the fact that they owe a certain obligation to the land in which they are now living and that they will be protected and allowed to enjoy all normal privileges only as long as they obey our laws and conduct themselves constructively.

7. Be willing to give every loyal citizen, regardless of race, a place in the scheme of national defense. No group should be denied the opportunity to do its share merely because of racial considerations.

8. Remember that loyalty grows only when it is given a chance to grow. It does not flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion, discrimination, and denial of opportunities to practice that loyalty.

These are the specific ideas that must be sold to all the people. To assist in the spreading of these ideas is the function of the committee at the present time. Changing conditions may, of course, necessitate a modification of this present objective.

How the Committee Operates

Meetings are held about twice a month, sometimes oftener. Problems are discussed informally and procedures mapped out. Most of the actual spreading of the

ideas referred to above is done through official and other established channels.
For instance:

For instance:

1. Mr. Shivers, as head of the F.B.I., and Cols. Marston and Fielder, as representatives of the Army, have addressed numerous racial, civic, and business groups throughout the Territory. These men, of course, have spoken each time in their respective official capacities and not in the name of the committee.

2. Certain key governmental and civic officials have been approached by members of the Committee and the problem discussed with them. These officials include the mayor of Honolulu and the governor of the Territory.

3. Talks at meetings of defense workers and of other racial, civic, and economic groups have also been given by lay members of the committee.

4. Certain key leaders of racial and other groups have been approached by members of the committee and their cooperation received.

It can be noted from the above that most of the work of the committee is done through indirect means. Very little is done directly in the name of the committee which has purposely kept its existence unpublicized with the result that only a few people know that it even exists.

There is also no set organization with by-laws and a group of officers. The only "officer" is the chairman. There is no office space, no hired help, although the desirability of hiring a paid executive secretary, at least on a part-time basis, has been discussed.

It is difficult to say at this point whether or not a more public and direct approach would have been more effective than the quiet, indirect, and informal way in which the committee has so far operated. The members of the committee are agreed, however, that the course it has so far followed has been a wise one.

How Effective Has Been Its Work

This is a difficult question to answer categorically. However, there are certain definite trends in the community operating at the present time which at least point in the direction of the committee's objective. One might say that these trends have developed irrespective of the committee's work, that certain things on which the evaluation of the committee's work is based were mere coincidences and not necessarily consequences of the committee's program. Be that as it may, there are hopeful trends in the community. Just how much the committee was responsible for is, of course, debatable and perhaps, in the final analysis, of little importance.

1. A calmness among all people in the community which is more than might be reasonably expected in view of the international scene.

2. Lack of hysteria among the Japanese aliens concerning their fate in case of a war. A growing confidence that as long as they behave themselves and conduct themselves within the law, they have nothing to fear from the authorities.

3. Confidence in the constituted authorities on the part of all

groups, citizens as well as aliens. So far, no vigilante group has reared its head.

4. Continuance of normal, pre-emergency relations--business, social, and otherwise. There have been some minor incidents of friction due to racial feeling but these have not been many. So far, during this emergency, there have been no wholesale dismissal of employees, consumers' boycotts, race riots, cancellation of insurance policies.

5. A tendency on the part of the governmental authorities to include people of all races in activities involving national defense. While the representation is not always present or proportional when present, there is no general tendency to exclude certain races, particularly the citizens of Japanese ancestry, from participation in important committees and activities.

6. A generous response on the part of all races in matters of national defense and community welfare. Each group is attempting to do its share and all groups seem to be working together toward a common goal.

The picture, of course, is not perfect. Much more remains to be done. There are still many individuals and groups who are suspicious of all aliens; who feel that every Japanese, citizen and alien alike, is an agent of the Mikado and should be placed in concentration camps; who would like to take the law into their hands when the crisis comes; who refuse to have anything to do with people of other races, particularly the Orientals; who refuse to hire Japanese or patronize Japanese firms; who fear the worst will happen when the crisis comes despite everything that the authorities may do; who are un-Christian and inhuman in their relationships with their fellow men. The seeming calmness in the islands may be only a veneer, a thin veil of oil on a turbulent sea. The first incident in an actual war in the Pacific may turn loose all the forces of hatred, suspicion, and race prejudice in these islands. What the future holds, no one, of course, can foretell. One is justified in saying, however, that the situation at present looks rather encouraging, at least, one can say it could be much worse. If the present trends continue, Hawaii may not only survive the crisis, if and when it comes, but actually use it constructively to establish a firm and more Christian basis of human relationship among people of diverse races.

Finally, it should be said that were it not for the active participation of the men who represent the F.B.I. and the armed services in Hawaii and the sympathetic support of the commanding general of the Hawaiian department, U.S.A., the committee would not be in a position to function effectively. The people of Hawaii are indeed fortunate that they have among them during this critical period such men as Mr. Robert L. Shivers and Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short who are interested in the human side of Hawaii as well as in its position as a military outpost of the nation.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

Cable: INPAREL, Honolulu

*Hello Galen - I will read this memo
when I go home from the hospital - tomorrow
but hope it will be helpful to you
Gen Barrows & Pres Wilbur
The army mess last week started*

223 Dillingham Building
September 16, 1941

Dear Mr. Fisher:

The enclosed confidential memo is a hasty compilation of rough notes by a member of the Committee for the Promotion of National Unity, written at Mr. Loomis' request. Before Mr. Loomis left for the hospital, where he is now recovering from a hernia operation, he asked me to mail this memo as soon as it came.

If there are any questions which occur to you and General Barrows, please send them to this office and Mr. Loomis will have the Committee answer them.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Ellen Honda
Secretary to Mr. Loomis

Encl.

Mr. Galen M. Fisher
11 El Sueno
Orinda, California

*Alchua
Alchua
F. Loomis*

May 21, 1942

THE JAPANESE POPULATION OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII--ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO THE WAR EFFORT

Over five months have elapsed since Pearl Harbor was bombed--during that period the Japanese group in the Territory of Hawaii--including alien dual citizen, and citizen--has been subject to certain restrictions by military and civil authorities as a part of the general plans developed to protect and defend this outpost of the Pacific Ocean. The Territory is in the combat zone and it is living under martial law. Consequently, any evaluation of the total problem presented by the Japanese in relation to the war effort must not only be considered against the economic and cultural setting which is unique to the Territory but also in terms of the peculiar restrictions and controls which are placed upon civilian life generally as a result of martial law.

It does not seem appropriate, therefore, to make comparisons between the problem as it exists in the Territory and as it is reported on the mainland without first considering the fundamental differences which exist in the military, economic, and cultural settings.

It is therefore proposed to describe the local setting as it bears upon the current problem of the entire Japanese population and to examine, upon the basis of existing information, the results of the steps which have been taken since December 7 in protecting the Territory, as a military outpost, from the dangers which may exist from the presence of a large group of enemy aliens and of Americans of Japanese ancestry within the civilian population.

The Japanese Population and Its Relation to the Entire Civilian Community

The Japanese comprise the largest single racial group in the population of the Territory. The 1940 Census indicated that Japanese inhabitants comprised 37.3 percent of the population, as compared with 24.5 percent Caucasians, the next largest group. Of the entire Japanese population, 37,353, or 23.6 percent, were aliens. Of a total population in 1940 of 423,330, Japanese comprised 157,905; Caucasians, 103,791; Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians, 46,310; Filipinos, 25,569; Chinese 28,774. The remainder included Koreans, Puerto Ricans, Portuguese, and all others.

Thus, the population is characterized not only by a high proportion of Japanese but also by a diverse racial situation which has resulted in social attitudes which might be considered unique and which have undoubtedly influenced the kind of approach which had been made to the Japanese "problem."

From a sociological standpoint, the Territory represents an experiment in racial relationships and social attitudes. The results of this experiment might be measured from one standpoint on the basis of acceptance which each racial group has in the community from both a social and economic standpoint.

In general, it can be said that the Oriental groups, particularly the Chinese, have a greater acceptance by the Caucasians here than exists on the mainland. The varying degrees of prestige attached to the racial groups stems principally from the length of time the groups have been in the Territory and consequently have removed themselves from the class of common agricultural labor. Thus, it might be said that among the non-Caucasians, the Chinese, also reaping other advantages in the situation, have the greatest acceptance and the Filipinos, the least acceptance. Within these two extremes, the Japanese, in varying degrees, depending upon how effectively they have become a part of the community life, have an acceptance which undoubtedly is greater than that which exists on the mainland.

Furthermore, among the non-Caucasian groups themselves, there is a tendency on the part of those longest established to have less acceptance of other groups who have a shorter history in the islands and have fewer community roots.

Such generalizations, however, are subject to many qualifications. The process of social integration has not been passive. Rather, each new generation, regardless of racial background, has been exposed to concepts of American life and American democratic institutions, particularly through the public school system. Community leadership has been exerted to make the process as positive as possible. Campaigns for the expatriation of dual citizens among the Japanese and for some measure of outside control of the foreign language schools have existed for many years. Whatever the results, it can be said fairly that the leadership in the Territory, while paternalistic by tradition and practice, has in many instances indicated a belief in equality of opportunity among all members of the community which has been interpreted to mean an equal chance to accept American ways of living and the social and economic opportunities which theoretically come as a result. That such equality has not been realized to the fullest is not necessarily an indication of failure. On the one hand, there are those in the various racial groups who have not been equipped emotionally or intellectually to grasp the opportunity. On the other side, there have been those in the community who have been reluctant to acknowledge a whole-hearted belief that this is a wise course. But if generalizations can be made, it can be stated that greater progress--in attitudes, mutual acceptance, and tangible results--has been made here than in other places in the United States where the existence of large racial groups and of well-defined minority groups influence the community pattern.

The island economy is based upon the utilization of non-Caucasian labor. The proportion of Caucasians in the population has always been small (in 1920 it was 19.2 percent and in 1930, 20.0 percent) and the labor needs of the sugar and pineapple industries--backbone of island economy--have been met by successive immigrations of Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos.

Of all of these groups, the Japanese displayed more determination to maintain family life in the Territory and consequently the number of Japanese women is larger proportionately than for the other racial groups,

with the exception of the Portuguese. This, together with the fact that the Chinese and Japanese were, in that order, the first immigrants to the Territory, imported to meet the needs of agricultural labor, has resulted in their becoming the more stable and energetic elements in the non-Caucasian population from the standpoint of family life and economic enterprise.

As the descendants of the earlier agricultural laborers left the plantations, they established themselves in the urban areas, as shopkeepers, white collar workers, artisans, contractors, etc. From the standpoint of the labor market in the Territory, these racial groups are therefore needed to meet the needs of not only agricultural labor but of many other enterprises such as manufacturing and processing, public utilities, and other service occupations. Consequently, from the standpoint of numbers, the Japanese represent an important source of labor in the Territory.

The critical labor needs which have faced the Territory since December 7 have resulted in an even greater necessity for the greatest possible utilization of all available labor. Many skilled workers have been imported from the mainland for war projects, and it is probably that unskilled laborers will also be brought in. However, the draining of labor from private enterprise has created labor shortages elsewhere and it is apparent that if the ordinary civilian activities are to be continued and the needs of the military operations are to be met, a careful utilization of all labor is necessary.

Since December 7, restrictions upon the employment of enemy aliens on war projects and, in some instances, restrictions upon the employment of Americans of Japanese ancestry, have limited the utility of this group on certain war projects. Further, community attitudes in some instances tend to restrict the use of such labor on other activities.

Reports Relative to Espionage and Sabotage Among the Japanese Population

Reports of espionage and sabotage among the Japanese population prior to December 7 has been the subject of much discussion on the mainland. Too frequently they use the convenient catch phrase "fifth column activity" which has no literal connotation--thus clouding the issue.

The terms "espionage" and "sabotage" which, unfortunately, have been used interchangeably in some mainland reports, refer to different kinds of activities. Espionage, from the military standpoint, is the act of securing information as to the disposition or movement of troops, ships, munitions, etc. The findings of fact in the Roberts report indicated that espionage on the island of Oahu was carried on prior to December:

- "XVI. There were, prior to December 7, 1941, Japanese spies on the Island of Oahu. Some were Japanese consular agents and others were persons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign service. These spies collected, and through various channels, transmitted information to the Japanese empire respecting the military and naval establishments and dispositions on the island."

The report further points out that because the United States was at peace with the Japanese Empire, the FBI and the military authorities were not in a position to obtain the contents of telephone and telegraph messages sent over commercial lines to Japan. However, the existence of such messages was known. The report says further, "It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japanese had complete information."

Sabotage is usually defined as any poor work or other damage done by dissatisfied workmen or the act of producing such work or damage. After the December 7 raid, efforts were made to determine if any local Japanese impeded the movements of the military by blocking traffic to military and naval centers on that day as one indication of the presence of sabotage. Delegate Sam King and W. A. Gabrielson, Chief of Police in Honolulu, indicated in messages to Congressman John H. Tolan, Chairman of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, that there were no evidences of sabotage of this kind on December 7.

The Roberts report did not reveal the existence of sabotage either prior to December 7 or during the December 7 raids. It did point out that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had taken certain anti-sabotage precautions as a regular part of the system of alerts under which the Hawaiian Department operated. Alert No. 1, which was in effect from November 27 to December 7, consisted of defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands when there was no threat from without. The Roberts report pointed out that while Alert No. 1 was in effect prior to the attack, it was not sufficient to prepare against the possibility of such attack. It did not, however, indicate that Alert No. 1 was not sufficient to provide adequate anti-sabotage protection within the islands,

Military and Civil Regulations Relative to Japanese After December 7

Immediately following December 7, certain steps were instituted in connection with the alien enemy group. These included the detainment and internment of certain enemy aliens and the issuance of orders by the Military Governor prescribing certain restrictions and regulations pertaining to the alien population of the Territory.

The FBI, working with the military, detained those persons who were known to have been active in espionage activities as well as others who were considered suspicious because of their alien status, known sympathies, or questionable contacts, etc. On Oahu, they were interned on Sand Island and are subsequently being sent to the mainland. Similar procedures were carried out on other islands. It has not been possible to secure from the military, for purposes of this report, the number of persons detained and/or interned since December 7 but it is believed that it is perhaps somewhat in excess of one thousand persons.

Military authorities have cautioned the civilian population to exercise care in actively expressing suspicions. They have been advised to report anything of suspicion to the FBI and there seems to be a general feeling that the FBI has controlled the problem of the suspicious enemy alien with care and dispatch.

Foreign-language schools, tea-houses, Shinto shrines, and most of the Buddhist temples were closed immediately after December 7. Many of those interned were priests and teachers and the closing of these typically Japanese establishments represented an attempt to curtail the activities of questionable leaders among the alien group.

Under martial law in the Territory, the Military Governor issues a series of General Orders, prescribing certain regulations and restrictions which apply to the activities of the civilian population. Such orders are issued only when, because of military necessity, it is necessary to indicate those points at which the activities of the civilian population are such that their regulation by the military is essential. As of April 1942, 92 such orders had been issued. Of those, 10 pertained directly to enemy aliens. Immediately following December 7 a General Order prescribing "Policy to be observed toward all Alien Japanese" was issued. On December 18 the order was revised as a policy toward all enemy aliens of age 14 and over and certain regulations were prescribed.

Enemy aliens were prohibited from having in their possession at any time or place to use or operate any of the following articles:

- Firearms
- Weapons or implements of war or component parts thereof
- Ammunition
- Bombs
- Explosives or material used in the manufacture of explosives
- Short-wave radio receiving sets
- Transmitting sets
- Signal devices
- Codes or ciphers
- Cameras
- Papers, documents or books in which there may be invisible writing; photographs; sketches; pictures; drawings, maps or graphical representations of any military or naval installation or equipment or of any arms, ammunition, implements of war, device or thing used or intended to be used in the combat equipment of the land or naval forces of the United States or of any military or naval post, camp or station.

The order provided that aliens should turn in such property to the police and that after the date set for reporting such articles to the police, they would be subject to seizure and the possessor subject to severe punishment.

In addition, no enemy alien was allowed to change his place of residence without securing permission from the Provost Marshal.

Other General Orders which were specifically directed toward this group prescribed such restrictions or regulations as:

- 1) Turning over Japanese Hospital on Oahu to the Army

- 2) Provision for an alien property controller
- 3) Restrictions on the publishing of Japanese newspapers
- 4) Surrender of certain sampans to the Navy

In addition, certain other General Orders, such as the one drastically limiting commercial fishing in Hawaiian waters, was substantially an order directed at the activities of this group, inasmuch as it resulted in the cessation of sampan fishing by alien fishermen who comprised the bulk of the fishing fleet.

Further regulations issued by the Civil Governor pertained to the closing of Japanese banks as well as the "freezing" of assets of Japanese nationals within the Territory and regulations relating to transactions in foreign exchange. Certain restrictions were also placed upon Japanese nationals engaged in agricultural activities under licenses granted to such persons but limiting them in certain kinds of financial transactions.

It should be pointed out further that under martial law, the presence of certain restrictions and regulations which apply to the entire civilian population provide controls of the enemy alien group in addition to those which are prescribed in orders directed solely toward this group. The blackout and curfew regulations in the Territory restrict the movement of people and provide the military with an effective means of controlling and observing the activities of the civilian population during other than daylight hours. Further, transportation restrictions cut down the movements of people. Through an identification system, every person carries an identification card.

The restrictions under which the civilian population is now living has resulted in a tightening of neighborhood groups. In addition, the alien Japanese, never an active part of general community life, have further retreated into their homes and neighborhoods. As a result, a person's movements, friends, and other outside contacts can be more easily determined and controlled. This results in a unique situation from the standpoint of enforcement and control.

The Military Governor and the Provost Marshal have established certain principles in their dealings with Japanese persons in the community which indicate a desire to consider them as a part of the civilian community in much the same way as other racial and cultural groups. Further, the Provost Marshal, in giving sentences to aliens who have not observed all of the restrictions placed upon them, has considered cases on their individual merit and has been no more severe with this group than with other violators. To those who may feel that such an attitude is not justifiable in a time of war, it should be reiterated that the Japanese here do not represent a minority group whose utility in the community might be questioned when weighed against military expediency. The Japanese are a part of the island community; in point of numbers they are the largest single group. Most of the alien group have lived here over a long period of years. Their children and grandchildren were born here, went to American schools as well as to Japanese language schools, inter-married with Chinese, Caucasians, and Hawaiians; and took jobs as tradesmen, office workers,

shop keepers, etc. Removing the Japanese population, or completely curtailing their economic activities, would mean that over one-third of the territory's population would be immobilized. The question would therefore seem to be one of adequate control under terms of martial law.

It is obvious that such an attitude is not developed at the expense of the safety of the military operations or the welfare of the civilian population. Conversely, it is apparent that the military, through its own activities and those of the FBI, have taken all precautions to apply those restrictions which are necessary. Identical methods cannot be applied in all situations. Methods now being employed in the Territory may not be effective on the mainland. It cannot therefore be said that differences in method necessarily indicate that one of the methods is not appropriate because the other one has proved more effective. What would seem to be important, however, is that the mainland judge the success of the Hawaii not alone on the basis of isolated statements, but rather upon all of the facts that are available, with an appreciation of the peculiar social and economic setting of the islands.

Social Problems Among the Japanese Group Since December 7

Social problems involving the Japanese group have been met as part of the new responsibilities which the social agencies are facing as a result of the war. A cooperative plan, involving the American Red Cross, the Territorial Department of Public Welfare, the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, and other community agencies, has been devised to provide assistance, where necessary, to the families of detained and interned persons. Of necessity, this plan was worked out in conjunction with the military. The American Red Cross acts as the official liaison between the military and the social agencies, the public assistance agency providing financial assistance where necessary, and other community agencies provided specialized services as needed.

The American Friends Service Committee, some of whose members have an extensive background in dealing with the Japanese people, has attempted to act as a leavening factor in community attitudes and activities.

The International Institute of the Y.W.C.A., in a unique position to reach the Japanese group in the community, has broadened and extended its activities to reach as many of the alien group as possible and through the sponsorship of service programs, such as sewing groups, first-aid classes, food demonstration classes, etc., has been in a position to interpret the local situation and guide the thinking of many of the older Japanese in an acceptance of the new restrictions and problems which such restrictions create.

Employment Problems Among the Japanese Group Since December 7

The small amount of unemployment which exists in the Territory at the present time is principally among the Japanese population--both aliens and Americans of Japanese ancestry. Military restrictions prohibit the employment of aliens, and in some instances, of other Japanese, on war

projects. In addition, however, the community attitude since December 7 has resulted in a reluctance on the part of many private employers to employ any Japanese persons despite the efforts by the morale groups, community agencies, and the United States Employment Service to encourage the employment of Japanese whose loyalty is not questioned on those jobs where their employment could represent no jeopardy to the war effort. It should be further noted, however, that many of the alien group, thrown out of employment immediately after December 7 due to restrictions on alien fishermen, photographers, teachers, etc., have been re-employed in other occupations--sometimes of a less remunerative nature. Therefore, while the entire Japanese group is in the most difficult position from the standpoint of employment opportunities, the critical labor market mentioned earlier has resulted in some alleviation of the situation.

Dealing with the Japanese Population From the Standpoint of Morale

While problems of social and economic maladjustments within this group can be indicated to some extent, the implications of the entire situation from the standpoint of morale are more tenuous and difficult of definition. Whether it is of greater or less importance than other factors in the situation is subject to controversy. But that it plays a large part in maintaining a desire for loyalty on the part of a group of people is unquestioned. Problems of morale as they affect the Japanese population in the Territory have therefore been of paramount concern to those persons in the military and civilian agencies whose primary responsibility rests in this direction.

The alien Japanese, unable to become an American citizen and clinging to the customs of the old country, is inevitably subject to divided loyalties. It is therefore not so much a question of what has gone before, but rather of how this group is treated now which will in most instances, determine where that loyalty will eventually settle. This of course does not apply to those persons previously engaged in espionage as agents of the Japanese government and who subsequently have been withdrawn from the community.

The question of divided loyalties among the Americans of Japanese ancestry comes as a result of conflicts between loyalty to the older generation and to the American principles which have been taught to them in the schools. The balance--here as elsewhere--is delicate.

Furthermore, there are expatriated and dual citizens. Within a single family group one may find a combination including all of these categories.

The Morale Section of the Office of the Military Governor was established January 26, 1942. Prior to that time it had functioned under the Liaison Division of the Territorial Office of Civilian Defense.

One of the three functions of the Morale Section is directed toward maintaining "a liaison between the military authorities and the racial and national groups on matters relating to the general adjustment to war."

In order to carry out this function, it works through the executive and advisory committees of various racial groups in the community and has stimulated activities among all racial groups which it believes necessary to carry out this phase of its responsibilities. The executive of the Morale Section is Caucasian. His two assistants are respectively Japanese and Chinese.

It could be argued that the peculiar social setting of the Territory and the resulting attitudes which have been described earlier, provide a more firm basis for strengthening the morale of such a racial group during the period of war. It must be recognized, however, that certain factors inevitably work against the effort of those persons who are seeking to strengthen those intangible stimula toward loyalty among both the alien and citizen groups. It would be foolhardy to attempt any measurement of the success of such activities. One can, however, list those factors which would seem to be indications of heightened morale on the one hand, and indicate others which would seem to be resulting in fears and uncertainties among the Japanese people.

Evidences of a desire on the part of the Japanese population to participate actively in the war effort and consequently identify themselves with the entire community have had overt expression in a variety of ways.

One development in meeting the problem of American youth of Japanese ancestry has been the formation of a volunteer labor battalion of young men from the University of Hawaii, organized expressly for them, following their offer to serve their country "for whatever service" the Military Governor saw fit to use them. One hundred and fifty five youths, many of whom were former Hawaii Territorial guards who had been demobilized, have called themselves the Varsity Victory Volunteers and are now working under the Hawaiian department engineers as a unit "somewhere on Oahu." Upon receipt of their first checks, without exception, each of these men bought a war bond.

This is cited as one example of the way in which the problem of morale among the American citizens of Japanese ancestry is being met in the Territory.

It is obvious that the problem of the alien Japanese is fraught with even greater complexities. However, the International Institute of the Y.W.C.A. has experienced, since December 7, contacts with certain Japanese aliens which are of interest and significance.

The Japanese tea-houses of Honolulu in the past have been operated by the older group of Japanese in the Japanese tradition. The women who worked in these establishments had no contact with the outside world other than the persons who came to the tea-houses for food and entertainment. They spoke no English and their dress and behavior were in the typical Japanese custom. Most of them lived in the tea-houses and some of them had not left the four walls of these establishments for a period of years. Following December 7, the establishments were closed, some of the owners and managers were detained and/or interned, and the older Japanese women

remaining in the tea-houses were left to shift for themselves. Members of the International Institute, through their activities with racial groups at the Y.W.C.A., learned of the situation and through their Japanese members contacted some of the tea-houses. An initial distrust and fear was slowly replaced by a feeling of gratitude for the help which this group was able to provide in explaining the situation and interpreting the regulations and restrictions which applied to the alien group. At the present time, the women in several of the larger tea-houses have organized into groups for sewing, first-aid, food study, and kindred activities which are providing them an opportunity to contribute their share to the community war effort and to identify themselves with the American war cause.

These two examples are tangible evidences of loyalty among this group. But the importance of such evidence is limited in view of the more intangible aspects of morale and consequently the impossibility of measuring their extent and effectiveness.

There are evidences of fears, resentment, distrust and other similar reactions on the part of some members of the Japanese population. In most instances fear arises from that which they do not understand. This applies particularly to the older alien group, most of whom speak only Japanese. Some of these persons have withdrawn completely from the community. Many servants of alien status did not report to their employers December 8 and in some instances, have made no attempt to again secure employment.

Questions concerning the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry would seem to have their roots in a lack of complete acceptance of them by the community. They feel the discrimination in employment practices particularly in the white-collar and professional fields in which they secured acceptance in the past though not without difficulty. Their prestige in the community is therefore questioned. Educated in American schools and encouraged to accept the principles of democracy as equally applicable to all races, they often feel that if the war is a test of such principles, the treatment which they are receiving now does not measure up to the principles which they have been taught. They resent the antagonism and distrust openly expressed by the Filipino groups and many of the enlisted service personnel.

And even in those cases where the young Japanese completely indentify themselves with the American war effort and consider themselves loyal American citizens, the conflicts with family loyalty are often of such intensity that they cannot adjust to the tensions thus created.

For these and other reasons, therefore, the ultimate loyalty of the Japanese population in the Territory is an unknown quantity. Opinion among those community leaders who, through background and experience, would seem to be best qualified to hazard a prediction, is divided. Possibly the only clue to the situation at this time is to further define what unsatisfactory elements in the situation stem directly from the attitudes and background of the Japanese themselves and which factors can be traced to the treatment of the situation.

Because the military and civil authorities have not found it practical to uproot large numbers of Japanese as a wholesale safeguard against the activities of a few potential saboteurs, the Territory has been given an opportunity to test the validity of the argument as to whether large-scale removal is necessary to meet this threat. On the basis of the experience during these five months, the necessity of such action has not been demonstrated.

From the standpoint of persons in the Territory of Hawaii who are primarily concerned with this problem the pertinent question seems to be: Would any further steps which may be taken in connection with this group-- complete curtailment of their social and economic activities, restrictions on many more phases of their lives, large-scale evacuation or internment-- result in a greater net contribution to the war effort than the present carefully planned system of control which allows them to continue as effective members of the community to the extent made possible by the military exigencies of the situation? If such is not the case, in a setting such as this it means that the community would pay a terrific and needless price in lost man-hours and community resources. Further, it would be subject to censure in playing an active part in dividing loyalties and withholding an opportunity for many of the Japanese to make their contributions to the war effort and to continue as effective members of the community in the post-war period.

#

Compiled by Erma M. Cull
Honolulu, T. H.
May 1, 1942.

Reviews on Publications

WRA Library Washington

Comments by ^{HAWAII} Dr. Gordon T. Boules
on an article by ^{Horlings} in the Nation July 25, 1942
regarding relocation of the Japanese
in Hawaii. Boules has spent
many years in Japan & Hawaii
is now with B.E.W.

The first sentence of the opening paragraph implies that if the 150,000 people of Japanese ancestry are disloyal the "internal stability" of Hawaii is insecure; an implication no one will deny. This seems, however, to carry also an inference that if internal stability is in any way impaired, Hawaii as a Fortress is doomed, a conclusion which seems considerably exaggerated unless there is an indication of the gravity of the instability referred to.

The second paragraph contains a statement to the effect that a Japanese fifth column "could do great damage during an attempted invasion". This again no one will deny but the statement is phrased in the subjunctive and carries with it a further implication that somehow or other there probably is a "fifth column". While not denying this possibility it is only fair to add that since December 7th the whole complexion of life in Hawaii and especially of the Japanese community has very drastically changed and everyone is subject to close investigation, especially the Japanese leaders. Furthermore, there is no Japanese leadership in the old sense: organizations have been disbanded and most of the officers are in detention camps. Formation of a fifth column would probably have to be limited to a picked few and to the "Japanese population".

At one time the Japanese population may have reached 40% of the total population but the percentage has been steadily decreasing as the accompanying table demonstrates. Furthermore, the writer appears to be totally unaware of the presence of over 30,000 Civilian Defense workers who have been brought to the Islands from every state in the Union. Practically all of these are adult male whites.

If we do not discriminate between alien Japanese and citizens of Japanese ancestry, an important error to commence with, and if we count all 160,000 as "Japanese" it must be remembered that more than half of these are under twenty years of age, and of the remaining 80,000 half are females. This leaves a total of about 40,000 adult males, not greatly in excess of the number of newly imported civilian defense workers and also, incidentally, just about the number of the adult male Filipino population. I suggest these figures merely to show the erroneous character of figures alone. A baby is just as important numerically as an expert saboteur.

The population figures for Hawaii as of June 1941 are indicated in the accompanying table.

The third paragraph reads, "We might deserve praise for risking so much on the human heart if only we were not making the bet for the wrong reasons". The military authorities never "really trust" any group of people in toto during wartime and least of all the Japanese in Hawaii, but there are also groups of people of European ancestry on the mainland whom they cannot completely trust either, not to mention individuals from any group. It is probably not so much the human heart that is concerned here as expediency combined with careful judgement.

Population Figures in Hawaii

	<u>July 1, 1940</u>				<u>July 1, 1941</u>			
	<u>Citizen</u>	<u>Alien</u>	<u>Both</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Citizen</u>	<u>Alien</u>	<u>Both</u>	<u>%</u>
Japanese	121,312	36,678	157,990	36.8	124,351	35,183	159,534	34.3
Caucasians	103,700	2,681	106,381	24.9	139,299	2,328	141,627	30.5
Filipinos	17,109	35,493	52,607	12.8	16,050	34,010	50,060	11.2
Pt. Hawaiians	50,470	--	50,470	11.8	52,445	--	52,445	11.3
Chinese	24,245	4,589	28,834	6.7	24,986	4,351	29,337	6.3
Hawaiians	14,359	--	14,359	3.3	14,246	--	14,246	3.1
Porto Ricans	8,322	--	8,322	1.9	8,460	--	8,460	1.8
Koreans	4,517	2,237	6,754	1.5	4,628	2,253	6,881	1.4
Others	837	50	887	.02	632	17	649	.02
Total	344,841	81,813	426,654	99.7	387,197	78,142	465,339	99.9

It is a great mistake to assume that the economy of the Islands can be viewed in isolation from the total national picture. When we consider that Hawaii in 1941 was producing over 10% of our national sugar supply and that our Phillipine sources are gone, and part of our Cuban and West Indian supplies, the importance of this one commodity alone should make us think twice, purely from the point of view of our own needs.

It is probably true that business men are using the plea of Island Economy and that they may or may not be selfishly motivated, but the important reason to us is that the Economy of the Islands is part and parcel of our entire national economy and in this all of us are interested. The item of sugar alone is extremely important but we should not forget also the pine-apples and small quantities of other foods produced in the Islands. It is true that the economy of the Islands is a deficiency economy since three quarters of the food supply and practically everything else must be imported, but this is more than made up by the increasing importance of sugar and fruits.

Although there are proportionally fewer Japanese than Filipinos on the plantations, the Japanese produce most of the locally grown food supply and are engaged in many of the jobs which would have to be filled by those now engaged in important defense jobs.

As to the statehood argument, this does not play an important role at present. The test is more individual. What is the meaning of citizenship? This question of citizenship is an all important one since, in the post war period it will involve all citizens of Oriental ancestry: Chinese, Korean, Filipino, and Japanese and in all fairness it should be added that the leading citizens of Chinese ancestry are deeply concerned over what happens now, since this will have direct bearing on their own future. "After all we realize that we are also Orientals" would not be an incorrect way to summarize much of the present thought.

"The United States is gambling the internal stability of its greatest base in the Pacific on the loyalty of 150,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans, 40,000 of whom are aliens, the majority of whom cannot read or speak English, and few of whom have ever seen America or have a clear understanding of what America stands for."

There were, according to the Governor's report of June 1941, 35,183 aliens and 124,351 citizens. It is true that few of the aliens or citizens have ever been to the mainland but to say they have not seen America and have no clear understanding of what America stands for is tantamount to saying that Hawaii is not a part of the United States, or, that even though a part of the United States, that no effort has been made to carry across to the Islands our culture and political and social ideals. This is certainly diametrically opposed to every effort we have been making in the past and does not state the case fairly.

The sentence concerning knowledge of English is so

worded that it is difficult to tell whether it is the 40,000 aliens or the 150,000 total population who cannot read or speak English. It is safe to say that the aliens on the whole generally know little more than pidgin but the citizens do read and write English and their knowledge of Japanese is on the whole comparatively poor. Very few citizens can write Japanese and few read it fluently. The spoken knowledge of Japanese is at best poor. If there are exceptions to this last statement there are also exceptions to the first statement, viz. that the aliens speak only pidgin.

Concerning evacuation, it should also be mentioned that while there does exist a strong feeling of uncertainty about the loyalty of the Japanese this feeling is not shared by all the "white islanders" and especially not by many of the old-timers who prefer to stay. Many Orientals including Japanese would leave if they could. Fear of attack is the real motive and only secondarily are the local Japanese the reason.

It seems somewhat hollow to make such sweeping generalizations as were made in the opening paragraphs and then to admit that there are a "few individuals" who "have become truly Americanized in spirit". Maybe there are more individuals of this kind than implied. After all, unless we know the facts we can only guess and in this matter a guess has to be based upon degree of intimacy and familiarity.

The writer has caught the spirit of the Islands in the second and third paragraphs on page 70. It is probably well in the next paragraph, however, to remember that Indians are Asiatics by classification and furthermore that we class them as "Orientals".

In paragraph four of page 70, it is most certainly true that we have been very kind to alien nationals of enemy countries but there is no intention of wasting kindness on enemy sympathizers and our conduct in Hawaii does not seem to differ from our "past performance". There is a very real question whether or not we are "needlessly affronting our friends". It is of course assumed that the excluded Chinese seaman referred to did not happen to be a Wang Ching Wei supporter. Furthermore, considerations are completely ignored which would certainly qualify the word "needlessly". The realistic problems involved in possible removal of the Japanese presents far more difficulties than the writer has implied.

Concerning the loyalty of the Japanese as expressed in the second paragraph, column two on page 70, the question remains as to what is meant by loyalty. It is too much to expect loyalty to the American flag by aliens who can never become citizens and there are undoubtedly those among the citizens who fill all of the categories mentioned. In the third paragraph however, the statement that "the majority have nothing to gain by the defeat of Japan" is open to serious question. On what basis have they "nothing to gain"? There are many competent observers who might make an opposite observation. The same might be said of every single observation in the paragraph. Let us change the entire paragraph to read as follows:

"But the proportion of these is uncertain; opinions differ widely. Some would undoubtedly profit by America's defeat but Japan has already demonstrated her ability and daring in "taking on" the United States and in "dishing it out" so that the prestige of the local Japanese is not necessarily dependent upon an eventual victory for Japan. The economic ties of most of the aliens and a few of the citizens with Japan remain strong but conservatively speaking the economy of the local Japanese, both of citizens and of aliens, is largely tied to the Islands. They import some goods from Japan (about 10% of the Islands trade is with Japan) but so have whites on the mainland of the United States. They have invested in Japanese securities although the investors are largely from the alien group. They used to work for Japanese banks and business houses until these were closed when war broke out. This was only natural since jobs were available. While, on the whole, they cannot attain the social and economic position of the whites they are infinitely better off than they would be in Japan and this they recognize and generally appreciate. While the aliens are generally untouched by American ways their American citizen children by the thousands, although they speak Japanese (rather poorly) in their homes and often with their friends, generally prefer to eat American or Island food, hear and sing only American songs and music, prefer American pictures, cannot read Japanese newspapers or magazines and consider themselves Americans".

While the Japanese can imagine the Islands under Japanese rule the image is not altogether pleasant. With the exception of the minority alien group, they know that if the Japanese were to take the Islands they would probably be worse off than before since the economy of the Islands would be "pegged" to that of the much lower standard of Japan. They would no longer receive the favorable balance from an economy integrated with that of the mainland of the United States and the crowning indignity and unhappiness would come when trained Japanese who really knew the language and business of the home Islands would be imported in droves from the home Islands. The 125,000 American citizens would be out on a limb even more so than they are now.

It is questionable whether there are more than 30,000 dual citizens, but the pleas of all but a few of these to have recognition of this dual status abolished by act of Congress is too well known to repeat. The alien parents were generally responsible for registering their children with the Japanese government and it was generally tedious and cumbersome to have their status changed. Many were careless and some preferred their dual status. Certainly most of those who failed to show their real sympathies are now regretting it when it is too late and are "paying for it". It is probably well that the Hawaiian-born Japanese who returned permanently to Japan did so. Whether the number is as high as 15,000 is open to question but America is much better rid of people who cannot appreciate her ideals. As to taking the father's ashes to the homeland, this was probably the wish of the father.

Paragraph two of the first column of page 71 hits the nail on the head. "Only a Pollyanna can conclude that there is no danger" among the Japanese in Hawaii. Certainly it may and probably does hide the Emperor's agents and those who are not assimilated do constitute a real problem and a potential menace.

In comparing the Japanese in Hawaii, however, with the Japanese in the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies, the difference which should be clearly born in mind is that in these latter countries they were a minority group among peoples who were subject races and Orientallike themselves.

The possibility of organized effective fifth columns and sabotaging were infinitely greater and they could make use of the local native populations to a certain extent. In Hawaii however, they are surrounded by people who are completely hostile to any efforts along these lines and who are constantly suspicious of anything that could possibly be used against them. It is not in keeping with the facts to assume that the five investigating and Intelligence agencies (Military, Naval, Marine, F.B.I., and Police) are not doing everything in their power to uncover evidence of a subversive character.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Japanese language schools and societies and organizations are no longer permitted and suspicious individuals are being or have been apprehended. This does not of course take away from the pageantry and propaganda displayed before the war, but such "patriotic" displays have been indulged in by all of the other Oriental groups with candor proportional to their numbers and degree of assimilation.

The suggestion is made that just because there was an absence of sabotage on December 7th this does not disprove the existence of a well-organized fifth column. This is most certainly true, but it should be remembered that the time when hundreds if not thousands of known Japanese sympathizers were still at liberty and when the military, naval, and civilian authorities were caught off guard would have been ideal for effective sabotage. Now the situation is quite different. Not only are suspicious people detained but those who were in confidential and critical posts have been removed, guards recruited from the local citizenry have been posted at strategic points in numbers proportional to their importance.

The really significant factor in the article appears to be in the third paragraph of the second column on page 71. "For whatever doubt there may be about the attitude of the Japanese before or during an invasion attempt, there is not doubt that the vast majority of Hawaii's Japanese will work with alacrity with the Emperor's forces if Japan ever takes the islands".

The important thing is not so much the loyalty of the Japanese as the retention of the Islands. After all, whatever the attitude of the local Japanese toward a conquering Japanese army might be after the conquest, whether they respond with "alacrity" or not is rather inconsequential from a military

point of view. Everyone else would probably also be put to work and the majority of these would probably not be able to express their sympathies.

The important thing is that the Islands must be held and no one is more aware of this than the armed forces who are faced with this responsibility. The critical period is during an invasion attempt, not after. It would be possible to remove the Japanese even though "plenty of bottoms" are not available for the purpose, but the argument that we could lightly forego sugar is quite a different proposition. Anyone familiar with the Islands now knows how essential man power is in building up the defenses. The plantations have gone begging for many months. Far from producing an over-supply of labor, the thousands of Filipinos, Chinese, Porto Ricans, and Koreans who are now on defense jobs would have to turn to truck farming and many other responsibilities now taken care of by the Japanese or else much more food would have to be imported.

The Military Authorities are doing their best to make the Islands impregnable and they are using all of the labor they can get. It is difficult to understand the reasons for favoring evacuation which are given as follows: 1) to remove this labor force, 2) bring less hardship, and 3) reduce Hawaii's consumption of food. Hawaii needs the labor badly now. It might bring less hardship to remove them to the interior of the mainland but this is extremely questionable. It would not appreciably reduce Hawaii's food problem since the amount of food raised locally is about 25%, largely by Japanese labor, and the Japanese population is now only about 34%.

If Micronesia is to be considered as an Island world of 2,500 islands it is only fair then to recognize that the seven Islands of the Hawaiian Islands are many times over the size of all these 2,500 combined and there are hundreds of other islands in the Hawaiian group up to Midway and many other stepping stones in the U.S. lands to the south as far as Samoa which are also being used as a "vast insular system of 'stationary aircraft carriers'".

We are after all dealing with a military problem and while Congress might demand an inquiry the decision would still remain a military one.

SHALL HAWAII EVACUATE

100,000 JAPANESE?

A Statement by the Honolulu Inter-Church Federation

The Executive Committee of the Honolulu Inter-Church Federation, after careful consideration, feels impelled to inform the Churches on the mainland regarding the proposals made by Mr. John A. Balch in a pamphlet printed and circulated privately.

He advocates the evacuation by our Military Authorities of 100,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry, and the importation of Porto Rican and Filipino laborers to fill the labor gap.

This proposal is so impracticable and fantastic that business and other interests in these Islands have not only given it no support but have not even given it serious attention. It should be said that the proposal of Mr. Balch, a retired President of the Mutual Telephone Company, does not represent the general opinion of the people of Hawaii. Indeed, as has been well pointed out by the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, even the Chinese here do not favor the proposed mass-evacuation. "You might think!" says the editorial, "that the Chinese, deeply indignant at Japan's cruel and arrogant war on China, would be the first to support exemplary and disciplinary measure against Japanese in Hawaii. Such, however, is not the case when the measures suggested are not in accord with the basic principles of the American democracy".

Mr. Balch has now gone to the Pacific Coast there to seek the aid of anti-Japanese forces, among them the California Joint Immigration Committee which has proposed that a Constitutional Amendment be adopted depriving American-born Japanese of their American citizenship.

The real significance of these three proposals should be given nationwide consideration.

1. The proposal summarily to evacuate 100,000 American citizens from these Islands merely because of their racial ancestry is probably unconstitutional. It violates the fundamental ideals and principles of our Democracy and specifically the Bill of Rights, Article V, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

2. It rejects in principle our epoch-making Declaration of Independence which "holds as self-evident truths ... that all men are created equal, and that they are endowed by their maker with certain inalienable rights, and that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness", and adopts in its place the very ideals and principles of Nazism, as seen for instance in the statement that "If the Germans can move 3,000,000 men from occupied Europe within a short period, surely our great Government can move 100,000 from Hawaii to the mainland without great difficulty."

3. The very aim and purpose of our war with Germany and Japan is, in defending ourselves, to establish a world-order in which race arrogance and cruel racial injustice and racial economic domination shall be outlawed. The Balch proposal conflicts, thus, with our fundamental war-aims.

4. The proposed mass-evacuation is not needed to insure the military security of these Islands, as evidenced by the situation on and since December 7, 1941 and by the recent statement to the press by our Military Governor, Lt. General Delos C. Emmons, that "mass evacuation is neither intended nor currently possible."

5. The proposal, if carried out, would deal a staggering blow to the economic welfare of these Islands, for it would virtually disrupt their basic business enterprises - sugar and pineapples. The sudden removal of thousands of Japanese laborers could not be met by any sudden importation of thousands of Porto Ricans and Filipinos, even supposing that these laborers could be secured, which is wholly problematical.

6. Whether the Balch proposals and those of the California Joint Immigration Committee are eventually adopted or not, their mere presentation at this time, and their vigorous advocacy in a political campaign give anti-American propaganda in the Orient a powerful weapon - "giving aid and comfort to the enemy". The proposals will also surely raise ominous doubts and suspicions in Chinese and Indian minds regarding the trustworthiness of the American

declarations of ideals and war-aims.

7. In contrast to the proposal of Mr. Balch and to the mass evacuation of Japanese carried out on the Pacific Coast, is the far-sighted and humane policy adopted by the Military Authorities of Hawaii, which has evacuated, in the main, only those individuals who, after careful investigation, have seemed to be of doubtful loyalty to the United States. This policy has insured military security, has not fomented racial ill-will, misunderstanding and suspicion, is thoroughly practical, has conserved the economic welfare of the Islands, and is in keeping with our national war-aims.

8. The following sentences from the statement by our Military Governor, General Emmons, inviting the enlistment of 1500 volunteers for the U. S. Army, of Americans of Japanese ancestry, (in response to which over 9,000 have already volunteered), throw important light on the situation. "All the people of the Hawaiian Islands", he said, "have contributed generously to our war effort. Among these have been the Americans of Japanese descent. Their role has not been an easy one. Open to distrust because of their racial origin, and discriminated against in certain fields of defense effort, they nevertheless have born their burdens without complaint and have added materially to the strength of the Hawaiian area. They have behaved themselves admirably under the most trying circumstances, and have bought great quantities of war-bonds, and by the labor of their hands have added to the common defense".

The Honolulu Inter-Church Federation sends its warm greetings to Federations and Councils of Churches on the mainland and bespeaks their interest and cooperation in informing and arousing an American and a Christian attitude in dealing with the situation.

March 1, 1943
Honolulu, T. H.

Signed:

Horace H. Leavitt
Horace H. Leavitt, President

Walter C. Moore
Walter C. Moore, Executive Secretary

For Executive Committee, Honolulu Inter-
Church Federation

Following is the text of President Roosevelt's letter to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, approving the plan to create an army combat unit composed of loyal American citizens of Japanese descent:

The war department's proposal to organize a combat team consisting of loyal American citizens of Japanese descent has my full approval. The new combat team will add to the nearly 5,000 loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry who already are serving in the armed forces of our country.

This is a natural and logical step toward reinstatement of selective service procedures which were temporarily disrupted by evacuation of the west coast.

No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied his democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship regardless of his ancestry. The principles on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of mind and heart; Americanism is not and never was a matter of race or ancestry.

A good American is one who is loyal to this country and to our creed of liberty and democracy. Every loyal American citizen should be given an opportunity to serve his country wherever his skills will make the greatest contribution—whether it be in the ranks of our armed forces, in war production, agriculture, government service or other work essential to the war effort.

I am glad to observe that the war department, navy department, war manpower commission, department of justice and war relocation authority are collaborating in this program which will assure an opportunity for all loyal Americans including Americans of Japanese ancestry to serve their country at a time when the fullest and wisest use of our manpower is all important to the war effort.

WE WILL NOT FAIL

Our government, through the War Department and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, has again presented to us Americans of Japanese ancestry the highest opportunity to serve our country. The plan, as announced by General Emmons, calls for the voluntary induction of 1,500 men from our group into the Army of the United States for combat duty.

Already several thousand men of Japanese ancestry are serving in our armed forces. It is partly in recognition of their fine record that the War Department has directed General Emmons to open this opportunity to us.

We have already done much as a group to strengthen Hawaii's war effort toward the ultimate defeat of our enemies. Now, however, has come this added opportunity. It is an opportunity to further serve our country and demonstrate the loyalty that we have long professed. It is a definite challenge that we must meet overwhelmingly to silence once and for all those who question our loyalty.

We must do this not only for our sake but for the sake of those who follow us. We must do it for the sake of those courageous individuals who have outspokenly maintained their faith in us. We must do it for the future welfare of Hawaii which is tied up with the question of our loyalty.

Are we going to meet this challenge? The answer is in our hands, in the hands of every one of us acceptable for military service. It is the opportunity we have been waiting for. Either we let it slip through our hands and forever remain half Americans in the eyes of others or we use it to win our rightful place among all other Americans of this great nation.

We Must Not Fail! We Will Not Fail!

The specific details of the plan have been and will be announced through the newspapers. For further information, consult your local draft board (or any draft board if you are not living on your home island), or members of the Emergency Service (Morale) Committee. (On Oahu, members of the Honolulu Police Contact Group also will be available for advice on this question).

—By a Committee of Americans of Japanese Ancestry Representing All the Islands.