

KEY TO INITIALS AND PSEUDONYMS

In order of appearance:

Kato - or Mr. "C" Yoshiyama
Adachi Frank Furakawa - conservative old Tulean.
Yamaguchi. Sally and George Yamashiro.
Nakao or "N" Bill Nishino from Gila.
Okamoto or "O" Yutaka Oda from Gila.
Fujimoto or "I" Jimmy Takeuchi from Gila.
Miss Ikeda. Yayoe Nishikawa, a conservative Gila
"M" Larry Kataoka, a nisei member of the Baihyo Sha
Miss Nakamura. Mebba Kaminana, one of Jimmy's old Tulean informants
Miss Tanaka. May Iwohara
Mr. Ono. T. Nakamura, employee in Legal Aid dept, old Tulean.

Caucasian. They also used the term "inside the fence" and referred to ~~the administrative visit~~ a visit to the administrative section as "going out to the Ad. area" or "going up to the Ad. area". There was, it should be remarked, no noticeable difference in altitude between the two areas.

~~The striking difference in appearance between the Caucasian and Japanese residential sections was most striking.~~

The difference in appearance between the Caucasian and Japanese residential sections was most striking. The Caucasian barracks and apartments and the administration buildings were made of wood and painted white or green. The evacuee barracks were covered with black tar paper of an unpleasant and most depressing appearance. While the ~~internal~~ internal appearance of the evacuee apartments was, by and large, ~~on a par~~ on a par with that of other centers, the barracks of the appointed personnel were reputed to be among the most pleasantly appointed of any project. While they were by no means luxurious ~~by~~ the frigidaire, inside toilets, ~~and~~ showers, and wash-basins, the linoleum, the fine electric ~~stoves~~ stoves in the family apartments, made them appear almost ~~sybaritic~~ sybaritic to the evacuee ~~the~~ domestic workers.

The chief physical change which segregation brought to the Tule Lake center was the erection of a seven foot man-proof wire fence, topped by three strands of barbed wire around that area termed the project center. This fenced enclosed the evacuee, administrative, and military sections. Along this fence at frequent and regular intervals were large watchtowers capable of holding at least four soldiers. These towers were equipped with high-powered searchlights. The great heavy fence, bristling with ~~green~~ watchtowers

Confidential

presented a formidable and awesome picture, particularly at night when the searchlights were in use. As a preparation for segregation and the confinement of evacuees "disloyal to the United States" the military police ~~xxxxxxx~~ guard was increased (although, blast it! I never found out what this increase was.)

Previous to segregation this project center had been enclosed only by a four foot barbed wire fence, though which the evacuees were allowed to pass freely during the day into the much larger area known as the project area ~~xxxx~~ which contained the farm, the high hill to the south of the project known as Castle Rock which offered a ~~pleasant~~ picnic spot in summer and slopes for rather perilous makeshift ~~skiing~~ skiing in winter time, or to the sewage pond to the north of the project which offered a surface for skating. At night, however, they were required to remain within the project center. Only four watchtowers overlooked the center and these were called "fire-towers", probably out of consideration for the evacuees' feelings.

This all refers to "before" segregation.

Neither before nor directly after segregation was there any prohibition on free movement between the evacuee residence section and the administrative area, except for a brief period in 1943 directly after Military Registration when a barbed wire fence was erected separating them. For a short time passes were required to pass through this inner barbed wire fence at night, but this policy was soon abandoned. The ^mMilitary ^aArea, however, was fenced off with a four foot barbed wire fence and evacuees were absolutely forbidden to enter.

Confusing - since restricted were placed

After segregations ^{additional} no prohibitions were placed on evacuee movements within the man-proof fence surrounding the center.

Anyone could enter the administrative or hospital area at any time of the day or night. The restriction on the military area, of course, remained. Farmers and other workers leaving the project center to work in the project area were required to show passes and were under some military surveillance.

After the October-November 1943 incident ~~additional~~ man proof barbed wire topped fences were erected between the evacuee area and the administrative area, the hospital area was surrounded by a separate fence and a stockade, called Area B in the administrative manual, was constructed to the west of the hospital. A similar fence was also built between the administrative area and the military area ~~which was removed~~ after the latter had been moved from a site directly southwest of the administrative area to the extreme southeastern ~~corner~~ corner of the project center. The fence between the evacuee residence section and the administrative area was equipped with watchtowers as was the ~~the~~ stockade. The stockade grew in size from one Army tent to five barracks, a mess-hall and a bathhouse. The final site covered about two-thirds of an acre and was surrounded by a fence which differed in one detail from the other fences. It had six strands of barbed wire, arranged to make either ingress or egress difficult. Soldiers manned the watchtowers which flanked the stockade by day and night and the searchlights were used at night. After the excitement of the incident had subsided soldiers no longer manned the watchtowers between the evacuee and administrative sections during the day. A night guard, however, was maintained and the searchlights lit.

In December of 1943 an additional ~~fence~~ manproof fence was erected between Ward VII and the rest of the colony because the administration for a time considered isolating

APPEARANCE AND PLAN OF TULE LAKE CENTER AFTER SEGREGATION

*Project area
"Culley"
-*

The chief physical change ^{which replaced the} in the Tule Lake center ~~after~~ ^{the creation of} because of segregation was ~~the creation of~~ a seven foot man-proof fence topped by three strands of barbed wire ~~which was erected by~~ around that area ~~commonly~~ termed the project center. ¹ Along this fence, at ^{regular and} intervals were ^{large} guard posts capable of holding ^{at least} four soldiers. These ~~were~~ towers were equipped with ~~searchlights~~ high-powered search lights. The great heavy fences, bristling with green guard posts, present ^a formidable picture, which, ~~once seen, can never be forgotten.~~ ^{but only at night, when the searchlight was in use.}

Previous to segregation ~~the~~ this project center had been ~~enclosed~~ only by a four foot barbed wire fence, through which ~~the~~ ^{the evacuees} were allowed to pass ~~quite~~ freely during the day ~~time~~ ^{at night} into the much larger area known as the project area which contained the farms, the ~~great~~ high hill to the south of the project known as Castle Rock which offered slopes for rather ~~dangerous~~ ^{perilous} ~~sk~~ makeshift skiing in winter time, or ^{to} the sewage pond to the north of the project which offered a surface for skating. At night, however, they were required to remain within the project center. ^{Neither before nor} directly after segregation was there any prohibition on ^{free} movement between the evacuee residence section and the administrative area, except for a brief period ^{in 1943} directly after Military Registration when a barbed wire fence was ~~erected~~ ^{erected} ~~separating~~ them. For a ^{short time} ~~brief period~~, passes were required to pass through this inner barbed wire fence and night, but this ~~was soon abandoned~~ policy was soon abandoned. ~~after segregation~~ The Military area, however,

~~After the excitement of the~~ Six months or more after the excitement of the incident had subsided, soldiers no longer manned the watchtowers between the evacuee and administrative sections during the day. A night guard, however, was always maintained and the searchlights employed.

The stockade grew in size from one Army tent to five barracks, a mess-hall and a bathhouse. The final site covered about two-thirds of an acre and was surrounded by a fence which differed in one detail from the other fences. It had six strands of barbed wire, arranged to make either ingress or egress difficult. Soldiers manned the watchtowers which flanked the stockade by day and night and the searchlights were always employed at night. The stockade continued to be used ~~in~~ as a place of detention from November 1943 until August of 1944 when it was abandoned. ~~A new stockade and a jail had been erected to the west of the administrative area.~~ By this time a new stockade and a jail had been erected to the west of the administrative area. The new stockade, however, never was used to ~~house~~ detain any evacuees, although the jail was used.

In December of 1943 an additional ~~fire~~ fireproof fence was erected between Ward VII and the rest of the colony because the administration for a time considered isolating some of the more vociferous ~~families of the~~ "trouble-making" families in this area. This action was never taken and ~~the fence~~ this particular fence was torn down in the late spring of 1944.

5.

some of the more vociferous "trouble-makers" in this area.
This action was never taken and the fence was torn down in the
late spring of 1944.

to 1E

or Caucasian

After the incident no evacuee ^{or enter} was ever allowed to leave the evacuee residence section without a pass. Passes were difficult ^{for the evacuees} to obtain and could be had only for legitimate business, such as employment in the area, business at the administrative building or for visits to the hospital. If an evacuee were given a pass to the hospital area he was not supposed to enter the administrative area. ~~offxxx~~ No evacuee was allowed to leave the project center without escort except the farmers, ~~and~~ and other workers who were checked by the military, and who were under some military surveillance while they worked.

Was it there
a military
"escort"?

For some five months after the incident no Caucasian employee was allowed to enter the evacuee residence section without a military escort. Soldiers were stationed at the high school area when school opened late in January of 1944. ^{This} ~~The~~ military guard was relaxed gradually, and by April of 1944 only the gate pass, described above, was required.

After the incident and for the remaining life of the project (to date) any non-Japanese who desired to visit the project or who was ^{to be} employed there first was required to obtain permission to enter from the Project Director. He would then have to pass the main gate into the project center and receive a pass from the military police stationed there, who also checked his credentials for entering the project. He would then proceed to the army processing office and obtain a temporary pass. Later he would be given a permanent pass. If he were an employee and expected to live on the project his finger prints and picture would be taken. He then passed the Internal Security station,

For some five months after the incident no Caucasian employeex~~was allowed~~ was allowed to enter the evacuee residence section without a military escort. Soldiers were stationed at the ~~school~~ high school area, when school opened late in January of 1944. This ~~rule~~^{military guard} was relaxed gradually, and by April of 1944 only the ~~maximum~~ gate pass was required.

passing through another gate guarded by Internal Security. If he were a newcomer and on foot, he might be asked to show his pass. If he were ~~xxx~~ riding in an automobile, newcomer or not, he was required to leave his name at the Internal Security station on entering and leaving ~~his~~ the project.

All Caucasians whose work required their presence inside the evacuee residence area were required to have a special pass to enter. On his way to this area, a person might or might not pass through the hospital area. If he did, he went through more fences, the gates of which, however, were not guarded. On arriving at the fence separating the Japanese from the Caucasian section, he would be required to show his pass to the military police stationed at the gates on going in and on coming out. Nor could he leave the project center without again showing his pass to the military police.

~~Additional changes~~

Emergency changes regarding the

in the Tule Lake project

The only other additional significant physical change was the erection of an entirely new ward Ward VIII at the east of the project to house additional segregees who did not enter Tule Lake until February, ~~and~~ ^{and (?)} March of 1944. While these latecomers came from ~~Manzanar~~, *1st unit? ? un known* so many of them came from Manzanar ^{and were housed here} that this Ward became commonly known as the Manzanar Section. ~~This new ward was~~

The barracks and facilities in the new ward were in most respects superior to those of the original Tule Lake. Instead of black, ~~rusty~~ looking tar paper, they were covered with a more ~~pleasing~~ pleasing grey material. The apartments were equipped with small entrance halls. The latrinal facilities were far superior, consisting of ^{small} porcelain wash basins instead of the broken down, overused, ~~metal~~ large metal wash basin "in which you had to watch another persons spit run down under your face", ~~with~~ which the inhabitants of the older part of the center were obliged to use.

9

In general then, the most striking difference in appearance *between the pre-segregation and post-* ~~in~~ the segregation Tule Lake was the ~~presence~~ ^{and the watchtowers} fence, and, after the incident, the multiplicity of fences which were hurriedly ^{partly} erected ^{formidable} to protect the personnel from the evacuees and partly to reassure the staff members, ~~many~~ many of whom would have refused to work at the center without the protection allegedly afforded by the fence.

THE ISSUE OF THE STOCKADE DETAINEES

The detention of the leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai and the Negotiating Committee which ^{the Army} ~~was~~ initiated on November 14, 1943 ~~by the Army~~ ^{created an} ~~presented~~ ^{the Army's political pressure group with an} ~~important~~ ^{important} issue, i. e., obtaining their release. ~~The issue was of great~~ ^{The issue was of great} ~~importance~~ ^{importance} as a tool by which ~~various factions~~ ^{various factions} attempted to increase their prestige in camp and bring pressure upon the administration. From late December of 1943 until late August of 1944 when ~~all~~ ^{last} the ~~remaining~~ ^{remaining} detainees were released unconditionally, an intermittent conflict was carried on between the administration and various pressure groups ^{and factions} working for release and between ~~various~~ pressure groups in the center, competing with each other for the credit and prestige which they believed would accrue to them if they were successful in bringing about release.

The first organized effort to bring about release of the members of the Negotiating Committee was initiated in late December when ^{an anonymous group} a group of relatives of the ^{detained} ~~interned~~ men and some of the supporters of the underground pro-status quo group attempted to contact Mr. Robertson with the intention of asking ^{to ask} his assistance in this matter. They were not able to ^{reach} ~~contact~~ Mr. Robertson until January 15, when he went to Mrs. Matsuda's home at the request of an anonymous group. The members of this group described themselves to Robertson as relatives of the detainees and, according to Robertson, they were "all stirred up" about getting people out of the stockade. They asked Robertson to talk to the detained leaders. Robertson did so and Kuratomi, who acted as spokesman for the detainees, promised him that if only two members of the Negotiating Committee were released in the colony, the committee would resign and induce the residents to hold another election. Robertson, however, was not able to get any consideration for this request from Mr. Best. 1/

1. R. Hankey, Notes, March, 1944, pp. 66, 67.

The first organized effort to bring about the release of members of the Negotiating Committee was made in late December when an anonymous group in the center attempted to contact Mr. Robertson. They did not succeed in reaching him until January 15 when he was asked to call at ~~Mr. Robertson's~~ the Matsudas' home. There he met a ~~group which had~~ number of people who described themselves as relatives of the detainees but who also were members of the underground pro-status quo group. According to Robertson they were "all stirred up" about getting people out of the stockade and they asked him to talk to the detained leaders. Robertson ~~and~~ called a number of the members of the Negotiating Committee to his office and Kuratomi, who acted as spokesman for the detainees, promised him that if ~~only~~ only two members of the Negotiating Committee were released in the colony, the committee would resign and induce the residents to hold another election. Robertson, however, was not able to get any consideration for this request from Mr. Best. 1/

The second attempt to obtain ~~the~~ releases was made by the Coordinating Committee. ~~The Coordinating Committee~~ Before the referendum election the Committee had issued propaganda to the effect that ending the status quo was one method by which releases could be facilitated. The Coordinating Committee, however, did not, in truth, desire the release of important leaders like Kai and Kuratomi. Rather the members hoped to increase their prestige by obtaining the release of men "innocently" detained. They also desired the release of minor leaders, ~~whom~~ who, the Committee hoped, would desert the Daihyo Sha Kai and help the Committee gain the confidence of the residents and ~~disrupt~~ ^{disrupt} the opposition which ~~it~~ ^{the Committee} was meeting from the

1. R. Hankey, Notes, March, 1944, pp. 66,67.

L + R over to Connie 4.90.

Hank - 6.70 - 3.73 = \$ 2.97 out of Hank
Harpe 3.73 - 3.49 = .24 Hank to FM
Connie 3.73 - 1.00 = 2.73 Connie to P.M.

4.90

2.73

underground pro-Daihyo Sha remnants ~~which~~ (among which was the group which had appealed to Mr. Robertson). The Coordinating Committee was ~~un~~successful in obtaining the release of about 35 men some of whom were minor leaders like Shimizu, Mori and Kimura. Some of these released leaders, it is said, did attempt to assist the cause of the Coordinating Committee. Others, like Kimura, immediately set themselves to doing all they could to bring about the release of Kai, Kuratomi, ~~Sugi~~ Sugi Sugimoto and the other leaders whom the Coordinating Committee regarded as enemies. In any case, the Coordinating Committee lost out in its attempt to gain the support of the residents and with its resignation in mid-April its importance as a faction attempting to use the release of the internees to its advantage disappeared.

Meanwhile, the underground pro-Daihyo Sha group had become known as the Resegregation Group through the sponsorship of the Akashi petition of late March 1944. During March and April the members of this group made no more organized attempts to obtain stockade releases. ~~They~~ ~~instead~~ ~~the~~ ~~members~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~group~~ ~~wrote~~ ~~pleading~~ ~~letters~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~Army~~ ~~and~~ ~~unceasing~~ ~~propaganda~~ ~~was~~ ~~kept~~ ~~up~~ ~~that~~ ~~peace~~ ~~would~~ ~~not~~ ~~come~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~camp~~ ~~unless~~ ~~the~~ ~~men~~ ~~were~~ ~~released~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~stockade~~.
 Instead, /Relatives of detainees who were members of the Resegregation Group wrote pleading letters to the Army and unceasing propaganda was kept up that peace would not come to the camp unless the men were released from the stockade.

Q Mr. Tsuda, the ex-chief of evacuee police and prominent Daihyo Sha Kai leader ~~was~~ next took up the cause of the detainees in energetic fashion. Tsuda, who had also been confined in the stockade, was released on April 7. According to his own account he left the stockade with the avowed intent of devoting all of his efforts to obtain the release of Kai, Kuratomi and the other leaders. To this end he joined forces with Mitsuho Kimura, Mori and Shimizu, ex-detainees who had been released previously. Tsuda and Kimura ~~talked to Mr. Best~~ particularly talked to Mr. Best whenever he would see them and kept up constant ~~arguments in favor of~~ ^{pressure} for the release of their friends. They met with no success. Tsuda then decided to solicit the aid of Mr. Tateishi. Tateishi was also an ex-detainee but since his release had obtained a position as advisor to Mr. Best. He had an office in the administration building and also an office in the colony called the "Research Bureau". Tsuda hoped to get the influential Mr. Tateishi to plead the cause of the detainees with Mr. Best and since Tsuda did not have a pass to the administrative area, he ~~hoped~~ reasoned that Mr. Tateishi was in a much better position to bring the issue before Mr. Best at frequent intervals. Tateishi, however, was also eager to establish himself politically and asked Kimura, Shimizu and Mori to work in his office. Tsuda, not trusting Tateishi, advised his friends to accept this offer so that they could keep an eye on Tateishi. 1 This proved to be an unwise move on Tsuda's part for Tateishi apparently did or was able to do nothing to further the release of the detainees and his office or "Research Bureau" was becoming increasingly notorious in the ~~colony~~ center as a reputed "inu" joint. ~~The Resegregation Group was especially~~

Meanwhile, the Resegregation Group had not been idle.

1. ibid., April 12, 1945, pp. 3-4.

~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Due to his apparent friendliness with Mr. Best he was rapidly becoming known as an inu. According to Tsuda, Tateishi ^{reasoned} ~~hoped~~ that if he could get on good terms with the Jerome faction, the supporters of Kai and Kuratomi, he could eradicate the suspicion that he was a stool-pigeon. Accordingly, ^{Tateishi} ~~he~~ asked Kimura, Simizu, Mori and some other ~~xxxxxxxx~~ ~~of~~ persons whom he thought were members of the Jerome faction to work in his office. Tsuda, not trusting Tateishi, advised his friends to accept this offer so that they could keep an eye on Tateishi. 1/ This proved to be an unwise move on Tsuda's part for Tateishi apparently did or was able to do nothing to further the release of the detainees and his office or "Research Bureau" ~~xxxxxxxx~~ became increasingly notorious in the center as a reputed "inu joint".

Meanwhile, ~~the Resegregation Group~~ ~~again took up the cause of the detainees.~~ ~~the Resegregation Group~~ the underground pro-Daihyo Sha Kai group had become known as the Resegregation Group through the sponsorship of the Akashi petition of late March 1944. The ~~xxxxxxxx~~ leaders of this group had kept up unceasing propaganda that peace would not come to the camp unless the men were released from the stockade.

1. ibid., April 18, 1945, pp. 3-4.

A special committee had been formed to work for ~~the~~ release, of ~~the detainees~~. This committee was called the Saiban-iin (Law Suit Committee) and is alleged to have been composed of ^{some of whom were, of course, relatives of detainees.} leaders of the Resegregation Group 1/ The early activities of this committee are not known. ~~xxxx Tsuda was on good terms with the members xxx~~ Tsuda, however, was on good terms with the Saiban-iin, with the relatives of the detainees and with the Resegregation Group in general during April and May of 1944. ~~However~~ As the weeks and months passed and Tsuda was able to accomplish nothing, he began to lose the support ~~of the~~ and confidence of the relatives. Moreover, he ~~continued to refuse~~ refused to join the Resegregation Group and thereby incurred ^{suspicion} the ~~hostility~~ of the leaders. When Tsuda saw himself losing ground ~~he considered the possibility of~~ and realized that he could look for little cooperation from Mr. Best he considered the possibility of getting legal aid of the detainees. He was still on ~~friendly terms with the leaders of the Resegregation xxx~~ at least outwardly friendly terms with the leaders of the Resegregation Group and asked the advice of Mr. Tachibana and Mr. Wakayama ~~of~~ this matter. They advised against this procedure.

M-6-8.
1/

Then, in early June, the Resegregationist leaders and the Saiban-iin ^{changed their minds and} ~~made a complete turn about~~, decided to ~~xxx~~ obtain the services of a lawyer. ^{they} Simultaneously initiated a smear campaign against Mr. Tsuda spreading libellous gossip about him, the most serious accusation being that he was a dog. The ~~xxxxxx~~ initiative in the matter of contacting a lawyer was taken by Kiyoshi Okamoto a recently arrived transferee from Ht. Mountain. At Heart Mountain Okamoto had been chairman of the Fair Play Committee and had ~~xxx~~ had experience ~~in contacting the AGIX~~

with the ACLU. Okamoto, it is ^{alleged,} ~~said,~~ suggested that the stockade detainees contact the ACLU. Data are contradictory as to whether the ~~suggestion~~ ~~was~~ ~~initiated~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~stockade~~ ~~or~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~colony.~~ ~~xxx~~ idea of obtaining the services of a lawyer initiated in the stockade or with Okamoto and the Saiban-iin. Both Kuratomi and Sugimoto insist that the detainees did not "know anything about the actual hiring of the attorney" and that the initiative was taken by persons in the colony. 1/ Mrs. Matsuda, on the other hand, stated on May 23 that the boys in the stockade had sent out 15 signatures requesting the hiring of a lawyer. 2/ In any case, the relatives of the detainees were called together by Okamoto and the Saiban-iin and were told that the detainees wished their case taken to court. Okamoto and the ~~Saiban-iin~~ Saiban-iin are said to have placed all responsibility ~~in~~ ~~the~~ upon the relatives. Having gained the consent of

 1. ibid., Sept. 18, 1944, pp. 2, 10.
 2. ibid., May 23, 1944, p. 1.

Some time in the spring of 1944, however, a special Committee was formed to work for the release of the detainees. This committee was called the Saiban-in (Law Suit Committee) and according to Kuratomi was composed of ^{leaders} ~~members~~ of the Resegregation Group. 1/

It was Mr. Tsuda, the ex-chief of evacuated police and prominent Daihyo Sha Kai leader who had himself been confined in the stockade, who next took up the cause of the detainees in energetic fashion.

1. Correspondence with Kuratomi, June 6, 1945.

the relatives, the Saiban-iin began to solicit ~~fundraising~~ donations from the residents to meet the expenses of the proposed law suit. According to Kuratomi ~~the~~, the Resegregation Group simultaneously began a campaign to raise funds "which was very confused in that the majority of the people thought the money was to be used for the Case exclusively whereas in fact only \$500.00 was forwarded to the Saiban-iin." *1/ The remainder, it is said, was kept by the Resegregation Group.*

no (

The ACLU was accordingly contacted ~~and~~ and early in June asked for permission to send an attorney to Tue ~~take~~ to ~~investigate~~ investigate the stockade situation.

~~Myer, however, refused~~ Myer, ~~however~~, refused ~~this~~ this first request and Mr. Besig, the ~~ACLU~~ ACLU attorney did not get permission to come until the week of July 12. This, however, was shortly after the ~~murder~~ murder of Hitomi when the residents and the administrative personnel were in a state of great tension. Nevertheless, Besig was able to talk to several of the stockade detainees and Okamoto, according to a Caucasian informant, ~~arranged~~ arranged interviews for him with several men already released from the stockade and with relatives of the men still detained. *Besig was asked to clear the program by the WRA administration, Tex* 2/1 On the basis of the information gained, the ACLU determined to bring a habeus corpus suit against the WRA.

~~The~~ ~~smear~~ ~~campaign~~ ~~carried~~ ~~on~~ ~~against~~ ~~Tsuda~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~Resegregation~~ ~~Group~~ ~~appears~~ ~~to~~ ~~have~~ ~~begun~~ ~~simultaneously~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~dominance~~ ~~of~~ ~~Okamoto~~ ~~over~~ ~~the~~ ~~relatives~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~detainees~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~Saiban-iin~~. The chief object of the campaign was to give Tsuda a camp wide reputation as a dog. Stories were spread to the effect that ~~the~~ the detainees had lost confidence

The ~~smear~~ smear campaign carried on against Tsuda by the Resegregation Group appears to have begun simultaneously with the ~~dominance~~ dominance of Okamoto over the relatives of the detainees and the Saiban-iin. The chief object of the campaign was to give Tsuda a camp wide reputation as a dog. Stories were spread to the effect that ~~the~~ the detainees had lost confidence

 1. Correspondence with Kuratomi, June 6, 1945,
 2. R. Hankey, Notes, July 12, 1944, p. 4.

On the evening of July 12, the day on which Mr. Besig left Tule Lake, Mr. Leckliter, the project attorney ~~and the~~ attended a meeting of 48 evacuees, said to be relatives of the detainees. Mr. Okamoto presided. Leckliter was questioned as to why Mr. Besig had been asked to leave the project and explained that the administration could allow no one to interfere with the investigation of the Hitomi murder. Leckliter was also asked why the detainees would have no visitors and replied that the ~~administration could~~ ~~not~~ ~~allow~~ ~~visits~~ ~~only~~ ~~on~~ ~~its~~ ~~own~~ ~~discretion.~~ 1/ ~~Shortly~~ ~~after~~ this meeting was held Okamoto was arrested and taken to Yreka to be tried for sedition in connection with his activities ~~as~~ chairman of the Fair Play Committee. He was ~~given~~ ~~a~~ ~~sentence~~ ~~of~~ ~~several~~ ~~years~~ ~~in~~ ~~prison.~~ ~~2/~~

Jyl4-1-2

The smear campaign carried on against Tsuda by the Resegregation Group appears to have begun simultaneously with the dominance of Okamoto over the relatives of the detainees and the Saiban-iin. The chief object of the ~~campaign~~ ~~was~~ ~~to~~ ~~give~~ ~~Tsuda~~ ~~a~~ ~~camp~~ ~~wide~~ ~~reputation~~ ~~as~~ ~~a~~ ~~dog~~. ~~Stories~~ ~~were~~ ~~spread~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~effect~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~detainees~~ ~~had~~ ~~lost~~ ~~confidence~~ ~~in~~ ~~Tsuda~~ ~~because~~ ~~he~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ~~able~~ ~~to~~ ~~accomplish~~ ~~nothing~~, ~~that~~ ~~he~~ ~~had~~ ~~advised~~ ~~them~~ ~~not~~ ~~to~~ ~~seek~~ ~~aid~~, ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~AGU~~ and that he was carrying out the wishes of Mr. Best rather than aiding his fellow evacuees. 3/ 2/ Tsuda's frequent visits to Best were ~~interpreted~~ ~~as~~ ~~sessions~~ ~~in~~ ~~which~~ ~~he~~ ~~Tsuda~~ ~~served~~ ~~as~~ ~~informer~~ ~~or~~ ~~inu~~. A great deal was made of Tsuda's apparent intimacy with Tateishi who by early June of 1944 ~~was~~ ~~regarded~~ ~~widely~~ ~~as~~ ~~one~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~worst~~ ~~inu~~ ~~in~~ ~~camp~~. Tsuda, an adept politician, was not slow in perceiving his danger. ~~He~~ ~~put~~ ~~pressure~~ ~~on~~ ~~Tateishi~~ ~~and~~ ~~convinced~~ ~~him~~ ~~that~~ ~~he~~ ~~should~~ ~~close~~ ~~his~~ ~~by~~ ~~now~~ ~~notorious~~ ~~Research~~ ~~Bureau~~. He then

1. ibid., July 14, 1944, pp. 1-2.
 2. ibid., June 19, 1944, p. 1; June 24, 1944, p. 1.

Jn-19-1
Jn-24-1

visited Mr. Tachibana, told Tachibana that he had prevailed upon Tateishi to close the Research Bureau and said: "I want you to use your influence to ~~to~~ stop this inu talk." The inu talk, however, increased rather than decreased, whereupon Tsuda called on Mr. Tachibana again and told him that if the talk did not stop ~~Tachibana would see that~~ he would see that Tachibana got his head beaten in. Tachibana, of course, denied any part in the gossip ~~campaign~~ campaign. 1/ It continued unabated. Since ~~this~~ the ~~the~~ craze of inu hatred was at its height during this period the ~~allegations~~ accusations against Tsuda were widely believed and eventually he was forced to withdraw from overt participation in politics ~~albeit~~ leaving the field entirely to the Resegregation Group.

Ap-18-4

~~On~~ In mid-July a new factor entered into the issue of stockade release. The detainees went on a hunger strike which, they stated, they would not abandon until they had all been released unconditionally. The relatives of the fasting men were greatly perturbed and the Saiban-~~in~~ grew anxious over what effect the hunger strike might have on the suit contemplated by the ACLU. On July 30 Mr. ~~Tachibana~~ Besig returned to Tule Lake but the WRA allowed him to ~~make~~ interview ~~as~~ only evacuees to whom he had spoken on his previous visit.² Tachibana, however, ~~sent~~ sent a personal message to Besig asking him to proceed with the suit despite the hunger strike. 3/ It is very probably that Tachibana was speaking for the Saiban-~~in~~ when he sent this message. As the hunger strike continued into August, the perturbation of the relatives increased. Tsuda is said to have told a Caucasian that ~~he feared~~ some of the relatives considered him responsible for the state of affairs and that he feared for his safety. 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only~~ only ~~factor~~ factor ~~in~~ in ~~the~~ the ~~matter~~ matter ~~and~~ and ~~that~~ that ~~he~~ he ~~feared~~ feared ~~for~~ for ~~his~~ his ~~safety.~~ safety. ~~4/~~ 4/ ~~Manbana~~ Manbana ~~of the~~ of the ~~Saiban-~~in~~ Saiban-~~in~~ ~~and~~ and ~~was~~ was ~~convinced~~ convinced ~~that~~ that ~~the~~ the ~~Resegregation~~ Resegregation ~~was~~ was ~~not~~ not ~~the~~ the ~~only</~~

The hunger strike created a serious dilemma for the ~~mainxxxxfixix~~ Saiban-iin. The group, dominated by Resegregationist leaders, had been pressuring for the release of the detainees. Nevertheless, they also looked forward to the embarrassment which a law suit would cause the administration and Mr. Best and it was their hope that such a suit might result in the resignation of Mr. Best and the appointment of a new administration whom they hoped would be more favorable to the Resegregationist point of view. They began to fear that if the strike ~~wouldxxxxxxxx~~ brought about release the suit would be abandoned. ~~On~~ Moreover, they themselves were under considerable pressure from the relatives of the fasting men, who would not be inclined to sit by calmly ~~while~~ ^{while} the detainees starved to death, merely to embarrass the administration. Consequently, when Mr. Besig returned to Tule Lake on July 30, Mr. Tachibana sent him a personal message asking him to proceed with the suit despite the hunger strike and emphasizing ~~thatxxxxthexxxxdetainees~~ (with no authority whatever from the detainees)

Jy-30-7-8-44 that the detainees were determined to proceed with the suit. 1/ Tachibana was very probably speaking for the Saiban-iin when he sent this message.

~~As the hunger strike proceeded continued into August, the relative perturbation of the relatives increased. Tsuda is said to have told a Caucasian, that some of the relatives considered him responsible for the state of affairs and that he feared for his safety. 2/~~

With the unconditional release of the detainees in late August, the Resegregationist leaders saw their hopes of legal action against the WRA ~~gxxx~~ ~~gixxxx~~ fading rapidly.

Just previous to Mr. Besig's visit of July 30 an unknown group in the colony began to circulate a petition for the release of the detainees. ~~This petition was mysteriously dropped and never presented to the administration.~~ Kuratomi stated that ~~itxxxxxxxtheSaiban-iin~~ the Saiban-iin brought pressure on the ~~circulators~~ ~~circulators~~ of the petition to withhold it until after Besig's

1. ibid., July 30, 7-8-44

arrival, ~~implying that the Saiban-in did not wish the release of the~~
 detainees to be accomplished ^{by a petition.} After Mr. Besig's arrival the petition
 was mysteriously dropped and was ~~not presented to the administration.~~
 As the hunger strike continued into August, the
 perturbation of the relatives increased. Tsuda is said to have told a Caucasian that
 some of the relatives considered him responsible for the state of affairs and that
 he feared for his safety. 2/

J-30-16

With the unconditional release of the detainees in late August, the
 Resegregationist leaders saw their hopes of legal action against the WRA fading
 rapidly. Some of the relatives wrote Besig, asking
 for his advice and some, probably ardent Resegregationists, wrote to the detainees ^{telling them} not to ~~leave~~
 the stockade. The detainees, however, were in no mood to endure more imprisonment.
 Moreover, ~~insisting on remaining in the stockade was~~
 manifestly a ridiculous thing to do. After several weeks of talking about
 bringing a suit against the WRA despite the release, the ~~proponents~~
^{Saiban-in} gave up. The ACLU had informed them that the chances of winning such
 a suit were ~~negligible.~~ ^{very slight.}

The stockade issue thereupon came to a close. ^{leaders} The Resegregationists/and the
 had
 Saiban-in ~~gained considerable prestige and power.~~
 Tsuda, their most powerful rival
 had been forced into ~~inactivity.~~ ^{inactivity, and loaded with camp-wide opprobrium.} The
 Resegregationist now hoped to ~~join forces with Kai and~~ join forces with Kai and
 Kuratomi and clinch their domination over the camp.

1. ~~ibid., Aug. 11, 1944, p. 2.~~
 2/ ~~ibid., Aug. 11, 1944, p. 2.~~

1. Correspondence with Kuratomi, July 6, 1945.
 2. ~~ibid.,~~ R. Hankey, Notes, Aug. 11, 1944, p. 2.

Hankney

DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSFEREE ATTITUDES PRIOR TO THE FARM ACCIDENT

The transferees on whose statements the following analysis of pre-farm accident attitudes is based did not, for the most part, take an active part in the activities of the pressure group. About half of them were of neutral convictions, sympathizing with the resentments of the people, supporting some of the statements of the pressure group and criticizing others. Two were active supporters and one an active opponent. Three others, while not "agitators" were definitely sympathetic. Roughly half came from Gila where the writer had most pre-segregation contacts. The Gilans, on the whole, took little part in the formation of the pressure group.

By the generally accepted irrevocability of the act of segregation as forcefully expressed by the WRA Administration, those persons who came to Tule Lake were strongly impressed with the fact that they had made a decision which would be extremely difficult if not impossible to retract. It is impossible to estimate what proportion of the transferees from other centers had definitely made up their minds to return to Japan regardless of the outcome of the war. It is indisputable that some were still undecided, having come to Tule Lake to escape military service or because they were alarmed by the increasing WRA pressure toward relocation. However, the enthusiasm and the militant attitude of that proportion of the transferees who had fully made up their minds to return to Japan was so overwhelming, that individual transferees who had other motives were forced either to dissemble and profess similar attitudes or suffer social ostracism. Very few took the latter course.

The overt step of segregation gave sincere individuals a powerful conviction of self-respect and morale. It was perhaps their first major opportunity to regain self-respect since the initiation of evacuation. They had done with shilly-shallying. They had made their final decision and irrevocably turned from America to Japan. To them, Tule Lake offered an opportunity for a new existence, a place where they might prepare themselves for life in Japan, a place where they might live with individuals of like opinion and be rid of the company of the indecisive fence sitters, the koomori (bats), neither flesh nor fowl, who could not make up their minds to support either the United States or Japan and who made up a large proportion of the individuals who remained in the relocation centers after the first egress of the nisei. No longer, they were sure, would they be angered and annoyed by the presence of the inu, the stool-pigeons who ran tattling to the Administration. Instead, they anticipated a camp where all the people would be of one mind. It is understandable that in the face of this vigorous and idealistic attitude, persons who had reserved their final decision maintained a politic silence.

A gentle kibel girl said:

"All during the trip all the people coming from Gila - all they talked about was how things were going to be in Tule Lake. There wouldn't be any more inus; no more Yes-Yes. They were so glad when they saw the camp. The people came here with such high hopes and they got so little. . .

"When we saw the camp there was a bunch of boys on a potato truck. They pointed. 'That's Tule,' they said. When I saw it tears came to my eyes. It was the first step towards Japan and George (her husband whom she hoped to join in Tule) would be here and everything. I really thought this camp was going to be much different than Gila."¹

¹R. Hankey, Notes, July 19, 1944, p. 3.

Another kibeï woman of very militant mind wrote:

"We came to Tule Lake with great expectation and high hopes to be able to join our fellow Japanese subjects whose ideas and future thoughts. Desire to return to our mother country at her emergencies and to serve her were the main purpose in seeking repatriation and expatriation."¹

A nisei girl said:

"At the relocation camp there were so many that were loyal to America. We felt people with the same kind of mind (persons who were all of one mind) would be assembled here."²

It was now possible, and in fact, obligatory, to express loyalty to Japan. The expression of such sentiments would no longer be followed by incarceration in Leupp or Santa Fe. Attitudes like the following were no doubt common to many segregees.

From an ex-Santa Fe internee:

"We came here for the purpose of repatriation so that we will be on the priority list to be segregated to Japan. We may change our feeling after the war, but for the time being, we must rely on the Emperor or Japan, not on the United States government.

"Our loyalty is to Japan. Naturally we are very earnest about it. Some Japanese say they are still loyal to the United States, but I don't believe it."³

From an older nisei:

"We who were segregated as unloyal must be considered heart and soul Japanese and for Japan."⁴

A kibeï leader of the pressure group which formed soon after segregation expressed his sentiments as follows:

"We expected the same status. We expected the same kind of group - all going back to Japan. We believed that ~~an~~ naturally thought this would be a peaceful colony.... Those fellows who said No-Yes or No-No and do not repatriate fooled this country (U.S.A) and fooled the government."⁵

¹ ibid., July 18, p. 2.

² ibid., July 19, p. 4.

³ ibid., May 21, p. 1.

⁴ ~~ibid~~ From a MS prepared by JYK, p. 7.

⁵ R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 11, 1944, pp. 1, 2.

A very shrewd nisei transferee who carefully kept himself out of all political entanglements expressed his opinion of the attitude of these militant segregees neatly and concisely:

"When they came here they thought it was going to be a Japanese Utopia. The resentment that arose was brought on by their feeling of frustration."¹

In some individuals this attitude led to an abhorrence of all things thought to be American and an idealization of all things thought to be Japanese. On arriving at Tule Lake many nisei and kibeï made a conscious attempt to turn their minds from "American ways of thinking and acting to Japanese ways of thinking and acting." Individuals were affected in varying degrees. Some, while complying outwardly, kept their true opinions to themselves; some embraced this attitude with stern earnestness; in some it grew to fanaticism. Outward expression of this attitude manifested itself on many minor occasions. Nisei social dances were broken up by kibeï demonstrations. Attendance at American movies was frowned upon. If any person were courageous or rash enough to speak favorably of a custom or ideal considered American, he would inevitably invite criticism and perhaps physical violence. Three men made the following interesting revelations of their consciousness of this psychological change in themselves.

A younger Americanized issei said:

"Previous to segregation I felt like an American and acted like an American. After segregation I could not help myself. In everything, I began to think and act like a Japanese. I was working on Internal Security then and had always gotten along with the Caucasians. But my mind was just turned around. The Administration just couldn't understand me and lost confidence in me."²

¹ ibid., Sept. 17, p. 1.

² R. Hankey, Notes, May 23, p. 6.

Another kibel:

"But if I'm going to be a Japanese I'm going to be pure Japanese and not American at all. I didn't used to be like this. But now I just see this camp from the Japanese point of view only. As a Japanese, I got to do it this way."¹

The non-realization of this Utopian dream was probably the most important psychological motivation of the leaders whose activities produced the sociological explosion of late October and November of 1943. There were other very important resentments having to do with the inferior facilities of Tule Lake when compared to the Relocation Centers which were shared to some extent by transferees and old residents of Tule Lake. These grievances of a more practical nature were taken up and used as fully as possible by the pressure group: but the emotional compulsion which led men to step forth, brave and wrath of the Administration and the Army and suffer imprisonment in the stockade was furnished by the psychological need to be recognized as Japanese, to be distinguished once and for all from the fence-sitters and be rid of their presence in camp. This desire for uniform status headed the list of the pressure group's demands to the Administration.

Though this sentiment was probably felt in some degree by most of the transferees, it should not be imagined that it was unanimous. To many of the old Tuleans it was illogical and had no significance at all. Nevertheless, it was the most vigorous, most deeply felt and, emotionally, the most significant of the complex of attitudes held by the members of the pressure group and undoubtedly, one of the strongest contributing factors to the support this group received from the transferees.

¹ibid., May 18, p. 3.

DISILLUSIONMENT OF THE IDEALISTS - GROWTH OF HOSTILITY TOWARD OLD
TULE LAKE POPULATION

Those of the transferees who had hoped to establish and become part of a genuine segregation center soon were bitterly disappointed. The old population of Tule Lake did not respond at all to the crusading spirit of the new-comers. To begin with, almost one-fifth of the population of old Tule Lake refused to answer the questionnaire at the time of registration. According to a statistical survey made December 3, 1943 there were still 1128 unauthorized residents in camp at that time. There is evidence that these persons, who had managed to convince the WRA hearing committees that they were "disloyal" to the United States, did not at first attempt to conceal their practical motives for remaining in Tule Lake from the transferees. However, when they remarked to the new-comers that they had stayed in Tule to await the end of the war before deciding where they wished to live or to get out of the draft they were met with an amazement which rapidly developed into hostility. The number of old Tuleans who actually were undecided as to loyalty or were neither No-No, repatriate or expatriate was greatly exaggerated by the transferees. Some transferees conceived and spread the idea that the old Tuleans were ikujinashi (spineless), that they were willing to take anything from the Administration, that on the whole, they did not wish to return to Japan. Certain transferees decided that WRA had perpetrated a deceitful trick, putting them down in a center purported to be for segregees only and actually populated by a large number of "Yes-Yes" people, still "loyal to the United States." Gone was the dream that in Tule Lake there

would be no more conflict of opinion on "loyalty" no more fence-sitters, no more inu.

many of the transferees and a still larger part of the old Tulean population were not affected in this manner and kept to the opinion that after all, everybody in Tule Lake should be treated as if they really wished to return to Japan. But certain minorities, particularly among the transferees from Jerome and Topaz, felt that the situation could not be tolerated. How this sentiment affected the development of the pressure group and the demands made to the administration will be discussed later in its proper place.

The following verbatim statements made by transferees from Gila, Jerome, Topaz and Manzanar throw some light on the psychological effect of the discovery that many of the old Tuleans did not think as they did.

From a letter written by a kibel woman, an active "agitator" from Jerome:

"When we learned the facts of failure on the part of the WRA to carry out this as a segregation center, that many a loyal ones still remained here in large numbers and many uncertain in status; the No-Yes, the Yes-No, the non-registrants, this, the dump, certainly was no place for us. . . .

"To make this center livable as possible as we have been privileged in other center, to ascertain a certain status as a repatriate and expatriate not to be dealt alike with the other uncertain element. It was the feeling and the opinion of the segregees to form a central committee to carry out these above-mentioned facts for the benefits of our own and felt it most necessary to ascertain a certain status as we previous had expected. . . .

"What the former Tuleans or the uncertain ones thought at this time I have no idea, but the segregees were all for it."¹

A nisei girl from Topaz, too young to take any part in political activity gave her reaction as follows. Her remarks

¹R. Hankey, Notes, July 18, 1944, pp. 2-3.

on the Co-op are particular noteworthy, since they were shared by many transferees.

"Another thing that struck us was the great number of Yes-Yes people and people who hadn't registered who were here. We had expected just one group and had expected to run this camp as we wanted to. We had high hopes of that. . .

"We noticed the people here were so easy going and let every thing up to the Administration, and didn't bother to put in their viewpoints or anything.

"Especially about the Co-op. It was so different from the other Co-ops. We were shocked to see all the vegetables, potatoes and luxuries like cosmetics and desserts, because at Topaz we just had simple cupcakes and one kind of cookery and things like that. We didn't have varieties there and yet that was adequate for us there.

"At first it was so new to us and so long since we had gone to a store that we were glad. But as time went on we noticed that it wasn't so good. That was one way of wasting our money as well as giving the government an opportunity of not feeding us."¹

At a later interview this same young woman gave the following apt description of the segregees' feelings toward the old Tuleans. For all its briefness this is a shrewd statement and gives an excellent picture of the attitude of the more idealistic segregees:

"Most of the former Tuleans who are here, they're the type that are never for anything. They're always saying, 'If only we would be quiet, it would be all right. Why make trouble?' Maybe it's because they're country people. A lot of them are Sacramento farmers.

"They're always saying, 'Before you people came it was this way and that way.' We try to explain to them but they don't get it through their heads."²

A young kibel girl from Gila said:

"There were some families here - old Tuleans - who said, 'We haven't decided whether we're going back to Japan yet. Our boys just refused to register.' I told my parents, 'Gee, they just stayed here. They didn't want to go out.' I don't have much respect for them."³

¹July 18, *ibid.*, p. 1.

²*ibid.*, Aug. 7, p. 2.

³*ibid.*, July 19, p. 3.

A young nisei girl from Gila, definitely not a supporter of the pressure group, said:

"At the relocation camp there were so many that were loyal to America. We felt people with the same kind of mind would be assembled here. But we found 5,000 Yes-Yes here. They (the transferees) thought they should be kicked out."¹

A young nisei man from Manzanar, who became involved in the pressure group after it was established, stated:

"That's a very important point. I think about 7,000 people were left here. Among those people there is quite a number who have no intention of going to Japan. Possibly half of them should go out of camp."²

An older nisei from Manzanar, who, although he did not arrive in camp until February, admitted that he had come to the conclusion that this attitude was very important, said:

"By gathering the news from the people, I think it amounts to this. I presume the people who came here as segregees from various centers were very much surprised to see the large amount of people of different status remaining in camp. You have to take into consideration the feeling of the segregees."³

K., an internee from Leupp, who also did not arrive in camp until after the outbreak of trouble, wrote such a detailed, honest account of his first reaction to the presence of the loyal group that it should be included here:

"Let us not forget the political side of the question. We who were segregated as unloyal must be considered heart and soul Japanese and for Japan. Yet amongst us the WRA has permitted the loyal group to remain. For what purpose we do not know unless their residence is permitted in order to employ them as spies. This is one of the sore spots requiring immediate attention.

"The greater majority of these so-called loyalists are not truly patriotic. They've declared themselves loyal because of personal reasons; the greatest of which is to avoid the conscription into the Japanese Military Forces in the event when exchange of prisoners of war is speedily carried out. But should they remain in the U. S. by swearing allegiance, they would escape

¹ ibid., p. 4.

² ibid., July 30, p. 4.

³ ibid., p. 8.

that fear of being conscripted since this government then was deferring all Japanese nationals to 4C and 4F. So they did and considered themselves wise and safe, laughing at those who hastily renounced their loyalty to the country of their birth. . . .

"This No-Yes-No group is doubly despised by the true adherents to Japan and to their Emperor. They are neither Americans nor Japanese. They are men without a country.

"Now to further crowd this camp with such opportunists of No-Yes-No, would create trouble. Therefore their admittance here will be greatly deplored. We do not want them. Those amongst us now ought to be thrown into a camp of their own. . . .

"Is it not palpable the Administration....is making a critical mistake of grouping people of contra-political beliefs here at Tule Lake? The demand to remove the loyals out of this camp has only been partially met. I hope for the good of all concerned, further augmentation of the loyals with the No-Yes-No group from various camps will not be permitted under any circumstances. We do not care to mingle with the degenerates."¹

At a later date, K. expressed his opinion more specifically on the old Tuleans. The accusations that they held the key positions in employment, that they were given preference in obtaining jobs and that they stayed at Tule Lake to make money were widely believed and repeated.

"The people from the Sacramento Valley are staying here today. Perhaps they knew each other so well, they didn't want to be parted. . . .To avoid the trouble of packing and moving to another camp and living among strangers again. And those who were doing a good business here - you can't blame them. Why not remain here and keep on making money? (K. speaks in irony here, since he abhors such motives.) Some of them were probably making more money than ever before in their lives.

"They were holding all the key positions. I was told (that) when I arrived here. I noticed it myself: if you tell the placement office which center you come from they don't pay much attention. But if you were an old Tulean, you seemed to get a job right away: When I told them I was from Leupp, the girls in the office made a face.....

"All the old Tuleans were pulling for the old Tuleans. They got into the good positions and just stuck with it. The others had the left overs."²

¹JYK, MS, pp. 7-9.

²K. Hankey, Notes, Aug. 21, pp. 1-2.

Another Leupp ex-internee, a young kibel made the same accusation:

"A fellow who works at the statistics office said that the old Tuleans had all the good jobs."¹

A member of the Negotiating Committee expressed his disgust with the old inhabitants of Tule Lake as follows:

"There were also a lot of old Tuleans who stayed here solely for their own good. I admire a person who pledges his loyalty to America and would show his loyalty by doing something about it.

"Most of the Japanese stayed here because they wanted to get out of the draft. They wanted to stay here too.... Besides many of them were making money here. . . In other centers there is also much money to be made. But to make money in here is wrong. If people want to make money they should get out."²

A conservative young nisei transferee from Gila described the attitude prevailing among the segregees soon after their arrival and the response of the old Tuleans as follows:

"I noticed that the Tule Lakers were all regretting the fact that this has become a segregation camp. They said, 'Gee, this camp was such a nice place before segregation.'

"We complained and they complained. In other words, they thought segregation wasn't as good as it should have been."³

This recognition of fundamental differences in aims and attitudes between the two groups, the transferees and the old inhabitants of Tule Lake developed soon after segregation. Almost a year later the differences had not been resolved: a large amount of the mutual distrust and hostility continued. When, in June and July of 1943, the writer attempted to extend her circle of old Tulean acquaintances and informants through her transferee friends she met with no success whatever. "I don't know any old Tuleans;" "We don't associate with them;" "We don't see eye to

¹ ibid., Aug. 23, p. 2.

² ibid., Sept. 11, 1944, p. 5.

³ ibid., Aug., 30, 1944, pp. 1-2.

eye on anything;" she was told repeatedly. Two intelligent nisei girls said with delicate scorn:

"They don't seem to have much in common with us. Several girls work in our office, but we don't get along."¹

RESENTMENTS OVER RECEPTION AND INFERIOR FACILITIES OF TULE LAKE

Some of the resentments which will be described in the following section preceded the realization that Tule Lake was not to be peopled by a group uniformly loyal to Japan. It has been thought preferable however, to describe the viewpoint of the frustrated idealists separately, and place it first, since the birth of the concept preceded the arrival of the transferees at Tule Lake. Some of the numerous, more mundane grievances which will now be described were experienced during the first few days of life at Tule Lake. As the days passed, new resentments were added. ~~The~~ ^{between} all feeling ~~sent~~ toward the older inhabitants of Tule Lake ^{and the transferees} was strengthened on this score also, for the old Tuleans did not appreciate being told that facilities at Tule Lake were far below the standards to which the transferees had become accustomed in the Relocation Centers.

A synthesis of these resentments over living conditions was expressed by "Y" who became an important leader in the pressure group:

"The way it started - of course, everybody who came to this center from the other relocation centers compared this center to the other centers. Food, housing, the hospital and sanitation was very low compared to the other centers we came from. We didn't do anything about it until the truck accident."²

The "prison-camp" atmosphere

As preparation for a camp of avowedly "disloyal" individuals, Tule Lake camp had been surrounded by a "man-Proof" fence 7 feet

¹ibid., July 31, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid., Sept. 11, p. 3.

turned into barracks to house young unmarried men. The conviction developed that this ill treatment was being meted out to the people because they were "disloyal". A reliable Caucasian informant who assisted in the Housing Division at this time stated that it was a madhouse. Former Tuleans who had left camp had sold their barrack improvements, shelves, built in cupboards and the like to evacuees remaining in Tule. The buyers moved into these apartments without notifying the Housing Department. When segregees arrived, they not infrequently found the barrack room assigned to them already occupied. Some of these stranded families ignored the Housing Department, found suitable unlocked quarters and moved in. This haphazard moving added to the burdens of the already overtaxed Housing Department. Most of the barracks were very dirty; some were filthy. One family found their assigned quarters so uninhabitable that they would not even put down their suitcases but slept the night in the block manager's office. The next morning the father came to the Housing Department and said he must have different quarters. He was told he must take the room assigned to him. This he refused to do and insisted that Mr. Huycke, who was then head of Housing, examine his apartment. After much argument, Mr. Huycke gave in. He found that the apartment in question had been used as distillery and that the fig mash had spilled over the entire apartment, creating a dreadful stench. A disinfecting and cleaning crew worked three days to render the room fit for habitation.¹

One nisei from Gila described his first impression of Tule Lake as follows:

¹R. Hankey, Notes, April, pp. 36, 37.

high and topped with three strands of barbed wire. Watchtowers had been hurriedly constructed at regular intervals around this fence. The presence of this fence was and continued to be regarded as an insult, a nagging reminder of American public opinion, by most of the segregees. Few, however, have expressed themselves as fluently or as bitterly as Mr. K:

"A very repulsive sight greeted us as we approached Tule Lake. It was the sight of numerous watch towers lining the perimeter of the camp. I felt as if we were a bunch of real criminals about to be impounded. . . . I felt sure others must have felt the same since I have heard them cursing and swearing vengeance.

"My feelings were further aggravated as we neared the camp. Though I have read about the high fences being erected, while at Leupp, my imagination seemed to have failed in its proper conception because the fences in reality are much high and more cruel, both in construction and appearance. I did not believe they were built so high and with meshed wires similar to those used at San Diego Zoo. Why even the gorillas with tremendous strength were held helpless captives, and when men of inferior strength were caged in like a bunch of wild animals, I felt terribly irritated. Unconsciously I too have sworn to avenge this injustice some day.

"Topping everything which tends to rouse the ire of the internees are the search lights beaming throughout the camp, watching us through the wee hours of the night as if we were incorrigible murderers. Have we not been the most law-abiding people in the past? Why must we now be subjected to such humiliation."¹

Resentment over Housing and Food

Additional irritating factors, were the confusion and crowding in the distribution of housing, the omnipresent dirt, caused not only by Tule Lake's frequent dust storms but by the fact that many of the barracks assigned had been inadequately cleaned or had not been cleaned at all. Moreover, housing accommodations were in most cases more crowded than in the centers from which the segregees had come. Many recreation halls were

¹MS, p. 1.

"When I came from Gila I just stood here like a dumbbell. Everything was dirty; the barracks were dirty; the showers were dirty, the mess halls were dirty. When I first came here, that's the way I felt. I think the old Tuleans were used to this mess. That's the main key point in the cause of the trouble."¹

A nisei girl from Topaz said:

"The thing that struck us was, I think, the first appearance of the camp. The comparison with Topaz was very poor. The latrines, the mess and the apartments were so poor in condition and so different."²

A nisei girl from Gila who later worked against the pressure group, said:

"You know how it was on the train. After being so tired, to come to this dirty camp which was so dark and dusty and windy. The Housing didn't want us to be what they call a homogeneous group. So they scattered us all over. We didn't have a single friend in our whole block. We resented the Housing Department. Then, in the latter part of October they broke the Housing Department's windows. They didn't find the guilty ones at that time. I think that was the spark of the whole incident (breaking the windows).

"Well, housing was the worst. We came into rooms with half the plaster board stolen; there was even nothing to light a stove with. We had to take it or leave it."³

A kibel man about thirty years old who came from Gila said:

"I felt this was really a sad smokey place."

His wife added, "I said, 'What a dump!'" On another occasion she stated,

"For a few months or so you can be crowded. But when you don't know when you're leaving, it's very hard."⁴

Another young kibel girl from Gila said:

"One thing, when I came here I almost cried was, that all of our friends were separated from us. We said, 'Let's move.' That was important with me. I almost cried when I came here and saw it.

¹ibid., p. 20.

²ibid., July 18, p. 1.

³ibid., July 19, p. 4.

⁴ibid., Aug. 8, p. 4; March, p. 5.

"The few people who came here later (In February and May) were not so bad off. They were put together more or less in one place."¹

A young kibeï woman from Jerome, an active member of a pressure group wrote in a letter to the writer:

"Then also, the poor facilities for housing, poor foods, employments unfair to newcomers, as compared to the previous camps we have come from, were all brought up to our attention and dissatisfaction arouse."²

Mr. K, who came into camp in December wrote:

"While in Leupp, I have heard from various sources that Tule Lake is a very dirty camp. Upon my arrival though I was prepared to see dirt, I was very much shocked to find it dirtier than I had really anticipated. I wondered what sort of people had lived here, or what sort of an Administrator was responsible for the health of the residents. . . . Day in day out, living in filth must have created disgust to such an extent that it finally became one of the contributing factors of the trouble."³

A very conservative young nisei girl from Gila said:

"I had friends here (in Tule Lake) and had always corresponded with them. They liked it here. It was like any other center - that's what I thought from their letters.

"I expected more than this in the camp. I expected better facilities. I didn't expect it to be just as good as Gila, but better than this. I didn't like the first impression at all."⁴

An equally conservative nisei girl, a resident of pre-segregation Tule Lake admitted the justification of the segregees' complaints about the housing:

"The segregees were so unsatisfied with the housing. Of course, you can't blame them because they had to sleep in the Rec. Halls. And besides, the people who went out had torn down their cabinets and cupboards."

¹ ibid., July 30, p. 5.

² ibid., July 18, p. 2.

³ MS, p. 5.

⁴ R. Hankey, Notes, Aug. 30, p. 1.

This young woman added that public feeling ran so high that for a time the Japanese girls employed in the Housing Department were afraid to go to work.¹

Kuratomi, chairman of the pressure group stated:

"The immediate impression I received after coming here was the unpreparedness on the part of the Administration, especially in the field of housing and reception. I arrived here at 5:00 p.m. on the 30th of September. That day the Army was good enough to give us a lunch. After we were through with the processing it was well towards evening.

"Eventually, we were thrown into an unpartitioned Recreation Hall. No mattresses were available. I got the block manager to find me a mattress. Even the stove wasn't ready for operation. The block manager had to get wood for us (for kindling). I don't believe the block manager was even notified we were to be there. There were ten boys and they told us that between 20 and 30 (more) would come. But they didn't know. They had no plan at all.....

"At that time the people leaving the project (leaving Jerome) had the feeling they would like to be housed closely together. But realizing the conditions at Tule Lake, they didn't expect too much....We did not feel that our treatment would be the same.

"When I arrived here I heard so many complaints about the separation in housing. Even families were sometimes separated from one end of the camp to the other.....

"As far as Jerome was concerned, the facilities were very good. Each latrine and urine basin was individual and the interiors of the shower were very much better.

"Food too was much better (at Jerome). This was especially strange, since Jerome raised so little. However, food there in comparison to this center was twice as good."²

Equally disgusting to the newcomers were the extremely dirty, over-used latrinal facilities. The writer can vouch for this from personal observation. The latrines of Tule Lake even in February of 1944 were far below the standard of those in Gila in cleanliness. The equipment is worn out and inferior; some of the toilets do not flush; fixtures are dingy and dirty; obscenities are scrawled on the walls.

¹ibid., Aug. 24, p. 1.

²ibid., Sept. 18, pp. 3,4,5.

Almost as irritating as the dirt and the unsatisfactory housing was the quality of the food, which most transferees considered definitely inferior to that of the Relocation Centers. If every comment made on the bad food at Tule Lake had been written down, it would comprise a separate paper. One informant remarked months later when the food had greatly improved, "If then food had been as it is now, it (the warehouse incident) could never have happened."¹

"We never get fresh vegetables. A week and a half ago they started coming in, but they didn't have any for 1½ or 2 months. All we had was potatoes or beets. We're getting some lettuce now. Why couldn't we get it when the canteen was selling it?"²

While Mr. K. did not arrive in Tule until December, his reaction to the food at that time, which he expressed most emphatically, was no doubt shared to a large extent, by many of the transferees who arrived two months earlier:

Upon my arrival here I have noticed one thing in particular that justified the Japanese to revolt. That is the food was terribly poor. I positively believe the food per person per day couldn't have gone over 20 cents which is less than half of what the Government really allows.

Much criticism was heard throughout the country that the Japanese are being well fed especially after the investigation conducted by the Dies Committee. What lies the Dies Committee could so boldly print. If they would only come and live with us; eat with us; and sleep with us for just a month instead of two years as we already have and report the truths as they really exist, I'll praise them for their fortitude.

Regardless of what the Dies Committee has said, the food was bad and is bad today. Though it improved a little, the difference is so small, it still must be hovering around 20¢ a day. Why we haven't had an egg for over two weeks now.

Food is one of the greatest contributing factors that determines the harmony of the camp. It affects the stomach of every man, woman, and child. The quality of the food can be judged at times by the mood of the people. Grumbling and cursing, animated criticism of this government is freely voiced.

¹Notes, May 15, p. 4.

²Notes, Mar., p. 14.

To my judgment the food lacks the essential elements that gives us strength and energy. Many boys are taking vitamins to keep their bodies from going to pieces. My eyes went bad on me since evacuation due to lack of proper food. I am not able today to do one fourth of the work I used to do before the war. Should I choose to do any manual work, my entire body starts to tremble and if I should persist, dizziness and fainting sensations overwhelm me. Though I look strong and vigorous, I could not in reality do the work that is required of me now.

Further enumerating on food as one of the greatest contributing factors of revolt. Is it not obvious when thousands upon thousands of men, women, and children, the majority of whom are not working and therefore have no appetite that relishes anything will naturally find fault with food? When the appetite is good after a good day's work, the food may be gobbled down to satisfy the hungry stomach, but when the appetite is bad, the best food is subject to criticism.

Many at time I've looked for meat in the plate and if I am gratified with more than two tiny pieces I consider myself lucky. The plate of stew is just a plate of carrots and potatoes flavored with bits of meat. Be it roast pork, if we get more than two slices of one mouthful each, it looks as if the cook had made a mistake. The rest is dressing and gravy which we use to finish a bowl of rice. Fish is of the poorest quality. Herring which is used for fertilizer is now being supplied to us. With such food with no varieties, I cannot blame the rioters when they demanded better food on November 1, 1943.¹

A nisei girl, an old Tulean resident, who disapproved strongly of the agitators, reflected this attitude by stating:

"We always get worse food here than at the other camps. At least that's what all the other people told us."²

Another conservative nisei girl, a transferee from Gila stated:

"Before the incident the food wasn't good. I missed the steak that we had every Sunday at Gila. But the food wasn't really bad."³

Two other girls, nisei transferees who had previously voiced strong hostility to the "trouble-making agitators" expressed themselves as follows:

"When I came here I got the impression that the Co-op sold so much fruit here. And we didn't get any fruit in the mess.

¹ MS, pp. 4, 5.

² R. Hankey, Notes, Aug. 24, p. 4.

³ ibid., Aug. 30, p. 1.

At Topaz we got so much fruit in the mess we always had extra fruit in the house."

Her friend added: "We hardly get fruit in the mess at all and I had to buy it in the Co-op."

The first informant continued:

"Here I have to ask for my brother in Topaz to send me some fruit. In Topaz they didn't sell fruit in the canteens but they gave it to us in the mess. Since we came here we spend so much money on food."

At this point another girl, an old resident of Tule joined her voice to the complaints:

"We've had chicken here only once."

A transferee from Topaz said nostalgically:

"And at Topaz we got duck or chicken once a week."

The first speaker, from Topaz, added:

"And ice cream every Sunday.....Also, all the other relocation centers get linoleum. But this place has none!"

The young girl who regretted the ducks and chickens of Topaz closed the conversation with the significant remark:

"Have you seen the personnel quarters here. They're positively extravagant! I went into the personnel rec. hall the other day and I thought, "Gosh."¹

Resentment of Suspected Graft

Along with this resentment over poor food a conviction developed that at least part of this condition was due to graft on the part of Caucasian and Japanese members of the Mess Division. This suspicion existed before segregation and was shared by the older inhabitants of Tule Lake. Rumors of project meat being shipped into Klamath Falls and sold on the black market were current not only among the evacuees but among members of the Appointed Personnel. It was also rumored that large food

¹ ibid., Sept. 14, p. 6.

bills were run up in nearby towns by members of the mess division and that those merchants who furnished an additional bribe were the first to have their bills met. According to members of the pressure group and persistent rumor among members of the appointed personnel, this condition was investigated by the F. B. I. in mid-November and resulted in the dismissal of several of the guilty staff members.¹

This belief in graft affected the evacuees profoundly. It's force is reflected only mildly in the following statements. "I" a nisei from Gila, referring to the suspicion of graft by the Caucasian said:

"Grafting started the whole works."²

K., referring to grafting by Japanese, said:

"Undue accusation of persons stealing and of grafts goes on without respect of the person under fire. Thus creating suspicion in the eyes of the people without proofs.

"Recently proofs were uncovered and the suspects were arrested (these were Japanese arrested for stealing rice). I personally hope they will be given the severest punishment if found guilty."³

The accumulation of evidence to prove the existence of graft on the part of the Caucasian personnel soon became one of the most important of the self-imposed tasks of the pressure group which was organized. They considered it one of the most potent weapons against the Administration.

Sentiment over inferior living conditions was summarized by a well educated issei, an ex-Santa Fe internee from Manzanar. This is an almost universal camp sentiment.

¹See p. .

²R. Hankey, Notes, February, p. 14.

³MS., p. 2.

"The starting of such an action (the rise of the pressure group and the trouble which resulted) is the responsibility of the Administration itself. If the Administration had taken consideration of the comfort of the people as a whole, I don't think they could ever have had any action as that which came from the miserable colony."

This gentleman, a graduate of Stanford, also stated that he was of the opinion that the segregees had been sacrificed to WRA policy by being branded as dangerous and confined within a special camp so that WRA's desire to speed relocation might be facilitated. This opinion has been expressed several times by segregees, but only by those of a high educational level.

"First there was segregation, a mistake. Then military registration which was illogical. Then, to push the relocation program, the answers made at military registration were used to segregate a group which never could have been segregated. This created a problem for WRA which they had not originally anticipated. Those who came into Tule Lake as segregees had been treated with greater severity than in their relocation centers."¹

Of minor though by no means insignificant importance was the insufficiency of work and recreation. The work shortage gave rise to the additional resentment, that all the good jobs, "the key positions" were held by the old residents of Tule. To a large extent this criticism was justified.

A young man, a nisei from Gila said:

"When I got here I got a job. I didn't feel bad at all. People who didn't get jobs felt awfully bad."²

K. said:

"No work is created to relieve the loathsome hours; no recreations are sponsored to divert the minds of the residents.... So far I have not seen any type of recreation sponsored for the adults, to divert their unpleasant minds. If there is enough work in this camp to keep the adults well occupied, recreation may not be necessary but when work is so scarce as it is here, recreation will play a great part in keeping the people satisfied. But neither work nor recreation are being sponsored to

¹R. Hankey, Notes, May 21, pp. 2, 4.

²R. Hankey, Notes, Mar., p. 13.

relieve the dissatisfied from concocting mischief. Seven days a week, 30 days a month, day in and day out without a thing to do, topped with lack of funds to keep oneself satisfied with wants really does get a man. This is another source of trouble.¹

Additional attitudes toward employment will be quoted in the discussion devoted to the hostility which developed toward the old Tuleans.

Another resentment which had a long pre-segregation history in Tule Lake sprang from the actions and attitude of the Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Pedicord. He had acquired an unprecedented degree of unpopularity with the Japanese before segregation took place. A petition signed by 7,500 evacuees requested his removal in June, 1943. Reasons for his unpopularity were set forth in detail by Marvin Opler, the Community Analyst, in a report dated July 6, 1943. In the petition his attitudes toward evacuees, both staff members and patients, is called unsympathetic and dictatorial. He is accused of addressing the evacuees as "Japs," not obtaining necessary medical equipment, placing economy above service, and forcing evacuee doctors to relocate by his dictatorial attitude. Some of the unconfirmed accusations made by informants in November include: That Pedicord had anti-Japanese views, that he was incompetent and negligent of his duties, that he refused to grant permission for transfusions to two or three patients who later died,² that he did not order sufficient medicine for hospital equipment, that he hired Caucasian quacks one of whom caused a child to be stillborn by giving the mother too much serum, that he cut the hospital staff so severely that it could not run efficiently, that he made the Caucasian nurses section heads and

²Report, Dec., 24, p. 21.

¹MS., pp. 5-6.

permitted them to give orders to the evacuee doctors (even though one evacuee doctor had a license to practice in California), that he cut down the allowance of baby food although there was an adequate supply in the warehouse. Because of hiring "quacks" he is also blamed for the death of a severely burned evacuee child who is said to have been left without treatment from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. when it was finally treated by a Japanese doctor coming on duty.¹ The transferees took over this older resentment with remarkable speed. Dr. Pedicord's removal became one of the planks in the program of the pressure group.

While most of the informants quoted in the preceding analysis belong to that section of the population which sincerely desired to return to Japan, the writer noted that those, who later changed their minds and asked to relocate were just as vociferous in their complaints over ill treatment at Tule Lake. There was one exception, however. Those who had decided to get out of Tule Lake by the middle of 1944, had never been strong advocates of "a camp where we can all act like Japanese and prepare for life in Japan." Instead, they had talked of "being treated like human beings and having as good a time as we can while we're waiting here." It should be kept in mind, therefore, that those who had found a comparatively safe and permanent place to stay until the end of the war shared many of the resentments of the sincere repatriates. Since the possibility of exchange was exceedingly remote, they realized that they might be forced to live at Tule Lake for an indefinite number of years. From Tule Lake and its living conditions, whether good or bad, there was no escape. There was no

¹ ibid., p. 17.

possibility of removal by relocation. Conditions had to be endured or changed.

ATTITUDES OF THE OLD TULEAN POPULATION

Although there were many exceptions, it is clear that the bulk of the older inhabitants of Tule Lake were characterized by a markedly different complex of attitudes. On the whole they did not wish to change the camp, especially if the attempt to effect changes would cause trouble. Moreover, they looked upon themselves as the established group, the "Old Timers" as one nisei girl expressed it, and felt that if any changes were to be made, they should be consulted. They did not take kindly to being told by the newcomers that Tule Lake was a dump, that the food was bad and the facilities far inferior to the relocation centers from which the complaining transferees had come. Some old Tuleans admitted that the facilities of Tule might have been inferior, but defended their acquiescence to the conditions by accusing the transferees of demanding luxury. One young woman said, "What do they expect. After all, there's a war on."

Repeatedly, old Tulean informants spoke nostalgically of "the old Tule Lake" and remarked that it was gone forever. "Before the segregees came in people got along well. There was peace." Some old Tuleans termed the pressure group's attempt to improve the camp a high-handed and unnecessary effort to make the camp over. "All they (the newcomers) did was talk, talk, talk." The younger men in the transferee group who, feeling the need of exhibitionism, broke up nisei dances, behaved rudely to the girls and, in general, acting according to their own peculiar concept of the acme of "Japanese" behavior, were criticized and looked upon with scorn

and fear. They were termed "the kibel" or "the geta boys" and were cordially disliked by the nisei girls. When discussing this period of camp life, old Tuleans often lay a large part of the hostility between the groups to the fact that the old Tuleans held the "key positions" in employment and had the best jobs. Most old Tuleans admit that this was the truth although they may not admit that the complaint was just.

It was understandably, extremely rare for an old Tulean to remark that the transferees resented the fact that the old inhabitants were not "loyal to Japan" and "disloyal to America." Instead, they preferred to state, "They said we were not loyal to Japan because we did not want to make trouble." Nevertheless, several old Tuleans did admit to the writer, that they did not intend to go to Japan and that they were remaining at Tule until it was safe to relocate or until they felt capable of deciding whether to remain in this country or go to Japan.

It should be remembered that this analysis is general and that some of the older inhabitants of Tule Lake were strong supporters of the pressure group's attempt at reform. On the other hand, some transferees came to Tule Lake with no intention of returning to Japan; others came determined to sit on the fence until the course of the war indicated which country would make a more satisfactory future home. Both pictures, that of the attitudes of the old inhabitants and that of the newcomers are somewhat exaggerated, the ^{chief} ~~major~~ differences having been over-emphasized. The bulk of the transferees were not as militant, arrogant and pro-Japanese as the Tuleans paint them; the bulk of the Tuleans were not as meek, spineless and pro-American as the segregees insist.

Very typical of the attitude of the old Tuleans population are the following verbatim statements made by an intelligent nisei girl "L" who was convinced of the foolishness of combating the Administration, and, after the incident, returned to work as soon as she could. She showed no concern over being seen with a Caucasian, and even walked through the camp with the writer, stating nonchalantly, "They call us inus anyway." Such unconcern toward being seen talking to a Caucasian was ordinarily shown only by "agitators" of established stature.

"What the old Tule Lake was, it's never going to be again. Then there were people from three states here, Washington, California, and Oregon. We got along well. . . . But now. . . ."

"We found out right off that the segregees who came from other centers were jealous of the old Tuleans - that they had higher positions. They wanted to take that over. Somebody came into the Community Activities office and broke the chairs and typewriters. We were supposed to be serving the people. They (the segregees) didn't give us a chance.

"The people who came in had one object: to crush this camp and make a new one. But the Old Tuleans interfered with that."¹

At a later interview the same informant said:

"They said we Tuleans were soft and good-for-nothing."²

During a conversation with four nisei girls, two of whom were Old Tuleans and two transferees of the same convictions as the Old Tuleans, "P", a nisei woman in her thirties, who had been very active politically in the center which she had left for Tule Lake, remarked:

"The Tuleans here were the old Timers. The strangers who came in didn't consult with the old Timers. They were going to control the camp."

"L" was present at this talk and added,

¹ ibid., Aug. 17, p. 4.

² ibid., Sept. 14, p. 2.

"They didn't like the idea of the old Tuleans having all the key jobs either."¹

The attitude of these young women toward expatriation is interesting. "P" admitted that she did not want to return to Japan. However, she explained at considerable length her apprehension toward her future in the United States should she decide to relocate. If she or her husband believed they could relocate with security, it is very likely that they would be glad to leave Tule Lake. "L" did not express her opinion on repatriation spontaneously. After she and the writer had become well acquainted, the writer ventured to ask her, "Do you really want to go back to Japan?" "L" thought for a moment and then said, "We'll, we've taken out repatriation."

As this conversation continued, Mrs. "P" admitted that conditions at Tule Lake were not ideal, but concluded:

"After all, this is war and we can't expect luxury."

"B" another old Tulean nisei girl added with a note of offended community pride:

"The first thing that struck me funny: the people from the other centers came in here and expected luxury. They said the latrines were bad, the food was bad, the housing was bad: everything was bad."

Mrs. "P" then pointed out the fallacy between the adoption of a stoic Japanese attitude and these complaints; admitting, however, that she herself did not think everything was as it should be at Tule Lake or the other centers, for that matter, and that it was probably the fault of the local Administrations.

"Fundamentally, they say they are loyal and want to go back to Japan. Then they should be willing to go through hell to get there. We were told what the camp was like before we came here.

¹ibid., p. 4.

"I feel that Washington is trying to do the right thing by us but that often we're not getting what we should be from there (the local Administration). I felt that from the beginning, even the first camp I went into. Even if they get only five cents a day (in graft) from each of us - why, they'll be millionaires.

"When we first came in here the food was O. K."

The two old Tulean girls present remarked that before segregation, when Mr. Peck was Chief Steward, the "food had been terrible." After segregation it had improved.¹

Another excellent expression of old Tulean attitudes came from a nisei girl "E", who is employed in the high school office. "E" did not exhibit as much prejudice against the segregees as "L" or "P" and made a deliberate effort to express herself objectively.

"You know what I thought. I thought this would be a peaceful camp. I thought that since it was a camp of all people going back to Japan we'd have the same combination. But due to people with selfish reasons, they made riots. Those people were quiet back home. But having nothing to do, they made trouble here.

"I was disappointed. I expected a different spirit and living peaceful. . .

"Being a Tulean, we felt that they were making it tough for us. We had nothing (like the trouble) before they came in.

"I guess we were all employed and had the best jobs and they didn't like that either."²

An elderly issei woman gave her opinion of the transferees without mincing any words. Her remarks could not be taken down verbatim and are reproduced from memory:

"Before "these people" came here, everything was quiet. Everything went fine. But when these people from Gila, Poston, Jerome, and Topaz came in, all they could talk about was how fine things had been where they came from. In the relocation camps the food was better; there they had nice houses, or they had

1

² ibid., Sept. 19, p. 2.

fine white bath tubs. Things at Tule Lake (they said) were no good. These newcomers, all they do is talk, talk, talk.

"The trouble in camp was all made by a few people. If the Tule Lakers say anything the others say they are ikuinashi (spineless). So they don't say anything. They don't want trouble.

"The way these few trouble-makers behave is not true Yamato Damashi. The person who really acts according to Yamato Damashi makes himself low and does not talk.

The informant added with unusual frankness:

"The people in Tule Lake think they will stay in Tule Lake and maybe go back to Japan after the war. Maybe they will stay in this country. But some of the people who came in, they want to go back right away. All they do is talk, talk, talk."¹

How large a proportion of the issei old Tule Lake population had a similar attitude is impossible to say. That a considerable number of the nisei were not enthusiastic over expatriating there can be no doubt. Naturally, such sentiments were rarely expressed before Caucasians. "K. M." a young girl employed in the hospital as a nurses' aide was determined to relocate and intended to remain in Tule Lake only until the time when a nursing school would accept her. She expressed concern over the unfriendly treatment which had been accorded some relocating nisei, but obviously felt that life in the United States was the lesser of two evils. She explained frankly that she had deliberately remained at Tule Lake because she did not want to leave the camp at segregation time and had used the simple expedient of refusing to register for the Military registration. She added that she thought her hearing had been silly and that the hearing board members had been rude.²

"K. M." was even more anti-pathetic to the newcomers than the nisei girls quoted previously. When asked to describe her

¹ ibid., Sept. 27, 1944, p. 2.

² ibid., Aug. 17, 1944, p. 1.

first reaction to the transferees, she said:

"The first thing that happened to me was that one of my uniforms was stolen (her nurses' aide uniform). It was stolen right off the line from my back porch. That never happened before. . . .

"I think they (transferees) came here with a chip on their shoulders.

"Right after they came we had a welcome dance and the kibel came and told the people to go home. Everything was supposed to be Japanese, they said.

"When they arrived they broke down buildings, busted walls, and built bonfires and went around shouting 'Banzai.'"¹

This young woman, who lived in a block which was predominantly old Tulean appeared to have a particularly active grudge against the transferee "kibel" boys. She stated that she hated them; they were trouble-makers; they were always goose-stepping around (in their Japanese exercises) early in the morning and waking her up; they made life miserable for the nisei because there were so many more kibel than nisei in camp and the nisei could do nothing about it. She recounted an incident which occurred at one of the first block meetings she attended. An absent-minded man, who was not listening or did not understand the issue under discussion, applauded out of turn. Immediately the tough boys said; "Let's get that guy after the meeting." The man had to sneak out quietly to escape a besting.²

The unelaborated factors listed above, to which many less important attitudes could be added if data were more abundant, laid the foundation for the sociological explosion of late October and November and the events which followed. The rapid mounting of fury engendered when accidental events added profound emotional

1

2

resentments to this already impressive accumulation, strained the self-control of many of the residents past endurance and furnished the leaders of the pressure group with an issue of sufficient magnitude to make an aggressive stand against the Administration.

For this manifestation, the Administration was totally unprepared. In fact, the National Director of WRA believed that Tule Lake would be the most peaceful of the centers.¹ Moreover, the Administration was still endeavoring to settle the most pressing preliminary problems of organization, necessitated by this vast and hurried influx of groups from many centers when it was overwhelmed by the phenomenally rapid rise of a pressure group within the camp. The farm strike occurred less than three weeks after the beginning of the arrival of the segragees.

An attempt was made by Dr. Opler and a few other members of the Appointed Personnel to set up a body of staff members, the Advisory Council to assist in the initiation of some kind of colony organization.

"Before the accident we were dickering with Best on colony organization."²

Nothing concrete was accomplished and this contemplated body was swept away by the impact of independent organization from within the colony. It was re-established, however, a month after the proclamation of Martial Law and was later to play an important part in the organization and establishment of a group of Japanese, who attempted to bring the camp back to what was termed "normalcy" and cooperate with the Administration.

¹Find and quote, if possible, D. Myer's statement.

²Notes, Mar., p. 59.

THE COAL STRIKE

Less than two weeks after the arrival of the first transferees the workers on the coal crew threatened to strike. The grievance, negotiations and outcome was described by a member of the committee which negotiated with the representatives of the Administration as follows:

"That happened about ten days after I came here from Topaz. I heard there was a coal strike because I was a member of the Planning Board. Then Mr. Akiyama, Mr. Takada (who are both now in Santa Fe) and Mr. Yamanaka, of block 14 came to see me. They told me there was a grievance among the coal drivers and they wished me to try to iron out the grievance. Mr. Saito and Mr. Idemoto were foremen and they also came.

"I wanted to know the dope. They said there were some Japanese resting when the car of coal arrived here. It (the weather) was really hot then. Then one of the Caucasians came and said said, 'You are getting paid \$16.00 a month and I don't want to see you loafing on your job and resting like this.'

"The Japanese said the food they were receiving was poor and that the work was too tough. The Caucasian stated that the food did not concern him and that his chief responsibility was to see that they all worked.

"Now the coal workers had had a contract with the Administration prior to this incident. The boys wanted the conditions to be the same as the contract signed by the Japanese and the Caucasians previously. They stated that they had one hour of laundry to do each day and that at ten o'clock they had a little chow time and at 2:30 another snack. They wanted to go back on the same basis.


"The Caucasian said flatly that there was no committment and that it didn't concern him. They had to work at all times, whether or not, or he'd fire them because there were so many on the list to get jobs.

"So Mr. Mayeda (Head of Civic Organizations) Mr. Akiyama, Mr. Takata and I went to see Mr. Smith. We conferred for two, three days and at last agreed to have the workers on the same basis as the previous contract.

"About 15 were fired on that day, so we wanted them to be returned with full pay, and that was agreed upon."

¹Sept. 29, 1944, p. 3. ibid.

Opler made a full report on this coal strike and has several times made the statement that he thought the Negotiating Committee could have been handled in the same way. It is unlikely that more data can be gained from evacuees. A consideration of the attitude of the Administration, as expressed through Opler's reports will be interesting when I get the report.



RISE OF THE COUNTER DAIHYO SHA KAI GROUP -- THE COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

Lead up

The initial confusion and anxiety brought about by the entrance of the Army was followed by growing discontent and increasing vacillation on the part of the residents. By the middle of December the Daihyo Sha Kai had lost virtually all of its able or forceful leaders since all of the members of the Negotiating Committee and many of the block representatives of the Daihyo Sha Kai had been arrested by the Army and confined in the stockade. ~~There was nothing for~~
~~the~~ The residents had no recourse but to wait for the authorities to give in (and the possibility of this eventuality dwindled week by week) or to abandon the partial strike and with it their hoped for gains.

In mid-December of 1943 the residents fell into three general categories:

1) Vociferous supporters of the incident, the Negotiating Committee and the status quo, i. e., persons who carried their resistance to the point of proposing a camp-wide hunger strike to gain their ends.

2) The greater number of the residents who vacillated between reluctance to admit defeat or abandon the ~~status~~ status quo and a desire to end the existing misery ~~and~~
and freedom confusion and return to the comparative comfort of a job and salary of 16 dollars a month.

3) A group of residents who had come to the conclusion that the best policy was to abandon the partial strike, go back to work and put a definite end to the uncomfortable and nerve-racking period of disturbance.

The vacillation of the greater number of residents

toward important issues relating to the Daihyo Sha and the Negotiating Committee is exemplified by the following phenomena, all of which took place in ~~early December~~ late November and early December:

a) In late November a petition was circulated ~~raising~~ among the residents, pledging support to the Negotiating Committee and its platform. Only half the residents signed the petition although much pressure must have been applied by vociferous supporters of the Daihyo Sha.

on December 4
b) Little more than a week later/a secret block election was held and the residents voted overwhelmingly in favor of continuing the status quo or partial strike.

c) Early in December the Daihyo Sha
~~on December 10~~ proposed to the Co-op that it cease the sale of "luxury" items so that the economic pinch of holding to the strike might be somewhat alleviated. The residents who were Co-op members voted on this issue and the proposal was defeated by a 9 - 1 block ratio.

The tremendous power of public opinion and, to a lesser extent, fear of the ~~and~~ vociferous Group I

exemplified by the following phenomena already discussed in the preceding chapter.

exemplified by the following phenomena already discussed in the preceding chapter:

a) The Block Managers unequivocally refused to cooperate with the Army in mid-November in the matter of giving up the hiding members of the Negotiating Committee.

b) On December 4 the center residents voted overwhelmingly in favor of continuing the status quo or partial strike (although there is no means of determining how much pressure was applied at the time of voting).

c) At the end of November only half of the residents signed the second Petition of the Daihyo Sha Kai, pledging support to the Negotiating Committee and its platform, even though much pressure must have been applied by vociferous supporters of the ~~the~~ Daihyo Sha Kai.

d) After Kai and Kuratomi gave themselves up to the Army, Mr. Takahashi of the Daihyo Sha made an eloquent plea to the body to disband. Although the body rejected Takahashi's proposal, his suggestion was not without support from other members.

e) In early December when the Daihyo Sha's proposal that the Co-op cease the sale of "luxury" items was put before the members of the Co-op it was voted down by a 9 to 1 block ratio.

~~Public opinion and fear of the vociferous Group I~~
 were still powerful factors working against the overt expression of the moderate attitudes held by Group III and by many members of Group II. By mid-December an increasing number of residents were leaning in this direction but they did not dare to say so. From Group III, however, sprang the leaders of a reactionary faction which organized and with the assistance of the administration was finally to ~~break~~ bring about the end of the strike.

Two factors were of the utmost importance in the development of the counter-Daihyo Sha Kai or the reactionary group. These were the constant ~~and~~ ~~unfading~~ encouragement given by the administration and the army and the fact that most of the Daihyo Sha leaders and block representatives had, by mid-December, been arrested and confined in the stockade. With the Negotiating Committee and its most overt supporters out of the way, the dangers and difficulties which an opposition group had to face were somewhat lessened. Even so, the step took courage for abuse and violence from the vociferous status-quo supporters was inevitable.

The Advisory Council, the administrative body first contemplated in early October, represented the administration in this delicate task of reinstating rapport with the colonists. 1/ On December 11 they contacted the first group of reactionary Japanese leaders from the Civic Organizations, a body on the WRA payroll whose duty it was to coordinate and facilitate relations between the Block Managers and the administration. Two former Tuleans, Mr. William Mayeda and Mr. Frank ~~Kawa~~ Furukawa and two newcomers Mr. Shimada (of Rohwer??) and Mr. Namekawa of Mt. Mountain represented this group. These men gave the Advisory Council their opinions of the incident and the part played by the Negotiating Committee:

-
1. The Advisory Council first began to function after the Nov. 4 incident as an advisory council to Mr. Best. In the large turnover which took place after the incident, several members left and were eventually replaced by Robertson, Head of Operations, Black, Head of Community Management, Markhim, Reports Officer and McNeil, Head of ~~Community Enterprises~~ Cooperative Enterprises.

newcomers, Mr. Shimada of ^{Behwer} and Mr. Namekawa represented this group. These men gave their opinions of the incident and the Negotiating Committee. ^{W. Admin. C.} Their account is freely transcribed from Opler's letter to Spicer of December 20: ^{1 Ht. Mt.}

The recent trouble had arisen because the "Jerome faction," also called the Kai-Kuratomi clique, had come to Tule Lake organized. This clique was also supported by and under pressure from a strong arm bunch from Jerome and that the leadership clique carried out the orders of this group "below it." The colonists were supporting the interned members of the Daihyo Sha's ward representatives, for although many colonists disagreed with the methods of the Committee, they had elected and seven had been thrown in as 'specialists', among the latter being the President and the Vice-President." After November 4, as its members were picked up, the committee augmented itself. "They elected seven men and then put seven others in to watch them. The Committee was a minority representation from the start, but there was nothing to counteract them with. There were a lot of people from Tule Lake who didn't like to be left out of it, but when all the 'black sheep' came into this camp, we were made to understand we couldn't have self-government, and even the Planning Board which isn't 'government' anyway, was broken up." When asked why the colony did not take steps, the representatives of Civic Organization pointed out that terrorism was feared: "A lot of people would speak up during the day, but they have to sleep in the colony at night; it would be different if we didn't have to live there."¹

¹Freely transcribed from Opler's letter ~~to Spicer~~, pp. 5, 6.

to Spicer, Dec. 20, 1944

The picture which these four Japanese presented to the Advisory Council was the view of Group III and contained among some truths a number of fallacious rationalizations which the more moderate colonists had developed by this time and which should be enlarged upon. That

Oplers conclusions from this conference were:

- (1) The Committee (Daihyo Sha Kai) was a minority faction.
- (2) Though a minority they exercised control by virtue of the methods; people felt they must be responsible for those in the military compound. "It was the principle of the thing."
- (3) Besides this, terroristic groups were making use of the situation to prolong the incident.¹

The picture which these four Japanese presented to the Advisory Council ^{was} ~~is~~ fundamentally correct, although certain statements ~~are open to criticism or should be enlarged upon.~~ ^{show bias and} That Kai and Kuratomi came to rule Lake with a group of supporters is almost certain. However, that this group was possessed of more than a very loose type of organization is very doubtful and that the trouble arose because of this "organized" group is quite false. These four anti-Daihyo Sha men were expressing a rationalization that became widespread among the camp residents later: that Kai and Kuratomi were responsible for the November difficulties and had forcibly led an unwilling misguided populace into misery and confusion. (The history of the development of the trouble has shown that this explanation of the phenomenon is very superficial; had not Kai and Kuratomi stepped forward, someone else, very likely Mr. Takahashi, would have been pushed into the saddle by the tremendous force of public pressure for action and would have become the scape-goat.)

The statement that "Kai and Kuratomi were dominated from below" requires some elucidation. The "strong-arm bunch" or rather, one of the strong-arm groups in camp certainly supported them and also exerted pressure upon them. However, it was not a matter of the leadership clique taking orders from the "group

¹ ibid., pp. 6, 7.

below" so much as the fact that the leaders had great difficulty controlling their "boys", as they are usually called, and keeping them in line.

The explanation which these evacuees gave the ~~Administrative~~ Advisory Council regarding the residents' support of the Daihyo Sha Kai is not entirely accurate. The Negotiating Committee and the Daihyo Sha Kai, properly ^{at the time of the incident} speaking, were not a minority representation. ~~They were~~ ^{residents} ~~at the time of the incident~~ The ~~people~~ themselves set up the standards of behavior. The basic motivations of these standards were seldom verbalized. Fundamentally they were; an emotional and unreasoning hatred of the administration; a powerful sense of group persecution and the accompanying notion that the Japanese should stick together against the WRA administration. When to these prevailing camp attitudes a situation of almost pathological excitement, such as that which existed in late October and November of 1943 was added, the idea of open opposition to the leaders who had initiated action against the despised administration or withdrawing support from them once they had been arrested was, ~~almost inconceivable~~ for many of the residents, almost inconceivable. Overt opposition to these powerful attitudes or to the leaders would immediately bring down the appellation of inu, ergo, counter-action on the part of any individual or group was impossible. Mr. Furukawa, himself, in this talk with the Advisory Council conveniently forget his own attitude at the inception of the incident. ^{to the writer} Later he ~~had~~ stated that ~~he~~ in truth he and the other Block Managers felt the same way as the Daihyo Sha Kai in the "improvement of food and maintenance." "They ~~looked~~ "They looked forward to improvements. Like me - I'd rather eat something better than beans if I could get it." 1/

Moreover, ~~these people~~ as these evacuees told the administrative council, some people did fear the violence of the "tough-boys". But infinitely greater was the fear of becoming stigmatized as a dog.

The attitudes of the residents at the time of the incident were difficult for the administration to understand since they can scarcely be appreciated except by an individual who has lived in a camp under this kind of ~~pressure~~ excitement and pressure. Apparently, therefore, the ~~Japann~~ four Japanese impressed the administration with a partially erroneous picture which they probably believed themselves at the time; that of a helpless populace frightened into submission by a small group of terrorists, a concept which the administration was very eager to accept since it justified many of its ~~actions~~ past actions.

1243

in December, admitted to the writer that in October he and the other block managers felt the same way as the Daihyo Sha in the "improvement of food and maintenance." "They looked forward to improvements. Like me - I'd rather eat something better than beans if I could get it."¹

A. With these conservative ^{vacuees} ~~men~~, members of the vested employment interests, who now felt it safe to criticize and denounce the Daihyo Sha, lay the administration's most obvious hope of breaking the status quo, and bringing about colony organization and a return to normal conditions which, it was hoped, would be followed by the withdrawal of the irksome Army rule. After the Co-operative's successful defiance of the Daihyo Sha Kai, meetings between small groups of Japanese and the Advisory Council were held almost daily. Ways and means of breaking the deadlock, the status-quo, were discussed. most prominent among the Japanese were Messrs. Shimada, Namekawa, Furukawa, Mayeda and [Naydo of the Civic Organizations; ~~and~~ Akitsuki, Yamatani, Ikemoto and Hitomi of the Co-operative Enterprises; ^{Kawai} ~~Kawai~~ of Housing and Takahashi, the ^{former} prominent member of the Daihyo Sha ^{zone}] also took an active part. It is interesting that some of these ^{zone} men had, according to Mr. Tsuda, taken a prominent part in the attempt to reestablish the Old Tulean Planning Board which was made just before and after the farm accident of October 14.² As has been explained, this attempt failed completely due chiefly to the fact that the Daihyo Sha Kai managed to get organized first. When the Daihyo Sha Kai began to totter, this group of early rivals appears to have been the first to take advantage of the situation.

¹ R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 8, 1945, p. 1.

² ibid. April 18, 1945, p. 2.

R. Hankey, Notes

In fact, the Old Tuleans as a whole were probably the first to withdraw support, turning against the Daihyo Sha leaders not so much because they were "radicals" but because they were outsiders. As Mr. Tsuda stated:

"When things popped up in Tule Lake most of the Old Tuleans were willing to give the Daihyo Sha moral support. But when things didn't look very nice. . . When the Army came in. . . they were the first to get out. . . the Old Tuleans and a few others turned against the Daihyo Sha Kai."

The Administration, anxious to break the deadlock, made the very most of these contacts. Meanwhile, the Army continued to arrest people ["much to the satisfaction of the opposition groups."¹

Some of the individuals named above volunteered the names of people whom they labeled as trouble makers. The Administration and the Army looked upon it as a hopeful sign that the colonists were beginning to be willing to transmit information to the officials. However, as was later to be proved all too clearly, this action was not yet typical of the attitude of the large number of colonists.

Simultaneously the Co-op and the Civic Organizations are said to have supported the organization of a counter goon-squad, which Opler described as a strong arm opposition group of about 500 young men, "~~supported by the more moderate and thoughtful elements in the Center.~~" These young men planned to go in a body to the headquarters of the ^{Daihyo Sha Kai} ~~Negotiating Committee~~ and request that the remaining members of the ~~Negotiating Committee~~ and the Daihyo Sha Kai resign.² The writer is strongly inclined to view these statements as braggadocio. Certain young men perhaps enjoyed visualizing themselves in this dramatic activity, but it is most

¹Community Analyst's Letter, Dec. 29, 1943, p. 4.

²ibid., Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, pp. 4, 5.

unlikely that they had any serious intentions of carrying out their threats.

There is a startling difference between the opinion of Dr. Opler on these men who contacted the Administration and the opinions of the majority of evacuee informants contacted shortly after this period. The attitude which seems particularly attractive to Dr. Opler, i.e., that these men felt that Tule Lake was not really the place for them, would damn them with the ordinary colonist. "Tule Lake," said most residents, "is no place for people who feel like that."

Opler states:

"Mr. Mayeda is here simply because his parents appealed to him to remain with them because their other son had 'forsaken them.' Since that time, they have finally come around to agreement that Tule Lake is no place for him. Mr. Furukawa is also here simply because of family reasons; as the father of five young children, and the sole support of aged parents, he feels he cannot go elsewhere and relocate; his father intends to die in Japan. Mr. Shimada likewise seems to have regrets about coming to Tule Lake; he was made a block representative in the Negotiating Committee; he resigned because he thought the methods of the group were undemocratic and their goals open to suspicion whereupon the block read in the washroom a number of charges against him, including the familiar one of inu.¹

Takahashi has the respect of the Co-op, Civic Organization and the opposition groups and has in the past, opposed the Kai-Kuratomi, or dominant clique, within the Daihyos. He is uniformly described as a man of good education, courage, and excellent reputation throughout the colony who was brought into the Daihyo's organization to lend his prestige; he opposed the Kai faction throughout though without effect, but did not resign like Yamatani and Shimada."²

This description should be given careful attention, for it was men with this background who formed the nucleus and much of the body of the opposition group. The Civic Organizations group, the Divisional Responsible Men, and the officers of the Co-operative

¹Ibid., Dec. 10, 1944, p. 4.

²ibid., Dec. 29, 1944, p. 5.

were, ^{in large} ~~for the most~~ part, old residents of Tule Lake. In a sense they represented vested groups. Their positions implied considerable prestige. Before segregation they had been in the habit of cooperating with the Administration, and, as Upler points out, some of them were undecided as to whether they ought to remain in Tule Lake.

As these men became more and more active in cooperating with the Administration, breaking the status quo and bringing the colony back to what was termed a normal state they incurred the furious hatred of the Daihyo Sha Kai supporters or the genjyo-iji group (pro status quo) and the dislike of many of the genjyo-daha (anti-status quo) people. On many occasions, when engaged in conversation with residents who themselves no longer supported the Daihyo Sha, the writer was surprised by the bitterness of the invectives heaped upon these most active opponents of the body.

The situation was paradoxical in the extreme. These anti-Daihyo Sha leaders were in the peculiar position of attempting to improve the miserable condition of the center, when most of the people wished for relief but were not willing to pay the price of relief: giving way to the authorities. For this philanthropy they received no gratitude. Most of the residents at this time were probably to be found between the two extreme points of view - the radical Daihyo Sha on the one hand and the ultra-conservative Co-op and Civic Organizations in the other. However, to gain relief from the oppressive discomfort of Army rule by approaching the WRA in a conciliatory matter was a method which the great majority of the people was not yet emotionally ready to stomach. Once the deed was accomplished, most were ready to take advantage of the improved

Lieutenant Forbes, Mr. Best and Mr. Huycke attended. Colonel Austin made an address in which he said in part:

"The Army is interested, as you people are, in this colony returning to a normal condition. The majority of the people are interested in a peaceful orderly existence. You people are in a position to take some responsibility in this regard, inasmuch as you know and have been working on the various jobs."

"Obviously after a period such as you have gone through, we must not start full speed. You have to build up gradually. I think you realize this and must bear this in mind in your discussion today."¹

Byron Akitsuki, who was serving as ^{executive} secretary to the Co-op at this time, was elected chairman. He then addressed the assemblage stating that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the existing situation. 16,600 colonists had suffered because of the political conflicts, neglect and blindness of a minority. This meeting had been called to find a solution to the present unhappy situation.

Mr. Shimada then spoke, explaining that he had received permission from Colonel Austin to meet with the Daihyo Sha Kai on January 5. However, at the appointed time, Mr. Kozuma of the Daihyo Sha did not appear giving illness as his excuse and Mr. Kataoka acting in his behalf stated that without a responsible person to conduct the meeting they could not very proceed.

Mr. Naido ^{of Civic Organization} then suggested that a resolution for returning to work be prepared, that a responsible political group be selected which would put this resolution to a vote; "abandon the existence of the Daihyo Shas; and finally foster the true Japanese spirit and base all our future ideas as a gentlemanly Japanese should." Mr. Hitomi ^{of the Co-op} supported Naido's suggestion saying "A few beatings

¹Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Lake WRA Project, Jan. 7, 1944, p. 1.

may result but such must be expected and prepared for." Mr. Namekawa ^{of Civic Organizations} moved that the question be put to a formal vote "and he motioned that the Daihyo Sha's 'Maintenance of status quo' be abandoned and workers accordingly return to their respective jobs." The motion was unanimously carried. . Mr. Shimada ^{of Civic Organizations} suggested that Mr. Naido's motion be carried out as follows: [the various divisions should meet ^{separately} and decide whether to accept or reject the resolution; the result should then be announced to the colonists; the resolution would then be put to a secret vote in each block] The minutes do not state whether this suggestion was voted upon, but it was followed explicitly the following week. Two days later the Divisional Heads met again. Byron Akitsuki was again appointed chairman by general consent. Yamatani ^{of the Co-op} and Shimada were appointed his advisors. The results of the vote cast by the separate divisions on the proposed resolution was announced. The vote was decidedly in favor of returning to work. Whether it was not necessary to take the referendum vote proposed by Mr. Shimada at the first meeting was now discussed at length. Opinions expressed are interesting.

T. Ikemoto: It is not necessary to take a referendum vote. People who are not working would naturally oppose it.

M. Shimada: Returning to work is the first step in restoring normal conditions; however, the question is whether to leave the camp in this abnormal condition or take the initiative step in an attempt to restore it, which should absolutely be on the basis of public opinions and finally their votes.

J. Nakao: It is necessary. We certainly need the support of the colonists.

I. Idamoto: I favor Mr. Ikemoto's suggestion. If the referendum should result unfavorably, it will mean a lot to those who want to return to work.

R. Kondo: Whether to return to work is a question for the workers to decide. It is unnecessary to refer such to the colonists.

J. Naido: ". . . I think it is our duty to have referendum vote. Otherwise the last meeting would be altogether meaningless."

The matter was put to a vote and, resulted in 40 affirmative votes and two neutral. Kawai^{Housing} then moved that a committee of seven be elected to prepare and make plans for the taking of the referendum. The following nominations were made in order: [Shimada, Akitsuki, Naido, Nakao, Okamoto, Yamatani and Namekawa.]^(a week later) This body of seven men ^{called the Coordinating Committee and was} ~~was later~~ to assume a position of great political prominence and take over the task of representing the people with the administration.)

Having decided on a referendum vote, the Divisional Heads and their committee named above, realized that if their plan was to be at all successful they must work so fast that the remnants of the Daihyo Sha would not have time to organize any opposition. Accordingly on the morning of January 10 the section foremen and one unnamed Caucasian met and prepared a working program to follow up the referendum results even though the referendum had not yet been held. The Employment Office was moved back to the Colony, and a back to work program planned on the basis of obtaining a nuclear staff of key workers. It was decided to employ Japanese secretarial workers in those of the Administrative offices where financial and confidential records were not kept; a security check, with the Army and Internal Security, was added to the ordinary recruitment procedure.

The referendum vote was scheduled for the evening of January 11. That morning the camp was deluged with mimeographed propaganda which was prepared by the Divisional Heads' committee. In this material, which is included below in toto, the Daihyo Sha Kai ^{was} ~~is~~ accused of failure, and of bringing misery upon the people. Most important

of all, the ~~San~~ Divisional Heads committed itself to an equitable distribution of future employment and, in somewhat ambiguous ~~terms~~ phrases, to a release of the detained internees. Both commitments are very significant for many residents took it for granted that they would be carried out completely and circumstances made this impossible. Consequently, the leaders of this movement were then regarded as having broken their promises to the people and their prestige, which had been precarious from the beginning, evaporated rapidly.

of all the committee commits itself to an equitable distribution of future employment, and, in somewhat ambiguous phrases to a release of the detained internees. Both commitments are very significant, ~~the latter in particular. The former was carried out incompletely and the latter not at all.~~ This failure, more than any other single factor, brought about the eventual downfall of this anti-Daihyo Sha. The camp population had been led to expect action in releasing the detainees and when very little was done, the precarious prestige of the opposition group evaporated rapidly.

RESOLUTION

January 7, 1944

- WHEREAS, a normal condition was previously existing in this colony;
- WHEREAS, Daihyo Sha came into being with a purpose of bettering the conditions in this colony;
- WHEREAS, although the purpose of the Daihyo Shas was worthy of being respected, the ways and means by which it has presented the demands were not in accord with accepted standard of conduct as pursued by a normal and peaceful society;
- WHEREAS, this Center was subsequently placed under the control of the Army;
- WHEREAS, as a result the colonists have been subject to suffer from abnormal conditions in which a curfew is restricting the free movement of people, no organized recreational facilities are available, and many people are left unemployed;
- WHEREAS, the Authority with which Daihyo Shas should logically negotiate has officially announced that it no longer recognize the Daihyo Shas as the representatives of this colonists;
- WHEREAS, although the Daihyo Shas has utterly failed in their negotiation, it has not attempted to dissolve itself, but rather it has adopted the policy of maintaining the so-called status quo;
- WHEREAS, there were among the colonists who were gravely concerned about the future of the colonists;

WHEREAS, on January 5, 1944, Daihyo Sha has called the meeting, with permission of the Army. Many division and section evacuees heads were formally invited to this meeting by the Daihyo Shas. Some 200 persons were present at this meeting, however, the meeting was dissolved without accomplishing any purpose because the one party responsible for the meeting failed to be present. The evacuee division and section heads were in attendance to witness an amicable solution by the Daihyo Shas of the present existing condition.

WHEREAS, under the circumstance, we have no other desire than to exist as a true Japanese and to return to Japan unashamed;

WHEREAS, the evacuee division and section heads have concluded that the Daihyo Shas are no longer in a position to bring back normal condition to the colony which is sincerely desired by the great majority of the colonists;

THEREFORE WE RESOLVE THAT as a vital preliminary measure in liquidating this so-called status quo as maintained by the Daihyo Sha and in order to bring forth normal condition to this colony in the very immediate future, every colonists, a respectful and peace-loving resident, should return to the work immediately;

NOW, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED on this 7th day of January, 1944 by all present that as an initial step, each evacuee division and section heads will confer on this matter to the colonists concerned in each division and section at meetings to be held at various places on January 8, 1944, from 1:30 p.m.

Signed

EVACUEE DIVISIONAL AND
SECTIONAL HEADS

This was followed by a statement accusing the Daihyo Sha of failure: they had "conclusively failed in their purpose of bettering the conditions of the center," they had not tried to obtain the release of the detained men, and they were unable to check the increasing number of internments. The economic suffering which the families were undergoing under the status quo, the policy of holding to passive resistance until the Army and the administration gave way, was pointed out with the comment that such self-imposed suffering did not reflect upon an individual's loyalty to his country.

A summary of the January 6 meeting of the Division and Section Heads was given and the information that these groups had voted overwhelmingly to return to work.

The new body pledged itself to the following commitments:

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF FUTURE EMPLOYMENT

It is our duty to materialize an equitable distribution of employment because it is the principal source of income for most of the colonists residing in this center. After restoring this center back to normal condition, a plan can be worked out in which there will be employment possibility for the greatest number of residents.

RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITION WILL AID IN THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINED PERSONS

The return of the colony to normal condition will create a favorable atmosphere where the justifiable release of detained colonists will become a greater possibility.

It is an unwise contention that if the status quo is liquidated, the persons detained will be deemed as guilty. If the status quo is maintained, there will be no possibility whatsoever for negotiation for the release with either the WRA or the Army. Not only that, but also it has become evident that the longer the status quo is maintained, the more colonists would be looking out of the stockade.

The election was held by secret ballot, with soldiers present. Soldiers also assisted in the vote counting, a fact which was regarded with suspicion by some evacuees.

The following interesting comments were made by members of the opposition group, in the Civic Organization's office. The night the returns began to come in, Colonel Austin was present.

THE REFERENDUM VOTE

The vote was held by secret ballot with soldiers present. Soldiers also assisted in the vote counting, a fact which was regarded with suspicion by some evacuees. Moreover, as an additional precaution some 14 or 15 persons thought to be vociferous supporters of the Negotiating Committee were arrested and confined in the stockade the evening before the election. 1/

The ~~following~~ night the returns began to come in the following comments were made by members of the opposition group in the Civic Organization's office. Colonel Austin was present.

-
1. Kuratomi ~~and his~~ and his wife informed me of this a day or so before I left T. Iake and I don't have it in my notes. R. H.

The vote from Block 11 was decidedly favorable (against the status quo). Said Mr. Furukawa, "Why that was the headquarters of that bunch of blank-blanks! (Remnant of Daihyo Sha Kai) Maybe we ought to have them open up an office in every block. Then others would get a real taste of those guys."

When the vote was announced for Ward VI, it showed most blocks defeating the proposal. Statements like the following were made to Colonel Austin:

"We're going to need a lot more fences around here."

"They voted against food too. Now about a hunger strike for those guys."

"No coal for that block."

Austin said, "Let's give them weiners for a week." Someone answered, "Say, wait a minute -- that's food! real food! How about salt herring only? Flat stinking fishes?" Said Furukawa, "I say don't give them any food. They don't need it!"¹

The official report on this election was:²

Total number of ballots --	8941
Total No. of ballots AGAINST STATUS QUO --	4593
Total No. of ballots FOR STATUS QUO -----	4120
Plurality -----	473
Blank ballots -----	228
Valid ballots -----	8713

The result by blocks was:

Against STATUS QUO -----	36
For STATUS QUO -----	27

The pro-Daihyo Sha remnant immediately attacked this result and distributed the following "report" of which one sheet written in Japanese fell into the hands of the administration.

"Report of Present Condition"

by

Nippon Patriotic Society

"The results of the referendum votes taken by force on January 11, 1944, after due investigation, is as follows:

¹Community Analyst's Letter, Jan. 12, 1944, p. 4.

²ibid., Jan. 14, 1944, p. 3.

31 blocks for status quo
29 blocks against status quo
4 blocks not clear
1 block refused to vote

"Ballots carried away by the Army, without even opening was the reason. One block refused to vote as they decided it was not necessary. total was 64 blocks which voted.

"Do you intend to support such a word and action to liquidate the status quo by betraying the Daihyo Sha, whom we, the whole colonists, elected? Do you recognize or consider this referendum taken without freedom of speech legal?

"Colonists: Do you intend to work from your own selfishness for a bait offered with false reports published by this so-called 'gogs'? Will you take action when you know it's dishonorable and accept their offer?

"We hereby submit to your cool and sane judgment on this matter."

"Nippon Patriotic Society"¹

this paper does not appear to have made much impression on the people. Very few informants accused the Administration or the army of perpetrating a deliberate hoax. Most admit that the people were discouraged and impressed with the futility of carrying on the status quo. A few state that the people were frightened by the presence of the army at the polls and voted against status quo because they feared that their ballot might be examined.

that the people voted to end the status quo because they thought this would mean release

The Administration chose to regard this shallow victory, a majority of 2.7% of the ballots cast, as a sign of the withdrawal of public support from the Daihyo Sha Kai. The small majority was explained by pressure, threats, and misunderstanding.² Japanese Informants, however, give a different explanation. Many people were becoming tired of the inconveniences, ~~and~~ *economic and freedom* hardships of the status quo, which appeared to be accomplishing nothing. Inconvenience and hardship outweighed loyalty to the representatives by a small margin.

to the extent determined

Oishi
Mr. ~~A~~, a neutral stated:

¹ ibid., p. 8.

² ibid., p. 4.

["The main reason (status quo broke) was not because they didn't want to stick with the Negotiating Committee but -- ~~one of the main reasons~~ was lack of finance. Another reason is they didn't want to loaf along doing nothing. Time lags so monotonous ~~If we were a bunch of Japanese soldiers quartered here, that is a different thing. But these are women and children and civilians.~~

"When the vote was taken here the status quo lost by 400 votes. That shows that the people who are favoring status quo are greater in number. Because many who favored status quo did not vote. They thought it was the way to go to the stockade. A lot of people thought they might be pulled in. They had a soldier by the vote box."¹

and ^{Takenchi} Mr. Fujimoto stated:

"You'd be surprised how many people voted for status quo. They were still gluttonous for punishment, or they had voted for it in the beginning. It was my opinion that status quo wouldn't accomplish a darn thing but would only increase the peoples' sufferings. You can't have status quo and expect things to improve."²

The Divisional Heads met the day after the election (Jan. 12) to plan the back to work movement. They decided not to circulate each block result, since in blocks where the status quo had lost, those who had voted for status quo might be criticized. It was thought wiser merely to tell the people that status quo had been defeated ^{by blocks -} 36 to 27.³

However, reporting back to work "tomorrow" was conceded to be impossible, since many former evacuee positions were still filled by Caucasians who would require some notice of termination. ~~The delicate and difficult position of the successful opposition who now had to take on the Negotiating Committee's task of dealing with the Administration is shown by the following section of the minutes:~~

"The Advisory Council . . . plans to hold a meeting probably today with all divisions chiefs, section heads, sub-section chiefs,

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Mar., 1944, p. 50.

²ibid., April, 1944, p. 31.

³Minutes of the Special meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake Center, Jan. 12, 1944, p. 1.

THE ATTITUDES OF THE OLD TULEAN POPULATION

From Miyamoto and Sakoda reports description of the Old Tulean's pre-segregation attitude should come here. I know little about how they felt except that they didn't ~~anticipate~~ ~~mark~~ ~~change~~ desire much change, they were afraid of the newcomers and disliked them and ~~were~~ *very* *fear* of them handed out the line of bull about ~~being~~ Tule being a camp for people of "one mind."

The segregees who remained in Tule Lake were characterized by somewhat different attitudes. Though they shared many of the resentments, of the newcomers, on the whole they did not wish to change the camp, especially if the attempt to effect changes would cause

trouble. Moreover, they looked upon themselves as the established group, the "Old Timers" as one nisei girl expressed it, and felt that if any changes were to be made, they should take the initiative or should at least be consulted. They did not take kindly to being told by the newcomers that Tule Lake was a dump, that the food was bad and the facilities far inferior to the relocation centers from which the complaining transferees had come. Some old Tuleans admitted that the facilities of Tule might have been inferior, but defended their acquiescence to the conditions by accusing the transferees of demanding luxury. One young woman ^{M. Nakao} said, "What do they expect. After all, there's a war on."

Repeatedly, old Tulean informants spoke nostalgically of "the old Tule Lake" and remarked that it was gone forever. "Before the segregees came in people got along well. There was peace." Since conditions in the pre-segregation Tule Lake had at times been far from peaceful as, for instance, at the time of military registration, this attitude was an obvious expression of hostility to the aggressive newcomers who were threatening the political control, the intricate inner-camp politics, the most influential positions, and the economic control, the better employment opportunities, which the old Tuleans hoped to maintain. A very clever old Tulean, Mr. Tsuda, stated:

"The old Tuleans figured they had a priority in Tule Lake. The other people who came in were strangers. The old Tuleans were supposed to know and do everything. They thought they had the right to. Then the people who came from the other centers had a different viewpoint. They felt the jobs and everything should be according to the population. But the old Tuleans didn't think that way."¹

Some old Tuleans termed the pressure group's attempt to improve the camp a high-handed and unnecessary effort to make the camp over. "All they (the newcomers) did was talk, talk, talk." The younger men in the transferee group who, feeling the need of exhibitionism, broke up nisei dances, behaved rudely to the girls and,

1.

what period?

in general, acting according to their own peculiar concept of the acme of "Japanese" behavior, were criticized and looked upon with scorn and fear. They were termed "the kibe yogore"¹ or "the geta boys" and were cordially disliked by the nisei girls. When discussing this period of camp life, old Tuleans often lay a large part of the hostility between the groups to the fact that the old Tuleans held the "key positions" in employment and had the best jobs. Most old Tuleans admit that this was the truth although they may not admit that the complaint was just.

As the greater part of the transferees denunciations of the old Tuleans were rationalizations so were the greater part of the counter-denunciations heaped upon the transferees by the in-group. Fear and resentment of the ambitious newcomers was often, though not always, hidden under the statement that the transferees were "radicals" or "agitators." The following attitude given by ~~an~~, an old Tulean nisei girl, exemplifies this: the newcomers, she said, wanted "to crush this camp and make a new one" and the "old Tuleans got along well (before segregation)." The old Tuleans did not get along at all well but the difficulties of the past two years appear to have been forgotten in the face of the antipathy to the threatening transferees. *L. Manji*

"What the old Tule Lake was, it's never going to be again. Then there were people from three states here, Washington, California, and Oregon. We got along well... But now . . .

"We found out right off that the segregees who came from other centers were jealous of the old Tuleans - that they had higher positions. They wanted to take that over. Somebody came into the Community Activities office and broke the chairs and typewriters. ~~We were supposed to be serving the people.~~ They (the segregees) didn't give us a chance.

"The people who came in had one object: to crush this camp and make a new one. But the Old Tuleans interfered with that."²

At a later interview the same informant^T said:

"They said we Tuleans were soft and good-for-nothing."³

² 1. Ibid., August 17, p. 4.

³ 2. Ibid., September 14, p. 2

1. Bum or hoodlum

During a conversation with four nisei girls, two of whom were old Tuleans and two transferees of the same conservative convictions as the old Tuleans, ~~and~~ ^{Mrs. Ito} a nisei woman in her thirties, who had been very active politically in the center which she had left for Tule Lake, remarked: *M. Nakao - L. Manji*

"The Tuleans here were the old Timers. The strangers who came in didn't consult with the old Timers. They were going to control the camp."

"~~L~~ ^{another girl} was present at this talk and added,

"They didn't like the idea of the old Tuleans having all the key jobs either."¹

^{Ito} Mrs. ~~A~~ admitted that conditions at Tule Lake were not ideal, but concluded:

"After all, this is war and we can't expect luxury."

"~~B~~ ^{an} ~~another~~ ^{present} old Tulean nisei girl added with a note of offended community

pride:

"The first thing that struck me funny: the people from the other centers came in here and expected luxury. They said the latrines were bad, the food was bad, the housing was bad: everything was bad."

^{Nakao} Mrs. ~~B~~ then pointed out the fallacy between the adoption of a stoic Japanese attitude and these complaints; admitting, however, that she herself did not think everything was as it should be at Tule Lake or the other centers, for that matter, and that it was probably the fault of the local Administrations.

"Fundamentally, they say they are loyal and want to go back to Japan. Then they should be willing to go through hell to get there. ~~We were told what the camp was like before we came here.~~

"I feel that Washington is trying to do the right thing by us but that often we're not getting what we should be from there (the local Administration). I felt that from the beginning, even the first camp I went into. Even if they get only five cents a day (in graft) from each of us - why, they'll be millionaires.

"When we first came in here the food was O.K."

The two old Tulean girls present remarked that before segregation, when Mr. Peck was Chief Steward, the "food had been terrible." After segregation it had improved.²

1. Ibid., p. 4.

2. Ibid., September 19, p. 2.

Another excellent expression of old Tulean attitudes came from a nisei girl "K." who ^{was} employed in the high school office. ^{She} did not exhibit as much prejudice against the segregees as ^{the informant just quoted} "I" or "F" and made a deliberate effort to express herself objectively. F. Yokota

"You know what I thought. I thought this would be a peaceful camp. I thought that since it was a camp of all people going back to Japan we'd have the same combination. But due to people with selfish reasons, they made riots. Those people were quiet back home. But having nothing to do, they made trouble here. (in the relocation centers).

"I was disappointed. I expected a different spirit and living peaceful. . .

"Being a Tulean, we felt that they were making it tough for us. We had nothing (like the trouble) before they came in.

"I guess we were all employed and had the best jobs and they didn't like that either."¹

An elderly issei woman gave her opinion of the transferees without mincing any words. Her remarks could not be taken down verbatim and are reproduced from memory:

"Before "these people" came here, everything was quiet. Everything went fine. But when these people from Gila, Poston, Jerome, and Topaz came in, all they could talk about was how fine things had been where they came from. In the relocation camps the food was better; there they had nice houses, or they had fine white bath tubs. Things at Tule Lake (they said) were no good. These newcomers, all they do is talk, talk, talk.

"The trouble in camp was all made by a few people. If the Tule Lakers say anything the others say they are ikujinashi (spineless). So they don't say anything. They don't want trouble.

"The way these few trouble-makers behave is not true Yamato/Damashi. The person who really acts according to Yamato/Damashi makes himself low and does not talk.

The informant added with unusual frankness:

"The people in Tule Lake think they will stay in Tule Lake and maybe go back to Japan after the war. Maybe they will stay in this country. But some of the people who came in, they want to go back right away. All they do is talk, talk, talk."²

^{Another old Tulean informant, a nisei, M. Kaminaka}
"K.M." was even more anti-pathetic to the newcomers than the nisei girls

quoted previously. When asked to describe her first reaction to the transferees,

1. Ibid., September 19, p. 2.

2. Ibid., September 27, 1944, p. 2.

she said:

"The first thing that happened to me was that one of my uniforms was stolen (her nurses' aide uniform). It was stolen right off the line from my back porch. That never happened before. . .

"I think they (transferees) came here with a chip on their shoulders.

"Right after they came we had a welcome dance and the kibeis came and told the people to go home. Everything was supposed to be Japanese, they said.

"When they arrived they broke down buildings, busted walls, and built bonfires and went around shouting 'Banzai.'"¹

This young woman, who lived in a block which was predominantly old Tulean appeared to have a particularly active grudge against the transferee "kibeis" boys. She stated that she hated them; they were trouble-makers; they were always goose-stepping around (in their Japanese exercises) early in the morning and waking her up; they made life miserable for the nisei because there were so many more kibeis than nisei in camp and the nisei could do nothing about it. She recounted an incident which occurred at one of the first block meetings she attended. An absent-minded man, who was not listening or did not understand the issue under discussion, applauded out of turn. Immediately the tough boys said: "Let's get that guy after the meeting." The man had to sneak out quietly to escape a beating."²

Growth of Hostility Toward the Old Tulean Population

Disillusionment of the Idealists - Growth of Hostility Toward Old Tule Lake Population

Introduction →

~~Those of the transferees who had built up the dream that Tule Lake would be a genuine segregation center soon were bitterly disappointed. Interestingly, they transferred the greater part of this resentment to the old Tulean population. There was, of course, some justification for this, for a significant part of the old Tulean residents had placed themselves in "disloyal" status because they did not want to leave Tule Lake. The transferees, however, conveniently forgot that a great many of their number had also taken the step of segregation for many other reasons than a desire to return to Japan. They also were inclined to forget that a large proportion of the transferee group came to Tule Lake as voluntary segregees, "loyal" issei accompanying~~

- 1.
- 2.

Section 32 - 38

20 - 25

to be integrated and
most carefully
reworked.

~~Spineless fence-sitters~~

GROWTH OF TRANSFEREE HOSTILITY TOWARD THE OLD TULEAN POPULATION

THE ~~COMMONS~~ FENCE-SITTER AND YES*YES CONCEPT

The resentments and frustrations of the transferees and their initial resentment and distrust of the older population manifested themselves in the development of a peculiar and fallacious concept. The transferees pictured themselves as sincere repatriates or expatriates "loyal" to Japan and accused the Old Tuleans of having among their number a very large percentage of persons who were fence-sitters, "loyal" to neither country or who were Yes-Yes and "loyal" to America, who had remained in Tule Lake not out of a sincere desire to go to Japan but because they did not wish to move. The fact that an unknown number of Old Tuleans had refused to register for Military Registration and so had never committed themselves was pointed to as evidence that a vast number of Old Tuleans had never made up their minds, i. e., were fence sitters. However, even Old Tuleans who had legitimate status as segregees, having applied for repatriation or expatriation or having answered No-No were branded as insincere and accused of having answered in this manner only so that they could stay in Tule Lake. Certain transferees decided that the WRA had perpetrated a deceitful trick, putting them down in a center purported to be for segregees only but actually populated by a large number of ~~Yes-Yes~~ ~~spineless~~ fence-sitters, "loyal" to neither country, or "Yes-Yes" loyal to the United States, who were to be used to spy on them. ~~The Old Tuleans were~~ Moreover, when the loud complaints of the newcomers were not received sympathetically by the older inhabitants, the Old Tuleans were called ikujinashi (spineless), and were described as being willing to submit

to any humiliation or mistreatment from the administration.

There was, of course, little logic in either of these accusations. For although a significant part of the Old Tulean population had placed themselves in "disloyal" status because they did not want to leave Tule Lake, the transferees conveniently forgot that a great many of their number had also taken the step of segregation for many other reasons than a desire to return to Japan. They were also inclined to forget that a large proportion of the transferee group came to Tule Lake as voluntary segregees, issei, "loyal to America" accompanying their "No-NO" children, or nisei, "loyal to America" accompanying their repatriate parents. Not infrequently a whole family moved to Tule Lake on the strength of one segregee member. Nor, ~~was the Old Tuleans spineless and meek~~ as the report by Mr. Miyamoto clearly shows, were the Old Tuleans spineless and meek.

Since this ~~is~~ attitude ~~is~~ probably ~~the most significant~~ influenced behavior in Tule Lake more powerfully than any other single factor it is unfortunate that its development cannot be accurately traced from ~~throughout~~ the beginning of segregation. All that is positively known is that it was widespread and very powerful in the spring of 1944. However, ~~it is known that~~ hostility to the fence-sitters and the Yes-Yes was already well developed in the relocation centers by those individuals and groups who ~~held to the~~ ~~opposite~~ purported to hold to the opposite view. It is also possible that some of the transferees came to Tule Lake with the fallacious notion that this segregation center would be different and that ~~there~~

grafting with evacuee food. The [~]Newcomers promptly took
over these resentments also. When the tension and discontent
reached a climax and ~~over~~ overt protest and organization ~~was~~ ^{were}
initiated by the ~~new~~ newcomers, a large proportion of the
Old Tulean population became infected with the excitement
and supported the ~~new~~ uprising.

"Loyal to America"

their "no-No" children, or ~~"loyal"~~ nisei, accompanying their repatriate parents. Not infrequently a whole family moved to Tule Lake on the strength of one segregee member. The major difference of attitude between the old Tuleans and the segregees, ^{It is possible, however, that} immediately after ~~the~~ segregation, ~~appears to have been that~~ the old Tuleans did not at first attempt to conceal their practical motives for remaining in Tule Lake. This honesty, however, was viewed with horror and amazement by some of the over-sensitive transferees and furnished a convenient mechanism for rationalizing ^{their hostility to the ingroup.} Antipathy to the old Tuleans because they were ^{more established in the position of advantage} was transformed into a barrage of accusations that they were not truly "loyal" to Japan. This anxiety over the difficult time the "No-No" group would have with the "Yes-Yes" was expressed to the writer even before segregation took place. A very frank transferee remarked the night before he left Gila:

redo

before

"Another thing, people are thinking about after they get to Tule - take here in Rivers, the groups are more or less divided into Yes and No groups. Naturally, if the Yes group plays its cards right and apple-polishes, the chances of their getting better paid positions in the office is more or less enhanced. The Yes group is more or less under the thumb of the administration. Any time the No people had a kick coming the first people they had to see (in the offices) were Yes people. Especially if the Project Director and the majority of the Caucasian staff is more or less unsympathetic with the No group."

The transferees greatly exaggerated the number of "fence-sitting" old Tuleans. They began to speak of the old Tuleans as ikujinashi (spineless), stated that they were willing to take anything from the Administration, that they did not wish to return to Japan. Certain transferees decided that WRA had perpetrated a deceitful trick, putting them down in a center purported to be for segregees only and actually populated by a large number of "Yes-Yes" people, still "loyal to the United States" who were to be used to spy on them. ~~Gone was the dream that in Tule Lake there would be no more conflict of opinion on "loyalty" no more fence-sitters, no more inu.~~

1. Hankey "Notes on Segregation," pp. 70-71.

Many of the transferees and a still larger part of the old Tulean population were not affected in this manner and kept to the opinion that after all, everybody in Tule Lake should be treated as if they really wished to return to Japan. But certain minorities, particularly among the transferees from Jerome, Poston and Topaz, ^{stated} ~~felt~~ that the situation could not be tolerated. ^{that yes you get out (not all to) no that any could be} ~~How this sentiment affected the development of the pressure group and the demands made to the Administration will be discussed later in its proper place.~~ ^{But giving people a camp the trouble until summer 1944.}

notes

The following verbatim statements made by transferees from Gila, Jerome, Topaz and Manzanar are examples of this ~~transference~~ transference of blame for the frustration.

From a letter written by a kibeï woman, an active "agitator" from Jerome: ^{Manzanar}

"When we learned the facts of failure on the part of the WRA to carry out this as a segregation center, that many a loyal ones still remained here in large numbers and many uncertain in status: the No-Yes, the Yes-No, the non-registrants, this, the dump, certainly was no place for us. . . ."

To make this center livable as possible as we have been privileged in other center, to ascertain a certain status as a repatriate and expatriate not to be dealt alike with the other uncertain element. It was the feeling and the opinion of the segregees to form a central committee to carry out these above-mentioned facts for the benefits of our own and felt it most necessary to ascertain a certain status as we previous had expected. . . .

"What the former Tuleans or the uncertain ones thought at this time I have no idea, but the segregees were all for it."¹

A nice girl from Topaz, ^{Kayo Iida} too young to take any part in political activity gave her reaction as follows: Her remarks on the Co-op are particularly noteworthy, since they were shared by many transferees.

"Another thing that struck us was the great number of Yes-Yes people and people who hadn't registered who were here. We had expected just one group and had expected to run this camp as we wanted to. We had high hopes of that. . . ."

"We noticed the people here were so easy going and let everything up to the Administration, and didn't bother to put in their viewpoints or anything.

"Especially about the Co-op. It was so different from the other Co-ops. We shocked to see all the vegetables, potatoes and luxuries like cosmetics and desserts, because at Topaz we just had simple cupcakes and one kind of cooky and things like that. We didn't have varieties there and yet that was adequate for us there.

"At first it was so new to us and so long since we had gone to a store that we were glad. But as time went on we noticed that it wasn't so good. That was one

1. R. Hankey, Notes, July 18, 1944, pp. 2-3

way of wasting our money as well as giving the government an opportunity of not feeding us."¹

At a later interview this same young woman gave the following apt description of the segregees' feelings toward the old Tuleans. ~~For all its briefness this is a shrewd statement and gives an excellent picture of the attitude of the more idealistic segregees:~~

"Most of the former Tuleans who are here, they're the type that are never for anything. They're always saying, 'If only we would be quiet, it would be all right. Why make trouble?' Maybe it's because they're country people. A lot of them are Sacramento farmers.

"They're always saying, 'Before you people came it was this way and that way.' We try to explain to them but they don't get it through their heads."²

A young kibeï girl from Gila said: *Mrs. Yamashiro*

"There were some families here - old Tuleans - who said, 'We haven't decided whether we're going back to Japan yet. Our boys just refused to register.' I told my parents, 'Gee, they just stayed here. They didn't want to go out.' I don't have much respect for them."³

A young nisei girl from Gila, definitely not a supporter of the pressure group, said:

~~"At the relocation camp there were so many that were loyal to America. We felt people with the same kind of mind would be assembled here. But we found 5,000 Yes-Yes here. They (the transferees) thought they should be kicked out."~~⁴

Sh. Matsumura
A young nisei man from Manzanar, who became involved in the pressure group after it was established, stated:

"That's a very important point. I think about 7,000 people were left here. Among those people there is quite a number who have no intention of going to Japan. Possibly half of them should go out of camp."⁵

Wakayama
An older nisei from Manzanar, who, although he did not arrived in camp until February, admitted that he had come to the conclusion that this attitude was very important, said:

-
1. July 18, ibid., p. 1
 2. Ibid., August 7, p. 2.
 3. Ibid., July 19, p. 3.
 4. Ibid., p. 4. This number is an exaggeration.
 5. Ibid., July 30, p. 4.

"By gathering the news from the people, I think it amounts to this. I presume the people who came here as segregees from various centers were very much surprised to see the large amount of people of different status remaining in camp. You have to take into consideration the feeling of the segregees."¹

Kurihara

K., an internee from Leupp, who also did not arrive in camp until after the outbreak of trouble, wrote such a detailed, honest account of his first reaction to the presence of the loyal group that it should be included here:

"Let us not forget the political side of the question. We who were segregated as unloyal must be considered heart and soul Japanese and for Japan. Yet among us the WRA has permitted the loyal group to remain. For what purpose we do not know unless their residence is permitted in order to employ them as spies. This is one of the sore spots requiring immediate attention.

"The greater majority of these so-called loyals are not truly patriotic. They've declared themselves loyal because of personal reasons; the greatest of which is to avoid the conscription into the Japanese Military Forces in the event when exchange of prisoners of war is speedily carried out. But should they remain in the U.S. by swearing allegiance, they would escape that fear of being conscripted since this government then was deferring all Japanese nationals² to 4C and 4F. So they did and considered themselves wise and safe, laughing at those who hastily renounced their loyalty to the country of their birth. . . .

"This No-Yes-No group is doubly despised by the true adherents to Japan and to their Emperor. They are neither Americans nor Japanese. They are men without a country.

"Now to further crowd this camp with such opportunists of No-Yes-No would create trouble. Therefore their admittance here will be greatly deplored. We do not want them. Those amongst us now ought to be thrown into a camp of their own. . . .

"Is it not palpable the Administration...is making a critical mistake of grouping people of contra-political beliefs here at Tule Lake? The demand to remove the loyals out of this camp has only been partially met. I hope for the good of all concerned, further augmentation of the loyals with the No-Yes-No group from various camps will not be permitted under any circumstance. We do not care to mingle with the degenerates."³

Kurihara

By "further augmentation of the loyals" K. referred to the widespread camp disapproval of bringing any more people to Tule Lake on a voluntary basis, i.e., persons who had not asked for repatriation or expatriation or persons who had not answered "No-No."

Kurihara

At a later date, K. expressed his opinion of the old Tuleans more specifically.

1. Ibid., p. 8.
2. "K" undoubtedly intended to say "Japanese-American citizens" here.
3. JYK, Ms. pp. 7-9.

37

The accusations that they held the key positions in employment, that they were given preference in obtaining jobs and that they stayed in Tule Lake to make money were widely believed and repeated.

"The people from the Sacramento Valley are staying here today. Perhaps they knew each other so well, they didn't want to be parted. . . . To avoid the trouble of packing and moving to another camp and living among strangers again. And those who were doing a good business here - (~~K. speaks in irony here, since he abhors such motives~~). Some of them were probably making more money than ever before in their lives.

"They were holding all the key positions. I was told (that) when I arrived here. I noticed it myself: if you tell the placement office which center you come from they don't pay much attention. But if you were an old Tulean, you seemed to get a job right away. When I told them I was from Leupp, the girls in the office made a face. . . .

"All the old Tuleans were pulling for the old Tuleans. They got into the good positions and just stuck with it. The others had the left-overs."¹

K. Sakata

Another Leupp ex-internee, a young kibeï made the same accusation:

"A fellow who works at the statistics office said that the old Tuleans had all the good jobs."²

Yoshiyama

A member of the Negotiating Committee expressed his disgust with the old inhabitants of Tule Lake as follows:

"There were also a lot of old Tuleans who stayed here solely for their own good. I admire a person who pledges his loyalty to America and would show his loyalty by doing something about it.

"Most of the Japanese stayed here because they wanted to get out of the draft. They wanted to stay here to. . . . Besides many of them were making money here. . . . In other centers there is not so much money to be made. But to make money in here is wrong. If people want to make money they should get out."³

M. Nishikawa

A conservative young nisei transferee from Gila described the attitude prevailing among the segregees soon after their arrival and the response of the old Tuleans as follows:

"I noticed that the Tule Lakers were all regretting the fact that this has become a segregation camp. They said, 'Gee, this camp was such a nice place before segregation.'

~~It was noticed that the Tule~~ "We complained and they complained. In other words, they thought segregation wasn't as good as it should have been."⁴

1. R. Hankey, Notes, August 21, pp. 1-2.
2. Ibid., August 23, p. 2.
3. Ibid., September 11, 1944, p. 5.
4. Ibid., August 30, 1944, pp. 1-2.

This hostility between the two groups, the transferees and the old inhabitants of Tule Lake developed soon after segregation. Almost a year later the differences had not been resolved: a large amount of the mutual distrust continued. When, in June and July of 1943, the writer attempted to extend her circle of old Tulean acquaintances and informants through her transferee friends she met with no success whatever. "I don't know any old Tuleans"; "We don't associate with them"; "We don't see eye to eye on anything"; she was told repeatedly. Two intelligent nisei girls said with delicate scorn:

"They don't seem to have much in common with us. Several girls work in our office, but we don't get along."¹

It should be kept in mind that the bulk of the transferees were not as militant, arrogant and pro-Japanese as the old Tuleans paint them and the bulk of the Old Tuleans were by no means as meek, spineless and pro-American as the transferees insist. Some of the older inhabitants of Tule Lake were strong supporters of the pressure group's attempt at reform. In spite of their idealistic statements, some of the transferees came to Tule Lake with no intention of returning to Japan; others came determined to sit on the fence until the course of the war indicated which country would make a more satisfactory future home. Judging only by uncritically accepted verbatim statements, the dichotomy between the attitudes of the true groups would appear to be enormous. This dichotomy however is an artificial one, built up by the conflicting desire for camp dominance. While there probably were more ~~dyed in the wool~~ ^{frank} fence sitters among the old Tuleans, both groups had very similar reasons for remaining in or coming to Tule Lake and both groups had much the same interests in approaching the administration to demand improvements in camp facilities or a uniform status as legitimate segregees.

1. Ibid., September 11, p. 3.

The following are sixth and fifth grade students answers to
a question put by a Caucasian teacher as to what they would like
to do morethan anything else in the world.


RG AND K-K-T-open conflict between

This section is inclusive, giving descriptions of the fight, the reactions of the RG faction and of the K-K-T- faction. The attitudes of the residents and the trial are also included.

For specific threats by the RG against Kai see: D-25-1-44; D-27-2-44;
D J-22-3-4-45 in this section.

THE POSTON CLIQUE

This is one of those nebulous but possibly important pieces of information that filtered out once the big shots of the RG had been interned. Both Kuratomi and Kurihara informed me that the small group of powerful leading lights behind the RG, especially in its pre-August 32 12, 1944 stage was composed of a small group of people from Poston lead by Tachibana and containing Ono, the member of the Resegregation Committee and the Uchida family - ~~father~~^{parents} of the black belt. Kuratomi implied that this bunch had worked together in Poston before coming to Tule Lake. Of course, there were no doubt other important leaders. I am inclined to the view that the Poston bunch at least stuck together and formed, perhaps, the most powerful faction in the RG.



KURIHARA, attitudes and activities of, re RG

This section contains everything Kurihara ever said or did about the Resegregation Group and also the things other informants said he did.

Unfortunately many items are included under other headings but these are noted on the card.

This section is concerned ~~xxxx~~ with the factional battle over the issue of the stockade detainees, the chief point of ~~xxxx~~ conflict between the Resegregation Group and the Tsuda-Kimura-Mori faction.

It is divided into three sections here but when there is overlapping it is noted. *on the cards*

SECTION 1 RG and Tsuda-Kimura-Mori fight over stockade detainees' issue.

This contains all data except that put into

SECTION 2 ACIJ and stockade detainees

which contains data pertaining only to Besig's visits when the Resegregation Group is not mentioned

and

SECTION 3 Stockade detainees, petition for release of

which contains specific data about this petition. (and the petition itself)

It should be kept in mind that Robertson was in close touch with the Underground Resegregation leaders and that when he speaks of "the people in the colony" he very often means ~~them~~ this group, especially when recounting threats or attitudes on resegregation.

FOR the squabble over the Hitomi murder indictment threat see M-6-4-5-6-45 in this section and also that section headed: RG attitudes re Kai-Kuratomi-Tsuda.

FACTIONALISM RESULTING FROM STATUS QUO

This section contains brief references to what must have been a widespread attitude of unease throughout the first half of 1944, due to the long lived conflict between the pro-status quo people and the remainder of the camp residents. This conflict, as has been noted, gradually merged into the ~~pro-Resegregationist~~ Resegregationist's conflict with the rest of the camp residents.

YAMASHIRO SE INEN -DAN

All I know about this seinen-dan is contained in these notes and the case history of Yamashiro. The faction was never very important in Tule Lake, although the administration appears to have been concerned over it early in 1944.

Undoubtedly, however, Yamashiro's position as leader of this bunch of young fellows predisposed him to be jealous and suspicious of the Resegregation Group's young men's organization and ended with his being termed dog.

Specific information in the case history relating to the seinen-dan and Yamashiro's opposition to the RG may be found on pp. 5B through 6, 7, 9 through 13.

OKAMOTO SHOOTING AND DIVISIONAL RESPONSIBLE MEN

This attempt of the Divisional Responsible Men, particularly members of the Ex-Coordinating Committee to reestablish themselves on the basis of the Okamoto shooting is mentioned only in my first draft. As the notes explain they tried to form a labor organization but Best said he could not give them recognition. They were very angry.

~~Since these men were still regarded as super-dogs by the people at~~

Since these men were ~~still~~ regarded as super-dogs by the people at this time, I was ~~as~~ flabbergasted when I heard that they had tried to get into the limelight again. Had Best ~~blown it~~ given them recognition, the opposition which they would have received from the Resegregation Group would have been something to watch.

Incidentally, Resegregation Group leaders accused the same bunch of conservatives of taking charge of the Spanish Consul Committee appointed to make a report to the Japanese govt. (via Sp. C.) on the Okamoto shooting. See RG, leaders of, attitudes of, re Spanish Consul Report of Okamoto shooting..

Then, in the spring of 1945, Kuratomi and Tsuda got the notion into their heads that these and other conservatives were again trying to get a representative body started. Their jealousy and indignation is clearly shown in the section headed: Kai-K-T: Jealousy of, re Spanish Consul Committee and Ex-Coordinating Committee. I investigated this business thoroughly and found no indication that Kuratomi's and Tsuda's fears had any grounds.

OUR GRATITUDE AND WISHES

TO THE RESIDENTS OF THE TULE LAKE CENTER

Without any warning or announced reasons, the United States Army with tanks, armored cars, machine guns, etc. was called into the residential area of this colony at the request of the W.R. A. administration on the night of November 4, 1943.

In order to ease tension and to re-establish normalcy in the colony, the representatives of the residents undertook the task of negotiating with the Army officials. However, the Army abandoned and severed all relation with said representatives, and subsequently started the oppressive and unlawful arrests. Under the unrest and the handicap of strict orders prohibiting meetings and mass congregation, the residents, nevertheless, strove to bring this unfortunate incident to an amicable end. The result was further arrests, and the number of persons arrested reached well over 300. There was no hope whatsoever of finding a solution to this ever-darkening situation at the time.

Previously, the Japanese Government had sent a formal note of protest dealing with the Tule Lake Incident. It seems that the authorities, reaching a state of confusion, realized their blunders. The gradual release of the stockade occupants was effected, and on August 24, 1944, the last of the 14 occupants was released unconditionally. During our long confinement we had two hunger strikes, never being fearful of fighting for a just cause and always upholding our virtues as true Japanese.

Now that we are back in the colony, we solemnly pledge ourselves, however insignificant our efforts may be, to our fundamental objective of establishing a constructive and peaceful community here at Tule Lake. In order that this Incident which became international in significance and scope, come to a formal conclusion, we will give our most earnest efforts in uniting the families of the Issei sent to Santa Fe Detention Station in connection with this affair. Hereafter, too, we sincerely hope that every resident of this center, manifesting the traditional high ideals of our race will cooperate and work in unison for the peaceful functioning of this center.

Furthermore, in conclusion, we wish to express our most heartfelt gratitude to all the justice-loving residents who had given us such diligent and sacrificial support.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ Tetsuo Abe	Tomio Kazama	Isamu Sugimoto
Takeo Hamamoto	Yoshio Kobayashi	Isamu Uchida
Shigeo Ishigami	Yukio Kobayashi	Mikio Yamamoto
Shizuo Kai	Toshio Kuratomi	Tokio Yamane
		Satoshi Yoshiyama

Mrs. Takemichi
"I"'s wife, and the women present, ~~did not appear to have taken~~ took a whimsical attitude toward this document as if it did not have much importance, which, in fact, in the eyes of the great majority of camp residents, it does not.

EMPLOYMENT CUT

During my visit to Tule of April 12-17, 1944 I picked up no hint of this coming employment cut from Opder or Robertson. We do not have the earliest copies of the Newell Star and so I cannot say when the first announcement about the forthcoming cut was made except that it was prior to April 27.

The evacuees ~~some of whom~~ complained about the cut now and then but as far as I noticed, since so many people needed jobs, complaints were limited to those who lost the jobs and to block managers who were asked to do something about it.

April 27, 1944VOIUNTARY TERMINATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY

Cooperation on the part of families where more than two persons have been employed in terminating voluntarily has been very good; disclosed Frank Fagan, acting director of Placement Office. The employment practice of the center limits jobs to two persons in a family.

Recently he asked for voluntary terminations in families where more than two were employed. In commenting on the results attained he said, "One or more members of 78 different families have signified their intention to voluntarily terminate so that there will be no more than two in the family employed. This is approximately 46 percent of the number of families to which requests have been made."

Terminations

It is hoped that in so far as possible the family members will agree on which person or persons should quit work in order to comply with the present employment practice, Mr. Fagan explained. However, terminations initiated by the administration will be necessary if this voluntary action is not taken.

"I hope," said Mr. Fagan "that in the family discussions as to who should terminate that consideration will be given to those who are employed in key positions or where they are improving their education or working skill. In such cases these people are getting experience which will better fit them for holding such positions after the war. This refers particularly to such positions as nurses aides, stenographers, typists, file clerks, teachers, mechanics and policemen. I am gratified at the response our placement people have had as it indicates the understanding of the residents of the center. It shows that they appreciate the value of extending employment opportunities to as many different family groups as possible.

May 11, 1944MAY 20 DEADLINE SET FOR VOIUNTARY TERMINATIONS

Unless terminations in line with the new center employment policy are made voluntarily before May 20, the Placement Office announces that it will be necessary for the Personnel Officer to decide who in the family shall be terminated.

It is urgently requested that terminations be made voluntarily as it will be much more satisfactory for all concerned.

To date, a total of 188 persons from 145 families have volunteered to terminate immediately and, of these, 80 have been terminated.

Of the 301 families requested to make voluntary terminations, 156 families with 225 excess people employed have not volunteered terminations.

KXEA

May 25, 1944

FAGAN REPORTS ON TERMINATION

Frank Fagan, acting personnel officer of the Placement Office, announced that 225 out of 314 families have offered terminations on a voluntary basis and through this move, 420 new workers will be employed. He said that Placement Office is now dismissing workers from the families where there are more than two working.

June 8, 1944

VOUNTARY TERMINATIONS ASKED IN FAMILIES OF TWO

In order that employment be given to as many people as possible, voluntary terminations will be appreciated wherever the family consists of only husband and wife and ~~only~~ both are employed, according to a statement released by Frank D. Fagan, acting personnel officer.

In making this request, Fagan expressed the belief that "everyone in the project wished to cooperate with and assist others in the project."

He also revealed that some 500 jobs had been created by the recent terminations which were made in line with the new policy of permitting only two members of a family to work at any one time. Of the 89 families that did not make voluntary terminations, "they are accepting the decision of the Personnel Office (in making terminations) in a very satisfactory manner," he said.

June 22, 1944

TERMINATIONS TO BEGIN JULY 1 FOR WORKING COUPLES

Reduction of employment in families of two where both had been working, is going ahead in good shape, according to a statement from Personnel Officer Frank D. Fagan.

Voluntary terminations in families of two where both are working will continue until July 1. After that date, the Personnel Officer will request division and section heads to make the necessary terminations. However, at the rate the voluntary terminations have been progressing it is expected that there will be very few left on the employment rolls where action by the division and section heads will become necessary.

JULY 13, 1944

FAGAN EXPLAINS POLICY ON JOB TERMINATIONS

Frank Fagan, personnel officer, revealed that there are yet some families where more than two members are employed.

He stated that arrangements to terminate these people have been made, but they are being permitted to remain on their jobs until a replacement has been secured and trained to do the work.

This is being done with the permission of the Personnel Office, and with the understanding that when a replacement is ready to assume the duties of the job, the old employee will be terminated.

July 13, 1944

MESSAGE ON EMPLOYMENT

I have been in close touch with the employment problem in this center and have been gratified at the cooperation shown by the evacuees in the reduction of number employed per family. Through this work we have made possible the employment of 367 new employees.

Those employed in the Placement Office who are responsible for the carrying out of instructions issued from both Washington and this office, have worked hard to see that the regulations are carried out that ~~xxx~~ every evacuee is given the same consideration. No one in the Placement Office assumes any responsibility as far as policy of the selection of workers is concerned.

At the present time we have no jobs open with the exception of stenographic, colonial police, and typing positions, and such other positions as may be replacing those terminated. Every effort is being made to create new projects which will result in the employment of additional evacuees.

I hope that the voluntary terminations of evacuees, where more than the stipulated number of employed, will continue, as it is one of the fair methods of giving employment to members of those families where no one is employed at the present time.

Ray R. Best
Project Director.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Nothing much ~~expl~~ about employment was heard for months to come. However, late in 1944 and early in 1945 more than two in a family were rehired if they had needed skills. Mr. Tokunaga was one of the men terminated in May and rehired in December 1944 or January of 1945. Nobody squawked particularly about this because people had so much else on their minds.

Keeping skilled people on, regardless of the number of employed members of a family was probably kept up quietly by the Placement Office throughout all these months as indicated by Fagan's statement of July 13.

*Rosalice's
Notes*

8211-I
Tule Lake Center
Newell, California
March 21, 1945

*Reply from
myra attached*

Mr. Francis Biddle
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Although I applied for renunciation of my United States citizenship and had my hearing about three weeks ago, I now have doubt whether I actually wanted to do this or not as I reconsider and analyze my action and my motives. Therefore I want to appeal this matter to your mercy in order that I may not lose my United States Citizenship which I asked to have renounced without much thought and consideration. At the same time, I want to explain to you what has motivated many of our people to apply for renunciation of their citizenship. I also want you to understand some of the things which persons in the Government in Washington failed to perceive and to understand:- What goes on in the minds of citizens who have been deprived of privileges and civil rights because of this present world-wide conflict.

I think the Government has failed to understand the feelings of persons who suffered physically and mentally because of evacuation. I think it is true at all times that if the Government loses the faith of its people, the people lose faith and confidence in the Government of the country in which they live. I can give a more simple illustration of what I mean. If a father does not love his own children, he cannot expect love and respect from them. Everybody knows this with common sense but this nonsense happened to us and it happened in this country. This helped us to lose our confidence in this country and in the authorities of this country, a country which is supposed to profess respect for the rights of people.

I want to give you an illustration of what I actually thought so that you may understand the thing easily and judge whether it is thoughtful thing to do or not. For instance, suppose the real father of several children, after he has mistreated them, without cause, and deprived them of privileges as his children, should ask them whether they love him. In such a case, you know how they would answer this. No one can demand the love and affection even from his children without proper, kindly treatment. If a father loves his son, his son will naturally love him without having to be asked. This same applies to people. The security of a nation depends upon how the people are treated just as it is true in one's home. There is an old saying that what you plant is what you harvest. I want to give you another illustration to express what I want to say. There was a sower who planted wicked seed in a field in Spring; and in Fall, he harvested what he planted. Then he found it was wicked crops and he blamed the field where he sowed the wicked seeds for not bringing forth good crop. You probably say what a fool he is. Believe it or not, this same ridiculous thing happened

in this country. It is a great mistake to test people's loyalty just like a chemical put in a test tube and determine it on color, odor and form.

This was the general feeling of our people at the Centers at the time when we were asked or rather I should say we were forced to fill out the questionnaire prepared by the Selective Service Board with the cooperation of the W.R.A. As it is today, question No. 28 hurts our feeling most. The question puzzled us because such a question only implies that the Government isn't sure whether we are her people or not. At that time, I felt that if the Government suspected us and had a doubt in mind whether we are her citizens or not, I myself was completely lost to think clearly and intelligently what I am and where I should stand because of the mental shock caused by evacuation. If I were to answer the question "Yes", I felt that I have no place to go in this world because the nature of the question was such that any Japanese who lived in Japan cannot answer "yes" to it, regardless of what he thinks about the country of his birth. We were educated to die for the country where we were born. The question did not have meaning for us. I was therefore compelled to answer in the negative.

If there had been no registration, such as we had, there would be no trouble and no headache which the Government now has. It was a great shock to many of the center residents that the news of the lifting of the blanket exclusion order took place at the same time that the Director of WRA announced that all the Relocation Centers would close in a year, because many of us thought and still think that we will have to go out of camp in the same manner as we were forced to evacuate from the Pacific Coast, without adequate time and preparation for the future.

Then there is the fact that Congress passed a bill to enable us to renounce our U. S. Citizenship. This gave us a deep impression that the Congress which represents the people in this country and its Government are keenly interested that we lose our citizenship and don't want our presence in this country. When we heard that Congress passed this bill, we felt that if we will not do what the Congress and the Government want us to do, we may be retaliated against in some other way. Therefore, we thought it wise for us to do what the Congress and the Government planned since we want to go where we feel that we will be well accepted and at the same time establish homes for our offsprings so that they may not go through what we have suffered.

I do not believe that it is right that a father make his son to hate his mother as much as she does to him even though they are having family trouble. To me, America is my father; and Japan is my mother; and I am their son. Therefore, it is impossible for me to swear whom I love most of these two. At this point I should explain myself to you before I proceed to tell you the matter which directly concerns the renunciation of my U. S. citizenship and the motives which made many of our people (Americans of Japanese ancestry) in this center to apply for renunciation of U. S. citizenship.

I was born in Seattle, Washington 24 years ago, and raised there until I was five years old. Then my father thought that since I was of Japanese blood, even though I am a U. S. citizen by birth, it is

essential for me to know the culture of Japan so that I can be worthy of my Japanese heritage and worthy to live as much for others as for myself; help promote the understanding and cooperation between these two peoples in the future so that the world may have peace and security, which at present, unfortunately, are at war. With this thought in mind, he sent me with my big brothers and one little sister to Japan to get an education there through which we would live up to the standard he expected from us. One factor which made my father decide this was that our first generation Issei people did not live among cultured Caucasians. Therefore he saw that if his children were grown up with children of non-cultured people, they may be bound to become good-for-nothing fellows, because children have no ability to discriminate good and bad in the things which they see and hear, and easily learn many wicked things before long. He also knew that he had no time to take care of his children even though he wants to do it, because he ought to work and support his family, which was difficult with a great handicap of knowing little English. Therefore he wished to send us where we were well cared for and where we could become good people. I was taken to my mother's home with my brothers and a sister. We lived with my mother's eldest brother and his wife and son. Even though we have no blood relation with his wife, she treated us just like his sons. We were well cared for. From there we went to elementary school. When my eldest brother failed to pass an entrance examination to a middle school, my father thought something was slipping and neglected in him. Therefore, he was very much concerned with it and told them to come back to this country since they attained the age to judge the things good and bad since they acquired the good parts of Japanese culture and life. After staying five years in Japan, my brothers returned to this country and lived with parents. And under my father's supervision, they continued their education in this country. I stayed in Japan for more than ten years, during which time I completed elementary school and entered a middle school. Somehow or other I didn't study hard. When my eldest brother came to Japan a second time to enter the Teachers' College in Tokio in the winter of 1935, he noticed that I neglected my study. Thus he worried about me and sent a word to my father that I should be called back to his home and given a proper supervision in getting a further education. In the Fall of 1936 I came back to this country and lived with my parents since then. I started my American education from Junior High School in Los Angeles and graduated from the local high school in the winter of 1942. At that time Japan and United States were already at war. I thought I should continue my education to high institution. Therefore, I went to Los Angeles Junior College and majored in engineering until the time when I was evacuated from that place. I enjoyed my school days and would have liked to continue my education.

The thing which you are very much interested in is probably what I think about this war. Even though I am aware of the fact that no one can serve two masters, my loyalty to USA is as much as to Japan. When I am forced to answer to which countries between these two, I am very much embarrassed to answer it, because I love this country as much as I do Japan. Just as I cannot deny that I was born in the soil of the USA I cannot deny that I am of Japanese blood, figure and color. Therefore, I really do not want to take part in this war between this country and Japan. Because of this conflict, I am greatly grieved and mourn. I know that in this war both countries gain nothing, rather a terrible

destruction and hatred and misery to themselves, for which reason I don't want to participate in this war. Furthermore, I know that the world cannot gain its peace and security with the means of war. Peace, security and prosperity of the world are achieved only by means of understanding, goodwill and cooperation.

I am not blind in this matter, and I want to live in what I believe right. My conviction is that I am willing to give my life for the cause of peace and security between these two nations. I do not want to die for the misery, destruction and hatred of these people, but I am glad to die for the peace and prosperity of these two countries that I love.

This belief being within me, I thought it is not wise for me to lose my U. S. citizenship. I know that this present war between USA and Japan will not continue forever. I know furthermore that there is a time to come when these nations and their peoples want to help each other to bring forth peace, security and prosperity to themselves. In such an event, I can give a great service to them if I am a citizen of the United States. What I stated above may sound too wishful thinking to you at present. One may think I overlook the realities of the world. It may seem so but I work to the end that the people of these two countries and their future generations may enjoy peace, security and prosperity.

Then, you might be interested in why I applied for renunciation of U. S. citizenship. This is what I want to explain to you. Although the Congress did not specifically state in words when they passed this bill, to enable for anyone to apply for renunciation of citizenship, we all felt that it was aimed at us. Many of us thought that if we were to refuse to renounce it, in some other way we may suffer because of that we failed to act according to what the Congress expected. I interpret this bill as the sentiment of the people of this country that they do not want us here. If it is so, I will be foolish enough to stay in this country. Therefore, I decided to renounce my U. S. citizenship and had my hearing. After I had gone through all the necessary steps to lose my citizenship of this country, I find my belief and conviction are the same as before.

But in discussions with one of the WRA personnel, I learned that there are many people who are interested in helping us. I feel I should not overlook the effort and goodwill of those people who are willing to help us. And at the same time with U. S. citizenship, I may complete what I have in mind, to promote the understanding and goodwill and peace between the peoples of the U. S. and Japan. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I hereby appeal that my renunciation of citizenship be cancelled.

I have wondered how many people sincerely believed what they did in this matter of renunciation. Furthermore, I doubt whether many people really understand what they are doing. I think there are some instances that although the person did not wish to lose his citizenship, he did it because he felt uncomfortable and uneasy when he learned many of his friends did. There are some cases that although a boy did not want to do such a thing, he has done it to please his parents. Therefore, this

bill did a crime to many Americans of Japanese ancestry. On the other hand, I will not deny that there are people who sincerely believe in what they have done. Especially, I feel sorry for the Nisei, a second generation, because if they were to go out to make their living in the American communities in the event this center be closed as the Director of WRA announced, I am sure that when they find a suitable place in the American communities, they will eventually forget the past bitterness and also the idea to go to Japan, where they never have been and whose language they are not so much familiar with; and choose to establish their home not only for themselves but also for their children, and regret their loss of citizenship. The reason why I believe this is that even though there are people in this country who dislike our people because they do not know us, or they have some other reasons, there are other kind of people who are willing to help us. That I learned from many sources.

At the same time, although our people lost the confidence and faith in this country because we were mistreated and roughly handled in the past, if there are people in the federal, state and local governments who are willing to help us in this misery, stretch forth their warm hands, they will surely recover from their physical and mental wounds and accommodate themselves to others. What I mean is that our people understand that life is give and take. Therefore, I am interested that our people, especially the Nisei, may not wrong their life, because of what happened to them in the past. I feel that we should admit ourselves that everybody makes a mistake and that we should forgive each other in such a case. What I want to ask you, at your mercy, is that the Government should be a little more lenient in handling our problems and at the same time give some more consideration, especially in the process of renunciation of our citizenship. I believe that the Government failed to perceive the fact that even in the scientific laws there are many deviations. They should not try to generalize the human problems because they are much more complicated. In other words, the government should not try to measure social problems with a yard stick such as a man-made law--the Renunciation Bill.

In the end I want to stress that if our people are properly treated in this country, they will prove themselves to be good Americans and become an integral part of America for its security and prosperity. I want to tell you some of the things which many good Americans overlooked in Americans of Japanese ancestry. That is, that our people are taught to repay good with good, but never good with evil. Every man of Japanese blood knows whosoever breaks this social code of Japanese life, should be punished with death. Anybody who says that he cannot trust "Japs" really doesn't know the Japanese people.

I hope that I have sufficiently explained the reasons why I do not wish to renounce my U. S. citizenship. I wish my renunciation of citizenship be reconsidered and cancelled so that I may continue to be a citizen of this country.

Sincerely yours,

Katsunobu Asano
8211-I
Newell, California

C O P Y
U.S. Dept. of the Interior
War Relocation Authority
Washington

April 9, 1945

Mr. Katsunobu Asano
8211 - I Tule Lake Center
Newell, California

Dear Mr. Asano:

This will acknowledge your communication of March 21, together with a copy of your letter of the same date to Attorney General Biddle commenting upon the reasons you requested renunciation of citizenship, explaining your present attitude, and requesting the Attorney General to cancel such renunciation.

I am much interested in your letter and the straight-forward manner in which you have set forth your reaction to the evacuation and related events. It is unfortunate that you and others who have felt similarly did not think the matter all the way through before renouncing rather than waiting until afterward. The Attorney-General, of course, is the only one who can make the final decision in your case and doubtless you have already received an acknowledgment of your communication from the Department of Justice.

There is one point on which I would like to comment, and that is the part of your letter on page 5 referring to the enactment by the Congress of a bill permitting voluntary renunciation of citizenship. Your interpretation seems to have been that, although the law provides voluntary renunciation, its purpose really was to encourage persons to renounce. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Doubtless, you are aware of the belief on the part of many persons that a considerable number of persons of Japanese ancestry are really loyal to the Emperor of Japan and regard their American citizenship lightly. You may know also that there were several bills introduced into the Congress providing for the mandatory revocation of the citizenship of individuals who have taken certain actions.

In the hearings before the Immigration Committee of the House, these bills were studied very carefully, and the attitude of the Committee in open hearings indicated a keen realization of the implications of any law which would revoke citizenship on a mandatory or categorical basis. As a consequence, the law as finally enacted was wholly permissive in character, and leaves the initiative wholly in the hands of the citizen who desires to divest himself of citizenship. The presumption, therefore, is that Congress did not desire to encourage renunciation but desired only to provide a process by which persons who desired to be loyal to a nation with which the United States was at war might divest themselves of a citizenship which they did not value and attain the status of enemy aliens.

I mention this point simply because it appears that you have misconstrued the intention of the Congress and have taken a very serious step under a considerable degree of misapprehension.

(Signed) Dillon S. Myer

KASHIMA FUNERAL

WRA - Tule Lake Incident - Sequence of Events:

October 23 --- Public Funeral for Farm Worker from Topaz

Funeral ceremony managed by Buddhist Leaders was attended by about three thousand evacuees. Three Caucasians also attended the funeral, one of these being the Reports Officer of the Project who was slightly roughed up after having taken four pictures of the ceremony. Evidence of organization appeared in the form of young evacuees directing people in the blocks to go to the funeral, and a group of young men patrolling at the rear of the crowd. Power was turned off on the Project so that the public address system could not function.

NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE'S ATTEMPT TO CONTACT MYER

Kuratomi stated October 19, 1944, p. 3: (altered from verbatim for clarity)

The farm group went to see Zimmer. Yoshiyama, Hayashi, and (other members of the Negotiating Committee) went to see Zimmer also.

made out

Zimmer ~~says~~/a type-written statement that Myer would see the Farm Committee on November 2.

Yoshiyama told Zimmer that he wasn't representing the Farm Group and that the Negotiating Committee wanted to see Mr. Myer. Zimmer refused this. So the Negotiating Committee had to make the other arrangement (the mass demonstration) to see Myer.

This matter, explained Kuratomi could have been the work only of Zimmer and ~~xxx~~ Best, ~~and~~ Myer may not have been notified that the Negotiating Committee wished to see him.

HANKEY * ADDITIONAL TULLE LAKE CASE HISTORIES

George Matsumura *Man.*

T. Nakamura *T. L.*

Mitzi Nakano *T. L.*

Yayoi Nishikawa *22 La*

Helen Sasajima *Topog*

Mrs. Yamashiro *Esia*

Kimi Hashimoto *Esia*

Kayo Iida *Topog*

May Iwchana *Esia*

Melba Kaminaka *T. L.*

Lillian Manji *T. L.*

Masao Shimada *Esia? Coordinating Committee.*

Morihiko Tokunaga. *Man.*

Mrs. Oda. *Esia.*

CRITERIA FOR SEGREGATION (check with document in Berkeley)

1. Persons who applied for repatriation or expatriation and who did not retract before July 1, 1943. Families in many cases signed as a group but where they failed to do so the Social Welfare Department will interview individual family members and render counseling service.

2. Those persons who answered No to question 28, who refused to answer and who refused to register. A neutral answer will be considered equivalent to a negative one. All persons in this category will be given an opportunity to state whether they have changed their minds since registration or not. In case of change they will be later given a hearing before the Board of Review for Leave Clearance and that body will recommend to the project director whether they should be sent to Tule Lake or be given leave clearance.

hearing
boards

enlarge
explain hearing Boards,

CRUDE BUT SIGNIFICANT FACTS OF POPULATION

(All figures to be checked)

DSS will have to do an angle check on this

Some 6, 198 people elected to stay in Tule Lake. In September and October of 1943, 8561 segregees were moved in from nine relocation centers. Of this population of about 14,750 people, approximately 8880 had ~~legitimate~~ status as segregees having either requested repatriation or expatriation or answered their military questionnaire in the negative. ~~about 4000 persons maximum~~ 3749 persons were listed as ^{Secondary} voluntary segregees which meant that they had come ^{or remained in} to Tule Lake to accompany some close segregee relative. More than a thousand additional persons were listed as "unauthorized residents" and they and a few hundred miscellaneous persons were ^{properly speaking} not segregees. Therefore, About 30% of the population of Tule Lake as a segregation center, were not in the category of persons "disloyal" to the United States. (There is no way of telling how many of this 30% were children.)

How many of these were children?

The young men of draft age composed about 18.3 % of the entire population. Young men of draft age outnumbered young women in the same age group by 58%.

(Data on hand does not indicate how many of this September-October ~~xxxx~~ 1943 population were citizens or aliens.) (Accurate list of how many individuals came from each center should also be given here.)

Besides the entrance of the men from Leupp in December 1943, and the occasional entrance of some family which got special permission to come to T. Lake ^{such as families of internees,} there were two major additional groups ~~sent to Tule Lake~~ of segregees sent to Tule lake, one in late February and one a couple of months later.

This brought the population up to 18,599.

By May of 1944, say the WKA statistics, this number had been reduced

238. Check. They had 4000 in Tule and 1000 in report - families. The latter

Pre-Incident Attitudes

An account of the spectacular events which occurred at Tule Lake within a few weeks after the influx of the ^{newcomers or} transferees is difficult to appreciate if the state of mind, the attitudes, and the expectations held by the thousands of people concerned are not clearly understood. The farm accident which took place about three weeks after the transferees began to enter Tule Lake is frequently blamed for the series of extraordinary events which followed. When, however, the psychological condition of the great majority of the camp residents is taken into account, it will be seen that this accident was not the reason for the outburst but instead merely the spark which set off a vast accumulation of frustrations and grievances and provided the avenue of release for a state of great and widespread ^{resentment and} tension.

relo { To provide some perspective for the appreciation of this situation the ~~the impact of the newcomers upon the entrenched Old Tule Lake population,~~ motivations for segregation, ~~the attitudes of the transferees, their expectations of life in Tule Lake,~~ an account of their ^{newcomer} primary impressions on entering the camp and their preliminary reactions to these impressions will be briefly described.

Attitudes of the Newcomers.
The Motivations for Segregation

The reasons why 8??? Japanese left the Relocation Centers to take up residence in Tule Lake are complex in the extreme. The studies made by capable observers in the various camps during the period when this decision was finally made indicate beyond cavil that in the overwhelming majority of cases this decision had nothing whatever to do with political allegiance "loyalty or dis-loyalty" either to the United States or to Japan. It should be kept in mind that very few individuals were sent to Tule Lake who did not express before their hearing boards their determined desire to go. Their decision to enter a center for Japanese "who by their acts have indicated that their loyalties lie with Japan"

The impact of almost 9000 newcomers upon the ~~population of~~ settled population of 6000 persons who remained in Tule Lake was enormous and gave rise to a hostility between the ingroup and the outgroup which played a significant part in the development of attitudes which were to direct camp behavior for many months to come. While in many respects the attitudes of both groups were quite similar, neither group perceived or would admit this and each criticised the other freely and bitterly. The transferees could find nothing about their new place of residence which suited them. Almost everything from the food to the scenery was alleged to be inferior to their former centers of residence. The Old Tuleans did not appreciate this at all and criticised the newcomers for what they considered outlandish demands and a "trouble-making" attitude. They also pointed out quite frankly that the transferees were jealous of the vested positions ~~with~~ and the "important jobs" which the Old Tuleans possessed. The newcomers then called the Old Tuleans ikujinashi (spineless) and accused them of having remained in Tule Lake not because they sincerely desired to return to Japan but because they were too lazy to move. However, the Old Tuleans were by no means spineless. They had ~~several spirited conflicts with the administration in pre-segregation times and after segregation had several well developed resentments of their own, in particular their hatred of Dr. Pedicord, the Chief Medical Officer and their suspicion that certain members of the Caucasian personnel were illegally disposing of evacuee food for their private profit. The newcomers promptly took over these resentments also.~~ had several spirited conflicts with the administration in pre-segregation times and after segregation had several well developed resentments of their own, in particular their hatred of Dr. Pedicord, the Chief Medical Officer and their suspicion that certain members of the Caucasian personnel were illegally disposing of evacuee food for their private profit. The newcomers promptly took over these resentments also. Moreover, when the tension and discontent reached a climax and overt protest and ~~insubordination~~ organization were initiated

Needs.

American public. Almost all of the evacuees shared this attitude to some degree. Those who did not ~~segregate~~ become segregees either chose to put some stock in the repeated WRA assurances that they would not be forced to leave the centers or decided that the move to Tule Lake, which did not by any means guarantee absolute security, entailed too much risk and trouble and would cut them off too far from a reentry into life in the United States, a possibility which they had by no means abandoned completely. It was wiser, they felt, to stay in the Relocation Centers and "wait and see".

Very
 inadequate
 description
 of
 people
 in
 Relocation
 centers

be the newcomers, a large proportion of the Old Tulean population became infected with the excitement of resistance and supported the uprising strongly. To give a perspective for the appreciation of this situation, the attitudes of both the newcomers and the Old Tuleans immediately before and after ~~the~~ segregation will be described.

ATTITUDES OF THE NEWCOMERS -- THE TRANSFEREES

The Motivations for Segregation

The reasons why 8800(?) Japanese left the Relocation Centers to take up residence in Tule Lake are complex in the extreme. The studies made by capable observers in the various camps during the period when this decision was finally made indicate beyond cavil that in the overwhelming majority of cases this decision had nothing whatever to do with political allegiance, "loyalty or disloyalty" either to the United States or to Japan. The most common motive for the decision was an attempt to escape from a complex of insecurities and fears. The greater number of these tormenting insecurities were connected with the widespread fear that sooner or later the evacuees would be forced to leave the centers, an eventuality ~~wich~~ which they were most reluctant to face. 1/ In short, they had not made up their minds whether they should throw in their lot with America or Japan. Evacuation had shocked, disillusioned and impoverished them. No one could be sure whether America with its racial prejudice and discrimination or Japan with its possibility of a difficult economic existence was the better choice. They wanted more time to observe the outcome of the war and the attitudes of the American government and the

 1. Morris Opler, "The Repatriate-Expatriate Group of Manzanar," p. 74; T. Tsuchiyama, "Segregation," pp. 1-6; R. Hankey, "Chronological Account of Segregation in Gila," p. 5.

(b) is not
 in "in short"
 description
 of (a)

(b)

war reparation for losses was also responsible for some issei desire for segregation as was the possession of property in Japan or relatives there, who it was optimistically hoped could be relied upon to give the repatriates some assistance in the event of exchange. Another important point should be kept in mind. Although the attitude was seldom overtly voiced, few of the segregees looked upon the act of segregation as a final cutting of their relationship with the United States. Instead, they believed that once again, at some future time, they would be given the opportunity to make up their minds. They had been given the opportunity to retract their applications for repatriation or expatriation; they had been given the opportunity to change their minds on their ~~questions~~ answers to the military questionnaire. Why then, they reasoned, should they not be given the ~~chance~~ opportunity to change their minds about segregation.

Though many of the ~~stated~~ motives listed above operated upon the nisei expatriates and No-Nos, in many cases the operation was indirect, i. e., the nisei gave way to the fear-instigated pressure put upon them by their parents. 1/ When questioned, nisei very frequently stated that they would not change their negative answers to the military questionnaire because of the

 / . Morris Opler, op. cit., p. 88; T. Tsuchiyama, op. cit., p. 15.

abridgment of their rights of citizenship incurred by evacuation, their conviction that a future in America would be made impossible by racial discrimination and, as an additional resentment, listed the property losses of their parents.¹ Since the greater proportion of these nisei segregees did not even have citizenship in Japan, their decision, as Morris Opler astutely states, was "purely a negative gesture . . . leading them exactly nowhere."²

The fear of induction into the United States Army was a very significant factor for those families with male members of military age. Despite Segregation Release 2A which stated that the Selective Service Act would also apply to persons confined in Tule Lake, a considerable number of the segregees eligible for the draft continued to hope that segregees would not be drafted or that segregation in itself would inhibit their chances of reclassification.³ Future events at Tule Lake were to show that they gambled correctly in this matter. It is apparent that even when the decision to become a segregee was based on practical motives it gave no guarantee of the security so greatly desired. It was a decision about which the people had many misgivings. If a segregee were sincere in his avowed desire to return to Japan the future did not promise much even to the most optimistic. If he were not sincere, and many were not, and intended to use Tule Lake as a war-duration refuge, he had no tangible assurance that he made the wiser decision. An elderly issei woman ~~told the writer~~ ^{stated} before segregation took place in Gila:

"I think they're a lot of families being segregated who don't really want to go. They're almost like expecting that it's going to be very strict (in Tule Lake). . . They don't know what to do. . . Even if you go back to Japan you don't have anything . . . They really won't be welcome."⁴

1. Opler, op. cit. pp. 44, 48; R. Hankey, op. cit., pp. 5, 16, 51, 54.
2. "The Repatriate-Expatriate Group of Manzanar," pp. 9-10.
3. T. Tsuchiyama, op. cit., pp. 15, 17, 19; Opler, op. cit., pp. 48, 75; R. Hankey, op. cit., pp. 29, 30, 78.
4. R. Hankey, op. cit., p. 26.

At TL,
they were
not
officially
that they
would not
be drafted
(see fn)

Morris Opler in his survey of ^{dates of application for} the repatriation ~~dates~~ concludes:

"For many families the decision to repatriate is not easy or clear-cut and even after it is made, it is a verdict about which there is much mis-giving. Since the margin of decision is so narrow and the application is so often canceled at least once before it is allowed to stand, it may be assumed that in spite of the alien status of the family heads and the strains of the war, many of the families who are repatriating would never have contemplated the action if it had not been for evacuation and the special conditions resulting from it."¹

1-64-65

Emotional State of the Segregees

In consideration of the factors listed above, it is not surprising that the great number of transferees packed and left for Tule Lake in a state of great emotional strain. ~~The writer had an excellent opportunity to witness this since she visited many evacuee friends in the two weeks prior to the departure.~~ ^{During their for Tule Lake} ~~The dominant impression which these people gave was of an emotional tension so intense that when they spoke of their decision they had difficulty in keeping back the tears. When they trusted the writer they~~ ^{many} ~~were~~ eager to talk about their "reasons" for going to Tule Lake but usually, instead of giving reasons, they poured out denunciations of the nullification of their rights as citizens, and the race prejudice which manifested itself in evacuation. A young man who had attended the University of California stated with scorching and incoherent bitterness:

^{Oda}
"I have no intention of going back to Japan. I'm just going to wait it out. . . It's just a burning resentment inside of us. In the first place nobody can tell us just why we were put here. . . Many people who said "no" are not disloyal. I don't consider that I am."²

53

The same tension and emotional stress was observed among the Poston segregees by ^{Nishimoto:}

"I noticed in the Poston segregants emotional stress and tension increase as the day of departure from Poston approached. I remember at least two segregants confided in me that they felt the same way just prior to the time of the evacuation from Southern California - the feeling of increasing anxiety and insecurity."³

N-5-4.

1. Op. cit., pp. 64-65.
2. Hankey, op. cit., p. 53.
3. "X's" Sociological Journal, November 5, 1943, p. 4.

interviewees in Kila

It is noteworthy that all of the potential segregees ~~interviewed by the writer~~ stressed that they did not consider themselves disloyal to the United States. Dr. Opler comments upon this same factor in his study of the citizen segregees ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ *among them!* One of the most sincere and moving expressions was made ~~to the writer~~ by a kibeï segregee: *in Kila!*

"I can not hardly understand what degree is disloyalty and loyalty. According to the military registration, I was designated as a disloyal citizen by WRA. I swear I did not do that on purpose. I do not believe and hope the disloyal attitude means direct sympathy to the Japanese government, or hating American government. . . I feel something deeply in my heart that we still have American ideals and thoughts."²

At the opposite extreme was a nisei informant who segregated for practical reasons alone and ^{stated} ~~confessed to the writer~~ that if he were given \$1,500 he would be glad to relocate.³

The most striking characteristic of the segregees ~~whom the writer~~ observed en-training for Tule Lake ^{from Kila} was their extreme, almost abnormal quiet and reserve. Most of *no p. 6 they were in bars.* [the weeping was done by friends who were left behind.⁴ The same phenomenon was noted at Poston.⁵ To the casual observer they appeared to be meek, bedraggled and submissive, the last group of people in the world one would expect to explode into resistance against the authorities. That this outward quiet and meekness covered a tremendous emotional tension later events were to ^{show} ~~prove~~ all too clearly.

~~I think D. Myer's optimistic statement might well be put here. R.H.~~

-
1. "Studies of Segregants at Manzanar," pp. 13, 129.
 2. Essay prepared for the writer, p. 13.
 3. Hankey, *op. cit.*, p. 68
 4. Hankey, "Chronological Account of Segregation," p. 25
 5. "X"'s Sociological Journal, October 20, 1945, p. 1.

Turned out old Tuleans used to be in the same group as the new ones.

*was on...
...
...*

to the Relocation Centers; others from practical antipathy to the established in-group, the old Tuleans. These grievances of a more practical nature added to the tension and unrest. But the emotional compulsion which led thousands of peaceful people brave the wrath of the Administration and the Army, demonstrated and was in part furnished by the bitter disappointment which followed on the realization that Tule Lake was not going to be "different," was not going to be filled with people of one mind, that the "fence-sitters" and inu had not become extinct and, above all, that the transferees' status as a unique sheltered group who could now forget the fear of ejection from the centers or the draft, was threatened by the presence of these doubters in their midst.

Resentments Over Reception and Inferior Facilities at Tule Lake

From the moment of the arrival of the transferees at Tule Lake, conditions appeared almost to conspire to add to the burden of emotional instability under which the newcomers were suffering. The sight of the great "man-proof" fence and the watch-towers manned by soldiers was a shock. The processing, picture-taking and fingerprinting was resented ^{by many} as treatment which ought to be reserved for criminals. The housing department was in a state of confusion; the camp was overcrowded; the introduction of many of the families to their dirty, crowded apartments was disappointing in the extreme. Moreover, the food was ^{alleged} considered to be generally inferior to that of the former centers. Ill-feeling toward the ^{Old Tuleans} ~~older inhabitants~~, who were soon accused of occupying all the good jobs or key positions, an accusation which was to some extent justified, developed rapidly. This latter resentment was returned in full measure by the old Tuleans who did not appreciate being told that "Tule Lake was a dump" and that all the facilities were far below the standards to which the transferees had become accustomed in the Relocation Centers. The confusion was probably increased by the fact that the newcomers from each center had been given

vague and variable ideas of what to expect at Tule Lake from the administrators of their former centers.

A synthesis of these primary resentments over camp conditions was expressed by ^{Goshiyama} Kato who later became very active in the pressure group:

"The way it started - of course, everybody who came to this center from the other relocation centers compared this center to the other centers. Food, housing, the hospital and sanitation was very low compared to the other centers we came from. We didn't do anything about it until the truck accident."¹

The "prison-camp" atmosphere

As preparation for a camp of avowedly "disloyal" individuals, Tule Lake ~~camp~~ had been surrounded by a "man-proof" fence, 7 feet high and topped with three strands of barbed wire. Watchtowers had been hurriedly constructed at regular intervals around this fence. The presence of this fence was and continued to be regarded as an insult, a nagging reminder of American public opinion, by most of the segregees. Few, however, have expressed themselves as fluently or as bitterly as Mr. ^{Oishi} (Kurihara)

"A very repulsive sight greeted us as we approached Tule Lake. It was the sight of numerous watch towers lining the perimeter of the camp. I felt as if we were a bunch of real criminals about to be impounded . . . I felt sure others must have felt the same since I have heard them cursing and swearing vengeance.

"My feelings were further aggravated as we neared the camp. Though I have read about the high fences being erected, ~~while at Leupp~~, my imagination seemed to have failed in its proper conception because the fences in reality are much higher and more cruel, both in construction and appearance. I did not believe they were built so high and with meshed wires similar to those used at San Diego Zoo. Why even the gorillas with tremendous strength were held helpless captives, and when men of inferior strength were caged in like a bunch of wild animals, I felt terribly irritated. Unconsciously I too have sworn to avenge this injustice some day.

"Topping everything which tends to rouse the ire of the internees are the search lights beaming throughout the camp, watching us through the wee hours of the night as if we were incorrigible murderers. Have we not been the most law-abiding people in the past? Why must we now be subjected to such humiliation."²

1. Ibid., Sept. 11, 1944, p. 3.

2. Ms. p. 1.

A transferee from Jerome expressed himself as follows in a letter to the Rocky Shimp:

"Inspection of hand baggages, census taking, photograph taking, fingerprinting; I felt as if we had entered a penitentiary. We had to repeat some fingerprinting twice. The reason is that our fingers are rough being the farmers' fingers and they did not print well. Especially, they have two copies of my finger prints, so I cannot commit any crime. . ."¹

A transferee from Poston wrote to friends in that center:

"Then I put the finger prints of all ten fingers of my hands on several sheets. I understand that they do this at a penitentiary when you are imprisoned. . ."²

Resentment over Housing and Food

Additional irritating factors~~x~~ were the confusion and crowding in the distribution of housing, the omnipresent dirt, caused not only by Tule Lake's frequent dust storms but by the fact that many of the barracks assigned had been inadequately cleaned or had not been cleaned at all. Moreover, housing accommodations were in most cases more crowded than in the centers from which the segregees had come. Many recreation halls were turned into barracks to house young unmarried men. The conviction developed that this ill treatment was being meted out to the people because they were "disloyal," although this was certainly not so. A reliable Caucasian informant who assisted in the Housing Division at this time stated that it was a madhouse. Former Tuleans who had left camp had sold their barrack improvements, shelves, built-in cupboards and the like to evacuees remaining in Tule. The buyers moved ~~xi~~ into these apartments without notifying the Housing Department. When segregees arrived, they not infrequently found the barrack room assigned to them already occupied. Some of these stranded families ignored the Housing Department, found suitable unlocked quarters and moved in. This haphazard moving added to the burdens of the already overtaxed

1. "X"'s Sociological Journal, November 17, 1943, p. 1.
2. Ibid., October 24, 1943, p. 4.

Housing Department. Most of the barracks were very dirty; some were filthy. One family found their assigned quarters so uninhabitable that they would not even put down their suitcases but slept the night in the block manager's office. The next morning the father came to the Housing Department and said he must have different quarters. He was told he must take the room assigned to him. This he refused to do and insisted that Mr. Huycke, who was then head of Housing, examine his apartment. After much argument, Mr. Huycke gave in. He found that the apartment in question had been used as distillery and that the fig mash had spilled over the entire apartment, creating a dreadful stench. A disinfecting and cleaning crew worked three days to render the room fit for habitation.¹

A nisei from Gila described his first impression of Tule Lake as follows:

Nishino
"When I came from Gila I just stood here like a dumbbell. Everything was dirty; the barracks were dirty; the showers were dirty, the mess halls were dirty. ~~When I first came here, that's the way I felt. I think the old Tuleans were used to this mess. That's the main key point in the cause of the trouble.~~"²

A nisei girl from Topaz said:

Kayo Tiden
"The thing that struck us was, I think, the first appearance of the camp. The comparison with Topaz was very poor. The latrines, the mess and the apartments were so poor in condition and so different."³

A nisei girl from Gila who later worked against the pressure group, said:

Yuhara
"You know how it was on the train. After being so tired, to come to this dirty camp which was so dark and dusty and windy. The Housing didn't want us to be what they call a homogeneous group. So they scattered us all over. We didn't have a single friend in our whole block. We resented the Housing Department. Then, in the latter part of October they broke the Housing Department's windows. They didn't find the guilty ones at that time. ~~I think that was the spark of the whole incident (breaking the windows).~~"

"Well, housing was the worst. We came into rooms with half the plaster board stolen; there was even nothing to light a stove with. We had to take it or leave it."⁴

(continued)

-
1. R. Hankey, Notes, April, pp. 36, 37.
 2. Ibid., p. 20.
 3. Ibid., July 18, p. 1
 4. Ibid., July 19, p. 4.

A kibeï man about thirty years old, ^{Oda} who came from Gila said:

"I felt this was really a sad smokey place."

His wife added, "I said, 'What a dump!'" On another occasion she stated:

"For a few months or so you can be crowded. But when you don't know when you're leaving, it's very hard."¹

Another young kibeï girl from Gila said:

"One thing, when I came here I almost cried was, that all of our friends were separated from us. We said, 'Let's move.' That was important with me. I almost cried when I came here and saw it.

~~"The few people who came here later (in February and May) were not so bad off. They were put together more or less in one place."~~²

A young kibeï woman from Jerome, ^{Matsuda} an active member of a pressure group wrote in a letter to the writer:

"Then, also, the poor facilities for housing, poor foods, employments unfair to newcomers, as compared to the previous camps we have come from, were all brought up to our attention and dissatisfaction arouse."³

Mr. ^{Oshi (Kunihara)} who came into camp in December wrote:

"While in Leupp, I have heard from various sources that Tule Lake is a very dirty camp. Upon my arrival though I was prepared to see dirt, I was very much shocked to find it dirtier than I had really anticipated. I wondered what sort of people had lived here, or what sort of an Administrator was responsible for the health of the residents. . . . Day in and day out, living in filth must have created disgust to such an extent that it finally became one of the contributing factors of the trouble."⁴

A very conservative young nisei girl from Gila said: ^{Y. Nishikawa}

"I had friends here (in Tule Lake) and had always corresponded with them. They liked it here. It was like any other center - that's what I thought from their letters.

"I expected more than this in the camp. I expected better facilities. I didn't expect it to be just as good as Gila, but better than this. I didn't like the first impression at all."⁵

~~An equally conservative~~ ^{Another} nisei girl, a resident of pre-segregation Tule Lake admitted the justification of the segregees' complaints about the housing:

-
1. Ibid., August 8, p. 4; March, p. 5.
 2. Ibid., July 30, p. 5.
 3. Ibid., July 18, p. 2.
 4. Ms. p. 5.
 5. R. Hankey, Notes, August 30, p. 1.

"The segregees were so unsatisfied with the housing. Of course, you can't blame them because they had to sleep in the Rec. Halls. And besides, the people who went out had torn down their cabinets and cupboards."

This young woman added that public feeling ran so high that for a time the Japanese girls employed in the Housing Department were afraid to go to work.¹

Kuratomi, chairman of the pressure group stated:

"The immediate impression I received after coming here was the unpreparedness on the part of the Administration, especially in the field of housing and reception. I arrived here at 5:00 p.m. on the 30th of September. That day the Army was good enough to give us a lunch. After we were through the processing it was well towards evening.

"Eventually, we were thrown into an unpartitioned Recreation Hall. No mattresses were available. I got the block manager to find me a mattress. Even the stove wasn't ready for operation. The block manager had to get wood for us (for kindling). I don't believe the block manager was even notified we were to be there. There were ten boys and they told us that between 20 and 30 (more) would come. But they didn't know. They had no plan at all.....

"At that time the people leaving the project (leaving Jerome) had the feeling they would like to be housed closely together. But realizing the conditions at Tule Lake, they didn't expect too much..... We did not feel that our treatment would be the same.

← "When I arrived here I heard so many complaints about the separation in housing. Even families were sometimes separated from one end of the camp to the other. . . .

"As far as Jerome was concerned, the facilities were very good. Each latrine and urine basin was individual and the interiors of the shower were very much better.

"Food too was much better (at Jerome). This was especially strange, since Jerome raised so little. However, food there in comparison to this center was twice as good."²

Another transferee from Jerome described the situation vividly in his letter to the Rocky Shimo:

"When I entered the apartment, I was surprised with the dirtiness. I was very irritated even though I am a thick headed man. The wall was dirty; there was no screens. Besides a stove in the center, it was a desolate empty room. . . I went to the Block Manager and asked for a broom. I was told, 'There is only one broom and everyone must share it.' . . . It is desolate in the block. Dry weeds are left untouched. It really is a dirty camp."³

Equally disgusting to the newcomers were the extremely dirty, over-used latrine facilities. The writer can vouch for this from personal observation. The latrines

1. Ibid., August 24, p. 1;

2. Ibid., September 18, pp. 3,4,5.

3. "X" 's Sociological Journal, November 17, 1943, p. 1.

of Tule Lake even in February of 1944 were far below the standard of those in Gila in cleanliness. The equipment was worn out and inferior; some of the toilets did not flush; fixtures were dingy and dirty; obscenities were scrawled on the walls.

Almost as irritating as the dirt and the unsatisfactory housing was the quality of the food, which most transferees considered definitely inferior to that of the Relocation Centers. If every comment made on the bad food at Tule Lake had been written down, it would comprise a separate paper. One informant ^{Nishino} remarked months later when the food had greatly improved, "If the food had been as it is now, it (the warehouse incident) could never have happened."¹

"We never get fresh vegetables. A week and a half ago they started coming in, but they didn't have any for 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ or 2 months. All we had was potatoes or beets. We're getting some lettuce now. Why couldn't we get it when the canteen was selling it?"²

While Mr. ^{Oishi (Kunihara)} did not arrive in Tule Lake until December, his reaction to the food at that time, which he expressed most emphatically, was no doubt shared to a large extent, by many of the transferees who arrived two months earlier:

"Upon my arrival here I have noticed one thing in particular that justified the Japanese to revolt. That is the food was terribly poor. I positively believe the food per person per day couldn't have gone over 20 cents which is less than half of what the Government really allows.

"Much criticism was heard throughout the country that the Japanese are being well fed especially after the investigation conducted by the Dies Committee. What lies the Dies Committee could so boldly print. If they would only come and live with us; eat with us; and sleep with us for just a month instead of two years as we already have and report the truths as they really exist, I'll praise them for their fortitude.

"Regardless of what the Dies Committee has said, the food was bad and is bad today. Though it improved a little, the difference is so small, it still must be hovering around 20¢ a day. Why we haven't had an egg for over ^{two weeks} now. _{a month}

"Food is one of the greatest contributing factors that determines the harmony of the camp. It affects the stomach of every man, woman, and child. The quality of the food can be judged at times by the mood of the people. Grumbling and cursing, animated criticism of this government is freely voiced.

1. Notes, May 15, p. 4.
2. Notes, March, p. 14.

"(a month)"

"To my judgment the food lacks the essential elements that gives us strength and energy. Many boys are taking vitamins to keep their bodies from going to pieces. My eyes went bad on me since evacuation due to lack of proper food. I am not able today to do one fourth of the work I used to do before the war. Should I choose to do any manual work, my entire body starts to tremble and if I should persist, dizziness and fainting sensations overwhelm me. Though I look strong and vigorous, I could not in reality do the work that is required of me now.

"Further enumerating on food as one of the greatest contributing factors of revolt. Is it not obvious when thousands upon thousands of men, women, and children, the majority of whom are not working and therefore have no appetite that relishes anything will naturally find fault with food? When the appetite is good after a good day's work, the food may be gobbled down to satisfy the hungry stomach, but when the appetite is bad, the best food is subject to criticism.

"Many a time I've looked for meat in the plate and if I am gratified with more than two tiny pieces I consider myself lucky. The plate of stew is just a plate of carrots and potatoes flavored with bits of meat. Be it roast pork, if we get more than two slices of one mouthful each, it looks as if the cook had made a mistake. The rest is dressing and gravy which we use to finish a bowl of rice. Fish is of the poorest quality. Herring which is used for fertilizer is now being supplied to us. With such food with no varieties, I cannot blame the rioters when they demanded better food on November 1, 1943.¹

A nisei girl, an old Tulean resident, who disapproved strongly of the agitators, reflected this attitude by stating:

"We always get worse food here than at the other camps. At least that's what all the other people told us."²

Another conservative nisei girl, ^{Y. Nishi/Kawa} a transferee from Gila stated:

"Before the incident the food wasn't good. I missed the steak that we had every Sunday at Gila. But the food wasn't really bad."³

Two other girls, nisei transferees who had previously voiced strong hostility to the "trouble-making agitators" expressed themselves as follows: ^{M. Nakao}

~~"When I came here I got the impression that the Co-op sold so much fruit here. And we didn't get any fruit in the mess."~~

"At Topaz we got so much fruit in the mess we always had extra fruit in the house."

Her friend added: "We hardly get fruit in the mess at all and I had to buy it in the Co-op."

The first informant continued:

-
1. Ms. pp. 4, 5
 2. R. Hankey, Notes, August 24, p. 4
 3. Ibid., August 30, p. 1.

This belief in graft affected the evacuees profoundly. Its force is reflected only mildly in the following statements. ^{Takeuchi} "I" a nisei from Gila, referring to the suspicion of graft by the Caucasians said:

"Grafting started the whole works."¹
^{Oishi} M., referring to grafting by Japanese, said:

"Undue accusation of persons stealing and of grafts goes on without respect of the person under fire. Thus creating suspicion in the eyes of the people without proofs.

"Recently proofs were uncovered and the suspects were arrested (these were Japanese arrested for stealing rice). I personally hope they will be given the severest punishment if found guilty."²

The accumulation of evidence to prove the existence of graft on the part of the Caucasian personnel soon became one of the most important of the self-imposed tasks of the pressure group which was organized. They considered it one of the most potent weapons against the Administration.

Another very important irritant was the insufficiency of work and recreation. The work shortage gave rise to the additional resentment, that all the good jobs, "the key positions" were held by the old residents of Tule. To ~~a large~~ ^{some} extent this criticism was justified.

A young man, a nisei from Gila ^{Mishiro} said:

"When I got here I got a job. I didn't feel bad at all. People who didn't get jobs felt awfully bad."³

^{Kurikara}
K₁ said:

"No work is created to relieve the loathsome hours; no recreations are sponsored to divert the minds of the residents.... So far I have not seen any type of recreation sponsored for the adults, to divert their unpleasant minds. If there is enough work in this camp to keep the adults well occupied, recreation may not be necessary but when work is so scarce as it is here, recreation will play a great part in keeping the people satisfied. But neither work nor recreation are being sponsored to relieve the dissatisfied from concocting mischief. Seven days a week, 30 days a month, day in and day out without a thing to do, topped with lack of funds to keep oneself satisfied with wants really does get a man. This is another source of trouble."⁴

1. R. Hankey, Notes, February, p. 14.
2. Ms. p. 2.
3. R. Hankey, Notes, ~~May 21, pp. 2xx4~~ Mar., p. 13
4. Report, Dec., 24, p. 21.

"Here I have to ask for my brother in Topaz to send me some fruit. In Topaz they didn't sell fruit in the canteens but they gave it to us in the mess. Since we came here we spend so much money on food."

At this point another girl, an old resident of Tule joined her voice to the complaints:

"We've had chicken here only once."

A transferee from Topaz said nostalgically:

"And at Topaz we got duck or chicken once a week."

The first speaker, from Topaz, added:

"And icecream every Sunday..... Also, all the other relocation centers get linoleum. But this place has none!" ()

The young girl who regretted the ducks and chickens of Topaz closed the conversation with the significant remark:

"Have you seen the personnel quarters here. They're positively extravagant! I went into the personnel rec. hall the other day and I thought, 'Gosh.'" 1

Resentment of Suspected Graft

Along with this resentment over poor food a conviction developed that at least part of this condition was due to graft on the part of Caucasian and Japanese members of the Mess Division. This suspicion existed before segregation and ^{originated with} ~~was shared by~~ the older inhabitants of Tule Lake. Rumors of project meat being shipped into Klamath Falls and sold on the black market were current not only among the evacuees but among members of the Appointed Personnel. It was also rumored that large food bills were run up in nearby towns by members of the mess division and that those merchants who furnished an additional bribe were the first to have their bills met. ~~According to members of the pressure group and persistent rumor among members of the appointed personnel,~~ ^{It was alleged that} this condition was investigated by the F.B.I. in mid-November and resulted in the dismissal of several of the guilty staff members.²

1. Ibid., September 14, p. 6

2. See p. .

Additional attitudes toward employment will be quoted ^{infra} in the discussion devoted to the hostility which developed toward the old Tuleans on this and other scores.

Another resentment which had a long pre-segregation history in Tule Lake sprang from the actions and attitude of the Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Pedicord. He had acquired an unprecedented degree of unpopularity with the Japanese before segregation took place. A petition signed by 7,500 evacuees requested his removal in June, 1943. ~~Reasons for his unpopularity were set forth in detail by Marvin Opler, the Community Analyst, in a report dated July 6, 1943.~~ In the petition his attitudes toward evacuees, both staff members and patients, is called unsympathetic and dictatorial. He is accused of addressing the evacuees as "Japs", not obtaining necessary medical equipment, placing economy above service, and forcing evacuee doctors to relocate by his dictatorial attitude. Some of the unconfirmed accusations made by informants in November include: That Pedicord had anti-Japanese views, that he was incompetent and negligent of his duties, that he refused to grant permission for transfusions to two or three patients who later died,¹ that he did not order sufficient medicine for hospital equipment, that he hired Caucasian quacks one of whom caused a child to be stillborn by giving the mother too much serum, that he cut the hospital staff so severely that it could not run efficiently, that he made the Caucasian nurses section heads and permitted them to give orders to the evacuee doctors (even though one evacuee doctor had a license to practice in California), that he cut down the allowance of baby food although there was an adequate supply in the warehouse. Because of hiring "quacks" he is also blamed for the death of a severely burned evacuee child who is said to have been left without treatment from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.

1. Ms., pp. 5-6.

when it was finally treated by a Japanese doctor coming on duty.¹ The transferees took over this older resentment with remarkable speed. Dr. Pedicord's removal became one of the planks in the program of the pressure group.

*after
wings
and
attitude*

Most of the informants quoted in the preceding analysis belonged to that section of the population which at least expressed the desire to return to Japan at the time of segregation. Yet before they had spent a year in Tule Lake some changed their minds and asked to relocate. In October and November of 1943, those who relocated later had been just as vociferous in their complaints over ill-treatment at Tule Lake as the evacuees who remained. There was an exception in one attitude, however. Those who had decided to get out of Tule Lake by the middle of 1944 had never been vigorous advocates of "a camp where we can all act like Japanese and prepare for life in Japan." Instead, they had talked of "being treated like human beings and having as good a time as we can while we're waiting here." It should be kept in mind, therefore, that those who had found a comparatively safe and permanent place to stay until the end of the war shared many of the resentments of the repatriates, who took their return to Japan seriously. Since the possibility of exchange was exceedingly remote, they realized that they might be forced to live at Tule Lake for an indefinite number of years. From Tule Lake and its living conditions, whether good or bad, there was no escape. There was no possibility of removal by relocation. Conditions had to be endured or changed.

Attitudes of the Old Tulean Population

From Miyamoto and Sukolla - described in N.O.T. etc. finds in report on these camps.

The older inhabitants of Tule Lake were characterized by somewhat different attitudes. Though they shared many of the resentments, on the whole they did not wish to change the camp, especially if the attempt to effect changes would cause

1. Ibid., p. 17.

20. *A good deal of this section is crappy.*

THE UTOPIAN DREAM OF UNITY OF THOUGHT AND PURPOSE

~~One of the most interesting reactions to the overt~~
~~step of segregation, ~~and~~ ^{the} an attitude which was to become ~~taken~~~~
~~of enormous ^{events} significance in future behavior of the~~
~~residents ^{and in the activities of the pressure group} was the appearance on the part of the newcomers~~
~~of wishful-thinking expressions that Tule Lake would~~
~~be free of the disturbing mental ~~insecurities and~~~~

ambivalences and conflicts of the Relocation Centers.

Four to five months after segregation

Many informants stated that they had looked upon Tule Lake as a place where they might begin a new existence, a place where they would at last be genuinely secure, a place where they might live with individuals of like ~~kind~~ opinion and be rid of the company of the indecisive fence-sitters who could not make up their minds to support either the United States or Japan and who made up a large proportion of the individuals who remained in the relocation centers after the first egress of the nisei.

Whether this attitude was widely held just previous to and after segregation cannot be determined. There is no doubt, however, that it developed and gained strength within the months that followed segregation and that almost every transferee felt obliged to say that this inconceivable unity of thought and intention was what he had expected at Tule Lake. Nor can it be

determined whether many persons, in their distraction and emotional unbalance, actually believed that this quite illogical dream could become a reality. Some, no doubt, did deceive themselves into an almost fanatical belief.

~~Others~~ Many others undoubtedly were obliged t

was fenced off with a four foot barbed wire fence and evacuees were ~~forbidden~~ absolutely forbidden to enter.

After segregation ~~the~~ no additional prohibitions were placed on evacuee movements within the ~~the~~ man-proof fence. Anyone could enter the administrative or hospital area at any time of the day or night. The restriction on the military area, of course, remained.

Colony inside area

In early November of 1943, ^{Formas and other workers built the project center for work in the project area} After the incident ~~fences were erected~~ additional ^{and were applied to other projects} man-proof barbed wire topped fences were erected between

the evacuee area and the administrative area, the hospital area was surrounded by an ~~the~~ ^a identical fence and ~~the~~ stockade, called Area B in the administrative manual, was constructed to the west of the hospital. ~~which was~~

the fence was also constructed between the Ad area as a whole and the military area.

~~enclosed by~~ ~~by~~ ~~six~~ ~~strands~~ ~~of~~ ~~barbed~~ ~~wire~~ ~~the~~ ~~stockade~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~military~~ ~~area~~.

~~xxxx~~ The fence between the evacuee residence section, ~~xxxx~~

~~the~~ ~~colony~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~administrative~~ ~~area~~ ~~was~~ ~~also~~ ~~equipped~~ ~~with~~ ~~guard~~ ~~towers~~ ~~as~~ ~~was~~ ~~the~~ ~~stockade~~.

was ~~also~~ equipped with guard towers as was the stockade.

The stockade fence differed in one detail. ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~usual~~

at night, residents were not allowed to leave

It had six strands of barbed wire, arranged ~~so~~ ~~that~~ ^{it was planned by Capt. Jones} to make either ingress or egress difficult. In December of

prison

1943 an additional ~~but~~ ^{in part} identical fence was erected between Ward VII and the rest of the colony because the administration

considered for a time, isolating some of the most vociferous trouble makers in this area. This action was never taken and

at stockade

the fence was torn down in the late spring of 1944. The stockade continued to serve as a place of detention from November of 1943 until August of 1944 when it was abandoned.

~~xxxx~~ A new stockade/and jail ^{had previously been} was erected to the west of the administrative area.

~~xxxx~~

That amorphous group of people commonly called fence-sitters were verbally flayed. The segregees, it was insisted, had by their overt act of segregation, set themselves ~~off~~ apart on a high plane of honesty and integrity.

Whether this attitude was widely held just previous to and after segregation cannot be determined. There is no doubt, however, that it developed and gained ~~strength within~~ tremendous strength in the months that followed segregation and that almost every transferee felt obliged to say that this inconceivable unity of thought and intention was what he had expected at Tule Lake. Nor can it be determined whether many persons, in their emotional unbalance and their need to justify their decision to become segregees, actually believed that this quite illogical dream could become a reality. Some, no doubt, did deceive themselves, ~~into an almost fanatical belief~~. Many others, undoubtedly, were obliged to pretend belief and repeat the denunciations of the fence-sitters so that they would not be suspected of being fence-sitters themselves. All that is certainly known concerning the inception of this ^{significant} ~~powerful~~ attitude is that it was vociferously ~~expressed~~ stated by many informants some four months after segregation that this was what they had thought.

This conflict between people who had "made up their minds to be Japanese" and people who had "not made up their minds" had a long history in the Relocation Centers and its force and influence cannot be appreciated unless the doubts and vacillations of the relocation center life are understood. In the matter of expatriation and repatriation ^{and} ~~even more so~~ in the matter of the answers to the military questionnaire, differences of opinion had produced argument, hostility and

demonstrations which in some centers^s caused such a disturbance that the WRA ~~had~~ interned many nisei in the Leupp camp and the Department of Justice had done the same with many issei "agitators". ~~Conflicting~~ Hostility between those persons who held that ~~the~~ after the ~~evacuation~~ experience of evacuation they could do nothing else but place reliance in Japan and those who held that it would be ~~wiser~~ ^{wise} not to commit oneself too far against the United States but await future developments ^{therefore} was ^{before segregation} already well developed. Strong dislike and in some cases bitter hatred arose between persons who overtly espoused one or the other point of view. When the internments took place some persons who had been very "pro-American" and had answered "Yes" to the Military Questionnaire were accused of having denounced the interned men to the administration. These alleged stool-pigeons were called inu (dog), not only by the more vociferous "No-N's" but also by most of the more neutral residents. In the rehabilitation centers anyone who defended his Yes-Yes answer too loudly or appeared to be friendly or cooperative with the higher administrative officials was liable to come under ~~the~~ suspicion of being an inu. This hatred of the "dogs" or the inu took a great and lasting hold upon the people. On the other hand, persons who answered No and then ~~changed~~ changed their answers to Yes were ~~regarded~~ sometimes regarded in as bad if not a worse light. They were known as ~~the~~ koomori (bats), neither flesh nor fowl.

~~Hadn't the signers not been in some of the same~~

The ~~hatred~~ disgust with which sincere repatriates or expatriates viewed the great number of ambivalent people is easy to appreciate. However, it

The Yes-Yes group or those "loyal" to America was commonly regarded by the No-No people as having an advantageous position with the administration. Before leaving Gila, a segregee pointed out ~~how~~^{the} difficult the position of the No-Nos ~~was there~~ and expressed the hope that in Tule Lake things might be different: Jakenchi

"Here in Rivers (Gila), the people are more or less divided into Yes and No groups. Naturally, of the Yes group plays its cards right and apple-polishes, the chances of their getting better paid positions in the ϕ (administrative) offices is more or less enhanced. The Yes group is more or less under the thumb of the administration. Any time the No people had a kick coming the first people they had to see (in the offices) were the Yes people." ~~Expected~~ 1/

The disgust with which sincere repatriates or expatriates viewed the great number of ambivalent people is easy to appreciate. However, it

should be stressed that the great number of people who went to Tule Lake or/ remained there were ambivalent themselves and a few weeks before segregation had been undergoing grave misgivings over the wisdom of their decision to become segregees. Apparently, this did not inhibit the strength with which some individuals seized upon the notion that Tule Lake would magically become a different kind of center where doubt and argument about holding to Japan or America would be stilled forevermore. ~~There were~~ Moreover, there were undoubtedly many individuals who remained sufficiently realistic to ~~xxxxxx~~ realize that segregation would not work a miraculous change upon the mental processes of the evacuees. ~~Soxpxmexmfuixmhmxxxxxx~~ This must have been true especially of the Old Tulean population which had not undergone the excitement and tansion of moving. Nevertheless, the fallacious idealistic notion was so powerful that more realistic individuals were largely forced to maintain a politic silence in the presence of ^{its} vociferous proponents. If they did not, they would promptly be called "fence-sitter" or even inu. The following are typical expressions of this wishful-thinking:

rr A.

return to Japan

Administration. Instead, they naively anticipated a camp where all the people would be of one mind. It should be remembered that these were the same people

who a few weeks before had been suffering grave misgivings over the wisdom of their decision to become segregees. It is not improbable that those who were mentally most insecure turned most eagerly to this consolation and expressed themselves most vociferously. It is understandable that in the face of this

apparently, this did not inhibit the strength or which
where they seized upon the concept of
individuals who were supposedly realistic to escape
this wishful dream were largely forced to
undergoing

serviced their final decision maintained a politic silence in the presence

Mr. Yamakura, a kiber

A gentle kiber girl said:

"All during the trip all the people coming from Gila - all they talked about was how things were going to be in Tule Lake. There wouldn't be any more inus; no more Yes-Yes. They were so glad when they saw the camp. The people came here with such high hopes and they got so little. . .

"When we saw the camp there was a bunch of boys on a potato truck. They pointed. 'That's Tule,' they said. When I saw it tears came to my eyes. It was the first step towards Japan and George (her husband whom she hoped to join in Tule) would be here and everything. I really thought this camp was going to be much different than Gila."¹

Miss. Matsuda who later became a militant agitator
Another kiber woman of very militant mind wrote:

we "We came to Tule Lake with great expectation and high hopes to be able to join our fellow Japanese subjects, whose ideas and future thoughts. Desired to return to our mother country at her emergencies and to serve her were the main purpose in seeking repatriation and expatriation."²

A nisei girl said:

"At the relocation camp there were so many that were loyal to America. We felt people with the same kind of mind (persons who were all of ~~one~~ *loyal to Japan* mind) would be assembled here."³

possible
It became, and in fact, obligatory to express unrestrained loyalty to Japan and an equally unrestrained hostility and scorn for the evacuees "loyal" to America. The transferees knew well that many individuals ^{who} had remained in the relocation centers ~~who~~ shared the greater part of their sentiments but had preferred to be labelled "loyal." The expression of such sentiments would no longer

1. R. Hankey, Notes, July 19, 1944, p. 3
2. Ibid., July 18, p. 2
3. Ibid., May 21, p. 1.

INSERTION ON PAGE 24

This is an extremely interesting statement for Tsuda,
the reputed vice-king of the camp, was and remained ~~an~~
~~entirely~~ entirely American in thought and behavior. ~~in the~~
~~presence~~ He made this statement, in the presence of ~~some~~
~~of~~ several vociferant exponents of Japanese behavior and
there is little doubt that he did not mean one word of it.

be followed by incarceration in Leupp or Santa Fe. Attitudes like the following were no doubt common to many segregees.

From an ex-Santa Fe internee: *Issei*;

"We came here for the purpose of repatriation so that we will be on the priority list to be segregated to Japan. We may change our feeling after the war, but for the time being, we must rely on the Emperor of Japan, not on the United States government.

"Our loyalty is to Japan. Naturally we are very earnest about it. Some Japanese say they are still loyal to the United States, but I don't believe it."¹

From an older nisei:

"We who were segregated as unloyal must be considered heart and soul Japanese and for Japan."²

Yoshiyama a member
~~A kibe leader~~ of the pressure group which formed soon after segregation

expressed his sentiments as follows:

"We expected the same status. We expected the same kind of group - all going back to Japan. We believed that and naturally thought this would be a peaceful colony. . . . Those fellows who said No-Yes or No-No and do not repatriate^vfooled this country (U.S.A.) and fooled the government."³

(former nisei)
A very shrewd nisei transferee^vwho carefully kept himself out of all political entanglements expressed his opinion of the attitude of these militant segregees neatly and concisely:

"When they came here they thought it was going to be^a Japanese Utopia. The resentment that arose was brought on by their feeling of frustration."⁴

In some individuals this attitude led to an expressed abhorrence of all things thought to be American and an idealization of all things thought to be Japanese. On arriving at Tule Lake many nisei and kibe made a conscious attempt to conform^v and to turn their minds from "American ways of thinking and acting to Japanese ways of thinking and acting." Individuals were affected in varying degrees. Many, while complying outwardly, kept their true opinions to themselves;

1. Ibid., May 21, p. 1
2. From a Ms. prepared by JYK, p. 7.
3. R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 11, 1944, pp. 1, 2.
4. Ibid., Sept. 17, p. 1

24

some embraced this attitude with stern earnestness; in a few it grew to fanaticism. Outward expression of this attitude manifested itself on many minor occasions. When the last trainload of segregants from Topaz arrived ^{at Tule Lake} on September 30, some young men gathered at the Induction Center near the high school and built a bonfire of two to four wooden benches. They stood around the benches and shouted "Banzai!"¹ Nisei social dances were broken up by kibe demonstrations. Attendance at American movies was frowned upon. If any person were courageous or rash enough to speak favorably of a custom or ideal considered American, he would inevitably invite criticism and perhaps physical violence. ~~Three~~ ^{Two} men made the following interesting revelations of their consciousness of this attempted psychological change in themselves.

*Mr. Suda An old Tule Lake nisei, in his forties said:
A younger Americanized issei said:*

"Previous to segregation I felt like an American and acted like an American. After segregation I could not help myself. In everything, I began to think and act like a Japanese. I was working on Internal Security then and had always gotten along with the Caucasians. But my mind was just turned around. The Administration just couldn't understand me and lost confidence in me."²

→ *Succession here -*

~~Another kibe:~~

Mr. Yamashiro, however probably was sincere when he made the following statement:

"But if I'm going to be a Japanese I'm going to be pure Japanese and not American at all. I didn't used to be like this. But now I just see this camp from the Japanese point of view only. As a Japanese, I got to do it this way."³

Though this ~~Stepian desire~~ ^{was probably} ~~felt in some degree~~ ^{probably expected} by most of the transferees, it should not be imagined that it was ~~unanimous~~ ^{a sentiment}. To ~~most of the old Tule Lake~~ ^{many it appeared as} ~~it was~~ ^{illogical and had no significance at all.} Nevertheless, it was ~~of deep~~ ^{of} emotional significance and its inevitable non-realization contributed greatly to the tension and sense of frustration. There were other very important resentments: some sprang from the inferior facilities of Tule Lake when compared

1. WRA, Tule Lake Incident, Sequence of Events.
2. R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 17, p. 1.
2. R. Hankey, Notes, May 23, p. 6
3. Ibid., May 18, p. 3.

