

PART I - SECTION 2 - ATTITUDE OF THE RESIDENTS FROM OCTOBER 15
TO NOVEMBER 4

State of general discontent responsible for support and speed of
organization - the power of public pressure

The most striking phenomenon of the events of October 15 to 17 ^{was} ~~is~~ the extreme rapidity with which a representative body was formed. Within the two days following the farm accident the farm workers met and decided to stop work, the Block Managers met and resolved to support them, each manager called a meeting in his respective block at which representatives were selected and the Daihyo Sha Kai, the body selected in the manner held its first meeting.

Despite the fact that these activities were largely initiated by self-appointed men who may be termed "leaders" or "agitators" according to ones point of view, it is indisputable that events would not have moved with such speed, nor would the block response to the selection of representatives ^{have} ~~been~~ unanimous had not the general population been in a state of extraordinary dissatisfaction. This does not imply, on the other hand, that general public sentiment toward this organizational activity was unanimously enthusiastic or whole-hearted. Some persons disapproved, some were indifferent, but others, probably the great majority, felt that it was a good idea if it would work. Therefore, to appreciate the events which occurred at Tule Lake in the first two months immediately after segregation, it should be kept in mind that a large part of the population, especially among the transferred, [&] did feel with fervor and conviction that something should be done about the ^{more} ~~serious~~ of their accumulated grievances and were ready

to support a proper and peaceful attempt to enduce the administration to improve the situation. Many of the Old Tulean population fell in with this attitude.

To attain some insight into the actions of the farm group and the block managers and to understand why there is no record of a protesting voice being raised, the reader must appreciate the power of the emotional forces set into motion by the grave farm accident which occurred at a time when every inhabitant of the camp, almost without exception, held some resentment against the Administration and when those persons inclined to fanaticism or idealism were in the throes of a major frustration. The conviction that some action should be taken to prevent the reoccurrence of the tragedy and that this opportunity should be utilized to improve the unsatisfactory camp conditions gained wide acceptance. As organization to effect these ends proceeded, the initial tension brought about by the accident increased. By constant discussion in barracks, latrines, and at work, public opinion favoring action crystallized. The primary organizers and their supporters set about spreading propaganda designed to increase the tension, bring the people into line and create a state of public opinion where dissenters would not only receive no attention but would incur great public opprobrium. Once this process was well under way it could not be stopped. Conformance with camp opinion was virtually obligatory. The penalties meted upon a dissenter in camp were painful in the extreme. Social ostracism was terrifying in its thoroughness. No one in his block would speak to him. On entering the latrine or sitting at a table in a mess a dead silence would fall on groups previously engaged in animated conversation. He

might receive threatening letters, be denounced as an inu (dog, stool-pigeon) on a paper pinned up in the latrine or laundry room, and, if very outspoken, might be beaten severely. At a time of such extraordinary tension as that which prevailed at Tule Lake during late October and November of 1943, this harsh treatment could be expected not only from the "radicals" but from one's own neighbors or friends. Since the situation was such that no one dared to raise a dissenting voice, the support, though admittedly strong, would appear to be even greater than it was. This, of course, would be an added factor in bringing timid persons into compliance with the popular view.

ATTITUDES OF THE PEOPLE ON THE FARM WORK STOPPAGE OR "STRIKE"

Unfortunately, few attitudes were expressed on the "farm strike" and all but one of the statements obtained were made six months or more after the difficulties began. Statements expressing disapproval of the strike outnumber those in favor of it. It should be kept in mind, however, that these opinions were offered long after the farm accident and that the informants had been powerfully impressed with the futility of the strike and the misery and inconvenience of the long conflict with the WRA and the Army. Had they expressed themselves immediately after the accident, when the camp was undergoing its primary emotional reaction to the death of the farm worker, more sympathy with the farmers and their plight would undoubtedly have been expressed.

Mr. Nakao an intelligent nisei block manager from Gila still considered himself a supporter of the Daihyo Sha when he made the following statement, which probably mirrors the general attitude prevailing immediately after the farmers refused to go to work:

"I said, 'Why didn't they put in some licensed driver. Who does the truck driving? Does the placement officer put anybody in? Did the head of Placement have experience in that field?'"

"I didn't blame them for striking. Before we came here they said they had requested a regular Army truck (to transport farm workers). They had suggested it many times and they couldn't get it. In October it's pretty cold to ride in an open truck."¹

Nakao's angry statements about the inefficiency of the Japanese truck driver and the man responsible for placing him in his position are particularly noteworthy for this was one of the first and most powerful reactions to the accident. The incorrect rumor that the driver was 16, 17 or 18 years old spread through camp immediately and produced great public hostility toward the parties thought responsible, the Japanese heads of the Motor Pool and the administration. A letter written by a Poston segregee about October 19, brings out this point clearly:

"The camp is in a big commotion demanding the administration to account for the accident. . . The main issue of this incident is the age of the driver. He is sixteen (maybe 17) years of age and they are asking the administration to explain why they had given the job to a minor. . . I understand the strike started when one kibeï had made a speech to the farm workers that they should not go to work until the administration announce what they would do to (for) these injured persons."²

When a nisei girl from Topaz was asked for her reaction to the farm strike, she said:

"I think that the farm accident came too soon. When we first came here we were disappointed and knew it had to be changed. If the farm accident had not come so soon we could have made the change gradually."³

Mr. Okamoto, a kibeï, and also a block manager and transferee from Gila said:

"They said 'Strike.' That time they had so many acres from which to get vegetables. I don't see any reason in a way why they

¹R. Hankey, Notes, April, 1944, p. 20.

²"X"'s Sociological Journal", Oct. 24, 1943, p. 7.

³ibid., July 18, 1944, p. 1.

should quit working, since we get so much productive stuff. They could consult WRA officials while they're working. They could talk instead of quit. If the conference didn't go through, they could quit."¹

It is interesting that Okamoto, a very conservative and moderate individual, apparently felt that the strike would have been justified if an attempt at negotiations had been made and had been rebuffed by the Administration.

Typical of the "on second thought" opinions expressed many months after the strike are the following:

Mr. Fujimoto, a shrewd nisei said:

"I felt that the people on the farm at that time were more or less unreasonable in striking because they could have kept on working and watched a satisfactory negotiations to be put through before striking. They jumped the gun. It was brought on by high pressure speakers."²

Mrs. Yamaguchi, a young kibe woman said:

"Well, I didn't think it (the truck accident) was the fault of the WRA like the people said it was and I didn't understand why the residents went on strike. There were many reasons, but they didn't sound very well grounded to me. The way everyone rushed to the farm office, standing in line and giving up their badges . . . "³

Attitudes like the latter three quoted must be accepted with reservations, since they are almost certainly after thoughts. It should be noted that even the most critical statements do not show lack of sympathy with the farm group or disapproval of the attempt to gain certain concessions from the administration so much as a disapproval of the method used - stopping work.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DAIHYO SHA AND THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE

The election of the Daihyo Sha Kai was perpetrated so rapidly that it is probable that many of the evacuees did not have a clear

¹ibid., April, 1944, p. 22.

²ibid., p. 30.

³ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 1.

idea of what was going on during the week following October 16. They knew, however, that many meetings were being held and that the object of the meetings was to settle the matter of the farm accident and improve the condition of the camp. In many of the blocks the people were requested to hand in their complaints and suggestions to the Daihyo Sha headquarters.¹ Data gathered during many hours of discussion on the subject indicate that the Daihyo Sha gathered strength through October and reached the highest point of popularity after November 1 and before the November 4 warehouse incident which was followed by the entrance of the Army.

It should be noted that the attitudes quoted below were almost all taken down after the election of January 15, 1944, the election which WRA used as evidence of public refutation of the Daihyo Sha.

The first informant interviewed who was in residence at Tule Lake during the period of the incident was an Old Tulean who had been sent from Tule to Gila on November 8 through the influence of certain members of the Tule Lake appointed personnel who were convinced of his loyalty to the United States and wished to keep him out of trouble. This young man exuded a remarkable sense of pride and accomplishment in the stand the Japanese had made at Tule Lake. When the writer expressed sympathy with the hardships which the people in Tule Lake were undergoing this Old Tulean retorted with pride, "Don't worry about them; they can take it." If a self-confessed "loyal" was so strongly infected with this spirit of pride in resistance to the administration, it is very probable that, as he assured the writer, "Most of the people were

¹ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 3.

behind it (the Negotiating Committee)".¹

A statement made in a letter quoted by "X" and written before October 24 also expresses an unquestioning acceptance of the representatives:

"... all the farm workers went on a strike and the camp is in a big commotion demanding the Administration to account for the accident. Every block held a meeting and elected a representative to form a council to negotiate with the Administration."²

^{Fujimoto}
"I" a Gilan transferee, later applied for leave clearance and left Tule Lake; moreover, he criticized certain policies of the Daihyo Sha vigorously and after the imprisonment of the Negotiating Committee, several times voiced the opinion that the "worst of the trouble-makers should not be let out"^{Nevertheless, he} was eloquent in his defense of their status as representatives:

"All of the respective people in the block elected them. . . . It was just a case of which representatives seemed most able. After every meeting the representatives always came back and at supper called for silence. They'd take Ayes and Nos for any question then. If there was no time in mess they'd call a special meeting at night. . . .

"What you call the block representatives always existed even previous to the trouble."³ Out of those that were representatives a lot relocated and newcomers were elected to take their place. . . . But there were quite a few old ones and that's one of the reasons the people got so burnt up. The name, Daihyo Sha, was first heard after the trouble (farm accident)... Under that title they tried to carry on the first negotiations."

As final emphasis of his contention that the election of the representatives was beyond cavil, ^{he} made the following statement with absolute seriousness:

"They might have been goon squads, but they were representatives."⁴

^{Kamoto}
"O", a block manager, heartily against agitation and trouble, gave the following description of the election:

¹Report on Tule Lake, Dec. 24, 1943

²"X"'s Sociological Journal, Oct. 27, 1943, p. 7.

³Here "I" refers to the Planning Board, See pp. .

⁴R. Hankey, Notes, Feb., 1944, p. 13; Mar., 1944, p. 41.

"In this block I think they held a meeting and appointed a man for block representative. They thought he was capable. But some blocks elected them. There were 63 representatives in organization."

His wife stated during an earlier interview:

"They (representatives) came from the farm incident....After the accident and before the funeral we were told to get a representative from each block. I don't know who was behind it. At that time the people wanted to get together and speak to the Project Director."¹

A nisei girl from Gila who disapproved of all the trouble and fuss said:

"We had an election in this block for the Daihyo Sha Kai. The election was conducted fairly in our block at least."²

The statements of members or strong supporters of the Daihyo Sha Kai may be given less weight. Nevertheless, they are not without significance. A young nisei who was selected to fill one of the numerous vacancies in the body brought about by the arrests, had resigned from the Daihyo Sha when he made the following statement in a tone which left no doubt as to his sincerity:

"The block representatives were elected by the people. I was voted in. It's a big responsibility and you stick your neck out. I'm acting for the people."³

Another nisei who also entered the body as a substitute, incorrectly stated that the election of representatives had been requested by the administration:

"The representatives were elected by the people as requested by the administration. From that representative group they chose the Negotiating Committee of seven members."⁴

Mr. Nakao, a block manager transferee from Gila was most insistent that the body had been elected by the people:

"The Daihyo sha were all elected from the segregates came in. They were elected after the farm accident."⁵

¹ibid., March, 1944, pp. 33, 4.

²ibid., Aug., 30, 1944, p. 2.

³ibid., Mar., 1944, p. 62.

⁴ibid., July 30, 1944, p. 3.

⁵ibid., Mar., 1944, p. 12.

Conviction of the legitimacy of the election, however, was not unanimous. Certain residents certainly did not approve of the proceedings. At the time, however, they did not dare to voice this disapproval in the face of ~~tremendous~~ ^{strong} public sanction of the Representative Body. A rash dissenter might be set upon by over-enthusiastic youthful supporters of the Daihyo Sha and he would certainly become very unpopular with his neighbors.

As one Old Tulean expressed it:

"The atmosphere at that time was such that there wasn't any chance to speak up if you disagreed. If anybody did speak up-----!"¹

Adachi, who later became one of the Daihyo Sha's most active opponents assured the writer that in October and November even the conservative Block Managers who were largely Old Tuleans believed that the organization of the Daihyo Sha was the proper step to take.

"When the Daihyo Sha requested the improvement of food and maintenance, naturally, the Block Managers felt the same way due to the numerous complaints they were receiving in some of the blocks. All human character is the same way. They looked forward to improvements - like me - I'd rather eat something better than beans if I could get it. . . The election was not for the sole purpose of ironing out the farm accident."²

This data indicates that the Daihyo Sha and the Negotiating Committee enjoyed a large amount of public sanction and support. Moreover, it is apparent that it did not occur to the great majority of people to doubt the legitimacy of either body. They criticized some of the actions and policies, they denounced the radical "strong-arm" boys, and sometimes they looked with disfavor upon the particular man who served as representative in their block. But in their next breath they affirmed, "But they were our representatives!" The attitude which the common people took toward

¹ ibid., Jan. 11, 1945, p. 1.

² ibid., Jan. 8, 1945, pp. 1, 4.

the leaders was most concisely expressed by a young kibeï girl who, when asked if the people had ever questioned the method by which the Negotiating Committee had been appointed, stated emphatically, "The people took the first Negotiating Committee for granted!"¹

With some individuals this sentiment appears to have increased in stubbornness after the representatives were imprisoned. The more insistent the WRA and the Army became in contending that the body did not represent the people, the more vehemently the majority of the people defended the body's status. The importance of this attitude cannot be over-emphasized. A sense of obligation (giri) toward the men whom they had selected endured for many months after the power of the negotiating body had been broken.

Considerable emphasis has been put upon this point because the situation was misunderstood to some extent by the authorities and this misunderstanding was, at least in part, responsible for the fact that hostility between the administration and the evacuees increased progressively.

Kai and Kuratomi were regarded as trouble-makers who had inflamed the people against Mr. Best. They had "aimed at whipping the whole center into line and creating what would look like mass action." To effect this they had used a "goon-squad which had operated in every block, intimidating people by marching around and threatening beatings." "They...and other minority leaders.... got together as soon as they reached Tule Lake and began to develop plans for dominating the majority....with their program and leadership. Up to the entrance of the army they utilized the goon boys to effect their domination."²

¹Ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 4.

²Spicer's letter to Provinse, Nov. 14, 1943, pp. 2-4.

Although this explanation of the situation contains much that is true or partially true, it is based on an incomplete perspective. Kai and Kuratomi undoubtedly made ~~many~~ inflammatory statements. But so did a large number of other ambitious leaders, some of whom later made a complete about face, and even went so far as to turn informer on the men who had succeeded in gaining the top positions which they themselves coveted. They certainly did aim at whipping the center into line - but so great was the general resentment and dissatisfaction that, at least for a few weeks, genuine mass action resulted. They utilized a group of strong-arm boys, who later got out of hand - but terrorism alone could^{not}/have forced the unanimous block response to the call for representatives or the mass response of November 1. In short, had not Kai and Kuratomi come to the fore, some one else would.

Mr. K., who was still confided in Leupp at this time, expressed his opinion of the administrative point of view as follows. His opinion is valuable because he is a scrupulously honest man and has had a unique experience in camp demonstrations of this order.

"That opinion was circulated by the Caucasian people, that the boys from Topaz and Jerome were trying to get hold of the controlling interest and trying to get the people under their control. When those boys had acted, we had quite a discussion in Leupp with Mr. Fredericks. He strongly believed at that time this opinion gotten through the newspapers, that those boys from various centers were trying to get hold of the leadership in the camp. I argued with him that it wasn't so. The only reason the boys from Jerome took the leadership here was because they themselves were leaders in Jerome. When they got here they naturally took leadership again, especially of the Jerome faction....I doubt whether they were trying to get leadership or that the plot was formed before. A thing of that nature happens spontaneously."¹

ATTITUDES ON MR. KASHIMA'S FUNERAL

It is apparent that Mr. Best's refusal to permit a public funeral for Mr. Kashima, the farmer killed in the truck accident,

¹R. Hankey, Notes, April, 1944, p. 17.

was responsible for an appreciable increase in the sense of group solidarity and in hostility toward him. Under the circumstances his act would appear to be motivated by lack of respect for the dead and sympathy for the bereaved. The excited people, who, at a time like this, were inclined to identify themselves with the injured person of their own race, were willing to agree with any denunciation of the "inhuman action". The following attitude which was expressed with strong emotion merits re quoting:

"They figured the people who got hurt represented the whole center. The feeling was very bad when Best refused to let them use the auditorium. They knew they couldn't all get in, but they wanted to give him an honorable funeral, because he represented all of us.

"The funeral didn't come out right. If he (Best) had run it normally, I don't think nothing like (the trouble) would have happened."¹

Fujimoto, a level headed practical nisei who never hesitated to criticize the Daihyo Sha stated in a letter to the writer:

"Mr. Best, in view of the fact that the crops were yet to be got in and that the farmers had not as yet returned to work, saw fit to refuse the request of the said committee. This, as you can see, was the act that sowed the seed for what was to come later."²

Four months later he stated:

"My opinion might be colored. I believe my disfavor to the stand taken by the administration was because of their refusal to allow the people to use the gymnasium. It was generally publicized it would be a camp-wide affair."³

In the following statement, Nakao, a supporter of the Daihyo Sha gives voice to a common rumor that Takahashi deliberately strove to discredit Kai and Kuratomi and take the credit for himself:

"I heard that Kai and Kuratomi went to Best and he okeyed the use of the school. Just before the day of the funeral he turned

¹ibid., March, 1944, p. 63.

²Writer's correspondence with Fujimoto.

³Hankey, Notes, April, 1944, pp. 30-31.

around and said No. Who was the cause of it? They say Takahashi.... When Best refused the auditorium, the people resented it."¹

However, condemnation of Mr. Best's decision was not unanimous. The conservative Mr. Okamoto said:

"I didn't go. I said, I'm very sorry.' But I didn't feel that very much, because WRA did all they could to compensate the family."²

The effect of this successful act of defiance against the administration should also not be overlooked. The Daihyo Sha, which took charge of the funeral had disobeyed Mr. Best openly and arrogantly and had gotten away with it. K, the loyal Tulean who transferred to Gila early in November expressed this attitude:

"The administration said they would not allow a community funeral. But the people had it anyway on an outdoor stage. They took a chance of trouble with the army; but they did it."³

That K. says "the people" here instead of the Daihyo Sha is also noteworthy.

Fujimoto, who possessed of an unusual sense of objectivity told the writer that had Mr. Best given the people the use of the gymnasium he could thereby have limited the attendance. "Had that happened there would have been a lot less people infected with the spirit of to heck with the administration and what not."⁴

THE ARRIVAL OF THE STRIKE-BREAKERS

Although the tension and discontent in the center had been becoming progressively more serious, the arrival of the "loyal" Japanese from other centers to harvest the crop and render futile the evacuees' chief weapon against the administration built up fury to fever pitch. Many informants have said, "That's when we

¹ibid., April, 1944, pp. 21, 22.

²Notes, April, 1944, p. 22.

³R. Hankey, "Report on Tule Lake", Dec, 24, 1943, p. 12.

⁴R. Hankey, Notes, April, 1944, p. 31.

really got mad." Rage against the administration and against the Japanese who were considered despicable in the extreme for being willing to betray their own people in this manner assumed tremendous proportions. Resentment was increased by the widely held belief that Mr. Best had promised to let the people know if he made any disposition to harvest the crop. The writer found no evidence to corroborate this promise. However, on October 26, Mr. Best did give the committee to understand that he would comply with their request to cut down the farm acreage and gave no indication whatever that he had the intention of turning the harvesting of the crop over to "loyal" evacuees. This was viewed as a "double-cross" by the Negotiating Committee and the great majority of colonists adopted the same view.

A member of the Daihyo Sha said:

"The harvesters who came in were Japanese. That's what you call the double cross. It was just like an anti-strike. Best stopped the work but didn't give them a chance to consider it. He gave the people no notice of the fact that he was going to bring in the farm workers". . . If the Administration had put out officially that they couldn't do things (at the beginning of the trouble) I don't think the people would have got so angry. But they didn't tell the people anything."¹

Mr. Nakao, a nisei block manager said:

This is true
 "It made me pretty sore. We were trying to negotiate and make things run smoothly. And here was a Japanese who did that. We felt pretty bad. Those fellows staying behind were supposed to be loyal to this country. On the Gauliflowers that were sent in they'd written, "Sore mitaka fuchusei mono," "See what you get for being disloyal." That made us sort of - give us a hatred toward those fellows. The people just coming in was bad enough."²

This colorful story is probably folklore. Still it is an indication of the kind of gossip prevalent at this time. It is not likely that the harvesters, feeling themselves in a precarious

¹ibid., Mar., 1944, p. 52.

²ibid., April, 1944, p. 21.

position and not relishing their position as "strike-breakers", would taunt the segregees as "disloyal".

Mr. Fujimoto, who relocated from Tule in September, 1944 said:

"Previous to all this, Mr. Best gave word that any action he decided to take to harvest the crops in the fields would first be made public to the evacuees and the evacuee farmers. However, with no notification whatever he had brought in about 90 or 100 "yes-yes" Japanese to take over the harvesting. . . I thought it was kind of a dirty trick, putting it mildly."¹

Mrs. Yamaguchi said:

"At that time I thought, 'If those people from the other centers really understood the situation in here they wouldn't dare come.' Even if Mr. Best did want them to come, they didn't have to. I didn't blame Mr. Best at all. Those Japanese who did come should know better."²

A very conservative "old Tulean" nisei girl said:

"That (bringing in the harvesters) was another mistake (on the part of the Administration), don't you think? We were angry against the people who came in more than anything. We thought now the Administration would think there are Japanese people willing to work against us. It made the break (between the Administration and the people) greater."³

Another very conservative nisei girl from Gila said:

"I didn't think there was anything wrong with harvesting the crop. But even among my nisei friends - they got mad and said it was a big difference. There were loyal and there were disloyal."⁴

It is interesting that some informants would not admit that they were hostile to the harvesters because they were breaking the strike but stressed the fact that they were taking food away from the residents.

A nisei member of the Daihyo Sha said:

"The food happened at night. The people didn't know about it. We figured this warehouse was for the center. What would you think if people came in with trucks at night?"⁵

¹Report, Dec. 24, p. 13; Notes, April p. 30; See also Notes, Feb, p. 14

²R. Hankey, Notes, Oct. 12, 1944, p. 1.

³ibid., Aug, 24, 1944, p. 2.

⁴ibid., Aug. 30, 1944, p. 2.

⁵ibid., Mar., 1944, p. 62.

Fujimoto stated in a letter to the writer:

"These workers were being fed from the project warehouse from which food was being taken out at all hours of the night and day. This led the evacuees to believe that they were being done out of a goodly portion of their food. Subsequent investigation upheld this belief."¹

This emphasis on the removal of food is very probably a rationalization. The writer approached Kato, a member of the Negotiating Committee and asked him which created the greater resentment, the coming of the harvesters or the removal of the food. He replied:

"Since we believed the people left behind in the other centers were loyal Americans, naturally we did not like loyal American-Japanese breaking our strike. That was the main thing. We didn't care about the food. We felt that since we were in camp the government was responsible for seeing that we were well fed. Of course, the harvests of this center were being sent to the other centers. We were opposed to that because we didn't want to feed the loyal American Japanese. It was like feeding the United States Army or Navy."²

Kato related another attempt of the part of the committee to inconvenience the harvesters:

"And then at that time the carpenter crew started going out to the farm. They went there to build little shacks for the convenience of the harvesters. We were definitely opposed to that. Three of us went to all the carpenter foreman to stop it at once. We said, 'All right, let them harvest it. But for goodness' sakes, we don't have to build shacks and put them in comfortable living while the farmers are on strike.'³

ATTITUDE OF THE RESIDENTS ON AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOVEMBER 1

Attitudes on the Demonstration

The attitudes of the residents toward the demonstration of November 1 show considerable variation. This was the first occasion at which the people were called upon to take part overtly in an activity which would expose the participants to administrative

¹Report, Dec. 24, 1943, pp. 13, 14.

²R. Hankey, Notes, Dec. 12, 1944, p. 5.

³ibid.,

If you should write up
Meiji Setzu ceremony on Nov. 3, 1943
A.M. at outdoor stage, then you will
find out how strongly Daikyo-sha
had support.

censure and even to possible injury or death. Despite these inhibitory factors, thousands of residents were ready and willing to go. Others went because they feared the guns and the tanks of the Army less than the censure of their neighbors. Some, like Fujimoto, though sympathetic to the Daihyo Sha's cause, stayed home and risked public disapproval.

Mr. Nakano's attitude was probably widespread:

"The first thing we heard was about Mr. Myer. He is coming and we (Daihyo Sha) would appreciate your cooperation in coming to the administration building. I said to myself, 'Things should be straightened out. Find out the true dope of how things are standing.'"¹

Several informants stressed the peaceful intent of the demonstrators. A young nisei man, an Old Tulean, made the following statement:

"So the representatives passed the word to each mess hall. They asked everybody to come to the administration building quietly, without sticks and without knives in their pockets. They wanted them to be as quiet as possible."2

A nisei girl, very much opposed to the "trouble-making" said:

"When all the people marched to the ad. building, it wasn't a riot or anything."³

It is interesting that some informants desired to give the writer the impression that they knew nothing about what was going on and that they went to the administration building only because they heard that Mr. Myer was to speak. They assiduously avoided giving the impression that they knew the demonstration was called to show public support of the Negotiating Committee. It is almost impossible that they could have been in a state of such ignorance and their verbatim statements must be viewed as attempts to escape

¹ibid., April, 1944, p. 20.

²Report, Dec. 24, 1943, p. 13.

³R. Hankey, Notes, April 30, 1944, p. 2.

responsibility for attending the gathering. These individuals were moderate people who probably knew very well why the meeting was called but preferred to state that they attended out of curiosity or because they were afraid. That many were afraid of incurring public stigma if they did not attend there is no doubt.

The attitudes expressed on the young men who went about the blocks urging people to attend the demonstration and later kept people from returning to the colony are interesting and vary a great deal. Some informants took the regimentation for granted and even a year later, expressed no resentment. Mrs. Yamaguchi, a kibe girl stated:

"They said they didn't care whether we were young or old. They wanted us to go and they told us that we would not be permitted to come home when we wanted to."¹

An Old Tulean nisei girl said:

"On November 1 we couldn't go home till they let us; but I didn't think they (the young men) bullied anybody."²

Mr. Fujimoto, who, it will be noted, did not attend the meeting, stated:

"The people gathered in some of the blocks (to go to the administration building in a group). In some blocks the representatives asked the people to come because Myer was going to give a speech. Then, when there wasn't enough people there, a few members of the goon squad got cars. They said it wasn't safe to remain in the barracks and asked the people to head for the administrative area. I sat tight. I figured if I'm going to get shot (by the Army) I can get shot here in this barrack. They talked to the people trying to make them go, saying, 'Are you Japanese or not?'"³

That statement, "If you're a Japanese, you'll go," was undoubtedly used over and over again by the Negotiating Committee. It is a favorite and powerful argument. It is doubtful if the group

¹ ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 2.

² ibid., Sept. 19, 1944, p. 3.

³ ibid., Feb. 1944, p. .

whom Fujimoto calls the "goon squad" engaged in any overt terrorization beyond telling people "they had better go." To tour the blocks in trucks and say, "Let's go, Let's go," was sufficient.

Two months after the demonstration Fujimoto, a very level headed individual still insisted "that the people had been behind the Daihyo Sha." Since he was one of the few informants who would not be offended or alienated by counter argument, the writer asked him what he thought of the administration's contention that the Negotiating Committee was composed of "agitators and radicals" and forced the people to obey them by using a "goon squad". Fujimoto pointed out that one should not judge the entire body by some of its members. He admitted that the strong-arm boys had done the body irreparable harm:

"Some of the representatives weren't exactly the people who ought to be acting as representatives. You can understand that trouble can arise from a fanatical kibe being a representative.

"There was a very small minority group of young radicals. They took it upon themselves to do things for the people in camp, without the peoples' permission. It was this group who first went about demanding the removal of the American flag¹ . . . They were all for Japanese stoicism. Nobody paid any attention to them. They were not real representatives."²

An interesting conversation showing the extreme conservative view of some of the young nisei girls was recorded while they were discussing the November 1 demonstration in August of 1944.

Miss Ikeda: All I know is that we were told, "Everybody go up there!" If they can't get what they want they said they were going to do something drastic.

Miss Watanabe: They told me if I didn't go they were going to kick me out of our block. We had roll call in our block. My mother said I was sick.

¹See p. .

²R. Hankey, Notes, Feb. 1944, p. 14.

Miss Ikeda: The other group (Daihyo Sha) just stood up in the mess hall and told us to go. When we went up there and then wanted to go home, they wouldn't let us.

Miss Watanabe: They had guys guarding the gates.

Miss Ikeda: They pushed me up in the front line. It just burned me up. We didn't know what was going on.

Miss Watanabe: They announced it at the mess hall and said, 'If you're Japanese, you'll go.'

Since Miss Watanabe was 18 years old it is most unlikely that anyone threatened to "kick her out of the block" if she did not attend. Her statement is probably a reflection of the widespread public fear of appearing to be a dissenter. That her mother explained that she was ill is natural. The mother undoubtedly feared that something violent might occur at the Administration building and wished to keep the girl safe at home. The statement, "If you're Japanese, you'll go" appears again.

REACTION TO MR. MYER'S SPEECH

Many informants have stated that they were anxious to hear what Mr. Myer had to say and admit that they were disappointed with his long-awaited speech. Mrs. Yamaguchi who is an extraordinarily good informant since she conscientiously attempts to put herself back into the spirit of this period and forget attitudes acquired later, stated that in her opinion the ordinary people were definitely disappointed in the results of the conference. The leaders, however, were greatly encouraged.

"It seems to me that ordinary people (not the leaders) were disappointed. They expected more to come out of it. They were especially disappointed about the boys who knocked Pedicord around.

"But it seemed the leaders got very enthusiastic. The meetings held after that meeting seemed to bring more unification among the block members."¹

¹ibid.,

One elderly issei woman remarked that she waited for hours and Dillon Myer did not speak. Finally Myer did speak "but just two-three minutes."¹

Mr. Okamoto, a conservative, expressed his reaction to the demonstration as follows:

"He, (Dillon Myer) didn't make any promise. He said, 'I have confidence with Best.' We went to the Administration building there for four hours. After three or four hours we find out it was for nothing because the committee couldn't accomplish anything!"²

REACTION TO THE BEATING OF DR. PEDICORD

The news of the beating of the phenominally unpopular Dr. Pedicord was received in camp with immense satisfaction. Several persons, especially issei, have stated that they disapproved. However, after conversations with many informants, the writer is convinced that this proper disapproval was strongly mixed with the inward conviction that "he got just what he deserved." Miss Nakamura, an Old Tulean employed as a nurses' aide, who has made some of the bitterest statements against the "trouble-makers" that the writer has heard stated with astonishing frankness:

"I guess the people kind of rejoiced with the kibeis about that. Everybody up at the hospital was glad about it."³

A young nisei boy defended the attackers as follows:

"He (Dr. Pedicord) came from the inside of the hospital and told them to go to hell. That's why they went in. They had no authority in the hospital. A house is like a fortress. They stepped in because there was a reason. I can't walk right into anybody else's house and make a stink!"⁴

Pedicord's assailants were never apprehended. He was unable to identify any of them.

ATTITUDE OF THE CAMP POPULATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOVEMBER 1

The successful demonstration and the apparent capitulation

¹ibid.,

²ibid., Aug. 24, 1944, p. 3.

³Report, Dec. p. 12.

⁴ibid., Mar. 1944, p. 59. Dr. Pedicord did not come out of the hospital but out of his office.

of the Administration added to the Negotiating Committee's prestige in the eyes of the people. Popular support was probably at its zenith during the period November 1 to November 4.

The Daihyo Sha Kai had scored a pronounced victory. The Committee had forced the administration to receive them as the peoples' representative body. With sagacity and political foresight the Committee had avoided major errors while the administration committed a series of acts which progressively increased the hostility of the evacuee population toward WRA, e.g., refusing to grant the use of the gymnasium for the funeral, sending a photographer to the funeral, calling in the harvest workers to break the "strike" and feeding them with food which the colonists thought belonged to them, and finally, refusing to recognize as representatives the members of the committee which the people themselves had selected by block election or appointment.

Most intelligent informants state that they believe that the few days after the November 1 demonstration up to the entrance of the Army on November 4 marked the high point of camp unification and public support of the Daihyo Sha and the Negotiating Committee. The committee appeared to be making progress, it had been "recognized", the demonstration had been staged successfully except for the beating of Pedicord which, after all, was received with satisfaction by almost everyone. In other words, the Negotiating Committee was looked upon as a successful group of leaders who had made noteworthy accomplishments without bringing any undue inconvenience upon the people. After November 4th when life became increasingly uncomfortable, support dwindled slowly but progressively. This sentiment was expressed by Mrs. Yamaguchi:

"My impression is that up until November 4, the people of the block seemed really to support the Daihyo Sha. They did not have so much support in the beginning (mid-October), when the Daihyo Sha was formed. Then the people were just split up.

"But after November 4, I think a lot of people were in doubt whether it's right to support the Daihyo Sha or not."¹

Very significant is the brief statement of Mr. Adachi, a prominent Old Tulean who had no use at all for the leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai and was, moreover, in an extraordinarily good position to appreciate the sentiment felt toward this body:

"The people were strongly behind the Daihyo Sha after November 1. . . . If the Co-ordinating Committee (the opposition body which arose later) had had the support that the Daihyo Sha had, it would have gone down in history!"²

Mr. Tsuda, a member of the Daihyo Sha and also an Old Tulean stated:

"Of course, in every block, the people knew they had selected the Daihyo Sha. In general, the people were most strongly behind the Daihyo Sha around the latter part of October and November 1."³

M. who is very honest, although being a member of the Daihyo Sha his opinion must be taken with reservations, said:

"At that time everybody believed in the Daihyo Sha, because we all had one camp and were trying to make it livable."⁴

Two men who are employed in the Cooperative and are very much against the committee's policies said:

"Kai, Kuratomi, and Kurashige^{no one by this name}?, they had done their best for the Japanese in Jerome. Whatever they did there was the best for the Japanese. The people from Jerome worshipped him and believed in him (Kai). He was honest but misguided."⁵

"They were supported by everybody."⁶

Even Miss Tanaka, who later became a member of the group

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²R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 8, 1945, p. 4.

³ibid., Jan. 11, 1945, p. 6.

⁴Notes, March, p. 62.

⁵Feb. pp. 26, 27, Notes.

⁶Mar., p. 19, Notes.

which devoted itself to the defeat of the Daihyo Sha stated honestly:

"To tell you the truth when the status quo (Daihyo Sha) group had the demonstration I wholeheartedly supported it. I said, 'I don't blame them.' It was how we were housed that affected me the most."¹

Mr. Ono, a university graduate and Old Tulean, and one of the few nisei who has managed to keep himself to the standard of workmanship he was accustomed to before evacuation made the following extremely interesting remarks on the attitudes of the people. At the time this statement was made most individuals of his temperament had joined the ranks of the denouncers of the Daihyo Sha. Ono is given to analysis, having had considerable work in political science.

"The way I look at it from what I've heard, there were mistakes on both sides. The sentiments of the people were with the minority group (Daihyo Sha) who were believed the self-appointed delegates. . . Many of them had the right intentions, but their methods were too aggressive.....

"The Administration did not have a sincere policy in mind in dealing with the representative groups. They were more or less trying to obtain further information from the representatives so as to use it in some ways according to their desires. If their intentions had been sincere in accepting some of the proposals made by the representative group, some form of understanding could have been reached. . . The fellow who stands on his principles gets stuck in the stockade."

Support, however, was not unanimous. Conservatives disapproved of the fuss and, especially after the lurid newspaper accounts which followed the November 1 demonstration, feared the reverberations outside the center. Nevertheless, persons who held opinions like those expressed below, were very careful to keep them to themselves:

¹ibid., July 19, 1944, p. 4.

"A minority does the most foolish things without any consideration and does not know what will happen and influence the rest of the people. I am deeply disappointed."¹

Some of the very Americanized young nisei girls probably never could be counted among the supporters of the Daihyo Sha. Their criticisms (made almost a year after the incident) are interesting:

"The Jerome group just wanted to make the whole camp over. They even went to the Planning Board (this is false) telling them they wanted to run this place."

"They said we Tuleans were soft and good for nothing!"

"That group turned out to be the Kai group. They might have had their good points, but we felt they were being very unreasonable and were doing more harm than good. . . .

"Another thing: they went about it in dictatorship style. They used physical threats. They said, 'You do what we tell you or else.'²

ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWARD ENTRANCE OF THE ARMY

Data on the immediate reactions of the residents to the entrance of the Army is very incomplete. Undoubtedly, the tanks and the gunfire caused great confusion and fear in those blocks into which the Army entered on the night of November 4. They did not know what was going on nor why the Army had come in. The excited soldiers drove the tanks through ~~the~~ some of the blocks, shouting at any Japanese who so much as put their head out of a door, "Get back! Get back!" and firing their guns into the air.³ The terror of some unfortunate issei caught between his home and the latrine is easy to imagine.

Interestingly, informants give two quite different reactions to this event. A few state frankly that they thought it was

¹From a letter; see Report, Dec. 24, p. 25.

²R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 14, 1944, pp. 2, 3.

³ibid., April 23, 1945, p. 2.

awful. Many, however, state that they were glad to see the Army come in because the Army was less likely to cheat the colonists than the WRA. The writer is inclined to doubt the sincerity of the latter statements. They are very probably rationalizations. It is most likely that for the week immediately following November 4 most of the colonists experienced great anxiety and fear, mingled with an attitude of suspended judgment on the part of some, who waited to see how Army rule would differ from that of the WRA.

The following statement from a young nisei girl exemplifies the first attitude:

"I just thought, 'What's this camp coming to?' After the Army came in I really felt like a prisoner. . . All during the time when the Army was controlling the camp, naturally, we were sad. There were no activities. Everything stopped. We had a curfew. Oh, it was a miserable life'. . . We got boloney for Thanksgiving."¹

The opposite attitude was also given by a nisei girl:

"I thought the people seemed to think that it was better for the Army to have control. Since the Army represented wholly the government they thought it would be better. There wouldn't be any more grafting. They expected more strict discipline, but they thought everything would be on the up and up. . . The people were really more or less relieved when the Army came in."²

The following attitudes are probably more typical than that quoted above. Mrs. Yamaguchi who can almost always be relied upon for an honest expression, stated:

"The people in this block were really scared stiff. They wouldn't go out at night. The people went to the Block Manager. But he had no way to get information."³

A letter from a transferee stated,

"In this critical atmosphere I really feel sick and want to get out. Weak mind, I guess!"⁴

¹ ibid., Aug. 30, 1944, p. 3.

² ibid., Aug. 24, 1944, pp. 3, 4.

³ ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 3.

⁴ "X"'s Sociological Journal, Nov. 16, 1943, p. 8.

To offset the oppressive feeling of helplessness before the armed might of the Army, the following brave statements were made in letters.

"Residents are taking the presence of the soldiers in the blocks nonchalantly and continuing their passive resistance. Their attitude is, 'What can they do if we don't do anything at all? We are guaranteed of food, clothing and shelter.'"¹

"It isn't as bad as it sounds although it was pretty bad. The Army is still in. They're delivering all the vegetables and food stuff to the messhalls accompanied by armored cars, jeeps, peeps, and lots of dumb soldier boys. Boy, those soldiers certainly get razing from the Japs. Some even say, 'Instead of fighting armless Japs in a cage, why don't you go to the Solomons where you'll have plenty of competition?'"²

The writer is of the opinion that if any such statement was made in the presence of a soldier it was sensibly made in Japanese and probably in an undertone. However, there was probably a great deal of surreptitious laughing at the soldiers. The hurried and fearful manner in which they delivered food, dropping it in the middle of the road and hurrying on, was regarded with great amusement.³ An informant told the writer:

"They used to bring in the food with an escort of two jeeps, two semi-trucks and four, five trucks. Twelve soldiers escorted the food trucks. That was a comical sight. Like the old Chicago gangster days."⁴

¹ibid., Nov. 20, 1943, p. 4.

²ibid., Nov. 26, 1943, p. 2.

³R. Hankey, Notes, April 23, 1945, p. 2-3.

⁴Report, Dec. 24, 1943, p. 18.

Synthesis of Developments - Segregation to November 4, 1943

The segregees began their life at Tule Lake Center in a state of great confusion and widespread dissatisfaction. As far as the transferees were concerned, this dissatisfaction arose from two main sources; 1) unfavorable comparisons of Tule Lake with the various relocation centers from which the transferees had come, 2) a great sense of insecurity, springing in part from the fact that their status had not been defined and, in part, from the fact that very few had made up their minds that a decision to return to Japan was the better choice. They did not know whether they were to be treated as internees or as a peculiar type of evacuee. They did not know their status either with the Government of the United States or with that of Japan. They did not know what the future held for them.

The Old Tulean population shared the dissatisfaction over living conditions only to a minor extent. As for status, they were as insecure as the transferees.

An important additional contributing factor to the general unrest was the desire of the Old Tuleans to maintain or, at least, not to lose ground to the newcomers in the matter of influence and control over the camp and the equally powerful intention of the newcomers to establish themselves and wrest part of this control from the older inhabitants. This attitude was shared to some extent by almost every evacuee but manifested itself most clearly in the activities of the politicians. Some of the prominent Old Tuleans were considering ways and means of maintaining control even before segregation. Some of the ambitious transferees occupied themselves with attempts to gain a following almost

immediately after their arrival in Tule Lake.

The farm truck accident of October 15, in which thirty persons were injured and one lost his life, furnished a focal point for the general widespread unrest, and led directly to organization aimed at creating^a a group which would lay the peoples' grievances before the administration and demand consideration and mitigatory action. For a short period, a remarkable state of group solidarity was produced. Although some Old Tuleans attempted to utilize this urge for organization to form a group dominated by pre-segregation residents, the opportunity slipped from their grasp and transferee leaders took over and held the positions of prominence. A large part of the Old Tulean population was pulled into this movement for positive action. It should be emphasized that had not the farm accident occurred at this time, some similar group action, would almost inevitably have been initiated at a later date. The force was so powerful that it demanded release.

The farmers, or rather their leaders, took the first step toward forming the organization, meeting directly after the accident and deciding that they would not work until administrative action had been taken both to prevent a similar accident, and to do away with some of their other numerous grievances. To increase the pressure they hoped to bring upon the administration, they decided to appeal for support of the entire camp. In this attempt they asked for and received the cooperation of the Block Managers. A meeting was called in each block and two representatives for the proposed body, the Daihyo Sha Kai were selected. Due, however, to the fact that the center had been established little more than two weeks and that the block population was

heterogeneous in the extreme, containing in some cases, families from as many as six or seven different centers, little consideration was given to the character or ability of the men selected. The body, therefore, contained an unusual number of exhibitionistic individuals, noted more for their overt expression of anti-administrative sentiments than for their capability as negotiators.

At the first meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai the leadership was immediately taken over by transferees. The comparatively small body of men who secured the active, policy-making positions of leadership was composed of a preponderance of men from Jerome although individuals from Topaz and Poston were also prominent. Under the guidance of these leaders plans were made for the selection of committees who were to investigate the most serious grievances and gather data to use in obtaining concessions from the administration. The first indications of personal antipathy and jealousy between would-be leaders appeared when Mr. Takahashi, an influential elderly man from Topaz lost the chairmanship to a young man from Jerome, Mr. Kuratomi. This antipathy was later to assume great significance.

On October 26 a body of negotiators, some of whom were selected in a most informal manner, approached Mr. Best, the Project Director, and presented the chief evacuee complaints. Mr. Best indicated that he would attempt to mitigate some of these and also gave the body permission to proceed with their plan for a permanent body of representatives.

Meanwhile, general resentment against the administration was increased by the administration's refusal to grant permission for a public funeral for the farmer killed in the accident. The

committee appointed by the Daihyo Sha Kai arranged and held the public funeral in spite of the refusal. A member of the appointed personnel was roughed up when he attempted to take pictures of the ceremony. Resentment and tension rose still higher when Mr. Best, in an attempt to save the valuable crop endangered by the work stoppage, terminated the striking farmers and brought in Japanese harvesters from the Relocation Centers. No notice of this decision was given either to the people or to the group of negotiators who had consulted with Mr. Best the day before the call for workers was sent out. Strong public sympathy for the farmers who had lost their positions was aroused. Moreover, with the breaking of the strike, the residents lost their chief bargaining point in their hope for obtaining concessions in the matter of alleviating the objectionable camp conditions. From the viewpoint of the colonists, insult was added to injury by the necessity of removing food from the colony warehouses to feed the strike breakers.

The administration, totally unprepared for this group manifestation and faced with the loss of the crop, probably did not appreciate the extent or the gravity of the resentment prevalent at this time. When Dillon Myer arrived on the project on October 30, ~~Mr. Zimmer was approached by the Negotiating Committee of the~~ *approached the administration and* Daihyo Sha Kai ~~who~~ requested an interview with Myer. They were told that Mr. Myer would see only the representatives of the farm, *desiring to lay their grievances before the highest possible authority* group on November 2. The leaders ~~gambling heavily on the chance~~ *that they would succeed better with Myer than with Best*, organized a demonstration. Thousands of people responded and surrounded the administration building on the afternoon of November¹. Mr. Myer

consented to see the Negotiating Committee. He paid no heed to their accusations against Mr. Best or their demand that the terminated farmers be given some consideration. He did, however, promise that their complaints would be investigated and just action taken. While this demonstration proceeded at the administration building, Dr. Pedicord, the unpopular Chief Medical Officer, was attacked by a gang of hoodlums and beaten severely.

Immediately after November 1, camp support of the representative body reached its highest point. The Negotiating Committee had made no significant errors and though little tangible had been gained, many of the residents were of the opinion that improvements would be made in the future. The leaders, after a very successful meeting with the Spanish Consul, were very optimistic and were of the opinion that, given a little time, most of the difficulties could be successfully resolved. The administration, however, was disturbed and confused, both by the demonstration and the extremely unfavorable newspaper publicity which followed. On the night of November 4 while the Daihyo Sha Kai was in session and proceeding with its plans for a permanent body to succeed them, members of the appointed personnel were sent to take three trucks from the motor pool. A fight broke out between these men and a group of young evacuee fellows who had taken it upon themselves to guard the warehouse to prevent any more food being removed to feed the strike breakers. Mr. Best called in the Army which assumed temporary control of the camp.