

RETYPE

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To be numbered
as is

we should get off on the wrong foot. I don't think there is a problem that we can't solve if we get together. We can work these things out just as they come up. I don't like to let these things out just as they come up. I don't like to let things magnify and get worse. We can get right down to the bottom of these things. Come up again.

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This meeting ^{was} ~~is~~ far more like a contest between two adversaries than like a conference. To begin with Mr. Best ~~appears to~~ refused to recognize the negotiating Committee as representatives of the Tule Lake residents. Kuratomi then implied that some of the questions to be asked might be above Best's authority and asked that in such cases they be referred to Washington. After these opening gambits the meeting ~~also~~ rapidly ^{developed} into a quarrel over Best's supposedly inhuman attitude in regard to the funeral. Both sides hurled accusations freely. A semblance of propriety ^{was} restored while discussing the request that the evacuees at Tule Lake wish ^{ed} to raise only enough food for their own consumption. ^{Mr.} Best, although he had not "recognized" the committee, ^{ad} accepted this request on its face value and in the presence of the Committee canceled a telegram to Gila ordering beef. "We will have to wait 50 days before we get any." From here on matters proceed with relative smoothness. However, near the end of the meeting Kuratomi remarks that in the event of a strike he imagines the administration would see that some quick solution was made. Best retorts: "A strike isn't the way to deal with me." That the negotiating Committee was already placing reliance on an appeal above Mr. Best is shown not only by the remark made early in the meeting but also near the end when Kuratomi asks if it will be necessary to refer some of the questions to Mr. Myer. Best agrees that it will be, and adds that he would like Myer to confer with the committee.

← According to Opler, this gesture was a bluff; Best merely pretended to send the telegram. ¶ From this point on, matters proceeded with relative smoothness. However, near the end of the meeting Kuratomi ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ remarked that in the event of a strike he imagined that the administration would see that some quick solution was made. Best retorted: "A strike isn't the way to deal with me." That the Negotiating Committee was already placing reliance on an appeal above Mr. Best ^{was} ~~/s/~~ shown not only by the remark made early in the meeting but also near the end when Kuratomi asked if it ^{would} ~~will~~ be necessary to refer ~~to~~ some of the questions to Mr. Myer. Best ~~/applied/~~ agreed that it would be necessary and added that he would like Myer to confer with the committee.

Neither side was acting entirely above board. The Negotiating Committee retained their trump card to lay before Director Myer: the "proof" of graft among the Caucasian personnel. Mr. Best stated at the beginning of the meeting that he did not "recognize" the Committee, yet said at the end:

"There is no reason why we can't come to an understanding. We can lay our problems right here on the table. I am here to help you. I am not here for any other purpose. I want to spend 90 percent of my time with you and your committee. That is what I am here forI don't think there is a problem that we can't solve if we get together.....We can get right down to the bottom of these things. Come up again."

The Negotiating Committee phased their requests on four major topics: (1) the question of the status of the evacuees under International law under which they included a request for re-segregation; (2) the settlement of the farm incident which included many minor points; (3) a request for community government; (4) a multitude of requests for the betterment of colony living conditions. Some of the points were brought up as requests for clarification, others as requests springing from the desires of the colonists and one request for an investigation as to why the food was so poor and what was happening to the products of the hog and chicken farms.

It will be interesting to consider these points one by one and the Project Director's decision on each. The points will then be compared with the considerable number of statements made by Japanese not closely connected with the Dainyo Sha Kai, ^{and} an attempt made to show how closely the points brought up by the Negotiating Committee paralleled the desires of the ordinary colonist at this time.

Status of Residents under International Law - Further Segregation

This is a major point which stands by itself. Kuratomi stated that the residents wished to know their status under International

Law. Mr. Best referred ^{him} ~~them~~ to the Department of Justice, Mr. Myer and the Spanish Consul. Supplementary to this, Kuratomi stated that the residents strongly desired resegregation. Mr. Best agreed that this would be a good idea.

Farm Accident

Kuratomi opened the discussion of this issue with a demand on the part of the colonists that WRA announce that it ^{would} ~~will~~ take full responsibility "in regard to these accidents" and express regret concerning them. The people, he added, ^{wish} ~~would~~ to know what steps have been taken toward compensation." Mr. Best answered that all forms of the United States Employees' Compensation have been completed and transmitted to that Commission.

Kuratomi then bluntly asked the reason for the inhuman attitude of the Administration in regard to the funeral. Best denied he had inhuman tendencies. Kuratomi countered with the fact that he had refused to go or send a representative to the funeral and give a speech of condolence. The discussion rapidly disintegrated into a quarrel, in which Mr. Best stated it was demanded that he go and Kuratomi denies it. Best stated that people were forced to go to the funeral, which is a fact; Kuratomi denied it. After arrogant words on both sides, Kuratomi stated that motor pool drivers should ^{over} be/21 years of age. This is already in effect, said Black.

Farm Acreage

Kuratomi stated that it ^{was} ~~is~~ the desire of the people that they farm no more acreage than ^{was} ~~is~~ necessary for the needs of the colony. Best inquired if this meant they want ^{ed} ~~ed~~ no more beef from Gila. Kuratomi agreed. Best immediately canceled a shipment of beef expected from Gila stating that 50 days must ~~now~~ elapse before any beef ~~can~~ ^{could}

be procured through the Army Quartermaster. Kuratomi, apparently unperturbed, asked for a farm committee; ^{stated} and Best ~~agreed~~ that ~~he~~ ^{he was} wholeheartedly in favor of the formation of such a body. He also assured the Committee that food ~~had~~ never been sent to the Army or Navy.

Public Schools

Black explained the proposed plan for public schools and in answer to a direct question, ^{would} stated there ~~will~~ be no flag ^{raising} ~~raising~~ ceremony, and that attendance ^{would} ~~will~~ not be compulsory.

Community Government

This is another major issue. Kuratomi ~~stated~~ ^{stated} that the people want ^{all} a center organization to govern and take care of the center residents and negotiate with the Administration. The organization of this body ^{was} ~~is~~ to be left entirely to the center residents. Best agreed that he too desired it, but ^{that it must be} ~~desired~~ complete representation. Black added that it must be quite clear, however, that there ^{would} ~~is~~ cannot be such a thing as self-government, ^{and} ~~but~~ ^{asked} that the present committee serve as an advisory committee to the Administration. Kuratomi again used the term "central governing body" and ^{was} ~~is~~ corrected by Black. Kuratomi then stated the center desired that Block Managers be put under the supervision of this proposed Center Committee. It ^{was} ~~is~~ explained that under WRA regulations this ^{could not} ~~cannot~~ be done.

Food Question

Kuratomi ~~stated~~ ^{stated} that the residents doubt ^{ed} that they ^{were} ~~are~~ getting their full share of poultry and eggs. Zimmer explained that since June 22 no hogs ~~have~~ been slaughtered and that all the ~~projects~~ ^{products} ~~were going~~ from the hog and poultry farms ^{to} ~~to~~ mess management. Best intimated

that if the workers at these farms should stop working he would have to sell these products off the project. Kuratomi then asks^{ed} for an investigation into mess hall distribution. Best refers^{ed} him to the mess department.

Later Kuratomi complains^{ed} that the food^{was} is very poor, that the children^{are} are not getting sufficient milk and that eggs^{were} were never served. Best, ^{replied} ~~however~~, states that the lack of milk ^{was} is probably the fault of Mess Management, ~~and~~ that eggs^{were} are on the menu every day, and suggests^{ed} the employment of a Japanese head steward under Mr. Peck.

In view of the tremendous public resentment over^{poor}/food, the rumors prevalent among evacuees and Caucasians that food was being sold off the project, either to the Army and Navy or to the black market, this referring of the food question to the mess department on the part of Mr. Best cannot be considered wise. Answering the charge that eggs are never served by saying that they are on the menu ~~is~~ shows ignorance of Mess conditions. Reliable evacuee informants repeatedly state that what is put on the menu and what is served are two different things. These questions on food were vital. By passing them off lightly a valuable opportunity to decrease the illwill of the colonists was disregarded.

Latrine Facilities

Kuratomi asks^{ed} for the improvement of latrinal facilities. Best explains^{ed} the difficulties of improving these and remarks^{ed} that the next housing adjustment^{would} will relieve the situation. Kuratomi complains^{ed} that the hot and cold water cannot be mixed and Best states^{ed} that he wants to improve all such conditions.

Lots around barracks - porches

Best stated that if proper plans were made and Washington's

approval is gained, porches could probably be built for about \$20,000.

Mail Delivery

Kuratomi stated that the residents felt that mail should be delivered to each unit, and not ^{to} the block managers. Best ~~says~~ ^{said} he will try to work it out.

TB Patients released in center

Kuratomi stated that tuberculosis patients ~~are~~ ^{were} being sent to the blocks. These should be segregated and sent back home. (Exactly what he means is not clear, ~~to the units~~.) Best ~~says~~ ^{said} this should be referred to the medical staff.

Inadequate preparation to receive segregees

Kuratomi asked who was responsible for the inadequate preparation for the segregees entering Tule. Best replied that he will have to blame the Congress of the United States.

Disappearance of WRA material

Kuratomi stated that in the past the disappearance of articles such as saws, hammers, and axes had been blamed on evacuees. If this should happen in Tule, he asked that the administration investigate thoroughly before they make an accusation. Best assured him that an investigation would be held.

Summary

Reviewing the answers given by Mr. Best it appears that the Negotiating Committee had reason to feel optimistic over the general results of this meeting. Mr. Best agreed wholeheartedly on the matter of cultivating farm acreage only for the needs of the colony and was almost enthusiastic over the formation of a farm committee and a representative body from the colony, stating, however, that this could not be a self-governing body. The Negotiating Committee was

asked to serve in an advisory capacity to the Administration in forming this body. Best stated that he "would do what he could" in the matter of porches, latrines and the mail, and agreed that segregation "would be a good idea." One request, on the age of truck drivers, was shown to be already in effect. The Committee was reassured that attendance at the American schools would not be compulsory. Two questions were referred to a higher authority and the Congress of the United States was conveniently blamed for the inconveniences of segregation. The impossibility of placing block managers under the supervision of the proposed Representative Body was adequately explained. The complaints about the mess, however, were pushed aside with a vague suggestion that the head of the Mess Division be consulted. This muddled mess situation was (aside from the emotional hostility engendered by the farmer's death) the most important issue brought up by the Committee. Sub-committees of the Daihyo Sha were busily gathering evidence of graft ~~with which~~ ^{to lay before} they ~~decided to face~~ Director Myer.

Colonists' Views on Demands of Negotiating Committee

It is doubtful if the Negotiating Committee's stress on clarification of status and community government was at this time ^{an entirely accurate} ~~as true~~ reflection of the sentiments of most of the colonists. Undoubtedly many of those ~~segregs~~ ^{guys} who truly intended to return to Japan wished this question of status cleared up. As the months passed this desire to know where they stood increased steadily in strength and became a major issue. However, from November through December very few informants who were not members of the Daihyo Sha Kai mention status or community government. Instead proper precaution to prevent the recurrence of accidents, improvement of living conditions and the

dismissal of Doctor Redicord are most emphatically stressed. Moreover, it is very doubtful if the Committee ever put the question of the reduction of farm acreage before the people. ~~It appears as if~~ ^{Apparently,} on some issues the Negotiating Committee acted as it saw fit. This policy, however, was not criticized by the ~~ordinary~~ colonists. These men had been put up as representatives; what ^{ever} they chose to do "for the benefit of the people" was all right. Some idea of what demands the people thought most important may be gained from the following statements.

From "I":

"The committee decided to request that (1) the motor depot and placement office set certain age limits to people who drive trucks and other types of vehicles within the center. (2) That the food in camp be improved. (3) That certain officials of the WRA who were known to have been chiseling be discharged. (4) That Dr. Redicord, the Chief Medical Officer, in view of his anti-Japanese views and actions, be discharged. That he was incompetent and negligent of his duties. That because of his refusal to grant permission for transfusions to two or three patients in the past (a Japanese doctor had recommended transfusions) these patients all died.¹

"They asked for porches for all the apartments. WRA had promised lumber for all the porches. It was never supplied. That's where that request came in. We were promised. That's inefficiency as far as I'm concerned.

"The only thing that everybody in camp absolutely endorsed was the dismissal of Dr. Redicord, and more care in placement of drivers, and an improvement of food, and I think, the request for an investigation of grafting. Grafting started the whole works."²

From "K":

"I don't know how much they demanded for the widow and children but the people figured it (60% of monthly wage) was not enough Then at the same time they made demands for porches and for the latrine to be better taken care of and other things. They also asked for Dr. Redicord to be taken out of the hospital. There were several other requests they threw in with the farmer's case."³

¹Report, Dec. 24, p. 21.

²Notes, Feb. pp. 13, 14.

³Report, Dec. 24, p. 12.

From a letter in X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 4:

" . . . on November 1 the representatives made the following demands to Director Myer and Director Best: (1) To supply each block with brooms, buckets, mops, and other necessary items. (2) Swindlings by the appointed personnel in the Subsistence Department were charged. They requested to remove these crooked Caucasians. (3) To discharge the Caucasian employees from the nospital. They also charged that the money appropriated for medicines had been swindled by the Caucasians. (4) All the better grade agricultural products have been packed in the shed and sent to the outside. Formerly the residents had thought that these were being sent to other relocation centers. Lately they have been informed that most of these had been sent to the Army. They argued that they should not be producing for the United States Army.

October 27 Best telegraphed Charles F. Ernst, Project Director at the Topaz Center and , of Poston, requesting the recruitment of farm workers to harvest the crops at Tule Lake.¹ The following day he terminated the striking farm workers as of October 19, "due to failure to report for work."² The first contingent of farm workers arrived in Tule October 30. It was commonly believed that Best had stated that he would take no action in regard to the strike without notification. Many colonists were convinced that Best had broken his word. The harvesters were regarded as strikebreaking double-crossers. Resentment increased.

¹The Topaz Times (Oct. 28, 1943), contains an interesting statement by Mr. Ernst: "In discussing the job I have been asked to find out if there is any trouble like a "strike" at Tule Lake. Last night I phoned to Tule Lake and received this information. 'There is no "strike" or labor trouble at Tule Lake.' The residents of Tule Lake have had meetings with their project director and have said they did not feel they should harvest crops that were going to other centers."

In Poston the existence of the strike was not officially announced until Oct. 31 (Poston Chronicle). The workers were offered 90 cents to \$1.00 an hour. "X" states that the telegram of October 27 did not state that a strike was in progress but did say that the Tule Lake people had refused to harvest the crop for shipment to the "loyal people" in other centers. X's Sociological Journal, October 27, pp 2, 10.

²Tulean Dispatch, Oct. 28, 1943

"M", member of the Daihyo Sha said:

"The harvesters who came in were Japanese. That's what you call the double cross. It was just like an anti-strike. Best stopped the work but didn't give them a chance to consider it. He gave the people no notice of the fact that he was going to bring in the farm workers" If the Administration had put out officially that they couldn't do things (at the beginning of the trouble) I don't think the people would have got so angry. But they didn't tell the people anything."¹

"N" said:

"It made me pretty sore. We were trying to negotiate and make things run smoothly. And here was a Japanese who did that. We felt pretty bad. Those fellows staying behind were supposed to be loyal to this country. On the cauliflowers that were sent in they'd write, "Sore mitaka fuchusei mono," "See what you get for being disloyal." That made us sort of - gave us a hatred toward those fellows. The people just coming in was bad enough."²

"I" said:

"Previous to all this, Mr. Best gave word that any action he decided to take to harvest the crops in the fields would first be made public to the evacuees and the evacuee farmers. However, with no notification whatever he had brought in about 90 or 100 "yes-yes" Japanese to take over the harvesting."³ I thought it was kind of a dirty trick, putting it mildly."³

Food for these unpopular harvest workers was taken by night from the warehouse which held the colonists' food. Opler stated that the food was taken at night because the trucks were needed for other work during the day.⁴ Evacuees noted the fact that trucks were driven to the warehouses, loaded with large quantities of food and then driven off the project. The next morning Japanese employed

¹Notes, Mar., p. 52.

²Notes, April 1944, p. 21.

³Report, Dec. 24, p. 13. Notes, April p. 30. See also Notes, Feb., p. 14.

⁴Notes, Feb., p. 21.

in the warehouse checked up on the missing items. According to one informant they found 120 sacks of rice, 50 cases of milk, many cans of corn and pineapple and much flour and catsup gone. They themselves never receive catsup at mess.¹ The fact that the food at Tule Lake was, in general, below the standards to which the colonists had been accustomed at other centers, and the well founded suspicion that graft existed among the A.P. members of the Mess Division added to the conviction of injustice. All informants agree that this removal of food was resented most bitterly.

Says "M":

"The food happened at night. The people didn't know about it. We figured this warehouse was for the center. What would you think if people came in with trucks at night?"²

Says "I":

"These workers were being fed from the project warehouse from which food was being taken out at all hours of the night and day. This led the evacuees to believe that they were being done out of a goodly portion of their food. Subsequent investigation upheld this belief."³

When the news spread, and the Negotiation Committee saw that it was widely publicized, it no doubt angered persons who had hitherto been indifferent or neutral. When Mr. Best was approached on the matter he is reputed to have said:

"It's none of your business because we haven't issued these things out to you yet, and besides we're feeding you people properly."⁴ The informant added, "They dismissed the case and that was the main trouble."

¹Report, Dec. 24, pp. 13, 21.

²Notes, Mar., p. 62.

³Report, Dec. 24, p. 21.

⁴Ibid., pp. 13. 14.

Whether Mr. Best actually made this statement is not known. However, the people, shocked by the farm accident, feeling a common insult in the Administration's refusal to allow a public funeral, were now pushed one step further into resentment by knowing that food, some of which consisted of "luxuries" they never received themselves, was being given to the strike breakers while they themselves continued to get only their miserable fare. The harvesters, it is said, added insult to injury by their attitude:

"It made me pretty sore. We were trying to negotiate and make things run smoothly. And here was a Japanese who did that. We felt pretty bad. . . . On the cauliflowers that were sent in, they'd write: "Sore mitaka fuchusei mono," "See what you get for being disloyal." That made us sort of - gave us a hatred toward those fellows. The people just coming in was bad enough. . . . They didn't trust the Administration at all about handling the food problem. Maybe they were putting money in their own pockets."^{1/}

On October 28 the Daihyo Sha Kai held its fourth meeting. (The minutes of the third meeting are not available) This meeting

^{1/} Notes, April, p. 21.

Whether Mr. Best actually made this statement is not known. However, the people, shocked by the farm accident, feeling a common insult in the Administration's refusal to allow a public funeral were now pushed one step further into hatred toward the Administration by knowing that food, some of which consisted of "luxuries" they never received themselves, was being given to the strike breakers, while they themselves continued to get only ~~their~~ miserably ^{food.} inadequate ~~same.~~

On October 28 the Daihyo Sha Kai held another meeting, which again was not too well attended, seven men being absent. The removal of food from the warehouses had evidently not yet been noted, for no mention is made in the minutes. The Committee made a report on their interview with Mr. Best which, except for a certain tone which made the Committee sound exceedingly arrogant and Mr. Best exceedingly meek, was fundamentally accurate.¹ The expected 50 day wait for food supplies ^{was fully explained.} ~~is fully mentioned.~~ In concluding the report, Kuratomi stated that no record of this interview had been kept and that the Project Director had promised to send a written memo "with regard to the demands." He then recommended that a representative body be formed at once. The following remarks were made on resegregation:

Question from the floor: Did the Negotiating Committee ever demand the WRA, resegregation of disloyal and loyal?

Chair: We have. Because we have the information by which we can distinguish the loyal from the disloyal.

Question from the floor: Regardless of their present address whether within or without the Center, they are all same Japanese. Disloyal or loyal status should not make any difference as far as Japanese are concerned.

¹Fourth Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai of the Tule Lake Center, pp. 1 - 4.

RETYPE

pp. 8 to 90 do not exist
having been absorbed in typing.

Begin this as p. 81 —
onwards.

The picture is still more confused by the insistence of Kobayashi and the group of young men who left the Daihyo Sha Kai ^{meeting} with him, who say that they were picked up at the high school on their way to stop the trouble. 2/

The Daihyo Sha faction, moreover, insists that the guard was placed around the warehouse area by Takahashi, who took this step unknown ~~with~~ to the Daihyo Sha ^{secretariat} to ~~add to~~ his waning pretige with the people. 3/

1/ Notes,

2/ Notes,

and non-social among the aborigines. Gradually they separated from the rest of the group and took up repulsive occupations."¹ (11) also (6a.19.20)

One informant explained that the eta had been ~~very~~ Chinese prisoners of war who became disliked because of their meat eating habits:

"There is this class of eta because in Japan a century or so ago, the Japanese didn't eat any meat. They stuck to vegetables and fish. Then/ Then these fellows, prisoners of war from China, became Japanese and they were eating meat. They used to kill the cows and hogs and they used to eat meat."²

One informant ~~has heard~~ they ~~very~~ eta sprang entirely from prisoners had heard that

(6)

~~of war~~

of war:

"I heard these persons were captured in war, Koreans, Chinese, Mongols, or South Sea Chinese. Just like the negro in the time of the Civil War used to be a slave."³

(6)

Another informant believed that the eta were the descendants of Japanese and Ainu rather than Koreans.⁴ (27)

An interesting comment was made on the place of Koreans proper in Japanese society today as compared to the eta:

"Those persons in the old country known as chosenjin (Koreans) stand a lot better chance than a fellow known as eta. A chosenjin is permitted to work in almost any kind of a household as a domestic or apprentice. He gives the impression that he knows his place. The eta being mainly of Japanese extraction tries to come above his place. That is one of the reasons the chosenjin are looked on more favorably. They are much more commonly engaged as servants."⁵ (432)

~~PHYSICAL APPEARANCE AND BEHAVIOR OF ETA - HABITS WHICH BETRAY THEM~~

PHYSICAL APPEARANCE AND BEHAVIOR OF ETA - HABITS WHICH BETRAY THEM

Among the most interesting of the folk beliefs concerning this despised group are those relating to their physical appearance and the habits by which it may be known that "they are one of those."

1 See p.

2 " "

3 " "

4 " "

5 " "

soldiers demanded entrance. They took the injured man with them over Miamoto's protests since he had not been treated. Three days later Miamoto was called to the stockade to attend to this injury. There he saw Kobayashi, the boy whom he had treated for a slight head injury, with his face tremendously swollen and ~~gash~~ bandages on his arms and legs. He also saw a boy with a broken arm and a boy with a great gash on his head which required eight stitches. The ~~boy~~ other boys may have been injured in the fight. However, Kobayashi was taken into custody with only the slight head injury.¹ ~~Kobayashi was kept in the stockade~~
 ← Kobayashi was kept in the stockade until May or June 1944, when he was released. Soon afterward he had a head operation.

The picture is still more confused by the insistence of ~~Kobayashi~~ Kobayashi and the group of young men who left the Daihyo Sha Kai with him, who say that they were picked up at the high school on the way to the trouble.²

This November 4 incident gave rise to atrocity stories
~~which were widely~~
~~some of the stories~~ broadcasted by members of the Appointed Personnel. A rumor ~~which reached~~ reached Gila in December that scores of evacuees were bayoneted and killed. Several Caucasian members of Internal Security are said to have ~~boasted~~ ^{openly} of the part they took in beating up the captured Japanese. A Caucasian's letter states:

"Did you hear of the trouble at the camp last night?"

'No,' says I.

'Well, five men were killed,' says he. I let five minutes pass before I asked, 'Who got killed?' And the answer: 'Five Japs, the bloody bastards!'

... Tonight after kitchen duty I went to the Rec Hall with the nurses.

A small group there told of the part they took in beating the Japs up. And as

¹ ~~Notes, April, pp. 34, 35.~~

² Notes,

*single
again*

intelligent fellow.

Nō - farmer class:

The farmer produced food to feed everybody.

Naturally, without food, a person can't live. So that's why he was given socially pretty high place. Now, where ever you go, money talks. So as long as you have accumulated great wealth now, you are respected. Even a banker is respected, which was very low by the old standard.

Kō - the manufacturer:

The manufacturer makes a lot of useful and convenient things. Naturally, his work is really essential for life, even though not essential for production of food. That's why he was given a higher place than a merchant.

Shō: - the merchant:

The merchant makes himself money and often accumulates great wealth. However, his wealth did not produce essential things to life according to the ideas of the feudal time. Regardless of his wealth, he was not respected, but was looked down upon. He was the undermost of the social strata.

But the shi-nō-kō-shō idea is still retained by the old issei in Japan and the old issai in the United States. Twenty or thirty years ago, the idea was very much stronger. But the young nisei growing up start mixing among all classes without bias or destination. They lose them.

Eta in Japan

Even in my childhood days the eta were allowed to attend public school, even among the grammar school children. But they still were looked down on. I still remember eta children used to have a hard time.

single page
 they told every gory detail, the nurses cheered - the more sadistic the story, the louder the cheers. There was a cook in the mess. It seems that when the shooting started the cook came out the window in his white outfit, his arms up. And the laughter at this poor guy who was in the dining room making pie crust. . . ." the letter ends abruptly here.¹ Half a dozen other Caucasians have stated that they too heard boasting of this sort.

~~To collect evidence as to whether Japanese were beaten after they had been apprehended, is not the object of this study. 7/1/42~~
 Mr. Schmidt admits, however, that ~~several~~ were badly beaten in the fight. Several Caucasians were also injured.

¹ From letter quoted in part on pp.

have it some place in their head even in a small amount. Particularly those extracted from the samurai group, regardless of the status of samurai. ~~Samurai themselves were of various ranks. R. H.~~ Among samurai there is a different standing, ^{like} general, captain and buck private. Even the descendants of the buck private still have their pride in their lineage. But this is rare among the nisei.

The ~~shinno~~ shi-nō-kō-shō, that's just for the ~~average~~ average people. In the upper group is princedom and below that is the eta group.

The eta in California and Camp

The eta feeling is still found among the nisei, though vaguely, because they heard it from their parents. But particularly among the issei, regardless of broadmindedness, they still have a dislike for the eta. But there are not many eta in the United States. There are very few. They are hardly any at all in camp. In pre-war time, in the Los Angeles or San Francisco colonies there were some persons who were looked down on as eta. I haven't heard about any in this camp.

A samurai's life is non-existent in definite time. He may die today or tomorrow. He's just like the boys in the front line. All farmers, merchants, and manufacturers may get along peacefully because of the sacrifice of the warrior. Deep in their hearts some of the old samurai descent may have pride for that.

Shinō-kō-shō was officially nullified at the very beginning of the Meiji era when national conscription was inaugurated. Instead of taking the soldiers only from samurai, they were taken from ~~all~~ ^{all} classes including the eta. That's the way the present Japanese army was formed, comprised of all classes.

The eta and the aristocracy still exist in Japan, but the shi-nō-kō-shō class distinction is practically all washed out.

Even among the issei outside in pre-war time, those persons who bragged about their samurai descent were looked down upon by the average

harvesters.¹ When this statement was repeated to Mr. and Mrs. Opler, they were dumbfounded. Opler stated that he was absolutely certain that the trucks were sent for food. Said Mrs. Opler, "Where would they go to get what harvesters?"²

~~The army immediately arrested and held nine young men whom they thought were implicated in the disturbance.~~ ^{not} Among those ^{Japanese} held were Isamu Uchida and Nogawa, ward representatives of the Daijyo Sha Kai, Inouye, the head of the Tule Lake Judo organization,³ and Fred Fukui.

On the morning of November 5 when the Japanese reported for work, they were stopped by soldiers and told to return to their barracks. Some protested that they had to go to work. Many curious people joined the throng. The army threw some tear gas bombs at them and told them to go home. The scene is described by an evacuee:

The next morning, everybody like usual went to report to work and all the Japanese truck drivers were stopped by the guards, searched and told to go back. They said they had to go to work. The soldiers told them to go back, not to come near the place. Some of the fellows still argued and the soldiers kicked some of them. Everybody was gathering at the front of their own blocks. So the army started throwing ~~x~~ tear gas at them and told them to go home.⁴

Under army control, compulsory idleness was imposed on most of the evacuees. Only the block managers, the hospital employees, and the mess crews continued to work.

The same day the Daihyo Sha Kai, which appears to have had complete control of the Tulean Dispatch during this period, published

1. Notes, March, p. 44

2. Ibid., p. 59

3. X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 5

4. Report, Dec. 24, p. 14

an account of the warehouse disturbance and a stern exhortation to keep order.

COOPERATION ASKED!

Army Occupied Administration Area, Following Incident.

"By a minor incident last night the center administration area was temporarily occupied by the army, who maintained a strict guard of the camp.

The Administration area was completely cut off from the rest of the center by patrolling M.P.'s. Number of tear gas bombs were thrown at residents standing by the zone limit.

Barb wire fences are being built southwest of the hospital area to keep the residents away from the Ad. area.

However, the facts of the incident are being closely guarded by the people's committees."

Residents Asked to Stay Calm, Com. Pass Resolutions.

"Trust in the actions of the residents' delegates, and do not take any individual actions," exclaimed the committee of seven representatives chosen to settle Thursday night's incident. Five resolutions were passed by the committee affecting the colonists' conduct during the following week.

"Young men are asked to be sensible and prudent due to the present situation, and residents are asked to refrain from spreading unfounded rumors, and congregating in more than five in a group. That the WRA properties within the center should not be damaged or destroyed, was emphasized by the committee resolutions.

The resolutions were agreed upon by the representatives to bring about a peaceful conclusion, and violators of the rules will be punished by due action of the entire populace warned the committee. The delegates also stated that the infractors of these rules are working against the peace, harmony and the well being of the entire camp."

Center Residents Pass Regulations.

The following regulations governing the conduct of the residents during the ensuing period have been made up by the seven representatives delegated by the residents and their delegates:

1. Trust the actions of this committee and do not take any individual actions.
2. Do not congregate in groups of more than five in the open.

3. Do not spread any unfounded rumors.
4. Young men! Be sensible and prudent about everything that you do.
5. Do not destroy anything in the center. Leave the entire camp and its facilities as it has been in the past.
6. Any person who willfully violate these regulations will be punished by due action of the entire populace as the infractor is working against the peace harmony and well being of the entire camp.

EDITORIAL

Let's Back Up Our Delegates

Residents! Let us show our faith in our representatives by obeying their regulations!

We have delegated our representatives to negotiate for us and act for us; they were not selected just as figureheads.

The merits of this wise step taken by our delegates can be readily seen by every thinking resident. The measures that they had taken in the form of these regulations was not a measure to show their authority; they had taken this step to protect us.

The rash and hasty actions of a few who because of bitterness or anger take things into their own hands without stopping to think is not doing the community any good. They are just jeopardizing the welfare of all of their fellow residents.

Fellow residents! Let us take steps to punish any person who may disregard these rules!"¹

On November 6, Lt. Col. Austin issued the following proclamation which was printed in the Tulean Dispatch of Nov. 9.

"The Army having taken over control of the Tulalake Segregee Center at the request of WRA, strict discipline will be maintained at all times. No outdoor gatherings will be permitted. The Commanding Officer will be glad to meet with any properly selected representative committee to discuss any problems relative to the administration of this Center."

Two Japanese voiced the people's sentiments toward the

1. All of above quotations from Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 5.

On November 5^{95.}

Mr. Yoshiyama of the Daihyo Sha Kai met with Colonel Austin and gave the following report of his interview *at a meeting held the same day* (Insert A to B here)

~~April 24, 1944~~

~~In a brief visit at their home today,~~ Mrs. Kondo told how her brother married a girl from Hiroshima in this country. ^{The} His family wanted the girl's family investigated. If the boy's father had been alive, the marriage might not have been allowed to take place. ~~Mrs. Kondo~~ Mrs. Kondo's brother refused to allow the investigation to take place, saying, "I'm not marrying her whole family background or her family tree!" ~~Mrs. Kondo~~ ^{a friend visiting} added, "Even if I do find out that a person is eta, it makes no difference to me. But with a lot of ~~people it makes a lot of~~ di issei it makes a lot of difference. Everybody suspects you if you're from Fukuoka ken."

Insert — (A) TALK WITH FUKUSHIMA

April, 1944 - Isile

I don't see much class distinction in the younger generation at all. It is almost nil as far as I see. ⁹ *Class in feudal Japan* In ~~the~~ Japan, class distinction ~~not~~ ^{only} is real. It not only exists but has a historical record. Besides the existence of the aristocracy or principedom there is what is called shi-nō-kō-shō. That is historical. Shi is warrior or bushi. Nō is noyoka (farmer). Kō is koyoka (Manufacturer). Shō is shonin (business man).

All of this is a vestigial idea of feudalism. In feudal times the warrior is naturally the protector of ~~the~~ everybody or the country. They are given the highest privileges in all sorts of life. They were not only ~~classified~~ as highest strata, but they were excused by the government even of murdering some non-essential person such as a beggar. For example, when a warrior bought a new sword and he wanted to test how sharp it is, he could try it out on a beggar on the roadside. That was almost their privilege to do that.

But there is no distinction between the farmer and the merchant here in the United States or in Japan. In older people, some might make a distinction between marrying a samurai or another person. They still

4/5
95A

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE DAI-HYO SHA KAI
OF THE
TULE LAKE CENTER

DATE: November 5, 1943

Mr. Yoshiyama reported on the incident and demands presented to Colonel Austin at an interview with him as follows:

- A //
- (1) Improvement of food quality was pointed out to which Colonel agreed to exert his utmost in that respect.
 - (2) Permission to hold wake and funeral services.
 - (3) Coal to be distributed in the afternoon to each block after the meeting with the coal crew foremen.
 - (4) Whether the shots fired were loaded or blank was not made clear.
 - (5) Upon question raised, it was informed that no lives were involved in the recent incident.
 - (6) Upon demand made to have all negotiation particulars and agreement reached in writing, Colonel stated that it was impossible to issue such in writing.
 - (7) Question of the distance between the WRA Stockade area was not made clear. (original is very ambiguous)
 - (8) Post office will resume operation in the High School Building. Block Manager and two assistants will handle the mail. There will be no censorship.
 - (9) Parcels and C.O.D. will be delivered to the Block Managers. Registered mail will be delivered at the following place and time:

Ward 1	--	9:30 A.M.
2	--	11:00 A.M.
3	--	10:30 A.M.
4	--	9 :00 A.M.
5	--	10:00 A.M.
6	--	1:30 P.M.
7	--	2:00 P.M.

Outgoing wires and messages will be negotiated again from 1:00 P.M.

B

finis

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE DAI-HYO SHA KAI OF THE TULE LAKE CENTER

Save

Date: November 6, 1943

Place: Mess Hall 13

Chairman Kuratomi addressed the body and emphasized that youths should refrain from rash and inconsiderate action.

Kobayashi, Negotiating Committee, made the following reports:

1. According Colonel Austin, 10 youths are confined in the hospital, however, they are not injured.
2. Permission will be granted for meeting within the building.
3. Tear gas was used because the crowd refused to disperse.
4. Hospital employees will be asked to remain within the building until the incident is under control. Report emergency cases to the Project Director.
5. In case of emergency, interviews with Authorities will be given.
6. No need of worry for food will be distributed daily.
7. Army will withdraw when Colony returns to normalcy.

Following statements were made from the floor:

1. There are several blocks without coal.
2. Some mess halls inconvenienced because of insufficient supply of Dutch Cleaners.
3. Toilet papers should be distributed as soon as possible.
4. Delivery of mail should be taken care of as soon as possible.
5. Disposition of garbage should be taken care of to prevent accumulation, which creates unsanitary condition.

Chair: Army entered the Center upon request of the WRA. Colonists are requested to maintain tranquility as much as possible, especially the Dai-hyo Sha representatives are asked to control the youths. In spite of the Army's agreement to interview us at any time, it will be unwise for us to call upon them at the present time. Those detained by the Army will not be permitted to return to the Center until they have their hearings.

At this time a youth brought a message and presented it to the Chair, who read it as follows: As far as known up to date, those injured in the incident are Hayashida, 23; Nakamura, J. 40; Todoroki, 28; Kobayashi, 59; Marubashi, 42; Kodani, 48; Yamane 27; Ogawa, 38; Tahara, 4; and five others whose names are unknown. This report was given confidentially by the Hospital employees, therefore, it should be kept as such. Until further notice from the Negotiating Committee, all rumors should be suppressed immediately. It was further made known that the reason why colonists are detained in the Hospital is not clear, however, wardens stated that they will deliver the internees' clothing. Because of several youths' rash action, the condition of the situation has grown worse. Doctors who worked yesterday have been granted permission from the WRA. At the present time, the following doctors are working: Yamauchi, Nakamura, and Yamane.

Chair then requested that Dai-hyo Sha should make full report of the baby food supply, especially milk. Such list should be submitted to the Negotiating Committee with the name of the baby, age, address. Any block inconvenienced because of lack of fuel and food should notify the Dai-hyo Sha office, 604-C. The body was requested to take census of block residents. If any person is found missing, such should be notified immediately to the above address.

Next the Chair reported on the interview with the Spanish Consul. Upon report made to the Consul by the Negotiating Committee with regard to hospital problems, such as the appointed personnel's abusiveness toward the Japanese evacuees that at the time of major operation, they refused to sterilize the apparatus, the Spanish Consul agreed to remedy the matter through the WRA authorities. It was also reported that due to the lack of medical instruments in the Hospital, some instruments have been purchased with colonists' money. Spanish Consul advised that complaints of this nature should be directly made by the colonists. If the case necessitates, the Consul will come at any time upon request. Upon presentation of food supply inventory prepared by Sugimoto, Negotiating Committee, the Spanish Consul was very much surprised and asked how such was gotten hold of. Copies of such records should be kept on Consulate's file inasmuch as WRA's report, which may come later, is not reliable, as the one prepared by Sugimoto. As to the termination of appointed personnel, the Consul replied that he will do his utmost to help on the matter. Complaints on the lack of facilities in each apartment such as shelves, chairs, stools, etc. the Consul replied that he had already discussed the matter with the authorities and they had agreed to distribute them through the block managers at once. Lastly the Consul emphasized that any rash or inconsiderate action on the part of the colonists will ultimately be your own responsibility. If there should be any victims, it will create a more difficult problem, therefore, such should be prevented at any cost. So long as the demands are within reasons, Consul stated that he will see to it that the demands are carried through. Report on the incident should be written and a copy of it should be submitted to him for he has the responsibility to see to it that it is transferred to the officials in Japan.

Lastly Chairman Kuratomi requested the body to have all the reports on food supply of each respective mess hall. Upon delivery of the menu card, responsible persons of each mess should refrain from signing it. Especially upon delivery of mess supplies, supplies should be checked and rechecked before signing the receipt. It is also advisable to prepare a list of all the articles received, which should be forwarded to the Negotiating Committee office. Great quantity of food supply are disappearing on the way from the Warehouse to the mess hall to which WRA officials are suspected.

Chair: Postal service has been permitted by the authorities. As I have stated before ~~blocks~~ because the authorities are afraid of spreading false rumors outside through the mail, delivery will be handled by block managers. All repatriation forms when completed should be sent directly to the Spanish Consul.

Kai: Army officers have reported that when the Army delivers food, block children will insult the boys. Such attitude on the part of the colonists should be refrained at a time like this. Please inform your respective blocks.

Chair: We were planning to call a mass meeting but because of several youths' rash action an incident of this nature occurred, which is very lamentable. You Dai-hyo Sha representatives are requested to see to it that people refrain from such actions in the future.

Meeting adjourned.

finis

On November 6 the Daihyo Sha Kai ~~the~~ met again, at which time Kobayashi, a member of the Negotiating Committee (not the young warden who was arrested) made the following report/ on an interview with Colonel Austin:

(Insert C to D here) (with ~~11~~ for note).

.

Next Kuratomi reported on an interview with the Spanish Consul which took place November 2. The Spanish Consul had promised to do what he could on the ~~Hosp/Hq~~ hospital situation,. Upon presentation of the food supply inventory prepared by Sugimoto (which the writer believes was also shown to Myer on November 1 and caused him great astonishment) the Spanish Consul was very much surprised and asked how he had gotten ~~it~~ hold of it. The Consul had also promised to do what he could ~~in~~ in the matter of the termination of the appointed personnel and lack of facilities ~~the~~ (furniture) in the apartments. Lastly, he had emphasized that any rash or inconsiderate action on the part of the colonists would ultimately be their own responsibility.²

~~The writer doubts~~

(← It is doubtful that the Consul was as amenable to Kuratomi's suggestions as this report implies.)

The meeting closed with the following statement by the chairman:

"We were planning to ~~may~~ call a mass meeting but because of several youth's rash action an incident of this nature occurred, which is very lamentable. You Daihyo Sha representatives are requested to see to it that people refrain from such actions in the future."³

¹ Minutes of the Daihyo Sha Kai of the Tule Lake Center, 7 Nov. 6. 1943, p. 1.

² ibid., p. 2.

³ ibid.

"I" is one of my best Tule Lake informants and is the brother of the class conscious Mrs. "M" of Gila. He is a ^{very proud} rather cynical young man of extraordinary practical common sense, ~~was proud~~ and an excellent worker in his division. It is interesting that while his sister boasted of her shizoku descent "I" did not even mention it. I have known him well for almost nine months and am sure that he spoke honestly and gave me ~~the best information~~ ~~in his power~~ as accurate information as he could.

~~He answered his~~

"I" has asked for repatriation, not because he is determined to make Japan his future home but because he "wants some peaceful place to stay where he will be left alone until the war is over."

Class distinction

You'll probably find among the nisei they still draw a line between the shin-heimin and the others. There is just that difference between ~~the~~ what you might call blue bloods and the working class. It's not just a matter of empty pride, for, when you stop to consider that if, for instance, you were to repatriate and go back to Japan, the differentiation between the two classes, the shin-heimin and the others, would be so apparent that you couldn't disregard it back there. Whereas here in this country people don't pay so much attention except in case when a young couple want to get married. Then they go into the family background and if one of the young people is found to be eta, you'll find that in 99 cases out of a hundred the combination is broken up, regardless of the feeling of those concerned. Naturally the couples concerned wouldn't want to break up, but the parents insist because they

On November 6, Lt. Col. Austin issued the following proclamation which was printed in the Tulean Dispatch of Nov. 9:

"The Army having taken over control of the Tulelake Segreges Center at the request of WRA, strict discipline will be maintained at all times. No outdoor gatherings will be permitted. The Commanding Officer will be glad to meet with any problems relative to the administration of this Center."

expressed their
Two Japanese ~~expressed~~ *the* people's sentiments toward the

consider what would happen if they went back
to Japan.

31

Except for the difference of color it's pretty much like the difference between a Caucasian and a negro. To look at them you sometimes can't tell the difference between a Caucasian and a high yellow. But the background is different. In the old country the 'shin-heimin thus far have never been allowed to mingle with the people in social life and business enterprise. They almost always have to live in a separate little town on the outskirts of the main town. ~~The~~ ^{the} so-called heimin probably wouldn't let them ~~enter the~~ ^{enter the} house come inside the house.

Case of Mixed Marriage

I have heard of cases in this country where a young couple got married. For some reason or other no formal investigation of the families was made. Then they went back to the old country to live. The girl was shizoku and didn't know the man was eta. Naturally, that's the first thing they ask. They got to talking about where the girl's husband came from and all the dirt came out. They ordered the poor girl out of the house. "Never darken my ~~door again~~ ^{door again} ~~door-step~~ ^{door-step} again" stuff.

Eta in United States

In this country you don't find it so much. I or my friends might know the fellow is of that descent but we wouldn't cut him dead. But I wouldn't let a daughter of mine marry one.

I think it's just something that's in the mind. If a fellow ~~that~~ ^{that} of that extraction is a decent sort, he should be able to rise above it.

I think it's been pounded in for generations and

army^{at} this time as follows:

" . . . The residents are taking the presence of the soldiers in the block nonchalantly and continuing their passive resistance. Their attitude is, 'What can't they do if we don't do anything at all. We are guaranteed of food, clothing, and shelter'.¹

"One night I went directly to the post and asked them to stop it (the informant refers to the soldiers shining their spot lights on the coal workers and inadvertently blinding them). They could have shot me. That showed that the Tule Lake guards were very understanding. Their Commanding Officer had been trained right During the riot they used to bring in the food with ~~the~~ an escort of two jeeps, two semi-trucks, and four, five trucks. Twelve soldiers escorted the food trucks. That was a comical sight. Like the old Chicago gangster days."²

The immediate effect of army control upon the general population was a series of hardships and inconveniences. Mail delivery was held up until November 9. The delivery of milk and baby food was seriously curtailed. People rushed the Cooperative stores to stock up for the lean days ahead. The shelves were soon emptied. The army confiscated the Tulean Dispatch's mimeographer and typewriters on Nov. 11, but returned the mimeographer two days later. The greatest hardship was the stopping of the distribution of coal. K. says:

"Then from the fifth to the sixth of November people began hollering about there not being enough coal. There was no milk. Only the seven-months-old children were getting milk through the warden's office. Children over seven months old were going hungry and crying. My children were crying for milk. The only person who could contact Lt. Col. Austin was Walter Tsuda, the head of Internal Security. Even the representatives can't see Austin and can't reach him So the morning of the 6th Lt. Col. Austin sent for us. He asked me about the coal situation. I told him we don't have enough coal. He asked me if my men would go to work. I said we'd work, not for money, but for the benefit of the Japanese. Then the Colonel asked me how many men I had. I told him 325.

1. X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 5
2. Report, Dec. 24, p. 18.

Then Mr. Cozzens was taking a note. He asked me. "Are you sure these boys are willing to go to work?" I told him, "If you see kids crying for cold and wife crying about the cold house . . . We are human and we don't cause any trouble."¹

Accordingly, on the request of both the army and the Negotiating Committee, the coal crew resumed work on November 11.

November 9, ^{who} the Spanish Consul ^{was also marked by the arrival of} made his second visit. He assured the residents that he would personally see that the center got adequate medical supplies and asked the committee to present any further problems directly to him.² The Nov. 11 issue of the Tulean Dispatch reports on his visit as follows:

Incident Investigated By Consul F. De Amat

"Coming here to investigate the facts of the incident, the Spanish Consul, F. de Amat told the representatives Tuesday that he had come here at the request of the Japanese government.

He told the committee that the residents can still make requests to the government as before.

Telling the representatives present at the meeting that he was the official representative of Japan, he asked the residents at all times to refrain from taking violent actions.

Before leaving, he stated that he would visit the center regularly twice a month and ~~will~~ will make special trips whenever necessary."

On November 9
~~The same day was also marked by the arrival of~~ D.C. Hayward *arrived on the project. He*
~~who~~ came to replace Ralph E. Peck, the former *Chief* Steward who had been accused of grafting by the evacuees and who, as Myer says, was dismissed for "chiefly drunkenness."

From November 6 on, the army made advances to the colonists, asking that a "properly selected negotiating committee" come forward. However, no one responded to these requests.

The Daihyo Sha, meanwhile felt its position becoming progress-

1. Ibid., pp. 14, 15

2. Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 9.

The full Daihyo Sha Kai report on this interview with the Consul
is reproduced here:

generations. It will die down here (in the U. S.) .

3✓

Higher status of Koreans in Japan

Those persons in the old country known as chosenjin (Koreans) stand a lot better chance than a fellow known as a Korean. A chosenjin is permitted to work in almost any kind of a household as a domestic or apprentice. He gives the impression that he knows his place. The eta being mainly of Japanese extraction tries to come above his place. That is one of the reasons the chosenjin are looked on more favorably. They are much more commonly engaged as servants.

Case of Parental Disapproval

There's a case I know of even here in camp where some parents expressly forbade a girl to go out with a boy whom they suspected of being eta.

(Here Mrs. "I" interrupted) "That happened to me. I was going out with a fellow and I was bawled out from every direction, my grand-father, my grand-mother, my mother and father, my employer and even him (^{future} her husband).

"I" continued: In one case a girl married the guy regardless of whether folks and everybody else said. As a result her older brother cut her dead. He himself, when he was younger, married an ets and as a result there actually wasn't any discrimination against him or his wife, but just knowing he was married to an eta affected him. If he thought he had received any small slight it seemed to make him think that it was because he was married to this girl. They really lived a miserable life. She's dead now. After she died his ~~pl~~ younger sister met this shin-heimin man and she wanted to marry him. He tried to stop her. But the girl was young and

11/9
100
INTERVIEW MINUTES WITH THE SPANISH CONSUL *Save*

TIME: 1:30 p.m.

DATE: November 9, 1943

PLACE: Block 13 Mess Hall

Spanish Consul F. de Amat of San Francisco arrived in Tule Lake Center upon instruction received from the Japanese Government to make full report as to the true cause of the entry of the Army into the Center. The Negotiating Committee Headquarters informed the Consulate of the incident; the Consul stated: I came to this Center upon instruction received from the Japanese Government to investigate the incident's cause, in order to make out a true report concerning this incident, since I am obligated to do so.

Question: Is it possible for a boy, who is now in the U.S. Army, to accompany his parent to Japan on the next exchange ship?

Answer: A letter of confidence should be submitted to the Spanish Consul with full information as to the relationship of the family. The Consul will be glad to consult with the WRA Administration to bring about his repatriation. However, such request should be initiated by the boy who is in the Army and approved by all those concerned on the matter. Then I could act upon it.

Question: For future consultation or negotiation by this organization, will it be advisable for us to contact you directly?

Answer: In the event you are unable to contact me directly, obtain permission from the Army through representatives of the colonists, then the Army will, no doubt, grant permission for you to contact me.

Question: If the Army takes control of this Center, will the colonists interned be subjected to International War-time Agreement and be treated accordingly?

Answer: Since you people have come into this Center without any action which endangers the security of this country and especially in view of the many children and women involved, it is unlikely that the Army will control this camp.

Question: Under what title and status will this Center be administered?

Answer: To my mind, there is no difference with the other relocation centers. The only difference is that you cannot relocate since you have not pledged allegiance to the U.S. However, this center may be called a Segregation Center.

Request: We wish to make a request that you notify the Japanese Government as to the actual condition of the recent incident and the fact that the colonists will remain loyal as Japanese subjects until the day we are allowed to return home. Please inform them not to worry about us.

Answer: It is my duty to make such reports to the Japanese Government and I have been especially instructed to give a full account of it.

Question: Why were six youths taken out of the Center?

Answer: The Army felt that necessity of questioning them; therefore, they were taken out around 5 o'clock. I believe they will be returned upon completion of the investigation.

Question: Was the stockade internees' condition reported to you?

Answer: Dr. Miyamoto sent me the full report.

Question: Will the unjustifiable firing of ammunitions conflict, in any way, with the International Law?

Answer: I don't know. However, I shall investigate and report to you later.

Following requests from the Dai-hyo Sha Kai were made to the Spanish Consul:

1. Recreation Hall be provided for recreational use. It has been utilized for office and other purposes that children have been deprived of recreational privileges.
2. Mimeograph machine (Tulean Dispatch) be returned immediately. Machine is now held by the Army.
3. Since new-comers from other centers have been assigned to recreation halls, which have no partitions, they should be assigned to regular quarters immediately. Request that you consult the Administration pertinent to the request.

4.

The Consul agreed to take up the above-mentioned requests. Then he asked the body to inform the block managers to have all the names and addresses of the parents who have sons in the U.S. Army.

Eward, official representative from Washington, reported as follows:

1. Chief Steward Peck has been terminated.
2. Allotment of food supplies to each block will be on a 300-person basis.
3. 25 pounds of rice to every 100 person and two sacks to each block, daily.
4. 75 pounds of coffee to each mess hall.
5. Two pounds of sugar monthly to each person.
6. 150 pounds of sugar per week per block or 600 pounds per month.
7. Meat will be provided in mass amount allowed by ration, which, of course, is subjected to WRA regulation.
8. Allowance of approximately 16 points per person per week.
9. Allowance of 48 points per person per month for canned goods.
10. Menu will be prepared a week ahead. Sufficient amount, to subsist for 45 days, of food stuff will be stored.

At this time the Spanish Consul appealed to the body that he was greatly concerned with the recent incident and asked the body to expend its utmost effort to bring about an amicable settlement. If negotiation for the settlement fail, the body should report to the Consul at once. Upon such notice, the latter will immediately call, inasmuch as he is assigned by the Japanese Government to insure the happiness of the Japanese colonists. The Consul asked for the promise of the body to see to it that such incident will not re-occur. Thus the block representatives assured him that they will not resort to any rash or inconsiderate action upon their honor. The Consul was very grateful.

Finis

From November 6 on, the Army made advances to the colonists, asking that a properly selected negotiating committee" come forward. However, no one but the Daihyo Sha Kai Negotiating Committee responded to this request.

The Daihyo Sha, meanwhile felt its position becoming progress-

very much in love. She just told him off. He didn't want 33.
her to suffer as he had.

There's another fellow in this camp, I've known ^{him} all my
life. He's twenty-seven years old and still unmarried.
Enough said.

I doubt if he's ever gone out with a girl steady. But
he doesn't want to marry an eta girl. It's family pride with
him. He wouldn't want to call it to the attention of other
people.

Different Physical Features

There's supposed to be a difference in the ~~face~~
facial features. In the pronounced eta the skin in that
area covering the bridge of the nose, from the corner of one
eye to the corner of the other is drawn tightly over a
pronouncedly low bridge.

When the girls are good looking they are unusually
good looking. But when they're bad looking there's no
getting around it.

Red eyes as far as I understand are also one of the
pronounced characteristics. Another is, in a large
majority of cases, the eyes of young kids four to five
years old have inflamed lids with an accumulation around
them that gives them a scabby appearance. ("I" agreed
readily with me that this eye condition might be the result
of poor sanitation.) But in this country they keep their house
as clean as the Japanese.

As far as food is concerned in this country I don't think
it's very much different.

Terms used to eta

Double
spun. (They are called umanokawahagi - horse-skin.
Or umanohone - horse's bone.

ively more insecure. The army did not recognize it as a representative body; its members probably feared arrest; it was faced with the task of explaining the disturbance at the warehouses and the discomfort and inconvenience which this deed had brought to the colonists. On November 11, it released its explanation of the incident:

Details of Incident Released by Committee

Six Young men Still held by Army for Investigation¹

After giving the details of the incident which led to the intervention of the Army to the Spanish Consul, the negotiating committee released to the press the following story.

During the negotiations with Dillon S. Myer and Raymond Best, these two had promised that in case any food was to be taken out of the warehouse, they would do so openly.

However, in spite of this promise, on the night of November 4 about 9:30 the internal security force spotted some Caucasian entering the warehouse.

During the resulting investigation, quarrel broke out between the young men who had accompanied the wardens and the Caucasian.

Fearing that the Caucasians were to be kidnapped, the WRA officials had called in the Army.

As a result of this incident six young men are still held by the Army for investigation. One of the six, Fred Fukui, was taken out of the center and the Army officials promised to give a full explanation of it today.

The extent of the injuries of these six are not known but it is reported that they are not serious.

In case the others are to be taken out of the center the Army had assured the committee that they will give full explanation of such action.²

Spicer comments upon this release in his letter:

"They played the whole thing down and by no means gave the truth. They are evidently feeling themselves in a

1. This was later amended to nine young men, the supposedly correct number.
2. Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 11, No. 26.

precarious position just now."¹

The Daihyo Sha continued to plead for support, even threatening to resign if the residents did not cooperate. However, it is most improbable that they intended to resign at this point.

Delegates Again Ask for Support

In asking the residents for their full support, the seven members of the negotiation committee stated that in case the residents do not obey their request for cooperation they will be forced to resign. Also in case the Army does not recognize the truth of the incident, they will have to relinquish their position. The committee asked residents that whenever a request for workers is made by them, to report immediately after the call is issued.²

EDITORIAL

Are you a Critic?

There are many residents who profess to know everything and who continually criticize the negotiation committee for the delay in informing the people of the proceedings of the negotiation or the lack of information of the various meetings.

In these critics would just stop to think how their attitude is proving detrimental to the solution of this problem; how these members of the committee are laboring day and night to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion at the earliest possible day-- they would not heap undue criticism upon these people who have been entrusted with the responsibility of representing the Japanese in here.

They have done a splendid job in trying to improve our welfare. Let's not change our horse in the middle of the stream!"³

To consolidate its position the Daihyo Sha Kai prepared a petition which stated that they signers recognized the body as its representatives. (No informant has been able to date this petition exactly beyond agreeing that it was prepared after November 1).

"I's" brother describes the proceedings:

"But the army wouldn't recognize them as block representatives. So the representatives made up a petition and had all

1. Report, Dec. 24, p. 30.

2. Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 11, No. 26.

3. Ibid., No. 27

of the people in the blocks, all 18 of them, to state that he was a real representative Then they took the petition with all the names signed. Then they went to talk to Austin. But they didn't get any place.¹

Lt. Col. Austin continued his vain efforts to meet with a "real negotiating committee." According to Opler he said, "Send us a real negotiating committee. Send us one nisei and one issei from each block."²

Eventually the Army and the Daihyo Sha Kai came to a temporary agreement and it was decided to hold a mass meeting at the outdoor stage on November 13 at which time Lt. Col Austin and Mr. Cozzens were to speak to the assembled populace. The Daikhyo

Sha controlled Tulean Dispatch announced that the negotiating committee would make a report of the proceedings of the conferences at that time.^{3a} Both Lt. Col. Austin and Cozzens prepared their speeches in advance. Opler, who saw Cozzens' prepared speech says that it began "It is a pleasure to talk to so many people." Then, the morning of the 13th, the Daihyo Sha announced the cancellation of the meeting, stating that the army had refused to recognize their body and that they saw no necessity for a mass meeting.

"The block delegates took the stand that there was no need for the meeting, since the Army had already told them that they (the army) would determine the size and composition of the work crews." "There is nothing to negotiate," was the stand.³ (B56,57)

The Committee's explanation of this refusal appears superficially to be extremely inadequate:

CENTER WIDE MASS MEETING CANCELLED

Delegates not Recognized Reports Committee

Feeling that there wasn't any necessity for a mass meeting, the sixty odd block delegates present at the representatives

1. Notes, March, p. 7, See also p. 11.

2. Ibid., p. 56

3a. Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 11, No. 27

3. Notes, March, pp. 56, 57

However, the day before this scheduled mass meeting, the Daihyo Sha met, considered the disadvantages, and ~~decided~~ decided to cancel it. Kuratomi stated at the beginning of the meeting that ~~negotiations with the Army~~ relations with the Army ~~were~~ had been jeopardized by some colonist who had told the Army that there was internal friction ~~in the~~ within the Daihyo Sha Kai.

Hayashi told the body: The impression we got at the negotiations today and yesterday, was that the attitude of the higher authorities was very oppressive. They told us that they suspected the Committee's status - whether it was a true representative body of the people. They pointed out that it was useless to consult with such a Committee any longer."¹

Sugimoto ~~the head of the Food Investigation Committee~~ made the following pessimistic report: "

I have been negotiating on the food situation and submitted the full report of the investigation up to date. Authorities' attitude is just as Hayashi described. As for the coal and garbage crews, 130 workers were employed up to date, yet only 60 are to be retained. . . . Yesterday, authorities agreed to retain the entire coal and garbage crews and today they changed their mind and reduced the number to such a minimum that we can see that the WRA has no co-operation. Reinstatement of all evacuee workers have been agreed yesterday and they promised to answer by 10:00 a. m. today, but they haven't kept the promise. . . . As a whole, the oppressive attitude of the Army is such that they wouldn't even recognize us. Even regarding the mass meeting, when they questioned us we answered that some 3,000 will attend. Army pointed out that mere 3,000 attendance was only a small part of the Colony and implicated that ~~the~~ Daihyo Sha Kai has little support from the colonists. Another thing they pointed out was that among the Negotiating Committee only two are old Tuleans which means that old Tuleans are not supporting you (Daihyo Sha).¹

Kuratomi explained to the body that the incident ~~of Nov. 4~~ (of Nov. 4) had occurred before the selection of the departmental committees, and that "the negotiations had been taken up by volunteers/ for the benefit of the colonists." Tsuchiya suggested that the signatures of the colonists be obtained as proof ~~of~~ of public support.

~~The fact that the army was allowing only 45 minutes for the mass meeting~~

The fact that the army was allowing only 45 minutes for the mass meeting scheduled for the next day was then discussed. Takahashi then stated that

¹ Minutes of the Meeting of the Tule Lake Center Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 12, p. 1.

² ibid.

~~45~~ 45 minutes was absolutely insufficient~~er~~ and that if the Army would give no more time the mass meeting should be postponed indefinitely.

• • • • •

Chair: It is apparent that we will encounter many obstacles because the Army does not recognize us as the true representatives of the people. Seven Hospital employees have been terminated and Fukui has been arrested and his whereabouts is unknown. Fearing the consequences, I withheld ~~W/X~~ that announcement, but as a whole just because of the Army's frivolous attitude, the Negotiating Committee is on the spot. The Committee's efforts will not solve this problem. We have assured the Army that we have the backing of 15,000 colonists. "Try and get it" attitude of the Army and their request to some employees to resume work - - -

Voice from the floor: If you are at the point of resigning, for what purpose should we call tomorrow's mass meeting?

Voice from the floor: Should the authorities assume such an attitude, then we should notify all those who are about to resume work to refrain and at the same time, support the Negotiating Committee.¹

• • • • •

Chair: Seven Negotiating Committee have already resigned because of several reasons. One of which is that the Army bluntly stated "try and get it" which discouraged them.

Tsuchiya: I recommend that forms for colonists' signature be prepared by Messrs. Takahashi and Yamanaka in time for the meeting tomorrow.

Takahashi: The matter of time, ~~5~~ 45 minutes, for tomorrow's meeting is not settled yet. I think that mass meeting is not necessary. Indefinitely postpone it. Signatures can be taken at any time.

Voice from the floor: ~~Don't~~ If that's the order from the Army, what's the use of calling the mass meeting tomorrow?

Chair: I favor Takahashi's recommendation. (Unanimously approved by body.)

Tsuehiya: I make a suggestion that the resolution be drawn and signatures by obtained and that should be guarded by the Daihyo Sha.

Voice from the floor? Don't let the authorities take advantage of it.

Heckler from the floor: Daihyo Sha are the representatives of the colonists, so let the Daihyo ~~sign it. Same thing.~~ Sha sign it. Same thing.

Chair: Don't leave such a large space on the signature forms or there will be the danger of being utilized for other purposes.

Takahashi: Two forms should be prepared and submitted to the Negotiating Committee and to the Block Managers for safekeeping.

Tsuchiya: Signatures should be submitted at tomorrow's mass~~meeting~~/ meeting and I think it's absolutely necessary. (He had already forgotten that the decision was made).

that they make good geta and zōri. People say that some people must be shin-heimin because they make such good geta. They also pick up waste paper in Japan.

Case of eta girl

There was a case on Terminal Island. A girl was so pretty. Pretty soon somebody said, 'She's eta,' and so nobody went after her. She was going with a hakujin (Caucasian) the last I knew about her.

Physical appearance of eta

The are better looking. It's funny, you just know.

The girls I knew were slender and pretty. Some might not be so pretty, but they try to attract attention. One girl (not eta) told me, ~~///~~ "That girl is trying to hide her "shinheiminness" by acting as if she was of a higher class.

Personal Feeling with regard to marrying an eta

If we get married to eta it isn't so bad. But when our children grown up, they can't marry anybody/ then, because of our "etaism."

When Ray (a close friend) brought over some chickens for a dinner I didn't want to kill them. He said, "I'll kill them; you're not an eta like me." So it's a sort of joke, too.

SHORT TALK WITH GEORGE NISHIMURA, PRESIDENT OF BUTTE COMMUNITY COUNCIL

George is an intelligent and able man, who attended college in Hawaii. He ~~also~~ speaks and writes Japanese extremely well and has/ translated ~~d/d/d~~ involved memoranda from Washington in a manner which was later commented on by other Japanese as excellent.

~~He admitted~~ Both he and his wife admitted that the

~~Heckler: Such trifling matter as signatures should be handled by someone other than the Negotiating Committee.~~

~~Heckler: Such trifling matter as signatures should be handled by someone other than the Negotiating Committee.~~

~~Negotiating Committee: If that's the way you feel, it's o.k. with us. We'll retire. (Thereupon, the Chairman and all other Negotiating Committee left the floor.)~~

~~Takahashi was elected ~~Chairman~~ temporary Chairman and the discussion on signatures continued.~~

~~Takahashi: The first thing to discuss is how to make good use of the signatures. The question is whether to obtain the signatures by giving support and confidence to the block representatives or to obtain each colonists' signature. Ages of the colonists should also be considered.~~

~~Yamagata: If authorities have any suspicion as to the support of the Negotiating Committee by the colonists, ~~should~~ such should be announced by means of a P.A. system.~~

~~Takahashi: The mass meeting was rejected unanimously so there's no chance of using the P. A. system. The primary problem is to decide how to use the signatures effectively. I think individual signatures are more effective.~~

~~Tsuchiya: There is a possibility of abusing the signatures. Therefore, until the submittal of such, Daihyo Sha of each block should take responsibility and guard it.~~

~~After a lengthy discussion, the results was as follows:~~

Signatures be obtained in every block

Date: November 13, 1943

Age: 18 years or over, regardless of sex

Resolution will be printed on top of the signatures

Two forms will be prepared, one to be given to the authority and other to be retained by either the Daihyo Sha Kai or the Block Managers. The form which is to be submitted to the authority will be a 'copy' form.¹

(strong margin)
This petition was circulated at this time. ~~The number of signatures is~~ *it is not known how many*

was obtained per not known
~~Whether a copy was presented to the Army is not known either.~~

If it was, it had no effect on the Army. ~~The aftermath of the cancelled mass meeting swept it into the background.~~

and
Lt. Col. Austin and Mr. Cozzins ~~were unaware of~~ *were not aware of or ignored* this cancellation, prepared their speeches in advance. ~~Dr. Opler, who saw Cozzins' prepared speech says that it began: "It is a pleasure to talk to so many people." On November~~

13 soldiers marched into the camp and set up the public address system. An entire company of soldiers stationed themselves before the platform.

ibid., pp. 3-5.

12.19

asked in what way. She said, "One is a glamour girl and one isn't." This ~~made me~~ made me think that there must be a difference in those two in the origin of where they came from. So I asked one girl, the good looking one. She said she was of the samurai race. The other one wasn't. So there's something to it after all.

There are not many samurai from Wakayama ken. But there's a lot from Fukuoka and Kagoshima and Fukushima. The samurai don't get any special respect. But when I came to Japan they asked me if I was shizoku or heimin or shin-heimin.

Case of Parents objecting to Marriage with Eta

There was a case where they were already engaged and then they found that out. The son wanted to marry her, but his parents found out and objected.

It's a funny thing. If you go into ~~thier~~ (eta) kitchen you would have a feeling that it's not kept up like it should be. So if you see it you get a hint that it's ~~not~~ not just Japanese common people. Another

thing: in Japan my wife says that the salesmen when they sell candy and things can tell whether they (the customers) are shin-heimin or not. In most cases they (shin-heimin) just come and sample of the things, which isn't Japanese custom. And sometimes then, they don't buy anything. Most Japanese who are not shin-heimin, usually buy something when they go into a store.

Origin of eta

Hideyoshi when he went to Chosen (Korea) he brought them over. It seems there's a certain feeling

The speakers arrived, mounted the platform and prepared to deliver their addresses. Not a single Japanese arrived to hear them. Austin and Cozzens doggedly gave their speeches, but to an empty ~~fire-break~~ fire-break. Two good observers, Opler and Spicer were present and describe the event:

"I stayed away from the platform. But I saw that the central firebreak was crowded with people. I saw more baby carriages than I've ever seen before. It was a studied indifference, people sweeping their front stoops; - there were about ten football games going on in the firebreak."¹

X. reporting on what Spicer told him:

"Lt. Col. Austin . . . arrived at the scene a little before the set time with a detachment of M. P's. Armed guards were stationed around the stage and armored cars made a cordon

¹Notes, March, pp. 56, 57.

KEN ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, April 28, 1944

around the ground where an audience was supposed to gather. In preparing this space the M.P.'s had to clear out some kids playing football in part of the field, but the kids moved on willingly. At two o'clock no one came, and there was no sign of any one coming to hear his speech. Like an Army man true to his tradition, Austin began his speech. No one was there. Not a single soul! Lt. Col Austin spoke to the air. There were some young girls coming along. They stopped, looked on, and a few moments later moved on to resume their walks toward their destinations. There were other men who passed by while the army officer spoke to the air, but they did not pay any attention and passed on. 'It was a pitiful sight which I cannot forget. I was there,' Spicer related with unusual emotion."¹

This humiliation was not to be endured. The army abandoned its vain policy of negotiation and in an effort once and for all to root the leadership out of camp, ^{ordered the arrest of the Negotiating Committee} ~~began a series of wholesale~~ ~~arrests and internments.~~ Martial law was declared: a strict curfew from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. was ordered. However, Kai and Kuratomi, the most important leaders, Komura, whom Opler calls Kai's messenger and bodyguard, Sugimoto and Hayashi, were not to be found. They had probably anticipated these arrests for some time. ~~The army concentrated on persons who they thought had been implicated in the November 4th disturbance and on Hawaiian born Japanese, reasoning that since Kai was Hawaiian born, his supporters were to be found in this group. That many of the trouble makers were Hawaiians is commonly believed by the colonists, but M., a member of the Negotiating Committee, denies this.~~²

The interned persons were placed in a separate stockade, surrounded by a man-proof fence and numerous watch towers.

1. x's Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, p. 6.

2. Notes, Mar., p. 62

The Daihyo Sha Kai explained its cancellation of the mass meetings in the Tulean Dispatch November 13 Tulean Dispatch:

CENTER WIDE MASS MEETING CANCELLED

Delegates not Recognized, Reports Committee

Feeling that there wasn't any necessity for a mass meeting, the sixty odd block delegates present at the representatives

feeling against the eta still persisted, particularly among the issei. He says that to his knowledge there are quite a few persons of eta descent in Butte. He thinks the prejudice will not die out until the Sanbei or Shibei generation ~~in the United States~~ (third and fourth generation, actually second and third generation of American citizens) in the United States.

KEN KITASAKO

Don't report (Mr. Kitasako is a nisei who attended Stanford University. He is at present one of the abler public spirited young men in Gila, having performed an excellent job as head of the Education Section of the evacuee Cooperative.

"Among the younger people and among what contacts I have with the older people, I haven't noticed any pride in samurai descent or remarks about it. Although at times when there's a marriage, the older folks stress family lineage and say, 'That person comes from a very good family.' A person who has a very good background ought to make a good match.

On discrimination against eta

"I don't believe in that! They're not marrying their ancestors. I've heard of a few people in camp who were well fixed who tried to show off about it. But they didn't have a chance.

Stratification in camp.

(I brought up the topic of the doctors and dentists who have occupied certain blocks in camp and associate chiefly among themselves.)

"Oh, once in a while they make a remark about the doctors. They have a golf course, you know.

meeting held yesterday afternoon at mess 18 voted unanimously to cancel the meeting scheduled for this afternoon at the community stage. The negotiating committee had planned to make a detailed report to the entire residents as to the proceedings of the conferences. However with the temporary termination of the negotiations with the Army officials, the committee members felt that there wasn't any report to be made to the center at such a meeting.

The committee reported to the elected delegates present that the negotiations with the Army had been cancelled because the Army did not recognize the committee as true representatives of the people. According to the committee, the Army felt that they knew how many workers were needed in each division and the WRA having worked with the Japanese should know who should work in each division.

The entire congregation expressed unanimous accord that there wasn't any necessity for negotiations if the Army had taken such an attitude.¹

In spite of this action by the committee, the Army went ahead with its plans for the mass meeting. Soldiers marched into camp and set up the public address system. An entire company of soldiers lined itself up before the platform. The speakers arrived, mounted the platform, and prepared to deliver their addresses. Not a single Japanese arrived to hear them. Austin and Cozzens doggedly gave their speeches, but to an empty fire-break. Two good observers, Opler and Spicer were present and describe the event:

"I stayed away from the platform. But I saw that the central firebreak was crowded with people. I saw more baby carriages than I've ever seen before. It was a studied indifference, people sweeping their front stoops; - there were about ten football games going on in the firebreak"²

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1. Ibid., November 13

2. Notes, March, p. 56, 57

This humiliation was not to be endured. The army abandoned its ~~vain~~ vain policy of attempting to contact "a real Negotiating Committee" and, in an effort once and for all to root the leadership out of camp, ordered the arrest of the Negotiating Committee. Martial law was declared: a strict curfew from 7 p. m. to 6 a. m. was ordered. However, Kai, Kuratomi, Komura, Sugimoto and Hayashi were not to be found. Those captured were placed in a separate stockade surrounded by a man-proof fence and watch towers. <

Whether the Army at this time went in for wholesale internments must be checked. Escuse informants imply this:

15. 22

Some people remark about that. They say they have equipment and money to spend on a golf course. That indicates a slight class feeling.

Eta before evacuation:

I used to hear about eta on the outside but that ^{the writer's} (remark) ^{is} the first time I've heard about it in here. On the outside you used to run into it once in a while.

At first I didn't know what it was. You know how I came across what the word eta means? Once I was talking to an old man, an issei. He says that the Japanese in America meet with considerable discrimination. But, he said, we meet with the same thing in Japan. I didn't know what he meant. Later on, I asked somebody about it. He said, 'Don't you know? He's an eta.' 'What do you mean?' I said. He told me that eta is a class of people in Japan very despised and looked down on. 'He's one, so he's explaining it to you.' He's looked down on by Americans and also by the heimin group in America.' That was the first time I heard about it.

MR. HIKIDA ON CLASS

Mr. Hikida is an issei, a graduate of U. C. He was ~~always~~ respected and influential in pre-evacuation days, having served as Secretary to the Japanese association. He is ^{so far} ~~one of~~ the ^{only} ~~few~~ issei to whom I have spoken on the subject of class who ~~apologizes for~~ ~~his/goodly~~ appears to feel apologetic about his prejudice toward the eta.

Respect shown to Shizoku

Even the issei are not so respectful to the shizoku in camp as in pre-evacuation days. Peoples' mind is preoccupied by other things; the old tradition, nobility,

"Then, the first thing that happened, the army started to put people in the stockade. At one time there must have been from 125 to 150. That is a small estimate. (The informant is correct when he says this is a small estimate.) In this block about six were taken. They weren't any of the block representatives, it so happened. The boys yanked from here happened to be Hawaiian born. They suspected the Hawaiians because the ringleader came from Hawaii. That was Kai."¹

"They took a person and his three room mates here. Only the room mates were just living with him. But a bachelor can't live by himself in one room. They keep taking people into the stockade."²

After November 14, developments entered a new phase. The stern policy of the army was met by a deadlock which even at present (April, 1944) is only partially resolved. This deadlock was termed "the status quo" by the people, and consisted of a policy of passive non-cooperation with the Army and WRA, continuing the strike, refusing to betray the leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai, and refusing to elect a new representative group. The army redoubled its attempts to find the leaders and the people stiffened their resolution not to give up the status quo until the interned persons were released.

The army picked up indiscriminately anyone who came forward as a negotiator. It is rumored that some well-intentioned Issei, intent only on alleviating the unhappy situation, were summarily put in the stockade but were released soon after. Popular support of the Daihyo Sha Kai appears to have strengthened under persecution. The people criticized the Negotiating Committee for its rash acts and the severity and number of its demands, but stood solidly behind the body as its rightful representatives. Had they not elected the men themselves and had they not signed the petition stating that

1. Notes, Feb., p. 11.
2. Notes, Mar., p. 34.

GRADUAL DISINTEGRATION 109 A OF DAIHYO SHA KAI

Developments now entered a new phase. The Daihyo Sha Kai went on the defensive and began a losing conflict with the Army. Kai and Kuratomi attempted to continue to direct procedure from hiding, but this ~~did~~ did not work well. The increasingly stern policy of the army was met by a ~~deadlock~~ ^{stubborn} an increasingly ^{on the part of the colonists} ~~deadlock~~ which even at present ~~(June 1944)~~ (June 1944) is not resolved in all its phases. This deadlock was termed "the status quo" by the people, and consisted of a policy of passive non-cooperation with the Army and WRA, continuing the ~~partial~~ strike, refusing to betray the leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai, and refusing to elect a new representative body. The Army redoubled its attempts to find the leaders and the people ^{became more & more convinced} ~~stiffened their resolution~~ ^{of their responsibility} not to give up the status quo until the interned persons were released.

This responsibility toward the interned representatives ^{was} ~~is~~ called giri by the Japanese. ^{is} signifies a moral obligation, in this case, a moral obligation toward the men enduring imprisonment because they had ~~attempted to~~ ^{attempted to} ~~"benefit the people."~~ ^{powerful} This sentiment developed until it held a ~~dominant~~ place in the attitudes of the colonists. As will be shown later, ~~the~~ the passing of six months did not weaken it.

A new sub-body of the Daihyo Sha Kai made its appearance after the leaders went into hiding. This body was called the Coordinating Committee and its origin is ~~quite~~ ^{quite} mysterious. It may have been the uninterned members of ^{that} ~~the~~ body

Developments now entered a new phase. The Daihyo Sha Kai went on the defensive and began a losing battle with the Army. Kai and Kuratomi attempted to continue to direct ~~next~~ procedure from ~~hiding~~ but this worked badly. ~~The Coordinating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai, that body purportedly~~ ^{purportedly} selected by Reverend Kai on the night of November 4th ^{It} met almost daily ~~in an attempt to carry on~~ from November 14 to Dec. 1 in ~~an attempt to~~ a futile attempt to carry on Daihyo Sha policies, but was split by internal dissention, uncertainty, fear and by the difficulty of ^{contacting} ~~meeting with~~ Kai and Kuratomi. ~~Sanitation~~ This body (which is not to be confused with the ~~later Coordinating Committee~~) WRA and Army supported Coordinating Committee ^(Jan. to June 1944) grasped at the Spanish Consul as their chief refuge, and on November 15, ~~the Daihyo Sha Kai~~ sent him a telegram ~~which was~~ signed by Yamatani. They ^{body} also selected a man from each ward (seven people) to coordinate with the ~~Daihyo Sha Kai~~ Daihyo Sha Kai. These ward coordinators were to hold their places only until the arrival of the Spanish Consul, at which time the Negotiating Committee ~~(in hiding)~~ ^{was} to ~~resume~~ negotiations.¹ On November 19 the Spanish Consul replied, "No instructions received from the Spanish Embassy, Washington; state the reason for my coming to Tule Lake Center." ¹¹ The Daihyo Sha Coordinating Committee after consultation sent the following reply:

~~Report~~
"Colonists are no longer able to endure the inconveniences caused by the martial law and desire nothing but normalcy; we request for your immediate visit." ~~But~~ ²

However, the words Martial Law were deleted By the censor and may have left the Spanish Consul in ignorance as to what the colonists were no longer able to endure.

¹ Minutes of the Meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 14, 1943.

² ibid., Nov. 19.

come forth and

On November 14 the following statement was issued by an anonymous source. *This source was probably* ~~The writer suspects that it is the authors~~ ^{were} the most radical faction of the Daihyo Sha Kai, who had had access to ~~the information which~~ ^{or took part in the discussion} framing of the resolution which Kai and Kuratomi ^{were to} released two weeks later, ~~and who could not contain themselves~~. It will be noted that ~~three of the demands are the same~~. ~~With no evidence except acquaintance with these radical individuals and a knowledge of how the work, the writer is of the opinion that they should not contain themselves and jumped the gun.~~ *They probably*

Anonymous Statement

The only way to oppose and protest the Army's oppressive barbarous action is to internationalize the problem from the angle of humanity.

1. Demand immediate release of all those detained.
2. Demand resignation en masse of WRA appointed personnel.
3. Demand immediate withdrawal of the Army from the Center.
4. Close all mess halls from this afternoon and enter ~~mass~~ ^{mass} hunger strike. All mess chiefs are hereby instructed to distribute whatever available food supplied among block residents.
5. Even at the risk of a torn-down door, every one should prevent the entrance of the Army into the living quarters when search is conducted.
6. Close all canteens.

Think of the Santa Anita incident. We are confident that the ultimate ~~of~~ victory is ours.

/s/

Second Negotiating Committee

The Daihyo Sha of ward eight countered with a resolution as follows:

1. Second Negotiating Committee's urgent instruction is premature.
2. All colonists are requested to remain cool and calm until the arrival of the Spanish Consul at which time negotiations will be properly conducted in compliance with the International Agreement.
3. Do not close mess hall, despite many circulating rumors.
4. Colonists should keep calm until the formulation of a definite future policy by the Daihyo Sha Kai.
5. Signatures of the colonists obtained yesterday should be withheld by the Daihyo Sha Kai for the time being.

1 See pp. 72, 73. Three of the demands are the same.

6. Colonists are requested to entrust full confidence to the block representatives and refrain from believing rumors.

/s/ All Daihyo Sha

The colonists were not impressed by this statement of the self-styled "Second Negotiating Committee." In fact, this premature action did definite harm to the remaining Daihyo Sha members, since many people became confused and identified this ~~radical body~~ anonymous radical body with the uninterned members of the Daihyo Sha. Some colonists took the attitude: "These men are not our representatives. Our representatives are interned."

After several weeks the tension and boredom, brought about by the complete cessation of all activities began to tell upon the people.

"Curfew hours here is 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. so we can't go out nights as we did before. Soon as I have supper I run over to Ma's and bring home rice and we eat before going to bed. They say this curfew is until things settle. The Spanish Consul is coming here again soon. So I hear there are all kinds of "dema" (wild rumors) about this camp. Right now they're taking in all the big shots. Can't hide very well until things settle."¹ (N. 26 2 let. N. 20)

"Right now curfew is in effect and martial law at the same time. No can go out from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. Anyway, there's no place to go, it's too cold (maybe sour grapes). Right now there's no movies or Engel kai or anything. Just Japanese schools in every ward. I use to go to the night school, but since the curfew I don't even study The army is still in; they're delivering all the vegetables and food stuff to the messhalls accompanied by armored cars, jeeps, peep, and lots of dumb soldier boys. Boy, those soldiers certainly get razzing from the Japs. Some even say, "Instead of fighting harmless Japs in a cage, why don't you go to the Solomons where you'll find plenty of competition." Perhaps this letter will be censored, if so tell me."² (SN26.2.N.16)

"Everything seems and looks cold and still and melancholy^{oline.} . . . Everything seems unchangeable like yesterday. The confine has not cleared out yet. No parcel and no money order can send out and every letters has examined. Three Niseis who came from Hawaii to live in this block were arrested this morning at 3 a.m. If you will not hear from me for the quite few days in the near future, you must understand that I am arrested. Don't forget that it will be possible."³

"The center is quite as usual, but it seems to me there is something very dull but with tension among us. At the present time, none knows how long this unfortunate situation will continue. And whether army will take control permanently or not is a big problem for people of the center and everyone is anxious to know."⁴

Several reliable informants state that the people received no vegetables except occasion- As the dull weeks passed, the food became worse; The unemployed people missed their monthly checks and their clothing allowance which an individual does not receive unless he works or unless he

1. From a letter dated Nov. 20 in X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 26 p. 2
2. Ibid., a letter dated Nov. 16
3. Ibid., letter dated Nov. 20, Nov. 26, p. 1.
4. Notes, Feb. p. 24

goes on relief, which is an extended process surrounded by red tape. Considerable criticism was vented upon the Negotiating Committee even by its supporters. Their arrogant, demanding manner was criticized, the demands were considered too numerous, some demands were called silly or fantastic. The actions of the radical fringe were condemned.

K. a supporter, said:

"I think they demanded too many things at one time."¹ D

O., a conservative said:

"I think some of the people (Negotiating Committee) wanted power. They say 'We're working for the people . . .'" I believe they're working for themselves . . . Maybe they really tried to bring the center better, but their demands were more like orders than suggestions."² A8

sympathizer
I., a ~~supporter~~, says:

"But there wasn't any representative who spoke real good English. Their terminology sounded more like a demand. It was a misunderstanding. Some allowance should be made for this lack of education in the English language. Their requests might have been couched in dictatorial terms.

Of course a lot of their requests as far as I'm concerned is purely nonsense . . . Some of the representatives weren't exactly the people who ought to be acting as representatives. You can understand that trouble can arise from a fanatical kibel being a representative."³

"I's" brother said:

"If they had had enough brains to kick aside the unreasonable requests and settle the reasonable ones, everybody would have been satisfied."⁴

N., a sympathizer says:

"The Negotiating Committee stating that all the Ad-

1. Report, Dec. 24, p. 12
2. Notes, Feb., p. 8
3. Ibid., pp. 11, 14
4. Notes, Mar., p. 8.

ministrative staff withdraw - that's fantastic in my personal opinion. If I was running one of the Japanese camps and the prisoner of war tell me to resign . . .¹ I don't think the Japanese government would stand for it."

Kurihara, who might be termed a neutral says:

"To a great extent the Daihyo Sha Kai has distorted the facts to make people believe they are working for the good of Japan - when to a great extent they are not."²

The Co-op group which is definitely unsympathetic, made the following criticisms. These must not be considered criticisms of the people.

"Nobody knows exactly who they (the Planning Board) were. Probably they were elected by pressure group methods."³

"I can't see why they tried to destroy everything like that. To me, what they did was not constructive, just destructive."

"They're chronic agitators."

"They're attitude was not at all conciliatory. I think they were inexperienced in negotiating. They were running away from their objective, demanding and making it impossible to grant."

"They really didn't have any right to order. They were supported by everybody. Really, I don't think they were working for improvement in the center."⁴

The most irksome and demoralizing factor which the people had to endure was the lack of money for wages and clothing allowance. Mr. Kurihara believes this was the primary cause for the eventual breaking of the strike.

"I" says:

"Besides their finances were petering out. Here - they're still paying off on October checks (statement made Feb. 1). Now these fellows who were not working got no clothing allowance, no welfare, no income."⁵

1. Ibid., p. 12

2. Ibid., p. 53

3. Notes, Feb., p. 27

4. Notes, Mar., pp. 18, 19

5. Notes, Feb., p. 12

"N" says on this subject:

"Criticism grew (as status quo dragged on). People had no clothes. They tried to get their shoes fixed. . . . With the canteens and things, the people were growing broke. Say I have \$2,000. My friend has only \$10. When his money is gone and he sees my children eating, he would like his children to get the same thing."¹

21.

"P" a young woman who supported the group which later ~~supported the~~ helped break the status quo said:

"We got no fresh fruit or vegetables all that month/ (after November 4). On Thanksgiving we had bologna."²

27

The extremely poor quality and the small quantity of the food served during the status quo period has been commented upon by all informants regardless of their ^{sentiment} ~~sentiment~~ toward ^{the} ~~the~~ pressure groups or toward the Administration. ~~But my own sentiment is~~ Almost no vegetables canned or fresh were served during this period except potatoes and occasionally beets. No eggs at all were served. The general consensus of opinion when those unhappy days are recalled now is "The food was lousy."

¹ Notes, April, p. 21

² ibid., p. 27.

Conflicting strongly with these critical attitudes was the conviction that the block representatives of the Daihyo Sha Kai and the Negotiating Committee, as the acting head of the body, were the legitimate representatives of the people and as such ~~were~~ could not be cast off or betrayed. The block meetings at which the men had been appointed or elected, the several petitions which were signed during the period of conflict and the fact that these men had stood courageously against the administration for the betterment of the people, a tremendously important psychological factor, bound the people to the Daihyo Sha Kai with a loyalty which, although it faltered at times, was never more than partially overcome.

333863863386338633863386 868686868686868686868686

partially overcome. This paper is a preliminary report on the results of the first phase of the study, which was designed to determine the effect of the treatment on the subjects' self-reported symptoms and on their performance on a series of tests.

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[illegible]

The people murmured and complained over the hardships; they criticised the policy and attitude of the Daihyo Sha Kai; but, very significantly, nobody challenged their position as representatives of the people. Having once selected them, girl the people were morally obliged (girl) to stand behind them to the end.

415B

"N" who criticised some of the demands as fantastic also said:

"Those fellows in the stockade - everybody signed their names after November 4th saying these people are the true representatives! ~~My~~ As more and more say in here (this statement was made in March 1944) we signed our names saying these men are our representatives; it isn't right to give in." 1 11

I asked "N" why the higing leaders were not given up. He replied:

"Because the Japanese people, once they sign their names and state a fact! I backed the Negotiating Committee up. Everyone signed that in the mess hall. How can they betray them as a man? As a man, after signing the petition I couldn't back up. At that time it was a majority." 2

11 Notes, March, 1943, p. 11

2 Notes, April, 1943, p. 21.

Conflicting with these critical attitudes was the conviction the the block representatives ~~were the legitimate/elected/appointed representatives~~ of the Daihyo Sha Kai ~~xxxxxxxlegitimatexxxxrepresentativesxxxxofxxxxpeoplexxx~~ ~~The Negotiating Committeexxxxxxxnegotiatingxxxxwithxxxxthe Daihyo Sha~~ and the Negotiating Committee as the acting head of the body were the legitimate representatives of the people and as such were not to be cast off or betrayed. The block meetings at which the men had been appointed or elected, ~~and~~ the several petitions which were signed during the period of conflict ~~were~~ and the ~~additional very powerful psychological~~ fact that these men had stood ~~up to the administration and defended better~~ courageously against the administration for the betterment of the people, a tremendously important psychological factor, bound the people to the Daihyo Sha Kai with a loyalty which, although it faltered at times, was never ~~overcome~~ more than partially overcome.

"N2, who criticized some of the demands as fantastic also said:

"Those fellows in the stockade - everybody signed their names after November 4th saying these people are the true representatives! As more and more say in here, we signed our names saying these men are our representatives; it ~~sayinx~~ isn't right to give in." ~~xxxxxxxstatusxxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxx~~

B11

In March/

K, not a supporter of the Daihyo Sha said in March:

In every case the Negotiating Committee who were elected even by a few hundred people must be considered the legitimate representatives of the people."²

B15

"I" who ~~called~~ called some of the Daihyo Sha Kai's requests, "purely nonsense" also said the following:

"What you call representatives always existed previous to the trouble. Out of those representatives, a lot relocated and new comers were elected to take their place. . . . There were quite a few old ones (in the Daihyo Sha) and that's one of the reasons why the people got so burnt up."³

B41.

¹ Notes, March, p. 11

² Notes, March, 1943
ibid., p. 15.

³ ibid., p. 41.

4216 A



i.

M. a member of the Daihyo Sha who resigned later said:

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conclusion

ATTITUDE OF WRA AFTER ENTRANCE OF ARMY

Abstract

² ibid., p. 64.

WRA which had had no intention of giving up the center at any time, and probably had not expected that the Army would take charge so thoroughly or maintain its rule so long, began a campaign to get the Army out^{of camp}. ~~Five months later (April, 1944) this campaign was still in progress.~~ A vital part of this plan consisted of an attempt to organize the community, to get a body of representatives who could be dealt with on WRA terms. Several attempts were made to re-establish contact with remnants of the Negotiating Committee. But the ever growing number of arrests foiled the Administration's efforts. On one occasion the Advisory Council (function and origin of this body to be explained in preface) met with a group; the next day 80% of the group were picked up.

For the first two months the rule of the Army was extremely strict. No personnel member was allowed to enter the colony without military guard, which, in November and December, meant a big jeep and several soldiers. Later this guard was reduced to one soldier. Opler gives an account of his experiences at this time:

"Things were tight as a drum. There was no way of talking above the din of the army. At first it was worse (military rule). You had to have a jeep to get into camp. I put off a trip to my office because I had to take the army with me. Not a little puddle jumper jeep but one of the big armored cars with a couple of soldiers. You couldn't go to see people. The army was stern and forbidding.

Certain elements in the WRA were trying to reach the Army. How to get the Army out? The Advisory Council had meetings with the Daihyo Sha remnants after the pickups. Unfortunately the army picked so many up - (getting names) from former Diahyo Sha's notebooks. On one occasion we met with a group. The next week 80% of them had been picked up."¹

Many evacuees who tried to deal with the Army independently

1. Notes, Mar., pp. 58, 59

were also picked up:

"I's" brother says:

"They went to talk to Austin. But they didn't get any place. Some guys went and hollered louder. They got picked up. The loudest ones just got yanked, that's all."¹

M. says:

"The Administration promised to negotiate and talk things over (after November 4)...~~But the search kind of mixed things up.~~ They thought they could pull them all in and everything would be all clear. Everytime we asked for a chance to talk things over we get picked up."²

I. says:

"The people hiding out had information that was vital for maintaining peace and normalcy in the center. But if they showed their face outside they would be put in the stockade. And so, naturally, the only thing they could do was hide out."³

-
1. Ibid., p. 7
 2. Ibid., pp. 62, 63
 3. Notes, Feb., p. 14

CONTINUED DISINTEGRATION OF THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

The Daihyo Sha met on November 16. Yamatani stated that he believed the Spanish Consul would arrive in the center in a few days and added that meanwhile, the Coordinating Committee was doing its best not to override the Negotiating Committee. He complained that he had been treated by a man named Yoshiyama because he (Yamatani) was not supporting the Negotiating Committee sufficiently.

Yamatani: . . . I have been doing my best to contact the Spanish Consul to visit this Center. Yet, my integrity has been doubted by some Negotiating Committee which I just can't stand for.

Kawamura: Do you object to the attitude of the Negotiating Committee?

Yamatani: Yes, especially when my integrity is looked upon with doubt. It is intolerable.

Yamagata: As one of the Coordinating Committee members, my opinion is the same with Mr. Yamatani's.

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Kawamura: I feel the same way. Colonists bring all their complaints and grievances to the Coordinating Committee just because the Negotiating Committee members are hiding. They don't realize that we have no authority to negotiate with the Administration or the Army. On top of that we are regarded with suspicion, that I, for one, thought of resigning.

Yamatani: I understand how Mr. Kawamura feels since I feel the same way. However in due time, the Spanish Consul will come here. Until that time, I wish you would refrain from resigning.¹

Toshio Shimonishi was appointed as official messenger of Kai, Kuratomi, Hayashi and Kimura, the hiding members of the Negotiating Committee. ~~However, Yamamoto, a member of the Negotiating Committee, questioned the authority of these hiding men, stating that they had no authority to give instructions from hiding. He felt that as a member of the Negotiating Committee he should have been consulted.~~

~~However, Yamamoto, a member of the Negotiating Committee, questioned the authority of these hiding men, stating that they had no authority to give instructions from hiding. He felt that as a member of the Negotiating Committee he should have been consulted.~~ Akuk A "voice from the floor" added to the confusion.

"By their action (hiding Committee) I don't think there is any necessity of maintaining the Co-ordinating Committee. Why doesn't the Negotiating Committee come out and take the initiative in the negotiation with the Administration and the Army?"²

The following byplay is also interesting:

Shimonishi: (the messenger) Even though you (the group present) claim that you are giving your ~~almost~~ support to the Negotiating Committee, there are some Daihyo Sha who are spreading irresponsible statements against the Committee, which peeves the Committee very much. The inconveniences we are subjected to suffer at this time are for final victory in the near future.

Voice from the floor: What do you think you are? Go back and tell those spineless Negotiating Committee to come out and work together with the ~~Coordinating~~ Coordinating Committee. In spite of bad reputations, we are doing our utmost for the Daihyo Sha's mission. You have no grounds upon which you should complain now.³

The policy and outcome of the status quo policy was questioned:

Watanabe: Could you explain to us fully the policy and the object and if possible, the consequence of status quo. To what extent will the colonists benefit by it?

Minutes of the Tule Lake Center Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 16, 1944, p. 1.

ibid., p. 2. This statement may have been doctored by the translators to aid Yamamoto's reputation.

ibid.

ibid., p. 4.

~~410~~ 4120



Kawamura: Is there any possibility of satisfying the colonists who are complaining about status quo, but still uphold the policy, I have no objection to stick to it. However, I think this is an impossibility.

Yamatani: Somehow our only hope is to wait for the arrival of the Spanish Consul.¹

mind.

Shimonishi: Such is misunderstood because of the lack of coordination between the ~~Coordinating Committee~~ Negotiating Committee and the Coordinating Committee.

Kawamura :

2727852727272

The job days package is for naming

કુલ 758293 બેઠકો જોડા

~~The members picked over what status quo implied and whether they were bound to support it~~
after hickering at length over

the members

Even when the possibility of a prejudiced translation is discounted, this meeting ~~gives an~~ ^{with most of the members} shows a leaderless, puzzled group, incapable or afraid to take any initiative, distrusting themselves and the hiding leaders. ~~Their only hope is~~ In their distraction they pin their one remaining hope on the arrival of the Spanish Consul, as a prelude to resuming negotiations with the Army and WRA.

On November 18 the Army made its last attempt to deal with the Daihyo Sha on a ~~very~~ partially negotiatory basis. A meeting was called which was attended by Colonels Austin and ~~Mee~~, Mr. Cozzens, nine block managers and the Daihyo Sha's Coordinating Committee. *The Colonels*
Col. Austin

attempted to place the maintenance of colony order on the shoulders of the block managers. According to several informants, his real intention was to shift the responsibility for the situation onto the block managers, but they ~~unambiguously~~ ^{unambiguously} refused. He pointed out that he was the ~~hiding negotiator~~ ^{hiding negotiator}. This and all other responsibilities the block managers ~~unambiguously~~ ^{unambiguously} refused to accept.

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but a co-ordinating body between the authority and the colony.¹

On November 24 the Coordinating Committee received a message from the Spanish Consul, stating that it would be impossible for him to visit the Center at this time but he would come as soon as ~~possible~~ possible. The same day the Daihyo Sha met again, a meeting marked by more squabbling over the maintenance of status quo, ~~the~~ additional complaints by Yamatani that he was being threatened ~~as an inu~~ for ~~inu-like~~ inu-like actions, ^{and} the suggestion that the Spanish Consul be reached by telephone. ^{Another} long discussion ^{was held} on the ~~proper~~ proper function of the Coordinating and the Negotiating Committee, ^{and} Yamatani ^{make an} emotional suggestion that the Coordinating Committee resign and ~~the Negotiating Committee~~ leave the Negotiating Committee to carry on. Nothing was accomplished except that the Coordinating Committee was induced to remain in office for a few more days.

Having failed to get the support of the Block Managers the Army on November 26 took another forceful step, a camp wide search.

¹ Joint Meeting of the Army, ward Chairman of Block Managers, and Daihyo Sha, Nov. 18, 1943, p. 2.

Kai and Kuratomi continued to direct operations from hiding. The army called a meeting of block managers and demanded that these men be given up. The men were not given up. Consequently, on November 26, the army made a camp-wide search in which every barrack was entered. The search was held ostensibly to look for contraband, hidden weapons, intoxicating liquor and rice from which sake could be made. WRA personnel was enlisted in this search, female teachers being required to accompany the soldiers to search women. Some complied unwillingly, but it is said that WRA chose the teachers carefully from those known to be not overly sympathetic to evacuees.¹ Of the group of leaders only Sugimoto was found and picked up.

It is rumored that Kai and Kuratomi escaped this search by disguising themselves as women and ~~that one~~ did the family wash while the soldiers searched their barracks.

"It sure was funny. One of the Negotiating Committee was in the washing room dressed in a skirt and a bandanna, washing away, while they were looking for him."² (B13)

Opler says:

"It was funny how the army would rush in and find their beds still warm. They must have kept a wonderful watch and spotted anyone coming."³ (A1 9)

Best, at this time, ^{is said to have} thought that Kai and Kuratomi had escaped and were outside the project.

No ~~information~~ informant accused the soldiers of brutality or even of discourtesy during this search.

"We had a very nice soldier come in. Some were good and some bad. The one who came here was really nice."⁴ A8

1. Ibid., p. 10
2. Notes, Mar., p. 13
3. Notes, Feb., p. 19
4. Notes, Mar., p. 8

M. says:

"You can't criticize the army. In Japan it would be worse. They (the U.S. army) are lenient. The people do respect the army more than WRA. In any country the army is supposed to represent the whole country. (M. implied that for this reason it must be respected.)¹ (B63)

Opler differs and is of the opinion that the Japanese resented the army's intrusion greatly. It is probably that his attitude is colored by personal prejudice toward the army and by the general resentment of the WRA personnel toward the military and their desire to be rid of them. Opler stated February 2:

"The simplest group will respect the army coming in with jeeps, tanks, etc. That's a Japanese cultural trait. The smartest resent the army and want to see it out. Generally the people feel it's safer if the army were out provided there wouldn't be a reign of terror again."² (A18)

~~Not the slightest~~^{No} corroboration ~~to~~^{of} these sentiments was given by any Japanese.

Opler continues:

"During the army search it was found that one of the soldiers had taken a watch out of someone's drawer. The party yelled to the Captain. The soldier was frisked and the watch returned.

I was in headquarters when they brought in two packages of ritz crackers. They were returned. Some people had tremendous stores of sake and rice. On one apartment two of the guys (soldiers) were at odds on the whole procedure. One was throwing things around; the other was practically apologizing for it.

It was a cold morning. Some of the soldiers had sake for themselves. One kept very warm. It was rumored that the whole military camp was supposed to be drunk."³

^A "You would have got venom against the army then! (In November or December).⁴

1. Notes, March, p. 63

2. Notes, Feb., p. 18

3. Ibid., pp. 18, 19, see also Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 10, 1943.

4. Notes, Mar., p. 59

On November 29 Kai and Kuratomi presented an ultimatum from the Negotiating Committee which had been drawn up for the residents' signatures. The signatures were not attached to the copy given the administration. (This appears to have been the second of two petitions; the first was initiated about the second week in November.) This document lays the blame for the incident that brought about Army occupation on the Administration for refusing to heed the committee's request that no more food be taken from the warehouse and states that Best's excuse, that Caucasian personnel were in danger of being kidnapped, is false.

RESOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO THE COMPLETE AND SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE INCIDENT BEGINNING NOVEMBER 4, 1943 WHEN THE U.S. ARMY TOOK POSSESSION OF THE TULBLAKE CAMP, NEWELL, CALIF.

Whereas, the negotiation committee, which was duly elected by the block representatives who were in turn elected by the block residents is our sole mean of conducting negotiations necessary for the well being of the residents of this center and especially in view of the fact that we, the residents of this center, give our undivided support to the above mentioned committee, and,

Whereas, we, as the residents of this center know that the present situation was caused by the failure of the WRA Administrators to heed our request not to take commodities out of the center warehouses in the middle of the night, and,

Whereas, Mr. Raymond R. Best, the Project Director, gave as his excuse for calling in the military that a group of center residents threatened to kidnap the Caucasian personnel, which statement is a plan false. As a result many unnecessary arrests have conducted.

Therefore, in order to bring this unfortunate incident to a satisfactory and complete solution we, the center residents, feel that we must put forward the following resolutions to express our unqualified support of our representative committee.

RESOLUTION

- 1) Not to enter any negotiation with camp administrators other than through our negotiation committee.
- 2) To demand the wholesale resignations of the WRA appointed personnels, who were here prior to November 4, 1943.
- 3) To ask the withdrawal of the U.S. Army from the camp site.
- 4) To put into practice the promises made by Mr. Raymond Best, the Project Director, during the conference held on November 1, 1943 in Mr. Dillon S. Myer's presence.
- 5) To request for the immediate and unconditional release of all the persons who are held without evidence.
- 6) Not to conduct further arrests in connection with this incident in the future.
- 7) To ask for the reemployment of all the workers who were terminated without reason.

Be it further resolved that without the satisfactory conclusion of the above resolutions we will not consider this incident closed. We, the residents of the Tule Lake Center, 18 years of age or over, hereby signify our determined stand by our signatures on the 29th day of November, 1943, as follows:¹

This petition was signed by about half the adults in camp. The demand for the wholesale resignation of the WRA personnel drew ^{some} colony criticism. ^{It was thought too radical.} (See p.) The leaders are also reported to have stated that they would surrender themselves providing those held in the stockage were released.² When by December 1, neither this resolution nor this promise brought any result, they decided to give themselves up. ~~This surrender was accompanied by considerable formality and was preceded by a meeting of the four free leaders with the P.D.I.~~

¹Taken from enclosure in Opler's letter. December 10, 1943.

²Notes, February, p. 19.

However, they gave themselves up to the D.B.I. and not the Army, an action greatly resented by the Army who had tried so long to apprehend them. This surrender was accompanied by considerable formality and was preceded by a meeting of the four free leaders with the F. B. I.

"An informant heard some ladies talking about a man who had married an eta and found out later that she was one. He divorced her. The ladies discussing the case didn't think he had done anything wrong, because "what would happen when they went back to Japan."1 (18A)

"~~There~~ "My very good girl friend liked a fellow in Canal¹, called Tada. They wanted to marry. Her folks found out he was one of "those." They told her they would disown her if she married him. On the other side, his family objected to his marrying an outsider. It was funny. Both sides had objections. All the etas got together and said, "We don't want you. You musn't marry her." She was quite broker hearted about it."2 (16)

The above is the only indication that the eta themselves might expect ^{more information} object to intermarriage. The writer made many attempts to obtain ~~corroboration~~ but was unsuccessful.

"I heard of cases in this country where a young couple got married. For some reason or other no formal investigation of the families was made. Then they went back to the old country to live. The girl was shizoku and didn't know the man was eta. Naturally, that's the first thing they ask. They got to talking about where the girl's husband came from and all the dirt came out. They ordered the poor girl out of the house. (Never darken my doorstep again) stuff."3 (31)

^{shows} ~~From~~ this evidence ~~it can be concluded~~ that as far as Vissei are most concerned, marriage with an eta still entails great social stigma ^{and} must be avoided, even at the cost of a broken betrothal. ~~and~~ In some cases at least, is considered justifiable cause for divorce. Nisei attitudes vary: : those who have any intention of returning to Japan appear most ^{He cannot afford to risk the social ostracism which an eta spouse would bring upon them.} prejudiced. ^{and} Few nisei admit to a personal feeling of repulsion ~~against~~

toward the eta, but many, perhaps even the majority, would hesitate in the matter of marriage. Those nisei who have rejected Japanese culture as completely as possible, refuse to admit ~~any~~ ^{any} personal prejudice. If moved to a ^{non-Japanese} ~~new American~~ environment they ^{would} ~~will~~ marry without investigation into ancestry and probably forget the eta question completely. Those who remain in camp or those who continue to practice the Japanese ideal of respect and consideration of parents, will be forced to ~~comply~~ ^{comply} with a prejudice in which they see no reason or significance.

1. Canal is the smaller camp at Esler.
2. See ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~same~~ ^{same} ~~place~~ ^{place}.
3. See ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~same~~ ^{same} ~~place~~ ^{place}.

independently called ^{upon} the Army for help.¹ The Army answered the call, marched in with guns and tanks, and with the assistance of Internal Security arrested 18 young men in the warehouse and closely-adjointing personnel residence area and in that part of the camp adjoining that area. All but nine of these young men were released the same night. ~~Almost all of them came from Topaz.~~² Several ~~were~~ ^{had been} severely injured.

1 and up to

There is great confusion and disagreement
~~The above is all that is known to have occurred. On every other detail there is contradiction and disagreement. Almost every account, whether related by a Caucasian or evacuee, differs in detail. Among these important controversial points are the use for which the trucks were intended, the contention of some of the members of the appointed personnel that the evacuees intended to kidnap Mr. Best, and the question of whether or not certain of the evacuees arrested were brutally beaten in the statistics office by members of Internal Security before being turned over to the Army.~~
ic. whether food was actually being transported
the denial by most evacuee informants of any such intention

The Army, under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Austin, now took over full control of the camp. On the morning of November 5, when the Japanese ~~working~~ ^{employed} in the administrative area reported for work, they were stopped by a cordon of soldiers stationed at intervals of a few yards and told to return to their barracks. The large majority of these people were ~~probably~~ ^{at this time} ignorant of the events of the preceding night.

~~A large number of informants stated~~ ^{that} they did not hear

1. So Schmidt stated to the writer.
2. WRA, Tule Lake Incident, Sequence of Events, p. 5.

the guns or tanks and had no idea that anything untoward had occurred until they attempted to go to work the next day. This is very possible since ~~those evacuees nearest the scene of the~~ fight live over one-quarter mile away. However, persons living in that section of the camp nearest the administration building knew that some violence was afoot.

Since about a thousand people worked outside the project proper at that time, the crowd soon grew very large. It was augmented by ^{the} curious ~~persons~~ and by ~~the~~ parents or relatives of the young women employed in the hospital who had not been allowed to return to their homes that night. The soldiers threw tear gas at the crowd, in spite of the fact that there was no evidence of violence. The scene is described by an evacuee:

"The next morning, everybody like usual went to report to work and all the Japanese truck drivers were stopped by the guards, searched and told to go back. They said they had to go to work. The soldiers told them to go back, not to come near the place. Some of the fellows still argued and the soldiers kicked some of them. Everybody was gathering at the front of their own blocks. So the Army started throwing tear gas at them and told them to go home."¹

Thus, in a sudden repressive movement, the camp was thrown into a state of involuntary idleness, and, to the hardships and grievances which had already seemed beyond endurance, were added loss of their only source of cash - the \$16.00-\$19.00 monthly wage - and the restrictions on movement which were a necessary concomitant of military rule.

1. Report, December 24, 1943, p. 14.

RETYPE

Page 149 on

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Mrs. O: No one knows about them. That's altogether unknown. There really was no Second Negotiating Committee. All the people said that their representatives were already chosen and were in the stockade. We had no election like that in our block."¹

"M", himself a member of the Second Negotiating Committee said:

"We thought this time, I don't think it could be straightened out. We thought we'd do what we could. But the people took what I do wrong. The people in here felt we weren't helping out either way. So I just resigned."²

While the evidence implied in the above remarks is far from conclusive, it hints that the defeat of the measure to limit Co-op sales may, to some extent, have been influenced by a public sentiment that the men now guiding the policy of the Daihyo Sha were not ^{the} real representatives and indicates that the vote may have been, at least in part, a gesture of support to the internees. Needless to say, the outcome of the Co-op issue was received with joy by the administration as proof of their contention that the Daihyo Sha had never had a strong following in camp.

~~Block Manager~~ Development of Counter Daihyo Sha Group

While the Co-op negotiations were being carried on the Administration had succeeded in establishing a contact with a group of evacuees with whom they could deal - an anti Daihyo-Sha group. ~~The first men contacted on December 11 and were representatives from the Civic Organizations group, a body on the WRA payroll whose duty it is to co-ordinate and facilitate relations between the block managers and the administration.~~

¹Notes, March, p. 4.

²Notes, April, p. 23.

This group at first was composed of representatives from the Civic Organizations and the Co-op, and later the ~~xxxxxx of xxxxxxx divisions xxxxxxx~~ Japanese heads of divisions still working. The rise of this ~~opposition~~ administrative and army backed group will be traced later, in detail. It is mentioned here because ~~XXXX~~ its genesis ~~XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX~~ coincided with the Co-op's defiance of the Daihyo Sha Kai.

referred
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referred

A brief outline of the history of the eta in Japan, gained chiefly from Shigeaki Ninomiya's paper¹, will precede the discussion. The technique used in collecting the material and the character of the informants will be described. Points which will receive special consideration are:

- ~~The~~ Importance of eta descent with regard to marriage;
- ~~The~~ extent of survival of prejudice in pre-evacuation California and in the Centers;
- Importance of family history in marriage;
- Popular explanations of the origin of the eta;
- Popular and personal reasons for dislike;
- Occupations of the eta in Japan and ~~the United States~~ California;
- Popular ~~conceptions~~ ^{concepts of} ~~on appearance and~~ physical appearance and behavior of eta;
- Methods of determining whether a person is ~~a/an~~ an eta;
- Synthesis of informants' statements on eta behavior and treatment in pre-evacuation California and the Centers.
- ~~Personal sentiments expressed by informants;~~
- ~~Variation of attitudes in connection with age or generation, and cultural influences;~~
- ~~Specific cases of discrimination.~~
- A brief discussion of the survival of attitudes held toward the samurai (warrior class of pre-Meiji era) will be appended.

In order to avoid constant translation of important and frequently used Japanese words, translations will be presented here. Less important terms will be followed by English translations in parenthesis.

Issei (first generation), by strict definition any Japanese residing

¹Ninomiya, Shigeaki, "The Japanese Eta" ~~in~~ Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 2nd Ser., V. X, pp. 47 - 158 (1933).

*I may alter this as please
omitted some remarks &
page blank.*

begin on p. 3.

100 9.

REPORT OF THE SPANISH CONSUL
December 13, 1943

DATE: December 13, 1943

TIME: 3:00 p.m.

PLACE: Front of Mess 21

Introduction of Consul De Amat, State Department Representative Deckerbach and Translator Inouye.

CONSUL: I came here by the order of his Excellency, the Spanish Embassy. I came here to visit the people living in Tule Lake, especially the men and women born in Japan to which the protection applies. I want to talk to all of those who wish to talk to me. I answer many complaints, if there are any who wish to speak to me or any desires they wish to make to me.

I realize that in the present moment, you are facing certain problems that are rather disturbing and I believe that those problems have to be faced with goodwill, on the part of American authorities, and also with the Japanese residents.

Today and tomorrow I will be here and I will be ready to heary any suggestions that anyone has, in the sense of helping you out of actual problems. In the morning, I will be in Mr. Best's office, and you can contact me through the telephone if you wish to see me.

MR. DECKERBACH: I am representing the Department of State, Washington, because the State Department is interested in Tule Lake. You may wonder why the State Department is interested. The reason is that the trouble in Tule Lake affects our international relations. The constant dispute at this camp are disturbing to our international relations and also detrimental to our own welfare. For example, you are interested in the exchange of American Nationals with the Japanese nationals interned here. The disputed at the Tule Lake camp will definitely hold up this exchange of nationals. For that reason the State Department wants to see a peaceful, quiet, orderly camp here at Tule Lake.

I have made a brief inspection of the camp and I have read the records of the meetings held by the Negotiating Committee and the Army authorities and I must say that I can see no obstacles that cannot be overcome and cannot see why we cannot come to an orderly camp. I believe that all obstacles and questions can be solved if they are approached in a spirit of cooperation, goodwill, and sincerity, but this spirit must be mutual, it must come from both sides. I mentioned that the authorities now in charge of this camp will be glad to approach every problem with sincere spirit of cooperation and they will do everything in their power to make you as comfortable as war-time conditions permit. But some things are impossible. For example, this morning the question was brought to my attention of releasing the nine members of the Negotiating Committee who have been detained. The Army picked up those members of the Committee because they believed it was necessary to do so, in order to preserve peace and security of this camp. They will be released by the Army if and when they believe it is desirable.

Now we are anxious to find some solution of this problem which will be satisfactory to both sides. This is not my job to find the solution, but I would like to make a suggestion or two which I think will help. I would like you to think some of those suggestions over.

I propose, in the first place, that you abolish the old Negotiating Com-

mittee which obviously is unable to function your present condition. I propose that you elect by popular vote, that is, the vote of the whole community, a new committee to be called a Central Committee. In my opinion this committee should be composed of members in proportion to the various classes in the community - that is Issei members should elect Issei and Nisei should elect Nisei representatives. I think in this way you will get a community truly represented by the whole colony - one which the Army Authorities will have confidence and which they will be able to cooperate.

I hope that such a committee can be formed under the supervision of the Army and that it will use all goodwill and sincerity to cooperate with the Army Authorities to build here a model camp which will be a credit, not only to the Japanese in this camp, but to the cooperation of the Army and the residents. As I have said before, it is not my job to find a solution, I am making the suggestion in the hope that you will all think it over carefully.

ANNOUNCER: The demands and problems are:

1. To conform to the suggestions made by the former representatives.
2. Food arrangement is bad -- make arrangements to bring us better food.
3. Threatened by martial law.
4. Soldiers entrance into women's shower rooms.
5. Recognition of the Negotiating Committee.
- 6.

QUESTION: They are building new fences by Ward 7, why are they building such fence?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: Find out the reason from the Army.

ANSWER: DE AMAT: I will ask the Army, probably it will be denied, but if they tell me I will give the answer.

QUESTION: Do you know that we had to endure difficulty because of the martial law? From November 4, we have suffered the difficulty which we encountered, because of martial law and curfew laid upon us. Did you know this fact?

ANSWER: Since November 4, I have received complaints about being inconvenient; e.g. martial law. The people were suffering -- I received a letter so I knew it. This complaint has been recorded in my office and submitted to the Spanish Embassy which will probably submit it to the proper authority.

QUESTION: We have been hearing for the past two weeks and twenty days that your Honor was going to visit us to meet our problems, however, even after one month you didn't come to this center, I would like to know the reason.

ANSWER: DEAMAT: I have been here to the Tule Lake Center three times. I am not absolutely free to come here whenever I wish. My visits are subject to certain formalities. I must be accompanied by a Washington State Department Representative; that makes it so that I cannot do it as quickly as you may ask. As I repeated, in October, beginning of November, I was here and I am here again.

ANNOUNCER: Did you receive any telegrams?

CONSUL: Yes, I have received them.

ANNOUNCER: We are supporting the Negotiating Committee we first selected, and I want you to meet this Negotiating Committee and talk things over.

ANSWER: I will ask the Army Authority to let me talk to these men in custody now, nevertheless, that permission may be denied me because they are American Citizens, since I am here to take care, especially those men and women born in Japan. It is my opinion that the commanding officer of the camp will allow me to see the men, so consequently, I will try to see them.

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QUESTION: This is the gravest concern of the residents up to now and still they do not believe that the former Negotiating Committee has done everything possible for the residents, not for their own benefits. I want you to understand that point.

ANSWER: It is not my own road to mix myself in this political question inside the camp. My visits are specifically to see that the living condition is according to the International Law, and these other questions tried by the committee are more or less a political nature, and I am not supposed to bring myself in.

QUESTION: This question is to ask you to inform the Japanese Government that this Negotiating Committee has been detained by the Army since November 4, 1943.

ANSWER: I will report your request to the Spanish Ambassador. I do not know if the Ambassador will report it to the Japanese Government. If they think it is important enough to forward it, they will.

QUESTION: They want you to report to Japan the fact that our Negotiating Committee has been detained by the Army from November 4. That is our demand. They don't want shall or will business, they want you to make sure.

ANSWER: I have already said that I will approach the Embassy that nine men have been detained by the Authority. I do not know if the Embassy will consider it. If it is necessary they will report it to the Japanese Government. If they think it is not important they will not do so.

On my visits I made reports to the Embassy about the events. Your reports, I suppose, have been sent to Japan. I have made reports of what I have seen and heard. The nature of the reports is absolutely confidential, I am not going to say it here.

QUESTION: They want to demand (the translator used this word) the status of the Nisei made clear, because even if they are American citizens they should be equal as Japanese Nationals.

ANSWER: I have specific orders from the Embassy that the protection should be applied to the Japanese subjects.

ANSWER BY STATE DEPT. REP. I would like to explain the status of the Nisei who have both Japanese and American citizenship. When you are in the United States you are an American Citizen, when you are in Japan you are a Japanese subject. When you are in Japan as Japanese subjects, the American Government does not protect you, and when you are in America/subjects the Japanese Government does not protect you or in this case the Spanish Government will not protect you. You cannot by saying so throw off your American Citizenship. You must do a specific act such as renouncing your citizenship. But you can do it in time of peace, but not in time of war. No American subject can throw off his citizenship.

QUESTION: Well, then why did the United States Government put American Citizen Nisei in the camp?

ANSWER: STATE DEPT. REP.: That was done for the security of the United States in time of war. If they think I am a dangerous person they would put me in the camp also.

QUESTION: They want to know whether, this is an important question, your Honor, did you come here under the order of the Army or by the request from the negotiating committee?

ANSWER: DE AMAT: Neither. I came by the order of the Spanish Ambassador as I have said before. The two precedent visits that I made here before was upon the request of the resident of Tule Lake, but this time I am here at the order of the Spanish Embassy. From here I am going to Manzanar.

QUESTION: Please inform the Japanese government to take steps so that to give the Americans interned there the same status and same treatment as we are given here.

Crowd disbanded at 5:50 p.m.

relates
 Opler ~~states~~ an incident not contained in the minutes, but does not
~~mix~~ give the source:

"Not recorded in these minutes is one incident which occurred during the meeting in the presence of both the Spanish Consul and the State Department Representative, the Hon. Mr. Deckerbach. The latter was making some suggestions in a speech intended to clarify the issues. He finally proposed that the old Negotiating Committee be abolished since it could no longer function, and that the people elect by vote a new committee. One evacuee present, engrossed in the talk and not too mindful of his surroundings, applauded loudly at these points which I daresay others present applauded inwardly; immediately, the goons present pointed to him, moved in their places menacingly, and yelled, "Let's get that guy!" The chairman restored order by reminding the goons of their surroundings, the respect due the officials, etc.. At the conclusion of the meeting, the goons raced for their prey, walking all over benches and tables, and the man who thought with his hands earlier disappeared through a window near his seat. The officials present (State Department and Consul) witnessed the intimidation and attempt at violence, and could on the strength of this as well as the arrogant tone adopted by the Daihyo spokesmen, deduce the proper conclusions."¹

The meeting with the Spanish Consul and the Hon. Mr. Deckerbach
 the two
 was regarded as a rather futile gesture by ~~those~~/informants who expressed
 themselves on the subject.

"N" said:

"The Spanish Consul said, 'I can't do anything except to report to the Japanese government how things stand.' He said, 'I'm here for the benefit of the issei, the natives of Japan.' . . . The representatives from the State Department who was here at that time, advised putting up the issei representatives."² B13

"I" said:

"Anybody was invited to the meeting with the Spanish Consul. It was open to the public. But the army presided over the meeting. The Consul always had Capt. Hartman sitting beside him. He couldn't say too much. All the answer the consul gave at that time - there wasn't anything definite said. They were all more or less suppositions and promises."³ (B41)

Stockade Activities during December

Meanwhile rumors of dissention within the stockade were beginning to trickle out, all of which were welcomed by the administration.

In the latter part of December, however, the Military Intelligence and the Internal Security *let only the Asst. Dir. know that* ~~reported that a message from the Kai-Muratori~~

¹ Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, 1943, p/ 3/

² Notes, Mar., p. 13.

³ *ibid.*, p. 41.

Army and Stockade Developments

When the appeal of the Spanish Consul that the Negotiating Committee resign failed, the Army began to pick up and ~~to~~ intern the Block Representatives, the main body of the Daihyo Sha Kai. ~~ONXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~theyxxxxxxxx~~ ^{these} attempted to go into hiding, but on December 17 five were picked up and on December ~~18~~ 18, ~~xxxxxxxx~~ fifteen more. ¹ ~~The policy of picking~~ ^{More were no doubt} ~~up anyone remotely suspected of being a trouble maker continued~~ ^{picked up later,} for six months. A census released by the Military shows that 216 persons ~~had been picked up by the military~~ were in the stockade in the latter part of January. ² Many more had been picked up and ^{already} released.

As the weeks passed rumors of dissention within the stockade began to trickle out, all of which were welcomed by the administration. In the latter part of December ~~xxxxxx~~ the Military Intelligence and the Internal Security informed ~~only~~ one Assistant Project ~~Director~~ ^{that}.

¹ Oplers letter to Spicer, Dec. 10, p. 8.

² Census attached to Opler letter to Spicer, Feb. 2, 1944.

note from Kuratomi had been smuggled out of the stockade in a cigarette. The exact wording of the message is not known, but according to Opler it called for two actions:

- (2) The transmission of orders to organize the female contingent, the wives and acquaintances of those incarcerated. 1/

Whether ~~this~~ message reached the colonists is not known. If it or other messages were smuggled out, there is no indication that they called for any other action than maintaining the status quo.

On December 31 the internees began a hunger strike in protest against treatment by the Army. ~~XXXXXX~~~~XXXXXXXXXXXXX~~~~internee~~~~s explained the strike~~

~~xxxxxx~~ The Army's version of this strike was not made public. However, several internees ~~xxxxxx~~ explained and described the strike as follows:

"The reason why we went on a hunger strike was because the Army boys stole our shirts, gloves, fountain pen, and even garlic, while we stood out in the snow for about three hours. I think they took about \$1,000 worth, of course, this is a guess. So we took an aggressive stand and said that isn't it a shame for men of the Army, the most responsible men who are now backing America in this war, to steal people's things and doesn't it spoil the history of U. S. They took an immediate retaliatory step by food. They threw loaves of bread into the gate - giving an attitude that bread and water was good enough for us. This is the first time we had real unity within the stockade. All were very indignant, so I think there isn't a single thing that cannot be fulfilled if one has a strong will and determination."

"The whole thing started just because we refused to appear for roll call.

"Chief reason, of course, was ~~why~~ because two men laughed during the roll call. They weren't laughing at the officer calling the roll, but were laughing at some men who were loading cartons of tobacco, I think. These men happened to be of extra small stature and they were really a comical sight juggling with a piled stack of cartons in an attempt to load it. Well, just because these two laughed they were segregated into another tent. This happened on the 30th. We refused roll call unless these two were released. Thereupon, the Army took this bread-and-water-is-good-enough-for-you attitude. On the 31st, I think, Army men gave in and said that if we appear for roll call these two will be released and they were released but as we said before we were left out in the snow while the Army boys searched our entire barracks, and took many of our belongings. On the 31st these two returned but we still refused to go out for roll call. The Army said, 'All right, we have plenty of soldiers.' And they brought out some 300 soldiers so we had to go out for roll call. Our punishment continued to be bread and water."

✓ Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, p. 7.

"As Japanese we couldn't just concede to the Army's mean attitude like this so we took the same stand. 'Let's not eat.'" 1/

1/ Report of the informal interview of the Responsible Men of Vairous Divisions with ~~the~~ the detained stockade internees, Jan. 14, 1944, pp. 8, 9.

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~~Message~~ note from Kuratomi had been smuggled out of the stockade in a cigarette. The exact wording of the message is not known, but according to Opler is called for two actions:

- (1) The calling of a general strike. ~~xxxxxxx~~
- (2) The transmission~~of~~ of orders to organize the female contingent, -- wives and acquaintances, -- of those incarcerated.¹ ~~(23)~~

~~Whxxxxxxxxxxxxsmuggledxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

message reached the colonel

Whether this ~~Notably occurred~~ cannot be determined at this time.

If other messages went through, there is no indication that they called for ~~xxxxxx~~ any other action than maintaining the status quo.

On December 31, however, the internees ~~entered upon~~ ^{begin} a hunger strike. This was, in substance, a protest against treatment by the army. ~~The~~ Stockade internees explained the event as follows:

~~xxxxxx~~

INSERT A TO B on Jan. 14 Interview here, pp. 8, 9. Follow by ² for note.

.

^{1/}
~~Shimizu:~~ Of course, prime motive of the hunger strike was one way of trying to clear up the incident in the center; they thought, because negotiations within the stockade, some were transferred to other tents just because they laughed or talked too much. We couldn't tell what was what. ~~On the 31st, I think, we had to stand in the snow for about three hours. Within that period, the Army had got into the barracks and some of our belongings were stolen by them. Hunger strike was caused by this. You see the Army took a strict stand--bread-and-water attitude. The strike continued for about a week, but it didn't affect any lives."~~³

Later it was rumored that the internees had taken fruit and vitamin pills into the stockade with them to fortify themselves in case of a hunger strike. A stockade internee when informed of this ~~by the opposition xxxxx~~ said:

Shimizu: Even during the hunger strike, I didn't know that some men ate food because I was just sleeping and barely living on water. I couldn't believe that people who weren't so young and people who were suppose to be responsible men did such a thing."⁴

~~Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, p. 7.~~

~~Report of the informal interview of the responsible men of various divisions with the detained stockade internees, Jan. 13, 14, pp. 8, 9.~~

³ ~~ibid.~~, Jan. 13, 1943, p. 3.

⁴ ~~ibid.~~, Feb. 5, 1944, p. 4

A soldier gave an interesting but fragmentary account of ~~the~~
 an incident which preceded the ^{hunger} strike; taking place on December 30 or
 31:

"One of the men in the stockade answered a soldier back, telling him,
 'You wouldn't be so brave if you didn't have a gun. If you didn't have that
 gun I'd kill you.'¹ The soldier told this boy to get over into the tent stockade,
 where, as the ~~xxx~~ narrator said, 'It was colder than blazes.' 'And,' added
 the soldier, 'any of the rest of you who want to go with him just step
 forward.' All fifty or so Japanese standing about stepped forward. The
 two tents would not accomodate so many men. 'Get back there, you _____',
 said the soldier.'²

~~the~~

When the news of this hunger strike filtered out to the colony it
 caused great concern among the relatives and friends of those interned.
~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ The writer was not able to ^{reach} ~~get~~ any satisfactory
 attitudes from ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ evacuees ~~not~~ intimately concerned.

~~Evidently the xxxxxx~~

Evidently some of the unapprehended members of the Baihyo Sha Kai
 or *staunch supporters*
 did attempt to start a camp wide hunger strike in sympathy with the
 internees. How this was received by ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ is frankly related by
 two informants, the former a strong Baihyo Sha Kai supporter.

"N":

Some of the fellows put in the stockade received rough treatment.
 So they said, 'We're going on a hunger strike.' That was January 1 or
 December 31. That leaked out. So the fellows still standing for status
 quo came around to each block in the morning and said, 'We are going on
 a hunger strike.' But at that time most of the block representatives had
~~been pulled in xxxxxx they had xxxxxx and xxxxxx~~ not been pulled in.
 (Perhaps about half were still free, 22 having been apprehended in mid-
 December. R. H.) They had a meeting and came back to each block and said,
 'None of this is official.' So the hunger strike did not go into practice
 in the colony!³

¹ The young man's words were repeated to me by Robertsons

² Notes, March, p. 4/43.

³ ibid., p. 13.

"I" said:

Then also at that time they had a Second Negotiating Committee that wanted us to go on a hunger strike. That didn't last long. Everybody ignored it altogether. They sent people to the block representatives to try to influence the people. The blocks were to go on a hunger strike. The people ignored the Second Negotiating Committee." 1/

The hunger strike in the stockade was brought to a conclusion by Captain Hartman who called out one of the internees, Mr. Tsuda, and convinced him that the strike should end. Tsuda went back and talked the other internees into abandoning it.

As the period of deadlock drew on into six weeks the army began to find its position increasingly embarrassing. The colonists stubbornly refused to elect a new negotiating body. There was no indication that they would ever approach the Army in an attempt to settle the situation. Spicer described the position of the Army as follows:

"The army did not want it (control of camp), because their job was to fight war, they said. As soon as the Army had moved into the center it found its shortcomings. The Army leaders found out that the M. P.'s were lacking in ability and training badly in coping with the situation like that. The Department of Justice refused to take it over because of legal technicalities. It was held that the center would be considered as an internment camp if the Department of Justice took it over. And the American citizens of Japanese ancestry could not be interned." 2/

1/ Notes, Feb., p. 14.

2/ X's Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, 1944, p. 6.

RISE OF THE COUNTER-DAIHYO SHA KAI GROUP - THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Two factors were of the utmost importance in the development of the counter-Daihyo Sha Kai group, or the opposition group, which, for brevity, it would be called. These were the constant and unfailing encouragement given by the Administration and the Army and the fact that the Daihyo Sha leaders and block representatives XXXX had, by mid-December, been arrested and confined in the stockade. With the Negotiating Committee and its most ardent supporters out of the way, it was comparatively safe to proceed. Even so, the step took courage, for any opposition group was bound to be considered inu and bring abuse and possible assault upon itself.

The Advisory Council, the administrative body first contemplated in early October, represented the Administration in this delicate task. It had been

add others → The Advisory Council, the administrative body first contemplated in early October, was given the responsibility of making this contact. This body, it appears, ^{is} 25353625 was loosely organized directly after the incident of November 4 and functioned first of all as an advisory council to Mr. Best. Opler says: "It was organized to keep Best on the beam, for me to get help in dealing with the Administration."¹ In the large turnover which took place among the appointed personnel after the incident, several members left and were eventually replaced by Robertson, Head of Operations, Black, Head of Community Management, Markhim, Reports Officer, and McNeil, Head of Community Enterprises. ¶ This body took over completely the task of reinstituting rapport with the colonists. On December 11 they contacted the first group of Japanese, representatives from the Civic Organizations, a body on the WRA payroll whose duty it is to co-ordinate and facilitate relations between the block managers and the administration.

¹ Notes, Mar., p. 59.

Nisei (second generation), by strict definition any Japanese born in the United States or Hawaii. ~~Note/property/used/for/individual/younger/than~~ In popular usage, however, it denotes an individual younger than 45, who has accepted American culture, prefers to speak English, attends social dances, speaks abruptly and to the point "like an American."

Two former Tuleans, Mr. William Mayeda and Mr. Frank Furakawa and two newcomers, Mr. Shimada of Rohwer and Mr. Namekawa represented this group. ~~Opfer described these men as follows:~~

"This group was represented by two former Tuleans of good reputation: Mr. William Mayeda and Mr. Frank Furakawa. In addition, they included two newcomers, Mr. Shimada and Mr. Iwao Namekawa. Mr. Mayeda. . . is here simply because his parents appealed to him to remain with them because their other son had "forsaken them;" since that time, they have finally come around to agreement that Tule Lake is no place for him. Mr. Furakawa is also here simply because of family reasons; as the father of five young children, and the sole support of aged parents, he feels he cannot go elsewhere and relocate; his father intends to die in Japan. Mr. Shimada likewise seems to have regrets about coming to Tule Lake; he was made a block representative in the Negotiations Committee pattern of organization; he resigned because he thought the methods of the group were undemocratic and their goals open to suspicion. . . in the block . . . a number

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no greater contrast to ~~men like Kai, Kuratomi and the nucleus~~
~~of the Daihyo Sha could have been found, had it been sought~~
~~with scientific exactitude.~~

~~At the~~ ^{which} meetings which were held more and more frequently,
~~as December ended, the Administration was represented by the~~
~~Advisory Committee.~~ ^{At the first meeting, the four Japanese}
~~representatives~~ ^{There were four} ~~presented~~ ^{gave} their ^{opinion} view of the incident and the
Negotiating Committee, a view which agreed in all major points
with that held by the Administration. ~~In fact, it is not just~~
~~to remark that they told these members of the Administration~~
~~exactly what they wanted to hear.~~ Their account is freely
transcribed from Opler's letter of December 20;

The recent trouble had arisen because the "Jerome faction",
also called the Kai-Kuratomi clique, had come to Tule Lake
organized. This clique was also supported by and under pressure
from a strong arm bunch from Jerome and that the leadership
clique carried out the orders of this group "below it." The
colonists were supporting the interned members of the Daihyo Sha's
ward representatives, for although many colonists disagreed
with the methods of the Committee, they had elected seven of
them ward representatives. "Seven had been elected and seven
had been thrown in as 'specialists', among the latter being
the president and the Vice-President." After November 4, as
its members were picked up, the committee augmented itself.
"They elected seven men and then put seven others into watch
them. The Committee was a minority representation from the
start, but there was nothing to counteract them with. There
were a lot of people from Tule Lake who didn't like to be left

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out of it, but when all the 'black sheep' came into this camp, we were made to understand we couldn't have self-government, and even the Planning Board which isn't 'government' anyway, was broken up". When asked why the colony did not take steps, the representatives of Civic Organization pointed out that terrorism was feared: "A lot of people would speak up during the day, but they have to sleep in the colony at night; it would be different if we didn't have to live there."¹

Oplers conclusions from this conference were:

- (1) The Committee (Daihyo Sha Kai) was a minority faction.
- (2) Though a minority they exercised control by virtue of the fact that they had been elected, regardless of the methods; people felt they must be responsible for those in the military compound. "It was the principle of the thing."
- (3) Besides this, terroristic groups were making use of the situation to prolong the incident.²

redo. Some of the statements of this group are open to criticism. Discounting the unrepresentative character of the men giving the information, the statement that the Committee was "a minority representation with nothing to counteract them with" is a misrepresentation. Support of the Negotiating Committee was ~~general~~.³ No evidence has been produced which shows that the Jerome group came already organized or that Kai and Kuratomi were dominated "from below." The unanimous strike, the large attendance at the funeral and the demonstration of November 1,

¹Freely transcribed from Opler's letter, ibid, pp. 5, 6.

²ibid., pp. 6, 7.

³See pp. for confirmation by many informants.

the fact that the hiding leaders were not betrayed, the six months popular resistance to the acceptance of any other body of representatives, and the unmistakable public refusal to elect a new Representative Committee in May¹⁹⁴⁴, ~~creates~~ creates a body of evidence impossible to ignore. The effects of the fear of terrorism are exaggerated. It is inconceivable that terrorists alone could be responsible for the stubborn six months support of the Negotiating Committee.

The Administration's willingness to believe these men is understandable, since their statements, if correct, justified the policy followed during October and November. Moreover, with this anti-Daihyo Sha Kai group, represented by these men and by the heads of the Co-operative, lay the Administration's most obvious hope of breaking the status quo, and bringing about colony organization and a return to normal conditions which, it was hoped, would be followed by the withdrawal of the irksome Army rule.

After the Co-operative's successful defiance of the Daihyo Sha Kai, meetings between small groups of Japanese and the Advisory Council ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ were held almost daily. Ways and means of breaking the deadlock were discussed. Most prominent among the Japanese were Messrs. Shimada, Namekawa, Furakawa, Mayeda and Naydo of the Civic Organizations, and Akitsuki, Yamatani, Ikemoto and Hitomi of the Co-operative Enterprises; Kawaii of Housing and Takahashi, the prominent member of the Daihyo Sha also took an active part. The Administration, anxious to break the deadlock, made the very most of these contacts. Meanwhile, the army continued to arrest people, "much to the satisfaction of the opposition groups." 1/
1/ Community Analyst's Letter, Dec. 29, 1943, p. 4.

to counteract them

After the Co-op had successfully defied the ~~Daihyo~~ Daihyo Sha Kai
 a few Japanese began to meet almost daily with the Administration's
 Advisory Council to discuss ways and means of breaking the deadlock. Meanwhile the
 army continued its ~~pickup~~ arrests, "much to the satisfaction of the
 opposition ~~gov~~ groups."¹ Dr. Opler gives an excellent account of this
 gradual organization, ~~expressed in telling way~~ ^{in his letters to Spicer} ~~presenting the nation as a whole~~ ^{presenting the nation as a whole} ~~view narrating what occurred in~~
 detail and giving a very clear picture of the attitude of the Administration.
 Most prominent among ~~the Japanese who now approached the Administration were~~ ^{these men were}
 Yamatani and Takahashi, ~~ex-Daihyo Sha Kai members, Mr. Shimoda, Mr. Mayeda and~~ ^{and Shimoda,}
 Furakawa of the Civic Organizations, ~~and Mr. Akitsuki, Mr. Maruyama and others of the Co-operative Enterprises.~~
~~These men were~~ ^{Some of the individuals named above} ~~Among the first~~ ^{unpublished names of people}
 actions of these men ~~(names not given by Opler)~~ was their ~~deliberation~~
 of the ~~deliberation~~ ^{names of people} whom they labeled as trouble makers. ~~Almost every Japanese would~~
 have only one word for this ~~innuendo~~ ^{sort of person} but the Administration and the Army
 looked upon it as a hopeful sign that the colonists were ~~beginning to be~~
 beginning to be willing to transmit information to the
 officials. However, as was later to be proved all too clearly, these
 men were not typical of the large number of colonists. ~~Dr. Opler and Captain Hartman's interpretation~~
 was stated as follows:

These names, furnished by more than one group without solicitation,
 indicates that the colonists are beginning to get certain people's numbers
 and are in the mood to transmit that information both from group to group
 in the colony, and more significantly to Caucasian officialdom. The Army
 Intelligence officer, Capt. Hartman, reports the same tendency for people in
 the colony to point the finger, which he says, "is most unusual for Japanese,
 who detest informers and suspect officials." Thus the village is moving
 ahead to a breaking of the deadlock imposed by the Daihyo Shas by pointing the finger at particular individuals.

¹ Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, p. 4.

Trace informants. In general, the national security information is not to be used in the execution of the

The attitude which ~~is~~ seems particularly attractive to Dr Opler, ~~that they~~ ^{these men} i. e., that ~~they feel~~ ^{was} that Tule Lake is not really the place for them, would damn them with ~~the~~ the ordinary colonist. ^{said most residents} "Tule Lake", ~~they say~~, "is no place for people who feel like that."

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Opler states:

Mr Mayeda is here simply because his parents appealed to him to remain with them because their other son had "forsaken them." Since that time, they have finally come around to agreement that Tule Lake is no place for him. Mr. Furakawa is also here simply because of family reasons; as the father of five young children, and the sole support of aged parents, he feels he cannot go elsewhere and relocate; his father intends to die in Japan. Mr. Shimada likewise weems to have regrets about coming to Tule Lake; he was made a block representative in the Negotiating Committee; he resigned because he thought the methods of the group were undemocratic and their goals open to suspicion whereupon the block read in the washroom a number of charges against him, including the familiar oke of inu.²

Takahashi has the respect of the ~~Wool~~ Co-op, Vivio Org. and the opposition groups and has in the past, opposed the Kai-Kuratomi, or dominant clique, within the Daihyos. He is uniformly described as a man of good education, courage, and excellent reputation throughout the colony who was brought into the Daihyo's organization to lend his prestige; he opposed the Kai faction throughout though without effect, but did not resign like Yamatani and Shimada.³

Mr. Informants, in complete contrast, whether they are pro Daikyo Sha, anti Daikyo Sha or neutral ~~and~~ ~~unbiased~~ have nothing but contempt for these gentlemen. In many ~~of~~ ~~the~~ conversations, the mere mention of their

¹Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, pp. 4, 5.

² ibid., Dec. 10, p. 4.

3 ibid., Dec. 29, p. 5.

Kai could have been found.

The mention of their names

"There's a case I know of even here in camp where some parents expressly forbade a girl to go out with a boy whom they suspected of being eta."

(Here the informants wife interrupted.) "That happened to me. I was going out with a fellow and I was bawled out from every direction, my grandfather, my grandmother, my mother and father, my employer and even him (her future husband).

"The informant continued.) "In one case a girl married the guy regardless of what her folks and everybody else said. As a result her older brother cut her dead. He himself, when he was younger, married an eta and as a result there actually wasn't any discrimination against him or his wife, but just knowing he was married to an eta affected him. If he thought he had received any small slight it seemed to make him think that it was because he was married to this girl. They really lived a miserable life. She's dead now. After she dies his younger sister met this shin-heimin man and she wanted to marry him. He tried to stop her. But the girl was young and very much in love. She just told him off. He didn't want her to suffer as he had.

"There's another fellow in this camp. I've known him all my life. He's twenty seven years old and still unmarried. Enough said.

"I doubt if he's ever gone out with a girl steady. But he doesn't want to marry an eta girl. It's family pride with him. ~~He~~ wouldn't want to call it to the attention of other people."

- - - - -

"Even in this country a boy fell in love with a girl; they married. But then it was found that the girl was of the eta class. The boy's mother was very angry because of the stigma.

"I know of one case of marriage where the people were outstanding. An eta married and found it out later. He was threatening to kill himself, and shoot his sho

single
page

The writer noted ~~there is~~ no evidence that the dissemination of these minutes played ^a ~~any~~ part in discrediting the Daihyo Sha.⁴ ~~ph. citations~~ quoted on a ~~report to be typical.~~

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~~4 Coratideg Jula p~~

2. Community Analyst's Letter, Dec. 29, 1943
p. 4.

~~quoted or considered in drawing this conclusion.~~

The first ^{opposition group} ~~anti-status quo~~ meeting for which minutes are available was a ~~very~~ meeting of the Divisional Responsible Men of those divisions still functioning under the status quo ^{held on January 7.} ~~The~~ Representatives from the Packing ~~Shed~~ Shed, the Coal Crew, Maintenance, Time Keeping, Payroll and Accounting, Placement, Co-operative, Civic Organizations, Housing, Clothing Unit, Hospital, Construction, Mess Management, Warehouse, and the Garage attended. Colonel Austin, Lieutenant Forbes, Mr. Best and Mr. Huyoko attended. Colonel Austin made an address in which he said in part:

"The Army is interested, as you people are, in this colony returning to a normal condition. The Majority of the people are interested in a peaceful orderly existence. You people are in a position to take some responsibility in this regard, inasmuch as you know and have been working on the various jobs."

"Obviously after a period such as you have gone through, we must not start full speed. You have to build up gradually. I think you realize this and must bear this in mind in your discussion today."¹

Byron Akissuki, ~~who~~ who was serving as secretary to the Co-op at this ~~time~~ time, was elected ~~by~~ chairman. He then addressed the ~~body~~ assemblage stating that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the existing situation. 16,600 colonists had suffered because of the political conflicts neglect and blindness of a minority. This meeting had been called to find a solution to the present unhappy situation.

Mr. Shimada then spoke, explaining that he had gotten permission from Colonel Austin to meet with the Daihyo Sha Kai on January 5. However, ~~at~~ at the appointed time, Mr. Kozura of the Daihyo Sha did not appear ~~and~~ ~~stayed in his room~~ giving illness as his excuse and Mr. Kataoka acting in his behalf stated that without a responsible person to conduct the meeting they could not very well proceed. *Said Mr. Shimada:*

"In my opinion we certainly cannot rely on these Daihyo Shas. Even the Administration and the Army authorities feel the same. Colonel Austin therefore pointed out that various division heads should be the only source whereby

¹ Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake WRA Project, Jan. 7, 1944, p. 1.

solution can be attained."¹

Mr. Nakao reported that several warehouse workers had wanted to return to work. Dr. Miyamoto, stating that the doctors did not wish to be mixed up in politics, asked for permission to leave, which was granted him. ~~Mr. Nakao~~
~~considered the situation and decided that discretion was the better part~~
~~of valor.~~

~~Mr. Nakao reported that several warehouse workers had wanted to return to work. Dr. Miyamoto, stating that the doctors did not wish to be mixed up in politics, asked for permission to leave, which was granted him.~~

~~It is not inconceivable that~~ Mr. Kozuma heard of the formation of the
and intentions of the ~~gang~~ ^{perhaps} "goon squad" described on p. 61 and decided that discretion was the better part
of valor.

Mr. Naido then suggested that a resolution ~~be prepared~~ for returning to work be prepared, that a responsible political group be selected which would put this resolution to a vote; ~~that the maintenance of the Daihyo Shas be abandoned and~~ "abandon the existence of the Daihyo Shas; and finally foster the true Japanese spirit and base all our future ideas as a gentlemanly Japanese should."² Mr. Hitomi supported Naido's suggestion saying "A few beatings may result but such must be expected and prepared for." Mr. Namekawa moved that the question be put to a formal vote "and he motioned that the Daihyo Sha's ~~status~~ "Maintenance of status quo" be abandoned and workers accordingly return to their respective jobs."³ The motion was unanimously carried. Mr. Shimada suggested that Mr. Naido's motion be carried out as follows: the various divisions should meet and decide whether to accept ~~and~~ or reject the ~~new~~ resolution; the result should then be announced to the colonists; the resolution would then be put to a secret vote in each block. The minutes do not state whether this suggestion was voted upon, but it was ~~thereafter~~ followed explicitly in the ~~next~~ ^{following} week.

1 *ibid.*, p. .

2.

Two days later the Divisional Heads met again. Byron Akitsuki was again appointed chairman by general consent. Yamatani and Shimada were appointed his advisors. The results of the ~~vote~~ vote cast by the separate divisions on the proposed resolution was announced. The vote was decidedly in favor of returning to work. ~~It~~ Whether it was now necessary to take the referendum vote proposed by Mr. Shimada at the first meeting was now discussed at length. Opinions expressed are interesting.

T. Ikemoto: It is not necessary to take a referendum vote. People who are ~~not working~~ not working would naturally oppose it.

M. Shimada: Returning to work is the first step in restoring normal conditions; however, the question is whether to leave the camp in this abnormal condition or take the initiative step in an attempt to restore it, which should ~~be~~ absolutely be on the basis of public opinions and finally their votes.

J. Nakao: It is ~~very~~ necessary. We certainly need the support of the colonists.

Idamoto: I favor Mr. Ikemoto's suggestion. If the referendum should result unfavorably, it will mean a lot to those who want to return to work.

R. Kondo: Whether to return to work is a question for the workers to decide. It is unnecessary to refer such to the colonists.

J. Naido: "... I think it is our duty to have referendum vote. Otherwise the last meeting would be altogether meaningless." 1

The matter was put to a vote and resulted in 40 affirmative votes and two neutral. ^{of seven} Kawaii then moved that a committee ~~be~~ be elected to prepare and make plans for the taking of the referendum. The following nominations were made in order: ~~Mr.~~ Shimada, Akitsuki, Naido, Nakao, Okamoto, Yamatani and Namekawa. Mr. Kawaii promised to obtain ~~the~~ 1608 - A as ~~headquarters~~ temporary headquarters for this committee.

Having decided on a referendum vote, the Divisional Heads and their committee named above, realized that if their plan was to ~~be~~ be at all successful they must work so fast that the remnants of the Daihyo Sha ~~could~~ would not have time to organize any opposition. Accordingly on the morning of January 10 the section foremen and one unnamed Caucasian met and prepared

a working program to follow up the referendum results even though the referendum had not yet been held. The Employment Office was moved back to the Colony, and a back to work program planned on the basis of ~~obtaining~~ obtaining a nuclear staff of key workers. It was decided to employ ~~secretarial~~ Japanese secretarial workers in those of the Administrative offices where financial and confidential records were not kept; a security check, with the Army and Internal Security, was added to the ordinary recruitment procedure; the possibility of opening the ~~schools~~ schools and sharing the school buildings with the Kokumin Gakko, the Japanese school, was discussed.¹

8

~~The~~

The referendum vote was scheduled for the evening of January 11. That morning the camp was deluged with mimeographed propaganda which was prepared by the ~~Divisional~~ Divisional ~~Heads'~~ Heads' committee. ~~IV~~ In this material, which is included below in toto, the Daihyo Sha Kai is accused of failure, ~~of bringing misery upon the people~~ and of bringing misery upon the people. Most important of all the committee ~~commits itself to an equitable distribution~~ commits itself to an equitable distribution of future employment, and, in ~~rather~~ somewhat ambiguous phrases to a release of the detained internees. ~~This latter commitment is worthy of careful note for~~ It was not carried out and this, ~~it brought more than any other single factor, brought about the eventual downfall of this anti-Daihyo Sha group in the eyes of the general public.~~

Both commitments are very significant, the latter in particular. The former was carried out incompletely and the latter not at all. This failure, more than any other single factor, brought about the eventual downfall of this anti-Daihyo Sha. The camp population had been led to expect action in releasing the detainees and when nothing was done, the precarious prestige of the opposition group evaporated rapidly.

The election was held by secret ballot, with soldiers present. Soldiers also assisted in the vote counting, which was ^{regarded} ~~looked upon~~ with suspicion by some evacuees.

The following interesting comments were made by ~~the~~ members of the opposition group, in the Civic Organization's office, the night the returns began to come in. Colonel Austin was present.

The vote from Block 11 was decidedly favorable (against the status-quo). ~~Sa/~~ Said Mr. Furukawa, "Why that was the headquarters of that bunch of blank-blanks! (Remnant of Daihyo Sha Kai) Maybe we ought to have them open up an office in every block. Then others would get a real taste of those guys."

When the vote was announced for Ward VI, it showed most blocks defeating the proposal. Statements like the following were made to Colonel Austin

"Were going to need a lot more fences around here."

"They ~~voted~~ against food too. How about a hunger strike for those guys."

"No coal for that block."

Austin said, "Let's give them weiners for a week." Someone answered, "Say, wait a minute -- that's food! real food! How about salt herring only? Flat stinking fishes?" Said Furukawa, "I say don't give them any food. They don't need it!"¹

~~Ward VI/VII/VIII/IX/X/Counted/11/~~

The ~~the~~ official report on this election was:²

Total number of ballots --	8941
Total No. of ballots AGAINST STATUS QUO --	4593
Total No. of ballots FOR STATUS QUO -----	4120
Plurality -----	473
Blank ballots -----	228
Valid ballots -----	8713

The pro-Daihyo Sha remnant immediately attacked this result and distributed the following ^{"report"} ~~and sheet~~ of which one sheet written in Japanese fell into the

¹ Community Analyst's Letter, Jan. 12, 1944, p. 4.

² ibid., Jan. 14, 1944, p. 3.

hands of the administration.

"Report of Present Condition"
by
Nippon Patriotic Society

"The results of the referendum votes taken by force on January 11, 1944, after due investigation, is as follows:

31 blocks for status quo
29 blocks against status quo
4 blocks not clear
1 block refused to vote

"Ballots carried away by the Army, without even opening was the reason. One block refused to vote as they decided it was not necessary. Total was 64 blocks which voted.

"Do you intend to support such a word and action to liquidate the status quo by betraying the Daihyo Sha, whom we, the whole colonists, elected? Do you recognize or consider this referendum taken without freedom of speech legal?

"Colonists: Do you intend to work from your own selfishness for a bait offered with false reports published by this so-called 'gogs'? Will you take action when you know it's dishonorable and accept their offer?

"We hereby submit to your cool and sane judgement on this matter."

"Nippon Patriotic Society"¹

This ~~paper~~ paper does not appear to have made much impression on the people. ~~Very few~~ Very few informants accuse the Administration or the Army of perpetrating a deliberate hoax. Most admit that the people were ~~discouraged~~ discouraged and impressed with the futility of carrying on the status quo. A few state that the people were frightened by the presence of the army at the polls and voted against status quo because they feared that ~~some~~ their ballot might be examined.

The Administration chose to regard this shallow victory, a majority of 2.7 % ~~as a sign of~~ of the ballots cast, as a sign of ~~the~~ the withdrawal of public support from the Daihyo Sha Kai. The small majority was ~~explained by pressure and threats~~ explained by pressure, ~~and~~ *and misunderstanding.*
Informants, however, give ~~different~~ *Japanese* different explanation. Many people were becoming tired of the inconveniences and hardships of the status quo, which appeared to be accomplishing nothing. Inconvenience and hardship

¹ ibid., p. 8.

² *ibid.*, p. 4.

January

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outweighed loyalty to the Representatives by a small margin.

"The main reason (status quo broke) was not because they didn't want to stick with the Negotiating Committee but -- one of the main reasons was lack of finance. Another reason is they didn't want to loaf along doing nothing. Time lags so monotonous. . . . If we were a bunch of Japanese soldiers quartered here, that is a different thing. But these are women and children and civilians.

"When the vote was taken here, ~~the~~ the status quo lost by 400 votes. That shows that the people who are favoring status quo are greater in number. Because many who favored status quo did not vote. They thought it was they way to go to the stockade. A lot of people thought they might be pulled in. They had a soldier by the vote box."¹

"This referendum vote -- the army more or less called that one. They were supposed to have united the people for the psychological moment to spring that question; whether they wanted to discard the status quo or continue. To help out, the bunch who wanted to discard the status quo kept pulling the people right and left. They said that anybody who was inciting the Japanese to continue the status quo strike, and that more or less damned a large majority, were only hurting themselves."

"Anyway, people got wise that the longer they maintained the status quo they were going to yank them and stick them in the stockade. ~~Yes~~

"Besides their finances were petering out. Here - they're still paying off on the October checks. ~~Now these fellows who were not working for the clothing allowance.~~ (This statement made in February). Now these fellows who were not working got no clothing allowance, no welfare, no income."

"Another point of view: the people here are supposed to be loyal to Japan now. Here's an argument some of the bright boys advanced. They said, in returning to normalcy we'll be drawing salaries. Then on top of that the government will have to pay us clothing allowance. That's just that much less money that the U. S. government is going to have to manufacture armaments to beat Japan.

"I couldn't see it. I know myself that regardless if the Japanese draw this monthly stipend, they'd not make much difference to the U. S. treasury. But it sounds good on the surface and it awayed some of the stubborn people.

"Two ~~xxxx~~ soldiers were present. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ . . . The soldiers with one Japanese present counted and tallied the votes."²

"You'd be surprised how many people voted for status quo. They were still gluttonous for punishment. or they had voted for it in the beginning. It was my opinion that status quo wouldn't accomplish a darn thing but would only increase the peoples' sufferings. You can't have status quo and expect things to improve."

¹From K. a neutral, Notes, Mar., p. 50.

²From I, a Daihyo Sha sympathizer, but not supporter, ~~V/V/V/V~~ Notes, Feb., p. 13, April, p. 31.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ETA DESCENT WITH REGARD TO MARRIAGE

All informants agree that prejudice against the eta has been greatly weakened among those Japanese residing in the United States and that it is gradually dying out. ~~Every one of our informants is an indication that any kind of discrimination is practiced here, either in the subject of marriage or in general.~~ However, ~~some~~ ^{in marriage} of discrimination has yielded far more stubbornly to the effects of a new economic and cultural environment. Repeatedly informants say, "There is no discrimination at all - except marriage," or, "Marriage is where your ancestry still counts." Especially among the issei." Nisei almost invariably comment upon the fact that the issei still consider ~~the~~ ^{any more} marriage with an eta out of the question.

"All issei strongly disprove of marrying eta"¹ (6)

Mr. Hikida, the only issei who spoke freely on the subject, ~~admitted:~~ ^{admitted prejudice}

"The shin-heimin: that is serious. Especially when it gets to the nisei marrying. First they must look up their family history. It's very deep rooted. In my case, I want to be fair and would like to forget those things. But somehow it's deep rooted from my childhood. I can't mix (with eta) except as a friend. But in case of marriage I wouldn't give my daughter to a shin-heimin." (23)

~~The issei is the one who is the most prejudiced.~~

Mrs. Okuno ~~speaking of~~ ^{who discussed} the subject with her daughter and the an issei writer said:

"But people think about it especially when a daughter or son is going to get married.....that's why it's hard to get married in this camp, because they can't find out so much (cannot investigate ancestry properly)." (146)

Insert A here →

Nisei vary greatly in their attitudes: some state absolutely that they would never marry an eta; ~~and~~ others, that they would like to be fair and forget, but they have to think of what might happen to them or ~~the~~ their children if they returned to Japan; others outwardly give the impression that they have no prejudice but still admit ~~that they would~~ ^{they would hesitate to keep company with an eta boy} around with an eta boy, then I'd have to marry very young nisei, particularly adolescents, ~~denounce~~ denounce the ~~prejudice~~ prejudice as silly or evil and

1 See p.
2 See p.
3 See p.

← I will fill in pages later
p. is small letter

"The first status quo (vote) proved the situation at that time. The difference was so small; that proved that the residents were against the Administration. If they had been in favor of the Administration, the vote at that time would have been overwhelming."¹ ~~(p. 23-24)~~

Two informants who voted for the status quo ~~pp/xx~~ expressed themselves as follows:

"O" a conservative, block manager of a very pro-status quo block:

"I said 'No' because our block said No. I thought deep in my heart it was very silly to keep on in a situation like this. We might as well change the system and have a better way to run the camp. I didn't have an objections to that election. I thought we did not have the authority to run the camp. WRA has the power. We listen to what they say and obey the law. If we keep going forever, we're just sunk."² ~~(p. 23)~~

"N" a Baihyo Sha supporter:

"I voted for the status quo. I said, 'Since I signed that petition I couldn't never back up as a man.'³

The Divisional Heads met the day after the election (~~Jan. 12~~ Jan. 13) to plan the back to work movement. ~~It was~~ ^{they} decided not to circulate each block result, since in blocks where the status quo had ~~lost~~ ^{lost}, those who had voted for ~~status quo~~ status quo might be criticized. It was thought wiser merely to tell the people that status quo had been defeated, 36 to 27.⁴

Reporting back to work "tomorrow" was conceded to be impossible, since many former evacuee positions were still filled by Caucasians who would require some notice of termination. The ~~very close tie up between the~~ ^{delicate and difficult position of the} ~~successful opposition who now had to take on the Negotiating Committee's~~ Divisional Heads and the Advisory Committee is shown by the following section of the minutes:

"The Advisory Council, ~~consisting of the following persons~~ . . . plans to hold a meeting probably today with all division chiefs, sections heads, sub-section chiefs, or whoever is at the head, confer with the evacuee leader for that particular division, section, etc., as the case may be, about the steps to be taken for 'back-to-work' movement. There have been many changes

¹ Notes, May 21, p. 6.

² ibid., April, p. 23.

³ ibid., p. 22.

⁴ Minutes of the Special meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake Center Jan. 12, 1944, p. 1.

Back of dealing with the Japanese -

THE IMPORTANCE OF ETA DESCENT WITH REGARD TO MARRIAGE

All informants agree that prejudice against the eta has been greatly weakened among those Japanese residing in the United States and that it is gradually dying out. However, discrimination in marriage has yielded ~~more~~ stubbornly to the effects of a new ~~or~~ cultural environment. Repeatedly informants say, "There is no discrimination at all any more ^{now} 3735513 - except marriage," or, "Marriage is where your ancestry still counts; especially among the issei." Nisei almost invariably comment upon the fact that the issei still consider marriage with an eta out of the question.

"All issei strongly disapprove of marrying eta."¹ (6)

pin' place { "When there is a marriage here some parents actually write back to Japan to find out if they can find out any of "that". The grooms family usually do it."² (17)

"Only until marriage is involved with the parents put their foot down."³ (3)

1 See p.

2 See p.

3 See p.

in the administrative staff. Some of these heads may not be cooperative; their attitudes cannot be changed in two days. Administrative policy is to cooperate as much as possible with the colony. On the other hand, it must be understood that pressure down here would not be tactful on our part nor welcome to the Caucasian Staff."¹

It was also decided to publish the true facts about the hunger strike in the stockade, and relieve the peoples' minds. (Incidentally, the Division Heads themselves, did not know these facts when this decision was made.)

It was moved by Mr. Kondo, seconded by Mr. Shimada and carried unanimously that the Committee of Seven, be ~~appointed~~ officially recognized by the Administration and the Army, and serve as the chief representative body, to dissolve as soon as normalcy returned to the center. These were the seven men elected January 9 to make plans for the referendum: Shimada, Naydo, Namekawa, Yamatani, Okamoto, Nakao, and Akitsuki.

On the next day, this ~~committee~~ Coordinating Committee, as yet not approved by the Authorities, interviewed a group of stockade internees without consulting the Administration. Opler says that the Administration did not learn of this until January 15 "too late to prevent it."² The Committee realized that it had pledged itself to facilitate the release of the internees as parts of its "abandon status quo" ~~program~~ program, and realized also, probably far better than the Administration, that the people expected this of them and that failure would mean their downfall.

The internees interviewed were Hoshiko, Mohri, Shimizu, Inouye, Katayama, and Nakamoto. Opler says this group "were by no means moderates, though Shimizu and Katayama were so described."³ This interview was held entirely in Japanese. No Caucasians were present, the soldier, who had escorted the internees, remaining outside.

¹ Ibid.

² Community Analyst's Letter, Jan. 14, 1944, p. 9.

³ Ibid.

The committee actually asked for several members of the Negotiating Committee, but the Army refused this.

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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

When compared to Japan

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in the administrative staff. Some of these heads may not be cooperative; their attitudes cannot be changed in two days. Administrative policy is to cooperate as much as possible with the colony. On the other hand, it must be understood that pressure down here would not be tactful on our part nor welcome to the Caucasian staff."¹

It was also decided to publish the true facts about the hunger strike in the stockade *(which was, incidentally, not yet known to the Division Center)*.

It was moved by Mr. Kondo, seconded by Mr. Shimada and carried unanimously that the Committee of seven be called the Co-ordinating elected Committee. These were the seven men ~~appointed~~ on ~~December~~ January 9 to make plans for the referendum. Shimada, Naydo, Namekawa, Yamatani, Okamoto, Nakao, and Akitsuki. It was decided that a request be made that this committee be officially recognized by the Administration and the Army, to dissolve as soon as normalcy returned to the Center.

On January 15 this committee was so recognized and the Army simultaneously withdrew the greater part of its colony patrols. Sentries, *and no member of the appointed Personnel was allowed to enter the camp without a military escort.* however, remained at all gates. ~~The Army~~ The Army withdrawal may not have been specifically connected with the breakdown of the status quo. Opler states that Best had been "rankling under the situation...It was wonderful because Col. Meek was kicking Best around. He would come all the way from Ft. Douglas to do it, and he gave no indication of a strategic retreat whatever. ... Best was tipping off Cozzens on what pariahs WRA was in the picture. It was WAR v. WRA. ... Cozzens took up the deal that ran Meek off the project. . . The new arrangement was that WRA could call in and off the dogs of war. With the old arrangement they could get them in but not out."²

~~Ibid.~~

² Notes, April, p. 25.

The next day, January 13, the Divisional Heads met again ~~W/X/X~~ to lay additional plans for the "back to work" movement. Mr. Huycke, Head of Community Management, who had never been ~~very~~ popular with the Japanese, was present as representative of the Administration and ~~to~~ report ^{ed} on the meetings of the Appointed Personnel (Community Management, Administrative Management and Operations) which had been held ~~11/11/44~~ ~~1944/11/11~~ that day and the day before. Throughout the meeting Mr. Huycke stressed evacuee responsibility in solving the work problem. He was, however, met with numerous requests from the divisional heads; requests for betterment of living conditions very similar to those made by the Negotiating Committee ~~two~~ two months before.

Huycke reported that the Administrative Division meetings had gone very well, with the exception of the Operations Division where there was "a solid block" that felt "somewhat uneasy." They feared "insubordinate sassiness," ~~from the evacuees~~ from the evacuees returning to work and "lack of respect on their authority." They had "also raised the problem...that there was a tendency of the crew to quit at 3:00 in the afternoon." ~~3:00~~ Huycke opined that "it is up to the foremen to control their crew to see that they do an honest day's work. . . You are working for yourselves and not WRA. That's what we have to get across to the crews." ~~12/12/~~ Huycke also stressed that ~~(12/12/)~~ "finishing of schools is your problem, production of food, the delivery of coal. . . I think the supervisor of the coal crew should be the matter for the evacuee heads to solve and not for the administrative personnel." 1/ (12)

A question was then raised from the floor as to whether WRA could furnish gloves and overalls to the coal crew. Huycke said he believed they would be provided. Another evacuee then remarked, "Lumber crew takes one 1/ Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake Center, Jan., 13, 1944, pp. 1, 2.

According to Opler, this gesture was a bluff on Best's part. He ~~did~~
~~not~~ merely pretended to ~~send~~ send the telegram. From here on matters

pair of gloves in a week. That'll cost 45¢. If you take 45¢ a week, BOY!"1/
Shoes were also requested.

Idemoto then stated that it was impossible to keep the coal crew working until 4:30. "Some time we have to work so hard some bunch of radicals all get on trucks and just go home. You can't control them then."1/ Huycke suggested that "Community Management devise some plan to ~~control~~ control such parties.

"There must be a community unit where problems must be solved. Solved through a strong well-knit ~~evacuees~~ organization. We want to get rid of the idea of ~~xxxx~~ appointed personnel to solve all these problems. You've got to solve it yourself. If we have up-rising against WRA and Army, they may take over the camp again and this will be just a prison camp, then, they will have to solve your problems."1/

He added that the problems at Tule Lake had been the result of two major causes, (1) Lack of evacuee community organizations carrying great responsibility and having wide sanction and (2) Lack of or absence of a well-knit administration with a clearly announced policy and working together.

Huycke was then asked outright how many people could return to work. From his answer it is obvious that he did not know, but he spoke at length around the point. Eventually he said, "Don't worry, I believe we can develop work for everybody. I'm not going to say what it is, because I will be making a commitment.

"I don't believe an employment ceiling will be applied in this Center. Principle of number of persons per family is not being applied here. It may never go into effect in Tule Lake. I am sure you will all find employment but it must be an honest day's work."1/

~~//Huycke/has/proved to/be/wrong~~

(In the six months which followed Huycke proved to be wrong in both these statements. An employment ceiling was applied to Tule Lake in June 1944, only two persons being allowed to work in each family, and only one, if the family consisted of a married couple. There was still ~~byxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ an enormous list of persons desiring employment.)

Huycke then outlined the contemplated "Back to Work" process:
1/ ibid., p. 3.

"I have no class distinction for my part. I don't have no fear for a title holder. I feel no personal pride over any very plain guy in the hill-billy country. To me, everybody's human and the same. But what I fear socially in American customs is marriage. It is necessary to consider the taint of infectious diseases such as epilepsy and T. B. lineage. That is a point in which I say American custom is unhealthy. It's a good thing to know what family your husband is from for these reasons."1 (13.14)

Mr. "O" a kibe i stated:

"If we were married in Japan the families would go where we were born and look up all the records, for T. B. or disease."

"There's a good point in looking up the family history. Suppose there's a feeble minded person. The way my mother told me, that's ~~23272327~~ the real reason. They look up the family's life and that included the health and the age (age of family line) of the family. The main point is the healthy line. It doesn't matter if the family is samurai. If your're an old family, it counts too." ² (7)

I think health standards are good; but ~~8824067~~ not money and things like that (eta descente).³ (15)

"When there is a marriage here some parents actually write back to Japan to find out if they can find out any of "that" (eta descent). They also 370727272727 look for sicknesses."4 (17)

"Marriage may mean a good deal in Japan. The family's history and

1. See p
2. " "
3. " "
4. " "

"The various section heads up there ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ (the Administration) were instructed today and yesterday to decide which key worker or workers they wished returned ~~to~~ to work tomorrow and Saturday. They are taking those names to the Police Office. These names have to be cleared with the Army. . . The names (when cleared) are taken to Mr. Fagan. He makes assignments and the section head then makes personal contact with you. . . The back to work process will be gradual." 1/ 4

Yamatani then asked that these reassigned workers be given their clothing allowance and added ~~that~~ "We do not want to ask WRA ~~being~~ reason." Huycke further explained that Mail and ~~File~~ and Statistics ~~of~~ sections would no longer hire evacuees "inasmuch as vital information (may be) forwarded to the Spanish Consul and WRA will be put in a bad light and they do not want to be fools again." 2/ He ~~also~~ also explained that workers would be given passes in order to ~~be~~ come into the administration area for work.

Yoshida pointed out to Mr. Huycke that the food situation was still critical and sounded very like a ~~Dark~~ member of the Negotiating Committee when he said:

"Lots of workers are skeptical about the food situation in camp. If we can get some Caucasian to come into the Mess Halls and actually try the food that the evacuees are eating and what kind of food are being served, I think we can have better food for the same price and avoid future troubles. Some Mess Hall crew are taking food home, some are lost on the road to the Mess Halls. The appointed Personnel can compare the food and see where ~~it~~ it's being lost." 3/

~~Yoshida~~

Yoshida stated also that food was the biggest problem in the center and that eating and sleeping are the only things he enjoyed here. He requested that diet specialists be hired.

Kawaii then asked what procedure was to be followed when a person wishing work was rejected by the police. Huycke stated that he had the right of appeal to Mr. Best. 3/ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

After Mr. Huycke left the meeting the discussion turned to the function of the proposed Coordinating Committee. Kawaii recommended that this Committee

1/ ibid., p. 4.

2/ ibid., p. 5.

3/ ibid., p. 6.

should assume the position of a Coordinating body and should also be privileged to ~~go in~~ investigate the history and records of individuals. 1/

On the ~~xxx~~^{same} day, this Coordinating Committee on their own initiative interviewed a group of stockade internees. Opler says that the Administration did not learn of this until January 15 "too late to prevent it." 2/ The Committee realised that it had pledged itself to facilitate the release of the internees as a part of its "abandon status quo" program and realised also, probably far better than the Administration, that the people expected this of them and that failure would mean their downfall.

The internees interviewed were Hoshiko, Mohri, Shimizu, Inouye, Katayama, and Nakamoto. Opler says this group "were by no means moderates, though Shimizu and Katayama were so described." 2/ The Committee actually attempted to interview several members of the Negotiating Committee, but the Army ~~xxx~~ refused this. 3/ Akitsuki described the behavior of the internees when they were brought to the Administration building: "They acted like cornered animals. They wouldn't even sit down." 4/

At this meeting the members of the Coordinating Committee explained the process of the referendum vote, stating: "efforts ~~to~~ in trying to get you people released from the stockade should be the preliminary step, prior to our ultimate objective (return of normal conditions)." 5/ They asked for ~~bringing about normal conditions and~~ the personal opinions of those present on ways of bringing about this desired return to normal. Four of the six internees present must have been exceedingly taciturn, for they said not one word that is recorded in the minutes. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Only Shimizu was inclined to be cooperative. He fenced with the Coordinating Committee but refused to give any advice or express himself as to the attitude of the internees as a whole. He did not even explain the hunger strike, which the Coordinating Committee

1/ ibid., p. 8.

2/ Community Analyst's Letter, Jan. 14, 1944, p. 9.

3/ Report of the Informal Interview of the Responsible men of various divisions with the detained stockade internees, Jan. 13, 1944, p. 1. (translated from Japanese).

4/ Notes, Mar., p. 24.

5/ ibid., Note 3, p. 2.

greatly desired to be explained, so that they might gain credit for reassuring the people. Inouye, the only other internee who spoke, reaffirmed his loyalty to the Negotiation Committee and reproved Akitsuki for asking "silly questions."

Shimada of the Coordinating Committee, restated his ~~body's~~ body's humane goal:

~~181/~~~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

"We thought it more important and humanly to work on the release of those detained, since some are so worried. Recently a woman, whose husband is detained, told me that their chief object in coming into this center was because they wanted to return to Japan and she certainly doesn't want to leave her husband here -- dead.."¹

(4)

~~Shimizu promised to "compile the opinions of the internees" and then~~
~~meet again.~~²

Shimada pointed out the hopelessness of relying on the Spanish Consul, reading his report to the internees, and explaining that the jurisdiction of the Spanish Consul applied only to those persons not born in Japan.

It is very interesting that only two of the internees spoke. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ According to the minutes, four said not a word throughout the entire meeting.

Shimada promised to "compile the opinions of the internees" and present them to the Coordinating Committee at a second meeting, which was the only point gained by the Coordinating Committee.

On the next day (Jan. 14) ~~another meeting~~ the second meeting was held. The same internees attended. In this meeting the internees took the offensive and held it. They met the Coordinating Committee with a barrage of questions on the legitimacy of their statement and threw a good deal of cold water on the closeness of the referendum vote. They asked why ~~other~~ members of the Negotiating Committee had not been called out and were told that the Army had refused permission. Shimizu (internee) ~~then~~ then stated that he had discussed the Committee's proposition ~~with~~
~~279~~ at a meeting of 247 of the stockade internees and explained their attempt to bring back the camp to a normal condition. He pointed out, however, that "merely return to work of a portion of the colonists is not enough."²

¹/ ibid., p. 4.

²/ ibid., Jan. 14, 1944, p. 2.

of returning to Japan owing to the prejudice more ~~more~~ tenaciously,
~~which the nisei and older nisei~~; ~~and it is the power but not the~~
~~to~~ ^{often} to apologize for it but admit its power; younger nisei abhor it.
 Some nisei defend their unwillingness to marry eta not only for their
 own sake, should they return to Japan, but for the sake of their
 children's future marital ~~changes~~ ^{opportunities}.

In general, the concept that ~~an person's~~ the health ^{history}
~~history~~ of a proposed spouse should be carefully examined is more
 tenacious ^{among the nisei} than fear of an eta alliance.

Folk beliefs ~~which distinguish~~ that the eta may be distinguished
 by peculiar ~~which~~ physical characteristics or behavior are fairly common.
 These are ~~far stronger~~ logically, far stronger among persons who
 possess considerable prejudice. Interestingly enough, eta are reputed to
 be ~~excellent~~ talented at making money.

Pride in ~~which is~~ shizoku descent and respect accorded
 to persons of shizoku birth is, in comparison to prejudice against
 an eta marriage, almost non-existent ~~in~~ among Japanese residing
 in the United States.

This, is was discovered later, was a falsehood, No meeting was held and the six internees had merely talked the matter over among themselves . 1/

1/ Report of the Informal Meeting of the Stockade Internees and the
Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Feb. 5, 1944, pp. 2, 3.

Shimada replied by reaffirming that the Committee were working with "sincerest faith." Akitsuki added, ~~Why/Why/Why~~ "We have no political ambitions whatsoever. We have strongly resolved to dissolve this group as soon as the Center returns to its normal conditions, as soon as people go back to work, as soon as we succeed in getting the release of those justifiable colonists detained, and finally when the responsible political group is established."¹

Shimizu (internee) remarked that since ~~4/4~~ according to the voting returns, 4,000 people still favored the status quo, it might be dangerous for a proportion of the people to return to work. Inouye (internee) and apparently a much stronger supporter of the Negotiating Committee than Shimizu, added:

Yes, after looking at the results, it's barely half and half. I wonder if the workers returning to work on Monday could go without complications. I surely hate to see the Japanese divided and hate to see them fighting with each other. It's obvious that majority of colonists have opposed status quo. If a portion return to work what do you think these people will think or what kind of reactions will they take? They might take an exactly reverse attitude instead of calmly, peacefully yielding to the winning side. In that case will you people take the responsibility? I hate to see anything like that happen, after all the things you people have gone through. Have you anything prepared in the event of such a circumstance?"²

Akitsuki replied ~~with an illustration~~ by comparing the ~~the~~ colony situation to the United States's presidential campaign, in which the "American people were divided when Roosevelt and Wilkie were running for President." But after Roosevelt won, all the people supported him. "Why can't we do that?" Inouye ignored Akitsuki and continued:

"The referendum was won by a bare majority, but I personally think that in reality status quo won. After all that hardship and all that misery the people had gone through for a long time, little less than a half still supported status quo. Without giving that point a thorough consideration and should people return to work on Monday, it may be pretty hard to continue or reestablish friendly relations among the Japanese. You may be worried about that point, but so are we."³

Shimada retorted that it was because the ~~the~~ Coordinating
^{1/}ibid., p. 2.
^{2/}ibid.,
^{3/}ibid., p. 3.

to notice any difference.

It is possible that there is ^{a slight} tendency on the part of eta in this country to isolate themselves and associate with each other. This subject, however, must be receive far more careful investigation. All informants who touched upon the subject agree that it was much easier to tell eta from non-eta in pre-evacuation days. "Everything is mixed up here in camp. We have a lot more important things to think about."

MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS ON TREATMENT OF ETA IN UNITED STATES - THE ETA AS CAPITALISTS

Eta in Japan
Mr. Fukushima, who was born in 1894 and left Japan when he was 17, offered the following reminiscences. They may be considered quite accurate; since the informant is very honest.

"Even in my childhood days the eta were allowed to attend public school, even among the grammar school children. But they still were looked down on. I still remember eta children used to have a hard time. They knew what they were and they didn't even try to mix among the average children, except in the functions of school activities.

In my town which was of pretty big size (20,000 people) there was no particular eta village. There were two families who lived in a desolate place. The two or three children from these two families used to come to school with me. In the next village, four miles away, there was a separate eta village of 30 families. They all farmed as their main occupation. In their spare time they were shoemakers, shoe repairers, slaughterers, meat merchants and geta (wooden clogs) repairers.

In this country (U. S.) a butcher can be a big potatoe. But in Japan, even though they have great wealth, they are nothing. In my

I have encountered this phenomenon at Lake Lake & will continue to investigate it

was worried that they were consulting the internees.

Shimizu then asked bluntly to what extent the Committee was attempting to get releases, pointing out that "the reason why status quo came into existence was chiefly for the purpose of getting our release."1/ ... You cannot remedy and settle this situation.. by merely liquidating status quo. Normalcy will automatically come back if you solve the root of it."1/ Mohri (internee) asked if they had made any arrangements with the Administration. Shimada ~~xxx~~ stated that they had tried and failed, and so had concluded that seeing the internees personally was the only way out.

Shimizu (internee) then stated his personally opinion that "if one or two men are left behind the rest of us cannot come out of the stockade. . .

If we are all released status quo will automatically disappear."² Going back to work was vain if the condition were not remedied fundamentally.

Shimada ~~NI~~ asked to repeat that the Army would not give them a chance to talk about release, until normal conditions had returned. Said Inouye (internee)

"The opinion of the internees in the stockade is that 'if one go out, we all go out, if one stay in we all stay in.' Do you realize why the people are so firm in their conviction?"3 // // . . . I think it is only proper to get the Negotiating Committee released first. If you don't do that the others will not come out. If release is impossible and the Army continues to ~~deny status quo~~ repress us, we will still continue to favor status quo, since that's the only thing we can do."3/

Shimizu (internee) asked if the Committee were willing to negotiate with the Administration for release en masse%. Shimada replied:

"We tried as I said before, we tried all methods and ways, but was kicked each time. This was the only alternative."

Katayama continued to press the question, asking:

"What is your outlook? What are you trying to tell us? Are you trying to get our understanding or concession?"

Shimada replied that the Committee was trying to get the internee's understanding, ~~and~~ cooperation and frank opinion. Mohri (internee) replied that the Committee had the internee's cooperation but asked: ~~if~~

1/ *ibid.*, p. 3

2/ ib id., pp. 3, 4.

3/ ibid., p. 4.

~~It is commonly believed that great many~~

Fukuoka ken is heavily populated by eta. Consequently anyone who emigrated from there is ^{vulnerable to} ~~put under suspicion by~~ gossips. Unusual skill in making geta or zori (wooden clogs and sandals) ~~will~~ ^{may} also give rise to malicious speculation.¹

Conclusions

No evidence can be brought forward that the eta bear any distinguishing physical characteristics. However, that some of that ^{group} ~~class~~ differ in appearance from the Japanese ~~is~~ ^{is} firmly believed by several informants. A few issei are said to have the ability of being able "to tell right away." Unusual beauty in the women and a red and inflamed condition of the eyes and eye-lids are the two most important means of distinction. It is probable that a considerable number of additional betraying characteristics ^{might} ~~would~~ be added to the list, were this study pursued further.

Nisei who have wholly or partially divorced themselves from the Japanese point of view, point out that these notions on appearance are most unreliable and state that they have never been able

1 See p.

"Don't you ~~people~~ think you people have more or less overridden us in not consulting or conferring with us before the referendum. If you people had any sincerity I don't see why you overlooked that."

Shimada: We admit that we overrode you people, but you see we tried to put this issue over in a matter of two or three days that. . . .

Inouye: (interrupting him) What is your future plan and what kind of negotiations are you expecting to carry on in regard to our release?

This problem does not concern the 247 ~~colonists~~ detained nor does it concern the mere 16,000 colonists -- this is a very delicate problem which ~~affects~~ affects Japan and America. Do you realize that?"^{1/}

Shimada and Akitsuki reaffirmed their ~~helplessness~~ helplessness in the face of the Administration's resolve that a normal condition must precede releases. Mohri (internee) then demanded unconditional release of all the internees, which, he said, would automatically solve the problem. Naide (Coordinating Committee) said, ~~that~~ "That may be impossible." Shimizu (internee) promised that if the Negotiating Committee were released, they would not mix in politics. Akitsuki remarked that negotiations with the Administration would be facilitated if they would give them such an assurance in writing, and pointed out that the Committee "had its weaknesses too, lest we are accused or suspected by the Administration."

Shimizu (internee) added that if unconditional release were impossible, the 14 members of the Negotiating Committee should be released for a few hours and they would then convince the people to yield to the plans of the Coordinating Committee. The Committee did not commit itself on this plan and after ~~some~~ additional discussion on the closeness of the vote Akitsuki said:

"Let me say this. We don't want to annoy the Japanese Government any more. We know that they have plenty on their hands. Let's try to solve our own problems with our own hands. We must fully realize that if we fail this time, the whole thing will go on a stand-still."^{2/}

Mohri then explained the hunger strike,^{3/} and with Akitsuki's
^{1/} Ibid., p. 5.

^{2/} ibid., p. 8

^{3/} See p. .

case which is occurring at Gila:

"I know that they refer to some people here in camp as being "that". "So what can you expect?" they say. I knew one girl here. I was just amazed that she came from that class. She was an outstanding person. But she and her husband never began to call on people. The people she lived near said, "She is peculiar. She has odd ways." Even here in camp people who know themselves to be eta keep away from the others." (3)

Mrs. Yamaguchi adds the following information on California.

and the Center. (Cf. p. also.)

"But the older people, the issei eta stuck together. They would talk to other issei but they barely ever associate. If they do, a non-eta will go down a road."

Mr. "A" of the Co-operative (one of the most able men in Canal camp, respected by both evacuees and members of the appointed personnel) is one. He was one of the biggest objectors in that marriage. He's very well to do.

"In block "X" there's a lot of "A's" relatives and his family. His daughter married a boy who's supposed to be of an eta family. They owned the store in our town. It was the "B's" son marrying the "A" daughter. All of them (in Canal camp) are just practically related and many live in the same block." 2 (16-17)

Conclusions

No evidence can be brought forward that the eta bear any distinguishing physical characteristics. However, ~~that they~~ *the above remarks show that believe* 27272 ~~is believed~~ by some Japanese that they do. A few issei are said to be able "to tell right away." Unusual beauty in the women, and a red and inflamed condition of the eyes and eye-lids are paradoxically the two most ~~importantly mentioned~~ *important* means of distinction. A delicate transparent skin and an extremely flat root of the nose over which the skin is tightly drawn were mentioned only once, 27272 727272 It is ~~possible~~ *probable* that a considerable number of additional betraying characteristics have not, as yet, come to the attention of the writer.

27272 727272 727272 727272 727272 727272 727272 727272

Nisei who have wholly or partially divorced themselves from the Japanese point of view point out that 27272 7272 these notions on appearance are a folk belief and state that they have never been able

1 - See p.

2 - See p.

3 - See p.

request that the Negotiating Committee put into writing whatever they wish to say to the people, the meeting closed.

On the same day ~~the Coordinating Committee met with~~ a delegation of the Divisional Responsible Men met with the Advisory Council which Lt. Forbes was also present. was represented by Messrs. Opler, McNeil and Silverthorne. The Administration was as yet not aware of the meetings which the as yet unauthorized Coordinating Committee had held with the stockade internees. Yamatani brought up the problem of returning employees to their positions and cited a case where a man had been recommended for immediate assignment but was rejected. Lt. Forbes replied that a similar case had been ~~thruashed out~~ brought up that morning. A case had been taken to Mr. Best who had recommended "that such a situation should be discussed and thrashed out by the employer who refused the employee and the employee who was not wanted", both meeting with the Project Director. 1/ Opler remarked that "inasmuch as the appointed personnel must be 'nursed' into this new plan, each division head will decide problems according to his own discretion without referring them to the Coordinating ~~Committee~~ Council." He ~~also~~ also asked the committee to recommend a staff for a new ~~new~~ newspaper and for the warden's organization. 1/

The following day the warden's organization was organized and the police and Army granted the Coordinating Committee's request for "day and night increased patrol during this period, at least four or five jeeps to a ward if possible; the more the merrier." The request for a curtailment of meetings in camp was also granted. 2/ Any proposed meeting, it was decided, must first be reported to the Police, whereupon the Army would investigate it to see if it were "not beneficial to the colonists." 2/ Obviously, the Coordinating Committee

1/ Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Divisional Responsible Men, Jan. 14, 1944, p. 2.

2/ Report of the informal meeting of the wardens, members of the Advisory Council and Co-ordinating Committee, Jan. 15, 1944, p. 1.

The ~~following~~ ^{next} informant, a young girl, injects a ~~pleasant~~ ^{per} feminine note into her observations:

"They say so many of the eta's daughters are very beautiful. I didn't notice it. Some I saw were certainly below average in looks. ~~11-10-47 (16-17)~~

Insertion here ^A This ~~next~~ informant is a young man "who wouldn't marry and eta:"

"They are better looking. It's funny, you just know. The girls ~~who~~ I knew were slender and pretty. Some might not be so pretty, but they try to attract attention. One girl (not eta) told me, "That girl is trying to hide her "shin-heiminess" by acting as if she was of a higher class."2 (20)

Insert at A * "There were a great many in our town (near Fresno). But I couldn't tell the difference. The only way I know who they are was by the issei. They said, "They're one "of those." They looked just the same to me. 1 (16-17)

Mrs. Okum, an issei, admits that she cannot tell the difference:

"Sometimes you could tell. Nobody knows exactly, but everybody doesn't like them. I can't tell the difference in this country, but some people can. One old lady told me that she can tell right away."2 (15)

Two kibe i men briefly but significantly express ~~express~~ ^{feel} a

"~~feeling~~ ^{feeling} ~~no doubt~~ ^{no doubt} acquired during their stay in Japan. ~~This implication of personal distaste was~~ ^{This implication of personal distaste was} ~~of distaste~~ ^{of distaste} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~statements~~ ^{statements} ~~made by~~ ^{made by} ~~none of the nisei~~ ^{none of the nisei} ~~7-10-47~~ ⁷⁻¹⁰⁻⁴⁷

^{made by} none of the nisei ~~7-10-47~~ ⁷⁻¹⁰⁻⁴⁷

"They look different, anyway." 3 (7)

"They're just kind of dirty."4 (8)

~~Behavior which betrays eta descent is mentioned less~~ ^{Behavior which betrays eta descent is mentioned less}

frequently than physical appearance. The dirty kitchens which are ~~confirmed~~ ^{affirmed} ~~5-13-73~~ ⁵⁻¹³⁻⁷³ by some informants and denied by others, have already been touched upon. 12-7-42 That is ~~was~~ ^{was} easier to tell

See p

2 " "
3 " "
4 " "

was becoming increasingly fearful of pressure group opposition, and intimidation.

On January 17 the Co-ordinating Committee was taken to task ~~for~~ ~~its~~

by Col. Austin and Mr. Best for taking matters into its own hands and meeting with the stockade internees. Yamatani was called upon to explain the action and questioned Col. Austin about the truth of the internees' story that tobacco, money, watches and fountain pens had been taken by the ~~soldiers~~ in the Army's search of the barracks. The Colonel admitted that "lots of things were taken, but many were returned. Theft of money? I question money. I doubt whether people ever leave money in their barracks. I don't question watches or tobacco." 1/ Yamatani then apologized "for the Committee's negligence in not consulting the Advisory Council previous to the interviews" and mentioned that Katayama, one of the internees had stated that "the detainees really desired liquidation of status quo; nevertheless, due to ~~of~~ some great pressure from the 'big bosses' of the 'headquarters' such feeling could not be expressed outwardly. Mr. Naido added that according to Kawamura, a recently discharged internee, some 170 detainees opposed status quo and about 30 favored it. 1/ Yamatani and Naido were probably exaggerating the anti-status quo feeling ~~for~~ ~~the~~ among the internees. It is however quite possible that some of the internees were turning against the idea of status quo, for the same reason which moved many of the practical colonists: it didn't work. This, however, can not be interpreted as a favorable growth of rapprochement with the Administration.

Mr. Best then suggested that "the greatest 'good' should be done to the people in the Center, where larger portion of people is involved and where the most good could be done. Attempt for the Committee's effort in getting the release of the detainees should be secondary." 1/ Akitsuki then suggested that a statement be printed by the Army and WRA whereby the Committee's efforts in attempting to secure the release of-(justifiable) detainees, which had been

1/ Informal meeting of the Divisional Responsible Men and the Project Director and Colonel Austin, Jan. 17, 1944, p. 1.

"Before evacuation there was quite a few cases of marriages stopped or separations after marriage if the family found out." (23)

"The "S" family, we were talking about marriage. (This if one of the best educated families in Gila. One boy is an extremely capable doctor, and the other a dentist. The younger son, Ta, has not followed his brothers' example and is known as a playboy.) Ta told me he said he have to find out about a girl first before he goes around with her and before he gets in too deep. He might find she was "that class.". If so, why, he can't marry her. If he like s her then it's too late. He asked me how'll he find out."² (15)

"Mrs.'s K.'s brother married a girl from Hiroshima in this country. The family wanted the girl's family investigated. If the boy's father had been alive, the marriage might not have been allowed to take place. Mrs. K~~ondo~~'s brother refused to allow the investigation to take place, saying, "I'm ~~marrying her~~ not marrying her whole family background or her family tree."

(8 6)

¹ See p.

2 Seep.

one of the planks of the Committee's platform so that doubts or accusations from the Colony could be avoided. Best approved the suggestion and stated that the wording should be as follows: "Proper recognition will be given to all the people in the stockade and those that meet the requirements for the return will be given consideration." In this way Mr Best felt that the making of commitments may be avoided." 1/

This first major difference of opinion, the Coordinating Committee's *which would be credited to them*
~~conviction that~~ *conviction that* ~~stockade releases~~ *justifiable stockade releases* should
be initiated immediately, and Mr. Best's policy of delay until the camp returned
to normal is *extremely important.* ~~Explained XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ *In the three weeks that followed many internees were*
~~but the lack of publicity nullified the effect they might have had~~ *but the lack of publicity nullified the effect they might have had*
~~the delay until the good effect of the releases which eventually did take place~~ *on the people.*
~~was lost, in the people.~~ The Coordinating Committee, whom many informants say,
~~XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXX~~ *promised that if status quo ended, the interned people would*
be released" were early branded as failures. In actuality, they were defeated
in their plan to bring back normal conditions before they started.

XXXXXX
Never in the 1980s, the administration at this time was very optimistic. Opler
expresses this as follows:

Then

On January 18, Mr. Best sent the Committee the following communication which while flattering and encouraging commits him to nothing:

"Your entiring efforts in connection with the plan to return the colony to an orderly and peaceful ~~existence~~ ~~has been~~ ~~the~~ existence have been very outstanding.

"It is noted that the first accomplishment has been the back to work program. This we learn is a direct reward of your labor in the Colony as the result of the ballot in which the entire people over 18 years of age participated.

"While you have not been successful in securing the release of all the men detained in the Army Stockade you can be assured that the cases of these men are being considered by both the WRA Police Department and the Army Intelligence and those persons who meet the requirements for the return to the Colony will be returned to the Colony at the earliest possible time. Be assured that your interests or requests in this connection are being given due consideration." 2/

1/ *ibid.*

2/ Community Analyst's Letter, Jan. 14, 1944, p. 11

"There's a case I know of even here in camp where some parents expressly forbade a girl to go out with a boy whom they suspected of being eta."

(Here the informants wife interrupted.) "That happened to me. I was going out with a fellow and I was bawled out from every direction, my grandfather, my grandmother, my mother and father, my employer and even him (her future husband).

"The informant continued.) "In one case a girl married the guy regardless of what her folks and everybody else said. As a result her older brother cut her dead. He himself, when he was younger, married an eta and as a result there actually wasn't any discrimination against him or his wife, but just knowing he was married to an eta affected him. If he thought he had received any small slight it seemed to make him think that it was because he was married to this girl. They really lived a miserable life. She's dead now. After she dies his younger sister met this shin-heimin man and she wanted to marry him. He tried to stop her. But the girl was young and very much in love. She just told him off. He didn't want her to suffer as he had.

"There's another fellow in this camp. I've known him all my life. He's twenty seven years old and still unmarried. Enough said.

"I doubt if he's ever gone out with a girl steady. But he doesn't want to marry an eta girl. It's family pride with him. He wouldn't want to call it to the attention of other people."

- - - - -

"Even in this country a boy fell in love with a girl; they married. But then it was found that the girl was of the eta class. The boy's mother was very angry because of the stigma.

"I know of one case of marriage where the people were outstanding. An eta married and found it out later. He was threatening to kill himself, and shoot his sho

The gradual return to work which proceeded slowly but steadily during this week filled the Administration with optimism. They were, however, too prone to look upon this as an anti status quo or anti Daihyo Sha Kai phenomenon and not, as it actually was, in many cases, dire economic necessity. Opler stated:

"The Committee is now in a position to go ahead and consolidate further gains. The vote . . . took them over the first hump . . . The initial stages of the back-to-work movement have seen them over the second hump without casualty. Daily their mimeographers are getting out information to a village starved for news. The propaganda, as we call it, forms a pattern with the efforts of the Co-op group earlier and Civic Organization. The Daihyo remnants are reduced to political maneuvering, calumny against the "Civic Organizations" bunch, Akitsuki and Shimada in particular. To these gentlemen, threats come in almost regular succession, but are beginning to taper off. Their blocks are behind them and the majority of residents. ~~(THISXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX IS XXXXXXXXXXXXX) XX~~ . . . The majority, once the opposition, is now in the saddle, and ~~XXX~~ now in the ascendancy. . . Former Daihyo leaders, like Komia, . . . are still insistent that failure to release the detained will rend the village in two. The charge appears to be a threat, a bargaining point. . . The important thing for the Coordinating Committee is results." 1/

Later it was shown that the Committee did not have the support of the majority and that the prophesy of future trouble over the non-release of the internees was not an empty threat.

XXXXXX

DAIHYO SHA ~~XXXXXXXX~~ ATTEMPT FOR RELEASE

On January 16 a group of Daihyo Sha Kai supporters made an attempt to gain the release of the internees through Mr. Robertson, Head of Operations. Mr. Robertson was contacted ~~probably through him~~ because of the recommendation of former Leupp inmates who ~~xxxxxx~~, while he was head of Leupp, had learned that he might be trusted. This group had attempted to reach Robertson during the latterpart of December and early January, but he had been absent from Tule Lake. However, on his return he ~~states that~~ received "a frantic telephone call" from block 11 (one of the strong Daihyo Sha blocks) asking him to come to block 11. ~~He called the~~ He went there and was told that a party in block six wished to see him. The next day he was invited to a meeting in block 6

1/ ibid.

where he met six members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ none of whom he had ever seen before. These people expressed their confidence in Mr. Robertson and asked his opinion of the present situation. He told them ~~thxxx~~ that as far as he could see there were only two avenues open (1) have the Daihyo Sha and the Co-ordinating Committee combine and bring the colony back to normal; (2) Have further segregation. The chief interest of this group was to bring about the release of the internees. Robertson advised that the Daihyo Sha resign which would leave the way open for ~~an~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ popular election of representatives in which the colony could have faith. The group appeared willing to take Robertson's advice and asked him to call a ~~body~~ body of internees into ~~the~~ his office, present the plan and gain their approval. He pointed out that this group were putting tremendous trust in him, since they left him free to tell the internees exactly what he pleased. They replied, "What you tell them is all right with us."

Accordingly Robertson called seven men to his office, among whom was George Kuratomi. After an hour and a half session, Kuratomi said, "If you'll promise us that we'll eventually get out of the stockade, we'll go for that plan." Robertson said, "I'm in no position to make that promise to you. That could be the first step toward your eventual release." Then Kuratomi replied, "If I ask the boys in the stockade to adopt this plan, I'll have to give them my word. If anything goes wrong, I'll have to commit hara-kiri." Robertson thereupon refused to allow Kuratomi to take on the responsibility of ~~fixing things~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ /convincing the interned members of the Negotiating Committee that they should resign, for he could give no guarantee of release.

Kuratomi then suggested that two internees be allowed temporary freedom "to convince the people that this is the thing to do." He added that the group Robertson had talked to was not strong enough to lead the people. Robertson said he would approach the Administration with this plan, but could hold out no hope. Kuratomi promised, "If you release two, we'll

resign and tell the people to hold an election." It was eventually agreed that Robertson should contact the group in the colony and tell them that until the release of the internees was guaranteed, matters should remain as they were.

Robertson was unable to get any cooperation from Mr. Best on this matter. In fact, Best warned him that Mrs. Matsuda, at whose home the meeting was held was a terrible troublemaker and if he persisted in calling on her she would probably run out of the house sometime, screaming, "Rape." Two days later, one of the boys to whom Robertson had spoken, was picked up.

~~XXXXX~~

~~Mrs. Matsuda~~

This contact which Mr. Robertson made with the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ remnants of the alleged agitating group was the beginning of a split between ~~%%~~ him and Mr. Best. Mr. Best ~~disapproved~~ disapproved of having anything to do with these trouble makers. Moreover, as Robertson's reputation for fairness, courtesy and consideration filtered through the colony he achieved a tremendous popularity which contrasted greatly with the combination of dislike, scorn, hatred and criticism ~~portrayed~~ manifested toward Best ~~xxxx~~ by almost all the ~~xxxxxxx~~ Japanese. Undoubtedly this was reported to Mr. Best by his spies, ~~evacuees~~ Japanese and Caucasian. The fact that most evacuees, when troubled or needing advice, would come to the office and consult Mr. Robertson and seldom come near Best did not escape Mr. Best's notice either. ~~This was the result of~~ The attitudes toward these two Administrators and the split in their ~~personal~~ personal points of view, ~~xxxxxxxx~~ developed steadily in the months to come and will be described in detail later, ~~when the~~

Mrs. Matsuda, meanwhile, was to be regarded as the most annoying trouble maker on the project by Mr. Best and Mr. Schmidt, head of ~~the~~ the Police. This reputation was not altogether unjustified, since she assumed a prominent place in the counter Coordinating Committee and counter Administration actions which arose in the colony. ~~Her~~ Her brother, Tokio Yamane had been

arrested on the night of November 4 and she has agitated constantly for his release. According to a statement made to her by Tsuda, her brother was among those seriously beaten. A handsome and energetic young woman, she gave the Administration and the Police little rest with her demands that justice be given her brother. As a result, according to her account, she has been subjected to constant persecution by the Police. On several occasions, members of the police force have entered her home and subjected her to "third degrees."

~~She states that she has been told~~ She states that Mr. Schmidt told her, "Why don't you stay home and mind your kids. Even your own people hate you. They say you're a liar and indecent and conceited. Go ahead and tell this to the damn Spanish Consulate. The next time he's here I'll tell him a few things." On one occasion, Sandburn and O'Brien, policemen, entered her home and accused her and her husband of being espionage agents.

"All the time they were threatening me to withdraw. They told me that for my own good I should take a letter to Schmidt before sending it to the Spanish Consul or Mr. Robertson. I was so frightened. They said they were going to try and get me for federal office. . . . When I went to see Mr. Robertson Internal Security, they came. . . and gave me a third degree. They said, "Hereafter you'll be denied a pass to the Administration building. They phoned Mr. Robertson two or three times while I was there, ~~and~~ accusing him of seeing me.

They sent two boys beaten up worse than my brother to Santa Fe. One of the boys had eight stitches taken in his head. These boys were beaten after the incident while they were being examined (in the Statistics office). If these boys were sent back to the colony it would be exposed. . . .

One boy kept saying at the hearing, "Mr. Schmidt attacked me." Mr. Schmidt/s said, 'If you'll withdraw that statement, I'll release you.'" 1/

Mrs. Matsuda is nisei, and has a brother in the United States Army, fighting in the South Pacific. She is excitable and not inclined to minimize any ~~55555555~~ objectionable behavior on the part of the Police. However, she gives no indication of being a woman of low character. Had her brother not been kept in the stockade ~~7887~~ it is possible that she would not have become such a thorn in the flesh of Mr. Best. Her reputation as a trouble maker is so great BY THE Administration that she is accused of being the instigator of almost all the trouble which arises

in camp, ~~and~~ an obviously incorrect generalization. Mr. Best's annoyance at her contact with Mr. Robertson ^{was} ~~has been~~ ^{was} concocorated by Robertson. She ~~is~~ ^{was} no longer given a pass to come to see him.

ENTIRE STRUGGLE OF THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE

~~The only XXXXXX existing XXXXXX accomplishment of the XXXXXX coordinating committee XXXXXX~~

XXXX

FURTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The Coordinating Committee with the support of the Divisional Responsible Men ~~had~~ ^{re-employment} succeeded in bringing the people back to work. While ~~the~~ proceeded slowly, at first, it gradually gained momentum so that within a month, as far as work was concerned, the center could be considered back to normal. However, ^{to} gaining popular support or ^{to} bringing about ~~even a semblance of cooperation~~ ~~between the colonists and the Administration, the Committee failed utterly.~~ During the latter part of January up to the middle of February, the Committee continued its efforts to have the Administration concede to certain requests which would make a good impression on the colonists. In certain very minor matters, the Administration cooperated, in all major matters it put the committee off. ~~If the Administration desired the Coordinating Committee to gain the support of the colony, they proceeded wrongly. If they were indifferent, and as to whether the Coordinating Committee could function as a successful temporary body of colony representatives, they proceeded rightly.~~ By ~~the first of February the Coordinating Committee~~ ~~became~~ ~~conscious~~ ~~of their impotence~~ ~~and suggested~~ ~~that it might be well for them to step down and make way for a permanent body.~~ ^{In} mid-February they handed in their first resignation which was not accepted.

During the latter part of January, the Committee ~~attempted to make some~~

~~way on increasing the~~ ~~in gaining colony popularity~~ and recommended the

193.194.

increasing of farm acreage, additional work opportunities and stockade releases. On each request they were put off with administrative statements that the time was not yet ripe. ~~The only major administrative concession~~ However, one important request was granted. After several ~~was made to the Coordinating Committee personally and not to the people's~~ requests the administration approved the organization of a group of informers and guards, called "fielders" whose function it was to protect the Coordinating Committee from "radicals" and to gain information on the activities of ~~radical~~ agitators. Thirty young men ^{and women} were hired for this purpose and ~~paid by the~~ put on the Administrative payroll.

The Administrative attitude ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ on the farm was ^{stated} ~~stated~~ by Mr. Best, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ "The time is not appropriate to talk about a farm program of any scale." 1/ On Feb. 2nd the 20 Committee recommended an expansion of farm acreage, and if possible, a reclamation of the "League-of Nations" tract which had been lost to the colonists ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ because of the farm strike. 2/ Mr. Best memo. expressed himself: "The answer is No.". Mr. Yamatani then asked if ~~xxx~~ it would be possible for the Japanese to get a lease of land in the district. Mr. Best replied, "Not ~~now~~, but perhaps in the future." 3/

Additional work opportunities were even more strongly stressed by the committee but nothing was accomplished. Akitsuki brought this up in a meeting on January 24, especially asking for a clean up crew of about 30 men. Best stated: "New projects such as the above-mentioned are not yet in order; until such time that the Center reestablishes itself to its former sound normal stage and all old activities function as usual, such plans should be withheld. However, all such plans will be duly considered." Akitsuki then suggested that work opportunities should be given the expected arrivals from Manzanar as soon as possible. Mr. Best disagreed

1/ Minutes of the meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Project Director and Colonel Austin, Jan. 20//p//1// 1944.

2/ Memorandum Co-ordinating Comm ttee, Feb. 2, 1944.

3/ Notes, Feb. p. 36.

and suggested that a thorough analysis should first be made. 1/ 24.

On January 29 the Divisional Heads met. Akitsuki explained the progress of the Committee in its various endeavors as follows:

"1. Approximately 1000 resumed work since January 13, 1944. In spite of the existing frictions between the pro and con status quo people, approximately 750 persons applied for jobs up to date.

2. Up to yesterday, 55 persons were released from the stockade and more will be released in the very near future. The Army has definitely stated that release en masse is impossible unless the Center has returned to its normal condition.

4. As decided at the last divisional meeting, the Co-ordinating Committee presented the suggestion to create new jobs for the purpose of increasing employment opportunities, such as clean-up crew, to the WRA. Project Director has stated definitely that the time is not appropriate to be discussing future plans unless the Center is back to normal and all old activities functioning as usual. Moreover, the Administration must get Washington's approval prior to the execution of any contemplated plans.

4. Relaxation of the curfew hour up until 9:30 p. m. has been recommended but it was felt inappropriate to life such now; moreover, it was felt that it should be withheld until center completely returns to its normal status.

As the meeting ended it was suggested from the floor that segregation within the center, "the good from the bad, is imperative." ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

The majority of the Divisional Heads were in favor of the segregation of these "scums of the society" but no recommendations were made. 2/ 29.

The Coordinating Committee renewed its efforts to get more jobs and on Feb. 2, sent a memorandum to Mr. Best, stating that "In view of the fact

single space (that there are 750 persons on the waiting list) new applicants are aware that their chances of employment are remote, hence a growing impatience is noted among them. We, the Committee, fear the result, lest ~~because~~ they be instigated by the pro status quo group who may aver that this back-to-work movement is beneficial only to those who had worked previously.

In order to relieve this situation, may this Committee again request for your special consideration on this matter of creating new employment opportunities such as general camp cleaning or sawing of kindling wood by crews of 20 to 30." 3/

When this suggestion was brought up in the meeting of the Coordinating Committee and the Advisory Council Mr. Best, ~~in answer, cited the 1934~~ and Mr.

1/4 Minutes of the Special Joint Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Yule Lake Center, Jan. 24, 1944, p. 1.

2/ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Yule Lake Center, Jan. 29, 1944, pp. 1, 3.

Black countered with the ~~statistic~~ employ^{ment} statistics which showed that there were only ~~165~~ ~~less~~ less persons employed than there had been before the strike. Said Black, "We don't have to step very far before we have more people working than ever before." 1/

In its attempt to get favorable publicity for its efforts in releasing men from the stockade, the Coordinating Committee was frustrated by the desire of the Administration that no publicity be given these releases, lest the Coordinating Committee be ~~subject to excessive pressure~~ undue pressure. ~~To a meeting at which only the Committee, the Project Director, Colonel Austin and Lt. Forbes were present, the Committee asked that the proposed list of persons to be released be submitted to them first. They also recommended four men for release at that time. The Colonel advised the Committee "to analyse the list and decide which is going to pay the greater dividend - release or continued detention." The Committee was also authorized to publish matters pertaining to this release. 2/ However, on January 26, at a meeting 3/ with the Advisory Council, Mr. Best cautioned the Co-ordinating Committee to proceed very slowly in its undertakings and thought it advisable to refrain from publicizing matters pertaining to the releases of the detainees, especially their names, too strongly. 3/~~

The sub-Co-ordinating Committee or the "fielders" was first brought up in a meeting of the Divisional Heads. It was then described as "a liason body acting between the Co-ordinating Committee and the Divisional Heads and workers to receive all reports, complaints, suggestions, plan etc." 4/

Two days latter the ma tter was put before the Advisory Council .

- 1/ Notes, Feb., p. 35.
- 2/ Minutes of the Meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Project Director AND Colonel Austin, Jan. 20, 1944.
- 3/ Minutes of the Special Joint Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee, Jan. 26, 1944, p. 3.
- 4/ Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake Center, Jan 22, 1944, p. 2.

"This sub-committee will refer such matters as it may deem necessary to the attention of the Project Director. Mr. Yamatani reiterated that inasmuch as the Committee is still encountering much difficulties with the antagonistic minority of pressure group, it is definitely imperative that this sub-committee be established immediately to accelerate the progress of this great task.

"It is urgent, Mr. Akitsuki admitted, due to the lack of a closer collaboration of the evacuee wardens with the Committee." 1/

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At this meeting Black recommended that the Committee prepare a ~~list~~ list of 50 names from which Mr. Schmidt on his arrival could select the personnel of this group.

On January 28, at the next meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council, Akitsuki put the matter before Schmidt, who

~~Had~~ "Dr. Katsuki asked whether there is any possibility of organizing a sub-ordinating Committee, composed of about 30 men with WRA remuneration for the purpose of performing intelligence work which is to be used only for the advantage and benefit of the colony.

asking for "30 men with WRA remuneration for the purpose of performing intelligence work which is to be used only for the advantage and benefit of the colony." Mr. Black said that the WRA budget had no quota whereby wages of this nature could be paid out. However, Mr. Schmidt gave full approval stating, "There is no reason why it couldn't be done since the other centers have people, such as the ones requested by Mr. Akitsuki, on the payroll. ...Such men could later be added to the police force." At the same meeting the restriction of meetings within the center was brought up, but on Mr. Black's suggestion the restriction was ~~thought unnecessary~~ deemed unnecessary "since the creation of an intelligence unit should alleviate the task to a certain degree by insinuating within these instigators and spotting and identifying the nature of the meeting and possibly the leaders."2/

28

When the 1993-94 Congress began its 1st session, 113 Democrats

When the organization of this body of "fielders" became know in the colony, it's members were considers spies (inu) and ~~guards~~ guards

1/ Minutes of the Special Joint Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Jan. 24, 1944, p. 2.

2/ ibid., Jan. 28, 1944,

for the Coordinating Committee, which ~~was~~ was growing progressively more unpopular. A reliable informant stated that the bunch of fellows constantly hanging around the Co-ordinating Committee's office, which was observed by the writer on several occasions, were guards and moreover, the group ran gambling houses which were never raided, while they reported other "non-protected" gambling joints. 1/

In late January

~~On January 26~~ Mr. Best received an anonymous letter:

"proposing the Administration to devise a plan whereby/ the camp/ be divided in two, in order to avoid possible flare-up or conflict and to preserve order."

This letter probably came for the pro-Daihyo Sha Group which was still maintaining an underground organization. It was the forerunner of an attempt to gain segregation which culminated three months later in a petition and general camp agitation. Interestingly, the Divisional Heads made a request for segregation on Jan. 29, but from ~~different~~ different motives. 2/ They wished to protect themselves from the "radicals", while the "radicals" were pushing the original Negotiating Committee's segregation proposal.

Mr. Best read the anonymous letter at a meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council. Yamatani remarked that "recent trends of the populace shows favorable inclination toward the brighter side. However, one cannot deny that some 'demagogues' are still left in each block." Dr. Opler believed, "that the letter was intended as tactics to sell the idea of dividing the Center now and also the idea of ~~opposing~~ the opposing group's desire to convert this Center into a prisoner-of-war camp." Akitsuki concurred with Opler, adding that the opposition hoped that if the camp were transformed into a prisoner-of-war or internment camp under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department, food would be delivered to the gate and the people would receive \$50 monthly

1/ Notes, Mar., p. 50.
2/ See p. 195.

without working. 1/ Members of this pro-Daihyo Sha group have several times expressed ^{in the writer's presence} the wish that the camp should be made into an Internment Center. ~~in the writer's presence~~

The writer was present at one meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council. The dominant tone of the meeting was the repeated attempts of the Committee to get some consideration for their proposals ~~all of which~~ all of which were faced by Administrative attempts to delay action until the camp had become more normal. As soon as the Japanese entered the room a n atmosphere of tension prevailed. ~~They~~
~~They~~ The members of the Committee seated themselves together ~~along~~ along one side of the room and appeared very ill at ease. The Caucasians habitually addressed the Japanese by their first names; ~~although~~ the Japanese always addressed the Caucasians by their surnames. The position of chairman was indecisive. Akitsuki was supposed to be chairman but Mr. Black usurped the place repeatedly. Most of the talking was done by the Caucasians and consisted of arguments and excuses to put off the Committee's proposals till some later and happier date.

Akitsuki opened the meeting by stating that the Committee recommended that immediate steps be taken to replace them by a body of legitimately elected represenatives. Mr. Black asked that this topic be put off until Mr. Best returned to the room. Akitsuki then recommended that the curfew be extended to 9:30 p. m. instead of 7:30. The discussion reached no conclusion and was interrupted by Yamatani, who said, "Some of the blocks have no block managers. This ought to be settled first." Mr. Huycke said he thought the mess hall crews were responsible for this and Yamatani asked, "Can't you stop delivering them coal?" The ~~g/y~~ discussion then swung

1/ Minutes of the Special Joint Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Coordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Jan. 26, 1944, p. 1.

swung back to the curfew and it was decided to leave matters as they were until the Internal Security was reorganized. 1/

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Akitsuki then brought up the suggestions of additional employment and additional farm acreage. On each subject the Caucasians talked at length but counselled waiting. Akitsuki mentioned that the people were suffering from lack of shower facilities but Mr. Best said, "We'll refer that to maintenance." 2/ He also reported that the mess managers were complaining that a ~~man~~ member of the appointed personnel, Mr. Foss was abusive to the Japanese, and that they requested his removal. Best replied, "Better look out there. That's requesting removal of appointed personnel." Black, however, promised to take care of it. A month later the writer was told by Akitsuki that nothing had ever been done about Foss. 3/

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Yamatani then complained ~~that~~: "We had a couple, three-four Caucasian workers come into the garage and the mess. They are new fellows. We thought we'd ask, why these people come in and work when we don't have enough work for the Japanese?"

Black: "They had been hired a month back."

Best: "Those are positions which involve responsibility. They will effect evacuee employment. Their being Caucasian will protect you are regards lost property."

Nakan: (member of Co-ordinating Committee) "One can't count numbers straight. He goes up to 56 and he can't go on. This is at the food warehouse. He sends out things to the messhalls and a lot has to be brought back."

Huycke: Maybe he's a Heintz man and can't count above ~~5~~ 57." 4/

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Akitsuki then brought up the matter of the segregation of the "scums."

Black: "Until we get the Manazanar people here, segregation will be too much of a load for housing. But the organization which succeeds yours can bring about the natural segregation you would like to have. I think it might be done voluntarily - keep like-thinking people together. But housing cannot stand the strain right now."

1/ Notes, Feb., pp. 33-35.

2/ ibid., pp. 35, 36.

3/ ibid., p. 37.

4/ ibid.

Black's remarks indicate that at this time the Administration was seriously considering some type of re-segregation as soon as it was convenient. The issue was kept in mind for several weeks but eventually dropped. ¶ Hints from Dr. Opler indicate that Washington was not willing to undertake it.

Next, Akitsuki reintroduced the subject of the initiation of a referendum

Black continued at great length and finally Akitsuki, who did not appear to favor the resegregation proposal too strongly dropped the subject and read the memorandum asking for the initiation of a referendum vote to replace his body.

"If we made preparations to replace the comitee, the colonists would feel better. That way, everybody is responsible for recommendations in the center. " 1/

The Caucasians discussed this proposal ~~was~~ but were very reluctant to take the step. They feared that if a referendum were held, radicals might get key positions. The Committee, conscious of their precarious position in colony esteem, wanted to leave "before their welcome was worn out" and wanted "at least to let the colonists know." Opler, more than any other ~~member~~ Caucasian present, realized ~~that~~ the position of the Committee and attempted to support them, but was unable to accomplish anything. At one point he was curtly reproved by Best.

Lt. Forbed: "Do put it in words of one syllable, do you think you can win ~~the~~ it the same way you won the last election."

Akitsuki: "I don't think so. But we want the people to realize that we are not like the Negotiating Committee but are interested in the welfare of every colonist in the center."

Huycke: "If you have an election - we've got a couple of bad wards. I'd say the chances are you'd have a Negotiating Committee selected with about 40% negative point of view. Then, a second point, if you select them now before the Manzanar group comes in, Manzanar will say, 'You're not our representatives.' ... I think we ought to wait until we're sure the trend is getting better."

Opler pressed the Committee's point of view and suggested that an election might be advisable because of the difficult position of the Committee. He suggested some public announcement:

"We should state our hope that the community can get further back to normal before the temporary group come to the point of holding a referendum. Down in the community I feel that there is a growing sentiment that the committee is working for the good of the colony. (No such sentiment voiced by ~~my~~ the writer's informants at this time.) ~~Worse than this~~ . . . I think we should take some responsibility."

1/ ibid., p. 38.

Black disagreed with Opler and supported Huycke.

Black: "If we have a referendum now, we're not going to get the quality of men on the committee we want."

Opler: "The main point is this group is begging to be released. I think that this responsibility lies on us, since we want them to continue."

Opler then suggested that at the very least some small privileges should be granted such as the establishment of a tofu manufacturing plant and the lifting of the curfew. Miss Florence Horn, one of the editor's of Fortune Magazine, who was also present at this meeting, could contain herself no longer at this point. Furious at the complete lack of cooperation being given to the Committee she slipped a note to Mr. Robertson in which she said, "What does the Committee think? The Caucasians are doing all the talking." Robertson then entered the discussion for the first time.

Robertson: What does the committee feel would be the reaction of the colonists to the fact that the Committee wants to leave. Do you think they'd clamor for a referendum?"

Opler: (answers for the committee) "Yes."

Robertson: "The Committee does not entirely approve of this statement from the Administration?"

Akitsuki: (too polite for his own good) "Not exactly."

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Lt. Forbes: "I think the opposition would seize on it and demand a vote." quite

Akitsuki: "It's not/democratic. We should leave before our welcome is worn out."

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Yamatani: (falling in with the dominant idea of the Caucasians) "It's too early yet. I feel personally there is more to be accomplished before we submit a referendum. We don't want people to think we're doing this because we like it. We want to accomplish something before we retire. When this is all fixed up, let Mr. Best give a big steak dinner for the incoming and outgoing committee."

The members of the Committee were now asked in turn if they agreed with Yamatani. All but one agreed hesitantly. Shimada stated firmly that he did think this was the time to retire. Akitsuki grasped at this straw and said, "At least to let the colonists know." However, the meeting

ended with no concessions made by the Administration and the Co-ordinating Committee remained in its insecure and uncomfortable position of prominence, standing as representatives of the people appointed by a small group, the Divisional Responsible men, and supported by the Army and the Administration. 1/

The people, having had nothing to do with the selection of the Committee were ~~about~~ generally, at this time, regarding the committee with some suspicion but not with hostility. Most of the Japanese were quite ignorant of how the Committee had attained its ~~exalted~~ exalted position and were still holding their judgement in abeyance. "O", a conservative said, "This new Coordinating Committee is all right." ~~When asked who had elected the Coordinating Committee "O's" wife, a nisei, spoke~~ ~~Before her husband could answer, "That's what I'd like to know."~~ 3/ Her husband explained, "I think they were elected from each division head." 2/ "N", a pro-Daihyo Sha man expressed the same opinion, saying that ~~all~~ the people would like to know how the Co-ordinating Committee had obtained ~~their~~ its position. 3/ "I", a Daihyo Sha sympathizer said:

"The committee, they are so-called men with ability. Akitsuki was an official in the Co-op here. I don't think they want political power." 4/

Other attitudes expressed at this time show relief that the ~~period of confusion~~ confusion and hardship of the status quo period had ended. Several informants stressed the fact that it was dangerous to speak their minds; too many people ~~still~~ still ~~felt too strongly~~ felt too strongly on the status quo issue. Work was being resumed quietly and without enthusiasm, ~~although the people~~ Although the people

1/ ibid., pp. 38-40.

2/ ~~Notes, April 11, 1944~~ Notes, Feb., p. 8.

3/ ibid., p. 13.

Miss Iwohara, secretary to the Coordinating Committee stated the position of the committee very frankly:

"The members of the committee were selected by the division heads and recognized by the project director. The people have to take it or else. Nobody wanted to take the initiative. The members of the committee have no political ambitions. Before this committee dissolves they want to get another referendum vote and get a real political body elected by the people. The people say that we're inu." 1/

Other attitudes expressed at this time show relief that the confusion and hardship of the status quo period had ended. Several informants stressed the fact that it was dangerous to speak one's mind: too many people still felt too strongly on the status quo issue. Work was being resumed quietly but without enthusiasm. Although the people felt that the worst was over, the future was not viewed optimistically. "O", a block manager, seemed very fearful of public opinion. He remarked that his block was composed almost entirely of individuals who ~~were in fact~~ favored keeping to the status quo. He felt differently and believed that the evacuees should obey the laws of the United States as long as they were on United States soil. But he dared say nothing. If he advised against violence he would get into trouble. Consequently, he followed a policy of agreeing with whomever he spoke without committing himself too much one way or the other.

"Honestly, I'd like this center back to normal conditions, but if I said that to the residents, they'd say I'm a dog. Since I took office two three men came over and threatened some of the block representatives." 2/

Another block manager friend confided that his block was just about 50-50 for and against status quo. He had to watch his step carefully, and tried to keep from being involved in camp affairs. 3/

"I", a young man waiting in Tule for the end of the war remarked:

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1/ ibid., p. 25.

2/ ibid., pp. 7,8.

3/ ibid., p. 30.