

there had stated that they did not wish to return to Tule Lake as long as Mr. Best was project director there. Mr. Best also said, "You boys have tried awfully hard to get me out. In sixty days I'll be gone anyway." 1/ The writer talked to several of the men on this committee and is convinced that Mr. Best did imply that the center would probably go under the Department of Justice within 60 days and that in that case, returning the men from Santa Fe would be an easy matter. Kuratomi showed the writer two letters from the Department of Justice, one of which stated that the Department of Justice was willing to return the internees to Tule Lake if Mr. Best approved and another which stated that the return of the internees was up to the WRA. Kuratomi reverted to the agitator pattern and stated that most of the families of the internees were determined to resist administrative pressure and would not go to Crystal City. He added:

"Honestly speaking, I don't want to cause any ill tension, but going back to Japanese psychology, whenever you can find no other alternative you may have to take strong measures. It will be pretty hard to do anything else than to take action embarrassing the WRA here.

"I think Mr. Best knows that the return of the men would bring about better feeling in the center. But if he feels like playing foxy with us, I can play foxy with him.

"I think he was told by Myer to stay out of the Santa Fe trouble. I think he has strict orders from Myer that the future Santa Fe business will be handled by Myer himself." 2/

Kato made an interesting statement on the meeting he had alone with Mr. Best, explaining its significance to the Resegregation Group and to the camp as a whole:

"If the Justice Department did not take over it would put me in a tough spot because I made a report to the Resegregation committee

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1/ ibid., Oct. 9, 1944, p. 2.

2/ ibid., Oct. 19, 1944, pp. 2-3.

that they (Justice) would take over in 60 days. Mr. Best definitely told me that this would take place within a week after the election. I told him, 'Why don't you put it in the Tulean Dispatch (Kato meant Newell Star) so the nisei who want to go out can think about it? He told me, 'Mr. Myer told him not to make any statement of any kind.' However, he said Mr. Myer had made a statement to the Gila paper hinting that Tule Lake will be under the Justice Department and that he (Mr. Best) will publish an exact copy of this statement in the Tulean Dispatch.

"Most people ~~xxx~~ who are really loyal to Japan would rather have this camp under the Justice Department. When I made this report to the Resegregation Committee they were very happy over it. They feel that under the Justice Department only the loyal Japanese will be here - no American citizens - and we would be under the Protecting Power, which is the Spanish Consul. Under WRA we do not know our status, whether we are under the government of Japan or America.

"There is not much rumor yet, as far as I hear. I was told by some of the Resegregation Committee not to start a rumor yet, so I'm keeping mum.

"Of course, the people who want 16 dollars a month shouldn't be here. If you're loyal to Japan you shouldn't be thinking of refrigeration and ice boxes. 1/ The real Japanese wish to go back to Japan in body only, that is, if it is necessary. We always think of the soldiers at the front. What we're going through now is nothing to that. That's why those who wish to resgregate don't get along well with the imm. 2/

This statement is significant not only because of its relevance to the topic under discussion but because it is a fine example of the propaganda which was being disseminated among the young men by the Resegregation Group.

Despite the efforts of Kuratomi and Kato, the process of re-uniting the Santa Fe internees with their families in Crystal City was carried forward. Mr. Best was quite right, however, when he said that most of them did not wish to return to Tule Lake. Kato attempted to see Mr. Best in late October, telephoning three times without success. He wrote two letters and received the following answer:

- 1/ R. Hankey, Notes, Oct. 16, 1944, pp. 1-2.  
 2/ This statement is almost identical with one made to the writer by Mr. Yamashita in which he outlined the psychology which the Resegregation Group intended to use.



me in a tough spot because I made a report

October 25, 1944

Dear Mr. Kato,

With reference to your letter of October 25 regarding the transfer to Santa Fe, I refer you to George Kuratomi. He understands the situation thoroughly.

Sincerely,

R. R. Best

This letter was a bitter pill for Kato to swallow for, as has been explained, he and Kuratomi were on very bad terms and he himself wished the credit for the effort of returning the internees. But worse was to come. In mid-November Kato received a letter from Hayashi, one of the internees, reproving him in no uncertain terms for his agitating activities in Tule Lake and stating that the internees did not appreciate or approve of his efforts on their behalf. This letter was the most insulting missive the writer has ever seen written by one Japanese to another. Kato was extremely angry and said he had answered the letter by telling the internees "to go to hell." He added, "Still, the Negotiating Committee can't resign until this matter is settled." Later, Hayashi wrote a letter apologizing for the harshness of his statements and thanking Kato for all that he had done on behalf of the internees.<sup>1/</sup> The families of the internees left Tule Lake on November 20. No one took the matter seriously except the two pressure groups.

The antipathy between the two factions grew more marked. In late October, Kato expressed his opinion of Kai and Kuratomi as follows:

"Kai and Kuratomi should realize that the people who really supported us were the people for the status quo. The status quo  
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<sup>1/</sup> ibid., Oct. 27, 1944, pp. 1-2; Nov. 10, p. 5; Nov. 20, p. 2.



people feel that they cannot get along with the people who do not want to go to Japan.

"Of course, when George Kuratomi met Mr. Myer he stated the necessity of the resegregation program. This group, the Resegregation Group, were the ones who really supported us (the stockade detainees). They gave money to hire the lawyer for us. The immediate families had a lot to do with it too.

"Reverend Kai ignored all that. He never expressed thanks of any nature. Naturally, the people who supported him got pretty mad about it. They (Kai and Kuratomi) still think the whole colony is supporting them.

"In a time of crisis like this we must stick together. We are not supposed to cooperate with the administration (as Kai and Kuratomi were accused of doing by the Resegregation Group). That's going against the will of the Japanese government, if you understand me.

"Many people just fell into the Caucasians' hand. There was trouble between the administration and the Japanese. That is as it should be. Now there is trouble between the Japanese and the Japanese, because of a minority people who spread opinion and propaganda and do a lot of inning around here.

"The incident could have been closed long, long ago if the people would only have supported us and stated that they would not work unless we were released. But the administration made the Coordinating Committee and stated that the Daihyo Sha was just a political organization.

"George Kuratomi wanted to bring all the people of Tule Lake into one. You can't do that. There are so many who came voluntarily or liked the climate or just refused to move. These people - we can't get along with these people! In a time of crisis, you have to make it black and white. It is impossible to bring this camp all into one. We will never get along with the other group. As far as I'm concerned, I'll never forget them. If I were a big shot in Japan, I'd know what to do with them. Unfortunately, I'm not.

"I've been only three years in Japan. The first thing I plan to do when I return to Japan is volunteer for the Army, even after the war. I want to be educated the hard way - the real Japanese way. At all times, I will have the government of Japan in my mind." 1/

#### Attitude of the People Regarding the Return of the Internees.

In spite of the contentions of both interested factions, the residents did not particularly care whether the internees were brought back or not. Many informants did not even know

1/ ibid., Oct. 27, 1944, pp. 2-3.

that the effort was being carried on and would have been indifferent if they had known. When asked, informants usually stated that they thought ~~it~~ was right to try to bring them back. Still, none of them would have taken any action. Mr. Yamaguchi said:

"I think it's right to bring them back. That's giri." 1/

Mr. K. said:

"We all sympathize with the families of these people. But I don't think the people will support (effort to get them back) by demonstrating." 2/

When the families finally left for Crystal City, on the night of November 20, their leavetaking was accompanied by an extremely interesting incident which will be described later.

#### THE FIGHT AT THE BASEBALL GAME

Sometime during late August a serious fracas broke out during a baseball game between two teams representing the Manzanar section and the Poston segregees. It was impossible to find out just what happened or who started the fight, but it appears that the Manzanar rooters thought their team was being treated unfairly and led by an issei from Manzanar, some of the Manzanar fans attacked the Poston team. The writer suspects that the issei was the notorious Kiyo Shimada. Non-Manzanites, when commenting upon the occurrence, blamed the Manzanar people, "who are always starting trouble." The older man who was supposed to have instigated the fight was also reputed to be a follower of Mr. Wakayama. Mr. Wakayama made the following interesting comment to the writer:

"You heard about the fight they had after the baseball game on Saturday? Well, one of the boys here (in the Manzanar section) had been struck over the head with a chair or something and had to have seven stitches taken.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., Oct. 2, 1944, p. 1.  
<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., Oct. 27, 1944, p. 5.



"I heard that Internal Security said to notify Wakayama not to take revenge. One of the men hurt is in the hospital and they won't release (him) from the hospital because they're afraid he'll be murdered by my gang." 1/

Natural ly, Mr. Wakayama assured the writer that he had no gang.

#### CAMP ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MANZANAR SECTION

The large group of transferees from Manzanar who were housed in a new section at the eastern side of the camp were received by the older inhabitants with considerable resentment. This resentment arose not only because the Manzanites were *welcomed* received by the administration with a courtesy and consideration which the October transferees had not received but also because of the fine new barracks and the much better latrinal facilities in the newly constructed ward. A year after their arrival, the Manzanites, who had by this time been joined by smaller groups of transferees from other centers, chiefly Jerome, still held themselves aloof and had become only partially integrated with the remainder of the population. On the other hand, as a unit or ward, they possessed infinitely more community spirit, made many positive and successful attempts to improve their ward, and, for this, were generally admired. Many of the residents of Ward VIII, the Manzanar section, continued to maintain a snobbish, stand-offish attitude toward ~~the~~ both the old Tuleans and the October 1943 transferees. "We had nothing to do with that old trouble," Manzanites would say. Whereupon older residents would retort, "If you'd been here then, you would have been worse than us." "We had our riot and we learned," the Manzanites would reply. This aloofness was repeatedly expressed by the writer's Manzanar informants

1/ *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1944, p. 4.

and the following statement by Mr. Abe is a good example of the attitude:

"We Manzanar group don't have much interest in what is going on in the old section." 1/

Probably the strongest factor in keeping alive hostility to the Manzanar group was the rumors (which were based on fact) that there were several gangs of tough, lawless boys who had their headquarters there. From well informed men, the writer learned that there were not more than two or three of these gangs, but their occasional deeds of vandalism and violence gave the entire ward a bad name. As a nisei girl remarked to the writer, "People blame Manzanar when anything happens. Every little beating and everything, they blame on Manzanar." 2/ The Manzanites were also accused of thievery. 3/

This hostility was also mixed with admiration and envy. Mr. Fujimoto stated:

"I've felt that snooty feeling when I've been over in the Manzanar section. But you have to hand it to them the way they've gotten things done." 4/

An old Tulean issei said:

"The Manzanar people are good. They are good workers." 5/

Two very conservative nisei girls had completely changed their attitude toward the Manzanar boys by the end of October, 1944. The following stories also bear witness that chivalry had not become extinct at Tule Lake. Kimi, who worked in the Community Activities Section got into an argument with a young man who worked in the same section. The argument became

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- 1/ ibid., Aug. 8, 1944, p. 2.  
2/ ibid., Sept. 28, 1944, p. 6.  
3/ ibid., Aug. 24, 1944, p. 1.  
4/ ibid., Aug. 19, 1944, p. 4.  
5/ ibid., Aug. 20, 1944, p. 1.



heated and the young man shoved her so that she fell. A group of Manzanar boys, passing in a truck observed this. They stopped the truck, grabbed the fellow, knocked him about a bit and forced him to apologize to Kimi. She was very much impressed and said of the Manzanar group as a whole:

"We get along perfectly with them. They're really cooperating and showing their spirit. They're meeting us half-way. Many of the people have the same idea we (CAS workers) do. Because they (Manzanar) were segregated over there, they were bitter. We mix in more now." 1/

Another Nisei girl also lauded the attitude of the young men from Manzanar:

"At first we didn't like them because we heard how rough they were. But now we've gotten to know them. A Manzanar boys' club invited some of the high school girls to a wienie bake and the girls were afraid to go. Those who did go, though, were treated so nicely that they were very impressed." 2/

The most accurate statement of the general camp attitude toward the Manzanar section was made by Mr. K.:

"It's true to some extent that they have gained liking. They (other residents) thought the Manzanar people were all radicals, but they changed their minds since and see that they are not." 3/

#### RESEGREGATION GROUP ATTEMPTS TO FORCE RESEGREGATION BY ISSUING UNAUTHORIZED PAMPHLET

In late September the Resegregation Group made a second attempt to separate the sheep from the goats by distributing a pamphlet widely through the camp and requesting registration of those who truly desired to return to Japan at the first opportunity. This was, of course, a deliberate attempt to force the WRA to take some action on resegregation by the power of vast public support. It was also intended to bring powerful pressure on the camp's population either to join the

1/ ibid., Oct. 27, 1944, p. 6.

2/ ibid., Oct. 29, 1944, p. 1.

3/ ibid., Oct. 30, 1944, p. 6.



Resegregation Group and support it or to join with it because they would be afraid to do otherwise, or to get out of camp. The writer was shown a copy of the pamphlet by Mr. Yamashita four days before the beginning of its distribution. She was, of course, asked to tell no one of the matter, a confidence which was not betrayed. The writer happened to call on Mr. Yamashita on September 21. He appeared ill at ease and nervous, which was unusual. After stating forcefully, "Resegregation is going to be something eventually. The philosophy of the majority of the residents will hereafter be changed," he brought out the proposed pamphlet and allowed her to read it. He stated:

"This petition will tell the administration exactly what we are and what we should be under the circumstances. We are certain that the administration and WRA cannot distinguish between the loyal and the disloyal people congregated in this camp. Even though it is for disloyals, it is different from other centers. This is the reason for so much restlessness and unfortunate disturbance in camp.

"We residents, the wiser people, cannot wait further anymore for the administration to have the camp like this. The time has come whereby the Japanese residents wish to formulate and determine their belief of themselves."

He then asked the writer if in her opinion the distribution of this pamphlet would be followed by the apprehension and punishment of the sponsors. The writer hedged by saying that it was difficult to predict what the administration might do. Yamashita appeared satisfied and continued:

"You know that the people behind this have been working underground for a long time. Anyone who would have come out openly would have been put in the stockade. We have been working on this since April, awaiting the moment; but we had to keep it a secret. Now the time has come.

"We are of the opinion that we cannot be loyal to two countries. As long as we are living here, why not make up our minds to be real Japanese or not? As long as this is



fully impressed on the residents, this camp will become more peaceful than ever.

"If the administration recognized this movement, we will have a good mutual understanding. Besides, Mr. Myer sent us a letter and recognized this movement through Mr. Black.

"If this proceeds successfully, the time will come when the others (the fence-sitters) will go out and proceed according to WRA policy. Therefore the time will come when we can accomplish our resegregation procedure. It will not be direct resegregation.

"Those who refuse to sign this will have people asking them, "Are you loyal to Japan or not? If you are not loyal to Japan, why don't you go out? Naturally, those loyal to Japan will stay here until the war ends.

"This way - the people will have to realize this - because as long as their appearance is Japanese, they will have to sign this. Being loyal to Japan is a very serious matter.

"If they don't sign this they will be known to be not loyal Japan and will be told in public. Of course, many people who don't want to go back to Japan will sign this, but then they will go in a corner and keep quiet.

"You know, 99 people out of 100 are taking the attitude and stating, 'I'm loyal to America,' - they are telling a lie. Those people aren't really loyal to America. They are loyal to their properties. It is just a selfish wish because they have an ice-box and a stove outside." 1/

This is a very significant statement of the aims and state of mind/<sup>of</sup> that part of the Resegregation Group leaders who sponsored this action. It will be noted that Mr. Yamashita admits that the group had been working underground since April. It is also apparent that having been refused resegregation, the leaders had now determined to follow a plan whereby resegregation could be accomplished by pushing the fence-sitters out of camp. Yamashita showed himself well acquainted with the power of public pressure on those persons who could be pointed at as "not true Japanese" and betrayed the group's intent to use this pressure to the utmost. <sup>These</sup> ~~These~~ particular statements have been underlined, for, though the pressure did not begin to operate immediately after -----  
1/ ibid., Sept. 21, 1944, pp. 3-5.



the distribution of the pamphlet, it became very powerful later, when other psychological factors were added to it. As to the statement that 99% of the Japanese professing loyalty to America were lying, it might be added that at least 90% professing loyalty to Japan were lying also.

The English translation of the pamphlet follows:

What is RESEGREGATION and What does it MEAN

After the last November, 1943 incident, and when our representatives and others were apprehended and taken into the Stockade, the residents became terribly restless and lived in days of most indignations and resentments. The residents feared to visualize when and if this unfavorable conditions could ever come to an end or not.

One of the main reasons for November's uprising and disturbances was because the WRA did not clearly clarify the distinctions between the loyals and the disloyals. Even, in view of the fact, that the WRA had previously announced both nationally and internationally that the Tule Lake Center was to be a Segregation Center only.

We, upon numerous occasions regretted to discover among the residents, the philosophies and attitudes differ much among one another due and on account of the various circumstances and conditions of the individuals.

Under such circumstances and conditions, those who felt loyal to Japan desired to be classified as an enemy alien and to be treated accordingly, forwarded a petition to both the American Government and the Spanish Embassy. It was petitioned under the name of Re-Segregation Application. This petition intended to serve as a mean by which the residents could be able to find ways to help release internees from the Stockade, for they were considered to be dangerous subjects. While at the same time it endeavored to inform both the Japanese Government and the American Government that those petitioned are very loyal to Japan and thus endeavored to make it clear the relationships of sovereign and her subjects, in order that our future may be built on solid foundation.

However, conditions at that time were so different and on account of much fears on the part of the residents, this petition for re-segregation remained uneffected for a later time. Today, the WRA both here and Washington is considering the seriousness of the petition, the problem thus being taken up at Washington. Therefore, we take this opportunity to determine and wish to formulate openly our policy so in order that all residents be known in general the facts and true meanings of the re-segregation application and petition. Those who are members already are given an opportunity to reconsider the principle of the re-segregation application. Those who are not yet members are given the fullest opportunity for registrations to join with this application. Your applications will be submitted with an up-to-date lists and shall be forwarded to both



the Japanese and the American Governments. This is to express our determined ~~beliefs~~ beliefs and our right attitudes in order that we make known ourselves clearly, the relationships between our sovereign and her subjects.

We request therefore, that every resident kindly read the following principles of facts and meanings of the re-segregation application. We request that every resident decide for his and her application for re-segregation with one's own discretion and free-will.

## 1.

Whereas, we be well informed and understand of this present war and because of our loyalty to Japan we cannot be loyal to America.

## 2.

Whereas, we realize the uselessness of our American Citizenship, and so as soon as and in the event a law of renunciation for citizenship become effective, we gladly renounce our citizenships. Therefore, we make clearly our positions by being a real Japanese. Furthermore, we be classified clearly as an enemy alien and thereby be treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

## 3.

Whereas, we pray for an immediate repatriation to Japan. We prepare to sacrifice everything; both materially and in manpowers to the country we dearly love with willingness and gladly do so as loyal citizens, especially at the time of the National emergency and at her disposal.

## 4.

Whereas, in the event our repatriations should be of impossibility for the duration, we transmit our sincere intentions to Japan for the purpose to make known clearly our relationships between sovereign and her subjects.

## 5.

Whereas, in the event, we Japanese shall be permitted to rehabilitate and return to the State of California or to others of our original places, we do not intend nor desire to return ever. Whereas instead/ we insist to remain within the Center provided by the Government.

## 6.

Whereas, we uphold highly our Japanese spirits and unceasingly endeavor to cultivate ourselves both mentally and physically in order to fulfill the principle of being nothing but a real Japanese. For this reason, it might necessitate for an withdrawal from memberships those who act Un-Japanese, and who bring disgrace to other Japanese.

## 7.

## 7.

Whereas, with aforementioned reasons, we request this Re-segregation Application and at the same time we are destined for expediency with all its accomplishment to re-segregate.

We have already submitted the lists of petitioners of the re-segregations and with aforementioned principles and statements by the ~~by the~~ petitioners to both the American and the Japanese Governments/ ~~inasmuch as~~ through the Spanish Embassy in last May 30, 1944. We



are now making the final list/ to be presented to both the Governments, informing of our Japanese spirits and our intentions ~~xxx~~ in order to clarify our status. Therefore, one must understand thoroughly the meaning of the Re-Segregation Application. We wish to request again for your own free-will decision and your own belief when upon the registration of your name.

Of all importance, we wish to repatriate during the war if possible, and upon the blessing of our repatriations, we wish to willingly and gladly sacrifice all our services to our Mother country. Finally, for this reason, we must maintain our good faiths and internations. We wish to endeavor to educate our children to uphold the Japanese spirits. We desire therefore, to strive to educate and cultivate ourselves and our children in full preparedness to meet every demand required to serve as one's duty toward our country; when and upon the blessings of our repatriations.

Several very revealing statements are to be found in this ~~mass~~ mass of ponderous English which the writer suspects Mr. Yamashita of lifting in ill digested chunks from a well known text on International Law which he had been studying assiduously for a month. It is to be noted that the people were not informed that the WRA had definitely decided against resegregation, but, on the other hand were told, "Today the WPA both here and in Washington is considering the seriousness of the petition." The overt purpose of the pamphlet, to give the people the opportunity of joining the movement or of "reconsidering the principle of re-segregation" <sup>was</sup> is clearly stated. Moreover, the presumptuous attempt of the group to assume the position of go-between between the Japanese and American governments <sup>was</sup> is revealed. This function was to be elaborated greatly in future activities, when the organization gave free service to members in such matters as securing birth records. The intent to renounce citizenship at the earliest opportunity was announced. Most revealing of all was the statement that in the event that the Japanese were permitted to return to California or to their other places of origin, "We do not



desire to return ever. Whereas instead we insist to remain within the Center provided by the Government." By this statement the leaders showed themselves cognizant of the fundamental popular attitude - the fear of expulsion - an attitude which was bound to give them some support. Notice was given that members who "act Un-Japanese" would be expelled, a procedure which was later to cause the Resegregation Group much trouble. All in all, the statement contained a fairly clear description of the policy which the Resegregation Group intended to follow and did follow in the succeeding two months. The only important policy omitted was the intent to silence opposition by violent means.

The circulation of this petition was begun on Sunday, September 24. It appears that the method of distribution varied in the different wards and blocks. In most blocks the residents were given a pamphlet and told to pass it on to the other inhabitants of the barrack. In some blocks they were informed that they would be able to sign the petition and thereby enroll as members of the Resegregation Group. They were told either to go to a Sokoku official in the ward or that a petition would be brought around later. Some informants stated that they were not even told that ~~examination~~ petition was to follow the pamphlet.

As a means of increasing the membership of the Resegregation Group, the pamphlet itself had little success except in the Manzanar section. All that it accomplished was to bring a temporary state of confusion upon the residents. For the first few days, some people were very much confused because



they did not know the source of the petition, whether it sprang from the WRA or from some ~~other~~ organization within the camp. Many of these individuals, however, comforted themselves with the decision that WRA would not bring out a statement in such "awful English." The Resegregation Group made no statement to the writer on how many people signed it, which indicates strongly that the new signatures must have been few in number. On the whole the petition was viewed with suspicion, denounced as a factor which would "bring troubles into camp, and condemned because it "had no authority." On Monday, Mrs. Yamaguchi, a very good informant gave the following account of reactions in her block. She lived in a strong status quo block and ward (VII) where the pressure group had concentrated its efforts and where it already had a strong following.

"We were handed this document last night. They gave you what resregation is about and why they want to be resegregated. There are four or five statements there that you have to do and obey. The people who live up to this can be resegregated.

"We haven't even heard what it's all about. There are so many people here of different opinions. All their opinions are different. I really don't know myself.

"~~Some~~ Some people are very much for it, but I believe there are more against it than for it. What the outcome of this will be, I don't know. On the whole, most of the people are very doubtful about it.

"I think it's a big trouble for the administration as well as the evacuees.

"I really don't see why we should resegregate. We're already repatriates. We've already signed up for repatriation. The WRA and the people as a whole know that we're loyal to Japan. And a lot of the people think as we do.

"The people haven't signed it yet. You hear so many opinions you get all mixed up. It was sent from barracks to barracks by the residents. They did not ask them to sign it then. I believe there's a representative or something in the block who'll try to get signatures later." 1/

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1/ ibid., Sept. 25, 1944, p. 1.



several organizations with different names. The name by which the entire body was most frequently called by the residents was Resegregation Group or in Japanese, Saikakuri (check this) and this is the name which will be adopted in this narrative. At it's very beginning, this name was not used, but since resegregation was always one of the group's major aims, this inaccuracy is not serious.

#### FUNDAMENTAL EVACUEE ATTITUDES WHICH SUPPORTED RESEGREGATION GROUP

The impulse for resegregation was based directly upon the incompleteness with which the segregation program had been carried out by the WRA. The great majority of transferees looked upon Tule Lake as a certain haven where they would once and for all be separated from the fence sitters, from those who had not made up their minds: a place where they would at last be safe from the haunting fear of ejection from the camps and from induction into the United States Army. Naturally, the latter two objectives were seldom admitted openly. Probably many individuals would not admit them to themselves. Instead, an utopian dream was conceived of the future Tule Lake as a place where all the residents would be of one mind and would live quietly until exchange or until the end of the war, preparing themselves for a life in Japan. (Undoubtedly, the great majority of transferees believed that Japan would be victorious in the war.) This attitude was embraced with an extraordinary emotional force and affected almost all of the newcomers to a certain degree. One of the most sincere expressions of the attitude came from a kibe girl who did not become a resegregationist:

"All during the trip all the people coming from Gila - all they talked about was how things were going to be in Tule Lake. There wouldn't be any more inus, no more Tes-Yes. They were so glad

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when they saw the camp. The people came here with such high hopes and they got so little. .

"When we saw the camp there was a bunch of boys on a potato truck. They pointed. 'That's Tule,' they said. When I saw it tears came to my eyes. It was the first step toward Japan and George (her husband) would be here and everything." 1/

It should be restressed that the underlying motivations for the fervor with which this attitude was adopted was the psychological need for stability, for security, for a place where these confused, tormented people, who were still not sure what they wished to do, would rest in peace. The rude awakening which they received and the enormous resentment this awakening engendered toward the "fence-sitting old Tuleans," some of whom frankly admitted that they did not intend to go back to Japan, has been fully described. 2/ The very presence of these nonchalant souls who made no attempt to hide their ambivalence was a nagging threat to the security which the transferees had hoped to gain. As has been shown, this frustration was one of the most potent of the emotional factors which contributed to the outbreak of October and November 1943. A woman who later became a fanatical resegregationist wrote in a letter:

"When we learned the facts of failure on the part of WRA to carry out this as a segregation center, that many loyal ones still remained here in large numbers and many uncertain in status: the No-Yes, the Yes-No, the non-registrants, this, the dump, certainly was no place for us." 3/

A non-resegregationist nisei girl said:

"Another thin that struck us was the great number of Yes-Yes people and people who hadn't registered who were here. We had expected just one group and had expected to run this camp as we wanted to. We had high hopes of that." 4/

Another non-resegregationist, a kibe girl, said:

"There were some families here - old Tuleans - who said, 'We haven't decided whether we're going back to Japan yet. Our boys

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1/ ibid., July 19, 1944, p. 3.

2/ See pp. 6-12 of "Development of Transferee Attitudes Prior to the Farm Accident."

3/ R. Hankey, Notes, July 18, 1944, p. 2.

4/ ibid., p. 1.



just refused to register.' I told my parents, 'Gee, they just stayed here. They didn't want to go out.' I don't have much respect for them.' 1/

The demand for a clarification of status was one of the major points brought to the administration by the Negotiating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai. Kuratomi, however, presented a true picture of public opinion when he requested that the people "loyal to America" be moved out of camp. It remained for the Resegregation Group to reverse the idea and demand that those "loyal to Japan" be removed, a policy which was destined to alienate the majority of the camp residents, since almost all desired security and refuge.

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1/ ibid., July 19, 1944, p. 3.

K. came out emphatically against the petition. He did not keep ~~his~~ opinions voiced below to himself, but expressed them honestly to the many confused and puzzled residents who came to him for advice. Consequently, he soon became known as one of the active opponent's of the pressure group and incurred the leaders' hostility. This perturbed him not at all and he continued to speak his mind.

"I heard about it (the petition) from a fellow in block 75. He didn't know his own mind about what he was to do. The reason he was puzzled was he didn't know where it came from - the WRA or some Japanese organization.

"To be frank with you, I've known about this too. I knew it was coming and who was working on it. I was also asked to attend the meeting, but I refused. I stayed away.

"I don't know how the people are going to react to this. I have a repulsive feeling against it, because I know where it comes from. I don't like the person who leads it. He's not doing it for the good of the Japanese; he's doing it to become famous. He's doing it for his own good and not for the good of the Japanese people as a whole.

"However, his supporters may not be as he is. They( can't be criticised as to what I've said. But as for the organizer of this organization, I have no confidence in him. Some few connected with it are very sincere. The people don't suspect that that the organizer is working for his own good.

"The other day, I told you the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinenedan must have some connection with the original party who want to be resegregated. I found out now that this SokokuKenkyu is nothing but an offspring of that organization. I suspected that all the time.

"They have brought it (the petition) forward at a very bad time. They may be wise or not. If this thing were presented two or three weeks from now, when the trend of war in the Pacific has turned (in favor of Japan), it would succeed. 1/ Right now, it will not. If the trend of the war in the Pacific keeps on as it is not, more than 50% of the people will want to relocate. But if the trend turns toward the Japanese, 90% will remain here.

"I'm sorry the questionnaire from Washington has not come. (Renunciation of citizenship.) They might not have done this if it had.

"If I criticize them too severely, they may cut my throat.

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1/ This is a very astute observation of a primary camp attitude.



"What they do doesn't reason out right. I can't see it. I pity many of them. They can't see very far. They have only selfish motives back of them. . . If they are successful they may gather three to four thousand signatures. They can't fool all of the people. The people have eyes to see. They'll discover the point. I know the people are not in favor of it. It seems so without any good purpose. They must consider they are working against 20,000 people." 1/

K,'s prophesy that the petition would receive a poor reception from the people as a whole was born out completely.

On September 26, Mrs. Fujimoto said:

"It was written in such awful English. When I saw it I said, 'What kind of English is that?' I couldn't make head or tail out of it. I thought, 'It couldn't be WRA. Not with that English.

"I don't know who we are supposed to give it back to. You're just supposed to pass it on to somebody else. It's to separate the people here from the "real Japanese."

"I read it but I don't know what it's all about. They want to be separated and follow the ideas of the old country. I guess the people with the idea that they want to go back to Japan - they might sign it." 2/

Miss Tanaka, who was strongly anti-status quo in her politics, said that her father had not even bothered to read the petition. She added that most of her friends were saying that you couldn't find out the truth about the petition. "Everything they heard was rumors and you couldn't get any real dope."

"Another thing, they are always talking about Yamato damashi. But in spite of that, when the block managers decided to send gifts to the Japanese prisoners of war in this country, the other side (Resegregation Group) said that it was not necessary. I don't see where they have their reason. They are always talking about Nippon Seishin." 3/

1/ ibid., Sept. 25, 1944, pp. 2-3.

2/ ibid., Sept. 26, 1944, p. 1.

3/ Nippon Seishin also means "The Japanese Spirit." If the Resegregation Group did disapprove of sending gifts to the Japanese prisoners of war, the only motive the writer can think of is that they were attempting to hold to the concept attributed to Japan: that a prisoner is a dead man.



Miss Tanaka added that people were saying that the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan had divided into four groups and that these groups were fighting each other for leadership. She also accused Mr. Best of supporting the group.

Mr. Abe, who had suspected the activities of the Resegregation Group leaders for some time, was heartily against the petition and courageously advised people not to sign it if they did not care to do so. He stated:

"I asked one man, 'Why did you sign the paper?' He said, 'So-and-so said so-and-so ~~so~~ so I signed it.' They do not have any judgement." 1/

An elderly issei woman, an old Tulean, said:

"They want us to sign to go back to Japan, but very few are signing. We don't want to pack up and move out of here. Too much trouble." 2/

Once the petition had gotten under way, the writer called on Dr. Opler and finding that he had no knowledge of it, told him that it was being circulated. Two days later Mr. Black issued the following statement:

#### MEMORANDUM ON RESEGREGATION MATERIAL

The proponents of resegregation have been active for several months. They have addressed letters and petitions to Mr. Myer, to secretary Ickes, and to Attorney General Biddle, all of which letters have been referred back to Project Director Best for consideration and reply. The interested leaders have been repeatedly advised that, regardless of letters and petitions, there will be no further segregation either at Tule Lake Center or elsewhere, because such a program is impractical and infeasible.

The petition now being circulated in the Colony deserves only to be ignored. It is anonymous, and, from its context, has no sponsorship. It is unauthorized, and, contrary to a statement contained therein, resegregation is receiving no consideration, serious or otherwise, from WRA, either here or in Washington.

Individuals and families who wish to look forward to a future in Japan have complied with all of the requirements of either the American or the Japanese Government when they have filed for repatriation, or expatriation. It is the official

1/ ibid., p. 3.

2/ ibid., Sept. 27, 1944, p. 2.



view of WRA that nothing more need be done. No further step will enhance the prospects of any individual or group for an early exchange, nor will the present agitation, circulation of petitions, or carrying on of correspondence serve to hasten the day of exchange.

It is obvious that the activities of the leaders of the resegregation question are detrimental to the residents of the colony. They incite unrest, produce confusion, upset peace of mind, and contribute to tension and nervousness. Uninformed people do not know what to think, do not know whom they can trust. Most people do not know who the leaders are. Few know whether to sign or refuse to sign. If they sign, they do not know what they have signed. If they are asked to sign, many are afraid to decline.

No petition will bring about resegregation because the administration policy on the subject has already been determined. No petition will gain preference for individuals and groups for exchange because the Japanese government is not at present interested in discussing further exchanges with the United States government. No petitions or letters addressed to officials in Washington will receive greater consideration than a request made to the Project Director. Such communications are always sent back to Mr. Best in any event.

Block Managers always have the right to their own personal opinions on any matter. Any advice they give residents on controvertial issues should be personal and unofficial. Such personal advice would depend, of course, on personal views. The resegregation question is, of course, a political question, and Block Managers should officially be neutral. They are not called upon, as Block Managers, to publicize unauthorized announcements and they should see that their offices, their bulletin boards and their mess halls are not used for the dissemination of unofficial information. The best official attitude toward resegregation propaganda is to ignore it completely.

The release of this administrative statement served to strengthen the original reaction of disapproval toward the petition. Residents now referred to the statement to back up their objections.

On September 29th K. was able to give the writer additional attitudes on the pamphlet which had been expressed to him in the past five days.

"A pamphlet was left at each house. This block had more than enough.

"With regard to signing the petition - it hasn't come



~~xxxxxx~~ around. In this block we haven't seen a thing. But we know just where to go to sign.

"There's no name on it. 'Who's trying to put this thing over?' That's ~~xxxxx~~ the objection I've heard in many blocks. We want to know who's responsible for it. We cannot be led like a bunch of sheep without knowing the leader.

"I could say definitely that he (Wakayama) is the one who originated it. But who's carrying it through. I don't know some of their names.

"That English! I said, 'For heaven's sake, why don't they try something better!' Probably they don't realize, but by providing such a poorly written statement, they lose the respect of the people."

K., knowing inner camp doings far better than the writer, anticipated serious trouble arising from the poor reception the pamphlet was receiving.

"Between ourselves, I have always told them (the Wakayama bunch) that if they go too far with it, I'll expose them myself. Whether they call me an inu or not, it doesn't matter. If I came out with the facts, I think I'll get most of the people to side with me.

"In many blocks I've heard this: the people are against it. They're saying they're a bunch of trouble makers. I think they're right.

"One point I really oppose: they threaten to use force. And if they use that force, I'm not going to stay quiet.

"Many people today are wondering whether they should sign or not. They're afraid. They're being led into it.

"So far I didn't want to be an informer. I didn't want to be called a dog. But if anybody is seriously hurt or killed, why should I hesitate? My conscience tells me that as long as I shield him (Wakayama) I'm responsible to the people. As long as he's at large, he'll continue. But as long as he doesn't do it, I won't say a thing.

"I've visited many people. The majority are considering. They're afraid something will happen. Those who have a mind of their own, they won't sign. Only one man (with a mind of his own) has told me he had signed it.

"Another thing I've heard from a most prominent person (in the Resegregation Group), he stated that they had a number of killers among themselves. 1/ Why does he say that?

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1/ This statement was made by Reverend Tsuha at the time he was leader of the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan.



"Today Wakayama is not respected in his block. The people are waking up to the facts. They are not dumb. They see things. Of course, there a a few still behind him. Even his wife has said that she wants to move away from that block." 1/

On the same day that this statement was made, the writer talked to two nisei girls. Neither had even heard of the pamphlet or the petition. The next day, another old Tulean nisei girl who lived in an anti-status quo block stated that all she knew about it was that some man had come around to get the people to sign something. 2/ Apparently, he was given little attention. Mrs. Okamoto told the writer that they had received the pamphlet but were waiting to see how other people felt about it before making up their minds. 3/

The writer called on the Matsuda's when the pamphlet had been in circulation about a week. They appeared somewhat subdued. Mrs. Matsuda remarked with determination that they had just about gotten all the signatures of "those who really wanted to go back to Japan" adding, "Today was the last day they could sign." This last statement was wither a falsehood or a bluff, since the writer had covered the camp very thoroughly and no informant mentioned that any ultimatum had been set regarding the date of signing the petition. "The people just laughed at Mr. Black's statement in the Newell Star which had warned that unauthorized petitions would not be allowed, said Mrs. Matsuda. She added that some of the block managers (pre-resegregation, no doubt) had been very angry because the statement in the Newell Star had contended that the matter had been brought up in the Block

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1/ R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 29, 1944, p. 6.

2/ ibid., Sept. 30, 1944, p. 1.

3/ ibid.,

Manager's meeting. This, said Mrs. Matsuda, was untrue. Said Mr. Matsuda:

"How can you get authority for a petition like this? The next time we put out something we are going to take the paper to the block manager beforehand and he better not say anything."

His energetic spouse remarked significantly:

"We are going on as we were even if the people squawk!" 1/

Attitudes showing resistance or indifference to the petition continued to be expressed well into the month of October. On October 2nd Mr. Yamaguchi's attitude had changed from one of semi-indifference to definite expressions of aggravation because of the pressure being put upon him to sign. He lived in Ward VII, one of the sections where the Hokoku concentrated its efforts.

"I say, 'Leave me alone and I'll leave you alone.' If I feel like it, I'll sign. I haven't signed yet.

"I'm Japanese - no matter what they (the pressure group) say. If we swear to be Japanese, we are Japanese.

"Myself, I went to see Reverend Tsuha. We talked until 1:30 in the morning. We had a different idea and couldn't come to an agreement, so I came back. . . . The Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan is back of it. Reverend Tsuha told me, 'Anybody who sign on the paper can be in the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan, but whoever doesn't sign can't be a member.' Reverend Tsuha told me, 'Mr. Akashi is the first one to put out the resegregation and he's the father of naming the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan.' 2/

"Even if we sign or don't sign, it won't do no harm. Maybe somebody will ask me and maybe I will sign, but nobody has asked me to sign. . . . We didn't get any time limit to sign. They didn't give us any deadline."

To indicate the closeness of the relationship between the original Resegregation Group and the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan, Yamaguchi said, "It's like brother and sister."

He added that he had called upon Reverend Kai and Mr. Kuratomi

1/ ibid., pp. 1-2.

2/ This was the petition of April, 1944.



to discuss the matter but "we were both being so careful what we said, that I couldn't get any clear picture."

In spite of his professions of ignorance, Yamaguchi had managed to find out a good deal about the strength of the young men's organization. He told the writer that they did not have more than 60 or 70 members in each ward, which would give them a membership of about 550 at this time. His own ward VII was very strong. However, Ward I with 52 members and Ward III with 50 members were weak. He agreed entirely with the writer that the organization had concentrated its efforts in certain wards. As final condemnation he added:

"I think the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan is just like that fellow Kawaii who went to the JACL that all of the nisei wanted to go into the Army. 1/ . . . The Sokoku Kenkyu doesn't say a thing what their purpose is." 2/

On October 5th a nisei girl, living in Ward IX remarked:

"Most of the people in block 7 don't seem too enthusiastic about it (the petition). But in block 8, I hear there are quite a few strong backers." 3/

On the same day another nisei girl stated that she had heard that in some wards the Sokoku Kenkyu had forced the children of parents who had not signed the petition to stop attending the morning exercises or taiso. 4/

Mr. Okamoto, the writer's conservative block manager friend, disapproved of the pamphlet and petition although he was at this time a member of the Sokoku and regularly attended their meetings and lectures. He appreciated the opportunity to learn more of Japanese culture and history.

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1/ Nobu Kawaii was a prominent member of the JACL in Gila with whom Yamaguchi came into conflict at the time of Military Registration.

2/ R. Hankey, Notes, Oct. 2, pp. 1, 2.

3/ ibid., Oct. 5, 1944, p. 1.

4/ ibid.

Of the petition he said:

"That is not authorized. That's one of the biggest objections right now. Everybody hates to sign because of the unauthorization of the statement.

"I got a notice last week (from Mr. Back) that Mr. Best was against resegregation. I don't know who's working on the body (Sokoku).

"Really, I'd like to know why those persons do it. Maybe they tried to get authorization (from the administration) but they were rejected?

"Everybody would like to go back to Japan. But that wasn't done through the proper channels. The way I feel, I think they should contact WRA before they distributed those pamphlets. That's the regular procedure to something like that.

"Some of the people want to take my advice. But I can't tell them because I don't want to give false statements. We had many signatures in this block. (Okamoto's block, 59, was very strongly pro-status quo.)

"Really, if they want to organize a good organization, they should contact WRA, if they want to carry out things." 1/

Okamoto was one of the many naive people lured into the Sokoku Kenkyu by the expressed high aims of the organization and by the instructive lectures. Later, many of these persons found it impossible to extricate themselves from the organization.

On October 10th the writer called on Mr. Abe who lived in the Manzanar section and obtained his reaction. She remarked that she had heard that in Manzanar alone 1200 new signatures had been obtained for the resegregation petition. Abe said:

"They may have gotten them here in the Manzanar section. The people here don't know what it was all about. The majority of them signed under intimidation or ignorance.

"Resegregation means nothing when you analyse what they say. My family of five have applied already through the Spanish ambassador to go back to Japan. So what more do we need? . . .

"Even those who signed for resegregation are tired of trouble. They simply think those who want to go back to Japan should live together. If we (men like Abe) were given a chance to explain our

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1/ ibid., Oct. 6, 1944, p. 1.



opinion, they would be convinced (and would swing away from resegregation). But we are not given the chance to.

"Some say they have 8000 signatures, some 6000, some 4000. I don't believe 10,000 signed. This time, in the old camp (excluding Manzanar) nobody signed. Even those who signed in this block, they are ignorant or uneducated. If they are educated, they are stubborn and narrow-minded." 1/

On October 12th Yamaguchi reported to the writer on the success of the petition in the Manzanar section:

"I sent a man over to Manzanar to see what was going on. He said only one-third signed. Two-thirds of the people haven't any interest in it. This man says the same thing I say, 'Leave me alone and I'll leave you alone.'" 2/

A very conservative old Tulean nisei girl, one of the legitimate fence-sitters, gave an attitude which was very common among her group:

"We never even thought about it (the petition). We just frowned on it. Everybody in camp is supposed to be equal. I think we should go back to Japan as the Japanese government says. A lot of my friends said, 'My old man signed because he was told to sign.' Now they regret it. The people say they (Resegregation Group) and those who sign are selfish to wish to go back to Japan before the others." 3/

#### Effects of the Petition on the Residents

This pamphlet and petition showed indubitably that the great majority of the camp residents was completely out of sympathy with the Resegregation Group. Some converts were gained, but by far the greater number of people changed from the attitudes of indifference or suspicion to dislike or hostility. As resegregationist pressure increased, certain courageous, ~~and~~ independent persons began to speak openly against the group, advising their friends and neighbors not to sign. The insinuation that those who did not sign were not "true Japanese" was resented enormously, but, at this time, did not force many people into signing. The fact that the petition was also an attempt to "make trouble in camp" was also resented by a populace

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1/ ibid., Oct. 10, 1944, pp. 1, 3.

2/ ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 5.

3/ ibid., Oct. 27, 1944, p. 6.

which had had nothing but trouble for a year, was exhausted by tension and ready for peace at any price. Had not the mass of the people so strongly desired peace, it is very likely that the petition would have caused more furor, more people would have joined and the opposition would have exerted more force.

ATTITUDES TOWARD RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP - SEPTEMBER 19 TO OCTOBER 2

Throughout this period the writer did not find that the prospect of renunciation of citizenship was occupying a major place in the attitudes of the residents. Undoubtedly, many individuals were thinking about it and discussing the pros and cons, but there was no general anxiety. Later, when questioned on this period, informants stated that "the people were waiting to see whether it would really be a law or not." The matter, however, was of great importance and interest to the Resegregation Group. On almost every visit to one of the leaders, the subject was brought up. Mr. Wakayama, an older nisei, though a prominent leader of the Resegregation Group, was by no means enthusiastic about renunciation as it applied to him personally. He realized the helplessness which loss of citizenship might bring upon him, but, as a leader of the group which was loudly demanding renunciation as soon as possible, found himself in a difficult position. The following statement betrays his vacillation:

"The only thing the people are interested in now is the denunciation of citizenship. Some people (the Resegregation Group) have sent a petition to Washinton to request forms. But the Attorney General's office is not prepared yet.

"~~The~~ I think that it (renunciation) is unconstitutional. I think it's a war time law. You can't descriminate against a certain portion of the people just because of their color and race. They evacuated them and then they try to pin them down to citizenship. They say it is voluntary, but once a person is thrown into camp and pushed around he looks at the thing emotionally. They (Japanese) are not responsible.



"The majority of the people are not disgusted with the United States, but with the people who are running the United States at the present time. But when they try to force me to sign my name for the benefit of the administration, I won't stand for it.

"But after the war the entire picture will be changed. Although I may be deported to Japan, I don't think the United States will do that." 1/

Mr. Yamashita also stated that he believed the renunciation of citizenship was another form of discrimination against the Japanese:

"Why, if this is not so, are they taking away the Japanese citizenship? Of course, there might be many many reasons for taking away Japanese citizenship. But from the Japanese view, we see it this way: the American government took this opportunity to solve the Japanese problem once and for all to get rid of all the Japanese race from the Western Hemisphere." 2/

On September 30, Mrs. Matsuda again informed the writer that "they" had received a letter from Mr. Ennis of the Department of Justice advising them to hold on, that everything was going smoothly and that they would be notified when the renunciation of citizenship forms were ready. 3/

Mr. K., one of the few non-Hokoku people who showed a pronounced interest in the renunciation of citizenship at this time, stated:

"We are anxiously awaiting that questionnaire to decide our citizenship. However, everything is very quiet in camp now." 4/

#### WARD CHAIRMEN AND BLOCK MANAGERS REMOVED FROM MR. HUYCKE'S JURISDICTION

In mid-September Mr. Huycke, who had previously had jurisdiction over the channeling of requests and complaints from the block managers to Mr. Best, was relieved of this duty and it was given to Mr. Thomas. Whether this was done because of the constant friction between Mr. Huycke and the block managers, which, it will be

1/ ibid., Sept. 21, 1944, p. 1.

2/ ibid., Oct. 3, 1944, p. 5.

3/ ibid., Sept. 30, 1944, p. 2.

4/ ibid., Sept. 19, 1944, p. 1.

remembered, broke out in serious proportions in June of 1944, the writer does not know. However, Mr. Thomas' accession was regarded with satisfaction by all of the writer's Block Manager informants. Thomas, on the whole, was well liked. Another indication of how Mr. Huycke was regarded by the residents at this time appears in the following story which was related with great relish by a Japanese:

"Mr. Huycke came to the Undo-kai (a kind of track meet) very late, about 4:30. He came to me (the informant was acting as a master of ceremony) and said he wanted a good seat. The guys around said in Japanese, 'What the hell! Put that guy in any old place.' Naturally Mr. Huycke didn't know what they said and it was funny because he was smiling and bowing and everybody was laughing at him." 1/

#### DIFFICULTIES AMONG CO-OP BOARD OF DIRECTORS

At this period a marked split appeared among the personnel of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative Enterprises. The writer was never able to get at the bottom of it, though she was well acquainted with one of the important board members. According to Currie, the Supervisor of the Enterprises, the split developed between the pro-status quo and anti-status quo members. Matsumura, the treasurer appeared to be very hostile to Nomura, the president. Currie also suspected that Matsumura and other Board members were attempting to gain evidence of a type which would discredit Nomura. Eventually Nomura resigned. The Board at this time was still wrestling with the old luxury issue and was considering dividing the merchandize into two arbitrary categories: essential and non-essential. Currie thought that by this action the Board was taking too much authority upon itself, and that instead, it should submit the decision to the Ward Assemblies and let the people decide it. 2/

1/ ibid., Sept. 11, 1944, p. 8.

2/ ibid., Sept. 18, 1944, pp. 4-5.



It is not known whether this was ever done. The luxury issue eventually was settled by the gradual withdrawal of certain of the more expensive and "non-essential" merchandise. Mr. K., who knew a great deal about the inner workings of the Co-op at this time, told the writer that it was the old Board of Directors who resigned after the Hitomi murder who were responsible for the difficulties.

"If the old Board of Directors get too nosy and keep on trying to cause trouble, if they go too far with their dirty work, we (the new Board) might investigate their past record. Certain things have already been uncovered which are not very good to tell.

"For instance, I have stopped the Co-op from investigating shipments of melon and chicken to the camp from Manzanar. Instead of giving it to the people they gave it to the canteens. There is no sense digging out any dirt, because a man got killed. Let it go at that." X/

"The former Board of Directors are jealous of the present Board. At the time the Co-op was turned over to them, they handled it like a hot potato. They (the old Board) were afraid of their necks. During the period of transition; they could not cooperate with the present Board. They were wishing that they would not be successful.

"The truth is, they were very successful. Now the (the old Board) are jealous of it and want to cause disruption and create disharmony among the present directors. ~~Texting~~ They bring up matters which they shouldn't." 1/

An interesting minor event which concerns the popular attitude toward the Internal Security more than it does the Co-op occurred at this time. Mr. Currie wrote a letter to the Internal Security, thanking them for their assistance in putting a stop to the vandalism and thievery which had been perpetrated against the canteens in recent weeks. Before sending the letter he showed it to George Matsudura, treasurer of the Co-op, who in Currie's words, "nearly had a stroke". George said, "We can't thank Internal Security for anything."

1/ ibid., Oct. 16, 1944, p. 6.

Do you want us all to get our throats cut?" Mr. Currie did not send the letter.<sup>1</sup>

#### CHICKEN AND OSASHIMI

An amusing but very common camp reaction to a temporary improvement in food was also reported by several informants at this time:

"I'll tell you something funny though. Recently we got chicken in this camp. Shortly after that we had what the Japanese really like, osashimi (raw fish). People are now wondering what's going to happen.

"Just before the Spanish Consul came here our food improved tremendously. We had three eggs a week. After he left, the food got bad again."<sup>2</sup>

Whenever there is a marked improvement in food, the residents invariably suspect that the administration is up to something which bodes no good. Humorous remarks such as, "I suppose they're going to take us out and shoot us and are giving us a good feed first," are common.

#### THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RUMOR

The rumor that the Department of Justice was to take over the Tule Lake Center soon after the presidential election had its origin with the higher members of the Administrative personnel. For several weeks, it was considered not a rumor but a near certainty. The writer first heard it from Dr. Opler who said on September 25 that he had heard that Dillon Myer had stated that Tule Lake would be going under the Department of Justice within six weeks.<sup>3</sup> The next evening at a meeting of the Community Management Division Mr. Black announced that the Pacific Coast probably

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<sup>1</sup>ibid., Oct. 6, 1944, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>ibid., Sept. 19, 1944, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>ibid., Sept. 25, 1944, p. 5.



would soon be opened to the Japanese and that Tule Lake would be closed to relocation. This announcement was immediately connected with the rumor concerning the Dept. of Justice and within a few days had become the chief topic of conversation among the appointed staff and had spread to the evacuees. The following discussion which took place at this meeting indicates the attitudes of various members of the personnel. After Mr. Black had made his announcement, Mrs. Deschin, a member of the Welfare Staff said:

"What concerns me is just how we can use this among the people if it is just a probability."

Mr. Black replied:

"If you know anybody intending to leave you can tell them this."

Two young female members of the Welfare Staff asked:

"May we use your name and tell people that the big officials in the Administration believe this?"

What Mr. Black replied is not known. However, several teachers, alarmed at what this might mean to their young students asked what could be done to help them. Mr. Huycke remarked:

"After the service men return, maybe things aren't going to be so rosy. Maybe we shouldn't pressure them (to leave camp)."

Mrs. Deschin attempted to return to the subject and asked, "Why can't a reasonable notice be given?" Mr. Gunderson and Mr. Black shouted simultaneously, "That's all Hearst would need!" Mrs. Deschin retorted, "Are we running this camp for Mr. Hearst or for the people."<sup>1</sup> No one present at the meeting supported Mrs. Deschin in her contention that some sort of warning should be given the people. Later, however, several school teachers discussed the possibility of petitioning Washington and asking that this might be done. Four days later the news had reached the

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<sup>1</sup>ibid., Oct. 1, 1944, p. 1.

Resegregation Group. Mrs. Matsuda asked the writer's advice, stating that since the camp was going under Justice would it not be a good idea to petition the Dept. of Justice to keep Mr. Robertson in Tule Lake on the Administrative Staff.<sup>1</sup> A week later she stated:

"When Justice takes over we are all going to petition for Mr. Robertson to stay. Mr. Yamashita says that in the internment camps, they could get a man to stay if everyone asked for it."<sup>2</sup>

On October 6th the Project Attorney, Mr. Campbell told the writer that the Administration was seriously considering making an announcement to the people on the transfer of the center to the Department of Justice.<sup>3</sup> Except for the ardent resegregationists, this rumor did not cause particular excitement in the center. Many informants favored the change in a lukewarm manner, some were indifferent and a few spoke against it. The attitudes expressed by Mr. Abe and Mr. Ono probably come closest to the general sentiment. Mr. Abe, an issei, and strongly against the Resegregation Group stated:

"I don't know. If the administration plays too much monkey-business, we prefer military rule. The rule is strict but they are honest. In Manzanar they felt that way. The only difference is that we would have soldiers with bayonettes hanging around."<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Ono stated:

"We'd rather have the camp under the Department of Justice. The majority of the people are very firm in their desire to return to Japan."<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Yamaguchi, though averring that he himself would prefer the camp to go under Justice, pointed out that this might not please a good percentage of the camp's population:

<sup>1</sup>ibid., Sept. 30, 1944, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>ibid., Oct. 9, 1944, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>ibid., Oct. 6, 1944, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup>ibid., Oct. 10, 1944, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup>ibid., Oct. 23, 1944, p. 9.



"If we go under Justice, those who have money will be all right. But those who can't earn will sure start crabbing again."

Yamaguchi pointed out that under Justice work would be voluntary and no salaries would be paid.

"You remember that was the main point against the status quo. For my frank opinion, I'd like to be an internee. But this is not a one person camp."<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Kato an ardent member of the Sokoku Seinen-dan, who was now becoming closely connected with Mr. Wakayama, had good reason for desiring the camp to go under Justice. As has already been mentioned he had quoted Mr. Best to the Resegregation Committee as saying that Justice would take control a week after the election. He added:

"Most people who are really loyal to Japan would rather have this camp under the Justice Department. When I made this report to the Resegregation Committee they were very happy over it. They feel that under the Justice Department only the loyal Japanese will be here - no American citizens - and would be under the protecting power, which is the Spanish Consul.

"There is not much rumor yet, so far as I hear. I was told by some of the Resegregation Committee not to start a rumor yet, so I'm keeping mum.

"Of course, the people who want 16 dollars a month shouldn't be in here. If you're loyal to Japan you shouldn't be thinking of refrigeration and ice boxes. The real Japanese wish to go back to Japan in body only, that is, if it is necessary. We always think of the soldiers at the front. What we're going through now is nothing to that. That's why those who wish to resegregate do not get along well with the inu."<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Ige, also an ardent member of the Sokoku and a friend of Kato's stated:

"My friends feel that it would be a fine thing if the Justice Department took over the camp because they have heard a lot of good stories of the internment camp and they think that then this camp will come directly under the management of the cabinet, under the U. S. A., not indirectly, as now."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>ibid., Oct. 2, 1944, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>ibid., Oct. 16, 1944, p. 2. Note to what extent Kato had come under the influence of Yamashita's oratory. See p. 626.

<sup>3</sup>ibid., Oct. 14, 1944, p. 2.



K, however, stated with characteristic bluntness:

"That (the rumor of Justice) is known throughout the camp, but it is not being talked about. The Resegregation Group are bragging throughout the camp that it is because of them that the camp is going under Justice. I said to one: 'If your influence is so great as that, you could do much more for the Japanese in other ways.'"<sup>1</sup>

This rumor was deflated very suddenly. When Dillon Myer visited the center on October 10th he stated at a general staff meeting that he did not know to whom Tule Lake was going to be turned over. "I wouldn't worry about it. Honestly, I don't know the answer. There are so many variables and too many different factors to be considered."<sup>2</sup> Mr. Robertson told the writer three days later in confidence:

"I had a long confidential talk with Myer and he told me that he really doesn't know about the Department of Justice taking over. I think Mr. Best jumped the gun on this. I don't think Myer intended him to do that. The rumor around here was so strong among the Administrative staff that I thought I'd ask Myer where I stood. I reckon it's about a 50-50 chance."<sup>3</sup>

Never having had an important effect on camp attitudes, the gradual realization that Justice was not to take over the camp was received with indifference by most of the Japanese. The pressure group however, was disappointed but decided to carry on regardless.

#### POLICY OF RESEGREGATION GROUP AFTER PETITION

According to Dr. Opler's analysis, the resistance with which the people met the petition brought about a marked change of tactics on the part of the Resegregation Group and a split in the leadership of the organization and a change of policy which consisted of minimizing resegregation as the primary aim of the group

<sup>1</sup>ibid., Oct. 16, 1944, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>ibid., Oct. 10, 1944, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup>ibid., Oct. 13, 1944, p. 1.



and instead, extending the activities of the Seinen-dan to educational, cultural, social and physical educational activities.

The writer's investigation during this period gives a different picture. At the end of September Yamashita and Wakayama came out of hiding and took over control of the Resegregation Group. Actually, as has been explained previously, they always had had a great deal of influence, but when no punitive action followed the release of the petition, they believed that the time was now opportune to come out into the open and take the lion's share of the prestige. To do this, they found it necessary to dispose of Reverend Tsuha, the leader and nominal founder of the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan. They also were now ready to proceed with the plans which they had been developing over a period of many months. These plans consisted of:

- 1) the formal organization of the adult supporters of the Resegregation Group, those people who had signed the newly circulated September petition or verified their signatures on the March petition. This group was now formed into a dues paying body which adopted the name of Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi-dan. (Organization to return to the homeland immediately to serve.);
- 2) the initiation of a program of varied activities, social, athletic, cultural, etc., for the young people;
- 3) the expulsion of members "who acted Un-Japanese", a step which was mentioned in the petition itself. This policy, however, was not put into effect until the latter part of October;
- 4) the adoption of threat and violence to stop the mouths of those who criticized the organization.

The poor reception of the petition was not responsible for the adoption of various activities of a public service nature for during the two weeks which preceded the appearance of the petition the writer was told several times by leaders of the Resegregation Group that these activities were being planned. 1/ The idea of resegregation was not dropped or even relegated to the background as both Dr. Opler and Mr. Robertson believed. The writer was firmly impressed with this by Mr. Yamashita when she visited him on October 30, after the Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi-dan had been organized. "We want to be resegregated so that we can prepare for immediate repatriation," stated Mr. Yamashita. 2/ Later, the writer discussed this period of the Resegregation Group's development with Mr. Kuratomi. He stated that her interpretation was correct: "They just followed their preconceived plan." 3/

It is also very doubtful if the reception of the petition brought about the resignation of Reverend Tsuha. The idea of circulating the petition was primarily Wakayama's and Tachibana's and it is difficult to see why Tsuha should resign because the petition was not a resounding success. Undoubtedly Tsuha was forced out because he was becoming a threat to the power of Wakayama and Tachibana. These developments are described in detail in the section following.

Meeting again on the 8th of October, the eighth being the date observed in Japan by nationwide prayer for victory, the Sokoku heard an address by Mr. Wakayama. Mr. K. commented on the speech:

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1/ ibid., Sept. 12, 1944, p. 3.

2/ ibid., Oct. 30, 1944, pp. 1-3.

3/ ibid., Mar. 6, 1945, p. 3.



"No people seemed to care to praise Mr. Wakayama's speech at the Sokoku Kenkyu meeting. When Mr. Yamashita spoke, I heard a lot of commendation.

"When Wakayama was introduced he said he had served as a senator of the United States. He told me that in San Pedro too. He said he went in and out of the Congressional Building so many times that no nisei had stepped in and out of that building as many times as he did.

"Now I know there is no senator from the Hawaiian Islands. (Wakayama comes from Hawaii.) I've read the Constitution carefully to see. I'd like to know what term he says he served so that I could check it." 1/

At this time and later, Mr. Wakayama, Mr. Tachibana and others, made numerous addresses in the mee halls of the center. In these speeches they stressed their intimate connection with high Japanese officials and the special privileges they would be able to gain for members of the Resegregation Group after repatriation. Both men apparently were fair orators and impressed the issei to a high degree. Two informants described the effect of these speeches:

"Wakayama and Yamashita gained a great following by making strong clearcut statements. They said, 'If you're not a follower of this group you can't go back to Japan. Wakayama also said that the Hoshi-dan (the name by which the adult organization was later to become commonly known) was going to have subdivisions in the various prefectures in Japan to handle the Japanese who were coming back from abroad for their future colonization." 2/

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 "Wakayama and Yamashita spoke in the mee halls and the auditorium and they appeared to be great speakers and well educated. They had the cleverness of fooling the issei with their manner of thinking. The issei fell in love with their way of expressing themselves - so like a great man, that they thought they were great men. Many believed in them very sincerely." 2/

"Wakayama, however, when speaking before groups of young men, made some extremely radical statements. These statements were received with shock and alarm by many of

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1/ ~~xxxxx~~ ibid., Oct. 16, 1944, pp. 6-7.

2/ ibid., Feb. 21, 1945, p. 2.

3/ ibid., Feb. 20, 1945, p. 2.



the residents and certain individuals, particularly issei, protested. These protests became more and more vehement, when Wakayama urged the young men on to violence if they met with opposition. It was to stifle this criticism that Wakayama adopted violence. The great majority of the members of the Resegregation Group, however, did not suspect that the leaders were embarking on actions of this type. The lectures, the aim of preparing for life in Japan and the rosy promises of special privileges on returning to Japan continued to lure in members. Several of the writer's informants became almost offended when she suggested that there might be more behind the organization than met the eye. Said Mr. Okamoto:

"It is an entirely unpolitical organization and the lectures are very good." 1/

A young nisei girl made the following comment on Wakayama's speech of October 8th:

"The speeches are quite impressive and they are very educational for the you people; and they impress the older men too." 2/

Mr. K, however, had no illusions as to the aims of the leaders. By refusing to join the organization or sign the petition, he, as a prominent man, had already incurred their hostility.

"They wanted me to join their group. But when they found that my name did not appear on the list (of signers) they commenced to avoid me. I'm afraid I will be suspected by them as long as I'm in this camp. They have asked me to represent this block, which I refused. I also refused to sign the petition."

"They are organizing, but not because the people are wholeheartedly behind them."

1/ ibid., Oct. 6, 1944, p. 1.

2/ ibid., Oct. 9, 1944, p. 1.



K. then informed the writer that she herself might be in danger if she entered the Manzanar section at night, providing the group suspected that she was talking to him. Except for the wild threat made after the Okamoto shooting, this was the first time that a Japanese had warned the writer against violence. Since the writer was on excellent terms with Wakayama, Yamashita and others she could not afford to abandon her activities and miss the opportunity of keeping informed of the activities of the group. Moreover, no evidence had as yet indicated that the group was really as dangerous as K. implied. The writer therefore decided to continue this odd type of espionage on the Resegregation Group and see what developed. K., who was <sup>in a</sup> very irate state of mind at this interview, added:

"They're stirring up unnecessary fear and unrest in camp. Some of them ought to be put behind bars."

It is so unusual for a Japanese to suggest imprisonment of another Japanese that the writer remarked that if the situation were as serious as this, the administration ought to know about it and take action. Mr. K. replied:

"At least the administration knows who are interested in the organization. The administration has the names of the people who signed the petition and should be able to go through the list and pick up whom they suspect." 2/

K's hope that the administration would take action proved ill founded.

The success of the October 8th meeting reflected itself in the attitude of Mrs. Matsuda whom the writer visited the day after the meeting. She strutted regally about the room while telling the writer what transpired.

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1/ Ibid., Oct. 6, 1944, p. 1.

She herself had not gone inside the auditorium because she had her hair up in curlers. While she was standing outside the door listening, Mr. Sandborn of the Internal Security drove up, "almost running over" her. He asked what was going on. She said she did not know, but that they had a permit for the meeting. Sandborn, according to her story, stated that he thought they had a permit for a dance and added that she ought to know what was going on inside since she was standing outside listening. He then asked how many people were present. Again Mrs. Matsuda said that she did not know. At this point a young man came out of the auditorium and in answer to Sandborn's question said that there were about 600 people present. Sandborn said he "didn't want any funny business" and drove away.

At this interview Mrs. Matsuda informed the writer that those persons who did not attend the meeting were being asked to resign. The writer doubts that this policy had already been initiated. Probably the lists of "Un-Japanese" persons were being made up. The first notices were sent out a few weeks later. She also said that each ward was holding weekly meetings. A complete tally of the "re-segregation signatures" had now been made and numbered 10,000.

"This is the final membership. We are not going to take any more because soon we'll be under the Justice Department." 1/

The true reason for Reverend Tsuha's resignation was very difficult to discover. Dr. Opler laid it to the poor reception accorded the petition. 1/ Japanese, however, laid it to

1/ ibid., Oct. 9, 1946, pp. 1-2.

2/ WRA Community Analysis, "Report on Center Trends," Oct. 16, 1944, p. 1.



jealousy. Mr. K. explained the matter in some detail:

"Tsuha was kicked out or demoted because a fight started between ~~Tsukikuma~~ Yamashita, Wakayama and Tsuda. Those three were looking for glory. As long as Tsuha was in the position he was the real organizer and ~~Tsukikuma~~ Yamashita and Wakayama couldn't get all the credit. They wanted to grab all the glory for themselves. By making a very shameful charge against Tsuha that he was flirting with Mrs. Matsuda - and that they didn't want anybody of that kind of character as a leader of their organization, so they started to kick him out." 1/

Later the writer was able to gain considerable corroboration that jealousy was the chief motive for Tsuha's ejection and also that this particular rumor was spread about him. K. added:

"When a bunch get together who like to get on the front page all the time, they will not allow any person who's smarter than themselves to be too popular. He (Tsuha) was the real organizer of the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan. He was getting well known throughout the camp, so the other people were afraid he was getting all the bouquets. So they kicked him out. They want all the credit for themselves. If Yamashita and Wakayama remain as counsellors, at the end they too will fight. They will try to regain all the credit.

K. also told of an amusing argument he had had with a strong Resegregationist:

"Something funny happened the other day. You know they have stopped serving liver sausage here because the Japanese don't like it. Well, one of the pressure group told me that they had stopped it. I said, 'If you have that much influence, why don't you ask for more eggs? Last week we got only two eggs.

"Those fellows are also bragging that it's because of them that Mr. Black and Mr. Best are going to be discharged.

"The other day I had an argument regarding the pamphlet. I was talking to one of the officers. I asked him if it was bona fide, why didn't they sign their names. He said, 'We can't sign our names.' I asked why. He said, 'There are spies among us who might report us.' I said, 'If there are dogs among your group, it's going to be terrible if you're resegregated.' I said, 'According to my understanding, you were permitted to organize the Resegregation Group. You have authority to go ahead with it. Then why are you afraid to sign your name? All in all, this is too fishy for me.'" 2/

1/ R. Hankey, Notes, Mar. 6, 1946, p. 3.

2/ ibid., Oct. 16, 1944, p. 7.



On October 10 Dillon Myer arrived on the project for a day. The Resegregation Group asked to have an interview with him but this request was not granted.

#### New Development of the Resegregation Group

The most revealing statement on the new developments within the organization came from Mr. Yamashita, one of the most powerful of the leaders, who said:

"We don't have exactly the name it was previously called. But being that this is a segregation camp, we wanted to be resegregated, so we could prepare for immediate repatriation. So under such circumstances, we became regarded and called 'the resegregants'.

"But because of the fact that this camp never has been a segregation camp in the real sense of the meaning, as there were so many residents who were not clarified themselves or by WRA as segregates, the main aim of the so-called resegregation petition was to wish for immediate repatriation. Therefore, we have named our organization specifically from the principal reason of the movement - Sokoku Kikoku Hoshi-dan - The Patriotic Organization of the Immediate Repatriates.

"We are not requesting priority. But we believe by our belief if we can be given the opportunity of boarding on the exchange boat, we prepare for immediate responsibility.

"It is ~~the~~ only ~~name~~ the name has been specifically made at this time. But the meaning and aim of the organization is the same. It is for the real Japanese who wanted to help the mother country if there is a possibility of doing so.

"It is nothing against the WRA or anything like that."

Mr. Yamashita continued to explain the aims of the organization in the fluent, intricate phraseology which he considered the proper mode of expression for a highly educated man:

"The Sokoku Kenkyu aim is just the same in that it has been adopted for the mother country. It is the study of the mother country. This younger generation can study every possible thing of the mother country while utilizing this ample time. This will keep in each one's mind what our countrymen in Japan are doing for the best of themselves to serve for the country and to prepare for himself all the possible necessity in physical and mental condition, so that what he will prepare for himself physically or mentally while residing here in this camp, can be utilized for the best of the mother country on his arrival, if he can go on the exchange boat.



"The principle of the organization cannot be changed. The program of organization cannot be further stated or thought of other than in preparing themselves, while residing here in this camp. They can have lectures here, to polish themselves mentally and physically. They can study and they can acknowledge modern education by studying electricity, radio, or any other things he wish to utilize.

"And for the physical training: it is necessary for it is natural for young people to train themselves physically because this camp can be considered as a little larger jail - and jail people even walk around the jail wall when they exercise themselves for their own benefit.

"Furthermore, since this is a war, our brothers, cousins and what not are actually fighting for the mother country. And so that we, the younger people in this camp cannot forget what is going on in Japan, by exercise and training, especially early in the morning after worshipping and praying for victory and eternal life for our soldiers. These young people can be deeply impressed with such thankful action and attitude taken by the Japanese people in Japan.

"So - physical training in the early morning here at this camp are first, physical training for themselves, and second, we feel that by training of this kind will give or can be utilized that particular time whereby these young people are strongly impressed in his heart what the people of Japan are doing, and these young people cannot forget that such thankful action taken by the people in Japan more or less of a spiritual commemoration."

Yamashita was quite frank about the psychological effect the leaders hoped to gain by encouraging the young men in these somewhat ascetic activities:

"If we were training in open daylight, it will not impress the people much - just ordinary exercises. But getting up early in the morning is to feel that we, even though here in this country, are not taking for granted that we can sleep long at any time. We cannot live here luxuriously. We must do parallel to what our brothers in Japan are doing."

Mrs. Yamashita interrupted here, asking the writer if she did not think it was terrible that certain Japanese had reported the exercises to Internal Security, claiming that they disturbed their sleep on Sunday mornings. Due to these complaints the Internal Security had forbidden the exercises in the Manzanar Section on Sundays.

At this interview Mr. Yamashita also stressed the impossibility



of uniting the camp into a unit as Kai and Kuratomi had attempted to do. Wishing to irk Yamashita a bit, the writer then remarked that certain people in camp were criticising the Resegregation Group, stating that they wished to get to Japan before the other people in Tule Lake. Yamashita grew quite indignant:

"If we are considered highly by the Japanese government and if we happen to return to Japan, we wish to sacrifice everything, mentally, physically and materially. We are not requesting priority. We ~~wish~~ just wish to let the Japanese government know what we have in our hearts. Therefore, there should not be any misunderstanding between our group and those who did not sign. Those who did not sign are still sitting on the fence." 1/

Mrs. Matsuda was reluctant to discuss the changing policy of that the Resegregation Group and suggested ~~to~~ the writer contact Mr. Yamashita. She probably feared to commit herself to any statement. She told the writer only that the Sokoku Kenkyu was going to devote itself to the service of the community. Her conversation with Robertson was related by the latter:

"Mrs. Matsuda told me that the Resegregation Group has changed their whole viewpoint now. They are trying an entirely different thing. They are going to form a service organization to promote the welfare of the colony. It probably grew out of a meeting held last night. She was all bubbling over with the new prospects. They intend to attack it from a new point of view." 2/

It should be remembered that the Resegregationist leaders were accustomed to be far more frank with the writer than with Mr. Robertson, even though he was the only member of the WRA personnel in whom they put any trust whatever. This purported change in emphasis may well have been what they desired the administration to believe. Evidently Dr. Opler was given the same information as Robertson, for he described the change in the organizations follows:

"The . . . leadership will move in a new direction, involving

1/ ibid., Oct. 30, 1944, p. 3.

2/ ibid., Oct. 13, 1944, p. 2.



camp life. . . the top leadership is contemplating several departments, activities, religious affairs, social welfare, sports, education, etc. Formerly there were social, cultural, and physical "Chairmen" only. An indication that exchange back to Japan is still the goal, but now a more imminent goal, is the fact that the name is no longer Sokoku, but a term meaning in translation, "association to Return to the Fatherland as Soon as Possible." 1/

Mr. Yamashita's statement and later developments show that Mr. Robertson and Dr. Opler were misinformed and that there was no significant change in the aim of the organization. As to the matter of the change of name, Dr. Opler was quite wrong. It was not the Sokoku Kenkyu which changed its name but the adult group which had formerly been called Sai-Kakuri. The change in name was explained in detail by Messers. Wakayama and Yamashita, and by Mrs. Matsuda. Mr. Wakayama stated:

"The name of the Resegregation Group is not appropriate. As one of the advisors, I made the suggestion to have it changed. It is now called Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi-dan. Very literal translation: 'Immediate return to country to serve society.' The people are getting tired of the name 'resegregation.' The new name now explains our real purpose." 2/

Mrs. Matsuda stated specifically that it was the Resegregation Group and not the Sokoku Kenkyu which had changed its name. She stated repeatedly that the Sokoku was only a branch of the adult group. However, the new name had not yet been officially adopted. She also told proudly of how a certain well educated Japanese had consented to present a course on Japanese literature for the group. His name was Kano and he was "a black cat of noble family in Japan". 3/

#### DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MR. WAKAYAMA AND THE ADMINISTRATION

On October 4th or 5th Mr. Wakayama became embroiled in a conflict with the administration, threatened to resign his

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1/ op. cit., pp. 2-3.

2/ R. Hanky, Notes, Oct. 23, 1944, p. 3.

3/ ibid., Oct. 25, 1944, p. 1.



block managership and also threatened to make all the Block Managers in the Manzanar Section and the fire inspectors resign with him. 1/ The writer got Wakayama's own account of the difficulty, a report which must be regarded with circumspection:

"A person named Goto who is one of the residents of my block built an additional porch for his daughter. He came to see me and told me about it.

"In the middle of June there was an article published in the Newell Star in regard to the building of additional extensions. At the same time one of the fire prevention inspectors came over to me and told me he was told by the fire department chief, Mr. Owens, that as long as 30 feet of space was maintained by the residents, it would be perfectly all right for them to make an extension to the building. The space between the barracks is 40 feet. So there is ten feet leeway.

"This was good news for the residents of the new area because the rooms were so small and the people at that time were requesting the administration to give them permission to build extensions or warehouse for their belongings.

"I made this announcement in the mess hall. The inspector was there too and told me that a permit is not required as long as the residents keep to the 30 foot limit.

"Mr. Goto followed instructions and built the room. Mr. Goto is a minister (Buddhist). He has a three room apartment which he uses for his church. After three months the administration charged him for violation. At first the police came over. Afterwards, Mr. Best signed the warrent for his arrest.

"They held a hearing last month. I appeared as a witness with my assistant and two Japanese members of the fire department to testify that Mr. Owen made such an announcement.

"A bulletin was issued from the administration in April saying that no construction should be made in the new area. This announcement (by Owen) was made in May.

"I said that I made the announcement (in the mess hall). It was not the fault of Mr. Goto. I told Mr. Best that the case is very clear and that Mr. Goto should be freed.

"Mr. Campbell was so excited when I testified. He went to whisper to the Caucasians there. Mr. Best was very excited also. Finally, the only excuse they made was that it did not apply to the new area. So I said, 'Why didn't you say so and why didn't

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1/ ibid., Oct. 13, 1944, p..1.



you say so and why didn't Mr. Owen make the announcement to the 26 members?

"Finally Mr. Best sentenced Mr. Goto to 30 days in the Klamath Falls jail, which would be suspended if he tore down the building in a week. But the building cost Mr. Goto 70 dollars. Now he blames me. I'm on the spot.

"I said, 'I don't think I can stay on as Block Manager.' Mr. Best said, 'Your fault is my fault.' I said, 'But you're behind the fence. I'm together with these people.' He said, 'The case is over.' I remained. I spoke to Mr. Best personally. I said that I thought the decision was very bad and that it will develop into something else. I have to resign. He said, 'You don't have to resign. I can send those persons to Santa Fe.'

"However, I made an announcement to the block residents that I was resigning that day because I couldn't face this person. It was my fault. The Japanese thought it a logical thing to do.

"Now the residents took the responsibility/ and said nobody will take on the job as block manager. They got sore and said, 'We shall continue to protest this to the Block Manager's Headquarters.'

"The next morning I went to the Block Manager's Headquarters and handed in my resignation. They refused to accept it. They said there is a rule that unless I bring along my successor they cannot accept. I said, 'I can't induce anyone to serve in my place.' I said, 'What are you people doing in this office? If you fellows are going to be WRA stooges, I don't think it's worth maintaining this office.'

"The boys were sore and demonstrated their offensive spirit to headquarters. (These boys were undoubtedly Wakayama's group of toughs.) They got sore and came over to my place. All my residents gathered in front of my office and demonstrated their real sentiments of the outcome of the case.

"They called a Ward Chairmen's meeting that evening at headquarters. Meantime, the news spread all over the center. Seventy or eighty young boys surrounded the headquarters. Mr. Thomas was observing the gathering. He rang up Mr. Best. Mr. Best said he would meet with a group of representatives from the Ward Chairmen.

"I got the report from the Block Manager's chairman that at first Mr. Best threatened these people. 'Do you want me to call the Army like last year and teach you folks a lesson?' Of course, the people were prepared for this. They said, 'Do you think you can teach the people a lesson or are you going to be in an embarrassing position?' The people of the new area are different from the people of the old area. We were all ready for it. They said, 'Go ahead and do it. We'd rather have Army control the center than the WRA.'

"As soon as the representatives said that Mr. Best changed his tone. He said he'd see Mr. Owens tomorrow and



give his answer.

"The people came back and told me about it. I announced to the people what had been done. The next day Mr. Thomas came with a paper signed by Mr. Best and asked me to go along to see Mr. Goto. The paper stated that he'd changed his mind and that he would give Mr. Goto two rooms in the new area, one for his church services and one for living. I told Mr. Goto, 'Are you satisfied?' He said he was satisfied so I was also satisfied.

"Mr. Best said he would not accept my resignation. The block people also expressed their opinion that they wanted nobody but Mr. Wakayama. Mr. Thomas also said he would issue a statement" 1/

This egotistical recital is a splendid example of Mr. Wakayama's pressure tactics. The fact that he forced Mr. Best to compromise increased his already over-exaggerated sense of importance. This was most apparent in his attitude when he made this statement to the writer. He and his henchmen publicized this occurrence and thereby increased the fear with which he and his group of followers were regarded. If Wakayama stood so well with Mr. Best that he could force him to his will, what chance had a resident who wished to protest against his activities?

#### THE BAI NIPPON SEINEN-DAN

It was in early October that the writer first began to hear rumors of an organization headed by Kai and Kuratomi, which was reputed to be opposing the Sokoku Kenkyu. Almost nothing is known of this organization since informants would do little more than hint that they knew of its existence and that Kai and Kuratomi were behind it. Kuratomi denied the existence of any organization to the writer. That he and Reverend Kai did have a loyal group of henchmen there is no doubt, for unmistakable evidence of this appeared later.

1/ ibid., Oct. 23, 1944, pp. 1-3.



Rumor had it that the Dai Nippon Seinen-dan was about 100 strong. The writer is of the opinion that this organization was never organized in any formal manner. It is very doubtful if they even called themselves by this name. However, the Resegregation Group denounced Kai and Kuratomi's group as a bunch of gamblers and drinkers, striving to blacken them with both the administration and the residents. Mr. K. who does not lie, stated that the organization existed:

"Kai, Kuratomi, Mori and Tsuda are behind the Dai Nippon Seinen-dan. I've been hearing that they've been organizing it. Ten days ago they claimed they had about 100 members.

"As far as I'm concerned, I'm not interested in either party. I was asked why I will not join either party. They arranged a dinner party for me, but I refused to attend the dinner party." 1/

Mr. K. also predicted that if the rivalry between the Kai-Kuratomi group and the Sokoku continued, it might well lead to gang warfare, a prediction which was accurately born out two months later.

Yamaguchi, an excellent snooper, also told the writer that Kuratomi had told him that he was forming a young men's organization which was called the Dai Nippon Seinen-dan. "I don't know who's backing it of it, but they are forming, I'm sure." 2/

#### Administrative Attitude

The attitude of the higher administrative staff members toward this intra-camp conflict was one of satisfaction. In its crudest form it manifested itself in remarks such as, "Let them cut each others throats so long as they don't bother us." The administration suspected and, to a certain

1/ ibid., Oct. 16, 1944, p. 5.

2/ ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 6.

extent, feared both groups and was inclined to look with favor on the conflict. In this particular case, at least, the constant evacuee complaint that the administration wanted make the Japanese fight each other, i. e., divide and rule, was justified. The bulk of the camp residents, as they became conscious of the rivalry wished only to keep free of it.

#### Minor Administrative Panic

The higher members of the administration were thrown into a state of extreme concern when a Japanese came to the administration building on the evening of October 3rd and revealed that the 'agitators' of which he had been one, were planning to disorganize the operation of the project. The next morning one of Mr. Robertson's key workers resigned and another threatened to resign. Robertson stated that he believed that tension in camp was at high pitch and that trouble might break out at any minute.

"There seems to be a very definite tension, worse than it has been since the Hitomi killing. Yesterday morning and today it sprang up. I look for something very definite in a couple of weeks.

"It came out in threats against the workmen. I had one resignation of a top man today and the threat of another. The excuses given are illness and personal affairs, but it appears to be pressure. They will not give details.

"The administration feels that its the anniversary of another November incident. They could paralyze operations in the camp. The tension spread like wildfire today. It looks as if the young Kibei are doing the work now. They are hitting from several different angles." 1/

The writer had been following camp attitudes very closely and was certain that no such tension as described above existed. Moreover, the idea of a "November Anniversary" was -----  
1/ Ibid., Oct. 4, 1944, p. 2.



quite ludicrous. She informed Mr. Robertson of this but he refused to be convinced. For several days following, the writer investigated the matter diligently but was unable to discover any tension whatever, except, of course, the prevalent suspicion of the Resegregation Group. A few weeks later Robertson told the writer that he had become convinced that the Japanese who had come in and made the report was merely trying to facilitate his leave clearance. All during October, however, tension rose among the staff and the fear that there would be some kind of memorial demonstration on November 1, 3, or 4 increased. It amused the writer to offer to wager on the matter. But she foolishly overplayed her hand by offering to take any odds and ended by having every trouble prophet back out or state that he had never meant the wager seriously.

#### TALK WITH IGE

On October 14th the writer had a long conversation with Mr. Ige, an ex-Isupp internee who on his arrival at Tule Lake had been kept in the stockade for many months for no reason but that the administration believed him to be an incorrigible trouble-maker. Though the administration may have been correct in this assumption, the long confinement did not improve Ige's temper or reform him. The writer called on him because she suspected that he had become a strong Sokolai man and wished to get an expression of attitudes. Ige showed clearly that he had become an ardent Resegregationist.

"Any person in this camp can tell that there is no unity or harmony because of political differences. And I understand that there is a group of elements here loyal to America who are not loyal to Japan.



"If the WRA or the administration which presides over the camp, I think if they can divide these two groups - those determined to go back to Japan and those who wish to remain in America - these should be segregated from the others.

"Another difference I see is that there are groups here among the so-called patriotic groups who have a point of view of not having resegregation while the other group desires resegregation. I understand (this is my personal view) the group that does not want to resegregate feels that inasmuch as the Japanese here are Japanese by blood they should not be demarcated by means of resegregation. I guess the conflict between these two groups originated in the earlier part of the year. (Ige was probably referring to the Kai-Kuratom group.) While the other group desires resegregation regardless of any circumstances, because of the fact that they feel that the Japanese here are not all at heart true patriotic Japanese.

"Now in the Japanese way of life their duty to the state and to the Emperor is far more grave than anything, including life. Therefore, the Japanese who are determined to go back to Japan should bear in mind to sacrifice everything they have, materially and bodily, and be separated from those who are indifferent or of contrary opinion."

Of the resegregation pamphlet, Ige said:

"I wouldn't try to criticize the pamphlet. I can't say it is good or bad. I thought that maybe the group or organization that put out the notice had the feeling that they wanted to make the colonists in general realize that the resegregation committee - their motives - by putting them on paper and making themselves understood.

"Reverend Tsuha, he didn't tell me directly, but he insinuated that the resegregation committee is not to intimidate any person to bring in more members. If they increase the membership by intimidation, the movement will fail when they return to Japan, bringing back a lot of numbskulls and addlebrains." 1/

#### THE BEATING OF OCTOBER 15

During early October, when it became apparent that the Resegregation Group's petition was not meeting with the success its instigators had anticipated, rumors of pressure and threats began to be heard. Yamaguchi, who was already becoming known as an opposer of the movement made the following significant statements:

"Now everybody is getting wise. I don't like the way the Sokoku Kenkyu threatens people. They said, 'If you don't sign,

1/ ibid., Oct. 14, 1944, p. 2.



you're going to be drafted. So a lot of dumb people signed."

Then feeling perhaps that he had said too much, Yamaguchi made an about face and defended the people who were signing.

"But I think those who signed were wise. I'm too stubborn to sign and that makes me enemies. It's better to be like the proverb: Nagai mono niwa makurero; oki mono niwa nomereyo. 'Let the long snake wind around you; let the big snake swallow you.' 2/

"If I were project director I would segregate them. I'd give each person a pink paper and a white paper and an envelope. Then those who want to be segregated could sign the pink paper and those who didn't could sign the white one. Then they could mail it to the WRA and nobody see it, no block manager, nobody to see. Then I'd like to see how many would sign."

"Then I'd fence off a place and put them in it, not going to make 16 dollars a week and all work voluntary. Then I'd make Mr. Best project director over them and Mr. Robertson over us. . . .

"When they had this petition, they said, 'If you sign this paper you won't be drafted and you'll be the first to get off the (exchange) boat. So everybody signed - boy! Maybe I'll be the last to get off the boat. My name begins with "Y" anyway.' 2/

Dr. Opler also recorded instances of pressure during this period:

"I am told feeling ran so high in Ward VII that the vocal anti-resegregationists or residents of 'tough block' who refused to sign were definitely on the spot. In block 73, the block manager was forced by public opinion to move quietly out of his block and later resign; his secretary did likewise. In block 74, adjoining in Ward VII, we learned that one aged anti-resegregationist was hit over the back of the head and knocked unconscious (Oct. 7) and when he 'came to' remembered that the wash-room had looked darker than usual when he went in. Ward VI also had its witch hunts." 3/

On October 15th three elderly men belonging to a religious organization called Seicho-no-Iye 4/ were attacked in block 54 while returning home from a meeting. The assailants used clubs

1/ Perhaps a more literal translation is: Let that which is long wind about you; let that which is great swallow you.

2/ R. Hankey, Notes, Oct. 12, 1944, p. 6.

3/ op. cit., p. 2.

4/ The writer has read some of the Seicho-no-Iye literature and while making no pretense of any but the shallowest knowledge of the cult, believes it is based on Buddhistic teachings with a strong emphasis on the power of healing by faith. Some Japanese call it "Christian Scientist".



and a hammer and the men were beaten so severely they were hospitalized for several days. One of the men was Mr. Abe, a friend of the writer's. On October 10th, five days before the beating, the writer visited him and having been impressed with Mr. K.'s frequent warnings that certain members of the Resegregation Group would not hesitate to employ violence to silence any opposition, ventured to warn Mr. Abe that his criticism of the Sokoku and particularly his opposition to the petition might get him into trouble. The writer also expressed concern over the safety of Mr. K. Abe, however, laughed at the writer's fears and said:

"I was going to tell Mr. K., don't worry about it. It's not as serious as you think."

Abe pointed out that Mr. Akitsuki had opposed the movement from the beginning and had come through unscathed.

"If Mr. K. tries to crawl around in the dark, he might be caught. These people are cowards. A really brave man wouldn't act that way. When the Japanese talk big, they don't bite.

"Even among themselves they are not agreed. The people who signed up say, 'When I go to Japan, I don't want to go with this group or that group. . . The majority of the people are sick of all this trouble.

"A lot of people are disgusted at the way the (the Resegregation Group) act. They are going out of camp because of it. You know there is a Japanese proverb: Tsuno wo tamento shite ushi wo korusu. 'By trying to straighten a cow's horns you kill it.' So, by trying to keep the Japanese in camp here, they (Resegregation Group) are driving the Japanese out of camp.

"Just yesterday, a woman and her daughter, 24 years old, came to see me. They had intended to go back to Japan. But after they saw all this kind of trouble, they wanted to leave camp. Her mother came to me yesterday and cried all afternoon."

Mr. Abe then gave his opinion of Mr. Wakayama, whom he had known very well in Manzanar and who was Block Manager of the block adjoining Mr. Abe's:

"Wakayama resigned the Block Managership to take charge of



the resegregation movement. That may be the cause of the trouble. He wishes for himself to be a big shot. I hate that type of man. Of course, if one works on something with a sincere idea, you will respect him, but when he does it for himself, I hate them." 1/

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1/ R. Hankey, Notes, Oct. 10, 1944, pp. 1, 2.

Mr. Abe's faith that the threats of the Wakayama gang were not serious was rudely shattered. The attack was cowardly in the extreme since the three men were elderly and the attackers numbered five or six. Abe was a very slight man, weighing little more than 100 pounds. He gave the following account of the beating.

"I never thought I had any enemies in camp. For a few days I thought it was a case of mistaken identity.

"I was coming home from a religious meeting at block 52. I heard noisy footsteps. One of the men (Abe's friend) was at my side at the other was 15 feet ahead. The first man who was attacked yelled. I turned around and saw that big stick. I can still see the club like a frozen picture, but I didn't know anything after that.

"When I got up I didn't even know I was hit. I felt something dripping. I noticed the blood. I thought I was clubbed. . . I walked right home and the blood stopped bleeding on the way. I went to the shower room and washed myself. I saw that the cut was spread open. The ambulance came and we went to the hospital. They put in four stitches.

"After that, for a few days, everybody asked me why and how. I said I think it's mistaken identity. Then one man who hasn't signed for resegregation and is very antagonistic to the segregation group, he spied all over camp why I was hit. 1/ So he told me the reason I was attacked. I and one other, Mr. Aritaka, both of us, didn't sign. I didn't speak against it. Whenever they asked me I just said that I didn't sign it for this reason or that. There are six families in my barrack and only one family signed.

"Another thing he spied out for me, about a month before that date I made a lecture at a religious meeting. I said that this camp is no place for young men to make trouble. They should study. I talked about 45 minutes. What I said there was reported to headquarters (resegregationist headquarters)." 2/

The ~~unidentified~~ attackers, the writer later discovered, were a group of Wakayama's henchmen led by a man named Sawada. Evidently Wakayama had decided that he could no longer tolerate the opposition raised by K. and others and had decided to silence it. Abe explained:

"K. knew everything that he (Wakayama) did in Manzanar (in which center Wakayama had caused a great deal of trouble). He knew Wakayama

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1/ This was very likely Mr. K.

2/ R. Hankey, Notes, Nov. 9, 1944, p. 1.



was a coward. And he still bragged himself. But K. kept quiet as long as Wakayama didn't do any big wrong. But since Wakayama's followers had attacked me at night, K. was as mad as a bulldog. He came to me immediately the next day and said he's going to kill him or have him arrested because he knew everything what he did in the past. I told him to be quiet and see what will happen in a month or two." 1/

K. gave the writer the following account of the beating:

"Very few people seem to have heard about that beating. The men themselves are keeping it under cover. The Police Department isn't doing anything about it.

"They were beaten because they refused to sign the petition. One of them you know, Mr. Abe. They were supposed to be the leaders of a certain religious sect. That group in particular did not sign the resegregation petition. They were blamed for it, for influencing the people against it.

"It was the act of a bunch of cowards. It must have been a bunch of gangsters with clubs and a hammer.

"I went to Mr. Abe on Tuesday. He requested me to let the thing die out. They fear that either they nor their families will be safe if I carry out my intentions. One of our friends was going right over to beat Wakayama all alone, but we restrained him.

"They were blamed because that particular sect didn't sign. We know threats were made and we know where the threats came from.

"Mr. Abe was hit across the forehead and had four or five stitches taken. One of the other men was struck with a hammer on the back of the head. The third on the back of his hand when he tried to protect his head." 2/

#### Attitude of the Administration

Since the victims refused to name their assailants or give any evidence, the Internal Security was able to do next to nothing in this matter. However, Wakayama was suspected and perhaps even the leader of the assault, Sawada. The Japanese Internal Security refused to have anything at all to do with the case. The writer is certain that the Japanese police must have known who engineered the beating, since Wakayama had made an unmistakable threat in a speech made on the 8th of October, a threat which spread all over camp by the grape vine. However, nothing was done, and Wakayama

1/ ibid., Dec. 14, 1944, p. 2.

2/ ibid., Oct. 23, 1944, p. 6.



and his group became more arrogant than ever.

#### Attitude of the People

Surprisingly few camp residents heard of the beating, which was largely due to the fact that the victims tried to keep it as quiet as possible. A young nisei girl remarked:

"We have heard very little about it. Very few people seem to know about it. All we hear is just that they were against the petition. They didn't sign for it. They were beaten up in block 54, Ward VI. Ward VI is always getting into fusses like that. They have their own Japanese school, you know." 1/

Another nisei girl had not heard of the beating, but remarked that there were a lot of small beatings going on. When asked why the Colonial Police did nothing, this informant said with immense scorn, "They can't do anything." 2/

However, when the writer called on Mrs. Yamashita, wife of the Resegregationist leader, that lady asked her if she had heard that another inu had been hit on the head. "I've heard a few rumors, said the writer. "Yes," said Mrs. Yamashita, "They got him over in block 54. He was a Christian Scientist. They beat up three of them but they wouldn't have beaten the other two if they hadn't been along." 3/ From this it appears that Mr. Aritaka was the man whom the gang particularly wished to silence. Mrs. Yamashita's statement was significant, since she was the only camp resident contacted who approved the beating and called Aritaka a dog.

The writer was enraged over her own helplessness in this matter and also concerned over the possibility that her occasional visits to Abe might have added to the suspicion with which he was regarded. Under the circumstances, however, it was impossible to do anything but keep quiet. The writer felt like taking personal

1/ ibid., p. 4.

2/ ibid., Oct. 24, 1944, p. 3.

3/ ibid., p. 2.



vengeance on Wakayama but whenever she called, found him guarded by half a dozen young men. She was invariably received with smug politeness. Finding all other avenues of coping with the situation closed, the writer thereupon threw in her lot with Mr. K. and since her good relationship with K. was not suspected by the Resegregation Group leaders, began an energetic program of espionage which produced some very interesting results about a month later. In late October Mr. K. still hoped that the camp residents would become so angry that they would turn on the terrorists. In this he was overly optimistic.

"To some extent these things are going on because the Administration lacks a strong hand. If the Administration acts at the right moment and holds the whip, I think they could bring these people into line. They try

to appease them too much. . .

"The people of this camp must choose if they want such terrorism to exist or else cast the leader out. They are just trying to beat the people into line. If those persons (Aritaka and Abe) had not asked me not to carry out my intentions, I would have done it.

"I'm afraid there's going to be serious trouble here if the people don't wake up and cast them out."

The writer remarked that she didn't think the camp residents had sufficient spirit left to undertake such action. Mr. K. said:

"You must remember that the Japanese people are not troublesome. They are peace-loving people." 1/

Mr. Abe handled the situation most courageously by contacting the Resegregation Group leaders and making his position clear to them. He recounted the interviews:

"I talked for two hours with Yamashita after I was struck. A few days after I was struck I heard a rumor that those who attacked me were members of the Hoshi-dan. Immediately I wanted to talk with both Wakayama and Yamashita but I had no connection. I had interviewed Yamashita in social welfare when he applied for assistance. I asked the Hoshi-dan representative to introduce me to both of them on Saturday.

"The next morning three representatives came to my place instead of Wakayama and Yamashita."

(The sending of representatives to deal with matters which they considered below them was typical of the leaders of the Resegregation Group. "People came to them." Later, they were to try the same technique on K. but found that they had scratched a Russian and found a Tartar.)

"I told them my opinion on how we should behave in this camp. By making trouble we gain nothing; we only cause suffering of the young people, the women and children. You issai want to take the young nisei with you to Japan and while here train them so they can be of some use. How can we train them by making unreasonable demands or just agitating them? While we are in camp we should adjust ourselves to this circumstance. I talked about an hour and a half. None of them could answer with one word of protest to my sayings.

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1/ ibid., Oct. 23, 1944, pp. 5, 6.



The just said, 'Yes. Yes.'

"A few days after I called on Yamashita myself. I talked two hours with him. I told him, 'I'm going to Japan as you are, but your opinion and mine don't meet on how we should behave in this camp. I can't see nothing that we gain by making trouble here. You say so often about the Japanese Spirit. The Japanese Spirit is to adjust ourselves to circumstances and be patient when we have to. And when the issei make big trouble, they are about 60 years old and they hardly can't do much bad or good to Japan. But the nisei are young. If we want them to be good we must educate them in camp to teach them what the real Japanese spirit is. Japan has a great big mission for the people of Asia, 1 billion people. If Japan fought for the Japanese only, she might make more profit. But Japan risks everything for the salvation of 1 billion people. To fulfill this mission they can't make trouble among themselves.

"He said not a word. He simply cavilled at details. I told him I'm not interested in details. He asked me not to say anything about that I had called on him because he himself might be misunderstood in his own group.

"I suggested that there was a rumor to the effect that those who attacked me were members of his seinen-dan. He said, 'What?' I said, 'Of course, I don't mean you did it yourself. But as usual in any group there are always radicals that you don't know. Whether it's true or not, the rumor is that members of your group did that to me.' He said, 'We don't do anything like that.' 1/

Several weeks after the beating the writer received the following letter from Mr. Abe:

October 28, 1944

Dear Miss Hankey,

"I thank you very kindly for your letter ~~expressing~~ expressing your sympathy to me. I am alright and feel as if nothing had happened to me now.

"The very first word I uttered right after the attack was "Baka". 2/ I rather feel sorry for those who attacked me because they do not know what they were doing.

"Be rest assured that your calling me was not the cause of the attack, and I welcome your coming at any time. However, it might be best for both of us to keep quiet for a while.

"Thanking you again for the letter."

Sincerely yours,

-----Abe.

1/ Ibid., Mar. 17, 1945, pp. 2-3.

2/ Baka means 'fool', but is a much stronger expression in Japanese than in English. Abe meant that the men who attacked him were fools.



Kuratomi's Remark

It was at this time that George Kuratomi, one of the Resegregation Group's strongest opponents remarked that "Mr. Best didn't know what to do with this new bunch who were forming kk (Sokoku Kenkyu). He didn't know whether to let them go ahead or whether to pick up the leaders." 1/ At this time some of the odium with which the Tsuda-Mori-Kimura group had been regarded by the residents in general was beginning to die down. They had kept very quiet and accusations of inu were heard less often. Mr. K. remarked:

"The rumors concerning them no longer exist. When they first undertook to get those boys in the stockade out, to some extent people said Tsuda and Mori were dogs. We were to some extent inclined to believe that." 2/

LATE OCTOBER ATTITUDES TOWARD RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP

In late October enthusiasm over the coming opportunity to renounce citizenship was still in large part limited to the leaders of the Resegregation Group. Mr. Ige, who had become an ardent supporter, expressed the sentiment which, in essence, was to become the unvarying response of the members of the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan when the question was put to them at their hearings:

"My personal opinion is that I would very much welcome this action. Those persons who will request denaturalization will be truly loyal to Japan. This will be very important for America and for Japan.

"Mr. Robertson asked me why I wanted to renounce my citizenship. We who are ready to face any eventuality to serve the Emperor feel that if we wait even one day, we are not serving the Emperor. Therefore, if we waited, we would be unpatriotic. If I could renounce my citizenship this minute, not because of Japan going to win the war - this matter does not concern victory or defeat. It's a matter of instinct and duty." 3/

1/ R. H. Hankey, Notes, Oct. 19, 1944, p. 4.

2/ ibid., Oct. 23, 1944, p. 5.

3/ ibid., Oct. 24, 1944, pp. 2-3.



Mr. Wakayama stated:

"The people are anxiously waiting for the denouncement of it. When Mr. Best made the statement that within 60 days the camp would be under Justice, the people were delighted. We more or less expect it." 1/

Mr. Yamaguchi, however, expressed a different attitude:

"That renunciation of citizenship will be pretty hard. You got to request for it. You got to write a whole mess of things. Then if you do it, it doesn't mean anything. They are going to check it in Washington.

"I think when it starts, I'll open an office and make some money (helping people fill out forms). 2/ (This statement was made facetiously.)

Most informants were still non-committal when the subject of renunciation was brought up. They stated that they might renounce and they might not.

TAMBARA, "THE JEW"; THREATENED

In late October the camp was enlivened by the prompt action taken against a certain man named Tambara, who was accused of profiteering. Mr. Tambara, who was said to come from Sacramento, managed to have some merchandize which he had acquired before evacuation brought to Tule Lake. This he proceeded to sell at very high prices.

"The people sure got sore at him. He sold a pound of tea for five dollars. Rice bowls worth ten cents he sold for fifty cents. They say his family is just coining money." 3/  
~~xxxxx~~

Mr. Tambara's lucrative career was interrupted, however, when notices suddenly appeared in the canteens (and perhaps in the latrines) which stated: "Mr. Tambara, would you like to see another Hitomi?" Tambara quickly gave up his business and attempted to get out of Tule Lake. The threats, according to popular report, were made by the Manzanar Gang. Informants

1/ ibid., Oct. 23, 1944, p. 5.

2/ ibid., Oct. 12, 1944, p. 6.

3/ ibid., Oct. 27, 1944, p. 7.

were unanimous in stating that he got what was coming to him. Even gentle Mrs. Yamaguchi said:

"I heard he made a lot of profit. The Manzanar group said to him, 'If you don't close the door of your store, we'll lay you flat.' This was something OK to do. The people like the Manzanar group for this." 1/ (Mrs. Yamaguchi meant that in a case like this, threats were not to be condemned.)

Mrs. Yamashita placed Tambara in the same category with Aritaka and Abe:

"Another inn was warned a few days ago. Mr. Tambara of block 31 was selling some of the things he had stored in ~~his~~ a warehouse. They were his own things and he was selling them at three or four times the price. Somebody blackmailed him. They wrote him, 'Would you like to see another Hitomi?' He closed his door. But he's probably selling things in his back yard now." 2/

Mr. K. stated bluntly:

"If Tambara had been killed I think everybody in camp would have rejoiced, just as they did when Hitomi was killed." 3/

Threats, however, were not limited to persons of Mr.

Tambara's character. Rumors of threats against non-resegregationists persisted. Mrs. Yamaguchi told the writer that she knew threats were being made but her husband would tell her nothing about them. 4/ Mr. Nomura, Business Manager of the Cooperative Enterprises was also the recipient of threats against his life. 5/

#### ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Occasionally the writer was drawn into a discussion on the coming presidential election. Several times she was asked if she thought Dewey had a chance to win. One thing is certain, the camp was extremely anti-Roosevelt. Mr. Yamashita remarked regretfully that he feared that Roosevelt would be re-elected and added:

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- 1/ ibid., Oct. 25, 1944, p. 2.  
 2/ ibid., Oct. 24, 1944, p. 2.  
 3/ ibid., Oct. 20, 1944, p. 6.  
 4/ ibid., Oct. 25, 1944, p. 2.  
 5/ ibid., p. 3.



"Even if Mr. Dewey is elected it will be the policy of the government to give the Japanese more freedom. Relocation hasn't been successful. It is not because they want the Japanese to have more freedom, but the American government isn't in a position anymore to feel the necessity of keeping the Japanese people in centers. They have learned by this time that the Japanese are not dangerous aliens." 1/

It is probable that Mr. Yamashita foresaw the opening of the Pacific Coast which was to have such an important effect on the activities of the Resegregation Group's Seinen-dan. If he foresaw the vigor which this decision was to give his organization and the tremendous increase in the effectiveness of his propaganda which was to result, he was astute indeed. On October 27th the writer saw a letter from Mr. Okamoto who brought the ACLU to Tule Lake on behalf of the stockade detainees and who was then serving a term for sedition in which Okamoto stated that "The Japanese' only hope in this country was if Dewey was elected." 2/

ASSOCIATION OF PARENTS TO KEEP BOYS OUT OF U. S. ARMY

Late in September of 1944 a representative of the FBI came to Tule Lake to investigate some peculiar activities on the part of Japanese serving in the United States Army. Twelve or fourteen of these soldiers had been given furloughs and had come to Tule Lake to spend the time with their families. After they had been in the center for a short time, they sent letters to the authorities stating that they had decided to apply for repatriation. These letters were extremely similar in form and some appeared to be copies. When questioned, the young men stated that they had come to their decision because no one in Tule Lake would have anything to do with them. Although no organization was uncovered at this time, later, by chance, a Caucasian in the Welfare Section discovered

1/ ibid., Sept. 7, 1944, p. 2.

2/ ibid., Oct. 27, 1944, p. 4.

that an organization of parents, devoted to the cause of getting their sons out of the Army did exist in the Manzanar Section. What action was taken by the authorities, the writer does not know.

#### CONTINUED ACTIVITIES OF RESEGREGATION GROUP

DR. Opler noted the first appearance of Japanese style hair cuts or bozo in mid-October. As he relates, the new style took hold slowly. It was not until early December when the Department of Justice and the Army Hearing Boards began activities at the project that the fashion of shaving the heads became obligatory for the members of the Seinen-dan and by force of pressure was adopted by many non-members to avoid criticism, or as one man put it, "as camouflage". It is very probable that the members of the Seinen-dan shaved their heads for the important December 8th ceremony. Opler relates the following incident:

"In Ward VII they (Sokoku) changed haircut. At an evening meeting in the Ward, the Ward leader, an ex-Stockade detainee, announced that 'it was desirable for all Japanese youth to have (trans.) "Half-inch cut".' The real reason for this announcement was to make the youth break sharply with all things American including dress and grooming. He next asked how many were willing. Of almost 200 boys lined up after marching exercises, only about twenty boys stepped forward to signify willingness. It was then explained that 'all should look like the youth of Japan today'. . . . On Monday, the Sokoku boys of Ward VII had 'half-inch cut', a few of the more Americanized laughing at their own transformation." 1/

#### THE MEETING IN MANZANAR SECTION ON OCTOBER 21

On the night of October 21, the Sokoku Kenkyu staged a ceremonial induction in the block 84 mess hall at which both Wakayama and Yamashita spoke. Two hundred boys were inducted and 800 persons are said to have attended the meeting. 2/ The most noteworthy part of the

1/ op. cit., p. 5.

2/ According to Dr. Opler, Community Analysis, "Weekly Report on Center Trends," Oct. 27, 1944, p. 2.



meeting were the radical statements uttered by MR. Wakayama. Possibly he was flushed with his success in the matter of the beating of October 15, for he made such rash and violent statements that the camp buzzed with them for weeks and even the administration heard about them. He urged the young men to violence, promising that he would take care of them. To emphasize his point, he said: "Dai no mushi wo tasukeru niwa; sho no mushi wo korosanekeba naranu," which was translated by an informant as "To save the big shots we have to kill the small guys." 1/

At this meeting wakayama also proposed his plan of communal colonization for those of the Tule Lake residents who returned to Japan under the auspices of the Resegregation Group. The writer chanced to call upon Mr. Wakayama two days after he delivered this oration. He did not mention his remark about "killing the small guys" but explained his idea of the communal return to Japan.

"If they are going back to Japan individually, they will regret very much as to their living in Japan, in that country where everything is difference from the United States. The people in Japan work hard, long hours; they can stand the poor food.

"But the boys and girls who have led an easy life in this country cannot compete with the Japanese. I told them the only way they could do this is to go back in a group, to work mutually for their existence. Otherwise it will be a failure. Otherwise, if they go back individually, they might as well stay in the United States.

"I made this statement the night before last in the newly organized Young Men's Association. Some of the people said, 'That's the only thing we've been worrying about.' I feel that unless they do this they would be a liability to their families and the country. Individually, they will get disgusted in three to six months. I think they should go back as a group and make their own community. But I heard

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1/ R. Hankey, Notes, Oct. 30, 1944, p. 4. A more literary translation is: "For the survival of the larger cause, we may have to sacrifice the smaller cause."



that many people, especially from Ward II, objected to the proposal. I have heard also that they are saying that Wakayama is doing this for his own personal selfishness." 1/

Wakayama thereupon predicted that there might soon be a split within the Resegregation Group:

"One thing might develop and that is that the Resegregation Group might be split in two. I have a hunch. The second group would be the one that doesn't want to go back to Japan immediately. There might be two factions." 2/

This remark may have been stimulated by the fact that after Wakayama exhorted the young men to violence and promised the protection, the more cautious Yamashita arose and denied that Wakayama's group was a part of the Resegregation Group:

"Then Yamashita stood up next and said, 'Our group is not for violence. Our idea is not to do harm to the non-segregants. This group (Wakayama's) is not a member of our group.' He said 'I'm very sorry that the resegregants are taking to violent actions.'"

The informant who attended this meeting added:

"Among the resegregants there is one group already against violence, a modest group, and then Wakayama's violent side." 3/

Mr. Ishigami also spoke in mess hall 8 and made a similar statement:

"Mr. Ishigami stated that the organization (Sokoku) wasn't for Mr. Wakayama and that he didn't have anything to do with it." 4/

Mr. K. was not impressed by Mr. Wakayama's idea of communal life in Japan:

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1/ It is amusing that Wakayama put forward this plan at the time when the Resegregation Group was doing all in its power to brank Kai and Kuratomi as Communists in the eyes of the center residents.

2/ R. Hankey, Notes, Oct. 23, 1944, pp. 3-4.

3/ ibid., Nov. 9, 1944, pp. 1-2.

4/ ibid., Feb. 28, 1945, p. 5.



"In some respects what Wakayama is preaching looks reasonable. But if we go back before or for several years after the war, we are going to be regimented and not allowed to do as we please. The government will put you in the place where you are best fitted. In many ways what he tells to the people seems reasonable. But knowing him, I have my doubts.

"He made a very serious statement that night which you should watch out for." 1/

The statement to which Mr. K. referred was Wakayama's remark that the small must die that the great may live.

K. continued:

"That's a very serious statement. He arouses and agitates the people. He tries to take the credit when things go good and pretends he had nothing to do with it when things go bad."

Of Yamashita's speech, K. said:

"I had a vague idea from what Yamashita said that he suspects Wakayama for the kind of person he is. It may be he will be kicked out. If he is, thank God. If he's not, then there may be trouble. Wakayama has lost the respect of a considerable number of people due to his very vicious statements he made.

"Their organization is so well formed now, it may not be so easy to break. But if internal dissention takes place and the organization is severely criticised (by the people) I think they will disband. The residents will lose interest. I expect this to take place within a month - perhaps before the 10th of November."

The writer disagreed with K., stating that she thought some of the leaders so fanatical that no amount of dissention would cause them to give up. K. replied that if the group split up the leaders would struggle on but the break would make them lose the respect of the people. 2/

The following day Reverend Tsuha delivered a speech which was also marked by violent statements. Within a

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1/ ibid., Oct. 23,, 1944, p. 5.  
2/ ibid., Oct. 30, 1944, p. 5.



a few days the camp buzzed with the news that Tsuha had said, "There are quite a number of killers in this organization." For this statement Tsuha was strongly criticized. Mr. K. expressed the peoples' general sentiment when he said: "I never expected that from a priest." 1/ Except for the violent statement quoted above, Dr. Opler gave a better account of this speech than the writer was able to procure:

"Reverend Tsuha delivered a complicated, if not confused lecture on Oriental and Occidental Values. The audience was due to be mystified and dazzled and the speaker apologized all through the process of dazzlement that he was unprepared and hadn't organized the lecture -- really. Some liked it, and some couldn't comprehend. The Orient, he said, was spiritualistic; the Occident materialistic. The latter's interest in such theories as the 'struggle for existence' was part of its 'get as much as you can' philosophy. The West believed in individual struggle; the East in organized progress. Only Hitler (!) had been able to catch the light of the East and think in terms of group, nation, etc. Yes, the Jews were the blight of the earth -- for several paragraphs. The Orient believed in group conscience, based on a family conscience. Hitler, of course, borrowed the Aryan myth and the idea of national consciousness from the bushido of ~~the~~ the Japanese. Plato's warrior-king state also came from the East. Thus, orientals are philosophers and we must train for the state." 2/

On the same day Reverend Tsuha delivered another speech and made an accusation which aroused the anger of the residents of Ward VII. Mrs. Yamaguchi, one of the residents of Ward VII, told the story:

"Reverend Tsuha made a very unreasonable statement about the Ward VII teachers. Reverend Tsuha said in his sermon last Sunday that a certain teacher in here said that the attack Japan made on Pearl Harbor was ridiculous. He said that if that teacher said such a thing, they ought to knock him down or kill him.

"The people in Ward VII got very angry and asked the principal if any teacher had said such a thing. No teacher did. The teachers are very angry. When they go back to Japan, if anybody thinks that one of them said such a thing it will be terrible for them.

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1/ ibid.

2/ op. cit., p. 5.



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"I know that they are planning to take some drastic steps. They will probably resign. They have held off for a few days because one of the teachers in Ward VII died and they are waiting for after his funeral.

"Reverend Tsuha said this at the Ward VII church.

"My husband went to him and said, 'Why did you say such a thing? If you have evidence, it's all right.' But Reverend Tsuha said that was only what he had heard. I heard that the head of the reverends (Buddhist) has become very worried about it. That's Mr. Nishikawa who is a good friend of George's." 1/

Tsuha, however, apologized for the statement and the matter was dropped. Nevertheless, he has not forgiven by the Ward VII residents. Reverend Tsuha's statement about killers also caused some perturbation among the Resegregation Group's leaders. A few days after it was made, Mrs. Matsuda told the writer that Reverend Tsuha had been making some statements in fun and that foolish people were taking them seriously.

#### THE KNIFING IN MANZANAR SECTION

On October 30th, Sawada, Wakayama's right hand man, credited by honest informants with being the leader of the group which beat Hitomi's brother, Morimoto, Aritaka and Abe, and several other men, knifed the son of a man who, though a Resegregationist, was very hostile to Wakayama. The arrest and trial which followed gave Wakayama and Yamashita the opportunity to prove that

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1/ ibid., Oct. 25, 1944, p. 1.



they "could take care of their men" and prove it they did. The victim gave less incriminating testimony every time he testified and at the final trial, asked for clemency for Sawada. So cleverly was the incident handled that the Project Attorney, Mr. Noyes, never doubted that the story told by the victim and defendant was true. This story, as related by Mr. Noyes, went as follows:

"It seems that three young men were on the way to Japanese school at about 6:45 in the evening. They passed two issei and noticed that the men were urinating. According to the boys, one of the older men called an insult to them. One of the boys turned and made for them. His friends tried to hold him back and the insulter's issei friend tried to restrain him. Words were exchanged. Suddenly the issei drew a knife, slashed the young man across the face, severing the temporal artery and returned the knife to his pocket so fast that neither of the boys saw the knife. (Probably neither of the boys cared or dared to admit that they saw the knife. R. H.)

"Even the boy wounded said that at first he thought he had been scratched. The Japanese Internal Security does not seem eager to press the case and it is rumored that the defendant is a friend of Yamashita. The attack took place in block 78. There is no evidence whatever that it is tied up in any political matter.

"The defendant was turned over for trial to the County Authorities and is being held on \$1000 bail." 1/

The Project Attorney anticipated that there would be pressure from Sawada's block in the form of a petition extolling his character. Since, however, the matter was now out of the WRA's hands, the petition could do no possible good.

The writer's two Japanese friends who kept their eyes on Wakayama's activities had very different stories to tell.

Mr. K. said:

"I wonder what Mr. Wakayama is feeling today. He definitely told the people in the mess hall that he'd assume any responsibility. "The little fellows must die so the big fellows may live." That's a very agitating statement to make in Japanese. He just told the people to go ahead and do anything they want. 'I'll stand

1/ ibid., Nov. 1, 1944, pp. 2-3.



responsible,' he said. This man (Sawada) did it, and he's in jail now.

"When he was arrested by the colonial police I was told that Wakayama and Yamashita and another person went and asked for his release, stating that he was a very nice person. But instead the police imprisoned him. Wakayama was not able to affect his release. I wonder how he feels today. Probably the people feel that what he tells you and what he could do are two different things."

These intriguing hints were too much for the writer and, abandoning Japanese roundabout speech, she asked flatly, "Are you telling me that this knifing had political significance?"

Mr. K. answered as directly, "I certainly am." He continued:

"The Japanese Internal Security is afraid it will be beaten up. If there were no organization, they might have spoken the ir mind. The man (Sawada) is a fanatical supporter of the Sokuji Kikoku (Resegregation Group). Now if he's released, Yamashita and Wakayama will feel so proud that doubtless they will do something really serious." a/

Mr. K. believed that Sawada would get his just deserts on this occasion. But he got off with 90 days. The events of the trial were narrated by the Project Attorney:

"On the 5th I got word that the District Attorney was going to give him (Sawada) a chance. He said his friends could meet with the prisoner and also meet with the District Attorney and have a discussion so that the man would feel he was given a fair trial and that his Civil Rights had been protected. My only position on the whole deal has been one of a neutral observer to see that the man was told he could employ council and that a fair discussion of the probabilities of the case was held with him - what the probabilities were if he pleaded innocent or guilty. My policy was to keep out of being in the middle. Therefore, in holding the meeting at the District Attorney's office before the trial, I insisted on these points: that any decision to be made on the plea had to be the prisoner's own, after his own consideration.

"The District Attorney stated that he was not going to press for a penitentiary sentence."

The writer asked what had caused the District Attorney to come to this decision. Mr. Noyes replied:

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1/ Ibid., Nov. 6, 1944, p. 3.

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"1) the nature of the evidence; 2) the age of the defendant;  
3) the fact that his past record was clear. (!)

"Yamashita, with two other friends of the defendant went along to the trial at Alturas. He was very gracious and polite. He addressed the District Attorney as 'your honor'. In the discussion



which was held in the District Attorney's office in the presence of the prisoner, he asked the District Attorney what he would advise they should do. The District Attorney said, 'If the man, after consulting his own conscience honestly believed he did not commit the assault with the knife, he should plead not guilty. If, after consulting his own conscience, he felt he did commit the crime, he may as well plead guilty and take some medicine.' (In the latter case) the District Attorney said he would make a recommendation to the court and would personally plead for mercy - for a county jail sentence.

"Yamashita explained this to the defendant. The defendants stated that he realized that what he did was wrong and that he would plead guilty. After the conference I asked Yamashita whether he felt that the conference was handled in a fair manner and whether the defendant was happy that he had his friends there. He said it was handled fairly.

"When Yamashita and his friends came in the District Attorney got up and shook hands with them and welcomed them in a very friendly manner.

"During the entire procedure Yamashita tried to make it sound as if he weren't a personal friend of the defendant's, that he was not one of the delegates, that he was just an intermediary.

~~During the entire procedure Yamashita tried to make it sound as if he weren't a personal friend of the defendant's, that he was not one of the delegates, that he was just an intermediary.~~

"It was also explained to the defendant ~~xxxx~~ and his friends that the District Attorney's recommendations were in no way binding on the court, that they were advisory, but that they were usually given considerable weight."

The writer then asked if Yamashita had attempted to contact Mr. Noyes before the trial. She was told that he had come in soon after Sawada's arrest, with two delegates.

"The complaining witness at the conclusion of his testimony took the stand - and all during his testimony at the trial he did not testify as strongly as he had before - and said, 'I will appreciate your giving this man as light a sentence as possible. The Internal Security officer (Japanese) concurred too.

"Yamashita and the defendant made a pledge in open court that what the defendant did was bad, that he would not drink anymore and that he would not do this act again." 1/

Sawada got off with the extremely light sentence of 90  
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1/ ibid., Nov. 7, 1944, pp. 204.



days in the county jail. After telling this story, however, the Project Attorney stated that he was disappointed in Yamashita. "How so?" asked the writer. "I've heard that he and the others are going around beating their chests and saying, 'I did it all'!" The writer herself received several accounts of the bragging which Yamashita and Wakayama were doing over this signal success.

#### THE MEIJI SETSU CEREMONY

The administration allowed the residents a full holiday for this important ceremony which commemorates the birth of the Emperor Meiji, the grandfather of the present Emperor. Elaborate preparations were made by several organizations in camp, the Japanese Language schools in particular. The Resegregation Group, comprising it's two organizations, the young mens' group or Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan, and the adult group, the Sokuji Kikoku Hoshidan determined to have the most impressive ceremony of all and to insure this, determined to get the use of the outdoor stage in the main firebreak. In spite of some opposition from the Kokumin Gakko, the campwide Japanese Language School, they succeeded. The Resegregation Group applied for permission to display the Japanese flag on the platform, but this was denied them. Instead, they gave the place of honor to a banner on which the Kimigayo, the Japanese national anthem, was inscribed. On October 25th Mrs. Matsuda told the writer that the Resegregation Group had reserved the outdoor stage for this occasion many months before, thereby outwitting both the Kokumin



Gakko and the Civic Organizations who applied for it later. She was very happy about this. <sup>1/</sup> Mrs. Yamaguchi, a teacher in the Kokumin Gakko was not so happy. On November 2nd he cheerfully told the writer that his school was going to hold their Meiji Setsu exercises on the outdoor stage at 9:30 a. m. "That's strange," said the writer, "I've been asked to come and see the Sokuji Kikoku hold their ceremony there at 10:00 a. m." "That can't be," said Mr. Yamaguchi, "We won't be through for two hours. What's going to happen with everybody wanting to celebrate there!" <sup>2/</sup> The writer said nothing but thought to herself that the Kokumin Gakko would give way, which it did. How the matter was settled the writer did not discover. The Kokumin Gakko probably used the highschool auditorium, which was just as well for them as the day proved most inclement. The other language schools, the Dai Towa of block 25 and the Nippon Kokumin Gakko of Ward VI found less desirable places.

On October 27th the writer had a very interesting talk with Mr. Kato, who by this time had confessed to her that he was one of the shining lights of the Resegregation Group and had, moreover, established very good relationships with Mr. Wakayama. "I ought not to tell you this," he said, "but there is not going to be any trouble here before November 3rd because if that happened we would not be allowed to use the outdoor stage for the Meiji Setsu exercises and we might have a hard time explaining that after we get to Japan. But after that, there is going to be big trouble. Naturally, I

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<sup>1/</sup> ibid., Oct. 25, 1944, p. 1.

<sup>2/</sup> ibid., Nov. 2, 1944, p. 1.

can't tell you just what I'm going to do, but I'm 99% sure we're going to do it." Kato added that he now had a tremendous amount of backing and was in x very good with Yamashita and Wakayama. Had the writer pressed him, he would probably have given more information; but since she was in a very precarious position, she preferred to let well enough alone. Kato stated several times during the interview, "I'm not afraid of going to jail." 1/

On November 1, the writer had a discussion with Dr. Opler in which she attempted to clarify the matter of the names of the organizations within the Resegregation Group. The writer insisted that the young men's organization had not changed its name and that it was the adult group which was now being termed Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi-dan. Dr. Opler was unconvinced and stated, "I can't understand it. I've sent boys right up to the throne to ask." 2/ It might be added here that anticipation of some type of anniversary demonstration was by this time running very high among certain members of the personnel. All Caucasians, except members of the Internal Security, were forbidden to enter the colony on November 3rd. The writer, however, did not hear of this prohibition and went into observe the Resegregation Group's ceremonies.

#### THE MEIJI SETSU CEREMONY

The writer was interested not only in observing the ceremony but also in obtaining an idea of how large

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1/ ibid., Oct. 27, 1944, pp. 1, 4.

2/ ibid., Nov. 1, 1944, p. 1.



~~xxxx~~ ~~xx~~ the group of fervant Resegregationists might be. No one who sincerely supported the organization would absent himself from a ceremony of this importance. There were not more that 600 young men in the group which marched and not more than 2000 adult spectators. The young men marched in columns from a position shouth of the stage to take up formation before the stage. However, they did not "shake the earth with their tread" as had been said in the colony. The adults formed themselves into rows facing the stage, but as a separate group. The young men wore only their suits and did not move during the ceremony. They must have suffered cruelly from the cold but all had placed their overcoats on the ground so as to participate more freely in the ceremony and they did not put them on. A few hundred older people did not go into the firebreak and get into line but stood timidly on the side lines and the writer took her place with them. The opening address was delivered by Mr. Yamashita. Uchida, the dansho also made a speech. The Imperial Rescript was reverently removed from its box and read aloud, the reader donning the necessary white gāoves. All present bowed to the rising sun, holding a position which would have appeared extremely ridiculous had it not been accompanied by manifest sincerity and reverence. Meanwhile, a corps of bugles inexpertly bugled several patriotic selections. (The sun did not show its face. Instead intermittent, icy rain showered down.) Several songs were then~~s~~ sung in unison, one of which was the Kimigayo. The chief speaker, Reverend

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Matsumoto.



delivered a long address which lasted almost an hour. The cold increased. Occasionally one of the older people weakened and put on an overcoat but the young men stood and shivered. A few clutched the sleeves of their coats surreptitiously. One became ill and had to be assisted from the field. The ceremonies ended with the shout, "Dai Nippon Teikoku, Banzai! Banzai! Banzai!" When the ceremonies were ended, the writer, who had stood as quietly as the Japanese, found herself so stiff from cold and impaired circulation that she could scarcely walk. The pathos and futility of this ceremony was deeply moving. 1/

#### INHIBITION OF MR. WAKAYAMA

After Mr. Kato's unsubtle hint that the Wakayama group were about to take action, the writer kept constantly on the alert to discover what type of action was contemplated. Mr. K., who had a good espionage system of his own said that he knew they were up to something but would give no details. Indication of pressure could be seen in the fear of Mrs. Yamaguchi, who was beginning to worry about her husband who had become noted for his resistance to the Sokoku. On November 7th the writer asked her conservative friend Okamoto if he had attended the Sokoku Meiji Setsu exercises. He replied that he had not, but had gone instead to those given by the Kokumin Gakko. Knowing that he had been an ardent member a few weeks before, the writer drew the following interesting change of attitude from him:

"I try to avoid everything. I haven't gone to the meetings. I told them, 'If I stay in your club I have to quit my job.' It's not only that, I have to avoid any other crowd. I just put down my name, but I don't go to the meetings."

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1/ ibid., Nov. 3, 1944, pp. 1-5.



"I'm afraid if that organization goes on as it is, it will get involved in more politics. That's why I'm afraid. They should consider every step. I don't see why those people want to start big organizations. The old issei, maybe they want name and titles (when they get to Japan).

"The organization is breaking from inside because of individual relations and differences among the members. There is so much friction.

"Most of the people in this center have decided to go back to Japan anyway.

"Some of the boys (in the Manzanar section) are so stiff and tough and hard too. Frankly, I myself am being awful careful of those boys. They do something very extreme, so I just kind of take more careful step. I watch my language." 1/

On November 6th Mr. K. agreed with the writer that the attendance at the Meiji Setsu exercise was a fair criterion of the actual strength of the Resegregation Group, since all non-members had been forbidden to attend the ceremony. He had attended the ceremony in his messhall, since every block had its own ceremony.

"Whoever does not take part in it is looked upon as not loyal. He is really not Japanese. It is a good thing that WRA permitted it."

Mr. K. also remarked that he had been informed that Wakayama had planned to beat in two or three peoples' heads in the last week but had held off because of the Meiji Setsu. K. had good reason to believe that he was one of those on the list.

"They are not leading the residents on the right path or the right way.

"This one (group) calculate things very carefully before they start it. I wouldn't say this if I didn't know the facts. They are always saying, 'When we get there.' Whom do they mean? They think they are going to be rewarded. If they think they're going to fool the Japanese officials in Japan, they're going to make a mistake.

"They have carried things too far, knocking in the heads



of people who are not for them. Just because I don't join their organization, they say I'm not loyal. How could they measure my loyalty that way?" 1/

K.'s last complaint on the Resegregation Group settings/ themselves up as judges on loyalty was repeated with increasing frequency in the months that followed and was the most common defense put up against the "you are not 'true Japanese'" pressure.

On November 10th the writer called on Mr. Kato with the deliberate intent of getting him to tell what plans for violence Mr. Wakayama had in mind. This was not difficult to do and the writer learned that the plan was to beat up twelve imm on the same night and simultaneously present Mr. Myer with a petition signed by thousands of names, asking for the removal of Best.

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Check with notes in Berkeley.  
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The writer agreed that such a sequence of events would indeed astonish the WRA, and made haste to inform Mr. K. of this spectacular plan. Mr. K. took the news calmly and told the writer he had already protected himself by placing a written expose of Wakayama's complicity in certain criminal acts in the hands of ✓ friends in Tile Lake and Manzanar. If he were attacked these statements were to be given to Mr. Best and the FBI. The writer was seriously alarmed and urged Mr. K. to denounce Wakayama before more innocent people were beaten. K., however, did not appear to be impressed by the writer's arguments and stated that he had the matter well in hand.

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1/ ibid., Nov. 6, 1944, p. 1.  
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### Attitude of the Administration

Singularly enough, this particular period was regarded by the administration as one of the most peaceful in the history of Tule Lake. Dr. Opler began his report of November 16 as follows:

"It has become trite, in trend reports on Tule Lake, first to predict and then report the peace and quiet of the center. Nevertheless, ever since the liquidation of the stockade, the progress made has been steady and unmistakable. . . . Three reactions have emerged: 1) the center has been improved since the period of last November. . . ; 2) Administration anticipates problems and functions efficiently. . . ; 3) Administration dispels problems quickly once they arise. . . The process of restoring confidence in Administration is completed." 1/

Dr. Opler was quite correct in that the center presented an outward appearance of extreme quiet. But it was the ominous quiet of anxiety. Most residents were of the opinion that the center had improved since November 1943, but that had been a time of such misery and anxiety that an improvement upon it would by no means guarantee a state of comfort or satisfaction. The writer noted no indication that residents were crediting the administration with more efficiency or more dispatch in dispelling problems. As for confidence, the administration had never enjoyed any confidence, so none could be restored.

Dr. Opler's optimism was shared by Mr. Best. On November 10th Mr. Robertson reported that Mr. Best was convinced that the colony was in a state of exceptional peace. No trouble at all was anticipated. The factions were fighting among themselves, but all else was serene. At the last staff meeting Mr. Best had read a letter from Dillon Myer which stated that Tule Lake was in the most peaceful state that he had ever seen it. Moreover,

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1/ WRA, Community Analysis, "Special Report on Center Trends,"  
Nov. 16, 1944, pp. 1, 2.



Best had had a talk with Kato and was convinced that Kato was being very quiet and had decided to behave himself. 1/

K. CHECKMATES WAKAYAMA

On November 20th the writer visited Kato and found him in a state of extreme depression. "There isn't going to be any trouble for some time," he stated, "not for a long time." In his pique, he denounced the Kai-Kuratomi faction:

"There are three groups now. One group is our group, the Resegregation Group. The other group is trying to hold back our group because they've made a mistake before. We were waiting for them to come out and have Reverend Kai be one of the advisors and Kuratomi one of the dansho or big shots of the ~~KMS~~ young men's association. They forget how much has been done for them.

"There's nothing we can do for quite some time.

"I'm fed up with this camp. They don't want to bow their heads and come under us. So to save their faces when they return to Japan, they must do something.

"The third group just does nothing. They don't give a damn what happens. They don't bother us. Most of us realize that we've been playing too much of a gentleman act. We should have done something before they started."

Kato added that his group knew that many of their plans were being reported to the administration and he knew who was doing it (Kai and Kuratomi). 2/

The writer deduced that something had caused Mr. Wakayama to abandon his violent plan. Mr. K., however, would not tell her what he had done. All he would say was that one of the chief counsellors of the Sokuji Kikoku had called on him and had a long talk with him. Now he was sure Wakayama was shivering in his shoes. This visitor ended by telling K. that a few weeks before Wakayama had

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1/ R. Hankey, Notes, Nov. 10, 1944, p. 5.

2/ ibid., Nov. 20, 1944, p. 2.

been responsible for several beatings. 1/

"The even talk about each other. You see how they are.

"They figure I'm not bluffing. They don't want to be dragged out. They tell me it wasn't them, but it was this guy (Wakayama).

"A friend of mine spread the truth to the people of Manzanar (section). Those boys have such confidence in me that they will not tolerate any nonsense. Even that bunch of boys in Manzanar (Wakayama's gang) they will definitely refuse to support him if he ever counsels any violence on me. He will be very much surprised to hear that. I hold the respect of those boys because I was in San Pedro along with them." 2/

Several weeks later the writer learned some of the details of Mr. K.'s campaign from mutual friends. Mr. Abe gave the following interesting account:

"Wakayama was in Terminal Island before the war and so was K. So they know each other for a long time and K. knows the personality of Wakayama and that he is always for himself only.

"He knew everything that he did in Manzanar. He knew Wakayama was a coward. And still he bragged himself. But K. kept quiet as long as Wakayama didn't do any big wrong. But since Wakayama's followers had attacked me at night, K. was as mad as a bulldog. He came to me immediately the next day and said he's going to either kill him or have him arrested because he knew everything what he did in the past. I told him to be quiet and see what will happen in a month or two.

"Then a young boy was slashed. And the fellow who attacked him was one of the men who attacked me.

"And then Wakayama tried to attack K. He planned it and K. found out. And then K. was kind of alarmed. And one of the Sokoku men, a mean fellow, he and one other went to K. early in the morning. Both went there and stayed there talking until two o'clock in the afternoon. And K. said to them, 'I might be attacked and killed, but in the meantime I might kill a couple of you. I dedicate myself to the justice and welfare of the camp. That's the only way we can keep the peace in camp. When Abe and Aritaka were attacked I was ready to punish Wakayama, but at the request of Abe and Aritaka I withheld. But now I am ready!'

"Then the two men said, 'As long as we let you alone,

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1/ Undoubtedly the Abe-Aritaka beating and probably several others.

2/ R. Hankey, Notes, Nov. 20, 1944, p. 1.



you shouldn't mind what happens in camp.' Then K. was madder than ever. 'What!!!' he said. Then he told them all about Wakayama and his movements. He said, 'You are hiding as leader such a man as Wakayama. Do you know about this?' The two men were surprised. . .

"And that was Thursday or Friday. The next morning Wakayama resigned for the reason that his wife had a baby and there was a lot of work to do in the house. And the baby was born four months ago. 1/

"Ever since K. has told all about Wakayama a lot of people found out what he was. The people didn't know (before) and they worshipped him highly. But now they've found out that he's a coward and just doing everything for publicity." 2/

The most succinct account of what K. had done to Wakayama was given by Mr. Yamaguchi, who smiled and quoted the proverb: Yobu wo tsutsuite, hebi wo desu<sup>h</sup>. This proverb was extremely pertinent since it means, "He who prys into the jungle will stir up a ~~snake~~ serpent." As for the matter of Mr. Wakayama's resignation, it must have been at least nominal for when the writer remarked to the Matsuda's that she had heard that Mr. Wakayama had resigned they looked ill at ease. After <sup>an awkward</sup> pause, Mr. Matsuda said, "Well, he's been sick." 3/

The writer had reason to suspect that K. had not limited his counter-Wakayama activities to this talk with the two Desegregationists but has rallied a group of friends to his assistance. K.'s friends would give no specific information on this point. Vague hints, however, showed that something of this kind may have been done. Mr. Abe said:

"Since I was attacked there has been born a new party in the spirit of justice. There are two men who say they will dedicate their lives for the peace of the camp. And especially because these Sokoku people were destroying the peace of the camp by attacking innocent people.

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1/ In spite of this "resignation" Wakayama undoubtedly continued to exert a powerful influence behind the scenes.

2/ ibid., Dec. 14, 1944, p. 2.

3/ ibid., ~~xxx~~ Dec. 9, 1944, p. 7.

"Soon after we were attacked, even among the Sokoku people, there were two parties - one extreme and one mild. Those who were mild were indignant at the radicalism and both were in feud among themselves. A big trouble was looming at that time.

"Then another party of justice appeared. That's why these radicals were scared to death." 1/

The Yamaguchi's told the writer that Mr. K. had called on them and stated:

"Now I am going to fight. You stay out of it George, because you're married. I'm a bachelor and have no one to depend on as if I get killed."

Yamaguchi, who was probably speaking of his own campwide seinen-den, which emphasizes athletics, added:

"Our organization is keeping very quiet now and waiting." 2/

It is doubtful if Mr. K's action had an important effect on many of the Desegregation Group leaders. He did, however, throw a powerful scare into Wakayama.

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1/ ibid., p. 3.

2/ ibid., Dec. 9, 1944, pp. 5-6.



It may have strengthened the opposition to Wakayama that had already arisen among the more moderate members of the Resegregation Group. Naturally, Wakayama would not broadcast the fact that he had pulled in his horns for fear that his former crimes might be exposed.

#### MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND ATTITUDES

On October 27th the writer was asked by a nisei girl:

"What about this rumor that the money they (the Resegregation Group) collected to give to the stockade people is all missing." 1/

This sounded suspiciously like a piece of insidious propaganda from the Kai- Kuratomi faction.

On November 1, Mrs. Fujimoto, whose husband had now relocated gave her impression of the present state of camp:

"People around here seem to dislike the Manzanar people. They even say that the Co-op Board was being run by Manzanar, by a man named Nomura."

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Evidence has now come out that Wakayama was trying to control the Co-op by several stooges on the board. I shall get this dope and insert it where it fits. R.H.  
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Of the knifing which occurred two days before, she said:

"They say that knifing still has some connection to the baseball fight. . . They say an old man started it. This old man fan is of an aggressive way. A lot of people know him. They say he practically runs the team."

"The renunciation of citizenship may bring big trouble," she added, which was an excellent prophecy. Nakao, Fujimoto's sister, added her bit on the Resegregation Group:

"I think there are two groups. One of them is really for it and the other group doesn't care. I don't think that there is any group really against it (the Resegregation Group), because if they talked against it they'd go out."

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1/ ibid., Oct. 27, 1944, p. 7.