

It has come to the attention of the Administration that two unauthorized reports have caused some uneasiness in the Colony during the past week.

The first rumor was to the effect that there would be a further segregation within the Center so that all individuals and families who had applied for repatriation or expatriation would be required to live in one area of the Center and all other individuals and families in another area. It is officially announced that the Administration has no intention to carry out a further segregation. Under present procedure individuals and families who wish to move from one part of the Center to another, may do so voluntarily by making application for the desired move at any time to the Housing Office.

The second rumor was to the effect that persons who wished prior consideration of applications to return to Japan at the first opportunity should sign a petition which was circulated among the Colonists. It is officially announced that no authorization or authenticity was given to the circulation of such a petition. At present the Government of Japan is giving no consideration to further exchanges. It is our understanding that if and when further exchanges are considered, the Japanese Government will make selection of persons to be exchanged on an individual basis, as has been the case in the past. Affiliation with any group within Tule Lake Center, or place of residence within the Center, will have no bearing upon the selection or rejection of the individual.

It is requested that this announcement be posted conspicuously for the information of all residents of the Center, and that announcements in all mess halls invite attention to its contents.

Harry L. Black
Assistant Project Director

Portions of this memorandum were reproduced in the Newell Star of April 13.

[To the Co-ordinating Committee, the recognition of this group whom they correctly termed Daihyo Sha Kai sympathizers was the final straw. As a last resort they went over the head of the WRA and appealed to the Army ^{for support backing} They received no help from the Army and incurred the ^{disapproval} ~~disapproval~~ of Mr. Best for their action.¹]

¹Minutes of the meeting of the Divisional Responsible Men and the Co-ordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, April 8, 1944.

On April 7, they presented their last resignation, plaintively pointing out what they had endured for the good of the colony. This time they refused to reconsider and although Mr. Best did gain their consent to remain in office nominally until the end of April, by which time permission and instructions on the formation of a new representative body were expected to arrive from Washington, their formal resignation was announced in the Newell Star a few days later.

Their resignation, presented to Mr. Best follows:

SUBJECT: RESIGNATION

[As the result of the election of January 11, 1944, the Army and the WRA have officially recognized the new body of responsible parties of various divisions and sections representatives entitled the Co-ordinating Committee, composed of:

Masao Shimada
Iwao Namekawa
John Naydo
George Yamatani

Kumaharu Okamoto
Joe Nakao
Byron Akitsuki
Aizo Takahashi

Since then we, the Committee, have expended our utmost in order to restore normalcy in this Center, in spite of threats, intimidations, bad names, such as 'dogs' -- literally we have exhausted ourselves physically and mentally for the good of the colonists by our utmost faith toward the Administrative personnel to attain our object.

As a result and reward of our effort, Proclamation #2 was revoked on March 21, 1944; in due time, some 2,000 ex-employees resumed work; and gradual return of normalcy of the Center has been definitely noted.

at this time, we, the Committee, feel that it is most proper and opportune for us to keep our promise, which we made at the time of the formation of this body, to dissolve and make way for the future responsible body, which will be selected by the entire colonists' vote. Prolonged existence of this Committee will wear out the welcome of the colonists, which is more concerned matter to us, that we, the Committee, hereby submit our resignation to be effective immediately upon due consideration.

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE]

At the meeting of the Divisional Responsible men held April 8, the committee reported on the effect of the petition and stated their intention to resign. However, the Divisional Responsible men took the Committee to task for resigning without first consulting them, "the body which elected the Committee." The members of the Committee apologized "for their rash action." In the prolonged discussion which followed it is interesting to note that several members of the Divisional Responsible Men's group were strongly opposed to the resignation. It would leave the field open for the "schemed insidious plan" of the agitators. It would be "like pouring gasoline atop a fire." Mr. Miyake's warning, "We must not forget the 16,000 colonists," is almost ludicrous in view of the odium in which the committee was held by the people at this time.

Significant parts of the minutes of this meeting follow:

"The following report of the Co-ordinating Committee was given by the Executive Secretary:

In view of the Ward Chairmen of Block managers urgent request for 1,000 additional brooms to be distributed to the old Tuleans, who were issued brooms some six months ago, which are absolutely not usable, the Committee has sent a memo to R. R. Best to fulfill this request. A memo, addressed to the Committee from the Project Director, informed us that there is no administrative authorization for the issue of additional supplies to former Tuleans.

Permit to take census and signatures for re-segregation, headed by Sanaye Akashi, was duly granted by Harry L. Black, upon instruction received from Washington office. Translation of the memo from Black to Akashi was then read. Due to the diversity of opinions, a brawl, which hospitalized one, has already been noted in Block 16. (Many cited that various arguments pro and con were noted in various blocks.) In view of the possibility of this movement, endangering the peace and normalcy of the Center, the Committee therein consulted the Army, (lest the conditions of the Center, which has markedly improved recently, after a long period of unrest, may return to its former abnormal status). [Colonel advised that the Committee should not 'tell' on such a trifling occurrence.

Justly so

- ① [Project Director felt indignant toward the Committee because the Committee had over-ridden the Administration.]

② Lastly, the Executive Secretary announced that inasmuch as [the Center condition had returned to normalcy and the object upon which the Committee was formed has been accomplished and in order to expedite the formation of a new colonists' representative body,] the Co-ordinating Committee has submitted a letter of resignation to the Administration and the Army. However, the Divisional Responsible Men did not approve of the way the resignation was presented to the Administration; that is, without first consulting the body which elected the Committee. Committee members apologized for their rash action. Discussion then followed into the matter of dissolution of the Divisional Responsible Men's group. A prolonged discussion pro and con pertinent to this subject pursued. Mr. Ikemoto felt that dissolution now is not timely and will make vain all the efforts, risks, and indomitable task expended, undergone, and accomplished by the body, inasmuch as the reactionary elements are anxiously awaiting for an opportunity to strike with their schemed insidious plan, and we must certainly not forget the ground upon which this body was organized. Mr. Miyake opinioned that [dissolution at the present time is like pouring gasoline atop a fire, and we must not forget the 16,000 colonists.] However few others, including Messrs. Ninomiya and Sakuma, felt that dissolution was in order. After due deliberation, the group resolved to dissolve on [April 29, 1944, which does not mean that the body will irresponsibly sever relations with the colonists or the Administration. Until that time (April 29), the body will expend its utmost to prepare for the replacement of this body. Furthermore, there are many unfinished business yet to be completed prior to dissolution. In other words, for the maintenance of peace and harmony among colonists, the resigned Co-ordinating Committee, as part of the Divisional Responsible Men's body, will give its undivided attention as heretofore.]

③ April 13, the Committee's resignation was announced in the Newell Star:

CO-ORDINATORS TENDER RESIGNATIONS - RETURN TO NORMAL STATE
GIVEN REASON FOR ACTION

④ The seven members of the Co-ordinating Committee, which for the past three months have represented the colony in dealing with the Administration on all matters pertaining to colony policies and was officially recognized by the Army and WRA, tendered their resignations to Director Best and Colonel Austin on Saturday. The committee will continue to function until the end of the month as representatives of "Sekinin Shakai" pending other arrangements.

The gradual return to normalcy in the center was cited as the reason for the action which was taken as promised at

the time of its inception in January "to make way for a future responsible body which will be selected by the entire colonists' vote".

STATEMENT

In resigning, the committee members submitted a signed statement which read in part: "Since then, we, the committee, have expended our utmost in order to restore normalcy in this center, in spite of threats, intimidations, bad names, such as 'dogs' -- literally, we have exhausted ourselves physically and mentally for the good of the colonists by our utmost faith toward the administrative personnel to attain our object.

"As a result and reward of our effort, Proclamation #2 was revoked on March 2, 1944; in due time, some 2000 ex-employees resumed work; and a gradual return to normalcy in the center has been definitely noted."

An election by secret ballot is soon to be arranged by the "Kaku Bumon Sekinin Shakai" (the responsible bodies of various divisions) which will continue to function to the end of the month.

The Co-ordinating Committee were the elected representatives of the Kaku Bumon Sekinin Shakai which was brought into existence to help restore normal conditions by bringing about a return to work of center residents and securing the release of the persons confined in the stockade.

The resigning members of the committee are Masao Shimada, John Naydo, Kumaharu Okamoto, Byron Akitsuki, Iwao Namekawa, George Yamatani, Joe Nakao, and Aizo Takahashi (advisor).

Mr. Akitsuki expressed his personal opinion of Mr. Black ^{and the Advisory Council} ~~and the Advisory Council~~ quite frankly:

"Mr. Black told the committee that the Co-ordinating Committee was not the only body representing the colonists. At that time we sort of felt it might be WRA policy to keep confusion among the colonists. ~~(This charge is repeatedly brought against WRA by colonists of all manner of sympathies.)~~

"Up to the 19th of February the Advisory Council would co-operate with us, but lately I was told, 'You people are making too much requests and getting in my hair.' It may be WRA's policy to stir up confusion, so that more colonists are disgusted with Center life and decide to repatriate.

"We worried a good deal when this resegregation (petition) took place. ~~We had a row in this block.~~ One man who had registered called the one who hadn't registered a dog. Three people were hospitalized. I heard some children were on the

petition. Persons of 18 years and over signed about 500 or 600. I saw two names of children about four years old. > .

① "There have been some members of the Administration working hand in hand with the Daihyo Sha. Perhaps this may explain Mr. Black's actions."

"We requested brooms from Mr. Best. We needed about 850 to 1000 brooms. Best said he would be glad to comply. That was March 30. We informed the people. Then Best said he couldn't get them. But we had already informed the people. On April 1, a second memorandum was released saying it couldn't be done.

"The Administration has been telling us we must continue until official permission comes (to elect another body).¹

Miss Iwohara, secretary to the Committee added salient details on the attitude of its members:

"On your last visit they submitted their resignation and it was kicked back too. Everytime they submitted their resignation they (the Administration) would say, 'The time is not right. We're waiting for self government appointment from Washington.'

"The Administration was rather stupified when they got the resignation. The Army pleaded with the committee not to resign because they're 100% for us. The Committee members feel the longer they hold it the longer they'll be called names. They don't have any political ambitions. Mr. Akitsuki is the only one of the WRA payroll; the others are on Co-op and Civic Organization.

② ["Everytime when something good was suggested, the Administration would over-ride us.]

"Last time Mr. Robertson said the new regulation from the WRA to preserve tire and gas. He sent out a memo to forbid the use of the trucks in the center to transport workers and cutting the working hours from eight to six and a half hours. Two weeks later a new regulation came out. You have to work eight and a half hours. Something bad like that, they just give it to the committee."²

Attitude of the Administration on the petition

The excitement which this petition engendered in the colony caused the administration to fall into a state of

¹ Notes, April, 1944, pp. 32, 33.

² ibid., pp. 25, 26.

alarm such as it had not experienced since the November incident. No one appeared to know exactly what to do because no one knew how seriously the colony was taking it. A few members of the appointed personnel cautiously voiced the suspicion that Mr. Best had no intention of returning until this, the first crisis since the incident, had blown over. In this way he could receive no blame ^{should} an incident ~~had~~ occurred while he was off the project. Said Dr. Opler:

"A man named Akashi, of bad reputation is behind the petition. He sent a letter to Biddle which was passed on to Ickes and then to Myer. Nobody wanted to touch it. It was then sent to the project. Best didn't want to touch it.

Swearing the writer to secrecy, Opler continued:

"I think Best turned the petition over to Harry Black to save his own skin and possibly to discredit Black. He may have said, 'Here, Harry, you do something about this and I'll stand behind you.' Then he lit out for Washington, letting Black holding the bag. He doesn't want anything to break while he's on the project and he's not coming back till this blows over.

"Akashi was known before evacuation to be a wild and wooly sort who yelled about Japanese ideals."¹

Mr. Robertson also was inclined to criticize Mr. Best's past policy and his present attempt to avoid responsibility in the matter of the petition. In an interview on April 12, he stated that Mr. Best was encouraging stool pigeons and refusing to have any contacts with the people in the colony. Best had even put spies to watch Mr. Robertson. The latter statement is almost certainly true. The writer has come across many evidences of an intricate espionage system not only in the colony but among the appointed personnel.

¹ ibid., p. 6.

Is this your guess? Or is it a common belief of segregationists or merely Opler's own guess?

would have to be in order to prepare such a petition

Attitude of the Administration toward the Co-ordinating Committee

As will be shown in a later section, the Co-ordinating Committee reached the zenith of its unpopularity in the colony at this period. There is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Best, Mr. Black, or Mr. Schmidt were conscious of the enormity of this unpopularity or realized to what a large extent they had contributed to it by keeping the Committee from resigning. It appears that the chief object of the administration was to keep the Committee in office until permission and instructions for the forming of a new body of representatives were received from Washington. Had ~~a new body of representatives were received~~ ~~from~~ the Committee relinquished its position before these orders came, it might have made a bad impression on Washington, giving some evidence that all was not proceeding smoothly at Tule Lake.

In April, Dr. Opler, was finally willing to concede that the Co-ordinating Committee had worked itself into a very difficult position. His advice, however, was disregarded by Mr. Best and Mr. Black; and as the petition issue shows, he was not consulted on important administrative steps. In mid-April, Opler appeared to be suffering pangs of conscience over the plight of the Committee. He stated that he wanted the Administration to take the weight off the Committee's shoulders. He was particularly concerned about Mr. Akitsuki, asking the writer to tell Akitsuki for him that he should resign. (The writer had advised Mr. Akitsuki to that effect three weeks before.) "I feel he's been taking it for the Administration," said Opler.¹

¹Ibid., pp. 2, 6.

ATTITUDES OF THE COLONISTS TOWARD PETITIONAttitude of Instigators

As one of the active instigators of the petition, the viewpoint of ^{Matsuda} Mrs. Q., which she expressed very fluently, merits close attention.

"Since we came here we call ourselves the real expatriates and repatriates seeking to go back to Japan and be with her in everything, win or lose, as her subjects. We've been denied all privileges in the United States. We're going to go to a place where our children can become somebody.

"When we came, much to our dismay we find many "loyal" are still here, although they put up a front of expatriation or repatriation. They did it as a means of escaping the draft or leaving the camps since Tule Lake wasn't closed or because they have an opportunity to make money here where five or six people in one family can get a job, which they can't do in other centers.¹ A lot of draft evaders came here. It's nothing but a dump. They are disloyal Japanese but do not have any future thoughts about bringing up their children, but would face on either side of the fence as the war progresses.

"We don't care which wins or loses. We're going to stick to Japan. We cannot raise our children overnight to become Japanese subjects. We can't do this (follow plans to act as true Japanese subjects) because there are so many elements here.

"The people say, 'they (the Administration) can always withdraw it.' How could we do anything in the center. These guys (the loyal Yes-Yes people) double crossed us. . . .

"I was hoping we'd have a certain status.

"The colony has signed a petition that the Daihyo Shas should not come back (from the stockade). But we want them back. We want them back here."²

When asked how those who were really sincere in their desire to return to Japan could be distinguished from those who were not, ^{Matsuda} Mrs. Q. said:

¹Mr. Robertson admitted that in some cases this charge was true. However, regulations limiting the jobs to only two to a family were in process of preparation at this time.

²I do not know to which petition Mrs. Q. refers here.

"We put up a question: those who like to go back to Japan at the first opportunity is the ones who really want to go back. They don't want to stay here until they see what happens

"We might be given a bad place to live (we say to them). Would you go? They said, 'Yes, we'll die there as Japanese! Those guys who won't say Yes to this are the guys who are going to stay here.

"The other people - they didn't stick up for us in the crises (status quo period). It's not our business to worry about them. We didn't force anybody. It was signed only by those to whom the statement appealed to."

Matsuda
Mrs. Q. also stated at this interview that five to six thousand signatures had been obtained. She also implied (as was suspected by the Administration) that Mr. Akashi, the nominal presenter of the petition was not a member of the inner circle from which the impetus for the petition sprang. She insisted, however, that the petition had been prepared with proper representation, i.e., two persons were selected from each center represented at Tule. She stated that the group had wished to avoid dealing with Mr. Best, did not trust him, and had therefore sent the letter direct to Mr. Biddle.¹

The above statement is one of the most complete, unguarded expressions available made by a strong supporter of Daihyo Sha Kai. The motives of this group, to obtain a comparatively homogeneous camp, the inhabitants of which would be able to devote themselves to preparation for life in Japan, and the desire of the group to see that the camp was run as persons of this conviction wished it to be run are clearly expressed. To the original attitude of scorn felt toward the undecided group which had remained in Tule Lake to "see which

¹Notes, April, 1944, pp. 9 - 11.

If you had given me this explanation, I'd have earlier (e.g. p. 297) enjoyed reading the previous pages

side would win" was added an intense hatred springing from the fact that the leaders of the group which broke the status quo and co-operated with the Administration, the Co-ordinating Committee, were, for the most part, members of the old Tule Lake population. Moreover, without the support of the 6,000 odd old Tuleans, it is doubtful if the status quo would have been abandoned in the vote of January 11.

Attitude of a Supporter

Nishino
"N", who has always sympathized with the efforts of the Daihyo Sha Kai and voted to keep the status quo, showed a very interesting reaction to the petition. On April 12 he was extremely excited and expressed himself almost incoherently.

"The Japanese statement which said that we want to live according to the Japanese way and educate our children in the Japanese manner. Therefore, it stated in the paper that anyone who wanted to be segregated, file in for a request to be segregated. It was signed in Japanese by Black.

"Now we receive a report from the Assistant Project Director put in the block managers' office that it is not authentic. We want to clarify this point. I think the signing of this petition is to the effect that we are citizens, but disloyal, and besides we have requested repatriation. Regardless of whether we are considered citizens, we want the American government to look upon us as Japanese.

what does he mean?
("Some of the Japanese here say, regardless of whether they have requested repatriation or expatriation, they say, even though they haven't signed applications, they are all Japanese. They are not loyal (Yes-Yes) people who say this.

"There are two sides. Some people think the petition problem is tied up with status quo or against status quo. The way I see it, it's not that way. If it is tied up with status quo, I wouldn't have signed it.

"Since we're in here, I want them to consider me as Japanese. We are half and half in this block (half for signing and half for not signing).

Confusing? meaning what?
In this center there are No-Nos and expatriates and also Yes-Yes. A lot of people who said Yes were sent here from other centers. Are we segregees or expatriates or disloyal? We want that point clarified. The majority of people want to live as Japanese. Manzanar is also going to

put up a petition of some sort.

Some people want to go back now - others after the war. We want to go back to our country as soon as possible. We wish to be separated from the inus; that's the main point.

^{Nishino}
"N" added that he had just been discussing the petition with an issei. "From the issei's point of view, we want the inu out."

Two days later, when the news of Mr. Black's memorandum to the effect that the petition had no authorization had had time to spread through the camp, ^{Nishino} "N" was discouraged:

"Outright support of the petition is not very strong. I've been talking to a fellow who says he did not sign the petition. But he says, 'We have to be segregated.' The petitioners have been asking to be put apart from those not asking for repatriation or segregation and for that reason we have our freedom. We would be under the army. So he didn't sign it. The man thought that the petition would be all right if Mr. Black had promised that segregation would take place and make this an internment camp. But Black just said you can make the survey if you wish. He went to see Black personally. Black just said you may take the survey.

"Without the power you can't do anything. Signing the petition like that will only make more trouble.

"People believe the petition don't have anything to enforce it. I found that out.

"The main object is to segregate the Yes from the Nos. That's why I signed it. If it was connected with status quo I wouldn't have signed it. Trouble like this is occurring because there are too many inus."

When asked if this segregation should be carried to the point of ^{Nishino} ~~separative~~ ^{separative} families, N. said:

"In many cases, when the wife is No and the husband Yes, in those cases if they did request for repatriation or expatriation, (even) if Yes, we should consider them the same (as re- or expatriates."¹

^{Ruihara}
K, not a supporter of the Daihyo Sha Kai expressed himself

¹ ibid., pp. 5, 19.

against the petition because of its narrowness and because of the way in which it was presented. However, he was absolutely convinced that for peace the Yes-Yes group of persons loyal to the United States must be removed from the camp.

"I objected to the petition. I couldn't sign it. I disapproved because I see their doings are from a very narrow viewpoint. I couldn't see it. They're trying to narrow it down to only those who have signed the petition, who want to repatriate. Their minds are too narrow. . .

"Another point I objected because when that matter was brought up, no clear cut explanation was made. It was given to the people in a haphazard manner. I couldn't be satisfied. I previously would not sign my name to anything unless I know thoroughly what it means.

"Many now regret signing the petition. They may have been afraid. It was a good cause without leadership. I think they should have explained it so thoroughly that even a child could understand it. Their attitude was, 'Take it or leave it.' It was too much of a high pressure group. Their associates were people that I could not place my confidence in. When I'm convinced 100% I go the limit. . .

"We consider them, those who answered Yes-Yes, are loyal to the United States. Those who answered No and then Yes, we consider them as koomori (bats), neither bird nor animal. The No and Yes, and now No, are such; neither Japanese nor Americans. They are men without a country. We despise them worse than those who said Yes.

"Whoever said No must be considered as Japanese, regardless of what they have in their hearts. The only things we could ask is that those who openly said Yes be removed from the camp. It may split the families; a husband may have said Yes and a wife No. A son may have said No and a father Yes. The father came with the son or the No-No. In any case, if the husband said Yes, regardless of whether it splits the family or not, we want him out.

"All those who said Yes - the issei who said Yes - we can't blame them. But if they were asked a question similar to the nisei, they might not have said the same thing. Naturally, they ought to be sent out of camp, whether it breaks the family up or not. This is a serious question. The life of the nation balances on it. They (the Administration) ought to have records here.

Kurikawa

Stressing that further segregation was imperative, K predicted that if action were not taken by the Administration,

serious trouble would spring up among the colonists themselves, as an example he cited a recent beating in which the brother of the man who showed the movies in camp had been assaulted.

Kunihara
K suspected the "Loyals" of this deed.

"Frankly speaking, you may convey to Mr. Robertson that if there is any trouble here, the trouble will be against the Japanese only. . . . No demonstration will be made. I don't know how badly it will affect the Administration. The only thing that will kill it is for the Administration to act in time to hasten the segregation of the Yes-Yes group, the American loyalists. If they don't, it will come to a head. The only other way is to have the army continually patrol the camp.

"I don't want to side with anybody, but the only thing to do is to get the Yes-Yes group out or have the Army patrol."¹

Yamashiro
Y, an ex-internee from Leupp said:

"This petition brings the status quo back again in front of the people. If the loyal group got out that would help a lot, but only half way. If the loyal group went out and the first exchange boat went out, then the people would have some hope. Now there is no hope at all.

Yamashiro
Y felt sure that underground Daihyo Sha Kai remnants were behind the petition:

"Naturally, the status quo is still underground. . . . If this kind of petition is allowed, thousands of petitions will come out in the future. We'll never have any peace. . . . Some wards didn't get any names. Some tore it down. In wards 7 and 4 it was pretty successful."

Yamashiro
Nor did Y have a good opinion of the chief signer, Mr. Akashi:

"You see, Akashi is chairman of this petition. He used to be a member of the Board of Education of the Japanese Language school. Since he'd so like to have political power, he sticks his nose in too much and so he was kicked out of the board. Naturally, he's bitter toward the Board of Education.

"He thinks this is the best time to segregate the Japanese on the first or second boat. . . . He thinks if he try to segregate two or three Japanese in this center, that make him very popular in Japan.

¹ibid., pp. 3, 18, 19. See also p. 37.

"A friend of mine went to see him and asked him, 'If you do this petition, what will be the result?' He answered, 'I'll do it anyway. I don't care about the result.' He's a poor leader.

"Naturally I didn't sign."¹

A very moderate, intelligent nisei girl said: *Kimie Hashimoto*

"I think there are three factions here. I think the Yes-Yes should be taken out of camp. I don't care about the No-Nos and the repatriates. I don't think there is any point in separating them. These two factions would be creating trouble between the Japanese. We came here for the same reason. The Yes-Yes should be taken out. That's what everybody is saying.

✓ (As it stands the above statement is confusing. The informant explained, saying that to take the Yes-Yes people out of camp would be good but she saw no reason to distinguish between No-Nos or repatriates or to move either out of camp ✓

"In the first place, this place was for the disloyal Japanese. They (Yes-Yes group) have no place here at all. They'll cause trouble and would be called inu."²

Oda
Another moderate person, Mr. O, while not himself in favor of resegregation at this time, felt that the removal of the settle Yes-Yes group would help the camp to/down. Three months later *Oda*
"O" advocated resegregation more strongly.

"Some small group feels that if we segregate the people, it's better. I think it's better if the loyal group go out so that we could stay here peacefully. Otherwise we don't get settled down. We'll be in the same spot when we're through.

"Mr. Black told us it is all right to have the survey. We all went to the block managers' meeting where he told us this. . . .

"After all. We came here, and I don't think it (re-segregation) is necessary. We were segregated once. All who are here ought to go back to Japan. Even if we signed the petition, that doesn't help us go back to Japan."³

¹ ibid., pp. 15, 16.

² ibid., p. 16.

³ ibid., p. 22.

Kataoka

M., who had been a member of the Daihyo Sha Kai second negotiating committee disapproved strongly of the group which put forward the petition. He felt they were showing off and causing trouble just when things were beginning to look better.

"They put a thing like that out and they are putting people against each other. They just mix the people up. There are two groups fighting the Co-ordinating Committee. Why not get organized?"¹

Takenuchi

1, a practical nisei, who voted for the general strike in December, did not approve of the petition either:

"The guys believe the petition is a radical goon-squad business. The group behind the petition was more or less responsible for the incident that happened in November. They proposed the general strike and the hunger strike. They are just a minority who feel that they have to make a name for themselves so they'll be honored when they get back to the old country.

"When this petition was circulated in this block, the first thing I looked for was official approval. Although Black's name was typewritten on the sheet, there was no signature. So personally, I ignored it. I haven't signed anything.

"Personally I think many people confused this petition with an announcement that came out through the Spanish embassy, which announced that all people who had applied for repatriation had to fill out a duplicate form. It seems that the committee just picked the right moment to send out the petition just so people would be muddled up. If that hadn't been done, they wouldn't have gotten half the signatures they did.

4 "The only segregation the colonists are in favor of is the segregation of the Yes-Yes from the No-Nos. The majority don't care if there's any distinction made at all between the No-Nos and the repatriates."²

A young nisei girl, rather Americanized, expressed the wish that the instigators of the petition would stop, because she didn't want any more trouble or demonstrations in camp.³

Analysis of Attitudes

These statements, which come predominantly from moderate

¹ ibid., p.

² ibid., p. 29.

³ ibid., p. 17.

people, show that most of the colonists whether they actively supported the petition or not, had a complex of strong sentiments in common; a great dislike for the loyal "Yes-Yes" group, the suspicion that they were inu, and the conviction that it would be a good thing to get them out of camp as fast as possible. Many of the informants profess a loyalty to Japan which the writer believes sincere. Yet, they do not hesitate to denounce the instigators of the petition as trouble-makers and persons with little public spirit. ^{Nishino's} "N"'s opening statement, "Outright support of the petition is not very strong," is an excellent generalization.

The attempt of the petitioners to distinguish between those who ardently desired to repatriate as soon as possible and those who had merely said No-No without asking for repatriation was not generally approved. Nor, be it noted, did the general run of informants speak of the necessity of obtaining a certain "status" or welcome the possibility "a bad place to live in where they could die as Japanese." In short, it appears that the small group which initiated the petition wished to further a type of re-segregation which would prominently set them off ^{as} a group of ardent patriots. The bulk of the camp population, on the other hand, wished only to expell a comparatively small group of people "loyal to the United States." Mr. Black's ^{policy} ~~statement~~ in first giving permission to circulate the petition and then stating that it had no official sanction was, however, generally viewed as typical WRA policy, i.e., making a statement and then going back on it. This was the first of a number of actions on his part which slowly increased his unpopularity in the colony.

P. 317 - lines 6 - 11

I question these statements, although I agree, ~~however~~, with your " these attitudes were well developed before the advent of the petition." I believe this incident contributed greatly to the later intense factionalism. The brawls and beatings, which you have mentioned, convince me that you have gone too far with your statement " the petition had dropped compeletely from the people's minds. I believe the incident further reinforced "these attitudes", which had been well developed, and the factions and the alignment of people became clearer and clearer.

Wasn't Black's "change of mind" planned on the Coord Com? This further discredited the Coord. Com. & Co-op, didn't it?

It seems to me from the passages in the pages following that the instigators of the petition incidentally thought of separating themselves from the Coordinating Committee and the Co-op gang by re-segregation. The developments following the circulation of the petition indicate that there must have been some tie up between the agitation in the camp and the Akitsuki's group.

Final Result of the Petition

The end result of the petition was negligible. Excitement died down almost as fast as it arose. The instigators were not at all discouraged, but continued their agitation. The general population continued to cherish its dislike for the "loyals". There is no evidence that the petition especially stimulated a desire for re-segregation or a hatred for the "loyals" or stool-pigeons. These attitudes were well developed before the advent of the petition and continued to grow steadily after the petition had dropped completely from the peoples' minds.

Agreement for statement. I believe this was one of the conditions for the later intervention.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE IN APRIL - BEFORE RESIGNATION

In early April hostility toward the Co-ordinating Committee had grown to alarming proportions. Had its members not resigned in mid-April some of them would have almost certainly been subjected to physical violence. ^{Takenuchi} "I" expressed the situation vividly and correctly when he said, "People are talking about dog-hunting with baseball bats."

Kunihara Oishi, the moderate "united" said
[A few days before the news of the committee's resignation spread, K. said:

"I heard that the members of the Co-ordinating Committee were going to resign and have the people elect persons in whom they can have confidence. If they do that it might help. The Co-ordinating Committee and the Civic Organizations group are suspected. From our point of judgment, they are "Loyals".

"The Administration knows this fact (that the people consider the Co-ordinating Committee and the Civic Organizations group inu), yet they continue to employ these people. They should know better.

The general trend of opinion of the people is: they got to get rid of, sever ~~off~~ the heads of the men on the Co-ordinating Committee. Unless they get rid of these men there's going

to be trouble!"¹

Oda
The conservative Mrs. "O", stating that the Co-ordinating Committee was more unpopular than ever before, said,

"This would be a fine time for the Co-ordinating Committee to resign."

Oda
Mr. O added:

"I think the people are so against the non-status quo (group) because they don't like the Co-ordinating Committee. They don't trust the members. If the members of the Co-ordinating Committee were chosen by election, that's another story. But they're self-appointed. We don't trust them. We don't know them."²

Yamashita
Y, while agreeing that it was time the Committee got out, did not think that they were in danger of violence in camp:

"This Co-ordinating Committee may get a two-by-four one year later. (A year from now) People are very scared about the stockade. If Leupp is opened I think they won't do it (attack Co-ordinating Committee).

"If the Co-ordinating Committee gets to Japan, something will happen."³

Attitude after resignation

2
[The news of the Committee's resignation, which was announced in the Newell Star, April 13, was followed by a great release ~~except the active agitators~~ *"gits" seemed to* of tension. Everyone *feel* better, ~~except the active agitators,~~ one of whom told the writer that she did not want the Committee to resign. This general relief was not ~~especially~~ *human* accompanied by an expressed hope for better things to come. ~~Simply the~~ *use* fact that the group of "self-appointed Loyals" or "Co-op dogs" had stepped from power ^{was} relished and enjoyed. Serious people were glad that one of the chief causes for unrest was removed and that violence toward the Committee need no longer be feared.]

¹ ibid., p. 3.

² ibid., p. 23.

³ ibid., p. 15.

Time did not permit the gathering of many verbatim statements. Only the following reaction of "I" is available. ^{Takenchi}

"Personally, I think the resignation of the Co-ordinating Committee is just the result of the Life photographer being here.¹ Now this center hasn't returned to any more normalcy than it had then. These poor saps got their faces in the magazine. There seemed to be quite an outcry about inu and stoolies. Then Life came out. I think that was the primary factor. I saw two-by-fours coming. It came to a head when the pictures came out in Life.

"The last week there's been a lot of talk about dog hunting with baseball bats. If there's trouble here in the next five or six months, it's going to be because of keeping the Yes-Yes in the camp."¹

When "I" speaks of the picture in Life he refers to the article and photographs which appeared in the issue of . One picture showed the entire Co-ordinating Committee sitting around a table, seated alternately with members of the Advisory Council. The effect of this visual proof of intimacy between the Co-ordinating Committee and the Advisory Council may have had been bad. The foundations for the Committee's unpopularity, had, however, been laid long before. Several evacuees remarked about the picture and it may well have been used as propaganda against the members of the Committee.

[The effect of final resignation upon the Committee itself was also very noticeable. Mr. Akitsuki ^{appeared} ~~was~~ happy and ^{and it was said} relieved that he looked like a new man. "Previously he had been extremely timid and cautious in speech; now he became almost garrulous. ^{and} the guard of fifteen or so husky boys ^{"Buddies"} no longer dawdled ^{disregard} around the Community Organizations' barrack where the committee had its office.]

¹ ibid., pp. 28, 31.

The reader will
fail to see the
connection between
Shannon and
the Life

p. 320, the first paragraph. I doubt if these people had the desire to keep the camp in tumultuous condition. I don't believe they tried to keep the condition intentionally; it's a byproduct of the other things they tried to attain. Especially, "To further the ends of this group the camp must not be allowed . . . co-operation might be accepted" is objectionable, because I can't believe the agitators could have figured all these out in advance. Too intelligent analyses for them. It is, however, true that they would enjoy all these troubles.

OTHER SIGNIFICANT ATTITUDES OF THE PERIOD

The statement made by Mrs. "Q" ^{ematauda} and the letter signed by Mr. Akashi are the only available data on the attitudes of the "agitating group."¹ Insofar as this material may be considered typical of the aims of this group it shows that they had devoted themselves to clearing the camp of "loyals" and in so doing, were eager to gain the reputation of true Japanese subjects. Just as vehemently, they desired to obtain the freedom of the stockade internees, although at this period, they did not stress this issue in their statements. To gain these ends, it was to their advantage to keep the camp in as tumultuous a condition as possible and to fan the already widespread hatred of Mr. Best. They were convinced that as long as Mr. Best remained project director, none of their desires would be realized. Their great hope, therefore, lay in the removal of Mr. Best. To accomplish this, the Project Director's superiors in Washington must be made to realize that he was incapable of administering the project properly. The petition, sent directly to Attorney Biddle over the heads of Messrs. Best and Myer was a step in this direction. To further the ends of this group the camp must not be allowed to sink into a peaceful or apathetic state in which the Administration's overtures of co-operation might be accepted.

To keep hostility toward Mr. Best at a high pitch proved an easy task. The events of October, November, and December were not easily forgotten; no administrative action which followed in 1944 succeeded in altering this impression appreciably. Most

¹ Notes, April, 1944, p. 15.
See pp. .

*I doubt they
whether all
thought out
have out.*

informants still maintained that the only way to better conditions on the project was to get rid of Mr. Best. "What is ^{this} rumor in camp that Best is going to quit in the near future?"¹ was a frequent question.

^{K. K. K.} K, who had no particular sympathy with the agitating group expressed the attitude of the more intelligent frank inhabitants. He also mentioned the holding of a secret meeting at which the consensus of opinion had been that Mr. Best must be removed:

"Best lost the confidence of the Japanese people. I shouldn't say this, but the other day they had a meeting and the demand is, 'Get rid of Mr. Best.' That's going to keep on.

"There is the greatest tension here. But no matter what feelings may exist here today, that could be wiped out immediately if Mr. Best resigned. You can't blame Best for staying. But if he sees he's not wanted, why does he remain? He's going to make it bad for everybody, even Ickes. . .

"Once the Japanese lose faith in you it'll be a very hard thing to regain it. They hold a grudge until they die. On the other hand, they will co-operate as long as they can. If they break: that's the end."²

Another requisite to the success of the agitating group was that the mass of the colonists would not feel the need of a representative group so acutely that they would be willing to set up some sort of organization to deal with the Administration. To this end they were aided not only by the still potent loyalty to the unrecognized first Negotiating Committee but by general apathy and the unwillingness of the ordinary resident to initiate any action. Many people preferred to have things roll along as they were.

¹Notes, April, 1944, p. 15.

²ibid., p. 4.

Takenuchi

Said "I":

"I don't think the people would go for an election right now. The minute you get a bunch of representatives, you're going to get in a few radicals. They're going to bring up proposals that are downright unreasonable. They will have to bring it up to the Administration and it will cause trouble. Why not let things ride and see what will come of it for a while? If things are let alone they might improve a little more.

"There's still a few people in this camp who don't seem to realize that things are on the upward trend and it might be a good thing if they let well enough alone. I ran into this guy (a Japanese) the other day who works in the hospital. He said the children from two to ten were badly malnourished. He came to the mess and demanded that the kids get more fruit. We're issuing fruit three times a week. Eighty percent of the kids don't eat all the fruit they get. Yet he wanted us to increase it by two times. He demanded. I suggested he stick up the hospital for a big supply of vitamin pills, since I don't think just issuing more fruit would greatly assist the malnourishment."

However, a few brave souls, quite unconnected with the old Tulean or Co-ordinating group expressed a different opinion. They sincerely desired the unification of the camp and the cessation of the constant factional struggles. Among this group, which appears to have been a minority, were the "O"s. ^{Oda} Mr. "O" said:

"One thing we urgently need is a good organized central power. . . The members should be elected to a board that would not have the handicap of being self-appointed (like the Co-ordinating Committee). . .

Again, "O" is a BKK member
^{Oda} "O" also suggested that the block managers might be used as the middle group between the Administration and the people. This sentiment grew slowly in the months to follow but was never put forward with any vigor, chiefly, it is very likely, because it was a sentiment common to ~~the~~ reasonable ^{jeek} ~~conservatives~~ who were too intelligent to call public disapproval on themselves

as supporters of any policy which could be interpreted as being helpful to the Administration.

"A member of the Administration could come to the block managers' meeting once a month and give a few minutes speech on policy; and the block managers could ask them questions."

Oda
"O", with other conservatives, bewailed the factionalism existing in camp:

"There are so many small groups in the center. That makes trouble all the time. That's one of the troubles of the Japanese. If they want to have an organization, (they should) make one or two big ones, so that they're really organizations. In such small groups, they are working against each other.

"One thing is funny about the Japanese: They want to organize so many small clubs. There's so many groups all over the center: seinen kai, fujin kai, etc., always biting each other, carrying on their own policy. Sooner or later it will start trouble."¹

Attitudes toward release of the stockade internees and the status quo

This section is presented with hesitation because very little material was gathered at this time. Mr. Robertson, expressing the opinion of the petition sponsoring group, said:

"There is a rumor (in the colony) that the stockade people are being moved away. Some (four, thought Robertson) were moved out yesterday; they were issel sent to Sata Fe. There is a rumor now that the rest will be moved. Some say they'll be a blow up on account of that. They are still urging the release of everybody there. I find the whole colony very tense. . . .

"Some people have suggested that the colony was right on the verge of another incident. Others said they didn't think anything would happen."²

So far as the writer was able to observe in the very brief stay made in April, only the instigators of a petition spoke of the imminence of another incident. Most other colonists thought the possibility very small. The people did not want more trouble. *Robertson* "K" said:

¹ Ibid., pp. 22, 23.

² Ibid., p. 2.

"The removal of the internees is not important in the segregation movement. But it will cause hard feeling among the people."

Kuniharu

K. discounted the possibility of an overt uprising because:

"Especially since Easter I notice the food has improved very much. That may change the mood of the people too."¹

Takenuchi

"I" and a few others expressed indifference. There are some indications that a part of the population was leaning to the opinion that to maintain the present condition of relative peace and comfort it might be just as well to leave some of the men in the stockade.

"(If the stockade internees were taken to Leupp) I couldn't say what would happen, if there would actually be any trouble. In a way, I think the large majority of the colonists would be glad that they weren't turned loose in camp again. On the other hand there are quite a few decent fellows in the stockade.

"If the Internal Security had a particle of intelligence, they should be able to sort out the innocent from the actual agitators. They could take out the innocent and throw out the agitators and send them to another camp. Personally, I think it would be a damn poor thing to turn them back into the colony. It would start another ruckus. What do I care about Dai Nippon? I came here to lead a peaceful life until the war's over."²

Continuation of hostility toward Co-op and growing suspicion of
evacuee Internal Security

That the Co-operative Enterprise had not improved its rapport with the general public was evidenced by the following remark from "K": *Kuniharu*

"The people in the Co-operative are running in conjunction with WRA. They say this to the people, 'Don't depend on the WRA. Let us supply the things for ourselves! The officials of the Co-op say that.

"But do you think the people will be satisfied? They (the Co-op) sell everything which the WRA will be furnishing. When they can buy them, they won't press the block leaders to fight these things. I saw 100 people standing in line to buy a

¹ ibid., p. 3.

² ibid., p. 30.

³ ibid., p. 18.

bucket. They asked (WRA) for it, couldn't get it, so they went and bought it."¹

Kurihara
"K" also expressed the first warning that the Japanese members of the police force were coming *to be suspected as spies* ~~under the suspicion of~~ ~~being spies~~ of the Administration. This attitude, too was to grow in the next few months and play it's part in the reign of violence. *Kurihara* "K" remarked that the internal relationships on the police force were far from serene:

"A group of issei on the force are suspected by the younger members of 'reporting things' to the Administration."²

Attitude toward possibility of draft

The Administration anticipated a difficult situation when the announcements for Selective Service were made on May 2 and 3. Mr. Markley stated that 73 young men were scheduled to appear before the board. He believed that the draftees would first be given their physical examinations and if they did not appear, they would be dealt with on the basis of their past records.

"I do know if the boys don't appear, the Selective Service will probably turn it over to the F.B.I. and warrants for their arrest will be issued. We did publish (in the Newell Star) that several were arrested in Poston."²

Whether the young men likely to be called felt great apprehension or not is open to doubt. None of them would admit that they were anxious. *Takenishi* "I"s prediction quoted below was not ^{who} born out. As will be shown later, boys/did not intend to serve, simply refused to go to their physical examinations.

"One of two things is going to happen. I think there are three groups. The gutless ones will betaken first. I still believe there's quite a few of them left. They'll show up at their physicals and for actual induction. Then there's another group who are going to try to take advantage of the new supreme

¹ ibid., p. 37.

² ibid., p. 28.

court ruling. The gist of it is: if a potential inductee refuses to appear for his physical examination he can be classified as a draft evader; whereas, if he should appear for his examination and should be classified 1A then at the time for actual induction refuses to comply, he could not be called a draft resister.

"Some will refuse to appear for their physicals and be draft resisters. But the other group is going to appear mainly for their physicals and then if they're accepted they'll kick them (the authorities) in the face."¹

Factional fight in gymnasium

A fight which broke out between two basket ball teams playing in the gymnasium illustrates the extent to which factional feeling occasionally manifested itself. One of the teams was composed of old Tule Lake residents and the other of Manzanar residents. One of the players tripped an opponent and a fight broke out in which both teams took part. The spectators soon joined in. An elderly Japanese janitor attempted to put a stop to the fight but he was turned on and beaten so severely he required hospitalization.²

This incident illustrates not only the presence of militant factionalism in the camp but also an astonishing lack of respect for age, one of the strongest of the Japanese cultural traits.

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(It is the writer's impression that the younger men in Tule Lake have taken a remarkably large part in the pressure groups' activities. Kai and Kuratomi are 28? and 38?. (Might look up age of members of Negotiating Committee and Co-ordinating Committee here.) Moreover, there is said to be a disproportionately large number of young men in the camp. Might be well to get

¹ ibid., p. 30.

² ibid., pp. 16, 17.

this data from statistics. This discussion of age groups ought, I believe, be put at the beginning of the paper.)

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Additional Administrative Actions and Attitudes

Once the Co-ordinating Committee had resigned the primary aim of the Administration was to obtain another legitimate representative body. The requisite permission for this arrived April 14. Even though an announcement had been made on April 4, the method preparing the people for this action was not particularly well formulated at this time. Mr. Black had suggested a mass meeting, to announce the matter to the people. Other members of the Administration did not favor this, believing that a meeting without questions and discussion would accomplish little.

On April 22, the matter was re-announced to the people by way of the Newell Star:

BLACK ANNOUNCES FIRST STEP TOWARDS COMMITTEE SELECTION

Arrangements Body to be Formed

In order to carry into effect the authorization for a permanent Representative Committee to work with Administration, plans for selection of block delegates were announced today by Harry L. Black, acting project director. The Administration desires an Arrangements Committee to work out the final plans and supervise the election of the permanent committee; it will be the responsibility of the block delegates to select these members of the Arrangement Committee. The reason for asking for block delegates is so that each block will be represented on a geographical basis and truly representative of the residents of the Tule Lake Center.

The acting project director today issued an invitation to all the residents to take steps immediately to select the two delegates in each block. In issuing this invitation, he said that he wanted these delegates selected as soon as possible so that they may meet by wards and choose one representative from each ward to serve on the Arrangements Committee by May 1. It is hoped that by May 1 a meeting may be held with this Arrangements Committee composed of one member from each ward,

and the Administration can outline the requirements of regulations of the War Relocation Authority, United States Department of the Interior.

Mr. Black said that the Administration does not wish to prescribe any method for the selection of the block delegates. This will be the responsibility of the persons living in each block. The Administration, however, does require these delegates to be chosen in a truly representative manner so that they will reflect the wishes of the people.

The duty of the block delegates will be merely to select one representative from each ward to serve on the Committee of Arrangements.

TWO FUNCTIONS

This Committee on Arrangements will have two functions: (1) Make plans for the election of a permanent Representative Committee under the framework of the official WRA regulations. This duty will include the fixing of the tenure of office, provide for the method of filling vacancies, prescribe the manner of conducting elections, and make all necessary preparations so that an orderly election may be held in the near future. (2) Supervise the election and certify the results to the administration.

It was suggested that when the block delegates in each ward meet a secretary be selected whose duty it will be to certify to the Administration the name and address of the person who is chosen to be representative of the Ward on the Arrangements Committee. As soon as these ward representatives have been properly certified, a meeting will be held and temporary officers will be chosen.

TEMPORARY

The Committee on Arrangements, made up of the representatives selected from each ward, will serve only for the period of time necessary to complete plans for the election and to supervise the holding of the findings of this committee will be kept, so that there will be a form of orderly procedure set up, within the restrictions of the WRA regulations, which will serve in lieu of any charter or other formal instrument of government.

It was pointed out by Acting Project Director Harry L. Black in making the announcement today, that there will be no community government within the Tule Lake center similar to that which exists at the relocation centers. The Representative Committee, which will serve in an advisory capacity to the Administration, has specific outlined duties. These duties are set forth in the WRA regulations which are soon to be issued officially but which are contained in the statement published in this issue of the NEWELL STAR.

The persons, who serve as ward representatives to make the arrangements and supervise the elections, will do so on a voluntary basis. Any necessary clerical service, mimeographing, or supplies will be furnished by the Administration. This will include the printing of the ballots for the election, announcements, and informational releases.

When the Representative Committee is elected the members will be placed on the WRA payroll in order that they may devote full time to their duties. The necessary clerks will be assigned through the Placement Office for work with the Representative Committee.

FULL POWER

The Committee on Arrangements will have full power to set up a formula for the selection of the representative advisory body, bound only by the principles laid down in the WRA regulations. If members of this committee want to do so they may invite other individuals to serve on special sub-committees or to seek advice and counsel from any residents of the center. Such individuals serving in an advisory capacity to the Committee on Arrangements will not be considered as members of the committee.

Ray R. Best, Project Director, has been informed fully of the plans which have been made for the selection of a Representative Committee, and has approved them. It was felt that the need for completing the organization was such that there should be no delay awaiting his return here.

It was accompanied by the text of Dillon Myer's approval of the formation of a representative group and by the announcement that the resignation of the Co-ordinating Committee had been accepted by Director Best.

MYER APPROVES FORMATION OF REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE

The following text of the provisions of the WRA administrative manual providing for a committee of residents to work with the Administration was received today from Dillon S. Myer, director of the War Relocation Authority.

"The residents of the segregation center will be invited to establish a Representative Committee. The membership of this Representative Committee shall be selected by orderly, representative, elective procedures. The members shall be selected on a geographical basis to represent residential areas within the center, shall be selected for fixed periods of time, and the total membership of the committee shall not be greater than 12 persons.

"The function of the Representative Committee shall be that of acting as the official representative of the residents of the center in communicating to the project director the viewpoints, attitudes, and requests of the residents, in conveying to the residents information concerning WRA regulations and determinations affecting them, and in advising with the project director on matters as to which collaboration between the Administration and the residents is needed."

It is this instruction which will be followed by the Committee on Arrangements in setting up the plans for the election of a permanent Representative Committee at the Tule Lake Center.

CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE RESIGNATIONS ACCEPTED

The resignations of the Co-ordinating Committee tendered on April 8 have been officially accepted by Director Best, according to a statement by Harry L. Black, acting project director.

The acceptance was prompted "by a sense of fairness and an appreciation of the position of the committee," although he, Mr. Best, did not feel that the time was opportune for the dissolution of the committee as he had hoped that the Co-ordinating Committee might continue to function until the Department of the Interior and the War Relocation authorities in Washington had given approval for a form of representation to be created to succeed it. (Ed. note: This has now been done.)

Mr. Black also expressed on behalf of Mr. Best, "his personal appreciation and that of the Advisory Committee for its inestimable assistance in bringing back a measurable degree of normalcy and stabilization within the center and its devotion to the cause of law and order and the highest welfare and well-being of the general community."

Another decision of great significance was the administration's determining that there would be no further re-segregation in Tule Lake. This, it will be remembered, was unequivocally stated by Mr. Black(See p.). In view of the almost unanimous public sentiment that the removal of the "loyal" Yes-Yes people from camp was an absolute essential to peace and order, such an Administrative statement was bound to contribute toward discontent.

Several changes in Administrative attitude were noticeable

at the end of March and throughout April. There was a subtle but very important relaxation in safe-guarding Caucasians in the colony. Until the status quo was broken, any Caucasian entering the colony was required to take with him an armed soldier or a member of the Caucasian police force. In early February, even male WRA personnel were still required to take a guard. In March this was no longer required of men; women personnel members almost never went into the colony at this time, except the teachers, who went only to the school which is within a few hundred yards of the fence. By April, however, the restrictions which had been breaking down gradually were greatly relaxed and all that was required to ensure entrance into the colony was a pass from the Police or from Mr. Black. Caucasian women, however, ventured beyond the school area so seldom that in the more distant sections of the colony the writer was frequently pointed out as an oddity by little children who would shout "Hakujin, Obasan, or hakujin no sensei." Very young children were likely to burst into tears if brought to say "Hello," to the hakujin. Even the dogs seemed to sense some difference and would rush out of the barracks to bark until the strange presence disappeared in the distance.

On April 29, the Divisional Responsible Men held their last formal meeting. Chairman Akitsuki listed the accomplishments of the Co-ordinating Committee. A report on the decisions made on the forthcoming election of a new representative body, at the meeting between the Committee and the Advisory Council was made. It should be noted that the Arrangements Committee was to consist of eight men elected from the wards and two selected from the Divisional Responsible Men. Just why these

two extra men were needed is not explained. Mr. Best's statement that the newspaper item regarding the transfer of some 100 "agitators and troublemakers" to Leupp and Santa Fe was not true should also be noted. As has been explained previously, the plan of sending the "agitators" who were American citizens to Leupp was abandoned by the Administration some time in mid-April. However, some nineteen aliens were sent from the stockade to Santa Fe ~~some~~ two months later.

The final meeting of the Divisional Responsible Men of the Tule Lake Center was held on April 29, 1944, at 1608, from 9:15 a.m. B. Akitsuki presided.

The Chairman addressed the group by stating that today's meeting will be the final one, since the body's inception on January 7, 1944, at which time 52 divisional and sectional responsible men were present. On behalf of the former Co-ordinating Committee, the Chairman thanked the body for the efforts expended during the trying period in attempting to restore the Center to normalcy. He then went on to give a summarized highlights of the activities of the body, since its inception, as follows:

1. On January 8, return-to-work voting was held at various places and by majority of affirmative votes, ex-employees of various sections and divisions resumed work.
2. On January 11, referendum vote was taken and by a margin of 473 votes or 35 blocks against status quo and 28 blocks for, policy of status quo was liquidated. A copy of the referendum results will be distributed to all the members of this body for their reference.
3. On January 12, seven members were selected from the Divisional Responsible Men as Co-ordinating Committee, which was officially recognized by the Administration and the Army forthwith. The Committee, since it felt that its purpose for which it was organized had been accomplished, tendered its resignation on the 10th of April.
4. On the 15th of January, the Army withdrew from the Center and the WRA resumed administration.
5. On January 19 and 20, first releasement of 26 internees was made.
6. By February 4, total of 3848 was at work. This figure was only 165 less than the full employment mark of October 1943.

7. Curfew was lifted on February 21.
8. 5145 employees were on the payroll on April 17.
9. 257 stockade internees were released and 19 recently released.
10. Since the Center returned to normalcy, the Divisional Responsible Men resolved to dissolve on April 30 at its meeting held on the 85h.

Tentative dissolution statement of the body was read by the Chairman. On the suggestion of Mr. Yamatani, Messrs. Shimada, Takahashi, Sakuma, and Namekawa were nominated and declared elected, by unanimous applause, to serve on a special Committee on Dissolution Statement. It was advised that the statement should be printed in the Newell Star as soon as possible.

The Chairman reported on the gists of the meeting of the Advisory Council and the Delegates of this body held on April 8 as follows: Way and means of electing the Arrangements Committee and the Representative Committee was the principal item on the agenda; as an amendment to the previously issued instruction, the Arrangements Committee will be duly compensated and if there be reasonable justifications for additional sub-committees, they are also warranted in getting pay; it was tentatively decided that a nominating election be held, followed by a general election, which will be conducted by means of a ballot box, under the observation of an Election Board; nominating election will be temporarily presided by the Block Manager until the regular Chairman is elected to proceed with the election; since the instruction provided that the total membership should not exceed 12, and in view of only eight wards in the Center, the remaining balance be made up with representatives of the Divisional and Sectional responsible men, the Delegates suggested, to which the Advisory Council considered the suggestion very expedient.

Mr. Shimada then read a resolution which read that the thanks of the body be expressed to Akitsuki and Iwohara for their services to the body as Executive Secretary and secretary respectively during the period of their occupancy of their positions. The resolution was cordially applauded. Mr. Yamatani then announced that Mr. Black had approved heartily the Delegates' request to have B. Akitsuki and secretary remain in the office to complete the left-over and unfinished business, as well as prepare the reports to be submitted to the Spanish Consul and the Administration. He further added that their continued occupancy will by no means have relationship with the newly contemplated Representative Committee.

In reference to the report which will be submitted to the Spanish Consul, B. Akitsuki asked for further suggestions, additions, or retractions, which should be included or excluded

in the report. It was recommended that a copy of this report be printed and distributed to the members of this body for their information. This was approved.

B. Akitsuki reported that Dr. Province, chief of the Community Management division of the Washington office, on behalf of the staff had extended his thanks and appreciation for the efforts of the body.

Upon question raised, the Chairman mentioned that approximately 92 are still confined in the stockade and the newspaper item regarding plans to transfer some 100 'agitators or trouble-makers' to the Leupp and Santa Fe camps was discounted by Mr. R. R. Best.

There being no further business, on motion duly made, seconded, and unanimously carried the meeting adjourned at 10:24 a.m. and the body of Divisional Responsible Men, which was incepted on January 7, 1944, duly dissolved.

On April 30, the disbanded Divisional Responsible Men released the following explanation of their past actions.

But, although the body had officially resigned, it did not lose its entity. ^{A month later} It's members later made another attempt to achieve a significant role in center politics immediately after the shooting of Okamoto.

S T A T E M E N T

Since the incident of last November 1943, this Center was placed in an abnormal condition, confronted with a critical state of affairs. All sectional and divisional works discontinued to function, with the exception of certain essential departments; out-weighed by many unfounded rumors, public sentiment aggravated; internment of colonists continued to increase daily; and, colonists' living condition as a whole became more miserable and intolerable. Yet when the channel for negotiation with the authorities to overcome the existing grave state of affairs was opened, such became automatically void.

In order to reestablish normalcy for the happiness and prosperity of the colonists, this temporary body of Divisional Responsible Men was incepted on January 7 from which the Coordinating Committee was elected. The body was to dissolve immediately upon formation of a representative body selected by the people. The Divisional Responsible Men, by will of the colonists, put the issue of resumption of work to vote, as a preliminary step toward restoration of normalcy. Upon conviction of the colonists favoring this movement, the body immediately took action and expended its effort toward this

return-to-work movement and justifiable releasement of the interned colonists. After many setbacks and complications, Army Proclamation #2 was revoked on February 21; some 3200 workers resumed work by April 17; and, some 269 internees obtained releasement.

It was obvious that the normalcy of the Center had once again returned. Thereupon the body of Divisional Responsible Men felt that the major part of its mission had been accomplished. The Co-ordinating Committee tendered its resignation, which was officially accepted by the Administration. Consequently the body of Divisional Responsible Men, in accordance with its statement issued at the time of its inception, resolved to dissolve on April 30, 1944.

Sincere request of the body is hereto extended to all colonists to form a central representative body, which will continue to serve for the happiness, prosperity, security, and order of the Center, as well as for further justifiable releasement of those detained.

The following letter from Miss Iwohara, dated May 7, contains some interesting personal attitudes concerning the resignation of the Divisional Responsible Men, general center sentiment, and Mr. Huycke:

Tule Lake Center continues to be subjected to many trifle discords, unrest, and disharmony, which probably will never end. Transfer of some 100 agitators to Leupp Center, (although this item was discounted by Best), Army Physicals, arrival of new segregees from other centers, election of a Representative Committee, etc, seems to be the basic cause of disorder. One consolation -- remember that War 7 fence, it's been torn down.

Well, finally on the 30th of April the Divisional Responsible Men disbanded. Thank heavens! They way is now completely opened for an election of a Representative Committee, which will be selected by first holding a nominating election, followed by an election, which will be conducted in the Block Manager's office by means of a ballot box. Perhaps you already know the particulars of this instructions permitting community government. There'll be 12 (that is, not to exceed 12) representatives who will be paid. I forgot to mention the fact that prior to the real election, they're going to elect an Arrangements Committee, which is going to devise or rather set up the mechanism.

Divisional Responsible men's group as well as the Co-ordinating Committee are practically out of existence. Sure hard to trace the members now. Mr. Akitsuki and I were asked to remain in the office to clean up all the left-over and unfinished works, so we're still in the same office, all by

ourselves. The place is so quiet and incidentally, hot that it makes us sleepy and restless.

In spite of many things, Center's social activities continue to function as if there's no trouble whatsoever. Baseball, basketball, dances, shows, engel kais, bazuars and field day of various track games are some of the activities which enliven our almost 'dead' spirit.

P. S. Mr. Huyche was deferred or rather he was reclassified as 4 - F or something like that. When he came to break the news to us, inside myself I felt like saying, "O villain, villain, smiling, damned villain!" I hated to see him smile so happily. Others felt the same, I reckon.

PERIOD OF QUIET - MID-April to May 24.

From the date on which the resignation of the Co-ordinating Committee was announced, the general camp attitude was marked by a gradual but unmistakable lessening of tension. There was also a marked change in Administrative policy. The food improved remarkably and Mr. Best made several efforts to improve his relationships with the people. Although little actual optimism was voiced by the colonists, the statements of many informants showed overtones of relief. A few of the least pessimistic said, "Now Tule Lake is going to become just like the other centers." Hostile rumor and gossip about the inu lessened. Toward the end of May, some people even complained of being bored.

A considerable number of disturbing new factors such as the reception of draft notices, and the persistence of some of the old grievances kept minor disturbing currents in motion, but on the whole, the camp progressed toward a semblance of a peaceful community.

STATEMENTS OF INFORMANTS

Some excellent expressions of this phenomenon were made in early May. It is interesting that two of these statements

include an appreciation of the improvement in food.

K. said:

"Things have changed a great deal. Mr. Robertson himself is feeling very much relieved. I heard Mr. Provinse had a great deal to do in influencing Mr. Best to change his mind and take advice from the right party (by right party Mr. K probably means Mr. Robertson).¹ I hope Best will continue. Right now things are simmering down pretty fast."²

"N" said:

"Ever since you left there hasn't been much change. All quiet on the western front. Things are going pretty good except for the reduction of persons working in the family. . .

"I think the Japanese people as a whole made a big mistake at the warehouse. (Nov. 4 incident). If then food had been as it is now, it couldn't have happened. Now we have tofu, all the Japanese food we want, plenty of rice and vegetables."³

"I" said:

"Inu hate has died down. Things are quieting down. People are forgetting Akitsuki. He stays in the background. As long as you don't keep floating something in front of peoples' faces, they forget about it.

"There's no undercurrent of coming explosion. They (the Administration) ought to know better than that. The Japanese don't work like that. When the Japanese get really started to boil over, you don't see the warning signs.

"Besides the food has really improved. We have 48,000 pounds of cured ham sitting there in cold storage. In the coming months we are going to average eight eggs per person per week. That's an egg a day!

"The food improvement is remarkable. Up until the end of March all we ever had was corned beef, salt pork, and cabbage - and then repeat it. Besides that all we had was weiners, balony and eggs. There was very little other vegetable except cabbage. But from the beginning of April, things have started to come in. Now we get lettuce, spinach and asparagus. We still get frankfurters and balony, but we also get beef and veal occasionally - lamb and mutton more than beef though.

"Our only squawk is our difficulty in getting pork. I think that's because the quartermaster refuses to send us pork

¹Mr. Provinse visited the project in the latter part of April. The impact of his visit will be described on pp. .

²Notes, May 14, p. 1.

³ibid., May 15, pp. 2, 4.

because we have a big hog farm here. And they'll only kill the damn dogs when we're out of all other meat. We don't even get it once a week."

"I" added some of the not particularly reliable "confidential information" in which he delights:

"Best has brought up a proposal to bring up the food costs. I had this from Hayward himself that Mr. Best called him in and suggested quietly that we have an allowance of 45 cents a meal and so wouldn't it be a good idea to keep the meal costs in the 40 cent bracket rather than the 30.

"Maybe he feels he's getting pretty stiff competition for his job. In WRA it seems to me, every man below is always trying to do something to get the job of the man above. That is one of the reasons the appointed personnel rarely gets to cooperating with each other. Black is trying to get Best's place; Hoover would like to get Hayward's place."¹

ALTERED ATTITUDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION

Co-existent with this gradual loosening¹ of tension, and perhaps to some extent responsible for it was a definite change in Administration policy. Mr. Best, in Dr. Opler's words, "was putting himself out to be agreeable." He had proposed a half-holiday to allow the people to celebrate the Emperor's birthday which fell on a Saturday; he had ordered the best meal of the week to be served on that day (the week's best meal is ordinarily served on Sunday); he threw the first baseball at the game which celebrated the occasion. He had also had the fence which separated ward VII from the rest of the colony which resulted in a surprising amount of happiness on the part of the colonists, particularly those living in VII. Every informant visited in that ward remarked, "The fence has been taken down. It certainly makes us feel better." Another action which was commented on with pleasure by many informants

¹ibid., May 13, pp. 4 - 6.

was that permission had been given to take a group of school children outside the boundaries of the fence to visit the pig farm. Many old people remarked, "It makes even us feel better to know that the children got a chance to go out for a while." ¹

Stockade Releases Procedure

The releasement of a large number of those men detained in the stockade, may also have had an effect on calming resentment. By May 13 only about 55 men were still confined.

The stockade situation was given the following publicity in the Newell Star of May 18.

ADMINISTRATION RELEASES LATEST STOCKADE FIGURES

"The number of people who have been confined in the stockade area has declined steadily since the WRA set up its program of reviewing evidence on which the men were detained.

The Administration revealed, the total number of persons detained in the stockade was 319, although there was never quite this number in the area at any one time. This was because some arrests were made after others had been released.

The total number of men released from the stockade to date is 264. Most of these people were returned to their homes in the center residence area. A small number of aliens were transferred to the Department of Justice.

The number of persons remaining in the area to date is 55. Each case is reviewed by the Administration's committee, and the evidence made available from Army files and from the reports of the FBI are carefully studied. Releases have been made on the recommendation of this committee, which works closely with the Army officials.

Releases of from two to five persons are being made almost daily."

However, the men left in the stockade were by no means forgotten. "K" was still dissatisfied over the continued incarceration of the three men from block 9. He also voiced

¹ibid., May 13, pp. 1, 2.

the suspicion that some people had been interned just to keep the remainder of the people in a state of subjection.

"Three issei from block 9 were thrown into the stockade only last month. They didn't raise no trouble but had been complaining against people in that block regarding the distribution of gifts sent from Japan. But they were thrown into the stockade and are still there."¹

On the subject of the block 9 difficulties, Dr. Opler was of the opinion that the trouble was more serious than a mere squabble over the distribution of the gifts:

"That block 9 is an old old squabble. Block 9 has a split vote. It was a majority of anti-status quo with a strong minded minority. After the vote was taken, people entered from the outside and swung it in the pro-status quo direction. Certain families were criticized. There was mess hall discrimination and a fight between two sets of mess hall crews.

"This criticism over gift distribution was only one of the things. When last heard from, some anti-status quo people were considering getting out of the block.

"There was a real threat of mess hall trouble. That's the real reason they were put in the stockade."²

"N"'s sentiments toward the internees had undergone no change:

"As for the (boys in the) stockade - when I sign my home for anything I want to live up to it. We said once they are out true representatives."³

Even Miss Iwohara, ex-secretary to the Co-ordinating Committee said:

"I think they ought to release all of those out of the stockade that have no charge against them. They're so slow. There are many innocent ones in there."⁴

Re-opening of Leupp Abandoned

¹ibid., May 14, p. 2.

²ibid., May 17, pp. 1-2 .

³ibid., May 15, p. 4.

⁴ibid., May 16, p. 2.

Although it was not definitely announced that Leupp was not to be reopened for the incarceration of those of the internees who were American citizens, the fact that no overt steps were taken, contributed negatively to the quieter atmosphere. The relatives of the interned men, however, were still very anxious. Ever since the unconfirmed report that the internees might be sent to Leupp had appeared in an outside newspaper, a steady stream of interested persons kept coming to the Administration building in an attempt to get some information.¹

No informant not intimately connected with an internee, expressed concern over the movement to Leupp. Nor did the ordinary evacuees think that such a movement could provoke any demonstration from the people.

The first indication that any of the men interned were considering the possibility of appealing to the courts of the United States, appeared at this time. The first rumor was that one of the boys in Leupp who had been kept in the stockade since his arrival on December 6 was considering asking for legal aid. This young man, however, was released May 21 (check) and took no action. (See pp. . for his story)

Effects of visit of John Provinse

Opler was inclined to give a great deal of credit for the administrative change of attitude to Mr. Provinse, head of the Report's Office, who visited the project late in April. According to Opler, Provinse was able to gain an excellent picture of the state of affairs. In particular, Opler credited Provinse with causing the abandonment of the Leupp proposition. Said he:

¹ibid., May 13, p. 7.

"I think Provinse got next to Dillon Myer on that subject. He really understood the colony situation. We arranged meetings in the colony to talk very frankly with 'the guy from Washington.' We even got him to talk with the pro status quo group. He's a shrewd operator, much better than Best or the chief of the Tule Lake Police Department (Schmidt). He told the people what he thought and it was 'not to Leupp.'

"The final meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee was with Provinse sitting in. They were bringing up any problem - even the stockade question. Huycke said, 'In some blocks they're going to try to put up Daihyo Sha Kai members (on the new proposed representative body). That is happening in some blocks. Provinse immediately called him on that. 'What if they do?' he said.

"Provinse told Slim Tsuda in my office that he was going to do his utmost to get rid of the stockade."¹

George Yamashiro gave the following account of a talk he had with Mr. Provinse:

"The other day I met Mr. Provinse. He asked me why I organized the Tule Lake seinen-dan. I told him the same old story of our fathers and mothers who gave up everything. They have nothing now so their sons and daughters should entertain their parents all they can.

(George's slip "same old story" is amusing; the writer does not doubt his devotion to the issei. However, his interest in publicity and power cannot be doubted either.)

"Mr. Provinse says, 'Is that the only reason?' I said, 'Yes, it's the main reason.' Mr. Provinse said, 'Well, George, that is going to make the camp very good. But if you make it a better place for the issei to live in, a lot of other issei will want to come to Tule Lake.'

"Mr. Provinse wouldn't like that."²

DISTURBING FACTORS OF THIS PERIOD

Although a series of potentially disturbing events occurred during this period and the employment cut began to make itself felt, no appreciable resent or trouble resulted. The arrival of approximately 1,700 new segregants from Jerome, Granada,

¹ ibid., May 17, pp. 1 - 2.

² ibid., March 18, p. 2.

Heart Mountain and Minidoka and the sending of notices to young men to appear for their Army physical examinations were the most important of these occurrences.

Arrival of Additional Segregees

The estimated number of persons who entered camp at this time was given as 700 from Rohwer, 660 from Jerome, 140 from Granada, 125 from Heart Mountain and 59 from Minidoka. No organized effort on the part of the pressure groups to propagandize these new arrivals came to the attention of the Administration. However the effort was almost certainly made. The most serious problem with which the Administration had to deal was insufficient space. To meet this, the room allotted to each individual in camp was cut to a minimum of 80 square feet and a maximum of 100 square feet. The intent to make this reduction was announced long before the arrival of the new segregees.

Notice being sent those occupying excess room

A center-wide consolidation move began early this week with notices being sent to small families and bachelors occupying excess living space.

A minimum of 80 sq. ft. and a maximum of 100 sq. ft. is the desired space to be given each person and partitions will be set up where necessary.

Vacant apartments created by this move are to remain so for the use of the housing department which will be responsible for housing the 2,500 or more segregees expected from other centers early this spring. Persons found to have moved into such vacated apartments without proper authorization will be compelled to move. The housing department requests the fullest cooperation of the center residents in the accomplishment of this consolidation."¹

Finding sufficient room for the influx of new segregees

¹Newell Star, April 6, 1944.

was and remained one of the Administration's major difficulties. At this time Mr. Robertson stated that in his opinion it was the most serious problem in camp.

While there was much muttering and grumbling over the situation, resentment over crowding remained unorganized. "I" predicted trouble, but none occurred:

"I wonder what's going to happen when all the rest get here. They've got just three blocks and then the vacancies. I think they're going to try to squeeze in 2,000 people. When they start putting them into Rec Halls and start partitioning off, I wonder what's going to happen."¹

"K" criticized the Administration for its policy of bringing the people in in small groups. Each time another group came in, said he, it caused a minor disturbance in camp:

"People coming in a little at a time like that will continue to cause small trouble and unrest during the period of transition. They're easily agitated and will fall in line with the agitators. What I'm looking forward to right now is that those who took the leadership in camp in the last incident were from Rohwer and Jerome. They are going to get a fair number of sympathizers (from the new groups). I'm thinking of watching that end of it."²

The appropriation of recreation barracks for living quarters worked a hardship on the Japanese language schools which had no other available places in which to hold their classes. This matter was eventually adjusted. The executive secretary of the Japanese Board of Education expressed himself as follows:

"When the last contingent came here, housing didn't have enough space to allot to the schools. My opinion is, if the American government wants to move the people, they ought to have the houses first. Once WRA decided one recreation hall was to be used by one block. That rule was absolutely clear. The people have a real need of a recreation place. Now WRA starts

¹Notes, Mar. 13, p. 5.

²ibid., May, 14, p. 1.

to use the Rec. Halls for housing quarters.

"I said, 'Of course, having housing quarters is important, but the people choose to use the rec halls ~~for their rec halls~~ for their education. I requested a reasonable amount of space for the schools."¹

"N" gave an interesting account of an incident which illustrates the attitude of the settled population toward the newcomers. Hostility toward Mr. Kawaii, an old Tulean and head of Housing, is also expressed:

"Mr. Kawaii, the head of Housing; he was No and changed to Yes and wants to be transferred to another center. He called a meeting before the people of Rohwer and Jerome came in. He told them that when Manzanar had come in they had worked overtime and didn't get paid for it. So he told his staff not to work overtime this time.

"He was kicked right back on his face by the staff. They said, 'We are all Japanese. We are going to help those guys even if we do work overtime.'"²

On May 18 the Newell Star published an additional announcement on the necessity for consolidation of housing. The shortage was acute. Twenty recreation halls were appropriated as temporary quarters for the newcomers. Considering the lack of sufficient employment in the center, the appropriation of these recreation halls for living quarters inevitably worked a considerable hardship on the population.

ARRIVALS FROM FOUR CENTERS EXPECTED OVER THE WEEK END

One hundred and twenty persons are tentatively scheduled to arrive here from Heart Mountain on Saturday and on the following day 500 are expected from Rohwer, Jerome, and Granada, all of whom have been pre-assigned and processed. On the 26th and 27th about 60 from Gila are anticipated, according to Frank Kawai, evacuee Housing Department head.

Twenty recreation halls are at the disposal of the Housing Department to assign as temporary residence for the newcomers.

¹ibid., Aug. 10, 1944, p. 4.

²ibid., May 15, p. 3.

These recreation halls were selected after due discussion with the Japanese language school heads and Community Activity leaders.

In the near future, further consolidation of families will be effected so that the living space per individual will be cut down to the minimum of 80 sq. ft. A family of three occupying a 24' room will be asked to occupy a room not more than 16', and a family of four will not be permitted to live in a room larger than 24'. The

The Housing Department will release no information whatsoever regarding the names of arrivals until the 24th of May when residents desiring to know the addresses of friends or relatives recently arrived may inquire at 714-A.

Response and Reaction to Draft Notification

When on May 2 and 3 ____ young men were called to appear for the Army physical examinations (Check number and date), the trouble which the Administration had anticipated did not materialize. ____ appeared and twenty-seven "No-nos" did not appear. These young men were questioned by a member of the F.B.I. a short time thereafter. No resentment was expressed over the manner of questioning. From the first, the majority of the colonists seemed to think that calling the self-avowed disloyal young men to the services was utterly ridiculous and so manifestly unjust that they would not be punished. However, several No-No-informants stated that they were willing to go to jail rather than go into the Army. The same sentiment was reported second hand from many more. It was ^{rumored} ~~reported~~ in admiring tones that before they were called up to see the F.B.I. representative, that several young men had packed their suitcases and were all ready to proceed to jail.

"Y", a kibel No-No, who did not receive any notification gave an excellent expression of the attitude of those who did not appear.

"This is the way I think the Japanese feel. Anyway, it's the way I feel. If I get called for selective service and show up for my physical examination, the Japanese think, if we are loyal to Japan, we are pure Japanese, so we don't have to go. If we go, that means we have some loyalty to the United States of America. If we are going to refuse to go into the Army, we are going to refuse from the beginning.

"I said, 'I'm going to refuse to appear! Mr. Robertson said, 'That's not wise, George. Take the American way. The physical examination is a federal law. You are going to involve federal law!

"But if I'm going to be a Japanese I'm going to be pure Japanese and not American at all.

"I didn't use to be like this. But now I just see this camp from the Japanese point of view only. As a Japanese, I got to do it this way."¹

"N" and "I" nisei No-Nos expressed themselves as follows.

Note the exaggeration in the numbers of those who did appear for their examinations:

"N":

"There were some Yes-Yes guys in this block. I hear they have asked for repatriation. I also heard that only two guys showed up for their physicals."²

"I":

"I don't think there's going to be anyone here who'll be taken, providing he's a repatriate. Of course the Yes-Yes boys showed up. I think they sent out 82 notices and 17 boys, all Yes-Yes showed up for their examinations. One No-No boy showed up too, but he knew his physical condition and knew he'd be refused.

"All they did was come around and pull you in for a couple of hours of routine questioning. Some boys had their suitcases all packed. They asked, 'Where do we go from here?' They (F.B.I.) said, 'You can go home now.'

"One of the kids is in our division. He got pulled in and asked the same questions he was asked on his military questionnaire. He said, 'I'm a Jap and a repatriate and disloyal.' He signed a statement then to back up what he said

¹ibid., May 18, pp. 2-3.

²ibid., May 15, p. 3.

and they turned him loose. He thought sure he'd be sent to Leupp.

"The only guys they are going to send to Leupp are the guys in the stockade and I think they ought to go anyway."¹

One incidence of anger shown toward a young man who did report for his physical examination was reported by a Caucasian. A young Japanese working for her suddenly asked for a three day vacation. When she gave it to him without question he revealed the reason. He could not endure the presence of a co-worker who was one of the eleven (?) boys who appeared for his physical examination.²

Although the young men concerned managed to create an impression of stalwart^t indifference to their fate, there is no reason to suppose that their relatives looked upon the matter with equal stoicism. One young kibe girl, extremely concerned over the possibility that her eighteen year old brother might be sent to prison poured out the following story of her brother's experiences. Having reached military age, he had just been sent his military questionnaire.

"My brother filled out his Military Registration, saying that he was loyal to Japan and would not serve in the United States Army. Unfortunately he did it with red crayon. So the F.B.I. called him in. He showed my brother the red crayon and my brother said, 'Looks bad, doesn't it.'

(This remark was not intended to be impudent. The boy didn't know what else to say.)

"The F.B.I. man said that my brother could be sent to the penitentiary for six years. My brother said he's been locked up in camp two years and it's not so bad. The man said, 'Why do you want to be repatriated?' My brother said, 'My parents are old and I want to be with them.' The F.B.I. man said,

¹ ibid., May 13, pp. 3-4.

² ibid., May 14, p. 3.

'Before you get back to Japan all of your relatives will be bombed; you'll have no place to go.' He said my brother was a rare case and he would have to be taken to Sacramento."¹

The twenty-seven boys who failed to appear were indicted and tried late in July. The result of the trial will be discussed in the proper chronological place.

Army Installs Uniform gate procedure

At this period the Army, which still maintained sentries at the gate leading from the colony to the Administrative section, decided to install a uniform gate procedure, for those evacuees regularly employed in the Administrative section, office workers, warehouse workers, hospital employees, domestics, etc. It was decided that each Japanese who passed through the gate daily must carry an identification tag, a blue card, and a large red numbered button. They were required to wear the button on the left lapel. The buttons were $2\frac{1}{4}$ inches in diameter by actual measurements and a strikingly brilliant red in color. Certain staff members remarked facetiously that they looked exactly like the emblem of the rising sun. The proper distribution of these three separate items caused those members of the Appointed Staff who worked with many colonists under them considerable inconvenience and there was a great deal of grumbling while the process lasted. Dr. Opler remarked:

"It's really funny. The buttons are great big red affairs that look like the rising sun. The Army's gotten all messed up on the button situation. They gave them out; we didn't. They're trying to work out a gate procedure. I think they should be issued by the head of each worker's office. I've heard Captain Hartman saying, 'There are too many rules for the Japanese. There's got to be one set of rules for all of them.'"²

¹ ibid., May 16, pp. 1, 2.

² ibid., May 17, p. 1.

For several days after the institution of this new regulation, Japanese passing through the gates were shouted at, and loudly scolded by the sentries if they did not wear their buttons properly.

As far as most evacuees were concerned, the button matter was accepted as a minor pain in the neck. It was merely another inconvenience and, for some, another humiliation. Many said it was silly. After a few strenuous days for the sentries, most people wore their buttons properly. "I" expressed a common attitude:

"This new business about getting off the colony is a pain in the neck. First they give you a little piece of paper with your name, age, etc., on it. Now they picked these up and give you another paper with a number on it. On Monday everybody will have to go through a turnstile and they'll give you a little button which matches the number on your little piece of blue paper. They'll probably try to stop you and see if your button matches the number.

"It's just downright silly. If a man is going to swipe your button he'll swipe your paper too. I could forge one of these in five minutes, anyway."¹

Employment Cut

A considerable number of complaints over the reduction in the number of persons allowed to work in one family were heard. The following is typical:

"Things are going pretty good except for the reduction of persons working in the family. In this block there were eight or nine persons who had more than two persons working. In my opinion the Administration is making a big mistake by saying that only two people in each family may work, because there are some families who have as many as ten members and they ought to be allowed to have more people working.

"In our block there is a family of seven with three people working. I told the man, when he came to talk to me, that it was not necessary for his daughter to quit. The Administration

¹ibid., May 13, p. 3.

put a notice in the paper which said that if they don't quit by May 20, they are going to send out termination notices."¹

Widespread Rumor of Coming of Exchange Ship

During May and June, a rumor that the coming of another exchange ship might be expected sprang from some undertermined source and swept the camp. Some persons were so sure they would be selected for this as yet quite unannounced journey that they made preliminary preparations such as attempting to purchase trunks. The rumor persisted for a long period and did not die down until late July. "I", a nisei, whose intent to go to Japan had never been very strong, said:

"There's a rumor that there's another exchange ship on the way. I won't believe that till I hear it on the radio. If it were true, it would be good for the morale of both sides."²

OLD ISSUES

While they gave rise to no spectacular manifestations, several resentments of long standing continued to smolder during this period. Evacuees continued to be suspicious of the inu, the old members of the Co-ordinating Committee, Civic Organizations, or the Co-operative Enterprises, in short, any old Tulean who held a position of prominence and had taken an active part against the status quo. While no action was taken to precipitate re-segregation, many informants told the writer, that it was by no means a dead issue. "It will come up again." A considerable number of complaints against certain of the living conditions continued to be made. Complaints about the food, however, were almost never heard.

¹ibid., May 15, p. 2.

²ibid., May 13, p. 4.

Inu

Individuals with status quo sympathies were annoyed on several occasions by a system of connivance between the Administration and the Civic Organizations (still strongly old Tulean in character) by which the appointment of ex-stockade internees was ignored and men of less "dangerous" character were selected for certain positions.

The following minor incident illustrates the attitude of Mr. Best and the administrative group which gave him support. Shortly before the 19th of May Mr. Schmidt came into Mr. Best's office quite provoked. "Who do you suppose they (the people) want for evacuee chief of police here?" said he, "Harry Ueno!" Mr. Schmidt's objection to Ueno was not on the score that he had been connected with any trouble in Tule Lake but merely that he had been confined in Leupp. Since he was confined in Leupp at the time, he could have taken no part in the November incident. Mr. Robertson added to his unpopularity with Best and Schmidt at this time by saying, "Well, why not?"¹

When certain informants complained that a certain Mr. Kamiya, an ex-stockade internee had been selected as block manager by the residents of block 31, and that his appointment had been delayed for three weeks, the writer questioned Mr. Akitsuki, who had taken a position on the Civic Organizations after his resignation. Akitsuki stated that Civic Organizations hesitated to confirm Kamiya's appointment, since he had been a prominent Daihyo Sha Kai member and had, moreover, continued to incite trouble since his release from the stockade.²

¹ ibid., May 19, p. 1.

² ibid., May 16, p. 2.

"N", a status quo supporter complained bitterly over this matter, although he was not a resident of 31. He also denounced Mr. Furakawa of the Civic Organization. Furakawa an old Tulean had taken a very prominent part in the anti-status quo movement. Resentments similar to those expressed by "N", were probably felt by half or possibly more than half of the population.

"Mr. Miyake was a ward chairman. (Miyake is also an old Tulean, generally unpopular for his supposed pro-administration view.) This man was here during the time of segregation and had his wife and his father leave for Minidoka while he stayed here himself. It may be he's going out.

"So he told Civic he would like them to get a new block manager for 31. So the block people had a meeting...and elected a new manager. He happened to be Mr. Kamiya, the ex-secretary of the Daihyo Sha Kai.

"So they took it up to Civic. It's been three weeks or a month now and Civic hasn't OK'd him. Mr. Miyake is acting as block manager but he doesn't show his face in the block (because he doesn't dare).

"That isn't right when the people want Mr. Kamiya as block manager. I think they should have him as block manager.

"Furakawa of Civic is good for nothing. I don't think he's capable of sitting in that office. He sent out a notice through Internal Security that all meetings which are to be held in the blocks should be reported to Internal Security 24 hours beforehand. Previous to this, if the meeting was for more than 50 people we had to take out a fire permit and get an OK from the CAS. This new regulation came through Internal Security signed by Furakawa. If he's thinking of the welfare of the people, he wouldn't do that thing. So today in block managers' meeting we shoved it right back at him."¹

Re-segregation

No pressure for re-segregation appeared during this period. However, almost all informants predicted that it would rise again. "I" made the carefree statement:

"People feel just about the same on resegregation, but they figure the draft will take care of that pretty nicely

¹ibid., May 15, pp. 3, 4.

(by automatically removing Yes-Yes people from camp)."¹

Complaints over sanitary Facilities and Screens

Several informants stated that the poor condition of the sanitary facilities was giving rise to a great many complaints. As has been stressed before, the general condition of the latrines in the old section of camp was extremely poor. Comparison with the unusually fine facilities provided for the Manzanar group caused additional resentment. It was decided to take the matter up with the Spanish Consul.

"I" gave a vivid description of certain sanitary annoyances:

"There are a lot of complaints over the sanitary facilities. There are lots of complaints over the duck boards in the shower room. They are very slippery and are dangerous. Also there is no place to wash out urinals. In any of the latrines there is no such place. They're squawking like everything.

"It's not a very pleasant thing to be brushing your teeth in the morning and have somebody come along and wash out a urinal beside you.

"There doesn't seem to be any such thing as a sanitation committee here. At least we ought to have something for the mess hall employees and things like that."²

Said "N":

"In block managers' meeting today the main factors we are requesting through the Spanish Consul is better sanitary condition. Have you heard about Manzanar? . . .

"We have no screens here. That is one more point we will ask the Spanish Consul. Some of the old Tuleans took our screens. Some people who went out took their screens with them".³

ADMINISTRATIVE ATTEMPT TO FORM REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE

From the date of the resignation of the Co-ordinating, which did not step out of office until the end of April, the

¹ ibid., May 13, p. 4. See also May 15, p. 3.

² ibid., May 13, pp. 5-6.

³ ibid., May 15, pp. 2, 4.

camp had been completely without representation. This situation was embarrassing and awkward, an inconvenience to both the Administration and the colonists. After the publication of the authorization for the formation of this body, more than two weeks passed while the Administration waited in vain for the slightest evidence of initiative on the part of the colony. Finally the Administration "prepared to assume the responsibility for proposing definite plans to bring about the organization of the Representative Committee and the establishment of harmonious and practical working relationships with it as the recognized and official spokesman of the residents." It was a curious reversal of the November situation. In November, the Administration had exerted itself to the utmost to inhibit and slow down the development of a representative body. Six months later, when it stood ready to welcome one with open arms, there was no response. On May 8 the following explanation and plan was printed in a special edition of the Newell Star:

BEST MEMORANDUM ON FARMING REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE

Outline for Procedure Presented

On April 22, 1944, a special edition of the NEWELL STAR printed the text of the authorization received from Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, for the election and establishment of a Representative Committee to serve as the official and recognized spokesman of the residents of Tule Lake Center to work with the Project Director and the Administration on all matters effecting the welfare and interests of the residents.

The same issue of the NEWELL STAR published to the Colony the official invitation of Acting Project Director, Harry L. Black, to the immediate steps toward the election and establishment of the Representative Committee. The announcement stated that the Administration did not wish to prescribe the method by which the Representative Committee should be chosen, but suggested that a temporary Committee on Arrangements should be selected by popular vote to make plans for the election of the

permanent Representative Committee and to supervise the election.

MYER'S INSTRUCTIONS

The text of the instructions providing for a committee of residents to work with the Administration was received directly from Mr. Myer, and it had previously received approval of the Department of the Interior. For the information of all residents, the instructions are again quoted as follows:

"The residents of the Segregation Center will be invited to establish a Representative Committee. The membership of this Committee shall be selected by orderly, representative, elective procedures. The members shall be selected on a geographical basis to represent residential areas within the Center, shall be selected for fixed periods of time and the total membership of the Representative Committee shall not be greater than 12 persons.

"The function of the Representative Committee shall be that of acting as the official representative of the residents of the Center in communicating to the Project Director the viewpoints, attitudes and requests of the residents, in conveying to the residents information concerning WRA regulations and determinations affecting them, and in advising with the Project Director on matters as to which collaboration between the Administration and the residents is needed."

It was the hope of the Administration that the residents themselves would assume the responsibility to take the initial steps toward the selection of a temporary Committee on Arrangements whose task it would be to plan and supervise the election and establishment of the permanent Representative Committee. And it was hoped that the temporary Arrangements Committee might be chosen and organized by May 1, in order that the establishment of the Representative Committee might not be too long delayed.

SLOW RESPONSE

However, there has been no substantial response to the Administration's invitation to proceed with the formation of the Representative Committee. This delay may be due to a number of factors, such as the size of the community, the diversity of interests, the more immediate importance of competent and sound leaders to assume the initiative which would put the program under way.

Therefore, in a spirit of helpfulness and cooperation, the Administration is prepared to assume the responsibility for proposing definite plans to bring about the organizations of the Representative Committee and the establishment of harmonious and practical working relationships with it as the recognized and official spokesman of the residents in accordance with the provisions of Mr. Myer's authorizations.

FOR THE SELECTION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE IS OUTLINED:

1. An election by ballot will take place in each block Monday, May 22, from 2:00 to 8:00 o'clock p.m., to designate two Block Delegates to a Ward Council. The office of the Block Manager will be the polling place and voting will be by secret marked ballot placed in a ballot box under the observation of a Block Election Board.
2. The Ward Council, composed of 18 Block Delegates in each Ward (20 in Wards VI and VIII), will meet on Thursday, May 25, and select from among themselves the Ward Member of the Arrangements Committee
3. The Arrangements Committee will meet at the call of the Project Director, elect a chairman from its own membership, and designate a secretary.
4. All members of the Arrangements Committee must be able to speak and understand both English and Japanese.
5. The designated secretary must be able to speak and understand both English and Japanese, and must be able to take shorthand notes and transcribe dictation. The secretary shall keep the minutes of all meetings of the Committee and handle the necessary correspondence of the Committee's office.
6. Members of the Arrangements Committee will be paid by WRA at the rate of \$19.00 per month from the date of their election until the Committee has completed its work and had dissolved.
7. The secretary of the Committee will be paid by WRA at the rate of \$16.00 per month from the date of his (or her) appointment until the duties of the secretary have been completed.
8. Members of any necessary sub-committees, approved by the Project Director, who are designated to work for the Arrangements Committee will be paid by WRA at appropriate rates from the date of their respective appointments until their duties have been completed.
9. Arrangements will be made to publicize the work of the Committee and keep the community informed as to the progress of its work.

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE ARE DEFINED
AS FOLLOWS:

1. To make preliminary plans for the election of the Representative Committee.

2. To fix the term of office of members of the Representative Committee to be elected.
3. To prescribe qualifications for members of the Representative Committee.
4. To prescribe the qualifications of voters.
5. To designate the date of the election.
6. To prescribe the manner of filling vacancies in its own membership, if any should occur.
7. To supervise the election of the Representative Committee.
8. To confer with the Project Director or his representative on matters related to the election and the inauguration of the Representative Committee.

THE ELECTION OF BLOCK DELEGATES TO THE WARD COUNCIL WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:

1. During the week of May 15 the block manager of each block will make frequent announcements and post notices calling for a block meeting of residents of the respective blocks to be held in the mess hall on May 18 at 7:30 p.m.
2. The Block Manager will serve as chairman pro tem until the meeting can elect its own chairman who will immediately assume his duties.
3. The order of business of the meeting will be:
 - a. To designate a secretary to make notes and compile the minutes of the meeting.
 - b. To review the information contained in this memorandum and the April 22nd issue of the NEWELL STAR to inform the residents of the plan for Community representation.
 - c. To nominate five residents of the block to be candidates for Block Delegates to the Ward Council.
 - d. To designate an Election Board of three to five members to conduct the election of Ward Delegates in the block.
 - e. To designate the Chairman of the Election Board.
4. The Chairman of the meeting will forward to the Project Director, through the Block Manager and Civic Organization, a memorandum giving the names and addresses of the residents nominated for Block Delegates and the names and addresses of the Block Election Board, and any additional particulars of the meeting he desires.
5. The Block Election Board will perform the following duties:
 - a. Prepare a list of the five nominees for Block delegates and have the same posted conspicuously in the Block

- Manager's office and in the block mess hall.
- b. Prepare a list in triplicate of all residents of the block 18 or more years of age who will be eligible to vote in the election of Block Delegates. One list will be transmitted to the Project Director through the Block Manager and Civic Organization. The other two lists will be used by the Block Election Board itself in checking voters at the block election.
 - c. Preside at the election at the polling place in the office of the Block Manager on Monday, May 22, from 2:00 p.m., until 8:00 p.m. If any designated member of the Block Election Board is employed on any WRA job, he will be relieved of his regular duties on Monday afternoon, May 22, and receive credit for work time.
 - d. Provide each eligible voter with a single ballot and cross out the voter's name on the two lists of qualified voters which were prepared in advance.
 - e. Instruct voters to mark their ballots in secret and fold them and deposit them personally in the ballot box.
 - f. Close the polls at 8:00 p.m., open the ballots boxes and count the ballots.
 - g. Certify the results of the block election to the Project Director through the Block Manager and Civic Organization, giving the names of all five nominees and the number of votes received by each.
 - h. Declare the two candidates who receive the highest number of votes elected as Block Delegates.
 - i. Publish the results of the election to residents of the block.
 - j. Preserve the ballots and other records of the election to be turned over later to the Arrangements Committee.

THE DUTIES OF THE WARD COUNCIL WILL BE CARRIED OUT AS FOLLOWS:

1. The Ward Councils, composed of the 18 Block Delegates from each ward (20 from Ward VI and VIII), will meet at 2:00 p.m. Thursday, May 25. If any elected Block Delegate is employed on any WRA job, he will be relieved of his regular duties on Thursday afternoon, May 25, and receive credit for work time.
2. The place of meeting in each Ward will be designated as the most convenient place in the Ward by the respective Ward Chairman of Civic Organization.
3. The Civic Organization Ward Chairman will see that all elected Block Delegates are advised in advance where the meeting will be held.
4. The Civic Organization Ward Chairman will call the meeting to order and serve as chairman pro tem until the Ward Council can elect its own chairman, whereupon the Civic Organization Ward Chairman will withdraw.

5. The elected Chairman of the Ward Council will designate a member of the Council to serve as secretary of the meeting.
6. The Ward Council will choose from its membership a representative and an alternate to serve on the Arrangements Committee.
7. The Chairman of the Ward Council will certify to the Project Director through Civic Organization the names and addresses of the members chosen as representative and alternate on the Arrangements Committee. He may also transmit to the Project Director any additional information he or the Ward Council may desire relative to the meeting of the Ward Council.
8. Upon completion of the duty of selecting a member of the Arrangements Committee, the Ward Council will not be dissolved, but will hold itself in readiness in case the Arrangements Committee may wish to refer to it any matter it may appropriately consider.

UPON CERTIFICATION BY THE RESPECTIVE WARD COUNCILS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES CHOSEN FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE. THE PROJECT DIRECTOR, OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE, WILL CALL A MEETING OF THE EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE AT A TIME AND PLACE TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE CALL FOR MEETING.

The Project Director, or his designated representative, will serve as chairman pro tem of the first meeting while the Arrangements Committee attends to the first order of business, the selection of its own Chairman.

Under the leadership of its own Chairman, the Arrangements Committee will then undertake its functions as outline previously in this memorandum.

The election procedure herein described will be referred to the Arrangements Committee in case the Committee should see fit to make use of it, or part of it, in conducting the election of the Representative Committee. All of the records pertaining to this preliminary election will be made available to the Arrangements Committee.

The Project Director, members of his staff, or committees of his staff will be available to the Arrangements Committee for any consultation they desire.

R. R. BEST
Project Director

Fear that agitators might be elected to office was still felt by many of the members of the Administration. This fear had haunted the Administration for many months and probably

delayed the preparations for the formation of a representative body during the months that the Co-ordinating Committee was striving to extricate itself from it's unwelcome duties. At the last meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee Mr. Huycke had said, in reference to the election of a new body: "In some blocks they're going to try to put up Daihyo Sha Kai members." Mr. Provinse, who sat in on this meeting, remarked, "What if they do?"¹ It appears that Mr. Provinse exerted a considerable influence on those members of the personnel obsessed with the fear of agitators, among whom could be numbered every high ranking member of the staff except Mr. Robertson and Dr. Opler. In any case, with varying amounts of apprehension on the part of Messrs. Best, Black, and Huycke the step was taken.

ATTITUDES OF THE JAPANESE BEFORE THE ELECTION

If the Administration had had knowledge of the opinions of the residents, it might have saved itself much apprehension. Instead of planning to obtain places on the body, the leaders of the Anti-Administration pressure groups were putting all their efforts into an attempt to make the election an utter failure. In this they received the positive or negative support of most of the colonists.

"K", while believing that a body ought to be formed, pointed out that any one who accepted a place on it stood in great danger of being branded an inu. The knife edged path of resisting the Administration sufficiently to gain the respect and confidence of the people and co-operating sufficiently to keep from being thrown into the stockade could be travelled

¹ibid., May 17, p. 2.

in safety only by an extremely able individual. And such individuals were not interested in the office. "K" was also the only informant frank and well informed enough to hint, albeit cautiously, at the existence of pressure groups working against the election.

"I know only a little about it. I'm not sure, but I'm afraid this thing is going to cause a little trouble. There is a party opposing it. The one who is opposing it, not because he knows anything about it, but because he merely took a dislike to it. He has some sort of false impression. He may try to cause a little trouble.

"People are not very enthusiastic about it. But I think that a body ought to be formed to try to co-operate with the Administration and set things rolling harmoniously. You'll find the issei will try to co-operate with the Administration whether they like it or not. The nisei will fall in with them too. So eventually they are all going to be called inu.

"It would be best if the body stood up and spoke for the rights of the Japanese, even if they are thrown into the stockade. Then they'll be idolized. But if he falls into line, he's going to be called a stooge no matter what he does.

"Mr. Best must recognize the opposition. If the people (elected) have the guts to stand up, O.K. But if mostly issei are elected they will swallow and swallow and just get to be despised.

"You're not going to find any respectable, well-educated Japanese willing to attempt that position. You'll get a body of people who before evacuation were just nobody."¹

"N", a block manager and former Daihyo Sha supporter also expressed the opinion that the election of the proposed body would be very difficult. He, like many individuals of his conviction, stressed the importance of the group still interned in the stockade. He also did not believe that the Administration would permit the election of any man on their "black list"

"They're going ahead with this Representative Committee, but I personally would really like to see the people in the stockade to be released. In my opinion getting new delegates for the Representative Committee will be pretty tough to operate. People say, "What's the use? We put up representatives once again and they wouldn't recognize them."

¹Ibid., May 14, p. 2.

"I don't know. You really don't hear people talk about it much. They're just sick of it. Some of the daha people, (those against status quo) they're talking about it. As far as I'm concerned I don't care if they do it or not, as long as they take care of sanitation and family employment. . . .

"In the election we'll have to take down the names of the persons and send them into the project director's office. If the person is on the black list, I know the administration will not O.K. it.

"As block managers we are not to stick our nose into any political affairs. So we are just going to act as chairmen until they get a chairman."¹

Miss "I", although strongly anti-status quo, did not think the election could succeed since so many people were unwilling to elect another body while the stockade matter was still unsettled:

"It doesn't seem as if this representative body ought to go through. I hear so many people say as long as they are obligated to the Daihyo Sha they will refuse to vote until they're released."²

"Y", an ex-Leupp internee assumed an attitude of extreme indifference:

"I have no idea about it. They've asked me to be one of the representatives, but I won't. I'm not going to be in any political organization. . . .

"Tonight every block is going to have a meeting. I'm going to play baseball, and have a lot of fun. . .

"The people feel pretty bad. If you do good for the people you get put in the stockade. If you do good for WRA you get called inu. So I'm going to play baseball."³

"I" took a view which was probably very common among these individuals with no passionate political convictions. The representatives were not really needed. Why elect a body which might plunge the camp into more trouble? The many evacuees who held this view consciously or unconsciously aided the pressure groups who were doing their utmost to bring about

¹ibid., May 15, pp. 3-4.

²ibid., May 16, p. 2.

³ibid., May 18, p. 2.

the failure of the election.

"Nobody cares a thing about having a representative government. So far as I can see, nobody is going to break their neck trying to work up a few representatives for the block. They just don't care. Things are going along pretty good, so leave well enough alone.

"We haven't any representatives now, just a war representative. But he's always been in existence. I don't see any call for them (representatives) at all.

"My idea is this: if there's a representative from each ward that's eight people. Then, if any problem or complaint is important enough to merit bringing before the attention of the higher-ups, whoever was interested enough to do so could look up the ward representatives and present his case. But if there is a representative in every block it would be a simple matter to bring up minor items and cause confusion. I think they should leave it that way and save a lot of trouble listening to minor complaints. Things will smooth themselves out. I think having a representative in each block makes it too damn easy for anybody to put up silly complaints."¹

Dr. Opler said that several of his informants had expressed the fear that hot heads would gain office and attempt to dominate the body. They would then cause trouble by insisting that demands be made with which the Administration could not comply.² This attitude, quite similar to "I"'s, was probably held by many of the old Tuleans. It is, moreover, the kind of statement which a Japanese would be likely to make to a member of the Administration, feeling that it might not be entirely safe to put emphasis on popular sentiment toward the stockade internees or on general hostility to any proposal put forward by the Administration.

Mr. Robertson's informants, on the other hand, stressed the importance of the stockade issue. It is also interesting that Mr. Robertson, on this occasion, made the most accurate prediction of any person on the project, Japanese or Caucasian. Said he, "I think the results of this election are going to be appalling."³

¹ibid., May 13, p. 6.

²ibid., p. 2.

³ibid., May 19, p. 1.

Letters from Stockade Internees Withheld

There is some uncorroborated evidence that just prior to the nomination meetings, the Administration withheld all or much of the mail sent by stockade internees to friends and relatives in the colony. If this was done, there may have been several motives. The Administration may have feared that the internees would exert what pressure they could on friends and relatives to ^{control} ~~influence~~ the election; Mrs. Q guessed that the Administration did not want the issei in the stockade to communicate with the Spanish Consul. Moreover, the internees were making more energetic attempts to obtain a lawyer. "Y" remarked that he had heard that no letters from stockade internees were being received.¹ Mrs. Q. complained:

"We haven't had a letter from the stockade for quite some time. I guess they don't want the issei messages to get smuggled out to the Spanish Consul. The boys who came out said the issei there wanted to have the Spanish Consul meet them. I heard all the issei wrote to Mr. Best to be allowed to see the Spanish Consul. I heard none of them received an answer. . . .

"Fifteen boys in the stockade did send out their signatures that they wanted a lawyer. Their parents were just frantic. Nothing has been done because we didn't know how to go about it."²

RESULTS OF NOMINATION MEETINGS

The results of the meetings scheduled for the evening of May 19, were not publicized by the Administration. The best data available was given to Dr. Opler by the Civic Organizations, which compiled the results. At the time Opler stated that this report was preliminary and not accurate. However, nothing better was ever released.

¹ ibid., May 22, p. 2.

² ibid., May 23, p. 1.

- 15 blocks - nominated representatives
- 44 blocks - no quorum, i.e., no meeting; no representatives
- 9 blocks - no attempt made to hold meeting
- 2 blocks - delegates nominated, but rejected by block¹

Since these results were presented by the Civic Organizations, a body which would be inclined to co-operate with the Administration, there is little likelihood that the failure of the meetings is exaggerated in any way. There is, therefore, no doubt that only 20% of the blocks in the center, responded to the suggestion of the Administration.

Accounts of Meetings

Some very interesting accounts of what transpired in the various blocks were given by informants.

"Y" said;

"I didn't go to the meeting. Eighty-two people were needed for a quorum and only 75 showed up. Then the anti-status quo people went around to get people to come. I went and I was nominated. I absolutely refused the nomination. I don't intend to engage in no politics. Things dragged along and about ten people left. They refused to let me decline the nomination. Then I said that there was no quorum anymore, so the nomination was not valid. After a lot more talk the meeting ended. Nobody was nominated.

"Mr. Takahashi worked very hard to get people out and did his best to get nominations.

When asked if this would not make Mr. Takahashi unpopular in his block (block 68) "Y" replied, "He's an old man and is going to die soon anyway."²

"K", who lives in block 7 stated;

"I didn't attend the meeting. I was home and they came for me. But I refused to attend. I heard they had only twenty people attending. They seem to have appointed me and another gentleman next door. But I flatly refused to accept the nomination. Regardless of what Mr. Best may say, I will absolutely refuse to serve."³

¹ ibid., May 20, p. 5.

² ibid., May 22, p. 1.

³ ibid., May 21, p. 5.

"O", block manager of 59, a very pro-status quo block, did his best to comply with the Administrative instructions. He failed.

"I had a meeting. Only 25 or 26 people attended. So I just told them the meeting was adjourned. As you know, the block managers can't stick their nose in politics, so I must be neutral. I did my best but the people feel that way."¹

A young married woman living in block 20, a notoriously "tough" block, said that the people in her block had had a meeting but they had said, "No, no, no, no!" No one was nominated.²

When a resident of block 5 was asked how the nominations had gone, he replied with a quiet smile, "Nobody was nominated," adding significantly, "Of course, this is Reverend Kai's block."³

Dr. Opler collected the following accounts of meetings:

"I heard that block 73 had a long argument. The block manager arrived and was accused of being an inu, for helping in this. He said he had a fight (verbal, it seems) with the "worst radical" in the block. He added that there were others "too radical to listen." Anyway, the group couldn't be handled. There were no nominees."

"In block 9 there were no nominees."

"In block 69 they put up representatives; but they also had an argument. Apparently it was in the blocks which had no nominees they they had the worst arguments."

"In block 29 things went OK. There was a nomination. But they had a one hour wait before people came. I think that was usual. They had to go around in the block and get them to come in. In block 16 an anti-status quo man said, 'We had to drag them out of bed to get nominees.' Block 16 is very pro-status quo."⁴

COLONISTS' REACTIONS TO FAILURE OF ELECTION: EXPLANATIONS

After the resounding failure of the nomination meetings,

¹ibid., May 23, p. 3.

²ibid., May 22, p. 1.

³ibid., May 20, p. 1.

⁴ibid., p. 6.

it was extremely obvious that many colonists, whether they were strong status quo supporters or not, reacted with unconcealed glee. During the week following, when the subject was brought up at informal gatherings, those present vied with each other in boasting of the degree of lack of co-operation in their particular block. The number of persons who attended the meetings were compared. A person from a block with lower attendance smiled with smug complacency. He, however, would have to give way if any person were present from a block where no meeting at all had been held.

This attitude was not unanimous. Persons with strong status quo sympathies were disappointed. Byron Akitsuki's sister who came from block 29, where no nominations had been made, was ashamed. When only the writer was present, she said she was worried about the situation. She did not want the men released from the stockade. "It is well know," said she, "that the agitators had been plotting trouble in Tule Lake even on the train coming from Jerome."¹

Members of the pressure groups were elated. "This is a great victory for the residents."² said Mr. Q. an undemonstrative individual.

Explanations

"K", who had never expressed himself as for or against the status quo gave a very interesting explanation of the failure. Significantly, he stressed that this failure put the status quo election of January 15, 1944 into its true perspective. The

¹ ibid., May 22, p. 2.

² ibid., May 21, p. 4.

majority of the people, said he, had never wished to give way to the Administration and break the status quo.

"People are taking the attitude, why should they make a committee when they (Administration and Army) refused to recognize them in the first place. If the Administration had recognized the boys at that time (November) they would have had success at this time.

"The agitators will certainly claim the credit for this.

"As you know, the Japanese people are, I would say, stubborn. Once they bear a grudge, they very seldom forget. Mr. Best has lost the confidence of the people at that time.

"The first status quo proved the situation at that time. The difference was so small. That proved that the residents were against the Administration. If they had been in favor of the Administration, the vote at that time would have been overwhelming.

"I heard that Kai is going to be released. But if they let Kai go they must let the rest go. If they did that it would create a much more happy atmosphere."¹

"Y", who had previously expressed himself as against the release of some of the men in the stockade now swung definitely to the opinion that they should be let out. His statement that the people had rejected the election, not out of loyalty to Kai and Kuratomi, but because they felt WRA had not treated the people fairly, was corroborated by many intelligent colonists.

"If Kai and Kuratomi are released, then maybe they'll have a Negotiating Committee. The Army and WRA made a promise to the Daihyo Sha Kai that they wouldn't arrest any of them. But they did.

"It was unfair to put the representatives in the stockade. It was a dirty deal. That's really what the people feel. Eighty percent of the camp feels this way, not because they support Kai and Kuratomi but because they think WRA treated them bad.

I inquired why some blocks had nominated candidates. Said "Y",

"In any block there are some young kibe and nisei who have no place in social organization, but they want to get a name

¹ibid., pp. 5-6.

somehow and that's maybe why they were candidates. Also there may be a few blocks who are pro-Administration.

"I think if it were put in the Newell Star that Mr. Best was going to resign and that they were going to take the fence down, then I think it's going to be peaceful here.

"Mr. Best asked me individually whether the election will be successful or not. I told him give me a job instead. He said, well, as soon as Mr. Black came back he's going to have the election."¹

Mr. "F", an issei, said:

"When the people came into camp they were confused. They are still confused. The reason they are refusing to support this proposal is that the old matter (the men in the stockade) is not settled. If they were all let out, the election would be proceeding in an entirely different manner. No intelligent able man would accept the nomination. I certainly wouldn't.

He also expressed his low opinion of Mr. Best:

"At Leupp Mr. Best used the outer entrance at all times and came inside the stockade as little as possible. Mr. Robertson always left by the exit which took him through camp, asking if he could get the boys something. This shows he (Robertson) has a Christian heart."²

The opinion of "G" a segregee from Manzanar who did not arrive in camp until late February of 1944 is interesting.

"G" is an issei and strongly against "radicals" and trouble making." When asked why the election had failed, "G" said:

"That's very simple. . . The first (representatives) we sent out - they were all put in the stockade. They (the Administration) were denouncing them that they were not representative of camp opinion. So they sent out the next one (Second Negotiating Committee). Then, negotiations were going on. Then the Administration say, 'You don't represent camp opinion either.' They sent them to the stockade (too). Then there were no representatives.

Then. . the Administration formally requested the camp people to elect representatives. Everybody's opinion was, 'What's the use? Everytime we send a representative they are arrested. If we make more representatives, they will only put more people in the stockade.' Everybody said, 'What the

¹ ibid., May 23, pp. 2-3.

² ibid., May 20, p. 1.

heck! We don't want to send anymore people to the stockade."¹

The "O"s, conservative segregees who arrived in camp in October, exhibited the same change of opinion that "Y" did, i.e., the only way to bring peace to the camp was to bring the stockade matter to a satisfactory conclusion. "O" also added some interesting current opinions on the activities of the ex-Co-ordinating Committee.

"In my opinion the reason it didn't come out successfully is because some of the people in the center feel that unless the men in the stockade are released, they will continue to back the Daihyo Sha Kai because the men in the stockade are our representatives.

"I told you the last time it was better to have a good strong organization. But the way the people feel right now I think it's better to release the men from the stockade. I feel pretty strong that way. . . .

"Another thing, the Co-ordinating Committee was organized for the purpose of releasing the men and bring the center back to normalcy. But right now, it is in better condition than it was three months ago. The camp seems normal now, but as long as the men are in the stockade people will feel that it is not a normal condition.

"Some of the people say that the Co-ordinating Committee didn't finish their work. They made a statement in the paper that they had completed their work but more than 50 persons are still in there (the stockade). Some of the issei were sent to the internment camp, which made the group mad. . . .

"Unless WRA releases the men in the stockade there is no necessity to organize another committee. If the men are sent to Leupp there is no hope at all to organize another committee. The majority of the people are just watching the Administration to see what they do.

"Besides people hesitate to be block delegates. They may go to the stockade if they are."²

Two Tuleans, both issei stressed the unpopularity of Mr. Best and the conviction that unless men in the stockade

¹ibid., July 27, pp. 3-4.

²ibid., May 23, p. 4.

were given a fair hearing, no new representative body would ever be elected.

"I think that Mr. Best and the people in the center don't see eye to eye on almost everything. Anything he (Best) proposes, won't get through. As you know, there are 14 people in the stockade at present (this statement was made August 14). There has been no definite verdict given. There has been no hearing.

"So until we know definitely how things stand, you know it's impossible to elect another committee. That's why, as they say, anything Mr. Best would say in that sense, it won't hold true."¹

Two nisei girls, old residents of Tule, stressed the fear with which a potential representative regarded the position:

"They were scared because everybody was getting beaten up. (The outbreak of beatings occurred after the election). They thought the best thing to do was to sit quiet and take what they (Administration) dish out. You're always in constant fear if you take that job."²

This list of attitudes will be closed with the analysis of Mr. "U" an ex-Santa Fe internee and a strong supporter of the pressure groups:

"It is the Japanese way of taking the responsibility. Any responsible person has to resign his position. It shows that the majority of the residents as a whole have no confidence in the Administration. It's as if the president of the United States gave an order which was not obeyed by the people. He'd no longer be president.

"Much of it is due to the people still in the stockade. They are taking too much time for settling this little business in the stockade. Mr. Best every day is taking valuable time with the chief consideration of keeping their (Administration's) face. They have to spend so much time on the stockade that they are disregarding other things such as watering the roads and improving the mess halls."³

Analysis

Comparing the statements made before and after the failure of the nominations, the most striking phenomenon is

¹ ibid., Aug. 14, p. 2.

² ibid., Aug. 17, p. 4.

³ ibid., May 21, p. 4.

the change in emphasis on the importance of the stockade issue. Three good informants, who had never before stressed wholesale release, now advocated it as the only possible method of clearing up the misunderstanding between the Administration and the people. The dominant sentiment in camp from May 19 to May 24 was a feeling of triumph and regained self-respect. "We showed them," was the theme underlying most of the statements. It is impossible to say which of the three most frequently ^{reasons for the failure of the nomination} expressed ~~attitudes~~ was most important: a sentiment of obligation to the men in the stockade; the conviction that it would be impossible to serve as a representative without getting into trouble either with the Administration or the people; a general disinclination to co-operate with the unpopular Administration and Mr. Best in any way whatever. As has been shown, most informants shared all three. Undoubtedly, the pressure groups felt that the first and third were most salient. Fear or disinclination to be called an inu and dislike for Mr. Best were strong enough to swing the conservative people against the proposition. The arguments which took place in certain blocks and the attempts of certain individuals to go about the block "and compel the people to come in," show that the Administration was not without it's supporters. However, these individuals were completely overwhelmed and risked great unpopularity and danger by their actions.

The fiasco had one noticeable effect on the public mind: the conviction that the state of non-cooperation between the Administration and the people could be resolved only by releasing the stockade internees was now well established and continued

so. It should be noted that some of the segregees who had little respect for the Negotiating Committee and even the old Tuleans who might call them agitators, upstarts and Communists still were convinced that their continued imprisonment would be an error. Moreover, although it was seldom verbalized, not appearing for meetings was henceforth adopted as a simple and safe method of putting the Administration in its place. The continuation of this pattern will be taken up in its proper chronological place.

REACTION OF ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Best is said to have taken the matter calmly and philosophically. Dr. Opler described his attitude:

"Best said in sweet tones that if the center felt that this was premature, we will have it later. He isn't calling it off.

"It's a curious inversion. Once, when they had the organization, Best was trying to slow it down. Now Best is saying, 'Go ahead.' and the people are slowing down. Many people told Best not to have it now."¹

On May 25th the following statement appeared in the Newell Star:

FORMATION OF REPRESENTATIVE BODY POSTPONED STATES BEST

Plans for the formation of the Representative Committee, a permanent intermediary body which was granted approval by the WRA, have been postponed for an indefinite period of time, announced Ray R. Best, project director. The block meetings, which were held Thursday evening to nominate candidates for the block delegates' election as the first step toward formation of the permanent body, did not show sufficient response from the residents.

"The failure of a large number of blocks to hold their meetings and select their nominees serves to defeat the purpose of the organization plan, and indicates that there is not enough popular sentiment in favor of the formation of the Representative Committee to warrant a continued effort to carry out the election at the present time," stated the project director.

¹ Ibid., May 20, p. 6.