

Spanish Consul

The Spanish Consul made his long awaited visit to Tule Lake December 13th and 14th. He was accompanied by the Hon. Mr. Deckerbach, the representative of the Department of State. It will be noted that the group of colonists who contacted these men were strongly pro-Daihyo Sha Kai and that they received no encouragement. Rather they were greeted with a request to disband on the part of Mr. Deckerbach. Their demand that the internment of Japanese citizens be reported to the Japanese government was met with a promise to report the fact to the Spanish Ambassador but with no assurance that it would be passed on to the Japanese government. The demand that the status of the nisei in Tule Lake be made clear was answered by Mr. Deckerbach with the statement, "No American can throw off his citizenship."

REPORT OF THE SPANISH CONSUL
December 13, 1943

DATE: December 13, 1943 TIME: 3:p.m. PLACE: Front of Mess 21

Introduction of Consul De Amat, State Department Representative Deckerbach and Translator Inouye.

CONSUL: I came here by the order of his Excellency, the Spanish Embassy. I came here to visit the people living in Tule Lake, especially the men and women born in Japan to which the protection applies. I want to talk to all of those who wish to talk to me. I answer many complaints, if there are any who wish to speak to me or any desires they wish to make to me.

I realize that in the present moment, you are facing certain problems that are rather disturbing and I believe that those problems have to be faced with goodwill, on the part of American authorities, and also with the Japanese residents.

Today and tomorrow I will be here and I will be ready to hear any suggestions that anyone has, in the sense of helping you out of actual problems. In the morning, I will be in Mr. Best's office, and you can contact me through the telephone if you wish to see me.

MR. DECKERBACH: I am representing the Department of State, Washington, because the State Department is interested in Tule Lake. You may wonder why the State Department is interested. The reason is that the trouble in Tule Lake affects our international relations. The constant dispute at this camp are disturbing to our international relations, and

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also detrimental to our own welfare. For example, you are interested in the exchange of American Nationals with the Japanese nationals interned here. The disputed at the Tule Lake camp will definitely hold up this exchange of nationals. For that reason the State Department wants to see a peaceful, quiet, orderly camp here at Tule Lake.

I have made a brief inspection of the camp and I have read the records of the meetings held by the Negotiating Committee and the Army authorities and I must say that I can see no obstacles that cannot be overcome and cannot see why we cannot come to an orderly camp. I believe that all obstacles and questions can be solved if they are approached in a spirit of cooperation, goodwill, and sincerity, but this spirit must be mutual, it must come from both sides. I mentioned that the authorities now in charge of this camp will be glad to approach every problem with sincere spirit of cooperation and they will do everything in their power to make you as comfortable as war-time conditions permit. But some things are impossible. For example, this morning the question was brought to my attention of releasing the nine members of the Negotiating Committee who have been detained. The Army picked up those members of the Committee because they believed it was necessary to do so, in order to preserve peace and security of this camp. They will be released by the Army if and when they believe it is desirable.

Now we are anxious to find some solution of this problem which will be satisfactory to both sides. This is not my job to find the solution, but I would like to make a suggestion or two which I think will help. I would like you to think some of those suggestions over.

I propose, in the first place, that you abolish the old Negotiating Committee which obviously is unable to function in your present condition. I propose that you elect by popular vote, that is, the vote of the whole community, a new committee to be called a Central Committee. In my opinion this committee should be composed of members in proportion to the various classes in the community - that is Issei members should elect Issei and Nisei should elect Nisei representatives. I think in this way you will get a community truly represented by the whole colony - one which the Army Authorities will have confidence and which they will be able to cooperate.

I hope that such a committee can be formed under the supervision of the Army and that it will use all goodwill and sincerity to cooperate with the Army Authorities to build here a model camp which will be a credit, not only to the Japanese in this camp, but to the cooperation of the Army and the residents. As I have said before, it is not my job to find a solution, I am making the suggestion in the hope that you will all think it over carefully.

ANNOUNCER: The demands and problems are:

1. To conform to the suggestions made by the former representatives.
2. Food arrangement is bad--make arrangements to bring us better food.
3. Threatened by martial law.

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4. Soldiers entrance into women's shower rooms.
 5. Recognition of the Negotiating Committee

QUESTION: They are building new fences by Ward 7, why are they building such fences?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: Find out the reason from the Army.

ANSWER: DE AMAT: I will ask the Army, probably it will be denied, but if they tell me I will give the answer.

QUESTION: Do you know that we had to endure difficulty because of martial law? From November 4, we have suffered the difficulty which we encountered, because of martial law and curfew laid upon us. Did you know this fact?

ANSWER: Since November 4, I have received complaints about being inconvenient; e.g. martial law. The people were suffering --I received a letter so I knew it. This complaint has been recorded in my office and submitted to the Spanish Embassy which will probably submit it to the proper authority.

QUESTION: We have been hearing for the past two weeks and twenty days that your Honor was going to visit us to meet our problems. however, even after one month you didn't come to this center, I would like to know the reason.

ANSWER: DE AMAT: I have been here to the Tule Lake Center three times. I am not absolutely free to come here whenever I wish. My visits are subject to certain formalities. I must be accompanied by a Washington State Department Representative; that makes it so that I cannot do it as quickly as you may ask. As I repeated, in October, beginning of November, I was here and I am here again.

ANNOUNCER: Did you receive any telegrams?

CONSUL: Yes, I have received them.

ANNOUNCER: We are supporting the Negotiating Committee we first selected, and I want you to meet this Negotiating Committee and talk things over.

ANSWER: I will ask the Army Authority to let me talk to these men in custody now, nevertheless, that permission may be denied me because they are American Citizens, since I am here to take care, especially those men and women born in Japan. It is my opinion that the commanding officer of the camp will allow me to see the men, so consequently, I will try to see them.

QUESTION: This is the gravest concern of the residents up to now and still they do not believe that the former Negotiating Committee has done everything possible for the residents, not for their own benefits. I want you to understand that point.

ANSWER: It is not my own road to mix myself in this political question inside the camp. My visits are specifically to see that the living condition is according to the International Law, and these other questions tried by the committee are more or less a political nature, and I am not supposed to bring myself in.

QUESTION: This question is to ask you to inform the Japanese Government that this Negotiating Committee has been detained by the Army since November 4, 1943.

ANSWER: I will report your request to the Spanish Ambassador. I do not know if the Ambassador will report it to the Japanese Government. If they think it is important enough to forward it, they will.

(1)

QUESTION: [They want you to report to Japan the fact that our Negotiating Committee has been detained by the Army from November 4. That is our demand. They don't want shall or will business, they want you to make sure.]

ANSWER: I have already said that I will approach the Embassy that nine men have been detained by the Authority. I do not know if the Embassy will consider it. If it is necessary they will report it to the Japanese Government. If they think it is not important they will not do so.

On my visits I made reports to the Embassy about the events. Your reports, I suppose, have been sent to Japan. I have made reports of what I have seen and heard. The nature of the reports is absolutely confidential, I am not going to say it here.

QUESTION: They want to demand (the translator used this word) the status of the Nisei made clear, because even if they are American citizens they should be equal as Japanese Nationals.

ANSWER: I have specific orders from the Embassy that the protection should be applied to the Japanese subjects.

ANSWER BY STATE DEPT. REP. I would like to explain the status of the Nisei who have both Japanese and American citizenship. When you are in the United States you are an American Citizen, when you are in Japan, you are a Japanese subject. When you are in Japan as Japanese subjects, the American Government does not protect you, and when you are in America as American subjects the Japanese Government does not protect you or in this case the Spanish Government will not protect you. You cannot by saying so throw off your American Citizenship. You must do a specific act such as renouncing your citizenship. But you can do it in time of peace, but not in time of war. No American subject can throw off his citizenship.

QUESTION: Well, then why did the United States Government put American Citizen Nisei in the camp?

(2)

ANSWER: STATE DEPT. REP.: That was done for the security of the United States in time of war. If they think I am a dangerous person they would put me in the camp also.]

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QUESTION: They want to know whether, this is an important question, your Honor, did you come here under the order of the Army or by the request from the negotiating committee?

ANSWER: DE AMAT: Neither. I came by the order of the Spanish Ambassadors as I have said before. The two precedent visits that I made here before was upon the request of the residents of Tule Lake, but this time I am here at the order of the Spanish Embassy. From here I am going to Manzanar.

QUESTION: Please inform the Japanese government to take steps to that to give the Americans interned there the same status and same treatment as we are given here.

Crowd disbanded at 5:50 p.m.

Opler relates an incident not contained in the minutes, but does not give the source:

"Not recorded in these minutes is one incident which occurred during the meeting in the presence of both the Spanish Consul and the State Department Representative, the Hon. Mr. Deckerbach. The latter was making some suggestions in a speech intended to clarify the issues. He finally proposed that the old Negotiating Committee be abolished since it could no longer function, and that the people elect by vote a new committee. One evacuee present, engrossed in the talk and not too mindful of his surroundings, applauded loudly at these points which I dare say others present applauded inwardly; immediately, the goons present pointed to him, moved in their places menacingly, and yelled, "Let's get that guy!" The chairman restored order by reminding the goons of their surroundings, the respect due the officials, etc. At the conclusion of the meeting, the goons raced for their prey, walking all over benches and tables, and the man who thought with his hands earlier disappeared through a window near his seat. The officials present (State Department and Consul) witnessed the intimidation and attempt at violence, and could on the strength of this as well as the arrogant tone adopted by the Daihyo spokesmen, deduce the proper conclusions."¹

The meeting with the Spanish Consul and the Hon. Mr. Deckerbach was regarded as a rather futile gesture by the two informants who expressed themselves on the subject.

¹Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, 1943, p. 3.

Mr. Nakao said:

"The Spanish Consul said, 'I can't do anything except to report to the Japanese government how things stand.' He said, 'I'm here for the benefit of the Issei, the natives of Japan.' . . . The representative from the State Department who was here at that time, advised putting up Issei representatives."¹

Mr. Fujimoto said:

"Anybody was invited to the meeting with the Spanish Consul. It was open to the public. But the Army presided over the meetings. The Consul always had Captain Hartman sitting beside him. He couldn't say too much. All the answer the consul gave at that time - there wasn't anything definite said. They were all more or less suppositions and promises."²

[~~The interview which the Negotiating Committee had with the Spanish Consul was not more successful.~~ ^{Conference below} ~~Kuratomis gave the clearest account of this meeting:~~ ^{was equally un} ~~successful.~~ ^{account} ~~Kuratomis gave the clearest account of this meeting:~~ ^{reports, which follows:}]

"We spoke with the Spanish Consul on December 13th or 14th in the Administration building because the people in the colony requested that he see us. Colonel Austin and Lt. Forbes were present at this meeting. I believe there were nine of us (Negotiating Committee and Executive Board) present.

"The conversation was very interesting in that we asked Colonel Austin for the reason of our detention. His contention was that he thought we were trouble-makers and that was the reason he was keeping us locked up. We asked, 'Can the Army, just because the commandant thinks a portion of the people are trouble-makers, can he detain us?' He didn't make a very clear reply and had to think a long time.

"We also asked what was the evidence (for their apprehension and detention). He thought a long moment and said, 'We'll get the evidence while we keep you boys in the stockade.'³

~~It was~~ ^A ~~at this meeting,~~ ^{reports} ~~that Kato had repeatedly told the~~ ~~writer that Colonel Austin made the remark:~~ ^{el} "I think you are trouble-makers and there ^{fore} you are trouble-makers."⁴]

¹R. Hankey, Notes, March, 1944, p. 13.

²ibid., p. 41.

³ibid., Jan. 10, 1945, p. 2.

⁴ibid., Sept 15, 1944 p. 7.

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Army and Stockade Developments

When the appeal of the Spanish Consul that the Negotiating Committee resign failed, the Army began to pick up and intern the Block Representatives, the main body of the Daihyo Sha Kai. These attempted to go into hiding, but on December 17 five were picked up and on December 18, fifteen more.³ A census released by the Military shows that 216 persons were in the stockade in the latter part of January.⁴ Many more had been picked up and already released.

As the weeks passed rumors of dissention within the stockade began to trickle out, all of which were welcomed by the administration. In the latter part of December the Military Intelligence and the Internal Security informed one Assistant Project Director that a note from Kuratomi had been smuggled out of the stockade in a cigarette. The exact working of the message is not known, but according to Opler it

¹Notes, Mar., p. 13

²ibid., p. 41

³Oplers letter to Spicer, Dec. 10, p. 8.

⁴Census attached to Opler letter to Spicer, Feb. 2, 1944

been given for their imprisonment. In any case, this accumulation of grievances proved too great to take without protest and the strike was decided upon. Probably the best account of this strike came from a young man who had been made a Daihyo Sha representative in December. He was not one of the leaders and certainly was not a radical agitator. Later he accepted one of the most difficult positions in the center, that of an officer of the Co-operative after Hitomi's murder, and was extraordinarily successful. His account probably approaches more closely to the general sentiment of the stockade detainees at this time than does that of Mr. Kato which is quoted later.

"On December 24th I was picked up. I thought they would give me a hearing immediately. For three months we didn't have any kind of a hearing.

"During all that time there was nothing to do. There was no kind of enjoyment in the stockade. I read and played Mah Jong, etc. The whole thing would have been all right if they had given us individual hearings.

"During that time on one occasion the Army came into the stockade. Trouble arose because we didn't keep the stockade clean. The Lieutenant got mad and said he'd give us bread and water only. We said, 'If they're going to be unfair, we'll go on a hunger strike.' We drew up a petition and gave it to the Military Command. After three days the medical officer was supposed to check up at regular times but he merely walked through. We requested treatment for a boy who was very sick, but he didn't give any.

"The third day the Army surrounded the stockade. Then, all the inmates were forced to line up in the snow for three hours. They kicked and shoved at us."

(Here the informant showed the writer a large scar on his leg, which he stated had been made by a kick.)

"There were other cases like that. Some of the boys were forced to take food from the barracks to the trucks. They refused. They were kicked and beaten and made to work at the point of a gun. The barracks were cleared of all the food stuff in them and all the cigarettes. Right in front of all these people (detainees) the soldiers gave away the cigarettes to each other or threw them away.

"While they were searching through the barracks they took money, all kinds of valuables, wrist-watches, fountain pens. We requested these things but they were never given back to us.

"Anyhow, the hunger strike lasted six days and three meals. Finally they decided to abandon the hunger strike because of a split within the

stockade.

"Another thing, I requested the Army to give me the OK to run a motion picture in the stockade. The Army gave me permission, but I found out that Huycke refused to loan the motion picture projector. The projector doesn't belong to the CAS anyhow, it belongs to one of the other men. But Huycke refused, stating that we were jail birds or to that effect." 1/

The account of Mr. Kato, a member of the Negotiating Committee, follows:

called for two actions:

- (1) The calling of a general strike.
- (2) The transmission of orders to organize the female contingent, the wives and acquaintances of those incarcerated.¹

Whether this message reached the colonists is not known. If it or other messages were smuggled out, there is no indication that they called for any other action than maintaining the status quo.

The December Hunger Strike

[On December 31 the ^{stockade} internees began a hunger strike in protest against treatment by the Army. The Army's version of this strike was not made public. The most coherent account comes from Mr. Kato, a member of the Negotiating Committee. It appears that the precipitating cause was a disagreement between the officer in charge of the stockade and the internees in the matter of keeping the stockade clean. The officer held that the stockade was filthy and the internees retorted that they were given no cleaning materials. When some of the most aggressive Japanese complained, they were placed in a separate stockade and housed in tents. ~~(The writer knows these men personally and strongly suspects that the language they used to the Army was not conciliatory, to say the least.)~~

Thereupon, the internees in the main stockade refused to answer roll call.² The officer in charge put them on a bread and water diet and removed all foodstuffs and cigarettes. In Kato's words:

"Naturally, the people in the stockade got really burned up. They wanted to know the reason they were put in the stockade in the first place."

It should be kept in mind that many persons now in the stockade had had little or no connection with the Daihyo Sha and had never

¹Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, 1943, p. 7.

²R. R. Hanky, Notes, Sept 15, 1944 p. 7.

been given a reason for their imprisonment. In any case, this accumulation of grievances proved too great to take without protest and the strike was decided upon. Kato's account follows:

"We asked for brooms, buckets and mops and we couldn't get them; The sanitation was terrible. They wouldn't give us any disinfectant for the lavatory. How can we clean the barracks? We asked Lt. Shaner for them.

"On December 30 I really talked to the Army and gave them a piece of my mind. I said I didn't know the United States Army was like this. Lt. Shaner got burned up. He brought in 18 soldiers and told me to pack up. He put me in the bull-pen again (the tent stockade). Mr. Tsuda went also. He was the head of the mess division (in the stockade) and had complained about the food. All we had gotten to eat was carrots and rice for many days.

"When Mr. Tsuda and I were put in the bull-pen a lot of people in there wished us to be returned to stockade again. Mr. Mori tried to negotiate with Lt. Shaner. Shaner promised he would return us if they cleaned out the barracks and the yard. He gave them a broom and a bucket. They went ahead and cleaned the barracks and the yard the best they can. Then Mr. Mori went again to Shaner saying that they were clean. Shaner refused again.

"The people then said, 'In that case we won't go out for roll call.' Everybody refused to go out unless we were returned. Uchida wanted us released from the bull pen. The Army said he acted a little fresh and they brought him to the bull pen on December 31. He didn't even bring a blanket or a mattress so both of us had to sleep in one cot.

"Then Lt. Shaner stated that as a punishment (for not answering roll) everybody in the stockade will receive just bread and water. They brought in a truck and the Army took out all the foodstuffs and all the cigarettes. These foodstuffs had been collected and brought in by the residents as Christmas gifts and New Year's presents. Other things were stolen also, including money.

"Naturally, the people in the stockade got really burned up. They wanted to know the reason they were put in the stockade in the first place. To express their sincerity, they wanted to go on a hunger strike as a last resort."

Accordingly the internees wrote out the following document which was signed by 202 persons, almost everyone in the stockade:

As of supper, December 31, 1943

We the undersigned have solemnly vowed to undergo hunger strike until such time as everyone here in the Stockade is released back to the colony simultaneously and unconditionally! 1

1. R. Hartney, Notes, Sept. 15, 1944, p. 8

Kato continued, betraying another of the underlying causes for the strike:

"It was the only way of showing the people on the outside (in the camp) how much we were suffering. Most of them (internees) didn't know why they were put in. (Many persons did not know why they had been imprisoned. R. H.)²

"On January 2, I was questioned by the FBI regarding the hunger strike. The FBI asked me why we were on the hunger strike. I didn't know the facts because I was in the bull pen. When we saw they weren't eating, we didn't eat either."

(This is no doubt true, since the bull-pen was just across the road from the main stockade.)

"Thirty minutes later we were retransferred to the stockade again. On January 6 Mr. Tsuda conferred with Captain Hartman and on the same day we began to eat at 8:45 p.m.

The writer asked Kato why the strike had been continued after he, Uchida and Tsuda had been returned to the main stockade. He replied:

"They kept on the hunger strike because they wished to be released unconditionally."¹

What the representatives of the FBI told the Army which brought about the return of the three men to the main stockade is not known. The actual strike was ended as the result of a conference between Captain Hartman and Mr. Tsuda, who convinced the other internees that they should abandon it.

Several other internees gave their reasons for striking in less coherent fashion. They should be included here however, because the motives for the strike were no doubt a jumble of various grievances, heaped upon the basic desire to get out of the stockade:

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 15, 1944, pp. 7 - 8.

²ibid.

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called for two actions:

- (1) The calling of a general strike.
- (2) The transmission of orders to organize the female contingent, the wives and acquaintances of those incarcerated.¹

Whether this message reached the colonists is not known. If it or other messages were smuggled out, there is no indication that they called for any other action than maintaining the status quo.

On December 31 the internees began a hunger strike in protest against treatment by the Army. The Army's version of this strike was not made public. However, several internees explained and described the strike as follows:

"The reason why we went on a hunger strike was because the Army boys stole our shirts, gloves, fountain pens, and even garlic, while we stood out in the snow for about three hours. I think they took about \$1,000 worth, of course, this is a guess. So we took an aggressive stand and said that isn't it a shame for men of the Army, the most responsible men who are now backing America in this war, to steal people's things and doesn't it spoil the history of U. S. They took an immediate retaliatory step by food. They threw loaves of bread into the gate - giving an attitude that bread and water was good enough for us. This is the first time we had real unity within the stockade. All were very indignant, I think there isn't a single thing that cannot be fulfilled if one has a strong will and determination."

"The whole thing started just because we refused to appear for roll call.

"Chief reason, of course was because two men laughed during roll call. They weren't laughing at the officer calling the roll, but were laughing at some men who were loading cartons of tobacco, I think. These men happened to be of extra small stature and they were really a comical sight juggling with a piled stack of cartons in an attempt to load it. Well, just because these two laughed they were segregated into another tent. This happened on the 30th. We refused roll call unless these two were released. Thereupon, the Army took this bread-and-water-is-good-enough-for-you attitude. On the 31st, I think, Army men gave in and said that if we appear for roll call these two will be released and they were released but as we said before we were left out in the snow while the Army boys searched our entire barracks, and took many of our belongings. On the 31st these two returned but we still refused to go out for roll call. The Army said, "All right, we have plenty of soldiers." And they brought out some 300 soldiers so we had to go out for roll call. Our punishment continued to be bread and water."

¹ Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, p.7.

"As Japanese we couldn't just concede to the Army's mean attitude like this so we took the same stand. 'Let's not eat.'"¹

"Of course, prime motive of the hunger strike was one way of trying to clear up the incident in the center; they thought, because negotiations within the stockade, some were transferred to other tents just because they laughed or talked too much. We couldn't tell what was what. The strike continued for about a week, but it didn't affect any lives."²

Later it was rumored that the internees had taken fruit and vitamin pills into the stockade with them to fortify themselves in case of a hunger strike. A stockade internee when informed of this said:

Shimizu: Even during the hunger strike, I didn't know that some men ate food because I was just sleeping and barely living on water. I couldn't believe that people who weren't so young and people who were supposed to be responsible men did such a thing."³

A soldier gave an interesting but fragmentary account of an incident which preceded the hunger strike; taking place on December 30 or 31:

"One of the men in the stockade answered a soldier back, telling him, 'You wouldn't be so brave if you didn't have a gun. If you didn't have that gun I'd kill you.'⁴ The soldier told this boy to get over into the tent stockade, where, as the narrator said, 'It was colder than blazes.' 'And,' added the soldier, 'any of the rest of you who want to go with him just step forward.' All fifty or so Japanese standing about stepped forward. The two tents could not accomodate so many men. 'Get back there, you _____'s,' said the soldier."⁵

When the news of this hunger strike filtered out to the colony it caused great concern among the relatives and friends of those interned. The writer was not able to record any satisfactory attitudes from evacuees intimately concerned.

¹Report of the informal interview of the Responsible Men of Various Divisions with the detained stockade internees, Jan. 14, 1944, pp. 8,9.

²ibid., Dec. 13, 1943, p.3.

³ibid., Feb.5, 1944, p.4.

⁴The young man's words were repeated to me by Robertsons

⁵Notes, March, p. 43.

Evidently some of the unapprehended members of the Daihyo Sha Kai or staunch supporters did attempt to start a camp wide hunger strike in sympathy with the internees. How this was received by is frankly related by two informants, the former a strong Daihyo Sha Kai supporter.

"N":

Some of the fellows put in the stockade received rough treatment. So they said, 'We're going on a hunger strike.' That was January 1 or December 31. That leaked out. So the fellows still standing for status quo came around to each block in the morning and said, 'We are going on a hunger strike.' But at that time most of the block representatives had not been pulled in. (Perhaps about half were still free, 22 having been apprehended in mid-December. R. H.) They had a meeting and came back to each block and said, 'None of this is official.' So the hunger strike did not go into practice in the colony."¹

"I" said:

"Then also at that time they had a Second Negotiating Committee that wanted us to go on a hunger strike. That didn't last long. Everybody ignored it altogether. They sent people to the block representatives to try to influence the people. The blocks were to go on a hunger strike. The people ignored the Second Negotiating Committee."²

The hunger strike in the stockade was brought to a conclusion by Captain Hartman who called out one of the internees, Mr. Tsuda, and convinced him that the strike should end. Tsuda went back and talked the other internees into abandoning it.

As the period of deadlock drew on into six weeks the army began to find its position increasingly embarrassing. The colonists stubbornly refused to elect a new negotiating body. There was no indication that they would ever approach the Army in an attempt to settle the situation. Spicer described the position of the Army as follows:

¹ ibid., p. 13

² X's Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, 1944, p. 6.

A young nisei girl remarked that when this suggestion was made the people said:

"What would the bachelors do? What would the babies do?"¹

As the period of deadlock drew on into six weeks the Army began to find its position increasingly embarrassing. The colonists stubbornly refused even to consider the election of a new negotiating body. There was no indication that they would ever approach the Army in an attempt to settle the situation. Spicer described the position of the Army as follows:

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Aug. 24, 1944, p. 4.

*Hydrocephalus
cells*

"The army did not want it (control of camp), because their job was to fight war, they said. As soon as the Army had moved into the center it found it's shortcomings. The Army leaders found out that the M. P.'s were lacking in ability and training badly in coping with the situation like that. The Department of Justice refused to take it over because of legal technicalities. It was held that the center would be considered as an internment camp if the Department of Justice took it over. And the American citizens of Japanese ancestry could not be interned."¹

RISE OF THE COUNTER-DAIHYO SHA KAI GROUP - THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE *Part III*

Two factors were of the utmost importance in the development of the counter-Daihyo Sha Kai or the opposition group. These were the constant and unfailing encouragement given by the Administration and the Army and the fact that most of the Daihyo Sha leaders and block representatives had, by mid-December, been arrested and confined in the stockade. With the Negotiating Committee and its most ardent supporters out of the way, it was comparatively safe to proceed. Even so, the step took courage, for any opposition group was bound to be considered inu and bring abuse and possible assault upon itself.



The Advisory Council, the administrative body first contemplated in early October, represented the Administration in this delicate task. It had been loosely reorganized directly after the incident of November 4 and functioned first of all as an advisory council to Mr. Best. Opler says: "It was organized to keep Best on the beam, for me to get help in dealing with the Administration."² In the large turnover which took place among the appointed personnel after the incident, several members left and were eventually replaced by Robertson, Head of Operations, Black, Head of Community Management, Markhim, Reports Officer, and McNeil, Head of Community Enterprises.

¹X's Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, 1944, p. 6.

²Notes, Mar., p. 59.

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This body took over completely the task of reinstating rapport with the colonists. On December 11 they contacted the first group of Japanese, representatives from the Civic Organizations, a body on the WRA payroll whose duty it is to co-ordinate and facilitate relations between the block managers and the administration. Two former Tuleans, Mr. William Mayeda and Mr. Frank Furakawa and two newcomers, Mr. Shimada of Rohwer and Mr. Namekawa represented this group. These men gave their opinion of the incident and the Negotiating Committee, a view which agreed in all major points with that held by the Administration. Their account is freely transcribed from Opler's letter of December 20:

The recent trouble had arisen because the "Jerome faction", also called the Kai-Kuratomi clique, had come to Tule Lake organized. This clique was also supported by and under pressure from a strong arm bunch from Jerome and that the leadership clique carried out the orders of this group "below it." The colonists were supporting the interned members of the Daihyo Sha's ward representatives, for although many colonists disagreed with the methods of the Committee, they had elected and seven had been thrown in as 'specialists', among the latter being the President and the Vice-President." After November 4, as its members were picked up, the committee augmented itself. "They elected seven men and then put seven others in to watch them. The Committee was a minority representation from the start, but there was nothing to counteract them with. There were a lot of people from Tule Lake who didn't like to be left out of it, but when all the 'black sheep' came into this camp, we were made to understand we couldn't have self-government, and even the Planning Board which isn't

'government' anyway, was broken up". When asked why the colony did not take steps, the representatives of Civic Organization pointed out that terrorism was feared: "A lot of people would speak up during the day, but they have to sleep in the colony at night; it would be different if we didn't have to live there."¹

Oplers conclusions from this conference were:

- (1) The Committee (Daihyo Sha Kai) was a minority faction.
- (2) Though a minority they exercised control by virtue of the fact that they had been elected, regardless of the methods; people felt they must be responsible for those in the military compound. "It was the principle of the thing."
- (3) Besides this, terroristic groups were making use of the situation to prolong the incident.²

Some of the statements of this group are open to criticism.

*I don't trust
Furekaway
according
to Carter's
deception*

Discounting the unrepresentative character of the men giving the information, the statement that the Committee was "a minority representation with nothing to counteract them with" is a misrepresentation. Support of the Negotiating Committee was general.³ No evidence has been produced which shows that the Jerome group came already organized or that Kai and Kuratomi were dominated "from below." The unanimous strike, the large attendance at the funeral and the demonstration of November 1, showed the fact that the hiding leaders were not betrayed, the six months popular resistance to the acceptance of any other body of representatives, and the unmistakable public refusal to elect a new Representative Committee in May, 1944 creates a body of evidence impossible to ignore. The effects of the fear of terrorism are exaggerated. It is inconceivable that terrorists alone could be

¹Freely transcribed from Opler's letter, ibid, pp. 5,6.

²ibid., pp. 6,7.

³See pp. for confirmation by many informants.

161A-161D
 Very Good

The picture which these four Japanese presented to the Advisory Council is fundamentally correct although certain statements are open to criticism or should be enlarged upon. That Kai and Kuratomi came to Tule Lake with a group of supporters is almost certain. However, that this group was possessed of more than a very loose type of organization is very doubtful and that the trouble arose because of this "organized" group is quite false. These four anti-Daihyo Sha men were expressing a rationalization that became widespread among the camp residents later: that Kai and Kuratomi were responsible for the November difficulties and had forcibly led an unwilling misguided populace into misery and confusion. The history of the development of the trouble has shown that this explanation of the phenomenon is very superficial; had not Kai and Kuratomi stepped forward, someone else, very likely Mr. Takahashi, would have been pushed into the saddle by the tremendous force of public pressure for action and would have become the scape-goat.

The statement that "Kai and Kuratomi were dominated from below" requires some elucidation. The "strong-arm bunch" or rather, one of the strong-arm groups in camp certainly supported them and also exerted great pressure upon them. However, it was not a matter of the leadership clique taking orders from the "Group below" so much as the fact that the leaders had great difficulty controlling their "boys", as they are usually called, and keeping them in line. As an example, Kai and Kuratomi might be pictured as the inexperienced drivers of a poorly broken team: the horses did not turn their heads around and tell them what to do; instead, they pulled the reins loose and raced the drivers to destruction.

Good
 analogy

The explanation of the support of the Daihyo Sha is excellent although the remarks on the methods of selecting the committee are inaccurate. Indisputably the committee was a minority representation but the circumstances were such that counter-action on the part of any individual or group was utterly impossible. Support appeared general because ^{organization or the force of public opinion} no one dared to oppose the ~~leaders~~. "We have to sleep in the colony at night." This paradoxical situation, the appearance of strong support of a minority, coupled with a fear of non-conformity which is so great that it cannot be appreciated unless a person has lived in a camp at a time like this is very difficult to ^{appreciate} understand. The four Japanese apparently impressed the Administration with a picture of a helpless populace scared to death by a small group of terrorists, a concept which the Administration was very eager to accept since it justified many of their actions. However, this shows only a part of the sociological situation. The people, or a large segment of the population, not the "minority leaders", set up the standards of behavior. The basic motivations of the standards are seldom verbalized. Fundamentally, they are an emotional and unreasoning hatred of the Administration, a powerful sense of group persecution and the accompanying notion that the Japanese should stick together against the appointed personnel; when to these prevailing camp attitudes a situation of almost pathological excitement, such as that which existed in late October and November of 1943 is added, the idea of open opposition to the leaders who have initiated action against the despised Administration, or of withdrawing support from them when they have been arrested, is almost inconceivable. People in such a state of mind are easily regimented. The

How true

leaders may not have represented the will of the people, their actions may have been motivated by a selfish desire for personal prestige. Still, to state these facts openly or worse yet, to go and tell the Administration ^{would be} a traitorous offense of the first magnitude. The punishment of being branded as inu (stool-pigeon) during a period of such tension would be risked only by men of tremendous courage or tremendous callousness. Although the example is by no means identical, the reader may increase his understanding of the situation by imagining himself in an internment camp in Japan and picture himself as betraying a "minority group" of fellow American internees, "agitating" leaders, to the Japanese authorities. It is this situation, pictured very inadequately here, which caused the "terrorism" in Tule Lake during this period. That some people feared the violence of the "tough-boys" is true. But infinitely greater was the fear of becoming known as a dog. It was only when this tension had greatly decreased, that criticism, which many people had felt but which they had not dared to express, began to be heard. Then, it not infrequently took the form of denying any sympathy with or even knowledge of the aims of the Daihyo Sha Kai, the informant conveniently forgetting his state of mind in late October. Even Mr. Furakawa, who was one of the men who worked with the Advisory Committee at this time, admitted to the writer that in October he and the other block managers felt the same way as the Daihyo Sha in the "improvement of food and maintenance." They looked forward to improvements. Like me - I'd rather eat something better than beans if I could get it."¹

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 8, 1945, p. 1.

why
apologize?

Correct

With these intelligent, conservative men, members of the vested employment interests, who now felt it safe to criticize and denounce the Daihyo Sha,

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responsible for the stubborn six months support of the Negotiating Committee.

The Administration's willingness to believe these men is understandable, since their statements, if correct, justified the policy followed during October and November. Moreover, with this anti-Daihyo Sha Kai group, represented by these men and by the heads of the Co-operative, lay the Administration's most obvious hope of breaking the status quo, and bringing about colony organization and a return to normal conditions which, it was hoped, would be followed by the withdrawal of the irksome Army rule.

After the Co-operative's successful defiance of the Daihyo Sha Kai, meetings between small groups of Japanese and the Advisory Council were held almost daily. Ways and means of breaking the deadlock were discussed. Most prominent among the Japanese were Messrs. Shimada, Namekawa, Furakawa, Mayeda and Naydo of the Civic Organizations, and Akitsuki, Yamatani, Ikemoto and Hitomi of the Co-operative Enterprises; Kawaii of Housing and Takahashi, the prominent member of the Daihyo Sha also took an active part. The Administration, anxious to break the deadlock, made the very most of these contacts. Meanwhile, the army continued to arrest people, "much to the satisfaction of the opposition groups."¹

Some of the individuals named above volunteered the names of people whom they labeled as trouble makers. The Administration and the Army looked upon it as a hopeful sign that the colonists were beginning to be willing to transmit information to the officials. However, as was later to be proved all too clearly, these men were not typical of the large number of colonists. Dr. Opler and Captain Hartman's

¹Community Analyst's Letter, Dec. 29, 1943, p. 4.

interpretation was stated as follows:

"These names, furnished by more than one group without solicitation, indicates that the colonists are beginning to get certain people's numbers and are in the mood to transmit that information both from group to group in the colony, and more significantly to Caucasian officialdom. The Army Intelligence Officer, Capt. Hartman, reports the same tendency for people in the colony to point the finger, which he says, 'is most unusual for Japanese, who detest informers and suspect officials.' Thus the village is moving ahead to a breaking of the deadlock imposed by the Daihyo Shas by pointing the finger at particular individuals."¹

Simultaneously the Co-op and the Civic Organizations are said to have supported the organization of a counter goon-squad, which Opler describes as a strong arm opposition group of about 500 young men "supported by the more moderate and thoughtful elements in the Center." These young men planned to go in a body to the headquarters of the Negotiating Committee and request that the remaining members of the Negotiating Committee and the Daihyo Sha Kai resign.² The writer is strongly inclined to view these statements as braggadocio. Certain young men perhaps enjoyed visualizing themselves in this dramatic activity, but it is most unlikely that they had any serious intentions of carrying out their threats.

There is a startling difference between the opinion of Dr. Opler on these men who contacted the Administration and the opinions of the majority of evacuee informants during this period. The attitude which seems particularly attractive to Dr. Opler, i. e., that these men felt that Tule Lake was not really the place for them, would damn them with the ordinary colonist. "Tule Lake," said most residents, "is no place for people who feel like that."

Opler states:

"Mr. Mayeda is here simply because his parents appealed to him to remain with them because their other son had 'forsaken them.'

libid.

²Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, pp. 4, 5.

Since that time, they have finally come around to agreement that Tule Lake is no place for him. Mr. Furakawa is also here simply because of family reasons; as the father of five young children, and the sole support of aged parents, he feels he cannot go elsewhere and relocate; his father intends to die in Japan. Mr. Shimada likewise seems to have regrets about

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¹libid.

²Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, pp. 4,5.

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coming to Tule Lake; he was made a block representative in the Negotiating Committee; he resigned because he thought the methods of the group were undemocratic and their goals open to suspicion whereupon the block read in the washroom a number of charges against him, including the familiar one of inu.¹

Takahashi has the respect of the Co-op, Civic Org. and the opposition groups and has in the past, opposed the Kai-Kuratomi, or dominant clique, within the Kaihyos. He is uniformly described as a man of good education, courage, and excellent reputation throughout the colony who was brought into the Daihyo's organization to lend his prestige; he opposed the Kai faction throughout though without effect, but did not resign like Yamatani and Shimada.²

This description should be given careful attention, for it was men with this background who formed the nucleus and much of the body of the opposition group. The Civic Organizations group, the Divisional Responsible Men, and the officers of the Co-operative were, for the most part, old residents of Tule Lake. In a sense they represented vested groups. Their positions implied considerable prestige. Before segregation they had been in the habit of cooperating with the Administration, and, as Opler points out, some of them were undecided as to whether they ought to remain in Tule Lake. In point of view, background, and in anticipation of the future, no greater contrast to men like Kai, Kuratomi and the nucleus of the Daihyo Sha Kai could have been found.

Evacuee informants, whether they are pro-Daihyo Sha, anti-Daihyo Sha, or neutral, have nothing but contempt for these men. The mention of their names provokes sneers, knowing smiles, and uncomplimentary remarks. Two informants began to discuss certain of them in the middle of a verbatim statement:

¹ibid., Dec. 10, p.4.

²ibid., Dec. 29, p. 5.

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Mr. Kurihara, never a supporter of the Kaihyo Sha Kai or a gossip said of Yamatani:

"My profession is public accountant. I nearly sent Yamatani to jail for defrauding the company of \$40,000.00.¹

"N", a somewhat pro-Daihyo Sha told the following story of Mr. Yamatani:

May Japanese have suffered financially as a result

"Y amatani, why when I was a kid in Terminal Island we had a Japanese Co-operative Fish Cannery. He was a member of this cannery, a share holder. He broke it up into bankruptcy. Then he came back to Santa Maria Valley, he and Miyake and Kono. They had a farm together and filed bankruptcy again. A guy like that shouldn't be a buyer for a fish market or anything."²

About Takahashi, "N" had the following tale. Two other informants have told the same story in less detail.

This is what I've heard. After the Negotiating Committee a certain man, let's call him X (Bill later gave me his name), wrote out a petition in English, stating that these nine people were not legally elected. He sent this to blocks 16 and 17 and said to please sign this paper. He was turned down very harshly. If you work for the project here, you'd find he's the key man. He's standing pretty high now, and has the confidence of the Administration.³

"Y", a kibe, remarked while discussing why Takahashi was not beaten for his activities:

"He's an old man and is going to die soon anyway."⁴

So widely and cordially are these men despised that it is most improbable that they ever represented a significant element in the colony. The attitudes of strong Daihyo Sha supporters have not been quoted or considered in drawing these conclusions. On December 23, the Co-op and the Civic Organizations mimeographed and circulated widely through the colony the minutes of the meeting with the Spanish

¹Notes, Mar., p. 15

²ibid., p. 12.

³ibid.

⁴Notes, May 22, p. 1.

Although these men were hated and despised with fury by a large proportion of the colonists, it should be pointed out that odd as it may seem, many of these views were shared by the people who denounced them. They were in the extremely peculiar position of attempting to improve the very miserable condition of the center, when most of the people wished for relief but were not willing to pay the price of relief. For this philanthropy they received no gratitude. Most of the residents at this time were probably to be found between the two extreme points of view - the radical Daihyo Sha on the one hand and the ultra-conservative Co-op and Civic Organizations in the other. However, to gain relief from the oppressive discomfort of Army rule by approaching the WRA in a conciliatory matter was a method which the great majority of the people was not yet emotionally ready to stomach. Once the deed was accomplished, most were ready to take advantage of the improved situation. Yet, for leading the movement which was looked upon as a surrender, these men were never forgiven.

Although there were some men of evil repute in this "Quisling Group," the writer is convinced that the intentions of most of them were sincere, that they had justified their action to themselves, and that they probably had the eventual good of the people at more closely at heart than the leaders of the Daihyo Sha. Moreover, most of them had no intention of assisting the WRA or the Army. They wished to relieve the plight of their fellow Japanese. That they were regarded as collaborationists was almost inevitable, but it was for the most part an injustice. Mr. Furakawa expressed himself to the writer as follows: (The Co-ordinating Committee, of which he speaks, was the organization which eventually was

appointed to lead the "back to normalcy" movement and consequently bore the chief brunt of public opprobrium.)

"When the back to work movement started, we told the colonel that we don't want anything to do with the Administration or the Army. [During those dark moments of camp life many people with children, they had no shoes, no money, no clothing. Some of the children were beginning to go barefooted. The camp condition was critical.]

"Seeing things like that, the Co-ordinating Committee was organized. We were doing something for the people. That wasn't a thing like the other organization (Daihyo Sha).

"The motive of the Co-ordinating Committee - realizing the unfortunate status of the people - there was only one way to bring the people back to normal condition: to put them back to work. The Co-ordinating Committee at the beginning was all the thing beared on. When (they) stepped into the picture, they put their lives at stake.

(The last statement above is scarcely an exaggeration.)

"You see, we had very little support when we started that thing. Although the Co-ordinating Committee was supported by all the working people, that is a very little percentage of the people in this center. And even so, all the working people were not supporting the Co-ordinating Committee."¹

On December 23, the Co-op and the Civic Organizations mimeographed and circulated widely through the camp the minutes of the meeting with the Spanish

¹ibid., Jan. 8, 1945, p. 3.

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Consul, a gesture intended to discredit the Daihyo Sha Kai. Opler states:

"Both groups (Co-op and Civic Org.) agreed that the following statement of the State Department representative would further discredit the Daihyo Shas, since some people in the colony wished to go back to Japan as soon as feasible: "The dispute of the Tule Lake Camp will definitely hold up this exchange of nationals."¹

The writer noted no evidence that the dissemination of these minutes played a part in discrediting the Daihyo Sha.

The first opposition group meeting for which minutes are available was a meeting of the Divisional Responsible Men of those divisions still functioning under the status quo held on January 7. Representatives from the Packing Shed, the Coal Crew, Maintenance, Time Keeping, Payroll and Accounting, Placement, Co-operative, Civic Organizations, Housing, Clothing Unit, Hospital, Construction, Mess Management, Warehouse, and the Garage attended. Colonel Austin, Lieutenant Forbes, Mr. Best and Mr. Huycke attended. Colonel Austin made an address in which he said in part:

"The Army is interested, as you people are, in this colony returning to a normal condition. The Majority of the people are interested in a peaceful orderly existence. You people are in a position to take some responsibility in this regard, inasmuch as you know and have been working on the various jobs."

"Obviously after a period such as you have gone through, we must not start full speed. You have to build up gradually. I think you realize this and must bear this in mind in your discussion today."²

Byron Akitsuke, who was serving as secretary to the Co-op at this time, was elected chairman. He then addressed the assemblage stating that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the existing situation. 16,600 colonists had suffered because of the political

¹Community Analyst's Letter, Dec. 29, 1943, p. 4.

²Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake WRA Project, Jan. 7, 1944, p. 1.

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conflicts neglect and blindness of a minority. This meeting had been called to find a solution to the present unhappy situation.

Mr. Shimada then spoke, explaining that he had gotten permission from Colonel Austin to meet with the Daihyo Sha Kai on January 5. However, at the appointed time, Mr. Kozura of the Daihyo Sha did not appear giving illness as his excuse and Mr. Kataoka acting in his behalf stated that without a responsible person to conduct the meeting they could not very well proceed. Said Mr. Shimoda:

"In my opinion we certainly cannot rely on these Daihyo Shas. Even the Administration and the Army authorities feel the same. Colonel Austin therefore pointed out that various division heads should be the only source whereby solution can be attained."¹ Mr. Kozuma heard of the formation and intentions of the "goon squad" described on p. 161 and decided that discretion was the better part valor.

Mr. Naido then suggested that a resolution for returning to work be prepared, that a responsible political group be selected which would put this resolution to a vote; "abandon the existence of the Daihyo Shas; and finally foster the true Japanese spirit and base all our future ideas as a gentlemanly Japanese should."² Mr. Hitomi supported Naido's suggestion saying "A few beatings may result but such must be expected and prepared for." Mr. Namekawa moved that the question be put to a formal vote "and he motioned that the Daihyo Sha's 'Maintenance of status quo' be abandoned and workers accordingly return to their respective jobs. The motion was unanimously carried . . . Mr. Shimada suggested that Mr. Naido's motion be carried out as follows: the various divisions should meet and decide whether to accept or reject the resolution; the result should then be announced to the colonists; the resolution would then be put to a secret vote

¹ ibid., p..

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in each block. The minutes do not state whether this suggestion was voted upon, but it was followed explicitly the following week. Two days later the Divisional Heads met again. Byron Akitusuki was again appointed chairman by general consent. Yamatani and Shimada were appointed his advisors. The results of the vote cast by the separate divisions on the proposed resolution was announced. The vote was decidedly in favor of returning to work. Whether it was necessary to take the referendum vote proposed by Mr. Shimada at the first meeting was now discussed at length. Opinions expressed are interesting.

T. Ikemoto: It is not necessary to take a referendum vote. People who are not working would naturally oppose it.

M. Shimada: Returning to work is the first step in restoring normal conditions; however, the question is whether to leave the camp in this abnormal condition or take the initiative step in an attempt to restore it, which should absolutely be on the basis of public opinions and finally their votes.

J. Nakao: It is necessary. We certainly need the support of the colonists.

Idamoto: I favor Mr. Ikemoto's suggestion. If the referendum should result unfavorably, it will mean a lot to those who want to return to work.

R. Kondo: Whether to return to work is a question for the workers to decide. It is unnecessary to refer such to the colonists.

J. Naido: ". . . I think it is our duty to have referendum vote. Otherwise the last meeting would be altogether meaningless."¹

The matter was put to a vote and resulted in 40 affirmative votes and two neutral. Kawaii then moved that a committee of seven be elected to prepare and make plans for the talking of the referendum. The following nominations were made in order: Shimada, Akitsuki, Naido, Nakao, Okamoto, Yamatani and Namekawa. Mr. Kawaii promised to obtain 1608 - A as temporary headquarters for this committee.

¹pp. 2,3.

Having decided on a referendum vote, the Divisional Heads and their committee named above, realized that if their plan was to be at all successful they must work so fast that the remnants of the Daihyo Sha would not have time to organize any opposition. Accordingly on the morning of January 10 the section formen and one unnamed Caucasian met and prepared a working program to follow up the referendum results even though the referendum had not yet been held. The Employment Office was moved back to the Colony, and a back to work program planned on the basis of obtaining a nuclear staff of key workers. It was decided to employ Japanese secretarial workers in those of the Administrative offices where financial and confidential records were not kept; a security check, with the Army and Internal Security, was added to the ordinary recruitment procedure; the possibility of opening the schools and sharing the school buildings with the Kokumin Gakko, the Japanese school, was discussed.

The referendum vote was scheduled for the evening of January 11. That morning the camp was deluged with mimeographed propaganda which was prepared by the Divisional Heads' committee. In this material, which is included below in toto, the Daihyo Sha Kai is accused of failure, and of bringing misery upon the people. Most important of all the committee commits itself to an equitable distribution of future employment, and, in somewhat ambiguous phrases to a release of the detained internees. Both commitments are very significant, the latter in particular. The former was carried out incompletely and the latter not at all. This failure, more than any other single factor, brought about the eventual downfall of this anti-Daihyo Sha. The camp population had been led to expect action in releasing the detainees and when nothing was done, the precarious prestige of the opposition group evaporated rapidly.

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RESOLUTION

January 7, 1944

- WHEREAS, a normal condition was previously existing in this colony;
- WHEREAS, Dai-hyo Sha came into being with a purpose of bettering the conditions in this colony;
- WHEREAS, although the purpose of the Dai-hyo Shas was worthy of being respected, the ways and means by which it has presented the demands were not in accord with accepted standard of conduct as pursued by a normal and peaceful society;
- WHEREAS, this Center was subsequently placed under the control of the Army;
- WHEREAS, as a result the colonists have been subject to suffer from abnormal conditions in which a curfew is restricting the free movement of people, no organized recreational facilities are available, and many people are left unemployed;
- WHEREAS, the Authority with which Dai-hyo Shas should logically negotiate has officially announced that it no longer recognize the Dai-hyo Shas as the representatives of this colonists;
- WHEREAS, although the Dai-hyo Shas has utterly failed in their negotiation, it has not attempted to dissolve itself, but rather it has adopted the policy of maintaining the so-called status quo;
- WHEREAS, there were among the colonists who were gravely concerned about the future of the colonists;
- WHEREAS, on January 5, 1944, Dai-hyo Sha has called the meeting, with permission of the Army. Many division and section evacuees heads were formally invited to this meeting by the Dai-hyo Shas. Some 200 persons were present at this meeting, however, the meeting was dissolved without accomplishing any purpose because the one party responsible for the meeting failed to be present. The evacuee division and section heads were in attendance to witness an amicable solution by the Dai-hyo Shas of the present existing condition.
- WHEREAS, under the circumstance, we have no other desire than to exist as a true Japanese and to return to Japan unashamed;
- WHEREAS, the evacuee division and section heads have concluded that the Dai-hyo Shas are no longer in a position to bring back normal condition to the colony which is sincerely desired by the great majority of the colonists;
- THEREFORE WE RESOLVE THAT as a vital preliminary measure in liquidating this so-called status quo as maintained by the Dai-hyo Sha and in order to bring forth normal condition to this colony in the very immediate future, every colonists, a respectful and peace-loving resident, should return to the work immediately;

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NOW, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED on this 7th day of January, 1944 by all present that as an initial step, each evacuee division and section heads will confer on this matter to the colonists concerned in each division and section at meetings to be held at various places on January 8, 1944, from 1:30 p.m.

Signed

EVACUEE DIVISIONAL AND
SECTIONAL HEADS

WHAT IS THIS SO-CALLED "STATUS QUO"

Immediately after the incident of November 4, 1943, the Army took control of this Center.

The authority with which the Dai-hyo Sha should logically negotiate has officially announced that they no longer recognize the Dai-hyo Sha as the representative of the colonists. In the meanwhile, several members of the Dai-hyo Sha were detained by the Army.

It became evident that the Dai-hyo Sha has utterly failed in their negotiation.

During the course of the situation, a notice urging the colonists to undergo a hunger strike was issued under the name of the "Second Negotiation Committee". The Dai-hyo Sha of Ward 7 acting upon this notice had its meeting. They concluded that the hunger strike was an unwise act. Thereupon they decided to maintain "status quo until the arrival of the Spanish Consul to this Center. They proposed this at the next meeting of the Dai-hyo Sha where it was formally accepted as its policy. This was the inception of this so-called "status quo".

Upon the arrival of the Spanish Consul, an attempt for negotiation was made; but again the Dai-hyo Sha failed in their purpose. However, they continued to maintain "status quo".

In spite of the fact that they have conclusively failed in their principal and initial purpose of bettering the condition of the Center, they have not endeavored in the release of already detained, but they were wholly unable to check the increasing number of persons being detained each day.

The great number of residents have come to believe as a fact that the so-called status quo as adopted by the Dai-hyo Sha is no longer effective in bringing the hope of every colonists --- the betterment of our livelihood -- and it is certainly not even possible to bring back normality to this Center.

[At present increasing number of families are suffering economically and they are requesting for relief through the Social Welfare department and the Spanish Consulate. C'est damage! Every colonist in this Center

has no other desire than to exist as a true Japanese.

Every colonist in this Center should keep in one's mind that such a self-imposed suffering in itself does not reflect upon one's loyalty to his country.

At the present time, the Dai-hyo Sha is existing in name only. It has utterly failed to accomplish its aim.

By "status quo", the Dai-hyo Sha, itself, defeated its fundamental purpose! ! !

FACTS ABOUT THE DAI-HYO-SHA

The whole colony is very anxious to know what position the Dai-hyo Sha are assuming after they were arrested by the Army. The following statement is the real facts of their status quo:

(1) The Dai-hyo Sha commenced the negotiation of improvement in Center life. However, at the present time, the Dai-hyo Sha have now come to doubt whether or not their capacity as colonists' representatives is still existing. As a result, majority of Dai-hyo Sha have denied their capacity and tendered resignations.

(2) The colonists who were disillusioned and tired of maintaining so called "Status Quo", attended the general meeting of Dai-hyo Sha of January 5, 1944, with great expectation. There were nearly 200 attendants at the meeting, including Dai-hyo Sha and the responsible head of all divisions and sections. However, despite their expectation, the meeting was indefinitely postponed without any object accomplished for a simple reason that only one responsible man was not present at the occasion. Moreover, that person (absentee at that time) was arrested shortly after, and the possibility of holding another meeting is gone forever. The sentiment of the colonists has grown even more miserable.

(3) The Dai-hyo Sha are not negotiating with the Army to release those people detained. Nor are they pushing forward the proposals that they previously rendered. As a consequence, 16,000 colonists have been driven into a more inconvenient and sadder condition.

(4) The group of division heads and section heads made a visit, after they held their meeting, with the Dai-hyo Sha in order to have their resolution approved. Notwithstanding, they could not find any party who would speak with responsibility. The Dai-hyo Sha did not seem to exist any longer.

(5) In spite of the fact that the function of the Dai-hyo Sha has ceased to exist since its executive staff was arrested, the Dai-hyo Sha have not only held on to their position, but still are disturbing the security and order of the 16,000 colonists, under mere nominal existence, and are thus evading their responsibilities. This is quite contrary to the real Japanese spirit.

THE MOTIVE AND COURSE OF EVENTS
OF THE MEETING OF
DIVISION AND SECTION HEADS

The other day a few young men, who believed that the abnormal policy of maintaining so-called status quo was disturbing the welfare of the colonists, applied for work to the Army. Mr. Smith, Head of the Receiving Warehouse, informed the ex-employees of this fact, and urged them to come back to work, lest they be replaced.

The ex-employees who had been worried over their jobs in the future, thought that the policy of maintaining status quo was now ceasing to exist and that the policy was not thorough-going anyway.

Thereupon, a meeting was called by Division Heads and Section Heads, January 6, 1944, at 708, and was attended by those people who were responsible for Construction, Receiving Warehouse, Mess Management, Clothing Unit, Maintenance, Administrative Management, and Coal Crew. The question of whether they should go back to work or not was lengthily and carefully discussed, and as a result, the group came to the conclusion that they should go back to work as the only means to return the center to normalcy. Votes were taken on the resumption of work, and the result was 32 affirmatives against 1 negative, and 7 abstentions.

Furthermore, they found it necessary to hold the general meeting of all ex-employees at 1:00 p.m., January 8, at the High School Auditorium in order to hear their opinions.

Then, the group decided to consult the negotiation committee, and went over to Mr. Kozuma's apartment, but Mr. Kozuma had been picked up, and Mr. Kataoka had resigned. Consequently, the group had to hold another general meeting of ex-employees and appealed to the Army for the permission to use the High School Auditorium for the occasion.

RESOLUTION

[BE IT RESOLVED THAT, as a vital preliminary measure in liquidating this so-called status quo as maintained by the Dai-hyo Sha and in order to bring forth normal condition to this colony in the very immediate future, every colonists, respectful and peace-loving residents, should return to work immediately.]

FURTHER, BE IT RESOLVED THAT, as an initial step, each evacuees division and section heads will confer on this matter to the colonists concerned in each division and section at meetings to be held at various places on January 8, 1944, from 1:30 p.m.

The above resolution was put into effect by holding the meeting at the stipulated time and place. Secret votes were taken after full discussion on whether they would resume their work or not, and the result was as follows:

DIVISION	YES	NO	BLANK
Construction	104	26	0
Packing Shed	106	34	0
Coal Crew	Unanimously yes		
Maintenance	Referendum preferred (Working)		
Co-op	Working		
Civic Organization	85	21	
Transportation & Supply	Refused to vote		
Mess Management			
Mess Warehouse	63	23	5
Mess Workers	Referendum preferred (Working)		
Ad. Mgmt. (Timekeeper, Payroll, Placement, Whse, Property Control, Evacuee Property)	144	29	17 (8 yes with condition)
Housing, Warden, Clothing, Recreation, Social Welfare, Comm. Mgmt., Education.	135	23	1
Hospital	Working		
Furniture Industry	11	11	

Now that the intention of the ex-employees was made clear by the majority of affirmative votes, the division and section heads resolved at the meeting held the very next day, to present this resolution to all the colonists, and by secret ballots, determine the acceptance of the resolution by the center.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF FUTURE EMPLOYMENT

(1) [It is our duty to materialize an equitable distribution of employment because it is the principal source of income for most of the colonists residing in this center. After restoring this center back to normal condition, a plan can be worked out in which there will be employment possibility for the greatest number of residents.]

RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITION WILL AID IN THE RELEASE OF THE DETAINED PERSONS

[The return of the colony to normal condition will create a favorable atmosphere where the justifiable release of detained colonists will become a greater possibility.]

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It is an unwise contention that if the status quo is liquidated, the persons detained will be deemed as guilty. If the status quo is maintained, there will be no possibility whatsoever for negotiation for the release with either the WRA or the Army. Not only that, but also it has become evident that the longer the status quo is maintained, the more colonists would be looking out of the stockade.

CONCLUSION:

We believe that the true picture of the present condition of this center has been presented by these reports. We, the residents of this center are in a position to regain future amicable settlements only by restoring immediately a normal and pleasant condition in this center. We believe that it is to the best interests of every colonist to restore this center to order, study and plan our post-war life in the various fields.

COLONISTS! Think of the future! Let us understand and realize the big issue we are now facing.

Do you want a liveable and a pleasant colony or do you still want an uncomfortable and miserable center?

With a deep sense of responsibility, let us vote carefully
and certainly wisely!!!

LET'S VOTE: "AGAINST STATUS QUO":

The election was held by secret ballot, with soldiers present. Soldiers also assisted in the vote counting, which was regarded with suspicion by some evacuees.

The following interesting comments were made by members of the opposition group, in the Civic Organization's office, the night the returns began to come in. Colonel Austin was present.

The vote from Block 11 was decidedly favorable (against the status quo). Said Mr. Furakawa, "Why that was the headquarters of that bunch of blank-blanks! (Remnant of Daihyo Sha Kai) Maybe we ought to have them open up an office in every block. Then others would get a real taste of those guys."

When the vote was announced for Ward VI, it showed most blocks defeating the proposal. Statements like the following were made to Colonel Austin:

"We're going to need a lot more fences around here."
"They voted against food too. How about a hunger strike for those guys."
"No coal for that block."

Austin said, "Let's give them weiners for a week." Someone answered, "Say, wait a minute -- that's food! real food! How about salt herring only? Flat stinking fishes?" Said Furukawa, "I say don't give them any food. They don't need it!"¹

The official report on this election was:²

Total number of ballots --	8941
Total No. of ballots AGAINST STATUS QUO --	4593
Total No. of ballots FOR STATUS QUO --	4120
Plurality -----	473
Blank ballots -----	228
Valid ballots -----	8713

The pro-Daihyo Sha remnant immediately attacked this result and distributed the following "report" of which one sheet written in Japanese

¹Community Analyst's Letter, Jan. 12, 1944, p. 4.

²ibid., Jan. 14, 1944, p. 3.

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fell into the hands of the administration.

"Report of Present Condition"
by
Nippon Patriotic Society

"The results of the referendum votes taken by force on January 11, 1944, after due investigation, is as follows:

31 blocks for status quo
29 blocks against status quo
4 blocks not clear
1 block refused to vote

"Ballots carried away by the Army, without even opening was the reason. One block refused to vote as they decided it was not necessary. Total was 64 blocks which voted.

"Do you intend to support such a word and action to liquidate the status quo by betraying the Daihyo Sha, whom we, the whole colonists, elected? Do you recognize or consider this referendum taken without freedom of speech legal?

"Colonists: Do you intend to work from your own selfishness for a bait offered with false reports published by this so-called 'gogs'? Will you take action when you know it's dishonorable and accept their offer?

"We hereby submit to your cool and sane judgement on this matter."

"Nippon Patriotic Society"¹

This paper does not appear to have made much impression on the people. Very few informants accuse the Administration or the Army of perpetrating a deliberate hoax. Most admit that the people were discouraged and impressed with the futility of carrying on the status quo. A few state that the people were frightened by the presence of the army at the polls and voted against status quo because they feared that their ballot might be examined.

The Administration chose to regard this shallow victory, a majority of 2.7% of the ballots cast, as a sign of the withdrawal of public support from the Daihyo Sha Kai. The small majority was explained by pressure, threats, and misunderstanding.² Japanese Informants, however, give a different explanation. Many people were

¹ibid., p. 8.

²ibid., p. 4.

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becoming tired of the inconveniences and hardships of the status quo, which appeared to be accomplishing nothing. Inconvenience and hardship outweighed loyalty to the Representatives by a small margin.

"The main reason (status quo broke) was not because they didn't want to stick with the Negotiating Committee but -- one of the main reasons was lack of finance. Another reason is they didn't want to loaf along doing nothing. Time lags so monotonous. . . . If we were a bunch of Japanese soldiers quartered here, that is a different thing. But these are women and children and civilians.

"When the vote was taken here the status quo lost by 400 votes. That shows that the people who are favoring status quo are greater in number. Because many who favored status quo did not vote. They thought it was the way to go to the stockade. A lot of people thought they might be pulled in. They had a soldier by the vote box."¹

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"This referendum vote -- the army more or less called that one. They were supposed to have united the people for the psychological moment to spring that question; whether they wanted to discard the status quo or continue. To help out, the bunch who wanted to discard the status quo kept pulling the people right and left. They said that anybody who was inciting the Japanese to continue the status quo strike, and that more or less damned a large majority, were only hurting themselves."

"Anyway, people got wise that the longer they maintained the status quo they were going to yank them and stick them in the stockade.

"Besides their finances were petering out. Here - they're still paying off on the October checks. (This statement made in February). Now these fellows who were not working got no clothing allowance, no welfare, no income."

"Another point of view: the people here are supposed to be loyal to Japan now. Here's an argument some of the bright boys advanced. They said, in returning to normalcy we'll be drawing salaries. Then on top of that the government will have to pay us clothing allowance. That's just that much less money that the U. S. government is going to have to manufacture armaments to beat Japan.

"I couldn't see it. I know myself that regardless if the Japanese draw this monthly stipend, they'd not make much difference to the U. S. treasury. But it sounds good on the surface and it swayed some of the stubborn people.

¹From *K. a neutral*, Notes, Mar., p. 50

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"Two soldiers were present. . . . The soldiers with one Japanese present counted and tallied the votes.¹

"You'd be surprised how many people voted for status quo. They were still gluttonous for punishment, or they had voted for it in the beginning. It was my opinion that status quo wouldn't accomplish a darn thing but would only increase the peoples' sufferings. You can't have status quo and expect things to improve.¹

"The first status quo (vote) proved the situation at that time. The difference was so small, that proved that the residents were against the Administration. If they had been in favor of the Administration, the vote at that time would have been overwhelming."²

Two informants who voted for the status expressed themselves as follows:

Oda

"O" a conservative, block manager of a very pro-status quo block:

"I said 'No' because our block said No. I thought deep in my heart it was very silly to keep on in a situation like this. We might as well change the system and have a better way to run the camp. I didn't have an objection to that election. I thought we did not have the authority to run the camp. WRA has the power. We listen to what they say and obey the law. If we keep going forever, we're just sunk."³

Nishino

"N" a Daihyo Sha supporter:

"I voted for the status quo. I said, 'Since I signed that petition I couldn't ~~never~~ back up as a man."⁴

The Divisional Heads met the day after the election (Jan. 12) to plan the back to work movement. They decided not to circulate each block result, since in blocks where the status quo had lost, those who had voted for status quo might be criticized. It was thought wiser merely to tell the people that status quo had been defeated, 36 to 27.⁵

Takenuchi
¹From I, a Daihyo Sha sympathizer, but not supporter, Notes, Feb., p. 13, April, p. 31.

²Notes, May 21, p. 6. *Kunihara*

³ibid., April, p. 23.

⁴ibid., p. 22.

⁵Minutes of the Special meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake Center Jan. 12, 1944, p. 1.

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Reporting back to work "tomorrow" was conceded to be impossible, since many former evacuee positions were still filled by Caucasians who would require some notice of termination. The delicate and difficult position of the successful opposition who now had to take on the Negotiating Committee's task of dealing with the Administration is shown by the following section of the minutes:

"The Advisory Council . . . plans to hold a meeting probably today with all division chiefs, section heads, sub-section chiefs, or whoever is at the head, confer with the evacuee leader for that particular division, section, etc., as the case may be, about the steps to be taken for 'back-to-work' movement. There have been many changes in the administrative staff. Some of these heads may not be cooperative; their attitudes cannot be changed in two days. Administrative policy is to cooperate as much as possible with the colony. On the other hand, it must be understood that pressure down here would not be tactful on our part nor welcome to the Caucasian Staff."¹

It was also decided to publish the true facts about the hunger strike in the stockade, and relieve the peoples' minds. (Incidentally, the Division Heads themselves, did not know these facts when this decision was made.)

It was moved by Mr. Kondo, seconded by Mr. Shimada and carried unanimously that the Committee of Seven, be officially recognized by the Administration and the Army, and serve as the chief representative body, to dissolve as soon as normalcy returned to the center. These were the seven men elected January 9 to make plans for the referendum: Shimada, Naydo, Namekawa, Yamatani, Okamoto, Nakao, and Akitsuki.

On January 15 this committee was so recognized and the Army simultaneously withdrew the greater part of its colony patrols. Sentries, however, remained at all gates and no member of the Appointed Personnel was allowed to enter the camp without a military escort.

¹ibid.

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The Army withdrawal may not have been specifically connected with the breakdown of the status quo. Opler states that Best had been "rankling under the situation. . . . It was wonderful because Col. Meek was kicking Best around. He would come all the way from Ft. Douglas to do it, and he gave no indication of a strategic retreat whatever. . . . Best was tipping off Cozzens on what pariahs WRA was in the picture. It was WAR vs. WRA. . . . Cozzens cooked up the deal that ran Meek off the project. . . . The new arrangement was that WRA could call in and off the dogs of war. With the old arrangement they could get them in but not out."¹

The next day, January 13, the Divisional Heads met again to lay additional plans for the "back to work" movement. Mr. Huycke, Head of Community Management, who had never been popular with the Japanese, was present as representative of the Administration and reported on the meetings of the Appointed Personnel (Community Management, Administrative Management and Operations) which had been held that day and the day before. Throughout the meeting Mr. Huycke stressed evacuee responsibility in solving the work problem. He was, however, met with numerous requests from the divisional heads; requests for betterment of living conditions very similar to those made by the Negotiating Committee two months before.

Huycke reported that the Administrative Division meetings had gone very well, with the exception of the Operations Division where there was "a solid block" that felt "somewhat uneasy." They feared "insubordinate sassiness," from the evacuees returning to work and "lack of respect on their authority." They had "also raised the problem. . .

¹Notes, April, p. 25.

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that there was a tendency of the crew to quit at 3:00 in the afternoon." Huycke opined: "It is up to the foremen to control their crew to see that they do an honest day's work. . . You are working for yourselves and not WRA. That's what we have to get across to the crews." Huycke also stressed that "finishing of schools is your problem, production of food, the delivery of coal. . . I think the supervisor of the coal crew should be the matter for the evacuee heads to solve and not for the administrative personnel."¹

A question was then raised from the floor as to whether WRA could furnish gloves and overalls to the coal crew. Huycke said he believed they would be provided. Another evacuee then remarked, "Lumber crew takes one pair of gloves in a week. That'll cost 45¢. If you take 45¢ a week, BOY!"² Shoes were also requested.

Idemoto then stated that it was impossible to keep the coal crew working until 4:30. "Sometimes we have to work so hard some bunch of radicals all get on trucks and just go home. You can't control them then!"² Huycke suggested that "Community Management devise some plan to control such parties.

"There must be a community unit where problems must be solved. Solved through a strong well-knit evacuee's organization. We want to get rid of the idea of appointed personnel to solve all these problems. You've got to solve it yourself. If we have uprising against WRA and Army, they may take over the camp again and this will be just a prison camp, then, they will have to solve your problems."²

He added that the problems at Tule Lake had been the result of two major causes, (1) Lack of evacuee community organization carrying great

¹Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Divisional Heads of the Tule Lake Center, Jan., 13, 1944, p..1,2.

²ibid., p. 3.

responsibility and having wide sanction and (2) Lack of or absence of a well-knit administration with a clearly announced policy and working together.

Huycke was then asked outright how many people could return to work. From his answer it is obvious that he did not know, but he spoke at length around the point. Eventually he said, "Don't worry, I believe we can develop work for everybody. I'm not going to say what it is, because I will be making a committment.

"I don't believe an employment ceiling will be applied in this Center. Principle of number of persons per family is not being applied here. It may never go into effect in Tule Lake. I am sure you w ll all find employment but it must be an honest day's work."¹

(In the six months which followed Huycke proved to be wrong in both these statements. An employment ceiling was applied to Tule Lake in June 1944, only two persons being allowed to work in each family, and only one, if the family consisted of a married couple. There was still an enormous list of persons desiring employment.)

Huycke then outlined the contemplated "Back to Work" process: "The various section heads up there (the Administration) were instructed today and yesterday to decide which key worker or workers they wished returned to work tomorrow and Saturday. They are taking those names to the Police Office. These names have to be cleared with the Army. . . The names (when cleared) are taken to Mr. Fagan. He makes assignments and the section head then makes personal contact with you. . . The back to work process will be gradual."²

Yamatani then asked that these reassigned workers be given their clothing allowance and added "We do not want to ask WRA beyond reason." Huycke further explained that Mail and File and Statistics sections

¹ ibid., p. 3.

² ibid., p. 4.

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would no longer hire evacuees "inasmuch as vital information (may be) forwarded to the Spanish Consul and WRA will be put in a bad light and they do not want to be fools again."¹ He also explained that workers would be given passes in order to come into the administration area for work.

Yoshida pointed out to Mr. Huycke that the food situation was still critical and sounded very like a member of the Negotiating Committee when he said:

"Lots of workers are skeptical about the food situation in camp. If we can get some Caucasian to come into the Mess Halls and actually try the food that the evacuees are eating and what kind of food are being served, I think we can have better food for the same price and avoid future troubles. Some Mess Hall crew are taking food home, some are lost on the road to the Mess Halls. The appointed Personnel can compare the food and see where it's being lost."²

Yoshida stated also that food was the biggest problem in the center and that eating and sleeping are the only things he enjoyed here. He requested that diet specialists be hired.

Kawaii then asked what procedure was to be followed when a person wishing work was rejected by the police. Huycke stated that he had the right of appeal to Mr. Best.²

After Mr. Huycke left the meeting the discussion turned to the function of the proposed Coordinating Committee. Kawaii recommended that this Committee should assume the position of a Coordinating body and should also be privileged to investigate the history and records of individuals.³

¹ibid., p. 5

²ibid., p. 6

³ibid., p. 8.

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On the same day, this Coordinating Committee on their own initiative interviewed a group of stockade internees. Opler says that the Administration did not learn of this until January 15 "too late to prevent it."¹ The Committee realized that it had pledged itself to facilitate the release of the internees as a part of its "abandon status quo" program and realized also, probably far better than the Administration, that the people expected this of them and that failure would mean their downfall.

The internees interviewed were Hoshiko, Mohri, Shimizu, Inouye, Katayama, and Nakamoto. Opler says this group "were by no means moderates, though Shimizu and Katayama were so described."¹ The Committee actually attempted to interview several members of the Negotiating Committee, but the Army refused this.² Akitsuki described the behavior of the internees when they were brought to the Administration Building: "They acted like cornered animals. They wouldn't even sit down."³

At this meeting the members of the Coordinating Committee explained the process of the referendum vote, stating: "efforts in trying to get you people released from the stockade should be the preliminary step, prior to our ultimate objective (return of normal conditions)."⁴ They asked for the personal opinions of those present on ways of bringing about this desired return to normal. Four of the six internees present must have been exceedingly taciturn, for

¹Community Analyst's Letter, Jan. 14, 1944, p. 9.

²Report of the Informal Interview of the Responsible men of various divisions with the detained stockade internees, Jan. 13, 1944, p. 1. (translated from Japanese).

³Notes, Mar., p. 24.

⁴ibid., Note 3, p. 2.

they said not one word that is recorded in the minutes. Only Shimizu was inclined to be cooperative. He fenced with the Coordinating Committee but refused to give any advice or express himself as to the attitude of the internees as a whole. He did not even explain the hunger strike, which the Coordinating Committee greatly desired to be explained, so that they might gain credit for reassuring the people. Inouye, the only other internee who spoke, reaffirmed his loyalty to the Negotiation Committee and reproved Akitsuki for asking "silly questions."

Shimada of the Coordinating Committee, restated his body's humane goal:

"We thought it more important and humanly to work on the release of those detained, since some are so worried. Recently a woman, whose husband is detained, told me that their chief object in coming into this center was because they wanted to return to Japan and she certainly doesn't want to leave her husband here -- dead.."¹

Shimada pointed out the hopelessness of relying on the Spanish Consul, reading his report to the internees, and explaining that the jurisdiction of the Spanish Consul applied only to those persons not born in Japan.

Shimada promised to "compile the opinions of the internees" and present them to the Coordinating Committee at a second meeting, which was the only point gained by the Coordinating Committee.

On the next day (Jan. 14) the second meeting was held. The same internees attended. In this meeting the internees took the offensive and held it. They met the Coordinating Committee with a barrage of questions on the legitimacy of their statement and threw a good deal of cold water on the closeness of the referendum vote. They asked why members of the Negotiating Committee had not been called out

¹libid., p. 4.

and were told that the Army had refused permission. Shimizu (internee) then stated that he had discussed the Committee's proposition at a meeting of 247 of the stockade internees and explained their attempt to bring back the camp to a normal condition. He pointed out, however, that "merely return to work of a portion of the colonists is not enough."¹

This, as was discovered later, was a falsehood. No meeting was held and the six internees had merely talked the matter over among themselves.²

Shimada replied by reaffirming that the Committee were working with "sincerest faith." Akitsuki added, ["We have no political ambitions whatsoever. We have strongly resolved to dissolve this group as soon as the Center returns to its normal conditions, as soon as people go back to work, as soon as we succeed in getting the release of those justifiable colonists detained, and finally when the responsible political group is established."³]

Shimizu (internee) remarked that since according to the voting returns, 4,000 people still favored the status quo, it might be dangerous for a proportion of the people to return to work. Inouye (internee) and apparently a much stronger supporter of the Negotiating Committee than Shimizu, added:

Yes, after looking at the results, it's barely half and half. I wonder if the workers returning to work on Monday could go without complications. I surely hate to see the Japanese divided and hate to see them fighting with each other. It's obvious that majority of colonists have opposed status quo.

Handwritten notes in Arabic script, possibly a translation or commentary, located on the left side of the page.

¹ibid., Jan. 14, 1944, p. 2.

²Report of the Informal Meeting of the Stockade Internees and the Coordinating Committee of the Tule Lake Center, Feb. 5, 1944, pp. 2,3.

³ibid., p. 2.

If a portion return to work what do you think these people will think or what kind of reactions will they take? They might take an exactly reverse attitude instead of calmly, peacefully yielding to the winning side. In that case will you people take the responsibility? I hate to see anything like that happen, after all the things you people have gone through. Have you anything prepared in the event of such a circumstance?¹

Akitsuki replied by comparing the colony situation to the United States's presidential campaign, in which the "American people were divided when Roosevelt and Wilkie were running for President." But after Roosevelt won, all the people supported him. "Why can't we do that?" Inouye ignored Akitsuki and continued:

"The referendum was won by a bare majority, but I personally think that in reality status quo won. After all that hardship and all that misery the people had gone through for a long time, little less than a half still supported status quo. Without giving that point a thorough consideration and should people return to work on Monday, it may be pretty hard to continue or reestablish friendly relations among the Japanese. You may be worried about that point, but so are we."²

Shimada retorted that it was because the Coordinating Committee was worried that they were consulting the internees.

Shimizu then asked bluntly to what extent the Committee was attempting to get releases, pointing out that "[The reason why status quo came into existence was chiefly for the purpose of getting our release". . . . You cannot remedy and settle this situation . . by merely liquidating status quo. Normalcy will automatically come back if you solve the root of it."³] Mohri (internee) asked if they had made any arrangements with the Administration. Shimada stated that they had

¹ ibid.

² ibid., p. 3.

³ ibid., p. 3.

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tried and failed, and so had concluded that seeing the internees personally was the only way out. Shimizu (internee) then stated his personal opinion that "if one or two men are left behind the rest of us cannot come out of the stockade. . . If we are all released status quo will automatically disappear."¹ Going back to work was vain if the condition were not remedied fundamentally. Shimada asked to repeat that the Army would not give them a chance to talk about release, until normal conditions had returned. Said Inouye (internee):

"The opinion of the internees in the stockade is that 'if one go out, we all go out, if one stay in we all stay in.' Do you realize why the people are so firm in their conviction?" . . . I think it is only proper to get the Negotiating Committee released first. If you don't do that the others will not come out. If release is impossible and the Army continues to repress us, we will still continue to favor status quo, since that's the only thing we can do."²

Shimizu (internee) asked if the Committee were willing to negotiate with the Administration for release en masse. Shimada replied:

"We tried as I said before, we tried all methods and ways, but was kicked each time. This was the only alternative."

Katayama continued to press the question, asking;

"What is your outlook? What are you trying to tell us? Are you trying to get our understanding or concession?"

Shimada replied that the Committee was trying to get the internee's understanding, cooperation and frank opinion. Mohri (internee) replied that the Committee had the internee's cooperation but asked:

"Don't you think you people have more or less overridden us in not consulting or conferring with us before the referendum. If you people had any sincerity I don't see why you overlooked that"

¹ ibid., pp. 3,4.

² ibid., p. 4.

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Shimada: We admit that we overrode you people, but you see we tried to put this issue over in a matter of two or three days that. . . .

Inouye: (interrupting him) What is your future plan and what kind of negotiations are you expecting to carry on in regard to our release?

This problem does not concern the 247 detained nor does it concern the mere 16,000 colonists -- this is a very delicate problem which affects Japan and America. Do you realize that?"¹

Shimada and Akitsuki reaffirmed their helplessness in the face of the Administration's resolve that a normal condition must precede releases. Mohri (internee) then demanded unconditional release of all the internees, which, he said, would automatically solve the problem. Naido (Coordinating Committee) said, "That may be impossible." Shimizu (internee) promised that if the Negotiating Committee were released, they would not mix in politics. Akitsuki remarked that negotiations with the Administration would be facilitated if they would give them such an assurance in writing, and pointed out that the Committee "had its weaknesses too, lest we are accused or suspected by the Administration."

Shimizu (internee) added that if unconditional release were impossible, the 14 members of the Negotiating Committee should be released for a few hours and they would then convince the people to yield to the plans of the Coordinating Committee. The Committee did not commit itself on this plan and after additional discussion on the closeness of the vote Akitsuki said:

"Let me say this. We don't want to annoy the Japanese Government any more. We know that they have plenty on their hands. Let's try to solve our own problems with our own hands. We must fully realize that if we fail this time, the whole thing will go on a stand-still."²

¹ibid., p. 5.

²ibid., p. 8.

Mohri then explained the hunger strike,¹ and with Akitsuki's request that the Negotiating Committee put into writing whatever they wish to say to the people, the meeting closed.

On the same day a delegation of the Divisional Responsible Men met with the Advisory Council which was represented by Messrs. Opler, McNeil and Silverthorne, Lt. Forbes was also present. The Administration was as yet not aware of the meetings which the as yet unauthorized Coordinating Committee had held with the stockade internees. Yamatani brought up the problem of returning employees to their positions and cited a case where a man had been recommended for immediate assignment but was rejected. Lt. Forbes replied that a similar case had been brought up that morning. A case had been taken to Mr. Best who had recommended "that such a situation should be discussed and thrashed out by the employer who refused the employee and the employee who was not wanted," both meeting with the Project Director.² Opler remarked that "inasmuch as the appointed personnel must be 'nursed' into this new plan, each division head will decide problems according to his own discretion without referring them to the Coordinating Council." He also asked the committee to recommend a staff for a new newspaper and for the warden's organization.²

The following day the warden's organization was organized and the police and Army granted the Coordinating Committee's request for "day and night increased patrol during this period, at least four or five jeeps to a ward if possible; the more the merrier." The re-

¹See p.

²Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Council and the Divisional Responsible Men, Jan. 14, 1944, p. 2.

³Report of the informal meeting of the wardens, members of the Advisory Council and Co-ordinating Committee, Jan. 15, 1944, p. 1.

quest for a curtailment of meetings in camp was also granted.¹ Any proposed meeting, it was decided, must first be reported to the Police, whereupon the Army would investigate it to see if it were "not beneficial to the colonists."¹ Obviously, the Coordinating Committee was becoming increasingly fearful of pressure group opposition, and intimidation.

Why Col. Austin -
of Army had
approved
plan?

On January 17 the Co-ordinating Committee was taken to task by Col. Austin and Mr. Best for taking matters into its own hands and meeting with the stockade internees. Yamatani was called upon to explain the action and questioned Col. Austin about the truth of the internees' story that tobacco, mousy, watches and fountain pens had been taken by the soldiers in the Army's search of the barracks. The Colonel admitted that "lots of things were taken, but many were returned. Theft of money? I question money. I doubt whether people ever leave money in their barracks. I don't question watches or tobacco."² [Yamatani ~~then~~ apologized "for the Committee's negligence in not consulting the Advisory Council previous to the interviews" and mentioned that Katayama, one of the internees had stated that "the detainees really desired liquidation of status quo; nevertheless, due to some great pressure from the 'big bosses' of the 'headquarters' such feeling could not be expressed outwardly. Mr. Naido added that according to Kawamura, a recently discharged internee, some 170 detainees opposed status quo and about 30 favored it."²] Yamatani and Nayido were probably exaggerating the anti-status quo feeling among the internees. It is however quite possible that some of the internees were turning against the idea of

¹ Report of the informal meeting of the wardens, members of the Advisory Council and Co-ordinating Committee, Jan. 15, 1944, p. 1.

² Informal meeting of the Divisional Responsible Men and the Project Director and Colonel Austin, Jan. 17, 1944, p. 1.

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status quo, for the same reason which moved many of the practical colonists: it didn't work. This, however, can not be interpreted as a favorable growth of rapport with the Administration.

Mr. Best then suggested that "the greatest 'good' should be done to the people in the Center, where larger portion of people is involved and where the most good could be done. Attempt for the Committee's effort in getting the release of the detainees should be secondary."¹ Akitsuki then suggested that a statement be printed by the Army and WRA whereby the Committee's efforts in attempting to secure the release of (justifiable) detainees, which had been one of the planks of the Committee's platform so that doubts or accusations from the Colony could be avoided. Best approved the suggestion and stated that the wording should be as follows: "Proper recognition will be given to all the people in the stockade and those that meet the requirements for the return will be given consideration." In this way Mr. Best felt that the making of commitments may be avoided."²

This first major difference of opinion, the Coordinating Committee's conviction that justifiable stockade releases which would be credited to them should be initiated immediately, and Mr. Best's policy of delay until the camp returned to normal is extremely important. In the three weeks that followed many internees were released but the lack of publicity nullified the effect they might have had on the people. The Coordinating Committee, whom many informants say, "promised that if status quo ended, the interned people would be released" were early

¹Informal meeting of the Divisional Responsible Men and the Project Director and Colonel Austin, Jan. 17, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid.

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branded as failures. In actuality, they were defeated in their plan to bring back normal conditions before they started.

On January 18, Mr. Best sent the Committee the following communication which while flattering and encouraging commits him to nothing:

["It is noted that the first accomplishment has been the back to work program. This we learn is a direct reward of your labor in the Colony as the result of the ballot in which the entire people over 18 years of age participated.

"While you have not been successful in securing the release of all the men detained in the Army Stockade you can be assured that the cases of these men and those persons who meet the requirements for the return to the Colony will be returned to the Colony at the earliest possible time. Be assured that your interest or requests in this connection are being given due consideration."¹]

The gradual return to work which proceeded slowly but steadily during this week filled the Administration with optimism. They were, however, too prone to look upon this as an anti status quo or anti Daihyo Sha Kai phenomenon and not, as it actually was in many cases, dire economic necessity. Opler stated:

"The Committee is now in a position to go ahead and consolidate further gains. The vote. . . took them over the first hump. . . the initial stages of the back-to-work movement have seen them over the second hump without casualty. Daily their mimeographers are getting out information to a village starved for news. The propaganda, as we call it, forms a pattern with the efforts of the Co-op group earlier and Civic Organization. The Daihyo remnants are reduced to political maneuvering, calumny against the "Civic Organizations" bunch, Akitsuki and Shimada in particular. To these gentlemen, threats come in almost regular succession, but are beginning to taper off. Their blocks are behind them and the majority of residents. The majority, once the opposition, is now in the saddle, and now in the ascendancy. . . former Daihyo leaders, like Komia, . . are still insistent that failure to release the detained will rend the village in two. The charge appears to be a threat, a bargaining point. . . The important thing for the Coordinating Committee is results."²

¹Community Analyst's Letter, Jan. 14, 1944, p. 11.

²ibid

Later it was shown that the Committee did not have the support of the majority and that the prophesy of future trouble over the non-release of the internees was not an empty threat.

DAIHYO SHA ATTEMPT FOR RELEASE

On January 16 a group of Daihyo Sha Kai supporters made an attempt to gain the release of the internees through Mr. Robertson, Head of Operations. Mr. Robertson was contacted because of the recommendation of former Leupp inmates who while he was head of Leupp, had learned that he might be trusted. This group had attempted to reach Robertson during the latter part of December and early January, but he had been absent from Tule Lake. However, on his return ^[Robertson up to the] he received "a frantic

①

telephone call" from block 11 (one of the strong Daihyo Sha blocks) asking him to come ^{on address in} to block 11. He went there and was told that ^{someone} a party in block 6 wished to see him. The next day he was invited to a meeting in block 6, where he met ^{by} members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, none of whom he had ever seen before.] These people expressed their confidence in

Mr. Robertson and asked his opinion of the present situation. He told them that as far as he could see there were only two avenues open (1) have the Daihyo Sha and the Co-ordinating Committee combine and bring the colony back to normal; (2) Have further segregation. The chief interest of this group was to bring about the release of the internees. [Get this meeting]

②

^{The group to negotiate the negotiation} Robertson advised ~~that~~ the Daihyo Sha resign, which would leaving the way open for popular election of representatives in which the colony could have faith.

The group appeared willing to take Robertson's advice and asked him to call ^{Some} ~~a~~ ^{the} body of internees into his office, present the plan, and gain their approval.] He pointed out that this group were putting tremendous trust in him, since they left him free to tell the internees exactly

what he pleased. They replied, "What you tell them is all right with us.

[no 9]

Accordingly Robertson called seven men to his office, among whom was George Kuratomi.

After an hour and a half session, Kuratomi said, "If you'll promise us that we'll eventually get out of the stockade, we'll go for that plan." Robertson said, ^{signed part of the plan} ~~that~~ ^{of the plan, but did through the 60th would finally be} ~~promise to you.~~ ^{is said to be} That could be the first step toward ~~your~~ ^{their} eventual release.

4. ~~Then~~ Kuratomi replied, "If I ask the boys in the stockade to adopt this plan, I'll have to give them my word. If anything goes wrong, I'll have to commit hara-kiri." Robertson thereupon refused to allow Kuratomi to take ~~on the~~ ^{some} responsibility of convincing the interned members of the Negotiating Committee that they should resign, for he could give no guarantee of release.

1

Kuratomi then suggested that two internees be allowed temporary freedom "to convince the people that this is the thing to do." He added that the group Robertson had talked to was not strong enough to lead the people. Robertson said he would approach the Administration with this plan, but could hold out no hope. Kuratomi promised, "If you release two, we'll resign and tell the people to hold an election." ~~It was eventually agreed that Robertson should contact the group in the colony and tell them that until the release of the internees was guaranteed, matters should remain as they were.~~

^{Agree especially Mr. Best}
~~Robertson was unable to get any cooperation from Mr. Best on~~
^{not} ~~and did not~~ ^{often}

In fact, Best warned him that Mrs. Matsuda, at whose home the meeting was held was a terrible troublemaker and if he persisted in calling on her she would probably run out of the house sometime, screaming, "Rape." Two days later, one of the boys to whom Robertson had spoken, was picked up.

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This contact which Mr. Robertson made with the remnants of the alleged agitating group was the beginning of a split between him and Mr. Best. Mr. Best disapproved of having anything to do with these trouble makers. Moreover, as Robertson's reputation for fairness, courtesy and consideration filtered through the colony he achieved a tremendous popularity which contrasted greatly with the combination of dislike, scorn, hatred and criticism manifested toward Best by almost all the Japanese. Undoubtedly this was reported to Mr. Best by his spies, Japanese and Caucasian. The fact that most evacuees, when troubled or needing advice, would come to the office and consult Mr. Robertson and seldom come near Best did not escape Mr. Best's notice either. The attitudes toward these two Administrators and the split in their personal points of view, developed steadily in the months to come and will be described in detail later.

Mrs. Matsuda, meanwhile, came to be regarded as the most annoying trouble maker on the project by Mr. Best and Mr. Schimdt, head of the Police. This reputation was not altogether unjustified, since she assumed a prominent place in the counter Coordinating Committee and counter Administration actions which arose in the colony. Her brother, Tokio Yamane had been arrested on the night of November 4 and she has agitated constantly for his release. According to a statement made to her by Tsuda, her brother was among those seriously beaten. A handsome and energetic young woman, she gave the Administration and the Police little rest with her demands that justice be given her brother. As a result, according to her account, she has been subjected to constant persecution by the Police. On several occasions, members of the police force have entered her home and subjected her to "third degrees."

She states that Mr. Schidt told her, "Why don't you stay home and mind your kids. Even your own people hate you. They say you're a liar and indecent and conceited. Go ahead and tell this to the damn Spanish Consulate. The next time he's here I'll tell him a few things." On one occasion, Sandburn and O'Brien, policemen, entered her home and accused her and her husband of being espionage agents.

"All the time they were threatening me to withdraw. They told me that for my own good I should take a letter to Schmidt before sending it to the Spanish Consul or Mr. Robertson. I was so frightened. They said they were going to try and get me for federal office. . . . When I went to see Mr. Robertson Internal Security, they came. . . and gave me a third degree. They said, "Hereafter you'll be denied a pass to the Administration building. They phoned Mr. Robertson two or three times while I was there, accusing him of seeing me.

2 you mean "offense"

They sent two boys beaten up worse than my brother to Santa Fe. Some of the boys had eight stitches taken in his head. These boys were beaten after the incident while they were being examined (in the Statistics office). If these boys were sent back to the colony it would be exposed. . . .

One boy kept saying at the hearing, "Mr. Schmidt attacked me." Mr. Schmidt said, 'If you'll withdraw that statement, I'll release you.'¹

Mrs. Matsuda is nisei, and has a brother in the United States Army, fighting in the South Pacific. She is exciteable and not inclined to minimize any objectionable behavior on the part of the Police. However, she gives no indication of being a woman of low character. Had her brother not been kept in the stockade it is possible that she would not have become such a thorn in the flesh of Mr. Best. Her reputation as a trouble maker is so great that she is accused of being the instigator of almost all the trouble which arises in camp, an obviously incorrect generalization. Mr. Best's annoyance at her contact with Mr. Robertson was corroborated by Robertson. She

¹Notes, April, 1944, pp. 8-9.

was no longer given a pass to come to see him.

FURTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The Coordinating Committee with the support of the Divisional Responsible Men had succeeded in bringing the people back to work. While reemployment proceeded slowly at first, it gradually gained momentum so that within a month, as far as work was concerned, the center could be considered back to normal. However the Committee failed utterly to gain popular support or to bring about even a semblance of cooperation between the colonists and the Administration. During the latter part of January up to the middle of February, the Committee continued its efforts to have the Administration concede to certain requests which would make a good impression on the colonists. In certain very minor matters, the Administration cooperated, in all major matters it put the committee off. By the first of February the Coordinating Committee were already conscious of their impotence and suggested that it might be well for them to step down and make way for a permanent body. In mid-February they handed in their first resignation which was not accepted.

During the latter part of January, the Committee recommended the increasing of farm acreage, additional work opportunities and stockade releases. On each request they were put off with administrative statements that the time was not yet ripe. However, one important request was granted. After several request the Administration approved the organization of a group of informers and guards, called "fielders", whose function it was to protect the Coordinating Committee from "radicals" and to gain information on the activities of agitators. Thirty young men and women were hired for this purpose and put on the Administration payroll.