

*pp. 85-85F entirely new.**Ch III
belongs in
Haley's draft*THE WEEK OF INDECISION - NOVEMBER 5 to NOVEMBER 12

The week following the entrance of the Army was a time of indecision with both the Army and the Daihyo Sha Kai attempting to adjust themselves to the radically new state of affairs. At first, the position of the Daihyo Sha did not seem entirely hopeless. For a few days it appeared as if the Army would recognize the Negotiating Committee. Certain members of the Daihyo Sha, in particular H. Tsuda, the head of the Japanese police force, who now assumed the leading role, succeeded in getting the hospital workers, the coal crew and the garbage crew back to work, a feat which encouraged the Negotiating Committee a great deal. However, the rapport was shortlived. Complicated misunderstanding arose, bringing a response from the Daihyo Sha which in turn, caused the Army to assume a policy of uncompromising repression.

The story of the developments from November 4th to November 9th was told to the writer in minute detail by Mr. Tsuda, who knows more about them than any other person. His narration is quoted here:

"As you know, the tanks rolled in on the night of Nov. 4. At that time we were having a meeting at the block 15 messhall. One of the news wardens, Kobayashi, was a little off - he came in and told me there was some trouble in the warehouse district. I told Kobayashi, since you're just a young man and new on the force, I don't think you know how to meet the consequences. I told him to go back to the warden's building and get as many supervisors as he could and proceed to the warehouse district. And if any Caucasians with trucks were planning to take foodstuffs to get the truck numbers and the names of the drivers and their mission, whether it has gone through the proper channels. He left and after he left the Daihyo Sha meeting, about his personal acts from there on I think you know more than I do.

"Then we saw the tanks come in making a big noise, shooting and whatnot.

"The following morning, Nov. 5, about 8:30, my son came home suddenly and said that no colonist can go any further than the high school district. There were a lot of soldiers fencing it

off (T. means the soldiers had formed a cordon.). He asked me what happened. It was my duty to go to the office right off the bat. A lot of people came and asked me what happened. Most of the center people didn't know what took place and they were pretty much worried as to the future and what they should do.

"I felt at the time, I thought my responsibility was to find out some way of bringing the camp sentiment into peace. So I took advantage over knowing Mr. Best and Mr. Cole, Acting head of I. S. I called him (Cole) up on the telephone. The operator told me that she has an order not to connect to any Caucasian. So I was lost at the time. There were big crowds in my office, trying to get information from me.

"I walked down to Fire Station #1. I used the emergency phone and succeeded in getting Mr. Rhodes, the chief of the Fire Dept. Through him I got Mr. Cole and I asked him whether I have any chance to see Mr. Best in regard to what happened last night and what could be done about the camp. About a half hour later I got a message saying I have been permitted to see Colonel Austin. So I went to see Col. Austin all by myself, escorted by Lt. Forbes, and Mr. Cole to the Ad. Bldg.

"And the first question I submitted to Col. Austin was; was it necessary to have the Army move into the center in the manner of last night? Of course, I asked him what actually took place. And third, I asked on what condition will the Army pull out from this center? And Col. Austin at the time told me if the center goes back to normal condition there is no need of the Army remaining in the center. So naturally, I had to ask Colonel Austin what would you call a normal condition in the center? He didn't say anything. I asked, "Did it mean so long as the center people resume the same activities as yesterday, will the Army withdraw?" Colonel Austin said "Yes."

"So I had to tell him that I think 99% of the center people didn't know what happened last night and it seems to me if the center is in a turbulent condition, I think it is caused by the Army and not by the people. So by letting the people go back to work as yesterday, would not be a very difficult job. Of course, I'm not top man in the center or an influential party, but fortunately I know some of the so-called leaders in the center, and the authorities could meet with them and iron out the kinks if there are any difficulties.

"And Colonel Austin told me that: 'How soon can you get these people together and come and see me?' So I made an appointment for 2:00 p.m. that afternoon. I said I would have a few gentlemen come in and talk things over with the authorities.

"So that was the first step I took on Nov. 5. I got back to the center and I got hold of the so-called Negotiating Committee - the Kosho-1in.

"As you know, the Negotiating Committee, there were a few who could not speak fluent English. These persons evidently do not brave themselves to go out in front. Naturally, it goes to George Kuratomi.

"That very afternoon, I think it was George and Hayashi and myself went to see Colonel Austin. At that time I wasn't a Kosho-iin. (Negotiating Committee)

After having made this contact with Colonel Austin, Tsuda thought it best to get in touch with the five members of the Executive Board which had been appointed - on a temporary basis - at the Daihyo Sha meeting of November 4. These men, Messrs. Ichiro Hayashi, Nogawa, Mitsuo Kimura, Tanaka, and Tsuda himself, with the aid of Kuratomi, who though not a member of the Board, still bore the major part of the responsibility, undertook the task of bringing the center into a state of order. This shift in the personnel of the negotiators was probably never understood clearly either by the Army or the WRA.

Tsuda continued:

"Therefore after I met Colonel Austin, my personal idea was to get in touch with these 5 men - to have these board members to negotiate with Colonel Austin immediately, regardless of the fact that the plan was tentative. We had 11 different divisional committees. So though these Executive Committees, whatever the intentions of the authorities were, I thought that we can relay the messages to the members so these members can start in their work and bring all the workers back onto the job through their efforts. That's how Hayashi, Nogawa, Kimura, Tanaka and myself was involved in the incident as far as the Army was concerned and we got put in the stockade.

"Regardless that George wasn't an Executive Board member, since this plan wasn't yet accepted by the center people, therefore, George could not very well get away from responsibility.

"So we went to see Colonel Austin, and the first thing we wanted to see was to get all the hospital workers back on the job. The nurses and doctors had not been permitted to go back to the hospital. That very afternoon I got the Army's OK to pass 90 hospital workers through the cordon to the hospital. And everyone of those workers had been checked by the head nurse and Dr. Pedicord.

"And so, the next most important division that should go back to work was the coal crew and the garbage crew. So we got hold of the coal crew and the garbage crew in two different places. The coal crew gathered at the block 12 messhall, over 300 of them, and the garbage crew congregated at 3008. And Mr. Nogawa and Hayashi and myself, we divided. Nogawa went to the garbage crew and I went to the coal crew with Hayashi. We talked it over with all the coal workers and stressed the coal shortage was being pretty much felt by the colonists and it isn't our idea to let the colonists suffer. So, regardless of the present circumstances, you young people should realize the fact and go back to work. The same was stressed to the garbage crew because we didn't want a stinky town.

"The trouble was that the authorities, I'm not sure if it was entirely the Army or half the WRA, specifically, on the coal crew, the authorities limited the number of workers who were to return to work. They wanted only 70 of the 300 members of the coal crew to go to work and they wanted to terminate the others. So we had a pretty hard time between the workers and the Army at that time. If only the Army had told us or guaranteed us that they would not clear all the 300 at once, therefore they would see 70 men at work on the first day following, half the rest on the next day and finally all the workers, then we'd have had an easier time to see the coal crew go back on the job. But we thought and the coal crew thought too, that if only 70 were allowed to go back to work and the rest terminated, therefore, the coal crew did not respond to the request. (This was on the 6th of November.)

"The same story goes with the garbage crew and further negotiations with the Army and the WRA personnel, we finally won the argument and succeeded in having every person in both divisions go back to work.

"Mr. Igami, the undertaker got a permit from the Army to go through the guards and the Co-op office and the warehouse workers to go through. So far it was very nice.

"Before all of that - I forgot - on the night of the 4th, 6 boys were taken in by the authorities. Pertaining to their releasement, what proceedings the authorities would take we asked the Army. We were told they would be given a fair trial and the consequences would be settled, Colonel Austin said. That was fair enough.

"There were other minor issues too - toilet paper, babies milk, the food situation and the Army delivering of food stuff and other small things.

"As the days were going by - I can't remember what date - somehow, on a certain day, the butcher shop workers were cleared by the Army to go back to work. Of course, the number of workers were very much decreased compared to the number working before the incident. So a dozen or 15 men went to work in the butcher shop. They were told with more or less under Army supervision they should

put in their hours stringently. At that time one of the Lieutenants asked them if there's any suggestions to make or any questions. And Mr. Fukui, of block 48, he is a nisei, he spoke up and said, "With the small number of workers we could not complete the work as much as we used to do. You should get more men and also the foreman of that division." And Mr. Fukui, that afternoon, was pulled in by the Army for making a speech and agitating or being insolent.]

"And naturally, we had the temporary Negotiating Committee office set up in an office adjoining mine at the wardens' headquarters. Mr. Fukui's family, his mother and his wife and several of his friends came to see me about it."

"So, the following day I asked Colonel Austin for the reason of the arrest. And he said he'd investigate and let us know. Two days after Mr. Fukui got pulled in Colonel Austin read the official statement about Mr. Fukui's case and we found the statement wasn't quite agreeable or wasn't stating the true fact, so we requested a reinvestigation of his case.

"At that time I had a serious argument with Colonel Austin and the other officers about the condition of the workers. Of course, due to the lack of my vocabulary, it may have sounded pretty insolent to the Army at that time. The first question was: Did the divisional workers who were called back to work by the Army, did they have to submit themselves up with absolute obedience? Did they have to work like a slave by shutting up or if any suggestion was to be made will they be privileged to speak up. If anybody should go to work in the Administrative area, and if he must work with absolute obedience are we in a position to inform these facts to the people?

"Colonel Austin said, "The Army gives you work and all you have to do is to work!" So that was it. And the further argument was that since the evacuation the WRA policy was all the working corps was on a voluntary basis. And first we was told that the 12-16-19 dollars was an advance, not the paycheck. Under these circumstances, the Army could not expect any of the Japanese to work as much as Colonel Austin expected his soldiers to work. Therefore, this certain amount of people in these certain jobs look sufficient as far as the Army is concerned, but from outside we can't fulfill the same amount of responsibility as the Army might complete.

"That was the argument with Colonel Austin and the conclusion was as we're in between the Negotiating Committee, whether temporary or permanent, we'd like to see every person in the center who had been working to be permitted by the authorities to resume his job. And it seems to me that was the very point that the Negotiating Committee got into trouble with the authority.

Mr. Tsuda then explained his personal motive for taking this prominent position at this time:

"The way I got into trouble and the way George and the rest got in are two different things. That goes back to the Internal Security. I can say the people dragged me into the trouble or I was blindly pulled into the trouble or I got in voluntarily. I don't ~~know~~ know. My intent was because warden's department wasn't a very popular organization right after segregation was completed. Now, up to segregation in Tule Lake, the warden's position or function was a very different job, simply because we had the peoples' understanding. But after segregation the largest number of people didn't understand our position. The new people thought the wardens' organization was an inu joint.

"Somebody had to take a stand to make the people understand what we were doing. So, way before the incident happened, I went to see Mr. Takahashi on two occasions, and explained about our work. And when the incident took place, I figured, maybe this was very foolish of me, nevertheless, I started out the first negotiations with Colonel Austin, to bring this tentative plan to life. By doing so, I figured people might understand about our organization (the police) and give us full support. My main object was to maintain tranquillity in the center. The function of the police department would eventually have been the nerve center of the center."¹

The hardship of the stopping of coal delivery and some of its effect on the camp population was described by K, a man who worked on the crew:

"Then from the fifth to the sixth of November people began hollering about there not being enough coal. There was no milk. Only the seven-months-old children were getting milk through the warden's office. Children over seven months old were going hungry and crying. My children were crying for milk. The only person who could contact Lt. Col. Austin was Walter Tsuda, the head of Internal Security. Even the representatives can't see Austin and can't reach him So the morning of the 6th Lt. Col. Austin sent for us. He asked me about the coal situation. I told him we don't have enough coal. He asked me if my men would go to work. I said we'd work, not for money, but for the benefit of the Japanese. Then the Colonel asked me how many men I had. I told him 325. Then Mr. Cozzens was taking a note. He asked me, "Are you sure these boys are willing to go to work?" I told him, "If you see kids crying for cold and wife crying about the cold house . . . We are human and we don't cause any trouble."²

Accordingly, on the request of both the Army and the Negotiating Committee, the coal crew ^{and the garbage crew} resumed work on November 11.

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 11, 1945, pp. 2-6.

²Ibid., pp. 14, 15.

Mr. Kuratomi, and no doubt other members of the Negotiating Committee, have always considered the return of these workers in the first few days of Army rule an example of their influence and good intent. It is their contention that had the Army continued to co-operate with them, the remainder of the people would have returned to work and the camp, in a comparatively short time, would have returned to a normal state. The matter of cutting down on the crews, however, on which neither the Army or the Japanese leaders were able to compromise, became an irreconcilable difference. Kuratomi explained the point of view of the Japanese as follows:

"The Army, however, wished only about 25 of the warehouse men to go back to work. Ninety-eight men had been working originally. The Army thought that 25 men could do all the work. But in their estimate the Army did not consider (the men needed) for unloading and maintenance.

"From Japanese psychology. . . ~~it~~ would be impossible for us to come back and tell the group that only 25 of the 98 could be picked out and approved by the FBI, WRA, and the Army. That would have left a queer impression on those picked. The remaining people would be thinking they were inu or informers. We stressed that point."¹

Apparently, however, this point was stressed in vain. The Army kept to its point of view, the smaller crews were maintained in all but the garbage and coal crews, and ill feeling increased.

The Daihyo Sha meeting of November 6, reflects many of the anxieties and inconveniences caused by the entrance of the Army. Kobayashi, a member of the Negotiating Committee (not the young warden who was arrested) made the following report on an interview with Colonel Austin:²

¹ ibid., Oct. 26, 1944, pp. 2-3.

² According to Tsuda, Kobayashi did not see Col. Austin at this time. I shall try to clarify this. R. H.

1. According Colonel Austin, 10 youths are confined in the hospital, however, they are not injured.
2. Permission will be granted for meeting within the building.
3. Tear gas was used because the crowd refused to disperse.
4. Hospital employees will be asked to remain within the building until the incident is under control. Report emergency cases to the Project Director.
5. In case of emergency, interviews with Authorities will be given.
6. No need of worry for food will be distributed daily.
7. Army will withdraw when Colony returns to normalcy.

Following statements were made from the floor:

1. There are several blocks without coal.
2. Some mess halls inconvenienced because of insufficient supply of Dutch Cleanser.
3. Toilet papers should be distributed as soon as possible.
4. Delivery of mail should be taken care of as soon as possible.
5. Disposition of garbage should be taken care of to prevent accumulation, which creates unsanitary condition.

Chair: Army entered the Center upon request of the WRA. Colonists are requested to maintain tranquility as much as possible, especially the Daihyo Sha representatives are asked to control the youths. In spite of the Army's agreement to interview us at any time, it will be unwise for us to call upon them at the present time. Those detained by the Army will not be permitted to return to the Center until they have their hearings.

At this time a youth brought a message and presented it to the Chair, who read it as follows: As far as known up to date, those injured in the incident are Hayashida, 23; Nakamura, J. 40; Todoroki, 28; Kobayashi, 59; Marubashi, 42; Kodani, 48; Yamane 27; Ogasa, 38; Tahara, 4; and five others whose names are unknown.¹

Next Kuratomi reported on a very favorable interview with the Spanish Consul which took place November 2.²

¹Minutes of the Daihyo Sha Kai of the Tule Lake Center, Nov. 6, 1943, p. 1.

²See p. 72 B.

Lastly Chairman Kuratomi requested the body to have all the reports on food supply of each respective mess hall. Upon delivery of the menu card, responsible persons of each mess should refrain from signing it. Especially upon delivery of mess supplies, supplies should be checked and rechecked before signing the receipt. It is also advisable to prepare a list of all articles received, which should be forwarded to the Negotiating Committee office. Great quantity of food supply are disappearing on the way from the Warehouse to the mess hall to which WRA officials are suspected.

Chair: Postal service has been permitted by the authorities. As I have stated before because the authorities are afraid of spreading false rumors outside through the mail, delivery will be handled by block managers. All repatriation forms when completed should be sent directly to the Spanish Consul.

Kai: Army officers have reported that when the Army delivers food, block children will insult the boys. Such attitude on the part of the colonists should be refrained at a time like this. Please inform your respective blocks.

Chair: We are planning to call a mass meeting but because of several youths' rash action an incident of this nature occurred, which is very lamentable. You Daihyo Sha representatives are requested to see to it that people refrain from such actions in the future.

On November 6, Lt. Col. Austin issued the following proclamation which was printed in the Tulean Dispatch of November 9:

"The Army having taken over control of the Tule Lake Segregee Center at the request of WRA, strict discipline will be maintained at all times. No outdoor gatherings will be permitted. The Commanding Officer will be glad to meet with any problems relative to the administration of this Center."

On November 9, D. C. Hayward arrived on the project. He came to replace Ralph E. Peck, the former Chief Steward who had been accused of grafting by the Japanese and who, as Myer stated, was dismissed for "chiefly drunkenness."

November 9 was also marked by the arrival of the Spanish Consul who made his second visit to the project. He assured the members of the Negotiating Committee that he would personally see that the center got adequate medical supplies and asked the committee to present any further problems directly to him.¹ The

¹Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 9, 1943.

November 11 issue of the Tulean Dispatch reports on his visit as follows:

Incident Investigated By Consul F. De Amat

"Coming here to investigate the facts of the incident, the Spanish Consul, F. De Amat told the representatives Tuesday that he had come here at the request of the Japanese government.

"He told the committee that the residents can still make requests to the government as before.

"Telling the representatives present at the meeting that he was

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Next Kuratomi reported on an interview with the Spanish Consul which took place November 2. The Spanish Consul had promised to do what he could on the hospital situation. Upon presentation of the food supply inventory prepared by Sugimoto (which the writer believes was also shown to Myer on November 1 and caused him great astonishment) the Spanish Consul was very much surprised and asked how he had gotten hold of it. The Consul had also promised to do what he could in the matter of the termination of the appointed personnel and lack of facilities (furniture) in the apartments. Lastly, he had emphasized that any rash or inconsiderate action on the part of the colonists would ultimately be their own responsibility.2/(It is doubtful that the Consul was as amenable to Kuratomi's suggestions as this report implies.)

The meeting closed with the following statement by the chairman:

"We were planning to call a mass meeting but because of several youth's rash action an incident of this nature occurred, which is very lamentable. You Daihyo Sha representatives are requested to see to it that people refrain from such actions in the future.3/

1/ Minutes of the Daihyo Sha Kai of the Tule Lake Center, Nov. 6. 1943, p. 1.

2/ Ibid., p. 2.

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Two Japanese expressed their sentiments toward the army at this time as follows:

"... The residents are taking the presence of the soldiers in the block nonchalantly and continuing their passive resistance. Their attitude is 'What can't they do if we don't do anything at all. We are guaranteed of food, clothing, and shelter.'"¹

"One night I went directly to the post and asked them to stop it (the informant refers to the soldiers shining their spot lights on the coal workers and inadvertently blinding them). They could have shot me. That showed that the Tule Lake guards were very understanding. Their Commanding Officer had been trained right During the riot they used to bring in the food with an escort of two jeeps, two semitrucks, and four, five trucks. Twelve soldiers escorted the food trucks. That was a comical sight. Like the old Chicago gangster days."²

The immediate effect of army control upon the general population was a series of hardships and inconveniences. Mail delivery was held up until November 9. The delivery of milk and baby food was seriously curtailed. People rushed the Cooperative stores to stock up for the lean days ahead. The shelves were soon emptied. The army confiscated the Tulean Dispatch's mimeographer and typewriters on Nov. 11, but returned the mimeographer two days later. The greatest hardship was the stopping of the distribution of coal. K. says:

"Then from the fifth to the sixth of November people began hollering about there not being enough coal. There was no milk. Only the seven-months-old children were getting milk through the warden's office. Children over seven months old were going

¹X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 5

²Report, Dec. 24, p. 18.

hungry and crying. My children were crying for milk. The only person who could contact Lt. Col. Austin was Walter Twuda, the head of Internal Security. Even the representatives can't see Austin and can't reach him So the morning of the 6th Lt. Col. Austin sent for us. He asked me about the coal situation. I told him we don't have enough coal. He asked me if my men would go to work. I said we'd work, not for money, but for the benefit of the Japanese. Then the Colonel asked me how many men I had. I told him 325. Then Mr. Cozzens was taking a note. He asked me, "Are you sure these boys are willing to go to work?" I told him, "If you see kids crying for cold and wife crying about the cold house . . . We are human and we don't cause any trouble."¹

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November 9 was also marked by the arrival of the Spanish Consul who made his second visit. He assured the residents that he would personally see that the center got adequate medical supplies and asked the committee to present any further problems directly to him.² The Nov. 11 issue of the Tulean Dispatch reports on his visit as follows:

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He told the committee that the residents can still make requests to the government as before.

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¹ Ibid., pp. 14, 15

² Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 9.

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the official representative of Japan, he asked the residents at all times to refrain from taking violent actions.

Before leaving, he stated that he would visit the center regularly twice a month and will make special trips whenever necessary."

The full Daihyo Sha Kai Report on this interview with the Consul is reproduced here:

INTERVIEW MINUTES WITH THE SPANISH CONSUL

TIME: 1:30 p.m. DATE: November 9, 1943 PLACE: Block 13 Mess Hall

Spanish Consul F. de Amat of San Francisco arrived in Tule Lake Center upon instruction received from the Japanese Government to make full report as to the true cause of the entry of the Army into the Center. The Negotiating Committee Headquarters informed the Consulate of the incident; the Consul stated: I came to this Center upon instruction received from the Japanese Government to investigate the incident's cause, in order to make out a true report concerning this incident, since I am obligated to do so.

Question: Is it possible for a boy, who is now in the U.S. Army, to accompany his parent to Japan on the next exchange ship?

Answer: A letter of confidence should be submitted to the Spanish Consul with full information as to the relationship of the family. The Consul will be glad to consult with the WRA Administration to bring about his repatriation. However, such request should be initiated by the boy who is in the Army and approved by all those concerned on the matter. Then I could act upon it.

Question: For future consultation or negotiation by this organization, will it be advisable for us to contact you directly?

Answer: In the event you are unable to contact me directly, obtain permission from the Army through representatives of the colonists, then the Army will, no doubt, grant permission for you to contact me.

Question: If the Army takes control of this Center, will the colonists interned be subjected to International Wartime Agreement and be treated accordingly?

Answer: Since you people have come into this Center without any action which endangers the security of this country and especially in view of the many children and women involved, it is unlikely that the Army will control this camp.

Question: Under what title and status will this Center be administered?

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Answer: To my mind, there is no difference with the other relocation. The only difference is that you cannot relocate since you have not pledged allegiance to the U.S. However, this center may be called a Segregation Center.

Request: We wish to make a request that you notify the Japanese Government as to the actual condition of the recent incident and the fact that the colonists will remain loyal as Japanese subjects until the day we are allowed to return home. Please inform them not to worry about us.

Answer: It is my duty to make such reports to the Japanese Government and I have been especially instructed to give a full account of it.

Question: Why were six youths taken out of the Center?

Answer: The Army felt that necessity of questioning them; therefore, they were taken out around 5 o'clock. I believe they will be returned upon completion of the investigation.

Question: Was the stockade internees' condition reported to you?

Answer: Dr. Miyamoto sent me the full report.

Question: Will the unjustifiable firing of ammunitions conflict, in any way, with the International Law?

Answer: I don't know. However, I shall investigate and report to you later.

Following requests from the Daihyo Sha Kai were made to the Spanish Consul:

1. Recreation Hall be provided for recreational use. It has been utilized for office and other purposes that children have been deprived of recreational privileges.
2. Mimeograph machine (Tulean Dispatch) be returned immediately. Machine is now held by the Army.
3. Since new-comers from other centers have been assigned to recreation halls, which have no partitions, they should be assigned to regular quarters immediately. Request that you consult the Administration pertinent to the request.

The Consul agreed to take up the above-mentioned requests. Then he asked the body to inform the block managers to have all the names and addresses of the parents who have sons in the U.S. Army.

Eward, official representative from Washington, reported as follows:

1. Chief Steward Peck has been terminated.
2. Allotment of food supplies to each block will be on a 300-person basis.
3. 25 pounds of rice to every 100 persons and two sacks to each block daily.
4. 75 pounds of coffee to each mess hall.
5. Two pounds of sugar monthly to each person.

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6. 150 pounds of sugar per week per block or 600 pounds per month.
 7. Meat will be provided in mass amount allowed by ration, which, of course, is subjected to WRA regulation.
 8. Allowance of approximately 16 points per person per week.
 9. Allowance of 48 points per person per month for canned goods.
 10. Menu will be prepared a week ahead. Sufficient amount, to subsist for 45 days, of food stuff will be stored.

At this time the Spanish Consul appealed to the body that he was greatly concerned with the recent incident and asked the body to expend its utmost effort to bring about an amicable settlement. If negotiation for the settlement fail, the body should report to the Consul at once. Upon such notice, the latter will immediately call, inasmuch as he is assigned by the Japanese Government to insure the happiness that incident will not re-occur. Thus the block representatives assured him that they will not resort to any rash or inconsiderate action upon their honor. The Consul was very grateful.

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From November 6 on, the Army made advances to the colonists, asking that a properly selected negotiating committee come forward. However, no one but the Daihyo Sha Kai Negotiating Committee responded to this request.

The Daihyo Sha, meanwhile felt its position becoming progressively more insecure. The army did not recognize it as a representative body; its members probably feared arrest; it was faced with the task of explaining the disturbance at the warehouses and the discomfort and inconvenience which this deed had brought to the colonists. On November 11, it released its explanation of the incident:

Details of Incident Released by Committee

Six Young men Still held by Army for Investigation¹

After giving the details of the incident which led to the intervention of the Army to the Spanish Consul, the negotiating committee released to the press the following story.

During the negotiations with Dillon S. Myer and Raymond Best, these two had promised that in case any food was to be taken out of

¹ This was later amended to nine young men, the supposedly correct number.

Daihyo Sha Releases Information to the People

Another of the uncomfortable tasks with which the Daihyo Sha was faced was the necessity of explaining the disturbance at the warehouses and the discomfort and inconvenience which this deed had brought to the colonists. On November 11, it released its explanation of the incident in the Tulean Dispatch:

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the warehouse, they would do so openly.

However, in spite of this promise, on the night of November 4 about 9:30 the internal security force spotted some Caucasian entering the warehouse.

During the resulting investigation, quarrel broke out between the young men who had accompanied the wardens and the Caucasian.

Fearing that the Caucasians were to be kidnapped, the WRA officials had called in the Army.

As a result of this incident six young men are still held by the Army for investigation. One of the six, Fred Fukui, was taken out of the center and the Army officials promised to give a full explanation of it today.

The extent of the injuries of these six are not known but it is reported that they are not serious.

In case the others are to be taken out of the center the Army had assured the committee that they will give full explanation of such action.¹

Spicer comments upon this release in his letter:

"They played the whole thing down and by no means gave the truth. They are evidently feeling themselves in a precarious position just now."²

The Daihyo Sha continued to plead for support, even threatening to resign if the residents did not cooperate. However, it is most improbable that they intended to resign at this point.

Delegates Again Ask for Support

In asking the residents for their full support, the seven members of the negotiation committee stated that in case the residents do not obey their request for cooperation they will be forced to resign. Also in case the Army does not recognize the truth of the incident, they will have to relinquish their position. The committee asked residents that whenever a request for workers is made by them, to report immediately after the call is issued.³

¹Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 11, No. 26

²Report, Dec. 24, p. 30

³Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 11, No. 26.

This article is particularly significant, indicating clearly the extreme insecurity of the committee and their fear of discreditation. The request to the workers to report for work immediately if they were called should be noted, since it shows the committee's almost frantic desire to get along with the Army and do away with the work stoppage.

On November 11, however, the Negotiating Committee found that Colonel Austin had changed his attitude and that the change was definitely for the worst as far as they were concerned. He told their representatives that he had been told that they did not represent the people and that therefore, he would not recognize their organization. This was a most depressing blow to the committee since it again forced upon them the necessity of proving that they had public support. Moreover, the people, shaken and confused by the violent turn of affairs were taking, were no longer in the mood to be stirred up as easily as on November 1. In fact, a demonstration to impress the Army was probably unthinkable.

Kato, one of the representatives who saw Colonel Austin described the interviews as follows:

"I can still remember when we went to see Col. Austin. His attitude was very good then. But later he said we were just a political organization and that we didn't represent the colonists. We told him, 'How can you say such a thing? We have a written petition signed by the people recognizing us.'

(Kato is probably anticipating himself here. The petition was not proposed until the colonel refused to recognize the committee.)

"He said that he had received mail from a group which said that we were just a political organization. So he changed his mind.

"As soon as we came back from this interview with him, we gathered all the Daihyo Shas and told them the situation. Because we were not recognized by Colonel Austin we felt we should resign so that new representatives should be elected. Mr. Takahashi was the first to object. He said we should carry on because we had been elected by the people and nothing had been accomplished."¹

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 11, 1944, p. 5.

EDITORIAL

Are you a Critic?

There are many residents who profess to know everything and who continually criticize the negotiation committee for the delay in informing the people of the proceedings of the negotiation or the lack of information of the various meetings.

If these critics would just stop to think how their attitude is proving detrimental to the solution of this problem; how these members of the committee are laboring day and night to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion at the earliest possible day;; they would not heap undue criticism upon these people who have been entrusted with the responsibility of representing the Japanese in here.

They have done a splendid job in trying to improve our welfare. Let's not change our horse in the middle of the stream!"¹

Eventually the Army and the Daihyo Sha Kai came to a temporary agreement and it was decided to hold a mass meeting at the outdoor stage on November 13 at which time Lt. Col. Austin and Mr. Cozzens were to speak to the assembled populace. The Daihyo Sha controlled Tulean Dispatch announced that the negotiating committee would make a report of the proceedings of the conferences at that time.² However, the day before this scheduled mass meeting, the Daihyo Sha met, considered the disadvantages, and decided to cancel it. Kuratomi stated at the beginning of the meeting that relations with the Army had been jeopardized by some colonist who had told the Army that there was internal friction within the Daihyo Sha Kai.

Hayashi told the body:

The impression we got at the negotiations today and yesterday, was that the attitude of the higher authorities was very oppressive. They told us that they suspected the Committee's status - whether it was a true representative body of the people. They pointed

¹Ibid., No. 27

²Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 11, No. 27

and after a long and heated argument, the Takahashi faction, which was fairly well organized by now, convinced the body that the mass meeting should not be held. Mr. Takahashi's logical motives for this act are not known. He may have sincerely believed that the short time allowed for the meeting by the Army would give the Daihyo Sha no opportunity to present their case to the people. However, his stand was also influenced by personal motives of an emotional nature. He had expected to be placed on the permanent Executive Board which had been selected on November 4 and instead found himself holding a less important position on the committee on personnel. Smarting under this disappointment, he came to the November 12 meeting with a group of supporters who heckled the chair, implied that the Negotiating Committee was doing a poor job with the Army and pushed through his contention that the mass meeting should not be held.

November 12 meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai

Chairman Kuratomi made an opening address in which he stated that negotiations with the Army had been ruptured because some Japanese had made a report to the authorities that there was internal friction within the Daihyo Sha. He then asked Hayashi to give a full report of the day's negotiations with the Army:

Hayashi: The impression we got at the negotiations today and yesterday, was that the attitude of the higher authorities was very oppressive. They told us that they suspected the Committee's status -- whether it was a true representative body of the people. They pointed out that it was useless to consult with such a Committee any longer.

According to the minutes Hayashi added that it was absolutely hopeless to continue negotiations.

Sugimoto then made the following pessimistic report on the activities of the Food Investigation Committee.

Sugimoto (Food Investigation Committee): I have been negotiating on the food situation and submitted the full report of the investigation up to date. Authorities' attitude is just as Hayashi described. As for the coal and garbage crews, 130 workers were employed up to date, yet, only 60 are to be retained. As representatives of the colonists the negotiation was pressed, however was refused altogether. [Yesterday, authorities agreed to retain the entire coal and garbage crews and today they changed their mind and reduced the number to such a minimum that we can see that the WRA has no co-operation. Reinstatement of all evacuee workers have been agreed yesterday and they promised to answer by 10:00 a.m. today, but they haven't kept the promise. Authorities know how many workers are required in certain departments, yet they evaded responsibility by bringing in WRA to handle employment matters.] With such an attitude, Daihyo Sha will be unable to get satisfactory results. As a whole, the oppressive attitude of the Army is such that they wouldn't even recognize us. Even regarding the mass meeting, when they questioned us we answered that some 3,000 will attend. Army pointed out that mere 3,000 attendance was only a small part of the Colony and implicated that Daihyo Sha Kai has little support from the colonists. Another thing they pointed out was that among the Negotiating Committee only two are old Tuleans which means that old Tuleans are not supporting you. Our attitude toward the authorities should be as one unified body. Even Chief Steward Hayward showed us the accounts of the mess division. Up to this date, food is still poor and insufficient. There may be other ways of remedying the situation. (1)

Tsuda reported the result of his negotiation with Colonel Austin and WRA officials regarding coal and garbage crews. [Prior to the incident, demand was made to increase the number of employees. Authorities refused to accept it until the next day. Yesterday they showed sincerity of recognizing the Negotiating Committee. Yet, they abruptly terminated hospital employees without notice. Virtually, negotiation has totally ruptured. If authorities' demands are yielded to, colonists will be disadvantaged.] He explained emphatically the position of the Daihyo Sha, who are regarded by the authorities with eyes of suspicion. Even when the authorities accepted the demands of the Daihyo Sha to retain all coal and garbage crews, they informed that they must first consult each worker to determine the intention and the working part will be left up to the authorities' discretion. In other words, authorities will do the selecting.

Chair: Before the selection of the departmental committees by the Selection Committee, the incident occurred and the negotiation was taken up by volunteers for the benefit of the colonists, because of the entrance of the Army. This fact should be fully understood by the Daihyo Sha. As to the mass meeting scheduled for tomorrow we've informed that some 3,000 will attend and we'd like to have permission for it. Colonel Austin replied that only 3,000 relative to 200 Daihyo Sha is too small, which means that political 'color' is evident in the Negotiating Committee. Only one Negotiating Committee from the old Tuleans shows that as a

whole colonists do not support the body.¹ Termination and reduction of the coal and garbage crews were decided by the Army. It is doubtless important for all the employees to resume work, but first of all, during negotiation the colonists should understand the position of the Negotiating Committee.

Tsuchiya: I appreciate the efforts expended by the Negotiating Committee. I suggest that the signatures of all colonists be obtained for submittal to the authorities to prove that they support us. Therefore, I request the Negotiating Committee to remain in their present position and continue with the negotiation.

Tsuda: From the Mess Management, one Fukui has been arrested and his whereabouts is not known at the present time. In spite of that, other employees of that department are not concerned with Fukui's matter and are working daily. I don't see any need of doing that. Seven employees of the Hospital have been terminated without notices. Strong protest should be made.

Yamanaka: Is it true that we are allowed only 45 minutes for the mass meeting tomorrow? 45 minutes isn't enough. Did you accept their proposal? If the authorities should suspect that there's internal friction among us, it's the work of the 'dogs'. I recommend that the Negotiating Committee continue to remain in their present capacity. *inu*

Tsuchiya: Is it really true that we are allowed only 45 minutes for the meeting?

Chair: Yes. That's Army order.

Tsuchiya: I wish you had told us about the limitation of time before the meeting?

Chair: Just because of time limitation, it doesn't mean that the announcement should be withheld.

Tsuchiya: I don't mean to implicate that there are 'dogs' among the Daihyo Sha, but if there should be, such persons should be pointed out now. I request that the Negotiating Committee continue to negotiate as before. *inu*

Mr. Takahashi then began his campaign to cancel the mass meeting. It is evident from the minutes that Takahashi was supported by his faction among whom were Saito, Yamanaka, Yamamoto and Fujimoto.² This clique, after long discussion and much heckling of the chair, was able to sway the body to its point of view.

¹Kuratomi means that this is the opinion of the Army.

²These names were given to the writer by GTK.

Takahashi: [I object to tomorrow's meeting. <I presume there is a notice issued by Colonel Austin, recognizing the departmental committees. Also from what I hear, there is a rumor that the Daihyo Sha Kai is going to dissolve. Please refrain from taking such an action. > 45 minutes for the mass meeting is absolutely not sufficient. I suggest that we give full support to the Negotiating Committee and the Daihyo Sha Kai. I request the Chairman to remain in his present capacity until the end for the sake of the colonists. Central committee will give full support. It isn't the question of success or failure of the negotiation. If the Army doesn't allow more than 45 minutes for the meeting we should notify the Army that the mass meeting will be postponed indefinitely.] (2)

The Chairman stated that since Takahashi was making indirect reference to the fact that the Chairman was evading the responsibility, he requested that Takahashi withdraw the statement.

This statement was further explained to the writer by Mr.

Kuratomi:

"When he (Takahashi) began to pound the table that there was not enough time allowed, he began to accuse the people who had negotiated that day of accepting such (unfavorable) terms from the Army."¹

Takahashi denied Kuratomi's accusation:

Takahashi: I didn't make such a statement.

Chair: Yes, you did. I heard it.

Takahashi: Then refer to the minutes of the meeting.

Chair: Secretary takes only the main points of the meeting.

Tsuchiya: I assure you there was nothing in Mr. Takahashi's statement which was against the Chairman.

Chair: That doesn't make any difference.

Tsuchiya: I want to make sure whether only 45 minutes is allowed for the meeting. It is necessary, at this time, to show the Army our firm determination by obtaining signatures of all colonists by tonight, showing that we fully support the Negotiating Committee.

Chair: It is apparent that we will encounter many obstacles because the Army does not recognize us as the true representatives of the people. [Seven Hospital employees have been terminated and Fukui has been arrested and his whereabouts is unknown. Fearing the consequences, I withheld that announcement,] but as a whole (1)

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 18, 1945, p. 1. The men who did this negotiating and were criticized by Takahashi were: Kuratomi, Tsuda, Sugimoto, Hayashi, and Kimura.

just because of the Army's frivolous attitude, the Negotiating Committee is in a spot. The Committee's efforts will not solve this problem. We have assured the Army that we have the backing of 15,000 colonists. "Try and get it" attitude of the Army and their request to some employees to resume work --- (very ambiguous).

Kuratomu told the writer that what he had explained here was the attitude of the Army toward increasing the number of workers in the crews. "The words he (Colonel Austin) said, were 'Take it or leave it.' This has already been brought out clearly in quoted statements by Tsuda and others.

Kuratomu continued his explanation of this ambiguous translation:

"Another thing I said was that since the negotiations had come to a rupture since the Army does not recognize us as being true representatives of the colonists, we who were negotiating didn't feel we could carry on the task. I bluntly stated that I wanted to resign."

Thereupon Yamamoto, one of the hecklers, who is said to have been drunk at this time, asked:

"If you are at the point of resigning, for what purpose should we call tomorrow's mass meeting?

The meeting continued:

Voice from the floor: If you are at the point of resigning (meaning the Negotiating Committee), for what purpose should we call tomorrow's mass meeting?

Voice from the floor: Should the authorities assume such an attitude, then we should notify all those who are about to resume work to refrain and at the same time, support the Negotiating Committee.

Voice from the floor: Who were the seven Hospital employees terminated?

(Thereupon, Tsuda read the names.)

Tsuchiya: I suggest that signatures of the colonists be obtained in order to let the authorities know that the colonists are fully supporting the Negotiating Committee.

Chair: If that should bring about a satisfactory result, present it at the mass meeting tomorrow.

Tsuchiya: I recommend that forms for colonists' signatures be prepared by Messrs. Takahashi and Iamanaka in time for the meeting tomorrow.

Takahashi: The matter of time, 45 minutes, for tomorrow's meeting is not settled yet. I think that mass meeting is not necessary. Indefinitely postpone it. Signatures can be taken any time.

Voice from the floor: If that's the order from the Army, what's the use of calling the mass meeting tomorrow.

Tsuchiya: I make a suggestion that the resolution be drawn and signatures be obtained and that should be guarded by the Daihyo Sha.

Voice from the floor: Don't let the authorities take advantage of it.

Heckler from the floor: Daihyo Sha are the representatives of the colonists, so let the Daihyo Sha sign it. Same thing.

Chair: Don't leave such a large space on the signature forms or there will be the danger of being utilized for other purposes.

Takahashi: Two forms should be prepared and submitted to the Negotiating Committee and to the Block Managers for safekeeping.

Tsuchiya: Signatures should be submitted at tomorrow's mass meeting and I think it's absolutely necessary. (As he had already forgotten that the decision was made.)

Heckler: Such trifle matter as signatures should be handled by someone other than the Negotiating Committee.

Negotiating Committee: If that's the way you feel, it's o.k. with us. We'll retire. (Thereupon, the Chairman and all other Negotiating Committee left the floor.)

This sounds as if the Negotiating Committee were piqued.

Kuratomi, however, told the writer that this was not the case.

They left the floor (and the meeting place) because their presence was not needed for the detailed preparation of the resolution.

"No, the reason why we left was that they were going to prepare the statement and after that resolution was properly signed, the representatives were going to bring it to us. They wanted to go into further detail."¹

Mr. Takahashi was then elected temporary chairman and discussion was resumed:

¹ ibid.,

Takahashi: The first thing to discuss is how to make good use of the signatures. The question is whether to obtain the signatures by giving support and confidence to the block representatives or to obtain each colonist's signature. Ages of the colonists should also be considered.

Yamagata: If authorities have any suspicion as to the support of the Negotiating Committee by the colonists, such should be announced by means of a P.A. system.

Takahashi: The mass meeting was rejected unanimously so there's no chance of using the P.A. system. The primary problem is to decide how to use the signatures effectively. I think individual signatures are more effective.

Tsuchiya: There is a possibility of abusing the signatures. Therefore, until the submittal of such, Daihyo Sha of each block should take responsibility and guard it.

After a lengthy discussion, the result was as follows:

Signatures be obtained in every block
 Date: November 13, 1943
 Age: 18 years or over, regardless of sex
 Resolution will be printed on top of the signatures
 Two forms will be prepared, one to be given to the authority and other to be retained by either the Daihyo Sha Kai or the Block Managers. The form which is to be submitted to the authority will be a 'copy' form.

The minutes end here. However, Kuratomi informed the writer that they were not complete:

"There was more to the meeting. After the thing was decided, they came back and told us to return to messhall 18. It was pretty late, about 4:30 in the afternoon. When we returned, they told us what had transpired. They reaffirmed full confidence and support in the Negotiating Committee and asked us to continue negotiations with the Army."¹

The following statement had been prepared for presentation to the people at the time of the mass meeting. However, since the meeting was cancelled, it was not used.

STATEMENT

1. We, the members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, feel that it is necessary and our duty to make reports on the progress of the negotiation with the authorities and the business discussed and decided upon at the various meetings of the body at the mass meeting to be held on November 13, 1943, at the outdoor stage.

¹ibid., p. 2.

2. Pursuant to the decision and resolution made at the Daihyo Sha Kai's fourth and fifth meetings, the agenda concerned the formation of departmental committees, which were requested and approved of by the Administration.
3. Furthermore, the following issues will be referred to at this mass meeting:
 - a. General approval of the departmental committees selected by the Daihyo Sha, their numbers, names of the committees, and the tenure of their office.
 - b. In order to facilitate the function of the committee and the maintenance of co-ordination among the block residents, new block representatives (assistants to the committee) be recommended.
 - c. Solicit support and cooperation of the entire colonists.

Tule Lake Daihyo Sha Kai
Negotiating Committee
Address to Tule Lake Center
Colonists

Date: November 13, 1943

Place: Outdoor stage

The petition, pledging support of the Negotiating Committee, which was circulated among the people after November 13 follows. It was headed by the names of the members of the Negotiating Committee proper, the Executive Board members and the committee heads who had taken over an important part of the negotiations, all of whom were now grouped under the title, Negotiating Committee.

Ward I - Kai, Shizue	Kib	Kuratomi, Toshio	Kib
Ward II - Yamamoto, Koichi	Is	Mori, Hyakutaro	Is
Ward III - Uchida, Isamu	Kib	Kimura, Mitsuko	Is
Ward IV - Hoshiko, Hiroshi	Is	Nogawa, Hiroshi	Is
Ward V - Nakao, Hatsumo nobi	Is	Sugimoto, Isamu	Kib
Ward VI - Hayashi, Ichiro	Is	Tsuda, Hiroshi	Kib
Ward VII - Kobayashi, Yukio	Is	Yoshiyama	

RESOLUTION

VOTE OF CONFIDENCE -- We, the undersigned, residents of Block _____ have this day hereby resolved to vest full power and authority to the above-mentioned Negotiating Committee to study, discuss, negotiate, and exercise, incidental or conducive to the carrying out the objects and purposes, for which the Committee was formed; wherein to bring about amicable settlement of our general welfare in the Tule Lake Project.

Signed and dated this 13th day of November, 1943.¹

This petition was signed by more than half the people in camp. Its effect on the attitude of the people was extremely important. According to Japanese ethics, when a Japanese signs anything, he feels himself bound by this act forevermore, even though he ^{may} ~~did~~ not agree with the statement at the time. Naturally, this obligation or giri did not hold all of the signees to everlasting loyalty to the Negotiating Committee. It was, however, a very important psychological factor in the stubborn support ~~of~~ ^{given by} some of the people which followed the committee's detention in the stockade. Many people held to their signed statements on the basis of individual ethics. The power of group pressure, the reiteration of the statement, "Japanese do not go back on their word," which was no doubt used to the hilt by the strong Daihyo Sha Kai supporters, was extremely potent in this respect. A man might ~~never~~ in his heart, but he could not bear to become publicly stigmatized as a man who broke his word. It is the opinion of the writer that this particular phenomenon approached more closely to the precepts of Yamato damashii, the term by which the abstract, extremely complicated and poorly-understood conception of the Japanese Spirit is known, than any other attitude held during the camp's history. In other words, this is one of the few attitudes manifested in Tule Lake which can be traced, even though only in part, to genuine Japanese ideology.²

Any comment? R. H.

¹ibid., Sept. 15, 1944, p. 4.

²This point is made here because much later in camp history a group purporting to base its activities entirely on Japanese ideology appeared and profoundly affected the sociological development. This manifestation, however, was ~~so~~ entirely synthetic. Moreover, it was so labled by most of the level headed Japanese in camp.

not sufficient explanation. Better delete this. This is "Bushido" concept not "Yamato" damashii.

Discussion of the November 12 meeting.

This was an extremely important meeting. Unmistakable indications of disintegration in the body were apparent. The very precarious relationship with the Army due in part to the disagreement over the number of men who were to resume work and in part to the work of informers had produced an atmosphere of discouragement and pessimism, which led to the adoption of negative rather than positive actions. This is the first meeting where unmistakable organized heckling from a faction opposed to the leaders made its appearance. The repeated reference to dogs or informers is also indicative of disintegration.

It is possible that Chairman Kuratomi and the other members of the Negotiating Committee were so discouraged by the turn of affairs with the Army that they were not altogether reluctant to allow Takahashi to have his own way in this matter and assume some of the responsibility for the time being. This, as will be shown later, proved to be an error of irremediable gravity.

The only positive action undertaken at the meeting was the decision to prepare and obtain signatures for a petition which was intended to prove to the Army that the Negotiating Committee had the support of the people.

Attitudes on the Petition

It will be difficult but I shall try to get some honest expressions of attitudes felt at this time. I may have some buried in unsuspected places in my notes. R. H.

The prestige of the Daihyo Sha and the Negotiating Committee had already suffered noticeably by the imposition of Army rule. Although some individuals, perhaps as many as half of the camp residents (???) signed the petition out of stubborn support of

their representatives many must have signed it out of fear of censure from their more stubborn neighbors and acquaintances. The presentation of the petition to the people was done in a manner which would guarantee the maximum of public pressure, at block meetings where anyone who did not sign would be observed. An interesting description from some young women who were extremely anti-Daihyo Sha was given to the writer. The number of individuals of this sentiment was probably ~~very~~ small, the informant being a member of the extreme conservative group. It will be noted that she signed:

"They had everything written down and would put it in front of your face and say, 'You sign it!' If you didn't sign it the next thing you'd know, you'd be beaten to a pulp. It nearly broke my heart when I had to sign it. They said, 'Don't anyone walk out that door.' I wanted to walk out but my husband wouldn't let me."

Another young girl present added:

"I fooled them. I said I was under age (under 18) and walked out."¹

THE MASS MEETING

The people were notified in their messhalls on the morning of November 13 that there would be no mass meeting that afternoon. This intelligence, however, did not penetrate to the Army or WRA. Lt. Col. Austin and Mr. Cozzins prepared their speeches in advance. Dr. Opler, who

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 14, 1944, p. 3.

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out that it was useless to consult with such a Committee any longer."¹

Suginoto, the head of the Food Investigation Committee made the following pessimistic report:

I have been negotiating on the food situation and submitted the full report of the investigation up to date. Authorities' attitude is just as Hayashi described. As for the coal and garbage crews, 130 workers were employed up to date, yet only 60 are to be retained. . . . Yesterday, authorities agreed to retain the entire coal and garbage crews and today they changed their mind and reduced the number to such a minimum that we can see that the WPA has no co-operation. Rein-statement of all evacuee workers have been agreed yesterday and they promised to answer by 10:00 a. m. today, but they haven't kept the promise As a whole, the oppressive attitude of the Army is such that they wouldn't even recognize us. Even regarding the mass meeting, when they questioned us we answered that some 3,000 will attend. Army pointed out that mere 3,000 attendance was only a small part of the Colony and implicated that Daihyo Sha Kai has little support from the colonists. Another thing they pointed out was that among the Negotiating Committee only two are old Tuleans which means that old Tuleans are not supporting you (Daihyo Sha).²

Kuratomi explained to the body that the incident (of Nov. 4) had occurred before the selection of the departmental committees, and that "the negotiations had been taken up by volunteers for the benefit of the colonists." Tsuchiya suggested that the signatures of the colonists be obtained as proof of public support.

The fact that the army was allowing only 45 minutes for the mass meeting scheduled for the next day was then discussed. Takahashi then stated that 45 minutes was absolutely insufficient and that if the Army would give no more time the mass meeting should be postponed indefinitely.

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Chair: It is apparent that we will encounter many obstacles because the Army does not recognize us as the true representatives of the people. Seven Hospital employees have been terminated and Fukui has been arrested and his whereabouts is unknown. Fearing the consequences, I

¹ Minutes of the Meeting of the Tule Lake Center Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 12, p. 1.

² Ibid.

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withheld that announcement, but as a whole just because of the Army's frivolous attitude, the Negotiating Committee is on the spot. The Committee's efforts will not solve this problem. We have assured the Army that we have the backing of 15,000 colonists. "Try and get it" attitude of the Army and their request to some employees to resume work * * *

Voice from the floor: If you are at the point of resigning, for what purpose should we call tomorrow's mass meeting?

Voice from the floor: Should the authorities assume such an attitude, then we should notify all those who are about to resume work to refrain and at the same time, support the Negotiating Committee.

* * * * *

Chair: Seven Negotiating Committee have already resigned because of several reasons. One of which is that the Army bluntly stated "try and get it" which discouraged them.

Tsuchiya: I recommend that forms for colonists' signature be prepared by Messrs. Takahashi and Yamanaka in time for the meeting tomorrow.

Takahashi: The matter of time, 45 minutes, for tomorrow's meeting is not settled yet. I think that mass meeting is not necessary. Indefinitely postpone it. Signatures can be taken at any time.

Voice from the floor: If that's the order from the Army, what's the use of calling the mass meeting tomorrow?

Chair: I favor Takahashi's recommendation. Unanimously approved by body.)

Tsuchiya: I make a suggestion that the resolution be drawn and signatures be obtained and that should be guarded by the Daihyo Sha.

Voice from the floor: Don't let the authorities take advantage of it.

Heckler from the floor: Daihyo Sha are the representatives of the colonists, so let the Daihyo Sha sign it. Same thing.

Chair: Don't leave such a large space on the signature forms or there will be the danger of being utilized for other purposes.

Takahashi: Two forms should be prepared and submitted to the Negotiating Committee and to the Block Managers for safekeeping.

Tsuchiya: Signatures should be submitted at tomorrow's mass meeting and I think it's absolutely necessary. (He had already forgotten that the decision was made).

¹Ibid., p. 3.

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Heckler: Such trifling matter as signatures should be handled by someone other than the Negotiating Committee.

Negotiating Committee: If that's the way you feel, it's o.k. with us. We'll retire. (Thereupon, the Chairman and all other Negotiating Committee left the floor.)

Takahashi was elected temporary Chairman and the discussion on signatures continued.

Takahashi: The first thing to discuss is how to make good use of the signatures. The question is whether to obtain the signatures by giving support and confidence to the block representatives or to obtain each colonists' signature. Ages of the colonists should also be considered.

Yamagata: If authorities have any suspicion as to the support of the Negotiating Committee by the colonists, such should be announced by means of a P.A. system.

Takahashi: The mass meeting was rejected unanimously so there's no chance of using the P.A. system. The primary problem is to decide how to use the signatures effectively. I think individual signatures are more effective.

Tsuchiya: There is a possibility of abusing the signatures. Therefore, until the submittal of such, Daihyo Sha of each block should take responsibility and guard it.

After a lengthy discussion, the result was as follows:

Signatures be obtained in every block
Date: November 13, 1943
Age: 18 years or over, regardless of sex
Resolution will be printed on top of the signatures
Two forms will be prepared, one to be given to the authority and other to be retained by either the Daihyo Sha Kai or the Block Managers. The form which is to be submitted to the authority will be a 'copy' form.¹

This petition was circulated at this time. It is not known how many were obtained nor whether a copy was presented to the Army. If it was, it had no effect on the Army. The aftermath of the cancelled mass meeting swept it into the background.

Lt. Col. Austin and Mr. Cozzins were not aware of or ignored this cancellation, and prepared their speeches in advance. Dr. Opler, who

¹Ibid., pp. 3-5

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saw Cozzens' prepared speech says that it began: "It is a pleasure to talk to so many people." On November 13, soldiers marched into the camp and set up the public address system. An entire company of soldiers stationed themselves before the platform. The speakers arrived, mounted the platform and prepared to deliver their addresses. Not a single Japanese arrived to hear them. Austin and Cozzens doggedly gave their speeches, but to an empty fire-break. Two good observers, Opler and Spicer were present and describe the event:

"I stayed away from the platform. But I saw that the central firebreak was crowded with people. I saw more baby carriages than I've ever seen before. It was a studied indifference, people sweeping their front stoops; there were about ten football games going on in the fire-break."¹

X. reporting on what Spicer told him:

"Lt. Col. Austin . . . arrived at the scene a little before the set time with a detachment of M. P's. Armed guards were stationed around the stage and armored cars made a cordon around the ground where an audience was supposed to gather. In preparing this space the M.P's had to clear out some kids playing football in part of the field, but the kids moved on willingly. At two O'clock no one came, and there was no sign of any one coming to hear his speech. Like an Army man true to his tradition, Austin began his speech. No one was there. Not a single soul! Lt. Col. Austin spoke to the air. There were some young girls coming along. They stopped, looked on, and a few moments later moved on to resume their walks toward their destinations. There were other men who passed by while the army officer spoke to the air, but they did not pay any attention and passed on. 'It was a pitiful sight which I cannot forget. I was there,' Spicer related with unusual emotion."²

The Daihyo Sha Kai explained its cancellation of the mass meetings in the November 13 Tulean Dispatch:

CENTER WIDE MASS MEETING CANCELLED

Delegates not Recognized, Reports Committee

Feeling that there wasn't any necessity for a mass meeting, the sixty odd block delegates present at the representatives meeting held

¹Notes, March, pp. 56, 57

²X's Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, p. 6.

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yesterday afternoon at mess 18 voted unanimously to cancel the meeting scheduled for this afternoon at the community stage. The negotiating committee had planned to make a detailed report to the entire residents as to the proceedings of the conferences. However with the temporary termination of the negotiations with the Army officials, the committee members felt that there wasn't any report to be made to the center at such a meeting.

The committee reported to the elected delegates present that the negotiations with the Army had been cancelled because the Army did not recognize the committee as true representatives of the people. According to the committee, the Army felt that they know how many workers were needed in each division and the WRA having worked with the Japanese should know who should work in each division.

The entire congregation expressed unanimous accord that there wasn't any necessity for negotiations if the Army had taken such an attitude.¹

This humiliation was not to be endured. The army abandoned its vain policy of attempting to contact "a real Negotiating Committee" and, in an effort once and for all to root the leadership out of camp, ordered the arrest of the Negotiating Committee. Martial law was declared; a strict curfew from 7 p. m. to 6 a. m. was ordered. Those captured were placed in a separate stockade surrounded by a man-proof fence and watch towers. However, Kai, Kuratomi, Komura, Sugimoto, and Hayashi were not to be found.

Whether the Army at this time went in for wholesale internments must be checked. Evacuee informants imply this:

"Then, the first thing that happened, the army started to put people in the stockade. At one time there must have been from 125 to 150. That is a small estimate. (The informant is correct when he says this is a small estimate.) In this block about six were taken. They weren't any of the block representatives, it so happened. The boys yanked from here happened to be Hawaiian born. They suspected the Hawaiians because the ringleader came from Hawaii. That was Kai."²

"They took a person and his three room mates here. Only the room mates were just living with him. But a bachelor can't live by himself in one room. They keep taking people into the stockade."³

¹ Ibid., November 13.

² Notes, Feb., p. 11.

³ Notes, Mar., p. 34.

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This humiliation was not to be endured. The army abandoned all attempt to deal with the Negotiating Committee and, in an effort once and for all to root the leadership out of camp, ordered their arrest. Martial law was declared: a strict curfew from 7 p. m. to 6 a. m. was ordered. Those captured were placed in the Army "bull-pen" a couple of tents fenced in by a strong wire fence. However, Kai, Kuratomi, Komura, Sugimoto, and Hayashi escaped the arrest and hid themselves.

¹ ibid., November 13

GRADUAL DISINTEGRATION OF DAIHYO SHA KAI

Developments now entered a new phase. The Daihyo Sha Kai went on the defensive and began a losing conflict with the Army. Kai and Kuratomi attempted to continue to direct procedure from hiding, but this did not work well. The increasingly stern policy of the army was met by an increasingly stubborn deadlock on the part of the colonists which even at present (June 1944) is not resolved in all its phases. This deadlock was termed "the status quo" by the people, and consisted of a policy of passive non-cooperation with the Army and WRA, continuing the partial strike, refusing to betray the leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai, and refusing to elect a new representative body. The Army redoubled its attempts to find the leaders and the people became more and more convinced of the responsibility not to give up the status quo until the interned persons were released.

This responsibility toward the interned representatives was called giri by the Japanese. Giri signifies a moral obligation, in this case, a moral obligation toward the men enduring imprisonment because they had attempted to "benefit the people." This sentiment developed until it held a powerful place in the attitudes of the colonists. As will be shown later, the passing of six months did not weaken it.

A new sub-body of the Daihyo Sha Kai made its appearance after the leaders went into hiding. This body was called the Coordinating Committee and its origin is mysterious. It may have been the uninterned members of that body purportedly selected by Reverend Kai on the night of November 4th. It met almost daily from November 14 to Dec. 1 in a futile attempt to carry on Daihyo Sha policies, but was split by internal dissention, uncertainty, fear and by the difficulty of contrasting Kai and Kuratomi. This body (which is not to be confused

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and was selected by the Daihyo Sha not to replace the interned committee-men but to act as a temporary substitute in negotiating with the Administration. The selection of a legitimate new committee would have been considered a betrayal of the original committee and an admission that this body had been in the wrong. This is the first time this attitude manifested itself. It was later to assume great importance. As explained by Kuratomi:

"After the Negotiating Committee was put on the spot and was hunted down by the Army, the remaining block representatives didn't feel they should elect any other body until the incident was satisfactorily closed. So they felt they shouldn't elect any committee to negotiate with the WRA and the Army and that was the greatest difficulty. So as a substitute they had the so-called, I believe it is translated Co-ordinating Committee, but that really isn't a proper name. On it were Yamatani, Yamanaka and Kawamura. They made themselves clear that they would not negotiate except through the Negotiating Committee."¹

This body (which should not be confused with the WRA and Army supported Co-ordinating Committee of January to June of 1944) met almost daily from November 14 to December 1 in a futile attempt to carry on Daihyo Sha policies, but was split by internal dissension, uncertainty, fear, and by the difficulty of contacting Kai and Kuratomi.

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 18, 1944, p. 9.

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with the WRA and Army supported Coordinating Committee of Jan. to June 1944) grasped at the Spanish Consul as their chief refuge, and on November 15 sent him a telegram signed by Yamatani. The body also selected a man from each ward (seven people) to coordinate with the Daihyo Sha Kai. These ward coordinators were to hold their places only until the arrival of the Spanish Consul, at which time the Negotiating Committee (in hiding) was to come forth and resume negotiations.¹ On November 19 the Spanish Consul replied, "no instruction received from the Spanish Embassy, Washington; state the reason for my coming to Tule Lake Center. The Daihyo Sha Coordinating Committee after consultation sent the following reply:

"Colonists are no longer able to endure the inconveniences caused by the martial law and desire nothing but normalcy; we request for your immediate visit".²

However, the words Martial Law were deleted by the censor and may have left the Spanish Consul in ignorance as to what the colonists were no longer able to endure.

On November 14 the following statement was issued by an anonymous source. This source was probably the most radical faction of the Daihyo Sha Kai, who had had access to or took part in the framing of the resolution which Kai and Kuratomi were to release two weeks later.³

Anonymous Statement

The only way to oppose and protest the Army's oppressive barbarous action is to internationalize the problem from the angle of humanity.

¹Minutes of the Meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai Nov. 14, 1943

²Ibid., Nov. 19.

³See pp. 72, 73, Three of the demands are the same.

In fact, the style is identical with that of a certain younger member of the Negotiating Committee whom the writer knows very well. This young man is extremely radical, took part in the funeral fracas, was one of the leaders of the group who guarded the warehouse, and later, in the stockade, became known for the unrestrained violence of his sentiments. It is very possible that he had prepared this statement to present to the people in the event that he was picked up. The statement was issued the day after he was taken:

"The only way to oppose and protest the Army's oppressive barbarous action is to internationalize the problem from the angle of humanity.

*Sounds all right. Such a pattern
is not uncommon*

*I think he's going
a little far here.*

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1. Demand immediate releasement of all those detained.
 2. Demand resignation en masse of WRA appointed personnel
 3. Demand immediate withdrawal of the Army from the Center.
 4. Close all mess halls from this afternoon and enter mass hunger strike. All mess chiefs are hereby instructed to distribute whatever available food supplied among block residents.
 5. Even at the risk of a torn-down door, every one should prevent the entrance of the Army into the living quarters when search is conducted.
 6. Close all canteens.

Think of the Santa Anita incident. We are confident that the ultimate victory is ours.

Second Negotiating Committee

The Daihyo Sha of ward ^{VII} eight countered with a resolution as follows:

1. Second Negotiating Committee's urgent instruction is premature.
2. All colonists are requested to remain cool and calm until the arrival of the Spanish Consul at which time negotiations will be properly conducted in compliance with the International Agreement.
3. Do not close mess hall, despite many circulating rumors.
4. Colonists should keep calm until the formulation of a definite future policy by the Daihyo Sha Kai.
5. Signatures of the colonists obtained yesterday should be withheld by the Daihyo Sha Kai for the time being.
6. Colonists are requested to entrust full confidence to the block representatives and refrain from believing rumors.

The colonists were not impressed by this statement of the self-styled "Second Negotiating Committee". In fact, this premature action did definite harm to the remaining Daihyo Sha members, since many people became confused and identified this anonymous radical body with the uninterned members of the Daihyo Sha. Some colonists took the attitude: "These men are not our representatives. Our representatives are interned."

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After several weeks the tension and boredom, brought about by the complete cessation of all activities began to tell upon the people.

"Curfew hours here is 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. so we can't go out nights as we did before. Soon as I have supper I run over to Ma's and bring home rice and we eat before going to bed. They say this curfew is until things settle. The Spanish Consul is coming here again soon. So I hear there are all kinds of "dema" (wild rumors) about this camp. Right now they're taking in all the big shots. Can't hide very well until things settle.¹" (N. 262 let. N. 20)

"Right now curfew is in effect and martial law at the same time. No can go out from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. Anyway, there's no place to go, it's too cold (maybe sour grapes). Right now there's no movies or Engel kai or anything. Just Japanese schools in every ward. I use to go to the night school, but since the curfew I don't even study The army is still in; they're delivering all the vegetables and food stuff to the messhalls accompanied by armored cars, jeeps, peep, and lots of dumb soldier boys. Boy, those soldiers certainly get razzing from the Japs. Some even say, "Instead of fighting harmless Japs in a cage, why don't you go to the Solomons where you'll find plenty of competition." Perhaps this letter will be censored, if so tell me."² (SN26.2.N.16)

"Everything seems and looks cold and still and melancholine. . . . Everything seems unchangeable like yesterday. The confine has not cleared out yet. No parcel and no money order can send out and every letters has examined. Three Niseis who came from Hawaii to live in this block were arrested this morning at 3 a.m. If you will not hear from me for the quite few days in the near future, you must understand that I am arrested. Don't forget that it will be possible."³

"The center is quite as usual, but it seems to me there is something very dull but with tension among us. At the present time, none knows how long this unfortunate situation will continue. And whether army will take control permanently or not is a big problem for people of the center and everyone is anxious to know."⁴

¹From a letter dated Nov. 20 in X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 26, p.2

²Ibid., a letter dated Nov. 16

³Ibid., letter dated Nov. 20, Nov. 26, p.1.

⁴Notes, Feb. p. 24

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Several reliable informants state that the people received no vegetable except occasional beets for two months. As the dull weeks passed, the food became worse. The unemployed people missed their monthly checks and their clothing allowance which an individual does not receive unless he works or unless he goes on relief, which is an extended process surrounded by red tape. Considerable criticism was vented upon the Negotiating Committee even by its supporters. Their arrogant, demanding manner was criticized, the demands were considered too numerous, some demands were called silly or fantastic. The actions of the radical fringe were condemned.

K. a supporter, said:

"I think they demanded too many things at one time."¹

O., a conservative said:

"I think some of the people (Negotiating Committee) wanted power. They say 'We're working for the people. . . ' I believe they're working for themselves Maybe they really tried to bring the center better, but their demands were more like orders than suggestions."² A8

I., a sympathizer says:

"But there wasn't any representative who spoke real good English. Their terminology sounded more like a demand. It was a misunderstanding. Some allowance should be made for this lack of education in the English language. Their requests might have been couched in dictatorial terms.

Of course a lot of their requests as far as I'm concerned is purely nonsense . . . Some of the representatives weren't exactly the people who ought to be acting as representatives. You can understand that trouble can arise from a fanatical kibe being a representative."³

"I's" brother said:

"If they had had enough brains to kick aside the unreasonable requests and settle the reasonable ones, everybody would have been satisfied."⁴

¹Report, Dec. 24, p. 12

²Notes, Feb., p. 8

³Ibid., pp. 11, 14

⁴Notes, Mar., p. 8.

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N., a sympathizer says:

"The Negotiating Committee stating that all the administrative staff withdraw - that's fantastic in my personal opinion. If I was running one of the Japanese camps and the prisoner of war tell me to resign . . . I don't think the Japanese government would stand for it."¹

Kurihara, who might be termed a neutral says:

"To a great extent the Kaihyo Sha Kai has distorted the facts to make people believe they are working for the good of Japan - when to a great extent they are not."²

The Co-op group which is definitely unsympathetic, made the following criticisms. These must not be considered criticisms of the people.

"Nobody knows exactly who they (the Planning Board) were. Probably they were elected by pressure group methods."³

"I can't see why they tried to destroy everything like that. To me, what they did was not constructive, just destructive."

"They're chronic agitators."

"They're attitude was not at all conciliatory. I think they were inexperienced in negotiating. They were running away from their objective, demanding and making it impossible to grant."

"They really didn't have any right to order. They were supported by everybody. Really, I don't think they were working for improvement in the center."⁴

The most irksome and demoralizing factor which the people had to endure was the lack of money for wages and clothing allowance. Mr. Kurihara believes this was the primary cause for the eventual breaking of the strike.

¹ Ibid., p. 12

² Ibid., p. 53

³ Notes, Feb., p. 27

⁴ Notes, Mar., pp. 18, 19

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"I" says:

"Besides their finances were petering out. Here - they're still paying off on October checks (statement made Feb. 1). Now these fellows who were not working got no clothing allowance, no welfare, no income."¹

"N" says on this subject:

"Criticism grew (as status quo dragged on). People had no clothes. They tried to get their shoes fixed. . . . With the canteens and things, the people were growing broke. Say I have \$2,000. My friend has only \$10. When his money is gone and he sees my children eating, he would like his children to get the same thing."²

"P" a young woman who supported the group which later helped break the status quo said:

"We got no fresh fruit or vegetables all that month. (after November 4). On Thanksgiving we had bologna."³

The extremely poor quality and the small quantity of the food served during the status quo period has been commented upon by all informants regardless of their sentiment toward the pressure groups or toward the Administration. Almost no vegetables canned or fresh were served during this period except potatoes and occasionally beets. No eggs at all were served. The general consensus of opinion when those unhappy days are recalled now is "The food was lousy."

Conflicting strongly with these critical attitudes was the conviction that the block representatives of the Daihyo Sha Kai and the Negotiating Committee, the acting head of the body, were the legitimate representatives of the people and as such could not be cast off or betrayed. The block meetings at which the men had been appointed or elected, the several petitions which were signed during the period of conflict and the fact that these men had stood courageously

¹Notes, Feb., p. 12

²Notes, April, p. 21

³ibid., p. 27

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against the administration for the betterment of the people, a tremendously important psychological factor, bound the people to the Daihyo Sha Kai with a loyalty which, although it faltered at times, was never more than partially overcome. The people murmured and complained over the hardships; they criticised the policy and attitude of the Daihyo Sha Kai; but, very significantly, nobody challenged their position as representatives of the people. Having once selected them, the people were morally obliged (giri) to stand behind them to the end.

"N" who criticised some of the demands as fantastic also said:

"Those fellows in the stockade - everybody signed their names after November 4th saying these people are the true representatives! As more and more say in here (this statement was made in March 1944) we signed our names saying these men are our representatives; it isn't right to give in."¹

I asked "N" why the hiding leaders were not given up. He replied:

"Because the Japanese people, once they sign their names and state a fact! I backed the Negotiating Committee up. Everyone signed that in the mess hall. How can they betray them as a man? As a man, after signing the petition I couldn't back up. At that time it was a majority."²

K, not a supporter of the Daihyo Sha said in March:

In every case the Negotiating Committee who were elected even by a few hundred people must be considered the legitimate representatives of the people."³

"I" who called some of the Daihyo Sha Kai's requests, "purely nonsense" also said the following:

"What you call representatives always existed previous to the trouble. Out of those representatives, a lot relocated and new comers were elected to take their place There were quite a few old ones (in the Daihyo Sha) and that's one of the reasons why the people got so burnt up."⁴

¹ Notes, March, 1943, p. 11

² Notes, April, 1943, p. 21.

³ Notes, March, 1943, p. 15

⁴ ibid., p. 41.

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When the writer questioned "I" further on the extent of support he insisted stubbornly:

"They might have been goon-squads but they were representatives!"¹

M. a member of the Daihyo Sha who resigned later said:

"At that time everybody believed in the Daihyo Sha, because we all had one camp and were trying to make it liveable."²

The conclusion that the Daihyo Sha Kai was supported by a majority of the people is based not only on these verbatim statements, but also on many informal conversations.

ATTITUDE OF WRA AFTER ENTRANCE OF ARMY

WRA which had had no intention of giving up the center at any time, and probably had not expected that the Army would take charge so thoroughly or maintain its rule so long, began a campaign to get the Army out of camp. A vital part of this plan consisted of an attempt to organize the community, to get a body of representatives who could be dealt with on WRA terms. Several attempts were made to reestablish contact with remnants of the Negotiating Committee. But the ever growing number of arrests foiled the Administration's efforts. On one occasion the Advisory Council (function and origin of this body to be explained in preface) met with a group; the next day 80% of the group were picked up.

For the first two months the rule of the Army was extremely strict. No personnel member was allowed to enter the colony without military guard, which, in November and December, meant a big jeep and several soldiers. Later this guard was reduced to one soldier.

¹ ibid.

² ibid., p. 64.

Opler gives an account of his experiences at this time:

"Things were tight as a drum. There was no way of talking above the din of the army. At first it was worse (military rule). You had to have a jeep to get into camp. I put off a trip to my office because I had to take the army with me. Not a little puddle jumper jeep but one of the big armored cars with a couple of soldiers. You couldn't go to see people. The army was stern and forbidding.

"Certain elements in the WRA were trying to reach the Army. How to get the Army out? The Advisory Council had meetings with the Daihyo Sha remnants after the pickups. Unfortunately the army picked so many up - (getting names) from former Daihyo Sha's notebooks. On one occasion we met with a group. The next week 80% of them had been picked up."¹

Many evacuees who tried to deal with the Army independently were also picked up:

"I's" brother says:

"They went to talk to Austin. But they didn't get any place. Some guys went and hollered louder. They got picked up. The loudest ones just got yanked, that's all."²

M. says:

"The Administration promised to negotiate and talk things over (after November 4) They thought they could pull them all in and everything would be all clear. Everytime we asked for a chance to talk things over we got picked up."³

I. says:

"The people hiding out had information that was vital for maintaining peace and normalcy in the center. But if they showed their face outside they would be put in the stockade. And so naturally, the only thing they could do was hide out."⁴

CONTINUED DISINTEGRATION OF THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

The Daihyo Sha met on November 16. Yamatani stated that he believed the Spanish Consul would arrive in the center in a few days and added that meanwhile, the Coordinating Committee was doing its

¹Notes, Mar., pp. 58, 59

²Ibid., p. 7

³Ibid., pp. 62, 63

⁴Notes, Feb., p. 14

CONTINUED DISINTEGRATION OF THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

The Daihyo Sha Kai met on November 16. In the absence of Kuratomi, who was hiding, Yamagata was appointed temporary chairman. Yamatani, a member of the Co-ordinating Committee, stated that he believed the Spanish Consul would arrive in the center in a few days and added that meanwhile, the Co-ordinating Committee was doing its best not to override the Negotiating Committee. He complained that he had been threatened by Yoshiyama, because he (Yamatani) was not supporting the Negotiating Committee sufficiently. Yoshiyama, a member of the Negotiating Committee, was in the custody of the Army at this time. ~~Yoshiyama's~~ It is however possible that the threat was made by a friend of Yoshiyama's. In any case, the ill feeling between the Co-ordinating Committee and the Negotiating Committee is ~~made~~ clearly apparent in the minutes:

YAMATANI: I believe the Spanish Consul will arrive in this center in a few days. We, the co-ordinating committee, are trying our best not to override the authority of the Negotiating Committee. The decision of the matter rests upon the Negotiating Committee's jurisdiction. Yesterday as I was waiting for the co-op truck to be transported to the warehouse where I work, Yoshiyama approached me and made threatening remarks to the effect that if I didn't support the Negotiating Committee, he will see to it that I be duly penalized. I have been doing my best to contact the Spanish Consul to visit this center. Yet, my integrity has been doubted by some Negotiating Committee which I just can't stand for.

KAWAMURA: Do you object to the attitude of the Negotiating Committee?

YAMATANI: Yes, especially when my integrity is looked upon with doubt. It is intollerable.

YAMAGATA: As one of the co-ordinating committee members, my opinion is the same with Mr. Yamatani's.

KAWAMURA: I feel the same way. Colonists bring all their complaints and grievances to the co-ordinating committee just because the Negotiating Committee members are hiding. They don't realize that we have no authority to negotiate with the Administration or the army. On top of that we are regarded with suspicion, that I, for one, thought of resigning.

YAMATANI: I understand how Mr. Kawamura feels since I feel the same way. However in due time, the Spanish consul will come here. Until that time, I wish you would refrain from resigning.

KAWAMURA: I recommend the institution of a sub-Co-ordinating Committee in each ward. (the body unanimously agreed to accept)

Kamiya suggested that two representatives be instituted in each block, which was unanimously approved by the body. Kamiya explained in details his recommendation, mentioning the advantages to be gained by having extra representatives. Nakano added that only one of the two representatives from each block has the voice and the right to vote. His suggested plan was accepted.

Chair then cautioned the members present that all kinds of rumors are being spread. To control such, some plan should be formed he stated. However no plan was made.

Another suggestion was that inasmuch as those arrested are suffering mentally and materially, block representatives should take responsibility in making fully reports of such, in order to prevent occurrence of possible tragedy in the near future. Yamatani cited an incident which occurred in Block 31, where the M.P. had no regard or consideration for the children. The group therein decided to investigate and report to the committee headquarters immediately.

In order to meet the incurred expenses by the committee members, it was suggested that funds be raised. Tokunaga at once agreed to the suggestion and recommended that one treasurer be appointed from the Committee.

YAMATANI: One treasurer is not enough. At least one from each ward or seven persons in all should be appointed. (Body unanimously accepted the suggestion)

Toshio Shimonishi, a big husky fellow, was now introduced as the official messenger of Kai, Kuratomi, Hayashi and Kimura, the hiding members of the Negotiating Committee. However, Yamamoto, a member of the Negotiating Committee who, for some reason, had not been picked up, questioned the authority of the hiding men to give instructions from hiding. He felt he should have been called in to consult with them on policy.

"They are undeniably dictatorial on their action, I for one, as original Negotiating Committee have never been consulted by those hiding committee. I don't want to approve of such an attitude."

This is the first indication of an open split between the leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai. The sense of obligation the newly formed "Co-ordinating Committee" felt toward the hiding leaders must have been small indeed to warrant some of the statements which followed. A "voice from the floor" added its criticism:

"By their action (hiding Committee) I don't think there is any necessity of maintaining the Co-ordinating Committee. Why doesn't the Negotiating Committee come out and take the initiative in the negotiating with the Administration and the Army."

The body agreed that the hiding leaders should have consulted with the two members of the Negotiating Committee who were not hiding.

KOZUMA: Out of 14 Negotiating Committee members, eight are known. If the others keep on hiding and we continue to maintain the Co-ordinating Committee and the special messenger, we would be regarded as if we are intentionally assisting the hiding Negotiating Committee. Result would be that the responsibility of the hiding Negotiating Committee will be assumed by the Co-ordinating Committee which we cannot afford to do.

Immediately upon such a statement, several persons voiced, "Why don't the Negotiating Committee members come out like a man?"

Thereupon the chair explained as to how and when the Co-ordinating Committee of seven was formed. Yamatani believed that Shimonishi should be included in the existing Co-ordinating Committee of seven to work together. He then appealed to Yamamoto and Hoshiko to understand their position and recognize Shimonishi as one of the Co-ordinating Committee for the good of the Daihyo Sha Kai. The Chair then stated that Co-ordinating Committee problem should be tabled to make way for discussion of other matters.

SHIMONISHI: The Negotiating Committee members expressed their thanks for the efforts of the Co-ordinating Committee during their absence.

Mess supervisors' problem should be reconsidered.

Shimonishi then took out a note from the Negotiating Committee and read to the body.

It was requested that the Negotiating Committee be supported by the colonists. (Comment of the translator: Evidently the Committee wanted to make sure the colonists sign this, signifying that they were still supporting the Negotiating Committee as shown by the following statement made by Shimonishi.)

SHIMONISHI: After this statement is accepted by the Daihyo Sha Kai, each block representative should post it in their respective mess halls, in order to inform the residents the purpose of the signatures.

Atmosphere of the meeting appeared very tense for the Chairman requested an intermission of five minutes stating that the statement was of such significance that subsequent to the intermission the subject will be duly discussed.
After intermission

YAMANAKA: (questioning Shimonishi) Is the statement that you just read the same with the one which was previously presented to the Daihyo Sha Kai?

KAWAMURA: (gave the explanation instead of Shimonishi): I read it and found it altogether different.

YAMAMOTO: We have already discussed the content of the statement previously at the Daihyo Sha Kai meeting so I think it is unnecessary to repeat it.

TOKUNAGA: We have already passed a resolution resolving that the entire colonists supported the Negotiating Committee by signatures.

YAMATANI: If the suggestion from Ward 7 by which the Daihyo Sha Kai adopted the status quo policy was really instructed by those hiding committee the attitude of the Daihyo Sha Kai would have been much different. By the way who are the responsible parties who published the statement on November 14 on which the title "Second Negotiating Committee" was printed. Without knowing the source of it, we will be very much confused as to the extent of our reliance and as to what extent we may act upon such instruction which may come again in the future. Since we have decided to uphold the status quo policy until the arrival of the Spanish Consul, it is advisable for us to wait until then.

Chair then explained in detail all the business taken up by the Daihyo Sha so that Shimonishi could convey it to the hiding Negotiating Committee.

NAKASHIMA: I wish to add that new recruits, to handle luggage that came from other centers worked voluntarily for the benefit of those who had been deprived of winter clothing. Please tell the Negotiating Committee that our intentions were to relieve the inconveniences suffered by the newcomers.

SHIMONISHI: Even though you (the group present) claim that you are giving your utmost support to the Negotiating Committee, there are some Daihyo Sha who are spreading irresponsible statements against the Committee, which peeves the committee very much. The inconvenience we are subjected to suffer at this time are for our final victory in the near future.

SHIMONISHI: After this statement is accepted by the Daihyo Sha Kai, each block representative should post it in their respective mess halls, in order to inform the residents the purpose of the signatures.

Atmosphere of the meeting appeared very tense for the Chairman requested an intermission of five minutes stating that the statement was of such significance that subsequent to the intermission the subject will be duly discussed.
After intermission

YAMANAKA: (questioning Shimonishi) Is the statement that you just read the same with the one which was previously presented to the Daihyo Sha Kai?

KAWAMURA: (gave the explanation instead of Shimonishi): I read it and found it altogether different.

YAMAMOTO: We have already discussed the content of the statement previously at the Daihyo Sha Kai meeting so I think it is unnecessary to repeat it.

TOKUNAGA: We have already passed a resolution resolving that the entire colonists supported the Negotiating Committee by signatures.

YAMATANI: If the suggestion from Ward 7 by which the Daihyo Sha Kai adopted the status quo policy was really instructed by those hiding committee the attitude of the Daihyo Sha Kai would have been much different. By the way who are the responsible parties who published the statement on November 14 on which the title "Second Negotiating Committee" was printed. Without knowing the source of it, we will be very much confused as to the extent of our reliance and as to what extent we may act upon such instruction which may come again in the future. Since we have decided to uphold the status quo policy until the arrival of the Spanish Consul, it is advisable for us to wait until then.

Chair then explained in detail all the business taken up by the Daihyo Sha so that Shimonishi could convey it to the hiding Negotiating Committee.

NAKASHIMA: I wish to add that new recruits, to handle luggage that came from other centers worked voluntarily for the benefit of those who had been deprived of winter clothing. Please tell the Negotiating Committee that our intentions were to relieve the inconveniences suffered by the newcomers.

SHIMONISHI: Even though you (the group present) claim that you are giving your utmost support to the Negotiating Committee, there are some Daihyo Sha who are spreading irresponsible statements against the Committee, which peeves the committee very much. The inconvenience we are subjected to suffer at this time are for our final victory in the near future.

VOICE FROM THE FLOOR: What do you think you are? Go back and tell those spineless Negotiating Committee to come out and work together with the Co-ordinating Committee. In spite of bad reputations we are doing our utmost for the Daihyo Sha's mission. You should have no grounds upon which you should complain now. This, under the circumstances, is a terrific statement.

*double
you*

The speaker either must have been convinced that the Negotiating Committee had been rendered powerless or he was goaded entirely past discretion by Shimonishi's accusations. It is possible that the translators exaggerated the statement.

The policy of the status quo was debated:

YAMANAKA: Even though a few may resume work, we shouldn't complain about that as long as they do not conflict with the policy of Status Quo.

WATANABE: Could you explain to us fully the policy and the object and if possible the consequences of status quo. To what extent will the colonists benefit by it?

No answer was given by the chair.

SHIMONISHI: The policy of status quo has been duly approved by those Negotiating Committee (hiding). Regardless of the outcome you are held responsible to uphold it.

KAWAMURA: If there is any possibility of satisfying the colonists who are complaining about status quo, but still uphold the policy, I have no objection to stick to it. However, I think this is an impossibility.

YAMATANI: Somehow our only hope is to wait for the arrival of the Spanish Consul.

YAMAMOTO: At the previous meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai, the policy of status quo was rejected. The Negotiating Committee has no authority to bring it up and force it on us.

SHIMONISHI: Such is misunderstood because of the lack of co-ordination between the Negotiating Committee and the Co-ordinating Committee.

KAWAMURA: Any statement pertinent to status quo policy by the Negotiating Committee has great influence on our future plans.

SHIMONISHI: (Ignoring Kawamura) Statement issued by the Negotiating Committee should be approved first of all.

YAMANAKA and YAMAMOTO: We have stated again and again that we are giving our utmost support. Why do you want us to sign again? (they pressed on Shimonishi)

SHIMONISHI: You claim that you are supporting status quo, but are you really sincerely supporting it?

KAWAMURA: The statement was first brought to me at the temporary Co-ordinating Committee office. It is of such importance I couldn't act upon it myself, so I brought along Mr. Shimonishi to explain it fully.

YAMANAKA: It is best that the Negotiating Committee come out at once, and clear the matter with us. If they have any sincerity toward the colonists, they certainly should come out.

VOICE FROM THE FLOOR: If we should take any more signatures we will be regarded as trouble makers by the Administration and the Army. The result will be disastrous, so we shouldn't sign on any kind of paper any more.

TOKUNAGA: I think it is because of the lack of Co-ordination between the Co-ordinating Committee and the Negotiating Committee. I suggest we inform the Committee of the condition of the center through Shimonishi. It is also important to tell the Negotiating Committee that up to this time-----the Co-ordinating Committee has done nothing to interfere with the jurisdiction of the Negotiating Committee in their consultation with the authorities. We have never consulted with the authorities in fact. (Authorities no longer recognize the Daihyo Sha Kai)

YAMATANI: (to SHIMONISHI) Also tell the committee the reason why the recommendation of Kawamura was rejected (referring to the statement of Nov. 14 when hunger and general strike was recommended). Even though it is best for the colonists, we have to always bear in mind the countless innocent women and children involved. The committee should take special consideration first of all, because otherwise they will be victims of circumstances and suffer more than the adults.

The chair then consulted the body as to the disposition of the statement submitted by Shimonishi. Kobayashi suggested that it should be withheld for future discussion. The body agreed and the meeting was adjourned.

This meeting is a remarkable exhibition of a leadersless, puzzled group in which most of the members were incapable or afraid to take any initiative, distrusting themselves and the hiding leaders. The out-and-out break between the new leaders and the hiding group is most significant, showing unmistakably that the integration of the Daihyo Sha was poor indeed. At times, the quarreling over policy grew so hot that it is surprising the meeting

did not dissolve into a violent brawl. In their distraction, the members pinned their one remaining hope of the arrival of the Spanish Consul as a prelude to resuming negotiations with the Army and WRA.

The antipathy between the hiding leaders and those members who had assumed responsibility in their places clearly marked. In fact this jealousy, hostility and complete lack of "co-ordination" was so strong that it is difficult to see how any constructive action could be anticipated.

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best not to override the Negotiating Committee. He complained that he had been threatened by a man named Yoshiyama because he (Yamatani) was not supporting the Negotiating Committee sufficiently.

Yamatani: . . . I have been doing my best to contact the Spanish Consul to visit this Center. Yet, my integrity has been doubted by some Negotiating Committee which I just can't stand for.

Kawamura: Do you object to the attitude of the Negotiating Committee?

Yamatani: Yes, especially when my integrity is looked upon with doubt. It is intolerable.

Yamagata: As one of the Coordinating Committee members, my opinion is the same with Mr. Yamatani's.

Kawamura: I feel the same way. Colonists bring all their complaints and grievances to the Coordinating Committee just because the Negotiating Committee members are hiding. They don't realize that we have no authority to negotiate with the Administration or the Army. On top of that we are regarded with suspicion, that I, for one, thought of resigning.

Yamatani: I understand how Mr. Kawamura feels since I feel the same way. However in due time, the Spanish Consul will come here. Until that time, I wish you would refrain from resigning.¹

Toshio Shimonishi was appointed as official messenger of Kai, Kuratomi, Hayashi and Kimura, the hiding members of the Negotiating Committee. However, Yamamoto, a member of the Negotiating Committee, questioned the authority of these hiding men, stating that they had no authority to give instructions from hiding. He felt that as a member of the Negotiating Committee he should have been consulted.

A "voice from the floor" added to the confusion:

"By their action (hiding Committee) I don't think there is any necessity of maintaining the Co-ordinating Committee. Why doesn't the Negotiating Committee come out and take the initiative in the negotiation with the Administration and the Army?"²

¹Minutes of the Tule Lake Center Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 16, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid.

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Shimonishi: (the messenger) Even though you (the group present claim that you are giving your utmost support to the Negotiating Committee, there are some Daihyo Sha who are spreading irresponsible statements against the Committee, which peeves the Committee very much. The inconveniences we are subjected to suffer at this time are for final victory in the near future.

Voice from the floor: What do you think you are? Go back and tell those spineless Negotiating Committee to come out and work together with the Coordinating Committee. In spite of bad reputations, we are doing our utmost for the Daihyo Sha's mission. You have no grounds upon which you should complain now.¹

The policy and outcome of the status quo policy was questioned:

Watanabe: Could you explain to us fully the policy and the object and if possible, the consequence of status quo. To what extent will the colonists benefit by it?

No answer was given by the Chair.

Shimonishi: The policy of status quo has been duly approved by those Negotiating Committee. Regardless of the outcome you are held responsible to uphold it.

Kawamura: Is there any possibility of satisfying the colonists who are complaining about status quo, but still uphold the policy, I have no objection to stick to it. However, I think this is an impossibility.

Yamatani: Somehow our only hope is to wait for the arrival of the Spanish Consul.²

After bickering at length over what status quo implied and whether they were bound to support it the members came to no decision.

Even when the possibility of a prejudiced translation is discounted, this meeting shows a leaderless, puzzled group with most of the members incapable or afraid to take any initiative, distrusting themselves and the hiding leaders. To their distraction they pin their one remaining hope on the arrival of the Spanish Consul, as a prelude to resuming negotiations with the Army and WRA.

¹ibid., p. 4.

²ibid

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On November 18 the Army made its last attempt to deal with the Daihyo Sha on a partially negotiatory basis. A meeting was called which was attended by Colonels Austin and Meek, Mr. Cozzens, nine block managers and the Daihyo Sha's Coordinating Committee. The Colonels attempted to place the maintenance of colony order on the shoulders of the block managers. According to evacuee informants, his real intention was to convince the block managers that it was their duty to give up the hiding negotiators. This and all other responsibilities the block managers unequivocally refused to accept. Colonel Meek pointed out that he had the right to forbid the entrance of the Spanish Consul according to the rules of Martial Law, but gave his permission that a message be sent. Col. Austin stated forcibly that the Army would never recognize the hiding Negotiating Committees. The Coordinating Committee attempted to explain that the Negotiating Committee had been elected by the block representatives but were unable to explain why only seven of a committee of 14 had approached the Army to negotiate. The uncompromising stand of the block managers' representatives merits inclusion here. The proposals of the Army officer show that they had almost no acquaintance with the function of the block managers in the WRA policy of community management.

Colonels Austin and Meek (alternately): Since the list of names of all block managers is at the disposal of the block managers,¹ they should assume full responsibility and suffer the consequence. The maintenance of order in each block is entirely up to the block managers.

Mayada: Wardens are for the maintenance of peace and order in the Center. Block managers have nothing to do with that.

¹This is probably a mistranslation. Probably it should read: Since the names of all block residents . . .

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Colonel Meek: Block managers are responsible for the food problem. They should see to it that complaints made by the residents with regard to food and mess problems are properly handled.

Furukawa and Maeda: Block managers have nothing to do with the mess and food problem. The responsibility rests upon the supervisor of each mess hall. (At this time Mayeda presented the instruction which was issued previously by the WRA with regard to this matter. Austin brought forth his glasses to read the instruction.)

Colonel Meek: I suggest that from now on block managers should receive complaints, suggestions, and recommendations from the colonists and consult with the authorities.

Mayeda: We are in no position to do that because the block representatives of Daihyo Sha have been duly elected by the colonists and supported by them that the block managers' position at the present time is nothing but a co-ordinating body between the authority and the colony.¹

On November 24 the Coordinating Committee received a message from the Spanish Consul, stating that it would be impossible for him to visit the Center at this time but he would come as soon as possible. The same day the Daihyo Sha met again, a meeting marked by more squabbling over the maintenance of status quo, additional complaints by Yamatani that he was being threatened for inu-like actions, and the suggestion that the Spanish Consul be reached by telephone. Another long discussion was held on the proper function of the Coordinating and the Negotiating Committee, Yamatani made an emotional suggestion that the Coordinating Committee resign and leave the Negotiating Committee to carry on. Nothing was accomplished except that the Coordinating Committee was induced to remain in office for a few more days.

Having failed to get the support of the Block Managers the Army on November 26 took another forceful step, a camp wide search. This

¹ Joint Meeting of the Army, Ward Chairmen of Block Managers, and Daihyo Sha, Nov. 18, 1943, p. 2.

search was held ostensibly to look for contraband, hidden weapons, intoxicating liquor and rice from which sake could be made. WRA personnel was enlisted in this search, female teachers being required to accompany the soldiers to search women. Some complied unwillingly, but it is said that WRA chose the teachers carefully from those known to be not overly sympathetic to evacuees.¹ Of the group of leaders only Sugimoto was found and picked up.

It is rumored that Kai and Kuratomi escaped this search by disguising themselves as women and did the family wash while the soldiers searched their barracks.

"It sure was funny. One of the Negotiating Committee was in the washing room dressed in a skirt and a bandanna, washing away, while they were looking for him."² (B13)

Opler says:

"It was funny how the army would rush in and find their beds still warm. They must have kept a wonderful watch and spotted anyone coming."³ (A1 9)

Best, at this time, is said to have thought that Kai and Kuratomi had escaped and were outside the project.

No informant accused the soldiers of brutality or even of discourtesy during this search.

"We had a very nice soldier come in. Some were good and some bad. The one who came here was really nice."⁴ (A8)

¹Ibid., p. 10

²Notes, Mar., p. 13

³Notes, Feb., p. 19

⁴Notes, Mar., p. 8

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M. says:

"You can't criticize the army. In Japan it would be worse. They (the U. S. Army) are lenient. The people do respect the army more than WRA. In any country the army is supposed to represent the whole country. (M. implied that for this reason it must be respected.)¹ (B63)

Opler differs and is of the opinion that the Japanese resented the army's intrusion greatly. It is probably that his attitude is colored by personal prejudice toward the army and by the general resentment of the WRA personnel toward the military and their desire to be rid of them. Opler stated February 2:

"The simplest group will respect the army coming in with jeeps, tanks, etc. That's a Japanese cultural trait. The smartest resent the army and want to see it out. Generally the people feel it's safer if the army were out provided there wouldn't be a reign of terror again."² (A18)

No corroboration of these sentiments was given by any Japanese.

Opler continues:

"During the army search it was found that one of the soldiers had taken a watch out of someone's drawer. The party yelped to the Captain. The soldier was frisked and the watch returned.

I was in headquarters when they brought in two packages of ritz crackers. They were returned. Some people had tremendous stores of sake nad rice. On one apartment two of the guys (soldiers) were at odds on the whole procedure. One was throwing things around; the other was practically apologizing for it.

It was a cold morning. Some of the soldiers had sake for themselves. One kept very warm. It was rumored that the whole military camp was supposed to be drunk."³

"You would have got venom against the army then! (in November or December)."⁴

¹ Notes, March, p. 63

² Notes, Feb., p. 18

³ Ibid., pp. 18, 19, see also Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 10, 1943.

⁴ Notes, Mar., p. 59

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On November 29 Kai and Kuratomi presented an ultimatum from the Negotiating Committee which had been drawn up for the residents' signatures. The signatures were not attached to the copy given the administration. (This appears to have been the second of two petitions; the first was initiated about the second week in November.) This document lays the blame for the incident that brought about Army occupation on the Administration for refusing to heed the committee's request that no more food be taken from the warehouse and states that Best's excuse, that Caucasian personnel were in danger of being kidnapped, is false.

RESOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO THE COMPLETE AND SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE INCIDENT BEGINNING NOVEMBER 4, 1943 WHEN THE U. S. ARMY TOOK POSSESSION OF THE TULELAKE CAMP, NEWELL, CALIF.

Whereas, the negotiation committee, which was duly elected by the block representatives who were in turn elected by the block residents is our sole mean of conducting negotiations necessary for the well being of the residents of this center and especially in view of the fact that we, the residents of this center, give our undivided support to the above mentioned committee, and,

Whereas, we, as the residents of this center know that the present situation was caused by the failure of the WRA Administrators to heed our request not to take commodities out of the center warehouses in the middle of the night, and,

Whereas, Mr. Raymond R. Best, the Project Director, gave as his excuse for calling in the military that a group of center residents threatened to kidnap the Caucasian personnel, which statement is a plan false. As a result many unnecessary arrests have conducted.

Therefore in order to bring this unfortunate incident to a satisfactory and complete solution we, the center residents, feel that we must put forward the following resolutions to express out unqualified support of our representative committee.

RESOLUTION

- 1) Not to enter any negotiation with camp administrators other than through our negotiation committee.
- 2) To demand the wholesale resignations of the WRA appointed personnels, who were here prior to November 4, 1943.

- 3) To ask the withdrawal of the U.S. Army from the camp site.
- 4) To put into practice the promises made by Mr. Raymond Best, the Project Director, during the conference held on November 1, 1943 in Mr. Dillon S. Myer's presence.
- 5) To request for the immediate and unconditional release of all of all the persons who are held without evidence.
- 6) Not to conduct further arrests in connection with this incident in the future.
- 7) To ask for the reemployment of all the workers who were terminated without reason.

Be it further resolved that without the satisfactory conclusion of the above resolutions we will not consider this incident closed. We, the residents of the Tule Lake Center, 18 years of age or over, hereby signify our determined stand by our signatures on the 29th day of November, 1943, as follows:¹

This petition was signed by about half the adults in camp. The demand for the wholesale resignation of the WRA personnel drew some colony criticism. It was thought too radical. (See p.) The leaders are also reported to have stated that they would surrender themselves providing those held in the stockage were released.² When by December 1, neither this resolution nor this promise brought any result, they decided to give themselves up. However, they gave themselves up to the F.B.I. and not the Army, an action greatly resented by the Army who had tried so long to apprehend them. This surrender was accompanied by considerable formality and was preceded by a meeting of the four free leaders with the F.B.I. _____

¹Taken from enclosure in Opler's letter. December 10, 1943

²Notes, February, p. 19

and a meeting of the Dai-hyo Sha Kai for which the army had granted permission. This meeting was held at 9:30, the morning of December 1. There were no absentees. Takahashi was elected chairman to succeed Kuratomi. When the four leaders entered they were greeted with thunderous applause. Kai addressed the group as follows:

"It grieves me to see that only one-half of the colonists signed on the resolution which was requested by the Dai-hyo Sha. I think this is very important because we, the Committee, cannot work without the support of the colonists. Those who have not signed should be demanded again to sign, in order to present the resolution to the authorities. As for the disposition of those who refused to sign, it should be discussed by you, who are remaining. As to the result it is obvious to say that the Committee had done its best and yet there are great number who do not realise and appreciate our work, these people will not be living with us after the disposition of the case. This is the responsibility of each block representatives when so many refused to sign. We, the committee, consulted the FBI yesterday."¹

Mr. Komiya then gave an account of Kai's meeting with the F.B.I. To Kai's questions as to how the matter might be settled, who was to assume the responsibility for the solution of the difficulty and to whom the signatures on the petition should be submitted, the F.B.I. representative gave vague answers, except to state that Colonel Austin was the responsible party.

To the F.B.I. representative's statement that the presence of the American citizens on the Negotiating Committee put them outside the jurisdiction of the Spanish Consul, Kai replied

¹Minutes of the Meeting of the Dai-hyo Sha Kai, December 1, 1943, 9:30 A.M., pp. 1, 2. Since these minutes are translated by the opposition, too much reliance cannot be placed on the threats implied in the latter part of the speech. (R.H.)

as follows:

"Authority of negotiation by Nisei, is entirely up to the Army's discretion. (his own interpretation) Entire colonists of the Tule Lake Center are Japanese, even though they may have been born in the U.S. Nevertheless, they are Japanese and they have determination to be Japanese. Therefore, the Negotiating Committee representatives are representatives of the entire Tule Lake Center. It Issei and Nisei are segregated, great problem will arise. From now on we should disregard the status of Issei and Nisei and bind together as father and son. When or not the Army recognizes the Negotiating Committee it is the matter of the Japanese Government, which has the final authority in making the decision. We, the Committee, have been fortunate to obtain signatures of majority of the colonists that our next problem is how to use this for the solution of the problem. We, four Negotiating Committee, have, in order to evade injustice of the Army, hidden. But realizing that the solution of the problem could not be initiated without us, we have decided to come out, by meeting with the FBI. We will submit to them a complete record of our activities up to date to Washington. Second, the responsible party or the key to the solution of the problem is Colonel Austin, who will be met immediately and we will do our best to make him expedite the solution. We shall force him to accept the resolution of the colonists for the mentioned two reasons. We are going to give up. Before we leave, there's one thing I'd like to plead to you and that is, since you have promised to give absolute support to the Negotiating Committee and recognize no other Committee than this one, I assume that I have authority to appoint an Acting Negotiating Committee during our absence to carry on the demands of the colonists. (He stressed the words 'appoint an Acting Negotiating Committee'). There will be four Acting Committee, which you must support as you have supported us in the past. The four are: Yoshida, 49; Shimizu, 32; Naito, 36; and Kozuma, 18".¹

Kuratomi then addressed the body as follows:

"The problem itself has brought international problem. Therefore, this has great meaning when we return to Japan. We have responsibility. No matter what happens, we have to solve this problem in favor of the colonists. However, portion of the colonists will be in the dark without us. They have duly promised to support us so we must assume all the responsibility. However there are some who are indifferent toward us. It is very important that block representatives make clear, by all means, and let them understand our mission and

¹ibid., p. 1, 2.

responsibility. We demand that they give the Negotiating Committee full support. Injustice done since the incident was the responsibility of the Army. On that day we met Myer and asked him to stop such practice as transporting food to the outside by night because colonists feel uneasy lest they be subjected to hunder. Their resentment may result to violence. Myer agreed. In spite of the November incident, Project Director broke this promise and called in the Army with silly excuse that some of the Caucasians were kidnapped. Colonel Austin also made similar statement, which is more than injustice. They have made unnecessary arrests. In order to solve problems of this nature, such would require eight demands or articles (no documentations). We have instructed all the block representatives to call meetings to get signatures of the colonists. With that resolution, we have consulted the WRA. As a result, WRA recognized the institution of all departmental committees with WRA pay to assist the management of the Center. Negotiating Committee also expressed desire of controlling the block managers, since they are directly connected with the colonists. WRA rejected this on the ground that they are the co-ordinating body of the WRA and the colonists. We demanded mass termination of Caucasian personnel, including the Project Director, Peck, Redicord, Kirkman, and Caucasian nurses and doctors. We also demanded an unconditional release of all those arrested and at the same time the stoppage of all future pick-ups. Since we have with us the resolution signed by most colonists of 18 years or over signifying that they were supporting us, we have sound grounds to proceed with our demands. Once again I shall meet with Colonel Austin to remind him that the incident has created international problem and that the Japanese Government itself is aware of this. With that in mind, I shall expend my effort to bring about amicable solution on the matter. I feel I must do this because after the war when negotiation between U.S. and Japan starts, Japanese government should not be placed in an embarrassing position. FBI is waiting for us and time is so valuable, we must leave now."

Takahashi now questioned Kuratomi as to which of the demands made on November 1 had been accepted to the body.

Kuratomi replied as follows:

"The only written form we have from Mr. Best is with regard to the Hospital problem. It was promised to be delivered to us by November 5, but after that incident I have daily called on him, and he always offered an excuse that they are not ready. Later, I was not even received by him that I had no opportunity to press on the matter up until today. As far as the hospital problem is concerned, I have been informed by Dr. Miyamoto by a memo. Dr. Thompson, Hospital Supervisor, arrived from Washington yesterday and

investigated the problem. Unfortunately, since Pedicord was assaulted, he seemed to have some grudge against Dr. Hashiba that he has told Dr. Thompson that the battery was instigated by Dr. Hashiba. Dr. Thompson took side of Pedicord and has threatened to discharge Dr. Hashiba, as well as Dr. Pedicord. At the present time, Army doctor Dr. Hammond is in charge of the Hospital and Dr. Hashiba is as usual working under him. How long that may last, I do not know because Dr. Thompson didn't answer my question. Dr. Hashiba may have no difficulty working, but if the Hospital be under WRA again, Pedicord will be reinstated and Dr. Hashiba will also be recalled as well as five other Caucasian doctors. Dr. Pedicord is already back at his work."¹

At this point the army escort arrived. Every representative stepped outside to see the four men off.

"As the Negotiating Committee stepped into the car, Chairman Takahashi grasped hands of Rev. Kai and said, 'There's nothing to worry about your family as the entire colonists will be responsible.' Kai thanked him with tears. Such dramatic scene was enacted and the automobile began journey to meet the authorities. Thereupon all the Daihyo Sha returned to the meeting place."²

The four men were placed in a separate stockade containing two tents, very cold quarters at this time of year.

The meeting then continued and it was decided to send a report of articles lost during the search of November 26 to the Army, WRA headquarters, the Spanish Consul and the Japanese government. The meeting was adjourned to resume at 1:00 p.m. that afternoon.

At the afternoon meeting the cases of two evacuees who had resumed work on the payroll division was taken up at considerable length. It was eventually decided that his action had not violated the status quo policy. It was pointed out that the public needed a clear definition of the status quo

¹ibid., p. 4.

²ibid., p. 5.

policy. "Without understanding, how could they uphold the policy?" Another member remarked,

"Negotiating Committee is going to give up today, which may start negotiation with the authorities so that. . . .

He was interrupted:

"We have nothing to do with the Negotiating Committee at this time. The important thing is to think about the colonists' welfare. Since the Committee is going to give up today, future consultation or negotiation with the authorities is impossible. It is up to us to discuss and decide the policy or plan whereby colonists benefit."¹

Kozuma suggested that work necessary to the center be taken up by a voluntary group, but Tsuchiya stated that he feared that the Negotiating Committee would not approve that. Takahashi, the chairman, partly supported the latter's stand, saying:

"Policy of status quo is not of importance now. To support the Negotiating Committee is our primary aim. Our future plan is to work within the limit of our power for which I would like to put to vote."²

All unanimously agreed.

Five new members, recommended by Kai were now added to the Negotiating Committee to replace vacancies through arrests and possible resignations. They were accepted without argument. Three old members and the five newly appointed, were vested with full responsibility.³

Apparently the "Second Negotiating Committee" now attempted to resume negotiations with the Army but was curtly rebuffed by Lt. Colonel Meek. The body met again on December 4 to consider the situation. This meeting

¹Minutes of the Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai, Dec. 1, 1943, 1:00 p.m., p. 3.

²ibid.

³ibid., p. 4.

which was very well attended, gives an unusually clear picture of the correct Daihyo Sha attitudes and will be reproduced here almost in toto.

Rebuffed by the Army, their leaders held incommunicado, the semi-decapitated body of the Daihyo Sha was now faced with the extraordinarily difficult and important decision of policy. If they disbanded, leaving their leaders in the stockade, it would be a betrayal and an admission of guilt. Moreover, they had no assurance that the leaders would be released if the body disbanded. This is the most salient factor of the discussion. It has remained a major camp issue for six months.

Eventually three paths of policy were suggested, each of which had adherents:

- (1) to continue the status quo
- (2) to call a general strike
- (3) to dissolve the Daihyo Sha Kai

Mr. Takahashi, who spoke so eloquently in favor of disbanding, later suffered camp wide odium as public inu number 1. Rumor accuse of him of betraying the organization to the army and administration. It will be noted that he does not continue as temporary chairman, that place being now occupied by Mr. Shimizu.

That the Daihyo Sha Kai should proclaim a general strike was strongly recommended by some members, but eventually, it was decided to put the matter before the people.

Acting Negotiating Committee Shimizu made the following address:

"Proclamation has been issued by the Army, which is already posted in each Mess Hall, stating that the Negotiating Committee, held in the stockade up to this time, will not be permitted to return to the Center under any condition. Army hereby proclaims that it does not and will not recognize the representative body of the colonists. They suggested that consultation with the Administration and the Army in the capacity of a co-ordinating body will be permitted. For that purpose, we have designated the Co-ordinating Committee office 1108 as our meeting place. We have assembled here to discuss and formulate our future plan as to what procedure to take in order to meet the situation. All those persons should seriously consider the grave importance of this meeting and express your unreserved opinions. All the Negotiating Committee Yoshida, Naito, Shimizu and original Negotiating Committee Yamamoto and office clerk Kataoka, five of them have met with Lt. Colonel Meek at the entrance of the stockade fence and obtained from Lt. Colonel Meek the following statement: 'I have been closely associated with Japanese people ever since the evacuation of three years ago. I know more about Japanese problems than any average person. As the war progresses, it may be possible that the colonists may have to remain in the center 3 to 5 years at the least. The reason why we, the Army, do not recognize the Negotiating Committee is that among the 17 members, four were selected from the same center and activities of the Dai-hyo Sha Kai have been completely reported to the Army, up to this time. Even though the Negotiating Committee ignored the colonists, it is our duty to report the developments to the authorities. Majority of the colonists do not know your activities at all. That is more than the reason why we can't recognize you.'"¹

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Voice from the floor: You say that the Army does not recognize the Negotiating Committee? Does that mean that the four who gave up the other day are the entire Negotiating Committee?

Chair: The entire Negotiating Committee is 14 persons. Today I have talked to Colonel and Lieutenant with regard to the resolution submitted by us. The Army asked me if the resolution and the signatures were obtained from the free will of the colonists. I answered it was so. However, Lieutenant answered in analogous statement, "It appears as if the Dai-hyo Sha has struck against a pavement and cannot progress any further." The only means of solution will be as Reverent Kai suggested day before yesterday at the meeting, whether to enter a general strike or entrust the whole matter to the WRA authorities until the time comes.

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¹Minutes of the Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai, Dec. 4, p. 1.

Uyeda: If we select new representatives at this time, will they be officially recognized?

Chair: I think they will. Army does not recognize our Committee for the reason that it's composed of same center people, as many as four. What the Army request of us is to select three people from each ward as representatives. I am not sure whether the Army will accept it. The fact is due to the humanitarian attitude of the people as a whole which forced you colonists in a situation of today. Therefore, regardless of like or dislike, the colonists may have to remain in this center some 3 to 5 years at least. Since there were four members of the Committee selected from the same Center segregants, especially Jerome, Colonel Austin pointed out at the negotiation previously that Kuratomi and Hayashi left the meeting place abruptly which was a very discourteous attitude on the part of the Negotiating Committee that he Colonel was very much indignant. After that I heard Colonel definitely stated that he no longer wanted to see them. Negotiation with them is entirely out of the question and he also said that he will not reverse his statement, for this matter concerned future negotiation with the Army that we have to decide the attitude of the Negotiating Committee here.

Question from the floor: Has the FBI jurisdiction and authority on a matter of this type?

Yamamoto: FBI works independently and has no connection with the WRA or the Army. Their work is to make full reports of their findings and report it to their headquarters in Washington. Therefore they have no jurisdiction as far as investigation is concerned. My suggestion is that if we maintain the status quo at this time and Washington officials having been informed by the WRA, the Japanese Government will not neglect making protests for the colonists, that U.S. Government will be forced to settle this matter, which means the instruction will be issued from the higher ups. That may be one way to solve and the other is as Reverend Kai suggested - that we enter a general hunger strike and leave ourselves to the mercy of the inhuman WRA officials by maintaining status quo.

Chair: Status quo or general strike or selection of new representatives to continue negotiation with the authorities, is the pending question. Since we have created an international problem, the Japanese Government will continue to protest. Our attitude toward them should be carefully planned.

Yamamoto: I recommend general hunger strike.

Yoshida: Since I heard Colonel Austin's statement, I realized all the more that I am a Japanese and will certainly not cooperate with the Army.

Nakashima: Even though the Army requests us to send new representatives, it is the Army's apparent intention to force us, so the result

will be the same. I am convinced that there is no other negotiating body more fitted than the old one and for that reason I request the body to give them full support.

Naruto: I recommend general strike.

Chair: Present your unreserved opinion. Up to this time decisions made at all the meetings have been leaking to the Army. I definitely notice evidences. I want discussion on this matter from the body.

Watanabe: Can you explain what the outcome of a general strike will (to Chair) be and the result, if a new committee is elected?

Chair: I am stuck. I cannot foretell or predict the future. We are, at present, discussing what plans or policy we should adopt.

Yamanaka: I would like to make a suggestion that the Dai-hyo Sha Kai decide on a general strike and then refer it to the people later, by fully explaining the ways and means and the result in each block.

Uchida: We should not make any decision here without first consulting the colonists.

Yamanaka: General strike is a great problem. If there's many slackers among colonists it is best that we do not make such declaration in the first place. If we were to decide on that issue, it is best if we decide ~~on the first place~~ first and let the colonists be informed.

Yamamoto: It is useless to tell the 'dogs' to go on a strike. They won't do it. It is useless in the first place.

Chair: Then how about consulting the colonists about this general strike and then meet again to decide.

Nakashima: Night meeting or any meeting is prohibited now. What difference does it make even if we decide now. Haven't we been entrusted with power to decide on any issue that concerns the colonists?

Yamamoto: I agree with Nakashima. It's best to decide on a general strike here and then refer it to the colonists.

Chair: In that case, we will be considered a dictator.

Takahashi: It isn't sound policy to decide on a general strike without consulting the colonists, first. We will be over-riding them if we decide on such a big issue as general strike by ourselves. If we should do so, it will undoubtedly bounce back on us and will affect our present and future plans. We should approach them gradually. We must let the colonists know the situation we are confronting and give reports as to how it came about

that hunger strike was decided. In other words, let the colonists realize that they are part of a great nation which obligates them to undergo any inconveniences as part of their duty. Since the Army suggested that we select new representatives to continue negotiation, we should study this. For without future negotiation, we will be lost. Our immediate obligation is the question of releasing those 200 held by the Army. If we should enter into general strike, there will be a possibility of those internees to be transferred to another concentration camp. Then there will be no way of releasing them in the future. Since the Army suggested that we should select a new negotiating body, why not consider and discuss that point. First of all, our main duty, at the present time, should be the releasement of those 200 already detained in the stockade. Since the Army made it clear to us that they will permit a co-ordinating body we should by all means give full support to the former Negotiating Committee and let the authorities realize that we are still for them, then a way may be opened. If we should enter a general strike now, by our own decision we are sure to regret it, because the colonists will not tolerate such hasty decision, even though we are entrusted with full power. I presume that within the center, there are many fair-minded and intelligent people. Why not dissolve the Dai-hyo Sha Kai now in order to get the release of all internees? [Then those who are not connected with the Dai-hyo Sha Kai can continue negotiation for the releasement, center betterment and other problems. General strike will bring us misery and grievance, whereby we gain nothing. If there's no alternative, strike should be our last card until we have no other way out.]

Tokunaga: Mr. Takahashi said that newly selected body not affiliated with Dai-hyo Sha Kai would be the proper group to continue negotiating, but I wonder. We are still supporting our Negotiating Committee by our letter of confidence signed by all. If a new body were selected and started negotiation that would make the Negotiating Committee a criminal. I wish this point is considered so that our legal standing can be formulated.

Tsuchiya: The Army claimed that they will recognize the representative but not Negotiating Committee. It is apparent that the Army's intention is to confuse the colonists. We should consult the colonists as soon as possible to let the Army know of our attitude.

Chair: Yes, I agree with you. We must make our attitude clear as soon as possible.

Sano: There are four problems confronting us which should be discussed and decided immediately.

- (1) Decide on a general strike and not conflict with Army.
- (2) Maintain status quo and leave ourselves to the mercy of the Army and WRA, and let time solve the problems.

(3) Dissolution of the Dai-hyo Sha-Kai and re-election of a new body representing the colonists, who can consult with WRA.

(4) Without publicizing Dai-hyoSha's intentions, just inform the colonists of the existing atmosphere, that is, inform them of the intention of the Army, and let them decide their future policy.

Tsuchiya: Do I understand that we are to elect the representatives for the Army? Is that correct?

Naito: No. Army never made such statement. They recognize no representative body.

Nakano: Army's attitude is unreasonable. Enter into general strike or adopt new policy after the Negotiating Committee meeting with the FBI. I am sure the U.S. Government will give in sooner or later because of the existing international problem.

Takahashi: I believe FBI will report to Washington, but do you realize the fact that the Army is trying to find our faults? I suggest that the Dai-hyo Sha Kai dissolve and make way for a new election. If Army should find our faults, then those 200 internees will be a sacrifice. Release of them is our present goal. I am sure even the Army will yield to our request provided we approach them nicely. In order to expedite the negotiation, we have to have order among us first. We need colonists' backing. I suggest that the question of dissolution of the Dai-hyo Sha Kai or general strike be decided by the colonists by means of secret ballots. When the result is obtained, then let's convene again.

Yamamoto: You said that Dai-hyo Sha Kai be dissolved and new body be selected? Do you have confidence in such that the 200 internees can be released?

Takahashi: I have no confidence but this is the best way to initiate the release of those detained.

Tsuchiya: It's a poor excuse of the Army to say that four Negotiating Committee members are representing the Jerome people. Negotiation to release the 200 by the new elected body is impossible, because colonists are supporting the Negotiating Committee. To select a new body means to discredit the Negotiating Committee. At any rate, we have to consult the colonists first.

Nakamoto: I object to the suggestion to elect a new body. Just because the Army revoked the original Negotiating Committee, that doesn't mean that we have to select a new body. We have one Negotiating Committee which still exists even though they are not active. We have to support them fully.

Chair: In that case shall we consult the colonists' opinion on status quo or general strike?

Voice from the floor: Co-op executives have no voice on the matter. Dai-hyo Sha should approach the colonists to support this recommendation.¹

It was also decided to demand the co-operation of the block managers.

(1) The motive for the action toward the Co-op was explained by "M" a Daihyo Sha Kai member, elected to replace a man who had resigned. M pointed out [that most of the people were not working, that they were getting poor and insufficient food at the mess and that they were doing their best to stick to the status quo.] Meanwhile, the children of parents with sufficient money were going about with candy and ice cream cones.

"Naturally we thought we should get together with the Co-op, and all fight for the same thing. A person with a lot of money can get what he wants from the canteen."²

(2) Representatives of the Daihyo Sha approached the Cooperative Enterprises on December 6 and demanded that the Co-op stop the selling of unessential "luxuries": [Chicken, fish, fruits, *which were to be allowed because of their nutritional value* (except oranges), vegetables, candies, hardware goods, presents, gifts (especially since Xmas is approaching), silk and woolen yardages, cakes and pastries, and ice cream and soft drinks during the winter months only.³] The representatives of the Daihyo Sha told the Co-op Board of Directors that some individuals had suggested that the sale of all fruit be stopped, but since this might constipate the children, selling oranges was to be allowed. When questioned, they admitted that the

¹ibid., p. 4.

²Notes, March, p. 63

³Quoted from the Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Directors Tule Lake Cooperative Enterprises, Inc., Dec. 6, '43, p. 1.

proposition had not been put to the people. Their chief contention was that all food should be furnished by WRA. The Board replied that they, as "an elected body which is governed by the By-Laws and the members" could not decide this matter. It must be referred to the Ward Assemblies of members of the Cooperative.¹]

According to Opler, the only business left to the Cooperative if it acceded to this request was the barber, beauty and watch shops and the laundry agency, the shoe shops and the pattern department. In November the Co-ops total sales were \$105,223.84. Income from the items which would be left them was \$5,152.75. Although November, with the tremendous Co-op business due to the fear of a food shortage, cannot be considered a typical month, it is obvious that granting the Second Negotiating Committee's request would have entailed the ruin of the Co-op.²

In the interests of chronology the recital of this Co-op issue must be interrupted here to note that on December 6, the men who had been confined in Leupp were transferred to Tule. Their transfer had been scheduled for October, but was postponed when the trouble broke out in Tule Lake. On their arrival the men from Leupp were put into the stockade by the Army and most of them were kept there for three days. Some are still there (May 24). This was very much against Best's wishes, Best fearing that they might be indoctrinated by

¹ibid., p. 4.

²Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 10, p. 5.

Takahashi: I have a suggestion to make. That is, we have four questions - status quo, general strike, the dissolution of the Dai-hyo Sha Kai or election of a new body. We will present the four problems to the colonists.

Kozuma: Don't be silly. We can't ever dissolve this organization. Takahashi's plan is premature. Negotiating Committee gave themselves up only day before yesterday.

Watanabe: In judging the two representatives, Kawakami and Kozuma, I doubt if they understand the suggestion made by Mr. Takahashi. His sole object is the releasement of 200 persons.

Shimada: I, too, believe that majority of the representatives do not understand Takahashi's suggestion. How to release the 200 is the main object of Takahashi. You all should think and discuss more seriously and intelligently on this great important matter.

Takahashi: The dissolution of the Dai-hyo Sha does not mean that we give in to the Army. (He then elaborated the impossibility at length, to which Yamanaka agreed that there is logic in Takahashi's suggestion.)

Kawakami: If we should select a new Negotiating body, now, that means the original Negotiating Committee of 14 will be a meaningless sacrifice. This is very important. I cannot concede to such foolishness.

Tokunaga: That's right. We can't dissolve now if we select a new body not only the Negotiating Committee, but those 200 will be a sacrifice. I know the Army is about to give in. Six points of request the Army made is enough to make anyone indignant. We cannot let the Army interfere with our plans. We have to discuss with stern determination, not to let those victims be a sacrifice.

Kawamura: I favor Takahashi's suggestion to elect a new body in order to get the release of those 200. Let's first get the colonists' opinion on the suggestion.

Yamanaka: Status quo, general strike, or dissolution of the body - these problems we must refer to the colonists and reconvene again at a later date.

Sano: Give a full report to the colonists of the activities and the result of the Dai-hyo Sha Kai and then select a new body.

Chair: We have reached the gravest period. So I shall now explain the three problems we have so far discussed and submitted to you for your decision. (Unanimously agreed.)

- [(1) To declare a general strike and at the same time enter a hunger strike.

- (2) By dissolution of the Dai-hyo Kai, select a new body, then request the Army for the releasement of 200 persons.
- (3) Maintain status quo and maintain the present condition no matter how long, until the authorities give in. In other words let time solve the problem. This should be put to secret votes in each block by the colonists.

Chair: In order to prevent misunderstanding of our decision, we should take utmost precaution and consult by tonight and report the result tomorrow. (Body unanimously agreed.)

Nakano: One should refrain from resigning at a time like this. As to the permission of the meetings, I believe that we should hold the meeting without consulting the authorities.¹

That night, the blocks met and voted behind locked doors.

The official results as given in the Daihyo Sha meeting were:

- ②
- 2 blocks undecided
 - 3 blocks for General Strike
 - 4 blocks for Dissolution
 - 56 blocks for Status Quo²

Only one informant has described his block meeting.

"There was one vote that the army wasn't supposed to know anything about. All the Japanese met in their representative blocks and voted whether to go back to normalcy or adopt the status quo permanently or call a general strike. All the time this status quo was on, the coal crew, the hospital bunch, the garbage and the mess halls were still working. At that time the vote came out that they should adopt the status quo instead of a general strike. They went against the return to normalcy because that would be an insult to the representatives barricaded in the stockage. All of their work would be for nothing.

"It was my opinion that status quo wouldn't accomplish a darn thing but would only increase the people's sufferings. You can't have status quo and expect things to improve. It just means taking a stand-offish attitude, not negotiating, not having a darn thing to do with the administration, just letting them do their worst.

"I voted for the general strike! I went radical that once. I was against status quo the latter part of November. In as much as status quo meant standing pat - they were still going on with the coal crew, the garbage, mess and hospital, all the janitors and boiler men were working, well, under these conditions status quo could be maintained indefinitely but

¹ibid., pp. 2 - 7.

²~~Notes~~ Minutes of the Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai, Dec 8, p.8.

being very harmful to the colonists. For that reason I voted for the general strike to bring things to a head right away fast. I knew the status quo would be a lingering suffering for the whole damn colony. These elections and meetings were held behind locked doors. The general strike was defeated. Sixty-four mess halls voted and there was a majority of 13 mess halls for status quo. So we had status quo.

"They got to thinking about the women and children, and that's why so many were in favor of status quo. They figured it would be awful to have to stand around and watch the kids cry."¹

The meeting held the next day (December 5) is disorganized and erratic. Several block representatives explained the decisions of their blocks:

Kawamura: Decision of Block 11 was status quo but with condition, which approved general strike if necessary.

Shimada: Decision of Block 16 was to obtain releasement of those interned first. General strike was considered a step which should be taken as a last card. Such will not solve the present problem, in fact, it will bring a result which is worse. As for status quo, we should first make a thorough study as to the possibility of maintaining it, because that would ignore Army's suggestion and provoke them. Majority thought that dissolution of this body should be done in order to obtain the releasement of interned colonists. After dissolution, a new body will be formed, which will be recognized by the Army. Then there is possibility of future negotiation.

Block 17: The same. No explanation is necessary.

Block 38: I have the same, in favor of status quo.

Block 68: Same decision as Block 16.

Tsuchiya: If the Army does not recognize the Negotiating Committee, I do not see any necessity for further negotiation.

Block 38: Either replacement of Dai-hyo Sha or dissolution was the decision made. however, there is a possibility of adopting status quo policy.

Shimizu: Then there are two undecided blocks. Since majority voted for status quo, I would like to hear the explanation on the decision made by Block 16.

Shimada: There are numerous complaints against the policy of status quo. It is imperative for the Dai-hyo Sha Kai to clarify to the colonists our activities. Since Dai-hyo Sha representatives

¹Notes, Feb., pp. 11, 12; April, p. 31.

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were elected by the colonists, if you permit me, I shall continue to explain.....(interrupted by Kawamura)

Kawamura: Opinion of the block 11 was:

- (1) To support the Negotiating Committee.
- (2) Release of the internees.
- (3) Settlement of the problems locally by newly appointed Negotiating Committee.

Block 71: Our block recommended status quo and also the closing of all canteens. If not possible, then the curtailment of the sale of luxuries.¹

The release of the four leaders was discussed next, but the minutes are so obscure it is impossible to determine what path of action was chosen. It appears, however, that it was decided to report the matter to the Department of Justice.²

Next, the problem of the canteens was taken up. The canteens were selling fruits, vegetables, candy and other commodities which the unpaid, striking colonists found it hard to deny their children. It was decided to request that the Co-operative limit ~~their~~ itself to the sale of necessities.

Yamanaka: Curtailment of candies, fruits for the children should be made gradually.

Tsuchiya: [Canteen is the cause of all the misery. Since it's colonists canteen, we have no reason to hesitate from closing it altogether. This will be only for a short while, since status quo will win.]

Kamiya: We are expecting a long war, therefore I recommend only the sale of daily needs in the canteens. Canteen 4 has been in red for a long time and I don't see why the Negotiating Committee doesn't advise the Co-op to close it altogether.

Block 69: Co-op problem is not as simple as you may think. There's room for long discussion.

Kobayashi: Co-op belongs to the colonists, so let's settle the problem by the colonists' voice.

¹Daihyo Sha Kai minutes, Dec. 5, p. 1

²ibid., p. 3.

Daihyo Sha members. The administration considered Kurihara, one of the Leupp internees, as a possible instigator of the Tule Lake trouble even though he had been confined during all the trouble. "If I were the instigator of the trouble here while I was in Leupp, I should be a general," was his succinct comment.

On December 10, a second conference was held between members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, representatives of the Board of Directors and the Management Committee of the Co-op. The Co-op chairman, vice-president Y. Tsukamoto pointed out that if this proposed step were taken it would mean that the Co-op would be forced to sever connections with purchasing firms ~~and~~ that these connections could not be renewed, the redemption of Certificates of Indebtedness would be postponed and that nearly 100 employees would have to be terminated.

Tokunaga spoke for the Daihyo Sha Kai:

Tokunaga: Let me tell you our side of the story. Up to November 3, negotiations with the WRA officials were progressing very satisfactory, but after the departure of Mr. Myer, Director of WRA, negotiations was abruptly terminated by them. To date the WRA has notified the Daihyo Sha Kai that they no longer recognize the Daihyo Sha Kai as representatives of the colonists. In the meantime, a great number of evacuees lost jobs and on top of that, up to date nearly 250 persons were picked up and detained in the Army quarters. It is evident that the WRA is about to give in to our demands, as we are continuing with all our efforts our negotiations, in spite of the fact that we are not recognized. Co-op does not cooperate with us. Too indifferent. Work daily without considering the difficulty encountered by the people who are without jobs. That's not fair. I presume you Co-op officials are evacuees, and of course, think of your native land. We are at war with this country, I want you to remember that, that is why we are asking you to cooperate. If you want to make money, you should have gone out where there is opportunity.]

Chair: Could there be any possibility of coming to an agreement so that we could keep up our business without arguing the policy.

General Manager: Along the basis of 1942 purchases, this year we are getting less than last year, so that by next year, 1944, it is evident that we will get far less; shoes for example, not because of shoe rationing, but there are no shoes to be bought in the wholesale, and if we sever contact with wholesales; even temporarily, it is impossible to renew such merchandise. As we want to comply with your request, from the standpoint of the management, it is impossible to do so, however, it is apparent that without immediate curtailment of business for the reason I have stated before, the Co-op business will be minimized in the near future. All commodities must be paid in cash and advance. We are operating the canteens from the funds obtained from these items which you request us to stop handling.

Yamanaka: If curtailment of business is in sight as you just said, why not curtail it now.

General Manager: That is up to some 7,000 members to decide. The people would buy, as they are at present, in great quantities, through mail order department nearly \$13,000 worth of merchandise purchased outside; therefore, there is no benefit from the standpoint of the Co-op or the colonists as a whole that the curtailment of the business at present would stop purchases by the colonists. Realizing the present ~~would stop~~ condition of this center, this policy of curtailment has been discussed long before your request came. I have placed no order for Xmas gifts. Last year they were plentiful at canteens.

Tokunaga: How about fish?

General Manager: Since this camp is a segregation center, our name on the outside is not particularly liked so that if we stop purchasing, renewal will be an impossibility.

Nakano: How about soda water? If, because of quota allotment that you cannot make purchases, why not get a great quantity and stock them until normality returns?

Maruyama: That's impossible because of the insufficient revolving fund.

General Manager: The soda manufacturers are suffering shortages on empty bottles, they want the empties returned as soon as possible and besides the deposits on bottles is 3 times the cost of the soda. It doesn't give the business management any advantage.¹

Tokunaga: They do not realize the importance of the Daihyo Sha Kai's mission, Daihyo Sha Kai created the international problem, the Japanese government is negotiating through the Spanish Consul with the United States government. Such was accomplished

¹Minutes of Special Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai, Representatives of the Board of Directors and the Management Committee of the Tule Lake Cooperative Enterprises, Incorporated, Dec. 10'43, pp, 1,2

by our untiring efforts. It is needless to say anymore, we the Daihyo Shas regard fish as luxury. If the Co-op stops handling them, the WRA will have to supply us free.¹

B. Akitsuki: [Referring to Mr. Tokunaga's statements that the Co-op's representatives, as a whole, are busy with the effort to make money only, and ignore the time and condition of this center, we want to make it clear to you that as far as loyalty and the seriousness and integrity are concerned, we allow no one to question us. We, the Board members and the Executives, on behalf of the 7500 Co-op members and colonists as a whole, must prevent the Co-op from disaster. I want you gentlemen to understand just that.²]

Preparations were thereupon made to put the proposal before the people. On December 12 the Co-operative distributed the following explanation to the people:

The Daihyo Sha Committee proposal is now in the air that certain departments of the Co-op handling so-called luxury goods, namely, Cigarette and Tobacco, Hardware, Groceries (including pastries, ice cream and soft drinks), Fruits, with the exception of oranges (thanks to the Committee) and Vegetable, Fish be closed immediately.

However, such a proposal should be duly considered in the light of true existing facts and the inevitable consequences that may follow in its wake. More particularly is it vital that such a proposal be viewed with reserved and rational attitude and certainly should not be left to the mere whim based upon bias and personal emotion. It cannot be too strongly overemphasized that any matter affecting as large a population as this should be studied in this atmosphere of attitudes, and especially is it true in facing this question.

Therefore, in order to have this problem more fully considered, the points which should not be overlooked are hereby presented for your study:

1. Many of the so-called luxury items are received by the Co-op under a distribution quota basis whereby the Co-op is allotted the quota of only $\frac{1}{4}$ of the 1942 sales made by the Co-op for the particular item. Since this wartime stringencies are increasing each day and if at any time the Co-op purchases from the wholesales are cancelled, the difficulty of renewing the quota at the later date will be insurmountable. Another point which must be recognized is that only a dwindling

¹ibid., p. 3.

²ibid., p. 4.

supply will be available for the Co-op as time progresses without going into immediate cancellation, because the quota allotment for each year will be based upon the actual sales of the preceding year.

2. Even if the sales of the so-called luxury items are discontinued, the colonists will most likely continue to obtain them through other sources such as friends outside and mail order stores. This will mean that the colonists will be paying higher prices for the benefit of the people outside, whereas if the items are distributed through the Co-op, discounts from bulk purchases and the patronage refunds are made available to the colonists here.
3. If the various departments mentioned above are closed, the financial status of the Co-op will become very precarious. For these 5 departments, last month sales amounted to \$67,176.88. For the same period, the sales from all departments amounted to \$110,356.57. The remainder amounted to \$43,179.69. The income from sales are one of the most important item in the revolving fund which is utilized in meeting any liabilities that may become due in the course of business and also in making cash payments for advanced purchases. The Co-op has been fortunate enough in being able to stock on credit some of the items now sold in these five departments, for the sales from these items amount to considerable sum and do materially strengthen the position of revolving fund. Furthermore, the fact must be accepted as one of business principles that even though there may be curtailment of income from these five departments, there will not be a proportionate decrease in the total overhead expenses for the Co-op as a whole. In such a case \$43,179.69 will be too insufficient an income to operate the Co-op; discharge of nearly 100 Co-op employees is inevitable.
4. When the Co-op finance is subjected to such a difficulty, it will become highly questionable whether the Co-op would be able to redeem the outstanding Certificates of Indebtedness.
5. Indisputably it must be admitted that everyone in this Center is sincerely hoping for a speedy solution of the present conditions and thinking that a solution must come. If such a solution is possible in the near future, the time will eventually arrive when the people will be more able to afford some of the things used in comforting our lives in this Center, which is otherwise very much dull and sullen.

Therefore, in order that we may have consolation in the future for whatever action you may take today, we must think,

think twice.

The voting, which took place the same day rejected the proposal by a ratio of 9 to 1, the Daihyo Sha Kai, carrying only five blocks.¹ This overwhelming rejection by the people was the most severe set back the Committee had so far received. Informants were reluctant to speak spontaneously on why the people had refused to support the Daihyo Sha Kai. Some stated that the idea was silly, that they did not have confidence in the "Second Negotiating Committee" (the remaining member of the Negotiating Committee and their appointed successors).

When asked who the Second Negotiating Committee were, "I" said:

"They put in their bid after they yanked the first representatives after November 4. . . . They were very radical. That same group went to see the Tule Lake Co-op. By December 6, the original Daihyo Sha was just about shot."²

"N", a pro-Daihyo man said:

"We heard they were going to have a Second Negotiating Committee but they didn't function right. I don't think the people did want that committee then. They were backing the First Negotiating Committee."³

The conservative "Os" said:

Mr. Q: "Since November we have had another so-called Negotiating Committee. They took care of all the camp affairs. WRA and the Army did not recognize them as true representatives. They (WRA) think they were not elected properly."⁴

¹Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 10, pp. 10, 11.

²Notes, March, p. 41.

³Notes, April, p. 20.

⁴Notes, February p. 8.

⁵Notes, March, p. 4.

Mrs. O; No one knows about them. That's altogether unknown. There really was no Second Negotiating Committee. All the people said that their representatives were already chosen and were in the stockade. We had no election like that in our block."¹

"M", himself a member of the Second Negotiating Committee said:

"We thought this time, I don't think it could be straightened out. We thought we'd do what we could. But the people took what I do wrong. The people in here felt we weren't helping out either way. So I just resigned."²

While the evidence implied in the above remarks is far from conclusive, it hints that the defeat of the measure to limit Co-op sales may, to some extent, have been influenced by a public sentiment that the men now guiding the policy of the Daihyo Sha were not the real representatives and indicates that the vote may have been, at least in part, a gesture of support to the internees. Needless to say, the outcome of the Co-op issue was received with joy by the administration as proof of their contention that the Daihyo Sha had never had a strong following in camp.

Development of Counter Daihyo Sha Group

While the Co-op negotiations were being carried on the Administration had succeeded in establishing a contact with a group of evacuees with whom they could deal - an anti Daihyo-Sha group. This group at first was composed of representatives from the Civic Organizations and the Co-op, and later the Japanese heads of divisions still working. The rise of this administrative and army backed group will be traced later, in detail. It is mentioned here because its genesis coincided with the Co-op's defiance of the Daihyo Sha Kai.

¹Notes, March, p. 4.

²Notes, April, p. 23.

*why not
that people
did not
wish to
inconvenience
themselves
by abolishing
the means
of raising
commodities*

Visit of the Spanish Consul

The Spanish Consul made his long awaited visit to Tule Lake December 13th and 14th. He was accompanied by the Hon. Mr. Deckerbach, the representative of the Department of State. The writer has been informed that the two men appeared at several meetings in the colony at different mess halls to address the people and to answer questions. The report on one of these meetings, included below, is puzzling in many respects if the temper of the Japanese attending the meeting is not understood. It will be noted that both Consul de Amat and Mr. Deckerbach made long speeches which were followed by questions from the people which had no relevance to the speeches whatever. When asked about this, a very pro-Daihyo Sha young woman explained as follows:

["The people didn't listen to their speeches. As soon as the speech was over, they'd yell, 'That's not what we want. We want the Negotiating Committee!' All through the meeting the Consul would get up and say something and the people would say, 'Oh to hell with you, we want the Negotiating Committee!'"¹]

It should not be assumed that all of the people were still as strongly pro-Daihyo Sha as this young woman. Nevertheless, she probably gave an accurate picture of the atmosphere of the meetings. The aggravated people paid scant attention to the involved speeches of the two men. No sooner had they finished their spokesmen thrust the most pressing grievances forward. According to Kuratomi, it was because of the insistence of the people, that Messrs. De Amat and Deckerbach met with the interned members of the Negotiating Committee at this time.

The report shows that the pro-Daihyo Sha were given little encouragement.

¹R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 10, 1945, p. 2.

*This is
verified
by a
letter to Seto
in the Tokyo
Shimbun
translated
somewhere
in my journal*