

outside. He failed, however, to get anything significant to which he could point as an indisputable accomplishment. It is also noteworthy that he attempted to direct himself to Director Myer over Mr. Best's head, a technique which has been followed ever since by the later pressure groups. Mr. Best would not allow this, although Myer frequently took over the argument when it threatened to get out of hand. The meeting at no time degenerated into the ~~squabbles~~ <sup>squabbling</sup> which mark that of October 27.

Both parties, Caucasians and Japanese must have been under tremendous tension. The beating of Doctor Pedicord was an initial handicap to the Negotiating Committee. Nevertheless, Kuratomi began carefully by asking for the notes of the first meeting. He had good reason for this, for he wished to refer to them to carry the major point of this consultation, the extremely important matter of the farm workers' dismissal. Best said that the notes had not been prepared. Before bringing up any specific questions Kuratomi pointed out that if the Administration should continue its past treatment of the Japanese, <sup>the Negotiating Committee</sup> ~~they~~ felt they could report the affair to the Japanese Government. He added that he believed American democratic principles were at stake and that if the conditions prevailing were allowed to continue, "the democratic quality of the United States will be greatly injured." He accused Mr. Best of failing to keep faith with the Negotiating Committee and of inhumanity in regard to the funeral of Mr. Kashima. The proceedings were interrupted to wait for a report from the hospital that order had been restored.

Kuratomi then brought up the same questions of evacuee status under International Law and the possibility of making Tule Lake a

center only for those persons who wished to return to Japan. He received no more satisfaction than at the October 27 meeting although he tried very hard to pin Myer down. Myer would not even admit that there was a possibility of making Tule Lake a center only of Japanese who wished to return to Japan.

Kuratomu then brought up the vital matter of the termination of the farmers as of October 19, stating that the farmers were furious over being terminated without warning since they had Mr. Kallum's signature that they were not striking.<sup>1</sup> Kuratomu betrayed his position by stating: "When we made the announcement over the result of our conference with Mr. Best, the farmers naturally felt they would be permitted to go back to work. However, just before they started back to work a notice was published that they were terminated as of October 19." He referred to Mr. Best's statement that he was willing to talk things over with the farm committee, but Best said that he had been discussing the next years' crop. Best also added that the committee had stated on October 27 that they were not interested in harvesting the crop and that from that time on there was no farm. "But that isn't the way we were terminated at Topaz," complained Kuratomu. The argument continues for 11 pages, Kuratomu battling valiently for some concession. He pointed out that Best had refused to see any Negotiating Body, referring to his first conversation with Mr. Best on October 1.<sup>2</sup> Said Mr. Best: "I definitely told you ... that I would make no public statement at that time. You are the only ones I told it to."

Kuratomu then pointed out that the farmers had been terminated at a date prior to the time Mr. Best's statement asking for representatives to come forward had been made.<sup>3</sup> Best ignored this and

<sup>1</sup>See p. .

<sup>2</sup>See p. .

<sup>3</sup>See p. .



told him to get along to the rest of the questions. Kuratomi in turn ignored this request and informed Best that the question was very serious and that he could not guarantee the reaction of the people outside if he were to report Best's answer to them. Myer stepped in here and stated that nothing could be done. The argument continued at great length, Kuratomi stating that it was not a matter of money but a matter of principal. Myer eventually settled the question by advising that the Administration's statement be retracted with the understanding that the terminations were still valid and that the terminated farmers would not be put back on the payroll. In this way the farmers would have the privilege asked by Kuratomi, of knowing they were going to be terminated before they were terminated.

Kuratomi then asked if any Japanese loyal to America were coming to harvest the crop. (He undoubtedly had been informed by letters from other centers that this was the case.) Myer admitted that arrangements to harvest the crop had been made but would not make any other comment. Kuratomi then asked why merchandise had been taken from the warehouse on the past two nights, and added that because of this one mess hall did not receive its share of food. He insisted several times that the people were waiting for a definite answer but Myer said, "I am sorry but there will be no report why the food was taken out." Exactly what the Administration hoped to accomplish by attempting to keep this matter dark is difficult to see.

Kuratomi then launched into a denunciation of Pedicord's work at the hospital. Furakawa, manager of block 16 told a pitiful story of how his nephew had died due to purported neglect on the

*I believe what Kuratomi said*

Kuratomi told the writer later that his chief concern in this matter was that the farmers had become so enraged that if some concession were not made then they could not be kept under control.

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Do you think this is the truth or only part of the truth? R. H.  
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The matter of the badges was a strong point of contention since, if they were not returned, 50¢ would be deducted from the farmers' paychecks.

"There was an effort on our part to try to minimize the grievance toward the administration and we had to have some ground to appeal to the farm group to be more patient. If Mr. Best made some concession, we could defend the practice (termination) at that time."<sup>1</sup>

*were not here already*

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<sup>1</sup>ibid., Dec. 26, 1944, p. 3.



part of Dr. Marks. Myer promised to go into the matter thoroughly. Kuratomi then demanded the immediate removal of all the Caucasian doctors and nurses. (He told the writer later that this request had come from the Japanese hospital staff itself.) Myer said this was impossible because he had to have time to investigate.

Sugimoto then presented the report of the food committee. He stated that the evacuees in September had been fed at the cost of 24¢ per person per day and that the Caucasian personnel was getting far more than its share of rationed goods. Moreover, they received the choicest cuts of meat. Myer stated that if it were true that the people were not getting the proper food it would be corrected immediately.

Kuratomi then went back over the points presented at the October 27 meeting, the uniform porches, improvement of the latrines, and dust control of the roads. Best said these matters were under consideration. Kuratomi brought up the absence of brooms, buckets, mops, closet space, and the recognition of a Central Organization. He gained no more satisfaction than at the first meeting. He then presented a statement "from the residents" demanding the removal of Mr. Best, the Project Director; Mr. Zimmer, Assistant Project Director; Mr. Schmidt, head of Internal Security; Mr. Kallum, head of the Agricultural Division; Mr. Peck, the chief steward; Mr. Kirkman of the Warehouse Section and all of the Caucasian doctors and nurses. Myer made a long speech at this point, stressing that he had absolute confidence in Best and making no direct answer to this demand for removals. Later, several informants criticized this request for removal of the Appointed Personnel. Whether this request actually sprang from the people is open to doubt. However,



agree ( all of the gentlemen concerned were very unpopular in the colony and their removal would have been received with rejoicing.

Concerning these latter proposals, Kuratomi made the following explanation to the writer:

"We felt that if a request were made to get rid of Mr. Best, Mr. Myer would investigate the matter. If he were investigated and remained, we could tell the people that an investigation had been made and that his position is vindicated. . . . Kirkman was thrown out of Anta Anita. He was caught in some kind of scandal there.

"The request to remove the Caucasian staff from the hospital came from the hospital employees. I don't think they'd like me to say that, but it's the truth. One point I want to make clear was their feeling that if the Caucasian doctors and nurses are human enough to realize the problem before them and are willing to work for the benefit of the people, it would have been all right."<sup>1</sup>

As far as actual accomplishment in negotiations is concerned, the committee did not gain very much more by this meeting than by that of October 27. Myer, however, did promise to investigate the food situation, which Best, in the first meeting, had passed off completely. The withholding of the termination notice which was finally granted the committee, might have satisfied the farm workers "principals" but it could not mitigate the fact that they had been fired and could not get another job for thirty days. Moreover, jobs were scarce at Tule Lake. Myer also promised to investigate the hospital situation. Psychologically, however, the committee had strengthened its position with the Administration. In spite of the attempts to explain the presence of the great crowd by "pressure" or "terrorization" Myer could not fail to realize that he had an aroused populace to deal with and that this populace "supported" the committee. The actions of the Administration in the two days that followed indicate that to some extent at least

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<sup>1</sup> ibid., Sept. 18, 1944, pp. 6-7.



the Administration was convinced that they would have to deal with the committee as representatives and consider their requests.

Attitude of the Crowd of Demonstrators

While the negotiations proceeded, the great crowd of Japanese stood quietly around the Administration building for two and a half hours. When informants were asked how they felt at this time many said, "We got terribly tired. I was never so tired in my life." The demands of nature caused a great run on the hospital toilet facilities. The disordered scene is recounted by one of the nurses aides, Miss Nakamura, an old Tulean girl very hostile to the Negotiating Committee:

"On November 1 I was scared to death to see so many people."

This informant had not gone home to lunch and did not know that a demonstration was scheduled. Her reaction is probably not unlike that of the astonished Caucasians.

"I knew something must be up. We were scared to death. It was funny though. So many people had to use the toilet. They went over and used the toilet in the TB Ward. The doctors told us to go and tell them that this wasn't safe and to use the other toilet. I'll never forget how I had to go and take in toilet paper to them. I was so embarrassed.

"Everybody was tired out. They wanted to come home but they wouldn't let them."

The writer asked Miss Nakamura whom she meant by "they".

She replied, "The kibe1, I guess."

"Some of the mothers had let their babies at home. They wanted to get home to feed them but the kibe1 wouldn't let them go. The kibe1 were sure dramatizing themselves. They went around in the blocks, I heard, and if people were washing or something, they told them to come to the meeting."<sup>1</sup>

The dramatic stalking about of the kibe1 committee, which had been appointed to keep order and keep the people in line on

<sup>1</sup> ibid., August 24, 1944, p. 2.

A chamber  
pattern



this occasion, has been commented upon resentfully by many of the Americanized nisei who were present at the demonstration. However, kibeï, like Mr. <sup>Oda</sup> Okamoto and Mrs. <sup>Yamashiro</sup> Yamaguchi, neither of whom were Daihyo Sha supporters when they made their statements, have no word of criticism against these young men. They imply that their presence was both needed and expected. Even a nisei girl, a conservative young lady, said:

"On November 1 we couldn't go home till they let us; but I didn't think they (the kibeï) bullied anybody."<sup>1</sup>

When the meeting was over, Dillon Myer on the request of Kuratomi made a very short address to the people. This address was preceded by a report from Kuratomi on the progress of the Negotiations and was followed by a speech by Reverend Kai. Kuratomi outlined the speeches he and Kai made at this time to the writer:

"I made a very short speech. I said we had an opportunity to negotiate not only with Mr. Best but also with Mr. Myer. I just briefly summed up the points. In the majority of cases Mr. Myer promised he'd conduct a thorough investigation and said we'd be notified. In general, the requests brought up were received in a harmonious manner. In due times, I was positive, everything would be ironed out. The recognition of a centralized committee was important to the people. I mentioned that and also about the food and the hospital.

"Mr. Myer spoke then. Then Reverend Kai spoke last. He refrained the people from going into any unreasonable acts and to always maintain their true virtue as real Japanese. The negotiations were well conducted. At the last he said, 'This is the end for the time being,' and told the people to disperse."

At the conclusion of Kai's speech, Yamane called on the people to bow. This they did, according to Kuratomi, "not only in gratitude to Reverend Kai but also as a gesture of gratitude to Mr. Myer."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>ibid., Sept. 19, 1944, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>ibid., Dec. 26, 1944, pp. 3-4.



The report of Myer's speech printed in the Tulean Dispatch of November 2 appears accurate:

#### DELEGATES CONFER

#### Myer Addresses Local Residents at Ad. Area.

Presenting the requests, suggestions, and demands of the colonists, seven representatives of the residents met with National Director Dillon S. Myer and Project Director Raymond R. Best yesterday afternoon.

During the conference which lasted over two hours, practically the entire population showed their support by surrounding the administration building area during the entire afternoon.

At the end of the negotiations Myer addressed the local residents over the public address system and stated that he has met with the people's delegates to discuss their representations. Expressing utmost confidence in Director Best, Myer concluded by asking residents to cooperate with the administration in settling all problems.

George Kuratomi, a member of the representative group, gave a brief report of the proceedings with the WRA officials.

In conclusion Reverend Kai appealed to the residents to remain calm during the negotiations and not create violence harmful to the Japanese interests.

The seven representatives will meet today and tomorrow with the national director and the project director to discuss further the points brought out in yesterday's initial conference.

Many informants have stated that they were anxious to hear what Mr. Myer had to say and admit that they were disappointed with his long-awaited speech. (Private note to "X": Do you think they had hopes that some specific concessions at least would be made to them? I do, but hesitate to say so, since nobody will admit it to me.) One elderly issei woman remarked that she waited for hours and Dillon Myer did not speak. Finally Myer did speak "but just two-three minutes."<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Okamoto, a conservative, expressed his reaction to the demonstration as follows:

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<sup>1</sup>ibid., April, p. 23.

*Yamashiro*  
 Mrs. Yamaguchi who is an extraordinarily good informant because she conscientiously attempts to put herself back into the spirit of this period and forget all ~~recently acquired~~ attitudes acquired later, stated that in her opinion the ordinary people were definitely dissatisfied in the results of the conference. The leaders, however, were greatly encouraged.

"It seems to me that ordinary people (not the leaders) were disappointed. They expected more to come out of it. They were especially disappointed about the boys who knocked Pedicord around.

"But it seemed the leaders got very enthusiastic. The meetings held after that meeting seemed to bring more unification among the block members." 1/

One elderly issei woman remarked that she waited for hours and Dillon Myer did not speak. Finally Myer did speak "but just two-three minutes." 2/

*Oda*  
 Mr. Okamoto, a conservative, expressed his reaction to the demonstration as follows:



"He (Dillon Myer) didn't make any promise. He said, 'I have confidence with Best.' We went to the Administration building there for four hours. After three or four hours we find out it was for nothing because the committee couldn't accomplish anything!"<sup>1</sup>

The news of the beating of the phenomenally unpopular Dr. Pedicord was received in camp with the greatest of glee. Several persons, especially issei, have stated that they disapproved. However, the writer is convinced that this proper disapproval was strongly mixed with the inward conviction that "he got just what he deserved." Miss Nakamura, an old Tulean employed as a nurses' aide, who has made some of the bitterest statements against the "trouble-makers" that the writer has heard stated with astonishing frankness:

"I guess the people kind of rejoiced with the kibeis about that. Everybody up at the hospital was glad about it."<sup>2</sup>

Pedicord's assailants were never apprehended. He was unable to identify any of them.

#### ATTITUDE OF THE CAMP POPULATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOVEMBER 1

The successful demonstration and the apparent capitulation of the Administration added ~~greatly~~ to the Negotiating Committee's prestige in the eyes of the people. While it is impossible to present conclusive evidence as to the extent of the support given the representatives, that the committee had the support of "the people" is admitted even by Japanese decidedly hostile to the Daihyo Sha. Several honest, unsophisticated informants imply that support was almost unanimous. K, the "loyal" coal crew worker who left Tule, said:

"Until this was straightened out they didn't want to work. Most of the people were behind it."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>ibid., Aug. 24, 1944, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Report, Dec. 24, p. 12.

correct  
under the  
circumstances

*Funakawa*

Very significant is the brief statement of Mr. Adachi, a prominent old Tudean who had no use at all for the leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai and was, moreover, in an extraordinarily good position to appreciate the sentiment felt toward this body:

"The people were strongly behind the Daihyo Sha after November 1. . . . If the Co-ordinating Committee (the opposition body which arose later) had had the support that the Daihyo Sha had, it would have gone down in history!" 1/

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1/ R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 8, 1945, p. 4.



Mr. Tsuda, a member of the Daihyo Sha and also an old Tulean stated:

"Of course, in every block, the people knew they had selected the Daihyo Sha. In general, the people were most strongly behind the Daihyo Sha around the latter part of October and November 1." 1/

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1/ ibid., Jan. 11, 1945, p. 6.

*Kataoka*

M. who is very honest, although being a member of the Daihyo Sha his opinion must be taken with reservations, said:

"At that time everybody believed in the Daihyo Sha, because we all had one camp and were trying to make it livable."<sup>1</sup>

Two men who are employed in the Cooperative and are very much against the committee's policies said: *Yosunura*

"Kai, Kuratomi, and Kurashige?, they had done their best for the Japanese in Jerome. Whatever they did there was the best for the Japanese. The people from Jerome worshipped him and believed in him (Kai). He was honest but misguided."<sup>2</sup>

"They were supported by everybody."<sup>3</sup>

Even Miss *Tanaka*, who later became a member of the group which devoted itself to the defeat of the Daihyo Sha stated honestly:

"To tell you the truth when the status-quo (Daihyo Sha) group had the demonstration I wholeheartedly supported it. I said, 'I don't blame them.' It was how we were housed that affected me the most."<sup>4</sup>

*Nakamura*  
Mr. Ono, a university graduate and old Tulean, and one of the few nisei who has managed to keep himself to the standard of workmanship he was accustomed to before evacuation made the following extremely interesting remarks on the attitudes of the people. At the time this statement was made most individuals of his temperament had joined the ranks of the denouncers of the Daihyo Sha. *Nakamura* Ono is given to analysis, having had considerable work in political science.

"The way I look at it from what I've heard, there were mistakes on both sides. The sentiments of the people were with the minority group (Daihyo Sha) who were believed the self-appointed delegates. . . Many of them had the right intentions, but their methods were too aggressive.....

<sup>1</sup>Notes, March, p. 62.

<sup>2</sup>Feb. pp. 26, 27., Notes.

<sup>3</sup>Mar., p. 19, Notes.

<sup>4</sup>ibid., July 19, 1944, p. 4.



"The Administration did not have a sincere policy in mind in dealing with the representative groups. They were more or less trying to obtain further information from the representatives so as to use it in some ways according to their desires. If their intentions had been sincere in accepting some of the proposals made by the representative group, some form of understanding could have been reached. . . The fellow who stands on his principles gets stuck in the stockade."

*Nakamura*

Ono then went on to explain the psychology of the more moderate group to which he, as an old Tulean, belongs: This is an extraordinarily frank expression of the "peaceful" methods the moderates favor in dealing with the Administration:

"We figure if you handle the damn fool Administration properly, why you can get a lot out of them. There is an old saying in Japanese, 'If a person is a fool and you call him a fool, he gets mad.'"

"Everything that WRA wants to do we'll be antagonistic to. It's no trouble at all to attack the personnel who are incapable. It's easy enough to put them on the spot. You might as well struggle along with the numbskulls. It's the sincere person who gets mad."<sup>1</sup>

Support, however, was not unanimous. Conservatives disapproved of the fuss and, especially after the lurid newspaper accounts which followed the November 1 demonstration, feared the reverberations outside the center. Nevertheless, persons who held opinions like those expressed below, were very careful to keep them to themselves:

*Oda*

"A minority does the most foolish things without any consideration and does not know what will happen and influence the rest of the people. I am deeply disappointed."<sup>2</sup>

Some of the very Americanized young nisei girls probably never could be counted among the supporters of the Daihyo Sha. Their criticisms (made almost a year after the incident) are ~~amusing~~ *interesting*.

<sup>1</sup> ibid., Oct. 23, 1944, pp. 7-9.

<sup>2</sup> From a letter; see Report, Dec. 24, p. 25.

*not clear to me. more explanation by you seems to be necessary*



*Manji and Nakas*

"The Jerome group just wanted to make the whole camp over. They even went to the Planning Board (this is false) telling them they wanted to run this place."

"They said we Tuleans were soft and good for nothing!"

"That group turned out to be the Kai group. They might have had their good points, but we felt they were being very unreasonable and were doing more harm than good. . .

"Another thing: they went about it in dictatorship style. They used physical threats. They said, 'You do what we tell you or else.'"<sup>1</sup>

Two months after the strike, Mr. <sup>*Jakenchi*</sup>Fujimoto, a very level headed fellow still insisted that the people had been behind the Daihyo Sha. Since he was one of the few informants who would not be offended or alienated by counter argument, the writer asked him what he thought of the Administration's contention that the Negotiating Committee was composed of agitators and radicals. <sup>*Jakenchi*</sup>Fujimoto pointed out that one should not judge the entire body by some of its members. He realized clearly that the strong-arm boys, the "young radicals," had done the body irreparable harm:

"Some of the representatives weren't exactly the people who ought to be acting as representatives. You can understand that trouble can arise from a fanatical kibe being a representative.

*A key account*

"There was a very small minority group of young radicals. They took it upon themselves to do things for the people in camp, without the peoples' permission. It was this group who first went around demanding the removal of the American flag. . . . They were all for Japanese stoicism. Nobody paid any attention to them. They were not real representatives."<sup>2</sup>

The Daihyo Sha Kai had scored a pronounced victory. From November 1 to November 4 it was at the zenith of its power. The committee had forced the Administration to receive them as the people's representative body. With sagacity and political foresight the members had avoided major errors while the administration

<sup>1</sup>R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 14, 1944, pp. 2, 3.

<sup>2</sup>ibid., Feb. 1944, p. 14.



committed a series of acts which progressively increased the hostility of the evacuee population toward WRA, i.e., refusing to grant the use of the gymnasium for the funeral, sending a photographer to the funeral, calling in the harvest workers and feeding them with food which the colonists thought belonged to them, and finally, refusing to recognize as representatives the members of the committee which the people themselves had selected by block election or appointment.

Most intelligent informants state that they believe that the few days after the November 1 demonstration up to the entrance of the Army on November 4 marked the high point of camp unification and public support of the Daihyo Sha and the Negotiating Committee. The committee appeared to be making progress, it had been "recognized", the demonstration had been staged successfully except for the beating of Pedicord which, after all, was received with glee by almost everyone. In other words, the Negotiating Committee was looked upon as a successful group of leaders who had made noteworthy accomplishments without bringing any undue inconvenience upon the people. After November 4th when life became increasingly uncomfortable, support dwindled slowly but progressively. This sentiment was expressed by Mrs. Yamaguchi:

"My impression is that up until November 4, the people of the block seemed really to support the Daihyo Sha. They did not have so much support in the beginning (mid-October), when the Daihyo Sha was formed. Then the people were just split up.

"But after November 4, I think a lot of people were in doubt whether it's right to support the Daihyo Sha or not."<sup>1</sup>

The committee lost no time in publicizing the fact that negotiations were proceeding favorably, and, according to Spicer,



that Myer had promised to discharge the unpopular members of the appointed personnel.<sup>1</sup> The extent of these so-called "promises" was greatly exaggerated by the people and for weeks and months after the Daihyo Sha began to suffer reverses, the camp rang with popular denunciation of Mr. Best because "he did not keep his promises to the people." It is, however, extremely doubtful that the more intelligent leaders of the Daihyo Sha kai deliberately deceived the people on this matter of promises. A goodly number of their requests had been promised consideration, their complaints were to be investigated, the minutes of the meetings with the administration show that they had every right to consider that they had been given permission to establish a representative body and, a few days after November 1, Mr. Best informed them that Dr. Pedicord would be dismissed. It is possible if not probable, that less responsible members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, with the assistance of self-appointed gossips spread rumors through camp that a large number of specific promises had been made. When, after November 4, camp life became more miserable than ever, it is natural that many of these rumors and exaggerated statements would be resurrected and used as a means of gaining relief by denouncing Mr. Best and the administration. A picture of Mr. Best as a man utterly without honor, a cheat and a liar, developed and was accepted by the great majority of the people, whether they were Daihyo Sha supporters or not. Nothing he did or accomplished in all of the period in which he remained director of Tule Lake, ever mitigated this unpopularity appreciably. His name remained synonymous with broken faith.

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<sup>1</sup> X's conversation with Spicer, Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, 1943, p.5



At least on the matter of the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord and the Caucasian appointed staff at the hospital the accusations of the people had some basis. On November 4 Mr. Best released the following letter. Later, Dr. Pedicord was reinstated at Tule Lake and continued in his work there for some time before his transfer to the Gila Relocation Center.

[ WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Tule Lake Center  
Newell, California

November 4, 1943

To whom it may concern:

Immediately following the incident at the hospital wherein Dr. Pedicord was beaten by some unknown group of men, Director Myer and Dr. Pedicord agreed that doctors on the appointed staff and the appointed staff of nurses were to be removed from further duty at the hospital. Federal regulations require that a hospital administrator must be responsible for government property and narcotics. In accordance therewith Nurse Shipps has been detailed as hospital administrator. There are no facts to the rumor that Dr. Pedicord will return to the Tule Lake hospital.

/s/ R. R. Best  
Project Director. ]

ATTITUDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOVEMBER 1.

The state of mind of the Administration immediately after November 1 was one of indecision, tension and fear which in some individuals amounted to hysteria. As far as the men in higher positions were concerned, the lurid and exaggerated accounts of the "Jap riots at Tule Lake" were most disturbing. Newspaper reporters, put off with innocuous statements, interviewed the Caucasians employed in construction work who lived off the project and built up fantastic stories based on the statements of these ill informed persons. The Japanese also were angered by these accounts, which described them as blood-thirsty Japs, but to them

this was only one of a large list of aggravations. To Dillon Myer and Mr. Best this publicity was a matter of appalling seriousness. In fact, the injury to public relations was probably the most severe blow dealt to WRA in all its history. Every Administrative action and every event or disturbance which followed November 1 was always considered first from the viewpoint of what effect it would have if the matter got into the newspapers. Extreme caution was observed to see that news did not leak out. The importance of this fear on the mind of Mr. Best and its effect on his policy cannot be over-emphasized.

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This section ought to be developed somewhat but I'll have to read the newspapers to do it. In it's proper place some mention ought to be made of the investigations of the WRA which the November 1 incident brought about. I must get more data on this, if possible.  
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Chair: Negotiating Committee will ask the WRA to rectify your misunderstanding on this matter of re-segregation of Japanese colonists. Re-segregation does not mean segregation among ourselves. The point is to divide between the loyal and the disloyal in the sense of their feeling.<sup>1</sup>

Additional questions were asked: Takahashi wondered if 700 acres of farm land would be sufficient. Other members asked about compensation for the widow and about the age of truck drivers.

Two voices from the floor again made themselves heard:

"How will we distinguish the disloyal from the loyal?"

"Utmost care and consideration should be taken"

Kuratomi answered:

"Due to the Administration's lack of understanding of Japanese psychology, many tragical incidents may result. We have to remember that we are Japanese and are for the greater and righteous things. That's why we are discussing this for the purpose of unification."

Tsuda: There are several colonists who have rejected the registration and there are others who registered 'yes', who at the time of re-segregation stubbornly remained and are still with us. If we should demand re-segregation of colonists, how should we present the problem?

Chair: I have no plan as to the ways and means. I know definitely that by the first of next year, the president of the U. S., by proclamation will recognize Japanese status as pro-Japanese.<sup>2</sup>

The Chair then proceeded with the plan for the election of various divisional committees and plans for the function of the farm department, farm produce, chicken and hog farm, food supply, motor pool, hospital, betterment of living conditions, internal security, and education. He mentioned that Best had agreed to give the colonists free reign in managing the Internal Security Department.

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<sup>1</sup>ibid., p. 4

<sup>2</sup>ibid., p. 5



Kozaka said:

"Wouldn't we be misunderstood if a central body is formed at this time without first consulting the colonists?"

Chair: No. Daihyo Sha Kai was elected from each block by recommendation and this body was formed by that representative body so there is no inconsistency.

Kozaka: I make a recommendation that block representatives consult the colonists first before further going into the discussion of plan for the further formation of divisional committees.

Chair: (reluctantly) Of course, it should be that way. We cannot decide by ourselves. (All agreed)<sup>1</sup>

Kai suggested that this plan be put before the colonists at a mass meeting. Kawamura suggested that this mass meeting be postponed "until we have accomplished something." Kai (according to the minuted) became indignant and demanded that Kawamura reverse his statement, saying, "If there's full collaboration among the Negotiating Committee the Daihyo-Sha and other committees, there should not be any monkey business." Kawamura reversed his statement.

Takahashi moved that the block representatives elect fitted persons for the various posts and that the final decision should be given to the Daihyo Sha Kai. A written recommendation should be conveyed to the colonists. This was unanimously carried.

Two days later Diller Myer arrived on the project. The Negotiating committee asked for audience with him and, according to evacuee informants, was refused.

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<sup>1</sup>ibid., p. 6. It is most unlikely that the secretary of the Daihyo Sha Kai commented upon the tone used by members in making statements. This "reluctantly" is without doubt an example of over-zealousness on the part of the hostile translators.



The Negotiating Committee decided to make a demonstration of public support and on the night of October 31 sent false messages to the mess halls that on the following day Mr. Myer was going to give a speech and the people were to come to the Administration Building to hear it. They were told to be as orderly as possible and carry no weapons.

"So the representatives passed the word to each mess hall. They asked everybody to come to the Administration Building quietly, without sticks and without knives in their pockets. They wanted them to be as quiet as possible."<sup>1</sup>

*Oda:*  
"The first thing we heard was about Mr. Myer. He is coming and we would appreciate your cooperation in coming to the administration building. I said to myself, 'Things should be straightened out.' Find out the true dope of how things are standing."

"The first time I didn't know the object why we should go. When I got there I find out the negotiation members were there to consult with WRA heads on the improvement of the center. . . . We went to the Ad. building there for four hours. After three or four hours we find out it was for nothing because the committee couldn't accomplish anything."<sup>3</sup>

When the crowd which gathered about the Administrative area appeared insufficient, the hoodlum element either was ordered or took it upon themselves to get more people out. They obtained cars and toured the camp, exhorting the people to come as "true Japanese" and threatening those who stayed away. Data are too vague to state exactly what the threats were. The following statement by <sup>*Takemichi*</sup> "I" is probably close to the truth except that it is doubtful that the people as he implied were told they might be shot. The statement is also interesting psychologically. Like many persons in camp, <sup>*Takemichi*</sup> "I" sympathizes absolutely with some of the "demands" of the committee;

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<sup>1</sup>Report, Dec. 24, p. 13

<sup>2</sup>Notes, April, p. 20.

<sup>3</sup>ibid., p. 23.



nevertheless, he would not risk his skin at the demonstration.

"When this came out, it so happened that the goon-squad went on the war path . . . . The people gathered in some blocks. In some blocks the representatives asked the people to come because Myer was going to give a speech. Then, when there wasn't enough people there, a few members of the goon squads got cars. They said it wasn't safe to remain in the barracks and asked the people to head for the Administrative area. I sat tight. I figured if I'm going to get shot I can get shot here in this barracks. They talked to the people trying to make them go, saying, 'Are you Japanese or not?'"<sup>1</sup>

By these various means a large crowd was induced to come. Estimates of its size vary. It may have been as many as 14,000 to the Administration Building. Many went out of curiosity.

Faced with this exhibition of "public trust in the representatives" Myer and Best decided to see the committee.

The Japanese overran the entire Administrative area; the Administration building was completely surrounded. Many of the appointed personnel were panic stricken. The fears of those who had always expected the worst of the colonists appeared about to be realized. Some feared rape for their wives and children. While the conference was going on Dr. Pedicord came out of the hospital and, using insulting language, ordered the group about the hospital to disperse. Four or five of the hoodlum group followed him into the hospital and into his office. He struck one; they turned upon him and beat him severely. The variation in the versions of this occurrence are legion. Opler says Pedicord changed his own version every time he was interviewed.<sup>2</sup> Two Japanese informants said that the boys went to get Pedicord to ask him to come to the conference.<sup>3</sup> However, Opler says that the nurses, who were eye-witnesses, testified that

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<sup>1</sup>Notes, Feb., p.

<sup>2</sup>Notes, Mar., p. 59.

<sup>3</sup>Report, Dec. 24, pp. 13, 22



Pedicord came out of the hospital and ordered the boys out.<sup>1</sup>

This is corroborated by M., the <sup>Kabooka</sup> Daihyo Sha informant, who added:

"He came from the inside of the hospital and told them to go to hell. That's why they went in. They had no authority in the hospital. A house is like a fortress. They stepped in because there was reason. I can't walk right into anybody else's house and made a stink!"<sup>2</sup>

Best and Myer are said to have realized that this episode was unrelated to the demonstration.<sup>3</sup> However, it did not help the negotiations. Stenographic notes were taken at this meeting, but have not yet been obtained. The demands made to Myer and Best were released by the Daihyo Sha Kai later. They do not appear to differ at all from the demands made on October 26., except for the addition of the request for immediate discharged of the Caucasian employees in the hospital and the immediate termination of responsible WRA personnel. Director Myer, however, in conversation with the writer, indicated that he had been given considerable more information on the graft which was supposed to be existing among the Caucasian personnel.

18 DEMANDS MADE TO D. S. MYER AND R. R. BEST, November 1, 1943

(1) WRA should submit an official written statement apologizing to the colonists for their responsibility of the farm incident. At the same time WRA should settle with sincerity the pending problem to the satisfaction of its colonists.

(2) Project Director has given no expression of condolence to the family of the deceased in the farm incident which is unwarrantable.

(3) The inhuman attitude of the Administration at the time of the funeral of the late Kashima is unpardonable.

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<sup>1</sup>Notes, Mar., p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>ibid., pp. 61. 62.

<sup>3</sup>Opler, loc. cit.



(4) Hospital's Official report of agreement concerning those injured in the accident should be made.

(5) In order to prevent future occurrence of an incident of this nature, plan formulated by the Administration is demanded.

(a) Absolute authority to select and appoint vehicle drivers, who must be 21 or over, by a committee selected from the colonists should be given.

(b) Discard all defective vehicles and purchase new ones. At the same time increase the number.

(6) Immediate clearance of the status of the Colonists should be made by re-segregating all those loyal to America from those who have applied for repatriation.

(7) There is no necessity of cultivating land more than necessary for our subsistence. Unemployment created by minimizing the area should be given other opportunities of employment. It is absolutely unpardonable for the WRA to ship the farm products to the Navy, Army and loyal Japanese.

(8) Public school should re-open immediately, however, subjects, pertinent to American principle should not be taught. Only language and knowledge should be the object and aim of the public school education.

(9) Officially recognized central consisting body composed of colonists' representatives should be formed. Function should be left up to the free will of the representatives. WRA should accede to the plan of instituting departments, as well as authority to function as the colonists see fit.

Negotiation should be done solely with this central consulting body. Employment in the farm, hospital, motor pool, school, mess, mess warehouse, sanitation, and Internal Security should be given to better the condition in this center.

(10) Block Managers should come under the jurisdiction of the central consulting body.

(11) Disposition of chicken and hog should be made clear to the colonists. Fair means of distribution to colonists must be practiced.

(12) Improvement of latrines and shower rooms.

(13) Improvement of roads.

(14) Immediate construction of proches.

(15) WRA should assume responsibility for the poor quality and insufficient supply of food. Food for children should be given special consideration.



(16) Responsibility of the WRA in accepting more colonists relative to the insufficient preparation.

(17) Sole responsibility of the WRA in an event of a strike.

(18) Treatment of the colonists in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conference.

These 18 demands were submitted to the Project Director and D. S. Myer.

Immediate discharge of Caucasian employees in the Hospital and immediate termination of responsible WRA personnel.

From m.: *Kataoka*

"Why we asked for better facilities: in the beginning of evacuation they said, "If you're loyal and go into camp they'll provide you with everything, clothing, and board. You don't have to worry about anything." Then you know what happened.<sup>1</sup>

Faced with this bewildering list of demands, surrounded by thousands of Japanese, knowing that Dr. Pedicord had been assaulted, and hearing the screams of the hysterical nurses and other members of the appointed personnel, Myer and Best were in a difficult position. As Opler points out, they were conscious of a great paradox in the committee's demands:

"The group said: (1) We represent the center; the people believe in us. And in the same speech usually (2) we've got to have further segregation. There are two big groups here. By this they meant unconsciously the minority they didn't control.<sup>2</sup>

They were by no means convinced that the committee was representative, so they temporized and appeased. They said they would do what they could.<sup>3</sup> They promised to investigate the accusations of graft on the part of appointed personnel.<sup>4</sup> What else, if anything, Myer and Best promised is not known.<sup>5</sup> However, immediately after the conference, some of the members of the Negotiating Committee spread the news

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<sup>1</sup>Notes, Mar., p. 62

<sup>2</sup>Notes, Feb., p. 20

<sup>3</sup>From M.; see Notes, March, p. 62.

<sup>4</sup>Spicer's statement to X; See X's Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup>Stenographic notes of this meeting are in the record. Best's permission, however, must be obtained to see them.



62

that he had promised to fire Dr. Pedicord, fire the grafters, and see that no more food was taken from the warehouse. <sup>Katsuka</sup> M. says he did not hear Myer mention the food-warehouse matter.<sup>1</sup>

After this conference which lasted from about two to four o'clock in the afternoon, Best and Myer made short addresses to the people. George Kuratomi gave a report of the conference and Reverend Kai appealed to the residents to remain calm during the negotiations and commit no violence. Many evacuees who were not present insist that Dillon Myer made certain promises at this time. However, no evacuee informant has stated that he heard Mr. Myer make any specific promises, except the promise to investigate the grafting. One evacuee present, a reliable informant, stated:

"He (Myer) didn't make any promise. He said, "I have confidence with Best."<sup>2</sup>

A teacher present, who is not anti-Japanese, stated that she remembered no promises.

~~After the conference which lasted from about two~~

The report of Myer's speech which appeared in the Tulean Dispatch of November 2 seems as complete and as accurate as any informant's statement:

#### DELEGATES CONFER

#### Myer Addresses Local Residents at Ad. area.

Presenting the requests, suggestions, and demands of the colonists, seven representatives of the residents met with National Director Dillon S. Myer and Project Director Raymond R. Best yesterday afternoon.

During the conference which lasted over two hours, practically the entire population showed their support by surrounding the

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<sup>1</sup>Notes, March, p. 62.

<sup>2</sup>Notes, April, p. 23.



administration building area during the entire afternoon.

At the end of the negotiations Myer addressed the local residents over the public address system and stated that he has met with the people's delegates to discuss their representations. Expressing utmost confidence in Director Best, Myer concluded by asking residents to cooperate with the administration in settling all problems.

George Kuratomi, a member of the representative group, gave a brief report of the proceedings with the WRA officials.

In conclusion Reverend Kai appealed to the residents to remain calm during the negotiations and not create violence harmful to the Japanese interests.

The seven representatives will meet today and tomorrow with the national director and the project director to discuss further the points brought out in yesterday's initial conference.

On the addresses made by Kai and Kuratomi at this time, Opler made the following remarks:

"A meeting was held in Mr. Best's office. The minutes indicate that there were no complete promises made. After the meeting inside there were some speeches. Kuratomi interpreted in Japanese only, what had been decided at the meeting. 'Remember what this man has promised.' This was followed by a speech by Kai of the Dai Nippon order. Kuratomi was under the influence of Kai."

The best explanation of this misunderstanding over the promises comes from <sup>Kurikawa</sup> "J" who became well acquainted with Mr. Best when he was confined in Leuppe during Best's term as director:

"The first fault with Mr. Best is that he 'Yesses' too quick. I found that out in all my conversations with him. Before I complete my conversation he says, 'Yes, I know; Yes, I know!' I'd like to know what he knows because I haven't completed the sentence."

And a man thinks he has made a promise. Two weeks will pass and he doesn't do anything. Two weeks later you go back and he 'Yesses' you again. Unless people have eyes to see and observe him properly, they will always take it for granted that he made the promises. I noticed that in Moab and Leuppe."<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Yosumura of the Cooperative who is definitely anti-Daihyo-Sha and somewhat pro-Administration said on February 3:

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<sup>1</sup>Notes, Feb. p. 19.

<sup>2</sup>Notes, March, p. 16.



64

"They did ignore their promises. But you must consider that a few days after that there was another incident. (The November 4 disturbance which brought in the army.) Probably they would have kept their promises if they had not been scared."<sup>1</sup>

This brief remark is very significant. Mr. Yosumura puts his finger on one of the salient factors responsible for the Administration's policy and its unfortunate results. If the Administration had not been so "scared," it is likely that the course of events would have been quite different. Opler stated several times that during this period the staff members were in a state of panic: It was rumored that a couple of kibei driving a truck had tried to run down Best's child. Best himself was afraid of being kidnapped.<sup>2</sup>

The Daihyo Sha Kai had scored a pronounced victory. From Nov..1 to Nov. 4 it was at the zenith of its power. The committee had forced the Administration to receive them as the people's representative body. With remarkable sagacity the members had shown the political foresight to wait until the administration had committed a series of acts which progressively increased the hostility of the evacuee population toward WRA, i.e., refusing to grant the use of the gymnasium for the funeral, sending a photographer to the funeral, calling in the harvest workers and feeding them with food which the colonists thought belonged to them, and finally, refusing to recognize as representatives the members of the committee which the people themselves had selected by block election or appointment.

The committee lost no time in publicizing the fact that it had

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<sup>1</sup>Notes, Feb., p. 27.

<sup>2</sup>According to Spicer and Opler; Report Dec. 24, p. 26. see also Notes, March.



65

received assurances from WRA that their demands would be met, specifically that Myer had promised to discharged the unpopular members of the appointed personnel.<sup>1</sup> That this was widely believed is shown by the almost unanimous insistence of evacuees that the promises were made and later broken.

Activities of Daihyo Sha Kai immediately after Nov. 1.

Had the negotiations ended here, with no further incident, they might have kept control of the camp. However, the more level-headed members realized the danger of such outbursts as that which resulted in the beating of Dr. Pedicord. Efforts were made to control the over-enthusiastic belligerent hoodlum group. This was first done by announcements in the mess halls.

*Nishino*  
N. says:

"The Block Representatives would come back to the block

and state that the young fellows - those in their teens and up to 22 were too hot tempered and they would like them to be quiet and decent. All the block representatives came back to the block (our's is still in the stockade) and said for the young people not to take matters into their own hands. This was right after the farm accident in October."

*Nishino*

N's statement and the remarks of other evacuees imply that the Negotiating Committee met frequently with the block managers.<sup>2</sup>

ATTITUDE OF THE CAMP POPULATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOVEMBER 1.

The successful demonstration and the apparent capitulation of the Administration added greatly to the Negotiating Committee's prestige in the eyes of the people. It is impossible to present

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<sup>1</sup>X's conversation with Spicer, Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>"M", "O", and "I" probably can give more information on this point.



66

conclusive evidence at present as to the extent of the support given the representatives. But that the committee had the support of "the people" is admitted even by Japanese decidedly hostile to the Daihyo Sha. Several honest, unsophisticated informants imply that support was almost unanimous. K, the "loyal" coal crew worker who left Tule, said:

"Until this was straightened out they didn't want to work. Most of the people were behind it."<sup>1</sup>

*Katayoko*  
M. who is very honest, although being a member of the Daihyo Sha his opinion must be taken with reservations, said:

"At that time everybody believed in the Daihyo Sha, because we all had one camp and were trying to make it livable."<sup>2</sup>

Two men who are employed in the Cooperative and are very much against the committee's policies said: *Yosumura - Ikemoto*

"Kai, Kuratomi, and Kurashige?, they had done their best for the Japanese in Jerome. Whatever they did there was the best for the Japanese. The people from Jerome worshipped him and believed in him (Kai). He was honest but misguided."<sup>3</sup>

"They were supported by everybody."<sup>4</sup>

Support, however, was not unanimous. Conservatives disapproved of the fuss and feared the reverberations outside the center.

*Oda*  
"It's really a disgusting story. I think some of the people (Negotiating Committee) wanted power. They say, 'We are working for the people.' I've heard a lot of rumors. I believe they're working for themselves. . . . Maybe they really tried to bring the center better. But they're demands were more like order than suggestions . . . . The leaders had no self-control themselves. There was so much excitement . . . The rest of the public just follow them."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Report, Dec. 24, p. 12

<sup>2</sup>Notes, March, p. 62

<sup>3</sup>Notes, Feb. pp. 26, 27

<sup>4</sup>Notes, Mar., p. 19.

<sup>5</sup>Notes, Feb., p. 8.



67

"A minority does the most foolish things without any consideration and does not know what will happen and influence the rest of the people. I am deeply disappointed."<sup>1</sup>

The lack of unity was deplored by those individuals themselves in favor of the strike and the stand being made against the Administration:

"A letter from Tule Lake mentioned that there is no unity for the strike on the part of the community. The kibel are exerting a great deal of pressure with threat of physical violence. He wished that the whole community would support the strike."<sup>2</sup>

The beating of Dr. Pedicord and the actions of the "Undisciplined young men was severely criticized.

*Yosumura*  
"On the other hand, when the people came to the Administration building they were forced to go. On that day I saw some of the young men drag out Dr. Pedicord. I was about 200 feet away. I didn't know who that old man was. I saw him dragged and hit by a young fellow. I saw that his head was bald. I felt quite sorry. He couldn't defend himself. I felt they shouldn't do that kind of thing.

"I was looking forward for punishment on those young people. But evidently they (the administration) didn't do anything about it."<sup>3</sup> They should have been punished. That was a great mistake (not punishing them). Later when I saw Mr. Myer he said Pedicord started the fight. If I was there and had any authority I would have stopped them. But with the mob psychology they would probably have hit me."<sup>4</sup>

*Jackson*  
"I" admits: They might have been goon squads but they were representatives."<sup>5</sup>

". . . Some of the representatives weren't exactly the people who ought to be acting as representatives. You can understand that trouble can arise from a fanatical kibel being a representative."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From a letter; see Report, Dec. 24, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup>X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 4, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup>The Administration tried but was unable to apprehend Dr. Pedicord's assailants.

<sup>4</sup>Notes, Feb., p. 27.

<sup>5</sup>Notes, Mar., p. 39.

<sup>6</sup>Notes, Feb., p. 14.



*Takenuchi*

But, in defense of the committee as a whole, "I" adds:

"There was a very small minority group of young radicals. They took it upon themselves to do things for the people in camp, without the peoples' permission. It was this group who first went around demanding the removal of the American flag . . . . They were all for Japanese stoicism. Nobody paid any attention to them. They were not real representatives."<sup>1</sup>

#### ATTITUDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOVEMBER 1.

The attitude of the Administration from November 1 to November 4 was one of indecision, tension and fear which in some individuals amounted to hysteria. By refusing to recognize the representatives and then relenting when the crowd gathered around the Administration building, they had lost face greatly. (That this was a great error was later admitted by Myer himself.<sup>2</sup>) The administration was not unsympathetic to many of the Negotiating Committee's requests.

Opler says:

"The Administration couldn't listen to them as demands. They were really sympathetic to all of them (the demands) except the dismissal of the staff members. The negotiating committee demanded promises. We said we'd do what we could. They took it as a promise and insisted we'd broken a promise."<sup>3</sup>

Yet, against recognition and cooperation with the Daihyo Sha Kai stood its obvious political machinations, and the violence which the body had been unable to control. The Daihyo Sha had posted men in the blocks on October 23 to try to convince or force the people to attend the funeral; young men, probably acting under orders, had patrolled the rear of the crowd at the funeral, although whether they actually attempted to keep the people there is open to question; the Reports Officer had been attached and Dr. Pedicord severely beaten. There was no doubt that supporters of the Daihyo Sha attempted to intimidate the people into coming to the Administration

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<sup>1</sup>ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Notes, March, p. 44.

<sup>3</sup>Notes, Feb., p. 21.



Building on November 1 and that it also lied to the people on October 31, when it was announced that Director Myer would speak. Although there was no proof, the Negotiating Committee was also blamed for breaking the windows of the housing office and tampering with the beds and belongings of the truck drivers hired from the outside to handle the transportation in connection with the farm harvest.<sup>1</sup>

The fact that the leadership was dominated by men from other centers, particularly Jerome, also discredited it in the eyes of the Administration.<sup>2</sup> In this regard, Opler expressed the Administration's attitude pretty well when he said:

"The Jerome group had a pressure group in the background that Kai had the greatest influence over. They whipped the whole bunch into line. . . . The Jerome group was the most prominent in agitating. They were status seeking. The original negotiating committee was composed of people from Jerome. My informants say that the Jerome group started organizing before they came."<sup>3</sup>

The Administration was correct in assuming that the Daihyo Sha did not have complete public support. However, it greatly underestimated the extent of the lack of support. Its greatest oversight was ignorance of the fact that the great mass of the people felt they had elected these representatives and that the people would always support actively or passively any group that stood stalwartly against the unpopular Administration, even if it used threats or employed violence. The public support of some of the demands was tremendous. The deeds of the Administration, no matter what their character, would be received with more or less

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<sup>1</sup>Spicer's letter, Report, Dec. 24, pp. 27

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 24, 29.

<sup>3</sup>Notes, Feb., p. 19.



opprobrium if for no other reason than that they sprang from this hated source.

The Administration's ignorance of the extent of public support of the Daihyo Sha Kai, and which of committee's policies were approved or disapproved, may be laid partially to the fact that they gained much of their information from informers or inu. Opler implied on two occasions that one man had come to the Administration and "told everything." According to camp rumor, a particularly dastardly example of informing was committed soon after November 1 by a disgruntled member of the Daihyo Sha, Mr. Takahashi, who had expected to be given a prominent place in the organization, but had been absent because of illness when the selections were made.

*Chickins*  
 "This is what I've heard. After the Negotiating Committee a certain man, let's call him X, wrote out a petition in English, stating that these nine people were not legally elected. He sent this to blocks 16 and 17 and said to please sign this paper. He was turned down very harshly. Then the Planning Board posted a bulletin, saying, Mr. X is an inu. If you work for the project here, you find he's the key man. He's standing pretty high now, and has the confidence of the Administration now.

X did this because he was jealous. They didn't recognize him. He's a graduate of a political school in Japan. He wanted to be a member of the nine."<sup>1</sup>

In failing to apprehend and punish the assailants of Dr. Pedicord, the Administration lost a valuable opportunity to assert its authority in a manner which would have gained general camp approval. The statement Myer is reported to have made, indicates that he thought the act had some justification, since Pedicord struck the first blow. This, as has been shown, was not the attitude of many of the Japanese.

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<sup>1</sup>Notes, Mar., P. 12.



On November 2, certain members of the Appointed Personnel, prominent among which were those members of the hospital staff who were staunch supporters of Dr. Pedicord held a meeting at Tule Lake. Myer attended unwillingly. The tenor of this meeting is described in the same letter quoted previously:

"The following day. . .after lunch, more talk, leading to our being whisked out of town (6 of us, 5 nurses and myself) to 10 miles away at the town of Tule Lake, against the wishes of the Director of the WRA, who, at a meeting that Tuesday, called by the irate personnel, asking for Military protection, 2 soldiers to each person and a machine gun and a tank.

"The WRA head was against a show of violence. He said it bred violence. He suggested that we were 'justifiably' scared, but insisted that adequate military protection was quietly in operation. He looked at us heroines in white at the meeting for support. The leader of us heroines snook with fear and rage that such an appeasement policy dare to be breached. Each small town orator got up and stalked and posed and in the moronic accents of . . . prep schools or sheriff county backgrounds stormed about his individual bravery. But the bastards should be smoked out because his loved ones, women and children, were in danger of rapine to say the least. Only one farmer, uncouth and simple, held out for a conciliatory and amicable discussion of the demands presented. The sum of the discussion was that some time ago, the personnel, little politicians, angling for the \$5,000. a year jobs that a few envied superiors got, had asked for a very expensive "fence" to be erected around personnel quarters. And this fence that would have meant plenty of dough to the neighbors and relatives in the nearby town, was refused by WRA head because it wouldn't have solved the problem sufficiently to entitle such expence. Besides a couple of armored tanks from the 10 feet away military post would have cleared up any real mob, said the director, but the minute military takes over, WRA goes out.

To the suggestions of this irate group Myer is reputed to have answered, "This is facism."

On November 2 the Daihyo Sha Kai met again. The minutes of this meeting are extremely ambiguous and all of the following discussion is open to question and amendment. Since the Administration wished to regard the procedure followed as "undemocratic", the translators, who favored the Administrative point of view,



However, immediately after Mr. Myer's departure, the construction of a high barbed-wire ~~xxxx~~ topped fence, separating the Japanese section of camp from the caucasian section (the Administration Buildings, living quarters and warehouses) was begun. Sentries were stationed at the gates and for the remainder of the camp's existence (this may have to be changed) Japanese had to procure passes to be allowed entrance into the "Caucasian Area." Needless to say, the presence of this fence was always resented.



On November 2, the Daihyo Sha met again. The chief task before the body was the determination of the method of selecting the permanent committees <sup>and</sup> the permanent representative body which was to head up the proposed community organization. The permanent representative body continued to be called "The Negotiating Committee" in the minutes. The committees considered necessary were Hospital Investigation Committee, Farm Department, Motor Pool, Warehouse, Mess Hall and Management, Police, Betterment of Living Condition, Education, Personal, Fire, Administration. These suggestions, however, were considered tentative and were to be referred to the people at a mass meeting.

The first question raised was how this permanent Negotiating Committee and the sub-committees were to be selected. The minutes are very confused and the discussion is difficult to follow. Kuratomi explained the plan accepted to the writer:

"Each block was to recommend suitable persons to the various committees. After the recommendation sheets were in, the Daihyo Sha was to elect a selection committee to make the final recommendation to the various committees. The committee members thus chosen were to be subject to the final approval of the administration and the people."

Kuratomi made the recommendation for a mass meeting and also advised that written personal histories should be attached to the names of the recommendees. Kai suggested that a written report of the decision of the Recommendation or Selection Committee be distributed in the blocks the next day and that the Daihyo Sha also be given the privilege of making recommendations to the committees. These suggestions were approved. The ways and means of recommendation were to be left to each ward (or block?). Both the persons making recommendation and those individuals recommended for positions were to be 21 years old or older. By

*Block seems  
to be more  
logical*



Monday, November , it was hoped that the permanent committees would be selected and work on the farm would be resumed. The meeting closed with the decision to organize the celebration of Meiji Setsu, the birthday of the first Meiji emperor, which fell on the next day.

The tone of this meeting is very optimistic. There is no indication whatever that the leaders, headed by Kai and Kuratomi, had any other intention but to push through the election of the permanent body which they had received Best's and Myer's permission to organize. Once this body was in existence it would be very difficult for the Administration not to "recognize" it. The impression gained is that the negotiators felt they had gained recognition and that by and large, they had a fairly clear field before them. Had there been no further incident, this group of leaders might have kept control of the camp for some time. The more level headed leaders were not unaware of the danger of such outbursts as that which resulted in the beating of Dr. Pedicord. Efforts were made to control the over-enthusiastic belligerent, strong-arm group. Announcements, such as those described by Mr. <sup>Nakao</sup> Nakao, were made in the mess halls:

"The Block Representatives would come back to the block and state that the young fellows - those in their teens and up to 22 - were too hot tempered and they would like them to be quiet and decent. All the block representatives came back to the block and said for the young people not to take matters into their own hands. This was right after the farm accident in October."<sup>1</sup>

As for the Administration, in spite of the hysteria of certain individuals, the men in the higher positions thought that the crisis had passed. Opler is reported to have said on the night of November 3 that there wasn't going to be any trouble.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>ibid.,

<sup>2</sup>According to Harkness, Superintendent of Schools, in informal conversation with the writer.



On November 3 the Spanish Consul arrived on the project to investigate the trouble. He met with the Negotiating Committee, but no documents on this meeting are available. Kuratomi seemed reluctant to give much detail:

"I think he came mainly to check up on the November 1 demonstration. He also asked about the auto accident - and the rest was of a personal nature. We did explain the situation to him. I also explained the proceedings of the conference with Mr. Myer.

"He asked us, 'Is it all right for me to leave?' I told him frankly that everything was under control. Then when he came back again (on Nov. 9) he was rather peeved with us."

"That was one of the most amicable meetings we ever had. The atmosphere in camp (immediately after Nov. 1) was very amicable. We had just had the celebration of Meiji Setsu too."

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Must check and see if anything was put in the Tulean Dispatch on this meeting.  
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At a later Daihyo Sha Kuratomi reported on this interview as follows:

Next the chair reported on the interview with the Spanish Consul. Upon report made to the Consul by the negotiating committee with regard to the hospital problems, such as the appointed personnel's abusiveness toward the Japanese evacuees that at the time of major operation, they refused to sterilize the apparatus, the Spanish Consul agreed to remedy the matter through the WRA authorities. It was also reported that due to the lack of medical instruments in the Hospital, some instruments have been purchased with colonists' money. Spanish Consul advised that complaints of this nature should be directly made by the colonists. If the case necessitates, the Consul will come at any time upon request. Upon presentation of food supply inventory prepared by Sugimoto, Negotiating Committee, the Spanish Consul was very much surprised and asked how such was gotten hold of. Copies of such records should be kept on Consulates file inasmuch as WRA's report, which may come later, is not reliable, as the one prepared by Sugimoto. As to the termination of appointed personnel, the Consul replied that he will do his utmost to help on the matter. Complaints on the lack of facilities in each apartment such as shelves, chairs, stools, etc., the Consul replied that he had already discussed the matter with the authorities and they had agreed to distribute them through the block managers at once. Lastly the Consul emphasized that any rash or inconsiderate action the part of the colonists will ultimately be your own responsibility. If there should be any victims, it will create a more difficult problem, therefore,

1R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 18, 1944, p. 7.



such should be prevented at any cost. So long as the demands are carried through. Report on the incident should be written and a copy of it should be submitted to him for he has the responsibility to see to it that it is transferred to the officials in Japan.



all rewritten.November 4 Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai

On the night of November 4 the Daihyo Sha Kai met again to proceed with the important matter of the organization of a permanent representative group.<sup>1</sup> Kuratomi, when asked to clarify the extremely confused minutes, made the following statement of his own and the body's intentions to the writer:

"Our main object was to elect our permanent committee men. Previous to that we had had a meeting and it was suggested that capable persons from their respective blocks should be nominated from the block people for the seven or eight committees we were to have. This was still to be approved by the administration and by the people.

"At the same time, if any persons who were chosen were not capable, it would be entirely up to the liberty of the people to refuse them. If the people wanted some other committee or wished to subtract a committee, this was also up to them."

"At the same time it was also our sincere desire to resign because we were only a temporary group. After our resignation, what would take place after the body was recognized was up to them. The Administration and the people might have many suggestions. The entire body of the Daihyo Sha Kai intended to resign and be replaced.

"That night, we were choosing the names of the permanent committee members from nominations that had been submitted by the residents of their blocks. We selected the names of people whom we thought would be capable.

"That night we had a so-called committee to choose from the nomination lists. After the committee members had filled in the names, they asked the block representatives for their approval. The only thing left to do was to bring this up to the Administration for their approval. We also intended to have the mass meeting and explain this to the people."<sup>2</sup>

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Any comments on this? R. H.  
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Matters did not run at all smoothly and the body wrestled with the problem and argued for six hours, from eight in the evening until two in the morning. Since much of the discussion is very interesting those parts of the minutes which meet with the approval

<sup>2</sup>R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 18, 1944, pp. 8-9.

<sup>1</sup>It is interesting that at this meeting an attempt was made to model the organization on that which was formed at Boston after the strike. Kuratomi - ibid. Dec. 26, 1944, p. 3.

no  
Comment



of Kuratomi will be quoted in toto. Those sections he considers interpolations, will also be quoted with his comments.

Discussion of the business on hand was begun by Yamatani who reported that in Ward I there had been no recommendations at all for the Selection Committee and suggested that the Daihyo Sha appoint a committee of nine men.<sup>1</sup> Takahashi criticized this method of selection and suggested instead that the Selection Committee be composed of men who represented each center.

Takahashi: To my mind nine persons to decide in the selection is not fair. I suggest that one Selection Committee from the Center from which they came should be selected to insure fairness.

The argument continued.

Chair: I want suggestions as to a practical procedure to follow in this selection.

Yamagata: Selection Committee should be chosen from people who have technical abilities.

Mr. Yamamoto, jumping the gun, nominated Mr. Takahashi to the Selection Committee, Yamamoto being a supporter of Takahashi's and coming from the same center. Yamanaka seconded the motion.

Anonymous: By selecting the Committee by wards will prevent trouble of segregating many unqualified persons.

Uchida: As Mr. Takahashi suggested, I recommend that Selection Committee be picked up from each Center segregees, one or two persons from each center.

Chair: There are segregees from eight different centers. If we were to choose committee from them, there will be some unfairness and disadvantage.

Anonymous: It doesn't matter how many recommendees we have, as long as selection is made fairly.

Uchida: A month will be sufficient to know one's ability and intelligence.

Takahashi: A month is not enough to know a person's character or intelligence. For example, in my block, I was appointed by the Block Manager. Unless representatives are elected from the group who came from the same center, it isn't fair.

<sup>1</sup>Kuratomi says he thinks this was Ward IV, not Ward I.



Yamatani: We may simply say Poston, but there are three camps there that there are many people you do not know. Block 31 recommended 43 persons<sup>1</sup> for a committee because they only had one day to study and select those recommendees. Therefore I again suggest that nine selection Committee be selected. (He meant 9 men from each ward - not from centers.)

Uyeda: I agree with Mr. Yamatani, but nine from each ward will not be enough.

Mohri: May I make a suggestion that the committee be selected from each center segregees and also 9 or 10 from the Daihyo Sha Kai for the Selection Committee.

Chair: With respect to the recommendation of each block recommender, we should proceed with the selection by the form we have here. First plan is that the Selection Committee be chosen from each center segregees; second, selection of nine from the Daihyo Sha Kai; third, selection from the wards; fourth, joint committee of center segregees and nine selected from the Daihyo Sha Kai; four plans were submitted to the floor and the Chair especially explained plan 4. result of the voting was as follows:

Plan 1	-	3 Votes
2	-	8 Votes
3	-	25 Votes
4	-	27 Votes

Chair asked whether the decision was agreeable to all and the answer was agreeable.

Having at length decided to have a negotiating committee composed jointly of representatives from each center and nine men from the Daihyo Sha, the body next discussed how many men should represent each center. However, before this discussion got under way Mr. Mohri, a Daihyo Sha member, who had fallen asleep, woke up and remarked, "One out of the whole center?" Kuratomi answered:

Chair: We are discussing about the 4th plan which is your recommendations, wasn't it?

Mohri did not reply.

The discussion continued:

Yamanaka: One from each center is fair and square.

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<sup>1</sup>This was true, said Kuratomi - Some blocks recommended 3 to 5 men for each committee.



Tsuda: I have been in Tule Center for over a year but I am not still sure of a good person so we can't expect perfection at this time.

Mohri: Your statement is not clear. State more clearly.

Tsuda: In order to perfect the representation of the colonists, I recommend that two be chosen from each block.

Chair had no comment to Tsuda's statement.

Tokunaga: We might merely say Poston camp but between camp 1 and camp 3 there is a distance of 6 miles, so you just can't know people perfectly. Same amount of representation should be made regardless of the population from each center.

Hyoge: Sincere attitude of the Daihyo Sha is well known that we have no grievances or complaints against the Selection Committee. Whoever is chosen for the post has nothing to do with the population. In order to proceed with the business, we should discuss and proceed with the agenda as Tuleans, without referring back to what center they came from.

Chair: I have no objections to your opinion.

Takahashi adheres to selection of two persons from each center. Thus the question was put to vote and the result was as follows:

two persons from each center - 36  
one person from each center - 17  
two persons from each center - 14  
(Poston three persons)

This matter having been decided the persons from the same center were instructed to get together and select the personnel of the Selection Committee.

At this moment the meeting was interrupted dramatically by the entrance of Yoshio Kobayashi, a young police warden who reported that Caucasians were transporting food supplies to the outside by trucks. Mr. Tsuda, the chief warden instructed him to return, take the license number of the trucks, keep note of the food stuff being taken out and report to the supervisor at once. According to the minutes:

"He further advised Kobayashi not to go alone but stop at the Internal Security and pick up three or four night patrols to go along with him and he further warned to refrain from taking



rash actions by all means. Kobayashi bowed and went out. Upon hearing this conversation several youths followed Kobayashi."

This matter, which was dismissed so casually, eventually brought about the ruin of the Daihyo Sha's plans. <sup>and</sup> ~~The occurrence~~ will be discussed in detail <sup>some</sup> ~~immediately following this meeting.~~ Kuratomi told the writer later:

"If I'd known anything like November 4th would have happened I'd have sent Mr. Tsuda down. I didn't think it was such a bad condition. Mr. Tsuda felt about the same as I did."<sup>1</sup>

The meeting continued and the following men were selected for the Selection Committee:

Topaz Selection Committee	Toshio Kawano
Tule Lake Center	Aizo Takahashi
Poston	Hiroyoshi Tsuda
Gila	Kuwata
Heart Mountain	H. Nogawa
Jerome	Hamamoto
Rohwer	S. Tokunaga
Manzanar	O. Yamauchi
(Granada, Minidoka -- no representatives.)	Tateishi
	Mohri
	S. Kai
	T. Kobayashi
	M. Shimada
	Kawamura
	Kameta

It was already past 11:30 and the selection of the committee was apparently infeasible to complete by tonight. Mr. Takahashi suggested that since it is infeasible, selection should be held until tomorrow morning, with serious deliberation.

Kai: Selection could be completed in about 30 minutes. For the sake of the Project Director and the colonists, we should complete this selection even though it may take the whole night. (So saying, he consulted the Chairman, who at once agreed to proceed with the selection.)

At this moment another youth came running in reported to Kai, addressing him as 'Sensei', that the Army had entered the Center. Noise of the guns and machine guns, which broke the tranquillity of a cold dark night, increased. Kai instructed the youths to command all other youths to disperse before any action or injury occurred. The youths hurried away.

<sup>1</sup> ibid., Dec. 26, 1944, p. 3.



The Chair then called each divisional committee head and suggested that 2 representatives from each Center should be sufficient. As the Chair restated his suggestion, he added that one representative should represent Manzanar, which will make the total Selection Committee, 15. Suggestion was raised from the floor stating that the Chairman also should be included. The Chair continued to mention that the selection will be made tonight and as the final step, the decision will be referred to the colonists for their approval, to which majority of the body agreed. Voice was heard from the floor stating that since the representatives were fully elected from the blocks, elected Selection Committee will have no difficulty from the colonists.

Chair: At any cost, we must complete the Selection Committee by tonight, since the colonists are so concerned of the outcome; therefore, I appeal to all block representatives to seriously consider this matter.

Whether the meeting should continue until the selections for the committees had been made was put to a vote by the Selection Committee. It was unanimously agreed to continue.

Kuratomi explained the difficulties of the task to the writer:

"Each block had recommended so many people. There was a stack of papers so (eight inches) high. There was a special form, (for each person recommended) marked out in columns. In the first column was the name of the committee, in the second the names of the men recommended, in the third their history, (which was brief), and in the 4th their block.

"For each committee each sheet had five, three or maybe ten names. We had to go through a pile of papers that high and select one person for each sheet - for each position there were 150 to 200 names to go through.

"It was all understood by the Daihyo Sha that after this recommendation was made that the names would be brought up before a mass meeting of the people and that the people would have the final say. If any man of the committee was unfitted, that position could be re-elected by the people. The Daihyo Sha had to disband after this approval by the people. We had left the making of the by-laws and anything like that to the new permanent representatives.

(*the negotiating committee*)  
 "We wanted to be released of the responsibility as fast as possible. I wanted myself to get the center church organized. That was my primary thought at this time. If I went into this kind of a thing (politics) I couldn't take my hands off. I wanted to be done with it and let time take care of itself."<sup>1</sup>

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 Any comments? R. H.  
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<sup>1</sup> ibid., Jan. 2, 1945, p. 4.



The minutes continue dramatically:

"It was now 1:30 A. M. and the thundering roar of the tanks, armored trucks, and jeeps rumbled near the block 15 Mess Hall."

The minutes state that the Selection Committee surrounded Kai and that he personally selected the new permanent body "by acting quickly as a machine." The writer doubts this. In any case, the selections were completed by 2:00 A. M. and the meeting was adjourned, the minutes ending with the ominous remark:

"Sound of the guns were no longer audible, however the rumbling of the Army trucks and tanks were heard."



While the Daihyo Sha was struggling with this difficult task of selecting permanent committees, events were transpiring which radically altered the situation and rendered all their efforts in vain. As has been previously mentioned, a group of young fellows had been guarding the warehouse area to see that no more food was taken away from the harvesters. Whether these young men had taken up these duties at the behest of the Daihyo Sha is not known. The administration has always contended that the guarding of the warehouses and the resulting trouble was the work of the Daihyo Sha. That Kai and Kuratomi were actually implicated, the writer is by no means convinced. On the other hand, a young member of the Negotiating Committee <sup>Yoshiyama</sup> has told the writer that he was in charge of the warehouse guard, a group of reckless fellows whom, he stated, were very hard to control. This young man later became a member of a faction which opposed Kai and Kuratomi and it is not unlikely that this group of young men took this adventure upon themselves much against the better judgment of certain of the Daihyo Sha leaders. Some of them were judo boys, feeling their oats and eager for action. A member of the Daihyo Sha, described one of the boys in this group. The writer knows several others and believes this description is fairly characteristic of the whole group.

<sup>Matsumura:</sup>

"I had a friend who had a fight with a Caucasian on that night. He's a dumb person and I think the fellows who went there that night were like him, a group of irresponsible fellows."<sup>1</sup>

These warehouse guards, in spite of their irresponsibility had a fair amount of organization. Certain of the motor pool employees were closely connected with them and were prepared to

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<sup>1</sup>R. Hankey, Notes, July 30, 1944, pp. 5-6.

give immediate notice if any trucks were taken out at night. (The motor pool at this time was located very near Mr. Best's residence.) About 9:50 p. m. Mr. Best sent four members of the personnel to get the keys for three trucks. The Japanese workers at the motor pool refused to give them the keys. The Caucasians left and returned with several men from Internal Security. They took out the trucks. A fight broke out between the Caucasians and the Japanese. Just how the fight began will never be certainly known. However, the writer was told by a Caucasian member of the personnel that the following day the Internal Security man who had been beaten on this night came into the mess hall and told what had happened. According to his account he was accosted by the Japanese and called "dirty names." Thereupon, "he lit right into them." Then they all jumped on him. This account is so typical of Japanese behavior that it deserves some credence. It would have been unusual indeed had the Japanese struck the Caucasian without provocation.



give immediate notice if any trucks were taken out at night. (The motor pool at this time was located very near Mr. Best's residence.) About 9:50 p.m. Mr. Best sent four members of the personnel to get the keys for three trucks. The Japanese workers at the motor pool refused to give them the keys. The Caucasians left and returned with several men on Internal Security. They took out the trucks. A fight broke out between the Caucasians and the Japanese. ~~Mr.~~ Schmidt, Head of Internal Security, called the Army for help.<sup>1</sup>

Then Mr. Best, who for some reason feared that he was going to be kidnapped by the Japanese, called the Army. The Army answered the call and with Internal Security arrested a large number of young men in the warehouse and closely adjoining personnel residence area and in that part of the camp adjoining that area. All but nine of these young men were released the same night. Some Caucasians and some Japanese were severely injured in the fight.

The above account lists what is known to have occurred. On every other detail there is contradiction and disagreement. Almost every account, whether related by a Caucasian or a Japanese, differs ~~from every other account~~. The story told by the young man in charge of the group who disavows any connection with the fight, follows:

*Yoshigami*  
 "On November 4 we were having a meeting. And then a warden told us that there was a suspicious movement going on around the warehouse near the Administration building. He further stated that it seemed as if food was being stolen from the warehouse.

"Mr. Best gave his word that no food will ever be taken out at night.

(The writer has never been able to find evidence that Mr. Best made this promise. It was, however, very widely believed in camp.)

"As soon as we heard of the commotion around the warehouse, because I was a member of the Negotiating Committee, I should go

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<sup>1</sup>So Schmidt stated to the writer.



and see about it. If it was unnecessary, I wanted everybody to return home peacefully.

"I went to the motor pool and asked the boys who were working there that night what happened. They said that Jarrett, Schmidt, Zimmer and Boerbeck came after a truck, but the Japanese said that they had refused to give them the keys. These Japanese felt they wanted to know the reason why they wanted to take out a truck because they were responsible for each and every truck that went out of the Motor Pool.

(This is a transparent excuse. Obviously, the boys did not wish the trucks taken out to carry food to the harvesters.)

"Then Jarrett and Schmidt came back with more men from Internal Security. They took out three trucks, nos. 116, 117, and 144.<sup>1</sup>

"Then I went to the warehouse to see if they were actually taking food out or not, so that on the next day I could see Mr. Best and ask for an explanation. I saw nothing unusual and told the boys there, I don't know their names, that if the young men should come here they should tell them to go home. It was too dark and nothing could be done anyway. I returned to the meeting then and I don't know what took place later.

" . . . At this time the negotiations with Mr. Best were going on quite amicably. We didn't want any disruption."<sup>2</sup>

It is very possible that this young man is telling the truth, that he was in charge of the fellows guarding the warehouse area and that the fight broke out after he had told the boys to go home. He has been scrupulously truthful in the other specific information he had given, much of which was checked and re-checked from other sources. He has a tendency to bravado, however, and remarked that "we were ready to beat up any of the Caucasians we caught taking food," a statement which must be taken with a grain of salt. He also recounted with glee how he and some other boys had pursued

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<sup>1</sup>The careful notation of the truck numbers is characteristic of the detail with which this young man keeps his records. He is convinced that when he returns to Japan he will be called to account for his activities at Tule Lake and must, therefore, be able to prove he did nothing wrong lest he be sent to prison.

<sup>2</sup>R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 11, 1944, pp. 5, 6.



Mr. Schmidt in a truck on the night of November 4 and scared him badly. When asked by the writer if the boys really had any intent to kidnap Mr. Best, he said, "Hell, no, what would we want him for."<sup>1</sup>

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Check for detail with notes in Berkeley.  
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Mr. Spicer in his letter to Province and Dillon Myer in an interview with the writer stated that the trucks taken out were not intended to transport food from the warehouse but were to be used to transport more harvesters.<sup>2</sup> Other members of the administration believe that the trucks were being sent for food, as do almost all the Japanese.

Three evacuee accounts of what transpired follow:

"The only way to stop this (removal of food) was to put a guard and then to watch so they wouldn't take the stuff away from camp. That night, November 4, the semi-truck reached the warehouse. So the youngsters got excited and started causing trouble. Some of the Japanese got beat up. Some of the Caucasians ran away from them and reported it to the Army. Within 20 minutes the Army had moved in. They caught ten of them around the military area, where the Caucasian staff lives. They were just innocent bystanders and three of them were just warehouse watchmen."<sup>3</sup>

*Sakemichi*  
"Both of them (Myer and Best) promised that "hereafter there will be no more food taken from the warehouses at night." . . . . A few nights later a truck drew up to one of the warehouses and demanded the watchmen (Japanese) to open up. They refused - - result: a couple of cracked heads and martial law."<sup>4</sup>

"Around midnight on the 4th two trucks loaded with food at the warehouse tried to take them out of camp. The warden on watch

<sup>1</sup>ibid.,

<sup>2</sup>ibid., Mar., 1944, p. 44; Spicer to Province.

<sup>3</sup>Report, Dec. 24, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup>ibid., p. 22.



72

unconsciously and sometimes consciously overemphasized any such tendency.

The chief task before the body was the selection of what the minutes term a "Negotiating Committee." This is confusing, since a Negotiating Committee had been functioning very actively for at least a week. What is no doubt implied is the selection of a permanent Negotiating Committee, who, with the consent of the people, were to head up the proposed community organization, and function as the properly selected head of the colony's representative organization. It was to preside at each departmental committee meeting, the departments being listed as follows: (1) Hospital; (2) Agricultural Department including chicken and hog farm; (3) Motor Pool; (4) Warehouse; (5) Food Supply, Mess Management, and Mess Halls; (6) Betterment of Living Condition, including Sanitation, Construction, Social Welfare, Highway Engineering, Placement; (7) Internal Security; (8) Education; (9) Complaint, including strikes and grievances; (10) Religion; (11) Fire Department.<sup>1</sup>

The first question raised was how this Negotiating Committee was to be selected. Yamatani recommended that a Selection Committee be formed to be composed of one person chosen from each ward. The minutes are confused here, but it appears that Yamatani's suggestion was approved. It was decided to delete the committee on Religion and leave it in the hands of Reverends Kai and Mohri. Kuratomi then suggested that prior to the selection of this Negotiating Committee, a mass meeting should be held to obtain the approval of the people. He also advised that written personal histories should be attached to the names of the recommendees. Kai suggested

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<sup>1</sup>Minutes of the Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 2, 1943, p. 1.



that a written report of the decision of the Recommending or Selection Committee be distributed in the blocks the next day. The ways and means of recommendation were to be left to each ward. By Monday, Nov. , it was hoped that the Negotiating Committee would be selected and work would be resumed.

These minutes show that the Daihyo Sha Kai and the existing Negotiating Committee headed by Kai and Kuratomi had confidence in Best's and Myer's permission to proceed with the organization of a legitimate representative group. The impression gained is that the negotiators felt they had gained recognition and that by and large they had a fairly clear field before them. As for the Administration - in spite of the hysteria of certain factions - the men in the highest positions thought that the crisis had passed. Opler is reported to have said on the night of November 3 that there wasn't going to be any more trouble.<sup>1</sup>

On the night of November 4 the Daihyo Sha Kai met again to proceed with the important matter of the organization of a representative group. Kuratomi opened the meeting by announcing that he had received a memorandum from the Project Director stating that the appointed personnel of the Hospital, including Dr. Pedicord, the doctors and nurses, would be terminated as soon as possible.

"As they (the Administration) were convinced that the confusion was the responsibility of the administration, they will retain only one Caucasian Hospital Manager. Thus, the Chair revealed a part of the consequence of the negotiation with the Administration."<sup>2</sup>

Discussion followed on the pressing question of the selection of recommendees for the proposed Negotiation Committee. Takahashi

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<sup>1</sup>According to Harkness, Superintendent of Schools, in informal conversation with the writer.

<sup>2</sup>Minutes of the Tule Lake Center Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 4, 1944, p. 1.



stated that he did not think a Selection Committee consisting only of nine men was fair and suggested the addition of one man from each relocation center. Yamagata suggested that the Selection Committee should be chosen from men with technical abilities. Kuratomi replied that in some departments there were no men with technical abilities. Takahashi continued his opposition and eventually won his point:

Anonymous: By selecting the Committee by wards will prevent trouble of segregating many unqualified persons.

Uchida: As Mr. Takahashi suggested, I recommend that Selection Committee be picked up from each Center segregees, one or two persons from each center.

Chair: I do not approve of that because such practice will repeat the same trouble we have gone through in the past.

Uchida: However, this is very important. I maintain that my recommendation is more fair.

Chair: There are segregees from eight different centers. If we were to choose committee from them, there will be some unfairness and disadvantage.

. . . . .

Uchida: A month will be sufficient to know ones ability and intelligence.

Takahashi: A month is not enough to know a person's character and intelligence. For example, in my block, I was appointed by the Block Manager. Unless representatives are elected from the group who came from the same center, it isn't fair.

. . . . .

Mohri: May I make a suggestion that the committee (Selection Committee) be selected from each center segregees and also 9 or 10 from the Daihyo Sha Kai for the Selection Committee.

Chair: With respect to the recommendation of each block recommender, we should proceed with the selection by the form we have here. First plan is that the Selection Committee be chosen from each center segregees; second, selection of nine from the Daihyo Sha Kai; third, selection from the wards; fourth, joint committee of center segregees and nine selected from the Daihyo Sha Kai.

(Four plans were submitted to the floor and the Chair especially explained plan 4.) Result of the voting was as follows:



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Plan 1 - 3 votes  
Plan 2 - 8 votes  
Plan 3 - 25 votes  
Plan 4 - 27 votes

Chair asked whether the decision was agreeable to all and the answer was 'agreeable.'

. . . . .

Yamanaka: One from each center is fair and square.

Tsuda: I have been in Tule Center for over a year but I am not still sure of a good person, so we can't expect perfection at this time.

Mohri: Your statement is not clear. State more clearly.

Tsuda: In order to perfect the representation of the colonists, I recommend that two be chosen from each block.

. . . . .

Takahashi adhered to the selection of two persons from each center. Thus the question was put to vote and the result was as follows:

Two persons from each center - 36  
One person from each center - 17  
Two persons from each center - 14  
(Poston three persons)

(The above vote is ambiguous, unless the third choice means "two persons from each center and three from Poston.")

"It was decided to proceed with the selection and all center representatives were instructed to assemble in one group and decide

At this moment Warden Yoshio Kobayashi came in to report that Caucasians were transporting food supplies to the outside by trucks. Kobayashi reported through Tsuda, Supervisor of the Wardens. Tsuda then instructed that the license numbers of the trucks be taken down and keep note of food stuff being taken out and report to the supervisor at once. He further advised Kobayashi not to go alone but stop at the Internal Security and pick up three or four night patrols to go along with him and he further warned to refrain from taking rash actions by all means. Kobayashi bowed and went out. Upon hearing this conversation several youths followed Kobayashi.<sup>1</sup>

It was now past 11:30 and Takahashi suggested postponing the

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<sup>1</sup>ibid., pp 1 - 3.



selection. Kai, according to the minutes "(indignantly)" insisted that "for the sake of the Project Director and the colonists, we should complete this selection even though it may take the whole night."

"At this moment another youth came running in and reported to Kai, addressing him as Sensei, that the Army had entered the Center. Noise of the guns and machine guns, which broke the tranquillity of a cold dark night, increased. Kai instructed the youths to command all other youths to disperse before any action or injury occurred. The youths hurried away.<sup>1</sup>

The remainder of the meeting was chaotic, and probably contains a considerable amount of interpolation by the translators. Since the Administration regards these statements as evidence that the Negotiating Committee was selected undemocratically they are included here in toto:

The literary quality of this quotation and the recounting of Kobayashi's report which is also considered evidence that the Daihyo Sha Kai fostered the conflict at the warehouse, differs markedly from the usual tone of the minutes.

The Chair then called each divisional committee head and suggested that 2 representatives from each Center should be sufficient. As the Chair restated his suggestion, he added that one representative should represent Manzanar, which will make the total Selection Committee, 15. Suggestion was raised from the floor stating that the Chairman also should be included. The Chair continued to mention that the selection will be made tonight and as the final step, the decision will be referred to the colonists for their approval, to which majority of the body agreed. Voice was heard from the floor stating that since the ~~Committee will have no difficulty from the colonists~~ representatives were duly elected from the blocks, elected Selection Committee will have no difficulty from the colonists. There were number of visitors at the meeting who voiced that, "even though we are not representatives of blocks, we have great faith in the Selection Committee. We will see to it that there will be no complaint hereafter."

Chair: At any cost, we must complete the Selection Committee by tonight, since the colonists are so concerned of the outcome; therefore,

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<sup>1</sup> ibid., p. 4.



The writer has been informed that on this night the Daihyo Sha also selected a very important body, their future Executive Board. This action does not appear in any part of the minutes. This board was intended to be the chief "governing body" of the future, dependent, of course, on the approval of the people. It was composed of five men: Ichiro Hayashi, Nogawa, Yukio Tanaka, Mitsuo Kimura, and H. Tsuda. These men were later to take on the important task of negotiating with the Army, an activity which resulted in their eventual detention in the stockade. 1/ Needless to say, the appearance of this "new committee" caused the Army and the WRA considerable bewilderment.

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 There is something vaguely fishy about the manner in which this "Board" was selected. Certain things Kuratomi has told me indicate that the men were selected in a pretty arbitrary manner after November 4th. Later Tsuda gave me the version stated above. I shall try to clarify this. R. H.  
 66666-----

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1/ ibid., Jan. 11, 1945, p. 3.

*This is  
 a Poston  
 pattern.  
 Clarification  
 is necessary  
 as you say*



I appeal to all block representatives to seriously consider this matter. (It was put to vote by the Selection Committee chosen from the Daihyo Sha. Unanimous approval of the group was received.)

It was now 1:30 a. m. and the thundering roar of the tanks, armored trucks, and jeeps rumbled near the Block 15 Mess Hall. Thereupon, recommendees' history cards were submitted to Kai by the block representatives. Other Selection Committee surrounded him, as Kai personally did the selecting by going through each history card by reading and acting quickly as a machine. Great majority of the Committee was selected by Kai himself. Departmental committees were selected by 2:00 a. m. and the meeting adjourned.

Sounds of the guns were no longer audible, however the rumbling of the Army trucks and tanks was heard.<sup>1</sup>

While this arduous task of selecting a Negotiating Committee was being carried on, events were transpiring which radically altered the situation and rendered all this effort vain. A group of young Japanese were guarding the warehouse area to see that no more food was taken away for the harvesters. About 9:50 p. m. Mr. Best sent several Caucasians to the Motor Pool to get keys for the trucks. Among these men were Mr. Zimmer, Assistant Project Director and Mr. Cahn. As the trucks were being taken out a fight started between the Caucasians and the Japanese.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Schmidt, Head of Internal Security, called the Army for help.<sup>3</sup> Then Mr. Best called the Army. The Army and Internal Security arrested a large group of young men in the warehouse and closely adjoining personnel residence area or approaching that area. All but nine of these young men were released the same night. Some Caucasians and some Japanese are reported to have been severely injured in the fight.

The above account lists what is known to have occurred. On every other detail there is disagreement; disagreement between the

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<sup>1</sup>ibid., p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Spicer's letter to Province, p. .

<sup>3</sup>So Schmidt stated to the writer.



Caucasians themselves and disagreement between the Caucasians and the Japanese.

There is disagreement among members of the Administration as to what use the trucks sent for by Mr. Best were to be put. All the evacuees and Mr. Opler believe they were intended to transport more food from the warehouse. Spicer,<sup>1</sup> and later Diller Myer in an interview with the writer, stated that they were to be used to transport harvesters.<sup>2</sup> When this statement was repeated to Mr. and Mrs. Opler, they were dumbfounded. Opler stated that he was absolutely certain that the trucks were sent for food. Said Mrs. Opler, "Where would they go to get what harvesters?" It is difficult to imagine where harvesters would be transported at this hour of the night.

(This must be checked.)

Three evacuee accounts of what transpired follow:

"The only way to stop this (removal of food) was to put a guard and then to watch so they wouldn't take the stuff away from camp. That night, November 4, the semi-truck reached the warehouse. So the youngsters got excited and started causing trouble. Some of the Japanese got beat up. Some of the Caucasians ran away from them and reported it to the army. Within 20 minutes the army had moved in. They caught ten of them around the military area, where the Caucasian staff lives. They were just innocent bystanders and three of them were just warehouse watchmen."<sup>3</sup>

"Both of them (Myer and Best) promised that "hereafter there will be no more food taken from the warehouses at night." . . . . A few nights later a truck drew up to one of the warehouses and demanded the watchmen (Japanese) to open up. They refused -- result: a couple of cracked heads and martial law."<sup>4</sup>

"Around midnight on the 4th two trucks loaded with food at the warehouse tried to take them out of camp. The Warden on watch

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<sup>1</sup>Report, Dec. 24, p. .

<sup>2</sup>Notes, Mar., p. 44.

<sup>3</sup>Report, Dec. 24, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup>ibid., p. 22.



79

sounded alarm. Kibei answered the summon immediately and began to beat the appointed personnel on the trucks. The M.P.'s were rushed to the scene and the fight ensued."<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Best was convinced at the time that the young men had come to kidnap him. This is unanimously denied by evacuees and doubted by Opler and Spicer.<sup>2</sup>

According to Mr. Schmidt, he himself was viciously attacked by the Japanese, suffering a dislocated shoulder. He then drove far into camp looking for additional troublemakers. When he arrived he found nine boys line up, one of them with a broken arm and another, Kobayashi, with a severe head injury caused by a blow on the head with a heavy flashlight. (This was the young warden who had reported the fight to Kai.) Schmidt himself had taught his men to defend themselves with chairs, and one had used a baseball bat to defend himself during the fight. The injured boys were taken into the Statistics Office in the Administration where Kobayashi's hair was cut to dress his injury.<sup>3</sup>

A very reliable Caucasian informant states that she cleaned up the Statistics Office on the morning of November 5. Blood and hair was spattered on the walls and floor. There was a bloody baseball bat in the corner.<sup>4</sup> (The Statistics Office is so situated that unlike most of the other rooms in the Administration Building, it cannot be seen into from the outside.)

Dr. <sup>Miyamoto</sup>"B", one of the evacuee doctors, stated that he had been asleep in the hospital when the trouble broke out but was awakened to treat Kobayashi for a slight bruise on the side of his head. He

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<sup>1</sup>X's Sociological Journal, Nov., 20, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Spicer's letter to Province.

<sup>3</sup>Told to writer in informal conversation.

<sup>4</sup>Notes, Feb., p. 35.



had asked Kobayashi what had happened and the boy explained that he had received the injury when he opened a truck door to get out and a stone had struck him on the head. Miyamoto and his assistant looked out of the hospital window toward the canteen. They saw a soldier pound on the door which was opened by an old issei, the Co-op watchman. The soldier raised his rifle and crashed the butt down on the old man's face. This injured man was also brought to the hospital (apparently by Japanese) for treatment. Before his cut lip was sewn up, the soldiers demanded entrance. They took the injured man and Kobayashi with them, although "B" <sup>Miyamoto</sup> protested that he had not been treated. Three days later "B" was called to the stockade to attend to this injury. There he saw Kobayashi, the boy whom he had treated for a slight head injury, with his face tremendously swollen and bandages on his arms and legs. He also saw a boy with a broken arm and a boy with a great gash on his head which required eight stitches. The other boys may have been injured on the night of November 4. However, according to "B", Kobayashi's was taken into custody with only a slight head injury.<sup>1</sup>

Kobayashi was released from the stockade in May or June of 1944. He has since told friends that he was taken into the Statistics Office and questioned by Caucasian and Japanese members of Internal Security. When he stated that he knew nothing, the Japanese head of Internal Security drew a revolver and threatened to shoot him. However, the gun was empty or misfired. Then, he says, he saw a baseball bat coming down and that's the last he remembers. Since his release from the stockade, he has undergone a head operation.

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<sup>1</sup>Notes, April, pp. 34, 35.



This picture is still more confused by the insistence of Kobayashi and the group of young men who left the Daihyo Sha Kai meeting with him, who say that they were picked up at the high school by the Internal Security on their way to stop the trouble.<sup>1</sup>

One Daihyo Sha Kai faction insists that the guard was placed around the warehouse area by Takahashi, who took this step unknown to the Daihyo Sha to reestablish his waning prestige with the people.<sup>2</sup>

Not too much reliance should be given either of these statements.  
-----  
What don't you understand about this? R.H.  
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There is a great deal of evidence to show that the great majority of the people did not know until the next morning that there had been any trouble or that the Army had taken control of the camp. A large number of honest informants state that they did not hear the guns or tanks and had no idea that anything untoward had occurred until they attempted to go to work the next day. This is very possible since those Japanese nearest the scene of the fight live over one-quarter mile away. However, persons living in that section of the camp nearest the Administration building knew that some violence was afoot. One nisei girl living here said she heard men running around in her block saying that Japanese were being murdered up in the Administration area and that they had to be rescued. "They were trying to get a bunch of people to go up and fight them."<sup>3</sup> One of the most vivid descriptions of the great confusion which reigned came from a young nisei girl <sup>Melba Kaminaka</sup> employed as a nurses' aide in the hospital. It is interesting that her story coincides very closely with Dr. B's.

<sup>1</sup>R. Hankey, Notes,

<sup>2</sup>ibid.,

<sup>3</sup>ibid., Sept. 14, 1944, p. 4.

*How does  
this relate  
Takahashi's  
prestige?*



"After November 4 we didn't get home for so many days. We were stuck in the hospital.

"That night a man walked in with blood gushing from his face. He was the canteen watchman. We put him on a table. Then another man walked in. He had a flesh wound in his head from a bullet. Then some soldiers walked in and told us to stand where we were. Then we were sent around the wards to quiet the patients.

"Then an awful banging came on the doors. We had to open the doors. Oh boy - those soldiers were scared, I tell you. They were actually shivering. They even went around looking under the beds. The poor patients didn't know what was going on.

"Then they started bringing in the boys who had been hurt. All of the boys had to hold up their hands all the time. They brought in Tokio Yamane. He had to hold up his hands all the time and meanwhile the soldiers would poke him in the back with a gun.

"The soldiers - maybe it was the psychological effect - they seemed so glad. They'd laugh and say, 'Huh, you Japs, we'll shoot you.' Then they'd laugh and laugh. It seemed so childish.

"Tokio Yamane wasn't hurt when they brought him in. It was later that they brought in the boys who had had their arms twisted. One boy had his ribs fractured. Their heads were all bashed up. They were such young kids.

"Some motor pool boys came in too. We pretended they were hospital boys so they wouldn't be arrested. We put them to washing dishes.

"We were terminated later as of November 4 so we never got paid for all the time we worked overtime then.

"When they brought in those boys they didn't look as if they had fought man to man. They looked beaten."<sup>1</sup>

When this informant made this statement she was extremely hostile to the Daihyo Sha, the kibeï and the "trouble-makers." Yet her sympathy with the beaten "trouble-makers" is very apparent. It is almost certain that public sentiment in November 1943 was even more sympathetic.

<sup>1</sup> ibid., August 24, 1944, p. 3.

*a mild statement*

12



81

The picture is still more confused by the insistence of Kobayashi and the group of young men who left the Daihyo Sha Kai meeting with him, who say that they were picked up at the high school on their way to stop the trouble.<sup>1/</sup> The Daihyo Sha faction, moreover, insists that the guard was placed around the warehouse area by Takahashi, who took this step unknown to the Daihyo Sha to reestablish his waning prestige with the people.<sup>2/</sup>

This November 4 incident gave rise to atrocity stories which were widely broadcasted by members of the Appointed Personnel. A rumor reached Gila in December that scores of evacuees were bayoneted and killed. Several Caucasian members of Internal Security are said to have boasted openly of the part they took in beating up the captured Japanese. A Caucasian's letter states:

"Did you hear of the trouble at the camp last night?"

'No,' says I.

'Well, five men were killed,' says he. I let five minutes pass before I asked, 'Who got killed?' And the answer: 'Five Japs, the bloody bastards!' . . . . Tonight after kitchen duty I went to the Rec Hall with the nurses. A small group there told of the part they took in beating the Japs up. And as they told every gory detail, the nurses cheered - the more sadistic the story, the louder the cheers. There was a cook in the mess. It seems that when the shooting started the cook came out the window in his white outfit, his arms up. And the laughter at this poor guy who was in the dining room making pie crust. . . " the letter ends abruptly here. <sup>3/</sup> Half a dozen other

Caucasians have stated that they too heard boasting of this sort. . . .

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<sup>1/</sup> Notes.

<sup>2/</sup> Notes.

<sup>3/</sup> From letter quoted in part on pp.



Among those Japanese held were Isamu Uchida and Nogawa, ward representatives of the Daihyo Sha Kai, Inouye, the head of the Tule Lake Judo organization, and Fred Fukui.

On the morning of November 5 when the Japanese reported for work, they were stopped by a cordon of soldiers stationed every few yards and told to return to their barracks. The large majority of these people were probably ignorant of the night's events. Since over a thousand people (check) worked in the outside of the colony at that time, the crowd soon grew very large. It was augmented by curious persons and by the parents or relatives of the young women employed in the hospital who had not been allowed to return to return home that night. The soldiers threw tear gas at the crowd. That the crowd had any violent intent whatever is most unlikely. The scene is described by an evacuee:

*I believe  
they had  
no hostile  
intent*

"The next morning, everybody like usual went to report to work and all the Japanese truck drivers were stopped by the guards, searched and told to go back. They said they had to go to work. The soldiers told them to go back, not to come near the place. Some of the fellows still argued and the soldiers kicked some of them. Everybody was gathering at the front of their own blocks. So the Army started throwing tear gas at them and told them to go home."<sup>1</sup>

This experience of being the targets for tear gas was resented so bitterly that even ten months later, the eyes of otherwise meek Tuleans would flash with indignation when the subject was brought up. It appears that since the crowd had had no more dangerous motive than curiosity or the desire to go to work the barrage of tear gas was looked upon with the extreme and natural resentment of the innocent unjustly accused and attacked. Mr. Sato, who was so meek and timid when interviewed by the writer that he dared

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<sup>1</sup> Report, Dec. 24, 1943, p. 14.



answer only in the most uninformative monosyllables grew suddenly animated when asked how he felt about the morning of November 5.

He said furiously:

"We weren't angry because they put the men in the stockade. We got mad because the Army came in that night with sub-machine guns and tear gas. We were all willing to go to work but they wouldn't let us go. They took our civil rights away. That's what made us mad."<sup>1</sup>

The resentment expressed because they were not allowed to go to work, though all were willing, is also significant. This sudden work stoppage for the majority of the center's residents was their first taste of hardship due to the strike and the cutting off of their salary checks was later to become the most unbearable of the inconveniences of Army rule.

Two similar but less irate expressions came from two conservative nisei girls: *Melba Kaminata*

"The tear gas bombs really upset the people. We were going to go to work the next day. That was the worst experience I ever had. I don't want to live through those two months again."<sup>2</sup>

"The people did get mad after November 4. The tear gas made them mad. And because of the papers (especially the Hearst Press). The awful lies! The soldiers weren't bad to us though. They were kind of good-natured guys."<sup>3</sup>

Under Army control, compulsory idleness was imposed on most of the evacuees, bringing with it the stoppage of the monthly 12 to 19 dollar stipend. Only the block managers, the hospital employees, and the mess crews continued to work.

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<sup>1</sup>Aug., 14, 1944, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>ibid., Aug. 17, 1944, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup>ibid., Aug. 24, 1944, p. 5.



92

Among those Japanese held were Isamu Uchida and Nogawa, ward representatives of the Daijyo Sha Kai, Inouye, the head of the Tule Lake Judo organization,<sup>1/</sup> and Fred Fukui.

On the morning of November 5 when the Japanese reported for work, they were stopped by soldiers and told to return to their barracks. Some protested that they had to go to work. Many curious people joined the throng. The army threw some tear gas bombs at them and told them to go home. The scene is described by an evacuee:

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The same day the Daihyo Sha Kai, which appears to have had complete control of the Tulean Dispatch during this period, published an account of the warehouse disturbance and a stern exhortation to keep order.

COOPERATION ASKED:

Army Occupied Administration Area, Following Incident.

"By a minor incident last night the center administration area was temporarily occupied by the army, who maintained a strict guard of the camp.

The Administration area was completely cut off from the rest of the center by patrolling M. P's. Number of tear gas bombs were

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<sup>1/</sup> X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 5

<sup>2/</sup> Report, Dec. 24, p. 14



thrown at residents standing by the zone limit.

Barb wire fences are being built southwest of the hospital area to keep the residents away from the Ad. area.

However, the facts of the incident are being closely guarded by the people's committees."

#### Residents Asked to Stay Calm, Com. Pass Resolutions.

"Trust in the actions of the resident's delegates, and do not take any individual actions," exclaimed the committee of seven representatives chosen to settle Thursday night's incident. Five resolutions were passed by the committee affecting the colonists' conduct during the following week.

"Young men are asked to be sensible and prudent due to the present situation, and residents are asked to refrain from spreading unfounded rumors, and congregating in more than five in a group. That the WRA properties within the center should not be damaged or destroyed, was emphasized by the committee resolutions.

The resolutions were agreed upon by the representatives to bring about a peaceful conclusion, and violators of the rules will be punished by due action of the entire populace warned the committee. The delegates also stated that the infractors of these rules are working against the peace, harmony and the well being of the entire camp."

#### Center Residents Pass Regulations.

The following regulations governing the conduct of the residents during the ensuing period have been made up by the seven representatives delegated by the residents and their delegates:

1. Trust the actions of this committee and do not take any individual actions.
2. Do not congregate in groups of more than five in the open.
3. Do not spread any unfounded rumors.
4. Young men! Be sensible and prudent about everything that you do.
5. Do not destroy anything in the center. Leave the entire camp and its facilities as it has been in the past.

Any person who willfully violate these regulations will be punished by due action of the entire populace as the infractor is working against the peace harmony and well being of the entire camp.



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Any persons who willfully violate these regulations will be punished by due action of the entire populace as the infractor is working against the peace harmony and well being of the entire camp.

<sup>1</sup>As explained by Kuratomi: "That was the Negotiating Committee. Nogawa was on it too. Volunteers were added to bring things to a favorable solution. Anyone who had an empty hand was asked to help it. The men were able volunteers who held some important position in the coming permanent body (chosen at the No. 4 meeting). They weren't delegated. We had to do it in an arbitrary manner. R. Hankey, Notes, Jan. 2, 1945, p. 4.



gk

EDITORIAL

Let's Back Up Our Delegates

Residents! Let us show our faith in our representatives by obeying their regulations!

We have delegated our representatives to negotiate for us and act for us; they were not selected just as figureheads.

The merits of this wise step taken by our delegates can be readily seen by every thinking resident. The measures that they had taken in the form of these regulations was not a measure to show their authority; they had taken this step to protect us.

The rash and hasty actions of a few who because of bitterness or anger take things into their own hands without stopping to think is not doing the community any good. They are just jeopardizing the welfare of all of their fellow residents.

Fellow residents! Let us take steps to punish any person who may disregard these rules! "1

On November 5 Mr. Yoshiyama of the Daihyo Sha Kai met with Colonel Austin and gave the following report of his interview at a meeting held the same day.

1. Improvement of food quality was pointed out to which Colonel agreed to exert his utmost in that respect.
2. Permission to hold wake and funeral services.
3. Coal to be distributed in the afternoon to each block after the meeting with the coal crew foremen.
4. Whether the shots fired were loaded or blank was not made clear.
5. Upon question raised, it was informed that no lives were involved in the recent incident.
6. Upon demand made to have all negotiation particulars and agreement reached in writing, Colonel stated that it was impossible to issue such in writing.
7. Question of the distance between the WRA Stockade area was not made clear. (original is very ambiguous)
8. Post office will resume operation in the High School Building. Block Manager and two assistants will handle the mail. There will be no censorship.

1/ All of above quotations from Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 5.



9. Parcels and C.O.D. will be delivered to the Block Managers. Registered mail will be delivered at the following place and time.

Ward 1 -- 9:30 A. M.  
 2 -- 11:00 A. M.  
 3 -- 10:30 A. M.  
 4 -- 9:00 A. M.  
 5 -- 10:00 A. M.  
 6 -- 1:30 P. M.  
 7 -- 2:00 P. M.

Outgoing wires and messages will be negotiated again from 1:00 P. M.

# ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWARD ENTRANCE OF THE ARMY

-----  
 Please make suggestions here. I don't know what I'm talking about here and hope to get some data from your journal. R. H.  
 -----

Sufficient data is not available to furnish material for even a guess as to the most important reactions of the colonists.

(Probably the prestige of the Daihyo Sha took an immediate slump, even though sympathy for the imprisoned boys and anger over the beatings they had received was strong. The writer has several times witnessed the phenomena of a body losing prestige and respect while its members become objects of public sympathy. The writer is inclined to doubt the sincerity of the statements of some informants that they were glad to see the Army take over because the Army was less likely to cheat the colonists than the WRA, rule by guns, tanks and tear gas cannot be considered a thing to be welcomed. It is not impossible, however, that a certain proportion of the colonists hoped for fairer and more considerate treatment by the Army and that during the week which followed November 4 the Japanese maintained, at least in part, an attitude of suspended judgment.

Two conservative nisei girls gave diametrically opposed

*I disagree  
 Did she re-  
 sidents have  
 time to blame  
 the incident on  
 them. It was  
 confused then.  
 Right at the  
 instant, all he-  
 lieve the people  
 were behind them  
 if they were glad  
 it seems to be  
 afterthoughts.  
 they were frightened  
 they did not want  
 to make of it.  
 all were victims  
 as to possible  
 atrocities  
 by the Army  
 could have been  
 rampant. As  
 the Army rule here  
 out to be better than  
 they had feared, they  
 expressed much optimism  
 as afterthoughts*

*suspended judgment  
 in a great fear*



descriptions of their reactions to the entrance of the Army.

*Nishi Kawa*  
Miss Ikeda said:

"I just thought, 'What's this camp coming to?' After the Army came in I really felt like a prisoner. . . All during the time when the Army was controlling the camp, naturally, we were sad. There were no activities. Everything stopped. We had a curfew. Oh, it was a miserable life! . . . We got baloney for Thanksgiving."<sup>1</sup>

*Miss Naka*  
"I thought the people seemed to think that it was better for the Army to have control. Since the Army represented wholly the government, they thought it would be better. There wouldn't be any more grafting. They expected more strict discipline, but they thought everything would be on the up and up. . . The people were really more or less relieved when the Army came in."<sup>2</sup>

*Yoshiyama*  
Mr. Kato of the Negotiating Committee stated:

"My first reaction to the Army taking control was that I thought it was making a terrible mistake to do such a thing. You cannot force people with arms. What can we do?"<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>R. Hankey, Notes, Aug. 30, 1943, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>ibid., Aug. 24, 1943, pp. 3, 4.

<sup>3</sup>ibid., Sept. 11, 1943, p. 5.

*This could  
not be a  
reaction  
immediately  
after the in-  
cident.*

*more likely  
to be the  
with some*

*Ask Kurohara how  
the managers people  
reacted when the Army  
stepped in and fired shots  
Reactions should be very  
much similar*



- 94c
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5 -- 10:00 A.M.  
6 -- 1:30 P. M.  
7 -- 2:00 P. M.

Outgoing wires and messages will be negotiated again from 1:00 P.M.

On November 6 the Daihyo Sha Kai met again, at which time Kobayashi, a member of the Negotiating Committee (not the young warden who was arrested) made the following report on an interview with Colonel Austin:

1. According Colonel Austin, 10 youths are confined in the hospital, however, they are not injured.
2. Permission will be granted for meeting within the building.
3. Tear gas was used because the crowd refused to disperse.
4. Hospital employees will be asked to remain within the building until the incident is under control Report emergency cases to the Project Director.
5. In case of emergency, interviews with Authorities will be given.
6. No need of worry for food will be distributed daily.
7. Army will withdraw when Colony returns to normalcy.

Following statements were made from the floor:

1. There are several blocks without coal.
2. Some mess halls inconvenienced because of insufficient supply of Dutch Cleanser.
3. Toilet papers should be distributed as soon as possible.
4. Delivery of mail should be taken care of as soon as possible.
5. Disposition of garbage should be taken care of to prevent accumulation, which creates unsanitary condition.