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D. S. Thomas  
Director

TULE LAKE REPORT

Rosalie Hankey  
Gila

April, 1944

Copy # 4

On October 14, a speeding fire truck answering a call turned over. Three firemen were seriously injured. This was followed two days later by a far more serious accident. A farm truck carrying at least 29 men turned over. The account published in the Tulean Dispatch of October 16, agrees in every important detail with the statements of informants:

**TWENTY-NINE FARM WORKERS INJURED IN SECOND ACCIDENT, FIVE ARE CRITICAL**

**Soft Shoulder Beside Road Causes Truck to Overturn**

Five residents were seriously injured and twenty-four others were treated for minor injuries yesterday afternoon in the second major accident to occur in the project within a week. The critically injured workers were: Tatsu Kashima, Toshio Yamada, Kensaburo Sawada, Tom Nakao and Takeshi Takagi.

The extent of the injuries was not known by the hospital at the time the paper went to press. Passengers with minor injuries were immediately sent home following treatments.

While speeding along about thirty miles per hour on the newly constructed highway to the project farm, a truck filled with farm workers turned over near the chicken farm when the driver attempted to pass a slow-moving truck. As the truck was overtaking the front vehicle, the hind wheel slid on the loose gravel bordering the highway and struck a soft shoulder, causing the Ford stake truck to turn over. Five passengers were pinned under by the rolling vehicle.

The workers were returning to the project farm to harvest the mature crops. The accident occurred about two miles northwest of the center on the road to the farm.

The driver of the ill-fated truck was Harry Maruno, formerly of Heart Mountain. Further details of the mishap will be published in the Tuesday issue.

The colonists blamed WRA for placing these men's lives in the hands of the supposedly reckless driver, a boy 18 or 19 years old. The following day no farm workers appeared for work. The so-called farm strike had begun. The only information on its instigation appears in a letter translated from the Japanese which X placed in his Sociological Journal. "I don't know the details yet, but I understand that the strike started when one Kibei had made a speech to the farm workers that they should not go to work



until the Administration announced what they would do to these injured persons." 1/

Several remarks made by ordinary residents several months later indicate that the general camp feeling at the time of the farm accident and the strike was not uniform: From N, an intelligent Nisei block manager:

"I said, 'Why didn't they put in some licensed driver. Who does the truck hiring? Does the placement officer put anybody in? Did the head of Placement have experience in that field?

I didn't blame them for striking. Before we came here they said they had requested a regular Army truck (to transport farm workers). They had suggested it many times and they couldn't get it. In October it's pretty cold to ride in an open truck." 2/

From O, a Kibei block manager, strongly inclined to a policy of peace, order and obedience to the Administration:

"They said strike. That time we had so many acres from which to get vegetables. I don't see any reason in a way why they should quit working, since we got so much productive stuff. They could consult WRA officials while they're working. They could talk instead of quit. If the conference didn't go through, they they could quit." 3/

From "I'm an intelligent practical young man, very anti-administrative:"

"I felt that the people on the farm at that time were more or less unreasonable in striking because they could have kept on working and watched a satisfactory negotiations to be put through before striking. They jumped the gun. It was brought on by high pressure speakers." 4/

From these and other statements it is apparent that although a camp wide sentiment that something ought to be done about the accidents existed, approval of the strike itself was not very strong. Satisfactory information on what took place in the colony in the next few days is impossible to obtain. However, the two accidents occurring in two days caused such indignation that a group of colonists determined to take action. This group was later to be known as The Representatives or the Daihyo Sha Kai. 5/ Immediately after the farm accident, it proceeded to organize the colonists with

1/ Oct. 24, p. 7.

2/ Notes, April, p. 20.

3/ Ibid, p. 22

4/ Ibid, p. 30

5/ The literal English translation is Negotiating Committee.



astonishing rapidity. Its first overt act was to suggest the selection of representatives from each of the blocks. The Administration was at that time quite ignorant of how this was carried on. Opler and Spicer hold that the leaders began laying their plans immediately after the segregates entered Tule, but no evidence proving this contention has been obtained. Four trustworthy informants state that the first move toward organization they know of occurred after the farm accident. The statements of these people and many others, regardless of whether they are supporters or critics of the Daihyo Sha, are in unanimous agreement that after the farm accident, an amorphous, apparently self-appointed group, asked the people in block meetings and at mess to select a representative from each block.

M., one of the men elected.

"The block representatives were elected by the people. I was voted in. It's a big responsibility and you stick your neck out. I'm acting for the people." 1/

N., a block manager, ostensibly neutral:

"The Daihyo Sha were all elected after the segregates came in. They were elected after the farm accident.

Mrs. Oda, wife of a block manager and not sympathetic to the Daihyo Sha:

"They came from the farm incident. They may have been started already before that (this statement prompted by R.H.) After the accident and before the funeral we were told to get a representative from each block. I don't know who was behind it. At that time the people wanted to get together and speak to the Project Director." 2/

Mr. Oda, block manager, stands for peace and order:

"In this block I think they held a meeting and appointed a man for block representative. They thought he was capable. But some blocks elected them. There were 63 representatives in the organization." 3/

I., sympathetic to Daihyo Sha:

"All of the respective people in the block elected them. .... It

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1/ Notes, March, p. 62.

2/ Notes, March, p. 4.

3/ Ibid., p. 33  
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was just a case of which representatives seemed most able. After every meeting the representatives always came back and at supper called for silence. They'd take Ayes and Nos for any question then. If there was no time in mess they'd call a special meeting at night." 1/

"What you call the block representatives always existed even previous to the trouble. Out of those that were representatives a lot relocated and new comers were elected to take their place ... But there were quite a few old ones and that's one of the reasons why the people got so burnt up. The name, Daihyo Sha was first heard after the trouble (farm accident) ... Under that title they tried to carry on the first negotiations.

"It was definitely decided by block consent to attend the funeral, and make it a project wide affair by the Negotiating Committee." 2/

2 / Mr. Yosumura, member of the Co-op and definitely opposed to Daihyo Sha, made the following statement. He has pro-administration leanings: Only one other informant, Akitsuki who is also anti-Daihyo-Sha criticised the fact that the committee was chiefly composed of persons who were not old residents of Tule Lake. There may have been some criticism in November, but it is doubtful that it was widespread on this point.

"It was done this way. I'm from Minidoka. Quite a few other people came from different parts of the country and were mixed up in my block, quite a few from Jerome, Gila, Heart Mountain, Topaz and Poston, and a few that stayed here. They wanted to elect someone to represent our block. I didn't know anybody but from Minidoka. So we had to do something. Naturally we elected someone from Minidoka. The result is more people from other centers got elected. These representatives went to meet and elected someone among the representatives to negotiate with the government. Nobody knows exactly who they were. Probably they were elected by pressure group methods." 3/

From a letter sent to X before October 24:

"... all the farm workers went on a strike and the camp is in a big commotion demanding the Administration to account for the accident. Every block held a meeting and elected a representative to form a council to negotiate with the Administration." 4/

Representatives were accordingly elected from all but two blocks, either by election or appointment. As to the legitimacy of this body proper, there can be no doubt. But the character of the group which instigated the elections remains, for the most part, a well kept secret. Spicer believes

1/ Notes, Feb., p. 13.

2/ Notes, Mar. p. 39

3/ Notes, Feb. p. 27

4/ X's Sociological Journal, Oct. 27, 1943, p. 7.



that Kai, Kuratomi, and other "leaders" had been "sizing up the situation from the minute they came in," that they were well acquainted with the "foci of dissatisfaction by the time the farm trouble started ... These minority leaders (in other centers) with a good deal of experience in center politics got together as soon as they reached Tule Lake and began to develop plans for dominating the majority here with their program and leadership." 1/ The most influential leaders probably were from other centers, especially from Jerome. 2/ However, that they had been plotting deliberately to take over center leadership since their entrance to Tule, rests only on the statements of informers and is, at present, an open question. 3/ Mr. Kurihara, although he was still confined in Leuppe at this time, is almost certain that the picture of the leaders plotting since their arrival at Tule is false.

very probable

"That opinion was circulated by the Caucasian people, that the boys from Topaz and Jerome were trying to get hold of the controlling interest and trying to get the people under their control. When those boys had acted, we had quite a discussion in Leupp with Mr. Fredericks. He strongly believed at that time this opinion gotten through the newspapers, that those boys from various centers were trying to get hold of the leadership in the camp. I argued with him that it wasn't so. The only reason the boys from Jerome took the leadership here was because they themselves were leaders in Jerome. When they got here they naturally took leadership again, especially of the Jerome faction. Jerome constituted the greatest number. I doubt whether they were trying to get leadership or that the plot was formed before. A thing of that nature happens spontaneously." 4/

Many of the colonists were puzzled by the development; some thought making demands to the Administration was silly. There was and still is considerable criticism of some of the policies of the selected body, the Daihyo Sha Kai, on the part of its supporters and by neutral colonists. It would be a grave error, however, to label the bulk of the representatives fanatics and agitators. When reliable information is obtained, they will almost

Parson

1/ See Spicer's letter, Report, Dec. 24, pp. 28, 29.

2/ This may some day be settled by contacting Kai and Kuratomi themselves.

3/ Notes, March p. 47.

4/ Notes, April p. 17.



certainly be shown to be comparatively able men, most of them respected in their blocks, selected because they were considered men of courage and, or because they had participated in some type of Administrative negotiation in the Relocation centers from which they came.<sup>1/</sup> The selection of men who had proved themselves in negotiations in other centers explains their preponderance on the Daihyo Sha (one of Mr. Best's expressed objections to the body).<sup>2/</sup> It was composed mostly of Issei and Kibei.<sup>3/</sup>

First Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai.

On October 17, the day after the farm accident, these elected and appointed block representatives met in the block 16 messhall and held their first formal meeting. The minutes of this and later sessions were obtained and translated from the Japanese by Byron Akitsuki. <sup>4/</sup> Since Akitsuki later took an important part in fighting the daihyo Sha Kai, this document must be employed with circumspection. However, the translation appears to be fundamentally honest and exact. The minutes will be quoted and discussed here at length for they are the most significant existing document relating to the spectacular events to come. The course of business and the topics of discussion reveal the psychological state, the motives and the intentions of the body, which, as has been stated previously, were largely misunderstood by the administration.

The meeting was attended by 73 men, each representing a block and by others who are referred to as "non-Daihyo Sha." Nominations were made for a chairman and Hyakutaro Mori was appointed temporary chairman by applause. It was then suggested that all non-members leave the floor to facilitate the calling of the roll. Whether this suggestion was carried out cannot

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<sup>1/</sup> I base this statement partly on my own judgment and partly on the hypothesis of J. Kurihara. See Notes, March, pp. 15, 47, April, p. 17.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., p. 25

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid., p. 62

<sup>4/</sup> The presentation of these translated minutes to the study was done in absolute confidence. Mr. Akitsuki's name must not be mentioned in publication without his permission.

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be determined from the minutes. Another suggestion was immediately put forward: that a vice-chairman be selected before roll call. The meeting proceeded with nominations for the office of chairman and the result of the voting was as follows: T. Kuratomi, 29; H. Mori, 20; A. Takahashi, 9. In this manner George Kuratomi was elected chairman. It was recommended that Mori, as second highest running candidate be made vice-chairman, which was done. With the understanding that the secretaries need not be Daihyo Sha Kai members, Hitoshi Katayama, Tanaka and S. Komiya were appointed Japanese Secretaries and Megumi Yoshiyama, English Secretary.

Kuratomi delivered an address, stressing that the agenda of this meeting was of great significance to the colonists and that rash and inconsiderate discussion should be restrained.

Hazama of the agricultural department now read a resolution concerning the disposition of those injured in the accident. (The translator was unable to obtain this resolution.) Kuratomi called for the expression of unreserved opinion on the subject.

Chair (Kuratomi): Before entering our discussion, I wish to recommend a definite policy by which we are to act in the future, therefore, will everyone express their own unreserved opinion on this matter?

Kai (representative of block 5): Since the time is limited, we should proceed with some specific agenda first.

Chair: Mr. Kai's motion is very thoughtful, shall we begin with the report of the farm incident?

Kai: I recommend that the farm department employees present the recommendation of the warehouse department.

(Thereupon Hatano explained fully the recommendation of the warehouse employees. (1) Prosecution of the responsible parties, (2) Termination of minors, (3) Urgency of consultation with the Administration and the Spanish Consul. (4) Report of the consultation with the Administration should be submitted to the Spanish Consul as soon as possible, and (5) Disposition of the case of those injured in the farm accident. 1/

Kaiten requested that Nishioka, the foreman of the Motor Pool give an explanation of the employment of minors. Three representatives from

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1/ Quoted from minutes, October 17, 1943, p. 2.

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the Motor Pool, Nishioka, Matsumoto and Okamoto alternately related the story of the accident, apologized for the fact that minors had been employed and stated that they were doing their utmost to "bring a satisfactory result of the disposition of the case," appealing to the body to give them full support. After considerable discussion on the employment of drivers 16 years of age (the driver in the second accident was 19), whether the driver had a chauffeur's license and whether Social Security compensation might be applicable a suggestion was made from the floor to select a committee to clarify the matter. Kai suggested that instead, the body proceed with urgent negotiation plans regarding the incident. The remainder of the meeting is included here in toto.

Chair: I have a plan to make, that is, instead of approaching the whole issue at this time, investigation should be made by departments. I suggest that the body select a committee to make the investigation.

Takahashi: Before going into the selection of committees, I want to make clear the legality of 16-year-old youths driving trucks and also if accident policy is applicable on this matter.

Chair: I will have the investigating committee undertake the job.

Kai: We have heard enough from the Motor pool representatives that we wish to ask them for their support of this body's future policy when it is decided. (Any statement made by Kai was applauded by the majority of the body. Thereupon Nishioka, Matsunaga, and Okamoto were excused from the floor.)

Uchida: Did the foreman of the agricultural division notify the occurrence of that accident with the names of those persons injured to the Administration within 48 hours?

Chief foreman Sato: (walked up to the chair and answered) As I was afraid to be taken as if I were taking side of the Administration, I hesitated to go alone to report this matter. I did not, as yet, make any report to the Administration.

Uchida: I suggest that this Committee be elected to prosecute the matter immediately with the Administration.

Kai: I question foreman Sato's responsibility, since he, as a responsible man, did not report such. I suggest that an investigation committee be formed at once to consult with the Administration. (The suggestion was approved by great applause.)



Mohri: Improvement of roads, shower rooms, latrines, and also the inside of the mess halls should be taken up with the Administration. (He then asked the Chair to consult the body.) We cannot afford to neglect or ignore such important matter as improvement of living condition, at this time. (The Chair expressed that difficulties must be encountered in making such extensive investigation at this time by the Committee. Thereupon Mohri indignantly read the resolution passed at the block manager's meeting.

Block 19 representative read a recommendation of his block in connection with the betterment of living condition.

As Block 4 Ikeda reported that according to Dr. Hashiba, T. Kashima, who was injured in the incident (farm), was in a very critical condition, silence reigned the meeting. Ikeda again pointed out the inhuman attitude taken by the WRA when a fire truck turned over four days ago. In spite of the fact that there are three ambulances only one is in operation for a colony of this size.

Hayashi: I have been informed from an authentic source that farm products are being transported to the Army and Navy. I demand that this body take action and investigate fully. If facts are established, we should altogether refuse shipment to the outside.

Shimada: As one means of solving employment problem, I like to see the public school re-opened as soon as possible for the sake of minor children.

Nishioka: Block 72: Properties owned by the colonists are their assets, which we should prevent loss by fire or theft by all means. Therefore, I recommend that the fire department of this Center be improved, by providing more fire extinguishers; fire hose, and trucks. Even though the population in Heart Mountain is less than this Center, they have more and better fire equipments. For instance, they have 25,000 feet of hose and fire extinguisher in each apartment. Since our bank accounts are frozen and we have no other means of income than our meager salary, we should be provided with all those necessary equipment to prevent fire. I understand that in some blocks, especially Block 59, they have insufficient water supply and they are very much handicapped. I recommend that at least 200 gallons of water per person daily should be allotted.

Takahashi: I make a motion to proceed with the business to be discussed and decided which must be presented to the Administration. Besides, time is getting short.

Chair: By discussion, we have planned to consult the Administration with all the issues of the Center. Therefore, we must discuss regarding creation of departments to draw up the resolution.

Takahashi: I wish to correct the titles of some committees.

Chair: We should prepare the resolution in writing so that we can present it to the Administration as well as to the Spanish Consul, as I regard the time to be opportune now.



Nii, Block 41: I suggest that we select committees on ward basis.

Kotani: Ward basis is not practical, since we need the most intelligent persons in our committees.

Chair: For your reference, let me explain the Sanitation Committee and the extent of its duties.

Katayama: I suggest that the farm incident be treated independently. The Committee on Betterment of Center Condition should prepare all reports of their investigation to be submitted later. As far as the Center condition betterment committee is concerned, I would like to recommend the following sub-divisions: betterment of delivery of food, hospital, mess hall and food supplies, and education.

It is definitely known that there are many minors employed in the farm department. In view of the fact that there are many employable people, fair adjustment should be made by immediately terminating the minors. The recommendation was unanimously accepted by the body.

Chair: What procedure should we take to select the committees for various departments? I'd like to suggest that the meeting be held in the Block Manager's office.

Vice-chairman Mori wrote on the blackboard as the Chair specified each committee's meeting place as follows: Sanitation and Betterment of Living Condition Committee, block 44 Manager's office; Farm Incident Settlement Committee, 14; Hospital Committee, 11; Mess Hall and Food Supply Committee, 70; Education Committee, 32; and Negotiating Committee, 29.

Wada, block 48: What should the members of the hog and chicken farm do in the meantime?

Chair: It is advisable to have them continue working until the matter is settled, because they must be fed daily.

Kubota and Kotani: We agree with the Chair that hogs and chickens should be fed by the colonist workers.

Chair: Please select six committees from each ward for the various departments and assemble by 9 o'clock tomorrow morning for election. (Approved by all.)

Uchida: Problems we are facing are the greatest importance to the colonists and the WRA should be fully responsible. Therefore, the Committee should do their utmost to bring about a satisfactory solution.

Chair: We are merely selecting the committee now so you should make that speech to the Committee.

Komiya: We should demand for unemployment insurance and clothing allowance. (Giggling heard from the floor.)

Chair: So much for discussions, we will proceed with the recommendation of the Committee. Each ward should hold a meeting tomorrow at 9 o'clock at the following places: Blocks 49, 43, 15, 28, 12, 31, and 71. Then the committees will meet at the same place at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Now is that clear? (Each makes note.)



At this time, it was recommended from the floor that a central Co-ordinating Committee should be instituted.

Chair: Since all those in the various committees will be the cream of the colony, they fully realize the importance of their duties, which makes the organization of such a Co-ordinating Committee unnecessary at this time.

Voice from the Floor: In order to unify the functions of a body of this size, it is urgent that a Co-ordinating Committee be instituted in the central part of this Center. This will facilitate the functions, advantageous to all those concerned, etc. (Interrupted by the Chair) such is the duty of the Committee. The Committee will decide at the meeting.)

Chair: After the meeting of the Committee at 2p.m. tomorrow, all agenda discussed and decided upon must be immediately reported to the Negotiating Committee and the latter in turn will again thrash the matter and report back to the various Committees for approval.

Voice from the Floor: Such is not necessary. Negotiating Committee is the supreme body. Discussion arose regarding the title of this organization. Takeshita: Before discussing such matters as title of this body, isn't it more important to specify our policy?

Chair: (with no reference to Takeshita's statement he went on to say) We will have our central office at Block 29 and the name of the organization will be for the time being Dai-hyo Sha Kai. (Unanimously approved)

Another suggestion was made to use the former Planning Board office as headquarters, however, decision had already been reached and the subject dropped.

Akiyama: Do the workers of the hog and chicken farm have to walk? I asked this because I know the fact that Motor Pool is not operating as usual. Since the incident occurred in the agricultural department all the farm workers stopped working. Doesn't that create some friction with the farm workers if the hog and chicken farm workers continue to work?

Chair: If certain department employed stop work altogether it will be regarded as a strike. The hogs and chickens should be fed, as we have not decided on a strike. (No reaction from the floor)

Wada: I wish to make this point clear for the workers of the hog and chicken farm. Whether it is approved by this Committee to continue to work.

Takata: Since the farm workers stopped working, why should they (hog and chicken farm workers) continue to work. That's not cooperation, to my mind.

Voice from the floor: Strike is not declared. Therefore, at least animals should be fed by colonist workers, otherwise we will be short on food stuff, especially in meat and egg.

Kodama: I am sure that upon declaration of general strike, all divisions and section workers should stop work altogether. Until then, continue work.

Takata: We did not come to Tule Lake to get jobs. We came here for the purpose of returning to Japan. The center management should be taken care of by the Army and the Administration. We have no responsibility as far as management of the Center is concerned. Therefore, why do we not support the farm workers and go into a strike?



Chair: We will bring up the issue to the Administration just as soon as the Committee completes its investigation and preparation.

Ikeda: Since the M.P.s have confiscated our passes for no reason at all. It means that we are prohibited from going out of the fence. Why should we continue to work?

Chair: We have absolute confidence that we will win in this consultation with the Administration on this issue. However, we should think about the time of this negotiation. If the hog farm workers should strike at this time and prove to be a failure, we have no excuse to offer to those injured.

Uchida: We have never had chicken or pork on our tables and I presume that hogs and chickens do not belong to us. Why should we assume responsibility for anything that doesn't belong to us?

Chair: That problem will be settled by the Food Supply and Mess Hall Committees.

Akiyama: Assuming that the hog farms/<sup>workers</sup> continued to work then, will the Motor Pool take responsibility of the workers' transportation?

Chair and Vice-chair: Motor Pool has nothing to do with this problem. We want the WRA to have the impression that we are working by just merely feeding the animals.

The problem of whether the chicken and hog farm workers should continue to work was put to vote. The result was as follows: Yes 58 and No 7.

Chair: As it is getting late we will adjourn the meeting. (The Chair reminded the body to see that tomorrow's meeting is attended and soothed the body by saying, "I will have the title of this organization discussed among the executives.")

After the meeting was adjourned, it was cautioned that since majority of the farm workers think that the strike is postponed, the chances are that they will go back to work on Monday. In that case, the question is whether there is any way of notifying them that they should not report to work.

Chair: We will have the block managers make the announcements in each mess hall to inform them.

Takahashi, at this time, made a motion that the chairman should be the president and the vice-chairman, the vice-president of this organization. Since time was so late everyone was anxious to go home that they unanimously approved with applause.

There is no reason to doubt that this meeting was not the first official meeting of the block representatives, although there is indication of some preliminary planning in the report of the warehouse department and in the naming of the five committees on Sanitation and Betterment of



Living, Farm Incident Settlement, Hospital, Mess Hall and Food Supply. Education, and the Negotiation Committee which is shortly after referred to as "the supreme body" by a voice from the floor.

The violent interjections by members who desired improvement of roads shower rooms, latrines, the inside of the messhalls, the reference to the "inhuman attitude of WRA toward the accident," and the expressed conviction that food was being sent to the U.S. Army and Navy are noteworthy. Kuratomi at first reminded the body that the extensive investigation involved in going into these matters would make the committee's task (he probably meant Negotiating Committee) very difficult. However, he gave way and stated, "By discussion we have planned to consult the Administration with all the issues of the Center."

The silence which fell on the meeting when Kashima's serious condition was mentioned is typical of a Japanese group. (According to the Tulean Dispatch, Kashima was already dead. It is possible that the news of his death was not immediately released.)

The meeting appears chaotic, erratic, very emotional and extremely unorganized, for which the translation may be partly responsible. Nevertheless, the members came to several concrete decisions: to put the colonists' grievances with regard to the farm accident and the living condition in the colony before the administration and the Spanish Consul, to continue to feed the hogs and chickens, to hold frequent meetings, and to accomplish the task of preparing their resolutions as fast as possible.

The administration knew nothing of this organization proceeding within the colony and faced the loss of the greater part of the farm crop. Three days passed during which the colonists made no attempt to negotiate with the administration. On October 20 Mr. Best, the Project Director, issued a statement pointing out that an immediate report had been sent to the



U.S. Employment Compensation Commission, that no official spokesman for the farm workers had come forward, that the entire farm crop must be harvested, adding the following ultimatum:

"If the farm workers are not interested enough in the settlement of this problem to send official spokesman to the administration by 8:30 a.m. October 21st, it will be necessary for the WRA to request harvesting by the Army and consequent loss of the crops to evacuees. 1/

(By "loss" Mr. Best means only the loss of food; colonists obtain no money and get no compensation from the sale of these farm stuffs).

So far as can be determined, this ultimatum brought no response from "official spokesman." The reason for this delay on the part of the colonists is clear. The meeting of October 17 indicates that the organizing group, the Daihyo Sha Kai, had undertaken a formidable and time consuming amount of organization and investigation. Informant K. a loyal evacuee sent from Tule to Gila on November 8, explained the situation:

"They were not prepared to make their demands. They were trying to figure out the proper approach. They wanted to ask each block's opinion getting their channel work done" 2/

#### Controversy over Public Funeral

When Kashima's death was announced, the Daihyo Sha Kai decided by block consent to attend and make an occasion of his funeral. The intensity of public sentiment at this time is well illustrated by the following remarks made by M, one of the representatives:

"The figured the people who got hurt (when the truck turned over) represented the whole center ... They knew they couldn't all get in (the gymnasium) but they wanted to give him an honorable funeral because he represented all of us." 3/

Shizue Kai and George Kuratomi, as members of the Negotiating committee, now approached Mr. Best and asked permission to use the high school gymnasium for the funeral. While Mr. Best was still undecided, another group came forward,

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1/ Tulean Dispatch, October 21  
2/ Report, Dec. 24, 1943. p. 12.  
3/ Notes, March, p. 63.

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stating that they, rather than the Kai-Kuratomi group should be given charge of the funeral, that they would be able to keep things under control. 1/ This second group implied that the Kai-Kuratomi group were radical. Both groups were cautious and secretive in the extreme as to their exact origin and their connections, beyond insisting that they were representatives of the people. Best made an effort to meet the second group, sending representatives to certain barracks when requested, but the plan miscarried. 2/ Nothing more has been heard of this second groups. 3/

Mr. Best did not know which group to believe. The Daihyo Sha Kai resented his refusal to accept them as legitimate representatives, but, understandably, did not choose to expose the foundations of their organization. Opler states:

"The Administration was aware of a group. The representatives of it would come to talk to Best. They didn't feel it was necessary to tell the the Administration how they had come to exist or who they were. They were pretty much organized from the inside." 4/

Eventually Best decided that he would give neither group the use of the gymnasium. This aroused great resentment and strengthened the position of the Daihyo Sha.

I says:

"Mr. Best, in view of the fact that the crops were yet to be got in and that the farmers had not as yet returned to work, saw fit to refuse the request of the said committee. This, as you can see, was the act that sowed the seed for what was to come later" 5/

M. Says:

"The funeral didn't come out right. If he'd (Best) run it normally I don't think nothing like this would have happend." 6/

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1/ Ibid., p. 57

2/ Notes, Feb. p. 20.

3/ Informants I. and M. may be able to give more information and possibly N.

4/ Notes, Mar. p. 25

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6/ Notes, Mar., p. 61

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Denied the use of the gymnasium, the Daihyo Sha determined to use the outdoor pavilion. A great crowd attended, forced to come by threats says Spicer, though, more probably because they shared the attitude expressed on p. 7. However, M., himself a member of the committee, admitted to me that threats had been employed.

"There were hoodlums like that. They didn't know any better." 1/

October 23, the day on which the rites were celebrated was an unseasonably cold and windy day. The mourners and spectators were most uncomfortable; the Buddhist dignitaries were nearly blown off the platform.

The first act of violence on the part of any of the colonists occurred at this funeral. Mr. Best wished to give the Japanese the impression that a record was being taken.<sup>2/</sup> He, therefore, sent the report's officer, John D. Cook, to the funeral with orders to stay in his car and act as if he were taking photographs. Opler, the Community Analyst, who states that he was one of the two Caucasians present besides Cook, saw a group of young men in the background. He thought they were mourners who intended to walk behind the bier. These young men formed themselves into a line between the warden's headquarters and the platform. It was not apparent that they were a guard. Cook disregarded Best's purported orders, left the car and took many pictures. The guard which objected to the taking of official pictures descended upon him took his camera by force and tossed him, took his camera by force and tossed him into the air. Opler states decidedly that it was all over in a moment. The camera and films were returned later. The identity of the boys is unknown. <sup>3/</sup> Opler says that they were Kibei. It is probable that they were younger members of ardent supporters of the Daihyo Sha Kai.

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1/ Ibid.

2/ See Opler's eye-witness account of this funeral, Notes, Feb. pp.20, 21

3/ How Mr. Opler can distinguish a Kibei from a Nisei by looking at him, I do not know.

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On the day of the funeral the Tulean Dispatch published the report from the U.S. Employment Compensation Commission, stating that the amount of compensation to which the widow and children were entitled was two-thirds of his monthly wage <sup>of</sup> as the date of the accident, i.e., the widow would receive \$10.66 or \$9.00, depending on the husband's classification.

This sum, the representatives and many of the people thought inadequate. An indication of the scorn which was manifested by some of the colonists appears in the letter written by "I" on November 18:

"The office then published in the local paper that the 'Compensation Law' that governs government employees was applicable in this instance and that the widow and the sons of the before-mentioned deceased was entitled to the grand sum of 60 per cent of whatever he was making in a month. Namely, 60 per cent of the kingly wage of 16 big dollars." 1/

The events of the next two days are not clear. Data can probably be obtained from Spicer's forthcoming report. All that is certain is that Mr. Best held a conference with representatives of the Daihyo Sha on October 26 at which time the representatives proposed that the colony be granted self-government, that is, a central governing body of evacuees. 2/ It is almost certain that other requests or "demands" were made. Until more data are obtained the reader is referred to the discussion of demands on p. . Mr. Best's reply is not known. His attitude, at this time, however, is described by Dr. Opler as follows:

"On some of the meetings with Best, only Kai and Kuratomi would come-up and say, 'We are the representatives of the people.' He'd ask them, 'Who do you represent?' They'd parry away in there (Best's office). On one occasion Kai just stormed out of the room. ...3/

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1/ See Report, Dec. 24, pp. 20,21

2/ See Spicer's letter to Province, Ibid., p. 29.

3/ See Notes, March, p. 59.

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"Best challenged the committee with the fact that there were no Tuleans (on it) ... Instead of recognizing the committee as I said he should he was always making a fanfare over the word representative. He'd argue with the committee about the meaning of the word representative. He'd argue with the committee about the meaning of the meaning of the word representative." 1/

This hesitation over recognizing the representatives whom the colonists had elected or appointed increased the unpopularity of Mr. Best and strengthened the power of the Negotiation Committee.

October 27 Best telegraphed Charles F. Ernest, Project Director at the Topas Center and *Wade Head*, of Poston, requesting the recruitment of farm workers to harvest the crops at Tule Lake. 2/ The following day he terminated the striking farm workers as of October 19, "due to failure to report for work." 3/ The first contingent of farm workers arrived in Tule October 30. It was commonly believed that Best had stated that he would take no action in regard to the strike without notification. Many colonists were convinced that Best had broken his word. The harvesters were regarded as strikebreaking double-crossers. Resentment increased. I says:

all

"Previous to this, Mr. Best gave word that any action he decided to take to harvest the crops in the fields would first be made public to the evacuees and the evacuee farmers. However, with no notification whatever he had brought in about 90 or 100 "yes-Yes" Japanese to take over the harvesting." 4/

M., Member of the Daihyo Sha says:

"The harvesters who came in were Japanese. That's what you call the double cross. It was just like an anti-strike. Best stopped the work but didn't give them a chance to consider it. He gave the people no notice of the fact that he was going to bring in the farm workers" ... If the Administration has put out officially that they couldn't do things (at the beginning of the trouble) I don't think the people would have got so angry. But they didn't tell the people anything." 5/

1/ Ibid., pp. 25, 26. I doubt that Opler went as far as to advise Best to recognize the committee. In Feb. he said that they were violent radicals. In March, when efforts to organize the community were stalemated, he had changed his mind.



(Footnotes continued)

2/ The Topaz Times (Oct. 28, 1943), contains an interesting statement by Mr. Ernst: "In discussing the job I have been asked to find out if there is any trouble like a 'strike' at Tule Lake. Last night I phoned to Tule Lake and received this information. 'There is no 'strike' or labor trouble at Tule Lake.' The residents of Tule Lake had have meetings with their project director and have said they did not feel they should harvest crops that were going to other centers."

In Poston the existence of the strike was not officially announced until Oct. 31 (Poston Chronicle). The workers were offered 90 cents to \$1.00 an hour. "X" states that the telegram of Oct. 27 did not state that a strike was in progress but did say that the Tule Lake people had refused to harvest the crop for shipment to the "loyal people" in other centers. X's Sociological Journal, Oct. 27, pp. 2, 10.

3/ Tulean Dispatch, Oct. 28, 1943

4/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 13. See also Notes, Feb., p. 14.

5/ Notes, Mar., p. 52.

Food for these unpopular harvest workers was taken by night from the warehouses which held the colonists' food. Opler stated that the food was taken at night because the trucks were needed for other work during the day. 1/ Evacuees noted the fact that trucks were driven to the warehouses, loaded with large quantities of food and then driven from the project. The next morning Japanese employed in the warehouse checked up on the missing items. According to one informant they found 120 sacks of rice, 50 cases of milk, many cans of corn and pineapple and much flour and catsup gone. They themselves never received catsup at mess. 2/ The fact that the food at Tule Lake was, in general, below the standards to which the colonists had been accustomed at other centers, and the well founded suspicion that graft existed among the A.P. members of the Mess Division added to the conviction of injustice. All informants agree that this removal of food was resented most bitterly.

Says M:

3/ "The food happened at night. The people didn't know about it."

1/ Notes, February p. 21.

2/ Report, Dec. 24, pp. 13, 21.



it. We figured this warehouse was for the center. What would you think if people came in with trucks at night?" 1/

Says I:

"These workers were being fed from the project warehouse from which food was being taken out at all hours of the night and day. This led the evacuees to believe that they were being done out of a goodly portion of their food. Subsequent investigation upheld this belief." 2/

When the news spread, and the Negotiation Committee saw that it was widely publicized, it no doubt angered persons who had hitherto been indifferent or neutral. When Mr. Best was approached on the matter he is reputed to have said:

"It's none of your business because we haven't issued these things out to you yet, and besides we're feeding you people properly." 3/ The informant added, "They dismissed the case and that was the main trouble."

It was at this propitious moment that Dillon Myer arrived on the project. The Negotiation Committee demanded audience with him and was refused on the ground that it did not represent the people. After the demonstration at the funeral the Administration probably was of the opinion that this group was a strongly organized minority of pro-Japanese radicals who had seized power illegally, inflamed the people against the Administration and subdued opposition by threats of violence.

The Daihyo Sha Kai, feeling that it had public support, determined to force recognition from the Administration and lay their grievances before Myer. On the night of October 31 it sent a false message to the mess hall that on the following day Mr. Myer was going to give a speech and the people were to come to the Administration Building to hear it. They were told to be as orderly as possible and carry no weapons.

"So the representatives passed the word to each mess hall.

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1/ Notes, Mar. p. 62.

2/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 21.

3/ Ibid., pp. 13, 14.

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The asked everybody to come to the Administration Building quietly, without sticks and without knives in their pockets. They wanted them to be as quiet as possible." 1/

When the crowd which gathered about the Administrative area appeared insufficient, the hoodlum element either was ordered or took it upon themselves to get more people out. They obtained cars and toured the camp, exhorting the people to come as "true Japanese" and threatening those who stayed away. Data are too value to state exactly what the threats were. The following statement by "I" is probably very close to the truth except that it is doubtful that the people as he implied were told they might be shot. The statement is also interesting psychologically. Like many persons in camp, "I" sympathizes absolutely with some of the "demands" of the committee; nevertheless, he would not risk his skin at the demonstration. (Private note: get more attitudes on relations to this "order to demonstrate.") The following statement by "I" a Daihyo Sha sympathizer is probably very close to the truth. It is doubtful, however, if the people were

"When this came out, it so happened that the goon-squad went on the war path ... The people gathered in some blocks. In some blocks the representatives asked the people to come because Myer was going to give a speech. Then, when there wasn't enough people there, a few members of the goon squads got cars. They said it wasn't safe to remain in the barracks and asked the people to head for the Administrative area. I sat tight. I figured if I'm going to get shot I can get shot here in this barracks. They talked to the people trying to make them go, saying, 'Are you Japanese or not?'" 2/

By these various means a large crowd was induced to come. Estimates of its size vary. It may have been as many as 14,000 to the Administration Building. Many went out of curiosity.

Faced with this exhibition of "public trust in the representatives" Myer and Best decided to see the committee.

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1/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 13.

2/ Notes, Feb., p. .

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The Japanese overran the entire Administrative area; the Administration building was completely surrounded. Many of the appointed personnel were panic stricken. The fears of those who had always expected the worst of the colonists appeared about to be realized. Some feared rape for their wives and children. While the conference was going on Dr. Pedicord came out of the hospital and using insulting language ordered the group about the hospital to disperse. Four or five of the hoodlum group followed him into the hospital and into his office. He struck one; they turned upon him and beat him severely. The variation in the versions of this occurrence are legion. Opler says Pedicord changed his own version everytime he was interviewed.<sup>1/</sup> Two Japanese informants said that the boys went to get Pedicord to ask him to come to the conference.<sup>2/</sup> However, Opler says that the nurses, who were eye-witnesses, testified that Pedicord came out of the hospital and ordered the boys out.<sup>3/</sup> This is corroborated by M., The Daihyo Sha informant, who added.

"He came from the inside of the hospital and told them to go to hell. That's why they went in. They had no authority in the hospital. A house is like a fortress. They stepped in because there was reason. I can't walk right into anybody else's house and make a stink!"<sup>4/</sup>

Best and Myer are said to have realized that this episode was unrelated to the demonstration.<sup>5/</sup> However it did not help the negotiations.

What transpired at the meeting between Myer, Best and the representatives of the Daihyo Sha is a subject on which members of the Administration and the colonists without exception are utterly in disagreement. The Negotiating Committee made an extraordinary number of demands to Myer and Best. One of X's informants states that in all 33 demands were made.<sup>6/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> Notes, Mar., p. 59

<sup>2/</sup> Report, Dec. 24, pp. 13, 22

<sup>3/</sup> Notes, Mar., p. 59

<sup>4/</sup> Ibid., pp. 61, 62

<sup>5/</sup> Opler, loc. cit.

<sup>6/</sup> X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 4, p. 6; See also Notes, Mar. p. 62.



Unfortunately the committee never released any written material; evidently they never stated in writing what they intended to accomplish for the people or what Director Myer had promised. According to the Administration and to many evacuee informants, they assumed an arrogant attitude, "they demanded rather than requested."

The demands may be divided into two section, (1) those having to do with fundamental improvement of the colonists living conditions; (2) those having to do with the clarification of the colonists' status as segregated or prisoners of war, as U.S. Citizens or citizens of Japan. Under this latter heading may also be placed the request that all the inhabitants of Tule be given the same status; that those who did not wish to return to Japan be segregated.

The improvement of living conditions had tremendous popular support; the demands for clarification of status had little or none. In February and March no informant mentioned them, although all were fluent on the living conditions.

Suggestions to improve living conditions included: the improvement of food, 1/ better housing and better interiors, 2/ the supplying of mops, bucket and soap to each block. 3/ (Such articles had not been given to the colonists on their entrance to Tule in October; their absence in the dusty coal smoke filled atmosphere was a great hardship); porches, 4/ cleaning up and repairing of the latrines, 5/ (I entered two women's latrines in March and found them in a sorry state. Some equipment for our of order; everything appeared dingy and overused.) The dismissal of Dr. Pedicord and those members of the hospital staff unsympathetic or rude to the Japanese. 6/ Additional compensation was demanded for the widow

1/ X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 14, p. 5; Notes Feb. p. 14, Report, Dec. 24, 4, 21.  
2/ Notes, Mar., p. 47.  
3/ Ibid. X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 4.  
4/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 12; Notes, Feb., p. 13.  
5/ Report, Ibid.  
6/ Ibid., also p. 21; Notes, Feb., p. 13; X's Sociological Journal Nov. 14, p. 5; 20, p. 45; Mar. 13, p. 5.



and children of the farm workers, 1/ that the motor depot and placement office set certain age limits for persons who drove the trucks and other vehicles in the center, 2/ that certain members of the Appointed Staff, particularly in the Mess Division be dismissed for misappropriation of evacuee food supplies; 3/ that no more food was to be taken from the warehouse to feed the harvesters; 4/ and that food products raised by the Japanese at Tule Lake were not to be given to the army. 5/

Under political demands, the committee is reputed to have asked for status of all segregants as Japanese nationals, i.e., as prisoners of war; 6/ and for further segregation; if necessary, the placement in a separate camp of all persons who although not loyal to the United States did not wish to return to Japan. 7/

(Insert discussion on enormity of demands Sakoda-Yosumura)

The requests of a political nature appear to have sprung from the desires of the leaders themselves. The following quotations show that they were not the demands which had the support of the people:

From "I":

"The committee decided to request that (1) the motor depot and placement office set certain age limits to people who drive trucks and other types of vehicles within the center. (2) That the food in camps be

1/ Ibid., also p. 21; Notes, Feb., p. 13; X's Sociological Journal Nov. 14, p. 5; 20, p. 45; Mar. 13, p. 5.

2/ Ibid., p. 21; Notes, Feb. p. 14

3/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 21; Notes, Feb. p. 14; X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 4; March 13, p. 5.

Gordon Brown (requesting that, since he does not have the evidence on hand, he be not quoted) states that Caucasian graft at Tule Lake had been investigated before the farm strike. Mr. Graves, head of Internal Security at Gila, was one of the investigators. Adequate proof was given Best that project food, particularly meat, was being taken from the project warehouse by Caucasians and sold in Klamath Falls. Best took no action until mid November when Peck was dismissed, chiefly for drunkenness, Dillon Myer told me. Notes, Mar., p. 44. These "releases" when they were made, appear to have been accomplished very quietly, with much saving of face.

4/ X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 5.

5/ Ibid.

6/ According to Spicer, Report, Dec. 24, p. 28, X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 4, p. 6; Nov. 14, p. 5.

7/ Spicer, Ibid., also X, March 13, p. 5.



improved. (3) That certain officials of the WRA who were known to have been chiseling be discharged. (4) That Dr. Pedicord, the Chief Medical Officer, in view of his anti-Japanese views and actions, be discharged. That he was incompetent and negligent of his studies. That because of his refusal to grant permission for transfusions to two or three patients in the past (a Japanese doctor had recommended transfusions) these patients all died ... "1/

"They asked for porches for all the apartments. WRA had promised lumber for all the porches. It was never supplied. That's where that request came in. We were promised. That's inefficiency as far as I'm concerned.

The only thing that everybody in camp absolutely endorsed was the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord, and more care in placement of drivers, and an improvement of food, and I think, the request for an investigation of grafting. Grafting started the whole works." 2/

From K:

"I don't know how much they demanded for the widows and children ... but the people figured it (60% of monthly wage) was not enough .. Then at the same time they made demands for porches and for the latrine to be better taken care of and other things. They also asked for Dr. Pedicord to be taken out of the hospital. There were several other requests they threw in with the farmer's case." 3/

From a letter in X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 4:

"... on November 1 the representatives made the following demands to Director Myer and Director Best: (1) To supply each block with brooms, buckets, mops, and other necessary items. (2) Swindlings by the appointed personnel in the Subsistence Department were charged. They requested to remove these crooked Caucasians. (3) To discharge the Caucasian employees from the hospital. They also charged that the money appropriated for medicines had been swindled by the Caucasians. (4) All the better grade agricultural products have been packed in the shed and sent to the outside. Formerly the residents had thought that these were being sent to other relocation centers. Lately they have been informed that most of these had been sent to the Army. They argued that they should not be producing for the United States Army.

From M:

"Why we asked for better facilities:- in the beginning of evacuation they said, 'If you're loyal and go into camp they'll provide you with everything, clothing, and board. You don't have to worry about anything.' Then you know what happened." 4/

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- 1/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 21.  
2/ Notes, Feb. pp. 13, 14.  
3/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 12.  
4/ Notes, Mar., p. 62.
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Faced with this bewildering list of demands, surrounded by thousands of Japanese, knowing that Dr. Pedicord had been assaulted, and hearing the screams of the hysterical nurses and other members of the appointed personnel, Myer and Best were in a difficult position. As Opler points out, they were conscious of a great paradox in the committee's demands:

"The group said: (1) We represent the center; the people believe in us. And in the same speech usually (2) we've got to have further segregation. There are two big groups here. By this they meant unconsciously the minority they didn't control. 1/"

They were by no means convinced that the committee was representative, so they temporized and appeased. They said they would do what they could. 2/ They promised to investigate the accusations of graft on the part of appointed personnel. 3/ What else, if anything, Myer and Best promised is not known. 4/ However, immediately after the conference, some of the members of the Negotiating Committee spread the news that he had promised to fire Dr. Pedicord, fire the grafters, and see that no more food was taken from the warehouse. M. says he did not hear Myer mention the food-warehouse matter. 5/

After the conference which lasted from about two to four o'clock in the afternoon, Best and Myer made short addresses to the people. George Kuratomi gave a report of the conference and Reverend Kai appealed to the residents to remain calm during the negotiations and commit no violence. Many evacuees who were not present insist that Dillon Myer made certain promises at this time. However, no evacuee informant has stated that he heard Mr. Myer make any specific promises, except the promise to investigate the grafting. A teacher, who is not anti-Japanese, stated that she remembered no promises.

The report of Myer's speech which appeared in the Tulcan Dispatch of November 2 seems as complete and as accurate as any informant's statement:

- 1/ Notes, Feb., p. 20.
- 2/ From M.; see Notes, March, p. 62.
- 3/ Spicer's statement to X; See X's Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, p. 5.
- 4/ Stenographic notes of this meeting are in the record. Best's permission, however, must be obtained to see them.
- 5/ Notes, March, p. 62.



DELEGATES CONFER

Myer Addresses Local Residents at Ad. area.

Presenting the requests, suggestions, and demands of the colonists, seven representatives of the residents met with National Director Dillon S. Myer and Project Director Raymond R. Best yesterday afternoon.

During the conference which lasted over two hours, practically the entire population showed their support by surrounding the administration building area during the entire afternoon.

At the end of the negotiations Myer addressed the local residents over the public address system and stated that he has met with the people's delegates to discuss their representations. Expressing utmost confidence in Director Best, Myer concluded by asking residents to cooperate with the Administration in settling all problems.

George Juratomi, a member of the representative group, gave a brief report of the proceedings with the WRA officials.

In conclusion Reverend Kai appealed to the residents to remain calm during the negotiations and not create violence harmful to the Japanese interests.

The seven representatives will meet today and tomorrow with the national director and the project director to discuss further the points brought out in yesterday's initial conference.

On the addresses made by Kai and Kuratomi at this time, Opler made the following remarks:

"A meeting was held in Mr. Best's office. The minutes indicate that there were no complete promises made. After the meeting inside there were some speeches. Kuratomi interpreted in Japanese only, what had been decided at the meeting. 'Remember what this man has promised.' This was followed by a speech Kai of the Dai Nippon order. Kuratomi was under the influence of Kai. 1/

The best explanation of this misunderstanding over the promises comes from "J" who became well acquainted with Mr. Best when he was confined in Leuppe during Best's term as director:

"The first fault with Mr. Best is that he 'Yesses' too quickly. I found that out in all my conversations with him. Before I complete my conversation he says, 'Yes, I know; Yes, I know.' I'd like to know what he knows because I haven't completed the sentence.

And a man thinks he has made a promise. Two weeks will pass and he doesn't do anything. Two weeks later you go back and he 'Yesses' you again. Unless



people have eyes to see and observe him properly, they will always take it for granted that he made the promises. I noticed that in Maob and Leuppe." 1/

Mr. Yosumura of the Cooperative who is definitely anti-Daihyo Sha and somewhat pro-administration said on February 3:

"They did ignore their promises. But you must consider that a few days after that there was another incident. (The November 4 disturbance which brought in the Army.) Probably they would have kept their promises if they had not been scared." 2/

This brief remark is very significant. Mr. Yosumura puts his finger on one of the salient factors responsible for the Administration's policy and its unfortunate results. If the Administration had not been so "scared," it is likely that the course of events would have been quite different. Opler stated several times that during this period the staff members were in a state of panic; It was rumored that a couple of Kibei driving a truck had tried to run down Best's child. Best himself was afraid of being kidnapped. 3/

The Daihyo Sha Kai had scored a pronounced victory. From Nov. 1 to Nov. 4 it was at the zenith of its power. The committee had forced the Administration to receive them as the people's representative body. With remarkable sagacity the members had shown the political foresight to wait until the administration had committed a series of acts which progressively increased the hostility of the evacuee population toward WRA, i.e., refusing to grant the use of the gymnasium for the funeral, sending a photographer to the funeral, calling in the harvest workers and feeding them with food which the colonists thought belonged to them, and finally, refusing to recognize as representatives the members of the committee which the people themselves had selected by block election or appointment.

~~-----The committee lost no time in publicizing the fact that it had received-----~~

1/ Notes, March, p. 16

2/ Notes, Feb., p. 27

3/ According to Spicer and Opler; Report Dec. 24, p. 26, see also Notes, March.



assurances from WRA that their demands would be met, specifically that Myer had promised to discharge the unpopular members of the appointed personnel.<sup>1/</sup> That this untruth was widely believed is shown by the almost unanimous insistence of evacuees that the promises were made and later broken.<sup>2/</sup>

Activities of Daihyo Sha Kai immediately after Nov. 1

Had the negotiations ended here, with no further incident, they might have kept control of the camp. However, the more levelheaded members realized the danger of such outbursts as that which resulted in the beating of Dr. Pedicord. Efforts were made to control the over-enthusiastic belligerent hoddlum group. This was first done by announcements in the mess halls.

N. says:

"The Block Representatives would come back to the block and state that the young fellows - those in their teens and up to 22 were too hot tempered and they would like them to be quiet and decent. All the block representatives came back to the block (our's is still in the stockade) and said for the young people not to take matters into their own hands. This was right after the farm accident in October."

N's statement and the remarks of other evacuees imply that the Negotiating Committee met frequently with the block managers.<sup>3/</sup>

Since the Administration had made an issue of the lack of a "Representative Committee" the nucleus of the Daihyo Sha decided to form one. The representatives from each block met and selected nine men to deal with the Administration. This smaller body was called "The Planning Board." "N", the only informant on this matter, states:

"November 1st Myer states, "Providing you people will get a committee to talk things over with the Administration, we are willing to negotiate with you. Then they selected the nine."<sup>4/</sup>

Kai, Kuratomi, and others who had been most active in negotiations up to this point were on this body. The Administration objected to this

<sup>1/</sup> X's conversation with Spicer, Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, p. 5.

<sup>2/</sup> Notes, March, p. 11.

<sup>3/</sup> "M", "O", and "I" probably can give more information on this point.

<sup>4/</sup> Notes, March p. 12.



Planning Board also, insisting that they had not been elected by the representatives but had been set in their positions by pressure politics.

ATTITUDE OF THE CAMP POPULATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOVEMBER 1.

The successful demonstration and the apparent capitulation of the Administration added greatly to the Negotiating Committee's prestige in the eyes of the people. It is impossible to present conclusive evidence at present as to the extent of the support given the representatives. But that the committee had the support of "the people" is admitted even by Japanese decidedly hostile to the Daihyo Sha. Several honest, unsophisticated informants imply that support was almost unanimous. K, the "loyal" coal crew worker who left Tule, says;

"Until this was straightened out they didn't want to work. Most of the people were behind it." 1/

M, who is very honest, although being a member of the Daihyo Sha his opinion must be taken with reservation, says:

"At that time everybody believed in the Daihyo Sha, because we all had one camp and were trying to make it livable." 2/

Two men who are employed in the Cooperative and are very much against the committee's policies say:

"Kai, Kuratomi, and Kurashige?, they had done their best for the Japanese in Jerome. Whatever they did there was the best for the Japanese. The people from Jerome worshipped him and believed in him (Kai). He was honest but misguided." 3/

"They were supported by everybody." 4/

Support, however, was not unanimous. Conservatives disapproved of the fuss and feared the reverberations outside the center.

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1/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 12.

2/ Notes, March, p. 62.

3/ Notes, Feb. pp. 26, 27.

4/ Notes, Mar., p. 19.

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"It's really a disgusting story. I think some of the people (Negotiating Committee) wanted power. They say, 'We are working for the people.' I've heard a lot of rumors. I believe they're working for themselves ... Maybe they really tried to bring the center better. But they're demands were more like orders than suggestions ... The leaders had no self-control themselves. There was so much excitement ... The rest of the public just follow them." 1/ ...

"A minority does the most foolish things without any consideration and does not know what will happen and influence the rest of the people. I am deeply disappointed." 2/

The lack of unity was deplored by those individuals themselves in favor of the strike and the stand being made against the Administration;

"A letter from Tule Lake mentioned that there is no unity for the strike on the part of the community. The Kibei are exerting a great deal of pressure with threat of physical violence. He wished that the whole community would support the strike." 3/

The beating of Dr. Pedicord and the actions of the "undisciplined young men was severely criticized.

"On the other hand, when the people came to the Administration building they were forced to go. On that day I saw some of the young men drag out Dr. Pedicord. I was about 200 feet away. I didn't know who the old man was. I saw him dragged and hit by a young fellow. I saw that his head was bald. I felt quite sorry. He couldn't defend himself. I felt they shouldn't do that kind of thing.

I was looking forward for punishment on those young people. But evidently they (The administration) didn't do anything about it. 4/ They should have been punished. That was a great mistake (not punishing them). Later when I saw Mr. Myer he said Pedicord started the fight. If I was there and had any authority I would have stopped them. But with the mob psychology they would probably have hit me." 5/

"I" admits: They might have been goon squads but they were representatives. 6/

"... Some of the representatives weren't exactly the people who ought to be acting as representatives. You can understand that trouble can arise from a fanatical Kibei being a representative." 7/

But, in defense of the committee as a whole, "I" adds:

"There was a very small minority group of young radicals. They took it upon themselves to do things for the people in camp, without the peoples' permission. It was this group who first went around demanding the removal of the American flag ... They were all for Japanese stoicism. Nobody paid any attention to them. They were not real representatives." 8/

1/ Notes, Feb. p. 8.

2/ From a letter; see Report, Dec. 24, p. 25

3/ X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 4, p. 5.

4/ The Administration tried but was unable to apprehend Dr. Pedicord's assailant

5/ Notes, Feb. p. 27.

6/ Notes, Feb. p. 27.

7/ Notes, Feb., p. 14

8/ Ibid.



ATTITUDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOVEMBER 1.

The attitude of the Administration from November 1 to November 4 was one of indecision, tension and fear which in some individuals amounted to hysteria. By refusing to recognize the representatives and then relenting when the crowd gathered around the Administration building, they had lost face greatly. (That this was a great error was later admitted by Myer himself. 1/) The Administration was not unsympathetic to many of the Negotiating Committee's requests. Opler says:

"The Administration couldn't listen to them as demands. They were really sympathetic to all of them (the demands) except the dismissal of the staff members. The negotiating committee demanded promises. We said we'd do what we could. They took it as a promise and insisted we'd broken a promise." 2/

Ye Yet, against recognition and cooperation with the Daihyo Sha Kai stood its obvious political machinations, and the violence which the body had been unable to control. The Daihyo Sha had posted men in the blocks on October 23 to try to convince or force the people to attend the funeral; young men, probably acting under orders, has patrolled the rear of the crowd at the funeral, although whether they actually attempted to keep the people there is open to question; the Reports Officer had been attacked and Dr. Pedicord severely beaten. There was no doubt that supporters of the Daihyo Sha attempted to intimidate the people into coming to the Administration Building on November 1 and that it also lied to the people on October 31, when it was announced that Director Myer would speak. Although there was no proof, the Negotiating Committee was also blamed for breaking the windows of the housing office and tampering with the beds and belongings of the truck drivers hired from the outside to handle the transportation in connection with the farm harvest. 3/

1/ Notes, March, p. 44.

2/ Notes, Feb., p. 21.

3/ Spicer's letter, Report, Dec. 24, pp. 27



The fact that the leadership was dominated by men from other centers, particularly Jerome, also discredited it in the eyes of the Administration. <sup>1/</sup>  
In this regard, Opler expressed the Administration's attitude pretty well when he said:

"The Jerome group had a pressure group in the background that Kai had the greatest influence over. They whipped the whole bunch into line ... The Jerome group was the most prominent in agitating. They were status seeking. The original negotiating committee was composed of people from Jerome. My informants say that the Jerome group started organizing before they came." <sup>2/</sup>

The Administration was correct in assuming that the Daihyo Sha did not have complete public support. However, it underestimated the extent of the lack of support. Its greatest oversight was ignorance of the fact that the great mass of the people felt they had elected these representatives and that the people would always support actively or passively any group that stood stalwartly against the unpopular Administration, even if it used threats or employed violence. The public support of some of the demands was tremendous. The deeds of the Administration, no matter what their character, would be received with more or less opprobrium if for no other reason than that they sprang from this hated source.

The Administration's ignorance of the extent of public support of the Daihyo Sha Kai, and which of committee's policies were approved or disapproved, may be laid partially to the fact that they gained much of their information from informers or inu. Opler implied on two occasions that one man had come to the Administration and "told everything." According to camp rumor, a particularly dastardly example of informing was committed soon after November 1 by a disgruntled member of the Daihyo Sha who had expected to be placed on the Planning Board, but had been absent because of illness when the selections were made. "H" whispered the story to me

<sup>1/</sup> Ibid., pp. 24, 29

<sup>2/</sup> Notes, Feb. p. 19



but refused to tell me the person's name. 1/

"This is what I've heard. After the Negotiating Committee a certain man, let's call him X, wrote out a petition in English, stating that these nine people were not legally elected. He sent this to blocks 16 and 17 and said to please sign this paper. He was turned down very harshly. Then the Planning Board posted a bulletin, saying, Mr. X is an inu. If you work for the project here, you find he's the key man. He's standing pretty high now, and has the confidence of the Administration now.

X did this because he was jealous. They didn't recognize him. He's a graduate of a political school in Japan. He wanted to be a member of the nine." 2/

In failing to apprehend and punish the assailants of Dr. Pedicord, the Administration lost a valuable opportunity to assert its authority in a manner which would have gained general camp approval. The statement Myer is reported to have made, indicates that he thought the act had some justification, since Pedicord struck the first blow. This, as has been shown, was not the attitude of many of the Japanese.

On November 2 or 3 certain members of the Appointed Personnel of the Hospital, staunch supporters of Dr. Pedicord, held a meeting in the hospital. Myer attended. Here Myer was roundly criticized for his appeasing attitude. According to a woman present there was a great deal of spectacular oratory, and denunciation of persons who would not trouble to protect their wives and six year old daughters from rape. To the suggestions of this group Myer is reported to have answered, "This is fascism." 3/

The Administration now committed its major error. On the night of November 4, trucks were again taken from the warehouse. The motor pool workers refused to give the keys for the trucks. A group of young men gathered in the warehouse area to prevent the removal of food. Myer and Spicer say that the trucks were intended to transport harvest workers and

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1/ I suspect it was Furikawa but will find out eventually.

2/ Notes, Mar., p. 12.

3/ My informant has promised more information

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and not to remove food. Three evacuee accounts of what transpired follow:

"The only way to stop this (removal of food) was to put a guard and then to watch so they wouldn't take the stuff away from camp. That night, November 4, the semi-truck reached the warehouse. So the youngsters got excited and started causing trouble. Some of the Japanese got beat up. Some of the Caucasians ran away from them and reported it to the Army. Within 20 minutes the Army was moved in. They caught ten of them around the military area, where the Caucasian staff lives. They were just innocent bystanders, and three of them were just warehouse watchmen." 1/

"Both of them (Myer and Best) promised that "hereafter there will be no more food taken from the warehouses at night" ... A few nights later a truck drew up to one of the warehouses and demanded the watchmen (Japanese) to open up. They refused -- result: a couple of cracked heads and martial law." 2/(D22)

"Around midnight on the 4th two trucks loaded with food at the warehouse and tried to take them out of camp. The Warden on watch sounded alarm. Kibel answered the summon immediately and began to beat the appointed personnel on the trucks. The M.P.'s were rushed to the scene and the fight ensued." 3/ (N.20.5)

An appointed staff member transferred from Tule to Gila stated that "many things went on which have not come out." He had his hand on his doorknob while one of the Caucasian members of Internal Security was being beaten by the Japanese outside his door. He could not make up his mind whether to go out and get beaten also or whether to save himself.

Mr. Best called in the Army to restore order. According to the Poston Chronicle (Nov. 7) printing an official statement, the incident took place at 9:50 at night. On the morning of the 5th when the evacuees reported for work they were met by soldiers who ordered them back to their quarters. Some people gathered in spite of orders and the Army used tear gas bombs to disperse them.

There is disagreement among members of the Administration as to what use the trucks sent for on the night of November were to be put. All the evacuees and Mr. Opler believe they were intended to transport more food from the

1/ Report. Dec. 24, p. 14

2/ Ibid., p. 22

3/ X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 5.



warehouses. Spicer, 1/ and later Dillon Myer, stated that they were to be used to transport harvesters. 2/ When this statement was repeated to Mr. and Mrs. Opler, they were dumbfounded. Opler stated that he was absolutely certain that the trucks were sent for food. Said Mrs. Opler, "Where would they go to get what harvesters?" 3/

The Army immediately arrested and held nine young men whom they thought were implicated in the disturbance. Among those held were Isamu Uchida and Nogawa, ward representatives of the Daihyo Sha Kai, Inouye, the head of the Tule Lake Jodo organization, 4/ and Fred Fukui.

On the morning of November 5 when the Japanese reported for work, they were stopped by soldiers and told to return to their barracks. Some protested that they had to go to work. Many curious people joined the throng. The Army threw some tear gas bombs at them and told them to go home. The scene is described by an evacuee:

The next morning, everybody like usual went to report to work and all the Japanese truck drivers were stopped by the guards, searched and told to go back. They said they had to go to work. The soldiers told them to go back, not to come near the place. Some of the fellows still argued and the soldiers kicked some of them. Everybody was gathering at the front of their own blocks. So the army started throwing tear gas at them and told them to go home. 5/

Under the Army control, compulsory idleness was imposed on most of the evacuees. Only the block managers, the hospital employees, and the mess crews continued to work.

The same day the Daihyo Sha Kai, which appears to have had complete control of the Tulean Dispatch during this period, published an account of the warehouse disturbance and a stern exhortation to keep order.

COOPERATION ASKED!

Army Occupied Administration Area, Following Incident.

1/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 26.

2/ Notes, March, p. 44.

3/ Ibid., p. 59

4/ X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 5.

5/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 14.



"By a minor incident last night the center administration area was temporarily occupied by the Army, who maintained a strict guard of the camp.

The Administration area was completely cut off from the rest of the center by patrolling M.P.'s. Number of tear gas bombs were thrown at residents standing by the zone limit.

Barb wire fences are being built southwest of the hospital area to keep the residents away from the Ad. area.

However, the facts of the incident are being closely guarded by the people's committees."

Residents Asked to Stay Calm, Com. Pass Resolutions.

"Trust in the actions of the residents' delegates, and do not take any individual actions," exclaimed the committee of seven representatives chosen to settle Thursday night's incident. Five resolutions were passed by the committee affecting the colonists' conduct during the following week.

"Young men are asked to be sensible and prudent due to the present situation, and residents are asked to refrain from spreading unfounded rumors, and congregating in more than five in a group. That the WRA properties within the center should not be damaged or destroyed, was emphasized by the committee resolutions.

The resolutions were agreed upon the representatives to bring about a peaceful conclusion, and violators of the rules will be punished by due action of the entire populace warned the committee. The delegates also stated that the infractors of these rules are working against the peace, harmony and the well being of the entire camp."

Center Residents Pass Regulations.

The following regulations governing the conduct of the residents during the ensuing period have been made up by the seven representatives delegated by the residents and their delegates:

1. Trust the actions of this committee and do not take any individual actions.
2. Do not congregate in groups of more than five in the open.
3. Do not spread any unfounded rumors.
4. Young men! Be sensible and prudent about everything that you do.
5. Do not destroy anything in the center. Leave the entire camp and its facilities as it has been in the past.

Any person who willfully violates these regulations will be punished by due action of the entire populace as the infractor is working against the peace, harmony and well-being of the entire camp.



EDITORIAL

Let's Back Up Our Delegates

Residents! Let us show our faith in our representatives by obeying their regulations!

We have delegated our representatives to negotiate for us and act for us; they were not selected just as figureheads.

The merits of this wise step taken by our delegates can be readily seen by every thinking resident. The measures that they had taken in the form of these regulations was not a measure to show their authority; they had taken this step to protect us.

The rash and hasty actions of a few who because of bitterness or anger take things into their own hands without stopping to think is not doing the community any good. They are just jeopardizing the welfare of all of their fellow residents.

Fellow residents! Let us take steps to punish any person who may disregard these rules!" 1/

On November 6, Lt. Col. Austin issued the following proclamation which was printed in the Tulean Dispatch of Nov. 9.

"The Army having taken over control of the Tule Lake Segregated Center at the request of WRA, strict discipline will be maintained at all times. No outdoor gatherings will be permitted. The Commanding Officer will be glad to meet with any properly selected representative committee to discuss any problems relative to the administration of this center."

Two Japanese voiced the people's sentiments toward the Army this time as follows:

"... The residents are taking the presence of the soldiers in the block nonchalantly and continuing their passive resistance. Their attitude is, 'What can't they do if we don't do anything at all. We are guaranteed of food, clothing, and shelter.'" 2/

"One night I went directly to the post and asked them to stop it (the informant refers to the soldiers shining their spot lights on the coal workers and inadvertently blinding them). They could have shot me. That showed that the Tule Lake guards were very understanding. Their Commanding Officer had been trained right ... During the riot they used to bring in the food with an escort of two jeeps, two semi-trucks, and four, five trucks. Twelve soldiers escorted the food trucks. That was a comical sight. Like the old Chicago gangster days." 3/

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1/ All of above quotations from Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 5.

2/ X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 5.

3/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 18.

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The immediate effect of Army control upon the general population was a series of hardships and inconveniences. Mail delivery was held up until November 9. The delivery of milk and baby food was seriously curtailed. People rushed the Cooperative stores to stock up for the lean days ahead. The shelves were soon emptied. The Army confiscated the Tulean Dispatch's mimeographer and typewriters on Nov. 11, but returned the mimeographer two days later. The greatest hardship was the stopping of the distribution of coal.

K. says:

"Then from the fifth to the sixth of November people began hollering about there not being enough coal. There was no milk. Only the seven-months-old children were getting milk through the warden's office. Children over seven months old were going hungry and crying. My children were crying for milk. The only person who could contact Lt. Col. Austin was Walter Tsuda, the head of Internal Security. Even the representatives can't see Austin and can't reach him. ... So the morning of the 6th Lt. Col. Austin sent for us. He asked me about the coal situation. I told him we don't have enough coal. He asked me if my men would go to work. I said we'd work, not for money, but for the benefit of the Japanese. Then the Colonel asked me how many men I had. I told him 325.

Then Mr. Cozzens was taking a note. He asked me. "Are you sure these boys are willing to go to work?" I told him, "If you see kids crying from cold and wife crying about the cold house... We are human and we don't cause any trouble." 1/

Accordingly, on the request of both the Army and the Negotiating Committee, the coal crew resumed work on November 11.

November 9, the Spanish Consul made his second visit. He assured the residents that he would personally see that the center got adequate medical supplies and asked the committee to present any further problems directly to him. 2/ The Nov. 11 issue of the Tulean Dispatch reports on his visit as follows:

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1/ Ibid., pp. 14, 15

2/ Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 9.  
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Incident Investigated by Consul F. De Amat

"Coming here to investigate the facts of the incident, the Spanish Consul, F. de Amat told the representatives Tuesday that he had come here at the request of the Japanese government.

He told the committee that the residents can still make requests to the government as before.

Telling the representatives present at the meeting that he was the official representative of Japan, he asked the residents at all times to refrain from taking violent actions.

Before leaving, he stated that he would visit the center regularly twice a month and will make special trips whenever necessary."

The same day was also marked by the arrival of D.C. Hayward who came to replace Ralph E. Peek, the former steward who had been accused of grafting the the evacuees and who, as Myer says, was dismissed for "chiefly drunkenness."

From November 6 on, the Army made advances to the colonists, asking that a "properly selected negotiating committee" come forward. However, no one responded to these requests.

The Daihyo Sha, meanwhile felt its position becoming progressively more insecure. The Army did not recognize it as a representative body; its members probably feared arrest; it was faced with the task of explaining the disturbance at the warehouses and the discomfort and inconvenience which this deed had brought to the colonists. On November 11, it released its explanation of the incident:

Details of Incident Released by Committee

Six Young men Still held by Army for Investigationl/

After giving the details of the incident which led to the intervention of the Army to the Spanish Consul, the negotiating committee released to the press the following story.

During the negotiations with Dillon S. Myer and Raymond Best, these two had promised that in case any food was to be taken out of the warehouse, they would do so openly.

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1/ This was later amended to nine young men, the supposedly correct number.  
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However, in spite of this promise, on the night of November 4 about 9:30 the internal security force spotted some Caucasian entering the warehouse.

During the resulting investigation, quarrel broke out between the young men who had accompanied the wardens and the Caucasian.

Fearing that the Caucasians were to be kidnapped, the WRA officials had called in the Army.

As a result of this incident six young men are still held by the Army for investigation. One of the six, Fred Fukui, was taken out of the center and the Army officials promised to give a full explanation of it today.

The extent of the injuries of these six are not known but it is reported that they are not serious.

In case the others are to be taken out of the center the Army had assured the committee that they will give full explanation of such action.<sup>1/</sup>

Spicer comments upon this release in his letter:

"They played the whole thing down and by no means give the truth. They are evidently feeling themselves in a precarious position just now."<sup>2/</sup>

The Daihyo Sha continued to plead for support, even threatening to resign if the residents did not cooperate. However, it is most improbable that they intended to resign at this point.

#### Delegates Again Ask for Support

In asking the residents for their full support, the seven members of the negotiation committee stated that in case the residents do not obey their request for cooperation they will be forced to resign. Also in case the Army does not recognize the truth of the incident, they will have to relinquish their position. The committee asked residents that whenever a request for workers is made by them, to report immediately after the call is issued.<sup>3/</sup>

#### EDITORIAL

##### Are you a Critic?

There are many residents who profess to know everything and who continually criticize the negotiation committee for the delay in informing the people of the proceedings of the negotiation or the lack of information of the various meetings.

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<sup>1/</sup> Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 11, No. 26.

<sup>2/</sup> Report, Dec. 24, p. 30.

<sup>3/</sup> Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 11, No. 26.

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In these critics would just stop to think how their attitude is proving detrimental to the solution of this problem; how these members of the committee are laboring day and night to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion at the earliest possible day -- they would not heap undue criticism upon these people who have been entrusted with the responsibility of representing the Japanese in here.

They have done a splendid job in trying to improve our welfare. Let's not change our horse in the middle of the stream!" 1/

To consolidate its position the Daihyo Sha Kai prepared a petition which stated that the signers recognized the body as its representatives. (No informant has been able to date this petition exactly beyond agreeing that it was prepared after November 11 1). "I's" brother describes the proceedings:

"But the Army wouldn't recognize them as block representatives. So the representatives made up a petition and had all of the people in the blocks, all 18 of them, to state that he was a real representative ... Then they took the petition with all the names signed. Then they went to talk to Austin. But they didn't get any place. 2/

Lt. Col. Austin continued his vain efforts to meet with a "real negotiating committee." According to Opler he said, "Send us a real Negotiating Committee. Send us one Nisei and one Issei from each block." 3/ Eventually the Army and the Daihyo Sha Kai came to a temporary agreement and it was decided to hold a mass meeting at the outdoor stage on November 13 at which time Lt. Col. Austin and Mr. Cozzens were to speak to the assembled populace. The Daihyo Sha controlled Tulean Dispatch announced that the negotiating committee would make a report of the proceedings of the conferences at that time. 4/ Both Lt. Col. Austin and Cozzens prepared their speeches in advance. Opler, who saw Cozzens' prepared speech says that it began "It is a pleasure to talk to so many people." Then the morning of the 13th, the Daihyo Sha announced the cancellation

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1/ Ibid., No. 27.

2/ Notes, March, p. 7, See also p. 11.

3/ Ibid., p. 56.

4/ Tulean Dispatch, Nov. 11, No. 27.

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of the meeting, stating that the Army had refused to recognize their body and that they saw no necessity for a mass meeting.

"The block delegates took the stand that there was not need for the meeting, since the Army had already told them that they (the Army) would determine the size and composition of the work crews." "There is nothing to negotiate," was the stand." 1/ (B56,57)

The Committee's explanation of this refusal appears superficially to be extremely inadequate:

CENTER WIDE MASS MEETING CANCELLED

Delegates not Recognized Reports Committee

Feeling that there wasn't any necessity for mass meeting, the sixty odd block delegates present at the representatives meeting held yesterday afternoon at mess 18 voted unanimously to cancel the meeting scheduled for this afternoon at the community stage. The negotiating committee had planned to make a detailed report to the entire residents as to the proceedings of the conferences. However with the temporary termination of the negotiations with the Army officials, the committee members felt that there wasn't any report to be made to the center at such a meeting.

The committee reported to the elected delegates present that the negotiations with the Army had been cancelled because the Army did not recognize the committee as true representatives of the people. According to the committee, the Army felt that they knew how many workers were needed in each division and the WRA having worked with the Japanese should know who should work in each division.

The entire congregation expressed unanimous accord that there wasn't any necessity for negotiations if the Army had taken such an attitude. 2/

In spite of this action by the committee, the Army went ahead with its plans for the mass meeting. Soldiers marched into camp and set up the public address system. An entire company of soldiers lined itself up before the platform. The speakers arrived, mounted the platform, and prepared to deliver their addresses. Not a single Japanese arrived to hear them. Austin and Cozzens doggedly gave their speeches, but to an empty fire-break. Two good observers, Opler and Späcer were present and describe the event:

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1/ Notes, March, pp. 56,57.

2/ Ibid., November 13  
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I stayed away from the platform. But I saw that the central firebreak was crowded with people. I saw more baby carriages than I've ever seen before. It was a studied indifference, people sweeping their front stoops; - there were about ten football games going on in the firebreak. 1/

X. reporting on what Spicer told him:

Lt. Col. Austin ... arrived at the scene little before the set time with a detachment of M.P.'s. Armed guards were stationed around the stage and armored cars made a cordon around where an audience was supposed to gather. In preparing this space the M.P.'s had to clear out some kids playing football in part of the field, but the kids moved on willingly. At two o'clock no one came, and there was no sign of any one coming to hear his speech. Like an Army man true to his tradition, Austin began his speech. No one was there. Not a single soul! Lt. Col. Austin spoke to the air. There were some young girls coming along. They stopped, looked on and a few moments later moved on to resume their walks toward their destinations. There were other men who passed by while the Army officer spoke to the air, but they did not pay any attention and passed on. 'It was a pitiful sight which I cannot forget. I was there,' Spicer related with unusual emotion." 2/

This humiliation was not to be endured. The army abandoned its vain policy of negotiation and in an effort once and for all to root the leadership out of camp, began a series of wholesale arrests and internments. Martial law was declared: a strict curfew from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. was ordered. However, Kai and Kuratomi, the most important leaders, Komura, whom Opler calls Kai's messenger and bodyguard, Sugimoto and Hayashi, were not to be found. They had probably anticipate these arrests for some time. The Army concentrated on persons who they thought had been implicated in the November 4th disturbance and on Hawaiian born Japanese, reasoning that since Kai was Hawaiian born, his supporters were to be found in this group. That many of the trouble makers were Hawaiians is commonly believed by the colonists, but M., a member of the Negotiating Committee, denies this. 3/

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1/ Notes, March, p. 56, 57

2/ N's Sociological Journal, March 13, p. 6.

3/ Notes, Mar., p. 62.

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The interned persons were placed in a separate stockade, surrounded by man-proof fence and numerous watch towers.

Then, the first thing that happened, the Army started to put people in the stockade. At one time there must have been from 125 to 150. This is a small estimate. (The informant is correct when he says this is a small estimate.) In this block about six were taken. They weren't any of the block representatives, it so happened. The boys yanked from here happened to be Hawaiian born. They suspected the Hawaiians because the ringleader came from Hawaii. That was Kai. 1/

They took a person and his three roommates here. Only the roommates were just living with him. But a bachelor can't live by himself in one room. They keep taking people into the stockade. 2/

After November 14, developments entered a new phase. The stern policy of the Army was met by deadlock which even at present (April, 1944) is only partially resolved. This deadlock was termed "the status quo" by the people, and consisted of a policy of passive non-cooperation with the Army and WRA, continuing the strike, refusing to betray the leaders of the Daihyo Sha Kai, and refusing to elect a new representative group. The Army redoubled its attempts to find the leaders and the people stiffened their resolution not to give up the status quo until the interned persons were released.

The Army picked up indiscriminately anyone who came forward as a negotiator. It is rumored that some well-intentioned Issei, intent only on alleviating the unhappy situation, were summarily put in the stockade but were released soon after. Popular support of the Daihyo Sha Kai appears to have strengthened under persecution. The people criticized the Negotiating Committee for its rash acts and the severity and number of its demands, but stood solidly behind the body as its rightful representatives. Had they not elected the men themselves and had they not signed the petition stating that these men were their representatives? They could not betray them now.

The peoples' attitude toward the Daihyo Sha, their representatives,

1/ Notes, Feb., p. 11.

2/ Notes, Mar., p. 34.



is well expressed by "N":

Those fellows in the stockade -- everybody signed their names November 4th, saying these people are the true representatives! As more and more say in here, we signed our names saying these men are our representatives; it isn't right to give in. The minority group for status quo says, "If you let people out of the stockade, everything will be all right." 1/

The extraordinary power and endurance of this public support is shown by the fact that the following attitude was expressed as late as March 15.

"If these nine came out (of the stockade) I think all this status quo will just vanish into the air. If all the 125 came out, the status quo will forget everything." 2/

Akitsuki, very anti-Daihyo Sha, made the following comment on the status quo:

"Since the remaining Daihyo Shas (those not interned) were less intelligent, had no leaders, the best thing they could think of was that policy of just stubbornly sticking to the status quo." 3/

Additional evidence proving the strength of public support may be drawn from the fact that up to March, 1944, the Administration's unceasing efforts to obtain another representative body has been utterly without success.

N says:

"There has been no attempt to get new representatives for the people. That shows quite a majority of the people are backing the status quo." 4/

Kai and Kuratomi continued to direct operations from hiding. The Army called a meeting block managers and demanded that these men be given up. The men were not given up. Consequently, on November 26, the Army made a camp-wide search in which every barrack was entered. The search

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1/ Notes, March p. 11

2/ Ibid., p. 12.

3/ Ibid., p. 51.

4/ Ibid., p. 13

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was held ostensibly to look for contraband, hidden weapons, intoxicating liquor and rice from which sake could be made. WRA personnel was enlisted in this search, female teachers being required to accompany the soldiers to search women. Some complied unwillingly, but it is said that WRA chose the teachers carefully from those known to be not overly sympathetic to evacuees.<sup>1/</sup> Of the group of leaders only Sugimoto was found and picked up.

It is rumored that Kai and Kuratomi escaped this search by disguising themselves as women and that one did the family wash while the soldiers searched their barracks.

"It sure was funny. One of the Negotiating Committee was in the washing room dressed in a skirt and a bandanna, washing away, while they were looking for him. "<sup>2/</sup> (B13)

Opler says:

It was funny how the Army would rush in and find their beds still warm. They must have kept a wonderful watch and spotted anyone coming. <sup>3/</sup> (A1 9)

Best, at this time, thought that Kai and Kuratomi had escaped and were outside the project.

No informant accused the soldiers of brutality or even of discourtesy during this search.

"We had a very nice soldier come in. Some were good and some bad. The one who came here was really nice." <sup>4/</sup> A8

M. says:

"You can't criticize the Army. In Japan it would be worse. They (the U.S. Army) are lenient. The people do respect the Army more than WRA. In any country the Army is supposed to represent the whole country. (M. implied that for this reason it must be respected.) <sup>5/</sup> (B63)

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<sup>1/</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>2/</sup> Notes, Mar., p. 13.

<sup>3/</sup> Notes, Feb., p. 19.

<sup>4/</sup> Notes, Mar., p. 8.

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Opler differs and is of the opinion that the Japanese resented the Army's intrusion greatly. It is probably that his attitude is colored by personal prejudice toward the Army and by the general resentment of the WRA personnel toward the military and their desire to be rid of them. Opler stated February 2:

The simplest group will respect the Army coming in with jeeps, tanks, etc. That's a Japanese cultural trait. The smartest resent the Army and want to see it out. Generally the people feel it's safer if the Army were out provided there wouldn't be a reign of terror again." 1/ (A18)

Not the slightest corroboration to these sentiments was given by any Japanese.

Opler continues:

During the Army search it was found that one of the soldiers had taken a watch out of someone's drawer. The party yelled to the Captain. The soldier was frisked and the watch returned.

I was in headquarters when they brought <sup>in</sup> two packages of ritz crackers. They were returned. Some people had tremendous stores of sake and rice. On one apartment two of the guys (soldiers) were at odds on the whole procedure. One was throwing things around; the other was practically apologizing for it.

It was a cold morning. Some of the soldiers had sake for themselves. One kept very warm. It was rumored that the whole military camp was supposed to be drunk." 2/

You would have got venom against the Army then! (In November or December). 3/

After several weeks the tension and boredom, brought about by the complete cessation of all activities began to tell upon the people.

"Curfew hours here are 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. so we can't go out nights as we did before. Soon as I have supper I run over to Ma's and bring home rice and we eat before going to bed. They say this curfew is until things settle. The Spanish Consul is coming here again soon. So I hear there are all kinds of "dema" (wild rumors) about this camp. Right now they're taking in all the big shots. Can't hide very well until things settle." 4/ (N. 26 2 let. No. 20)

Right now curfew is in effect and martial law at the same time. No can go out from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. Anyway, there's no place to go,

1/ Notes, Feb., p. 18.

2/ Ibid., pp. 18, 19, see also Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 10, 1943.

3/ Notes, Mar., p. 59.

4/ From a letter dated Nov. 20 in X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 26, p. 2.



it's too cold (maybe sour grapes). Right now there are no movies or Engei kai or anything. Just Japanese schools in every ward. I use to go to the night school, but since the curfew I don't even study ... The Army is still in; they're delivering all the vegetables and foodstuff to the messhalls accompanied by armored cars, jeeps, peep, and lots of dumb soldier boys. Boy, those soldiers certainly get razzing from the Japs. Some even say, "Instead of fighting harmless Japs in a cage, why don't you go to the Solomons where you'll find plenty of competition." Perhaps this lett4r will be censored, if so tell me." 1/ (SN26.2.N.16)

Everything seems and looks cold and still and melancholine... Everything seems unchangeable like yesterday. The confine has not cleared out yet. No parcel and no money order can send out and every letters has examined. Three Niseis who came from Hawaii to live in this block were arrested this morning at 3 a.m. If you will not hear from for the quite few days in the near future, you must understand that I am arrested. Don't forget that it will be possible. 2/

The center is quiet as usual, but it seems to me there is something very dull but with tension among us. At the present time, none knows how long this unfortunate situation will continue. And whether Army will take control permanently or not is a big problem for people of the center and everyone is anxious to know." 3/

Several reliable informants state that the people received no vegetables except occasional beets for two months. As the dull weeks passed, the food became worse; the unemployed people missed their monthly checks and their clothing allowance which an individual does not receive unless he works or unless he goes on relief which is an extended process surrounded by red tape. Considerable criticism was vented upon the Negotiating Committee even by its supporters. Their arrogant, demanding manner was criticized, the demands were considered too numerous, some demands were called silly or fantastic. The actions of the radical fringe were condemn.

K. a supporter, said:

"I think they demanded too many things at one time." 4/ D. O.

a conservative said:

I think some of the people (Negotiating Committee) wanted power. They say 'We're working for the people ...' I believe they're

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1/ Ibid., a letter dated Nov. 16.

2/ Ibid., letter dated Nov. 20, Nov. 26, p. 1.

3/ Notes, Feb. p. 24.

4/ Report, Dec. 24, p. 12.

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working for themselves ... Maybe they really tried to bring the center better but their demands were more like orders than suggestions. 1/ A8

I., a supporter, says:

But there wasn't any representative who spoke real good English. Their terminology sounded more like a demand. It was a misunderstanding. Some allowance should be made for this lack of education in the English language. Their requests might have been couched in dictatorial terms.

Of course a lot of their requests as far as I'm concerned is purely nonsense. Some of the representatives weren't exactly the people who ought to be acting as representatives. You can understand that trouble can arise from a fanatical Kibei being a representative. 2/

"I's" brother said:

If they had had enough brains to kick aside the unreasonable requests and settle the reasonable ones, everybody would have been satisfied. 3/

N., a sympathizer says:

The Negotiating Committee stating that all the Administrative staff withdraw -- that's fantastic in my personal opinion. If I was running one of the Japanese camps and the prisoner of war tell me to resign ... I don't think the Japanese government would stand for it. 4/

Kurihara, who might be termed a neutral says:

To a great extent the Daihyo Sha Kai has distorted the facts to make people believe they are working for the good of Japan -- when to a great extent they are not. 5/

The Co-op group which is definitely unsympathetic, made the following criticisms. These must not be considered criticisms of the people.

Nobody knows who they (the Planning Board) were. Probably they were elected by pressure group methods. 6/

I can't see why they tried to destroy everything like that. To me, what they did was not constructive, just destructive.

They're chronic agitators.

They're attitude was not at all conciliatory. I think they were inexperienced in negotiating. They were running away from their

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1/ Notes, Feb., p. 8.

2/ Ibid., pp. 11, 14.

3/ Notes, Mar., p. 8.

4/ Ibid., p. 12.

5/ Ibid., p. 53

6/ Notes, Feb., p. 27  
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objective, demanding and making it impossible to grant.

They really didn't have any right to order. They were supported by everybody. Really, I don't think they were working for improvement in the center.

The most irksome and demoralizing factor which the people had to endure was the lack of money for wages and clothing allowance. Mr. Kurihara believes this was the primary cause for the eventual breaking of the strike.

"I" says:

Besides their finances were petering out. Here -- they're still paying off on October checks (statement made Feb. 1). Now these fellows who were not working got no clothing allowance, no welfare, no income. 1/

WRA which had had no intention of giving up the center at any time, and probably had not expected that the Army would take charge so thoroughly or maintain its rule so long, began a campaign to get the Army out. Five months later (April, 1944) this campaign still in progress. A vital part of this plan consisted of an attempt to organize the community, to get a body of representatives who could be dealt with on WRA terms. Several attempts were made to reestablish contact with remnants of the Negotiating Committee. But the ever growing number of arrests foiled the Administration's efforts. On one occasion the Advisory Council (function and origin of this body to be explained in preface) met with a group and the next day 80% of the group were picked up.

For the first two months the rule of the Army was extremely strict. No personnel member was allowed to enter the colony without military guard, which, in November and December, meant a big jeep and several soldiers. Later this guard was reduced to one soldier. Opler gives an account of

1/ Notes, Feb., p. 12.



Things were tight as a drum. There was no way of talking above the din of the Army. At first it was worse (military rule). You had to have jeep to get into camp. I put off a trip to my office because I had to take the Army with me. Not a little puddle jumper jeep but one of the big armored cars with a couple of soldiers. You couldn't go to see people. The Army was stern and forbidding.

Certain elements in the WRA were trying to reach the Army. How to get the Army out? The Advisory Council had meetings with the Dalhyo Sha remnants after the pickups. Unfortunately the Army picked so many -- (getting names) from former Dalhyo Sha notebooks. On one occasion we met with a group. The next week 80% of them had been picked up. 1/

Many evacuees who tried to deal with the Army independently were also picked up:

"I's" brother says:

They went to talk to Austin. But they didn't get any place. Some boys went and hollered louder. They got picked up. The loudest ones just got yanked, that's all. 2/

M. says:

The Administration promised to negotiate and talk things over (after November 4). But the search kind of mixed things up. They thought they could pull them all in and everything would be all clear. Everytime we asked for a chance to talk things over we got picked up. 3/

I says:

The people hiding out had information that was vital for maintaining peace and normalcy in the center. But if they showed their face outside they would be put in the stockade. And so, naturally, the only thing they could do was hide out. 4/

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1/ Notes, Mar., pp. 58, 59.  
2/ Ibid., p. 7.  
3/ Ibid., pp. 62, 63.  
4/ Notes, Feb., p. 14.

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