

REPORT

Rosalie Hankey
Tule Lake

December 24, 1943

Since my last report on Tule Lake I have received a letter and two lengthy and detailed reports from evacuees residing there. I was also given one of Mr. Spicer's confidential letters.

"I" is the individual who gave me such a long bitter statement before segregation. He is married and has one child. He has a Junior College education and has never been to Japan. How he managed to escape being sent to Leupp in February, I am at a loss to understand. How much a part he played in the Tule Lake trouble, I do not know, but it is obvious where his sympathies lie. He is extremely bitter against WRA and against Caucasians in general, and feels that should Japan win the war, it would be a good lesson for the conceited white race.

Comparing his well ordered narrative with the verbatim statement of the less sophisticated "K," one may find considerable evidence that "I" has toned down the picture of the activities of the agitating representatives. I am sure that neither "I" nor "K" are motivated by any loyalty to the Japanese government or to the Emperor. They want their "rights" and are willing to fight for them. Both have told me they would have been more than willing to fight in the U.S. Army if they had been given their "rights."

"K" although more naive and, I believe, more honest than "I" is more "Japanesey." He is about the same age, the late twenties, is married, and has two children. He was given ten minutes to leave Tule Lake on November 11. He carefully corrected and added additional material to his verbatim statement.

Both young men are very likeable fellows, and very able conversationalists.

This additional information on the occurrences at Tule Lake is interesting not only because of the expression of quite different points of view on the part of Mr. Spicer and my evacuee informants, but because of the confidential information I have from Mr. Brown that some of the WRA appointed staff in Tule Lake were

criminally involved in the matter of taking food from the warehouses.

I am informed that before the evacuees complained of the food being taken from the warehouses and given to the so-called loyal harvesters, an investigation had shown that the food was being taken out of the camp and sold in a nearby city. Brown says that another riot has resulted in the death of many evacuees. (Note by DST: Later shown to be unfounded rumor.) The news has not yet been released. WRA is attempting to lay the blame for the violence on the army.

Passing from this unconfirmed information to a hasty analysis of the material on hand, we see that Mr. Spicer agrees with all my evacuee informants that the immediate cause of the trouble was evacuee resentment over food being given to the loyal harvesters. So far as I have been able to discover, none of the evacuees as yet has any idea as to how justified their complaints were. Mr. Spicer states definitely that Mr. Best called in the army so there can be little question of the fact that the army entered Tule on WRA's request and did not force military protection on the Caucasian staff as it attempted to do at Gila, December 1.

Mr. Spicer appears to be of the opinion that evacuee action during the trouble was controlled by a "gang" which has been organizing steadily since October 23. He gives a complete list of their activities. 1. Posting men in each of the blocks on October 23 to try to force people to go to the public funeral. 2. Patrolling the rear of the crowd at the funeral and keeping people there. 3. Roughing up the reports officers who took pictures at the funeral. 4. Possibly breaking the windows of the housing office and the bank. 5. Possibly tampering with the beds and buildings of the truck drivers who handle transportation in connection with the harvest. 6. Intimidating people into attending the mass gathering in the Administration Building. 7. Intimidating people to leave their jobs and picking them up in trucks on Wed. to facilitate their attendance at ceremonies to honor the grandfather of the present Emperor, and 8. Attempting to prevent the trucks from moving food out of the warehouses, and attacking Mr. Best on Thursday night.

Neither of my informants give the impression that this organizing group was a gang which by intimidation forced anti-administration activities on a reluctant body of evacuees, although I believe that is Mr. Spicer's opinion. It is, of course, possible that my informants may have been members of the "gang." Nevertheless the impression of evacuee solidarity and morale which permeate "I's" and "K's" statements indicate that the young men whom Spicer calls gang leaders were considered genuine representatives by some of the evacuees. Oda's letter (p.) shows the conservative point of view. He calls the agitators "a minority."

Another point in which Mr. Spicer's account is strongly at variance with that of my informants is the general character of the demands made by the evacuees. Spicer describes them as chiefly political in character. Both "K" and "I" on the contrary, stress specific grievances affecting the daily life in the camps, the food, Dr. Pedicord, the chiseling by WRA officials. ✓

Neither of my evacuee informants give any information at all on the mass meeting which the army requested and which none of the evacuees attended. "K" however left the camp before the meeting was scheduled.

Spicer, both my informants, and Mr. Hikida who received information from friends, are agreed that the incident in which the farm truck overturned started the trouble. The best description I have so far of the difficulty is given by "K," ✓ in which he tells how the truck was driven on to the soft shoulder of a newly constructed road whereupon the driver lost his head and overturned it. "K's" remarks leave no doubt that this incident was seized upon deliberately by the evacuees to force administrative recognition of their demands. I questioned "K" as tactfully as possible on the status of these representatives. He insisted that they were genuine representatives of the people and had been selected from

✓ See pages

2 ✓ See pages

each ward. He volunteered the information that they were not pro-Japanese agitators. He added that he had little respect for people who would get up and sing the Japanese national anthem. "They ought to have more sense." "K" a very practical fellow, added at this point that he thought the representatives made too many demands. They shouldn't have hit the administration with all of these demands at once. It was poor politics. He described -- more clearly than his verbatim statement shows -- how the "representatives" needed time to get the people together and "channel their activities." But while this time was being taken, the crops were spoiling and Mr. Best decided not to allow the evacuees to hold the dead farm labor's funeral in the high school auditorium. ✓

At this point Mr. Best brought in the volunteer farm workers to do the harvesting although, according to "I," ✓ he had promised that he would not take any step of this kind without notifying the evacuees.

There was considerable feeling against these volunteers not only at Tule but also at Gila, and according to some of my informants, at Poston. In the opinion of some evacuees the "loyal" volunteers were chiefly administrative stooges, inu, who were glad of this opportunity to get ^{out of} the camps where their pro-administrative views had made them unpopular. ✓

The demands which my informants say were eventually made to Mr. Best are interesting. "K" does not state them clearly and says merely that they demanded that the widow be taken care of, that they be given porches and that the care of the latrines be improved. "I" gives a very orderly presentation: 1. The motor depot and placement office should set certain age limits to people who drive trucks and other types of vehicles within the center. 2. That the food in camp should be improved. 3. That certain officials of the WRA who were known to have been chiseling should be discharged. 4. That Dr. Pedicord, in view of his anti-

3 ✓ See "I's" description of this event, p. .

4 ✓ Oda also mentions this promise. See p. .

Japanese views and actions be discharged, that he was incompetent and negligent of his duties, that because of his refusal to grant permission for transfusions to two or three patients (transfusions which Japanese doctors had recommended) these patients had died.^{5/} The contrast of these demands compared to the picture given by Mr. Spicer is puzzling.

Faced with these demands and unable, according to "I," to give a clear explanation of what was happening to the food, Best consented to call Myer and the Spanish Consul. I do not believe that there is any doubt that Myer refused to see the representatives after he arrived, although Spicer does not describe this. Perhaps he included it in a different report. On Myer's refusal to give the committee audience, the representatives apparently decided to force the administration into recognizing them and set out to compel all Caucasians to attend the conference. How the representatives rounding up the people and told them to come to the Ad. Building "without knives or clubs" is quite naively described by "K."^{6/} When Dr. Pedicord refused to accompany the evacuees sent to fetch him to the administration building and called them names, he received his "going over." "K's" words are significant. "We are the representatives and therefore Myer will have to see us."

Dr. P.
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Myer eventually consented to see these representatives or "gang" leaders, as the case may be, and according to "I" promised that Pedicord would go and that food would not longer be taken from the warehouses. He also promised to investigate the chiseling. Unfortunately "K" who, while not so intelligent as "I" is less likely to give a biased account, was not there. I questioned him on Myer's remarks at this conference and he could remember only that Myer had given them a lot of "smooth talk."

Whether a promise to stop the removal of the food from the warehouse was

^{5/} See "K" on Dr. Pedicord, p. ^

^{6/} See p. ^

made or not, another attempt to remove food took place on November 4 and resulted in the riot after which Best called in the army. Neither of my informants stated that the evacuees intended to beat up Best at that time. Had that been their intention, I am pretty certain "K" would have given me some indication.

The statements of these two evacuee informants bear out, I believe, Mr. Spicer's conclusion that the bulk of the evacuees were following the dictates of a group of agitators. I suspect, however, that the representatives had very strong support, and I know the Tule Lake people have a great deal of morale. When I sympathized with "K" on the hardship the people of Tule were undergoing, he said, "Don't worry about them, they can take it."

Mr. Oda, who definitely disapproves of the actions of the agitators, does not accuse them of intimidation. His letter, however, is evidence of the fact that the inhabitants of Tule Lake are by no means unanimous supporters of the agitators. (Oda wrote the long article on segregation for me.)

There is no indication in either of my informants' statements that the soldiers were brutal or that they tried to start trouble. This is significant because according to Brown, WRA intends to blame the as yet unpublished trouble on the army.

unfounded
rumor

K's STATEMENT

VERBATIM STATEMENT FROM YOUNG MAN RETURNED FROM TULE LAKE -- December 7, 1943.

The man who gave me this statement went to Tule Lake from Santa Anita Assembly Center. After the October-November trouble he was notified by the authorities that he and his family must leave. Apparently he stood high in the regard of influential members of the Caucasian staff. He is married and has two children. He did not register at military registration. He is a close friend of my block manager, Ken Nishini -- had it not been for Ken's work as go-between, I doubt if I would have received so frank a story. Later he corrected and added details to the manuscript.

"I was at Santa Anita. When my mother got sick, I went to Tule Lake July 13. There I was bumming around for about a month and then started work as a garbage man, a "G" man, they call them. ^{2/} Well, after three months I got a job as a foreman.

"Then the supervisor for maintenance took me on as a key man. They kept me 'till October 15 (1943). Then they extended me to October 25. ^{3/} Then on the 25th the coal crew gets into a little trouble, and they asked me to take over the coal crew and supervise.

"I never registered. But all my family is registered. That's a long story. Like my case, I was kind of a half-way register. They were going to ask me to register before I got out of camp.

"See -- it was like this. First Lieutenant Carlo came from Washington and called two, three staff members together. First they had a meeting with the councilmen. They read the orders. It took about forty-five minutes. The Council then had a chance to ask questions, but they didn't give them enough

^{1/} Garbage men are called "G" men at Gila also.

^{2/} The informant is not considered a disloyal evacuee. He believes they kept him in Tule because they needed him.

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time. The people got the council all balled up. They didn't know how to answer the questions the people asked them. Many of the councilmen resigned. I don't blame them. WRA didn't do a good job explaining things. We have a number of wards in our camp. In each they did the same thing. The next day, well, they had one Caucasian school teacher with a Japanese helper to interpret. There they sat in each block manager's office.^{9/} Almost nobody went to register. Some resented it so much that they didn't ever burn the stoves for the school teachers. There they sat in the cold! The school teachers didn't know what to answer when they were cross-examined by the people!

That 28 question, naturally the Issei can't be loyal to this country and turn against the Emperor, because that's their country. They changed right away but ...

The Nisei figured we ought to register if they recognized us as loyal citizens. We demanded three things:

1. Their parents were to be treated like the German and Italian aliens.
 2. When we join the army we want to be treated on the same basis. The boys had received letters from a friend in the army who when he went into the mess and tried to sit in a seat some Caucasian would stick out his arm and say that the seat was taken. This happened everytime he wanted to sit down. He asked the sergeant about it and the sergeant said, "What do you expect out of you Japs?" We want equal treatment.
 3. There was a lot of propaganda against the Japanese. We said we wanted President Roosevelt to talk on the radio for more favorable attitude for the Nisei.
- The Nisei talked it over among themselves. One said, "Why don't we register and then demand?" The others said, "We want to demand, and after we're recognized, then register."

^{9/} Here Nishino asked if a soldier were not also there. The informant said No.

In the first evacuation we just went quietly into camp. Now we want the public to recognize the Nisei as loyal citizens. We made these demands because we were willing to give our lives for this country. That means we were willing to go to the front and die. We did not intend to come back. Some of the soldiers go nowadays and expect to come back. That's how the old people have always felt and we felt that way too.

In Block 42 that morning about thirty six of the young people signed a petition and turned it in to Lieutenant Carlo, or the WRA, I forget. The next day the army moved into camp and took these thirty-six people out of camp. The soldiers came into Block 42 with their machine guns. They came into the homes without knocking on the doors and picked up the boys to jail and kept them there from three to five days. After eight days they removed them into the C.C. Camp across the Lake. Three of the boys were just seventeen years old, high school students.

These boys were later given a trial and were judged according to the answers they had given on the questionnaire. Some were given a penalty which ranged from 45 to 60 days in the C.C. Camp. This included the days they had already been confined. These boys were right; the WRA didn't want to admit it. Five of the 150 boys picked up (including the signers of the petition and the Kibei-Nisei) were sent to Leupp. They were supposed to be the real agitators. When they were real agitators we didn't have much sympathy for them. After all, they are educated and not ignorant. By their foolish actions they disgraced all the other Japanese.

When they started this -- what they call Kibei-Nisei back of it. They started picking up all the Kibei-Nisei. They classified me as a Kibei-Nisei. They came after me, but I wasn't home. They came after me at work, but they couldn't locate me. They picked up my brothers in Block 5 along with 15 other Kibei. They threatened them, saying that if they did not register they'd put them

in the C.C. Camp. They had to register.

Then that day somebody came and told me at work how my brothers had been picked up and were about to be sent to the C. C. Camp and then I went and talked to my brother. He asked me to register because I have a wife and two children. But I went home and asked my wife to pack for me. I went to see Mr. Hayes, the Assistant Project Director. He was my friend. I asked his opinion. I also went to see Frank Smith, a friend of mine, and Mr. Harkness, the superintendent of the school. These three try to convince me that I'm wrong for holding out on registration and silly to ask for these resolutions. They explained the real meaning of registration. They told me that they were trying to help the Japanese out to relocate, how they can use this for a weapon against the American Legion.

So I agree I will register. But yet I asked them to vouch for me that I'm a loyal American. I was fighting against the WRA method of registration. They dropped that thing right in our laps and gave us no time to digest it.

That night I went to see Mr. Hayes again and met Major Marshall. He said registration was not going so good, so he came. So I talked to these two men to give us Nisei another chance to register on their own will. I asked them to take everyone out of the C. C. Camp and explain it. At the same time I asked them to have a mass meeting and explain to all the Nisei the same way they had explained it to me. Then they told me to come back tomorrow. The next day when I arrived with Hayes, they say, "There's no use of a mass meeting. We've had so many meetings we're supposed to understand everything." Their meaning is, they have had the representative talk to Major Marshall, but they didn't realize that the representatives were more like stooges to WRA and they didn't know what the score was anyway. Mr. Coverly had about four Japanese who represented clubs, very

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- ✓ They referred to the meeting described on page 1 .
- ✓ The representatives.

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pro-American in their ways. They didn't understand the real inside of the Japanese. Most of them can't even speak Japanese.

I told Major Marshall, "You are trying to take the words of men who are trying to sell out their own race."

We felt it wasn't right. We were fighting for some rights for the Japanese. All the Caucasian staff would like to see the Japanese spread into two different groups and fight among themselves.

That morning I called on the Project Director, Mr. Coverly, and asked him for the mass meeting. He gave me the same answer that Mr. Hayes and Major Marshall had given me. But he finally said he would talk to his Japanese associates. He said a meeting to explain matters was really not necessary because the people were coming in to register. I tried to explain that the people were coming because they had been threatened and not because they understood. I asked him to pitch in and try to understand the Japanese psychology. I explained that a lot of our parents figured the Nisei should be treated equally like other Americans, because after all, their parents have sweated to send them through school. They love this country and want to stay here. I tried to convince him from every angle. He knew he wasn't right but he wouldn't admit it.

So after he turned us down, many of us got together and decided not to register.

The October Difficulties at Tule Lake.

Well, let's start out with the farmer's accident. There were twenty or so on the truck. Everyone was injured, three critically. One died. I don't know very much about it. But I overheard a conversation by Mr. Zimmer. He said the boy was driving 30 to 35 miles an hour on the new highway built by the Marco construction company. The highway had been finished about a week before the accident happened. The driver was trying to overtake another car and his left rear tire went on a shoulder. It was too soft. The kid got excited, both tires went in and the truck turned over.

The evacuees blamed the truck driver for a long time. They blamed WRA for hiring this young truck driver. He was 17 or 18 years old.

They were going to have a funeral service for the whole camp. They asked for the use of the high school auditorium and first Mr. Best okeyed it. The next day he changed his mind. The administration said they would not allow a community funeral. But the people had it anyway on an outdoor stage. They took a chance of trouble with the army; but they did it.

The Japanese started putting up arguments, saying that the injured should be properly cared for. Then I don't know how much they demanded for the widow and children. WRA said they'd pay 60 per cent of the wages plus clothing to the widow for the duration. But the people figured this was not enough. So they'd wait till more information came from Washington.

Then at the same time they made demands for porches and for the latrines to be better taken care of and other things. They also asked for Dr. Pedicord to be taken out of the hospital. There were several other requests they threw in with the farmer's case. Until this was straightened out they didn't want to work. Most of the people were behind it. I think they demanded too many things at a time.

Then, well, WRA, Mr. Zimmer, our assistant project director, he asked all the farmers to report on the 20th of October for work. But nobody showed up. Then WRA asked them to send their representatives to meet WRA that day. At this time our representatives were not prepared to make their demands. They were trying to figure out the proper approach. They wanted to ask each block's opinion, getting their channel work done. (These representatives were selected by the people, one for each ward. There are nine blocks in each ward.) So they waited two days while they were settling in.

By that time WRA was kind of sore over the crops not being taken care of. They got excited. They looked at this as an un-American activity. They didn't want to recognize the representatives as representatives of the people. So we

asked them to send for Myer and for the Spanish Consul.

They finally got Mr. Myer. He was probably influenced by the Caucasian personnel and he said he didn't want to recognize the representatives either. So the representatives passed the word to each mess hall. They (the representatives) asked everybody to come to the Administration Building quietly, without sticks and without knives in their pockets. They wanted them to be quiet as possible. Then these representatives went in to see Mr. Myer and demanded for the meeting on the part of the people and said, "We are the representatives and therefore Myer has to see us."

But by that time the Japanese had all their plans made and they decided to get all of the Caucasians in the Administration Building. So some of the group went after Dr. Pedicord (to fetch him). He resented that and called them names. They pushed him out and kicked him. There was not much damage done to him.

Then we had all the personnel staff in the next door to Mr. Ray Best. Then the representatives started asking questions. My sister was taking shorthand notes there. I don't know very much about it. When they made some of the demands like the porch, Mr. Myer said, "You people are new here. It takes time to organize things. So until then you must be patient." It was a smooth talk he gave out.

Well, then the main trouble started by the food business. Around the end of October we saw them taking two semi-truck loads of food out of camp. The Caucasians ordered the food taken from the warehouse. The next morning the Japanese checked up on the missing items, 120 sacks of rice, 50 cases of milk, cans of corn and pineapples, flour, catsup (which we never get in the mess hall.) We didn't know where they went to. Maybe to the C.C. Camp to the loyal Japanese harvesting the crop. We're not sure. They figure it's not right for them to take the stuff out of camp.

So we asked Mr. Myer. He asked them to ask Mr. Best. Best told the boys, "It's none of your business because we haven't issued those things out to you yet

and besides we're feeding you people properly."

They dismissed the case and that was the main trouble.

The only way to stop this was to put a guard and then to watch so they wouldn't take the stuff away from the camp. That night, November 4, the semi-truck reached the warehouse. So the youngsters got excited, and started causing trouble. Some of the Japanese got beat up. Some of the Caucasians ran away from them and reported it to the army. Within 20 minutes the army was moved in. They caught ten of them around the military area, where the Caucasian staff lives. They were just innocent bystanders, and three of them were just warehouse watchmen. Then the next morning, everybody like usual, went to report to work and all the Japanese truck drivers were stopped by the guards, searched and told to go back. They said they had to go to work. The soldiers told them to go back, not to come near the place. Some of the fellows still argued and the soldiers kicked some of them. Everyone was gathering at the front of their own blocks. So the army started throwing tear gas at them and told them to go home. The Japanese got sore and tried to make fun of the soldiers by razzing them. One old Japanese man tried to go see somebody of his family who was in the hospital. He tried to reason with the M.P. at the gate. The M.P. shot two shots into the air and told him to go home. He was scared and went home.

Later on we questioned Lieutenant Colonel Austin why they shot and he said anybody who comes near the fence he will shoot him. Then we ask, "What is the line?" He said, "Your house is the line."

Then from the fifth to the sixth of November people began hollering about there not being enough coal. There was no milk. Only the seven-months-old children were getting milk through the warden's office. Children over seven-months-old were going hungry and crying. My children were crying for milk. The only person who could contact Lt. Col. Austin was Walter Tsuda, the head of Internal Security. Even the representatives can't see Austin and can't reach him.

The representatives asked Tsuda to report the shortage of milk and the coal situation.

So the morning of the 6th, Lt. Col. Austin sent for us. He asked me about the coal situation. I told him we don't have enough coal. He asked me if my men would go to work. I said we'd work, not for money, but for the benefit of the Japanese. Then the Colonel asked me how many men I had. I told him 325. Then Mr. Cozzens was taking a note. He asked me, "Are you sure these boys are willing to go to work?" I told him, "If you see kids crying for cold and wife crying about the cold house ... We are human and we don't cause any trouble."

I asked Colonel Austin, I want him to do something about the milk business and he said -- before he could answer Cozzens pops in from the side and says, "It wasn't our fault that happened." I was going to tell him off then, but for the sake of 16,000 people I kept my mouth shut.

Well, then he asked me which head Caucasian was taking charge of the coal now. I said Zimmer. The Colonel said he will contact me the next day through Mr. Zimmer.

Then the coal crew was going on smoothly under the supervision of Lieutenant Archi and his D Company. And well, then on the afternoon of the 8th, I was going to take the second shift to work and the lieutenant came over to me and told me there was trouble about the coal business because the soldiers had found two Japanese boys by the warehouse and took the boys to WRA who questioned them and found they are sneaking onto the military area. So WRA raises fuss with the army, saying the army had been careless to let the boys sneak in. The lieutenant explained to me that from now on the army would have to be strict with the coal crew. All its members would have to be passed on. (Before this they had been easy on us and had just counted us.) So Lieutenant Archie said from now on all the coal crew have to go through F.B.I. record. Instead of we sending the men, they are going to pick the men out for us.

So I asked the lieutenant for the sake of Japanese favoritism -- I ask him to fight for us. We are harmless and want to be treated equally. If F.B.I.

pick me out, that means favoritism. We'd get back to the same system. We don't want soldiers with bayonets to watch workers.

He said it would take time and he would let me know. That day, the Spanish consul was there having a meeting. The Spanish consul asked me to explain the coal situation. I told him Lieutenant Colonel Austin's statement. He said he'd try to straighten the thing^{out} for us.

The next morning, on the 9, I was waiting for their answer and soldiers came with a truck and one Caucasian school teacher and asked me to pack my things and leave in ten minutes. I went to see Lieutenant Archie because I am the only man in camp using my truck and I didn't want him to think a saboteur was going on. I had trouble with the car that night. I had had to cut the windshield wiper and use it as a pipe to blow the dust out of the tank. I reported that to the lieutenant and left. That was the last thing I did.

This thing burns me up. My trip here was good. But at Reno the girl didn't know I was a Japanese. She said I was crazy to take the route through Boulder City to Phoenix. Why not go from Las Vegas to Phoenix straight? She told me it was only an eight-hour ride. This way it takes two days. But the idea of me not taking the route is if I take it I have to go through California thirty minutes. But to obey army orders I had to route my trip the long way.

ON DR. PEDICORD

Dr. Pedicord was taking over after Dr. Carson left. Many of the medical corps came in the summer of 1942. Well, since he got in he's made everything impossible for the Japanese doctors and the hospital staff to run the place; so all the people signed a petition and tried to get rid of him. During this time Dr. Coverly was head director. He said, "You evacuees have no right to sign a petition to throw out a member of the Caucasian personnel who has been appointed through the civil service act."

So ever since then, Dr. Pedicord hates the Japs more and more. He reduced the ambulances from seven to four, and on Sunday just one ambulance to save gas. According to the pharmacist he hasn't ordered enough medicine or hospital equipment. Like he hired too many Caucasian quacks. He caused one case of stillbirth by a Caucasian giving too strong serum. One case a five-year-old child sat in some hot boiling water and burned its rear. They took it to the hospital. They didn't take proper care and they didn't take any care till seven in the morning when it was treated by a Japanese doctor. The child got no treatment from eleven at night until seven in the morning. Those burns weren't bad enough to kill a person.

Another thing, when it came to cutting the people down, the hospital was the first place to cut. They cut so hard they made it impossible to run the place. A lot of nurses aides were paid by the evacuees.

The nurses are just like heads of each section, acting as section heads. They are giving orders to the evacuee doctors. (Caucasian nurses giving orders to evacuee doctors.) They even gave orders to an evacuee doctor who had a license to practice in California.

The people resented Pedicord's cutting the baby food down. They had a lot in the warehouse and they didn't issue it.

After I left I got a letter from my sister. Some of the loyal people left in Tule Lake, 2,000 of them, were taken out. They were given five hours notice to get out of there. One person in Block 5 stayed. He had a two-months-old child. They gave him only five hours notice to pack. All the people helped, dragging things out and throwing them into apple boxes and lettuce crates. They were dumped in Minidoka.

(I inquired about the stores current in Gila that the Kibei had stopped Nisei social functions.)

It's true that the Kibei were mean to the Nisei. Not all though. A few would crash dances. They had no tickets and when they were not let in they'd crash and say, "You guys better wait. We don't want Americans dancing in camp."

The soldiers never fired machine guns. There were only two shots fired. They shot blanks many times.

When I was on the coal crew the soldiers had spotlights on us from the tower. This would blind the truck drivers. We asked them to stop but they kept on. The fellows started calling them names. One fellow from Gila yelled, "Shiroi inu," and it looked like there was going to be trouble.

The warden came over and asked me to quiet the boys down. If I can't, they are going to take the matter into their own hands. I asked him to take me over to the lieutenant to see him. Before I got there the head of Internal Security and Smith got hold of me and asked me. I told about it. Internal Security and Smith said, "It happened to us." "You fellows must be right." So they stopped.

But every new guard did the same thing. One night I went directly to the post and asked them to stop it. They could have shot me. That showed that the Tule Lake guards were very understanding. Their Commanding Officer had been trained right.

During the riot they used to bring in the food with an escort of two jeeps, two semi-trucks, and four, five trucks. Twelve soldiers escorted the food trucks. That was a comical sight. Like the old Chicago gangster days.

The Administration here in Gila is nothing but a bunch of Okies. In Tule Lake they are gentlemen. Here the Japs are no good either. "That's what everybody says who comes here," agreed Nishino, my block manager.

Rosalie Hankey
Tule Lake

REPORT

December 24, 1943

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The Japanese aren't ignorant. They're just like a bird in a cage.
Even the ignorant ones know that.

Maybe in Tule Lake we went too far. Even many of the Japanese have
resentment against us.

Rosalie Hankey
Tule Lake

REPORT

December 24, 1943

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I's STATEMENT:

November 18, 1943

Dear -----:

After a long, long period of self-imposed inactivity, I finally rouse myself long enough to write to this belated letter. Believe it or not you are the person to have the very dubious honor of being the first to receive a letter from me since my departure from Gila.

I am certainly gratified to hear that whatever information I may have given you has been of some aid in your work.

To quote you in part, "Much has happened in Tule." I suppose you must have read something about the ruckus we had out here last month. However, I'm quite sure that the versions given by the tabloids weren't quite accurate about the actual happenings.

To be absolutely truthful about it -- the whole incident had its beginning in an unfortunate motor accident in which 29 or 30 persons were injured, and which subsequently caused the death of one of the injured party. I say the accident was unfortunate, not in the sense of the injured or deceased parties, but because it could have been prevented so easily had there been a little more care exercised in the primary choice of its driver. As it came out after the accident, the driver was found to be far too youthful and reckless to have been assigned to a truck transporting agricultural workers to and from the camp to the fields.

To continue -- the accident gave the rest of the farm workers a bad case of the jitters, so they in turn refused to go back to work unless they were assured of safe transportation and also of adequate compensation in the event of injuries or etc.

The office then published in the local paper that the "Compensation Law" that governs government employees was applicable in this instance, and that the widow and the son of the before-mentioned deceased was entitled to the grand sum of 60 per cent of whatever he was making in a month. Namely, 60 per cent of the

kingly wage of 16 big dollars. Now all this time, funeral arrangements were going on, and it was decided that in view of the circumstances under which the man met his end, that it would be most appropriate if everyone were to contribute some small sum and also to hold services in the High School gymnasium.

The committee forthwith went to Mr. Best, our (beloved?) director to request the use of the gym for said purpose. Mr. Best, in view of the fact that the crops were yet to be got in and that the farmers had not as yet returned to work, saw fit to refuse the request of said committee. (This, as you can see, was the act that sowed the seed for what was to come later.) Anyhow, being defeated in their purpose, the services were held at the out-door pavilion on a windy cold, raw, day. Then came the breeze that heralded the storm: The committee decided to request that (1) the motor depot and placement office set certain age limits to people who drive trucks and other types of vehicles within the center. (2) That the food in camp be improved. (3) That certain officials of the WRA who were known to have been chiseling be discharged. (4) That Dr. Pedicord, the Chief Medical Officer, in view of his anti-Japanese views and actions, be discharged. That he was incompetent and negligent of his duties. That because of his refusal to grant permission for transfusions to two or three patients in the past (a Japanese doctor had recommended transfusions) these patients all died.

It might be a good idea to inform you that in the light of all this -- Mr. Best consented to discuss matters with Mr. Myer.

Previous to all this, Mr. Best gave word that any action he decided to take to harvest the crops in the fields would first be made public to the evacuees and the evacuee farmers. However, with no notification whatever he had brought in about 90 or 100 "yes-yes" Japanese to take over the harvesting. These workers were being fed from the Project warehouse from which food was being taken out at all hours of the night and day. This led the evacuees to believe that they were being done out of a goodly portion of their food. (Subsequent investigation upheld this belief.) The project hog farm was killing and butchering hogs on

a large scale but no pork appeared on the table. (We've not had pork chops yet.)

All this and more, the committee put before Mr. Best.

This individual as it turned out, couldn't give a clear explanation of what the goings on were about as concerns the departure of food from the P. Warehouses at night or of what or where the ultimate destination of said Project grown hogs may be. But he conceded one point.

To let the committee put all this before Myer on the latter's arrival.

Finally, Mr. Myer arrived. The committee went to see him but was refused audience. Then it was that a group went to ask Dr. Pedicord to come out and join the conference that they (the Committee) felt must ultimately result. Dr. Pedicord instead of acquiescing refused and struck one of the group whereupon the others just took him in tow and swarmed to the Ad. building out of sheer curiosity. (There's your frenzied, blood-thirsty "mob" of Japs.)

Mr. Myer and Mr. Best thought it best under the circumstances to talk with the committee.

In this talk Myer backed up Best as to the latter's ability to run this center but both promised that Dr. Pedicord and his sympathetic Caucasian staff would "go". Both of them also promised that "hereafter there will be no more food taken from the warehouses at night." With those promises and the promise to investigate the matters about chiseling and the mysterious how-come of the transformation of a shipment of beef allotted to this camp into muttons or lamb on its arrival, the "demonstration" ended. A few nights later a truck drew up to one of the warehouses and demanded the watchmen (Japanese) to open up. They refused -- result: a couple of cracked heads and martial law.

I'd like to go on and on but let me save some for next time. In the meantime, if you so feel, when you see Bennett (dear Bennett) upon some occasion, would you be so good as to inform him that 2 eggs a couple of times a week is hardly enough to fortify the "poor" "dumb" Japs for the hardships and rigors of relocation.

Rosalie Hankey
Tule Lake

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You might suggest to him that although the expenses would amount a great deal he could try giving the people a shot of adrenalin (he could stand one too, I'm sure) or if not that, tell him to try slipping some cocaine or morphine into those eggs.--??

Sincerely,

P.S. Almost forgot -- received your candy this A.M. Haven't tasted anything like it in the last two years. Boy, it really tastes like Xmas with a capital X.

Please remember you can use the contents of this letter in whatever manner you see fit ----

If some parts are not quite coherent, you'll have to "excuse it, please" --- my pen gets ahead of my mind.

P.P.S. My wife is also eating the chocolates so --- no cracks. She sends thanks and her best. We all wish you a Merry Xmas.

Rosalie Hankey
Tule Lake

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Dear Miss Hankey,

Dec. 3, 1943

Thanks for the most cheerful letter. I really enjoyed it very much. I can imagine that you must have had a terrible time hunting an iron for us. We are very grateful for your kindness.

I am terribly sorry to have delayed in informing you of our arrival and life in Tule Lake. I was going to write as soon as we arrived here but the sudden change of climate sent me to bed.

I was elected as Block Manager end of October and I assumed my duty on November 5. Right after I took over the office, the present trouble was started. Ever since I am having quite a busy time, day after day. One day while I was writing a letter to you at my office, a little case came up in our Block which took me about ten days to straighten up.

Perhaps you have heard that we are having the most difficult time ever since that serious fatal farm accident. One night a warden spotted some Caucasians entering the warehouse. During the resulting investigating, quarrel broke out between the young men who had accompanied the wardens, and the Caucasian. In previous conference with WRA they had promised that in case any food was to be taken out of the warehouse, they would do so openly. However, this promise was not carried out. That same night army went into action to maintain order and later took over the control of the entire center.

To tell the truth, I really do not know what the matter is and what they are really holding against each other. The center is quite as usual, but it seems to me there is something very dull but with tension among us. At the present time, none knows how long this unfortunate situation will continue. And whether army will take control permanently or not is a big problem for people of the center and everyone is anxious to know.

As you know, I came here with the most strongly determined mind to make this center better than any other Relocation Center spiritually and morally. I

Rosalie Hankey
Tule Lake

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hoped that people in here would have the same thoughts and decisions. But now I found out that there is misunderstanding among us. A minority does the most foolish things without any consideration and does not know what will happen and influence the rest of the decent people. I am deeply disappointed.

We are in here as disloyal and repatriators and personally as long as I live in the U.S. under the government authority I respect the laws and shall obey. I believe if we desire to go back to the Orient we should act a little more like gentlemen. It is most discouraging to see our young excited people act as though without paying any attention to the laws.

Sincerely yours,

Yutaka Oda

SPICER'S LETTER

Sunday, Nov. 14, 1943

Dear John,

The parts fall gradually into place. Here is how I size it up at the moment. (See the outline sequence of events which we are sending in tomorrow for a brief narrative account of the significant happenings.)

The immediate cause of the violence Thursday night that brought the army in was conflict over the relation of the outside evacuees brought in for harvest to the Tule Lake people. There was resentment over the fact that food had been taken out of the warehouse to supply the harvesters. Some of the evacuees at the motor pool on Thursday thought that trucks which were wanted to transport harvesters were to be used to carry more food to the harvesters. The motor pool workers refused to give the keys for these trucks. Meanwhile a bunch of young fellows gathered in the warehouse area to try to prevent any removal of food. The leaders, Kuratomi's group, told the people that Best had promised not to move any more food out without informing the Tule Lake evacuees. This was untrue, but the statement was used to inflame the young fellows against Best when they heard from the motor pool workers that some trucks had been asked for. The gang of young fellows collected first at the warehouses and then also in the vicinity of the motor pool which is in the administrative residence area. At both places they were spotted by Internal Security men. Meanwhile Zimmer had gotten the keys for the trucks at the motor pool and the trucks were being taken out. It looked to the gang as if their plan to stop the trucks had been scotched and they then went wild and made a desperate effort to get Best. (Frankly, I am rather doubtful that they had any plan to "kidnap" him, as is generally believed here and which Cahn believes. The evidence looks to me as though they did probably try to get him to beat him perhaps. He was there by the motor pool and had participated with Zimmer and Cahn in getting the keys for the trucks. The gang had been inflamed

against him by Kuratomi for many days and here was their chance to beat him up. Anyway whatever their real intentions, they went after him and that plan was also broken up by Internal Security men and ultimately by Best's calling in the Army.) The main point in connection with this whole incident is that feeling against the outside harvest-workers set it off.

The gang that operated on Thursday night had been operating all through the week and since at least the time of the funeral for the Topaz farm-worker on October 23. The leader who headed them Thursday night was the same one who headed the young fellows who patrolled the crowd on Monday afternoon. They had been getting organized steadily since Oct. 23. Some of their activities have been (1) the posting of men in each of the blocks on October 23 to try to force people to go to the public funeral; (2) patrolling the rear of the crowd at the funeral, keeping people there; (3) roughing up the Reports officer when he took pictures at the funeral; (4) probably breaking the windows of the housing office and bank (although it is not really known who did this); (5) possibly tampering with the beds and belongs of the truck drivers who were hired from outside to handle the transportation in connection with the farm harvest (this too is a doubtful point); (6) intimidating people into attending the Monday afternoon gathering at the Ad. Building and patrolling the people in the crowd through the afternoon; (7) intimidating people to leave their jobs and picking them up in trucks on Wednesday morning Nov. 3 to attend the commemoration ceremonies for the grandfather of the present Emperor; and (8) the attempt to prevent the trucks from moving food out of the warehouses and the attack on Best Thursday night. The leader was a former warden. They were mostly young men and there was a strong nucleus of Hawaiian Kibei from Topaz.

This gang has operated very much as did the one which put in motion the Poston strike. Operating in every block, intimidating people by marching about and threatening beatings, they have aimed at whipping the whole center into line

and creating what would look like mass actions. The same sort of goon squad techniques were used in Poston at the beginning of the general strike. I feel however, that there has been a closer relationship between the goons here and the leaders like Kuratomi than there ever was between the Poston goons and the men who emerged as the effective leaders of the strike there. I think the leaders here, having tactics through the Santa Anita, Poston, and Manzanar incidents, have utilized the goons consciously and more systematically than leaders did elsewhere. (Maybe I'm wrong, but the Monday incident suggests that.) However, on Thursday night the goons probably got off the beam as defined by the leaders, their anger and frustration getting the better of them. The leaders probably had difficulty in controlling them after Monday's success.

The leadership has developed steadily since the farm strike. It had not crystallized at all during the coal troubles. But Kuratomi and Kai of Jerome especially had been sizing up the Tule Lake situation from the minute they came in. They learned the current gripes quickly, and according to Opler, had a good grasp of the foci of dissatisfaction by the time the farm trouble started. The basic political feature of the program, as it emerges from the conferences with Best and the Spanish Consul, was the clarification of the segregants' status. They wanted status for all segregants as Japanese nations. (They discussed with the Spanish Consul the possibility of taking up the question with the Japanese government of making the Tule Lake Nisei Japanese citizens.) Their line to the residents was necessity for such clarification in order to have security for the future. They urged that all persons in Tule Lake should legally be given a definite and the same status. They wanted further segregation, if necessary, namely the placement in a separate camp of all persons who although not loyal to the United States do not want to return to Japan. They worked out a program of Japanization of Tule Lake residents, emphasizing the Japanese language schools, organizing the Meiji Setsu Commemoration ceremonies, and probably numerous other things that we don't know about yet. A radio broadcasting set had been operating

for some time, as you know, in one of the apartments -- for the purpose of broadcasting throughout the center records of Japanese music. (It was not strong enough to reach more than a few miles beyond the center.)

This leadership was also determined to have self-government, that is, a central governing body of evacuees. This proposal was made in the conference with Best on October 26. The leadership was evidently dominated by people from other centers -- Kai of Jerome working on the Japanese nationalistic aspects of the program, Kuratomi working especially on evacuee-administration relationships and the political organization, and Sugimoto of Poston making a careful study of the mess situation to locate the weak points and develop systematic complaints. Mori of Ht. Mt. was also in on the organization, as were Hiyashi and others of Jerome. Kuratomi dominated the strategy of relations with the administration. He early (see McVoy's letter) conceived a sharp dislike of Best. In every meeting he rubbed Best the wrong way, as he seems to have affected all other members of the administrative staff. Anything that he said sounded like a demand to Best. It was probably a sure thing from the start that they could never have gotten together on any point.

In understanding this leadership, we have to remember that it was composed of persons who had been minority leaders in other centers. Sugimoto of Poston is a good example. He had been in high places at the beginning of the strike last year. Gradually he was eased out of his high spot because he would work neither with administration or the developing cooperative evacuee leadership. As the months went on, he became an opposition leader until by the time of segregation he was wholly without influence. These minority leaders with a good deal of experience in center politics got together as soon as they reached Tule Lake and began to develop plans for dominating the majority here with their program and leadership.

Up to the entrance of the army they utilized the goon oboys to effect their domination. The situation is probably changing sharply at the moment.

Just before the army moved in, the WRA had taken away the mimeograph machine used to publish the Dispatch, after the evacuees had issued the Nov. 4 number with its exhortation to residents to act like Japanese. The Army after it came in gave the mimeograph machine back. We learned yesterday afternoon that 5 more issues of the Dispatch were brought out under the management of the Kuratomi leadership. (The Army went in and removed the mimeograph machine and the remaining copies of the Dispatch yesterday afternoon.) These issues of the Dispatch indicate that there is plenty of criticism of the leaders and that they are feeling it since the army moved in. They have been on the spot for not publishing details of the incident which led to the entrance of the army. When they finally did publish an account it was described as a breach of faith by Best in sending out food to the harvesters which brought the incident about. They played the whole thing down and by no means gave the truth. They are evidently feeling themselves in a precarious position just now.

However, their leadership held good up through yesterday afternoon. They persuaded the block delegates to vote against complying with the army's request for a mass meeting yesterday afternoon. Col. Austin and Mr. Cozzens were to address the mass meeting. The block delegates took the stand that there was no need for the meeting, since the Army had already told them that they (the army) would determine the size and composition of work crews. "There is nothing to negotiate" -- was the stand. Therefore in the last issue of the Dispatch just before the meeting scheduled by the army, an announcement of the cancellation of the meeting was published. As a result not a soul turned out for the meeting. We went in with a contingent of soldiers and exactly on schedule at 2 P.M. Col. Austin and Mr. Cozzens gave their speeches, but it was to an empty fire-break. People went on about what they were doing when the soldiers came in -- playing basketball or football, sitting on their porches, strolling about. Only the circle of soldiers gathered around the speaker's platform. It was immediately after that the army went in and took out the mimeograph machine.

The army's next move seems to be to step in and take out the leadership,
With best wishes, As ever,