

W. I. Thomas on His Study of Jewish People

W.I.:

his
How/study of the Jewish started.

In 1918 went to New York to study immigrants.

There are two types of Jews.

Ashkanadic (90 per cent of the Jews)

Safardic (the aristocratic Jews)

It was a critical period in immigration due to
flood of immigrants, whose assimilation was
considered questionable.

Three possible groups I could have studied:

1. Italians
2. Poles
3. Jews

There were more Jews in New York alone than any
other country in Europe, except Russia.

1½ million in New York.

3 million in United States.

14 million in the world.

7 or 8 million in Russia and Poland.

Immigration was closed except to quota.

Jews are very opportunistic, are exploratory.

Jews in New York were very green when they first
arrived.

Abraham Kahn started a Yiddish newspaper.

Ran 15 years until 1906.

Introduced the B_____ column.

They are letter asking for information--I call them
trouble letters.

People were encouraged to write about themselves.

The approach of the study

I decided to study them from the standpoint of
"definition of the situation."

You have to make up your mind about a thing before
acting.

15,000 letters have been printed to date.

I learned to read Yiddish in about three weeks.

I use the material to analyze how the editor in
his answer defines the situation--how he at-
tempts to regulate social life.

Also, what situations arise to be defined.

Examples

1. Opportunism

Request for medical care.

Desire to sell her own hair to send money to
parents.

2. Mobility

Seeking of relatives is common.

Example of "Stony Heart"

Example of the "All-right-nich"

One who is doing well, but who moves out
of the Jewish community and participates
little in Jewish community affairs.

Editor can be considered a secular rabbi.

Gives advice.

Among immigrants usually pay envelope is handed to the wife. It is hard to make ends meet.

3. Unsocial Wish

Jews often desire justification for action.

An "Allrighter" with a blind wife wants to know whether he should take his wife's advice and get a divorce.

A boy meets a girl, who becomes sick with T.B. Wants to marry someone else.

A man falls in love with a friend's girl.

4. The Generations

Jewish patriarchs follow ritualistic observances.

In America children have changed. Complete harmony in the home cannot be expected.

Greatest obstacle--kosher kitchen.

Often children and parents cannot live in the same house.

The community complains if they live separately.

Example: Parent not satisfied with Jewishness of children.

Editor's note: In old country the struggle between old and young went on. But the parent had the power. Here bitterness is not necessary. The power is in the hands of the son.

5. Community Participation

Community concern over members of the community.

They take care of each other to see that
no one starves--mutual aid.

Community pressure.

Over-participation--gossip, meddling.

3.00 p.m.

Jews are not always racing for wealth. Happiness often depends on your claim (ambition.).

"Poison Tongue"

Effective as a means of social control.

Prejudice of Jew against Jew, especially
from different countries.

Rumanian Jew considered the lowest.

Example of community sentiment:

~~Example~~ Italian boys who marry a Jewish
girl. Often circumcized and given
Jewish teachings.

Editor is strongly against mixed marriages.

Prospect of conflict of two worlds.

Exception is with those who are both
cultured.

6. Family Life

Kinship mad

Permanent or long-continued anger.

Yenti A wife who is always scolding.

Karger A miser

Exure A stubborn man who won't change his
mind.

Schleiger One who won't talk.

Kanipal Keeper Hides a small bundle of money.

_____ A jealous person.

Gambler

Men never went through a period of chivalry .

Both men and women tend to be coarse.

Men are often preoccupied with their
work.

7. General Remarks

of
The great contrast ~~xxx~~ the generous indi-
vidual and the "Stony Heart."

Thriving in spite of self-imposed handicaps.

E.g. Succeeding in business in spite of
Talmudic learning, which is memory work.

Why do people print about people close to
them so harshly?

Indirect communication seems to be
acceptable.

Discussion

F.M. commented that the material that we had dif-
ferred from those presented by W.I. in that the material
that we had was concerned largely with "historical"
events, such as strikes, whereas W.I.'s material

po portrayed intimate family life. Frank was concerned about the part played by the more intimate, and what we might call the more trivial, aspects of community life in the major incidents affecting the community. Frank's question was not answered to his satisfaction.

Comments

The material presented by W.I. today was in many respects different from the work being done in the centers by the Study workers. The discussion did not bring out all of the similarities and differences. Two points of difference, however, were noted. The first was in the way in which W.I. intended to organize the material. His section headings indicated something of his method of organization. The use of the concept of "defining the situation" was also brought out by W.I.

The other point of difference indicated by F.M.'s question was the nature of the material. He said that the material that we had was concerned largely with "historical" events, such as strikes. He thought that there was a connection between the intimate family life, portrayed by W.I.'s material, and these major social trends. Frank was concerned with the part played by the more intimate and what we might call the more trivial aspects of community life and the major incidents affecting the community. Frank's question was actually not answered to his satisfaction.

I attempted to give my point of view which I thought answered Frank's question, but did not receive much support. I made the statement that the family life of an individual--

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say a leader or a worker--who participated in an event might give the answer to his question. Dorothy objected that I was getting into the field of psychology and individual motivation.

Frank's problem is one of attempting to drive the analysis of social trends down to the level of the individual, which he says, is usually not done by historical writers. This, it seems to me, is where history, anthropology, and sociology have all tended to be too narrow in its outlook. They have ~~tended~~ tended to explain phenomena in terms of events, culture, and institutional behavior pattern, and have reserved little place for the individual. The concept of residents v.s. the administration, for instance, does not explain the difference in attitude among both residents and administrative staff members and the changes that take place in their attitudes toward each other. The sum total of their attitude toward each other should be analyzed in terms of individual attitudes and the interaction of these individuals.

Dorothy mentioned that no matter what person was placed in the position of project director the result was generally about the same so that individual factors could be largely discounted. I would counter with the assertion that the attitude of one man, especially the project director, can make a great deal of difference in the attitude of certain residents toward him. Best and Robertson are good contrasts. The attitude of the stern father strongly affects the per-

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sonality of the child, etc. The project situation imposes serious limitations on the extent of benevolence that a director can show the residents, but it can be shown that he still has opportunities to affect a given situation through his ability to comprehend the evacuees, his philosophy of government, race prejudice, etc., which go to make for individual differences.

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Togo Tanaka on JACL Files and Report

TT: "I've listed material I've already seen. To be a basis for a history of the JACL from the beginning. The files here are disorganized. Record of conventions are available. How important are they?"

DS: For the organizational picture only.

TT: There are no complete history of the JACL, according to Yatabe and Kido. The only history is by Mike Masaoka, dated April 22, 1944, written at Shelby. Some of the dates are not all accurate.

DS: Will you explain the JACL briefly?

TT: What I thought JACL was different from what it actually was. Kido says that it was never political, as I thought it was. He says it^{is} fraternal and education.

RN: But from 1929 on they were involved in city politics.

TT: But that's their claim. At the time of evacuation they played the role of leader. They went on record in February, 1942, that they would be in "constructive cooperation" with DeWitt's proclamation.

EM: Before evacuation JACL was a relative weak organization. After evacuation it was the only body in office.

TT: Mike Masaoka feels that they were unprepared to meet the evacuation and that if they had had the endowment fund of \$100,000 that they had planned, things would have been different. Let me give part of the history that Mike wrote.

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F.M: For what purpose is Togo making the study?

DS: For the camp situation we have material on the JACL. We should have the history of the organization. Their part in the relocation program should also be investigated.

TT: The records are not clear as to the beginning of the JACL. The first group to organize the JACL met in San Francisco in 1918--a group of five business and professional people. Their purpose was to start a discussion group of citizens with no well-defined aims. According to Mike, the average age of the Nisei was 5-10 years. This group seems to have died out with accomplishing much.

Several years later the next appearance is ~~the~~ ^{at} Fresno, where Thomas T. Yatabe, a dentist, ~~in~~ became the first president in 1921 (or 1923). This was planned as a state-wide organization. It was called the American Loyalty League. The story of this is like the first group, chapter after chapter closed and only the Fresno chapter remained.

In Seattle the Seattle Progressive Citizens League was organized by Clarence Arai in 1929.

FM: There was also an organization in 1921 or 23 which was organized to help people who were hit by the anti-alien land laws.

TT: Was it close to the Japanese Association?

FM: Yes

TT: I find that the two often cannot be separated.

The first biennial meeting of the Japanese American

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Citizens League was held in Seattle in 1930. Notice that JapaneseAmerican is written as one word. Mike writes that there was no hyphen between Japanese and American. (Reads statement by Mike.) That convention organized the national JACL. They put the cart before the horse. They set up a national organization, and then went out and organized the local chapters.

The purpose of the organization was educational and fraternal.

RN: I remember that I took part in mass meetings to set up chapters in 1929. The older people had ulterior motives in setting up this organization. There were many laws barring aliens from activities. They wanted a strong organization of citizens among the Japanese.

DS: It was tied up with land-ownership, too.

TT: A resolution was passed in favor of supporting the Cable Act.

RN: Isn't that the first example of effort to influence the American Government. Until then they approached the Japanese Government first.

TT: Although this was a national JACL, there was no real coordination between the local chapters, except that they had the same objectives. You get ~~xxx~~ different names. After the 1930 convention there were 7 local chapters.

RN: These sprung up independently in each locality and was supported by the older people.

TT: It was ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ not a movement of citizens,

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but was supported by aliens. The telegrams on the Cable Act shows the lack of coordination among the various chapters. The headquarter was in San Francisco or Seattle, but the reply went through the Los Angeles chapter from Sumi Sugi to the chapter head.

DS: Who is Sumi Sugi.

RN: She's a friend of mine. She was born in Los Angeles. About 38, graduated from UCLA with a teaching certificate, but could not find a job. The JACL thought that it was a good idea to send a girl. She's a tiny girl, with the facial expression of a Japanese doll.

TT: Here's a letter from Suma Sugi to Saburo Kido. ~~xx~~
(Reads letter on the raising of funds to send delegates to Washington to help on the Cable Bill.) There's indication of cooperation with the Chinese American Alliance League on the bill.

RN: The Los Angeles chapter was run by the Hiawaiian group. They were instrumental in forming this chapter.

FM: Their relationship with the Japana-America Society-- in Seattle the Japan Society, the business people who got together for cultural and social purposes, was invited to the conference held in Seattle.

RN: The leaders were largely lawyers ^{who} ~~and~~ were interested in influencing the city judges and officials and worked hard for their election.

TT: In the 1930's the activities of the JACL in California was concentrated on the fishing bills.

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RN: In 1930 Nisei supported a councilman.

TT: I asked Saburo Kido for the minutes of the chapters, but Kido says that he doesn't know whether they exist or not. From 1939-40 I have correspondence with Walter Tsukamoto, who was lobbyist for the fishing bill, and he was also involved in getting votes.

RN: Wakayama comes in here, too. This tie-up is very important.

....

RN: We're interested in the role that the JACL played in the whole Japanese society rather than in the history of the structure.

DS: I agree. The structural history is not too important.

RN: Charles Yoshii's name is here. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ He is the main commentator for Radio Tokyo.

TT: Goro Murata is the editor for the Japan Advertiser, and he was active in organizing the JACL. I'm interested in a man like George Nakamoto. Through the Rafu Shimpo he campaigned seriously to do away with dual citizenship. He and repatriated, ~~xxx~~ return to Japan. His correspondence states that he was fighting the Nationality Act which required Nisei to return to America to retain their citizenship. Where does that place him?

RN: It shows that he was an opportunist.

FM: That's right.

RN: They could avoid going into the Japanese Army

by repatriating.

TT: But he was over weight for the Army.

W WI: Don't ~~things~~ think that being for America and defending Japanese interests is good behavior.

DS: They ~~fell~~ down at the time of evacuation because they felt that they couldn't defend Japanese interests. They swallowed the American propaganda that they should show patriotism by evacuating. JACL swallowed it.

TT. I doubt that. The letter that got JACL to acquiesce stated that they were going to be dumped out in 24 hours if they didn't ~~co~~operate. Bendettson said that there two plans: constructive cooperation and being dumped out.

Up to 1941 the history can be pretty well compressed-- as an independent organization that played a role in the community which was secondary to the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and the Japanese Association. It was a loosely organized league of little clubs.

RN: The main event was the annual dance.

TT: Even in Mike's report only a few pages are devoted to the period prior to 1941. After 1941 it increased its membership and reached its climax in activities.

DS: To what extent did Isseis support the JACL after the war.

RN: They encouraged their joining, and ran to it for help.

TT: The JACL earned the reputation for being inu among Isseis, in Brawley, for instance.

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RN: Prior to the war JACL window-dressed for the purpose of the Isseis.

TT: Perhaps. You can't keep JACL separate from the Central Japanese Association and others.

FM: Japanese attacked Manchuria in 1931. Any results?

TT: It appears in the Pacific Citizen. The JACL and individuals identified themselves pretty clearly with the pro-Japn stand and some remained a little aloof, but(agræed) with a "bandit-rid China." There's a leaning later in 1937 towards neutrality. In rural Japanese you get this intense effort to get comfort bags out.

DS: That's why the Army is so suspicious. We were told that at the Presidio.

TT: The national organization is only a name and title and had no control over the local chapters. There is no agreement on the Pacific issue.

FM: Do you find that the editor takes a pro-Japan stand in the Sino-Japan war and still takes a patriotic stand towards the United States.

TT: That's the stand of most Nisei.

RN: JACL was the apologist for Japan.

FM: One other question, do you see any stand taken on labor issues? James Sakamoto and JACL was constantly Republican in stand.

TT: In the Los Angeles chapter they have been Republican politically and anti-labor.

FM: I think that's important to bring up. They have

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with which
no tradition/to defend themselves against such a thing as
the evacuation. Their stand is defensive.

DS: The Japanese have always been very conservative.
Even now there's hesitation to join the labor unions.

TT: On what the JACL has done Mike M.'s statement is
the best statement, according to Saburo Kido. (Reads state-
ment. JACL is strictly a service organization.)

DS: How wide-spread were the segregated schools.

TT: They had it in El Monte.

RN: In Terminal Island it was....accidental.

DS: Was there another place aside from Walnut Grove?

JS: At Newcastle they had segregated classes.

WI: This program sounds like one to be presented.

FM: That's the sort of things that they always talked
about. (Ends list of JACL activities.)

TT: I don't know whether JACL was important in smaller
communities in organizing activities.

RN: It depends on the chapter.

FM: In small communities the JACL activities were
likely to stand out and Nisei activities ~~were~~ were likely
to be centered around JACL activities.

RN: The Fresno chapter was powerful, I remember.

FM: I'm not sure that the Washington ~~area~~ chapters
were powerful, but a lot of activities were centered around
the JACL.

RN: Some chapters centered their activities around
sports and socials and others on political activities.

DS: Sports and socials tended towards segregations,

didn't they?

Give us a summary of the general activities of the JACL.

TT: The largest amount is on war activities. Joe Masaoka tells me that Saburo Kido and Mike Masaoka had a meeting with DeWitt before evacuation, but I can't find any record of it anywhere.

DS: We should get a copy of that report.

RN: Will you read ~~xxx~~ how he felt on December 7?

TT: (reads)

DS: Mike Masaoka made a terrible impression on those who were in charge of evacuation because he gave an impression that he attempted to save his own skin. He did the same thing at the Tolan Committee Hearing.

TT: (reads about volunteer suicide battalion and family hostages advocated by JACL.) Mike wasn't probably alone in thinking like that.

FM: It's the position of a man placed in a hole and who finds it necessary to show everything.

TT: (reads about farming for the government.)

RN: Many Isseis thought in that way, too.

TT: (reads) I get the impression that here was an organization who wanted to be first in everything--even in cooperating for evacuation. Desire for recognition is a pretty strong motivating force. (Reads decision on "constructive cooperation.") We have to remember that for a whole year the Central Japanese Association has been telling the people that as ^{permanent} ~~permanent~~ residents they would receive

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equal treatment. There seems to have been confusion in the minds of the people as to what constructive cooperation meant. (Reads: Opposition was thought impossible. Compromise was thought impractical. "Constructive Cooperation" was decided upon. Reasons herein follow. JACL decided to cooperate under protest.)

RN: I think I would have done the same thing under the circumstances.

TT: (Reads: fears of race riot.)

DS: I wonder if he thought of that later.

TT: (Reads: safeguard of property. Aliens must go as a matter of course. Children should volunteer to go along.)

BS: There's nothing matter of course about it.

RN: That's where the young ones alienated the Isseis.

TT: (Reads: Proof of loyalty. To win good will.)

It seems to me that the pro-Japanese-American, the church people, are helping in spite of the cooperation. There's no recognition of this cooperation.

DS: The factor of cooperation may be important in the Government circle. But popularly it failed.

TT: (Reads: Common sense to get sane and humane treatment. To avoid antagonism.)

JS: (Gives comparison with the feeling of leaders in Minidoka who desires to avoid trouble with the administration.)

TT: (Reads: Amendment made to reserve right to question the constitutionality of evacuation. Unanimous decision to pass the resolution. Everyone was happy.)

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DS: Were they really happy?

RN: I think they were.

FM: There was so much indecis on.

TT: (Many realized that difficulty would be met in carrying the decision to their constituents. People cooperated out of their own free will)

DS: I remember that Mike ~~remembered~~ remembered the Hawaiian stories and said that "we aren't like the Hawaiians."

TT: Joe Masaoka says that even men ~~like~~ like Ringle told us that the Hawaii stories were true.

RN: Did they make any preparation as to how the decision was to be relayed? It was an important task.

TT. Not at this meeting, but it was to be the work of the national organization. The individual delegation just came back and related the message. Nobie Kawai from Pasadena came back and just gave the message.

FM

RN: That's the feeling that I got, too.

RN: Will you let me comment at this point? The suicide squad and hostages which you mentioned: You should picture that the Japanese held the same idea. That they wanted to participate and compensate. If they were allowed to remain in California they would have done the same thing all along. When JACL began to talk about evacuating the aliens alone, it was the turning point. The "core" was in the saddle at that time. The moderate and ambivalent group lost influence and the one on the "red" side emerges.

TT: Could you point the date when the change took place?

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FM: Was the matter of alien only being evacuated talked about?

RN: It was in Los Angeles.

FM: The idea was discarded immediately in Seattle.

RN: This leadership changed, and continued to change in the center.

FM: That's for Los Angeles.

JS: Can you mention names?

RN: Fujii, G. Nakamura, Mukaida were in the moderate group. This leadership was gradually eased out. This change began somewhat before evacuation and continued in the center. If you follow the Isseis at first it's the completely operative group and later it's completely disloyal group.

FM: Don't you think that it's too clear-cut?

TT: Don't you think that some of the changes took place in the people themselves? Men who said that they would like to become American citizens are now all out the opposite way.

I wonder if I could get some instruction on how I should proceed.

DS: Documents of this sort are important. The variation in the role of the JACL has to be picked up, not in detail. Types of surveys that the JACL has made. Tell us a little more of what you have seen there.

TT: A major bulk of the material is on the correspondence between chapters, mostly of a recent date. They are usually centered about conventions and council meetings.

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Also on the lobbying carried on by Walter Tsukamoto. Also on plans to build up the \$100,000 endowment fund. There isn't much on the finances. Some correspondences were destroyed.

DS: I think most of correspondence between chapter can be neglected.

RN: The anti-fishing legislation became a racket for the assemblymen.

TT: The Pacific Citizen, I find, is a very good source. There's a lot of differences in the data from various sources. There's also surveys. Kibei survey, property evaluation survey.

RN: The JACL delegates met and acquiesced to evacuation. The pattern was carried over into the center of not consulting the older people. Up to evacuation the JACL leaders consulted with the older leaders. This is one of the decided breakaway from the previous pattern. In the early stages in the center of young people getting together to make decision.

TT: Here's a report from the JACL members in Manzanar to the national organization. 'here's the feeling that they must divorce their activities from Issei influence.

FM: Provinse was very much impressed by the report, and it influenced the decision that Isseis should not participate in camp government.

TT: I felt that way, but I changed my mind later.

FM: I was telling James Sakamoto that you couldn't

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break
~~xxx~~ away from a thing like that.

RN: The various force at work should be brought out
in the report.

WI: What would have an American group in Japan had
done, being frantic about justifying themselves.

DS: It's hard to make the analogy. The American in
the Orient is usually only a traveler.

TT: Paul Rusch was describing his 6 months of interne-
ment in Japan and drew some parallels with the experience
of the Niseis.

DS: I asked a person who came back on the Gripsholm
about inu, and he said that there were plenty of them.

Togo Tanaka on Pre-Evacuation Political History

TT: I had difficulty in organizing my material. Chapter I is Economic Life. My source was chiefly the year book and directory of the Rafu Shimpo, 1937-40.

Chapter II. Political Organization. Describes efforts on the part of economic interests to protect themselves, especially in 41 and 42. In order to understand that picture I tried to get the kind of businesses the Japanese were engaged in.

I have a list of organizations which represented certain kinds of industries. You have farmers' organizations, retail produce organizations, etc.

DS: If Togo's hypothesis is right, political activity was due to desire of protecting economic interest.

RN: Intense organization along business lines to protect economic interest against the majority group.

DS: The Chinese didn't have anything like it, did they?

TT: Organizational leadership, both economic and political, came from the employer class. Labor union development was only recent. It was successful only in the produce field--first in the ~~xxxxxxx~~ wholesale and then in the retail. You get exceedingly heavy resistance to labor movements. In truck farms you get some racial divisions.

are
Isseis/in control of business. Later there's an effort on citizens' organization fostered alongside the Issei organization. The Nisei organizations are based on union workers. The attempt on the part of the Isseis is to separate the Nisei

union organization from the parent labor organization.

RN: In many cases their sentiments were not in union movements. Goon squads and pressure was used on employees. Arrangements were made to return part of the wages to the employer.

TT: Another factor is the major dependence of the urban organizations on the rural districts.

Four major political organizations were;

1. Central Japanese Association
2. Japanese Chamber of Commerce
3. Southern California Japanese Association
4. JACL

The Central Japanese Association was made up of 21 smaller chapters. It was the most powerful organization in the Japanese community.

RN: Each chapter was assessed so much by the Central Japanese Association. I won't challenge your statement, although it's a matter of opinion. I can't say that one organization had more power than another over the Japanese community. As I said, before, I think the newspaper had the greatest influence.

You might ask whether the Central Japanese Association was able to establish any policy over the Japanese community. Could it force the Japanese people to do anything.

TT: The leaders could through the use of the newspaper, and Nakamura had real influence over Komai and Fujii.

RN: It bears out my thesis that the institution is only

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the shadow of individuals. The individuals controlled the organization.

But I'd agree that the Central Japanese Association is the strongest organization of all the organizations.

TT: I wonder if we couldn't get Mr. G. Nakamura to write a history of the Japanese Association.

FM: JACL had more influence over the community than the Japanese Association had before then.

TT: I think some policies could be laid down by the Japanese Association.

RN: The Consulate lost control over the Japanese Association around 1930. After that the Japanese government had little formal influence over the Japanese Associations. Up to 1920 the Japanese Government had a lot of control over the Japanese Associations.

FM: In Seattle there was no direct control of the consulate over the Japanese association, but there was indirect control--they would be glad to do anything suggested by the consulate.

TT: Nisei position changes around 1940. Nakamura stated time and again that Isseis in Southern California were permanent residents, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ war or no war.

RN: The Japanese community up to 1935 was under strong control under the Japanese Government. Because of the hostility towards Japan, there was an effort to divorce themselves from Japan.

TT: (reads what he has written on economic base of

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political organization (?), relationship between the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and the JACL in 1937-40. Political organization was centered around the Consul.)

FM: How about the kenjinkai, which was important?

RN: Kay Sugahara got money from the Japanese Consulate during the time of the Manchurian Incident for making speeches.

FM: Many of these organizations were essentially social, economic and political organization than just a political organization. Like the kenjinkai, it finds itself taking part in political ~~xx~~ activities. I would question whether the kenjinkai was formed with a political aim.

RN: Kenjinkai and Japanese Association are different.

DS: Was there anything sinister about getting money from the consulate?

RN: But he didn't believe in what he was saying. \$25 each shot isn't bad.

TT: (reads) All organizations sought favor from the Consul. Two events were important--Sino-Japanese War and the abrogation of the treaty between Japan and America. The first solidified relations, especially bringing in closer to the consulate the JACL. Abrogation of the Japan-American Treaty in 1940 affected Nisei thinking. It affect the Issei thinking ~~xxx~~ only at the top.

Chapter III. Vernacular Newspaper

FM: Is there anything on the attitude towards the selective service around October, 1940? I was thinking that the absence of the issue is very interesting ^{compared} to what

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happened later.

TT: This chapter is devoted too much to the paper with which I was connected. I think you get a good picture of the other papers, too.

RN: Rafu Shimpo was popular in the city, and Kashu Mainichi was popular in the rural areas.

TT: Kashu Mainichi was a one-man journal. (reads) The newspapers included are Rafu Shimpo, Kashu Mainichi, and Sangyo Nippo. Each was owned and controlled by Issei. Each was a Japanese language medium with English sections. No collaboration existed between the English and Japanese editorials. The Japanese section usually used the Domei news, and English Section INS and other sources. Combined circulation was 17,000. Income of papers was small. Low salary paid to the staff.

Issei writers were from all sorts of political background, but the cardinal sin was to be labelled aka. This included Russian sympathizers, those who favored labor unions, and wrote unfavorably about the Japanese militarists.

July 7, 1937, the outbreak of the Sino-Japan conflict seems to be an important date. A split developed on the staff.

Analysis of the Rafu Shimpo Staff.

Suzuki was managing editor. Allowed the English Section to express the opinion that Niseis owed loyalty to America.

Shimozuma, telegraph editor. Edited the front page from the Japanese point of view. Believed firmly in Japan's point

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of view. He believed in Nisei's devotion to the role of spokesman for Japan. The Nisei staff came under his influence.

Yoneo Sakai/ had a leftist view, and was against the Japanese military rule and imperialism in Asia. He upheld Japan-American cooperation.

FM: To what extent did the change in editorial policy at the time of the outbreak coincide with public opinion.

RN: The change made by Sakai was considered too radical by the Issei.

These Japanese people were acting as though they were loyal, but didn't feel that way, and didn't want to read what was written in the Rafu Shimpō.

TT: \$50,000 in unpaid subscription remained. Our biggest complaint came from Doiuchi, the collector, who said he couldn't collect.

FM: I'm interested in the development of Japanese nationalism. Yanaga stated that the variety of the immigrants' / nationalism was different from that of the 1930's. The nationalism of the immigrants was what they learned before they came.

RN: The pattern was dormant until they met persecution. That's, they veered away from America.

DS: How can they know of the new nationalism? It's the same with the Swedes. They don't know the new Sweden.

FM: I think that the kind of nationalism you find would be different.

JS: H_w about comparing Kibei and Issei?

Rosalie: There is some difference between Kibei and

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Issei, but I haven't analyzed it.

RN: There's a difference--a difference in degree.

GS: How about the Poles, W.I.?

WI: Their efforts was to have a body of Poles who had relations with Poland--the concept of Polonia Americana.

When the question of assimilation was very hot in 1918 the English was for complete assimilation ~~and~~ the Polish section stated that the _____ should be ignored. I think you could say that among Poles and Italians you found the intense loyalty to the old country.

TT: There were differences in the editorial policy of the English and the Japanese sections.

Chapter IV. Social Organization

Kenjinkai is taken up here. One of the most important reasons for perpetuation was marriage.

Junior kenjinkai was the rival of the JACL in Los Angeles. I didn't find that the participation was largely Kibei.

FM: In Seattle the large number of the members were Nisei and not Kibei. It was the result of family acquaintance.

TT: Dr. Suski started the idea of the junior kenjinkai.

JS: Was the junior kenjinkai fostered by the Issei?

TT: Yes, it was usually started by the heads of the older kenjinkai.

I got the impression that there were two worlds of social activities--one predominantly Japanese and one American--that they didn't have an opportunity to rub elbows.

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DS: I met a couple of YWCA secretaries. They looked so thoroughly YWCA.

TT: Nisei Salon was the only non-segregated club, along with Nisei Student Club in the Los Angeles City College. Its guiding light was Mrs. Nelly Oliver.

FM: I'm interested in the status of these organizations.

RN: It good back to our early statement that it was for different section of the population.

TT: I think there was some status attached to belonging to the university organization.

FM: In my study I made the statement that class distinction was not clear. I was wondering whether it was a matter of time.

TT: I remember the Japanese Savings Club--young men in business. Men wanted to get into this exclusive club because it was good for business. In time that group would come to mean something.

RN: Speaking of social class, I think we had a vague class distinction, and that was whether he had money or not.

TT: But Mr. Muto was despised sometimes even though he had money and even called an eta, even though this was not true.

JS: Which of the social worlds had more status.

TT: I don't know how to answer that.

JS: I've always felt that those who were Americanized were of higher status.

TT: Kibei had the edge when it came to getting jobs.

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FM: But not in the social world.

Chapter V. Religious Organizations

Chapter VI. Gambling

TT: (Explains) The Tokyo Club in Los Angeles was headed by Yamatoda,...

RN: Many of the businesses were financed by the Tokyo Club.

TT: The arrival of the Yuge gang spelled the fall of the Tokyo Club. There was a raid in 1941.

RN: You have to mention that the Tokyo Club was influential in the Japanese community, but also very pro-Japan. You have to bring that out, if you're not afraid of your neck.

WI: The reflection on the Japanese people because of this is unfair.

The End

Conference Notes 12/1/44 Friday

Frank Miyamoto on Tule Lake Report

Social History Section

FM: How I saw the chronology of events: As a collective adjustment to bring about social order. I asked: How did the evacuees come to clarify the relocation center situation. I used W.I.'s general framework pointed out in the Polish Peasant.

Tule Lake was a community in flux. It could not be looked at as an organized thing. The change was one in which people were attempting to clarify the situation.

There are two views of social change:

1. Environment is the chief influence in social change.

This leaves out the individual as a factor in social change.

2. Individual as the source of social change.

Both views are difficult to apply to center life. ^{idea of} The/in-
teraction between individual and environment which is human--
collective interaction--was worked out.

My selection of data were:

1. The customary interpretations of people,
2. In reference to particular events,
e.g. forms of
3. The nature of interaction-/communication (agitation,
leadership, discussion.)

Three periods:

1. Growing Unrest
2. Rebellion
3. Stability Within Instability.

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Cooperation of the Northwest People

RN: Cooperation is the recognition of the caste line.

FM: The administration was good. Shirrell was good. The administration was willing to help the evacuees. The WRA was compared with the Army. There was a block effort toward cooperation.

Factors for Cooperation

1. Excellence of the food.
2. Favorable attitude toward the administration.

Sacramento Group

When the Sacramento group came in there was a ~~marked~~ change in atmosphere. The cooperative attitude disappeared.

Background of the Sacramento people:

There was considerable hostility against the JACL, which was accused of:

1. Lacking courage to oppose evacuation.
2. Bootlicking the Caucasians.
3. Personal criticism.
4. Being dictatorial toward evacuees.
5. Favoritism.

JS: But the same anti-JACL feeling existed in Puyallup.

FM: A change occurred. Niseis were being needed by Isseis to protest against injustice. The incoming Sacramento group was aggressive. There was no channelizing of the hostility to the JACL. The Marysville people developed little anti-JACL feeling, but followed the Sacramento leadership.

Pinedale Movement

The Pinedale people complained that they were happy in Pinedale and that Tule Lake was too large. By and large, they were cooperative with the administration.

Emergence of Unrest

1. There was a decline of restraint.

a. Decline of fear, for one thing because of the large number of evacuees.

bx WRA policy and Shirrell's ideas allowed the decline of fear.

b. There was a disregard for government property.

c. Social irresponsibility.

d. Loss of regard for Caucasians.

2. There appeared a need for action. WRA promises created false hopes/ and a feeling of insecurity.

Unrest does not result in action until the definition of responsibility is made. The importance of rights and the desire for equality were stressed. The WRA was considered to be the responsible agent. There was a delayed protest.

Afternoon Session

FM: Process of Communication in the Growth of Unrest

Rebellion began in the work group. One factor was the appearance of leaders, whom the crowd followed.

The agitator is distinguished from the leader in that he questions the existing system publicly. The leader attempts to make changes within the existing system.

RN: Leaders are those who have a following.

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FM: Accusations of bootlicking were made, as well as declaration of rights. The Japanese conception of the use of force to correct injustice was another factor.

Outline of the other chapters (See outline)

The End

Conference Notes 12/2/44 Saturday

Rosalie Hankey on Post-Segregation Tule Lake

RH: I am going to give first my method which I employed. A Caucasian has handicaps which has to be taken into consideration. I want to explain the type of informants which I have.

RN: Your advantages are great, too.

RH: Two methods have to be used.

1. Write up the history of attitudes during the period you were not there. People's minds change, and it is difficult to trace it.

2. While I was living there, it's much easier to keep track of what's going on. My method of identification helps me to feel what is going on.

I have very few informants. I do my contacting by visits. The chief handicap is being a Caucasian. This is especially true in Tule Lake. At times of tension men spit when I pass by. They're supposed to despise a Caucasian. There's a fear of being beaten on the part of the informant if I visit them. There's a fear of my being a spy and of being seen with me. There was a tremendous bias and clinging to one side or other--for or against the Daihyoshakai. Sometimes people will lie to me. It's my fault when I ask a direct question. It's poor technique.

There's a greater fear on the part of the WRA. There's a fear of newspaper publicity. My rapport with the Caucasian is rare. They are under orders not to give me information.

My own personal bias--I'm an agitator at heart. I may not

do a good job of presenting the side of the meek people. Being cut off from the Caucasian and getting my social life with the Japanese, I feel as they do, and I go as biserk as the people do. At the time of the Okamoto shooting and the beating of inu, I felt as the people did. At the time of the hunger strike I felt ~~as~~ a Caucasian, and felt responsible for it.

Informants There are 16 families that I can visit any time that I want. There are 50-100 casual informants. There are also friends of informants. Sixteen people, however, are few.

DS: But anthropologists usually have only one.

RH: I've tried to get people from various factions. It's difficult when they keep splitting up like amoeba. The two major factions are:

1. Genjo Iji Sticking with the "bastard-strike" (half-baked strike). Refusal to go to work. Keeping certain essential functions going.

2. The opposite side is the Genjo Daha. The moderates. In both groups are ranges from the "red" to the "blue."

The Negotiating Committee is the leaders of the Genjo Iji group. I have two very good informants in this group. B.N. ~~gx~~ from Gila gave me the views of a transferee who is genjo iji. Kondos from Gila are also in this group. I lost them both because of tension in their blocks. I gained the confidence of two substitute daihosha members. G.Y.'s wife changed away from status quo. Following her change is

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interesting because it happened to many people. I., the fanatic from Leupp who was placed in the stockade. K.I., my secretary, is a strong daihyosha supporter. K. a strong supporter. George N. defends the daihyosha. Feels that the committee was betrayed.

Conservative Informants They were difficult to get at first. I tried and tried until I got some names from JS. They were mostly Nisei girls. The older folks are afraid to talk. They took me in in spite of social ostracism because they are lonely.

Neutrals, Wise Heads The best is K., who spies for me. He's about the ablest man in Tule Lake. J.T. a blab-mouth from Gila. He was a strong supporter, but changed to the point of relocating. He got points of views for me. O., a block manager, who hates to see trouble of any kind. Sincere about wanted to return to Japan.

Present Day Agitators I contacted them through Robertson. By being inu for them, I gained their confidence. They introduced me to T. They will be shown to be honorable Japanese, and they give that impression themselves, and I give them that impression.

Administration Poor contacts in the administration. Robertson is one of the few--he is an honorable man. Teachers tell me what is going on. I keep scarce by not eating in the Ad mess and not going to the administration area.

Technique of Getting Information

Because of the courtesy of the Japanese, nobody will

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refuse me. There's a great desire to talk about things that go ⁱⁿ on/other parts of the camp. They don't object to my writing things down. They want to give justification for having done right. There is exhibitionism. They use me as a spy. I'm a woman. They came out of the stockade and did not receive the attention they expected. We're kindred souls. I show them admiration. They think that I'm a scholar. My German background is a still greater advantage. My method is not really sociological.

RN: One advantage that ~~you~~ she has. She was a Caucasian single woman. There's an emotional affection for her.

Attitude of People Before the Volcanic Eruption

Transferees The transferees had a utopian dream, especially among leaders. They spoke of an entirely different camp of like minds. There would be no dogs; they would be unified. The breaking of that dream I consider to be an important factor. They expressed dissatisfaction with the physical facilities, and the watchtower and the barbed wire fences. They complained of the attitude of the Caucasian staff. They deplored the terrible housing condition. They felt that the old Tuleans took advantage of the housing situation. They complained that friends had been separated. The latrine was dirty. There was unemployment, and the good positions were held by Tuleans. They complained of Dr. Pedicord's attitude.

Old Tuleans They were waiting to see what would happen. They held the attitude of wanting to avoid trouble. They resented the transferee.

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Transferees v.s. Old Tuleans The transferres resent the Tulean fence-sitters. They resent the "yes-yes" people. They resent the lack of pressuring the administration. This split, however, is not too clearcut.

RW: These people went to Tule Lake with chips on their shoulders.

Coal Crew Strike The coal crew was told to work all time, and they struck. They came to Y. and T. for aid. The administration was reasonable and the matter settled.

Farm Truck Accident Because of the accident Kashima died. There was an immediate organization of farm workers to do something. There existed a desire to make it a camp issue. The Farm Committee called on Kai, Takahashi, and Yoshiyama. Furious speeches were made. The Opposition did not dare raise his voice. It was decided that no work would be done until the issue was settled. Minors were not allowed to drive. Compensation for the injured was requested.

Daihyoshakai Block representatives from each block were elected with support from block managers. It was the result of pressure of the mass. I don not believe in the claim of plotting to control the camp. There was reaction to Best's attitude that no one was going to tell him what to do. Those elected were men from previous center experience with aggressive and anti-administration reputation. People as a whole were not in favor of striking until negotiating first. People were not free to express themselves.

First Meeting of the Daihyoshakai 64 representatives, visitors, workers, and agitators attended the meeting. Kuratomi was elected chairman. Takahashi came out third.

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Recommendation of the Farm Committee was heard. It was decided that grievances would be studied by sub-committees. A central coordinating committee was formed. Ward representatives were called upon to select committee members. Chaos and spontaneous force ruled. Level-headed people tried to keep the agitators down. There was jealousy among the men. A decision was reached to make the incident a camp-wide issue.

Administration Best was advised to be tough. No one appeared to work or to negotiate. Best issued an ultimatum. Kallam met with the Farm Committee. It was decided that the negotiation would be turned over to the Negotiating Committee (Central Coordinating Committee). Kashima died. A public funeral was requested by the Farm Group. Best^{was}/asked to send an official representative to the funeral. Best decided to be stern. Takahashi's group visited Best. Best suggested that he might be able to lend the auditorium. But Best was advised to be stern. Takahashi's request was spurned, which angered him. He decided to hold a public funeral, anyway.

JS: How strong was the organization of the strong-arm group?

RN: I don't think that the men were organized.

RH: The people were affected by the funeral. The people began to get guts. We have the beginning of the struggle of power--on the part of Takahashi. Takahashi called a meeting of the Planning Board. There was little response. He called a second meeting, and old Tuleans and substitutes appeared. They voted to dissolve the Planning Board.

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Best's Statement On October 22 Best requested a representative body. Kuratomi claimed that he represented the residents, and claimed "official recognition" from the administration. On October 26 the Negotiating Committee met with Best. Best refused to "recognize" the committee as representatives of the people. Kuratomi's demands included:

Segregation of the small group of disloyal.

A public funeral.

Care in hiring of drivers.

Abolishing of flag saluting.

Suggestion on center organization.

Improvement of food.

Other improvements such as porches, latrine improvement, better mail delivery.

More employment.

While there was a general agreement on the part of most people to the above demands, there were some differences of opinion. The people may not have been in favor of the reduction in the number of acreage planted. The suggestion for a community government might have ~~the~~ been the idea of the leaders themselves.

After the meeting Best left the project. The farmers were terminated. Evacuees from other centers came in to work.

RN: They were breaking the strike.

FM: Betrayal of fellow Japanese would affect the community more.

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RN: Leaders could impose their point of view.

RH: Food was taken out of the project warehouse. This aroused resentment on the part of the residents.

October 28 Daihyoshakai Meeting Myer arrived on the project. Best refused to let the Daihyoshakai meet Myer. The Farm Group was allowed a meeting. The Committee decided to hold a demonstration to force recognition. Crowd surrounded the Ad Area. Pressure boys formed a cordon around the crowd. Myer decided to see the Committee. Pedicord was beaten up.

At the meeting with Myer and Best the Negotiating Committee asked for resegregation. They asked for a reconsideration of the termination of farm workers. They complained that they were not recognized as representatives of the residents. They brought up the matter of food being taken from the warehouse. Best at this time did not promise that food would not be taken out. They requested the termination of the Caucasian hospital staff. The Food Report was presented. They asked for an improvement in the latrine and the building of uniform porches, and the distribution of buckets and brooms.

The Negotiating Committee received support from the people. Anyone who stands up to the administration and gets away with something is popular. Remember the emotional tension.

FM: Would a person with poor reputation get the same support?

RN: Certainly, under the emotional tension.

RH: The administration felt that the Negotiating Committee

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was not supported by the people. The use of threat was not the threat of a small group but of the fear of the majority.

RN: Once the pathological tension is removed, you can't get it back.

RH: ~~At~~ The staff asked for military protection. It accused Myer of compromising with the residents.

November 4 Incident On November 2 there was a meeting with the Spanish Consul, in which he asked for the suppression of violence. On November 3 Dr. Opler advised the administration that there would be no further trouble. On November 4 Best agreed to terminate the Caucasian doctors in the hospital. The Negotiating Committee planned for the selection of project representatives. Report came in that food was being taken out of the warehouse. A fight ensued, and became larger. Schmidt called in the Army. Soldiers who came in were hysterical and glad to get back at the Japs. The Internal Security beat up some of the boys. This brutality seemed to be a reaction to a state of fear.

Workers going to the Ad Area in the morning were surprised by tear bombs being thrown at them by soldiers. Many did not know that the Army had come in. A stockade was built, and additional fences were put up. Many said that the Army was better than the WRA. Some leaders thought that the people could not be scared. Solidarity was increased by news of the beatings and the leaders being picked up. Work was discontinued. There was suffering because of the lack of coal. The Negotiating Committee asked the coal crew to go

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back to work.

On November 9 Peck was dismissed. The Spanish Consul arrived. The discussion centered around the international complication. The administration claimed that the Negotiating Committee started trouble to start an international incident. The Negotiating Committee was repulsed as people's representatives. The Army planned a meeting with the residents, but no one showed up. The Negotiating Committee was arrested.

End of Section I

Deadlock From here on it was disintegration. The only hope of the Negotiating Committee was in the Spanish Consul and the Japanese Government. This was before Sapan. The colonists went into a deadlock. No further work was to be done until the men were released from the stockade. This attitude ~~was~~ was upheld for a whole year. This is the attitude of giri.

On November 13 curfew went into effect. The food was very poor. There was no entertainment. The hardest to bear was the lack of employment.

On November 14 the Second Negotiating Committee issued a radical proclamation, advocating the release of those picked up, and of people going on a mass hunger strike until they achieved their aim. The people reacted to this badly.

RN: People were afraid.

RH: This was countered by another part of the Daihyosha kai (Ward VII)--the Coordinating Committee (substitute

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for the Negotiating Committee.)

The WRA was in a hole. It did not want to turn the center over to the Army. The WRA effort was to get a substitute representative group to get the Army out.

On November 26 a campwide search was held, essentially to look for Kuratomi and Kai. They finally gave themselves up to the FBI.

RN: They did not want to inconvenience the people, and they feared being turned in.

RH: The stand of Kai and Kuratomi was that a petition should be circulated and signed by the people. The matter was referred to the people. The result was that they desired to stick to the status quo.

DS: Wasn't there any suggestion for the people who worked to share their pay?

RH: I haven't heard of any.

They expected help from the Japanese Government. Pressure was brought to bear on the Co-op not to sell luxuries. The Co-op referred the matter to the people, and won out on the issue.

The Spanish Consul arrived and advised the Daihyosha to resign.

The Army treated the men in the stockade badly, and the men went on a hunger strike on December 31. However, they did not all stick to the strike. On January 2 the FBI came in to investigate the situation. On January 6 the Army convinced the men to go off the hunger strike.

Rise of the Anti-Daihyosha People

The WRA attempted strongly to get a representative of the people. The Administrative Advisory Council met with the extremely cooperative leaders. They included many older Tuleans--vested interests. They desired to make the best of the situation.

RN: They were collaborators.

JS: Akitsuki was considered an agitator before.

RH: It was a mixed group. The important thing is that the people were against them. It was the shift from the extreme to the extreme.

RN: Among them you find men who lost their position, and were frustrated. They emerge as collaborators.

There was a meeting of Divisional Men with Best. Return to work was suggested. They decided upon a referendum. Those in favor of returning to work won out by a slight margin. The economic situation was given as the reason for returning to work, not the love of the WRA. The Army and the WRA recognized the Coordinating Committee as the official representatives of the residents. They asked those interned in the stockade to support them.

JS: With the Negotiating Committee which comes first, the firm stand or the welfare of the people?

RH: They say they're for the people, but they say that they'll fight on even if the people complain.

The administration and the Coordinating Committee seem to have distrusted each other.

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Beginning in Under Cover Pressure ~~XXXXX~~

The group was centered ~~in~~ around the Matsudas. They were supporters of Kai and Kuratomi. They contacted Robertson. A split existed between Robertson and Best.

In February the antagonism toward the Coordinating Committee was not too great. In March this feeling was great. The Coordinating Committee was frustrated in their attempt to get results which would enhance their position.

FM: Wouldn't the community want to control this committee.

RH: The people wondered how they got into office. They didn't want to do anything about it because of fear.

FM: How can you get fielders to join the staff.

RN: A lot of people can't define the ~~the~~ situation according to the mores.

FM: To certain section of the community the Coordinating Committee wasn't so bad. Did these fielders have protection?

RH: Yes, of secrecy.

Argument Miyamoto and Sakoda maintained that the existence of the fielders was indication that there was more than mere personal support for members of the Coordinating Committee. Hankey presented the view that this support from fielders was, she thought, personal in nature. Nishimoto declared that there was no great support for the committee. Sakoda pointed out that Hankey had gotten her data from Tuleans only recently and might be biased. She agreed to consider rewriting this section.

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RN: The pressure group was effective.

FM: But the other group was effective, too. You can't understand the fielders if they don't have some support.

RN: Would they have honorable intentions.

DS: I don't think that the job was called spying.

FM: Reporting to a Japanese is a dangerous thing.

RH: I look on these young men as boys who had the same outlook as Akitsuki.

DS: Rosalie should consider the point of view of the other side. Let's go on.

RH: The Coordinating Committee attempted to get release of internees, and more employment opportunities. They were in great fear. There was conflict within the block. On February 15 they handed in their resignation. The undercover group--"peach bunch"--proposed the dissolution of the Coordinating Committee. There were two distinct pressure groups involved. The Coordinating Committee resented this. The administration did not accept the resignation.

Takahashi was accused of "telling all" on the Paihyosha. On February he took the position of advisor to the Coordinating Committee. The Committee made further attempts to get release for internees. The administration set up a committee to consider releases. On March 9 11 men were released, but the Committee was not allowed to announce this.

Manzanar Group The Manzanar group came in late in March and April. Potent agitators were in the group. They tied in with the undercover pressure group. There was a struggle

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to gain the support of the Manzanar group. They held themselves aloof.

RN: The Manzanar and Poston people are cooperative because they went through a riot.

RH: Tule Lake people resented the Manzanar people because of special treatment. Manzanar people are now fairly liked except W. and his group. But sometimes they are disliked for being pugnacious. They are considered good citizens.

The release of the internees did not help the Coordinating Committee. Talk of inu increased.

DS: Doesn't the Community Analyst's report have effect in Washington?

RN: Spicer sits in on inner conferences.

DS: We've gotten the pattern. You've got to skip the details.

RN: It's about the same up to the Okamoto murder.

RH: I'll continue orally.

A petition was circulated for resegregation. This was for the resegregation of people who wanted to return to Japan immediately. Many people resented this. The Coordinating Committee resigned. The resegregation group lost support of the people. The camp became strangely quiet. Best made a few concessions. The administration came out with a request for a representative body. The people were apathetic. Block meetings were held on May 22 to elect representatives, but very few came to the meetings. The camp was charged with glee.

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There was a growth in self-respect. The reasons for the failure of the election were:

1. Fear of taking the job.
2. Giri to the stockade men.
3. To slap the administration in the face seems to me to be the strongest reason.

Only May 24 Okamoto was shot. Something changed in camp. There was a tenseness in the air, which I cannot identify myself because I was a savage. So were the people.

RN: It was resentment toward the people because of the failure ~~xxxxxx~~ of the administration.

RH: In June the wildest stories of inu were circulated. There was resentment against the co-op. A blacklist was discussed, and it included such men as Yamatani, Tateishi, Akitsuki, Tahahashi. The common people were not afraid.

RN: But they were afraid of being called inu. P

RH: People gained satisfaction from beatings. This long tension was never released, but it became worse than before. The pressure group "dished out" the inu story and helped to increase the tension. On June 12 Hitomi's brother was beaten. The reason was favoritism. On June 13 Morimoto was beaten. The reason was that he was an inu of long standing. More stories against the inu were circulated. The domestic service issue came. There was a hammer attack by a disranged individual. 15 men were sent to Santa Fe. Komia, Takahashi's secretary, was included when Takahashi wasn't. The pressure warned Robertson of terrible things to happen. Another man

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was beaten.

On July 2 Robertson ~~xx~~ was told by the pressure group that this would lead to murder. Then Hitomi was murdered. Takahashi was beaten up. There were statements of rejoicing. The inu were sent to the Ad Area for protection. They returned after the tension was lifted. Yamatani, Tateishi, and Shimokon left Tube Lake. After this murder I could not make the good contacts I made before.

The stockage people had a hunger strike from July 19 to 26 and August 2 to 12. They appealed to the American Civil Liberties Union. Before a suit could be brought up, the internees were released.

The End

ds.
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Chicago Material

7.30 p.m.

DS: I want to present ~~with~~ what I have gotten in. Charlie's case history number over 50. Charlie extended the range of his sampling. He made an effort to approach individuals who do not think like him. Charlie is completely cut off from Issei interview unless they're English-speaking persons. He is getting a number of Kibei. He has built up this series of which he is proud.

Charlie has also ~~xxx~~ kept a diary of events that he has come across. Instances of discrimination, political activities, activity of segregated groups/ are included. He has sacrificed himself for the sake of the study. He does not like to be with Nisei, but has been forced to be with them all the time.

About March of last year we did something for the WRA. This was to prepare a rather general report on the resettlers' adjustment in Chicago. This was done by Frank. It's an extremely well-organized report.

FM: This is a joint project with Togo.

DS: (Reads the Table of Content.) Since this was done at the request of the WRA only the most general source of our own material was used. But it's an excellent frame work in which to place the rest of our data.

FM: We didn't attempt to make it thorough.

DS: Spicer didn't get it, but it went into the hands of the Relocation Planning Division.

Togo wrote an additional section on adjustment problems, based on interviews. Togo will describe the type of material that he has. They are, of course, selected, and cover some 3500 cases. Togo has in addition written some special report for his own organization and has elaborated some for us.

Tom was particularly interested in investigating the occupational adjustment and the extreme alleged mobility of the Nisei. He had interviews, but was stopped by the Army. The only time we have been hampered was on the outside. He had a number of firms, but it was a limited range.

JS: Is it true that the Nisei changed their jobs often.

DS: It is true. But there is no control group with which to compare. Americans now on the whole are quite mobile.

A youngman who I haven't met is working on his master's thesis and is following up on the occupational study. Tom had an elaborate plan to study groups, formal and informal. The group ~~xxxx~~ that he was able to follow up was the Buddhist, of which he has written an excellent report. Tom participated has a sort of go-between in this attempt to set up a church. It's a very complete and good report of that particular development. The rest of his plans more or less was left up in the air.

Frank will tell you what he has been doing. Mostly he has been working on the Tule Lake report. He had the difficulty of the administration of the Chicago report. He has been collecting the data for the whole resettling group in
Louise
Chicago. ~~xxxx~~ has been working on it under Frank's direction.

3

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I'll turn the meeting over to Frank and Togo.

FM: In our Chicago files our work has been an (incidental) one. We didn't have any idea what was going to come out. We started out by making a series of outlines (laughter). About half were discarded. We were interested in

1. Case histories (Charlie concentrated on it.)
2. Group studies (Tom concentrated on that).
3. I worked on both and on this thing.

We felt that it was necessary to get some data on the people out there. We didn't know where they lived and other things definite about them. Tom was interested in making a residential study, which we thought was basic. We wanted to get an employment history of the people in Chicago, and also other data like sex and age. (Passes around card.)

We started with the Chicago intake file of the WRA, on which most of the data here was there, but was really incomplete. Not all the people going to Chicago go to the WRA office. There's an additional problem that many go elsewhere. So there were difficulties about this set of cards. There are about 8000 cards. Many of them are people who pass through. At the time we started this the number of cards was about half as at present. We went through them rapidly.

They also have a file with individual folders. I had no intention that anyone should go through them to get additional information, but Lousie's sister started in on them when I instructed her to get the departure notices. You get information which is missing on the cards. You get more complete

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data. Louise is going to finish this up. I think we shall have that completed soon.

The additional work that we thought of doing was to go through the Friends' Service file and going through the Brethren file, but I don't know whether it will be worth the trouble.

DS: I don't think so. Your departure advices will give certain information on all evacuees.

FM: We'd like to take a sampling of our card (10 or 15 per cent) and to send out a printed questionnaire, and then enclose a return envelope for all persons, and then by personal interviews to check on all those who fail to answer. This task might involve some work-- some bit of foot work, anyway. People are usually at work during the day time and much of the work would have to be done at night. It's the best way to check the total universe of cards.

DS: What you want is the residential and the occupational.

FM: It has been important to get our addresses as accurate as possible. Once we have the data we have some basic information about the resettlers. We really don't know anything accurate about them. We don't know the composition of the population, either.

DS: My idea is to work out their distribution and concentration and work out simple analyses. It's simple but essential. The WRA should have done it.

TT: I wonder whether it's possible to anticipate where the residents have moved.

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DS: I don't think you can anticipate, neither can you anticipate the resistance you'll get.

TT: The United Ministry sent out 400 questionnaire and received only 12 back in the first 10 days. The Lower North Side was found to be the region of extreme mobility.

DS: Wasn't the questionnaire complicated?

TT: Yes.

Discussion of the Lower North Side.

FM: There's another use for these cards--to check Charlie's samples.

RN: Charlie has about the widest range of Nisei as possible.

DS: It will be the conventional type of thing, but necessary.

FM: I don't know what Dorothy expects in the way of a report. The outline that we have here--we have considerable information to add.

DS: The structure of the report is excellent. Now bring in all your data for the purpose of the study. Charlie's material will be important. The Friends' file may be helpful.

WI: I was very much impressed by Frank and Togo's report. All you have to do is to fill the thing out.

DS: You have wonderful structuralization. What I would like as a practical procedure is this. You and Charlie and Togo collaborate. Charlie must be gotten off of this goal of 100 cases.

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WI: Give him 57 as a goal (laughter).

50

DS: His terrible fear before he got his/cases was awful. His hundred cases was set up ~~hm~~ as the next goal. Charlie must pull from his diary material to put in the report. Togo does the same thing. Frank does the super-organizational job there and the editing. So that you can prepare the way with Charlie--I'll write to him, too.

FM: I'd like to have you show the statistical fallacy of increasing the number of cases.

DS: A 100 cases still will not be a sufficient sample. I've never seen people using case history material who has been able to get a good sample. Charlie feels that he must get a 100 cases or that all the money that he has gotten will be wasted. Certainly as other cases turn up he'll have to get them. For his own benefit he'll have to analyze some of the cases that he has gotten. He has the zoot-suit, the quiet girls who will talk only Charlie, the house-wives, etc.

We don't have any publishing scheme. Suppose I publish a series of Charlie's case history. You might select about 5 and make an analysis. He's got to get credit for it. For his future career there's some importance to him. He may say that he doesn't want any credit. He's terrified about analyzing a case history. Have him throw light on these points by using his case histories.

FM: In this outline Chapter II, Japanese in Pre-Evacuation Chicago...

DS: Leave Chapter One to me. Chapter II, we have a

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little data on that. Charlie has one case history of an old resident. If he were approached with questions, he might be able to give some more information.

TT: I understand that there were two factions and Tashiro was the head of one of them.

DS: I think the agencies have been increased. Stick to an analysis of the important one. List the others.

FM: Chapter V. Problems of adjustment of resettlers. A great deal is found in Charlie's diary. He's used the same headings as ourselves. Is there anything else that might be used.

DS: Sensitivity to Caucasian attitude is important.

RN: Where is the recreational problems.

DS: Expand the section on loneliness. If Jimmy and Dick could contribute something from the other end.

RN: The only two things we hear are nostalgia and housing. The parents are worried about the morals of their daughters.

FM: Nisei gatherings have increased, and it's getting to be like little Tokyo before the war. The general pattern of events is very clear.

RN: That's identification with your own group, isn't it?

FM: There are any number of unorganized informal group. Resettler Collective Enterprise--meaning businesses. There are increasing numbers. There are about 40 boarding and rooming houses.

RN: Don't you think we ought to get the case history of

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Tom Masuda. I'd like to have him to get the case history of Mieki Hayano.

DS: How about the Takahashis?

TT: They're in JACL.

FM: The Chicago Little Tokyo is not the Little Tokyo of pre-evacuation. There's more mixing in with the majority group. The tendency towards identification with your own group is still there. But the group who migrated were already assimilated.

I think we can drop the comparison with pre-evacuation Japanese community.

TT: I wonder whether there was any use in getting the changing relation between agencies because you get the attitude of resettlers. First it was a series of non-cooperative attitude among agencies. It's an attitude of withdrawal of private agencies. You get WRA sponsorship of evacuee groups.

JS; (Questions)

TT: The history of private agencies starts with the attitude that there should be no segregated groups. The WRA went along for a while, but some people in the WRA really didn't believe in it. A year later as you get changes in WRA, there is a stand taken by WRA that this is an impossible position. Therefore, the church agencies can get out of Chicago. I think that's the situation now. Then go into the hinterlands. Some of the agencies, like the American Friends Service Committee, felt that that was a good idea since its job was to do what the WRA won't do.

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RN: I think the church people has a lot to do.

TT: What the private agencies in Chicago have been doing in Chicago in the last two months: The Friends have gotten out of job placement. The Friends and the Brethrens have decided to go into the Lower North Side. There's been a lot of Nisei prostitutes arrested. Jason Lee's gambling enterprise (is directed toward evacuees). There is a heavy investment ~~mk~~ by Issei along 1600 Clark to 1400 Clark where it was known to be habited by drunks and prostitutes.

For my benefit, I think, they say that note-taking is not necessary because they are not making a sociological study.

The interview cards (about 3000 cards) have nothing ~~in~~ not covered by Charlies' cases, except that they cover a greater range.

WI: Are they trying to clean up the whole district, or just the Japanese?

TT: Just the resettlers. Principally to move them out of that area. An effort has been made to get families better housing.

There's a friction between the Italians and the Negroes. When resettlers come it creates new problems. The rumor~~x~~ is that six Japanese men and 9 women have married Negroes.

The attitude of the police is:

The old ones are all right. They cleaned out the place.

The young ones are no good. They've got into trouble.

DS: ^{we} What/have is the disintegration of the second generation. It's the same with every immigrant group.

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WI: If a immigrant group can keep its customs for a certain amount of time, it can become stabilized. The Poles show a lack of continuity of mores. I'm not alarmed by this except that it would be a very beneficial invasion of the Lower North Side.

RN: Tom Masuda said that the Isseis should come out because the influence of the Issei is needed.

TT: We have some activities of the church organizations and the formation of Nisei groups under the churches.

FM: The change of policies of agencies is interesting. For instance, Smeltzer's idea of getting people out into the small towns.

TT: On that there might not have been agreement among the others.

FM: For instance, Jacoby's trying to get people into clubs and organization.

WI: Aren't these reports of disorganization exaggerated?

TT: I think so, except when I read Charlie's cases of the zoot-suiters.

WI: If you read the report of the Chicago Crime Commission you'd think that everybody in Chicago was a criminal.

RH: The same is true of the police record of the gangs. I hear there are only two gangs ^{in Tule Lake} and only one is bad and it has only 30 members.

DS: I think most of them are being only slightly immoral.

WI: I think exhibitionism is a good word for it.

TT: Parents are concerned about their children and give

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that as a reason when they come out.

FM: There are psychopaths in Chicago. Maybe we should get some records of them.

WI: It will be very interesting to get a comparison between Chicago and in Los Angeles, where they had criminal records before. It existed before evacuation.

FM: With many of these people the breakdown comes with extreme sensitivity to Caucasians.

TT: There are about 20 confined in the Elgin State Hospital.

The End

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Richard Nishimoto on the Political Organization
of Poston

RN: I want to give the political organization of Poston from May, 1942 to November, 1944. This will enable you to understand my journal. This was supposed to be done last year, but was not done because of human elements.

In April, 1942 Solon Kimball came when the barracks were still being built and only one block was completed. This diagram shows his ideal political structure. Kimball was an idealist, disturbed about evacuation. He noticed this so-called "erosion of loyalty." He was a "flag-waving type" in the beginning. As he came in to Poston, this is the structure that he conceptualized.

Unit Administrator

Executive Assistant to
Unit Administrator

Chairman of
Local Council

Supervisor of
Block Managers

36 Local
Councilmen

Executive Committee
of Block Managers

36 Block Managers

36 Block Councils

Residents

At the earliest stage we had a Executive-Assistant, but he left early. Unit administrators were the head of the evacuee hierarchy. They later occupied the positions of the Assistant Project Directors. We have two sets of relationships.

1. Operational hierarchy

2. Governmental hierarchy (above)

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This set-up never came into actual realization until July-November, 1943. Kimball said that the line of authority in the operational hierarchy was from the top down. Grievances of the workers would be taken up by the local Council. We don't have a direct contact with the Caucasian hierarchy.

We had high quality officials.

As Kimball realized the structure (he didn't have the executive committee of the block managers), from the residents the complaints went up through the Council. The authority coming down through the block managers. But it never worked in that way.

Why didn't it happen in that way? Kimball scrapped the idea of appointing block managers. About the first part of May, 1942, before any evacuee arrived in Poston, the only center existing at that time Manzanar. A group of Caucasian employees, including Galvin (deputy p.d.) and division heads went to Los Angeles to procure some material. They decided to stop at Manzanar. They noticed that there each block had a block leader and acted as information dispenser and doing all kind of menial work in each block, acting as an agent of the administration. The men were interested in this system because it seemed to be working. They asked for the origin of the system. Each block presented three candidates for block leader. There were submitted to the administration and picked one of the three and appointed him as block leader. In Manzanar that was called block leader, but Galvin liked the idea. He talked it over with Kimball, who

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liked it. That was the beginning of the block manager system. The first project director, it can be said, originated this system--by accident. Onx May 13-14 volunteers came in. ~~xxxxxx~~ In order to understand our contribution to the Study from Poston, the nature of the volunteerx group must be explained.

As you remember many Japanese were out of jobs before evacuation was announced. They went to the offices of unemployment insurance under federal security and applied for unemployment compensation. The federal security agency allowed the payment of compensation to the applicants. Some time in March the workers in these unemployment insurance offices began to say that job was available in Parker Dam. Some people who were told refused to go and some were willing. Those who refused to go were denied the payment ofx unemployment insurance. The same line of approach was employed in Imperial Valley, Bakersfield, etc. I don't have to explain what kind of people ~~xx~~ became the volunteers for the Parker Dam Assembly Center. They were adventurers--people who lost their jobs. They occupied Blocks 6 and 11.

This must be explained to explain the early troubles. They came into Block 6 and 11. They never played a leadership role in the Japanese community before. They included store clerks, wholesale market owners, merchants, swampers, farmers who were cleaned out. They went into the key positions--foremen, assistant to section and division heads, positions in which they gave orders to Japanese. They were

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officious, arrogant. They were given key position because they worked hard before the others came.

Tomo Ito, one of the advance ~~xxx~~ volunteers, attended Stanford in the fall of 1926. His father had a grocery store. He worked through school and lived with Caucasians. He took up geology. During the four years he worked in a Caucasian family in Palo Alto. We had a Japanese organization on the campus, but he lived apart from the Japanese element as much as possible. He was employed by a Caucasian firm after graduation. He lived apart from the Japanese community. Just because he had been employed by a Caucasian firm--which was unusual--he was cocky. He thought that he was better than any other "Jap." He said that to me. He wanted to recruit a gang of laborers to clean up the fire breaks, which were filled with rubbish. He wanted a foreman. He was surprised to see me in Poston. He asked me: "You'll be loyal to the United States. How about helping the war effort?" I want to show how inconsistent with the sentiment of the people he was. He came with the volunteer group. He lost his job early. He wanted to cooperate with the WRA.

Kimball liked Ito because he was working hard. He had a good background. He had an AB degree, and a good employment history. Kimball said that he regretted to admit that he liked Ito because he spoke his language. He was atypical as a Japanese. He was made supervisor of block managers. As people came in Ito sent someone from his own block to become block manager. They're the kind of people ~~xxx~~ you

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find on the "blue" side. They were young, and didn't have experience in leadership in pre-evacuation Japanese community.

36 blocks were filled. The last contingent came in July. The block managers were supposed to be temporary. Ito requested that these block managers be approved by the residents. Many blocks kept the same block manager, except Block 46. It is an interesting block in this respect. There was a Boyle Heights group of youngsters who were formerly the Golden Bears. It consisted of young kids. They knew of the set-up in Poston and selected their own block manager. They occupied Block 46, and out-numbered their parents. Most of the block managers were young kids. There were two or three Isseis. But they were the kind of fellows who were on the "blue" side. As early as June, 1942, block residents of each block formed a block council. This was composed of one man from each barrack. Well, I don't have to go into this. It's easy to conceive that you'll have Isseis elected. Therefore, the block council was dominated by Isseis. The block managers were Nisei and the block council was Issei.

In July the temporary community council was formed by electing Nisei from each block. It was called a "kid council". Both the council and the block managers were dominated by Nisei. It was just the same as not having anything at all. They were passing the orders down in an officious and arrogant way. Now you see why it doesn't last too long. In pre-evacuation Japanese community the Issei were on the top. After evacuation this situation was reversed. With a month

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as early as July, 1942, you find the block council controlling the block councilman and the block manager. The orders must go through the block council to reach the residents. The administrators began to feel that the block managers and councilmen were not effective. They acted as "errand boys." Many block managers were changed. Many Nisei block managers quit because Issei complained against them. They lost their officiousness right away. The formen, on the other hand, retained their officiousness longer.

There was so many demands for Issei representation that the WRA had to work out some compromise. They formed a Issei advisory board which was to advise the councilmen. The chairman of the advisory board was placed in line with the chairman of the council. The assistant to the unit administrator never did function. The position of the Issei advisory board rises. The council cannot make a decision without a joint meeting with advisory board. The block council controls the Issei advisor from his block.

The tendency of the older group is to ascend--to return to the set-up of pre-evacuation days. The November strike occurs. This caused a shift. We go into the informal side. The balance of power is reversed. The chairman of the Issei advisory board was above the chairman of the community council. They were the kind of people who were frustrated in pre-evacuation days, although they had been in leadership position at some time. These people came up early in the history of Poston. Nagai, for instance, came to this country about 50

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years ago. He never went to school, except night school, worked on ranches as ^amigratory laborer, and was later operating a small ranch. He's the type that ~~likes~~ follows the Black Dragon Society ideas. As soon as he came in, he became the leader of Issei bachelors because he knew many of them in pro-evacuation days. The first agitation came in his block. He advocated that the people should be treated according to the Geneva Conference. No one need work. He was an anti-administration person.

Chairman of
Issei Advisory Board

Issei
Advisory Board

Chairman of
Local Council

Block Council

36 councilmen

36 block managers

Residents

The strike came and a new board was created. The block managers were disturbing to the Issei elements. A Labor Relation Board and an Executive Board were created. The representation was Issei and Nisei, but actually the Issei controlled. The attempt was made to place the block managers under the Executive Board, but this was never granted. Nagai becomes the chairman of the Executive Board, and tries to dominate the other groups, but this is resented and conflict arises. Nagai purges his first membership--Okamura and Nakamura--and splits away from the Executive Board, and later comes into the Issei Advisory Board. The Executive Board

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is to function as advisor to the project director. Wade Head objected and a compromise was made whereby the Executive Board would act as advisors to the unit administrator.

~~xxxxxxoperationsxxx~~

Unit Administrator

Labor Relation
Board

Executive
Board

Chairman of
Issei Advisory Board

In the operational hierarchy there were complaints about the officiousness of the foremen. The Labor Relation Board obtained the power to terminate any appointed ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ person in a key position. This is the beginning of control in the labor field by Issei.

Many people ~~xxxxxx~~ thought that Nagai was a good leader. But he made a mistake, and went a little too far. When the Spanish Consul visited Poston he demanded indemnification of the Japanese nationals to the extent of 200 million yen. This was asked of the Japanese Government. They figured that the Japanese Government would demand from the United States Government when she won the war. There's great opposition. Sawada started amovement against the attempt to collect money. He was Machiavelian. The same pattern one after another. At the same time other groups formed against this action of the Executive Board. A counter-movement is worked up. Nagai finally withdraws his stand.

The arguments against Nagai was that true Japanese would not demand anything of the Japanese Government when people are dying for the war cause in Japan.

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Because the Executive Board is discredited Okamoto, Nakamura, and Kawasaki schemed to take over the Executive Board by discrediting Nagai. Okamoto saw a chance to organize the Kibei. In this way he was able to control the Labor Relation Board, the Executive Board, and the Advisory Board. Sawada also quashed the Kibei movement. In the background of this is the registration. Sawada held no official position, but had good influence over pre-evacuation leaders who returned from internment camp or who were afraid to take part in the movement of the extremists. They didn't hold official positions. Orange County blocks, for instance, was controlled by contacting a man named Murata. The Salinas group was also controlled through another man. (What Tami calls the Yushi.) He contacted about 5 of these men. He controlled the Orange County, Salinas, Imperial, and Los Angeles groups. He knew how the -re-evacuation politics worked. That's the beginning of the fall of the Executive Board and the Kibei power, which failed to organize at the time of the registration crisis. Most of the Political maneuvering was going on in the Issei Advisory Board.

Because of two things (1) the counter-movement against the 20 million dollar proposal and (2) the counter-movement against the Kibei groups, the ascent of the moderate group is brought about. The advance of the Japanese military should also be considered. The main melody is the war, and the second melody is going on--the repercussion of strikes. The sentiment of the evacuees in regards to the war is important.

FM: Question.

RN: I wish you would refer to my journal. It's interesting to compare the trend of the war and sentiment expressed by the residents.

About May, 1943, Nomura comes into power as chairman of the temporary Community Council. He showed that he was fearless in meting out sentences in the Judicial Commission to those who deserved them." Nomura gained popularity because he was able to negotiate peacefully between the Executive Board and the Issei Advisory Board. He was born in Hawaii about 50 years ago, a veteran of the last war, and came to this country in 1918, and was working in the Mare Island Navy Yard. Hawaiian Nisei in Los Angeles were tough. The Tokyo Club syndicate was annoyed by these people. Seeing Nomura beginning to influence this Nisei group, he was taken in. Nomura started to go to Southwestern University. He was ambitious and studied law at night. He was employed by the gambling syndicate at night. He controlled these Hawaiian Nisei to behave well against the gambling syndicate. He became the brain of the Tokyo Club. He had prestige of the Japanese community, especially over the Issei. He could not speak English or Japanese well.

FM: How was Nomura able to gain prestige when he meted out punishment?

RN: He was feared. Nobody talked against him. You don't talk against a Tokyo Club man. If anyone does anything against the Tokyo Club, he would be bumped off.

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RM: Because of the strike the block managers became Issei.

RM: What were you doing all this time?

RN: I had no official title. I worked for Leighton until December, and until February I was block manager as a loan from the Sociological Bureau. But the block manager group didn't have power because the supervisor was appointed by the unit administrator. Tomo Ito quit at the time of the strike.

Meanwhile the constitution was adopted, and a new election was held in May. The camp was in a turmoil because of lawlessness. Gambling and bribe-taking by the police force occurred. The police chief was reputed to have taken in \$5000 in bribe, but lost it in gambling. Criticism came in because young kids were coming into gambling dens after coming back from seasonal work. He goes into the den (there are 7 or 8 large ones) and says he's short of money. He sits and gambles. Most of the time he loses the money.

About that time--May--the election of councilmen is held. The election is not bicameral--a single body, either Issei or Nisei, one to a block. The whole thing changes. There's no necessity for a Issei Advisory Board. Instead you have a local council and 36 councilmen. The block council is becoming weaker because the original agitators have gotten on top. In this election an overall community council for the three units is created.

There is a councilman from each block (about half Issei and half Nisei), and 36 in the Community Council. Because

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of lack of coordination the Community Council never had much power. It's independent, and "floating in the air." It doesn't have control over the residents. Okamoto, Kawasaki, Nakamura are in the Council, and Nakamura is made chairman. Retaliation against Nagai takes place.

The position of City Manager was created (executive assistant to the chairman of the Community Council). Okamoto held that and thought that he was able to run three camps. He failed to control the other groups. They are called the "city-hall gang." The extreme group got into the Community Council, but they didn't realize that they didn't have direct lines to the people. If you're too far removed from the residents you can't do anything.

Nomura is chairman of the local ~~EXXEXEX~~ council. City Manager is nive-chairman of the local council. Therefore, he was under Nomura. Some people in the city-hall gangx cannot rise abouve Nomura because of debt to the Tokyo Club. We had a lawless condition in camp. One of the most known gang is called "Exclusive 20's"--a Los Angeles gang with criminal records in Los Angeles, and evicted from Santa Anita. They established themselves as bosses in a fire station and headed Nisei kids. These beatings are gang fights that you find in Mexican communities right now. Two of those four gang leaders were the sons of chairman of the Community Council--Nakamura. Eveyone realized that something has to be done to clean up the community. Rumors of girls getting raped started. No one was willing to do anything.

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Evans came in and Nelson came in. He cusses but takes it, too. He talks like an evacuee agitators. He was very much worried about camp condition. He got up six in the morning to see if everything was all right. He went around in the evening to get hold of gang fights. No one had the goods on these kids. The Issei were afraid to apprehend these four kids because they were sons of the chairman of the Community Council, because they were supposed to have the support of the Kibei. The past glory carries over. Only a few people knew that they lost out. In July, 1943 a day-and-night gang fight started in which these four boys were involved. They ganged up on one single kid. None of them are willing to fight alone. The Executive Committee of the block managers was very strong. Because the block managers were concerned about the condition in camp. First they contacted the city-hall group, but they just stalled. Nelson, who wanted a strong block manager organization, ~~ix~~ called the Executive Committee who were willing to take vigorous action. Sawada was in the Executive, and he had control over of the pressure group ~~and~~ the Kibei and Nisei. Nelson worked out a plan to purge these youngsters. The first step was to solicit the aid of the Internal Security. The police were not consulted. The police maintains law and order in camp. The office of Internal Security has power to maintain law and order over the evacuee group. This step became known, and there was no longer any fight. Gambling decreased. Everything became quiet. Names were furnished through the

block managers and the responsible persons were apprehended, although not sent out right away. The block managers became strong ^{at} ~~for~~ the same time.

The city-hall group moves to have the boys pardoned. The project director wavers. The counter-movement to pardon the boys is supported by Sawada. Nomura was afraid of taking any action. Residents supported the block managers in this suppression of vice. Nomura was a reformist by that time.

The block manager group now feels power. In spite of all the opposition from the city-hall gang this group was able to support the opposition. The block manager doesn't listen to the Council any more. Rivalry is created. This takes to about November, 1943. There is no open rupture because Nomura and Sawada were in the same block. There's a close friendship between them. Soon after the strike Nomura began to take orders from Sawada. The latter was the block manager, was dictatorial, but succeeded in evicting a family because of not following the wishes of the residents. That example, made the people follow block decisions. This evicted family becomes the object of social ostracism.

RH: Are you referring to the fact that evicting a family which divided the block, united the block?

RN: (Explains)

It is revealed that Sawada is Nishimoto.

RN: Sawada came to control the block managers. On November 7 because Poston was to be taken over by the WRA, the unit administrator was not allowed. The unit administrator

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(evacuee) was hand-chosen by Nelson. Nelson selected Nomura. Certain difficulties arise. When on the same level the block managers are willing to take it. Because Nomura is the unit administrator the block managers feel they are subordinated. Nomura finds difficulty sending orders through the block managers. Nomura now takes Sawada as advisor to him. I think Nomura was a stooge to Sawada. In this way, he was able to send down orders through the block managers. The local council is discredited in the eyes of the residents. They increase their desire to live peacefully in their block. For that purpose they realize that they have to be organized well in their block. They found the necessity of selecting their true leader--someone who is capable of organizing the block in such a way that the block becomes a harmonious unit. This trend ~~was~~ also appear in many blocks. These persons were elected as block managers, which strengthened the block managers. The Executive Committee of the block managers are selected by the block manager. There's a strong tie between the Executive Committee of the block managers and the residents. The Council did not have that close connection. The residents want to bring their problems where it is most effective. By bringing problems to the block managers their problems are being solved. The city-hall group is still in the air. Only a formal structure. Nomura and the city-hall gang couldn't get along. Some blocks began to elect (in October) block managers as councilmen, but those five or so always identified themselves as block

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managers. Sawada was able to influence the Council through the block managers.

Project Director

Deputy
Project Director

Chairman
Local Council

Sawada

Local Council

Executive Committee
Block Managers

Supervisor
Block Managers

36
Block Managers

Block Council
~~Residents~~
Residents

In April, 1944 the WRA tried to cut down the block staff from 5 to 3½. The Deputy Project Director, Morris Berge, came from England and studied business. He went to the University of Sorbourne. In the early 20's he came to America. He was employed by the Swift Company. He was connected with a trading post of Indians, and ~~made~~ made a study of Navajo blankets. He joined a group headed by John Collier, and later became the president of this organization. He applied for naturalization in 1940. He acted like a British colonial administrator when he first came. We didn't like him because of his British way of treating natives. He tried to put in a system by talking to the Nisei supervisor of block managers. A struggle begins. He acted like the viceroy of India, refusing to listen to the ~~natives~~ natives.

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The block managers threatened to strike. It stops channels of communication. Nisei draft question was in the background. The administration was shaky as to that. The block managers used that as an opportunity. We say, if you don't listen to us, we are forced to resign. After all, these janitors are the ones who came into Poston and began to work in latrines right away. They are public-spirited people. Before they knew that they would be paid by the WRA they have been in their positions. You mean to say that we are able to terminate any of them before we terminate ourselves. It's a threat. They promise to take the matter up with Washington. That's the first time the Deputy Project Director learns that they can't do as they want. The Washington reply is "no." The block managers say that they're going to quit. The residents are aroused. The community analyst goes into the camp and finds the situation very grave. Meanwhile the Deputy Project Director was in trouble with the Red Cross and is afraid that this might become mixed up in this matter. Powell, Assistant Project Director knocks on Sawada's apartment. Community Analyst knocks on Sawada's door, too. Sawada is agitating to cause trouble among residents. Nomura was instructed by Sawada to stay out. Administration has to save face. Sawada tells the Community Analyst that the negotiation committee of the block manager has resigned. Tomorrow the block managers will resign. The Council is to meet next day, and choose a committee to negotiate for the block managers. Sawada flames up the Council. The Council

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meets with the administration. The project director accedes to the Council. There is no reduction in the number of janitors. The Council begins to think it has power, and has a conflict in May with the block managers.

In May there was a trouble between a councilman Onish and the block managers. He asked for biannual election of block managers. He wanted to kick the block manager in his block out. This idea was railroaded in the Council and the city hall meeting, with^{out} consulting the block managers. The administration recognizes the power of the block managers. This is the first time that the Council recognizes the power of the block managers. For the first time the necessity of purging the city-hall gang arises.

Nomura leaves. Okamura becomes the chairman of the local Council. He is also City Manager and a member of the Community Council. It was a good thing that the block managers had control over the local Council. Okamura, however, was becoming more and more ameliorative (traveling from "red" to "blue."). June 20-July 25, Sawada becomes personal advisor to the administration. Sawada carries anything out. When the chairman of the Community Council attempts to carry anything through, it's turned down. It increases prestige for the block managers. Anything that goes up through the block managers is listened to the administration.

Pressure comes from Camp II and III to have unit administrator position to be filled because of fear of losing the position of unit administrator. Supervisor of block manager

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leaves, and Sawada takes over the position. The Executive Committee is in name only. Block managers are controlling the block council. How unit administrator is elected--Sumida is a henchman to Sawada. They were always termed together in the public eye.

FM: In the community's eyes were they considered moderates?

RH: They're people who could get things done for the people.

RN: That's the way they're regarded. Okamoto selected a committee of 3 councilmen and 3 block managers to offer a candidate. Sumida was maneuvered into the position.

The block managers make an underground movement with the Red Cross unit to purge the city hall gang. The hospital fund is said to have been misappropriated. In the last election the city hall gang is entirely purged, except for Okamoto. Sawada supported Okamoto in the election. People are willing to awaken to the situation. The block managers control the communication system. That's the situation now. The block manager group is becoming powerful as far as the administration is concerned.

When rabies is spreading, Sawada is given the power to do something quickly. He called in a number of appointed personnel, and gave each section head a function. It worked out well. That is the first time that evacuees was placed above Caucasians. From Civil Service status Sawada was somewhere around CAF-9.

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Berge leaves. Sawada acts as personal advisor to the project director. Anything dealing with evacuees, the project director does not act on important matters without consulting Sawada. The assistant project directors come to Sawada. ~~It~~ It creates pressure on the Caucasian hierarchy. When any emergency arises, Caucasians are placed under Sawada. Quite a many people say this is because of the individual. It's not an institutional pattern, they say. This system works so well. The project director wants results. For the past 10 months he has been getting results. It has to come out, because that's the way he makes it work out.

WI: Shirt-sleeve diplomacy is what this isn't. How are these influences carried on to the other camps.

RN: There's no integration. Every Wednesday morning a meeting of the division heads, and unit administrators is held. Sawada is asked to attend. It's become a dialogue between the project director and Sawada. Sawada is now elevated to CAF-11.

Last June I said that unless the community is integrated you can't get anything done at all. They can't integrate at either end of the scale--it has to be somewhere near the middle. ^{By} ~~But~~ segregation and relocation it's become easier to organize in the middle. A good example is that it's difficult to move flakes of snow in any one direction. After making it into a ball, it's easy to move.

End of Morning Session

d.s.

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George Sabagh on Economic Aspects
of Evacuation

GS: I'll give a background of how I came on the Study. Just before evacuation the interest in this (economic) section of the Study was aroused quite early. However, the first person, Phil Neff, of the Department of Economics, in March, 1942 went down to Los Angeles County to get some material on the losses. He interviewed a number of people--evacuees--and brought back some material. I made a card for each case, property involved, and the kind of transaction that took place, but there's very little material there.

DS: In the beginning the Study was under a combined direction--Lowie from anthropology, Kidner from economics, ~~xxxxxx~~ Aiken from political science, Thomas from sociology, and Churnin from social welfare. Kidner got Neff to work, but he couldn't get much material. I asked for twice the salary he was earning, and he left. Virginia G. came to work for several months, but I finally asked Kidner to drop out. We recognized the importance of the economic effect on the evacuees and the California economy, but I didn't want to get it mixed up. Virginia tried to get the background of the Japanese farmers and went through newspapers.

~~DS~~ Bendetson had the main data frozen, anyway.

GS: We thought we could get the depletion of assets within the camp, but we had to give that up. I came in last

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July. With all this background we thought that the main emphasis should be on the losses incurred at the time of evacuation. I went to the WRA and went through the folders. Then after going through some material and feeling around, I made some sort of outline which was really beyond the data on hand. It was an ambitious outline titled "Economic Study of the Japanese since December, 1941." The difficulty was to fill in the material. On farm property I could get some material, but I could get little on non-farm property, private business, and personal property.

After my first defeat, I talked to Dorothy and she suggested that I could investigate the relationship between the segregation and the economic factors. The idea was to find out whether the effect of owning large material assets in California which could not be liquidated easily had an effect on the evacuee. This is a hypothesis which is to be tested.

DS: How it affected their loyalty or whether they became a segregant.

JS: Are you abandoning this outline of yours.

GS: I had that problem in mind in going through the records available. While I was getting this material I came in contact with some other type of material which gave me the idea that I should also treat either as a part of this or a separate entity--to what extent the agencies concerned with the protection of evacuee property were able to achieve the end which they set out and claimed in their final report. I have the DeWitt and Federal Reserve reports. There are the

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two main reports that I have been concerned with until now. I might change my outline if I get more data.

I'll first talk about the economic factors affecting segregation. There are two ways of approaching the problem. The one way is following what Dorothy is doing--to follow the statistical analysis. Taking a sample of the population on which there is some economic data. The other approach is to give a background of the area from which the "disloyal" came and, as a basis of comparison, the area from which the "loyal" came. I'm limiting myself now to the "disloyal." I'm taking the area which extends from Walnut Grove, through Sacramento, Marysville, to Auburn. My problem is to give the background of that area in terms of economic relationship--is. when the Japanese came in, economic conflicts, and the general configuration of that area. This part is not too clear to me now. That is the pre-war economic set-up. I also want the war-period. I have two treatments--statistical or non-statistical. It's difficult to arrive at conclusions because of many other factors which are involved. The economic factors might be counteracted entirely by other factors.

I have defined what the problem is. In order to treat that problem I have certain methodological difficulties. The main one is the measurement of the economic status of the individual and also finding an adequate sample in which I would have individuals with strong, weak and no economic ties. In one case you would trace back ~~xx~~ those with a strong

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economic tie and trace disloyalty against loyalty and see the relationship. Maybe you'll find

strong economic tie--10 per cent disloyal

weak economic tie--30 per cent disloyal

no economic tie--50 per cent disloyal--

If I get something like that it would be wonderful. But I don't expect it. A preliminary analysis has been discouraging. I am limiting myself to material assets. The data I got cannot be easily put in these three categories.

I'll describe the data first. I told you first that the WRA had farm security forms. This includes all the farms owned or rented by Japanese before the war. There are some amount of duplication and error. There are two forms. The first one is one on which the Japanese...

FM: In the Myrdal study what data did they use?

DS: They used census data.

GS: The first form is WFA-1. (Reads information available.) Cards differ in the amount of data filled in. There's another form which was filled out at the control station. This is another farm security form. This form is much more complete.

These forms cover the situation over a period of time and the period of time is not the same. As the date of evacuation differs it covers a period of about two months. It's a period of time. It doesn't give you the farm settled (e.g. sold) before evacuation. It gives you a pretty good universe of Japanese owned and operated farms before evacuation. One can get the importance of the economic status of the family.

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The farm is really participated by more than one member of the family. A farm with 5 acres and few equipment can be contrasted with a farm with many acres and structures on it. It's difficult to give a definite economic status, however. What is not covered by these forms is all the farm laborers. There's no information on them and it's a great gap. If I had a form for all farm laborers then I would have the whole range of the economic structure. Here you only get a part of it.

One thing that I don't have on these forms is the assessed value of the farm. Acreage has different value in different localities. The WRA has a section called economic analysis section. A very promising title, but the work there is not as promising. They have done something that is pretty good from my standpoint. They've gone through the list of ownerships and taken down all the Japanese names and the assessed value of the ownership. This covers both rural and urban. They made separate cards for this information. This does not include farms which were purchased on a contract. The form itself, from what I gather, the only information they got from the county record were name, address, assessed value. They've covered all of the Northern California counties already. This was made in 1943 to find out to what extent the Japanese were transferring their ownership. Unfortunately, they ~~xxxxx~~ haven't done the change from then to the present. For the purpose of segregation, however, it wouldn't be important.

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What I did was to get copies and duplicate forms, putting the relevant forms together--a folder for each individual.

FM: Did you make out some form for yourself?

GS: The universe on the farm tenants is not covered at all.

FM: These forms don't give the ~~xxxxxx~~ value of the farm.

GS: That's given by the WRA forms.

That's for the farms. The WRA has information on the urban properties. The value of lots and the structure on it. We have here a sample or universe of urban properties. On the urban information that I was able to get from WRA cards I only have the property owned. This is incomplete because a large number of evacuees did not own their lands. Investment was heavy in business enterprises, itself. One could argue that the ties of one who has property ~~xxxxxx~~ is a stronger one than one who hasn't property.

FM: How do they assess the value?

DS: The county assessor. It's 40 per cent of the real value. It's consistent within the county.

GS: It gives a range in relative form. The WRA plotted ^{land} on a map/which was still owned in March, 1943 and those transferred. It is striking that very few transferred their property.

FM: Is the ownership rate high in Placer County?

GS: It is.

FM: Is the Butte Farm Land Company a Japanese Corporation?

GS: Yes.

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As a check I found out that the name of the tenant and the address ~~xx~~ to check my cards to be sure that I have covered all the cards. I'll summarize:

Farm By individual farm I can get an idea of the value, acreage, the crops grown, and the transfer that occurred and to some extent the mortgage.

Urban I only have the lot owned. Here I am going to limit myself as to the type of analysis that I can make. Of the farm security cards in Sacramento County and Placer County, I am going to trace the names back to the Army list of segregants in Tule Lake. In Placer County where they all went to ~~xx~~ Tule Lake out of the owners I get 43 per cent disloyal, and tenants 49 per cent disloyal.

RN: How about in terms of acres?

GS: If you start to break the number down in terms of acres you get small numbers.

In Sacramento County the owners are 12 per cent disloyal and the tenants 31 per cent disloyal. In Sacramento owners over \$4000 are 9 per cent disloyal, and in Placer 32 per cent disloyal. In the Delta Area 4 owners and none disloyal, 50 per cent of the tenants disloyal, and 28 per cent of the tenants of the rest of Sacramento County disloyal.

(There is a discussion of extreme difference between the highway and the Delta regions in terms of economic status.)

FM: It didn't matter what income they had, they lived in shacks?

RN: Yes.

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DS: We must get something from the Japanese. We can't build ~~xxx~~ up only on statistical material.

GS: I realized that my great limitation of separating Tule Lake people from non-Tule Lake people. Also, tracing names back to the Army list. Also, there's the problem of numbers. If I'm going to break down these units, I sometimes get very small numbers. What I would like to do is to get some figure of persons ^{over a} ~~of~~ certain age interested in the farm. How many persons living or connected with the farm and weight each farm by that figure. I'd also like to get hold of the Form 26's.

(Discussion on family grouping.)

GS: Family number is not representative.

RN: We made a family card when we entered the project.

GS: That's a problem you can't solve. But for Nisei you can get the father and mother. From this you can get some idea of the family composition. The ~~purpose~~ purpose of getting WRA 26's was to find out whether they went to Tule Lake or not and also as you know this form as some information of the employment history and other side information.

JS: You can get farm laborers from Form 26.

GS: That's a good idea.

DS: George should also do something on the Northwest. He's on a fellowship, and is supposed to be doing research. But he will have to finish one first.

GS: I would like to get a farm and all the individuals over a certain age interested in that farm, get a demographic characteristic--like Issei-Nisei, males and females--

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and break it down and keep the other factors constant. And then give a weight to each family.

I got some lists from the Federal Reserve files. A list of business of Japanese in Sacramento County. There are about 253 business. I don't think they are very accurate because the JACL gives over 400. This is the state of my forms. I want to make an analysis on the basis of economic categories first. Farm laborers I must get because it's important.

Getting the non-quantitative material is very inteersting. It gives insight into the problems and helps to interpret the statistical data. On pre-evacuation material there's the census data, newspaper material, but there's no books on that area. The library in Sacramento has clippings by subject. The material has to be gotten from persons in that area.

DS: Maybe you could get contacts in Tule Lake.

RH: I could make contacts.

DS: I have a notion that the level of education would be low.

GS: On the evacuation you find material. One of the main material is the WRA folders on properties.- Evacuee Property Department of the WRA. It's built up mainly of correspondence. You get ideas about the problems that have arisen. I'm using the folders for a dual purpose. I went to the Sacramento office and got a lost of the cards of what they call their closed cases.

DS: These are trouble cases which got in contact with

WRA and therefore are a selected group.

GS: Then we got in touch with the Federal Reserve Bank and found folders in their files along the same line. These are types of economic case studies, and I'll see what I can do with them. I don't know to what extent they can be used.

DS: You can use them as examples of what comes out of your statistical analysis.

GS: At the same time I saw the advantage of field trips, and a WRA man took me through Florin and other places. I intend to go back again.

JS: Did you ask about return of evacuees?

GS: I asked about it to the director of ^{the} Florin Fruit Growers Association, who had a great deal of contact with Japanese. He said: "Well, of course, we object to their coming back, but really I miss their labor. The town is dead." I think most of the growers would like to have them coming back.

DS: The lower classes were antagonistic and the higher classes would like to have them back.

GS: Newcastle and Isleton and Walnut Grove struck me as alike and Florin impressed me as being more wealthy. My field work, however, is very incomplete. That is all the historical information that I could think of.

FM: What kind of historical information do you want?

GS: I would like to know of the economic relationships-- the rise of the Japanese from non-owner to owners and the resistance to that. ~~The~~ Also to what extent the Caucasians took advantage of the Japanese.

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DS: You want an economic history. When they came in, what line they went into, what organization they set up.

WI: Isn't there any literature on that?

DS: Practically none.

RN: A good paper was done for Arizona.

GS: I have a report by Hatch of the WRA on a field trip. It shows the naive attitude of the WRA officials. Hatch says that very few evacuees are willing to sell their property. The price is really high now.

DS: The Najimas don't want to sell because ~~that~~ that's all they have left. Why should the WRA try to make them sell.

GS: The second section is the description of the agencies to protect the properties of the evacuees. (Reads from DeWitt's report.) The agencies imply that they have done a good job. (Reads letter from Mary tsukamoto of the Florin JACL. ~~Suppressed~~ expressed by those present at the sentiment of gratitude expressed to the U.S. Government for the humane treatment received by the Japanese. R.N. raises four fingers to R.H., who nods.)

RN: It showed that that sort of sentiment prevailed prior to evacuation.

RH: Many people felt that they ~~were~~ were grateful for not being murdered.

GS: (Reads letter from people in Walnut Grove.)

RN: They wanted to get on the good side of the officials.

WI: Don't Japanese write that sort of letter all of the time?

FM: Yes.

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RH: When they want to get something.

FM: The JACL is like that.

GS: (Reads letter from Tom Hirashima, JACL leader of Santa Barbara.)

RN: Find out whether the national JACL sent out directiges to local chapters to send such letters.

DS: This is almost all from JACL people.

RH: In defense I grovel in front of the agitators.

GS: The main tehsis is this. Here agencies were set up whose aim was to protect the properties of the evacuees. They were given certain powers. They expressed the opinion that they achieved the aim set for them. My job is to find the aim, and find out the powers that ~~xx~~ were given to them, to what extent they were used, and to what extent they achieved their aim. The freezing power, for instance, which was used only once. The power of attorney, for instance, was not exercised.

JS: People were afraid to store their belongings in federal storage.

GH: They also didn't give any assurance of taking responsibility.

RN: Many people didn't expect to stay away long. Many people stored their goods in such a way as to require repacking because they expected to come back soon.

GS: The Federal Reserve Bank is a very conservative organization. They could appeal to outside agengies to deal with the evacuees.

DS: Tell what they did, perhaps in the afternoon.

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GS: To what extent could I integrate the two sections of my reports?

DS: You have to give an over all picture of the agencies. Then you can make an intensive study of a certain area. He should neglect the reaction of the evacuees for the present. What was the agencies trying to do, assuming cooperation. Then you can say why evacuees could not cooperate.

RN: Our duty is to feed you human elements.

DS: There may be certain things that you might be able to gather in the center.

This expectation that the evacuees thought that this would be a short war--I don't know what the WCCA thought. I don't think that they thought that out. (Discussion). The WRA seems to be afraid of suits against the government after the war.

GS: (Reads percentage transferred) Average 20 per cent. Placer 8 per cent. Sacramento 13 per cent.

JS: Many people should relocate from Tule Lake.

RH: Many people can't say so, but they want to get out and relocate.

DS: It would be terrible if people went back to Placer County from Tule Lake.

JS: They should be released to some other center first.

DS: Rosalie, you should get this resegregation movement started.

RN: Are evacuees getting income from these properties?

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Afternoon Session

GS: I was going to talk about the federal agencies. The Federal Reserve Bank came into the picture about March, 1942. The whole program was geared around the idea of voluntary evacuation--there was some carry-over of that attitude. Emphasis was on the word voluntary, and help was to be voluntary. We'll be there to see that creditors and Japanese can be brought together. ~~But~~ By and large it appears that everything came under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Bank--both urban and rural. The Farm Security came in on March 15. Their policy was similar to the Federal Reserve Bank. The Farm Security discussed the possibility of freezing all farms, for instance, a step which the Federal Reserve Bank was not willing to ~~take~~ take.

The Farm Security task was two fold: the continuation of agricultural work, and second the protection of evacuee property. This is the general goal.

As far as power is concerned, they made the whole matter voluntary and were not going to act as custodian. In some cases the power of attorney to act for the Japanese might have been necessary. The Federal Reserve Bank did not use the power of attorney. The Farm Security did use the power of attorney to some extent. They had one power which they could use to insist on fair treatment. This is the freezing power. Any property which is frozen can not be acted upon without special permission. For alien property this power was used. The same power was delegated to the Federal Reserve Bank. This freezing power was first applied to aliens

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and extended to citizens. Somewhere in April this power was given to the Farm Security, and the WRA in November, 1942. The Farm Security used it only once.

But the argument of all the agencies is that they have a club. As they didn't hit anybody with that club, it didn't do much good. It's a very extensive power. But it was used for enemy alien property. I had one case where the evacuee asked whether the freezing power could be applied, and he was told that his property was too small to apply the freezing order. They claimed that there was no necessity of using this weapon.

FM: Where did you get your data.

GS: I have the final reports of the Federal Reserve Bank and the Farm Security. I also have some correspondence from the San Francisco WRA. I have a letter from Col. Bendetsen which asks why the power of freezing is not being used. I have nothing from evacuees. I think a lot of things were not put down.

FM: It was a very confused period.

GS: You get a very confused picture. The transfer from federal agencies to WRA is very confused. I'll take the types of properties and follow some of the problems.

Personal and movable property The main problem was that of storage. There was some confusion between ~~which~~ agencies as to which agency should take care of a equipment. Before March/ 30, the Federal Reserve Bank insisted on emphasizing the fact that people should store with their friends. After

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that they started to get busy getting ~~xxxxxx~~ goods to store. Still the general emphasis, while it did improve, still allowed for stories about goods stored not being insured, etc.

RN: They expected the evacuees to crate the things up in a certain way.

GS: The WRA now does the crating and everything.

DS: They do a very good job, it seems.

GS: I don't think that the matter of transportation and storage is so important.

RN: With evacuee permission they send stored goods to various centers.

Last year a warehouse in Poston was burned up, and these property were sent to the center without evacuee consent. The evacuee had to waive claim for damage.

GS: Non-farm Property This came almost wholly under the Federal Reserve Bank. How much came under the Federal Reserve Bank is not known. Of the 253 business on this list, about a 100 came under the notice of the Federal Reserve. They give a large number of cases, but many of them were not real cases.

RN: They probably didn't care what happened to the small farms.

DS: They never got the social implication of the whole movement. Of course, an individual, if he had to move, would have to take a great loss in selling property.

GS: Some of them probably felt that small loss wouldn't hurt the economy of the nation. It's global thinking.

When an evacuee came, the Federal Reserve Bank would ask

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who he usually dealt with. If he didn't have anyone, the bank suggested someone.

DS: The dishonesty of government reporting will be a small aspect of the report, but will be brought out.

RN: You have to remember that many of the goods were frozen, and these Caucasians began to hear that you could buy things for almost ~~xxingx~~ nothing.

DS: Caucasians in Chinatown were just disgusting--buying up the things for a fraction of the price.

GS: There's a report ~~by~~ put out by the investigating section of the Federal Reserve and they went down to Los Angeles, and brought out a pretty pessimistic report.

~~x~~ RN: ~~Im~~ don't hear much bad report from people in other area.

FM: This must have disrupted the Federal Reserve work.

GS: No, the Federal Reserve is a big organization. It's possible, however. San Francisco was a policy-making office.

FM: If they had been able to set up a separate office it might have been more orderly.

GS: They took little responsibility themselves. After they claimed that everything was voluntary, how can they claim all the things that they do. They didn't know the actual condition, because when they sent out a form letter about 9 out of 10 did not answer.

RN: There was some fear of going to a Federal Building.

GS: The important thing is the policy. There were probably local differences.

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The Jews earned a bad reputation for themselves. You can get this part of the story from evacuees. Maybe Rosalie can get something.

DS: What happened between the time evacuation was decided and the federal agencies came in. Mari Okazaki was with the WCCA teams. We must get her help. Mari kept notes. I could write to her.

RN: Marion Wright, lawyer, is an important man to see.

GS: Farm Property I have only worked with the area I was talking about. I don't know the situation in Los Angeles, but in the Sacramento Area there were apparently difficulties in finding operators for the Japanese farms.

RN: What type of farming was carried on?

GS: Orchards in Placer Country--40 - 50 acre ~~XXXXX~~ orchards. Grapes and berries in Florin. Along the Sacramento River you get quite a bit of tenant truck farming--tomato, beans, etc. Further down the river you get asparagus, tomato, beets.

RN: About 20 years ago you had orchard after orchard. It seems to have changed. You know what happened to the fruit industry during the depression.

DS: On the general farming situation we can get all the stuff that we want. Dave _____, Wellman, and others know about the type of transfer in farming that went on in that region.

RN: My memory is that that section is a fruit section, except that asparagus acreage was increasing. Sugar beet fields/ existed, too. Charlie hasn't any case history

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from that area.

GS: Don't you get the community of origin in your cards?

DS: But you can't just pick a card. You have to have an introduction.

RN: Perhaps Doctor Akamatsu could help us on this matter.

GS: The reason for difficulty in getting operators was that it was submarginal farming. I'll have to check because the Placer County land is supposed to be good land. Florin land is not as good. But they give that argument, anyway. My theory is that pressure came from private groups to get in the large shipping companies.

RN: They did control the Japanese farms, anyway.

FM: What were the fruits?

GS: They were deciduous fruits--pear, plum, peaches, cherries, persimmons. In Florin and Lodi they had grapes. Some of the farm corporations are cooperative. The fruit is packed and shipped. The expense is borne by the growers if it is not cooperative. It is important because the farmers ship it to the East. The farm corporation began to take over the Japanese farm on a managerial basis--50-50 basis. The FSA were active in getting the operators. The FSA had a loaning power to operate the farms. Close to a million dollars went to the farm corporations.

RN: One ~~Ab~~kie family wasn't getting anyplace at all, got a loan from the FSA and started farming after a Japanese left. You can't blame them for not making money. Japanese could plow in a straight line/ by holding the

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plow himself. It took three Oakies to make a straight line. One held the reins, another lead the horse, and a third held the plow. (laughter)

GS: The farm corporation got permission to form a separate entity--Northern Farms Incorporated, Florin Farms Incorporated, etc.

RN: Does it show that shipping companies were disturbed because the Japanese were being moved?

GS: Even in March they tried to get extension of the period before evacuation.

RN: There was an intimate relation between the Japanese farmers and the shipping companies.

GS: This parent corporation would operate the farm on a 50-50 basis for one season and for the duration if they wanted. All the machinery was supposed to be left on the farm. Then they had the loan from the Farm Security. I wasn't able to get financial statements from all. But two reports showed that 80 per cent of the farms were operated at a loss.

FM: Do the corporations lose?

GS: The WRA came into the picture. A big conference was held after the first season. The corporation said that they couldn't operate without a loan.

JS: How could they collect from the evacuees?

GS: That puzzles me. There was one case where an evacuee was told that the farm tractor was sold to cover the loss.

RN: The orchard industry is a highly skilled industry.

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They have to ship to the eastern markets just at the right time.

I don't think the shipping company lost any money. In fact, they made money by commission charges.

GS: They wanted to do it again. The WRA didn't want to make the loan. The FSA went out of the picture. Then WRA got the bright idea to get the Chinese on the farms. They brag about it. They got the Chinese broadcaster to broadcast, and got about 500 applicants. A new contract was drawn up between the evacuees and the Chinese. It proved to be one of the best seasons in 40 years or so. Hatch said that if the evacuees had been here all farms would have been out of mortgage. We went to see the 200 acre farm of which he was proud--tomatoes, mostly. The long-timer Chinese had healthy tomato plants, and there was a contrast with the new-comers. That particular person happened to own a bar in San Francisco. He didn't seem to like it very much. He made a thousand dollars. Wellman said that it was incredible, that they should have made much more.

RN: Japanese could have made \$20,000. If a lug of tomatoes sell for 50 cents, that covers everything. A lug sold for about \$3 or so.

GS: Don't forget the scarcity of labor and the high prices. You have to compare with other farmers. For the freezing power the FSA formed a corporation to take care of frozen farms, if necessary.

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Farm Machinery The attitude of FSA first was preventing selling for scrap, but insisting on leaving machinery on the farm. In Los Angeles quite a bit of farm machinery was stored. There were complaints. A survey was made by WRA, and it was revealed that about 250 farm machinery was stored in Southern California.

RN: On some small farms they practically gave up their farm machinery for almost nothing. You hear that evacuees are saying ~~that's the use of going back~~ 'What's the use of going back. You have to start all over again.'

DS: There you have a very interesting case material about farm machinery that has been used. The evacuee forgets that it's being used, they try to sell it, and in many cases ~~it~~ amount of deterioration of the machinery is not taken into consideration.

GS: I have some information on the productivity of the area. I intended to follow this general line of treatment.

DS: Statistical treatment in over all terms. Specific analysis in ~~in~~ a single area. Trying to get collaboration in a little while from people on the project. Your policy section is pretty good now, except on developing the farm security section.

GS: I made a questionnaire of information I would like from each individual. I would like criticism ~~from~~ on how I could get this information.

RN: What's the reason for your questionnaire?

GS: To trace the change in ownership.

RN: What evacuees?

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GS: You get what you can get.

DS: You mean you want some cases?

GS: I want static and dynamic information on ownership. (Explains the questionnaire.)

RN: The next question is, from where can you get it.

GS: Perhaps you can get hold of a lawyer. Maybe he can't answer it.

RN: Here's the point. That's the ideal set-up. To find whether those questions are practical or not. We have to determine how you're going to get that information.

DS: Are you asking Dick whether he can get this sort of information in Poston?

RN: You to remember two different things. Asking a lawyer and asking us. Don't you see we understand what type of information you want. The actual situation is there. Instead to get it, what is the best method. I'll say that you ~~xxxxx~~ won't get that from evacuees directly.

GS: Maybe you'll have to ask lawyers.

EM: You mean to say you can't get it?

DS: It's delicate information.

GS: But here's the point. A lawyer has professional ethics.

RH: Will you tell me what I could get? I might be able to get to see a number of people to see where they have their land, the amount of acreage, how much they lost, how much agencies didn't help them. It's unlikely ~~xx~~ I'll get detailed information on equipment, without cracking rapport.

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RN: The only way I could get anything is by quitting my job and going into evacuee property.

FM: I've talked to Niseis who talked about their losses.

RN: You're forgetting that relocation centers are a cultural island.

DS: Frank says that it's not impossible. It might be possible with those who are relocated. You could get the farm people whom Charlie have interviewed.

RN: You can't get case history in camp.

DS: You could get hidden interviews in camp.

RN: You could print a questionnaire with a fancy name and then send out direct from the University to these people. You might get something.

RH: With the prestige that Tachibana has maybe he might be able to furnish some names.

DS: I think you're on the wrong track in what you want from evacuees. You are not going to be fooled by the official data. What would you add here from the evacuees that would make it otherwise. Actually I am not impressed that this is going to give you a heck of a lot more than what you already have.

The thing to do is to get more of the relationships and attitudes. Relationship with the agencies. What gripes they have. How they feel.

RN: At Poston I'll guarantee three forms filled out for youx.

RH: If my good trusted friend, if they're in the property group--good. They'd be suspicious if I brought the

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questions in right away.

DS: I'm afraid that he's defeated before he begins on a questionnaire. Universities have lost their prestige already with tie-ups with what Japanese consider to be the Intelligence Service. I'd be suspicious of anything that comes back. I think you have a swell basis for working. Then submitting what you get to people like Dick, who can criticize and indicate evacuee attitude. I believe that's all you're going to get right at the moment.

RN: If you present this one year from now, it might be possible. Although this study is ~~bound~~ bound to end soon, as you all know, it's probable that people will be working for a long time. After the Japanese come back contacts can be made later. They'll be suspicious and change their figures. A Japanese who brought it up would arouse suspicion.

GS: The material will be general.

DS: I think on the general evolution of the results that you get and the inference that you make and feeling in something of the attitude, the whole attitude of the Japanese towards economic losses and the attitude towards agencies can be brought up.

RN: Many people went into the relocation with the idea of asking questions.

GS: As this is thrown over-board, the only other thing that we might be able to get was a background for the particular Sacramento Area. It's unfortunate that many of them are in Tule Lake now and are not accessible.

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DS: My solution for the present is that I think you had better work up thoroughly what you have on hand. It's unfortunate you ~~xx~~ have to ignore a body of data which ~~xx~~ hasn't been assembled with regards to the evacuee attitude. You'll have to act like Morton. Study with immediate access to evacuees~~x~~. Morton had to take registration from ~~xx~~ official records only.

RH: You see the resistance we're putting up? You'd get ten times the resistance by other people.

FM: I would like to have a list of general questions in reference to what you want. I feel sure we might get something.

RH: I'll make another offer. If~~x~~ you could write a list of 20 questions, I might be able to get Nakamura to do something about it.

JS: ~~A~~re you interested in the depletion of savings?

DS: We're interested, but it's difficult to get. We may be able to get the mail-order house sales and also the postal accounts.

The End