

Labor unions - Communist  
~~party influence~~ PROBLEM ✓  
(1952)

What to do ✓

about

# COMMUNISM in UNIONS,

+

By

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A letter to Senator Humphrey, in response  
to his request for our views on this subject  
for use by the Senate Subcommittee on Labor  
and Labor-Management Relations

# COMMUNISM IN UNIONS

March 21, 1952

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey  
Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-  
Management Relations  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Humphrey:

You have asked three questions on behalf of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations:

1. Is there an effective legislative approach to the problem of Communist-dominated unions?
2. Can you suggest the principles or statutory language which ought to be embodied in such legislation?
3. Can you suggest avenues of inquiry which the Subcommittee ought to pursue?

After full and careful study, we are respectfully submitting our observations and recommendations. We offer our views in no dogmatic vein, as any thoughtful person with experience in the labor field will recognize that this is a most difficult subject. Concern for the national security in this area involves necessarily the consideration of some possible limitation on free choice of representatives by employees.

## FIRST QUESTION

In answer to your first question, we believe it is now finally up to Congress to use to the very fullest all

its legislative power to eradicate dangerous Communists from positions of power or influence in labor unions. Present legislation appears to be inadequate. There is no reason why this cannot be corrected. We think that Supreme Court Justice Jackson was right when he said, "I cannot believe that Congress has less power to protect labor unions from Communist Party domination than it has from employer domination."

For many years both the public and Congress have been convinced that certain labor unions were dominated by Communists. Yet—despite the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act—many of these same unions have had the entire support of the United States Government through its agencies and courts in compelling employers to bargain collectively with them as agents for employees in plants which are engaged in interstate commerce and in production for the Armed Services.

The Taft-Hartley provisions — requiring union officers to file non-Communist affidavits in order to use the services of the National Labor Relations Board —have apparently not proved a complete answer to the problem, though obviously helpful.

It must be noted that when the Attorney General of the United States was authorized and directed by Executive Order 9835 to prepare lists of organizations or groups which were determined by him to be "totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive", the names of labor unions so generally believed to be dominated by Communists nowhere appeared on such lists.

A careful study of the Internal Security Act of 1950 by which Congress apparently sought to identify and expose Communist organizations and Communist-front organizations shows that it contains no specific reference to the problem of Communist-dominated labor unions. The act leaves considerable doubt as to whether a labor union, devoting substantial effort and time to collective bargaining, can be found to be a

"Communist-front organization" since, by definition, such an organization must be "*primarily* operated for the purpose of giving aid and support" to a foreign Communist government or other Communist organizations.

## **SECOND QUESTION**

We believe an independent government agency should be empowered and directed to seek out, authoritatively identify, and publicly designate Communists or their agents in labor unions. Congress should take measures to see that such Communists—provided their identity as such is sustained in a fair and prompt proceeding giving Constitutional due-process protections—will be surely eliminated from any vantage points from which to do damage personally or to exercise damaging influence over others. Later on in this letter we offer some specific suggestions as to how this might be done.

## **THIRD QUESTION**

As to your third question—concerning whether there are avenues of inquiry not already studied by other committees and which your Committee ought to pursue—we have no special experience or information that would seem to promise you any help in your problem. Although General Electric deals with some sixty or more different union bargaining agencies—all certified by the Federal Government to us as legal representatives with whom we must bargain in good faith—such knowledge as we have concerning the problem of Communist infiltration of labor unions is derived from the outside information available to the public generally, from prior investigations of various Congressional Committees, and from the public expressions or other claims made available by private individuals who interest themselves in the anti-Communist field for various reasons. In this we believe that Congress must be, of necessity, better and more reliably informed than we.

# *The Nature of the Problem*

Before detailing our suggestions, we want to offer these observations:

## **Determination of Communist Domination**

One of the major fears about Communist-dominated unions, which has previously been recognized by Congress, is that such unions may encourage strikes for "political" purposes, particularly in times of emergency. In practice, however, it is not only difficult to determine what strikes are "political", but we would hardly feel justified in identifying unions as being Communist dominated merely because they call or support strikes in defense plants. Certainly in the present defense period, the various "anti-Communist" or "right-wing" unions are at least neck-and-neck with any "left-wing" unions—publicly suspected of subversive tendencies or dangers—in their threatened or actual interruption of critical defense production in our own atomic, steel, electronics, and aircraft plants.

Our own actual day-to-day negotiations and other such Government-compelled relationships have not provided us with any conclusive evidence for our reliably and authoritatively determining that one or more of these unions were in actual fact under Communist domination. In certain anti-Communist unions, we so often find ourselves dealing with substantially the same leaders in a new role who only yesterday and for years past were in the camp they now denounce. It is our impression that the employees and the country at large are entitled to know *authoritatively* who are the leaders whose conversions have been genuine and who are the leaders who have shifted for reasons of internal union political expediency or, more important, who are agents of new infiltration of the reformed group.

One of the criteria we hear most frequently urged—for use as positive proof of Communist Party mem-

bership or other such dangerous association—is sworn testimony before the Un-American Activities Committee or other Congressional Committees. But we have never been able to convince ourselves that we could determine what unions or individuals were Communists merely upon the existence of such testimony, for the reason that we did not believe that we were qualified to determine the credibility or trustworthiness of the individuals who had testified. It seems to us to be obvious that individual employers, such as we, cannot and should not make the determination as to what unions are led by Communists even on the basis of sworn testimony, for the reason that some of those union leaders who are now most avowedly "anti-Communist" have, in fact, been identified by testimony under oath as having been at one time members of the Communist Party. For example, there is testimony under oath before the House Un-American Activities Committee in October 1939 that Mr. James B. Carey, Secretary of the CIO and now President of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (CIO), who is quite vocally opposed to Communism and Communists, was a member of the Communist Party.\* From anything we know, we should think that such a statement was inaccurate in the extreme. But, accurate or inaccurate, it illustrates that an employer could hardly be expected to have competent information on which to decide which sworn witnesses he will rely on and which he will reject.

In other words, we do not believe that employers are qualified to safely and fairly exercise the judicial function of appraising evidence concerning Communist affiliations of individuals or unions. This is primarily a governmental function which ought to be exercised by either judicial or administrative agencies specifically charged with such responsibility.

### **Can We Rely on Internal House Cleaning?**

A little history may illustrate the intricacy and difficulty of these complications which we could all well

\* Hearings before Special Committee on Un-American Activities, H. R. 76th Cong. 1st Session, Vol. 9, pp. 5760, 5794 (1939).

wish did not exist. For years there had been charges that certain unions were socialistic and then Communistic, and these claims became more insistent after the formation of CIO. Then, you will recall that, as early as 1939, this had gotten to the point where testimony was given before Congressional committees concerning infiltration and control of unions by Communists. Some of the same unions, which were expelled from the CIO only in 1949, were identified by witnesses in those 1939 hearings as being under Communist leadership or control.

For many years now it seems to have been well established that—following passage of the Wagner Act and during the widespread union organization campaigns that followed for some years—certain union labor leaders knowingly accepted and welcomed the assistance and participation of or joined with Communists in the belief that the latter's ideas and methods were effective and useful.

Consequently, during the more than a decade between the passage of the Wagner Act, and the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, it is not surprising that those who attempted to warn of the dangers of Communist domination of the ideas and activities of labor unions were characterized as "Red baiters" by those in power—including many labor leaders who are now prominent as "anti-Communists" and as "right-wing" leaders. It is also not surprising that, during this period of "usefulness" of the Communists and while the majority of employees and public were unsuspecting, certain major labor organizations and leaders attempted little, if anything, toward really eliminating and exposing those of their officers and useful associates who were known to them as Communists or heavily suspected as being such.

It was not until the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act that Congress for the first time took a step toward denying to Communists the power, immunities, and other privileges which Congress had granted to union officials in guiding labor unions. It would have been



expected that loyal union leaders would much earlier have taken even more drastic steps. But unfortunately they had done so in too few instances. Furthermore, many labor leaders, who had never associated with Communists and whose loyalty had never been doubted, have been very vocal in opposing that section of the Taft-Hartley Act which goes only so far as to require the signing of non-Communist affidavits by officers of unions seeking the services of the National Labor Relations Board.

It seems true that the Taft-Hartley provision has proved inadequate and something more effective is needed. But it should be recognized that any possible hope that the non-Communist affidavit procedure would serve to distinguish Communist and non-Communist labor leaders was in large measure destroyed when prominent and obviously non-Communist labor leaders, for reasons which seemed to suit their purposes, refused to cooperate and sign the affidavit.

### **The Internal Purge**

Much has been said about the recent voluntary "purge" of certain unions by the CIO as proving that there is no need for legislation on this problem. However, as we read the record of the CIO 1949 Convention, it seems to us that the organizations were expelled, not because they were found to constitute a danger or threat to the country, but chiefly because they had refused to follow the political and other policies which had been adopted and endorsed by the CIO. The record appears to indicate that the CIO was not objecting to the right of Communists to function as labor union leaders, but was objecting to the right of any such Communists to function as leaders of a union *affiliated with the CIO*.

The "Purge Convention" record includes the following:

DELEGATE REUTHER, United Automobile Workers—Page 266:\*

"We don't challenge the Communist Party's right to stand up in America and have their say.

\* Excerpts from CIO Proceedings, 1949.

We don't challenge these few people in CIO to go out and peddle the Communist Party Line. What we do challenge and what this constitutional provision provides putting an end to is not their right to peddle the Communist Party Line. We challenge, and we are going to put a stop to their right to peddle the Communist Party Line with a CIO label on the wrapper. That's what we are going to do.

"Let them peddle the Line; let them stand up wherever they can get an audience and peddle the Communist Party Line to their heart's content. But we say, if you are going to peddle the Party Line, put the Party label on it, don't put the CIO label on it. That's the basic question before us. It has nothing to do with the democratic rights of the minority. It has everything to do with how a free, democratic, voluntary association of working people handle their internal affairs."

DELEGATE BALDANZI, Textile Workers — Page 307\*

"This is one of the most important discussions and developments in the history of the CIO. It was not taken in any hasty fashion. When one says that Philip Murray has the patience of Job, they are putting it very mildly.

"This development began nine years ago, and it was inevitable that it come to a conclusion sooner or later, and many of us feel that it is nine years too late."

Such "house cleaning"—no matter how motivated or timed—does not go to the root of the problem. The expelled unions—whose officers filed the non-Communist affidavits—have continued to enjoy the full protection of Federal law.

The historical attitude of labor union leaders in general toward the problem of Communist domination of unions leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the elimination of Communists from positions of union leadership can only be accomplished through effective action by Congress. Some evidence that even the voluntary "house cleaning" has not been continued thoroughly and aggressively is found in news-

\* Excerpts from CIO Proceedings, 1949.

paper reports of only the past two weeks. These reports indicate that, following a Congressional hearing in Detroit, a major International union has taken over the administration of one of its largest locals and expelled some minor officers who had been identified as "members of or subservient to the Communist Party". The most significant aspect of this action is that it took place only after public identification of the expelled individuals as Communists in testimony before the Un-American Activities Committee. It is difficult to believe—after the publicity this situation in question has received over a long period—that either the local or the international officers have any more information now than before the Congressional hearing concerning the individuals who have just been removed.

Human nature being what it is and the realities of union politics being what they are, it seems evident that in many cases any needed "house cleaning" in certain unions will come about voluntarily only when long overdue, or when such house cleaning is politically desirable or necessary. Obviously, what the country is interested in is not the particular politics of the moment as between various factions in unions or as between competing unions but rather in the prompt exposure and elimination of Communists from positions of leadership and influence in unions.

### **Congress Should Act**

When we responded to your request and wired you some time ago that we believed new legislation was necessary to deal with the problem of Communist domination of labor unions, we fully anticipated that we would be attacked for making such recommendation and that our motives would be questioned. This, of course, has occurred by simultaneous attacks from the Daily Worker and from IUE-CIO. This is not unlike the situation we experienced in 1948 and 1949 when the Atomic Energy Commission ordered us to withdraw recognition from the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America when that

organization declined to satisfy the Commission concerning its alleged Communist connections. When we complied with the order of the Atomic Energy Commission, we and the Commission were not only sued for \$1,000,000 by the UE but, to our utter amazement, the action of the Commission and General Electric was condemned and opposed by CIO both in the courts and publicly. (You may want to keep this example in mind when considering some proposals now before you about tripartite committees made up of Government, union and employer representatives.)

We recite the above history only to suggest that your action in considering legislation in this area and the time and effort spent by all of those whom you have consulted will be wholly in vain unless your Subcommittee is sufficiently concerned with this problem to take action you deem proper regardless of strong opposition by some of the union organizations. Certain unions are of course supporting more effective legislation, according to your preparatory Report.

We are hopeful that your Subcommittee will go forward and recommend such new legislation. We believe that union members and the American people in general will support you when it is made clear to them that the organizations which oppose such legislation do so not on the ground that it would be injurious or harmful to the public generally, but on the ground that the legislation might possibly be abused or used to hamper the now available practices of their private organizations.

We happen to believe, unlike these organizations, that the American people in general are more concerned with eliminating Communists from positions in which they can possibly injure the country than they are in remote or speculative dangers which might result to a particular organization or in shifts in the competitive advantages enjoyed by various union leaders. If it is true that Communist domination of unions constitutes a danger to the country, it would seem that loyal and patriotic organizations would wel-

come and cooperate with the Government's efforts to eradicate such danger if, as is the case, legislation can be prepared which is surrounded with proper safeguards to their legitimate and real concerns.

If labor unions could be persuaded that they, like other groups in our society, should be subject to regulatory legislation for the over-all benefit of the country, they could be of real service in suggesting legislation which would be effective and contain the safeguards legitimate unions are entitled to. But whether or not they will be so persuaded, it is nevertheless up to Congress to go ahead to see what can be done for the security of the country in the balanced best interests of all—including that approximately one fourth of the work force which is represented by unions.

### **The Tripartite Approach**

One suggestion before your Subcommittee has been that authority and responsibility for handling the problem of Communist-dominated unions should be put in the hands of a tripartite board composed of employer, union and Government representatives, with authority to withhold Government contracts.

The proposal to withhold granting Government contracts to employers who recognize and deal with Communist-dominated unions would have our endorsement if it were merely one of the penalties which followed continued recognition by an employer of a union which had been found by an impartial Board to be Communist-dominated, which had had its NLRB certifications nullified, and which had been ordered to cease and desist from representing itself as a labor union.

However, the proposal as made to your Subcommittee seems clearly unworkable for many reasons. For one thing, it would permit NLRB certifications to the union in question to continue in effect. This would create the situation whereby the Federal Gov-

ernment through the NLRB and the courts would be ordering an employer to recognize and deal with a particular union, but through another Government agency would be telling the same employer he could not secure Government contracts if he obeyed such an order. Certainly if the union in question were so dominated by Communists that the employees whom it represents would be deprived of the opportunity to work on Government contracts, the union should at least be stripped of its rights before the NLRB and forbidden to assert that it is a labor organization.

In addition to this major weakness of the proposal, there is also the suggestion that the determination of Communist domination be made by a tripartite group composed in part of employers and union representatives.

We do not believe employers would be proper participants in a tripartite proceeding for the same reasons given against sole responsibility being put on employers.

We also feel that unions are too likely to be influenced by the political or emotional factors bearing on their other immediate interests at the given moment ever to be dependable members of such a tripartite group. We take as a single example the instance cited on pages 11 and 12 where the CIO in 1949 publicly and in the courts condemned the Government's action in denying representation to UE in our atomic plants but where CIO itself, later in the same year, expelled UE from any further representation or membership in CIO. The calm gathering and impartial judging of the facts as to Communism itself and related enemy agents can best and only be done by those who have no possible conflicting interests to color their judgment.

To repeat, we believe that the judicial function of appraising evidence concerning Communist affiliations of individuals or unions is primarily a governmental function to be exercised by either judicial or

administrative agencies specifically charged with such responsibility. It is for this same reason that we do not believe any tripartite organization should be established to determine the issue of Communist domination or the presence or possibility of enemy agent danger. A tripartite organization of union and employer representatives may be of some use where there is need for compromising opposing interests of management and employees on particular issues. However, when the issue to be decided is the important question of whether an individual or organization is serving the interests of a Communist foreign government, the interests of employers and of employees represented by the unions are not in conflict. The matter should not be determined on the basis of compromise—or with reference to any other interests more compelling at the moment—but rather on the basis of impartial, unbiased and judicial analysis of facts about Communism as proved and established.

It seems to us that a tripartite organization is far more dangerous to the rights of individuals or organizations than is an impartial and unbiased group charged with exercising judicial or quasi-judicial responsibilities on behalf of the public at large. The tripartite device would lend itself to connivance and special schemes to discredit a minority group in favor of a more popular or powerful group, which we should think would be most vehemently opposed by all persons who support civil liberties and fair dealing.

In addition to the foregoing objections, we have only last year witnessed what amounted to practically a national boycott of the tripartite Wage Stabilization Board by representatives of certain labor organizations. You will recall that union officers refused to participate in the proceedings of the tripartite Wage Stabilization Board until certain governmental policies and procedures satisfactory to them had been adopted. In view of such history, is it not fair to assume that reliance on a tripartite arrangement in the future for

exposing and ascertaining who are Communists might well lead to another boycott until the Tripartite Board was willing to adopt policies, procedures and practices satisfactory to certain unions? If this is even a possibility, it would throw the issue of determining Communists into the area of the fortunes of unions rather than putting it where it belongs—namely, in the area of protecting the country and employees from dangerous individuals.

## *Specific Recommendations*

The general principles which we believe might effectively be incorporated in new legislation to deal with the problem of Communist domination of labor unions, are as follows:

### **1. Official Government investigation and identification of Communist-dominated unions and Communist union leaders.**

As you already know from our prior communications, we believe that Congress should assign to an independent Government agency the duty and responsibility for investigating and determining which, if any, labor organizations are dominated by Communists. It is a matter of mere detail whether this task is assigned to the National Labor Relations Board, the Subversive Activities Control Board, or some wholly new agency created for this special purpose. It is important, however, that some impartial, unbiased, official and wholly Government agency perform the task of determining when Communist domination exists and when it has been falsely alleged. In our opinion, no private organization should be empowered to make such a delicate and important determination. We would feel the same about any tripartite group.

To avoid the possibility that such a Commission might be used to harass or injure a bona fide labor



organization, your Subcommittee might deem it appropriate that proceedings before the Commission could only be commenced either upon the Commission's own initiative or a complaint filed by the Attorney General. Thus any employers who might be inclined to do so, could not utilize the procedures of the Commission to resist organization of their employees or embarrass a union. Similarly, a union could not use the procedures of the Commission merely to harass a rival union. In any event, it seems to us quite obvious that only the Federal Government has available the investigative resources, the objectivity, and the authority by which a proper determination of this issue can be made.

## **2. Establishment of criteria, pursuant to which the independent agency would make its determination.**

Congress has already established criteria by which the Subversive Activities Control Board may determine whether other forms of voluntary organizations are Communist-action organizations or Communist-front organizations. As noted before, there would seem to be some difficulties in the way of this Board finding that a labor organization is a "Communist-front organization" since, by definition, such an organization must be "primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support" to a foreign Communist government or other Communist organizations.

We believe that these criteria already established by Congress can be adapted to any special problems of identifying Communist labor organizations and Communist labor leaders. The extent to which such adaptation or modification is necessary is a problem which your Subcommittee, with the aid of experts and witnesses available to you, is far more capable of resolving than are we.

In general, however, it would seem proper that the Commission should be authorized to consider as relevant, but not necessarily wholly determinative of

its decision, evidence of such facts as (1) financial aid given or received from Communist organizations; (2) membership of union leaders in such organizations; (3) any substantial identity over a lengthy period of time between the varying and contradictory positions taken by Communist organizations and positions taken by the union in question on matters of policy—particularly on international, economic or military policy as opposed to matters concerning employees' wages, hours and working conditions.

Upon finding that any labor organization was Communist-dominated under these or other criteria specified by Congress, the Commission should also be empowered to designate, as a Communist labor leader, any individual responsible in the organization for the formulation of the policies which caused it to be designated as Communist-dominated.

As applied to labor unions, the principles underlying the criteria adopted by Congress in the Internal Security Act of 1950 may possibly, for reasons not now known to us, be too broad and might apply to activity of organizations or individuals from which no proper inference of guilt could arise. To the extent such is the case, and if their application might improperly attribute guilt to any person or organization, we would want to see them qualified or rejected entirely if necessary. The task of formulating criteria might well be undertaken by your Subcommittee in light of testimony presented to you by various groups including of course labor unions.

This question of devising criteria is, of course, the most difficult phase of the problem and, while we have attempted to make some general suggestions which we think may be worthy of your consideration, we want it clearly understood that any criteria or procedures adopted should make not only possible but certain that loyal trade unions and labor leaders would not have the legislation improperly applied to them. We do, however, believe that since Congress has given to labor unions special privileges, immuni-

ties and rights not granted to other forms of voluntary organization, it may properly require, as a condition for enjoyment of these special privileges, that neither the organization nor its leaders are serving the interests of a foreign country under the guise and pretext of functioning as a labor organization.

### **3. Disabilities and penalties resulting from determination by the Commission that an organization is Communist-dominated.**

Once a final order of the Commission had been entered designating a labor organization as Communist-dominated and designating those responsible for its policies as Communist labor leaders, we believe there are very effective procedures and penalties which Congress might impose which would have the effect of ridding the organization of its Communist leaders.

For example, the Commission might, like the National Labor Relations Board, be empowered to direct that the members of the organization take, within a prescribed period of time, such affirmative action as the Commission would determine would effectuate the policy of Congress in eliminating Communists in positions of union leadership. In other words, before being subjected to any disabilities or penalties, the members of the organization would be given by the Commission an opportunity to purge itself of those leaders which had been designated by the Commission as Communists.

In the event the organization fails to take the action as prescribed by the Commission, we believe that as a very minimum, Congress should withdraw from the organization the special advantages and privileges which Congress has granted to labor organizations and associations of employees. For this purpose, it is suggested that an organization which is found to be Communist-dominated and which fails to take the affirmative action required by the Commission to purge itself should lose the protection of:

- (a) The National Labor Relations Act, as amended;
- (b) The Norris-LaGuardia Act;
- (c) Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act; and
- (d) It should be provided that the courts of the United States would have no jurisdiction to determine any cause of action brought by it as a representative of employees in interstate commerce. (Although its legal rights otherwise to sue and be sued should be preserved.)

With perhaps the exception of the last-enumerated item, the foregoing would merely withdraw from the labor organization the special advantages of Federal law which Congress intended and designed for unions led by officials presumed to be good Americans.

To meet the situation of an organization which would attempt to operate, even under such disabilities, we believe that the Commission should be empowered to direct that an organization which failed to purge itself of officials as directed, shall cease and desist from attempting in any way to function as a bargaining representative of employees. It might properly be provided that such a cease and desist order prohibited the designated individuals and the organization from: soliciting or receiving union dues; encouraging or supporting strikes or other interferences with production and from any attempt to compel employers to recognize or continue to recognize the organization or individual as a bargaining representative. Consideration should be given to providing criminal, as well as civil, penalties for violation of such a final order of the Commission.

Upon the entry of such a final order of the Commission, all prior National Labor Relations Board certifications running to the organization should become null and void and the order should have the effect of prohibiting employers from continuing to

recognize and bargain with either the organization or the designated individuals as collective bargaining representatives of employees. To the extent legally possible, these provisions should be specifically applicable to cases where employers have existing contracts with the organization designated by the Commission, as well as where no such contracts exist.

However, whatever effect the above suggestions might have on the right of the organization or its leaders to enforce collective bargaining agreements, we believe that any new legislation should make it clear that its provisions would not have the effect of relieving employers from the obligations of any existing labor agreements with respect to wages, hours and working conditions of the individual employees covered by the contracts.

There are, of course, many procedural problems related to any such suggested legislation which we have not attempted to cover here. We would be the first to deny any expertness or even sophistication in this field. But, in general, we believe that the procedural provisions could be patterned after those incorporated in the Internal Security Act of 1950. Since investigations concerning Communists so frequently encounter refusals to answer questions on the grounds of possible incrimination, it would seem that, among the major procedural provisions, might well be one which would permit the Commission in its discretion to grant to a recalcitrant witness, who claims such privilege, the immunity from prosecution under other Federal statutes based upon or related to any matter concerning which he is required to testify. However, we are sure that your own legislative experts can be of far more assistance to you in covering such phases of the proposed legislation than can we.

### **In Conclusion**

As indicated above, we are very hopeful that the investigations of your Subcommittee will prove profitable and of advantage to the country as a whole and

specifically to labor unions, to their members, and to employers presently compelled by law to recognize and deal in good faith with any and all organizations certified to them by the National Labor Relations Board regardless of what may be the employers' feelings or doubts concerning the loyalty of such organizations. The objective, of course, would seem—in the public interest—to be the governmental seeking out, authoritative identification, and public designation of Communist labor leaders—as of other dangerous Communists—and governmental removing of them from positions of danger or influence.

It is only fair to add that in recommending legislative action on this problem we have been beset by certain misgivings—as would any good citizen when suggesting that the liberty and freedom of others be curtailed. The problem posed is admittedly difficult because of the very nature of Communist doctrine, involving as it does a disregard for truth and indeed an emphasis on strategic deceit and tactical treachery.

We yield to no one in our hatred of Communism. However, we likewise yield to no one in our desire to protect innocent individuals from false accusations or injury. The problem of protecting minorities or unpopular groups or individuals is always present in any regulatory legislation and it may be an even more serious problem in this area where unadorned struggles for power exist both within unions and between rival unions. In such cases we know that feelings run high, and the strategy and tactics are often rough and unrestrained. We believe, however, that, if the realities of this situation are understood, appropriate safeguards can be devised so that guilty individuals and organizations may be exposed while innocent ones are protected.

We hope that the foregoing views and suggestions may be of some possible value to you. If there is any further way in which we can try to be of assistance, we shall be delighted to hear from you.

/s/ L. R. BOULWARE