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(West Coast Collective  
Bargaining Series)

Collective  
Bargaining  
in the

Pacific  
Northwest  
Lumber  
Industry

Margaret S. Glock

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**WEST COAST COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEMS**

**Edited by**

**Clark Kerr and Curtis Aller**

**Institute of Industrial Relations  
University of California, Berkeley**

Collective Bargaining  
IN THE  
Pacific Northwest  
Lumber Industry

MARGARET S. GLOCK

INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (Rekeley)  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY  
ARTHUR M. ROSS, DIRECTOR

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## FOREWORD

This is the sixth in a series of short monographs which the Institute of Industrial Relations is publishing on collective bargaining on the Pacific Coast.

This region provides a splendid locale for such a group of studies. It has been familiar with unionism, collective agreements, and industrial conflicts for more than a century. Not only are workers more highly organized than in most other regions, but employer associations are unique, both quantitatively and in the extent of their activities. In some areas, particularly the San Francisco Bay Area, central labor bodies are unusually influential in the conduct of collective bargaining. And as Clark Kerr and Curtis Aller pointed out in their preface, the West Coast presents a fascinating diversity of industrial and social environments which have placed their stamp on labor-management relations. For these reasons collective bargaining on the West Coast has deservedly attracted national and international interest among practitioners and students.

The editors of the series have had a wide and varied experience in analyzing industrial relations problems on the Pacific Coast and elsewhere. Clark Kerr was Director of the Institute at the time the original plans for the series were formulated. He is now Chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, as well as a member of the Institute staff. Curtis Aller is also a member of the Institute staff and Lecturer in the School of Business Administration on the Berkeley campus.

Earlier monographs in the series dealt with collective bargaining in the motion picture, construction, and nonferrous metals

industries, and with labor relations in agriculture and in the non-factory sector of the economy. Subsequent monographs will analyze collective bargaining in longshoring, aircraft, and several other significant industries.

Mrs. Margaret S. Glock, the author of the present chapter, is a former Research Assistant at the Institute. She formerly served, also, as Research Associate and Instructor in the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the State College of Washington and as Wage Analyst in the New York Regional Office of the Wage Stabilization Board.

ARTHUR M. ROSS  
*Director*

## PREFACE

The West Coast has a rich and remarkably varied history of collective bargaining despite its youth as a region of economic importance. Its Embarcadero in San Francisco, its streets of Seattle, its logging camps in the Northwest, its motion picture lots in the Los Angeles area, its fisheries in Alaska, its hard rock mines on either side of the Continental Divide, among other locales, have witnessed the development of unique and consequential systems of labor-management relations.

This study of the Pacific Northwest lumber industry is the sixth in a series of reports being published on individual West Coast bargaining situations. Each report is concerned with a single distinct system, whether it covers an industry, a portion of an industry, a union, or a group of unions. None of the studies purports to be an exhaustive analysis of the total collective bargaining experience of the system under survey. Rather, it is the intention to investigate one or a few central themes in each bargaining relationship—themes which relate to the essence of that relationship. The series will thus constitute a many-sided treatment of collective bargaining, illustrating both its diversity and its complexity.

Rival unionism was for long violently abhorred by the American Federation of Labor and its effects were generally considered to be destructive to the interests of the worker, the employer, and the public. The experience with rival unionism in the Pacific Northwest Lumber Industry suggests, however, that this appraisal is not universally valid and may in fact accurately describe only the initial period following the emergence of a dual union. Certainly during the years from 1936 to 1940 the all-out efforts of the two

unions in this industry to dislodge one another resulted in violence, interruptions in supplies of lumber products, and severe losses to employers and workers. But when the parties realized that total victory could not be achieved, reliance upon strong-arm methods and economic sanctions ceased. Subsequently the unions competed more for the unorganized worker than for each other's members. Rivalry became mature, and hence livable to all concerned, as the unions sparred for a favorable position within the existing legal and collective bargaining framework.

Mrs. Glock's study provides the details of this evolution from destructive to mature rivalry. Mature rivalry, the author concludes, may have paid dividends to the workers in terms of more complete organization, better contract terms, and greater leadership responsiveness, without any offsetting increase in strike costs. The burden upon the industry has not been great although individual employers upon whom the rivalry focussed may have suffered.

Two possibly unique factors, it should be noted, contributed to this favorable experience. The industry during the latter period was expanding and could usually afford to make concessions. A sustained depression in the industry at some time in the future might destroy the existing reliance on peaceful rivalry. Both unions had the support of their respective federations, which added to each union's power to withstand attack and to engage in retaliatory boycotts and picketing. A united labor movement, in the absence of restraining laws, might have dealt more summarily with a rival union and in turn provoked in desperation a more extreme counter-attack.

This report has been reviewed by employer, union, and public representatives who have special familiarity with collective bargaining in the industry. Among those to whom thanks are due are: Walter A. Durham, Jr., Secretary-Manager, Lumberman's Industrial Relations Committee, Inc.; E. W. Kenney, Director, Research and Education, International Woodworkers of America, CIO; Vernon Jensen, Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University; Kenneth McClaskey, Chief Field Examiner, National Labor Relations Board, Seattle, Washington; Ralph Thayer, Professor of Economics, State College of Washington, and George J. Tichy, Manager, Timber Products Manufacturers' Association.

**PREFACE**

Their willingness to study the manuscript and to make constructive suggestions puts us deeply in their debt. The interpretations of the facts and the judgments expressed are, of course, solely the responsibility of the author.

**CLARK KERR**  
**CURTIS ALLER**  
*Editors*

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## INTRODUCTION

The Pacific Northwest lumber industry is an excellent field for studying the consequences of having two unions in close competition with one another. Almost from the inception of permanent labor organization in the industry, two industrial-type unions have claimed jurisdiction and have competed vigorously in organizing the lumberworkers. These two unions have organized the major part of the workers in the industry. They are fairly equal in membership in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry as a whole, although in individual sectors of the industry there are some differences in number of members. The employer associations that have been established are designed to function in a rival union situation. Since the industry has a history of militant union action, bitter employer resistance, and violence in labor relations, the frictions arising because of rival unionism could be expected to take an accentuated form.

### The Industry and the Parties to Collective Bargaining

The industry itself is important to the economy of the region and to the economy of the nation as a whole. It is composed of a large number of different types of operations, varying widely in size, method of operation, and end product. As it has been delineated by the collective bargaining system which has developed, the Pacific Northwest lumber industry includes logging operations, sawmills, veneer mills, planing mills, plywood and door mills, box factories, and wood-preserving plants in the Douglas fir region of western Washington and western Oregon, and the pine regions of eastern Washington, eastern Oregon, northern California, northern

Idaho, and western Montana. On the fringe of the collective bargaining structure of the industry is the Redwood region of northern California.<sup>1</sup> A number of associations, covering different segments of the industry, represent the bulk of the employers in collective bargaining. However, several of the largest companies have, in recent years, chosen to deal separately with the unions.

The two unions which have organized the lumberworkers are the Lumber and Sawmill Workers (AFL)—affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America—and the International Woodworkers of America (CIO). The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America charters all LSW local unions and district councils. There are 12 of these district councils in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana. To coordinate the activities of the LSW unions in the Pacific Northwest, the Carpenters have also set up a regional council, the Northwestern Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers, with which the district councils are affiliated. Although the Carpenters have chartered LSW locals in the other lumber sections of the United States, there is no formal linkage of these LSW locals with the Northwestern Council except through the Brotherhood itself.

The claimed jurisdiction and organizing activities of the International Woodworkers of America extend throughout the important lumber areas of the United States and Canada. Its central office and its major strength lie in the Pacific Northwest. There are eight district councils in the Northwest region with which the local unions affiliate on an area or sub-industry basis. For purposes of achieving coordinated negotiations on a region-wide basis, the IWA unions in the Pacific Northwest region have established the Northwest Regional Negotiating Committee, which takes its in-

<sup>1</sup> Most of the large redwood operations are unorganized. There is, however, considerable production of Douglas fir in the geographical region recognized as the redwood area, and a substantial number of operations in this geographical area are organized. Both unions have district councils covering workers in the area. There is an employer association in the geographical area, the Northern California Lumber Operators Association, but, for the most part, the big redwood operators are not affiliated with it. Although the major employers have generally followed the settlements made since World War II in the rest of the industry and the operators and lumberworkers in the geographical area were involved in the 1954 lumber strike, the redwood region was not, during the course of this study, an integral part of the "industry-wide" bargaining system in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry.

structions from a specially called regional wage conference or from the IWA convention each year.

A pattern of settlements has evolved which embraces the diverse industry and the two unions. A lead settlement is generally made each negotiating period with one of the two unions by one of the employer associations or large companies in the Douglas fir area. Substantially the same or comparable settlements are then made throughout the entire industry. This, very briefly, is the collective bargaining structure as it exists today. Within this framework, the effects of rival unionism may be studied.

### Prevalent Concepts of Rival Unionism

Rival unionism has long been cited by labor writers as a major problem in the field of labor-management relations in this country. The weight of the evidence that they present would seem to support a conclusion that rival unionism, wherever it has appeared, has operated to the detriment of the unions and employers involved, as well as to the public. Although critics of rival unionism have, to some extent, given attention to the effects that disunity has on the national political goals of the American trade-union movement, primary concern has been with the effects of rivalry in spheres of collective bargaining. The phenomenon of two unions attempting to organize the same industry, the same trade, or the same group of workers seems naturally to lead to competition, or to apparent threats of competition, for membership. This competition has traditionally been viewed in turn, as leading to bitter inter-union strife.

The effects of disputes over representation which have been most frequently emphasized by writers on labor questions are those which are distinctly disadvantageous to the trade-union movement as a whole, although the possibility of considerable organizational gains to the winning side is admitted freely. Disputes between groups of workers may well give rise to a great deal of ill-feeling and bitterness. As friction develops between fellow unionists, the degree of unity within the trade-union movement is lessened. In addition, time, energy, and money are lost as unionists battle one another instead of attempting to concentrate all their forces on bettering the conditions for the workers within an industry or

trade. Strikes over matters of representation cause loss of wages which are regained even less often than in those instances in which the strikes are against an employer on wage or fringe issues. Workers obviously lose in wages when union leaders accept lower wages in return for recognition from an employer. Furthermore, representational struggles for membership which result in strikes and the cessation of business operations are harmful to the employer who may be caught in the middle of a fight which is not his own. The general public may be inconvenienced or actually harmed by the loss of production that occurs—a loss which they may consider unnecessary.

However, the periods of labor history that captured the attention of most writers on the subject of rival unionism were those periods during which unionism per se was fighting for a foothold in this country and those during which rival unionism on a big scale was first introduced. The suggestion may be made that the difficulties that are credited to competition between unions are in part transitory phenomena—that they persist during the period when unions are attempting to establish themselves in an industry but diminish once the industry has been organized and competing unions have each secured a position. Thus, occasionally during the early periods of unionism and more frequently in recent years as effective labor legislation has been enacted and as large-scale unions have become strong in America, suggestions have been made that competition between unions need not lead to destructive representational warfare and might, instead, be beneficial at least to union members. David J. Saposs, writing before the creation of the CIO, comments: “. . . it is only infrequently that rival unions come into serious conflict in the same jurisdiction. . . . While from time to time warfare breaks out, yet if both unions are strong, neither dares risk a decisive battle; skirmishes go along the frontiers of control afforded by the vast area which is totally unorganized.” Other students of labor, writing in the late 1940's, have suggested that diversity in the ranks of labor has allowed some unionists to escape from corrupt, inefficient, or unduly conservative or radical

<sup>2</sup> David J. Saposs, “Dual Unionism,” *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. V (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1931), p. 261.

leaders<sup>3</sup> and has lessened the "risks of over-centralized authority and the nation-wide control of the workers by dictatorial leaders who have ignored democratic procedures."<sup>4</sup> It has been suggested, in addition, that rivalry between unions claiming the same jurisdiction might well encourage higher wage rates as each union attempts to "outbid" the rival group in achieving economic advantages.<sup>5</sup>

### The Lumber Industry and Rival Unionism

An analysis of the rivalry existing between the competing lumber unions immediately after the formation of the IWA-CIO by a group of insurgent AFL lumberworkers would seem to support the traditional views about the consequences of union rivalry. The split came at a time when labor organization as such was struggling for a foothold in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry. Violent and bitter representational warfare characterized the collective bargaining scene from 1937 to about 1940. The conflict was wasteful and destructive. The lumberworkers as a whole lost wages and effectiveness in achieving better working conditions. Employers suffered economic losses and came out of the struggle "fighting mad." The public in some localities was inconvenienced and outraged.

Since the early 1940's, however, this extreme turbulence has tended to disappear. An examination of the effects of rival unionism, as it exists in the lumber industry today, tends to support a conclusion that rival unionism may not, at least in this industry and at this stage of union development, be as much of a disturbance in labor-management relations as it has traditionally been considered to be. A fairly well-defined system of collective bargaining has developed which encompasses the two competing unions. A more "mature" form of rivalry has developed in which representational questions are settled through National Labor Relations Board machinery and legal channels rather than on the picket line. Prob-

<sup>3</sup> Clyde E. Dankert, *Contemporary Unionism in the United States* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), p. 96.

<sup>4</sup> Foster Rhea Dulles, *Labor in America* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1949), p. 310.

<sup>5</sup> Arthur M. Ross, *Trade Union Wage Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), p. 68; and Charles E. Lindblom, *Unions and Capitalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 47.

lems are not absent, but, in general, the existence of two unions has been accepted by the employers and union leaders as a "livable" condition. For this reason, it seems worth while to study the present collective bargaining system in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry with an eye to re-evaluating the traditional concepts of rival unionism.

## HISTORICAL INFLUENCES

Some knowledge of the history of collective bargaining in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry is important in evaluating the problems of rival unionism in that industry today. The experiences of the participants during the very early attempts at organizing and also during the early years of dual unionism have an influence on their present behavior. In addition, the period of representational warfare immediately following the advent of rival unions can be used as a base point against which to appraise the present situation.

### Early Attempts at Organization

The early recorded history of unionism in the lumber industry of the Pacific Northwest can be characterized in terms of attempted organization, strikes and lockouts as a primary means to achieve desired ends, and, in many cases, bitter suppression of labor groups.<sup>9</sup> Although the first lumberworkers' union in the Pacific area is said to have existed under the Knights of Labor between the years 1884 and 1890 in Eureka, California, serious organizing attempts in the industry by national labor groups did not take place until just before 1905. The AFL granted a charter to the International Brotherhood of Woodsmen and Sawmill Workers in that year. It managed to maintain an organization almost continuously among the lumberworkers from 1905 to 1923, although the organization lost its charter occasionally, changed names, and changed form—at times including only lumberworkers, as the in-

<sup>9</sup> For the history of labor-management relations in the Northwest lumber industry, the reader is referred to the following: Cloice R. Howd, *Industrial Relations in the West Coast Lumber Industry*, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Miscellaneous Bulletin No. 349 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924); Herbert A. Resner, *Trees and Men* (2d ed.; Seattle, Washington: U. S. Works Progress Administration, 1938); and Vernon H. Jensen, *Lumber and Labor* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1945).

dustry has been defined above, and at times being combined with an organization of shingle weavers. During the same period, 1905-23, the Industrial Workers of the World was also actively engaged in organizing the lumberworkers.

During the initial organizing period there was a major strike in some sector of the industry almost every year. However, a strike that occurred in 1917 was by far the most extensive labor disturbance the industry had seen. It was the culmination of the intense organizing activity and disturbances which had preceded it, and it set the stage for developments in labor-management relations for almost two decades to follow.

The AFL and IWW lumberworkers made demands for better living conditions in logging camps, for the eight-hour day, better wages, and union recognition. The strike that resulted extended throughout most of the Northwest lumber industry, involved a great number of men, and was accompanied by well-organized picketing. The aroused employers joined together to resist union demands and formed the Lumberman's Protective Association. The conflict that arose was one of the more bitter labor-management struggles the Northwest has witnessed and at times was accompanied by physical violence. The strike was not successful for the unions. After several months, they allowed their members to return to work. Members of the IWW, however, went back to their jobs with instructions to continue the strike there by adopting tactics which would slow down production.

Lumber was in great demand for World War I purposes. The War Department, alarmed at the fact that lumber production was decreasing, apparently owing to labor difficulties, established the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen, or the 4L. It was originally designed to be a propaganda agency to counteract the IWW. Later, however, it became an organization for dealing with labor-management relations on a formalized basis. It was continued as such until 1937, when it was succeeded by the Industrial Employees' Union, Inc.

Although many members of the AFL lumber unions and the IWW joined the 4L under wartime pressure, they again made attempts to establish effective independent unions when the war was terminated. The AFL group, however, was not successful in

maintaining a membership. By 1923, it was forced to surrender its charter. The IWW had little better success. Following a general strike in the industry in 1923, the membership of the IWW dwindled. Except for periodic outbursts, the IWW was no longer effective as a labor organization in the West Coast lumber industry.

On the management side of the picture, it is reported that an Employers' Clearing House was established in 1923 which practically controlled all employment in the lumber industry of the region. Employment was refused to labor leaders and those who had been active in former labor disputes. Eventually the system was discontinued but not before it did considerable damage to the chances of reorganizing labor in the industry.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, the beginnings of labor organization in the Northwest lumber industry gave rise to several factors which have long affected union-management relations in the area. First, the strikes and lockouts which characterized the early attempts at collective bargaining produced a tradition of violence and bitterness in the industry. Second, the IWW, with its philosophy of revolutionary syndicalism, increased employer resistance to unionization by the workers. In addition, it left certain groups of workers in the industry with a belief in militancy of action. Third, the use of early employer associations to suppress unionization left workers distrustful of the employer groups that sprang up later. Fourth, this early period ended with the 4L as the dominant organization among the workers, and that organization never achieved the form or function of a true labor union. There was joint membership of workers and employers in the organization and a conference system for settling disputes; but the employers were the dominant members of the organization. If an employer withdrew, for whatever cause, the workers in his operation were no longer members.<sup>8</sup> In 1940, the 4L and its successor, the IEU, were found by the National Labor Relations Board to be company-dominated and -supported unions, existing on a multi-plant basis throughout several sectors of the Pacific Northwest.<sup>9</sup> The IEU was effectively

<sup>7</sup> Resner, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

<sup>8</sup> Jensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-36.

<sup>9</sup> *Decisions and Orders*, U. S. National Labor Relations Board, Vol. XIX (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 887-950.

broken up shortly thereafter but its existence in the industry had undoubtedly slowed down other attempts at organization in the sections of the industry where it was strong.

### Permanent Organization Achieved

By 1930, however, independent unionism had again appeared in the lumber industry of the Pacific Northwest. In 1929, a Communist organization, the National Lumber Workers Union, made a bid for membership. In the early thirties, the American Federation of Labor granted "federal" charters to several locals which, in 1933, formed the Northwest Council of Sawmill and Timber Workers Unions. On April 1, 1935, this group accepted the jurisdiction of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (AFL). Almost immediately, the union drew up demands in the form of a uniform working agreement. By May 7 attempts at negotiation and mediation had failed and almost fifty per cent of the men employed in the Douglas fir region were out on strike.

The strike was an extremely complicated affair. The union was afflicted with internal strife caused by a group who resented the Carpenters' leadership and by Communist members of the National Lumber Workers Union which had disbanded in favor of "boring from within." The employers were not united in their stand, although most of them resisted the demand of the union for recognition as the sole bargaining agent. Many refused to bargain with the union at all. Attempts on the part of public agencies to intervene were ineffective. Violence was far from uncommon as employers attempted to operate behind picket lines and state patrolmen were used to "preserve peace." In the state of Washington, troops were used, notably in Tacoma and the Grays Harbor area, to protect workers who wished to work behind picket lines. Feelings ran high and skirmishes were common.<sup>20</sup>

Settlements were gradually achieved, however, and the strike subsided. Although there were not a large number of contracts and those which had been drawn up were not uniform, the 1935 strike was successful as an organizational strike. A large number of workers had joined the union. Permanent organization among the lumberworkers was established.

<sup>20</sup> Jensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-85.

## Advent of Rival Unionism

The newly organized workers of the lumber industry, however, were not to be a unified group. During the period of the strike and the months immediately following it, there developed a growing dissension within the new organization, eventually leading to the formation of the International Woodworkers of America in 1937 and the existence of two major lumber unions in the Pacific Northwest. The split that occurred was caused by a number of factors: differences among the lumberworkers themselves, and among their leaders, and dissatisfaction with the relationship between the lumberworker locals and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America—each played a role in the formation of dual unions in the industry.

When the Carpenters were given jurisdiction over the lumberworkers in 1935, they sent to the Northwest lumber industry one of their executive board members, A. W. Muir, and a number of organizers. Dues were reduced to 25 cents per month to facilitate organization. Since these dues were less than those paid by regular Carpenter members, the lumberworkers were given a “non-beneficial” status—they were not entitled to all of the retirement, death, and disability benefits derived from the regular 75-cent Carpenter dues and were not entitled to vote in the Carpenter conventions.

IWA officials, a few LSW officials,<sup>11</sup> and the history itself of the 1935 strike testify to attempted domination by Muir and resentment towards him among the independent lumberworkers. Many lumberworkers became dissatisfied with the Carpenter organizers who they felt did not understand the industry, the jobs, or the workers. They wanted organizers who came from the industry. Furthermore, delegates from the lumber industry were not given a vote in the 1936 Carpenter convention despite a request that they be given voice and vote in all matters pertaining directly to their industry and to their status in the Brotherhood.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The names of these officials cannot be revealed. Much of the information given in the interviews for this study, with union officers, employer representatives, and public officials, was of a confidential nature.

<sup>12</sup> Suggested sources for details concerning the events leading to the formation of the IWA are: Jensen, *op. cit.*; United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, *Proceedings of the Twenty-third General Convention, 1936* (Indianapolis:

In addition to resentment against the Carpenter leadership in the industry and against the denial of vote in the convention, discontent arose from the status of industrial unions in the AFL craft organization. The lumberworkers, generally, believed in an industrial type of union. President William Hutcheson, of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, however, had told the lumberworkers that they must respect the jurisdictional claims of the Boilermakers, the Blacksmiths, the Machinists, and "any other trade which might be within the confines of where they worked."<sup>13</sup> Craft unions, even building crafts, did attempt to obtain jurisdiction in several plants where the lumberworkers had established an industrial type union.

There can be little doubt that many of the lumberworkers were dissatisfied with their position in the Carpenters. However, while these aspects of the situation were important, the primary role in the actual split which brought dual unions to the Northwest lumber industry may be assigned to differences among the lumberworkers themselves, or their leaders. In part, these differences were ideological; but to some extent they were due to personal antagonisms and personal ambitions.

A number of Lumber and Sawmill Worker officials and employer representatives currently explain the secession of the International Woodworkers of America from the Carpenters as a move engineered by Communists to establish a lumberworker organization which they could control. Among the workers participating in the secession, there apparently were leaders who were far left in their thinking if not active Communists. When the National Lumber Workers Union had met in Tacoma on April 17, 1935, the members had voted to disband their union to allow, as mentioned before, effective "boring from within." Former members of this group are reported to have been a part of the insurgents who opposed Muir during the 1935 strike<sup>14</sup> and to have contributed to the subsequent split. In addition, Harold Pritchett, first president of the IWA, is alleged to have been a Communist. However, the

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United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 1936); and American Federation of Labor, *Report of the Proceedings of the Fifty-seventh Annual Convention, 1937* (Washington, D. C.: Judd and Tetweiler, 1937).

<sup>13</sup> American Federation of Labor, *op cit.*, p. 464.

<sup>14</sup> Jensen, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

group that seceded from the Carpenters was not composed primarily of the left-wing elements among the lumberworkers. There was also a strong body of more conservative unionists who felt that the problems of the lumberworkers in their relationship to the Carpenters could be solved only by secession and affiliation with the newly formed CIO. The Pritchett leadership in the IWA was immediately challenged by a strong opposition bloc of these more conservative forces. By 1942, with the help of the national CIO, this latter group was able to gain and keep control of the union, although the IWA was to be plagued in the years following by the struggles for power between the two factions.<sup>15</sup>

Among those groups remaining in the Carpenters were lumberworkers and their leaders who were opposed to Pritchett and refused to accept his leadership. In addition, there were groups who believed that despite the shortcomings of the Carpenter-lumberworker relationship, the strength of the newly organized lumberworker unions lay in the strength of the Carpenters. The Carpenters who had organized the trades using lumber products could use the boycott to assist the lumberworkers in their struggles with the employers. These leaders favored staying in the AFL and attempting to improve the relationship with it rather than resorting to secession.

Despite the opposition of these latter groups, a majority of delegates to a lumberworker convention held in Tacoma, Washington, in July, 1937, voted to affiliate with the CIO and a charter was granted to the International Woodworkers of America. In subsequent meetings, locals voted on the issue of whether to affiliate

<sup>15</sup> The Pritchett group retained strength primarily in British Columbia and in the Northern Washington District, as well as the Plywood, Box Shook, and Door District, and the Midwest District of the IWA. In 1948, this group attempted to withdraw the British Columbia membership from the IWA and establish the Woodworkers' Industrial Union of Canada. Although the Pritchett forces were partially successful in setting up an independent union in Canada, the IWA was able to recoup much of its membership losses in British Columbia by the next year. The Northern Washington District Council remained in the IWA but acted on several occasions to embarrass the administration, either by public criticism or by evidencing disunity in negotiations. In 1952, the Northern Washington District Council merged with the Southwest Washington District Council. The former president of the Northern Washington District Council, a leader among the old Pritchett forces, was later removed from his position as an official in the newly formed council. It appears that at the present time, the old Pritchett forces have little remaining strength in the IWA.

with the IWA or to remain in the Carpenters. Immediately after the break, the new CIO organization had a decided majority of the organized men in the industry as a whole. The Carpenters, however, retained their strength in several areas and in August, 1937, chartered the Oregon-Washington Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers, giving cohesion to the AFL locals and district councils.<sup>16</sup> A period of intense representational warfare began as dual unionism was initiated in the lumber industry of the Pacific Northwest.

### Initial Period of Representational Conflict

The secession of the locals comprising the IWA was not well received by Hutcheson and the Carpenters. They had sent organizers and given financial support to help organize the lumberworkers. Moreover, since within the AFL Hutcheson had played a principal role in fighting the formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization, a secession of a part of his union to the CIO was particularly provoking. In the 1936 convention of the Carpenters, General Secretary Frank Duffy made the following statement to the lumberworkers:

Let me tell you this—and this is no threat. Go on out of the Brotherhood, and we will give you the sweetest fight you ever had in your lives. First of all, we will notify all local unions not to take any notice of you, not to give you any support, moral, financial or otherwise. The next step will be that we will notify all the big firms with which we have contracts covering hours, wages and working conditions for the timber workers that if they want to continue employing you outside of the Brotherhood we will put them on the unfair list and your manufactured stuff won't be handled elsewhere.<sup>17</sup>

This statement sounded the keynote for the representational battle which followed the formation of the IWA. The Brotherhood boycott and the support which the Carpenters received from other AFL unions during the jurisdictional fracas were probably the most effective tactics used in recouping the losses suffered by the Carpenters in the initial switch.

It has been asserted that the fight between the Carpenters and

<sup>16</sup> Jensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-14.

<sup>17</sup> United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

the IWA was the greatest of the representational disputes that occurred between the CIO and the AFL in the period immediately following the formation of the CIO.<sup>18</sup> The most bitter and hard-fought battles in the lumber industry took place between 1936 and 1940. They centered in Portland, although Tacoma, Bellingham, Grays Harbor, Longview, and other lumber areas also experienced jurisdictional difficulties arising from the rivalry between the two unions. A description of a major part of the Portland conflict will portray many of the aspects of the lumberworkers' representational conflict which gave dual unionism a reputation of destruction and waste in the lumber industry.

Although other mills in the area were affected, six lumber mills were the center of the struggle for membership in Portland during the first few years following the split. These were: the Jones Lumber Company, the West Oregon Lumber Company, the B. F. Johnson Company, the Portland Lumber Mills, the Inman-Poulsen Lumber Company, and the Eastern and Western Lumber Company.

The union members in Portland had been organized into one local prior to 1937. Following the formation of the IWA, the local applied for a charter from the new CIO union. On August 14, 1937, an IWA charter was installed, and all members theoretically changed their affiliation. On August 11, however, the Carpenters had sent out a special circular asking all Brotherhood local unions, district councils, and state councils to refrain from handling lumber and millwork manufactured by any operator employing IWA workers.<sup>19</sup> As a result, the employers were threatened with picketing and boycotting before the IWA made a claim to represent the Portland lumberworkers. On August 16, still before the IWA had made representation claims, the Portland lumber companies were closed down, each plant being picketed by one AFL picket.<sup>20</sup> Violence broke out as soon as the pickets appeared. Trucks delivering fuel were dumped in the streets and fights developed. The employ-

<sup>18</sup> Jensen, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>19</sup> American Federation of Labor, *op. cit.*, p. 468.

<sup>20</sup> *Proposed Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, Hearings*, U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 76th Congress, 1st Session, on S. 1000, S. 1264, S. 1392, S. 1550, S. 1580, and S. 2123 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 934-35.

ers asserted that this was the reason they shut down; whereas, the IWA felt that the employers were discriminating against the IWA by closing.

On August 23, the IWA local notified the Portland mill employers that it represented a majority of the employees in the mills and that its members were ready to continue work under the contract existing with the Brotherhood local prior to August 14. The IWA local filed lockout charges against the employers with the National Labor Relations Board in Seattle. On August 27, the regional director of the National Labor Relations Board held a conference to attempt to reach a settlement. Representatives of the Carpenters' Lumber and Sawmill Workers presented written documents stating that they refused to meet with the IWA Portland local. The IWA local, however, attended the conference and requested that the plants be opened. An understanding was reached whereby the employers agreed to open their mills on August 30, 1937; the question of representation was to be left to the NLRB. It is asserted that the AFL had not agreed to this plan, but the plants were opened on August 30. On September 1, the IWA filed representation petitions with the NLRB for each of the six lumber companies mentioned above.<sup>21</sup>

The mills started to close again after running a week. Members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America, an AFL affiliate, refused to deliver fuel and lumber. When lumber was hauled from the mills, it was often refused on the job because of the boycott. The AFL maintained a picket line on the rivers with small power boats. Log rafts could not be brought to the sawmills for cutting because crews of the towboats refused to make deliveries through the picket lines. Employees' homes were assailed with rocks, and other property was damaged.<sup>22</sup>

The NLRB held its representation hearing from September 20 through September 22. Sixty-one to 80 per cent of the employees in each of the companies had signed petitions designating the IWA as their bargaining agent, and 68 to 92 per cent of the employees in

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 935 and 2860; and *Decisions and Orders*, U. S. National Labor Relations Board, Vol. III, p. 860.

<sup>22</sup> *Proposed Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, Hearings*, p. 940.

each of the companies had signed IWA membership application cards. In light of this evidence, the NLRB found that an election was unnecessary. On October 1, the NLRB certified the IWA as the representative of the employees in each of the six mills.<sup>23</sup> Following the decision and certification, the Carpenters tightened their boycott of IWA lumber and intensified their organizing activity. Longshoremen refused for a time to load ships with AFL-produced lumber when the IWA instituted pickets on the docks.<sup>24</sup>

Apparently, a deadlock had been reached. The IWA had been certified by the Board, but the AFL refused to recognize the certification. At this point, Governor Charles H. Martin of Oregon decided to intervene. He called an election of his own in December at the Inman-Paulsen Mill. It is reported that this mill was selected because it was believed it would go AFL; with such results, the mill could open without incurring the AFL boycott.<sup>25</sup> The election, however, went CIO by a large majority and the stalemate continued.

When the Carpenters intensified their drive to recoup their losses in the Portland lumber mills, they attempted to establish separate locals in each mill. Where a core of loyal AFL men could be found, new locals were established. During January, most of the Portland lumber mills again started operating. In February, the AFL claimed majorities in most of the individual mills. They removed their boycotts as they made these claims. Throughout 1938 and the early part of 1939, the fight between the two unions continued. The struggles, however, were carried on more and more through the machinery of the NLRB. Elections were being held and challenged. Votes were counted and recounted. Nevertheless, the lines were being drawn. Of the six Portland companies that carried the brunt of the battle, three were finally won by the IWA and three by the Lumber and Sawmill Workers.<sup>26</sup>

A similar pattern of events was experienced by many other plants in the Northwest lumber industry. Lumber and Sawmill Worker locals switched affiliations to the IWA. Companies were faced with threats of boycott, or actually were boycotted and pick-

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2860.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 941-42.

<sup>25</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>26</sup> Jensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-22.

eted. The AFL attempted to re-establish locals. Elections resulting in the certification of one union did not always mean the termination of the dispute. Violence often accompanied the conflict.

In a number of cases, settlements were complicated by the existence of closed shop contracts with former Carpenter locals. Upon revival of a Carpenter local, disputes arose concerning the organization to which the bargaining rights and closed shop contract belonged. The NLRB was called upon to decide the issue. The decision concerning the closed shop contract was extremely important because the union possessing the contract could use it to eliminate staunch supporters of the rival union from the plant. In some plants, the Carpenters were able to prove that a core of lumberworkers had remained loyal to the Carpenters and were thus able to regain their bargaining rights in these plants.

### Effects of the Representational Conflict

Taken as a whole, the representational battle that raged in the Northwest lumber industry was extremely complicated. Government officials were drawn into the fray. In some cases the officials merely attempted to suppress violence by furnishing police protection where skirmishes were expected. In other cases officials participated more actively. The regional director of the NLRB was accused of favoring the IWA, and Governor Martin of Oregon, of favoring the Carpenters.<sup>27</sup>

Employers were the victims of the representational dispute and were directly or indirectly participating in its outcome. Where the Carpenter boycott was effectively applied to the products of IWA mills, cancellations of orders were numerous. Many mills were forced to stop producing entirely, and the losses of these companies were reported to run into millions of dollars.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, markets were lost which were never regained. Many employers were experiencing difficulties in operating profitably in 1937 and 1938 because of the general business recession. Although they might have continued operations despite labor difficulties if the markets had generally been good, some mills closed down in the face of union

<sup>27</sup> *Proposed Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, Hearings*, p. 2860.

<sup>28</sup> Walter Galenson, *Rival Unionism in the United States* (New York: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940), p. 47.

problems. The shutdown period in a number of places allowed the Carpenters to regain their membership. This caused the IWA to accuse many operators of actively favoring the AFL lumber union.

Although some employers were undoubtedly innocent of aiding one union, other employers, in the opinion of many, did actively favor the Carpenters in the early period of rival unionism in the lumber industry. The new IWA union was not known by the employers and was pictured as being a "Commie" organization. Employers might easily be expected to support the more conservative AFL unions. Several of the NLRB decisions indicate that companies did engage in practices which aided the AFL.<sup>29</sup>

The workers also suffered from the representational scrap. Physical violence injured many workers and their property was damaged. While the plants were closed down workers were deprived of their income. Morris A. Jones, president of the Jones Lumber Company of Portland, estimated that between September 1, 1937, and April 1, 1938, the mills in Portland lost, on the average, approximately three months of operations. For each day that ten major mills in the area were closed down, the employees of mills lost \$19,500 in wages, and the workers in logging camps lost \$14,000 in wages.<sup>30</sup> Because of the danger in frequent shifts in affiliation, many workers began to carry cards in both unions.<sup>31</sup>

The public, too, were harmed by the disputes. They were unable to get lumber; they were threatened by violence; and they lost business because of the lack of purchasing power on the part of the workers. The state of Oregon adopted by referendum a labor regulation bill which outlawed boycotting and sympathetic strikes. It also provided that a majority of employees within a plant must vote to strike before picketing could be resorted to and that labor organizations must register with the state and show their books.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, the organizing periods and the years of intense representational warfare have had their influence on the collective bargaining system as it exists in the Northwest lumber industry. The violent conditions under which recognition was initiated into many

<sup>29</sup> *Decisions and Orders*, U. S. National Labor Relations Board, Vol. VI, pp. 372-82, and Vol. VII, pp. 950-59.

<sup>30</sup> *Proposed Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, Hearings*, p. 95.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 954.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1485.

plants and the battles over membership immediately following the formation of the IWA left harsh feelings and suspicion between labor and management. The workers had a history of militancy, and the employers, of resistance. The unions emerged from the split with feelings of distrust and bitterness between them. An evaluation of the collective bargaining situation as it exists today in the lumber industry must give consideration to the influences of these historical factors.

As the smoke from the first years of intense representational difficulties began to disperse, however, the labor-management relationships that constitute the present collective bargaining system in the Northwest were taking form. The Lumber and Sawmill Workers had regained some of the plants that were lost when the IWA was first formed; the IWA had established unquestionable bargaining rights in the others. The strength of the two groups gradually became balanced. Employer associations emerged which were designed to negotiate with unions rather than to carry on the anti-union activities of some of the earlier groups. Patterns of regional negotiations developed. During the war, the groups were forced to work together to a greater extent than ever before; the market for lumber was excellent; the employers granted substantial wage increases and fringe benefits; and the unions made great gains in membership. Moreover, the character of rival unionism in the Northwest lumber industry altered as the first years of rivalry passed. The effects of this more "mature" rivalry on the collective bargaining situation in the Northwest lumber industry are the primary concern of the analysis that follows.

#### "MATURE" RIVALRY IN ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES

The rivalry existing between the two lumber unions in the Pacific Northwest may be viewed at two levels: one, at the level of direct organizing activities among workers in mills and logging operations in the industry; two, at the level of negotiations with major employer associations. Though the rivalry existing in organizing activities and in negotiations are interrelated, the characteristics of rivalry and the effects on the workers and employers can be more clearly shown by examining the current situation separately at the two levels. The character of the rivalry in organizing mem-

bership is dealt with in this section. Rivalry in negotiations is treated in the next section. The effects of rivalry on the participants are summarized in a later section.

There is a strong contrast between the character of rivalry as it exists in present organizing activities and that which flared in the months immediately following the split. In attempting to build up their organizations, the unions have tended, since the early months of dual unionism, to waste less of their efforts on raiding. Each union now has established strongholds. Workers who were staunch supporters of one or the other union have tended to drift to plants which had contracts with the favored union. Since 1940, changes in affiliation have become relatively infrequent. Rivalry in organization exists between the two unions, but efforts to obtain members have been concentrated largely in plants which are unorganized. By 1940, the unions had generally accepted the National Labor Relations Board as the means by which representational claims in lumber operations could be decided. Union tactics changed generally from boycotting, picketing, and violence to more peaceful persuasion and to maneuvering within the framework of the National Labor Relations Act and other legal regulations.

#### Organizing the Unorganized vs. Raiding

Some measure of the extent to which the unions "raid" and the extent to which the unions compete in organizing the unorganized segments of the industry can be found in the records of the NLRB. An analysis was made of 141 elections held during 1948 and 1949 by the Northwest regional office of the National Labor Relations Board in which one or both of the lumber unions were listed on the ballot. Only one union was listed on the ballot in 111 of the cases; both unions were listed in 30 of the cases. Among the latter, five were cases in which one union had a contract and the other union had petitioned for an election. In none of these did the "raiding" union succeed in winning the election. In Oregon, which contains the newest of the lumbering areas, 91 elections had been held; whereas in the Washington, Idaho, and Montana areas, 50 elections took place. In the Northwest as a whole, each union petitioned for an almost equal number of elections, although the IWA

was more active in Oregon and the LSW in the rest of the Northwest region in those years. The average size of those plants for which both unions competed was almost twice the size of those plants in which only one union requested representation. This is not surprising since it would be expected that the two unions would compete most actively for the larger plants.

In evaluating the extent to which the unions compete in organizing, however, it must be pointed out that the 30 cases in which both unions appeared on the ballot represent only those dual efforts at obtaining bargaining rights which resulted in an actual election between the two unions. Where a fairly clear possibility of winning does not exist, a union will tend to withdraw from an election rather than suffer defeat. Instances of such unsuccessful bids for membership by one or the other union will not show up, therefore, in statistics on elections.

Though raiding is now relatively uncommon in the industry and no change in affiliation occurs in a large proportion of election cases, there have been operations in the past ten years in which the workers have changed the union representing them. Where raids have occurred in large and strategic operations, the rivalry between the two unions has reached its peak. The contrast between the disputes over representation in recent years and those occurring around 1937-38 can be most clearly drawn by examining a "hotly contested" dispute occurring in 1942-44 and comparing it with the Portland lumber situation in 1937-38.

Potlatch Forests, Inc. is one of the principal lumber concerns in the area and the largest in the pine region of the Inland Empire—eastern Washington, northern Idaho, and western Montana. Consequently, there is strategic value for a union in representing the Potlatch workers. The LSW had begun to organize the Potlatch mills in 1937, although an independent union was dominant from 1936 to around 1939. Following 1939, the LSW was accorded bargaining rights and it is estimated that the LSW had secured approximately ninety per cent of the workers as members. However, membership in the LSW diminished after 1940. In 1942, the union attempted to regain lost members by demanding that the company enforce union security clauses in the contracts. That same year, the IWA began to organize intensively at Potlatch. In March, 1943,

the IWA petitioned the NLRB for elections in three of the five Potlatch operational divisions. The LSW, on the other hand, believed that all five divisions of the company should be treated as one unit. A hearing was held, and the Board dismissed the IWA petition on the ground that the five divisional unit was appropriate. In July, 1943, the IWA petitioned for an election in the bargaining unit consisting of all five Potlatch operational divisions. The election, which was held in November, 1943, resulted in IWA certification on March 4, 1944. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners protested the certification of the IWA in the District Court in Washington, D. C., in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally in the U. S. Supreme Court. The last upheld the ruling of the National Labor Relations Board.<sup>88</sup> The LSW petitioned for elections at Potlatch in 1946, in 1948, and again in 1952, but on none of these occasions was it selected by the workers as bargaining agent.

Perhaps the greatest contrast between the experience in the Potlatch company in 1942-44 and the experience in the Portland mills in 1937-38 was the acceptance by both unions of legal procedure in the later period. When the LSW lost the election, it protested by means of legal action rather than by picketing and boycotting. When the court ruled against it, the decision was regarded as final until another election could be attempted. The mill was not forced to close and did not lose sales and markets. The workers did not lose wages. The public was not inconvenienced or terrorized. Large-scale violence did not occur, although it is reported that a few "blows" were exchanged by international officials of the two unions.

#### Rival Union Tactics

As acceptance has been given by the lumber unions to legal procedure, a pattern of tactics contrasting markedly with those used earlier has developed by which each seeks to increase its membership relative to the other. One of the most important tactics used is petitioning in a multiple-operation company for bargaining units which will be advantageous to the petitioning union. If part of

<sup>88</sup> Northwest Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers, *The Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Convention*, 1944, p. 68; and the International Woodworkers of America, *Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Convention*, 1945, p. 269.

a company has previously been organized by the latter, there is a tendency for the union to select a unit which will utilize the strength of the workers already organized and which will increase the size of the bargaining unit. If the petitioning union is attempting to get a toe-hold in a company which has a larger total number of workers loyal to the rival union, it will ask for a fractional bargaining unit in which there is a possibility of winning.

An illustration of this tactic is found in an NLRB case in 1948 involving the Longview Branch of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company. The IWA had contracts with Weyerhaeuser for the mill and woods operations constituting the Longview Branch. However, a new plywood plant had been added which was not represented by any union. Both unions were intensely desirous of representing the workers of the new plywood operation, because Weyerhaeuser was the leading lumber company in the Northwest and because plywood was becoming an important branch of the lumber industry. The IWA petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for a unit including the sawmill and planing unit, in which it already represented the workers, and the new plywood plant. The LSW petitioned for a separate unit of the plywood mill. Since the plywood plant had not been represented by any organization previously, the Board ruled that the workers of the plywood plant should have an opportunity to determine for themselves their union representative.<sup>34</sup>

The LSW won the election for the plywood plant at Longview. The IWA attempted to reduce the victory of the LSW by petitioning for exclusion of plywood maintenance employees from the plywood bargaining unit. The Board decided that all maintenance employees, clean-up men, and lumber handlers who were assigned to the plywood plant on a monthly basis should be in the plywood bargaining unit, but that all casual plywood maintenance employees and transportation employees who worked under the general lumber superintendent of the Longview Branch should be excluded from the plywood unit.<sup>35</sup>

When both unions attempt to organize a company or company

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<sup>34</sup> *Labor Relations Reference Manual*, 22 (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1948), p. 1355.

<sup>35</sup> *Labor Relations Reference Manual*, 23 (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1948), pp. 1376-77.

branch with several possible units, in which neither union has had bargaining rights before, the choice of the appropriate bargaining unit is as important as in the case cited above. However, the choice of the most advantageous unit becomes less certain. One union may have obtained sufficient membership cards to ascertain that it might win the whole company if the bargaining unit were a multiple one; or it may have obtained sufficient cards in one plant or camp to assure it of winning bargaining rights for that one, but not enough cards all told for a combined unit. Such calculations help determine the bargaining unit each union will request.

It may be noted here that, when petitioning for a bargaining unit, each of the two lumber unions must, at times, defend itself against petitions by craft unions for bargaining units along craft lines.<sup>38</sup>

The rival unions sometimes use delaying tactics to influence election results when the timing of an election is important to one or the other union. Such tactics may be utilized by a union which has a contract when a rival union has petitioned for an election. The incumbent union may delay in giving its consent to the election and thus gain time to strengthen its position among the workers. The seasonal nature of the industry will sometimes work to the advantage of one of the unions, and the timing of an election may be vital.

When the bargaining unit and the date of election have been established in an operation for which both unions are competing, the outcome is determined largely by the relative persuasiveness of the two unions. Each union publishes a paper, which is used as a medium of propaganda as well as of news. The Northwestern Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers publishes *The Union Register*. The International Woodworkers of America publish the *International Woodworker*. In addition to attempting to stimulate interest in the activities of the union and educate the workers on economic and political affairs, each union in its paper tries to place itself in a more favorable light than the other union. This is done by publicizing all gains made in wages and working conditions and

<sup>38</sup> For an example, see "Decision, Order, and Direction of Election," Case Numbers: 36-RC-328, 36-RC-254, 36-RC-256, 36-RC-357, and 36-RC-264, U. S. National Labor Relations Board, December 16, 1949 (mimeographed), p. 3.

by praising the democratic procedures of the union. These gains and political advantages are contrasted with the alleged economic shortcomings and undemocratic nature of the rival. During the annual negotiating period, the union papers are especially filled with self-praise and derision of the rival. When the settlements of the two unions are separated by a period of days, the union settling first terms the rival a "coat-tail rider"; whereas the union settling last declares the agreement of the rival a "sellout." Any slight difference in the two settlements to the advantage of one union is publicized strongly by that union. The other union attempts to defend its position or to point to some other advantage that it has over the competitor.

Internal political problems of each union are often in the spotlight of the rival's paper, and old problems are kept alive by the opposing union. Thus, the IWA will point out any indication of Carpenter control in the LSW. The LSW will editorialize on any "left-wing" difficulties which the IWA may be experiencing. In addition, each successful raid or election in an unorganized plant is given publicity by the winning union. Prior to an important election, the paper of each union is likely to focus attention on the advantages which the workers in that plant will gain by selecting that union.

When both unions are preparing for an election, short-run and concentrated organizing tactics are employed. At large plants where the results are of strategic importance, local, district, and international officials are likely to be present to help with the organizing. Leaflets are handed out at the gates; the men are approached personally; the workers' homes may be visited; mass meetings are held; and the city newspaper may be asked for favorable publicity. In substance, the approach is much the same as that used by the unions in their regular publicity.

Feelings may run high prior to the election and some personal animosities may flare. Nevertheless, when the election is finished and one union has been certified by the NLRB, dissatisfaction with the results is generally directed by the defeated union through legal procedural channels. The defeated union may appeal the election, as was done at Potlatch following the 1943 election; or it may attempt to "chisel away" part of the victory of the rival, as was done

with respect to the maintenance employees in the Weyerhaeuser plywood plant at Longview. More often, however, the election results are accepted until another time and organizing activity is directed toward other plants and camps.

The boycott was discarded, for the most part, as a means of settling representational disputes after 1940, though occasional threats of such action have been made by each union in more recent years. Thus, in 1945, the IWA delegates attending their annual convention passed a resolution asking for the cooperation of the Longshoremen and the Inland Boatmen as well as the boommen within the IWA to keep logs from reaching AFL mills. The LSW has constantly heralded the strength which it receives from affiliation with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, since the Carpenters are the union using a major portion of the lumber from the Northwest. In practice, however, the boycott has not been important; furthermore, the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act has made it unlikely that a union defeated in an election could hope to gain by picketing or employing the boycott. Although union labels have been adopted by each of the lumber unions, they have limited use in the Northwest lumber regions because of the near abandonment of the boycott.

In the early period of disputes over membership between the LSW and the IWA, union shop or closed shop contracts were instrumental in giving security to a union in an operation. The contract was used to exclude from employment in the operation members of the rival union as well as members of the incumbent union who might favor the rival union. However, the effectiveness of these types of contracts in blocking a raid or in disciplining members within the union diminished greatly after the first few years following the split.

In 1946, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, made a significant ruling on the extent to which a closed shop contract could be used to prevent changes in affiliation among the lumberworkers. The case concerned an appeal from an NLRB decision in the matter of unfair labor practices involving the Lumber and Sawmill Workers and the Portland Lumber Mills. After winning a bargaining election in this company's mills in 1940, the LSW had signed a contract which included a closed shop agree-

ment. The IWA petitioned for another election in 1944. This was held in June of that year, with the LSW again the victor. During the election an employee of the company acted as an observer for the IWA and later was charged by the LSW with "giving aid and support to a dual organization, with intent to disrupt [the LSW]." The employee was found guilty of the charges and expelled. The union demanded that the employer enforce the closed shop clause of the contract, and the employee was discharged.<sup>37</sup>

The National Labor Relations Board, and subsequently the Circuit Court of Appeals, ruled that the company had engaged in unfair labor practices in discharging the employee on the grounds cited. It stated that the closed shop provision of the National Labor Relations Act was to be construed "to confirm the democratic process in bargaining agency elections and to prevent the use of the proviso for perpetuation of a particular union's control of employees once it enters into closed shop contract with an employer."<sup>38</sup>

In its decision, the Circuit Court of Appeals mentioned a number of conditions existing in the Northwest lumber industry which made the action of the LSW and the employer untenable. It was pointed out that interunion rivalry was a major characteristic of the Northwest lumber industry. Since a large percentage of the workers in the industry were permanent residents, deprivation of employment in local mills would mean "the loss of installments on the purchases of the family home, the disturbance of the children's education by removal to a distant place of the father's employment, if he can find one, and the dislocation of long established intimacies of relations with neighboring friends."<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, the court indicated that the voting was close and the elections warmly contested in many mill towns. Since all advocates of changes in affiliation might be subject to trial and dismissal if the court ruled otherwise in this case, the court felt that the closed shop contract could not be used to force the dismissal of the employee.<sup>40</sup>

The National Labor Relations Board has made an interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act which restricts the use of union shop

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<sup>37</sup> *Labor Relations Reference Manual*, 19 (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1947), pp. 2099-2100.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2098.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2100.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2101.

contracts by unions for disciplinary reasons. Under this ruling, an employee is protected from discharge if he pays, or offers to pay, to a union having a union shop contract, the amount of money equal to the initiation fee and accrued dues of the union and if he continues to pay the union's periodic dues. The employee is not compelled to apply for membership or to accept membership in the union. Under this interpretation, membership in a rival union coupled with nonmembership in the contracting union is not sufficient ground for discharge. It constitutes a deterrent to employers asked to fire an employee who is a member of a rival union or has refused to join the union under the contract.<sup>41</sup>

A number of persons well acquainted with the Northwest lumber industry have stated that union security clauses are no more numerous than in other West Coast industries where rival unionism does not exist. Because union shop clauses are usually considered a means of insuring against incursions by rival unions, this observation may seem surprising. It may now be recognized that a union shop gives financial security to the incumbent union but is not a guarantee against raiding by a rival union. Consequently, union shop clauses appear of little more value to a lumber union nowadays than to a union not faced with competition from a rival organization.

The lumber unions recognize other tactics as being more effective in preventing invasion by a rival organization. A union official has stated that efficient settlement of grievances and policing of contracts is one of the best means to preclude a change in affiliation in an operation. In addition, the workers and union officials themselves undoubtedly exert social pressures toward cohesiveness.

It is rather widely believed that during the early period of rival union conflicts between the IWA and the LSW the unions on several occasions organized a plant by approaching the employers directly. The employers, convinced that one union would be the more desirable for their plants, gave encouragement to the favored union or entered into contracts without allowing the workers to choose their bargaining agents freely and independently. It is generally agreed that collusion with the employer is no longer a

<sup>41</sup> The Bureau of National Affairs, "Analysis," *Labor Relations Reporter*, Vol. 25, No. 15 (December 26, 1949), pp. 30-33.

tactic used by the rival lumber unions. In the first place, the employer is subject to unfair labor practice charges from the union losing by such an arrangement. In the second place, any hint of collusion between one union and the employer will be publicized immediately by the rival union. Since the history of bitter employer resistance to unionism has left the lumberworkers with an aversion to working with the employer, action of this type on the part of the union leaders would not be accepted tolerantly by most workers. Possibility of publicity by the rival union would, therefore, be a deterrent from such action.

Hiring hall agreements, formal and informal, were made for a number of years in some plants in the industry. By these agreements the union was assured that new workers hired by an employer would be loyal to the incumbent union. Danger of infiltration by workers of the other union was thereby reduced. Since enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, the practice of hiring through union hiring halls has been reduced because the employer may be charged with discrimination in hiring and be subject to charges of unfair labor practice.

One of the greatest dangers in a rival union situation is the possibility that one union may scab a rival union while the latter is on strike against an employer. There is agreement among persons who are familiar with the Northwest lumber industry that scabbing is not a tactic which can be used by the IWA or the LSW. Even if leaders of the unions might find an opportunistic advantage in asking the workers to work behind the picket lines of the striking union, the majority of workers would not follow the leaders' request. However, a striking union may be vulnerable to attacks from the rival in another respect. While the striking union is attempting to hold the workers together during a strike period, the rival union may intensify its organizing activities and attempt to capitalize on any dissatisfaction among the workers which might have been engendered in the strike situation. Therefore, even though a union is not in danger from scabbing during a strike period, it may be more vulnerable to raiding. Undoubtedly in recognition of this, the two unions signed a "no-raid" agreement in 1954 for a period during which they were both on strike. Following the strike, however, the unions resumed their raiding and competitive activities.

A number of factors have played a role in changing the character of the rivalry which has existed in the lumber industry since the period immediately following the formation of the IWA. Each union apparently recognizes the futility of attempting to raid the strongholds of the other. A pattern of tactics has developed which differs from the earlier period. Labor legislation which now allows the peaceful settlement of disputes and which restricts the kinds of tactics that may be legally used has undoubtedly played an important role. The unions have tended to accept the machinery of the NLRB as the means by which to settle questions of representation. The Taft-Hartley Act has placed restrictions on tactics which may be effectively utilized. Furthermore, part of the change is undoubtedly based on a recognition that some tactics are difficult to defend on ethical grounds. A recognition by each union that practices which it may use may also be used against it in the long run has also had an effect in limiting the use of questionable tactics.

#### THE BARGAINING SYSTEM AND UNION RIVALRY

The system of collective bargaining which has developed in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry, encompassing the rival unions, is of rather complex design, but it leads to a fairly well-defined pattern of settlements throughout the entire region. To understand its character, rivalry between the two unions must be viewed on this level as well as on the organizing level.

##### The Employer Bargaining Groups

The employers have chosen, for the most part, to negotiate with the unions through a number of employer associations, which generally have rather loose and informal control over their membership. Several of the largest companies, however, have chosen to negotiate independently in recent years. Although there is some overlapping, the associations generally cover different geographical areas of production or different types of operations. The Lumbermen's Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., largest of the employer associations, includes employers from the fir area in western Washington and northwestern Oregon. Many of the employers belonging to LIRC are also members of small associations which ordinarily function independently of LIRC in negotiating

local agreements and in handling local labor matters. They may also, from time to time, negotiate independently from the other LIRC members on all issues. Included in these are the Tri-County Loggers Association, Inc., functioning in northwestern Washington around Bellingham and Everett, and the Columbia Basin Loggers and Columbia Basin Sawmills, covering operators in the Columbia River area of southwestern Washington and northwestern Oregon. The Industrial Conference Board of Tacoma, which has a similar relationship with LIRC, covers firms from many industries in and around Tacoma and includes a substantial number of lumber operators who form a group within the organization.

Independent of the LIRC but including employers in the geographical area covered by that organization are the Timber Operators Association and the Plywood and Door Manufacturers Industrial Committee. TOA includes a number of "gyppo," or small contract loggers, in southwestern Washington and on the Olympic Peninsula. The plywood and door organization covers a major portion of the plywood and door producers throughout western Washington and western Oregon.

The Willamette Valley Lumber Operators Association comprises operators in the Willamette Valley in Oregon. The Oregon Coast Operators Association draws its membership from lumber firms in the Oregon coast area of Lane, Douglas, Coos, and Curry counties. Both of these organizations are composed primarily of fir operators but are separate from LIRC.

In the pine regions of the Pacific Northwest, there are two major employers associations: the Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., and the Timber Products Manufacturers Association. The first association chiefly comprises lumber operations in an area east of the Cascade Mountains, stretching from the Columbia River in Oregon down into California. The latter is composed of operators located in the pine area east of the Cascades in Washington, northern and central Idaho, and western Montana.

Although collective bargaining in the Northwest lumber industry is generally characterized by association bargaining, the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company has negotiated separately since 1950. Other companies, such as the Long-Bell Lumber Company, the Simpson Logging Company, the Coos Bay Lumber Company,

C. D. Johnson Company, the M. and M. Woodworking Company, and the Georgia Pacific Plywood Corporation, have, in separate instances, in the past few years, negotiated separately or have negotiated concurrently with a group of employer associations.

While several of the smaller groups of employers deal exclusively, or almost exclusively, with one union only, the major associations and Long-Bell, Weyerhaeuser, and Simpson negotiate with both of the unions. The methods by which the associations take part in the negotiating procedure, however, are different. In most cases, the employers delegate to their associations a temporary or conditional power during each negotiating period to bargain on "broad" issues—issues which have industry-wide or region-wide application. They then choose to accept or reject the recommendations that result, and sign individual contracts. Separate negotiating committees may be selected to bargain with each of the unions. In other associations, the employers give the organization the authority both to bargain and to sign a collective agreement. Some employers meet separately with the local unions with whom they deal and utilize the staff of the association for advice or as negotiators.

Most associations, therefore, seem to maintain an official loose-knit character which would appear to prohibit the development of an organization with much power over its membership. There are, however, informal pressures which lend more cohesiveness to the employer groups than the formal structures of the organizations would indicate. The pressures come from two sources: (1) from fellow employers who stand to gain from some uniformity of existing contracts or contract changes and (2) from the unions who, on the whole, strive for standardization of contracts. Nevertheless, there appears to be a noticeable degree of traditional "individualism" still prevalent among the lumber operators in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry which tempers pressures that would lead to large associations with strong formal control over their members.

### The Union Bargaining Groups

The bargaining structures of the two unions are somewhat different. In each, however, there are formal means by which the

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“industry-wide” or the “coordinated” demands of the union are formulated and in each the district councils and the local unions preserve some independence in actual negotiations. The LSW and the IWA do not bargain together nor do they present identical demands to the employers. Demands or negotiations may be “industry-wide” or “coordinated,” therefore, only with respect to that segment of the Pacific Northwest lumber industry having contracts with the LSW or with respect to that segment of the industry having contracts with the IWA, but not with respect to the industry as a whole.

The Northwestern Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers grew out of the Oregon-Washington Council chartered by the Carpenters in 1937. In 1945, the Lumber and Sawmill Workers in the Pacific Northwest attempted to establish industry-wide bargaining through the Northwestern Council. A strike was ultimately called of Lumber and Sawmill Workers throughout the area to achieve the industry-wide wage demands of the group. The employers, however, refused to negotiate on an industry-wide basis and settlement was finally reached on an association or individual employer level. Since that time, the function of the Northwestern Council in negotiations has been notably one of coordinating the activities of the district councils within its jurisdiction or of sending a member to assist in individual district or local bargaining. It has not constituted a centralized bargaining unit for the district councils and locals within its jurisdiction. In the past few years, the Northwestern Council has also met with the California State Council of the Lumber and Sawmill Workers in an effort to coordinate wage negotiations for the Pacific Northwest states and California.

It has become the policy of the Northwestern Council to call a wage conference after the first of the year to establish a “coordinated” plan for negotiations during the spring negotiating season. In the fall, the annual convention serves the same purpose. The results of the conferences are usually recommendations on uniform wage increases and fringe issues to be included in the demands presented to operators throughout the area. The district councils and local unions have the formal right to decide whether or not they will accept the recommendations of the wage conference and, in addition, to determine those local issues which will be included in their negotiations.

In actual negotiations with employer associations, the bargaining group is ordinarily the district council covering the locals whose members are employed by operators within the association. If the association is composed of employers dealing with locals from more than one district council, the several councils may bargain jointly or may each bargain with the employer association separately. If the negotiations are between an individual local and an individual operator, the union bargaining group is more likely to be composed of representatives from the local union involved, with a district official assisting. A member of the Northwestern Council may be asked to be a member of the bargaining group when the issues involved have been decided on an industry-wide basis or when the situation has become particularly ticklish. Contracts are signed generally by the local union and the individual operator even when the negotiations are on the district and association level; consequently, locals maintain formal control of their individual agreements in district-wide or association-wide negotiations although in general they follow the pattern of settlement established for the industry.

In the IWA, the Northwest Regional Negotiating Committee is of primary importance to collective bargaining in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry. This committee had its inception in January, 1938, when the International Policy Committee was formed to act as an advisory board to the district councils and locals in an effort to effect a unified policy in negotiations. For the first few years the committee made recommendations for demands, but the negotiations were conducted on the district and local level. In the last few years, however, the negotiations themselves have, with a few exceptions, been carried on by a centralized committee.

Points for industry-wide negotiations are decided in the fall at the international convention and in the spring at a specially called regional meeting of delegates, the Industry-wide Negotiating Conference. The individual district councils or local unions determine whether or not they will accept the industry-wide demands and whether or not they will authorize the Northwest Regional Negotiating Committee, or subcommittee of that group, to negotiate for them. Ordinarily, the assistance and the demands of the International are accepted by the individual districts and

locals. Purely local or district matters may, at times, be added to the broad issues for the Regional Negotiating Committee to bargain on as well. Negotiations are then carried on with the major associations or with individual employers who may or may not have the assistance of an association. When an agreement is reached, it generally takes the form of a recommendation to the local union and to the employer to accept, with the contract being signed usually by the local union and the individual employer.

Thus, as in the case of the Lumber and Sawmill Workers, the locals and district councils have formal control of their negotiations and individual agreements. Although there have been instances in the past few years of IWA district councils and locals making settlements without the assistance of the Regional Negotiating Committee, in general, the locals and district councils follow the pattern of settlements established for the IWA segment of the industry.

#### The Composition of Negotiating Groups

The combination of employer associations and union negotiating committees may vary from year to year for purposes of bargaining on the "industry-wide" or "coordinated" demands of each of the unions. With reference to the IWA, the first three years after the war saw the Lumbermen's Industrial Relations Committee, the Willamette Valley Lumber Operators Association, and the Oregon Coast Operators meeting together for purposes of bargaining with the IWA Regional Negotiating Committee. In 1949, these associations met the IWA Regional Negotiating Committee separately and continued to do so, through 1952. In 1950, Weyerhaeuser withdrew its membership from LIRC and began carrying on individual negotiations. In 1952, the Tri-County Loggers and a group of other Washington employers within LIRC made settlements separate from the Oregon LIRC members. In 1953 and again in 1954, several employer associations and employers held concurrent meetings with the IWA Regional Negotiating Committee, each, however, maintaining its identity. The employer group was composed of LIRC (representing employers affiliated with it as well as employers affiliated with the Columbia Basin Loggers and the Industrial Conference Board), Columbia Basin Sawmills, Tri-County Loggers Association, Timber Operators Association, Willamette

Valley Lumber Operators Association, Plywood and Door Manufacturers Industrial Committee, Long-Bell Lumber Company, Umpqua Plywood Corporation, Georgia Pacific Plywood Corporation, and many smaller companies who did not wish to delegate authority to an association. The extent to which the employer groups in fir negotiate jointly or separately appears to be a matter of year-to-year strategy.

With reference to the LSW, bargaining is generally on a more fractionalized basis, with each of the major associations dealing with the dominant district council or councils covering locals with contracts with its members. There are exceptions, however, such as in 1945, when the union attempted to bargain in an industry grouping and in 1948, when five district councils from the fir area met jointly for a time with LIRC, WVLOA, and OCO. In each of those years, however, settlements were reached between the individual association and district council. The members of the pine associations have traditionally negotiated separately from fir and from each other when meeting the negotiating committees of both of the unions.

### The Heterogeneous Industry

There are a few islands of uniform contracts existing within the smaller associations which draw their members from similar operations within a limited area. However, a large number of different contracts signed by an individual operator and local union also exist within the Pacific Northwest lumber industry. The heterogeneity of contracts, as well as the number and type of employer associations, is a reflection of the economic characteristics of the industry.

The lumber industry has long been recognized as one of the most competitive major manufacturing industries in the United States. There are a tremendous number of mills and logging operations in the basic lumber industry; and although a very small number of firms in the industry produce a significant proportion of the total lumber supply, competitive conditions exist in the producing and selling of the bulk of logging and sawmill products.

The many operations within the industry can be classified in a large number of ways, each indicating differences in problems

faced by the operators. They can be grouped according to product, according to area of operation and species of timber utilized, according to size of operation, according to degree of mechanization, and according to degree of integration (extent to which one company engages in successive operations such as logging, saw-milling, and producing more finished products). Taking into consideration the major producing areas of the Northwest lumber industry, for instance, it is apparent that the fir, the pine, and the redwood areas differ generally in climate and in seasonality of operations, in type of terrain, and in means of transportation. Each major species has characteristics that affect logging and sawmill methods, degree of manufacture, and type of market. There are also areas within the major regions—particularly in the pine region—which are, on the whole, recognized as having different producing conditions. The differences in production and market characteristics for different types and areas of operation have generally been reflected in variations in costs and prices. These, in turn, have helped create differences in wages and other conditions of employment between operations and between regions.

Because operations within the Northwest lumber industry tend to be heterogeneous and competitive, a tradition of individualism on the part of employers is not surprising. Each employer tends to look at his problems as being different from those of other operators who turn out another product, or operate a different size of plant, or are located in another region or even another area of the same region. This individualism is largely responsible for the rather numerous and loose-knit employer associations that exist. To the extent that interests are different, the areas of common action are restricted and the binding power of the group limited. Thus, the most close-knit employer associations are found in several relatively small areas and among loggers differing not too radically in size of operation, and also in the plywood industry. Most operators, however, focus on the differences in their plants as compared with the industry generally and assert that differences in wage rates and fringe practices must be maintained.

Despite the fact that separate contracts predominate in the industry, however, there are certain clauses and conditions within the IWA contracts and LSW contracts throughout the area that are

fairly uniform. Many of the standardized clauses in current contracts are the result of War Labor Board or West Coast Lumber Commission directives and National Defense Mediation Board decisions which were incorporated into contracts during World War II. Others follow from wide acceptance of recommendations resulting from "broad" negotiations. Work week, vacations, holidays, night-shift differentials, and, to a certain minor extent, safety provisions and work-call provisions are reported by officials in the industry to be largely uniform in IWA contracts throughout the area. LSW contract clauses are reported not to have the same degree of uniformity throughout the Northwest, although in smaller areas contracts appear to be somewhat uniform in work week, vacation, and reopening provisions.

The West Coast Lumber Commission established standardized common labor rates within the basic producing regions of the industry, which recognized general labor market areas and areas with similar conditions of production. Although price and labor conditions in the various regions have fluctuated over time, and averages of wage rates in the various regions indicate no well-established differentials that consistently apply, wage rates generally are highest in the logging camps and sawmills of the Douglas fir region and lowest in the northern divisions of the western pine region. Wage rates in the southern divisions of the pine regions are nearer to Douglas fir than to the northern divisions of pine. Wage rates in the redwood region appear to vary between fir and the northern divisions of pine. The regional common labor rates established by the West Coast Lumber Commission reflected these differentials. The unions have on several occasions attempted to obtain wage increases designed to eliminate the general differences between areas, but have not met with success.

Standardized rates in the higher paid classifications have not existed on a regional or industry-wide basis. There are only a few instances of multiple-employer wage "standardization" plans in effect which apply to rates for higher paid jobs. A number of Douglas fir plywood mills affiliated with the Plywood and Door Manufacturers Industrial Committee and having contracts with the IWA have instituted a job evaluation program which has resulted in standardized job classifications and wage rates. In 1948, a plan was

negotiated by the Tri-County Loggers and the Northern Washington District Council of the IWA whereby a minimum and a maximum within which an operator could set his rates were established for approximately twenty-five per cent of the job classifications in the industry. Contracts signed by employer-members of the Columbia Basin Loggers and by local unions affiliated with the Columbia River District Council of the IWA and contracts signed by the Timber Operators Association and the Southern Washington District Council of the IWA set forth minimum rates for certain major classifications but do not establish standard wages for job classifications.

### The Bargaining Pattern and Wage Competition

Despite the heterogeneity of the Northwest lumber industry itself and the complexity of the bargaining structure, a fairly well-defined pattern for settlements has developed. Following the determination of "coordinated" or "industry-wide" demands on the part of each of the two unions, contracts are reopened throughout the area. Bargaining sessions are scheduled between the employer and union negotiating groups in the industry. The first settlements are reached in the fir region and these establish the pattern for the rest of the industry. Although there has been some change in recent years, the unions generally have competed actively in the fir negotiations, each attempting to settle for more than or, at least, as much as the other. Over the years, neither one of the unions has traditionally settled first.

The primary change resulting from each negotiating period between World War II and 1950 was an increase in wages, usually negotiated as a cents-per-hour increase across-the-board, although there were some changes in other contract provisions. During that period, each union received in the end the same amount of wage increase as the other. Two instances occurred, however, in which one union settled for a wage higher than that gained in an earlier settlement by the other. On each of these two occasions, the employers had to grant a second increase to the union making the first and lower settlement to effect equality between the two groups. These two years provide manifest examples of the rivalry between the two lumber unions as well as a picture of the bargaining pattern in the industry.

The first of these instances occurred in 1945. During the latter part of the war, both the IWA and the LSW demanded wage increases. The demands of the IWA were referred to the National War Labor Board, but on August 1, 1945, the wage issue was returned to the parties for further negotiations. The LSW decided to by-pass the board and petitioned for a strike ballot under the provisions of the War Labor Disputes Act. On September 24, 1945, the LSW struck the plants with which it had contracts. On November 1, 1945, the IWA negotiating committee and the Lumbermen's Industrial Relations Committee reached an agreement for an increase of 12½ cents per hour, effective November 1, 1945. This settlement set the pattern for other IWA locals and employers in the area. The LSW Strike Policy Committee rejected an offer of 12½ cents, but indicated its willingness to accept 15 cents per hour, effective "immediately," and an increase of 5 cents per hour, effective January 1, 1946. On November 25, settlements were reached between the LSW and employers in the Tacoma, Washington, area for a 15 cents per hour increase effective on the date of plant openings. This settlement set the pattern for the LSW locals and employers throughout the industry. Immediately following the LSW settlements, the IWA again made demands upon the employers and obtained an additional 2½ cents, effective November 1.<sup>42</sup>

During the 1948 spring negotiating period, a similar situation arose but with the position of the two unions reversed. The LSW Puget Sound District Council reached an agreement with the Plywood and Door Manufacturers Industrial Committee on January 23 for a 7½ cent increase, retroactive to January 1. This established the settlement pattern for LSW locals in the region. On April 3, the IWA negotiating committee and the Lumbermen's Industrial Relations Committee agreed on a 12½ cents per hour increase, effective April 1. This settlement was subsequently adopted by IWA locals and employers throughout the industry. On April 5, the Lumbermen's Industrial Relations Committee made a second settlement with the LSW Puget Sound District Council for a 5 cent

<sup>42</sup> *The Termination Report of the National War Labor Board*, U. S. Department of Labor, Vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 1072-73; *International Woodworker*, October 3 and 24, November 7 and 14, 1945; and *The Union Register*, May 4, September 17, October 5, November 9 and 30, 1945.

wage increase, effective April 1. Other LSW locals in the Northwest made the same general settlement at later dates.<sup>48</sup> On both of the above noted occasions, the union achieving the higher single wage settlement heralded itself as being the more militant union; the other union subsequently demanded and received an equal settlement.

In 1950, however, this design of settlements in which one of the major fir associations established a pattern of wage increases which resulted in identical or almost identical agreements for both unions began to change. Weyerhaeuser withdrew from LIRC and in 1950, 1951, and 1952 clearly made the lead settlement in the industry. Furthermore, in 1950, the parties departed from the past practice of uniform wage increases for the two union groups. In spring negotiations with the employers covered by IWA contracts, the IWA Regional Negotiating Committee settled for three paid holidays and a 7½ cents per hour wage increase which was earmarked for payment into a health and welfare program. The LSW, on the other hand, settled for a straight wage increase of 10½ cents per hour, the computed money value of the IWA settlement. In 1951, the LSW made two wage settlements, totaling 15½ cents per hour across-the-board. The IWA settled for 12½ cents per hour in wage increases and three additional paid holidays. The Wage Stabilization Board approved only a 12½ cents per hour wage increase for the entire industry. In 1952, the major portion of the IWA settled for a 7½ cents per hour wage increase,<sup>49</sup> three additional paid holidays (making a total of six), a reduction from five to three years' service in the eligibility requirements for two weeks' vacation, a 2 cents per hour increase in shift differentials, and an agreement that the night shift differential would apply to the "hoot owl" shift—a special shift necessitated by fire weather. The LSW settled for a 12½ cents per hour wage increase, again the computed value

<sup>48</sup> Lumbermen's Industrial Relations Committee, *Newsletter*, November 13, 1947 to April 27, 1948; *The Union Register*, September 26, 1947, to June 11, 1948; and *International Woodworker*, January 14, 1948, to June 9, 1948.

<sup>49</sup> The IWA Northwestern Washington District Council No. 2, Southwestern Washington District Council No. 3, and several locals from the Boommen and Rafters' District Council No. 11 continued negotiations independently of the Northwest Regional Negotiating Committee in that year and agreed to a 7½ cents per hour wage increase for April, May, and June which was dropped July 1 in return for a group insurance program paid for and administered by the employers.

of the IWA settlement. The Wage Stabilization Board gave approval to each of the settlements.

The lead settlements in 1950, 1951, and 1952 were still made in the fir segment of the industry, but were made by a company so large in operation that its problems differed from those of the bulk of the companies in the industry. If this became the pattern, it could create real difficulties for the smaller producers in the industry. For this reason, employers in many instances have felt that although Weyerhaeuser's settlements do have a bearing on other negotiations in the industry, the remainder of the industry must take a firm stand which is independent. In 1953, Weyerhaeuser granted an increase of 5 cents per hour; whereas the major portion of the industry granted no wage increases. The events of 1954, as they relate to this point, are discussed in the next section, dealing with strikes.

More important to the rival union situation, however, were the different settlements made by the two unions in 1950 and 1952. Although the computed money value of the settlements made by the LSW and by the IWA unions in those years were the same, the wage rates in the LSW plants were increased 8 cents per hour more than in the bulk of the IWA plants; whereas the IWA contracts gained fringe benefits not found generally in LSW contracts. The unions have traditionally appealed to workers by publicizing the dissimilarities between the two unions, although the differences have never been too apparent from the point of view of economic factors. Differences do exist now, on an over-all basis, between the agreements which have been made by each of the unions concerning wage increases and fringe benefits. In appealing to workers, the LSW can point to the settlements of 1950 and 1952 and declare wage advantages in plants that have contracts with its local unions. The IWA, on the other hand, can point to the settlements in 1950 and 1952 and emphasize the advantages that will accrue to workers from a health and welfare program, paid holidays, and more liberal vacation benefits. Although the situation could thus be viewed as setting the stage for intensified rivalry, there has been, as yet, no apparent increase in rivalry on the organizing level.

On the level of "broad" negotiations, there was a discernible change in 1952 in the rivalry between the two groups. Furthermore,

the change appears to have been one toward less, rather than more, rivalry in negotiations. Observers reported that in 1952, the Lumber and Sawmill Workers did not actively enter into negotiations with the employer groups until after the IWA settlements and then settled peaceably for the computed value of the IWA settlements. The traditional element of competition to obtain "more" in industry-wide negotiations appeared absent, although the differences in settlements in 1950 and 1952 were apparently considered by the LSW to be an advantage. In 1953, it appears that the IWA again took the lead in negotiations, although neither group obtained increases from more than a small proportion of the employers in the industry.

In 1954, employer resistance to granting an increase was strong. In that year, both of the unions undertook strikes affecting the major portion of the industry and, in addition, signed a "mutual-aid, no-raid" pact with one another for the duration of the strike. Just prior to strike action, the LSW and the IWA issued a joint statement covering the threatened strike situation. They declared that if either union entered into a strike, the other would honor the picket line; that there would be no raiding for the duration of the strike; that any strike by either of the unions should be regarded as a strike for the lumberworkers as a whole.

The effects of this instance of cooperation between the unions are yet to be seen. Although the "no-raid" aspect of the agreement was effective during the strike, it apparently did little to curb the normal competition for membership afterwards. Observers state that there is some evidence that raiding has diminished slightly, but that competition for membership in nonunion operations continues to be vigorous.

With respect to future instances of cooperation during negotiations, there seems to be little evidence at this time that anything permanent will come out of the 1954 experience alone. The unions did not bargain together, although they did have observers in some of one another's bargaining meetings. There seems to have been little actual assistance given by either union to the other, although this varied from area to area. In addition, the different settlements made by the unions in 1950 and 1952 may still create difficulties in future negotiations. Now that a precedent has been established,

however, cooperation in bargaining may be determined as a matter of year-by-year strategy.

At the present time, of course, any speculation concerning future cooperation between the two unions must take into consideration the proposed merger of the national CIO and AFL. Although the IWA has signed the national no-raiding pact between the AFL and CIO, the Carpenters and the LSW have not. As indicated above, competition for membership continues to exist between the two lumber unions, both in union and nonunion establishments. If the national CIO and AFL succeed in their proposed merger, the fate of the two lumber unions will still be undecided. It is felt that the bitter feelings leading to and following the formation of the IWA still affect the relationship among many officials in the two unions. For this reason, the IWA would not be likely to agree to return to the Carpenters. In addition, the merger of any two organizations, with the vested interests of separate sets of officials, is generally difficult.

### The Strike Record

Collective bargaining in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry has not been carried on during the past few years without major disturbances between the employer groups and the unions. During the early part of World War II, the National War Labor Board established the West Coast Lumber Commission to help stabilize labor-management relations in the industry. Primary consideration is given in these pages, however, to the period since the war.

The key negotiations in almost every year since 1945 have been characterized by threats of strike action and by requests for assistance from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, although in only a few of the years has a major strike occurred. In 1945, the LSW called an "industry-wide" strike in an effort to obtain one level of wage increases in the fir areas and an even higher level in other regions. The latter was designed to eliminate the differentials between the various producing regions as measured by the common labor rates established by the West Coast Lumber Commission. The duration of the strike was from two to five months in the various areas and operations. The union also attempted at this time to establish bargaining on an industry-wide basis. In

1947, the IWA struck, for about 16 weeks, 23 operations in eastern Washington and northern Idaho in an attempt to obtain increases exceeding the industry pattern—the increases again designed to eliminate the differential between that area and fir as measured by the difference in common labor rates. In 1952, IWA locals in western Oregon and the Columbia Basin engaged in a strike for three weeks against operators with whom they had contracts. IWA locals in western Washington, negotiating separately from the Regional Negotiating Committee, engaged in a strike for eight weeks. The issues in this strike concerned a demand for an employer-administered health and welfare program (as opposed to the union-administered health and welfare program then in effect) and local issues such as qualifying periods for winter holidays and union shop. A strike over the same issues in the area covered by TPMA lasted for approximately two weeks.

In addition to these major strikes, the IWA Boommen, constituting a separate district council within the union organization have independently conducted strikes affecting various coast operations in 1947, 1948, 1950, and 1952, notably in an effort to achieve wage increases in excess of those established for the industry and to achieve the six-hour day. In 1947, the LSW engaged in a two-month strike in four plywood and door plants in the Tacoma area to eliminate piecework for several classifications of workers. In 1950, the IWA struck the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company for approximately two months, primarily over the issue of union shop which they have never been able to obtain from the company. The LSW stopped work for several days in 1951 in plants in the Puget Sound area to effect wage settlements which were to become part of the LSW industry-wide pattern in that year. In 1952, the LSW conducted a number of strikes in the eastern Washington-northern Idaho area in an effort to achieve the “pattern” settlement in that area.

As can be determined from the above, none of these strikes were the direct result of representational squabbles between the two unions, such as those which characterized the years immediately following the formation of the IWA. On the other hand, neither had the two unions participated in a strike together. During the 1945 strike, the LSW attempted by picketing to force IWA

members in a number of operations along the coast to stop work. The IWA, however, obtained restraining orders from state courts in Washington to remove the LSW pickets and continued to work. Although the Washington State Supreme Court later ruled the picketing to be lawful,<sup>45</sup> there were no subsequent attempts of this sort.

In 1954, a strike occurred in the industry which set a new industry record in terms of lost wages and man-days. As mentioned above, both of the unions were on strike, and, in addition, had effected a degree of co-operation never before experienced in the industry.

In the negotiations for the year prior to the strike, 1953, the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company had granted a 5 cent per hour wage increase. A few scattered companies followed Weyerhaeuser's lead, but these settlements affected a proportionately small number of employees. The major section of the industry terminated negotiations with no increases in wages or in major fringe benefits. In 1954, the unions were determined to secure an increase. The IWA demanded a 12½ cent per hour wage increase, three weeks' vacation after five years' seniority, and the correction of inequities in plant wage rates based on job analysis. The LSW demanded a 12½ cent wage increase. The employers, in general, took the position that economic conditions did not warrant any wage, or cost, increase in 1954, just as they had not warranted an increase in 1953. Their position was based, in large part, on the fact that prices for lumber had dropped in 1953 to a level below the two previous years and had continued to be lower during the first months of negotiations in 1954.

The first meetings in the industry were held on February 10 between the IWA Northwest Regional Negotiating Committee and the concurrent fir employer negotiating groups described above. Negotiations by both unions with the other major associations and companies followed. Representatives of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service were called in for their first meeting with the employers and unions on March 25 but were unable to effect a settlement.

<sup>45</sup> *Labor Relations Reference Manual*, 17 (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1946), p. 700.

Although the major portion of the Northwest lumber industry was not involved in a strike until June 21, employers in a few scattered localities were struck in the early part of June. Not all areas were affected equally, but the majority of the large employers in all areas were strikebound as the picketing spread after June 21. It is estimated that some 77,000 employees were involved, with about equal numbers from each union.

Although a number of companies began operating earlier with interim agreements providing for varying amounts of wage increases or with agreements incorporating no cost increases, the major portion of the affected operations remained struck through August. Late in the month, Governor Arthur B. Langlie of Washington and Governor Paul Patterson of Oregon proposed that a "fact-finding" panel of seven members, representing the unions, the employers, and the public, be established to investigate the issues of the strike and to report its findings to labor and management. The parties to the strike were urged to accept the "fact-finding procedures" by written agreement, and to return all crews to work pending the issuance of a report by the panel. The employers and unions were not committed to accept the findings or recommendations of the panel, but the "procedures" provided for the release of pertinent facts to the public if the parties failed to act in accordance with the recommendations.

As details for the plan were being completed, the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company signed agreements for a 2½ cent per hour wage increase. The unions heralded the settlement as establishing a pattern for 7½ cents—5 cents in 1953 and 2½ cents in 1954. Most of the employers and local unions in the Douglas fir area, however, accepted the "fact-finding procedures." The employers in the pine areas refused to become parties to the "procedures," but, in general, a "cease-fire" was called in those pine operations which were still strikebound. Practically all of the industry had returned to work by about September 10.

Because of the refusal of the employers in the pine areas to accept the "fact-finding procedures," the Governors' Lumber Fact Finding Board, as it was called, was concerned primarily with the Douglas fir area. The unions joined forces to prepare and present their cases to the Board.

On December 22, 1954, the Board issued its findings. It recommended an increase of 7½ cents per hour, effective January 1, 1955, to April 1, 1956. It provided that this increase would in effect conclude all contract openings related to the issues of the strike until the latter date. The Board further recommended that a committee of representatives of management and labor be established to formulate a plan for the improvement of collective bargaining procedures in the industry.

The employer associations and union bargaining committees in the Douglas fir area recommended acceptance of the wage increase and the effective dates for the increase, but the panel recommendation concerning improvement in negotiating procedures met with strong opposition from the employers. It was nowhere part of the settlement recommendations by the associations, although a separate agreement was reached between the LSW and LIRC to explore ways for improving negotiating procedures. The pine associations did not make formal recommendations to their memberships with respect to following the fir settlements, but, in general, the employers in the pine areas granted wage increases of 7½ cents. The increases were effective, however, on dates mostly following January 1, 1955. Practically all of the lumber operations in the Northwest, including those employers who had made interim strike settlements with their unions, effected the settlement for 7½ cents per hour.

It is interesting to note that the panel recommendation for a 7½ cent wage increase corresponds arithmetically to the sum of the Weyerhaeuser settlements in 1953 and 1954. The basis upon which the panel arrived at this figure was not made public, however, and there is an insistence on the part of some employer representatives in the industry that the figure finally arrived at by the panel "just happened" to coincide with the Weyerhaeuser figures.

The effect of the use of fact-finding procedures in the Douglas fir area as a means of breaking a deadlock in collective bargaining is yet to be seen. The employers, during the 1954 strike, as well as on occasions in the past, have been adamant in their refusal to accept arbitration as a means of settling disputes. They are generally too independent to look with favor on any type of "third party" determination of wage or cost issues. The refusal on the part

of the employers to accept the recommendation of the panel to set up a labor-management committee to attempt to improve bargaining procedures and, as a matter of fact, to follow the wording of the panel in their recommendations, is undoubtedly an expression of this independence and of a determination to maintain it, despite the experience in 1954. One employer association formally released a statement expressing strong disapproval of the panel recommendation.

The unions incurred some problems during the strike. There was evidence of discontent among the memberships. Some scabbing was reported to have occurred, although not by one union against the other. In addition, workers in several plants filed petitions for decertification with the NLRB.

In general, the instances of industrial strife in the Northwest lumber industry may be assigned to a number of factors. To the extent that the strikes have been fostered by competition between the two unions for wage or fringe advantages, they may be charged to the rival unionism which exists in the industry. However, the character of labor-management relations within the industry is influenced also by such factors as the tradition of militancy on the part of the unions and resistance on the part of the employers, the memory of past causes for bitterness and suspicion between the parties, and the economic problems of the industry. It is notable that industry and union representatives in the industry seem to feel that the collective bargaining relationship in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry "has not been too bad" considering all of the factors that could give rise to industrial strife.

#### THE CONSEQUENCES OF MATURE RIVALRY

It is clear that the character of the rivalry between the IWA and the LSW in the Northwest lumber industry has changed considerably over the years. The "destructive" rivalry of the early period of dual unionism gave way to competition for potential members within limits established by law and practical (or ethical) considerations. The unions have gone so far as to initiate a degree of cooperation in negotiations when faced with a period of strong employer resistance to wage concessions. In view of the preponderance of literature emphasizing the destructive consequences of

rival unionism, it is worth while to evaluate the effects of this more "mature" rivalry on the collective bargaining system in the lumber industry.

### Competition and Degree of Organization

In the opinion of many authorities in the industry, rival unionism has helped to extend organization throughout the lumber area of the Pacific Northwest, both in terms of the number of operations under contract with one or the other of the unions and in terms of number of workers who are actual union members.

In August, 1944, the Bureau of Labor Statistics conducted a wage survey which also indicated the extent of organization in the Northwest lumber industry. Over four-fifths of the workers were employed in operations having contracts with a union. The IWA had contracts that covered a little more than one-half the workers in unionized plants; the Carpenter affiliates—the Lumber and Sawmill Workers, the Lumber Handlers Union, and the Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers District Council—had contracts which covered a little less than one-half. The BLS data also indicated that a preponderance of the large operations in the area were organized, but that a great many of the smaller mills and camps did not have contracts with either of the unions.<sup>46</sup> Most authorities in the industry estimate that at the present time approximately eighty per cent or more of the workers in the Pacific Northwest industry are employed in operations that have union contracts, although the workers in small operations are still not well organized. There is also general agreement on the part of all but the officials of the two unions that the IWA and the LSW represent approximately the same number of workers in the area.

Some further comments on the economic characteristics of the lumber industry should be considered in an evaluation of its degree of organization. As mentioned above, the industry is composed of a large number of operations of various sizes and is highly competitive. In 1947, there were almost four thousand sawmills alone in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and California. One per

<sup>46</sup> *Wages in the Basic Lumber Industry in the Far West, 1944*, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 840 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 8.

cent of the total number of mills each produced fifty million board feet of lumber or over per year, and as a group accounted for over twenty per cent of the lumber produced in that year. Sixty per cent of the total number of mills each produced less than one million board feet per year and as a group accounted for approximately five per cent of the total lumber produced in 1947.<sup>47</sup> The lumber produced in these mills and the prices received fluctuate widely during the course of the business cycle. The small mills and small logging operations are continually shutting down and resuming operations because of cyclical changes in the price of lumber and the price of stumpage. It is this group, comprising a large number of individual operations, which is the most difficult to organize.

Employer resistance is often strong in small operations because the employer knows well the few persons who work for him, has built his business personally, and resents the interference of an outside group. For the union, the relative expense involved in organizing the workers, in servicing them, and in keeping them organized, often in "backwoods" areas, is generally greater in small operations than in larger plants. In addition, the rewards are less certain because the life of the small operation is often short. Small operations are organized and then must be reorganized as the plant or camp changes owners or moves to another area. Furthermore, the center of lumbering activities in the Northwest has been moving from Washington to Oregon, and constant activity and expense has been necessary to organize the new lumber areas.

In the light of these facts, it is significant that so large a proportion of workers in the industry are covered by union contracts. Competition between the two lumber unions has been given a part of the credit for this high degree of organization. There are still many small operations in the industry which are not organized, but in the opinion of many people connected with the industry, the organization of small operations has been advanced by attempts by each union to expand its influence and control relative to the other.

But the organization of the lumberworkers has been advanced by the rival union situation in another way. The opinion has been expressed by persons familiar with the industry that rival unionism

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<sup>47</sup> *Census of Manufactures, 1947*, U. S. Bureau of the Census (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950).

has increased the proportion of workers who are union members as well as the proportion of operations that have union contracts. In large mills and in many smaller operations, the two unions warmly compete for bargaining rights. When both unions are applying pressure to employees to join during the organizing period immediately preceding the elections most workers tend to choose sides, leaving few nonunion workers. Some support for this assertion is found in data from 91 NLRB election cases occurring in Oregon in 1948 and 1949. Nineteen per cent of those cases in which only one union appeared on the election ballot resulted in no union being chosen as the bargaining agent; only 10 per cent of those cases in which both unions appeared on the ballot resulted in no union being chosen. Moreover, the competition between the unions in seeking new members has kept the cost of joining a union low. For a number of years, each union was reluctant to raise dues and initiation fees to make them higher than the dues and fees of the rival. As late as 1946, the IWA convention pointed out that the IWA must keep its dues low because the LSW would be charging low dues.<sup>48</sup>

#### Competition and the Level of Wages

To the extent that rivalry has led to a high degree of organization, it might also be expected to lead to greater effectiveness in achieving the unions' economic goals. But rivalry, as a matter of fact, appears to have contributed in a more direct manner to higher wages and improved working conditions. Each union has attempted at various times to obtain higher wages and better working conditions than its rival. This competition appears to have been a factor in increasing the wages and improving working conditions for all lumberworkers.

Wages in the Northwest lumber industry have increased tremendously since 1940, in absolute terms and in relation to wages in other industries in the Pacific region. In 1940, average hourly earnings in the logging camps and sawmills of the Douglas fir region of western Washington and Oregon were \$.78 per hour. By 1948, they had increased to \$1.71 per hour, and by 1952, to \$2.01

<sup>48</sup> International Woodworkers of America, *Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention*, 1946, p. 147.

per hour. The average hourly earnings in western pine lumbermills were \$.75 per hour in 1940 and \$1.66 per hour in 1948. In 1952, the average hourly earnings in the northern districts of western pine—eastern Washington, Idaho, Montana, and eight counties in Oregon—were \$1.89 per hour.<sup>49</sup>

In 1940, the lumber industry was one of the lowest wage paying industries in the Northwest.<sup>50</sup> In September, 1948, the average hourly earnings in the lumber and basic-timber products industries of the State of Washington were \$1.74, as high as, or higher than, those in any other major industry of that state except printing and publishing. The average hourly earnings for all manufacturing industries in Washington in September, 1948, were \$1.61.<sup>51</sup> In 1948, average hourly earnings in California in the lumber and basic timber products industries were \$1.78 and in all manufacturing were \$1.56. In that year average hourly earnings in the California lumber industry were below only those in the printing and publishing industry and the petroleum industry.<sup>52</sup> Such comparisons cannot be made for Oregon, Idaho, and Montana, but some indication of the large relative increase in wages in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry can be found in the above figures.

A multiplicity of factors has affected the wages that are paid to the workers in the lumber industry, although the tremendous war and post-war boom in the industry has undoubtedly been of primary importance in producing the wage increases noted above. The indexes of wholesale prices, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, show that in August, 1949, wholesale prices of lumber in the United States had increased 210 per cent over the August, 1939, level; in August, 1949, the wholesale price for lumber stood higher above the 1926 base year than the wholesale prices of any other of the 49 commodities listed.<sup>53</sup> As prices went up and production

<sup>49</sup> Unpublished data, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; and *Sawmilling, West Coast Douglas Fir, February 1952* and *Sawmilling, West Coast Western Pine, Northern Districts, February 1952*, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952).

<sup>50</sup> Dexter M. Keezer, "Inter-Departmental Report on the Douglas Fir Lumber Industry," Portland, Oregon 1941 (mimeographed), p. 71.

<sup>51</sup> *The Washington Labor Market*, Washington, Employment Security Department, November, 1949.

<sup>52</sup> *California Labor Statistics Bulletin*, California, Department of Industrial Relations, September, 1949.

<sup>53</sup> *Monthly Labor Review*, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 69 (December, 1949), p. 737.

mounted, competition for labor in the area increased and the lumber unions pressured for, and obtained, higher and higher wages. Furthermore, for the early part of the period covered above, the impact of initial union organization undoubtedly contributed to the increase in wages. There is also evidence to suggest, however, that rival unionism has contributed to producing higher wages and improved working conditions in the lumber industry in the past ten to fifteen years.

The unions have, in the past, competed in regional negotiations to obtain higher settlements. Twice since the end of World War II, one of the unions succeeded in settling for an increase higher than that gained in an earlier settlement by the other. On each of these occasions, the employers had to grant a second increase to the union making the first and lower settlement, to effect equality between the two groups. Wages of workers throughout the industry have been increased thereby. Although a rival union situation has been looked upon as one in which employers can play one union against the other to effect low settlements, the operators apparently have not been able, or perhaps have not attempted, effectively to utilize this tactic in the lumber industry.

Most union officials deny that rival unionism has led to economic gains for the workers, but insist that it has led to a lessening of the effectiveness of unionism. Certain factors, however, appear to balance the loss of strength which union officials feel comes from disunity. The unions have remained militant—undoubtedly rivalry has played an important role. Moreover, rivalry in negotiations has called forth sharpened bargaining techniques. Each of the unions has been developing research programs with which to meet employer arguments effectively, with a resultant diminution in ineffectual blustering, bulldozer tactics. The incentive for wage increases that comes from competition and from the sharpening of bargaining techniques seems to have outweighed any loss of effectiveness that might have resulted from disunity among the lumberworkers and appears to have contributed to increased wages in the industry.

There is a danger in such a rival union situation that competition might drive wages beyond a level that is economically sound

for an industry.<sup>64</sup> Serious economic problems may thus be created for the lumber producers by the activities of the dual unions. However, the economic condition of the Northwest lumber industry has apparently not been seriously endangered up to this point by pressure for wage increases, although the evidence available now is not conclusive. The effect of rival unionism on the economic condition of the industry needs to be studied also in a period of prolonged stability or recession before a valid conclusion can be drawn. It is significant, nevertheless, that in 1949, the first year following 1940 in which lumber prices fell below what they had been in the previous year, and again in 1953, when prices fell below those of the previous year, industry-wide negotiations resulted in no general wage increases. An increase was given following the 1954 strike, but only with the provision that contracts be closed until 1956.

The above conclusions, of course, fail to take into consideration the individual "marginal" producer. In a rival union situation, such as in the lumber industry where each union is under the constant surveillance of the other and under pressure to offer the workers "more than" or "as much as" the other, the unions are less likely to offer wage concessions to the high cost producer. These individual employers, therefore, may find rival unionism a situation which is adverse to their welfare except in periods of very good markets and prices.

#### Rivalry and the Individual Employer

It has already been pointed out that the competition between the two unions in attempting to expand their memberships relative to each other has undergone a "maturing" process. Disputes incident to organizing are no longer a serious problem for the industry as a whole. Individual employers, however, whose operations have not become "strongholds" or whose operations, thus far nonunion, are the scenes of organizing attempts by both unions, are faced with problems engendered by rival unionism. In those operations which are the subject of periodic raids, the possibility of a sudden transfer of bargaining rights hinders long-range planning. The employer cannot be certain whether he will be dealing with the pres-

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<sup>64</sup> Joseph Shister, *Economics of the Labor Market* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1949), p. 71.

ent union or the rival group within a few years. Furthermore, these employers are often faced with requests from both of the unions to negotiate prior to the actual election. Fearing his vulnerability to charges of unfair labor practices, the employer is likely to refuse to meet either union. The ill feeling, suspicion, and bitterness which may arise in such a situation will color negotiations and labor-management relations for some time following the certification of the victor.

In addition, those employers whose operations are being raided and whose operations are being organized for the first time are likely to find the intense period of organizing prior to the election disturbing to their labor forces and to production. In the heat produced by arguments presented by organizers for both unions, differences of opinion among the workers may disrupt personal relationships in the plant, with a concomitant reduction in the efficient operation of the plant for a considerable period of time following the election. Those employers, therefore, in addition to the "marginal" producers cited above, are likely to feel the brunt of any adverse effects arising from rival unionism.

#### Rivalry and the Employers' Associations

For the most part, the employer associations in the Northwest lumber industry have found rival unionism to be a "livable" situation. Since rival unionism was initiated almost at the same time as large-scale organization itself, most of the present associations were formed to engage in collective bargaining in a rival union situation. The associations, some with provisions for separate negotiating committees to deal with each of the unions, were structured to negotiate with competing unions. Although they have been faced with pressures for wage concessions that have been intensified by competition between the two unions, they have apparently been able to hold the increases to a level that is not economically unsound for the industry as a whole under present market conditions.

The associations have, of course, incurred costs in the rival union situation which are greater than those that would have been incurred had only one major industrial union been established in the industry. Major negotiations with committees from two unions

instead of from one increase the bargaining expenses of the associations. The negotiating staffs of the associations themselves must be larger when negotiations with both unions overlap. Furthermore, the different settlements made in recent years make it necessary for the associations to conduct research on a greater number of issues. These increased costs, however, are not so great as to be burdensome for the employer members and will likely never be a serious problem for the associations.

Rival unionism, however, has contributed to another problem which is more real for the associations in the industry. To some extent in certain areas, frictions have existed between employers who have contracts with the LSW and those who have contracts with the IWA. To the extent that their contracts are different and the demands of the unions are different, the problems and interests of these members are also different. On the whole, the associations are founded on democratic principles. Pre-negotiating policy meetings of association members consider the interests of all employers. Over-all bargaining policy is established on the basis of the association as a whole, with neither of the two groups of employers generally the dominant one in the major associations. When, however, a settlement with one union establishes the pattern for the industry, the employers dealing with the other union may feel that they have not had control over the amount of their own settlements. If, in addition, different kinds of settlements are made such as in 1950 and 1952, and these give one or the other of the groups of employers an advantage in obtaining labor, dissension may increase. These frictions must not be overemphasized, however. The problems of holding an association together are generated in the lumber industry more by the individualism of the employers, based on economic factors, than by frictions arising directly from a rival union situation.

#### Rivalry and the Unions—Leaders and Members

The unions themselves have never been able to achieve the security which can be found in an industry where one union is dominant. Although each group has secure bargaining rights in a vast majority of the plants with which it has contracts, each of the unions is constantly threatened on its borders by the activities of

the other. There are two principal ways in which either organization might lose its relative position in the industry. One is by a switch in affiliation by the members of a local or the workers in a plant if they become sufficiently dissatisfied with the union representing them. The other is by failure on the part of the union to offer appeals to the unorganized worker which are as convincing as those offered by the rival union.

Some union leaders deny that there is a danger that dissatisfied groups may change affiliation. These persons assert that a group dissatisfied with one union is more likely to attempt to correct the source of dissatisfaction through the channels of that union rather than by a change in affiliation. This may be true to a considerable extent. There have been few instances of switches in union affiliation in recent years. The unions tend to build up a core of faithful and loyal members who have fought for the organization against employers and the rival union; democratic channels for instituting change exist in each union. These members obviously would not consider becoming members of the rival union.

There is undoubtedly a fringe of union members, however, who choose to be union men, but have no special loyalty to either organization. Dissatisfaction among these "fringe" members may cause them to seek (or accept) representation from the rival if they find it difficult to effect change through regular channels. Despite contrary claims and the infrequency with which raids actually occur, the union leaders in the lumber industry are aware of the threats which a rival union makes to the size of membership in each organization. Union leaders have indicated that the efficient processing of grievances is very important in insuring an operation against the raids of the rival. It has been asserted that raids are not initiated entirely within the raiding union but are often invited by the workers in a plant who are dissatisfied with the union currently representing them. The two unions openly vie in their appeals to unorganized workers—both in terms of what each has to offer and in pointing out the faults of the other. The publicity tactics of the rival unions undoubtedly compel the leaders to consider carefully their actions with reference to their respective memberships. The rival union press stands constantly ready to criticize.

It has already been indicated that the unions have remained

militant in the rival situation and that they have generally competed for wage advantages to offer the lumberworkers. The workers appear to have gained also in democratic processes because of the rival union situation. The leaders must be constantly alert to the will of the rank-and-file lumberworker or face the danger of a decreasing position in the industry for their respective union. An alternative organization stands ready to take over dissatisfied workers. It is significant that following the secession of the IWA, the LSW received a vote in the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and apparently have been able to achieve a considerable degree of autonomy in their relationship with the Brotherhood. Organizers and representatives who are appointed by the Brotherhood to the industry are now primarily from the lumber industry itself.

### CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

The predominant view of rival unionism has been that competition between two unions in the same industry or portion of industry will hamper effective union action, will cause the employers in the industry to suffer unnecessary economic losses, and will inconvenience, if not actually harm, the general public. The harmful aspects of union rivalry are seen to arise primarily from disputes over representation resulting from the efforts of each union to achieve supremacy. In the period of intense conflict immediately following the advent of dual unionism in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry, the destructive aspects of rival unionism were experienced by labor, by employers, and by the public in the industry and area. More recent experience in the lumber industry, however, has indicated that the period of destructive representational conflicts may be short in duration. A "mature" rivalry may develop as each union establishes strongholds and is forced to recognize the futility of attempting to eliminate the other from activity within the industry. Each of the rival unions then attempts to increase its prestige relative to the other by extending its membership through peaceful means to fringe groups of workers who are not loyal to one or the other union.

The enactment of effective labor legislation and an acceptance of this legislation have played an important role in the maturing

process in the lumber industry. Tactics now utilized by the rival unions in organizing revolve around National Labor Relations Board bargaining elections. Scabbing and wage concessions to employers, which were at one time believed to be inherent in a rival union situation, have generally not occurred among the organized lumberworkers. The Taft-Hartley Act has had a restrictive influence on the tactics used. Boycotts and sympathy strikes, which were characteristic of the early period of rivalry in the industry, are not now important tactics for lumber unions.

The unions do, however, compete in organizing. The competition has apparently extended the degree of labor organization in the industry. An employer may at times suffer inconvenience from union competition for members prior to an election. Productive efficiency of an operation may drop for a period because of emotions aroused as workers choose sides. Nevertheless, rival unionism has not resulted in recent years in large-scale disputes over representation nor in extensive production losses to employers in the lumber industry or in inconvenience to the public in the Northwest.

Since the formation of the International Woodworkers of America as a rival organization of the Lumber and Sawmill Workers, a system of collective bargaining has developed in the industry which encompasses the two unions. During each negotiating period each of the unions formulates "coordinated" or "industry-wide" demands; the major employer associations bargain with groups from each of the unions; and a pattern of settlements on major issues evolves which is industry-wide in scope. Within this framework, the unions generally have competed for a more advantageous settlement. In the last few years, however, there appears to have been some slackening of competition in negotiations, with the two unions entering into a "mutual-aid, no-raid" agreement during a strike in 1954 which involved both groups. Nevertheless, there is little evidence in this one experience to convince one that the two unions will cooperate on any permanent basis in the future.

The strike record of the industry includes a number of major conflicts between labor and management since World War II. Competition for wage increases has undoubtedly contributed to promoting strife in the industry, but the economic problems of the

industry and the influences of past labor-management relations must also be assigned important roles.

There is evidence to suggest that rivalry between the two unions has led to higher wages in the Northwest lumber industry than would have existed had rivalry been absent, although it cannot be assigned the primary role in producing the high level of wages now existing in the industry.

The rival-union situation has apparently contributed somewhat to the problems of creating unified and strong employer associations in an industry composed of heterogeneous and independent operators. Dealing with two unions has created somewhat higher costs than would be the case in a single-union industry, but the costs have not been a problem. Although faced with maneuvering for advantageous wage increases or other concessions, the employer associations have apparently been able to cope with the rival-union situation.

Each of the unions has achieved a high degree of institutional security by establishing a large core of loyal members. Neither of the unions has been able to obtain permanent settlements of greater monetary value than the other. The leaders of the dual unions, however, must be constantly on guard to defend the relative positions of their respective unions in the industry. The workers have apparently gained in terms of wages and working conditions and, to some extent, in terms of leadership responsibility toward the will of the rank-and-file.

The period of rival unionism in the lumber industry has been one in which the employers have, for the most part, enjoyed favorable economic conditions and one in which each of the lumber unions has been able to expand its membership as the industry has expanded. A period of prolonged stability or recession may prove that competition for wage advantage, if it occurs in the future, does endanger the economic well-being of the industry. The Pacific Northwest lumber industry may find itself at a competitive disadvantage with respect to other producing areas and industries producing substitute materials. If each union must fight in a depression to maintain its total membership and to find jobs for its members, the peaceful means of settling organizing problems may be abandoned.

## PACIFIC NORTHWEST LUMBER INDUSTRY

Rival unionism has existed in the Northwest lumber industry for 18 years. This is too short a period of time and too limited an experience to permit of drawing any general conclusions for the trade-union movement as a whole. Problems are not absent in the collective bargaining system of the lumber industry. But rival unionism, as it has developed over the past decade and a half in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry, has become a livable situation for most groups concerned.

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