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HUMAN RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONISM =by=

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HUMAN RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONISM

A large section of human relations literature is concerned with the concept and mechanics of industrial democracy. The human relations approach to industrial democracy, however, has been viewed both as a threat to the traditional trade union approach to democracy and as a scientific affirmation of the collective bargaining and grievance machinery. The purpose of this article is to examine the ideas in human relations regarding leadership, participative management and organization theory as related to the ideology and practices of trade unionism. In addition the trade union concept of mature industrial government will be related to the concepts of human relations.

I. Group Centered Leadership.

Human relations research supports the proposition that leadership style is a key variable in morale, in satisfactory relations with employees, and, perhaps, in productive output. Moreover, research evidence indicates that a "democratic," "permissive," "employee-oriented," "group-centered" style of leadership is superior to an authoritarian, task-oriented style.¹ When human relationists elaborate on what is meant as group-centered leadership, while condemning autocratic leadership, it would appear that employees are offered ideal supervision with which no unionist could find fault.² There are, however, two aspects of human relations leadership theory to which unions may object: the clinical approach to leadership and the role of the foreman as leader of the employees.

1. The clinical approach to leadership: Human relations is strongly influenced by clinical psychology and psychiatry, and consequently the couch-side manner

of counselor, social worker and therapist, developed for the treatment of the emotionally disturbed, the amoral and the anti-social is sometimes recommended as the desirable supervisory style in the treatment of employees.³ Human relations research indicates that confused and conflicting motivation at the subconscious level -- attitude towards authority, stereotyped thinking, non-rational aggressiveness -- are major causes of employee dissatisfaction. (Most human relationists concede that there are other causes for dissatisfaction and do not suggest that clinical treatment should replace union representation.) The clinical approach recommends that supervision receive leadership training -- which is light weight therapy in itself, thereby reducing employee dissatisfaction caused by the supervisors' personality conflicts -- that he may treat the subconscious roots to employee dissatisfaction. Assuming for the moment that human relations training can accomplish this, the question arises as to the propriety of the supervisor attempting it.

For example, one author advises that all problems confronting the supervisor should be treated clinically; that is: do not confront, accuse, or blame, but help the employee see for himself his non-rational, subconscious motivations which tend to lead to faulty perception and blocked communications.⁴ It is held that employees (patients) are threatened and become excessively defensive when told anything in a forthright manner. Hence, the correct supervisory style is to rephrase the statements of employees as questions in the style of Rogerian client centered therapy.⁵ The clinical approach to problem solving is correct only in those instances where the basis of employee dissatisfaction is purely emotional. There are cases of conflict over conscious, well understood issues. There are cases where the employee would have greater respect for the supervisor who showed some human emotion himself instead of assuming the counselor's professional pose.⁶ (The same

applies for the clinical approach to the teacher-student, parent-child, husband-wife relationship.) If industrial democracy is to have meaning there must be an equality in the foreman-employee relationship that does not exist in the doctor-patient relationship. Although client-centered therapy strives at establishing an equality between "client" (patient) and "~~counselor~~^{se}" (doctor) the fact remains that it is the patient who needs help and the doctor who is the expert. Being permissive and non-directive, in the clinical sense, is not the same as being democratic in any relationship between mature adults. Normal, well-adjusted employees will resent the condescending overtones of the clinical approach to leadership.

The story is told of an employee who reported to his foreman, with some anger, that he failed to "make-out" on the incentive rate as a result of faulty equipment. The foreman, trained in the clinical approach, rephrased the complaint as a question. Whereupon the employee became truly angry at the foreman's inability to understand plain shop English.⁷

Thomas Gordon, in discussing limits on the area of work group freedom, uses the example of toilet-training in the parent-child relationship. Restriction of the child's area of freedom is for the parent's sake, not the child's, and it can be psychologically harmful to the child. Gordon advises parents to genuinely accept the child's untrained habits and the child will eventually train himself without psychological repercussions. Although conceding that different groups must have different limits on freedom, Gordon compares toilet-training to the broad area of industrial training.⁸

To pursue the analogy further, there may be no argument that the constraints of industrial discipline are imposed for the benefit of management, not work groups and it may be that these constraints are psychologically

harmful. Unlike toilet-training, however, it is doubtful that work groups would learn the habits of industrial discipline by themselves if supervisors were "patient, loving, and affectionate." The parental viewpoint on toilet-training has fairly wide acceptance (except for infants and anal-oriented psychiatrists) whereas the management viewpoint on discipline does not have as extensive support. There are some compelling reasons why a child will toilet train himself that do not apply to industrial discipline. Applying psychological dicta in parent-child relations to foreman-employee relations may not contribute to good industrial relations.

Human relationists point out that no one can become a true leader of a group without first gaining acceptance as a member of the group. The clinical approach recommends that the therapist become "one of the boys" in order to become the leader for the purpose of practicing group therapy. A major problem in every superior-subordinate relationship, human relationists observe, is non-rational hostility towards authority stemming from childhood ambivalence towards parental authority.⁹ Assuming that human relations training has cured the supervisor's sadistic joy or guilt feelings about holding authority, it is recommended that foremen become "members" of the work group in order to treat the group's irrational hostility towards authority. Such tactics may be appropriate for the treatment of delinquents or those who voluntarily submit to group therapy, but it smacks of manipulation when applied to work groups.

It is no doubt true that subconscious, non-rational ambivalent attitudes toward authority exist among employees, but failure to point out other sources of hostility leaves the implication that non-rational hostility is the major problem. The author's point of view is that there can be, and ought to be, a conscious, reasoned, and controlled hostility towards authority, no matter how democratic or just the authority may be. All authority, parental, teacher,

union, and managerial, has a propensity to tyranny and corruption against which subordinates must guard. There is nothing wrong with clinical treatment of subconscious confusion over attitudes toward authority, but it is a mistake to think that the clinical approach to leadership will remove all hostility towards authority or that the foreman should be giving the treatment. A proper union function is to promote a healthy hostility toward managerial authority.

Human relationists also point out that to be a leader requires acceptance of group norms. In the clinical approach the therapist first accepts the norms of the delinquents, criminals, or neurotics in order to become group leader for the purpose of changing the group norms. Posing as sympathetic and understanding, the councilor tricks the patients into lowering "resistance to change" that he may establish norms "at a higher level of maturity" which are "more in keeping with the social environment."¹⁰

While the anti-social and the psychologically incompetent may be fair game for this type of group therapy, it is insidious manipulation when applied to industrial situations. Management's norms do not represent a higher level of maturity and are not supported by society as the only valid norms. "Resistance to change" in the clinical sense changes subtly in meaning when applied to production norms and technological change. Solomon Barkin is correct in describing the clinical approach to supervisory leadership as the art of seduction and as brainwashing of captive audiences.¹¹

2. The role of the foreman within the work group: Human relations literature offers several viewpoints on the relation of the foreman to his subordinates, some of which threaten and some support the union viewpoint. At one extreme is the traditional management viewpoint, condemned by most human relationists, which holds that the foreman should be a completely task-oriented, autocratic

management representative who is formal, official, gives orders through lieutenants and does not mingle with the ranks. In such a relationship the group would require an informal leader, padrone, or shop steward through which to communicate to the foreman. Some unionists prefer this style of foremanship because it makes clear-cut who is for management and who is for the workers.¹² One sociologist, observing the frequency of such a superior-subordinate relationship among many different groups, suggests that it is a natural characteristic of leadership.¹³

Other human relationists, however, describe this as "headship" rather than leadership. From their observations they conclude that leadership through the consent of the group is far more effective than headship which is imposed on the group by external authority.¹⁴ Accordingly, some human relationists go to the other extreme, recommending that the foreman become the undisputed leader of the group. There are two variations to this view; the first being the (older) Mayo view that workers were in desperate need of rational leadership and management was the natural, legitimate elite to lead work groups.¹⁵ This view was properly attacked as manipulative and loaded with value judgements. Although the Mayo view on foreman-leadership is no longer accepted in most academic circles, some companies utilize human relations research for the purpose of competing with the union for the leadership of the workers.

A second variation on the idea that foreman become group members in order to be leaders is that the foreman should abdicate from management's ranks and become a worker.¹⁶ Unlike the clinical approach to "joining the group," this view holds that no parent, teacher, foreman, or even boy scout master can really become "one of the boys" so long as he holds a position of authority. One cannot honestly become a member of a group

without sincerely accepting the norms of the group. Since personnel specialists have long been aware of the marginal position of the foreman as "management's poor relation," the formal recognition of foremen as industrial n.c.o.'s might solve many problems. The foreman-leader as a member of the work group rather than as a management representative would be compatible with old line craft unions, such as the typographers and papermakers, where there is a tradition of the foreman being both gang leader and a union man.

A middle of the road position places the foreman between the two extremes. As management's representative the foreman exercises headship and is task-oriented but, trained in human relations skills, he tries to understand the group's norms, attempts to be employee-oriented and to speak in behalf of his group to his superiors even though he realizes that he never can be fully accepted to membership and leadership. Some human relationists observe that groups have two leaders -- one task-oriented and one personal-problem oriented -- simply because it takes a person of rare ability to lead in both spheres simultaneously.¹⁷ Such a viewpoint recognizes the need for a shop steward or other informal leader who is a legitimate member of the group to serve as spokesman and specialize in personal problems.

II. Participative Management.

1. Definition: Participative management, as generally used in human relations literature, means turning all policy-making decisions within the sphere of authority of the immediate supervisor over to his subordinates for group decision making.¹⁸ Further, it means that the supervisor is completely non-directive and permissive in the conduct of decision-making meetings. Until such time as subordinates see him as an equal who is participating in problem solving, his function is to state the policy problem, state the "area of freedom" which he is turning over to the group, and to serve as an expert in

supplying technical information. The supervisor does not "consult" with his workers or secure their "consent"; they tell him. The foreman makes day-to-day routine decisions within the framework of policy, and, of necessity, makes decisions when emergencies arise, but where the work group has achieved self-government they will call their own meetings and enforce their policy. Finally, participative management assumes that, through a democratic leadership style together with the therapeutic nature of group decision making, the work group will become emotionally involved in all aspects of the work situation which directly affects the employees.

2. Self realization vs. enterprise consciousness: The logic of modern industrial technique makes workers into specialized automatons. The complaint that workers have been deprived of the opportunity for self-expression in meaningful work pre-dates the human relations movement. Human relations research seems to indicate that workers desire a greater voice in planning their work; that creative work is necessary to mental health, and that workers are capable of responsible, reasonable, and wise decisions. Furthermore, it is held that a rising standard of living and greater economic security makes it possible for workers to become more concerned with "self-realization," through their work.¹⁹ Human relationists see, in participative management, workers regaining collective control of their jobs and, in so doing, securing self-expression, dignity, and status.²⁰

Trade unionists, while agreeing that most work arrangements are humbling and ignoble, charge that human relations shop democracy is a shoddy trick to make employees "enterprise conscious." Accordingly, unionists predict that the shop committees will not generate much enthusiasm or ego involvement in the solution of problems that rightfully belong to management. Workers are

notorious for their interest in their own problems and lack of enthusiasm for problems that do not relate directly to their own particular interests.²¹

Upon analysis there is no conflict between these two viewpoints. The union charge of promoting enterprise consciousness through human relations technique applies only to those firms that attempt to abuse the theory. Human relations research, supporting the union view, indicates that workers will not become enterprise conscious.²² Workers are job conscious and the objective of human relations shop democracy is to permit work groups to make decisions about those job problems that are of vital interest to them.

The real issue, and it is an old one, is how broad is job consciousness and at what points does it touch upon enterprise consciousness. The same issue arose over the union's role in the administration of job evaluation and incentive systems. Some unions prefer active participation in every phase of wage administration, even to the point of supporting joint union-management decisions before the workers, while other unions take the narrow role of critic, challenging management's decisions on wage issues. Unions tend to be ambivalent as to the area of worker job interest, arguing at the time of the management prerogative crusade that job interest was involved in every management decision and now arguing, when offered greater employee prerogatives, that employee job interest is limited and narrow. Human relationists answer that workers are always suspicious of new found shop freedom -- past experience makes their suspicion reasonable -- and adjustment to democracy is one of the most difficult problems in participative management. The extent of job consciousness may be determined by the workers themselves.

Closely allied to the enterprise consciousness issue is the money motivation debate.²³ Perhaps human relations overstated their case in initial

observations on worker motivation, but it is true that workers are motivated by good supervision, a cohesive work group, and participative management as well as by money. It is probably true that workers sometimes ask for more money when they are unable to diagnose the non-monetary issues that cause job dissatisfaction. Accordingly, unionists have charged that human relations is an attempt to get employees to work harder without financial reward. In making their case unionists paint a picture of the worker as a economic man in a simple buyer-seller relationship -- a price for a quantity of work delivered. In a previous era, however, unionists denounced the commodity concept of labor, and in their explanations for the failure of incentive systems took a position on the issue similar to that of present day human relationists. Human relationists, today, take no simple either-or position as motivation to work while trade unionists are notorious for their pragmatism in arguments.

3. Area of freedom: As indicated in the definition above, participative management is limited to the area of the supervisor's authority -- which is called the area of freedom. The foreman cannot give to his work group decision-making authority which he himself does not possess. Shop democracy could be made a mockery simply by reducing the foreman's authority. (The author was once an employee in a university which gave the faculty complete control over academic affairs although every important issue was ruled by the president to be an "administrative affair" and was therefore settled by the president.) In the absence of union power to negotiate the area of freedom participative management could be as "phoney" as is student government in most universities. It is proper, therefore, to ask for clarification when it is stated that the area of freedom is "limited by company policy" or that it is the area "defined

by management."²⁴ Other authorities limit the area of freedom to the extent that workers "understand and identify with organizational goals."²⁵ As discussed in the preceeding section, workers are not going to become enterprise conscious and such a requirement would severely limit the area of freedom.

A distinction must be made between human relations theory and management practice. Human relationists reproach those industrialists who sugar coat their autocracy with the name participative management. Human relations theory questions the desirability of highly centralized authority, claiming that there are good organizational reasons for permitting more decision making at the lower levels of management. From the human relations viewpoint the area of freedom should be liberally defined.

Acknowledgement of any limits to the area of freedom, however, may cause some to conclude that participative management is not genuine democracy. In reply, it may be said that aside from the fact that democracy does not allow group decisions to govern those who are not members of the group, the area of freedom is limited by the provincial interests of job conscious workers. Unionists cannot, logically, argue that limits on the area of freedom proves the insincerity of participative management while at the same time arguing that job interest is so narrow that workers are not interested in participative management. There is an area of job interest, though difficult to define, in which worker groups will have a desire for self-government without that area expanding into complete group autonomy in an organizational anarchy. The problem is not the ambition of work groups for complete autonomy, but the desire of authoritarian managements to restrict the area of freedom to a degree that is greater than necessary for effective management.

Proponents of participative management list the union agreement itself as a limit to the area of freedom.²⁶ Clearly, the work group may not make

decisions on such matters as seniority or job rates which are contrary to general policy as set forth in the contract, but the group may make decisions which adjust contract provisions to local conditions. Just as participative management threatens authoritarian managers it may also threaten authoritarian union leaders. Participative management leads to an examination of the degree of group autonomy and local union autonomy that is possible while at the same time promoting the general welfare of the membership. Questions raised as to the true intent of contracts which centralize authority in the hands of national union officers will be condemned by authoritarian union leaders and welcomed by those interested in union democracy. On the other hand, management may use the idea of participative management as a device to circumvent the contract and to encourage employees to be independent of union leadership. Unions have cause to guard against such abuse of the idea of group autonomy.

4. Individual goals, group goals, and organizational goals: That branch of human relations research devoted to experimental groups places great emphasis upon the conflict between individual goals and group goals, particularly subconscious, non-rational individual goals which prevent group cohesion. Much of the theoretical framework for shop level participative management stems from this research. Failure to recognize the possibility of conflicts between group goals and the goals of the organization, however, leaves one with the impression that by resolving the real and imagined problems of individuals participative management creates a cohesive social group with high morale.²⁷ Not all human relationists are guilty of omitting considerations of inter-group and group organizational conflict, however, and many of them are concerned with the resolution of this type of conflict.²⁸

Once again the issue becomes a matter of degree. Solomon Barkin states that group cohesiveness is the basis of union solidarity and arises from a

basic conflict between employee and employer interests which are always present.²⁹ Human relationists concede this point, but reply that there are areas of parallel interests which unionists, on occasion, would like to play down. Participative management does not come to grips with the basic conflict of interests between "capital" and "labor," but is concerned with the solution of a large number of disputes involving the area of supervisory discretion. Both unionists and human relationists will agree that most grievances are directed against the specific acts of foremen rather than the policies of the organization.

Harold Wilensky sees a basic conflict between administrative necessity and democratic ideology which must favor top management and severely limit shop level democracy.³⁰ The question of states rights, local autonomy, sovereignty, and international law have troubled political scientists for some time, and the question is no easier to answer in the field of industrial democracy.³¹ The fact remains that participative management may resolve two areas of conflict -- inter-personal conflict within the group and group-foreman conflict. Participative management cannot resolve disputes with other work groups or with the organization, and the group's freedom is in how they will adjust to management directives based upon administrative necessity.

5. Benefits of participative management to the employer: Unions cannot argue against the many positive benefits of participative management to the workers, but to justify their suspicions of a "gift horse" they question the benefits of the plan to management. Reviewing this line of attack, James Worthy observes that since critics of human relations cannot argue against good -- against the very reforms that critics themselves have advocated -- they shift their attack to management's motives.³² (When human relations is coupled with the activities of a Nathan Shefferman, however, management's motives are apt to be doubted.) Attacking the motives of human relations critics, George Homans suggests that

they are not against the benefits of human relations but are simply against management itself.³³

First, higher profits are listed as a benefit to management and some unionists respond that this proves participative management to be a plot to get employees to work harder for the capitalist's gain. This argument may be put to test by recalling that unionists have held that high wages are profitable to the employer in securing high quality workers, reducing turnover, motivating workers and "maintaining purchasing power." Unions have never looked upon higher wages as a capitalistic trick. Participative management, if successful, is also profitable but it involves no more trickery than first aid stations, safety equipment, canteens and rest rooms, or an effective grievance procedure.

Second, there is some experimental evidence that if work groups are permitted to set their own production standards, output will be higher than in the usual case where the work group resists the standards set by management.³⁴ To the old line unionist it appears to be the scheming of Rasputin when workers voluntarily agree to increase output. Without going into all the details as to why workers behave in this apparently unnatural manner, it is sufficient to say that work groups will set no standard which jeopardizes their security or income. The disarmingly simple fact is that workers resist management standards because acceptance has usually led to still higher standards. When given the freedom to set standards the work group studies how high they may safely go without causing fatigue, unemployment or wage inequities. The group often discovers that the safe level of output is higher than the traditional level. Human relationists agree with unionists that workers are not naturally lazy and need not be driven to work. Restricting output can be as hard work as working hard. If the foreman and time study

man are no longer policing standards, all the elements of gamesmanship are removed and output restriction is no longer any fun.³⁵ The most insidious aspect of this "management trick" is that the union can no longer crusade against management's sweat shop standards.

A third benefit to management is in reducing employee resistance to technological change.³⁶ (We are not concerned with the condescending aspects of the clinical notion of resistance to change, discussed in a previous section, but with participative management as a means of gaining employee acceptance of changes in shop methods.) As with production standards, the charge may be made that participative management is a device causing workers to act against their own interests but, for the reasons stated above, the charge is incorrect. Participative management, like job conscious unionism, accepts the right of management to make innovations but demands the right to negotiate concerning the consequences to workers jobs. The right of management to make technological change is neither within the area of collective bargaining nor within the work group's area of freedom. Some job problems arising from technological change are of such a magnitude that they are best handled at the top level in collective bargaining, but the multitude of details in the adjustment of the work force as a consequence of innovations are a matter of group decision at the shop level. Research indicates that workers will not sabotage innovations if they are given full information in advance and are given the opportunity to make their own adjustments to the change.

Finally, participative management is of benefit to employers because the group solves problems before the problems can become grievances. This is also an advantage to the work group, but it takes from the union its bread and butter function of processing grievances. Accordingly participative management may be considered as a device to circumvent the union. Such a view harks

back to the days when companies insisted that an employee must see his foreman before calling his shop steward, while unions insisted that no foreman could talk to a worker except in the presence of a steward. The mark of mature industrial government is a foreman-steward relationship that reduces the number of formal grievances; that leads to settlement at the first step, without appeal; and that anticipates problems before they arise so that discussions lead to informal agreement instead of grievances. Participative management goes one step further to permit the steward-leader and his work group to make the decisions.

In brief, there is nothing sinister in participative management per se that suggests the coming of a Brave New World. Employees will not oppose their own interests, nor will they identify with management or become contentedly passive. Management must be honest, sincere, and consistent or employees will revert to the ritualistic rubber stamping of settled policy while at the same time sabotaging it.³⁷

III. Human Relations Organization Theory.

The problem of group goals versus organization goals and of limits on the area of group freedom, discussed above, makes clear that participative management at the shop level does not solve all problems. The issue arises as to how to represent work group interests which lie beyond the area of freedom and by what mechanism to handle conflicts between work groups and between general policy and the policy of the work group. Until recently, human relations has been primarily concerned with the work group and has been slow to apply human relations concepts to the relationship between the group and the organization. While criticizing the mechanical, procedural and administrative approaches to industrial democracy as the misapplication of political

science, human relationists have difficulty applying psychological and sociological theory to the organization as a whole.

Although this is not the place to set forth the growing body of organization theory developed by human relationists, a few propositions must be stated to consider their implications upon trade unionism. The relevant propositions are:

1. The philosophy of participative management should pervade all levels of management; that is, democratic leadership style, group decision making by subordinates within every supervisor's area of authority -- at every level in the organization -- and fixing authority at the lowest level feasible. Human relations research has discovered that participative management cannot succeed at the shop level in an authoritarian organizational environment.³⁸ The change-over to industrial democracy must begin at the top -- preferably with psychotherapy for top management.

2. Human relations theory favors a broad, flat organizational structure with three or four steps in the hierarchy as contrasted with the traditional long chain of command, small span of control style of organization.³⁹ Any loss in control is overcome in speed and accuracy in communications, it is held.

3. The foreman is the representative of his work group when meeting with his superiors, instead of just a subordinate management representative receiving orders and supplying information. Two-way communication means that supervisors must honestly and effectively represent their constituents, to higher management as well as present the views of their superiors to the workers.⁴⁰ In this manner, problems that are beyond the work group area of freedom are resolved by a committee at the next level in management -- committee members who represent their respective work groups. An organization is seen as a network of overlapping groups rather than a pyramid of superior-subordinate relationships.

Human relations theory places a limitation on this employee representation plan, however, by requiring that all conflict be approached in a problem solving frame of mind rather than as representatives of particular interest groups.⁴¹

4. Although the importance of formal organization is recognized, human relationists stress the spontaneity, accuracy, and speed of informal procedures. Hence supervisors are encouraged to deal directly with related groups and departments rather than going through channels.⁴² Ad hoc committees of interested parties are urged to resolve their difficulties within the framework of general policy but without the intercession of higher management.

Beyond these points, human relations theory falters as to the actual mechanics of industrial democracy within the total organization. It is apparent that workers and even foremen need effective representation at top policy making levels in matters pertaining to conditions of employment. Successive upward representation in group meetings of managers, even with only three levels of management and all managers capable of understanding the viewpoint of their work groups, is an inadequate procedure for placing some types of work group viewpoints before top management.

Human relationists have reviewed the apparatus for employee representation found in production committees, joint labor-management councils, formal union-management cooperation plans and co-determination, and found them wanting.⁴³ Their criticism of these schemes is similar to that of other labor relations specialists. Employees are job conscious and are not interested in all top level management problems. Employees are suspicious that worker representatives may become too management oriented. Joint consultation is usually treated as an appendage rather than an integral part of the organization. Middle management feels that they are being circumvented. Top management subconsciously

fears employee representation because it requires a change in organization, attitudes, and communication flow. Although the acceptance of human relations philosophy may reduce these difficulties, it appears that schemes for employee representation outside of the organizational framework do not function satisfactorily. Scott concludes in his study of joint council plans that effective use of organizational structure as envisaged in human relations theory will prove more workable than employee representation schemes.

Claiming that the modern corporation is more than an economic entity which has become a social-political unit as well, some human relationists state that corporations are in fact economic governments. Accordingly, more care is needed in planning so that the executive, legislative and judicial functions of corporate government should be separated.⁴⁴ Human relations thinking on corporate government is even more theoretical than their work in organization theory, however, and the place of workers in this government has not been crystalized.

It is clear, then, that human relations theory offers no scheme for industrial democracy at the corporation level, as distinct from the shop level, which competes with collective bargaining and the grievance procedure. Human relationists concede the need for some form of direct employee representation but offer no substitute for trade unionism. Some human relationists concede that business organizations by their very nature must be authoritarian and no successful substitutes to authoritarian organization have been demonstrated.⁴⁵ On the other hand unionists can find many flaws in human relations theory even though the propositions on organization may improve the employer-employee relationship. Unions, quoting human relations theory, can point out that supervisors are not members of the work group and, therefore, can never adequately represent worker interests. On two-way communications, unionists can correctly point out that foremen may carry viewpoints upward but they must

carry orders downward. The trade unionist may look with distrust upon the problem solving emphasis in group decision making. Political scientists have been unable to determine when it is democratic (or wise) to be a politician representing the narrow interest of constituents and when it is more democratic (or wise) to be a statesman, rising above partisan interests. Since supervisors can not legitimately represent worker interest, unionists may suspect that problem-oriented decision making will be at the expense of worker interests.

Trade unionists belittle human relationists for their concern with the psychological aspects of conflict while ignoring real power issues.⁴⁷ The criticism is not well taken, however, because human relations theory is concerned with the locus of power. Participative management and human relations organization requires a redistribution of power from the top downward; the emphasis is upon shared power and authority stemming from consent of the group rather than from naked power.

The fatal weakness of the human relations approach, however, is in the manner in which power is to be redistributed. The human relations approach to industrial Democracy hinges upon a change in the attitude of top management which is achieved voluntarily and with the aid of human relations therapy. If it is correct that power struggles within top management make the executive suite a "snake pit," then it will be difficult to secure a voluntary redistribution of power.⁴⁸ More significant, if it is correct that most managers are cheerful autocrats, suffering no guilt feelings, they will fight plans for the redistribution of their power whether it be plans for union or human relations democracy.⁴⁹ The power of the union, not "light weight therapy," says Gomberg, will bring good human relations to industry.⁵⁰ It has been observed, however, that the collective bargaining process is itself a form of group therapy as well as a power struggle.⁵¹ Human relations may be

likened to Christianity in that it will work only if everyone will practice the basic tenets of Christianity. Human relationists advocate conversion through therapy while trade unionists favor countervailing power.

Finally, unionists may be wary of human relations style industrial democracy because of the labor movement's unhappy experiences with earlier schemes for equal citizenship through utopian anarchy. From 1837 to 1862 the labor movement was strongly influenced by the Associationists who unsuccessfully endeavored to establish utopian socialist communities. Fourierism was remarkably similar to present-day human relations in its belief in the inherent goodness of man -- if placed in the right environment; in the belief that cooperation and efficiency will be attained if "instincts" and "passions" are given free play (many human relationists urge uninhibited emotional expression as a means of achieving group cohesion); and in the belief that productivity would increase if the creative ambitions of workers were not stifled by supervision.⁵¹

During the 1860's and 1870's the union movement devoted much of its energies to the establishment of self-governing workshops -- producers cooperatives.⁵² Idealists foresaw the day when the economy would be made up of syndicates of worker-owned and managed industries. The reasons favoring the self-governing workshop are in many ways similar to the idealism found in human relations concepts of industrial democracy. All of these schemes failed. Failure was due to the shortcomings of human nature and in the unfriendliness of our acquisitive cultural environment to utopian schemes, as well as to the lack of capital. A criticism of all plans for utopian anarchy is that they fail to explain how men of good will, who agree on common goals, will coordinate their activities in the absence of an administrative authority.⁵³ Past failure, however, is not an argument against fresh

attempts to achieve success and perhaps the human relations approach to leadership, groups, and organization - the psychotherapy approach to good will -- will modify irresponsible individualism, groupism, and nationalism. Nevertheless, the experience of the labor movement entitles unionists to be skeptical.

IV. Mature Industrial Government and Human Relations Concepts.

While human relationists worked on democratic organization theory, unions have developed a system of industrial government that meets the requirements of human relations theory in several ways. Collective bargaining is job oriented -- something in which workers can evoke genuine interest; takes labor policy matters directly to the top without going through the organizational hierarchy; and legitimate representatives of the workers join with management in establishing the organization's labor policy. Collective bargaining both deals with policy beyond the work group's area of freedom and, in stating general policy, is a limit on the area of work group freedom. Collective bargaining is the legislative branch of industrial government. The grievance machinery is the executive branch of industrial government and arbitration its judicial branch.⁵⁴

Although it is not the purpose of this article to take up the criticisms and suggestions of human relationists regarding collective bargaining and the grievance procedure, it should be noted that the development of mature industrial government coincides with the human relations approach.⁵⁵ Both labor and management representatives come to understand and appreciate each others problems -- they learn to listen and not think in stereotypes. Negotiating sessions become more problem oriented, with less power conflict, when unions and management no longer see each other as a mortal threat to survival. There is a decline in the number and duration of strikes; staged conflict at the

bargaining table is called ceremonial or union drama; while union oratory and cartoons against capitalist exploiters are referred to as union folklore. Relaxed informality replaces coldly correct, "arms length" bargaining. The mature industrial government becomes less legalistic and depends more upon mutual good will. Union leaders do become concerned with the problems of the industry in spite of their disclaiming enterprise consciousness. Union and management representatives have been aware of the difference between stated grievances -- alleged violation of contract -- and the psychological aspects of grievances long before there was a human relations approach. Flexibility and informality are indicated by studies showing that industry abounds with shop level agreements made by foreman, steward and work group that are in violation to the strict terms of the union agreement. Where human relations stresses the virtues of group norms over legalism, mature industrial government stressed the embodiment of shop custom into industrial common law. In brief, mature industrial government appears to be in harmony with concepts of human relations.

Since human relations philosophy is similar to that of job conscious unionism when mature industrial government is achieved, it would seem that trade unionists should be enthusiastic supporters of human relations in unionized industry. Such is not the case -- much to the disillusionment of many human relationists.⁵⁶ In addition to the union objections already examined, some unionists hold that a basic power struggle goes on between unions and management that nullifies any gains to be made in practicing good human relations.⁵⁷ Not only does this statement contradict the union view that union power is necessary to good human relations, but human relationists deny the charge. The history of union-management relations demonstrates that the power struggle subsides when management genuinely accepts the union and mature

industrial government develops. It is interesting that unions expounded the same view point at a time when anti-union management accused the union movement of having an unlimited thirst for power.

Unionists may also feel threatened by human relations when it is suggested that industrial democracy is possible without unionism, or that human relations democracy will make unions superfluous. Some argue that while union power may be necessary to reach industrial democracy, the union is unnecessary once the psychological and cultural basis for democracy is achieved. Other human relationists argue that without the power of autonomous trade unionism industrial democracy rests upon the good will of the employer, and, as such, is sophisticated paternalism.⁵⁸ The pluralistic society requires diffused centers of power. On the other hand, some students of industrial relations express fear that mature industrial government will become union-management paternalism, but such fears are not the concern of trade unionism.

Unionists also point out that mature industrial government differs from human relations democracy in the concern of the former with "fair competition" within the entire industry. Unions, as institutions seeking to stabilize employment conditions within the industry, oppose local union agreements which are either above or below union scale (except under special circumstances). The Scanlon Plan or Lincoln Electric Plan may appeal to one group of workers, but the international union fears what would result if every work group in the industry became so emotionally involved in self-expression through greater output.⁵⁹ Human relationists have not concerned themselves with the union function of bringing some order -- and some monopoly -- into those industries where the alternative is not discipline of healthy competition but economic planning by racketeers.

The real threat of human relations to trade unionism is revealed when trade unionists challenge the entire theoretical foundations of human relations.

It is suggested that human relations research is inconclusive if not completely in error and, accordingly, none of the theory or recommendations follow. It is suggested that authoritarian management is both more efficient and necessary to national welfare, and the conclusion follows that militant unionism will be forever necessary to combat the immorality of authoritarianism.⁶⁰ This line of reasoning is the more surprising when it is recalled that the usual trade union position holds that autocracy engenders apathy and rebellion leading to inefficiency in the long run, while industrial democracy is both moral and efficient in the long run. The root of the problem is that job conscious unionism would prefer to be the irresponsible champions of worker self-interest and this is only possible if management resists the union, demanding efficiency from workers. Human relations democracy is in harmony with the work groups' desire for self-determination but human relations asks the work group to exercise a self-restraint in the interest of the general welfare of the type British unions under the Labour Government found hard to endure.

Human relationists explain the lack of union enthusiasm by observing unions have a history of warfare and are institutionally oriented to conflict. Herbert Thelen comments that the end of conflict causes institutional confusion, the need for new goals, and new outlets for aggression.⁶¹ Elliot Jaques reports that union leaders feel uncomfortable when not fighting management because industrial conflict is a socially approved type of aggression which they personally enjoy; conflict gives status to leaders whereas workers become apathetic during times of peace; and conflict increased personal security where cooperation with management lead to guilt feelings.⁶² Continuing, Jaques theorizes that unions need an institutionalized "bad guy" as an outlet for sadistic impulses, to escape personal guilt feelings by hating the enemy, to promote a comrade-in-arms feeling, and to cause members to overlook internal stresses.⁶³

Actually, unions are ambivalent toward both human relations and to mature industrial government. Unionists have been fond of saying that management gets the type of unionism management deserves; and now unions are not sure they want to be the type of unions deserved by a management which practices good human relations. It appears that under mature industrial government unions will continue to exercise a police function and may assume some welfare functions, but will lose their dynamic qualities and crusading zeal. Unionists find themselves in an uncomfortable position similar to that of colonial nationalists who have won their independence, no longer have a "bad guy" on which to blame their country's ills, and find it difficult to assume the responsibilities they fought so hard to win. In both cases, the transition period will be difficult.

Although the point has been made concerning the parallelism between human relations concepts of industrial democracy and that of mature industrial government, there are differences that should be noted. The difference was clearly brought out by Hillery Marquand in a lecture on industrial relations under the British labor government.⁶⁴ With full employment, comprehensive social security, the industrial government established by the unions, joint labor-management councils and nationalized industry, workers thought that the millinium had arrived. Although their gains were substantial, they were disillusioned to find their job was no more interesting, dignified, nor challenging than before. In spite of the revolution that had been wrought, they had the same old inter-personal squabbles, the foreman was the same old boss, and ^anational planning board bureaucracy imposed on top of a corporate bureaucracy made the center of decision making more remote from the work group instead of improving the quality of the bureaucracy. Managers of nationalized industries had the same production minded, task orientation as the capitalistic managers. Since the causes of

this disillusionment are the subject of human relations research, there is in England new interest in human relations.

Except under ideal circumstances mature industrial government tends to emphasize the administrative and legal aspects of decision making rather than the socio-psychological aspects. Full participation of the work group is only partly encouraged because the position of the union bureaucracy is enhanced if workers become dependent upon the services of the union officers. While the contribution of collective bargaining and the grievance machinery to industrial democracy cannot be depreciated, the corporate organizational structure remains authoritarian. Inter-group conflict, personality issues, and subconscious motivation tend to be played down or translated into labor-management conflict simply because this is the type of conflict unions are geared to handle.

Human relations research reveals that a large area of industrial conflict is actually a part of the conflict between age groups, between the sexes, skilled vs. unskilled, white collar vs. blue collar, line vs. staff, night shift vs. day shift, high seniority workers vs. low seniority workers, and many more kinds of inter-group conflict.⁶⁵ Of necessity unions must deal with these feuds but since they do not like to emphasize inter-group conflict, industrial government neglects these issues. Wilbert Moore observes that labor-management conflict characterizes only one stage of industrial development; that the machinery of collective bargaining structures one type of conflict only to ignore a large area of unstructured conflict; and concludes that over-simplified, stereotyped notions of industrial conflict do not tend to clarify issues.⁶⁶

Where mature industrial government exists, it is possible that unions may become interested in human relations as a union function. For instance, problems of mental health in industry are suspected to be vast and as yet uncharted. Management is reluctant to attack these problems alone for fear of charges of

paternalism, "playing God," and invasion of privacy. Mental health in industry may become a concern of unionism or an area of union-management cooperation.⁶⁷ A mental health approach to industrial democracy combines industrial government with human relations.

In speculating on the future of unionism under the relatively static conditions of mature industrial government some labor relations specialists suggest that there may be a trend toward "uplift unionism." The older notion of uplift unionism may be broadened to include treatment of the above listed type of conflict by union, member-centered councilors. Old union warriors may be horrified by this trend toward middle-class respectability just as they resent union participation in the community chest, school board, and scholarship awards.

V. Summary.

1. It is concluded that some of the implications of the clinical approach to supervisory leadership may be considered either condescending or manipulative. Permissive leadership is a "democratic style," using democratic as an adjective, but it is not to be confused with the noun "industrial democracy." Unions have cause to object to both the implications of and mis-labeling of the clinical approach to leadership.

On the other hand, the clinical approach has an honest concern with the non-rational, the subconscious, stereotyped thinking, ambivalence towards authority, and other personality problems that are at the root of much industrial conflict. Unions may feel threatened by research in this area because it deals with the source of worker dissatisfaction that unions are poorly equipped to handle, and furthermore, it detracts from the central union theme of employee-employer conflict. Gomberg observes that union leaders are acute in detecting the psychological weak points of management but would resent any probing of their

own psyche. Once again, however, unions may question the propriety of the supervisor playing therapist.

2. The leadership role of the foreman is not a serious threat to unionism for human relationists believe that a true leader must be a member of the group, and accept group norms. If the foreman joins the work group and the union, or if the foreman shares leadership with the union steward, the union has no problem. If, on the other hand, the foreman acquires the trusts and skills of democratic leadership while remaining as management's representative, he may put the union in a difficult position. Even though he can never be a true leader, he competes with the steward for the loyalty of the work group. Those unions that demand the undivided loyalty of workers prefer not to share leadership. More important, it is difficult to be militant against a "nice guy." Those who prefer aggressive unionism also prefer the traditional foreman who is an autocrat. Militancy requires a villain.

3. Some human relationists see in their view of industrial democracy a new society based upon a notion of utopian anarchy of cohesive work groups whose internalized goals and self-discipline will permit coordination of activities with minimum of organizational authority. Union leaders and management alike will reject this recipe for pie in the sky. The fact of the matter is that the apathy of workers, inter-group conflict, administrative imperatives, and the requirements of overall policy place severe limits on participative management ^{upon} and/a decentralized, loose, informal organization structure. Human relations has a contribution to make in this area, but it merely suggests modification of the existing management structure rather than precipitating a revolution. An examination of human relations theory of participative management at the shop level coupled with organization theory reveals no anti-union plot. Participative management is not against the workers' best interest, not

manipulative, and will not cause workers to become management oriented. On the contrary, participative management offers many positive benefits to workers. Human relations organization theory is also favorable to worker interests, as far as it goes, but does not provide satisfactory employee representation in the determination of over-all, organization-wide labor policy. Participative management is limited by the area of freedom possible at the shop level, and human relations organization theory offers no substitute for collective bargaining. On the contrary, human relations concepts are in harmony with mature industrial government.

4. Anti-union corporations may use human relations concepts to head off union organization. To be effective, however, such a management must be absolutely sincere and honest in its leadership style, participative management, and organizational structure. Phoney democracy will not work, for employees will know the difference. Human relations concepts do not allow for autocracy in attitude or in organization structure. Human relations concepts will not bear fruit under conditions where management arbitrarily and unilaterally varies or limits democratic decision making. William Gomberg states that unions oppose the kind of human relations that would create good serf-lord relations. Most human relationists today would agree.

It is possible, however, for a company to replace traditional authoritarian management philosophy with an honest application of human relations philosophy for the purpose of making unionism less attractive to its employees. As technological change brings about an occupational shift away from jobs in direct production and toward technical, staff, and service jobs, worker psychology will shift from a "shop mentality" to a "white collar mentality." The "white collar mentality" tends to be anti-union, and if corporations offer these workers genuine industrial democracy -- human relations plus some form of employee

representation plan -- the trade union movement will have a difficult time organizing these workers. Unionists have cause to doubt management's motives in the application of human relations.

5. Most employers are not apt to voluntarily practice sincere human relations and union power is therefore still necessary to end industrial autocracy. In addition, human relationists hold that autonomous unionism is necessary to industrial democracy in order to achieve a balance of power and to avoid paternalism. Unionists would go further to state that the union has an economic function in maintaining industry-wide standards that is ignored by human relationists. Human relations, then, holds no serious threat to the existence of unions.

The development of mature industrial government, which some specialists consider a logical trend in union-management relations, is very similar in nature to the human relations concept of industrial democracy. Whereas the notion of industrial government is largely based upon "industrial jurisprudence," while human relations stresses therapy, leadership style, and group norms, it appears elements of the latter are also present in mature industrial government. The real issue arises over the union function under industrial government -- whether mature industrial government is achieved through union power or by therapy. Unions are reluctant to give up militant, crusading traditions to assume a new role. Human relations offers unions a new function which would combine the legal and psychological approaches to democracy. Yet it will be hard for the charismatic union leader to become clinically oriented.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. A. C. Brown, The Social Psychology of Industry (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 294; Norman Maier, Principles of Human Relations: Applications to Management (New York: Wiley, 1952), pp. 1-3; Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, Richard Peterson and Dora Capwell, Job Attitudes: Review of Research and Opinion (Pittsburgh: Psychological Service of Pittsburgh, 1957), pp. 174-178.
2. See for example Thomas Gordon, Group Centered Leadership (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955).
3. Alvin Zander, "Overcoming Resistance to Change," Advanced Management, January, 1950.
4. F. K. Berrien and Wendell H. Bash, Human Relations: Comments and Cases, (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 180; Gordon, op. cit., p. 86; Maier, op. cit., pp. 11-13.
5. Carl Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951); for application to industry see Maier, op. cit., pp. 30-35, 40-46.
6. Not all human relationists favor the client-centered approach to supervision. For example see Chris Argyris, "Leadership Pattern in the Plant," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1954), p. 59
7. This story was related at a meeting of the American Society of Training Directors following a stirring address on the client-centered leadership given by S. I. Hayakawa.
8. Gordon, op. cit., pp. 145-146.
9. Herbert Thelen, Dynamics of Groups at Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 319.
10. Rudolf M. Wittenberg, The Art of Group Discipline, A Mental Hygiene Approach (New York: Association Press, 1951), p. 90.

11. Solomon Barkin, "Commentary on Mr. Simon's Chapter," in Research in Industrial Human Relations, Conrad Arensberg et al. (eds.) (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 117.
12. Herzberg, op. cit., p. 169.
13. George Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt Brace, 195), pp. 428-432.
14. Cecil A. Gibb, "The Principles and Traits of Leadership," in Small Groups, Studies in Social Interaction, A. Paul Hare, Edgar Borgatta and Robert Bales (eds.) (New York: Knopf, 1955), p. 87; Homans, op. cit., p. 428.
15. For a critical statement on Mayo's views of foremanship see Harold Wilensky, "Human Relations in the Workplace," in Research in Industrial Human Relations, op. cit., p. 39; see also Herzberg, op. cit., p. 169.
16. Donald and Eleanor Laird, The New Psychology for Leadership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. 178.
17. Henry C. Lindgren, Effective Leadership in Human Relations (New York: Hermitage House, 1954), pp. 142-214; Philip E. Slater, "Role Differentiation in Small Groups," in Small Groups, Studies in Social Interaction, op. cit., pp. 498-525; Warren H. Schmidt and Paul C. Buchanan, Techniques that Produce Teamwork (New London, Connecticut : Croft, 1954), p. 33.
18. Keith Davis, Human Relations in Business (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), pp. 298-305; Maier, op. cit., p. 11; Robert Tannenbaum and Warren Schmidt, "How to Choose a Leadership Pattern," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (March-April 1958), pp. 97-98.
19. Michael P. Fogarty, Personality and Group Relations in Industry, (London: Longmans Green, 1956), p. 168; Gordon, op. cit., p. 55. Fritz Roethlisberger in his introduction to Abraham Zalesnik's Worker Satisfaction and Development

(Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business, 1956), p. xi states that a major issue in today's society is how to get millions of employees meaningfully involved in the great adventure of science and technology.

20. For examples see Berrien and Bash, op. cit., pp. 209-212; Davis, op. cit., pp. 290-294.
21. Solomon Barkin, "Management Personnel Philosophy in a Collective Bargaining Era," Proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association, December, 1953, pp. 1-12.
22. Davis, op. cit., p. 296; Herzberg, op. cit., p. 145.
23. For an analysis of the issue concerning the motivation of workers see William F. Whyte, Money and Motivation (New York: Harpers, 1955).
24. Brown, op. cit., p. 96; Davis, op. cit., p. 296; Maier, op. cit., pp. 11, 26. Schmidt and Buchanan, op. cit., pp. 14-18 warn that the area of freedom must be carefully defined in order to prevent disillusionment of employees, but they fail to indicate how the boundry will be drawn and by whom.
25. Tannenbaum and Schmidt, op. cit., p. 99.
26. Davis, op. cit., p. 296. Maier, op. cit., p. 250 states that participative management is too new to have its relationship with traditional union negotiation machinery worked out and he anticipates that there could be some friction as to the role of each.
27. For example, Schmidt and Buchanan, op. cit., pp. 30-33 stress the conflict between individual and group goals while Wittenberg, op. cit., p. 19 correctly points out that human relations must consider the conflict between group goals and "agency goals."

28. For example, inter-group conflict is a major theme in Mazafer and Carolyn Sherif, Groups in Harmony and in Tension (New York: Harpers, 1953) and in Thelen, Dynamics of Groups at Work, op. cit.
29. Solomon Barkin in Research in Industrial Human Relations, op. cit., p. 116.
30. Wilensky, op. cit., p. 43.
31. Many examples suggest themselves to illustrate the problem of group goals versus organization goals. Segregated schools were permitted by local option until the supreme court limited this area of local self-determination. National policy permits the union shop and the sale of alcoholic drinks unless restricted by local option. Unions claim a sovereign job territory as their legitimate jurisdiction, but the NLRB requires a plabacite. Departments of universities are permitted a large area of academic freedom in curriculum planning which leads to course proliferation to the detriment of students and the expense of tax payers. While psychotherapy and permissive leadership may reduce conflict stemming from the ambitions of segregationists, prohibitionists, anti-togetherness free riders, and job imperialists in both unions and universities some genuine conflict of economic interests remains to be resolved between the particular group and the general welfare.
32. James Worthy, "Management Approach to Human Relations," in Research in Industrial Human Relations, op. cit., p. 14.
33. Homans, op. cit., p. 428.
34. For example see Maier, op. cit., p. 254.
35. Whyte, op. cit., pp. 30-42. Fogarty, op. cit., p. 173 reports a study of a London dock strike in which one of the causes listed was boredom as a consequence of oversized work gangs.

36. For examples of the extensive literature on overcoming resistance to change see Berrien and Bash, op. cit., p. 200; Laird and Laird, op. cit., pp. 85-86; Robert Tannenbaum, "The Introduction of change in Industrial Organizations," American Management Association Reprint No. 186, 1957.
37. Brown, op. cit., pp. 284-307; Mason Haire, "Group Dynamics in the Industrial Situation," in Industrial Conflict, Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Nubin, Arthur M. Ross (eds.) (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 384; Wilensky, op. cit., p. 39; William F. Whyte, "Problems of Industrial Sociology," Social Problems, Vol. 4, No. 2 (October 1957), p. 158.
38. Eli Ginsberg and Ewing Reilly, Effecting Change in Large Organizations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957); Lewin, op. cit., p. 49; Herzberg, op. cit., p. 181.
39. For examples see C. R. Walker and F. L. W. Richardson, Human Relations in an Expanding Company, (New Haven: Yale University Labor Management Center, 1948).
40. For example see Laird and Laird, op. cit., pp. 27-28, 113, 178; Lindgren, op. cit., p. 263.
41. Berrien and Bash, op. cit., p. 204; John Perry, Human Relations in Small Industry (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), pp. 157-159; Thelen, op. cit., pp. 191, 284; William Utterback, Group Thinking and Conference Leadership (New York: Rinehart, 1950), pp. 59-60.
42. For example see James Richard, "Group Centered Leadership in an Industrial Organization," in Gordon, op. cit., pp. 307-342.
43. Brown, op. cit., p. 297; Elliot Jaques, The Changing Culture of a Factory (London: Tavistock Institute, 1951), pp. 106-181, 204-243; William H. Knowles, Personnel Management; A Human Relations Approach (New York: American Book, 1955), pp. 307-322; W. H. Scott, Industrial Leadership and

- Joint Consultation, A Study of Human Relations in Three Merseyside Firms (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1952), pp. 114, 140-155;
- C. R. Renold, Joint Consultation Over Thirty Years, A Case Study (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950).
44. Fogarty, op. cit., p. 220; Jaques, op. cit., pp. 258-263-265; Scott, op. cit., pp. 14-15. William Gomberg, "The Use of Psychology in Industry," Management Science, Vol. 3, No. 4 (July, 1947), p. 369 criticizes human relations for failure to view corporations as economic governments and foresees human relations democracy turning into "manorial capitalism."
45. Chris Argyris, Executive Leadership (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 111; Theodore Levitt, "The Changing Character of Capitalism," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (July-August 1956), pp. 37-47.
46. Gomberg, op. cit., p. 362 quotes Professor R. Clemmens to the effect that human relations is not interested in a redistribution of power. For a few examples to illustrate that human relations are very much concerned with the problem of power see Jaques, op. cit., pp. 263-272; Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflict (New York: Harpers, 1948), p. 49; Lindgren, op. cit., pp. 142-214; Perry, op. cit., p. 98; Herbert Simon, Authority in Research in Industrial Human Relations, op. cit., pp. 103-115.
47. Gomberg, op. cit., p. 358.
48. Wilensky, op. cit., p. 43
49. Gomberg, op. cit., p. 363.
50. William H. Knowles, "Non-Economic Factors in Collective Bargaining," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 9 (September 1958), pp. 628-704; William H. Knowles, "Mediation and the Psychology of Small Groups," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 10 (October 1958), pp.

51. Selig Perlman, History of Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 29-30. That human relations ideology is similar to Fourierism is not surprising since they both have their intellectual roots in the theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau. One branch led to utopian socialism while the other became influential in progressive education from whence stems many human relations concepts.
52. Ibid., pp. 52-56.
53. Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 73.
54. See Knowles, Personnel Management, op. cit., pp. 265-277.
55. Ibid., pp. 286-305; National Planning Association, Causes of Industrial Peace Under Collective Bargaining, A Final Report, (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1953).
56. Brown, op. cit., p. 303; Davis, op. cit., p. 296; Perry, op. cit., p. 154; Stuart Chase, Roads to Agreement (New York: Harpers, 1951), pp. 151-155.
57. Solomon Barkin, "A Trade Unionist Appraises Management Personnel Philosophy," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 28, No. 5 (September 1950), pp. 60-61.
58. Ibid., p. 64. Brown, op. cit., pp. 303-304, quotes Gordon R. Taylor to the effect that successful human relations will make unions unnecessary and then debates this point of view. William F. Whyte, "Some Problems in Industrial Sociology," op. cit., p. 156 argues that human relations contributes to democracy at the shop level and that unionism is necessary to move unresolved issues out of the shop to higher levels of management.
59. Gordon, op. cit., p. 59 and Chase, op. cit., p. 130 see in schemes such as the Scanlon Plan a successful marriage between incentive plans and participative management; between money motivation and emotional involvement. Abraham J. Siegel, "The Economic Environment in Human Relations," in Research in Human Relations, op. cit., pp. 86-99, points out that there are economic limitations on even the organization's area of freedom.

60. Gomberg, op. cit., p. 370.
61. Thelen, op. cit., p. 349; Gordon, op. cit., pp. 70-73 also makes this point.
62. Jaques, op. cit., p. 80. See also William F. Whyte, Money and Motivation, op. cit., pp. 251-253.
63. Jaques, "Dynamics of Social Structure," Human Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1953, pp. 3-23. See also Lewin, op. cit., pp. 56-66, 165.
64. Lecture given at the University of California, Berkeley, California, October, 1956. On this same point see Brown, op. cit., p. 302.
65. Jaques, op. cit., pp. 227-284-285; Lewin, op. cit., pp. 125-141; Scott, op. cit., pp. 123-138.
66. Wilbert Moore, "Occupational Structure and Industrial Conflict," in Industrial Conflict, op. cit., p. 229.
67. Herzberg, op. cit., pp. 229-236.