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JAPANESE-AMERICAN EVACUATION

LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES SENATE

1943-44

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171

SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE IN
RELOCATION CENTERS

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

REPORT ON SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 166 RELATING TO SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE IN RELOCATION CENTERS AND PLANS FOR FUTURE OPERATION OF SUCH CENTERS

SEPTEMBER 14, 1943.—Read; referred to the Committee on Military Affairs and ordered to be printed

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 14, 1943.

The PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE.

Subject: Senate Resolution 166 adopted by the Senate on July 6, 1943.

SIR: On July 6, 1943, the Senate considered and agreed to Senate Resolution 166.

The resolution relates to the program for relocating persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from west coast military areas and asks that the President issue an Executive order to accomplish two things—(1) to direct the War Relocation Authority to segregate the disloyal persons, and the persons whose loyalty is questionable, from those whose loyalty to the United States has been established; and (2) to direct the appropriate agency of the Government to issue a full and complete authoritative statement on conditions in relocation centers and plans for future operations.

I find that the War Relocation Authority has already undertaken a program of segregation. That program is now under way. The first train movements began in early September.

In response to the resolution I asked the Director of the Office of War Mobilization to issue a full and complete authoritative public

statement on conditions in relocation centers and plans for future operations. A short preliminary statement on this subject was issued on July 17, 1943. A full and complete statement is being made public today. Copies of these statements are transmitted with this message.

Thus, both of the steps called for in Senate Resolution 166 have already been taken, and it appears that issuance of a further Executive order is not necessary for accomplishment of these purposes.

The segregation program of the War Relocation Authority provides for transferring to a single center, the Tule Lake Center in northeastern California, those persons of Japanese ancestry residing in relocation centers who have indicated that their loyalties lie with Japan. All persons among the evacuees who have expressed a wish to return to Japan for permanent residence have been included among the segregants, along with those among the citizen evacuees who have answered in the negative, or have refused to answer, a direct question as to their willingness to declare their loyalty to the United States and to renounce any allegiance to any foreign government. In addition, those evacuees who are found, after investigation and hearing, to be ineligible to secure indefinite leave from a relocation center, under the leave regulations of the War Relocation Authority, are to be included among the segregants.

While the precise number of segregants is not established at this time because a number of leave clearance investigations have not yet been completed, it is established that the disloyal persons among the evacuees constitute but a small minority, and that the great majority of evacuees are loyal to the democratic institutions of the United States.

Arrangements are being completed for the adequate guarding and supervision of the segregated evacuees. They will be adequately fed and housed and their treatment will in all respects be fair and humane; they will not, however, be eligible to leave the Tule Lake Center while the war with Japan continues or so long as the military situation requires their residence there. An appeals procedure to allow for the correction of mistakes made in determining who shall be segregated has been established so that the entire procedure may be fair and equitable.

With the segregation of the disloyal evacuees in a separate center, the War Relocation Authority proposes now to redouble its efforts to accomplish the relocation into normal homes and jobs in communities throughout the United States, but outside the evacuated areas, of those Americans of Japanese ancestry whose loyalty to this country has remained unshaken through the hardships of the evacuation which military necessity made unavoidable. We shall restore to the loyal evacuees the right to return to the evacuated areas as soon as the military situation will make such restoration feasible. Americans of Japanese ancestry, like those of many other ancestries, have shown that they can, and want to, accept our institutions and work loyally with the rest of us, making their own valuable contribution to the national wealth and well-being. In vindication of the very ideals for which we are fighting this war it is important to us to maintain a high standard of fair, considerate, and equal treatment for the people of this minority as of all other minorities.

Respectfully,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR OF WAR MOBILIZATION

On July 17, James F. Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization, issued a preliminary statement which was prepared at the President's request by the War Department and the War Relocation Authority in response to Senate Resolution 166 relative to the treatment of persons of Japanese ancestry in relocation centers. Justice Byrnes today issued a more comprehensive statement which was prepared at the President's request by the War Relocation Authority in response to Senate Resolution 166. The statement in full follows:

A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO SENATE RESOLUTION No. 166

On July 6, 1943, the United States Senate adopted Senate Resolution No. 166 introduced by Senator Sheridan Downey of California. The resolution called upon the President (1) to order the immediate segregation of disloyal persons of Japanese ancestry in relocation centers and (2) to have issued by the appropriate agency of Government a comprehensive authoritative statement on relocation centers and future relocation plans. Since the War Relocation Authority had initiated plans for a segregation program prior to adoption of the resolution, no Presidential action on the first part of the resolution has been necessary. The following statement is issued in response to the second part of the resolution.

THE PACIFIC COAST EVACUATION

On February 19, 1942, the President signed Executive Order No. 9066 empowering the Secretary of War or any military commander the Secretary might designate to prescribe military areas and to provide for the exclusion from such areas of any persons whose presence was deemed prejudicial to the national defense. Eleven days later, on March 2, the commanding general of the Western Defense Command issued a proclamation prescribing the western portion of the three west coast States¹ and the southern part of Arizona, as a military area and announced that all persons of Japanese ancestry—both alien and citizen—would be excluded from this area. On March 18 the President signed Executive Order No. 9102 establishing the War Relocation Authority within the Office for Emergency Management and directing the Authority to provide for the relocation of persons evacuated from military areas under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9066. The principal aim behind the creation of the new agency was to relieve the military of the complicated and burdensome job of maintaining and reestablishing a dislocated people.

Throughout most of March in 1942 the people of Japanese ancestry residing within the prescribed west coast area were freely permitted and even encouraged to move out voluntarily and resettle inland on

¹ Later, in June, the evacuation area was enlarged to take in the entire State of California.

their own initiative. The original hope was that a considerable portion of these people would be able to establish themselves outside the prescribed area with a minimum of Government assistance. Before the War Relocation Authority was more than a week old, however, it became apparent that such a large-scale migration could be handled effectively only on a controlled and orderly basis. In many communities of the intermountain region, there were strong protests against the arrival of evacuees from the coastal zone; and in some areas, violence appeared imminent. Consequently, on March 27 the commanding general of the Western Defense Command issued an order (to become effective on March 29) prohibiting further voluntary migration and "freezing" the people of Japanese ancestry in their homes until they could be moved by the Army.

Nine days after this order became effective—on April 7—the Director of the War Relocation Authority and Col. Karl R. Bendetsen, representing the Western Defense Command, met with a group of Governors and other State officials of the Western States in Salt Lake City to discuss plans for relocating the evacuated people. At that meeting the War Relocation Authority presented for consideration a relocation plan composed of three basic points:

- (1) Establishment of Government-operated centers where some of the evacuees could be quartered and could contribute through work on Government projects, to their own support;
- (2) Reemployment of evacuees in private industry or in agriculture outside the evacuated areas;
- (3) Governmental assistance for small groups of evacuees desiring to establish self-supporting colonies of an agricultural character.

The reaction of the assembled Governors and other State officials to this program was unmistakable. Strong opposition was expressed to any type of unsupervised relocation and some of the Governors refused to be responsible for maintenance of law and order unless evacuees brought into their States were kept under constant military surveillance. Following the meeting, the War Relocation Authority abandoned plans for assisting groups of evacuees in private colonization, temporarily laid aside plans for private employment, and concentrated on establishment of Government-operated centers with sufficient capacity and facilities to accommodate the entire evacuee population.

FUNCTIONS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Almost immediately after the creation of the War Relocation Authority, a tentative agreement was reached between the Director of the Authority and the Western Defense Command covering the responsibilities of the two agencies in the evacuation and relocation process. Later, on April 17, this agreement was expanded and formalized in a memorandum of understanding signed by the Director of the Authority and the Assistant Secretary of War. Briefly, the memorandum provided that the War Department would be responsible for (1) evacuating the people of Japanese ancestry from their homes, (2) establishing and administering temporary assembly

centers where the evacuees could be quartered while relocation centers were being constructed, (3) construction of basic housing and facilities at relocation center sites, (4) transporting the evacuees from assembly to relocation centers, and (5) provision of a military guard around the exterior boundaries of relocation centers. The War Relocation Authority assumed full responsibility for management of the relocation centers and for maintenance of the evacuees once they were delivered by the Army at the relocation center gates. The full text of the agreement follows:

APRIL 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND WAR
RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Preamble: The War Relocation Authority is an independent establishment created by Executive Order of the President No. 9102, dated March 18, 1942, with a primary objective of relieving the Military Establishment of the burden of providing for the relocation of persons excluded from military areas by order of the Secretary of War or any designated military commander acting pursuant to Executive Order of the President No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942. The emphasis in all War Relocation Authority activities will be increasingly to alleviate the drain on military resources with regard to all phases of evacuation and relocation. The War Relocation Authority has agreed to prepare itself as rapidly as practicable to assume those burdens now imposed on the War Department respecting such activities and particularly in connection with Pacific coast evacuation now in progress. Accordingly the following understanding is executed between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority to meet the present situation.

1. The evacuation of combat zones is a military necessity and when determined upon must not be retarded by resettlement and relocation. In other words, the timing of evacuation is a military function which War Relocation Authority will do all in its power to accommodate.

2. Assembly centers are staging areas and necessary because of the time required to select relocation sites and to construct relocation centers (reception centers). Assembly centers are constructed and will be supplied and operated by the War Department.

3. Relocation sites, upon which relocation centers (reception centers) are built, are to be selected by the War Relocation Authority, subject to War Department approval.

4. The acquisition, as distinguished from selection, of sites for relocation centers (reception centers) is a War Department function. Such acquisition will be made by the War Department upon the request of the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority will reimburse the War Department for the acquisition cost of relocation sites or pay the cost in the first instance.

(a) As a part of the acquisition procedure, respecting both private and public lands, the War Department, through an appropriate military commander, will advise the chief executive of the State concerned of the military necessity for the location of a relocation project within that State.

(b) The War Relocation Authority has full responsibility for compilation of the necessary data and descriptions in connection with 3 and 4 above.

5. Construction of initial facilities at relocation centers (reception centers) will be accomplished by the War Department. This initial construction will include all facilities necessary to provide the minimum essentials of living, viz, shelter, hospital, mess, sanitary facilities, administration building, housing for relocation staff, post office, storehouses, essential refrigeration equipment, and military police housing. (War Department construction will not include refinements such as schools, churches, and other community planning adjuncts.) The placement and construction of military police housing will be subject to the approval of the appropriate military commander.

6. The War Department will procure and supply the initial equipment for relocation centers (reception centers), viz, kitchen equipment, minimum mess and barrack equipment, hospital equipment, and 10 days' supply of nonperishable subsistence based on the relocation center (reception center) evacuee capacity. From the date of opening, or the date on which the War Relocation Authority initiates the operation of any relocation center (reception center), as the case

may be, the War Department will transfer accountability for all such equipment and property to the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority agrees to assume such accountability. Thereafter, the War Relocation Authority will maintain and replace all such equipment and property, including subsistence, and will procure whatever additional supplies, subsistence, and equipment it may require. The War Department agrees that the War Relocation Authority may effect its procurement through War Department agencies.

(a) As to all routine procurement effected by the War Relocation Authority through War Department agencies, said Authority agrees that it will transmit to the War Department a forecast of its requirements semiannually in advance, and that it will confirm in writing to the appropriate War Department agency its actual requirements from time to time as the need for such procurement develops. The War Relocation Authority will take all possible and practicable steps to inform the War Department well in advance of its requirements.

7. After pending arrangements for existing reception centers are completed the War Relocation Authority will operate relocation centers (reception centers) from the date of opening. This will include staffing, administration, project planning, and complete operation and maintenance. In undertaking such operations the War Relocation Authority will not retard completion of the evacuation process but will accommodate military requirements. It will be prepared to accept successive increments of evacuees as construction is completed and supplies and equipment are delivered. In each case the War Relocation Authority will provide a project manager who will be available to the War Department local construction representative for consultation as soon as a given project is approved for construction.

8. The War Department will provide for the transportation of evacuees to assembly centers and from assembly centers to relocation centers (reception centers) under appropriate military escort. The War Department, through the Western Defense Command, has arranged for the storage of household effects of evacuees through the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. At War Department expense, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has acquired warehouse space, provided civilian guards, and has arranged for inventories of goods stored by each evacuee. When evacuee goods are stored and the Federal Reserve Bank delivers inventory receipts to the War Relocation Authority, said Authority will accept such receipts from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and, upon such acceptance, said Authority assumes the responsibility now borne by the War Department for the warehousing program, including the assumption from the date of delivery of receipts, of payment of all costs. Thereafter, the disposition of such household effects and the transportation thereof to relocation centers, or elsewhere, will be the sole responsibility of the War Relocation Authority.

9. In the interest of the security of the evacuee relocation sites will be designated by the appropriate military commander or by the Secretary of War, as the case may be, as prohibited zones and military areas, and appropriate restrictions with respect to the rights of evacuees and others to enter, remain in, or leave such areas will be promulgated so that ingress and egress of all persons, including evacuees, will be subject to the control of the responsible military commander. Each relocation site will be under military-police patrol and protection as determined by the War Department. Relocation centers (reception centers) will have a minimum capacity of 5,000 evacuees (until otherwise agreed to) in order that the number of military police required for patrol and protection will be kept at a minimum.

10. It is understood that all commitments herein as relate to the use of War Department and/or war relocation funds are subject to the approval of the Bureau of the Budget.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY,
By M. S. EISENHOWER,
Director.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
By J. J. McCLOY,
Assistant Secretary of War.

SELECTION OF SITES FOR RELOCATION CENTERS

While the evacuation was moving forward under supervision of the Western Defense Command, the War Relocation Authority and the Army began an extensive search for areas where the evacuees might

settle down to a more stable kind of life until plans could be developed for their permanent relocation in communities outside of the evacuated areas. Because of the nature of the relocation program, the possibilities were sharply limited. Requirements for sites were announced by the Authority on April 13 as follows:

1. All centers must be located on public land so that improvements at public expense become public, not private, assets. Any land acquired for this purpose will remain in public ownership.

2. Because of manpower needs in the armed services and because the minimum guard unit can guard 5,000 persons as easily as smaller groups, first attention will be given to sites adequate for large projects.

3. Each center must provide work opportunities throughout the year for the available workers to be located there.

4. All centers must be located at a safe distance from strategic works.

To aid in the job of site selection, the Authority enlisted the cooperation of technicians from a number of Federal and State agencies. More than 300 proposals were considered on paper and nearly 100 possible sites were actually examined by field inspection crews. Some were rejected because they were too small; others were turned down by the Army for military reasons; and still others were found unsuitable for a wide variety of causes.

By June 5 sites for 10 relocation centers had been selected and construction work at four of the sites was well under way. By the first week in November the entire evacuee population had been transferred either from assembly centers or—in some cases—direct from their homes into relocation centers. A total of 110,000 persons, according to records of the Western Defense Command, were evacuated from their homes. The location of the 10 centers and their population as of July 10, 1943, are shown in the following table:

Relocation center	Location	Population as of July 10, 1943
Central Utah.....	Topaz, Utah.....	7,287
Colorado River.....	Poston, Ariz.....	15,530
Gila River.....	Rivers, Ariz.....	12,355
Granada.....	Amache, Colo.....	6,170
Heart Mountain.....	Heart Mountain, Wyo.....	9,292
Jerome.....	Denson, Ark.....	7,767
Manzanar.....	Manzanar, Calif.....	8,716
Minidoka.....	Hunt, Idaho.....	7,548
Rohwer.....	Relocation, Ark.....	7,616
Tule Lake.....	Newell, Calif.....	13,422
Total.....		95,703

(The War Relocation Authority is also operating a small isolation center at Leupp, Ariz.)

GENERAL PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE EVACUATION

Evacuation of the Japanese American population from their homes and occupations on the west coast, and their relocation in 10 newly established wartime communities is a movement without precedent in the United States. Inevitably such an undertaking has created problems, not all of which could be foreseen. The size of the task, involving more than 100,000 men, women, and children, as well as its unprecedented character, has contributed to the complexity of the undertaking.

At the present time the responsibilities of the War Relocation Authority, in dealing with these problems, fall into three main categories. First are those problems arising in the administration of

relocation centers. While the Authority does not consider the centers as permanent places of residence and does not feel that the maintenance of evacuees in relocation centers represents the most constructive solution to the over-all problem, the fact remains that the great majority of evacuees are now in the centers, and that their proper maintenance there is a clear responsibility of the Government.

Second are the problems arising from the release of evacuees for work outside the centers and for other purposes. Even before the evacuation from certain of the restricted areas had been initiated, the Army and the War Relocation Authority were forced by the demands in many of the Western States for agricultural labor to develop a program for releasing large numbers of evacuees for outside employment. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1942, the number of evacuees released on temporary work leave reached nearly 10,000.

Problems arising in the management of property owned by evacuees in the evacuated areas constitute the third major category of problems with which the War Relocation Authority is concerned. Under plans developed by the Army as a part of the evacuation program, evacuees were offered assistance through the medium of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Farm Security Administration in the leasing, sale, or management of their property. In August 1942 responsibilities in this field were transferred, at the request of the cooperating agencies, to the War Relocation Authority.

THE NATURE OF THE EVACUATED POPULATION

The present population of the 10 relocation centers is approximately 95,000. Roughly two-thirds of these people are American citizens by virtue of birth in this country. The remaining one-third are aliens, whose naturalization is not permitted under the laws of the United States. The distribution of this population by age and sex is suggested by the following table, based upon the United States Census of 1940:

Distribution of Japanese population by age, sex, and nativity compared to "average" ¹ groupings of non-Japanese population—States of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, 1940

Age groups	Male				Female				Total	
	Japanese population			"Average" ¹ population	Japanese population			"Average" ¹ population	Japanese population	"Average" ¹ population
	Native-born	Foreign-born	Total		Native-born	Foreign-born	Total			
0 to 4 years.....	3,728	30	3,758	4,330	3,407	25	3,432	3,447	7,190	7,777
5 to 9 years.....	4,148	37	4,185	4,135	4,131	39	4,170	3,322	8,355	7,457
10 to 14 years.....	6,476	63	6,539	4,519	6,271	54	6,325	3,627	12,864	8,146
15 to 19 years.....	9,291	141	9,432	5,074	8,596	105	8,701	4,099	18,133	9,173
20 to 24 years.....	7,654	227	7,881	5,248	6,540	215	6,755	4,221	14,636	9,460
25 to 29 years.....	3,964	341	4,305	5,505	3,113	252	3,365	4,357	7,670	9,862
30 to 34 years.....	1,561	959	2,520	5,211	1,138	812	1,950	4,047	4,470	9,258
35 to 39 years.....	749	2,588	3,337	4,975	371	2,673	3,044	3,816	6,381	8,791
40 to 44 years.....	262	2,892	3,154	4,634	132	3,782	3,914	3,588	7,068	8,222
45 to 49 years.....	132	2,169	2,301	4,414	63	3,490	3,553	3,385	5,854	7,790
50 to 54 years.....	58	5,157	5,215	4,143	25	2,172	2,197	3,055	7,412	7,198
55 to 59 years.....	32	4,720	4,752	3,454	5	1,160	1,165	2,545	5,917	5,990
60 to 64 years.....	15	3,662	3,677	2,729	3	770	773	2,128	4,450	4,857
65 to 69 years.....	6	1,500	1,506	2,019	1	292	293	1,689	1,799	3,708
70 to 74 years.....	9	476	485	1,402	1	80	81	1,175	566	2,577
75 years and over.....	9	152	161	1,416	5	54	59	1,276	220	2,692
Total.....	38,094	25,114	63,208	63,208	33,802	15,975	49,777	49,777	112,985	112,985

¹ The "average" population indicates what the distribution, by age and sex, of the Japanese-American population in the Pacific Coast States in 1940 would have been had it conformed to the distribution by age and sex of the non-Japanese population in these 4 States.

Source: Bureau of Census.

As of 1942, the median age of the alien male population was approximately 56 years; of the alien female population approximately 47 years; and of the citizen population about 18 years. The "average" column in the previous tabulation is introduced to indicate what the distribution, by age and sex, of the Japanese-American population in the Pacific coast in 1940 would have been had it conformed to the distribution by age and sex of the non-Japanese population in the four States in 1940.

In addition to the wide and distinct difference in age between the citizen and alien groups in this population, probably its most important characteristics from the point of view of relocation center administration are (1) the relative lack of persons in the age group of 30 to 50, which generally constitutes the most productive part of the working populations; (2) the relatively high proportion of school students (5 to 19) in the total population and the relatively high population of high-school students in the school population (nearly double that found in a normal community); and (3) the relatively low proportion of persons 65 years of age and older. These abnormal age characteristics of the evacuee population have occasioned problems differing both in kind and size from those found in the normal American community.

EVACUATION FROM HAWAII

Although no mass evacuation of persons of Japanese descent, similar to that on the west coast, was deemed necessary or advisable in the Hawaiian Islands, the Army has carried out a small-scale evacuation of people of Japanese ancestry from the Territory to the mainland.

The first evacuees from Hawaii were received in relocation centers on November 23, 1942. Since that time, 1,037 Hawaiian evacuees have been received at centers. Of this group, approximately 60 percent are males, approximately 40 percent are under 17 years of age, and 13 percent over 37 years of age.

BASIC POLICIES OF CENTER ADMINISTRATION

The War Relocation Authority has undertaken to provide all evacuees residing in centers the following essentials: Housing, food, medical care, and education through the high-school level. In each of these categories the facilities provided are the minimum necessary to meet reasonable American standards.

HOUSING

All evacuees in centers are housed in barracks, which are divided into four or more one-room apartments. The barracks are grouped in blocks, each of which is made up of 14 barracks, a central toilet and bathhouse, a laundry room, mess hall, and a recreation hall.

This housing for evacuees is part of the basic center construction, which was designed and built by the United States Army Engineers. The Army's original plan, which was agreed to by the War Relocation Authority, contemplated that a minimum of one room would be made available to each family, and that no family would be required to share its one-room apartment with anyone else. At the present time, in order to make barracks space available for schools, church

services, and other community purposes, the War Relocation Authority is unable to meet this standard. Many families are, at the present time, required to share barracks space with outsiders. Similarly, few recreation halls are available for the block uses for which they were constructed. The War Relocation Authority's program for the construction of schools and other facilities and the gradual relocation outside the centers of eligible families are both steps aimed to remedy this situation.

All center construction is of a temporary character, similar to the Army's theater of operations type of construction. While the centers differ from each other in minor details, the most common type of building is a frame structure covered with plain sheathing lumber and tar paper. Because of the heat, the Arizona centers have double roofs; because of the cold, some of the more northern centers have finished interior walls. None of the barracks has running water; all have electric lights and some sort of heating stove for each apartment.

Food and mess operations.

All evacuees eat in mess halls operated by the Authority. In each center, mess operations are directed by a chief steward, who is a member of the administrative staff. He has one or two appointed assistants. Under the direction of the chief steward and his immediate assistants, all work connected with requisitioning, receipt, warehousing, issue, preparation and serving of food, and the maintenance and operation of subsistence warehouses and mess halls is performed by evacuee personnel. Recognizing the importance of mess operations to the morale of the centers, the stewards undertake to provide good, wholesome food, selected and prepared to the taste of the evacuees. Because of the varied nature of the population, which includes some peoples whose tastes are very largely Japanese, along with others whose tastes are almost wholly American, it is not easy to prepare menus which will satisfy the entire population. Experience seems to indicate that the best way to deal with this situation is to alternate Oriental and American types of foods.

It is the policy of the Authority to provide simple, substantial foods. All rationing regulations and recommendations applicable to the civilian population of this country are observed in the administration of center mess operations. In addition, 2 meatless days are observed each week and no fancy meats of any kind are served. In areas where local milk supplies are short, milk is provided only to small children, nursing or expectant mothers, and special dietary cases.

With the exception of some food which is produced by the evacuees themselves at the centers and some perishable commodities which are bought locally, practically all food served at the centers is purchased through the Quartermaster Corps of the United States Army. Arrangements were made to buy food through the Army both to give the War Relocation Authority the advantage of Army experience and facilities, and to give the Army an opportunity to prevent competition by the War Relocation Authority in certain markets for food needed for the armed forces.

War relocation centers are operating under a cash ration allowance of 45 cents per person per day. This cost includes the cost of feeding special diet cases, infants, and pregnant women. Over the past few months the actual daily cost of feeding has ranged from 34 to 42 cents per person.

EDUCATION

One-fourth of the evacuee population in the centers is of school age and is in school. This is substantially larger than the proportion of school children in the normal population. Moreover, as has been suggested above, a disproportionately large part of the school population is of high-school age. Virtually all of the school children in the population were born in this country and are citizens. Virtually all were being educated prior to evacuation in American public schools.

It is the policy of the War Relocation Authority to provide elementary and high-school facilities, meeting the minimum standards of the States in which the centers are located and providing education which will permit the students to return to public school outside the centers after the war without loss of credit for the time spent in the centers. Educational programs have been developed and curricula planned in cooperation with the State school authorities of the States in which centers are located. All teaching is in English. No Japanese language schools of the type common on the Pacific coast before evacuation are permitted in the centers. Refresher courses in the Japanese language, however, are being given at some of the centers for instructors and interpreters intending to go out in intelligence work.

The entire evacuee population has expressed a keen interest in the educational program. When basic educational plans were being made, the Authority was asked expressly by leaders of the evacuee population to provide as large a proportion as possible of non-Japanese teachers. They felt that prior to evacuation schools had been the biggest single force for Americanization and expressed the hope that their children would continue to have contact with qualified non-Japanese teachers. Because of this fact, and because there are relatively few qualified teachers among the evacuees, original plans called for employment of at least three-fourths of the teaching staff from outside the centers. At the present time, nearly 90 percent of the certified teaching staff is composed of persons who are not of Japanese descent. Evacuees are used extensively as assistant teachers and teacher aides.

Appointed teachers are employed under Civil Service regulations and are paid salaries established under the Classification Act. Because of the administrative necessity of keeping children occupied in the relatively crowded confines of the relocation centers, schools are operated 11 months out of the year. Even on such a basis it will be more than a year before the school time lost during evacuation and relocation is made up.

Schools are now operating in space originally constructed for barracks. Facilities for scientific and vocational work at the high-school level are inadequate. In most centers, living quarters have been crowded to make barrack space available for schools. To relieve this situation, the War Relocation Authority has undertaken to build school buildings of a temporary character similar in construction to the other buildings of the centers. Plans have been completed and priorities secured for the construction of high schools at most centers. Elementary classes, however, will continue to be held in the barracks.

MEDICAL CARE AND HOSPITALIZATION

Recognizing the possibility that the process of evacuation and relocation might increase the susceptibility of the evacuee population to disease and that the likelihood of serious epidemics is greater in camp communities than in normal communities, the Army made provision in the basic construction program of the centers for a fully equipped hospital on each center. Because the barracks-type housing is unsuited to home care of the sick, even minor illnesses are considered hospital cases in the relocation centers. This consideration caused the Army to provide a higher ratio of hospital beds to the population (about 18 to 1,000) than is customary in most normal communities.

The War Relocation Authority provides an appointed medical director in each center, appointed under civil service and paid according to the Classification Act. All other medical positions, all dental positions, and such technical positions as X-ray technologist, pharmacist, and laboratory technician are filled to the fullest extent possible with evacuee personnel. From the beginning there has been a serious shortage of qualified evacuee nurses at the centers; and within the past few months the number of evacuee doctors has been drastically reduced by outside relocation. In fact, the most serious problem of health administration on the centers is the very small number of qualified doctors and nurses available. At present, the Authority is using a much larger proportion of nurses aides from the evacuee population than is desirable from a point of view of sound medical practice.

Evacuees are provided medical care, hospitalization, and medication without charge. Up to the present, health conditions on the centers have been remarkably good. But the current shortage of doctors and nurses may make the continuance of such a record exceedingly difficult.

EMPLOYMENT

In order to hold down the costs of administration, the War Relocation Authority has filled the great majority of positions needed in the operation of the centers with evacuee personnel. Only key supervisory positions are filled with appointed civil-service employees. In fact, it is the policy of the War Relocation Authority, so far as possible, to provide useful, productive work for all employable evacuees. Approximately 90 percent of the employable residents of the centers are employed at the present time. Work in the administrative offices, the transport and warehousing systems, and other essential administrative operations employs about a third of this number. The remainder are used in productive enterprises in the fields of agriculture, industry, and public works.

Evacuees are selected and assigned to their work under a systematic program of employment administration; they are paid at the rate of \$12, \$16, or \$19 a month, according to the nature of their duties. This compensation is not considered a wage commensurate with the work being performed but is more in the nature of a cash allowance, intended to enable the evacuees who work to purchase such things as haircuts, shoe repairs, tobacco, confections, and other goods and services that are not provided by the Authority. Evacuees who work also receive a cash clothing allowance for themselves and their de-

pendents. Clothing allowances, depending upon the age of the dependents and the location of the centers, range from \$2 to \$3.75 per month per person.

AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, AND PUBLIC WORKS

When initial plans for relocation centers were being made the Authority did not anticipate the great demand which subsequently arose for evacuee labor outside the centers. It was expected that extensive programs of agricultural and industrial production and public works would be needed to provide useful occupations for the evacuees. The possibility of establishing industries, not only to produce goods needed in the centers but also goods required in the war effort, was extensively explored. Similarly, care was taken to locate all centers on relatively large areas of potential or developed agricultural land. On a number of centers a substantial program of land development was planned. On all centers a number of buildings, roads, and other community facilities were omitted from the basic construction and left to be built by evacuees.

Outside demands for labor, however, have reduced the labor forces on the centers substantially below what was anticipated. It is now evident that there will be little opportunity or need for industrial development. A few small industrial projects contributing to the subsistence program of the centers are being operated. A few enterprises contributing to the war effort were established in some of the earlier centers and will be continued. The extensive industrial program, involving the establishment on the centers of industrial plants under private management paying prevailing wages, which was at one time contemplated, has been abandoned as unnecessary.

On centers having developed agricultural land, production is limited to crops needed in the subsistence of the centers. It has appeared wiser in every way to release evacuees for work in private agricultural enterprises than to attempt to develop agricultural production for the market. On centers on which there is no developed agricultural land at present, the Authority is developing only sufficient acreage to provide subsistence crops and livestock. All evacuees engaged in such activities are compensated in accordance with the established employment program of the Authority.

Even this restricted program is contributing substantially to the maintenance of the centers. During the calendar year 1942, with most of the centers in operation only a portion of the year, approximately \$800,000 worth of vegetables and other crops were produced at four relocation centers. It is expected that \$2,750,000 worth of vegetables will be produced during the calendar year 1943. Livestock and poultry produced on the centers will provide an additional contribution to the mess operations program. It is estimated that during the fiscal year 1944, the value of livestock and poultry products produced on the centers will reach \$2,000,000.

In addition to land development on certain centers, the Public Works Program is confined largely to the development and construction of buildings needed in project operations. These include schools, community store buildings, agricultural buildings such as swine and poultry sheds, maintenance and repair shops, and additional quarters for appointed personnel.

COMMUNITY WELFARE

Since the evacuee population is a complete cross-section of our general population, it inevitably includes a proportion of socially maladjusted people, the bad along with the good. Moreover, the process of evacuation and relocation has introduced various strains and dislocations into the population. For example, eating in mess halls, bathing in community bathhouses, and utilizing community laundries and toilet facilities have already strained the normal ties of family life and threaten to weaken if not destroy the authority of parents over their children. These problems are intensified by the relatively crowded and inadequate living conditions.

The War Relocation Authority is attempting to counteract the bad social effects of relocation by such administrative means as are at its disposal. Considerable can be accomplished through the educational system, but in addition the Authority has found it necessary to provide a qualified social welfare staff on each center. This staff is particularly concerned with the problems of family relationship, and of the old, the sick, and with orphans and delinquent children. The welfare staff determines family composition for the purposes of granting clothing allowances and making housing adjustments, and is responsible for administering a program of cash grants to persons who, because of health or for other reasons, are unemployable.

COMMUNITY ENTERPRISES

The evacuees have been encouraged to establish community stores at all centers so that residents might buy essential goods and services not furnished by the administration. These include such personal services as are provided by shoe-repair shops, mending and pressing shops, beauty parlors, and barber shops, and such goods as clothing, confections, toilet goods, stationery, and books and magazines.

All community enterprises have been organized and financed by evacuees (either through the use of their own funds or through credit secured from private sources) and are operated on a cooperative basis with profits used for community purposes or distributed to the evacuees in the form of dividends. All evacuee personnel employed in the community enterprises are paid out of the funds of the enterprises at the same rate as if they were employed in operations of the Authority. The enterprises pay the Authority a reasonable rental for the space they occupy on the center. The Authority provides a community enterprise adviser on each center and undertakes to audit the books of the enterprises but otherwise is not responsible for their operations.

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT AND INTERNAL SECURITY

Although final responsibility for management of the relocation centers rests with the War Relocation Authority, the Authority is, to the fullest feasible extent, giving the evacuees an active voice in the management of their own affairs.

In the first place, the director of each center has selected in each block a block manager to represent the administration in the transmission of information and instructions to the residents and to represent the block in the presentation of requests and proposals to the

administration. Block managers are also responsible for seeing that block buildings are adequately maintained and that block services are kept up to standards.

In the second place, regulations of the War Relocation Authority provide procedures under which members of the evacuee community may select a community council and other agencies of community government to advise and assist the project director in administering community aspects of the center's activity. While all residents of the centers 18 years of age and older may vote in community elections, only those 21 or over are permitted, by regulation of the Authority, to hold elective office. The authority of the community council, and such other agencies of local government and administration as may be established, is founded entirely upon the legal authority of the project director, as administrative head of the relocation center. It is the policy of the Authority to delegate to the evacuee representatives as much authority as is consistent with sound administration and as the governmental organization of the community appears qualified to assume. The community organizations of the several centers, naturally, vary somewhat in the degree of their development and in their capacity to assist the project director. Consequently the degree of responsibility delegated by the project directors varies from center to center and will continue to be modified as the maturity and competence of the governmental organization increase or are altered by local circumstances.

Evacuees in the relocation centers are governed by three general categories of law and regulation:

1. The general law of the United States and of the State in which the center is situated;
2. Regulations of the War Relocation Authority and the project director;
3. Regulations made by the community council under the authority of the project director and with his approval.

Enforcement of these laws and regulations is the responsibility of the project director, who utilizes in the exercise of his responsibility both the agencies of community government and the internal-security staff of the center.

The internal security staff on each center is headed by a qualified appointed internal-security officer. He is provided with from 2 to 10 appointed assistants, the exact number depending upon decision by the Authority as to requirements in the center. In addition, the internal-security officer directs a staff of evacuee internal-security assistants. These evacuee officers are selected because of their previous police experience or other special qualifications for the work. They are trained particularly in the preventive aspects of police administration.

EXTERNAL SECURITY

By agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the Army, the exterior boundary of each relocation center is guarded by a military police detachment. During the day the military police patrol the perimeter of the entire project area; at night they maintain a patrol around the immediate boundary of the relocation center or barracks area. In addition, they are available to assume responsibility for policing the interior of the center upon request of the project

director. The Authority has experienced only one case in which it was found necessary to ask the military police to assume responsibility for maintaining order within a relocation center. This was in the Manzanar Relocation Center in California early in December. Experience at that time indicates that the present military policing arrangements are entirely adequate to maintain the external security for which they are intended and to assume responsibility when necessary for maintaining order within the centers.

ISOLATION CENTER

Primarily as a result of the disturbance which occurred at the Manzanar Relocation Center in December 1942, the War Relocation Authority in early 1943 worked out procedures whereby persistent and incorrigible troublemakers among the evacuees might be removed from relocation centers. Arrangements were completed with the Department of Justice empowering the Authority to certify for detention in internment camps alien residents of relocation centers, who, in the judgment of the project director, constitute a threat to the community peace and security. For the handling of troublemakers among the American citizens at relocation centers, however, a special center had to be established under direction of the War Relocation Authority.

In January of 1943 a temporary center of this kind was established on the site of an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp near Moab, Utah. The first group to be transferred to this center was a contingent of 23 men from Manzanar who were suspected of being the instigators behind the December outbreak. In April the Moab Center was closed out and its population transferred to the present isolation center which is located on the site of an Indian boarding school at Leupp, Ariz. The current population of the Leupp Center is 70 evacuees.

FIRE PROTECTION

Because of the highly inflammable character of the buildings at all relocation centers and the comparatively dry climate at most of them, the fire hazard is unusually acute. From the beginning, intensive efforts have been made to train evacuee fire-fighting crews and to make the population of each center fire conscious. Fire protection work at the centers is under the direction of a member of the appointed (nonevacuee) staff and currently involves evacuee crews ranging from 34 to 93 members, depending on the size and needs of each center. The total fire loss at the 10 centers up to June 15, 1943, was \$25,894 or 25 cents per capita.

BASIC POLICIES ON LEAVE AND OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT

Ever since the evacuation, the military authorities and the War Relocation Authority have had arrangements under which evacuees might be privately employed in various parts of the country outside the evacuated area on the Pacific coast. The War Relocation Authority first took the position that evacuation should be completed, the relocation centers built and staffed, and all evacuees transferred to the centers before expending a major effort on private relocation. However, the need for labor in agriculture, especially for the produc-

tion of sugar beets, became so great that the Western Defense Command and the War Relocation Authority made arrangements for the recruitment of farm and other work in May 1942 when the great majority of the evacuees were still in the Army assembly centers. By July 1, 1942, some 1,700 evacuees were employed under this joint procedure in 5 Western States. During the fall harvest season about 10,000 were employed on group work leave in 11 States.

SEASONAL LEAVE

Recruitment of evacuees under the group-leave policy (also called seasonal-work leave) and their release from both assembly centers and relocation centers were accomplished under the following terms:

1. Evacuees proceeded at the expense of the employer to a designated locality, usually a county.
2. Evacuees were recruited only for areas in which the United States Employment Service certified that labor was needed.
3. Evacuees were granted group work leave to accept employment under the terms of a written contract. (They were, however, permitted to move to other employers in the same areas and, with prior approval of field representatives of the Authority, were permitted to move from one designated area to another, as the need for labor shifted. Thus, many evacuees who started work in the spring were kept in continuous employment throughout the summer. Out of the 10,000 on group work leave in 1942, about one-fifth are still in outside employment under the group leave policy.)
4. Evacuees were given group work leave to go only to States in which the Governor had given written assurance that he would maintain law and order and to counties in which similar assurances had been provided by local authorities.

This group-leave procedure has undoubtedly given the evacuees an opportunity, which, for the most part, they welcomed, to work as free labor, and to assist in the agricultural program of the country. It contributed substantially to the production of sugar in the United States. There were some minor changes in the group-work-leave procedures before the beginning of the 1943 agricultural season, and at the same time the type of leave was designated as seasonal work leave. On July 1, 1943, there were approximately 5,500 evacuees on seasonal work leave.

TEMPORARY AND INDEFINITE LEAVE

On October 1, 1942, the War Relocation Authority published in the Federal Register leave regulations embodying the present policies of the Authority on the granting of leave to evacuees to depart from centers. These regulations outline three general types of procedure under which leave from relocation centers may be granted:

1. Group work leave under terms of the procedure outlined above;
2. Short term leave for a period not to exceed 60 days, under which evacuees may be permitted to attend funerals, visit

sick relatives, attend court, or take care of other important business, justifying their temporary release from the centers.

3. Indefinite leave, under which evacuees subject to the conditions outlined below are permitted to leave the centers to take up permanent residence.

Any resident of the relocation center is eligible to apply for indefinite leave, but before leave is granted the following procedure is carried through:

1. The evacuee must show that he has a definite offer of employment or other evidence that he can take care of himself at some point outside the areas from which persons of Japanese descent are excluded by military order.
2. The War Relocation Authority must secure reasonable assurance that the community in which the evacuee proposes to relocate will accept him without incident.
3. The War Relocation Authority has acquired extensive information concerning the past history, affiliations, and attitudes of evacuees past the age of 17 years. On the basis of these records, leave permits are granted. As a further precaution, names of more than 85 percent of the evacuees have been checked against records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and these checks will be continued until the list of adult evacuees has been completely covered. If there is evidence from any source that the evacuee might endanger the internal security of the Nation or interfere with the war effort, permission for leave is denied.
4. In addition, there has been established a joint board, composed of representatives of the War and Navy Departments and the War Relocation Authority. This board maintains liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Approval of the board is required by the War Department for evacuees who desire to work in war industries and has been secured for those who wish to relocate from relocation centers into the Eastern Military Area. Such approval is given only after all pertinent information available from the cooperating agencies has been examined and evaluated.
5. The evacuee must agree to keep the War Relocation Authority informed of his location at all times.

At the present time some 10,000 evacuees, approximately 900 of them college students, are on indefinite leave.

No phase of the relocation program has been given more careful study and thought than the leave policy of the Authority. On the one hand, the problem of national security has been kept constantly in mind. On the other hand, the Authority has recognized from the outset that a relocation program which stopped with the transfer of evacuees to relocation centers would create more national problems than it would solve. It has never been the policy of the Federal Government to incarcerate aliens, and certainly not citizens, solely on the basis of their racial or national origin and regardless of their individual merits.

The leave policy was discussed with both the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before it was announced. The leave regulations were approved by the Department

Pasadenans Await Call to Testify

(Continued From Page One)

Japanese should be allowed to return to Southern California until after the war as he believed that the majority would be loyal to Japan.

The morning session followed much the pattern of other recent state and national subversive investigations held recently in Los Angeles. Other witnesses at this session were Edward Robbin, reporter for the People's World and Clinton J. Taft, publisher of The Forum, and secretary of the American Civil Liberties Union, Southern California District, who both testified they both favored return of loyal Japanese.

Charles Colden, Jr., Los Angeles attorney, was named examiner for the investigating committee with committee members joining in interrogation of the witnesses. Beside Mr. Gannon, committee members are Alfred W. Robertson, Santa Barbara; C. Don Fields, Glendale; Vincent Thomas, San Pedro, and R. Fred Price, Ontario.

John R. Lechner, Legion Member, Is Censured By Executive Committee

John R. Lechner, executive director of Americanism Educational League, and who also is a member of the American Legion, Department of California, was censured by unanimous vote of the Legion's Executive Committee at its December meeting.

Lechner, who is the author of a pamphlet on the Japanese question that has been distributed by his organization, appeared recently before Congressmen, Government officials, newspapermen and others in Washington, D.C. and represented, it was charged, that he made the trip at the request of the American Legion, whose committee on the Japanese problem he was directing. He held himself out as representing the Legion under resolutions adopted by the Department of California and ratified by the National organization.

Such representations were unauthorized and in flagrant violation of written notice from our then Department Commander, Leon Happell, that in the event a representative from the Americanism Educational League went to Washington, D.C. or elsewhere, for the purpose of testifying on the Japanese question, it should be plainly stated that he was speaking for that organization and not for the American Legion, for the reason that the Legion has a National Legislative Committee and full time staff in Washington to represent its more than one million members.

FIVE WIRE SERVICE

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PASADENANS AWAIT CALL TO TESTIFY

Only One Takes Stand Briefly at Japanese Hearing

By C. P. CORLISS

Pasadenans summoned to testify before the state interim Assembly committee on Japanese problems hearing which opened in the State Building at Los Angeles today waited throughout the morning without being called while the committee heard testimony on generalities from five witnesses.

Mrs. Maynard F. Thayer, chairman of the Pasadena chapter, Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play, member of her executive committee and other Pasadenans were present waiting to testify but were not called. Some of these had been subpoenaed and others came to volunteer their testimony.

Pasadenan Testifies

Just before the hearing recessed at 12:30, William C. Burton, 989 South El Molino Avenue, Pasadena, secretary-treasurer of the Pasadena chapter, was called to the stand and sworn in. Assemblyman Chester F. Gannon, Sacramento, committee chairman, merely asked Mr. Burton whether he had brought with him books and records and a complete financial statement of the Pasadena committee.

Mr. Burton turned the records over to the committee and will be called for further testimony this afternoon.

Although considerable reference had been made to activities of the committee on American Principles and Fair Play in announcing this hearing, the only reference this morning was by Dr. John R. Lechner, head of the American Educational League. Dr. Lechner filed as evidence a report on Japanese activities in California which he had made for the American Legion's Americanization committee of the 23rd district. He then stated that he felt that several organizations were being misled and when asked by Chairman Gannon as to what organization he referred he replied:

Group Declared Hoodwinked

"Particularly the committee on American Principles and Fair Play of which there are 23 chapters on the Pacific Coast and the Pasadena chapter the most active. I think that this organization is being taken for a beautiful ride and is being hoodwinked by persons who have an ulterior motive. It is time for members of this organization to take stock and not be swayed by pleas of racial prejudice."

Before he could elaborate any further on this matter, Dr. Lechner was excused temporarily and Dr. Ralph L. Phillips, returned missionary to China, was called. Dr. Phillips, who was born in Pasadena and now lives in Inglewood, returned to the United States in December, 1941 after 25 years in China.

Believed Loyal to Japan

Dr. Phillips' testimony especially concerned Japanese atrocities he had witnessed and he stated he thought these actions were typical illustrations of the Japanese mind. He stated that for this reason no

(Continued on Page 2, Column 1)

of Justice before they were issued. The leave process requires continuous, close cooperation between the War Relocation Authority and the Department of Justice. The leave policy has also been approved by the War Manpower Commission from the point of view of its contribution to the manpower supply of the country. Through cooperation with the War Manpower Commission, relocation offices established by the Authority at appropriate locations throughout the country are endeavoring to place evacuees in occupations which will contribute as effectively as possible to the war effort.

Under the sponsorship of the National Student Relocation Committee, a nongovernmental organization, several hundred evacuees have been granted leave from relocation centers to attend college in institutions outside the evacuated areas. For several months students, with the cooperation of the War Department, were granted special educational leave from Army assembly centers and later from relocation centers under temporary procedures of the Authority. Under present regulations, attendance at college is one of the purposes for which indefinite leave is granted. All students, now on educational leave, are subject to the same investigation and restrictions as are applied to other evacuees granted indefinite leave.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE RELOCATION PROGRAM

The evacuation and relocation program raise important questions of constitutionality. This is so because two-thirds of the persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from west coast military areas are citizens of the United States. The great majority of the remainder are law-abiding aliens.

It is the position of the War Relocation Authority that its leave regulations are essential to the legal validity of the evacuation and relocation program. These leave regulations establish a procedure under which the loyal citizens and law-abiding aliens may leave a relocation center to become reestablished in normal life.

When the evacuation was originally determined upon, it was contemplated that the evacuees would be free immediately to go anywhere they wanted within the United States so long as they remained outside of the evacuated area. Approximately 8,000 evacuees left the evacuated area voluntarily at that time and 5,000 of these have never lived in relocation centers. The decision to provide relocation centers for the evacuees was not made until some 6 weeks after evacuation was decided upon, and was made largely because of a recognition of the danger that the hasty and unplanned resettlement of 112,000 people might create civil disorder.

Detention within a relocation center is not, therefore, a permanent part of the evacuation process. It is not intended to be more than a temporary stage in the process of relocating the evacuees into new homes and jobs.

The detention or internment of citizens of the United States against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made, or can be made, for longer than the minimum period necessary to screen the loyal from the disloyal, and to provide the necessary guidance for relocation, is beyond the power of the War Relocation Authority. In the first place, neither the Congress nor the President has directed the War Relocation Authority to carry out such detention or internment. Secondly, lawyers will readily agree that an

attempt to authorize such confinement would be very hard to reconcile with the constitutional rights of citizens.

On June 21, 1943, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its decision in the case of *Gordon Hirabayashi v. United States*. Hirabayashi had been convicted of violating both the curfew orders and the evacuation orders applicable to Japanese-Americans. The Court held that the curfew was a valid exercise of the war power. Although the question of the validity of the evacuation orders was presented to the Court in that case, the Court did not find it necessary to decide that question. There is evidence in the majority and concurring opinions of the Court in the *Hirabayashi* case that, although it found the curfew to be valid, it believed the evacuation orders present difficult questions of constitutional power, and detention within a relocation center even more difficult questions. Mr. Justice Murphy in his concurring opinion said concerning the curfew orders:

In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power.

Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion said:

Detention for reasonable cause is one thing. Detention on account of ancestry is another. Obedience to the military orders is one thing. Whether an individual member of a group must be afforded at some stage an opportunity to show that, being loyal, he should be reclassified is a wholly different question * * *. But if it were plain that no machinery was available whereby the individual could demonstrate his loyalty as a citizen in order to be reclassified, questions of a more serious character would be presented. The United States, however, takes no such position.

The Chief Justice, in the majority opinion, was careful to point out that the Court was limiting its decision to the curfew orders and was not considering the evacuation orders or confinement in a relocation center.

More than a year has passed since evacuation was begun. During this year the War Relocation Authority has had time to make necessary investigations and to begin the process of considering the evacuees on an individual basis. The release procedures, including the leave regulations, are intended to provide the due process and hearing which fair dealing, democratic procedures, and the American Constitution all require.

SEGREGATION OF THE DISLOYAL

The War Relocation Authority is now undertaking to segregate from the total population in relocation centers those individuals who have indicated (either by express statement or by action) that their loyalties lie with Japan in the current hostilities. These individuals will be quartered in a segregation center to be established on the grounds of the Tule Lake Relocation Center in Northern California.

The first group to be segregated will be those individuals—about 6,300 in number—who have requested repatriation or expatriation to Japan and who have not withdrawn their applications prior to July 1, 1943. In determining who shall be segregated over and above this group, the War Relocation Authority will hold individual hearings and will carefully weigh all available evidence. Aside from the repatriates and expatriates, candidates for segregation will be drawn from the following groups:

1. American citizen evacuees who have refused to pledge loyalty to the United States and alien evacuees who have refused

- to swear that they would abide by the laws of the United States and refrain from interfering with the war effort;
2. Persons who have been denied leave clearance under the procedures of the War Relocation Authority because of an adverse report from a Federal intelligence agency, or some other information indicating loyalty to Japan.

Hearings connected with segregation are already under way at the relocation centers and are being carried forward as rapidly as possible. Present residents of the Tule Lake Center who are eligible for indefinite leave and who are thus not to be segregated will be given a choice of relocating immediately or transferring to one of the other centers. Residents of the other centers who are designated for segregation will be transferred to Tule Lake. Actual movements will begin in September as soon as preliminary arrangements can be completed and transportation becomes available.

Segregation is being carried out primarily to separate the loyal evacuees in relocation centers from the influence of those who are pro-Japanese and to speed the relocation in normal communities of the loyal group. It is not, however, in any sense a punitive program and the segregation center is not to be confused with the isolation center maintained at Leupp, Ariz. As a group, the segregates will be law-abiding persons who have simply given up trying to become adjusted in the United States. Any person at the segregation center who shows persistent troublemaking tendencies will be transferred to the isolation center.

An appeals board will be established at the Tule Lake Center to rectify mistakes that may be made in the segregation process and to hear the cases of those who wish to appeal their status. Except for those whose appeal is granted, residents of the segregation center will not be eligible for seasonal or indefinite leave.

In most other respects, the residents of the segregation center will be accorded the same type of treatment that is now given to residents of relocation centers generally. They will be provided by the Government with food, shelter, and medical care. Work opportunities will be available for those who wish to earn spending money and clothing allowances. Education will be furnished to children of school age. There will not, however, be opportunity for the establishment of an evacuee government at the segregation center.

EVACUEE PROPERTY

Determination by the Army that persons of Japanese ancestry should be evacuated from certain Pacific coast areas was accompanied by a recognition that assistance in the conservation of the property and property rights of evacuees should be given by the Federal Government. Respect for this principle was dictated not only by standards of equity but also by ordinary business sense.

On March 15, 1942, the Army announced the formation of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The Treasury Department, acting through the Federal Reserve Bank, was asked to take over the conservation of urban evacuee property, including real and personal, both business and residential, and intangible assets. The Farm Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture was assigned the task of accomplishing continuity in the agricultural opera-

tions already under way by evacuees and fair and equitable dealings in the transfer of evacuee interests to substitute operators.

On March 17, 1942, the Farm Security Administration established the wartime farm adjustment program to assist in a fair disposition of evacuee agricultural holdings and to aid qualified farmers in taking over such operations and obtaining credit. Where usual channels of commercial and governmental credit were not open to substitute operators, the Farm Security Administration received from the War Department \$1,000,000 for a lending program. Subsequently, an additional \$5,000,000 from the President's emergency fund was made available to them. Some 650 loans, totaling approximately \$3,500,000, were made from these funds.

Prior to the departure of evacuees to assembly centers, they were passed through one of 64 control stations established in Military Zone No. 1 in cooperation with the United States Employment Service. In these control centers three-man teams, composed of representatives of the Federal Security Agency, Federal Reserve Bank, and the Farm Security Administration were available to assist evacuees in settling their affairs before the evacuation dead line, and to check to determine whether arrangements for handling of their property had been completed by the evacuees.

Activities of the Federal Reserve Bank.

This agency rendered assistance to evacuees in the leasing or otherwise disposing of their urban properties, and on March 29, 1942, provisions for the storage of personal property and effects of evacuees in warehouses were published, and evacuees were urged to take advantage of this service. This activity was administered by the Federal Reserve Bank through its set-up designated as the Evacuee Property Department. As evacuees were transferred to assembly centers, those who availed themselves of the service afforded by the Federal Reserve Bank placed their household goods and personal belongings in warehouses leased by the bank for this purpose. A considerable percentage, however, preferred to place their goods in private storage, either in warehouses of their own selection, in churches and meeting halls, or with nonevacuee friends.

Pursuant to an agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the property of 2,867 evacuees was assigned by the above bank to the War Relocation Authority. These goods totaled over 2,000 tons in weight.

The records of the Federal Reserve Bank indicate that there were referred to them some 5,000 properties of either residential or commercial character. The list included all those activities normally engaged in by business and professional people with a high percentage of the total being in cleaning establishments and laundries, hotels, nurseries, and residences. Food markets also held a high place in the statistical summary.

Activities of the Farm Security Administration.

The records of the Farm Security Administration indicate that some 6,664 pieces of agricultural property, totaling 258,000 acres, were involved in the evacuation process. Practically all this land was intensively cultivated and devoted to the production of the food requirements of the area.

The farm machinery used on these properties was disposed of in one of several ways:

(a) Outright sale; (b) by a leasing arrangement; (c) as a loan to the lessee of the evacuee's farm, the only requirements being maintenance and upkeep.

Some was placed in storage. It was usually insisted upon by the Farm Security Administration that where the equipment was required for the operation of the property, equipment as well as land should be included in the transfer arrangements.

Responsibilities of the War Relocation Authority.

Since completion of the evacuation in the summer of 1942, both the Federal Reserve bank and the Farm Security Administration have taken the position that responsibility for the future handling of evacuee property should rest with the War Relocation Authority.

Scrutiny of the statistics presented above clearly indicates the importance of maintaining production of farm lands and of maximum possible utilization of all other property, both in the national interests and to preserve the equities of the owners thereof. Failure so to do would have a detrimental effect in several ways. The impact upon the tax structure of the communities involved would be serious. The food supply of the areas wherein the properties are located would be affected. There would be a marked reduction in the housing facilities in certain defense areas, notably in Seattle, where 206 out of a total of 325 hotels (63 percent) in the city were operated by Japanese.

Organization.—It was recognized that the evacuees, having been removed from the areas indicated, were no longer in a position to personally operate, manage, or otherwise care for their property. The War Relocation Authority accordingly established the Division of Relocation Assistance. This Division has a Pacific coast evacuee-property office at San Francisco. There are field offices in Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. In addition, provision has been made for evacuee-property representatives at each relocation project.

Functions.

Evacuees are free to choose the manner in which they desire to have their properties cared for. They may select a person or concern to act as attorney-in-fact, they may choose an agent to act for them, or they may deal directly with persons having transactions with them. The services of the evacuee-property office are made available to evacuees if they prefer to use them. The functions of this office include acting upon the request of evacuees to determine if property is being properly maintained; securing tenants or operators of both agricultural and commercial property; negotiating leases or sales; adjusting differences; checking inventories of goods and equipment; and similar activities. The policies guiding the activities of the evacuee-property office are predicated upon the national interests and a recognition of the need for preserving the lawful interests of evacuees.

ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Each of the 11 centers of the War Relocation Authority (including the isolation center at Leupp, Ariz.) is administered by a project director, who is responsible for supervising all activities within the

center and for cooperating with the commander of the military police company assigned to exterior patrol. Each director is provided with a staff of from 125 to 200 nonevacuee assistants. Top positions in all branches of community and project administration are occupied by these civil-service employees. At the present time more than a third of all project appointed personnel are employed in the education program.

Each project director is immediately responsible administratively to the Director of the Authority. He is vested by the Director with appropriate authority to expend and account for Government funds allotted to the project, to employ appointed personnel under civil-service regulations, and to purchase and to utilize necessary supplies and equipment. Subject to regulations and policies of the Authority and the general laws and regulations of the Government service, he is in full charge of the relocation center.

The Office of the Director of the War Relocation Authority is maintained in Washington, D. C. The Director is appointed by the President, and, within the framework of the Office for Emergency Management, of the Executive Office of the President, is administratively responsible to him. The Director is assisted by a Deputy Director and a staff in Washington, organized into the following divisions:

1. Reports;
2. Administrative Management;
3. Office of the Solicitor;
4. Relocation Planning;
5. Relocation Assistance;
6. Community Services;
7. Employment;
8. Agriculture and Engineering.

Three Assistant Directors of the Authority are maintained in field offices; one in Little Rock, Ark.; a second in Denver, Colo.; and the third in San Francisco, Calif. Each field Assistant Director has from one to three principal assistants and a small clerical staff. The field Assistant Directors are responsible for assisting the Director in inspection and supervision of relocation centers and other field activities of the Authority and for representing the Director in contacts with other governmental agencies and with the public.

To perform the functions of the War Relocation Authority in the field of evacuee property management, a property office under the direction of the Relocation Assistance Division in Washington is maintained in San Francisco. Branches of this office have been located in Seattle and Los Angeles. To assist in the relocation of evacuees outside centers, and to maintain contact with those who have been granted leave, a series of field offices has been established under the direction of the Employment Division of the Washington staff. At the present time key relocation offices have been established in Salt Lake City, Denver, Kansas City, Chicago, Cleveland, New York City, and Boston. Nearly 40 branch offices have been set up at other cities located mainly throughout the interior sections of the country.

INDIVIDUAL EXCLUSION

In addition to work connected with the relocation of the Japanese-American population, with which the War Relocation Authority is primarily concerned, the Authority is also responsible for providing assistance to individuals excluded from military areas. Removal of the Japanese-American population from the Pacific coast is the only wholesale evacuation which the Army has ordered under Executive Order 9066. It has for some months, however, been engaged in the removal of designated individuals, both aliens and citizens, from restricted areas along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. Under the present procedure, individuals, after appropriate investigations and hearings, are ordered by the military authorities to leave the restricted areas. Pursuant to Executive Order 9102, the War Relocation Authority has developed procedures under which it interviews individual excludees, and undertakes to provide them with such financial and other assistance as they may require to comply with the military orders. It is not expected, however, that the individual exclusion program will ever approach in scope or complexity the work of the Authority arising from the evacuation of the Japanese population from the west coast.



SENATE JOINT MEMORIAL NO. 9

Introduced by Senator Mahoney and read February 17, 1943

WHEREAS THERE ARE NOW RESIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OVER 130,000 JAPANESE; MANY OF WHOM ARE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES SOLELY BY ACCIDENT OF BIRTH; AND

WHEREAS MANY OF THESE JAPANESE RESIDED IN OREGON PRIOR TO THE PRESENT WAR WITH THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, AND WILL, UNLESS OTHERWISE PREVENTED, RETURN TO OREGON AFTER VICTORY OVER JAPAN HAS BEEN ATTAINED; AND

WHEREAS EXPERIENCE HAS PROVEN THAT THE JAPANESE PEOPLE DO NOT AND CAN NOT ASSIMILATE WITH CIVILIZED, WHITE, CHRISTIAN AMERICANS; AND

WHEREAS THE PRESENCE IN OUR MIDST OF THIS RAPIDLY PROPAGATING PEOPLE HAS PRESENTED AND ALWAYS WILL PRESENT AN ECONOMIC PROBLEM AS WELL AS A THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AS A NATION; AND

WHEREAS THERE HAS BEEN AND WILL BE NO METHOD OF DETERMINING WHICH AMERICAN-BORN JAPANESE ARE LOYAL TO THE LAND OF THEIR BIRTH AND WHICH ARE LOYAL TO THE PAGAN IDEOLOGY OF THEIR ANCESTORS; NOW, THEREFORE,

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF OREGON, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINTLY CONCURRING THEREIN:

THAT THE FORTY-SECOND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF OREGON RESPECTFULLY PETITIONS AND MEMORIALIZES THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO CAUSE THE DEPORTATION OF ALL JAPANESE ALIENS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENT WAR; AND FURTHER RESPECTFULLY PETITIONS AND MEMORIALIZES THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUBMIT TO THE SEVERAL STATES AN AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES THAT WILL EMPOWER AND AUTHORIZE THE CONGRESS AND THE PROPER AUTHORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES TO CANCEL THE CITIZENSHIP OF AMERICAN-BORN JAPANESE AND LIKEWISE CAUSE THEIR DEPORTATION.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF OREGON BE AND HE HEREBY IS INSTRUCTED TO TRANSMIT COPIES OF THIS MEMORIAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TO BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND TO EACH MEMBER OF THE OREGON DELEGATION IN CONGRESS,

Calif. State Leg. -
May 8, 1945

File

HOUSE RESOLUTION NO. 238

Whereas, The problems of this State arising out of the presence of great numbers of Japanese, native born and alien, will become even more acute upon the termination of the war than ever before; and

Whereas, The Japanese problem is one of great concern to the people of this State, but a matter of considerably less consequence to the people of the Nation as a whole; and

Whereas, Many of the problems have arisen out of treaties between the United States and Japan in the making of which the desires of the people of this State may not have been fully considered; and

Whereas, The existence of the present state of war and the suspension of treaty rights affords an opportunity to settle these problems in such manner as will prove both fair to the individuals affected and at the same time satisfactory to the people of this State; and

Whereas, The people of the State look to the Legislature for leadership in this matter and the Legislature requires information based upon an impartial study and investigation of all of the factors involved in order that it may proceed intelligently toward a solution of these problems; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That there is hereby created the Assembly Interim Committee on the Japanese Problem which shall investigate, ascertain and appraise all facts concerning the solution of the problem of the Japanese in California, including but limited to the constitutional and other legal factors involved, and the possibilities that treaty rights may again be acquired to an extent not desired by the people of this State;

C O P Y

H. R. 3012

78th Congress
1st Session

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 21, 1943

Mr. J. Leroy Johnson introduced the following bill; which was referred to
the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization

A B I L L

To create the Japanese Deportation Commission, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) there is hereby created a commission, to be known as the Japanese Deportation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"), which shall be composed of three members who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President shall designate one member to act as Chairman. Vacancies in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointments were made. Each member of the Commission shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year.

(b) A vacancy in the Commission shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all the powers of the Commission and two members of the Commission shall, at all times, constitute a quorum. The Commission shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.

SEC. 2. (a) The Commission shall, as soon as possible after its organization, prescribe rules and regulations for the conduct of its proceedings.

(b) For the purposes of this Act the Commission shall have the power to issue subpoenas for and to compel the attendance of witnesses, require the production of books, papers, and other documents, and to administer oaths and examine witnesses upon any matter within its jurisdiction. In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued by the Commission, the Commission may invoke the aid of any district court of the United States in requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence, and such court, within the jurisdiction where the inquiry is carried on or where the party subpoenaed resides or may be found, may issue an order requiring the person to whom the subpoena is directed to appear and testify before the Commission or give evidence touching on the matter in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. Any person so required to attend as

a witness shall be allowed and paid the same fees and mileage as are paid witnesses in the district courts of the United States.

(c) Whoever in any proceeding before the Commission, or in any document produced for the consideration of the Commission, knowingly makes a false statement under oath of a material fact shall be guilty of perjury and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(d) The Commission shall, without regard to the civil service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, appoint and fix the compensation of a secretary and general counsel, and shall, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, have the power to employ and fix the compensation of such other employees as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. The Commission may call upon any other department or independent agency of the Government for such expert assistance or for copies of such books, papers, or records in their possession as may be helpful to the Commission in the execution of its functions, and it shall be the duty of any such department or agency to comply with any such request for books, papers, or records.

(e) The Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice shall make such investigations with respect to persons of Japanese descent who are nationals of the United States as may be requested by the Commission, and shall report to the Commission the results of any such investigation.

(f) The principal office of the Commission shall be in the District of Columbia, but it may meet and exercise any or all of its powers at any other place.

(g) The Commission shall keep permanent records of the proceedings before it and orders issued by it, copies of which shall be made available upon request to the heads of the various departments and independent agencies of the Government.

(h) The Commission may make such expenditures (including expenditures for rent and personal services at the seat of government and elsewhere, for office supplies, periodicals, and books of reference, and for printing and binding) as may be necessary in the execution of the functions of the Commission. All expenditures of the Commission, including necessary traveling and subsistence expenses outside the District of Columbia incurred by the members or employees of the Commission, shall be allowed and paid upon the presentation of itemized vouchers therefor approved by the Commission or by any employee thereof designated by the Commission to perform such duty.

SEC. 3. (a) It shall be the duty of the Commission to determine whether persons of Japanese descent who are nationals of the United States and found within the United States or its Territories or possessions (1) have given aid or comfort to any enemy of the United States in the present war, (2) have been or are advocating or teaching the overthrow by force or

violence of the Government of the United States, or (3) have knowingly and intentionally expressed by deed, or by word, either orally or in writing, loyalty to a foreign state.

(b) Whenever any such person of Japanese descent is charged with giving aid or comfort to any enemy of the United States in the present war, advocating or teaching the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States, or knowingly and intentionally expressing by deed, or by word, either orally or in writing, loyalty to a foreign state, the Commission shall issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges and containing a notice of hearing before the Commission at a specified place and time. The person so complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and time specified in the notice of hearing. The testimony taken in any such proceeding shall be reduced to writing and placed in the files of the Commission. Thereafter, in its discretion, the Commission, upon giving of notice, may take further testimony or hear argument.

(c) If upon all the testimony taken the Commission shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complain has given aid or comfort to any enemy of the United States in the present war, has been or is engaged in advocating or teaching the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States, or has knowingly and intentionally expressed by deed, or by word, either orally or in writing, loyalty to a foreign state, then the Commission shall transmit its decision to the Attorney General who shall thereupon issue a warrant of deportation and take such person into custody for deportation to Japan or to such other place outside the Western Hemisphere as may be determined upon by the Attorney General

SEC. 4. (a) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Commission may obtain a review of such decision in the circuit court of appeals of the United States, within any circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court a written petition praying that the decision of the Commission be set aside and that the warrant of deportation be canceled. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon the Commission, and thereupon the Commission shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding, including the testimony and findings of the Commission. No objection to the decision of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission. The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree, affirming or setting aside any decision of the Commission, shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in sections 239 and 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U.S.C., 1940 edition, title 28, secs. 346 and 347).

(b) The commencement of proceedings under subsection (a) shall operate as a temporary stay of execution of the warrant of deportation. If the judgment of the court is adverse such person of Japanese descent shall forthwith be deported.

SEC. 5. Any person of Japanese descent deported under the provisions of the Act shall cease to be a national of the United States on the date of his deportation.

SEC. 6. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid shall not be affected thereby.

SEC. 7. This Act shall cease to be in effect five years after the date of the termination of the present war with Japan, as proclaimed by the President.

S. RES. 166

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 2 (legislative day, MAY 24), 1943

Mr. DOWNEY submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on Military Affairs

JULY 3 (legislative day, MAY 24), 1943

Reported by Mr. DOWNEY, without amendment

JULY 6 (legislative day, MAY 24), 1943

Considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

1 *Resolved*, That the President of the United States is
2 respectfully requested to issue an Executive order (1) di-
3 recting the War Relocation Authority to take such steps as
4 may be necessary for the purpose of segregating persons of
5 Japanese ancestry in relocation centers, whose loyalty to
6 the United States is questionable or who are known to be
7 disloyal, from those whose loyalty to the United States has
8 been established, and for the purpose of establishing addi-
9 tional safeguards against sabotage by such persons; and (2)
10 directing the appropriate agency of the Government to issue
11 a full and complete authoritative public statement concern-
12 ing conditions in relocation centers, and plans with respect
13 to future operation of centers and the movement of persons
14 of Japanese ancestry interned therein.

78TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 166

RESOLUTION

Relating to segregation of loyal and disloyal
Japanese in relocation centers and plans for
future operation of such centers.

By Mr. DOWNEY

JULY 2 (legislative day, MAY 24), 1943

Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs

JULY 3 (legislative day, MAY 24), 1943

Reported without amendment

JULY 6 (legislative day, MAY 24), 1943

Considered and agreed to

June 9, 1943

Representative Samuel Dickstein, Chairman
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Representative Dickstein:

Enclosed is a copy of the letter the Board of Directors of the Portland YWCA has just sent to Representative Lowell Stockman, from Oregon, of your committee.

In spite of the fever heat that seems to reflect the Pacific Coast temper just now, there are very many citizens in the Coast States who are gravely concerned that the United States shall express her own honest intent of good will toward the Orient in the manner most meaningful to the Chinese. We feel also that such taken now will be more powerful a weapon than any planes or tanks or ships, and that without this act of faith in China the machinery and men we send have only a partial value to her.

This is just to send you our expression of confidence and encouragement as you lead the fight to abrogate the Oriental Exclusion Act for the Chinese.

Very truly yours,

Enc.
MB:AR

Mrs. Fred Brundage
Corresponding Secretary
YWCA

June 9, 1943

Representative Lowell Stockman
Immigration and Naturalization Committee
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Representative Stockman:

The Board of Directors of the Portland YCCA heard this morning a discussion of the hearings on the Kennedy Bill held by the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. We understand you spoke clearly for it in Committee and we wish to register our appreciation and support of your position.

A press Association dispatch on Monday June 7 reports that the Committee came within one vote of repealing the bar against Chinese immigration, but that final action has not yet been taken."

Please know the Portland YCCA Board Members feel very strongly that to hesitate to repeal the Exclusion Act is to break faith with China as a great Ally. It furnishes Japan with another weapon to use against China and against us as penetrating as the scrap iron we have sent her.

Our best wishes to you in your work on the Immigration and Naturalization Committee. Will you please call on us for any special help we might furnish you.

Very sincerely yours,

Mrs. Fred Brundage
Corresponding Secretary

MB:AM

CHAPTER 89

HOUSE BILL NO. 187

AN ACT

RELATING TO DEALINGS WITH PERSONS WHOSE MOVEMENTS ARE RESTRICTED; PRESENT-
ING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH DEALINGS MAY BE HAD;
AND DECLARING ANY EMERGENCY.

Be it Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona:

Section 1. Notice of business relations with restricted person.

Any person who: 1. enters into any contract, agreement, or understanding, written or verbal, involving business relations; 2. purchases, sells, trades or exchanges any real or personal property, commodity or thing, except goods, wares and merchandise for personal consumption, from a person whose movements are restricted by operation of law or by any executive or other order authorized by law, or from a person who is not eligible to citizenship, shall give notice of the transaction or business relationship, by publication not less than three times in a newspaper of general circulation published in the county in which the principal place of business of such person is located. Upon the completion of notice and at least ten days prior to the consummation of the proposed transaction, he shall file in the office of the secretary of state a copy of the notice, accompanied by detailed information regarding the transaction, and a report thereon not later than the fifth day of each month. A separate notice and report shall be required for each separate transaction.

Sec. 2. Penalty. Failure to comply with any provision of this Act is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, imprisonment of not less than thirty

days nor more than six months, or both. The making of any false statement, in either the notice or the report prescribed by this Act is a felony, punishable by not less than one nor more than three years imprisonment.

Sec. 3. Exceptions. This Act shall not be construed to apply to any person: 1. acting on behalf of an agency of the United States; 2. dealing with or on behalf of Indian wards of the government, or, 3. dealing at wholesale or retail in wearing apparel, food supplies, medicines or spirituous liquors.

Sec. 4. Emergency. To preserve the public peace, health, and safety it is necessary that this Act become immediately operative. It is therefore declared to be an emergency measure, to take effect in the manner provided by law.

Approved by the Governor, March 23, 1943

Filed in the Office of the Secretary of State, March 24, 1943

Meeting of California State Board of Agriculture Jan. 17, 1944

WHEREAS this board believes that questions of policy such as expressed the resolution adopted at the previous meeting of this board relative to the return of Japanese evacuees not be passed upon by less than a majority of the whole board, and

WHEREAS, there is serious doubt that the said resolution would have been passed had a majority of the board been present to vote, and

WHEREAS, it is the sense of this meeting of the board that said previous resolution was untimely and susceptible of misinterpretation of the views of California Agriculture in relation to a problem that is both military and national in character:

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that said action is hereby rescinded.

A. J. MCFADDEN
PRESIDENT

California
State Board of Agriculture

SACRAMENTO

JAMES E. ARMSTRONG, LOS ANGELES
DONALD C. BULL, MARYSVILLE
MRS. GRACE McDONALD, SANTA CLARA
A. J. MCFADDEN, SANTA ANA
STEWART MEIGS, CARPINTERIA
W. B. PARKER, LODI
W. L. SMITH, BUTTONWILLOW
~~PAUL C. TAYLOR, BERKELEY~~
JOHN S. WATSON, PETALUMA

C.B. Hutchison,
Berkeley

MOTION RESCINDING RESOLUTION OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE ADOPTED DECEMBER 20, 1943, RELATIVE TO LAWFUL PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY IN THE AGRICULTURAL LIFE AND INDUSTRY OF CALIFORNIA.

It was regularly moved by W.L. Smith, seconded by D.C. Bull, that the resolution of the California State Board of Agriculture relative to "Lawful Participation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in the Agricultural Life and Industry of California", passed at the December 20, 1943, meeting of the California State Board of Agriculture be rescinded at this the regular meeting of said Board on January 17, 1944, and that vote by roll call be taken.
Carried.

Roll Call revealed the following members voting for rescission: James E. Armstrong, Donald C. Bull, A.J. McFadden, W.L. Smith, John S. Watson, and Mrs. Grace McDonald voting against rescission. Members C.B. Hutchison, Stewart Meigs, and W.B. Parker were absent.

The Chairman declared the resolution rescinded.

FOR VICTORY



POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT AS TO RESIDENT JAPANESE - RESOLUTION
ADOPTED BY THE CALIFORNIA DELEGATION, WASHINGTON, D. C., JUNE 14, 1943

WHEREAS, the California Delegation in the House of Representatives in January 1942 initiated its effort to secure the evacuation from critical areas of all enemy aliens and their families, whether or not aliens, the internment of such evacuated aliens; that no evacuated alien be permitted to return to critical areas without a special license; that such critical areas be enlarged to include the three Pacific Coast states and Alaska;

WHEREAS, General John L. DeWitt commanding the Western Defense of the Western Division subsequently put into effect a protective plan of evacuation and internment consistent with the plan urged by this Delegation;

WHEREAS, an effort is being made to remove and relax some of the provisions made under General DeWitt's administration for the protection of the public against subversive enemy efforts;

THEREFORE, the California Delegation in the House of Representatives recommend that in order to guarantee the security and continued safety of all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in the United States and protect against any sabotage, espionage or disruption of our efforts to destroy the war machine of the Government of Japan which so ruthlessly attacked the United States,

1. That should the War Department continue to recruit Japanese for military service:
 - a. That Japanese troops should not be utilized anywhere in the Pacific theatre.
 - b. That Japanese troops should not be admitted into any areas where the Government of Japan might attempt the landing of any saboteurs or invasion forces and
 - c. That no Japanese women should be recruited for use in any of the women's organizations attached to or part of the armed forces or services.
2. That all known subversive Japanese be immediately segregated or removed to such relocation camps to be confined in special detention camps for the duration of the war with Japan.
3. That such Japanese as can be utilized be employed in agriculture and industry in areas outside the defined restrictive zones; that only such Japanese shall be so employed who are reasonably believed to be loyal to the United States after having been investigated and so certified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; that all Japanese so employed shall be subject to the direct supervision and such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

4. That all remaining Japanese who are loyal to the United States that cannot be definitely certified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be retained in war relocation camps for the duration of the war with Japan.

X
5. That no person of Japanese ancestry, whether in the military service, related to persons of the military service, or formerly resident within the existent restricted areas of the Pacific Coast shall be permitted to enter any such designated restricted areas without the direct, individual authorization in writing of the commanding officer of such area.

6. That every effort be made with the Government of Japan to exchange all interned Japanese, subversive and disloyal Japanese, and such other Japanese desiring such exchange for American citizens now interned or held as prisoners of war by the Government of Japan.

(Not printed at Government expense)



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 77th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

The Japanese Question

SPEECH

OF

HON. HOMER T. BONE

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

September 10, 1942

Mr. President, there is one other matter to which I should like to refer, which may be a matter of more immediate concern to the people of the Pacific coast than to people of the east coast. It has to do with the viewpoint of a well-known citizen of my State and of the Pacific coast. His name is Miller Freeman. At one time Mr. Freeman was the Republican national committeeman from my State. He publishes seven journals devoted to business life on the coast. The Miller Freeman publications are as follows:

Pacific Fisherman, founded 1903: Devoted to the commercial fisheries of the Pacific. Leading fisheries journal of the world, and a recognized authority.

Pacific Motor Boat, founded 1908: Devoted to motor boat activities of the Pacific coast.

West Coast Lumberman, founded 1900: Devoted to the timber industries of the West. Largest and most successful journal of its kind in the world.

Pacific Pulp and Paper Industry: Devoted to the important pulp and paper activities of the Pacific slope, including Western Canada.

The Log: Devoted to the maritime interests of the Pacific. Founded 1920, catering particularly to the personnel, including masters, mates, pilots, and engineers. Largest circulation of any marine journal published in the Pacific area, with world-wide distribution.

Mining World: Champion of the mining and metallurgical industries of the West.

Western Canner and Packer, founded 1908: Devoted to the food processing and packing industries of the West.

Mr. President, this will give some idea of Mr. Freeman's interest, which is purely at present, and has been for many years past, in the business world. Mr. Freeman has for many years interested himself in the Japanese question. As far back as 34 years ago he was publicizing the Japanese question and writing editorials on the subject, and I should like to quote two or three paragraphs from an editorial he wrote back in 1908:

It is high time that the people of the Pacific coast cease their futile pursuit of that will-o'-the-wisp, the Japanese trade, which selfish interests have held dangling before their eyes, and realize to what goal this blind com-

mercialism is leading them. It is time they began to appreciate that, even were the dream of a big Japanese commerce to come true, some other things are just as much worth while.

It would be a low order of patriotism indeed that seeks for a hollow trade supremacy at the cost of social welfare, perhaps at the cost of ultimate strife, and of all the basic principles which are the foundation of American home supremacy, of domestic integrity, and of national pride. And it is an even lower order of patriotism that will inflict these dangers and this deception upon an altogether too unconscious people, merely for the gratification of personal and corporate ambitions.

He winds up the editorial with this paragraph:

If we follow the false doctrines preached by pro-Japanese press, we will soon be making Japan a present of the Pacific coast in order to preserve our friendly relations and build up a large American-Japanese commerce for Nippon steamships to handle.

That expression of 34 years ago is typical of the viewpoint of Miller Freeman. Whether one agree with his economic or political views, or any other views he may cherish, one can only be constrained to regard him a prophet. He was pointing out those many years ago that we might pay a tragic price for our commercial relations with Japan.

Mr. President, those of us who have lived among the Japanese know that they are a very cold and hard and purposeful people. They do not deceive anyone who is realistic in his contemplation of the problem presented by this whole business of Japanese trade.

We know now to our sorrow what it meant to arm Japan by sending to her millions of tons of scrap iron and munitions of war at a time when we were professing friendship for poor China.

We are also learning, Mr. President, I may say parenthetically, that our altogether pleasant pre-war relations with Germany, represented by recently uncovered connections of big American business organizations, have come back to us, and will come back to us, in the form of blood and tears and ashes in our mouths, although some publications in this country are stoutly defending these business relations with the Hitler machine and the cartel crowd as though they were utterly sacrosanct. They say, on the one hand, that we cannot do business with Hitler, and in the next breath decry the fact that some of us are trying to show up these business relations which have been carried on, relations which, as I view them, have been

distinctly to our national disadvantage, since they meant a close relationship that vitally affected our military preparations.

Without attempting to evaluate Mr. Freeman's views, because they speak for themselves, it may be said, whether one agrees with his party philosophy or not, that he is a very able and patriotic man. He has written an editorial which will appear or already has appeared in his Pacific coast publications. It deals with the Japanese question. Because it is an interesting and forceful editorial, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks. I am sure that all those who are vitally interested in the Japanese question will find it to their advantage to read it.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The problem arising from the presence in the Western United States of some 300,000 persons of Japanese ancestry has been temporarily controlled, but it has not been solved.

This population is, and will continue to be, a growing, threatening, incubus upon the United States—unless the riddle which arises from it is accorded energetic and courageous attention.

The writer for many years challenged Japanese immigration and infiltration into the United States as jeopardizing the safety of this country. For this he has been pilloried by some, scoffed at by others—until Pearl Harbor silenced such critics in shame.

Before the Tolson Congressional Committee Investigating National Defense Migration the writer on March 2, 1942, uttered a statement which sought to enunciate certain considered principles touching the Japanese population, its position in this country, and America's attitude toward its people of Japanese ancestry.

The Tolson committee statement has been accorded no small measure of attention. Perhaps significantly, its opening sentence squares precisely with the control currently being exercised over Japanese in Pacific coastal areas. The sentence was: "It is my recommendation that all Japanese, both alien and American-born, be evacuated from the Pacific Coast States, and other defense areas, and kept in the interior under strict control for the duration of the war."

This present writing seeks to extend the statement made before the Tolson committee.

It enunciates a doctrine which the Miller Freeman Publications will espouse and support. It raises a standard to which we invite adherence in patriotism and tolerance.

By our blindness in the past we have brought upon ourselves and future generations the problem of the presence in this country of a prolific, insoluble Oriental race, already numbering some 300,000 persons.

For the safety of these people, and ourselves as well, we must recognize this problem, and seek its solution. We have currently controlled it; but the future will bring it back again, intensified by the bitter memories of war and perfidy.

Let no one cry "persecution." There is no taint of persecution in our doctrine. Rather it is conceived in tolerance, but in realistic recognition of the dangers and brutality of racial hatreds, and of the perils inherent in a national ambition which litters its history with the tattered shreds of its honor and its most solemn obligations.

We are not here considering our future relations with Japan and its people. Japan has taken the sword, and Japan must perish by the sword. To that end America fights in unity and with inflexible purpose.

We are concerned here with America's problem of the Japanese within her gates—most of them, by our own will, American citizens.

As a result of the strange vagaries of American law, the Japanese who are American citizens enjoy that status merely by the accident of birth.

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They were born American citizens because they were born here. We have given them full rights with any American, and have exacted no obligation of them.

They did not ask to be Americans. They took no obligation to be Americans. They have not even foresworn the dual citizenship which Japan maintains for them.

Some American-born Japanese are loyal to America, but among their ranks are many who are not. Unfortunately, the loyal share the onus which treason and espionage and treachery have brought to all of them.

When the war is won, must the Japanese come back from the inland areas to bitterness, suspicion, and hatred won for them by traitorous elements among them and the failure of the loyal to prove their loyalty?

Solution must be found for this problem—and it should be sought most assiduously by those Japanese who are loyal Americans, aided by all who tolerantly and intelligently seek the welfare of the United States and future peace on and along the Pacific.

It is not enough for Japanese-Americans to buy bonds and prate of loyalty. Words spoken and oaths sworn by Japanese tongues

will bear little weight with the American people so long as Pearl Harbor reverberates in American memories.

The stain must be wiped out by actions.

Let Japanese who would enjoy American citizenship denounce the Japanese program for the enslavement of east Asia.

Let there be an end to Japanese-language schools dedicated to the training of American citizens in allegiance to Japan.

Let the loyal drive out those who bring shame upon them by traitorous activities.

Let every Japanese repudiate the doctrine of the divinity of the Emperor of Japan and denounce him as the dishonored foe of civilized mankind.

Let us on our part seek the means by which to prevent persons of alien heart from winning American citizenship based on birth alone and without assumption of those duties and obligations which that citizenship imposes.

This is not persecution—for persecution offers no solution to the problem.

Neither is the cry "persecution" an answer to the call to thoughtful, tolerant recognition and consideration of the problem.

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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 78th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Investigation of the Japanese in America

SPEECH
OF

HON. HENRY M. JACKSON

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 23, 1943

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] is recognized for 15 minutes.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. JACKSON was granted permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a resolution, asking that a special committee of the House be set up to investigate Japanese activities in the United States and its possessions. I have requested that this committee direct an investigation into any and all activities of the Japanese in the United States; its Territories, and possessions, including their infiltration into American economic, political, and social life, with the end of preserving the security of the United States during the war and looking toward the establishment of a proper policy toward the Japanese residents of the United States, its Territories and possessions after the war.

We first heard much of Japanese infiltration tactics on Bataan and in the Philippines, but the Japanese had for many years practiced a different type of infiltration—infiltration into the vitals of our economic, political, and domestic structure. The disciples of Bushido, by insidious and indirect means, inserted themselves in a great many organizations in much the same fashion as the Nazis have utilized their front organizations. In our great Pacific coast cities they controlled much of the hotel and restaurant business although always there was a white manager who would front for them with the general public. They lowered prices to their own countrymen in the fresh produce and vegetable field, forcing out their white competition, only to raise prices as soon as they had monopolized this sphere of business. Always they had prominent civic leaders as their attorneys, paying them on a retainer basis. Whenever a situation came up in which they were interested, they had only to contact these individuals with their specious reasons to have them immediately come forward in their interest. Investiga-

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tion will show that Japanese consuls in our large cities lavished expensive and sumptuous gifts on a great number of prominent citizens at Christmas and other appropriate occasions.

I wish to make it clear here that I do not intend to indict the great majority of these individuals because I am positive there was no disloyalty to their country in their minds. However, because their actions were unintentional, does not alter the fact that they were of great importance and value in the subtle propagandizing efforts of the Japanese nation and enabled them to exert an unbelievable amount of influence on the economic, political, and social life of the Pacific coast region.

After my study of this question, I wish to assure the Members of this House that there is not the slightest doubt in my mind but that the Japanese consul, taking his orders directly from Tokyo, ruled the Japanese colonies in our country with an iron and dictatorial hand; thus there was a society within a society and a race within a race. Every 2 years the Japanese consul in the large Pacific coast cities was changed and a new consul came in, bearing direct orders from the "Son of Heaven" in Tokyo. He directed the establishment of Japanese language schools; he managed the complicated Japanese financial system through the Japanese banks, owned and controlled in the land of the Samurai. The consulate office was the fountainhead from which flowed all directives to Japanese residents, both alien and native to this country, and was also the center of espionage and propaganda activity to which came all the data which the Japanese were able to gather regarding our Pacific coast line and the isles and inlets of the Alaskan Peninsula.

Let me outline briefly to you a few of the examples of Japanese infiltration tactics which have recently come to light. The most striking example, in my opinion, is a fact recently brought out by Mr. Miller Freeman, of Seattle, Wash., publisher of eight trade journals and who is undoubtedly one of the greatest experts on the Japanese problem in our country. He points out that in the China Club of Seattle, Wash., which has an executive board composed of 29 members, 11 members are listed in the 1942 roster of officers and members of the Japan Society of Seattle. How ironic it is that with China and Japan having been at war for over 5 years, such a large majority of the directors of the China Club and the

Japan Club should belong to both organizations.

I wonder also if you gentlemen know that immediately after Pearl Harbor, several Japanese organizations turned over to the American Red Cross a number of bandages, medical supplies, and other material fashioned by Japanese societies. They attempted to obtain wide publicity and made great fanfare about their patriotism at that time, neglecting, however, to mention that all their supplies up to that date had been forwarded to the Japanese military machine. They neglected, also, to mention that it was necessary for them to remove the bills of lading from the material which they donated to our Government because it had been addressed previously to Tokyo.

The War Relocation Authority and the Federal Reserve Bank Board now have all the information regarding the financial assets and economic enterprises of the Japanese in this country. Now that we are at war with Japan, we need not be concerned with diplomatic niceties. Is there any reason why this information should not be made available to the American people? Do not the American people, and particularly the residents of the Pacific coast, have the right to know the extent of the economic stranglehold possessed by Japanese residents on the domestic economy of our country? I for one must insist that the American people have a right to be fully informed on this subject.

Let me point out also here that these are not recent developments in Japanese strategy. The Japanese have used these tactics for many years. Over 20 years ago, our able colleague [Mr. WOODRUFF] called to the attention of CONGRESS some information which he has recently again brought to light before this Seventy-eighth Congress. During World War No. 1, our so-called ally, Japan, owned two airplane plants in the State of New Jersey which were employed on Government contracts. These two plants were the Standard Aircraft Corporation and the Standard Aero Co., which were in the control of Mitsui & Co., the fiscal agents of the Japanese Government at that time. Japan, therefore, had access to our most advanced secret military information regarding that vital military weapon, the airplane. Under orders from Tokyo, this company actually shipped a number of complete airplane engines to Japan for study and imitation at the height of this war. It has even been reliably reported that Japanese emissaries applied at that time to

Thomas Edison, head of the United States War Invention Board, to share in all the technical military information available to this country.

Despite the enlightening exposé made by the gentleman from Michigan, Congressman WOODRUFF, and despite the fact further investigation showed the Japanese had not only stolen our military secrets but while so doing had milked the United States Treasury of over \$16,000,000, I can find no evidence to demonstrate that any successful effort was ever made to follow up these events and to receive an accounting from the Japanese nation.

Those who have read the White Paper of the State Department, outlining our Nation's course of diplomacy with Japan prior to Pearl Harbor, find it difficult to understand why the American people were left so much in the dark as to the actual trend of diplomatic events in that area. I venture to say that if the true facts are brought out regarding the inadequacy of our naval intelligence in the Pacific area the American public will find such a revelation even more astounding. I know conclusively that the facts regarding Japanese military preparations, the Japanese war psychosis, and Japanese plans for conquest were brought forcefully to the attention of our Naval Intelligence not once but many times in the years preceding Pearl Harbor.

Even the schoolboys in coastal cities on the Pacific coast who had observed Japanese merchant marine sailors, cameras slung over their backs, on their Sunday afternoon stroll over the waterfronts of our large cities were more aware of the crisis which might become imminent at any moment.

Certainly, the fishermen in the great Alaskan salmon industry, who had fought to expel Japanese floating canneries from our Alaskan waters, were well aware of the true facts. Certainly, too, it is no wonder that these same fishermen expressed their wonder in times past that not only did the State Department exert its influence against their efforts to expell the Japs from these regions, but even urged that their technical and student missions receive special courtesies in viewing this area. If anyone doubts the accuracy of the information which the Japanese have regarding the shores and inlets of the Alaskan Peninsula, I urge him to ask any experienced fishing skipper in those waters if he would not prefer to have the Japanese maps and sounding charts in preference to those obtained by the belated efforts of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey.

In my mind there is no question but that the same pro-Japanese influences which existed in this country prior to Pearl Harbor still exist, although they have temporarily gone underground. I believe the investigation of Japanese activity during these many years in our

country will bring out a number of startling revelations which will materially assist us in the prosecution of the present war. Mme. Chiang Kai-shek quoted a Chinese proverb in her recent address to this House: "Know thyself; know thy enemy." I do not believe that either the American people, the Members of Congress, or even the military authorities can fully understand the Japanese conflict in all its aspects without knowing more fully what has been the history of pre-war infiltration and propagandizing in this country. If we fully study and analyze their mode of second-front activity in this country, we will better be able to conduct the present war to a successful and speedy conclusion. Armed with this information, we will realize the necessity for diverting a greater portion of our military might to the war in the Pacific before they have been able to consolidate the vast industrial and economic empire they have recently taken over.

Even a dilettante student of history knows Japan, although nominally one of our allies in World War No. 1, did practically nothing for the common cause in that conflict. They did manage, however, to take Tsingtao from the Germans, which they afterward retained along with the mandated isles, which they fortified strongly in abrogation of their solemn trust and which we must now reckon with in the war of the Pacific. By building up previous to the First World War a great stock pile of materials which they lacked, they also managed to grab a great part of world trade. In truth, the greatest factor in the modern economic development of Japan was the First World War. Japan felt no obligation to her allies in that war any more than she has given us any reason in World War No. 2 to believe she will assist Germany unless such help coincide with her own nefarious purposes. However, in the event Germany seems about to succumb to weight of combined Allied military might, may we not expect that she will attempt a diversion to save her own skin?

I submit, gentleman, in view of what has already transpired in the past and future eventualities we may anticipate, this investigation is an urgent and immediate necessity.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I compliment the gentleman for bringing this subject to the attention of the House at this time. I think it is high time that we look into the status of the Japanese in this country not only during the war but after the war. Will the gentleman give the House his attitude on the present War Department project of developing a Japanese unit within our own armed services?

Mr. JACKSON. I might say to the gentleman that I have not gone into that matter in any great detail. We all know, however, that it is one which requires the greatest precaution. From what we have been able to gather up to date I think it is pretty clear that the Japanese we trusted most are those who often proved to be the most treacherous.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Does not the gentleman believe that the utmost care must be taken in separating the wheat from the chaff, so to speak, before any Japanese in this country are permitted to join our armed forces?

Mr. JACKSON. That is right. I do not see how it is possible for the War Relocation Authority or any other branch of the Government to determine the loyalty of the individual Japanese on the basis of the information we now have on hand.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. The gentleman comes from the Pacific coast and knows the reaction of the people out there just as I do.

Mr. JACKSON. That is right.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. HINSHAW. The gentleman knows that there are already a number of Japanese in the Army—several thousand who are there under operation of the Selective Service Act prior to our going into war with Japan.

Mr. JACKSON. That is right.

Mr. HINSHAW. They are now in the service.

Mr. JACKSON. That is right.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. KEFAUVER. The gentleman, I understand, is proposing a committee to make this investigation; is that correct?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, I may say that it is for a study of the Japanese problem in all its aspects.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I believe the gentleman is proposing a very good line of inquiry, but I see the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DIES] present, and I wonder if this does not come within the purview of the work of the Dies committee.

Mr. JACKSON. I may say to the gentleman from Tennessee in that connection that what I propose is a study of the whole Japanese question, not just the matter of the subversive side of it with which the gentleman from Texas is interested. The committee that I propose is of much broader scope than that of the Dies committee.

POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT AS TO RESIDENT JAPANESE - RESOLUTION
ADOPTED BY THE CALIFORNIA DELEGATION WASHINGTON, D. C. June 14, 1943

WHEREAS, the California Delegation in the House of Representatives in January, 1942 initiated its effort to secure the evacuation from critical areas of all enemy aliens and their families, whether or not aliens, the internment of such evacuated aliens; that no evacuated alien be permitted to return to critical areas without a special license; that such critical areas be enlarged to include the three Pacific Coast states and Alaska;

WHEREAS, General John L. DeWitt commanding the western defense of the Western Division subsequently put into effect a protective plan of evacuation and internment consistent with the plan urged by this Delegation;

WHEREAS, an effort is being made to remove and relax some of the provisions made under General DeWitt's administration for the protection of the public against subversive enemy efforts;

THEREFORE, the California Delegation in the House of Representatives recommend that in order to guarantee the security and continued safety of all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in the United States and protect against any sabotage, espionage or disruption of our efforts to destroy the war machine of the Government of Japan which so ruthlessly attacked the United States,

1. That should the War Department continue to recruit Japanese for military service:

a. That Japanese troops should not be utilized anywhere in the Pacific theatre.

b. That Japanese troops should not be admitted into any areas where the Government of Japan might attempt the landing of any saboteurs or invasion forces and

c. That no Japanese women should be recruited for use in any of the women's organizations attached to or part of the armed forces or services.

2. That all known subversive Japanese be immediately segregated or removed to such relocation camps to be confined in special detention camps for the duration of the war with Japan.

3. That such Japanese as can be utilized be employed in agriculture and industry in areas outside the defined restrictive zones; that only such Japanese shall be so employed who are reasonably believed to be loyal to the United States

after having been investigated and so certified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; that all Japanese so employed shall be subject to the direct supervision and such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

4. That all remaining Japanese who are loyal to the United States that cannot be definitely certified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be retained in war relocation camps for the duration of the war with Japan.

5. That no person of Japanese ancestry, whether in the military service, related to persons of the military service, or formerly resident within the existent restricted areas of the Pacific Coast shall be permitted to enter any such designated restricted areas without the direct, individual authorization in writing of the commanding officer of such area.

6. That every effort be made with the Government of Japan to exchange all interned Japanese, subversive and disloyal Japanese, and such other Japanese desiring such exchange for American citizens now interned or held as prisoners of war by the Government of Japan.