

THE SEGREGATION PROGRAM

IN TULE LAKE

The following is the first draft of a report of the segregation program at Tule Lake in the summer of 1943 and is in no way a finished product. It was begun on October 20, 1943 in Hunt immediately after the segregation program, but was discontinued soon after following the completion of the present first four sections. The completion of the factual account was undertaken under press for time to organize material on the segregation program for the first volume of the Study. No attempt was made to revise the first four sections which were already written and the disjointed account of the administrative aspect of the program, which was also written in Hunt. It was also found necessary to restrict the material relevant to post-segregation Tule Lake. On the other hand, it was desirous to include available case history material. The result is a highly disjointed account.

Section V. on Resettlement was written to provide necessary background material, and should be read with the introduction. This is also true of the introductory section on Politics (IX).

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December 1, 1945

Berkeley, California

Segregation Report

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THE SEGREGATION PROGRAM IN TULE LAKE

Hunt, Idaho
Report Begun Oct. 20, 1943

Section I Introduction

I. Prologue

Significance of the Segregation Program If the evacuation of 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast, their concentration in assembly and relocation centers, and the attempt to resettle them in more normal communities throughout the nation can be conceived of as a huge experiment, then the segregation program can be considered one of the more important experimental changes that has been introduced into the lives of these evacuees. Within the relocation center, evacuee residents have been exposed uniformly to three major programs instituted by the WRA administration. The first was the registration program, the second the segregation program, and the third the resettlement program, which is still in progress. Each of these programs has met with definite and, in some cases, violent reactions on the part of the evacuees. In the process of separating the so-called "loyal" from the "disloyal", the evacuees were required to make important decisions and commit themselves in writing--decisions which in many cases would have far reaching effects on their future welfare. The registration and segregation programs were the type of

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I. Introduction

experiments that an eccentric scientist would have liked to undertake just to observe how the people would react. The results have been excruciatingly painful for a large number of evacuees--friendships broken up, families irreconcilably split, fears aroused, a few persons beaten up, many wrongly branded as "disloyal". While in many ways, these programs were unfortunate for the evacuees, just as the fact of their original evacuation was unfortunate, they offer a wealth of material with which to gain insight into their psychological and sociological make-up. It is the task of a participant observer in the field, not only to experience along with the rest of his people their joys and sorrows, hopes and fears, but to detach himself sufficiently from them to analyze their reactions--and his own--with objectivity. It is with the realization that the segregation program constitutes an important chapter of the Study that this report is being undertaken.

IntroductionSignificance of the Segregation Program

The segregation program is significant to the Study from several different angles. From the political standpoint, it has served as a shock to force Japanese who were withholding their decision about their loyalty to Japan or to America to make up their minds and "get off the fence". [For the Niseis the same purpose was served by the registration program.] This time, however, the program affected the Isseis, too, and had far more telling consequences because it involved the separation, not only into different categories of "loyal" and "disloyal", but also into different centers. Although the purpose of the program was to separate the loyal from the disloyal, this has been accomplished only grossly because of innumerable complicating factors.

Incorrect JS

Still from a political angle, the program has been a move to return political power within most of the centers to those who are ^{so-called} "loyal" to the United States. In the assembly centers, Niseis and pro-American groups were, by and large, in power. In the relocation centers, however, Isseis gained control over Niseis.¹ Protests against the administration, resistance to volunteering, and resettlement, the beating up of JACL leaders, the flare-up of major incidents, notably in Poston and Manzanar, all pointed to the dominance of ^{what was thought to be} the pro-Japan element within the center. The segregation program was an attempt to remove these latter from all centers except one, leaving most of the camps free of politically undesirable elements. Again, because of complicating

1. See "Political Organization in Tule Lake" by F. M. in Structural Report.

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factors, this aim has been only partially achieved.

The third political significance of the segregation program is that it represents a concession by the WRA to reactionary elements within the American public. While the basic problem of weeding the loyal from the disloyal existed from the outset of the evacuation program, the actual segregation of the latter probably would not have taken place when it did if it had not been for political pressure from the outside. While it is true that many of the incidents within the centers were caused ^{ostensibly} by pro-Japan groups, many of them would not have occurred if they had been skillfully handled by the administration. But the tendency of the administration has been to explain all incidents in terms of "pro-Axis sympathizers" and "agitators", laying the major blame, not on mishandling on the part of the administration, but on disturbances by ^{supposedly} the disloyal elements. The segregation program, in a way, has been the answer of the WRA to charges that it was incapable of administering the centers and that evacuees should not be allowed to leave the centers to work. In the words of a sociologist, it was "second-best" step of giving up a little, in order not to lose everything.¹ This charge is backed up by the fact that Myer¹ was against "negative segregation"--the segregation of the "disloyal"--even after the registration program, and many WRA administrators doubted that an adequate separation of the "loyal" from the "disloyal" could be made.

From the study of the family the segregation program was a

1. JS Journal, 8-7-43, #1

disorganizing influence of major proportion. Since politically ^{on the whole} Isseis were already committed to Japan through their citizenship and Nisei for the same reason was committed to America, the segregation program, if thoroughly carried out, meant a split within the majority of the families. However, the desire of the WRA and most of the evacuees was to keep family units together, rather than carry out the segregation program too rigidly. Consequently, the result was ^{often} a tustle within the family between those who wanted to be considered "loyal" and those who preferred to be stamped as "disloyal". This struggle, however, was not based merely on consideration of loyalty for one country or the other, but was complicated by fear of being drafted, fear of being thrown out of centers, fear of being unable to return to Japan, fantastic belief about rewards from Japan for suffering incurred through evacuation, etc. In spite of the solidarity of the Japanese family, many families were nonetheless irreconcilably split ^{in some cases} and younger and older generations forced to go their separate ways. In other words, the segregation program served to disorganize many families, and the family solidarity in turn made the segregation of the "loyal" from the "disloyal" only partially possible.

From the standpoint of community organization, the segregation program was at first a disorganizing influence, but one which promised a more stable organization in the future. In most of the centers the replacement of a small part of the population of segregees with others from Tule Lake caused initial

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friction between incoming Tuleans and old-timers. All indications were that the integration of the Tuleans into the old population would be speedy. [On the other hand, the removal from the center of the majority of the most "pro-Japan" and "trouble-making" elements offered a more sound bases for community organization.] In Tule Lake, disorganizing influences dominated over organizing influences, since one-half of the old Tule Lake population was scattered to five different centers, and the majority of the new population came from nine different centers.

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from statistics

From the standpoint of the study of motivation, the segregation program has offered a wealth of material. While the decision to remain in Tule Lake or leave for another center has been complicated by numberless fears and fantasies, especially on the part of the Issei population, it has been possible to indicate the important factors which have affected the decisions of a majority of the people. The comparison of those leaving and those segregated, the comparison of Isseis and Niseis, the analysis of rumors and those resisting the segregation program all give important basis for studying the attitude, beliefs, and motives of the evacuees.

Thus far the study of personality has been largely a matter of studying individual personalities. Various incidents within the center, however, have served as a background stage for one type of personality--the troublemaker. In the segregation program, this type of personality again makes itself evident, and a

get a better word.

deeper insight into his nature made possible.

While this report is devoted mainly to the study of evacuee reaction, the attitude of the administration is brought out wherever possible. The segregation program was enlightening in bringing out the attitudes and beliefs of the liberal elements of the administration which handled the segregation program, in contrast to the reactionary elements which was largely responsible for the failure of the registration program in Tule Lake. The method in which the resistance to the segregation program was handled is of interest. Also a sketch of the struggle within the administration between different factions, during which the liberal elements rise and fall in power, gives some insight into the attitudes and beliefs which determines the policy and attitude toward evacuees and their problems.

The segregation program as it took place in Tule Lake offered some distinct advantages to a worker in the field. In the first place, practically every resident on the project was affected deeply--the "loyal" ones because they had to move in order to make room for the "disloyal" ones coming from other centers, and the "disloyal" ones because they had to stay. Also, the number involved was about equal in both groups. In other centers the problem generally affected only a small percentage which had to be designated as disloyal and moved to Tule Lake. The fact that an inu situation, which played an important part in the registration program, in Tule Lake, did not arise during the segregation program, made it ^{easier} ~~easy~~ to get firsthand reactions from the people. Also, the collaboration of evacuee leaders with the liberal

elements in the administrative personnel which directed the segregation program made it easier to see the administrative side of the picture. Records of the segregation hearings and the social welfare interviews, though largely untapped as yet, ~~were~~ ^{were} made available to a limited extent. Discussions with the Community Analyst also contributed toward making the report complete. These factors have combined to make the segregation program in Tule Lake more meaningful to the Study.

Method of Writing What is desirable in a report of this sort is first a description of the event as it took place, without adding the biases of the writer. This then can serve as the basis for interpretation and analysis by other workers desiring to use the material for their own purpose. [However, if the account is not to be purely journalistic, then interpretations and analyses by the writer are also desirable. ' However, since data must be selected in order to write the report, the tendency of the viewpoint of the writer to order the data of a supposedly objective account can probably never be eliminated. Since the basic material for this report is available in the form of a daily journal, this report will embody interpretations and analyses by the writer. A conscious effort will be made, however, to make these analyses in separate sections, preferably at the beginning and end of the descriptive account. Also, the report will be written up in three different sections. In the first, the events leading up to the segregation program will be reviewed. In the second, a descriptive account of the various

This original plan was discarded. The whole report is a chronological account, with special given to the attitudes of the residents.

phases of the segregation program will be written. These two sections will be written up largely in chronological order, with the emphasis on a descriptive, rather than an analytical, account. Finally, an analytical section will be devoted to analyses of the reaction of various people--evacuee and Caucasian--and the motives for their behavior.]

II. History of the Segregation Movement

The problem of segregating the loyal from the disloyal Japanese had its beginning in pre-evacuation days, when even then a certain portion of the Japanese population was suspected of being unassimilable, anti-American, and disloyal. With the outbreak of the war, however, this suspicion and fear became a real one. The basic problem was to find means whereby these Japanese in America suspected and feared could adjust themselves within the United States for the duration and after. During the clamor to remove all of the Japanese from the Pacific Coast, the possibility of evacuating only the potentially dangerous from the Coast was suggested. In this process of separating the loyal from the disloyal, we find the basis for the idea of segregation. However, the Army decided to evacuate all Japanese from the Coast because of "military necessity", and evacuees were concentrated in assembly and relocation centers. When it was decided that an attempt would be made to return them to more normal communities, care was taken that none who might commit a disloyal act would be allowed to leave the centers. This was the program of "positive segregation" which was advocated by the WRA. Several factors, however, contributed to hinder the progress of this program and the very existence of the WRA. The WRA was accused of coddling the Japanese, of not being able to keep order within the centers, and of allowing disloyal evacuees to leave the centers. The WRA denied that it was coddling the

Japanese and refused to stop relocating evacuees whom they considered to be loyal. But incidents had occurred in most centers which were attributed to the presence of "pro-Axis" elements", and with the help of pressure from the critical public, the WRA decided to carry out a program of segregating the disloyal.

Pre-Evacuation Situation Even prior to the outbreak of the war between Japan and America, a deep-seated prejudice existed in the United States against the Japanese. The belief among the American public that a Japanese could hardly be expected to become ~~an~~ American, and, therefore, were unassimilable and undesirable was common. There was a fear on the part of a few that Japanese were potentially dangerous to the country. Japanese fishermen on the Coast, for instance, were accused time and again of spying on naval establishments. Niseis with dual citizenships were accused of not being pro-American. Japanese language schools were attacked for teaching loyalty to the Emperor. Adjustment to this situation was made by Japanese on the Coast by only partially being assimilated into the normal American socio-economic system. The alien Japanese generally clustered together in certain sections of a town or country-side and organized their own community life. Wherever there were enough Japanese within the radius of several miles, they maintained their own Japanese Association, Kenjinkai, churches, language school, and had recreation of their own. In some cases, they were allowed to live only in certain section of a city and in a few communities to attend

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schools apart from Caucasians. Because of discrimination in securing jobs, Japanese tended to specialize in certain occupations such as farming, domestic work, vegetable markets, and in occupations catering to the Japanese. This concentration of Japanese in certain areas and their dependence on each other for economic and social security tended to perpetuate Japanese culture and reliance upon Japan for moral support. Niseis, who were growing up greatly Americanized, were beginning to become more assimilated into the American society proper, but only slowly and in some cases painfully. They often met the same sort of discrimination that confronted the Isseis, and could not immediately leave in large numbers the security, both social and economic, offered by the Japanese community.

While a working sort of adjustment had been achieved in this manner by the Japanese on the Coast, it did not remove the prejudice and suspicion that necessitated such an adjustment. In fact, because they concentrated and maintained their own culture, they were more likely to be looked upon with suspicion. Reactionary individuals and groups still clamored for the restriction of the rights of the Japanese. It was the existence of this basic prejudice against the Japanese and also of individuals and groups who believed in restricted rights for them in this country that complicated the adjustment of the Japanese in normal communities after evacuation.

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The war broke between Japan and America the equilibrium that had been achieved between the majority Caucasian population and the minority Japanese group. Public sentiment against the Japanese was whipped up to a point where every Japanese was considered a possible saboteur. This was aided by the losses incurred at Pearl Harbor and subsequent set-backs in the Pacific theater of war. The evacuation of all Japanese from the Coast was finally ordered by the Army because of "military necessity", but it was unlikely that this would have been possible if fear of disloyal acts by Japanese was not greatly overworked by distorted newspaper and radio accounts. The action of the FBI, which rounded up hundreds of Japanese who were suspected of being dangerous, and the clearing of certain strategic areas of aliens, which was ordered, would have been sufficient to guard against wholesale sabotage.

The argument of those demanding the evacuation of all Japanese was that this was necessary because there was no way of telling which Japanese was loyal and which was disloyal. Some extremists argued that all Japanese were disloyal--"Once a Jap, always a Jap". A less powerful group of people, sympathetic to the Japanese, opposed the deprivation of privileges on a racial basis. They tried to point out that most of the Japanese were loyal, and that it was unAmerican to treat Japanese any different from Germans or Italians. In answer to the declaration that

there was no way of establishing the loyalty of a Japanese, they suggested that courts be set up to determine the loyalty or disloyalty of an individual. They maintained that it was not fair that the loyal should suffer along with the disloyal, and that the disloyal only should be evacuated from the Coast. The idea of separating the loyal from the disloyal was presented at this time by those sympathetic to the Japanese.

At this time practically all of the Japanese were afraid of being suspected of being dangerous and being picked up by the FBI. ~~It~~ at all possible, they wanted to be considered loyal to the United States. They had their family, their business, their friends, their community at stake, and they did not want to spend the duration in an internment camp. Consequently, even the Isseis destroyed Japanese books, pictures of the Emperor, ~~and~~ relatives in the Japanese Army, and the like which might make them suspects of the FBI. Consequently, if a program of separating the loyal from the disloyal had been put into effect at this time the vast majority probably would have tried to avoid being considered disloyal. This was in direct contrast to the situation later found in relocation centers, where many did not seem to mind at all being considered disloyal.

An Intelligence Officer's Report In May, 1942, while most of the Japanese on the Coast were herded into temporary assembly centers, an intelligence officer wrote a report clarifying the

problem of handling the Japanese. He estimated that at least seventy five per cent of the Niseis were loyal to the United States, and that if the war had not come along, "in another ten or fifteen years, there would have been no Japanese problem, for the Issei would have passed on, and the Nisei taken their place naturally in American community and national life." He also stated that of the Isseis the large majority were "passively loyal" to the United States, and that only about three per cent of the total would act as saboteurs or enemy agents. He thought that it was the Kibei as a group who was dangerous, and should be considered guilty until proven innocent, expressing confidence that a Kibei could be readily ascertained from United States government records. He advocated a program of segregation of the potentially dangerous, which he thought was feasible. For this purpose, he advised first a program of registration, to determine all those who wished to express their loyalty to Japan, to identify Kibeis, and those who were otherwise considered potentially dangerous. These persons would then be reviewed by a special board to decide whether they were to be considered in the class of potentially dangerous. Finally, he advocated that those who were considered dangerous and their families be segregated and kept separate from other evacuees.

The reason for advocating a program of segregation even at this early date foresaw the difficulties which the WRA would later meet in carrying out its resettlement policy:

"A forcible argument in favor of separation of the Kibei and potentially dangerous aliens from the other Japanese is the effect such a segregation would have on the American populace as a whole. If other American citizens could be assured through strong and vigorous advertisement and publicity by the government that some step of this nature had been taken, and that those persons permitted to accept private employment or to be members of the War Relocation Authority work corps were only those who were not considered to be dangerous by the Authority, I believe that much of the hysterical resentment against these people would disappear. Employers would have far less hesitancy about accepting such people for harvesting crops or even doing war production work. Such action would permit a very appreciable saving in government funds and effort." 1

In other words, segregation of the disloyal could be a step toward gaining of acceptance for the loyal evacuee on the outside. Evidently, the WRA was split on the issue of carrying out a segregation program, since Goverley remarked at a meeting with Isseis that he had advocated the segregation of the loyal from the disloyal at the time of transfer of evacuees from assembly centers to relocation centers, but it did not take place.²

1. See "The Japanese in America", Harpers, October, 1942

2. JS Journal, July 13, 1943, #7

Launching the Resettlement Program

The effect of the evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific Coast was the upsetting of the adjustment that they had achieved in terms of little communities of their own all along the Coast. At first it was hoped that evacuation further inland could be accomplished voluntarily but this was prevented by the refusal of governors of the western states to accept evacuees. The same force that was instrumental in driving the Japanese out of the Coast made it impossible for them to acquire land further inland and resettle for themselves. Consequently, they were crowded into hurriedly constructed assembly centers, and then moved to more permanent relocation centers, a movement completed in the summer of 1942. At this time, the WRA assumed that the centers were going to be permanent for the duration. There was talk about making the centers as self-sufficient as possible, turning over the management of the whole project to the evacuees as soon as possible. This idea, too, met with objectⁱⁿ, and was soon discarded. From the beginning the WRA worked out the idea of having a military guard wherever labor was needed. The idea of having a work corp was also abandoned, but in the summer and fall of 1942 many evacuees were allowed to go out to do seasonal work and return to the center again. But with Myer taking over the post of Director of the WRA in the late summer, the whole WRA program made ^asharp about-face. Until this time, effort was made within the centers to build up a livable and happy community

with as many activities as possible. Recreational, educational, and religious programs were begun, while agriculture and small industries were planned in each center. But a fear seized the administration that if the centers were made permanent for the duration they would have another Indian problem on their hands. The adjustment would neither be normal, nor permanent, nor desirable. Consequently, the building up of the center and the creation of work opportunities within the project was discouraged, and plans made to launch a resettlement program. Efforts were to be made to resettle evacuees in normal communities.

By the first of October, the resettlement program was begun with the setting up of regulations for leave clearance. The following conditions had to be met before an individual was approved by the director of a center for indefinite furlough:

- "(1) Give satisfactory evidence that he has either a job or some other visible means of support to insure that he will not become a public charge;
- (2) Give satisfactory evidence that the community in which he intends to resettle is willing to receive or accept him; and
- (3) Receive clearance from the government investigative departments; and
- (4) Promise to keep the WRA informed of any changes in address."

The number of applicants for leave clearance was relatively small, and the process of being cleared often required months. Nevertheless, the small number of resettlers in various sections of the United States again raised the question of whether they were acceptable in their new communities. From the very beginning

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there was a tendency for evacuees to cluster in certain localities, like Denver and Salt Lake City, where they became conspicuous in the eyes of the other residents, and which aroused antagonism toward the whole group. There was also a belief on the part of the WRA that the basic reason why evacuation took place in the first place was that too many Japanese were living too close together on the Coast. Consequently, steps were taken to prevent clustering and to attempt to disperse the resettlers throughout the United States as much as possible. Resentment toward the Japanese flared up in scattered places, but never on a serious scale. WRA officials attempted to improve the public reception of evacuee labor in different communities. The program was succeeding; those who wanted to resettle were generally able to find suitable jobs, and housing and be accepted in their new community.¹

By the spring of 1943 it became clear that the resettlement program was not proceeding as quickly as desired. One reason for this was that the procedure for receiving clearance was slow. Another was that on the part of many residents, especially Issei and Kibei, there was resentment toward those who relocated on the grounds that they were being traitors to the Japanese by helping the American war effort. Many who could have relocated did not do so because of rumors of the dangerousness on the outside for Japanese, and pressure from friends and the community in general. Still another reason was that in certain community resentment against the Japanese was hostile enough to make settlement their impossible. This was true on the Pacific Coast, where

1. For Myer's attitude toward resettlement, see Minutes of JACL Special Emergency Nation Conference, Eleventh Session, Nov. 21, 1942.

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feeling ran high against allowing the Japanese to return to the Coast. A more serious threat to the resettlement program and to the very existence of the WRA was the hostility of certain reactionary elements in the political circle toward the WRA program and which argued, for one thing, that Japs should not be released from the centers.

A segregation program at this time would have helped to break down the opposition to resettlement by pointing out that the disloyal elements in the evacuee population had been concentrated in one center and were not being allowed to leave it.

Incidents within the Center In the assembly centers, except for a strike in Santa Anita Assembly Center, there was relative peace within the center, with the majority of the political power vested in Niseis. In the relocation centers, however, the Issei and pro-Japan elements gained greater and greater control. The increasing strength in this direction showed up for one thing in protests against the administration and demands made on it, which in many cases ended up in refusal to work and the calling of general strikes throughout the camp. Within the administration there was increasing belief that most of the trouble within the center was being fomented by "agitators" and that if they were removed most of the trouble would cease. The lack of response on the part of the evacuees to the recruiting of volunteers for the Army and offer of jobs on the outside was often blamed on Isseis and pro-Japan elements which actively opposed the cooperation of the more loyal evacuees to these programs. The effect of these smaller incidents and frictions, however, was confined to the center where they took place and did not reach the general public. Several major incidents, however, made the headlines in papers, especially on the Pacific Coast, and produced important effects.

Two major incidents, one in Poston and the other in Manzanar, should be reviewed to show the effect they had in shaping the future course of events. The one that occurred in Poston, in November, 1942, was caused by the beating up of a man and the jailing of several suspects by the administration. This brought

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a protest by a group of men, which ended up in a general strike, which lasted for several days. The effect of the incident on the general public can be gleaned by the way in which the incident was officially announced by the administration and subsequently written up in papers along the Coast. The following are excerpts from news item describing the Poston Incident:

"Head (Project Director) described the rebels as a 'small but well-organized pro-Axis group' who took advantage of the situation to seize control of the largest of three Poston units and create a general strike."

"Head added that he desired to express his appreciation to army, federal, country and state agencies, and to 'hundreds of fine Japanese who have cooperated and worked as a team in defeating all pro-Axis groups without bloodshed or loss of property.'"

"American born Japanese were of the opinion that a very small minority was responsible for the demonstration, but indicated that this small minority, by terrorism and threats of terroristic reprisals, was wielding influence."¹

The Manzanar Incident occurred soon after in December caused by the beating up of a JACL leader, Tayama, arrest of suspects, and a demonstration by evacuees which resulted in the death of two individuals and the wounding of several others. In the newspaper account this incident was explained in the following manner:

"The disturbance reputedly inspired by a group of pro-Axis sympathizers at Manzanar, began Saturday night when 6 masked men attacked Fred Tayama, chairman of the Southern California district council of the Japanese American Citizens League and an outstanding leader of the center."²

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1. Pacific Citizen, 11-26-42
 2. Pacific Citizen, 12-10-42

In both incidents it was persons who were considered loyal that were beaten up or threatened, and those accused of fomenting the disturbance were described as a small group of pro-Axis sympathizers. The concept was being built up that there were two opposing groups within the centers. The majority were loyal, but there was a small but powerful group of disloyal individuals who wielded tremendous influence throughout the center. This building up in the minds of the public of the existence of two conflicting groups is at the basis of the segregation program.

In both incidents those whose lives were threatened with danger were removed from the center and resettled on the outside. In the Manzanar Incident it was necessary to move several families out of the centers, and the inadvisability of allowing the two groups to live in the same center was clearly demonstrated. This brought a discussion of the possibility of a segregation program.

"Indications Thursday were that a policy of segregation would be adopted. At present, it was stated, according to the Times, that there has been no move to segregate pro-American from pro-Axis Japanese, but loyal Japanese American leaders in the center are being given added military protection." 1

After the Manzanar Incident the following two moves by the administration were announced:

- "1. Immediate segregation of known Axis sympathizers and other unruly elements." They were placed in county jails.
- "2. The relocation program for Japanese American citizens known to be loyal to the United States was stepped up to allow these people to relocate in gainful work outside of the strategic military zone of the Pacific Coast" 2

1. Ibid

2. Pacific Citizenship 12-17-41

The solution to the problem posed by the Manzanar Incident was suggested in an editorial in the Pacific Citizen entitled, Lessons from Manzanar:

"The answer to the question posed by the Manzanar situation is that of segregation and isolation for those who oppose America, for the apostles of defeatism and despair. The answer is that of greater freedom for those who stand by America, for those who look to democracy."²

The answer then was the segregation of the small number of "pro-Axis sympathizers". It should be noted that the word disloyal was still avoided, and that the segregation was meant to apply, not to a large number of individuals, but to small group of "unruly" individuals. The answer also was the speeding up of the relocation program for those who were considered loyal to the United States.

2. Ibid

Senate Investigating Committee Throughout its existence, The WRA was accused by the public, especially those who had no particular sympathy for the plight of the Japanese, of pampering the evacuees. Rumors were rampant in regions surrounding the centers of the fabulous treatment that the Japanese were given at government expense. These charges served to dampen the enthusiasm of the administration in carrying out a "humanitarian" program too far. These charges did not hold serious consequences for the WRA until the same charges were directed at them by a senate investigating committee which threatened to turn the control of the centers over to the Army. This investigation followed soon after the occurrence of the Poston and Manzanar Incidents, and was probably a direct result of their becoming public news.

In January, 1943, Senator Wallgren, of Washington, announced an investigation of the relocation program for evacuees to determine the truth of the "disturbing reports" that he had. He introduced a bill in the Senate to transfer evacuee centers back under Army jurisdiction. The purpose of this move was stated as a desire "to halt the pro-Axis demonstration reported in the camps". It was also charged that the WRA had "pampered" the evacuees. Before the bill was brought up for hearing, an investigating committee headed by Senator Chandler, of Kentucky, a subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, was to conduct an investigation of the relocation centers.¹

The investigating committee visited Rohwer, but the activi-

1. Pacific Citizen 1-14-43, 1-21-43

ties were cut short by the stand of the War Department that it did not want to bother with the running of an evacuee camp. This announcement allowed the WRA to breathe more easily and continue its existence. After making investigations, however, the committee made the following recommendations:

1. Segregation of loyal and disloyal.
2. Drafting of loyal.
3. Concentration camps for disloyal.¹

Later on it also added the recommendation that loyal evacuees be employed in areas where they are acceptable to the local population and dropped the recommendation to segregate the loyal and disloyal.²

The concept of the existence of people who were loyal and others who were disloyal continued to be used. Segregation of the disloyal in concentration camps and the employment of loyal citizens on the outside continued to be advocated.

1. Pacific Citizen 3-18-43

2. Ibid 5-14-43

Registration Program According to the intelligence officer's report, to segregate the loyal from the disloyal, a program of registration was desirable. Such a program was undertaken with the centers in February, 1943, but not with the intention of actually segregating the two groups within the center. It was carried out as a preparation to draft the loyal Niseis and also to clear all others, 17 years or older, for possible resettlement on the outside. Those who were found not to be loyal were to be retained within the center. The registration results, however, were eventually used as the basis for the segregation program which was decided upon later in the year.

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Niseis were being drafted along with other American citizens, and were employed in various units of the Army. By and large, their treatment was, on the surface, on equal terms with other Americans. Certain branches of the Armed Forces, such as the Navy, would not accept Nisei volunteers. Also, the tendency was for Japanese to be assigned to the more menial tasks in the Army, and to find advancement difficult. Nevertheless, they were accorded the privilege and responsibility of a citizen to serve in the Armed Forces of their country.

With the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, however, further drafting of Japanese was suspended. Some who were already in training were sent home with honorable discharges, and all of those eligible for the draft were placed in the 4-C classification with other aliens. Just as the Japanese were refused the right to live on the Coast, citizens of Japanese ancestry

were refused admittance into the Armed Forces. The reason given for both moves again was the question of loyalty--could the Japanese be trusted to defend the United States against the enemy? This suspicion was kept alive by a more basic race prejudice, increased by the stress of war between Japan and America. However, both suspension from the draft and concentration of a center of persons whose disloyalty was not proven was painful for a country which professed to uphold as its ideals freedom and equality, and there was necessity for a more satisfactory adjustment.

The segment of the American public sympathetic to the Japanese advocated the drafting of Niseis along with other American citizens to give them a chance to prove their loyalty, which was being questioned. Certain elements in the Nisei population, notably the JACL, also came to the conclusion that the only way to prove their loyalty to the U. S. and to pave the way for full acceptance here in this country was to fight in the Armed Forces. The National Secretary of the JACL said:

"It seems to me that this Selective Service is the only thing left for us in the way of proving what our real attitudes are today....Our first consideration is to seek the right to be drafted to serve in our country's armed forces....."

"We have had a pretty tough blow, but we are still American citizens and our sacrifices may be a part of our contribution to the war effort. We want a chance now to go out and show the people, especially on the Pacific Coast, that we are ready to fight for our country in spite of what some people have done to us. There are many stories of Nisei soldiers who want to do more than just work; they want to die to show their loyalty. The vast majority of Nisei, in their own quiet way, still want the Selective Service. Some few may be bitter, but the rest of us must carry on for the rest of the Japanese Americans as well as for our children to come."¹

1. Minutes of the JACL Special Emergency National Conference, Sixth Session, Nov. 19, 1942.

The subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee which was investigating conditions in relocation centers advocated drafting of the loyal Niseis. The War Department, too, ^{was persuaded} ~~approved~~ ^{to consider} of the drafting of Niseis.

If the problem had been one of merely suspecting the loyalty of the Nisei, the reclassification of Niseis from 4-C back to ^{an} ~~to~~ appropriate category would have set in motion once more the drafting of Niseis along with other American citizens. The problem was complicated, however, by the fact that discrimination against the Japanese existed in the Army, even as it existed against other racial minorities such as Negroes and Filipinos. And the same line of attack employed for these other racial minority groups was used for the Japanese. Instead of attempting to eradicate the existing racial prejudice of the majority of the people, it was recognized and coped with by establishing a separate combat unit for Japanese Americans alone. The planned combat unit was limited to a relatively small number--6,000--and it was hoped that recruiting for it could be done wholly on a voluntary basis. The wholesale drafting of Niseis was to be delayed until later.

In the meantime the resettlement of the recognized loyal persons of Japanese ancestry proceeded slowly, for one thing, because very few applied for leave clearance and the process of clearance was slow. It was necessary for the War Department to register all male Niseis, 17 years or older, as a basis for

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accepting volunteers and for drafting Niseis. An agreement was reached between the WRA and the War Department whereby everyone above 17 years of age would be registered for leave clearance at the same time registration for Selective Service was held. The solutions of the Japanese problem through the draft and resettlement, thus restoring to them their normal rights and privileges were to be carried out simultaneously.

The registration program was aimed primarily at determining who were to be considered loyal and who disloyal, who were going to be accepted as volunteers, drafted, or allowed to leave the center for resettlement on the outside, and who were to remain in the center for the duration. Toward this purpose a loyalty question was put on the registration form. Unfortunately, the program was hurriedly set up and inadequate attention given to the matter. Both Isseis and Niseis, for instance, were to answer whether they would swear loyalty to the United States and forswear loyalty to all other countries. While this question was a logical one for Niseis to answer, Isseis, who were ineligible for citizenship, protested their necessity of having to answer such a question. Consequently, the question for alien Isseis was changed to one asking whether they would abide by the laws of the United States and do nothing to interfere with its war effort. The answers to these questions were to serve as the basis for determining loyalty or disloyalty, and other governmental records were to be consulted, too.

In spite of the fact that Niseis were outwardly Americanized, their loyalty to the United States was questioned by more than a few persons who disliked the Japanese. During the beginning of its program, the WRA released statements to the public declaring that the Nisei was loyal to the United States. Actually from even before the outbreak of the war there were some Niseis who identified themselves more with Japan than with America. This was true of the majority of Niseis brought up in Japan (Kibei-Nisei), but were not confined to them. One reason for this identification with Japan was the fact that many of these Niseis felt that they had a better future in Japan than they did here in America where they had to face prejudice. On the other hand, there were quite a number of Niseis who wanted to live in America and who declared their loyalty to their country. Many of them were willing to fight against Japan in order to defend their country. The large majority of the Niseis, however, postponed declaring themselves ^{openly} for one side or the other, and in most cases maintained a silence on the matter. This was a painful subject to many of them, and one which many avoided discussing. Many of those in the middle group wavered from one side to the other, depending on circumstances, never being able to make a definite decision for one side or the other.

The loyalty of the Niseis was tested when volunteers were recruited for the Military Intelligence School at Camp Savage, where the language ability of the Nisei was to be employed to aid the war effort of the United States. The response to this call

was only fair, and did not serve to show definitely whether the large number of Niseis were loyal or not. The registration for Selective Service for males and for leave clearance for females, however, served to drive a wedge into the Nisei group, knocking them off to either one side or the other of the "fence" on which they sat. They were required to register and to answer either "Yes" or "No" to Question 28. Refusal to register or to answer "Yes" to Question 28 was taken as a declaration of disloyalty. A third means of testing the loyalty of the Nisei was the call for volunteers for the newly-formed Japanese American combat unit, a call which was made at the same time the registration for Selective Service was held within the centers.

The result of this attempt to establish the "loyalty" and "disloyalty" of the Nisei differed widely in different centers. In Minidoka, for instance, several hundred volunteers were obtained for the combat unit, and only a handful of Niseis put themselves down as "disloyal." Only 40 answered "no" to Question 28, none refused to register, and only a handful took out repatriation papers. In Tule Lake about 40 per cent of the Niseis involved put themselves down on paper as "disloyal", and only a handful volunteered for the combat unit. Several hundred took out repatriation papers rather than register, almost a thousand answered "No" to Question 28 or gave qualified answers, and several hundred refused to register. In other centers results were not as good as in Minidoka or as bad as in Tule Lake. In all of the centers, probably 25 to 30 per cent of the Niseis, including males and females, put themselves down as "disloyal" to the United

States. The response to the call for volunteers was far smaller within the centers than on the outside, and much smaller in the United States than in Hawaii.

It was recognized by evacuees and by WRA officials that more of the Niseis had gotten off on the "disloyal" side of the fence than was expected. There were many factors contributing to this phenomenon, which should be pointed out at this point in order to understand the behavior of individuals during the segregation program. The factors making it difficult for an individual to register and to register "Yes" was most numerous in Tule Lake, which came out with the worst record of all the centers. Prior to evacuation, both Isseis and Niseis (including Kibeis) were desirous of avoiding the stigma of being disloyal to the United States. This was because the consequence would be interment and the inability to live a normal life in America. Once evacuated and put into virtual concentration camps, however, the stigma of disloyalty only prevented the possibility of relocating on the outside and possibly of living in America after the war. Both pulls toward being loyal to the United States was greatly weakened with evacuation, since many Niseis became skeptical about being able to live in the United States without being oppressed. At the same time, they toyed more and more with the idea that they would have a better chance in Japan after the war. This important consideration which made Niseis waver in their declaration of loyalty was backed up by other factors. One was the tremendous pressure brought to bear by parents and neighbors to prevent Niseis from declaring their loyalty to the United

States. This was especially true in Tule Lake, where the main issue was whether to register or not, and where anyone who went to register against the decision of the majority of the people in the block was considered an inu. Another important factor was the sense of futility that seized the Nisei on being discriminated against, a fact which was brought home strongly by evacuation and life within barbed-wire fences, and a desire to protest that fact in some manner. For many, the refusal to register and serve in the Armed Forces, especially if Niseis were not going to be allowed to serve on the same basis as other Americans, was a protest against deprivation of privileges according other citizens who were not Japanese. Another important factor was the fear of being drafted and of dying on the front, a fear which public opinion did practically nothing to suppress, since Isseis were equally fearful of having their sons die. In Tule Lake, the whole issue was confused by the fact that the registration program was inadequately explained to the evacuees, and many people only registered because of threat of imprisonment.

These factors and others served to draw a line between the "loyal" and "disloyal" at a point where more were included among the "disloyal" than otherwise might have been if the registration had taken place under more favorable circumstances. The administration set up procedures to enable those who wished to change their stand if they so wished, and some did. However, the stand of a large number of Niseis had been determined and placed on record.

The Isseis, who had to register for leave clearance, went through a different experience. In spite of the fact that many Isseis had lived in America for thirty or forty years, their ties with America in many cases were not very strong ones. Their two main ties to America were the dependence on America for livelihood and their citizen children. These two ties were not permanent ones since whenever Isseis made enough money they could return to Japan, and because in some cases they could also take their children with them. On the other hand, they maintained their Japanese culture and in most cases did not become very Americanized. Also, they had a strong sentimental tie with their country. This tie was greatly strengthened by the fact that they were refused citizenship in this country and were otherwise relegated to a relative low position on the social scale because of their race. Most Isseis came to look to their country and its deeds for moral support. On top of that, the Issei concept of loyalty forbade them to declare themselves loyal to any other country besides Japan. To Issei loyalty was an established relationship between a citizen and his country or a country and its people. In most cases, an Issei could not consider himself anything else but Japanese, and he therefore felt he owed his loyalty to Japan.

Consequently, if the loyalty of the Issei had been tested on the same basis as that of the Nisei was tested, the former would have been practically certain to be classed as "disloyal."

Isseis, however, were fortunate in that they could refuse to swear "loyalty" to the United States without necessarily attaching a stigma on themselves as being disloyal or dangerous. Since they were not eligible for citizenship, they could hardly be expected to forswear their loyalty to Japan and not be given an opportunity to be the citizen of this country. Consequently, when the "loyalty" question, Question 28, was first presented to the Isseis, most of them refused to answer it. Another question was therefore substituted, and this one asked whether an Issei would abide by the laws of the United States and not interfere with the war effort. This question was not a "loyalty" question in any sense of the term since it did not ask whether an Issei preferred one country to another, either politically or culturally. It did not imply that he wished to live in this country, desired victory for the United States, or preferred the American way of life. On the basis of this question, however, the "loyalty" of the Issei was tested.

The result of the registration for Isseis was that practically everyone of them answered "Yes" to Question 28. Where a large number of Niseis had hesitated to answered "Yes" to their Question 28, about the only way an Issei could answer his question was by putting down "Yes". It was inconceivable why anyone would put himself down as not wanting to obey the laws of the country in which he resided. Some Isseis hesitated to register for another reason. Since the registration was for application for leave clearance, they suspected that this was a trick on the part of the administration to get them to sign something and force them out of the center. Since most of them lost their economic security on the outside, they clung to the

security that life in a relocation center gave them. Consequently, they were reluctant to register, even though they did not mind answering "yes" to Question 28. For this reason, a number of Isseis took out repatriation papers. In all of the centers except Tule Lake, practically everyone who was supposed to register did so, but in Tule Lake a resistance to the registration program was developed, and several thousand did not register. Consequently, the only Isseis who were placed in the category of the "disloyal" were those who had taken out repatriation papers and those in Tule Lake who had refused to register.

The result of the registration program was to encourage a program of segregation. In the first place, the disloyalty of a sizable group of evacuees was definitely established. The WRA was no longer able to maintain that practically all of the Japanese were "loyal." On the other hand, it could now point out that it had a basis on which to determine "loyalty" and "disloyalty," and that only the "loyal" ones were being allowed to leave the centers. The response to the call for volunteers for the Japanese-American combat unit was small, giving the impression that Niseis were reluctant to cooperate with the War Department. This observation probably served to dampen the enthusiasm on the part of the War Department to follow the voluntary enlistment with a general drafting of all eligible Niseis. The registration program also impeded the resettlement program since it created a fear among Isseis that the administration was trying to force them out and aroused resentment against the administration. The impeding of these processes of returning evacuees to a more normal life encouraged segregation

indirectly, since it increased the need for such a program. Incidents had occurred in several of centers, especially in Tule Lake, and it was brought home strongly to the administration that it was not advisable to have the loyal and disloyal living together in the same center, since the latter seemed to have control over the former. Also as a result of these incidents, those suspected of fomenting trouble were picked up and sent to an isolation center in Moab, Arizona, which was later transferred to Leupp. By these examples, the wholesale segregation of the disloyal elements was encouraged.

In spite of these factors which favored a segregation program, Myer, the Director of the WRA, was against "negative segregation". He did not want to segregate the "disloyal." He favored what he called "positive segregation," a process whereby the "loyal" ones would be resettled outside of the center as fast as possible. After the registration program was over, he visited the centers with this message.

Dies Committee Attack on WRA The WRA met opposition to its program of restoring the evacuees in normal communities from two sources. One was the evacuees themselves, who were not receptive to the idea of volunteering for a Japanese American combat unit and many of whom were afraid to leave the security of the center to resettle on the outside. The other was from the reactionary elements in the public, who desired to see the Japanese deprived of as much privileges as possible. They were composed of people who believed in more privileges for themselves than for others, and who believed in the superiority of their own flesh and blood and despised racial minority groups. They were the ones who were most instrumental in arousing public hysteria which made necessary the evacuation of the Japanese from the Coast. They were the same ones which passed resolutions to refuse to let the evacuees go back to their homes. They were also the ones who favored such ideas as taking away the citizenship of Niseis, deporting all Japanese after the war, not allowing them to own land. They had been the ones who had prevented the voluntary evacuation of Japanese into their states and opposed the idea of turning over the centers to the Japanese to run for themselves. They had been instrumental in causing the Japanese problem, and they were the ones who were obstructing the efforts of the WRA for a decent solution. The WRA had been hampered in carrying out a policy favorable to evacuees by this reactionary element, both within its organization and outside of it, but it received its most serious attack first from the Senate Investigating Committee and then from the Dies Committee.

In May, the Dies Committee released a series of announcements that it would open up investigation of the relocation centers in Los Angeles and would issue special reports disclosing subversive activities by Japanese Americans.¹ With these advance publicities the committee held hearings in Los Angeles, where it heard testimonies of various WRA officials and others revealing or refuting charges of subversive activity on the part of evacuees. The committee investigated conditions in Poston, and then held a short hearing in Washington, D. C., before ending the investigation. While the charges of the Senate Investigating Committee had been fairly reasonable, the charges of the Dies Committee against the WRA were made without much regard for the truth of the statements uttered. The attitude with which the committee carried on its investigation was illustrated by a statement by one of its members:

"I personally feel that no Japs, I don't care what their sentiments may be, should be released from relocation centers unless they are exchanged for American prisoners held by the Japanese."²

The main attack of the Dies Committee on the WRA was the charge that it was releasing large number of disloyal Japs and saboteurs from the centers. Charges by the committee included the fact that they had acquired "a list of 10,000 member of the American youth organization of Japan's Black Dragon Society and has found most of them to be Japanese Americans".³ The WRA was also charged that in spite of the fact that a recent army questionnaire showed that 24 per cent of the residents were disloyal, there was

1. Pacific Citizen, May 27, 1943
2. Ibid, May 20, 1943
3. Pacific Citizen, May 27, 1943

no evidence that the WRA was making proper checks in releasing evacuees from centers.¹ One testimony before the committee charged that evacuees at Poston had hidden bread and other food in the desert for invasion forces and paratroopers.²

Myer denied the charges made by the Dies Committee and declared that the public statements made by it charging that spies and saboteurs were being released from the centers were "irresponsible" and "ignorant". He declared that there had not been one instance of disloyal activity on the part of 12,000 evacuees now on leave from the centers. He further stated that if there were any disloyal evacuee released they could be recalled to the center, and asked for any list of names of disloyal elements that the committee had found. When the committee asked that further releases of evacuees from the centers be stopped until investigations were completed, by the committee, Myer flatly refused to do so.³ When the hearings of the committee was opened up in Washington and Myer was requested to appear before the committee, he gave it a thorough lashing. He charged that "program of the WRA investigation for the past eight weeks was conducted in such a manner as to achieve publicity by sensational statements based on half truths, exaggerations, and falsehoods; statements of witnesses were released to the public without verification of their accuracy, thus giving nation-wide publicity to many distortions and downright untruths."⁴ He refuted every one of the fantastic charges made by the Dies Committee.

1. Ibid., June 3, 1943

2. Ibid., June 17, 1943

3. Ibid., June 10, 1943

4. Pacific Citizen, June 10, 1943

Besides the trumped-up charges of disloyalty within the center and the release of disloyal evacuees from the center which were made public by the Dies Committee through its hearings, the finding of the committee is illustrated by the conclusions made by members of the committee of the hearings held in Los Angeles:

1. Project personnel lacks previous experience in dealing with persons of Japanese ancestry prior to their present assignments.
2. There has been no adequate segregation made of loyal and disloyal evacuees.
3. Government funds have been expended unwisely for teaching judo and goh.
4. Outbreaks of violence, including riots and strikes, induced by the kibe group, have occurred, yet the investigators have gone unpunished.
5. Loyal Japanese Americans have suffered beatings at the hands of pro-Japanese in the centers, yet the offenders have gone unpunished.
6. There are indications that confusion exists regarding the responsibility for investigating the history and background of persons of Japanese ancestry who are being released from the relocation centers.
7. There is evidence of lack of planning by procurement officers.
8. Sufficient work opportunities for the evacuees have not been provided in the centers.
9. More adequate protection should be given to public utilities, dams, reservoirs and other strategic installations in the vicinity of relocation centers.
10. While housing has been provided for all evacuees, overcrowding is apparent; lack of privacy and cramped quarters create a condition that should be remedied immediately."

Besides pointing out certain points on which the administration mishandled the relocation centers it referred to two points

1. Pacific Citizen, June 24, 1943

worth noting. One was that evacuees should be thoroughly investigated before being released from the centers. The other was the fact that riots and strikes and the beating up of loyal evacuees had been caused by pro-Japan elements, and that the segregation of the disloyal evacuees was advisable.

This fact that incidents and beatings had taken place within the center and that there had been no program of segregating the loyal from the disloyal was a weak point of the WRA. It had explained its incidents and troubles in terms of "agitators", "kibeis", and "pro-axis sympathizers", and now it was called upon by both the subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee and the Dies Committee to take the logical step to solve this problem. In July, the Senate passed a resolution asking the President to issue an executive order for the WRA to segregate "persons of Japanese ancestry to relocation centers, whose loyalty to the United States is questionable or who are known to be disloyal, from those whose loyalty to the United States has been established".¹ Myer was able to pull through these investigations with his resettlement program intact, but he could no longer put off the long contemplated segregation program. On July 7, he announced before the Dies Committee that the WRA was planning a program of segregation of the disloyal elements in the centers. This was his answer to the critics of the WRA program. In a way it was a concession on his part, but at the same time it strengthened his hand. He was able to gain support of Congress for his resettlement program and was given the full amount of the budget for the

1. Ibid, July 10, 1943

next fiscal year beginning July 1. When the investigations of the WRA by the two committees were called off, only the warning that there should be an adequate investigation of all evacuees released from the centers remained as a threat to the WRA and its program.

These were the train of events which led to the segregation program. Highly important in this series was the process of formation of the dual concepts of loyalty and disloyalty, which were thought to be identifiable without too much difficulty. The development of these concepts was encouraged by newspaper accounts and official reports by the WRA of incidents and conditions within the centers. To most laymen these concepts were abstract and simple--they were stereotypes of two extremes of a continuum. They did not take into consideration that most of the people were neither 100 per cent loyal nor 100 per cent disloyal. Loyalty was a matter of degree, and most persons could be considered "loyal" or "disloyal" according to the definition of the term. The main difficulty of those who shaped the policy of the WRA toward a segregation program was that they did not come in direct contact with evacuees. They could not picture, for instance, the complicated relationship between Issei and Nisei. For one thing, the situation was highly dynamic. A Nisei could have enough influence over his parents to make them more "loyal" than other parents. Parents and community pressure, on the other hand, could make Niseis talk as if they were "disloyal." The bitterness which evacuees felt was an important factor whose effect was difficult to gauge. The segregation program was put into effect

without the intimate knowledge of evacuees and evacuee psychology, and confusion was to result from this fact.

III. Conditions in Tule Lake at the Time of the Segregation Program

Administration The condition in Tule Lake just prior to the launching of the segregation program can be seen from the repercussions caused by the registration program. In Tule Lake, this was a major incident, comparable to the incidents in Poston and Manzanar which occurred at the end of the previous year. The repercussions of the registration program affected both the administration and evacuees in their attitude toward the segregation program.

Probably the most important factor which governed the attitude of the administration during the registration period was Coverley, the project director, who succeeded Shirrell at the end of the preceding year. He came to the project with a policy which laid emphasis on the maintenance of strict administrative procedure. His main concern was to carry out orders that he received from Washington without too much deviations, instead of trying to influence and change these instructions in view of local conditions. Consequently, he did not consult evacuees in dealing with their problems or study their problems and their psychology very closely. His attitude agreed more with the reactionary elements within the administration than with the liberal elements, and he sided with the former. In administering the registration program, he relied almost wholly on the more reactionary elements in the administration, for one thing, because the matter of registration fell into the function of the Housing and Employment Division, which they dominated. The handling of

the program, consequently, was characterized by methods which relied on authority and the use of force rather than those which employed understanding and persuasion. In the first place, very little explanation of the program was done beforehand to prepare the people for it, and answers to questions raised were very mechanical and lacked sincerity. Also, practically every suggestion made by evacuee leaders to help the program along was turned down, and they in turn found it difficult to support the program actively. When a resistance to registering occurred, threat of punishment and the use of force was employed to push through the program. The upshot of this situation was that a large number of persons refused to register, something which did not happen in any of the other centers.

The result of this mishandling of an important program was that Coverley and those who helped him on the program lost prestige within the WRA. Coverley had to leave the project at the end of July. The fact that the administration of the program had been placed in wrong hands was brought to Myer's attention, discrediting the reactionary elements, and giving the liberal elements an opportunity to assert themselves. In a "Report to Mr. Dillon S. Myer" evacuee leaders, with the help of a few of the more liberal staff members, pointed out the mistakes that had been made by leaving the administration of the registration program to persons unsympathetic to evacuees and incapable of understanding human problems. The report read in part:

"From the foregoing facts, it is obvious that there are other methods which could have been more effective in carrying out the registration program

Foremost in the formulation of propaganda for the colonists' consumption is the establishment of capable leadership. In establishing an approach to a problem of this sort, it is necessary that the administrator consult and receive suggestions from leaders in the colony and members of the administrative staff who are familiar with evacuee psychology. The policy followed by the Administration in carrying out this program along strictly administrative lines resulted in placing men in important advisory capacities to the Project Director who were not capable of understanding the human problems involved nor the proper techniques for carrying out the program. There are available among the administrative personnel on this project people with many years of training and of experience in the field of manipulating of people's ideas and actions. In choosing advisors along strictly administrative lines, the actual result was the choice of individuals unsympathetic toward the Japanese problem and incapable of effectively carrying on the program. At the same time, there were people available on the administrative staff who were highly qualified in the field by training, experience, and ability. The services that they could have offered were not utilized."¹

By persons "with many years of training and of experience in the field of manipulating of people's ideas and actions" were meant such individuals as Dr. Jacoby, Chief of Internal Security, a former college professor in sociology; Don Elbertson, Chief of Community Enterprises, an expert in cooperatives and with interest in sociology and labor relations, and Shirrell's labor relation man; Paul Fleming, Chief of Community Services, former counselor in a high school. They had had practically no part in the administration of the registration program, when they felt that they were well-trained to deal with such matters, and consequently were dissatisfied.

As a result of the incident that took place in Tule Lake during the registration program, the administration was impressed with the fact that it was not safe to use threat against evacuees

1. "Report to Mr. Dillon S. Myer", April 14, 1943. See Appendix

for fear of organized resistance, such as they met against registering. It also learned that if confusion were to be avoided, education of the people was necessary. The advisability of the consulting evacuee leaders on important issues was brought home strongly. These lessons from the registration program had their effect on the way in which the segregation program was met by the administration.

Colony The effect of the registration program on the colonists was greater than it was on the administration. In the first place, the colony was split into two camps--the "loyal" and the "disloyal." The main split was between those who registered, either "yes" or "no" and those who refused to register. There was also another split between those who registered "yes" and those who registered "no". In many cases, even close friends ceased speaking to each other because of their difference in the stands they took on the registration. New friendships were formed on the basis of the similar attitudes on the registration question. Those who favored registration or registering "yes" were accused of being traitors to the group, and at the height of the crisis a great deal of suspicion and antagonism was aroused.

At the end of the registration period, there were 560 repatriates, 90 of whom cancelled their repatriation. There were 1202 persons who answered "no" (practically all Niseis), failed to answer Question 28, or qualified their answer in some way. Of these, 246 later changed their answers. There were also 2919 persons who refused to register.¹ Probably about 40 per

1. Segregation Manual. As of July 13, 1943. Table IV.

cent of the Niseis had put themselves down on record as being disloyal either by taking out repatriation papers, answering "no" to Question 28, or not registering at all. The Issei situation was more confused because they were only asked to answer whether they would be law-abiding or not, and practically everyone who registered answered "yes" to Question 28, and there were a large number who did not register. The colony, at any rate, was effectively split into opposing camps. As time passed, however, many of those who had answered "no" or had not registered regreted their action, and some took steps to change their answers. They also changed their attitude toward those who had answered "yes" or who went to register, thus reducing the gulf between the two groups. By the time the segregation program was announced in July, both groups regreted the fact that a conflict had taken place among the evacuees.

Within the family, conflicts had taken place, especially between Isseis and Niseis. Many Niseis wanted to register, as it was an important issue to them. To this, many parents objected, not so much that it was disloyalty to Japan, but that it was going against the wish of the majority of the people. Since the primary issue was whether to register or not, those who registered were considered traitors by the majority of the people. This group pressure made it difficult for parents to give in to their children even when they wanted to. In extreme cases, some children were disinherited for registering. In many cases, different stands were taken by different members of the family, causing an unpleasant gulf within the family group.

Because of the unpleasant situation caused by the registration conflict, many people came to fear another crisis of a similar nature. They were anxious to avoid trouble. They were not too willing to have meetings, which might be the source of troublesome decisions affecting the whole group. They were now suspicious of the so-called "agitators", by and large irresponsible individuals without family ties. They were more likely to think twice before accusing another person of being an inu, an accusation which was freely made during registration. These lessons from the registration crisis served to make the segregation program an easier one to handle than it otherwise might have been if these lessons had not been learned.

One effect of the registration program ^{was} ~~has been~~ to disorganize the community. Many capable Niseis favored registration and were consequently accused of being inus. They sensed the futility of staying within the project to work for the people since they seemed to show so little gratitude, and in the few months following the registration issue, many of the most capable Niseis left the project. This alone served to disorganize the activities within the community to some extent. Added to this was the fact that Niseis lost what little power they retained within the community. Not only did the capable leaders leave, but their Community Council never was revived after resigning during the registration crisis. The power passed over to the Isseis, but they too were only able to maintain a skeleton Planning Board, which was not active in organizing the community. An effort was made to revive self-

government according to new administrative instructions, which allowed Isseis, as well as Niseis, to hold elective offices, but an impasse was reached when a supplementary instruction was issued ruling that those who had taken out repatriation papers, registered "no", or failed to register could not hold elective offices. No real self-government could be effected without giving the so-called disloyal persons an equal voice in the government with the loyal ones, and the administration evidently wanted to return political power to the so-called loyal. The result was that the community remained largely unorganized and without a system of self-government. This lack of organization, coupled with the reluctance to hold meetings, which might be further sources of trouble, made organized resistance to the segregation program unlikely as long as it was handled fairly decently.

Two important attitudes became crystallized during the registration period. One was the Issei attitude toward the resettlement program. The program was harped upon by the administration with Coverley's arrival on the project, but at this time very little fear was expressed by the people that they would be forced to leave the center. Resistance to leaving the center was strong, however, and people noticed that it was the WRA policy not to allow anyone to return to the project once they went out on indefinite leave. When everyone was required to apply for leave clearance, fear was expressed by many people that this was a scheme to get them at some future date to leave the project. It was impressed upon them strongly that the main aim of the WRA was to get as many people as possible out of the project. Many persons felt that they could not afford to leave the security

of the center under the terms offered by the administration to accept jobs on the outside. The mass registration gave the people the impression that resettlement by force was a possibility, although it was now being done on a voluntary basis. This fear was instrumental, not only in impeding the resettlement program, but also in forming their understanding of the segregation program as a means to oust evacuees from the centers.

Another attitude formed ~~d~~during the registration crisis, which affected the Niseis, but not so generally, was the attempt to avoid being drafted. Many Niseis feared being drafted even while remaining in a relocation center, but were probably willing to be drafted if it should happen. Many of them were straddling a fence, as far as their decision on being "loyal" to the U. S. went, not wanting to make up their minds one way or the other. The registration program, however, served to knock them off that fence. If it had been merely a matter of registering for Selective Service, probably the vast majority would have answered "yes" to Question 28. However, they were encouraged to volunteer for a separate Japanese American combat unit at the same time they were required to register. This sent a fear through many youngsters that they would be sacrificed on the battlefield if they were drafted. Also, they were given a chance to determine whether they wanted to be drafted or not. To many who were bitter about having been evacuated and discriminated against deliberately choosing to join the Army without having all of the rights of a citizen returned seemed like slapping one's own face. The same persons probably would have

been willing to be drafted against his will. The choice of answering "yes" or "no" to many Niseis was a choice of showing a willingness or unwillingness to die for a country which had treated them unfairly. Backing up this unwillingness to die for his country was the conviction that he was right in taking such a stand. Behind this conviction was the fear of most men of going to war under modern conditions, where a person was at the mercy of modern weapons. The Nisei was able to cloak this fear with his indignation of being discriminated against. Moreover, with equal rights with other citizens refused him and with very little prospects that this state of affairs would be corrected soon, if at all, he could feel that he did not have much at stake even if he answered "no". Also, within the center the public pressure on him was stronger toward making him answer "no" than answer "yes". The formation of this attitude of unashamed fear of being drafted lead many families to stay in Tule Lake, from where they assumed that Niseis would not be drafted.

In general it can be said that the failure of the registration program in Tule Lake served to make the program following successful by placing it in the hands of the liberal elements within the administration and making the evacuees less likely to organize a resistance. The registration program also influenced a large number of evacuees to desire to stay in Tule Lake.

SECTION II. ~~CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT~~

~~II. The Plan~~ I. Announcement of the Plan.
~~III. The Denver Conference~~

I. Issuance of the Segregation Plan

If the registration program was planned and executed care-
lessly and ~~in a hurry~~ ^{hurriedly}, the segregation program was planned and
executed with minute care. Toward the end of May, a conference
of project directors was held in Washington, ~~where~~ ^{when} it was de-
~~clared~~ ^{announced} that segregation would be put into effect. It was also
decided at that time that Tule Lake would be chosen as the seg-
regation center. Coverley himself is said to have favored the
choice of Tule Lake as the segregation center, because of its
capacity and the large number of segregees (at least 5000) that
would be involved. The Project directors, however, were committed
to secrecy until full plans for the segregation program could be
published. ~~in order~~ ^(to avoid confusion) After the conference the
whole Washington office put its full energy into making minute
plans for the segregation program which were embodied in Admin-
istrative Instructions No. 100 and a voluminous manual on the
details of ~~how~~ the program should be worked out. In planning
even ~~details~~ ^{items} such as provisions for soap, baby food and dispos-
able diapers to be used on the train were ~~taken care of~~ ^{included}.

The concern of the Washington office over the possible rep-
etition of mistakes made during the registration issue was clear-
ly shown by the steps they took, ~~to avoid as many mistakes as pos-
sible~~. In the first place, the planning of the program and its
administration was put into the hands of the Community Management
Division, the division which seemed to be most sympathetic to
evacuees. The social welfare department, which was ~~supposed to~~ ^{presumably}

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be staffed with persons trained in dealing with human problems, was ~~to play~~ ^{assigned} an important role in executing the new program. ~~Some time was to be devoted to the education of residents~~ ~~There was to be sufficient time in which to educate the people~~ ~~on the nature of the program.~~ ~~and to give them an opportunity to think the matter over before coming to a decision.~~ The community analyst in each project was consulted beforehand as to their opinion of the effect of the segregation program. From the very beginning warnings were issued that force was not to be ~~used~~ ^{employed}, and that in case of a crisis, evacuee leaders were to be consulted. The project director of ~~Tule Lake~~ ^{Tule Lake} was advised:

"The project director of the proposed segregation center should be prepared for some opposition to the idea of moving on the part of these people. To physically force them to move would be to turn them into potential segregationists and so defeat the whole purpose of the segregation program. If a crisis arises, the project director should do all in his power to gain the assistance of evacuee leadership....."1 ✓

Lessons learned during the registration program were being put to use.

In some of the centers, the project director announced the segregation program to the staff and evacuee leaders, and made plans to cope with it. In Tule Lake, however, the project director maintained a strict silence both as to the possibility of the segregation program ~~being put into effect~~ ^{and as to} and Tule Lake being selected already as the segregation center. The news of the segregation program was released by a newspaper reporting Myer's appearance before the Dies Committee. Myer told the Dies Committee on July 7 that a segregation program had already been decided upon, but asked that the matter be kept confidential until

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plans were made for it. Since the news of the segregation program leaked out, an official announcement was made soon after by the WRA. In Tule Lake it was announced in the Dispatch on July 12.

The announcement indicated who were to be segregated, on what basis, and also hinted what segregation would mean. The announcement read in part:

revised group ① "The first groups to be segregated will be those who have asked for repatriation and had not withdrawn their requests prior to June 1, 1943, according to Mr. Myer's telegram.

"Others to be segregated will be those who are known to be disloyal to the United States or unsympathetic to the cause of this country, after individual hearings. This group will include persons with unfavorable records with intelligence agencies or with the WRA; those who answered the loyalty question in the negative or in such a way as to raise serious doubt about their loyalty, and those who refused to register and answer the loyalty question.

"The hearings are to be sufficiently thorough to satisfy possible legal requirements and to make certain that selections for segregation are justly determined.

"One relocation center, to be announced later, will be designated to accommodate all persons not eligible for leave. All residents of the other centers will be eligible for indefinite leave.

"A special appeals procedure will be available for residents of the segregation center.

"Segregation will be undertaken for the purpose of promoting harmony in relocation centers and to facilitate the program of outside relocation for loyal American citizens and law-abiding aliens now in relocation centers."

opposition to S.P. The possibility of segregation was discussed at the time of the registration program. There were hopes on the part of many who feared that the program might yet be put into effect that it might not take place. The community analyst, for instance,

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who had been asked to write a report on the possible repercussions from a segregation program was determined to fight to prevent such a program from being put into effect.¹ This opposition to the segregation program was general throughout the colony and among many of the Caucasian staff members. In spite of the fact that there was a great deal of antagonism created between those who registered and those who did not, not ~~very~~ many felt that the segregation program would do much to ~~make life within the center easier for those who were willing to decrease the friction among evacuees.~~ ^{of the latter, even,} be cooperative with the administration. ~~When~~ ^{When} members of the Planning Board were asked whether they thought much good would result ^{of the opinion that the segregation program} from a segregation program, they could only point out that a ~~would cause a~~ great deal of trouble would be caused without achieving anything favorable. ^{constructive results.}

Fears

One of the dominant opinions expressed by various individuals when the segregation was announced was that there was a possibility of another incident arising, comparable to the one during the registration. While some stated that there would be trouble, others thought that the people had learned their lesson and that they would avoid trouble this time. Another major fear was that families would be split as a result of the segregation program.

Anxiety

The people were anxious to know exactly who were to be segregated. Since it was announced that those who had repatriated would be segregated without a trial, there was a feeling on the part of many that it was unfair to them because many had taken out repatriation papers only to avoid having to register. Prior to the registration, only about 180 (individuals had taken out)

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individuals had taken out repatriation papers. Just prior to the closing of the repatriation procedure during the registration program almost 300 individuals took out repatriation papers, primarily to avoid having to register. After the registration program was completed and repatriation was again allowed, about 100 persons took out repatriation papers. After registration, however, some persons changed their minds and cancelled their application for repatriation, but by May only about 120 had done so. In other words, only about a third of the people who had taken out repatriation papers during the heat of the registration crisis had cancelled their hasty act. If the other two thirds were to be segregated without a trial, there was a fear that injustice would result.

When the segregation program was announced details of the procedure ^{or} ~~or~~ the reason for carrying out the program, were not released at the same time. The people were told that details of the programs would be announced later. Since there were no official explanation of the program, people began to give explanations of their own. Within the intellectual circle of both the administrative staff and the colony the most acceptable explanation of the program taking place was the influence of reactionary pressure groups in Congress. This explanation was plausible because the segregation program came on the heels of the activities of the Senate Investigating Committee and the Dies Committee, which resulted in a Senate resolution in favor of segregation of the loyal and the disloyal elements in the centers. Although no explanation of the segregation program was given at this point, the presentation to the public of this one, which seemed to be

the real one, presented certain difficulties for the WRA. As one staff member, who thought that segregation was the result of pressure brought to bear by reactionary pressure groups, said:

"Do you think that the WRA ought to admit that segregation is taking place because they 'butched' the registration and were being high-pressured by reactionary and Fascist pressure groups? Dies has always been a racist, and he's not satisfied with the brand of war we're waging at the present time. He wants to turn it into a race war!"¹

The more common explanation given by the evacuees was different, although just as plausible from their standpoint of view. At first a few vocal colonists began to say that the segregation program was being carried out in order to force the loyal ones out of the centers. This explanation was begun by the more vocal and argumentative Isseis.² Without an official explanation, even those who doubted that the WRA was ^{preparing} ~~getting ready~~ to ^{force} ~~throw~~ ~~help~~ ^{less} ~~people~~ ^{residents} out of the centers could counter-act this explanation.³

In the meantime, the administration did not seem to realize the seriousness of the interpretation the Isseis were making of the situation, ~~since~~ ^{it then did not realize that} ~~it would mean that many of them~~ ^{residents} would refuse to leave Tule Lake for fear of being thrown out of another center.

A week after the announcement of the segregation program, the Social Analyst said:

"Don't you think that perhaps it's best not to play up the segregation too much and make it seem so important?"⁴

Coverley's Meetings with Evacuee Leaders

On the segregation program there was more indications of cooperation between the Washington office and the various projects than on previous programs. The Community Analyst, for instance, had been asked to report on the possible effect of a segregation program. Similarly

1. JS Journal, 7-20-43, #2. See also 8-7-43, #1, 7-16-43, #3
2. JS Journal, 7-19-43, #3; 7-14-43, #2; 9-5-43, #6, 7-17-43, #4
3. JS Journal, 7-22-43, #2
4. JS Journal, 7-20-43, #1

ref.

rev.
there was much more cooperation between the administration and the evacuee leaders in Tule Lake. On July 15, Coverley called together a group of evacuee leaders to discuss the coming segregation program. Those invited to attend included Dr. Ichihashi (no official position in the Colony, but a professor from Stanford University), Kuramoto (President of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative Enterprises), Kihei Ikeda (influential member on the Planning Board), Noboru Shirai (Executive Secretary of the Community Council), Harry Mayeda (Chairman of the Community Council and the leading Nisei leader on the Project), Wallace Tsuda (Nisei and chairman of the block managers), and Rev. Tanabe (Christian minister, Nisei). From the Caucasian staff, Harkness (acting head of the new Community Management Division), John D. Cook (Reports Officer), and Silverthorne (Project Attorney) were present, probably because they were all scheduled to attend the Denver Conference.

Since details of the segregation procedure was not yet published, the discussion centered around the ways in which the program might be handled. It was suggested, for instance, since delegates often failed to bring back correct information to the people, meetings should be held in small enough unit for the people themselves to attend personally. A system of counselors for families was suggested to avoid block meetings and block decisions. There was a feeling that the meeting of project directors in Denver was not solely for the purpose of receiving instructions, but that there would be possibilities for making suggestions as to how parts of the program might be carried out

and there was a discussion of some of the demands that the project director might take to the conference. One demand suggested was that a trial should be allowed repatriates who wanted to change their mind since otherwise injustice would result in some cases. No definite conclusions were reached at this meeting, but more such meetings were promised.¹

On July 20 it was announced in the Dispatch that Tule Lake had been chosen as the segregation center. No particular reasons were given for this choice, although to many people it was not surprising because Tule Lake had the largest number of possible segregants and it was situated in a military zone. Along with this announcement, it was stated that there would be a conference of project directors in Denver on July 26 and 27, and that they would be in a better position to answer questions concerning details of the segregation program, after their return. People were warned not to "accept rumors as substitute for facts."

The reaction to the announcement that Tule Lake was to be the segregation center was varied. The attitude of those who were to be segregated seemed to be one of "I don't care".² Others taunted those who were going to be considered "loyal" and who would have to leave Tule Lake by telling them that they were fools, or that they were going to be thrown out of the centers eventually.³ There was a conspicuous lack of widespread fear of having to stay in Tule Lake, probably because a great many of those who had taken out repatriation papers had cancelled them, and they had had an opportunity to change their answers or regis-

1. JS Journal, 7-16-43, #3

2. JS Journal, 7-21-43, #3

3. Ibid, 7-22-43, #2, #4

ter late. Those who had answered "no" to Question 28 and those who did not register still had the advantage of a segregation hearing, at which time they would be able to decide one way or the other--whether to be considered loyal or disloyal.

The greatest repercussion of this announcement was on those who were to be considered "loyal" and had to leave Tule Lake. Reluctance was expressed about having to go through the trouble of packing and moving, which they had done twice before already.¹ This was especially true of those who were aged and weak, and felt that if they moved to another center, where conditions, they felt, were not as good as in Tule Lake, they would not be able to survive the ordeal.² Most of the people had adjusted themselves comfortably to Tule Lake, and they were not particularly desirous of going to another center at this time, in spite of the unpleasantness caused by the registration issue. There was discussion about which center they would be sent to, whether they would have a choice of centers, or not, and where they wanted to go. People began to go to the Social Welfare Department, 20 or 30 every-day to give their choice of center, hoping to receive first consideration on this matter. There was a fear on the part of some that by leaving Tule Lake, they were going to be called fools by those staying. They wondered whether they were going to be able to take all of their furniture and belongings and have their needs taken care of.³ Work in various departments was coming to a halt, and there was a feeling of futility on the part of those leaving to put any more energy into their work. Those

1. Ibid, 7-21-43, #6

2. See analysis of social welfare interviews.

3. JS Journal, 7-21-43, #11

4. Ibid, 7-22-43, #6, #8

who had put their energies into building up a department were dismayed by the thought that their work was going to be torn down by the segregation program.¹ A resolution was passed by Blocks 51, 52, and 53, all predominated by "loyal" individuals, to make it possible for the "loyal" ones to remain, but it only served to rouse the indignation of the segregants.²

There were still others who were not quite sure where they were going to stand when segregation actually took place--whether they were going to stay or to leave. They turned over in their minds the pros and cons of the two courses open to them.³ What were the chances of being thrown out of a center? Would Niseis in other centers be drafted? What would Tule Lake be like after the segregation program? Where would they be sent? Were they going to be given an opportunity to change their answer if they had already answered "yes" to Question 28? Were Isseis going to be considered loyal just because they said that they would be law-abiding?⁴ Was it safer to be considered loyal to America or to Japan? There was talk of splits between families on the stand they should take, and wounds in family unity incurred at the time of the registration issue but largely healed, were opened again.⁵ Both sides began to line up arguments why they should leave or stay, and bickering overflowed from private apartments and became the common knowledge of block residents.

The normal routine of camp life, however, was not upset very much. Since details of the segregation program would not be avail-

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1. Ibid, 7-22-43, #6, #8
 2. Ibid, 7-23-43, #1
 3. JS Journal, 7-21-43, #4; #12
 4. Ibid, 7-22-43, #11
 5. Ibid, 7-23-43, #2, #4

able till the first of August, discussions were apt to be half-hearted and decisions tentative. The breach between the "loyal" and the "disloyal," which had been arbitrarily opened at the time of the registration issue, was not reopened again. The alignments had changed somewhat, and the split between those desiring to leave and those desiring to stay was not obvious. Block residents took more interest in such activities as the softball tournaments, which was in full swing for boys, girls, and men.¹ At a meeting of the project director with the Isseis on July 12 in which they asked him questions, most of the questions concerned such matters as the lack of service in the hospital, the amount being spent for food, the difficulty of getting shoes. Only one person asked about segregation, and the project director replied that he knew no more than what was printed in the Dispatch.²

Second Meeting of Coverley with Colonist Leaders The second meeting of evacuee leaders with Coverley was called on July 22, with about the same individuals present as on the first conference. The meeting was presided ~~by~~ Harry Mayeda, who had arranged for the meeting, and who explained that the meeting was for the purpose of getting delegates from the project to the Denver conference acquainted with the feeling of the people. The hope was that the delegates could influence the policies and procedures by which the segregation program was going to be carried out.

Since Tule Lake had been announced as the segregation center, most of the discussion centered around this fact. The

1. JS Journal, 7-23-43, #1

2. Ibid, 7-13-43, #7

leaders were concerned for their own position as well as the injustice that was being done to those who had chosen to remain loyal. Serious discussion was held as to possibilities of having Tule Lake not be considered the segregation center. The writer, who attended the meeting, recorded it as follows:

"One of the first points brought up, first by Harry Mayeda and then by others, was the fact that the selection of Tule Lake as the segregation center was working hardship on the loyal leaders. The leaders were afraid that they would be blamed for the loyal ones being required to leave the center. They felt that they were entitled to some consideration--to some protection--for their cooperation. The point was brought out very clearly that taking out the loyal ones was penalizing them, and that the leaders would be called upon to bear the brunt of protests resulting from such disadvantages. Mr. Ikeda stated that one man had threatened his wife already. He also stated that people keep coming into the Planning Board office to complain. Some demand that the loyal ones, too, be given a hearing to change their answers if they wish to. Harry gave the example of a man in Ward V who took part in registering people. Since people kept coming to him with complaints, he made it a rule not to stay at home in the evening. When questioned as to the possibility of violence, Ikeda answered that it was very possible that this state of affairs could lead to violence. Harry envisioned the loyal ones being taken out of the center at the point of bayonet. (Ikeda later related one person in his block who declared that he would not move unless he were taken out at the point of a gun.) The loyal leaders protested that there was very little advantage in remaining loyal. It had been announced already that the treatment of individuals in the segregation center would not be very much different from that in any other center, except for the fact that they would not be allowed to leave the center. Harkness wanted to know whether the leaders desired to make conditions in the segregation center worse than in other centers. Harry's reply was that that would be unfair to the minors who would have to go along with their parents regardless of their own stands. Mr. Ikeda said that the loyal ones should be given some inducement, such as the choice of centers. Coverley's answer to this was that he couldn't promise anything right now".

Serious discussion was held as to the possibility of having another center constructed to house the disloyal, or in some way

make it unnecessary to move the "loyal". Coverley's reception to these ideas was rather cool, and the leaders had to make an effort to impress him with the fact that there would be a lot more "disloyal" persons than otherwise if the "loyal" ones were to be sent to another center. One person opposed the attempt to prevent the moving of the "loyal" on the ground that any consideration of the possibility of preventing the movement of the "loyal" out of Tule Lake would result in mass resistance, which would split the ranks of the "loyal" and also lead to a riot.

The Caucasians seemed to find difficulty in understanding why so many persons would prefer to remain in Tule Lake. Harkness asked whether the "loyal" ones who talked of staying in Tule Lake didn't consider the stigma that would be attached to them after the war. Wallace Tsuda answered this adequately by saying that the people had lost everything already, and consequently, they could not see how they could lose any more. To them it was just as good staying in Tule Lake for the duration as it was to move to another center and have to relocate. Coverley's understanding of the situation was rather shallow. He thought that the people did not want to leave because they did not want to part from friends and from established homes. The evacuee leaders pointed out some of the many reasons which would make people stay in Tule Lake, even at the expense of being branded "disloyal". The "disloyal" were laughing at the "loyal" people who were being forced to leave; they were afraid of being thrown out of a center; Tule Lake was considered the best center; people did not know the condition in other centers and were afraid of them; if they went to

a freer camp they would be spending too much money if they went to town.

Discussion was held on methods of choosing counselors to counsel families and to give out official information during the segregation program. There was no agreement on methods of selecting the counselors, but everyone agreed that it was a good idea to have counselors. Only Dr. Ichihashi thought that the people would select their own counselors, and that there was not need to have official counselors, an idea for which he had no support from the others present.

One evacuee leader asked that an explanation of the segregation should be made in order to keep down rumors. Coverley's answer was that he couldn't explain it because he didn't have any definite information as to what went on in Myer's mind when he decided upon segregation. He thought he would only add to the confusion by attempting an explanation. At best they could only make guesses. He suggested that the people wait till they received official word. Silverthorne thought that certain incidents and pressure groups could be given as possible reasons for the segregation taking place. All action was to wait until after the Denver conference. One concrete result of this conference was that the delegates were going to make an effort in Denver to see if they could not get the Washington officials to find some other place besides Tule Lake in which to put the disloyal ones.¹

Form 130 Misunderstanding Procedures for changing answers to questions on the registration form had been changed several times. At first the individual in question had to write to

¹ JS Journal, 7-23-43, #3

Washington directly, stating his reasons for wanting to change his answer. Then he was required to contact the project director, instead. A new procedure was outlined, whereby a hearing board would be set up in the project, but this had not been put into effect as yet. In the meantime, all of those who had answered "no" or who had not registered on time were not allowed to leave the project on seasonal or indefinite leaves.¹ On July 29, it was announced in the Dispatch that all those who wished to change their answer, those who registered late, those who cancelled their application for repatriation, and those who qualified their affirmative answer to Question 28 and desired a hearing in order to leave the project would have to fill out Form 130. Form 130 was an application for indefinite leave.

The Dispatch stated:

"It is not compulsory for those persons ineligible for leave to fill out form 130, however, filling out form 130 is a necessary step in obtaining release for those who desire it."²

This was the first of a series of misunderstandings which increased the belief on the part of many Isseis that the WRA intended to force people out of the centers if it possibly could. The first reaction on the part of the Issei on hearing of this procedure was that it was a scheme on the part of the WRA to get people to sign something which would force them to leave the center. At the time of registration, Isseis were asked to fill out applications for leave clearance, and many had refused to do so on the grounds that they did not intend to leave and did not want to commit themselves at that time and be forced to leave later. This time it seemed as though filling out of Form 130 was being

1. Ibid, 7-13-43, #6
2. Dispatch, 7-29-43

requested in return for the privilege of changing one's answer to the registration form. This was being interpreted as a scheme on the part of the WRA to force people to leave the center. It was difficult to assure anyone that this was not the case since there was no assurance from the administration that no one would be forced out of a center. Even if they were assured of such intentions on the part of the WRA, the people would not trust the word of its officials because administrative instructions have changed so often. A man came to the Planning Board office the day following the announcement to put in a complaint. He did not want to fill out such a form in order to change his answer.¹

The planning Board called up Mr. Huycke of the Leave Office, and inquired about the matter:

PB: "I would like to know why Form 130 is being used in order to apply for a hearing to change one's answer."

H: "I would imagine because it is necessary to apply for leave clearance in order to be cleared. I really don't know why Form 130 is being used. I believe it's only a technical procedure."

PB: "Then it's an instruction from Washington?"

H: "Yes.)

PB: "A fellow has come in to ask whether it would mean that he would be thrown out of a center."

H: "No, it doesn't mean that. If a person wants to be cleared he wants to be cleared because he wants to go out on indefinite leave, say to Chicago, or he wants to leave the segregation center for another Project. If he wants to go to Chicago, he can't unless he has an assurance of a job which is approved by the WRA officer. If he wants to go to another center, he has to be cleared first.

1. JS Journal, 7-30-43, #3

H

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PB: "But they are afraid of being forced to leave a center."

H: "There's no worry of that because you can't go out unless you have a job. And if the Government wants to throw the people out of the centers, they will be thrown out whether he signs a piece of paper or not. You weren't asked to sign a paper when you were evacuated or moved from the assembly center, were you?"

PB: "No, but the people are going to want to stay in here if they don't have some assurance that they will not be thrown out in the future. They will advise members of the family not to change their answers in order to be able to stay here, even though they themselves may have answered "yes".

H: (He doesn't get the point for a while, and then): "Yes, I see what you mean. There's a possibility that the loyal ones will be allowed to stay here with their families. We won't know definitely till we get reports from the Denver conference. But I don't think anyone would be allowed to change their answer from "yes" to "no"."

PB: "What I want is an assurance for the people that they will not be thrown out of a center if they don't want to leave. We might get such a statement from Washington."

H: "It's unnecessary to get a statement like that from Washington. If you read Administrative Instruction No. 22, you'll see that a person can't go out without being assured of a job."

PB: "But the Administrative Instruction can be changed, you know."

H: "The Government can throw the people out any time it wishes, for that matter."

PB: "Well, thanks a lot. We'll wait for further word of the Denver conference."

H: "Sure, I'd like to get down there some time and talk things over with you. Don't hesitate to ask questions."¹

In one block where this matter of having to fill out Form 130 was discussed, one man said:

"They were saying that you have to fill out an

application for leaving before you can change your answer. Crazy. Who's going to do such a thing, anyway."

His wife was a Kibei, and had answered "no" to Questions 28, and he probably did not intend to let her change her answer if it meant that she had to fill out Form 130 and stand the chance of being thrown out of a center.¹

Confusion was caused by the fact that there were to be two types of hearings--segregation hearings for those who had answered "no" to Question 28 or had not registered, and leave clearance hearing for those who had already changed their answers from "no" to "yes", those who had cancelled their application for repatriation, and those who had registered late. The Leave Office had made the mistake of putting out the announcement without knowing very much about it. It was not until August 6 that this matter was clarified in the first Rumor Clinic column:

ABOUT FORM 130

Q. Will the Application for Indefinite Leave, Form 130, be used to apply for a segregation hearing? If so, does this mean that those who leave this Center will have pledged themselves to relocate from the new center to which they are going?

A. No. In the first place, Form 130, Application for Indefinite Leave will not be used for segregation hearings. The notice which appeared a week ago in the Tulean Dispatch concerning the use of Form 130 was in error. Segregation is not for the purpose of forcing anyone to relocate, and there will be no forced relocation of anyone from the new relocation centers to which people choose to go. Relocation will be on a voluntary basis in the future as in the past. The only difference will be that persons remaining in the Tule Lake Center will not be allowed to go out from the center for the duration except under unusual circumstances.²

1. Ibid, 7-31-43, #3
2. Dispatch, 8-6-43

This misunderstanding, which was only the first of a series, brought out some interesting facts. One was the Issei's fear of being thrown out of a center. This attitude was strongly present at the time of the registration issue, and was one of the first to crystallize during the segregation program. [The other interesting fact is Huycké's inability to grasp fully the problem confronting the Japanese and his lack of sympathy for their plight. He seems to take it for granted that Japanese ought to be satisfied with reduced privileges. These attitudes seem to go hand in hand, and are characteristic of those who are unsympathetic toward Japanese.]

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III Denver Conference: Official InstructionsThe Delegation.

The conference held in Denver for project delegates was primarily for the purpose of giving instructions to delegates as to how the segregation program was to be carried. The Washington office had carefully worked out details of the program and had provided a bulky manual, which specified how the whole program was to be carried out. This was a blow to delegates who had hoped to be able to participate in the making of parts of the program to insure smooth functioning. This was especially true of the delegation from Tule Lake, which hoped to have Tule Lake changed as the segregation center. However, because the plans had been made carefully with consideration for the welfare of the people that had to be moved and otherwise inconvenience, even the delegation from Tule Lake returned, not entirely dissatisfied, to their project with the detail of the procedure.

The delegation to the Denver Conference from Tule Lake included Coverley, the Project Director; Harkness, Acting Head of the Community Management Division; Carter, Harkness' assistant; Dr. Jacoby, Chief of Internal Security; Dr. Opler, Community Analyst; Silverthorne, Project Attorney; and John D. Cook, Reports Officer. The first thought in the minds of the delegates was to get Tule Lake changed as the segregation center in order to avoid trouble. They expected a great deal of trouble if the loyal ones were expected to move from the project. Various members of the delegation discussed this matter with higher officials from San Francisco and Washington. Opler, for instance,

according to his own account, discussed the matter with Embree and Provinse the evening before the conference took place. He impressed upon them that the people in Tule Lake had not been prepared by the project director for the segregation program since he had not revealed the fact to anyone on the project that such a program was to take place. They had not known that Tule Lake had been chosen as the segregation center, either. They found out that at Manzanar an educational program had been carried on for two months to prepare the people for the impending program. Embree felt that Tule Lake might not have been selected as the segregation center if he and others had known of local conditions in Tule Lake. Opler was angry because his reports on the possible effect of segregation on residents in Tule Lake had not reached the higher officials because they were too busy setting up procedures. He felt that the segregation program had been planned without consulting local conditions. Coverley, however, had been consulted earlier at the Washington conference, and he was reported to have favored having Tule Lake as the segregation center.

However desirable it was to have another center besides Tule Lake as the segregation center, it seemed that too much of the plans had been made to make such drastic changes. The possibility of getting one or two assembly centers to use as segregation centers was discussed. But even the train schedule had been worked out with the Army, and the Tule Lake delegates had to realize that the conference was largely one where they received instructions, and not where they offered suggestions in working out the procedures, as they had hoped. The Tule Lake

delegates appealed to Myer, but they failed to get Tule Lake changed as the segregation center.

The best that the Tule Lake delegates could manage at the conference was to bring back some "concessions" for the loyal ones who had to leave Tule Lake. Probably the greatest concession was the careful way in which plans had been worked out, taking into consideration human problems. For instance, it was decided that crating material would be supplied free of charge, and arrangements had been made to provide special food, soap, and disposable diapers for babies. As far as possible those leaving Tule Lake were to have their choice of center. A special relocation team was to be sent to Tule Lake during the segregation program and during that period all outside jobs were to be sent to Tule Lake first to give the people there priority on outside jobs. The other project directors also agreed to save quota of jobs for people from Tule Lake. Sleeper accommodations were to be provided for those who were aged or ill, and those who could not travel were to be allowed to remain in Tule Lake until they were well.

Also, Administrative Instruction No. 100 was amended so that the project director could recommend persons who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to the Director to be excepted from the category and allowed to reside in some other center besides Tule Lake.¹

Why Segregation? Officially the WRA never made public the statement that the segregation program was taking place because of pressure of certain reactionary groups. Rowait, Acting Direc-

1. Supplement to Administrative Instruction No. 100

tor, in his speech to colonists in Tule Lake denied this fact specifically. Many officials with the WRA, for instance, felt that the segregation program would not have taken place had it not been for pressure from such groups as the Dies Committee. Many of the delegates to the Denver conference from Tule Lake held this point of view. A more positive reason for segregating the loyal from the disloyal, however, was given by the administration. This was well-expressed by Myer, in a forward to a pamphlet explaining the segregation program:

"The War Relocation Authority is responsible for the welfare of all the people of Japanese ancestry who live in relocation centers. The execution of this responsibility is made more difficult by the fact that some of the relocation center residents have indicated that they are neither loyal to this country nor sympathetic to its war aims, while the great majority have indicated that they wish to be American. The War Relocation Authority has an obligation to each of these groups, and it also has an obligation to safeguard and further the national interest.

"After long and serious deliberation, the decision has been made that the responsibilities of the War Relocation Authority can best be fulfilled if a separation is made between those who wish to follow the American way of life, and those whose interests are not in harmony with those of the United States.....

"Segregation offers promise of giving to those evacuees who want to be American the opportunity to live as Americans and to express their Americanism without interference; it should result in increased assurance of harmony in the relocation centers; it should increase public acceptance of those granted leave clearance, and thus aid in the relocation of these people."¹

In other words, officially the segregation program was being carried out to allow those who want to be American a chance to live within a center without interference and to increase

1. Segregation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Tule Lake Relocation Center, p. 3-4, August, 1943 (Referred to as Segregation Pamphlet)

public acceptance on the outside. Some WRA officials chose to believe in line with this explanation that the segregation program was being carried out for the good of the evacuees. Still others, however, still believed that it was a program forced on the WRA by reactionary elements and that it meant unnecessary suffering for the Japanese people.

Basis for Segregation The segregation program recognized two groups who were to be separated. Casually they had been referred to up to this time as "loyal" and "disloyal". For the purpose of carrying out the segregation program it was necessary to define these two groups more accurately. The difficulty in defining these two terms to suit the situation was shown by the fact that different synonyms were employed by the administration at different times, and different interpretations were made by different officials. Roughly speaking, two different bases were employed at different times to designate the two groups which were to be separated. One was political, and on this basis loyalty conveyed the traditional concept of the term to mean siding with one country rather than another. Such an interpretation was employed in various announcements made by both the Washington and project administration:

".... All relocation center residents found not to be loyal or sympathetic to the United States will be moved to the Tule Lake Center, and those Tule Lake residents found to be American in their loyalties or sympathies will be moved to other centers or, preferably, given permission to relocate outside. The population of the relocation centers after segregation will be composed of those whose interests are bound with the welfare of the United States, and who therefore are eligible to move from the relocation centers to outside communities.¹

1. Ibid, page 3-4. In a foreword by Myer.

"From time to time, because of changing conditions, the War Relocation Authority must make certain changes at the relocation centers. Such a change has recently been announced in regard to the Tule Lake Center. This action has been taken in order to provide a place of protection and promote the general welfare of all evacuees who prefer to live in Japan or are known to favor the cause of Japan in the present hostilities or whose loyalties do not lie with the United States.

"You have by your acts and declaration indicated that your loyalty and future lie with the United States."¹

"The persons to be segregated consist of people who prefer to be Japanese; that is, those who favor Japan in the present war and who wish to go to Japan now or when the war is over. Because of this, they are to be segregated from persons who look to the United States as their country and their home."²

Along with the political interpretation of loyalty and dis-loyalty was an interpretation based more on cultural factors. This interpretation was presented to the People in Tule Lake by Rowalt, Deputy Director of the WRA:

"You perhaps will want to know why we decided upon the segregation policy. I want to assure you that it was not born because of public clamor which we have heard of the last six to ten weeks. As we all know, there are in relocation centers, two separate groups of people, those who look to the United States as their future home, and those who look to Japan as their future home. Very naturally, there will be a conflict of interests between these two groups. We cannot be fair to either one by having them all mixed together. It is not fair to those who want to be Japanese in their culture and in their way of living to have to live with those who want to be Americans. It is not fair to those who want to be American to have to live with those who want to be Japanese in their way of life.....³

The tendency was for the official pronouncements to be couched in terms of political loyalty, whereas the cultural interpretation was ~~directed more~~ ^{emphasized more often} when explaining the program to evacuees.

The parallel use of these two interpretations showed the

1. From a letter from the project director to evacuees on the removal list.
2. Administrative Instruction No. 100, July 15, 1943
3. Tule Lake, August 3, 1943.

predicament in which the WRA found itself. On the one hand, it had to deal with the critical public, which could think only in terms of definitely "loyal" and "disloyal" evacuees. To satisfy this group, the WRA would have to carry out the segregation program on the basis of political "loyalty" or "disloyalty," which would mean the segregation of persons who were considered "dangerous" to the United States. On the other hand, the WRA had to deal with evacuees themselves, for whom "loyalty" and "disloyalty" was not a clear-cut issue. Practically none of the Niseis, for instance, would have refused to be drafted and fight for the United States prior to evacuation, in spite of the discrimination they had received both inside and outside of the Army. Now that they had been removed from their homes on the Coast and placed in government camps, many refused to take the chance to being drafted, even going to the extent of declaring themselves to be "disloyal" to the United States. The majority of the Isseis refused to give up their "loyalty" to their country, for one reason, because they were not able to become American citizens, but more because of their concept of "loyalty" as a fixed relationship between a citizen and his country. Under these circumstances, it would have been unfair to the evacuees to apply the terms "loyal" and "disloyal" strictly because so many other factors entered in to make them declare themselves "disloyal". On the other hand, the outside public would not have been satisfied unless segregation was effected on the basis of political "loyalty" and "disloyalty." The use of the two interpretations based on political and cultural preference can be considered a manifestation of this predicament of the WRA.

In the official announcements, the WRA gave the impression that evacuees had been or would be given a chance to express their choice of loyalty, and that it would not be something enforced on them. This was revealed in the use of such terms as "those who want to be Japanese" or "all evacuees who prefer to live in Japan". This matter of choice, however, was illusory for many individuals, since it was presumed that those who registered in February and March and had answered Question 28 had already signified their choice of "loyalty." The pamphlet explaining segregation stated:

"Those persons of Japanese ancestry now in relocation centers have had the opportunity to state their individual choices, and to back their statements by their actions."¹

In other words, the actual basis for segregation was different from either the political or cultural interpretation given by the administration, and further complicated by the fact that at the time the choice of "loyalty" was supposed to have been made, no hint of its use as a basis for a segregation program had been made.

It should be remembered that Question 28 for citizens was a "loyalty" question, asking if he would swear loyalty to the United States and forswear "loyalty" to all other countries. On the other hand, Question 28 for aliens was a law-abiding question, asking if he would abide by the laws of the United States and do nothing to interfere with the nation's war effort. One of the fundamental sources of confusion was the consideration of both questions as being equally applicable to its respective category. This

1. Segregation of persons of Japanese Ancestry in Tule Lake Relocation Center, page 5.

assumption was explained in the pamphlet as follows:

"In recognition of the fact that many alien-born evacuees are prevented from being loyal American citizens only by legal technicalities, and that some individuals who legally are American citizens actually are sympathetic to Japan in the present war, the process of segregation will be conducted without regard for citizenship."¹

In other words, it was assumed that for an Issei to answer "yes" to Question 28, asking if he would be law-abiding was considered the same as a Nisei answering "yes" to another Question 28, asking if he would be "loyal" to the United States. This assumption apparently disregarded the fact that any Issei who registered and answered Question 28 at all, in practically every case, answered "yes", that he would be law-abiding, and that this question did not serve to separate the "loyal" from the "disloyal", or those who wanted to be Japanese from those who wanted to be American.

The segregation procedure created four distinct groups, based largely on application for repatriation or expatriation and on answers to Question 28 on the registration form.

Group I.

"Persons who will be designated for segregation without further hearing. This group includes those persons who made formal application for repatriation or expatriation before July 1, 1943, and did not retract their applications before that date."

Group II.

"Those persons who, on the strength of their answers to Question 28 or their refusal to answer the question, would appear to be loyal to Japan rather than to the United States. Each of these persons will be asked to appear before a Board of Review for Segregation which will ascertain whether the evidence of pro-Japan-

1. Ibid, Page 5

III
ese loyalty correctly represents the attitude of the individual. This group includes those who answered "No" to Question 28 and who did not change their answers to "Yes" before July 15, 1943; those who refused to register; those who registered but did not answer Question 28.

"The hearings before the Board of Review will be comparatively brief. Those persons found by the Board to continue to hold to their pro-Japanese views will be designated for segregation. Those who sign a statement of loyalty to or sympathy with the United States at the hearings will be reclassified to Group III for further hearings on eligibility for leave clearance."

Group III.

"Those persons who may have stated their loyalty to or sympathy with the United States, but whose loyalty or sympathy is in doubt because of previous statements or because of other evidence. This group includes:

- a. Those reclassified from Group II.
- b. Those who answered "No" to Question 28 at the time of registration but who changed their answers to "Yes" before July 15, 1943.
- c. Those who qualified their affirmative answers to Question 28.
- d. Those who requested repatriation or expatriation but retracted their requests before July 1, 1943.
- e. Those about whom there is other information indicating lack of allegiance to the United States.
- f. Those who have been denied leave by the Director.

"Persons in Group III as outlined above will be given hearings by the Leave Section at the relocation center with sufficient thoroughness to enable the Leave section to determine the true loyalty of each individual, and to decide whether or not he should be declared eligible for leave. The leave clearance hearings may be held at the transfer center after the actual movement of non-segregants."

Group IV.

Those who are eligible for leave. (Not to be segregated.)¹

1. Ibid, Page 6-7

Those who were to be segregated in Tule Lake included the following:

- a. All those in Group I.
- b. Those in Group II found by the Board of Review to be not loyal or sympathetic to the United States.
- c. Those in Group III who are denied clearance in their leave clearance hearings.
- d. Those in Group IV who wish to remain with members of their immediate families.

Segregation Procedure The procedure for carrying out the segregation procedure was carefully outlined in a bulky manual. Those in Group I were to be segregated without a hearing, except for cases given special consideration by the project director and given approval by the Director. Those in Group II were to be given a segregation hearing. These hearings were to be "comparatively brief", and it was decided that "no persons in this category shall be considered loyal to the United States unless he expressly changes his answer to Question 28 to an affirmative and satisfies the Project Director that the changed answer is bona fide".¹ There were discussions of considering loyal even some who refused to change their answer to the affirmative, but it was decided by the Director that a person would have to be responsible for the answer he gave.² In other words, those who had put themselves on the side of the disloyal either by answering "No" to Question 28 or by not registering were to be given a chance to change their answers to the affirmative if they wanted, or refuse to change it if they so wished. This was on the grounds that at the time of registration loyalty was not the only issue

1. Amendment to Administrative Instructions No. 100.
2. JS Journal August 2, 1943, #1

involved, since a feeling of protest against evacuation, pressure from the community, parents, and friends, fear of being drafted, fear of being ousted from a center, all affected the decisions of those who placed themselves in Group II. Those in Group III and IV did not have the benefit of a segregation hearing so that they were not able to change their answers from the affirmative to the negative. This was based on the assumption that anyone who registered in the affirmative in spite of pressure from a large part of the community could be considered loyal. Those persons in Group II who were considered loyal automatically fell in Group III as a person who had changed his answer or registered late.

Those in Group III, however, were still under probation. They were not to be released from a center until they were given a thorough leave clearance hearing by the Leave Section to determine "the true loyalty of each individual, and to decide whether or not he should be declared eligible for leave".¹ These leave clearance hearings could take place during or after the movement of segregants and non-segregants from and to Tule Lake. Presumably an individual in Group III could stay in a center indefinitely without being given a hearing as long as he did not apply for leave clearance.

Each person to be transferred from Tule Lake (Group III and IV) was to be interviewed by the Welfare Section. This interview was to determine the following:

1. Preference of centers to move to from among the following: Granada, Minidoka, Central Utah, Heart Mountain, Jerome, Rohwer.

2. Whether such person was able to travel, and if so, whether special accommodations were necessary. Those who could not travel were to be allowed to stay in Tule Lake with members of their immediate families until they were able to travel. The medical officer on the project was to determine whether a person was able to travel or not.

3. What members of the immediate family wished to accompany him. Those in Groups I and II could not leave Tule Lake, but those in Groups III and IV could stay members of the immediate family who were to be segregated.

An interview was to be arranged by the Welfare Section in other centers for those being segregated and sent to Tule Lake. A priority was established for the order in which they would be moved to the segregation center. First were those in Group I. Second were bachelor Kibeis in Group II and those in Group III who were denied leave clearance. By bachelor kibeï was meant "a male citizen evacuee, unmarried as of the date of this instruction, who has spent a total of three or more years in Japan since January 1, 1935".¹ Third were all others who were to be moved to Tule Lake.

In order to correct any injustice which might result from the segregation process, an Appeals Board was to be established to consider cases of persons living in the Tule Lake Center. Those in other relocation centers could be sent to the segregation center after the segregation program was over by filing an

1. Administrative Instruction No. 100, Page 5

application for repatriation or expatriation or by being refused leave clearance. In other words, a person's status as resident of the segregation center was by no means final. There would be opportunities to appeal for a hearing and to be assigned to a relocation center. Unfortunately, no clarification was made as to how stringent the Appeals Board would be in allowing changes.

Only those in Group IV were eligible for direct relocation from Tule Lake to the outside, since those in Group III had to await leave clearance hearings before they could relocate. Arrangements were made for a special staff from various relocation offices on the outside to be in Tule Lake to offer the latest jobs and to encourage those in Tule Lake to relocate directly rather than to go to another center. Concessions offered for direct relocation included payment of grants without question and the movement of all of the freight of the individual and his family without any weight limit.

Checkable baggage was to be limited to 150 pounds per full freight ticket. Creating material was to be furnished by the WRA free of charge. Evacuees were to be warned that the freight might not reach the destination for sixty days.

The following train schedule for trains leaving Tule Lake was published:

September	10	Central Utah
	11	Heart Mountain
	15	Central Utah
	17	Heart Mountain
	18	Granada
	20	Central Utah
	23	Heart Mountain
	25	Central Utah
	26	Granada
	29	Heart Mountain

October 1 Jerome
3 Jerome
5 Minidoka
9 Minidoka
11 Jerome
15 Minidoka
19 Minidoka

There were also 28 trains coming in from other centers which were schedule to arrive between September 13 and October 29. According to this schedule the segregation process was not expected to end till the end of October.

Attitude Toward the Segregation Center While under ordinary circumstances, especially during wartime, "disloyal" would have been synonymous with "undesirable" or "potentially dangerous", the administration tried to avoid giving this connotation to the future residents of the segregation center. This attitude is best illustrated by explanations from Myer:

Nature of the Segregation Center

"The persons to be segregated consist of people who prefer to be Japanese; that is, those who favor Japan in the present war and who wish to go to Japan now or when the war is over. Because of this, they are to be segregated from persons who look to the United States as their country and their home. The segregation center is very definitely not a punishment center, nor is it a place for trouble-makers. Leupp is our isolation center for those purposes.

"It is most important that the function of the segregation center be made clear to both segregees and non-segregates. Residents of the centers are much more likely to cooperate with the program when they understand its nature and it is made clear to them that they program is in no sense a punitive measure".¹

"The program of segregation is not being undertaken in any sense as a measure of punishment or penalty for those who will be moved to the Tule Lake Center. The War Relocation Authority recognizes the integrity of those persons of Japanese ancestry who frankly have

1. Segregation Manual

declared their sympathy for Japan or their lack of allegiance to the United States. While the privilege of leave will be denied to those assigned to the Tule Lake Center, this privilege would not have been available to them had they remained in their present center".²

As far as the WRA was concerned regulations in the segregation center was not going to be very different from those operative in other centers. The major difference was to be the fact that residents of the segregation center would not be eligible for leave. Also, there would be no provisions for self-government, although a representative advisory council of evacuees would be recognized. Only in special cases would visits to the center be allowed. The Army was to be responsible for external security only, and the internal control would still remain in the hands of the WRA, with the help of evacuees. American elementary and high schools were to be provided, but attendance was to be voluntary. Other types of schools, such as Japanese language schools, would be allowed, but no financial aid would be given by the WRA. Adult education and vocational training classes would be provided. Freedom of religion would be maintained, except for Shinto, which was not regarded as a religion by the Japanese government. The hospital would be maintained as in the past. A community newspaper would be maintained in English or Japanese or both. Employment would be voluntary and at the same rate as in other center. The Consumer Cooperative Enterprises would continue to operate.

In other words, the administration made an effort to make the segregation center free of unpleasant connotations. In the first place, it was not going to be a concentration camp with

2. Segregation Pamphlet, Page 4

a minimum of privileges, as was requested by some of the pressure groups. The WRA was acceding to the demand for a segregation program, but not to the creation of a concentration camp. As far as possible, living condition within the segregation center was going to be the same as in relocation centers. In the second place, the WRA was not going to attach any stigma on residents of the segregation center. The critical public demanded that the "disloyal" be identified and segregated. The WRA acceded to both, but refused to place emphasis on the "disloyalty" of the segregants. They would be guarded and not be allowed to leave the center for the duration, but they would not be punished. Here again we see the efforts of the WRA to adjust its desire to treat the evacuees justly and humanely to pressure from reactionary elements. The reactionary pressure groups had demanded that the disloyal be placed in "concentration camps". The answer of the WRA seemed to be that they would be segregated but not placed in concentration camps.

Four reasons were given for having chosen Tule Lake, rather than any other center, as the segregation center:

- "1. With a capacity of over 15,000 persons it is expected to be able to accommodate all those who will be segregated.
2. The farm is well-developed and will provide food and employment on a large scale for residents of the center.
3. The Tule Lake Center has more residents who will be designated for segregation, thus reducing the total number of persons to be moved in the segregation process.
4. The center is located in the evacuated area where escort requirements have increased the cost and difficulty of outside relocation".¹

1. Segregation Pamphlet, Page 12

It should be noted that no mention was made as to whether Tule Lake was the worse center or not. In fact, the residents of Tule Lake felt that their center was one of the best--especially in regards to weather condition. If a center like Poston had been chosen as the segregation center it would have been less likely that people would have looked forward to going to, or remaining in, the segregation center. Also, while a policy of reducing work opportunities on the various project was put into effect in order to encourage relocation, the fact that the farm in Tule Lake would provide work on the project was mentioned. The selection of Tule Lake as the segregation center and the attitude of the administration toward it resulted in making it seem a more desirable center to live in than was justified by actual circumstances and future developments.

Raymond R. Best The future course of the segregation center rested to a large extent on the new project director replacing Coverley, since the project director was given a great deal of leeway in the way he chose to run his center. Raymond R. Best was appointed project director of the Tule Lake Center on August 1. He had been successful in administering the isolation center at Leupp, where he won the confidence of the residents there. Before that he had spent six months in the Minidoka Relocation Center. From the delegates drifted back reports to the project that Best was a "darn good man". He was credited with a liberal point of view when he declared to some project directors: "If these men whom you sent to Leupp are the bad ones, what sort of persons do you have in the centers--saints?" It was reputed that he was so popular in the isolation

center that persons there didn't want to be sent back to their own center. He even allowed some of the residents in the isolation center to go out on indefinite leave.¹ All of the reports about Best's ability to administer the segregation center was favorable.

These instructions given to delegates to the Denver Conference were contained in a bulky manual, half a dozen of which were distributed to each project. The delegates were faced with the task of digesting all of this material and conveying it to members of the staff and to evacuees, as well as to start the segregation program into motion. Train movements were to begin the first part of September, and they had only a little over a month in which to make preparations. To aid in explaining the segregation program to evacuees, reports officers remained in Denver after the conference to write up a pamphlet² explaining the segregation program in non-technical terms. For the benefit of the Issëi, a Japanese translation was to be prepared. The whole program was planned so that there would be sufficient time and means to prepare the people for the program.

1. JS Journal, August 2, 1943, #1

2. Referred to as Segregation Pamphlet by writer. Actual Title: Segregation of Person of Japanese Ancestry in Tule Lake Relocation Center, WRA, Washington, D. C. August, 1943.

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III. The Scope of the Segregation Program

The scope of the segregation program in Tule Lake was much greater than that of the registration program carried out earlier in the year. In this program practically every group who had connections with evacuees played a part in it. Critics of the WRA were instrumental in forcing it to carry out this program. The Senate passed a resolution advocating that such a step be ordered by the President. Plans were worked out for the program by the Washington office, and they were transmitted to local project officials. Within the local administration a struggle went on between the liberal and the reactionary elements for control over the situation. Best, the new project director and the unknown quantity in the situation, at first sided with the liberal elements which was allowed to handle a large part of the program but later went over to the side of the reactionaries. There was also a struggle between the local officials and workers from Washington and other places. The Army had a hand in the program since it was responsible for the transportation of evacuees and also for guarding the segregation center more closely than before. There was a good possibility that if the WRA could not keep order within the segregation center that the Army might be allowed to take it over. Every evacuee was involved in the program. If he were to be segregated, he would have to face the stigma of being branded as disloyal, the inability to leave the center, the possibility of being deported after the war. If he were not to be segregated,

he would have all the trouble of packing and getting ready to move, the need to face the uncertainty of going to a strange center, the possibility of not being able to stay in a center for long.

The Issei-Nisei struggle in many families came to a sharp focus since most Niseis did not want to stay in Tule Lake and many Isseis insisted on so doing. All of the forces worked toward segregating the Kibei--especially the bachelor Kibei--in Tule Lake. The stage was again set for agitators and would-be leaders, although the mass was unwilling to be swayed as they had been during the registration program. Niseis who identified themselves with America parted company with those who identified themselves with Japan, while those on the borderline were forced to make up their minds one way or the other, often by circumstances outside of their control. The segregation drama was therefore carried out on a stage crowded with actors.

While the registration program would have been relatively simple to understand if it had been explained thoroughly, the segregation program was both difficult to understand and covered a more extensive array of activities. There were a number of phases of the program which had to be carried through simultaneously. The first task, of course, was to prepare the people for the program. The task of getting information from the delegates, to staff members, to evacuee workers, and then to the mass of people was extremely difficult. For this purpose, ample time was not available, for segregation hearings for those in Group

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II began about the tenth of August. Social welfare interviews began soon after for those in Group III and IV, and then for those who completed segregation hearings and placed in Group III. People had to make decision without a full understanding of the program. By about August 25 it was necessary to start making up train lists for the first trains, which were schedule to start leaving on September 10. The fact that train schedules were changed by the Army and the first train lists discarded the the period in which to complete the segregation program shortened to end early in October did not help matters any. For each train list many requests for changes had to be considered, and changes made for the more urgent cases. A sizable number of resistance cases appeared among those who were on the removal list and special attention was given them to assure that it did not develop into an organized resistance. At the hospital, a check-up had to be made of all those leaving and special consideration had to be given to individuals desiring sleepers or claiming inability to travel. Arrangements had to be worked out to construct boxes and provide crating material for those leaving, to pick up freight and baggages, much of which had to be done by volunteer workers. After September 10, a group of about 500 had to be sent out of the project almost every other day until September 30. After September 19, groups from other centers had to be inducted into the center and assigned to living quarters until October 9 (except for groups from Manzanar to

arrive later). It was probably not an exaggeration to say that the scope of the program was staggering, and not surprising that there were signs of disorganization throughout the program.

To complicate matters, a relocation program was started along with the segregation program in an attempt to relocate as many as possible of those in Group IV, instead of having them move to another center. This program only increased the belief on the part of the people that the segregation program was only another means of relocating people. A rivalry was developed between the protagonists of the two programs--the segregation program was handled by the liberal elements on the Project, while the relocation program was the field of the more reactionary group on the project. The fact that the project newspaper was devoted almost wholly to the relocation program did not help the segregation program.

To accomplish these two programs other activities within the project ^{were} generally halted, but not entirely. Recreational activities were greatly reduced. The Adult Education program was stopped. Schools were closed during the segregation program, not to reopen till after the completion of the program. Even the hospital service was reduced to take care of only emergency cases. In the political field a representative body of the community was organized and bid for power with the already existing Planning Board, but neither was able to carry on any significant activity. A hurried visit by a representative of

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the Spanish Consul produced only disappointment among the Isseis. As people left the project and newcomers arrived, the composition of colonists and the nature of the center gradually changed.

Thus we see the wide scope that must be covered to describe this period of transition from a relocation center to a tightly guarded segregation center. [For the sake of convenience, each phase of the period covered by the segregation program will be taken up separately. As much as possible a chronological scheme of presentation will be followed.]

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IV. Educational Program

IV. Educational Program

Introduction

The educational program preceding the actual segregation movements was considered very important both by Washington and by the local WRA officials. It was felt that if the segregation program was carefully explained, residents of the centers would be much more likely to cooperate. The problem for delegates to the Denver Conference was to return to the center to explain the segregation program first to the staff members, then to evacuee workers connected with the program, and finally to the mass of people who were to be separated into segregees and non-segreges. The explanation to the staff and evacuee workers would not be difficult because of their ability to understand a program of this sort without being confused by rumors. It was difficult to explain anything to the mass of people without having fears and rumors distort the whole picture. Even the relatively simple registration program was greatly misunderstood by a large number of people.

The educational program, however, was still more complicated by lack of unity and clarity of the presentation by the delegates returning from the Denver Conference. In some cases, the official interpretation as presented by the Washington office did not coincide with the interpretation given by the delegate himself, and resulted in two sets of interpretations being presented to the people. In other cases, the explanation given

officially did not agree with facts. In still others, the explanation was incomprehensible to evacuees, who naturally did not see things from the same standpoint as did the staff members.

For instance, from the very beginning there was disagreement on the part of delegates and staff members as to why segregation was taking place. The official explanation was that it was a positive program to be fair to both the disloyal and the loyal groups--to allow one to live the Japanese way and the other to live the American way. The more liberal interpretation, however, was that the segregation program was a means of appeasing the more reactionary elements of the public--more specifically the Dies Committee and reactionary senators. This latter interpretation was adopted by the more liberal elements on the project, which constituted the bulk of the delegation from Tule Lake. Opler, Jacoby, Harkness and Carter all accepted this point of view. This explanation of the segregation program, however, was considered unpresentable to the public since it would involve an admittance on the part of the WRA that it was forced to take an action which it did not want to take. Consequently, the official explanation was made public without too much conviction, and what was considered to be the real explanation was circulated only among the more intellectual circle of evacuees. Within the Appointed Personnel, the official explanation was accepted by those who did not have sufficient sociological insight into the political situation which shaped the policy of

the WRA, and who could only interpret instructions from Washington liberally. This was most likely to be true of staff members who did not have close contact with evacuees and understand them well. Dr. Pedicord and Huycke, Leave Officer, well illustrated the latter group.

A similar confusion rested in the interpretation of the basis for segregation. The reason accepted by the public was one based on political loyalty. The Washington office also presented a cultural basis for segregation. Actually, however, segregation was to be based on the results of the registration program, which did not necessarily reflect loyalty or disloyalty. This fact was probably best understood by the more liberal members of the staff and by evacuee leaders. Since all of these points of views were presented simultaneously, it added to the confusion aroused in the minds of the people.

The Washington office also implied that the people would be able to make a choice of loyalty, but actually those in Groups I, III, and IV did not have any choice in the matter at the time the segregation program was announced. This was a deep source of concern to Isseis, who had merely answered "yes" to a question asking whether he would be law-abiding, and who did not want to pledge loyalty to the United States. Till the very end, this contradiction on the part of the administration confused the issue.

The Washington office also insisted that no stigma would be attached to the segregation center. Some staff members interpreted

ininterpreted this literally. The more liberal members of the staff, however, insisted that a great deal of stigma would be attached to the segregation by the public. Both of these views were presented to the people, who tended to believe the view that suited their point of view best. The official stand made it difficult for leaders to convince the people that they would do well not to choose to remain in Tule Lake.

Another important source of confusion was the difference in interpretation of the word "loyalty" by Japanese and Caucasians. To the Japanese it was a fixed relationship which could not be changed as long as he was a subject and citizen of Japan. The interpretation of the Caucasians seemed to be more in terms of where a person desired to live, Democracy vs Fascism, and the like, where there was leeway for a choice. Even some of the liberal members of the staff did not understand the feeling of the evacuees on this matter, and made explanations that confused the people.

The presentation of this confused mass of material was left largely in the hands of the delegates to the Denver Conference. The educational program was put in charge of Carter, who had liberal ideas. He also had an understanding of mass psychology, since he had worked in the field of labor relations. This was fortunate for the success of the educational program because he and his staff was sympathetic toward evacuees, had friends among their leaders with whom they could discuss matters, and believed in putting over the segregation program by the use of persuasion rather than force.

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The time allowed for the presentation of the educational program was not as sufficient as some people from the Washington Office assumed, certainly there were^{no} "ample opportunities" in the next 6 to 8 weeks to get all of your questions answered."¹ Soon after the educational program was begun, segregation hearings were begun. This meant that people had to decide whether they should declare themselves loyal or disloyal without knowing fully the consequences of either decision. The welfare interviews were also started for those in Group III and IV and people had to decide to which center they wished to go without having any official information as to what the other centers were like. Since the important decisions were made at these two interviews, many people had to decide the future for themselves and their families without the benefit of a complete understanding of all of the factors that should have been considered. Not only was there not sufficient time to present the confusion of material, it was insufficient to combat the rumors and fears that seized many people.

When the delegates returned from the Denver Conference, a series of staff meetings were held to report the instructions received at the conference. These conferences were held for the appointed personnel and also for evacuee workers in different departments. Opportunities were allowed for questioning, and one question that was asked of Dr. Jacoby was what would happen if people insisted on not leaving the center. His answer was, as recorded in one minutes, that "Everyone who an-

1. A statement by Rowalt, August 3, 1943

swered 'yes' will not be forced to leave Tule Lake. However, everyone who has the opportunity to leave the segregation center will be expected to leave".¹ Another version that was circulated was that people would not be forced out at the point of a bayonet. This was Dr. Jacoby's interpretations of the instructions that he had received at Denver. This reply gave the impression that people did not have to leave if they stood their ground firmly, making an opening wedge for the resistance to being moved from the center.

Rowalt-Best Meeting In general evacuees waited patiently for the first news of the segregation program from the delegates. Rumors had been circulated for weeks that the purpose of the segregation program was to encourage relocation and many people half believed this. The scrutiny of the official announcement to the mass of people would be made from this standpoint. The initial announcement to the public of details of the segregation program was made on August 3 at the outdoor stage. A large crowd, made up of old and young, gathered to hear the speakers. Carter acted as the chairman for the evening, while the two speakers for the evening were Rowalt, Deputy Director of the WRA from Washington, and Best, the new project director. The translator for the evening was Mr. Tsuda, a warden.

Mr. Rowalt had come from Washington to present the official account of how the segregation program came to take place and what it would mean. First he outlined how the WRA had been studying the policy for over a year, how it was decided at a meeting of project directors in Washington on May 24 to June 1,

1. Minutes of Staff Meeting of the Community Activities Section and the Social Welfare Department, August 4, 1943.

and how the Washington staff put their full time into working out the details before the Denver Conference. Then he explained the cause and basis for segregation in the following manner:

"You perhaps will want to know why we decided upon the segregation policy. I want to assure you that it was not born because of public clamor which we have heard of the last six to ten weeks. As we all know, there are in relocation centers, two separate groups of people, those who look to the United States as their future home, and those who look to Japan as their future home. Very naturally, there will be a conflict of interests between these two groups. We cannot be fair to either one by having them all mixed together. It is not fair to those who want to be Japanese in their culture and in their way of living to have to live with those who want to be Americans. It is not fair to those who want to be American to have to live with those who want to be Japanese in their way of life. The presence of these two groups has led to some decisions. It also has led to public misunderstanding of the position of those persons who want to become and remain Americans, for those who go out on relocation are not always fully accepted because of the presence in the centers of those who want to become Japanese in their culture and in their way of life.

"I suppose that the results of the registration period led inevitably to a segregation program. It brought to a sharp focus into the public eye the presence of these two groups of people of which I have spoken and led to a public demand for a separation."

Then Rowalt went in to explain why Tule Lake had been selected as the segregation center, and the relocation possibilities being offered those who were put at a disadvantage by having to leave Tule Lake. Then in an attempt to clarify the rumor that people would be forced to relocate, he said:

"The purpose of segregation is in no way connected, as I have heard the rumor stated, to forcing persons to relocate against their wishes. It is the primary policy, of course, as you all know, of the WRA to aid you in every way possible to get relocated during the war-time period. We think that is the best solution to this problem. But we do not wish to force anyone to relocate.

The purpose of relocation is to make it as easy as it is possible, and not to force anyone to move from a center against his wishes. We know that there are many among you who do not wish to relocate during the war period. So, as a representative of the Government, I can make no promises beyond the appropriation period set by Congress. That means that I can, here and now, guarantee your residence in a relocation center, if you choose that way, until June 30, 1944, but I cannot as a public servant say what the Congress will do beyond that fiscal year. That determines what they will do during the next year. I must say that during the last year, Congress very graciously gave us every penny we asked for in the operation of the relocation centers. I might also add that the Congress of the United States endorses and approves of our program of relocation outside of the evacuated areas."

The speech by Best, the new project director, was aimed primarily at establishing his relationship with the people. The speech was short and easy to understand, whereas Rowalt's speech had been long and rather technical at points. It had a ring of friendliness, as when he said:

"I have come to stay. Mrs. Best and two of our boys are already living here."

He assured the colonists that he wished to cooperate with the people and suggested that "if you people will select and name a working committee on segregation, who will work with our administrative committees, it will be very beneficial to you all". the main point of his speech, however, was his clarification of what the future of the segregation center will be like. Here he painted an optimistic picture, which was suggested by the instructions given at the Denver Conference. He said:

"Many of you want to know what the policies of the segregation center will be. We can assure you that no major changes in policy have been contemplated. We will have good schools, good hospital standards will be maintained, the WRA will have complete control of the administration of the center as in the past. What regulations

will be enforced outside of the center we do not know at this time, but the army does not have any new duty within the center. The one thing which we do know about is that visiting or leave privileges will be extended only in very particular cases that the National Director can grant exceptions. I assure you that our entire administrative staff desire to be of service to you. Bring your problems and your troubles to us and we will do our best to assist you in any manner possible. I, particularly, at this time, want you to know that we desire to keep the Tule Lake Center a decent, livable, and peaceful community."

The initial presentation of the details of the segregation program was complicated by the difficulty in translating the material and ~~getting~~ ^{presenting} it to the Isseis without distortion. Since the program was planned as soon as the delegates returned from the conference, there was difficulty in getting a translator. Finally, the services of a Mr. Tsuda, Investigator for the Internal Security Division, was secured. Mr. Tsuda was a citizen in his late thirties, but he was more like a young Issei in every way. He spoke Japanese fluently, and did not understand English fully. His thinking was also more like an Issei's than a Nisei's. On top of that he was scheduled to be segregated here in Tule Lake, thus making it likely that he would present the viewpoint of one who was staying. As a translator, Mr. Tsuda was ~~not an~~ ^{a poor} ~~excellent~~ one. His difficulty in translation was complicated by the fact that he was not prepared beforehand with a copy of Mr. Rowalt's speech, that the speech was long and the translation was done at the end of the speech, and that Tsuda allowed his biases to enter into the translation.

In giving his translation, Tsuda gave the impression that it was the desire of the WRA to get as many people out of the center as possible. He stated, for instance, that as early as May, 1942,

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the WRA desired to get people out of the centers. Rowalt had merely said that segregation had been discussed as early as May, 1942. Tsuda stated that the segregation was taking place because it was unfair to the loyal group to be kept with the disloyal, and made it more difficult for them to resettle. Then he explained the concessions being made to the loyal group in terms of aid to those who wished to relocate directly, the impression was given that the segregation program was only another aspect of the more important resettlement program. Then when he explained that no one would be forced to relocate, it sounded as though no one would be forced to leave a center, that they could either stay in or leave Tule Lake as they wished. Then he stated that since the matter of appropriations was in the hands of Congress, residence in a center could not be guaranteed beyond June 30, 1944. All through his speech, Mr. Rowalt avoided the use of the term "loyal" and "disloyal", but the translator insisted on using them throughout his translation--employing the words "chusei" (loyal), "fuchusei" (disloyal), "chusei-ha" (loyal faction), "fuchusei-gumi" (disloyal group), and the like. This gave the interpretation that segregation was to take place on the basis of political "loyalty" and "disloyalty". At the same time Rowalt's statement that one camp was to be for those who wanted to return to Japan and who wanted to remain Japanese and the other camps would be for those who wanted to be American and lead the American way of life was presented in the translation.

On the other hand, Best made a very short speech, and Tsuda found no difficulty in remembering all of the things that had

been said. In fact, Tsuda took more time in giving the translation than Best did in giving his speech.¹

Evacuee Reaction

The effect of the Rowalt-Best meeting on the people was far-reaching and one which was never wholly counteracted. Niseis who were present at the meeting noted the discrepancies in the translation presented by Tsuda. Since they understood the English version better than they did the Japanese translation, they were able to see the whole segregation problem somewhat in the manner presented by Rowalt. Moreover, they were not worried very much in the first place whether they would be forced out of a center and it was logical to them that the government should attempt to determine whether they were "loyal" to the United States or not. Consequently, the amount of distortion of the material presented by the administration was not as great among Niseis as it was among Isseis. Even among Niseis, however, some claimed that the purpose of the administration in carrying out the segregation program was to enable them to get more people out of the centers, which was true in a way.

The material presented by the administration was confusing, it was mis-translated, and many Isseis added their own biases in comprehending what they heard. While the more intelligent and intellectual Isseis did not make as many errors in understanding the true nature of the segregation program as did the less intelligent Isseis, nevertheless the points of confusion were definitely channeled. In the first place, they received the impression from the translation that the WRA was ~~getting~~ preparing to throw evacuees out of the centers. They felt that

1. For a full discussion of the Rowalt-Best meeting, see JS Journal, August 4, 1943, #1

their stay in a center was guaranteed them only until June 30, 1944. As one block manager said the morning after the meeting:

"The people in this block were saying this morning that it was going to be better to stay here, after what they heard last night. The thing that they were worried about most was whether they would be allowed to stay in another center or not. They got the impression that after a year they would be thrown out of a "loyal" camp."

He himself, however, was intelligent enough to see that while no one could guarantee that the centers would not be closed, it was unlikely that anyone would be thrown out of one against his will. This became plausible to him when it was pointed out that there had been mistakes in the translation.

This fear of being thrown out of a center is well illustrated by one Issei couple. They had lived as domestics for over 15 years, and consequently identified themselves quite strongly with Caucasians. Also, they had no children to worry about and were thinking about going out to work if opportunity presented itself. At any rate, they wanted to work several years in this country before they made up their minds definitely to return to Japan. In spite of these ties with America and with Caucasians, the couple was greatly confused by Rowait's speech. In spite of the fact that the husband was intelligent and a religious leader (Seicho-no-Iye) he suspected the WRA of getting ready to force the loyal ones out of the centers. He said:

"They mean to tie up the disloyal ones here, don't they, so they can't get out? Isn't that being done to make people want to leave this place and get out of the centers? They know very well that Japanese don't like being stamped as being 'disloyal'."

The couple did not know whether they should stay in Tule Lake and

stand the chance of being considered "disloyal", or go to another center and then be forced to go out to work. They hesitated on taking the latter step because they were afraid that the Caucasians on the outside would be hostile to Japanese while the war was in progress. When it was pointed out that going to another center did not mean that they would be forced to leave it, the wife said:

"But I hear that after June, 1944, we aren't going to be allowed to stay".¹

Since this fear of being thrown out was true of this couple who had associated with Caucasians and who had no children to worry about, it was much truer of other Isseis who had practically no contact with Caucasians and who had small children to worry about.

Another worry that seized the Isseis was the fact that those remaining in Tule Lake were going to be considered, not only "disloyal" to America, which they did not mind so much, but also as those who wanted to be Japanese or return to Japan. This worried ~~those who planned to leave Tule Lake~~ ^{did not relinquish the idea of someday} ~~them~~ because most of them ~~wanted to return to Japan at some future date~~ ^{returning} and it sounded as though they were renouncing their claim to being a true Japanese by leaving Tule Lake. The block manager put it in this way:

"If segregation is going to mean that they are going to separate the people who want to be 'Japanese' and those who want to be 'American' a lot of people are going to think twice before they leave this place".²

The following conversation is indicative of the confusion caused among Isseis by the segregation program:

"I understand that in those families where there is a split the loyal ones aren't going to be allowed to stay here."

1. JS Journal, August 4, 1943, #5; August 6 #5
2. JS Journal, August 4, 1943, #2

~~IV~~

"Yes, they say that they are going to send them out first, and perhaps return them later on."

"Why do they go to all that trouble. Why don't they let them stay here in the first place."

"They're trying to get as many people out of here as possible. How can you expect them to send anyone back here?"

"This is a big problem. If we leave this place, it's going to mean that we are loyal to America and not loyal to Japan. We are still Japanese citizens. The only reason we were able to come to America was because Japan allowed us to. That stamp on our passport is something we have to be thankful for and which we can't forget."¹

This fear by Isseis of being considered "disloyal" Japanese was to continue till the very end, and those remaining in Tule Lake continued to claim that they were "loyal" to Japan while those who left the center were not.

Another impression that Isseis received from the speeches was that Tule Lake was going to be a fairly livable place. Best had said that there would be very few changes in policy. Rowalt said that one reason for the choice of Tule Lake as the segregation center was the abundant work opportunities offered by the farm here. From their appraisal of the situation, many Isseis could not see much advantage in moving to other centers. For one thing, they would be assured of being able to stay in Tule Lake for the duration, while there was a good possibility of being thrown out of another center. In Tule Lake there would be abundant work opportunities; while in other centers they would proceed to reduce the number of work opportunities. It was a disadvantage, of course, not to be able to leave the center when one wanted to, but many of them did not intend to go out, anyway. They were

1. Ibid, August 6, 1943, #5

assured that otherwise the segregation center would not be greatly different from other centers. This was one reason why many Isseis thought that it was better to stay in Tule Lake than to leave.

Another impression that the people got from Tsuda's translation was that they had a choice of either staying in or leaving Tule Lake. There were differences of opinion on this score, but many people were under the impression that they had this choice. As one Issie said right after the meeting:

"It's all very simple. Those who want to stay can stay, and those who want to go can go."

Later on at the time of the welfare interview and on other occasions it was revealed that many people thought that Best or someone else had said that they would not be forced to move if they didn't ^{not} want to.¹

Rumor Clinic
Immediately after the meeting the seriousness of the mistakes in translation was pointed out to the administration by certain evacuee leaders, but nothing effective was done to counteract the majority of the wrong impressions that were given at the meeting. The following day Best's speech was reprinted in full and Rowalt's speech on in part, both in English. A Rumor Clinic was started by Opler, the Social Analyst, under Best's name, to clarify some of the rumors that were floating around. The following were attempts to counteract the rumors that were floating around after the Rowalt-Best meeting.

"Q. Is it true that the other nine centers will be closed down immediately following segregation, thus forcing those leaving the Tule Lake Center to relocate?

1. Tulean Dispatch, August 6, 1943

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"A. The WRA has no present intention of closing down the other nine centers, and there will be no forced relocation of their inhabitants. The Congress of the United States has appropriated all the money WRA asked for to operate the centers for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, and there is no reason to believe that the Congress will not continue to appropriate money for the operation of the relocation centers so long as the centers are necessary."¹

"Q. If an Issei answered "Yes" to Question 28 but wishes to go to Japan after the war, is it necessary for him to move to another center at this time?"

"A. Yes."

"Q. Is the WRA Relocation Authority forcing relocation by means of segregation?"

"A. The War Relocation Authority is not forcing relocation through segregation but is emphasizing relocation for those who would have to move to another center, from whence they would eventually relocate."²

Loyalty-Dishonesty Questions

There was a necessity of releasing the details of the segregation procedure to the people. A pamphlet had been promised by the Washington office and it was to be printed in Denver after the conference by reports officers and sent immediately to all of the projects. A Japanese translation was going to be made of this pamphlet for the benefit of the Isseis. In the meantime, the only items on segregation printed in the Dispatch were excerpts of the Administrative Instructions No. 100, explaining the different categories from Group I to IV, and the rumor clinic items. In the excerpts from Administrative Instruction No. 100, it was stated that:

"The Tule Lake Relocation Center in the State of California is designated as the center which is set apart for the residence of persons of Japanese ancestry residing in relocation centers who have indicated that their loyalties lie with Japan during the present hostilities."³

1. Tulean Dispatch, August 6, 1943
2. Ibid, August 7, 1943
3. Tulean Dispatch, August 5, 1943

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In the translation those to be segregated in Tule Lake were referred to as:

"Genzai shinkochu no senji ni saishi jibun wa
Nihon ni taishite chusei de aru koto o shijiseshi....."

Retranslated in English this would read:

"Those who have indicated that they are loyal
to Japan in the present war....."

This item stated very clearly that those who remained who in Tule Lake were to be considered "loyal" to Japan. The reactions of Isseis to this interpretation differed. Some felt that it did ~~not~~ apply to Isseis at all, but only to Niseis. Others insisted that it should not apply to Isseis, but were afraid that it did. Still others were wondering whether they had ~~not~~ better stay if they were to be considered "disloyal" to Japan by leaving. Those who definitely made up their minds to stay were most likely those who believed that they were being "loyal" Japanese by staying, whereas those who were thinking of leaving were of doubtful "loyalty".

Speaker's Bureau
A speaker's bureau was organized to speak on segregation before organization and to ward units. The speakers included: Harkness, Jacoby, Elberson, Silverthorne, Carter, Gunderson, Cooke, Lowery, and Montgomery.¹ At one of the ward meetings the most important question asked was that concerning the inappropriateness of the use of the word "loyalty" to Isseis. A request was made at that time to have some other word besides "loyalty" used.² By means of having speakers in each ward and answering questions at the end of the meeting, the whole project was covered once, giving details of the segregation procedure.

1. Tulean Dispatch, August 7, 1943
2. JS Journal, August 11, 1943, #1

IP
Social Welfare Department

On August 6 the Social Welfare Department, under the leadership of its supervisor, Dorothy Montgomery, began its training program for its interviewers for the welfare interviews. At the first staff meeting Montgomery and Gifford from Washington explained the segregation procedure, including the nature of the welfare interviews. Most of the interviewers were Niseis, and a number of Caucasians were included in the group. The questions asked at this meeting revealed the attitudes of the evacuees and the administration. The question that drew the most interest were the ones dealing with the possibility of resistance to movement, being forced out of a center, and with the matter of loyalty for Isseis.

As one of the interviewers put the question on the possibility of being thrown out of a center:

Q. "This question was asked by someone close to the people. 'Can it be guaranteed that the other centers will not be closed?'"

Montgomery's answer was:

A. "Let's stop and think about how much anyone can guarantee anything. We can't guarantee that Congress will appropriate the money to keep the Army going. We can't guarantee that they will keep the United States Treasury going, because it's up to Congress to vote the money. We are just the same as any other agency. As far as we know we have no reason to believe that any relocation center will be closed up."

Miss Gifford, who worked closely with Myer, assured the interviewers that there was no intention on the part of the WRA to force anyone out. However, the best assurance she could give of this fact was:

"You'll have to take my word for it."

This, of course, was not a very strong reassurance to the people, who had heard so many broken promises and had seen so many changes in WRA policy.

Another important question was what should be done if a person insisted on going to a certain center or staying in Tule Lake, or insisted on not leaving Tule Lake at all. The evacuees were feeling out the possibility of not having to move, although it might not have been necessarily for themselves. Montgomery said:

"Then you'd have to explain the advisability of making a second choice, because otherwise we might have to make that choice for them."

The person who asked the question answered:

"But it was explained that we aren't going to be forced out at the point of a bayonet?"

Montgomery turned the question over to Gifford, who said:

"We don't want to threaten anybody. And we don't want to make selections for people. But I suppose one of the alternatives is that we'd have to designate a center for such individuals. We might choose a place of that sort, then I don't know how the administration is going to handle it. There are going to have to be enough space made here to accommodate those coming in."

Gifford implied that force might have to be used if necessary to get people out. Jacoby's answer to a possibility of a family's staying when it should leave was:

"We have been told which groups are to move and which groups are to stay. There are no techniques outlined that I know of which will allow those who should leave to stay. It is felt that if enough reasons are gotten out about what segregation is about, such cases will not appear."

In answers to these questions, no one stated that force would be

used in getting people out of the center. They were not told that they could stay if they wanted to, but the possibility of staying was implied.

Another question that bothered some interviewers was the matter of applying the term "loyalty" and "disloyalty" to Isseis. One interviewer asked whether it meant being "disloyal" to Japan if he went to another center. Jacoby answered:

"No, I don't think so. I don't think the choice has international implications. They can be loyal Japanese subjects and show a desire to live in the United States with their children."

He seemed to show a good insight into predicament in which the Issei found himself. Gifford answered:

"We have to watch out for people who aid Japan as far as the war is concerned. But still they can have concern for relatives in Japan. The fact that they have that concern is not enough to show disloyalty to America."

Her answer showed that she did not know the exact nature of the predicament in which the Issei found himself. She seemed to be interpreting the situation without the help of intimate knowledge of evacuees.

When she was asked:

"Can we take disloyalty to mean whether a person is dangerous or not dangerous?"

she answered:

"I think it's a very good way to put it, don't you think, Dr. Jacoby?"

to which Dr. Jacoby answered:

"Yes."

This explanation, however, was confusing because people in Tule

~~11~~
Lake were assured that the segregation center was not going to be for the dangerous or troublemakers, since they were sent to Leupp. The instructions from Washington which might have seemed clear at the time they were written, were meeting difficulties in the face of these questions direct from evacuees.

One question that was asked, which is worth noting, was whether a person could leave the segregation center later. The answer was that an appeal board would be set up to consider applications for change of status.

To the question, "Will there be stigma attached to the people here?" the answer by Montgomery was:

"As far as the public is concerned, they may attach a stigma to staying here. We have to be realistic about it. We may not want to, but the public may."

The answer to this question reversed the official stand, which insisted that there would be no stigma attached to those remaining in Tule Lake.

Another question which elicited discussion was: "Is it possible to return to the center after going out on indefinite leave?" Montgomery answered the question in the following manner:

"It's on the same basis as before. If he can show a good reason, he can come back."

When the question was asked again, she said:

"Relocation offices have guaranteed jobs and housing. If they do not come through, then they have no recourse except to allow them to return."

The retort was:

"It depends on what kind of housing and job."

The answer was:

"The guarantee involves only temporary ^{house's} jobs and only ordinary jobs."

The question was pressed again:

"Is it really hard to come back? How difficult is it?"

The answer was still:

"I think that if a person really couldn't get along, he could get back."

The conclusion of the person asking the question was:

"It sounds to me as though it's pretty hard to get back."

Another question asked more than once was what would happen to minors or those who were "loyal," but preferred to stay in Tule Lake with their parents. The answer was that their citizenship would not be taken away from them and that an appeals board would be set up to take care of such cases.

Other questions were directed toward finding out the details of the segregation procedure, such as the possibility of inspection of baggages and freight, getting of crating material, whether the WRA would pay expenses for relocating after a person goes to another center. These questions can be looked upon as an exploration on the part of evacuees of alternative adjustments to make in order to take the best possible step. The administration officials were trying to answer all of the questions, but in some cases were finding difficulty in clarifying the issue.¹

Information Centers On August 10, Information Centers were set up in four different places to impart official news on segregation to the general public. This was done in order to

1. JS Journal, August 10, 1943, #1, #2

counteract rumors which were spread by people without accurate information. It was the hope of the administration that people would come to these centers to verify any rumor they might have heard. These centers were staffed with several evacuee interviewers and with a Caucasian supervisor. Any question which could not be answered on the spot were to be referred back to the administration. On the first day only a few people appeared at the centers to ask questions, and this continued all through the segregation program. Even only a few of the people who lived in the block where the centers were located took the trouble to come to the center to find out for themselves the official stand on matters. The general trend was for Niseis to patronage the information centers more than Isseis. Questions which could not be answered on the first day at the center at 2508 were questions relating to Niseis:


- "1. Are any boys of Japanese ancestry to be drafted?
2. If a boy stays in Tule Lake, can he volunteer into the Army, provided his record is clear?
3. Are people notified if their application to change answers have been accepted?"

There should have been a great many questions that people wanted to have answered, since the Dispatch published very little information about the segregation program, the pamphlet that was promised had not been issued, and there were very few sources of information. However, the information center was not successful in disseminating a volume of information to a large number of people.

Slip in Translation On August 10 a serious slip was made
1. JS Journal, August 12, 1943, #1

in the translation of an English phrase in the Japanese Section. A chart was printed in Japanese to show who were in Groups I, II, III, and IV, and the relation of these groups to the segregation hearing, the segregation center, other centers, leave clearance hearing and relocation. This was a translation of a chart, drawn by Dr. Jacoby, and posted in various places for the benefit of both the staff members and evacuees.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
PLAN OF SEGREGATION MOVEMENTS



SR-1-VII-25

In the translation, the words "Persons Denied Clearance" was translated: "Gaibu iju o kyohi seru mono." This meant: "Those who refused to relocate". The translation should have read: "Gaibu iju o kyohi serareshi mono". This was another one of the series of slips which gave Isseis the impression that the WRA meant to force people to relocate. Those who saw this item were given the idea that if they went to another center they would be asked to relocate, and that if they refused to do so, would be sent right back to Tule Lake. The conclusion, therefore, of some people was that if they were going to be sent back to Tule Lake anyway (since they didn't intend to relocate), it was better not to move in the first place. This mistake was rectified on August 13 in the Dispatch. The damage had already been done, however, since some Isseis claimed that the original statement was the correct one, and that the WRA was only trying to cover up the truth. This slip in translation did not reach all of the Isseis by any means, since some of them did not know anything about it. It was most widely circulated among those who intended to remain in Tule Lake. Among those who planned to leave the supposition that the majority of the people would be leaving Tule Lake was not uncommon.¹

Because of this mistake in translation, John D. Cook, the Reports Officer, was reprimanded by Best. It was discovered that he had not taken care to see that the translations were being made correctly. The Community Analyst claimed that the Reports Officer did not know that there could be a great deal

1. JS Journal, August 13, 1943, #2

of difference in translations. Cook tried to blame the translators and fire them all, and they in turn threatened to resign their position because of Cook's attitude. The matter was solved without anyone losing his position. An official translation board was set up in the Planning Board, which was to pass on all official translations of important items in the Dispatch. The translation board included Mr. and Mrs. Yoshida, Executive Secretary and secretary of the Planning Board, Kihei Ikeda, and Rev. Kitagawa, all of whom were on good terms with the Community Analyst. This was a successful move on the part of the liberal elements to gain some control over the Dispatch. This incident brought to a sharper focus the antagonism between Cook and the liberal elements, and eventually lead to Cook's handing in his resignation.

Tulean Dispatch The project daily newspaper showed clearly the gulf between those who were handling the segregation program and the reports officer and those whom he favored. Day after day a great deal of space was given to publicizing relocation opportunities. The Reports Officer himself wrote editorials advocating relocation. On the other hand, he did not write anything himself to clarify the segregation programs. All of the items concerning segregation were written either by Carter or Opler, and they were usually given smaller space and headlines than were those on relocation. When the WAC recruiter came into the project, a three page write-up was given to the matter, which probably interested only a handful of persons, whereas the immediate matter of segregation which concerned everyone

vitally, went generally unheralded.¹ This was especially unfortunate in view of the fact that the pamphlet which was supposed to answer all of the questions on segregation had not arrived from Denver, and the Reports Officer was the only one on the project who knew the contents of that pamphlet, since he stayed behind to work on it. It was not until August 20 that the printing of the description of various centers was begun, and by this time the majority of the people had completed their welfare interviews and had made their choices of centers to which to move.

Pamphlet The pamphlet explaining segregation was promised to the people during the week of August 8.² It was held up in the mail, however, and the English version was not ready for distribution until the following week. In the meantime, segregation hearings were begun on August 11 and welfare interviews on the 12th. For the Niseis the pamphlet was not quite as necessary as it was for Isseis. But the Japanese translation did not arrive till almost the end of the month. Then it was found that the translation was too direct and would cause further confusion if published in its present form. For instance, the term loyalty was applied to Isseis as well as Niseis and translated "chusei". The translation board felt that the term "chusei" should be avoided because Isseis would not want to be considered "chusei" to American and not "chusei" to Japan. Consequently, even where the original English version used the term "loyal to this country" in the project translation, the term "prefer the American way of life" was employed. In this way, an attempt was made to avoid confusion on the part of Isseis caused by direct

1. Tulean Dispatch, August 17, 1943
2. Tulean Dispatch, August 4, 1943

translation. However the use of the word chusei was used in scattered parts of the translation. Also, the official translation was direct, awkward, and difficult to understand, and in the project translation simpler words were used. This Japanese translation, however, was not issued until August 28, when it was much too late to do much good. This was realized by the administration, since there was some discussion about the wisdom of not publishing the Japanese version. Publication was decided upon, however, since the people had been promised a Japanese translation of the pamphlet.

Best's Speech On August 15, Best made his second public appearance ~~on the project.~~