

## WAREHOUSE CONFLICT REPORT

Hunt, Idaho

### CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

#### A. The Significance of the Conflict

The labor conflict that broke out in the warehouse area on the Minidoka Project in April, 1944, can be considered a major event in the social history of the project. In the first place, it resulted in an unprecedented phenomenon--the forced resignation of an assistant project director who attempted to impose his will on evacuee workers. This was attempted with the help of a number of Caucasians within his influence and who were considered unsympathetic to evacuees, and the outcome of the conflict was a serious blow to this element within the administration, which had thus far met with no major check on its attitude. This upset for certain administrative personnel was a victory for the newly formed Community Council, for whom this conflict was the first major test case of its status on the project. The Council had replaced the administration-dominated block managers as the major leadership organization on the project, and had shown that the administration could not impose its will freely on the residents in total disregard for their feeling and interests thus receiving the approval of many residents. This establishment of status by the Council, however, was only made possible by a corresponding recognition by the project director, and subsequently by other members

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of the administrative personnel, that the Council was a political force which could not be ignored. At first, it seemed as though the project director were going to attempt to dominate the Council, as it had the system of block managers. In the midst of the conflict, however, he changed his attitude toward the Council, gave adequate recognition to its recommendations, and collaborated with the Council in checking the group of administrative personnel who were disrupting his own orders to them for a status quo until difficulties were ironed out. The plan of the Washington office to create a representative body of the residents to iron out difficulties with the administration had evidently succeeded, and the fear of the project director, the administration in general and even among some residents, of giving political power to evacuees was replaced by a more optimistic outlook.

### B. Method of Writing the Report

The contents of the report will be divided into two sections. The main body of the report will be preceded by a section describing the participants in the conflict. This will eliminate the necessity of giving a description of a participant in the middle of the report. It will also serve to give, not only a background of the individual in question, but through the individuals and groups concerned, the political<sup>1</sup> background on which the present conflict rests.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Defined broadly as pertaining to relationships between groups and individuals.
  2. For a complete background history leading to the present conflict it will be necessary to refer to reports of various past events, only a number of which are available.

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The bulk of the report will be given in chronological order, showing what the participants did overtly and covertly. Attempt will be made to include all available material either completely or in condensed form. Both the choice of a chronological sequence and attempt at completeness are adopted as means of retaining as much objectivity as possible.

With increasing experience on the project it is becoming possible to point out the possibility of the use of certain concepts and the possible significance of certain behavior. An Attempt will be made to introduce cautiously some of these personal observations. Wherever possible attention will be called to them, to avoid confusing them with factual data, which will occupy the bulk of the report. The introduction of these observations is now considered desirable by the writer to show the development of concepts and perhaps of biases, which should be recorded along with the incident itself.

For the purpose of the report the warehouse conflict has been broken up into the following five periods:

1. February-April 1, 1944. Disbanding of the Central Service system leads to a labor conflict.
2. April 2-18. Attempt to remedy the situation results in wholesale terminations.
3. April 18-20. An emergency solution is worked out between the Negotiation Committee and Stafford.
4. April 20-25. The emergency settlement is disrupted by more terminations, and Stafford and the Council collaborates on another emergency solution with

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an evacuee labor supervisor.

5. April 25-<sup>May 31</sup>30. Miller resigns, and the conflict is dissolved.

## CHAPTER II. PARTICIPANTS IN THE WAREHOUSE CONFLICT

### A. Washington Office

The Washington Office was interested in the establishment of a functioning Community Council in the Minidoka project. Minidoka was the last of the projects to establish a Council, and Washington brought pressure to bear on the local administration to establish a political group representing the residents. According to Kimball, representative from the Washington office, the objective was to create a "balanced structure," whereby a constant adjustment of evacuee needs would be made possible through a representative body. This meant that the recommendations of the Council would have to be taken into serious consideration and the Council given a definite status on the project. On the other hand, the same body would be entrusted with the task of explaining the position of the administration to the residents. To establish the Council the Washington office brought pressure to bear on the local administration to give it status. In line with this attempt, the function of the block managers was reduced to that of a clerk, leaving the political field open for block commissioners and councilmen.

### B. Stafford

Stafford, the project director, was skeptical of placing political power in the hands of evacuees. The history of

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the project up to this point clearly showed the attempt made by Stafford to keep evacuees from gaining political power. The opposition to self-government, to the organization of the block, the reduction of the number of block managers all indicated his skepticism. Instead of a formal system of representatives of the residents he preferred to deal with a small number of informal leaders, over whom he had control. While he indicated willingness to Washington officials to give the Council due status, he also aired the view more privately that he meant to keep the Council under control. It was not very clear whether he meant to do this by dominating the Council through administrative power accorded a project director, or by more subtle means of winning the friendship of the Council. His reputation for being "dictatorial", however, made the former method seem quite likely.

Stafford showed that he liked certain members in his administrative staff and disliked others. All evidence point to the fact that he thought highly of Miller's efficient management of his duties. Since early this year Miller displaced Davidson as the Acting Director in Stafford's absence. On the other hand, Stafford did not think highly of Davidson as an administrator. Men in Davidson's division like Connor and Olson were also not on good terms with Stafford.

### C. Administration

The administration in Minidoka has often been described by outsiders as being very childish in their quarreling relationship to each other. Early in the history of the

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project cliques had been formed, and some of them had been on antagonistic relationship with each other. Among the assistant project directors, for instance, Davidson, head of the Operations Division, and Miller, head of the Administrative Management Division were constantly having conflicts. Ford of the Property Control Section (Miller's division) had quarrels with Connor and Olson of Central Service (Davidson's Division) over the use of trucks. Wilder of the Mess Management Section (Miller's Division) had quarrels with Rawlings of the Agriculture Section over the price and quantity of food that Wilder accepted from Rawlings. Alignment, however, was not always on a divisional or sectional basis. While Davidson had the support of Connor and Olson, Rawlings sided with Miller. While Miller was supported by many men in his division, Wilder sometimes opposed him.

For the purpose of this report only those administrators who are directly involved in this conflict need be considered. This means the consideration of two divisions, and certain Sections within these divisions. On the one hand we must consider Davidson, at the head of the Operations Division, and Connor and Olson under him in Central Service. In the other division we have Miller as the head of the Administrative Management Division and under him Ford and Cox in the Property Control Section and Wilder and Powers in the Mess Management Section.

1. Davidson and the Operations Division By evacuees Davidson was considered one of the more sympathetic administrators on the project. He showed more respect and sympathy to evacuees and their problems than most of the others in the

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administration. In this respect he was considered at one extreme and opposite from Miller. He was lenient to evacuees, for instance, in the matter of issuance of clothing to workers and had collided with Ford on this very policy. During the boilermen strike, however, Davidson, who was then Acting Director, failed to appease the boilermen sufficiently to effect a temporary solution. In fact, he showed a lack of insight into the attitude of the boilermen. By Stafford Davidson has been considered a poor administrator, and received a very low rating from him in May. One complaint that the project director had against his assistant was that he made too many promises to evacuees which could not be carried out. Davidson was also accused of showing favoritism in the distribution of cars and trucks, and has collided with both Miller and Ford on this matter.

2. Central Service Davidson had two important sections in his division--Agriculture and Central Service. The Agriculture Section was in the hands of a person with whom he could not get along and who aligned himself with Miller. Central Service, however, was within his control and was a section of some significance in project life. Central Service was a glorified Motor Pool. Early in the history of the project when a shortage of equipment existed, the Motor Pool was expanded by the addition of labor crews to a point where most of the warehousing, trucking, and swamping was done by this section for all other sections. The service of a truck or passenger car had to be obtained by applying to Central Service. Here in one section was concentrated the Garbage

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Crew, the Coal Crew, the Milk Crew, and a general crew of workers who took care of the requests that came into the section. While the control of this section meant some power for Davidson, it was also a source of friction when others could not obtain the service they desired.

Supervising work in Central Service were Connor and Olson. Of the two Connor was more respected by evacuees, although he was definitely not the polished gentleman. Olson, while not quite as well liked by evacuees as Connor, nevertheless was not greatly disliked. Both of them stood low in Stafford's favor. Their one outstanding quality perhaps was their ability to get along with their evacuee workers, who had the dirtiest and hardest work on the project to perform. Much of the success of their relationship, however, was attributed to their willingness<sup>ness</sup> to give their foreman responsibility.

### 3. Miller and the Administrative Management Division

Miller, who replaced a man to whom evacuees used to take their troubles (Shaffer), was never popular with evacuees. He backed up Rawlings in closing down the pickling plant to settle a labor conflict. His avowed attitude toward Tuleans was that they were all trouble-makers. In several instances he refused to listen to the Council. However, he had had no direct clash with a large group of evacuees, and to many of them he was an unknown quantity. He was well-thought/<sup>of</sup>by Stafford for his administrative ability, and perhaps for similarity in their attitudes toward evacuees. In Stafford's absence this spring he was made Acting Director, a position that Davidson formerly held.

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4. Mess Management Section Of the two sections under the Administrative Management Division which participated in the warehouse conflict, the Mess Management Section was the more important in terms of function. Since the feeding of evacuees was handled through this section, it was one which was constantly meeting criticism from evacuees. Wilder, who was in charge of this section, was inclined to be sympathetic to evacuees. For instance, he was always quarreling with the Agriculture Section which tried to dump poor products in excess quantities at high prices in order to keep their books balanced. Like Davidson he was described by some as not being a dominating person. Again like Davidson he had become entangled in administrative difficulties.

Powers, who worked under Wilder, was considered to be highly antagonistic toward evacuees. The workers claimed to dislike him.

5. Property Control Section The Property Control Section in Miller's division was not an important one, as far as function was concerned. It took care of project equipment, warehouses, and a lumber yard. Ford, the head of the section, like Miller, arrived on the project the latter part of 1943. While he was able to get along with some evacuees, he was considered by most to be highly undesirable as a supervisor. Once he accused the Central Service personnel of stealing clothing which had been requisitioned and he had issued, and Ford proved to be wrong. On this occasion he is said to have

Wlost his head and shouted to Mr. Itami, "SHUT UP."  
Mr. Itami informed him he would not shut up. Then Mr. Ford retaliated by saying, 'Watch out for your neck.

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There are places for guys like you.<sup>1</sup>

When he took some young boys to bring back some trucks from Spokane he is reported to have been drunk most of the time and very irresponsible. It was his arrogant attitude and use of abusive language which was the object of criticism from evacuees. Very little is known of Cox, except his behavior during the warehouse conflict.

### D. Evacuee Workers

The warehouse conflict involved warehouse workers in three separate sections and two divisions, but essentially there was no conflict among evacuee workers in different sections. There was no disturbance of amicable relationship between foreman and workers. To locate some of the factors accounting for the disturbance it is necessary to examine the relationship between the Caucasian supervisor and his evacuee workers, their attitude toward each other, and the sort of working adjustment they had made to each other.

1. Central Service Workers The Central Service workers are a unique group on the project. Their number in the first place is large. While some Isseis are working in this group, many of the swampers and truck drivers are young Niseis of the "tough" variety. Their management in hard and the dirtiest work on the project would have been difficult unless they were given special consideration. Their foreman, C. T. Takahashi and later Y. Doi, was able to get work accomplished by not being too strict with them in the matter of hours, by obtaining clothing for them, by taking them into town and treating them, by getting refreshments for them.

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Consequently, they had become accustomed not to take any arrogance from a Caucasian. Both C. T. Takahashi and Y. Doi evidently had demonstrated that they would not allow themselves to be bossed around by a Caucasian. More than once Takahashi had been accused by Caucasians of being a "gangster." During the boilermen conflict boys working in Central Service had committed acts of mild "terrorism" and the existence of this strong organization of evacuees was feared by some administrators.

2. Mess Management Workers Of the Mess Management workers, we are here interested in three groups of warehouse workers who took part in the conflict. First was Ito's crew of 13, handling the distribution of produce to the messhalls. Ito was considered somewhat arrogant, but during the incident he did not have particular trouble with his crew. Next was Horiuchi's crew, 13 in number, which handled other food products besides produce, fish and meat. Both of these crews were manned largely by Isseis, some of them close to 60. Of the other crew of swampers very little is known. While these workers expressed dislike for Powers and his attitude they seemed to have adjusted themselves to their work.

3. Property Control Workers Two crews in the Property Control Section took part in the warehouse conflict. One was the Lumber Yard Crew, under Newbry's supervision. Mr. Matsuda, the foreman, seemed to take pride in his work and to do it well. However, the crew never did like Ford with whom they came in contact occasionally. The other crew was Yamamoto's crew, who worked directly under Ford and Cox. This

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crew seemed to be the only one which worked with Ford with any degree of harmony. Yamamoto was a middle-aged Issei, a family man. He was disliked by some of the people in his block, and considered to lack leadership ability. However, he showed a desire for leadership positions. He bragged about achieving efficiency in the warehouse by doing a work in shorter time than the former crew. One person attributed this attitude on Yamamoto's part as being motivated by a desire to be patted on the shoulder by his Caucasian superior. This attitude on his part made it possible for him to maintain a smooth working arrangement with Ford, thus upsetting the charge that Ford could not work with any evacuee because of his antagonistic attitude.

### B. Council

The newly-elected Council was one of the main participants in this conflict. Its status on the project had not been definitely determined by its actions up to this point. It was looked upon with suspicion by the administration, as a possible anti-administration organization. The residents looked upon it with suspicion as a possible pro-administration body. Many potential leaders refused to accept positions on the Council, which was another indication of lack of status of the Council. The warehouse conflict was the first issue handled by the Council which caused sufficient stir within the project, both in the administration and among the residents, to establish a reputation for itself.

The general attitude of the councilmen toward Stafford and his administration was negative. Stafford, after all,

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had opposed the creation of the Council for a long time. Attitudes of individual councilmen, however, differed. Fujii, the chairman, for instance, showed himself to be willing to compromise with the administration on issues. Also, he was careful not to tread on anyone's toes, thus often refusing to take any action--especially drastic action. At the opposite extreme from Fujii was Takeda, ex-Tulean leader and councilman, who brought with him the Tulean attitude that the residents should stick together to protect their interest against the administration. As chairman of the Food Committee of the Council, for instance, he had attempted to institute certain reforms in the preparation of the food which were favored by the majority of the residents and to organize the opinion of the residents in favor of the evacuee interest. He was critical and suspicious of any of the Minidoka leaders, who thought more in terms of their own interest than the welfare of the residents. The other five councilmen ranged somewhere in between these two.

### F. Block Commissioners

As representative of the various blocks, the block commissioners in general were closer to the residents than the councilmen. There was a definite anti-Stafford, anti-administration sentiment among them, which was reflected in the declaration of a few, supported by the others, that the business of the Council was to protect evacuees' interest against the administration. They were dominated by the Council, however, with which they met once a month in a joint session. The status of block commissioners within the

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blocks in many cases was doubtful, thus further weakening their power. Part of this lack of power was due to the definite lack of men of high leadership ability among them.

### G. Residents

The residents in general were not too much concerned about the Council and its activities. While the more vocal members of the residents expressed the strongest anti-administration sentiment, some of the residents looked upon the Council with distrust; others were merely unconcerned. There was no general opinion that the Council could not be relied upon to uphold the interest of residents against the administration.

### H. Others

1. Community Analyst The new Community Analyst, Elmer Smith, arrived on the project in the midst of the labor conflict. As a former professor of racial anthropology, he was able to view the conflict without necessarily siding with the administration. His interest in improving the welfare of the Japanese in America as a racial minority group seems to have given him a pro-evacuee leaning. When he arrived on the project he discovered that many members of the administration looked upon him with suspicion both for the racial views and for the position of Community Analyst that he held.

2. C. T. Takahashi Takahashi, while only a block commissioner, wielded considerable power on the project through his political manipulations. He was known by some to be one of Stafford's personal advisor. Among the residents and among

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
block commissioners he was thought to be fearless anti-administration man. This dual role, which he played fairly successfully, gave him considerable political backing which most block commissioners or even councilmen did not have. The only one who rivaled him in this respect was Fujii, as this report will show. At some point he gained considerable influence over Fujii, thus increasing his power to influence the course of events on the project.

### I. Charts.

1. Participants in the Warehouse Conflict The following chart will give a rough idea of the participants and their relationship to each other. The position on the vertical scale indicates the hierarchy of authority. The opposition of the Council and block commissioners to the Administration and the workers indicates the dual system of relationship through which political "balance" is expected to be achieved. In this incident, which begins as a friction between the workers and the administration, the workers, through their foremen, take the matter to the Council. The Council through their Chairman takes the matter to Stafford. Stafford arrives at a decision and transmits it back to the Council and on to his administration. The Council relays its decisions through the block commissioners to the residents in general.

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CHART I. PARTICIPANTS IN THE WAREHOUSE CONFLICT



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2. Administration-Worker Relationship The second chart shows the relationship among the administrative personnel and the workers involved in the warehouse conflict. The vertical scale again indicates superordinate and subordinate positions in terms of supervisor-foreman-worker relationships. Caucasians are indicated by ellipse and circles, the size of which shows their relative position on the superordinate-subordinate scale. Evacuees are indicated by triangles. The rectangles are employed to show functional units, such as divisions and sections. By the use of red and green colors attempt is made to show a person's position on an attitudinal scale.


-  Highly unsympathetic to evacuees
-  Unsympathetic to evacuees
-  Indifferent or unknown
-  Dual attitude shown
-  Sympathetic to evacuees
-  Highly sympathetic to evacuees<sup>1</sup>

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1. For a discussion of this attitudinal scale see Pickling Plant Conflict Analysis.

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CHART II. ADMINISTRATION-WORKER RELATIONSHIP



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CHAPTER III. FEBRUARY-APRIL 1, 1944. DISBANDING OF  
THE CENTRAL SERVICE SYSTEM LEADS TO A LABOR CONFLICT.

A. Instructions received to disband the Central Service.

Toward the end of February orders were received by the Central Service Section to transfer all evacuee workers in that section except drivers to the Property Control Section. This meant the reduction of the Central Service to the function of a motor pool, as operating in other centers. This change was ordered from Washington, according to Stafford, and several reasons were given for it. Minidoka was the only center operating with a Central Service system, and it was believed best to create uniformity in the operation in this division, especially because sufficient equipment was now available to make the idea of a Central Service unnecessary. The Central Service also made cost accounting difficult. Washington also had the notion that evacuees would not react favorably to the Central Service system.

The actual reason why the Central Service was ultimately abandoned was difficult to determine. Stafford, although originally in favor of the idea of a Central Service, is said to have frowned upon a large concentration of evacuee workers under an evacuee foreman. The danger of the Center Service organization was brought home to many administrative personnel when nisei workers, presumably instigated by their leader, resorted to mild "terrorism" in an attempt to make the boiler-men walkout effective. Consequently, it was possible that Stafford did not try too hard to convince Washington that the Central Service organization should be retained. Another

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factor that should be considered is the rivalry between Davidson and Miller. The transfer was undoubtedly favored by the latter and opposed by the former since the control of trucking service had been a point of inter-divisional friction. Davidson, Connor, and Olson's unpopularity with Stafford should also be considered.

This breakup of the Central Service meant the disrupting of a number of relationships. Within the administration it meant that Davidson would lose an important part of his division, and that Ford, in Miller's division, would acquire control of it. For evacuees it meant the loss of a strongly organized group of workers. In terms of function it meant that the work formerly carried out by Central Service would be disrupted until Property Control was able to iron out difficulties. Trucking equipment and drivers would be retained in Central Service while swampers would be in another division. In terms of workers it meant the breaking up of crews and the change of foremen and supervisors. For Ford it meant the increase of function (one of the most troublesome on the project), and the acquiring of workers among the most difficult to handle on the project.

### B. Reluctance of Property Control to accept all of the workers from Central Service.

The transfer of workers from Central Service to Property Control was to become effective on March 1 and to affect a total of 77 men. On February 29 Central Service submitted a list of 77 workers to be transferred. Apparently Property Control was not prepared to accept the new function and the

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workers, and obtained a month's extension of the transfer.

About March 15 Property Control began to exclude certain individuals from the list of 77. This included those who had Stop Orders, whom Ford did not want to use outside the gate, and also those who were working parttime. It was known that Doi, because of lack of workers, was using high school workers part time on the coal crew. This selection of men would have broken up the garbage and coal crews, and it was prevented by orders from the project director to the effect that these two crews were not to be transferred. This left 27 men to be transferred, but because of the selection insisted upon by Ford, the actual transfer on April 1 involved 16 boys. Ford was credited as having declared that he could carry on the increased work with this number of men. This insistence on selection by Ford did not help to smooth his relationship with the boys to be transferred. The transferees were Nisei boys, most of them of draft-age, and some merely waiting for their physical or to be inducted.

C. April 1, Cox and Ford terminates all except one of the 16 transferees.

On the morning of April 1, Saturday, when the transfer was to be made, a conflict developed between the supervisors of Property Control, Ford and Cox, and the transferees. It seems that the boys to be transferred were not notified in advance, and those who reported to work late did not know where they were to supposed to go. Ford, angered because the boys were not on hand to work, declared that he would terminate all those who did not report to him on time. Con-

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sequently, on Monday, April 3 Ford wrote terminations for 12 of the 16 transferred workers. Eventually only one of the 16 boys was working for Ford, the rest having declared that they would not work for a fellow like him. There is some evidence on hand that Ford employed abusive language toward some of the boys, and some of the latter mentioned something about being drafted soon and not having to work for a person like Ford. The workers, it seemed, were somewhat at fault for giving Ford cause for termination, but the latter was also not in the frame of mind to overlook this.

These terminations, while of little consequence in themselves, lead directly to a labor trouble in the whole warehouse area.

CHAPTER IV. ATTEMPT ON FORD'S PART TO REMEDY THE SITUATION RESULTS IN WHOLESALE TERMINATION OF WORKERS.

A. First weeks in April. The Property Control is short-handed for the additional work imposed upon it.

Under the new setup the Property Control Section was supposed to have a crew of 18 men to do all-round warehousing and swamping work, including the unloading of railway cars. This crew, under Yamamoto, since April 3 consisted only of from 4 to 9 men. This deficiency in the number of workers was never made up. Ford made applications to the Placement Office for workers, but could not obtain more than a few workers. Word had been passed around that Ford had terminated workers--an act which was undoubtedly construed by other workers in the warehouse area to be unjust--and a silent

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boycott of Ford took place. While other sections hired workers when they were required, in spite of the increasingly tight situation, Ford continued shorthanded.

During the first two weeks of April the Property Control Section resorted to emergency measures to make up for their lack of workers. The Yamamoto crew went to other crews in the warehouse area for help, especially in carrying out its new duty of unloading railroad cars. Appeal was made to the workers in the Property Control warehouses (No. 16 and 2) and in the Lumber Yard. Some men responded to this appeal, and the Property Control Section managed to carry out their newly assigned functions. In some instances, crew members of other sections besides the Property Control were asked to unload products pertaining to their work, as when the meat crew was asked to unload meat and the motor transportation crew to unload machinery. During the second week there were 12 cars to be unloaded, containing such goods as produce, meat, machinery and wood slabs.

This make-shift arrangement was evidently a source of strain to the participants. Yamamoto, the foreman, requested Ford for more workers, and was told that he would have to wait until the Placement Office sent some. For men from the other crews who offered their services the work was extra. Also, the work of unloading was arduous, especially for the older Issais. Men prepared for indoor work also did not like to undertake outdoor work. In some cases they were taking orders from a supervisor in another section or even in another division. Unable to carry the full weight of the

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additional functions transferred to it, the Property Control Section was distributing this burden on various other crews and sections. This was an emergency measure which was not ordered or worked out through regular channels, and one which could not be welcomed by any of the other crews.

B. April 15. Two crews are terminated for refusal to work for the Property Control Section.

On Saturday April 15 the increasing strain on working arrangements among the warehouse workers caused by the Property Control Section ended in wholesale terminations of two entire crews. The Property Control Section sent workers to handle evacuee relocation baggage to Eden, and had less men than usual to unload two carloads of cement. Mr. Ford himself, early in the morning, went to the Lumber Yard crew and asked it to furnish four workers to unload the cement. The workers flatly refused to do this work, and the entire crew of eight was terminated. The same request was made of a crew in Davidson's division. Ono's Utility crew of 16, attached to the Motor Pool under Connor and Olson, was asked to unload the cement. The workers, some of them who had been refused to be accepted or was terminated by Ford, flatly turned down this request. Olson, evidently in collaboration with Ford, terminated the entire crew. The number of workers in the warehouse area was reduced by 24, and work continued to pile up on the Property Control Section.

C. April 15-17. Administrative action to rectify the situation.

Without consultation of evacuee workers the administra-

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tion took action to rectify the strained labor condition in the warehouse area. A staff meeting was held (probably on April 15) and decision reached to facilitate Ford's carrying out his new duties. A decision was made to the effect that evacuee workers would be required to undertake similar work when ordered, even though in another section or division. Any worker in the warehouse area, in other words, could be ordered to undertake the work of unloading cars. Also, decision was reached that each section would unload goods pertaining to its work, such as the produce warehouse workers unloading produce. These decisions<sup>1</sup> constituted a major change in working conditions, but through some oversight no official notification of this change was made to foremen and evacuee workers.

At the same time steps were taken to discourage refusal to accept work and to remain on the job in the warehouse area under the new working conditions. On April 17, Stafford issued a mimeographed memorandum, which appeared on most messhall bulletin boards. This memorandum announced the following:

1. Requisitions for workers for positions in the warehouse, agriculture and irrigation sections shall have priorities over all other activities of the project.
2. No assignments or transfers will be authorized until the above positions have been filled.

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1. Actually it is not clear what decisions were made by the administration. From the actions taken and other evidences present it is presumed that decisions of this sort were made. At this time Stafford was evidently in agreement with these measures.

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3. When an employee is terminated for cause, an automatic 30-day suspension will be given him.
4. All division heads were requested to notify their employees of the above, emphasizing that a separation carries with it a suspension of clothing benefits.

Clearly these instructions were designed

1. to force workers to accept jobs in the warehouse area even if they desired to work elsewhere, and
2. to force those on the job in the warehouse area to stay on and work under the new working arrangements.

D. April 18. Food warehouse crews terminated for refusal to work under the new arrangement.

On Tuesday, April 18, the effectiveness of the plan worked out by the administration was put to a test and resulted in the termination of several crews. While the administrative personnel involved apparently were conscious of working under a new setup, the evacuee workers later declared ignorance of their responsibility to accept work outside of their routine tasks. A railway car of citrus fruit and another of slab wood required unloading. Mr. Cox, assistant to Ford, went to the warehouse of the Mess Management Section to negotiate for workers to unload the produce. This step presumably was in accordance with the decision of the administration that each section should unload its own goods. Cox approached Ito, foreman of the produce warehouse crew (Warehouse #10) and requested five workers to go to the spur to unload the carload of citrus fruit. Ito consulted his crew of 13 men, and the latter requested that they all be allowed to go out together. Various reasons

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were attributed for this request:

1. The work was strenuous, and the men desired to share this responsibility.
2. If the men all went out and completed the work in short order, there would be little interference with their ordinary duties, which consisted of distributing produce to 38 messhalls.
3. The work on the spur was a "lark," and all the men wanted to participate in it.

Ito consequently approached Wilder, Chief Steward, with the request that the whole crew be allowed to go out to the spur to do the unloading. Wilder insisted that five men were sufficient, since more than that number could not work advantageously on the job. The crew discussed the matter and finally decided not to accept this task, which they considered extra work. Powers, Wilder's assistant, then came to the workers and said in effect:

"I asked you--I begged you--you won't obey--you are all terminated!"

Wilder's standpoint was that the unloading of the produce was the duty now of the Ito crew, that he considered five workers sufficient for the job, and that if they refused to obey him, he had the right to terminate them. An important reason for the crew's refusing to knuckle under to this order from their superior was considered to be the view of the crew that this work of unloading was additional work which was being imposed upon them. To replace these workers Wilder placed a requisition with the Placement Office for more

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warehouse workers.

After Ito's crew was terminated, Powers went to Horiuchi's crew, which handled staple products, and requested four workers to help at the spur. Ito had contacted Horiuchi's crew to look after their warehouse in their absence if the whole crew were allowed to go out to the spur, and the story of their termination evidently had reached Horiuchi's crew. They refused to carry out this task, one of their reasons being that they were generally shorthanded for the work on hand, anyway. This entire crew was terminated. 13 steward's swampers attached to Warehouse 7 (food warehouse) were also terminated, without any apparent reason. Termination of the first crew did not prevent the other crews from refusing to accept the job the first one had turned down.

By noon four food warehouses ceased to function, with the result that only fresh milk, fresh meats and fish were delivered to the messhalls. The Yamamoto crew, which had been told that unloading of the oranges would not be necessary, and which was unloading slab wood, was approached by Ford, Cox, and Powers and told to start unloading oranges.

The administration had attempted to spread the work of the Property Control Section to other sections by threatening workers with termination. The result was more terminations.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Fact Finding Committee Report, May 8, 1944

CHAPTER V. AN EMERGENCY SOLUTION IS WORKED OUT BETWEEN  
THE NEGOTIATION COMMITTEE AND STAFFORD.

A. April 18. The Council Investigates the Trouble

Ito, foreman of the Warehouse 10 crew, went to the Community Council office and reported the circumstances of his crew's termination to Fujii, Chairman of the Council. This evidently was the first intimation that the Council had of the labor conflict in the warehouse area. Ito's version of the reasons for refusing to accept Cox, Wilder and Powers' order for five men only to unload the one carload of citrus fruit included the following:

1. The work was too strenuous for five men in his crew, since many of them were over 50.
2. There was no particular work to be done that morning.

Ito wanted the Council to understand that he and his crew were not responsible for what might happen as the result of their termination. Fujii thought that a discussion with some of the administrators concerned would solve the difficulty, and called up Pomeroy, Assistant Project Director in charge of Mess Management, Mann, Supply Officer, Wilder, Project Chief Steward, and Powers, Project Steward.

Fujii's preliminary contact with the administrative personnel involved in the conflict produced no grounds for an arbitration of difficulties on the spot. Wilder continued his stand that he terminated Ito's crew because they refused to take orders from him. Miller backed up both

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Wilder and Powers on their action, saying that he would terminate entire crews under similar circumstances. The stand of the administrative personnel involved--Miller, Ford, Cox, Wilder and Powers--was later recorded by Council as follows:

"We are the bosses--you evacuees are the workers--when we give orders and the workers refuse them, what can we do but fire them?--what would you do?--When a foreman and his men hold consultation to determine whether they will or will not carry out one of our orders, and decide not to, that is mutiny, and what can we do but fire the entire crew?--what would happen in a similar case on the outside, in a normal community?"<sup>1</sup>

Fujii's attempt to deal directly with the administrative staff members concerned ended in a rebuff.

### B. April 18. The Council organizes for action.

On the afternoon of April 18 a regular joint meeting of the Council (seven elected at large) and the Coordinating Council (one block commissioner from each block) was held and the warehouse trouble discussed. Although many other problems were brought up, the potential conflict with the administration on the labor situation was the main subject for the afternoon. Fujii gave a brief summary of what he knew of the conflict. The general attitude expressed by those present was that the administration was at fault. Wilder was attacked by several on the grounds that he had no business causing another trouble when he was under investigation for previous labor trouble.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Fact Finding Committee Warehouse Conflict Report
  2. The investigation was to be conducted by Shafer, but was not continued when he left the project.

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C. T. Takahashi attacked both Ford and Cox, saying:

"Mr. Ford of Warehouse #2 and Mr. Cox are the basis of trouble. They think that all Japanese are thieves. They are irresponsible and like beasts. I'm worried because Mr. Cox was asked to take over Mr. Linville's (Evacuee Property Officer) position. They don't care at all for Japanese."<sup>1</sup>

Ken Yamada and H. Hatate, block commissioners, mentioned that the administration was trying to do the same thing that it had done at the time of the boilermen walkout. Presumably they referred to the attempt on the part of the administration to impose excessive work on the workers.

The immediate concern of the two bodies, however, was not with the labor situation, but with the problem of food distribution. Since only milk, meat and fish were being delivered to the messhalls since the latest terminations, and messhalls generally had supplies on hand for only a day or two in advance, food shortage was bound to develop immediately among the residents. Fujii at first took the stand that the function of supplying food belonged to the administration. He said:

"That's (supplying food) the responsibility of the administration. They said that they would be able to carry on the function in some way."<sup>2</sup>

Y. Doi, block commissioner expressed this by saying:

"I don't think we can leave this matter like this. Tomorrow is the day to deliver rice (rice is delivered once a week.) This matter affects our own food problem."

Mentally the residents were clearing the deck for action. The Horiuchi crew had already indicated that they were willing to accept wholesale termination of crews in order to back

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1. Minutes of the Joint Meeting, J 4/18/44 #1

2. Ibid.

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up the crews that were already terminated. It was revealed at this meeting that the meat crew had approached Doi in order to find out whether they should stop working or not. Doi, however, told the workers to continue work until they were asked to do excessive work. The representatives of the residents, too, were preparing for a possible showdown with the administration. For one thing, those who expressed their opinions were those who did not fear, or perhaps even favored, a conflict with the administration. They included Hatate, Doi, C. T. Takahashi, Yamada, Takeda, M. Mihara, G. Mihara, Kuraoka. M. Mihara's stand at this meeting on the subject of standardization of social obligations and Keirokai (a party to honor the aged) received popular support from those present. M. Mihara said:

"Aren't we going into too much detail? We should handle a few problems with the administration very strongly. I'd like to see a hand-off policy on small matters like keirokai and living expenses."

Fujii, the Chairman of the Council, although known to be highly compromising, indicated the possibility of an open conflict with the administration, which he recognized after the rebuff he received from the small group he had approached. He stated that while there were two sides to the questions, the administration had indicated that they would carry out their function of supplying food in their own way, having already refused to reconsider their wholesale terminations.

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1. Ibid.

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He implied that if the workers had good reason for complaint against the administration, the Council would have to present something stronger than a mere request to it.

The discussion immediately entered the field of action. Since a Fair Labor Board had not been set up thus far by the Council, suggestion was made for a temporary committee to handle the problem. Fujii himself suggested that a body of the seven councilmen and seven block commissioners be formed to handle the pending labor conflict. This suggestion was accepted, and a written vote taken to elect the seven block commissioners to serve on the special committee (later called Fact Finding Committee). Those elected were in the order of votes:

Hatate (Former Supervisor of the boilermen and present President of the Co-op Board of Directors.)

Doi (Supervisor of the Central Service organization.)

Kuraoka (Translator in the Irrigator office.)

C. T. Takahashi (Former head of the Central Service.)

Yamada (Adult Education teacher, formerly an organizer for the C.I.O. restaurant union.)

Kanaya (Community Analysis worker.)

Hayasaka

The runner-ups were M. Mihara and Ota. These included block commissioners who did the most talking at meetings. Both Hatate and Doi attempted to resign from their positions, one on the ground of having too much work and having been involved in a previous labor trouble and the other on the ground that he had his hands full handling the extra work being brought to Central Service. They were prevailed upon,

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however, to remain on the committee.

For the first meeting of the newly formed Fact Finding Committee, Chairman Fujii suggested the afternoon of the following day. G. Mihara stated that a meeting ought to be held sooner to prevent the residents from feeling a food shortage. His stand was overruled by the others, however, on the ground that it was too hasty. Takeda said:

"since we want to reach a thorough settlement, we'll have to get a knowledge of the trouble first. I think tomorrow morning is more convenient. Supplies are sent two days ahead of time and we don't have to worry. It's good to let the people know of the trouble."

M. Mihara said:

"We shouldn't get excited over a matter of this sort. We can get by in some way. The Hakujin can't afford to let a trouble of this sort occur. They knew that this sort of trouble was going to occur when they took their stand. Well, let it happen, then."<sup>1</sup>

Decision was reached to have the meeting in the morning, and to have people involved in the conflict there to supply information. The representatives of the residents were now prepared to carry on a more formal negotiation with the administration.

C. April 19-20. Negotiations with Stafford ends in temporary decision adverse to the workers.

On the morning of the 19th the Fact Finding Committee met. Fujii was chosen the chairman of the committee. Reports were heard from various individuals who had been involved in the labor trouble. Yamamoto, Ford's foreman, found himself the target of criticism from residents, and was about to re-

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1. Ibid.

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sign from his position and leave the project for a while to visit his sons on the outside. However, he was persuaded by the Committee to remain on the project and attend the meeting to make a report. A memorandum was written to Stafford in which the following was pointed out:

1. The closing of warehouses as a result of wholesale termination of workers.
2. The creation of the Fact Finding Committee to handle the labor difficulty.
3. The election of a delegation of five to meet with the project director.
4. Request that immediate step be taken to insure delivery of food to the messhalls.
5. A recommendation that, pending final settlement of the dispute, the terminated workers be allowed to return to work "on work conditions as existing prior to April 1st, 1944."

The Delegation of five consisted of Fujii, Takeda, G. Mihara (later replace by Osawa), Kuraoka, and Takahashi. This then was the stand of the Fact Finding Committee in approaching Stafford.

The Delegation (of five), lead by Fujii, and accompanied by the Community Clerk, Ogawa, met with Stafford on the morning of the 20th. Stafford attacked the Delegation with vehemence. He was the Stafford of the dictator tradition. The stand of the committee that the workers should be allowed to go back to work on working conditions existing prior to April 1 was repulsed by the project director. He stated that

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he would not stand for "mutiny and insubordination" on the part of the workers. Warehousemen were warehousemen, wherever they were, and should accept "relative assignments." According to one report, Stafford is supposed to have told the Delegation that if the workers did not go back to work, he would have the M.P.'s do the work of delivering food to the messhalls. The result of this meeting was a strongly worded memo from Stafford:

April 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Y. Fujii, Chairman  
Fact Finding Committee

Pursuant to our meeting at 9:00 A.M., April 20, 1944, it seems advisable to permit all persons in the Warehouse Foods and Property Control areas, as well as utility men of Motor Pool and others involved, to return to work, provided that all such persons understand that mutiny or refusal to take relative assignments as may be ordered will constitute violation of general working conditions.

In behalf of the Administration, I am willing to enter into a full review of the material gathered by the Fact Finding Committee and look forward to a clarification of difficulty and differences of opinion or interpretation. This agreement covers all persons recently discharged for insubordination irrespective of category and assumes common understanding that insubordination will not be resorted to irrespective of inter-divisional work involving relative types of task.

/s/ H. L. Stafford

Project Director

In other words, an agreement had been reached with the project director, whereby the terminated workers would return to work. This meant that the food supply to the messhalls would continue to be delivered. However, they were to return to work on the understanding that they were to work as ordered by their superiors. Only on this basis was Stafford

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willing to enter into a review of the underlying difficulties in the labor situation in the warehouse area.

D. April 20. Reaction of Evacuees to the Temporary Agreement

After the meeting with Stafford, the Delegation reported the results of the meeting to the Fact Finding Committee. Criticisms of the conditions under which the workers were to return to work were expressed by several members of the committee, including Yamada, Hatate, Doi. Some of the points of criticism (as given by Yamada) were:

- a. The Delegation had accepted a memo which was not acceptable to the workers. They were ordered to go back to work and accept relative assignment. This was the very point that was being contested, and the workers should not have gone back to work, except on the old basis, existing prior to April 1.
- b. The Delegation took upon itself to solve the problem of delivering food to the messhalls. This was the responsibility of the administration and not of the Council.
- c. The Delegation accepted a highly insulting memo from Stafford which employed the words "mutiny" and "in-subordination."

This working arrangement accepted by the Delegation, however, was approved by both the Fact Finding Committee and the workers.<sup>1</sup> At 1:00 P.M., April 20, according to the agreement, the workers who were terminated were expected to return to work.

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1. Fujii's appeal for acceptance of this arrangement was undoubtedly on the basis of the necessity of supplying the residents with food.

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CHAPTER VI. THE EMERGENCY SETUP IS DISRUPTED BY MORE TERMINATIONS, AND STAFFORD AND THE COUNCIL COLLABORATES ON A SOLUTION EMPLOYING AN EVACUEE LABOR SUPERVISOR.

A. April 20. As Workers return to their Jobs They Hit a Snag.

Soon after 1:00 P.M. food warehouse workers, consisting of Ito and Horiuchi's crew and the swampers returned to their jobs, but met with an uncooperative attitude from their supervisors. As the workers returned to work they were asked by Wilder and Powers whether they would promise to work as ordered. According to a plan already adopted, Wilder intended to shift men between Ito and Horiuchi's crew, and then to transfer others to Ford's Property Control Section. This meant not only the breaking of crews and the reduction of the size of the crews, but also the transfer of some workers from their regular duties within the warehouse to work on the Yamamoto crew, whose duty it was to unload freight cars. It also meant working for Ford and Cox. Because of this step taken by their supervisors, the food warehouse workers postponed the return to their jobs, and sent word to the Council of the predicament in which they landed. Their claim was that, as they understood it, this seemed to be an abrogation of working conditions on the part of their Caucasian superiors.

Fujii, on hearing of the trouble the workers were having, took steps to have it clarified. He called up Wilder, and was told that he was making some "minor adjustments." The chairman of the Fact Finding Committee then called up Stafford and called his attention to the trouble. The project director

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informed Fujii that Miller, assistant project director, was being sent to clear up the matter.

B. Fujii Is Ignored by Miller

Fujii went to the warehouse area to meet Miller. Before Miller arrived Fujii talked to Wilder and found out that he did not intend to change his plan of reassigning the workers. Wilder's argument was that the workers had been terminated once, and that he had the right to assign them wherever he pleased. The workers, on the other hand, were not willing to return to work under the new plan especially because Wilder had stated that the change would be of a permanent nature. Fujii himself felt that according to his understanding of the agreement with Stafford, the workers were to return to their own jobs, but were to do "relative assignments" as ordered. Miller soon arrived on the scene accompanied by Ford, Cox, Minnesang, Personnel Technician. Powers was in the warehouse office, too. Obviously, the person to approach among the group was Miller, the assistant project director, who was acting in behalf of Stafford.

Miller, however, chose to ignore Fujii. About this time a truck filled with staple groceries arrived at a nearby warehouse, and required unloading. Ito and Horiuchi's crews were gathered together close by, and did not make any gesture toward unloading the truck. Their stand was that they could not work until the Council had ironed out the difficulty for them. Miller, ignoring both Fujii and the two evacuee crews, took his followers and began to unload the truck themselves. Fujii, accompanied by Ogawa, the Community Clerk, and G. Mihara,

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councilman who worked in the food warehouse office, waited for about half an hour to receive some attention from the Caucasians. When he suggested to Miller that they have a talk to clarify misunderstandings, Ford interjected the suggestion that the talk be postponed until the following morning and both walked away. Fujii, who was obviously concerned about the delivery of food to the messhalls, was irritated by the apathy shown by the Caucasians. Rather than wait for them to finish their work of unloading, he decided to see Stafford directly.

C. April 20, 3:30 P.M. Fujii Is Given a Sympathetic Ear by Stafford;

Fujii, with Ogawa, Mihara and Takeda, a member of the Delegation, went to see Stafford in his office. They explained their stand that they thought that according to the agreement the workers were to be returned to their former positions, pending final settlement. They argued that the terminations had been cancelled, so that there was no need for reassignments. Stafford agreed with this view presented to him, and conceded that reassignments were not necessary. This, according to Fujii, was a change on Stafford's part for he had maintained previously that the reassignments could be considered "minor adjustments." Miller entered the office at this juncture, and Stafford explained to him that he had agreed to the proposal made by the men present to return the workers to their former jobs, pending final settlement of the disturbance.

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Miller's face changed color, and he blurted out:

"Is the administration required to operate in accordance with recommendations from the Community Council?"

Fujii's reply was:

"I think as Community Council, we have the privilege of making any kind of recommendation as we see fit."<sup>1</sup>

Miller thereupon pointed his finger at Fujii and said that there must be an agitator behind all these current disturbances. Miller evidently was referring to the fact that the workers refused to return to work until Fujii was able to iron out the differences of opinion with the administration. Stafford's remark to Miller was to the effect that Miller's plans were somewhat hasty where the emergency setup was concerned. An over-all planning of readjustments would have to be made later, but temporary adjustment should not be disturbed at the present time. With this understanding, Fujii left Stafford's office.

Fujii and his Fact Finding Committee had been rebuffed first by Stafford, who ordered workers to return to work and to accept relative assignments. Their appeal to Wilder to change the plans for "minor adjustments" was not heeded. When Fujii called Stafford, the latter sent Miller, who merely ignored Fujii. Finally when he approached Stafford once more, he found a sympathetic listener. For the first time Stafford upheld Fujii and his Council, rather than his staff members. Evidently this turn of event was a surprise to Miller.

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1. See Fujii's Report, May 8, 1944

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D. April 21-24. In Spite of Stafford's Orders to Miller,  
Disruptions of the Temporary Agreement Continue.

While the disruption of working arrangements in one section was being patched, others broke out in different sections. The Ito and Horiuchi crews were duly instructed by Fujii to return to their old positions. On April 21 these crews and Yamamoto's crew in Property Control were reported to have returned to work. Trouble, however, had broken out in other crews.

On the morning of April 21 the Lumber Yard crew (Property Control) under Newbry, was told that they were not needed. The eight men had reported to work at 8:00 A.M., but were informed that they were not needed because replacements had already been secured (two new workers). Newbry also told them that if they wished to work, they could go to the Property Control warehouse and work on the swamper's (Yamamoto's) crew. The workers then refused to return to work on this basis. Evidently attempt was being made to force workers to take an assignment under Ford, in spite of Stafford's new stand on the matter of reassignments.

A similar predicament was being experienced by Ono's utility crew in another division. This crew, numbering 16 workers, under the former Central Service, was confronted with the following proposal. Miller and Connor met with Ono and proposed that 10 out of 16 men be transferred to the swamper crew under Property Control. Ford's claim was that even if his entire crew (8 or 9) returned to work he would still need 10 more workers to carry on the work required of the Property

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Control Section. The following morning the workers of Ono's crew held a meeting and decided not to return to work for the following reasons:

1. The return to work on conditions involving a transfer of 10 out of 16 to an entirely different division was not in accordance with terms of the emergency arrangement concluded between Mr. Stafford and the delegates of the Fact Finding Committee.
2. The young men who would have been included in such a transfer are those who had once been included in such a transfer on April 1st, and had been refused and terminated by Mr. Ford at about that time.

Since Miller was directly involved in this attempt to re-assign workers, he was working in defiance of Stafford's orders to him not to break the temporary working arrangement.

Ito's crew was kept busy with piled-up work, but did not go unmolested. Since it was Friday, the entire crew of 13 men was busy sending out two days' supply of food for the weekend to the messhalls. They were behind in their regular work because the warehouses had been closed Tuesday afternoon, Wednesday, and Thursday. A carload of produce required unloading, and Ito's crew was called upon to unload it. While the crew was reluctant to leave their regular work, they acceded to this call for unloading work primarily because of the agreement that they were not to resort to "insubordination." Seven men of the crew of 13 were sent to unload the produce. While they were working Powers approached them, and ordered two of them to go further up the track to

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help unload evacuee property, which was being unloaded by Yamamoto's crew of nine. The workers after consultation with one another decided to turn down Powers' request for the following stated reasons:

1. This would defeat their plan of completing in a hurry the work of unloading the produce, and returning to their own warehouse as early as possible to carry on their regular duties which they considered important.
2. The request seemed unreasonable/<sup>in</sup>that the crew working on the evacuee property seemed adequate. (This adequateness was later attested to by a report from Yamamoto, the foreman, that their crew of nine completed the unloading of the evacuee property without extra help by 4:00 P.M.)
3. They gained the impression that this order was being given by Mr. Powers merely as a means of testing whether the men would or would not obey orders.

Powers consequently terminated the seven workers and told them to go home.

These men were allowed to retain their old positions, but were told to unload produce, and later two were further ordered to help unload evacuee property. Evidently there was a limit to the men's working without resorting to "insubordination," for they refused to carry out the last order.

This was not all that Ito's crew had to face. From Saturday until Tuesday only four men of the six that remained of the crew were able to work. The foreman had personal

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business to attend to, and one other member of the crew was ill. The amount of regular work to be done by these men was far in excess of their working capacity and they began to fall behind on the delivery of food. All of the remaining men were Isseis, 58, 58, 53 and 48 years of age. On Tuesday, April 25, Powers approached the four men and ordered two to report to the spur to help unload produce, and a little later told all four of them to go. The men attempted to beg off from this work on the grounds that they had more than enough delivery of food to do, which they considered their first duty. Powers' stand was that the men either report to the spur or be terminated, and upon being refused, he terminated the four workers. If the terms of the working arrangement had not been broken by Powers, the working arrangement itself had been disrupted, and resulted in the complete shutdown of the produce warehouse.

On April 25, 15 workers on the Steward's swamper crew received termination notices dated April 20. The reason given for the terminations was: "refusal to work." The swamper crew had never been approached to work on the spur, and consequently had never refused to do this type of work. The terminations were evidently the result of misunderstanding.

Stafford's agreement with Fujii on the terms of the temporary agreement met with antagonistic attitude from his own staff members. In several cases attempts at reassignments were made in total disregard for Stafford's stand. In others, the agreement that workers must accept

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"relative assignments" was abused to the extent that workers refused to take further orders. All the while work was piling up all around in the warehouses and on the spur. The first temporary arrangement had failed.

E. April 25. Fujii and Stafford Works Out a Temporary Working Arrangement Using an Evacuee Labor Supervisor.

The rapid breakdown of the temporary working arrangement brought the issue to a dramatic climax. It had been the understanding of evacuees that the Caucasians involved were deliberately going about making the temporary setup unworkable. Opinion was being voiced that Miller was at the head of the whole trouble, although there was no way of proving this. Some thought that Miller, being politically ambitious and having some local support because he was a former Idaho resident, wanted to cause trouble for Stafford and perhaps take his position away from him. For some time Stafford did not seem to be aware of this unhealthy undercurrent within his own administration, but developments brought it to the surface. Stafford came to see the necessity of a "housecleaning" within his own administration.

With increasing number of terminations of workers, Fujii was having his hands full. He called up Stafford to inform him of the circumstances of the termination of Ito's crew. Then he sent word around to Ito's crew to gather at his office to await further developments. In the meantime Connor had called up Fujii to discuss the rehiring of Ono's Utility crew. Stafford called Fujii into his office and discussed both matters with him.

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In regards to the Utility crew Stafford and Connor asked Fujii to consider the necessity of transporting evacuee baggages. As a result of the conference, arrangement was made whereby a crew of eight would be made up of part of the Utility crew to handle evacuee property. This crew was to work under the order of Cox, who had been transferred from the Property Control Section to take another man's place in the Evacuee Property Section. The memo issued by Stafford stated:

Pursuant to our memorandum of April 20, all men are asked to return to work subject to a final arrangement between the representatives of the Council and the Project Director.

This memorandum seeks to keep current some of the jobs necessary to be done but does not propose direct or permanent assignment, except as a joint meeting between the Council representatives and the project staff shall clarify and establish.

Where Miller and Connor had failed to secure by the use of threat workers to carry out an emergency job, Stafford had succeeded by negotiation with the Council representative.

It was the termination of the Ito crew, however, which brought matters to a head. Fujii brought this matter up with Stafford. Stafford called up Miller to find out what had been done about the matter. Evidently Stafford had been working through Miller, rather than looking into the matter himself. Miller's reply was to the effect that the seven men of Ito's crew who had been terminated on April 21 (this was April 25) had decided earlier in the afternoon not to return to work. Fujii informed Stafford that no such decision could have been reached because the entire crew was now assembled in the Council office, awaiting word of the negotia-

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tion. This information was conveyed to Miller. The latter, it seems, was directed by Stafford to rehire all those who had been terminated. Instead of a request for terminated workers to return to work, however, Wilder sent a messenger to the Council Chamber, asking whether the four workers who were terminated this morning were willing to unload the produce, yes or no. This message was conveyed to both Stafford and Fujii, who were carrying on their conference. Stafford then called up Wilder, and is said to have asked him whose orders he was carrying out. Wilder replied that he was carrying out orders from Miller. Stafford then told him to take orders from him directly, and Wilder is said to have refused this on the ground that Miller was his superior.

Stafford then decided to take drastic measures to rectify the situation. It had become clear to him that it was members of his staff, rather than evacuees, who were at fault. In the presence of Davidson and Folsom, Personnel Officer, Stafford dictated the following memo:

April 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Y. Fujii  
Chairman, Community Council

Whereas confusion and chaos exist concerning recent terminations on the grounds of mutiny and insubordination and, to date, 4:00 P.M., we have not been successful in getting a solution, I recommend that you designate an emergency labor supervisor with whom I may negotiate assignments of necessary work that may involve the utility men, the Steward Service Warehouses 7 and 10, and Property Control Section.

Conditions hereinabove are resorted to for the purpose of keeping miscellaneous jobs current until joint

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sessions of the Council representatives and project staff can clarify and establish settlement of difficulties.

/s/ H. L. Stafford

Project Director

Stafford had decided that he and Fujii would handle the labor situation temporarily until the whole matter was ironed out. In effect, the job of trying to keep warehouse work going was taken out of the hands of Miller, Ford, Cox, Wilder and Powers, and entrusted to an evacuee labor supervisor. An attempt to maintain a temporary working arrangement through Miller failed, and Stafford decided to handle the matter himself through Fujii and other evacuees.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Fujii's Report on Warehouse Labor Disturbances, May 8, 1944

CHAPTER VII. THE CONFLICT IS DISSOLVED, AS MILLER RESIGNS.

When Stafford took matters into his own hands and decided to direct the labor situation himself, the major disturbances of labor relations ceased. Much of this was accomplished by leaving the responsibility for carrying out the required work to evacuees, and reverting to the Central Service system. The evacuee representatives, however, had yet to work on a report to Stafford, which was to be the basis for the more permanent settlement of the conflict. The actual negotiation with the administration was carried on through May. In the middle of May the personnel director from the Washington office arrived to investigate the dispute. Miller resigned and left the project at the end of the month. It was not until June that Powers resigned, and Ford was asked to resign in July. While the warehouse conflict served as the background for other events, it can be considered roughly ended by July.

A. April 26 on. Evacuees Manage the Labor Situation

Faced with the task of assuming responsibility for solving the labor difficulty, evacuees immediately went into action. On April 26 a meeting of the Fact Finding Committee and workers was called to order by Fujii. The latest memo from Stafford was considered a victory for evacuees, and remarks were heard to the effect that it turned out to be a good thing that the evacuees gave in to all administrative demands at first. C. T. Takahashi was elected Co-ordinator

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of Labor, to work directly under Fujii. Doi, supervisor of the former Central Service organization, was to carry the greater part of the work load by revival of the old system. Since his swamper crew was shorthanded by the transfer which began the conflict, he was to be allowed some workers from the Property Control Section. Doi accepted the task of unloading freight cars and other odd warehousing jobs. By gaining cooperation from his crews, Doi was able to catch up with back work in a few days. K. Takeda was selected as Supervisor of Labor, Actually, however, his task was only nominal, since his supervision only included routine tasks in the food warehouses. The emergency situation was saved by returning to the old Central Service system of pooling equipment and labor together in one place to take care of necessary work. In this way, the difficulty of getting workers into the Property Control swamper crew was by-passed.

Although work was accomplished under evacuee supervision, some friction existed between evacuee workers and Miller and Ford. Miller had evidently accused Central Service of not providing every section its share of trucks. Doi proceeded to make a survey of each section to find out whether each had a complaint as to whether Central Service had failed to provide a truck when one was requisitioned. Doi complained that the Property Control Section held up the trucks too often. Sometimes drivers would have to wait for the Property Control workers to appear, or to come back empty because of lack of workers. Doi also complained that he

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could not get raincoats for his workers. Olson asked Miller, but the latter replied that he didn't know whether there were any in the warehouse or not, and that he could not give them out. Doi then appealed to the head of his own division--Davidson-- but failed to be supplied with raincoats. The coal and garbage crews lost their waiting room in the process of reorganization, and they had to sit in their trucks while it rained. There was also some conflict of supervision over the workers in the Property Control Section who had been loaned to Doi. Part of the time they were taking orders from Doi, and at other times Ford was giving them contradictory orders. It seemed that the evacuees were carrying the full load of the labor situation/<sup>only</sup>with extra effort and patience.<sup>1</sup>

According to this new arrangement Stafford was responsible for giving orders to Fujii. The latter then passed on the orders to Takahashi, Doi, and Takeda. Soon the work to be done was being carried out in a routine manner without the benefit of the superstructure of supervisors. The system gradually returned to the old Central Service organization. Takeda left the project for seasonal work in June, and Takahashi was left without anything in particular to do.

### B. The Council Reports to the Residents

Thus far most of the residents had no opportunity in participating directly in the conflict, either to be ac-

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1. Joint Meeting Minutes, J 4/28/44 #1

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acquainted with the nature of the conflict or the solution being reached. The conflict had begun as a friction between workers and their supervisors. The foremen of the workers appealed for help to the Council, which in turn dealt with both administrative personnel concerned and with Stafford to settle the matter. The residents had been neither consulted nor informed about the labor conflict in the warehouse area except indirectly. The existence of some sort of labor conflict in the warehouse area trickled down to residents in the blocks via block commissioners or workers in that area. Messhall workers learned of the conflict through irregular delivery of food. Since a serious food shortage never developed, residents did not develop an intense interest in the conflict through this channel. Terminations had been halted and a satisfactory solution, even though temporary, had been reached as a result of negotiations with Stafford, and this provided an opportune moment to make a report of the conflict to the residents.

On April 28 a special joint meeting of the Council and the Coordinating Council was called by Chairman Fujii, specifically for the purpose of reporting the results of the negotiation with the administration. Fujii stated that the real negotiation with the administration had not taken place as yet. He said:

"But to delay the report to you block commissioners might cause misunderstanding, and we decided to report the progress thus far, and have you inform the residents of the situation."

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After giving a lengthy chronological account of the conflict, Fujii explained:

"All this was necessary to pave the way to carry on a negotiation with the administration. It was mere patchwork. The real problem must await a report of the Fact Finding Committee, which may take a week or so yet. This is my progress report."

Very few questions were asked concerning the report itself. Takeda asked that Takahashi's position in the emergency setup be explained, since Fujii had failed to mention him. Fujii's explanation was simple:

"Since Mr. Takahashi is in the Fact Finding Committee, he is working as the coordinator of Takeda, Doi, and others."

Before the group could bring up comments of its own, C. T. Takahashi introduced an attack on Miller. Takahashi accused Miller of having called Fujii an "agitator," and suggested that he be asked to retract this. He said:

"Miller said to Fujii and called him an agitator, thus showing his insincerity. We as representatives should consider such a charge an insult. I think one of us should make a motion and go on record in view of Myer's congratulation and desire for cooperation and promotion of harmony. We should ask for an apology or retraction from Miller. There's too much of that name-calling going on around here. Miller's position has nothing to do with it. It's a matter of principle."

Takahashi was obviously employing his anti-keto manners. In general the group was in favor of Takahashi's suggestion.

Criticisms, which revealed the Stafford-shielding nature of Takahashi's suggestion, came from two individuals. Akiyama, who as a block delegate, previously had had altercations with Stafford got up and said:

"Before this matter is taken up, there's a man higher up who called a person an agitator. I would like to have that taken up first."

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This attack on Stafford brought an excited chairman to his feet. He hastily suppressed this suggestion by saying:

"That's a different matter. It's a personal issue, while this one is against the Council, since I was representing the Council."

Several individuals upheld Fujii, including Takahashi and Kuraoka. No one offered to back up Akiyama in his attack on the project director. Then Fujii tried to explain the position he was maintaining by saying:

"There's something that's difficult to explain. If there's someone who would kidnap me it's not Stafford or an evacuee. If a reporter comes in here, Stafford says he'll say, there's no labor trouble, but an administrative trouble. You'll have to understand this to understand the problem."

Clearly Fujii was pointing out that Miller was behind the current trouble.

Kuraoka's criticism of Takahashi's stand was that it might jeopardize the settlement of the labor dispute. He said:

"The first problem is to settle the labor dispute. If Mr. Takahashi's motion helps to solve the Problem, we should go ahead with it. But it it's to confuse the problem, we should place it on record, but wait for a better time to put it into effect."

Takahashi gracefully accepted the suggestion that the Council merely go on record objecting to Miller's accusation.

Towards the end of the meeting it was not clear whether the group approved of shielding Stafford or not until Fujii went into his final emotional appeal. He has succeeded in having workers go back to work on what seemed to be adverse terms, and he again succeeded in swinging the group of block commissioners to his way of thinking. He said at the close of the meeting:

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"I have one request to make. I think you understand the source of trouble. If the problem is not solved, what would happen? If we push matters through, what would happen? They'll discharge everyone, they say. I don't think you would be satisfied with slave treatment. But in a final showdown the people may suffer for weeks. This is what I fear. I want to see a settlement before then. Some people want to take this matter to a showdown, and it is not Stafford. Stafford wants to get rid of the M.P.'s. He is willing to join us against the 'Firecracker.' The end of the month is approaching, and the payroll section is confused. But Stafford's stand is that he ordered the workers to go back to their jobs. It's not the fault of the Japanese, but due to the fault in his own management. He is willing to give the workers full pay. A final showdown would be whose responsibility? The project director's, of course. What is his position? Who has a design on it? I can't reveal everything. But I want you to understand this problem."

Fujii was applauded as he finished his speech. Evidently he had succeeded in conveying the impression that it was Miller, and not Stafford, who was behind the whole trouble.

During the next few days block commissioners made reports to their blocks of the negotiations thus far. This report was asked to be made by Chairman Fujii, and its content was largely directed by the report Fujii had made to the block commissioners. This was the second of the tasks in which the block commissioners were asked to participate-- the first was the election of seven persons to the Fact Finding Committee. Where Fujii had merely hinted of the part that Miller might have played in the incident, the report to the resident stated more plainly that Miller was causing Stafford trouble because he was after the project director's position. Some block commissioners plainly stated that it was good politics to support Stafford against Miller, and this seemed to have been the position taken by the majority of the block commissioners.

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The general lack of interest in the warehouse conflict on the part of the residents was not greatly disturbed by favorable reports of the negotiations carried on by the Council. Scattered verbal expressions of antagonism toward the administration and Caucasian supervisors in general or toward Stafford were heard among the residents. One Issei, on seeing the announcement that warehouse workers would be given priority, etc., said:

"There's no use putting up a sign like that because nobody is going to work until the matter is settled. Anyone who goes to work in the warehouse is going to be beaten up this time."<sup>1</sup>

Others were saying that all of the Hakujins should be kicked out of the project instead of being increased in number.<sup>2</sup>

Another expression heard was that since Stafford and other Caucasians were mean, the Japanese couldn't take it "lying down" (naki neiri) all the time.<sup>3</sup> Very few residents were aware of Miller's existence on the project until reports were made by block commissioners. However, the story that Miller was behind the whole trouble and was after Stafford's job was readily accepted without any evidence by many residents.

Attitudes of Tuleans toward the conflict was not more evident than those of other residents. One Tulean Issei who was terminated in this conflict expressed what appeared to be an attitude adopted as a result of residence in Tule Lake:

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1. J 4/20/44 #1
  2. J 4/29/44 #3
  3. J 4/31/44 #1

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"The people around here are no good because they always give in. Now if this were in Tule Lake they'd start with the messhall and serve only two meals a day. They have a good reason because the messhalls are not getting in any food now. If it were in Tule Lake the people would know how to handle a matter of this sort."<sup>1</sup>

### C. Report to Washington by the Community Analyst

Elmer Smith, who arrived on the project just as the warehouse conflict had exploded, sized up the situation rapidly, and established his own status on the project. Even on the very first day of his arrival he ran across a Caucasian (probably Ford) using abusive language toward a group of boys, and he did not think that the Caucasian was taking the right attitude. He heard that the "cause" of the warehouse terminations were several Caucasians, and this idea that Caucasians were primarily to blame was only substantiated by further investigation. He sensed that the administration looked upon him with suspicion and with some individuals with hostility. From the very beginning he took the policy of reporting to Washington what he thought was the truth, ~~ir~~regardless of what the administration thought. Stafford accepted this working arrangement. Other staff members were cautious of what they said in Smith's presence.

Smith wrote a series of report to Washington giving his version of the conflict. While he did mention such factor as the feeling of persecution on the part of evacuees, the main difficulty was given as the antagonistic attitude toward evacuee workers of a number of Caucasians--and he named

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Miller, Ford, Powers, Wilder and Cox. By both evacuees and administrative personnel Smith was considered to have aligned himself with evacuees. Some like Ford even refused to eat with him at the same table. However, both Miller and his clique and Davidson and his group were said to have tried to explain to him their side of the story.

### D. Fujii and Stafford:

Fujii and Stafford were both prepared for a conflict. Every evidence shows that Fujii was willing to lead a strong protest against the administration and that Stafford approved of "cracking down" on the evacuees. At some point, however, they both changed their attitude toward each other, and began to think alike more and more on how to deal with project problems. The first indication of a shift toward better understanding between the two was on April 20. By April 25 this trend had become clear. For this reason it seems important to record some remarks made by Fujii and others attributed to Stafford around or after April 25.

One definite trend in the relationship between Fujii and Stafford was increased intimacy. At first the meetings between the two were merely formal, and Fujii was generally accompanied by other members of the Council. However, at least two or three times Fujii went to see Stafford in his office alone, in direct violation of a Council ruling to the effect that a representative from the Council must consist of at least two individuals. Also, Stafford invited Fujii to Sunday dinners at his home, in violation to his own ruling of "non-fraternization" on the project between

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the staff and evacuee associates. Fujii also was able to speak to Stafford privately over the phone.

At the meeting with the block commissioners on April 28 Fujii showed evidences of high regard for Stafford. At that meeting Fujii said or implied the following:

1. Stafford should be protected against Miller.
2. Stafford wants to get rid of the M.P.'s.
3. Stafford is willing to join evacuees against Miller.
4. Stafford is willing to pay the wages of those terminated for the period in which they did not work.
5. Stafford is willing to blame his own administration and not evacuees for the warehouse conflict.

On another occasion Fujii said:

1. Stafford believes that 90 per cent of the trouble here on the project results from the mishandling by the administrative staff.
2. Stafford said that he was going to reduce the number of Caucasians working and replace them with evacuees.
3. Stafford said that Davidson was good because he was sympathetic to evacuees and sincere, but that he made too many promises that could not be carried out.<sup>1</sup>

These statements that Fujii made not only reveals Fujii's attitude toward Stafford, but the latter's behavior toward Fujii.

The attitude of Stafford and Fujii toward C. T. Takahashi seems to be significant. There was evidence of close

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collaboration among the three. C. T. Takahashi has acted in many instances as Stafford's personal aide, and in return has received such privileges as living in Twin Falls on short-term leave and being allowed to come into the project everyday, which was against regulations. Later he was allowed an indefinite leave. According to Ogawa, Community Clerk, Fujii seems to be influenced a great deal by Takahashi. The three agreed that Miller should be attacked and that Stafford should be protected.

### E. The Fact Finding Committee Works on a Report to Stafford

While the temporary labor situation was being patched up, the Fact Finding Committee worked on a report on the warehouse conflict to be presented to Stafford. This report was to become the basis for the more permanent solution of the conflict. This was the major move on the part of the evacuees in their "negotiation" with the administration. Because of the attitude taken by Stafford towards Miller and some of the others, however, the report ended up by actually being the result of collaboration between Stafford and the members of the Fact Finding Committee. The contents of the report to a great extent was governed by this new relationship between the Council and Stafford. This state of affairs evolved gradually within the Fact Finding Committee, and was not entirely free of internal conflict.

The Fact Finding Committee met several times after receiving Stafford's memo on April 20. Much of the work of the committee, however, was carried on either alone by Fujii, the Chairman of the Council, or in conjunction with only

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one or two other members of the committee, especially the Community Clerk, Ogawa. Most of the work of taking testimony of workers was done by Fujii and Ogawa. The latter was also asked to undertake the task of writing a report on the basis of the findings that he made. While a standing committee of five was set up for actual negotiations with Stafford, Fujii did not always bother to go gather these men in talking matters over with Stafford. Towards the end Fujii was seeing Stafford by himself, and making decisions without always consulting the others. While Ogawa, as Community Clerk, wielded considerable influence in the Council and Fact Finding Committee, C. T. Takahashi, who kept in close touch with both Stafford and Fujii, influenced Fujii and the course of the committee. In the meetings of the committee the opinions of Fujii and Takahashi were the strongest and eventually governed the general policy of the committee.

Ogawa, in writing the report to be presented to the Fact Finding Committee for acceptance, ran into two main difficulties. The first one, and the less controversial among the members, concerned the desirability of including or excluding all material which was adverse to evacuees. Ogawa was in favor of writing what he found to be true. For instance, he learned that the boys who were terminated by Ford were partly responsible for it since they had not shown up for work promptly. Again, he found out that other workers would not work for Ford because they wanted to stick together in supporting the ones who had been terminated, whether they were right or wrong. The majority of the members of

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the Fact Finding Committee were desirous of leaving out from the report all material which was adverse to evacuees, and in the final writing of the report, this policy prevailed.

The second conflict within the committee which confused Ogawa was the advisability of including material adverse to Stafford. At first, the majority of the committee seemed in favor of attacking Stafford for the attitude that he had taken towards the evacuee workers and for using such terms as "mutiny and insubordination." They could have also indicated that Stafford signed the memorandum which was designed to coerce workers into accepting jobs in the warehouse area. At the meeting of the Fact Finding Committee on April 24 some members of the committee were in favor of including Stafford along with Miller, Ford, Cox, Wilder, and Powers as the source of trouble. These included Hatate, Yamada, Akiyama, and Kuraoka. Fujii, who even at that time seemed to be trying to "fix matters up" between himself and Stafford, was in favor of giving Stafford another chance. Ogawa was inclined to believe that it was permissible to give Stafford this chance. C. T. Takahashi was undoubtedly in favor of Stafford all the time, and he was always able to influence Doi to his point of view.

Gradually the views of Fujii and Takahashi received general approval of the Fact Finding Committee. At the joint meeting of the Council and block commissioners, Fujii was able to gain acceptance for his attack on Miller and protection of Stafford. On May 8 the Fact Finding Committee held a meeting in which the final corrections to the report

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written by Ogawa were made. This meeting was attended by Fujii, Mihara, Osawa, Akiyama, Takeda (councilmen), and Yamada, Kanaya, Takahashi (block commissioners). At this meeting the desire to protect Stafford was voiced by Fujii and Takahashi. Takahashi, for instance, said:

"Shouldn't we say somewhere that the council appreciates Stafford's broad outlook on this?"

Both Fujii and Takahashi said:

"Anyway, we've got to watch out to see that we don't get Stafford into trouble."

Akiyama, who had been desirous of blasting Stafford before Miller, by this meeting had changed his attitude entirely, evidently having buried his differences with Fujii. He said:

"If Stafford showed half the sincerity as he did on this problem, we wouldn't have any trouble."

And again:

"Be careful not to make it Stafford's fault."

Evidently Akiyama was the sort of person who could reverse his stand quite easily.

When the question as to why the Central Service was being disbanded was discussed, Ogawa said that he thought that Stafford might have been against it because the evacuees were too strongly organized there. Kanaya backed him up on this. Fujii, however, chose to side with Stafford, saying:

"Mr. Stafford told me that he wanted the Central Service back again, and that he wanted the Council to request this setup. He wants the Council to take more responsibility."

With minor changes Ogawa's report was accepted by the Fact Finding Committee without too much disagreement among the members. After reviewing the disturbance up until April

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18, the report came to the conclusion that the behavior of certain administrative personnel was responsible for the labor conflict.

"The Committee has heard and recorded the statements of all the evacuee foremen involved, also the large majority of the workers involved. Every statement includes the opinion that basically the root of the disturbances is attributable to a small group of the appointed personnel, including, as most prominently mentioned, Mr. Ford, Mr. Cox, and Mr. Powers, and, (to somewhat less extent, Mr. Dean Miller and Mr. Wilder.) Some others were mentioned.

"The consensus of opinion is that these few of the appointed personnel were largely at fault due to some or all the following reasons:

- A. Their attitude towards evacuees generally is one of superiority, as such not in keeping with expressed W. R. A. policies.
- B. They have failed to exercise good judgment and tact as necessary to obtain good work cheerfully from evacuee employees. They have not lived up to employer's responsibilities in an employer-employee relationship.
- C. They have, at times to more-or-less extent, shown that they are not fully qualified, competent at their own assigned duties.
- D. They are not sufficiently conscientious in the carrying out of their responsibilities and in the performance of their duties.
- E. Most of the appointed personnel in question are comparative newcomers to this project, apparently without sufficient knowledge of the peculiar, abnormal situation here, and without sympathetic understanding of the evacuees' positions. Evacuees have been given the impression that these men consider themselves wardens of a prison camp, and that, as such, exercise of dictatorial and arbitrary attitudes in order.

Due to foregoing, they have not merited, hence failed to obtain the proper respect of foremen and workers under them. There is practically no harmonious, wholesome feeling of cooperation between the said appointed personnel and the evacuee employees. The constant usage of undiplomatic language and the threat of termination as an alternative to the carrying out of orders, is obviously not conducive to work morale. The welfare of the residents of the project has in many instances been

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relegated, by members of this group, to one of little or no consequence. Wholesale terminations are a manifest example of shortcomings on the part of the said appointed personnel, who, if they are deserving of supervisory positions, should have at least bothered to try to discover the reasons underlying 'Insubordination' on the part of the workers."<sup>1</sup>

Other conclusions of the report included charges against the administration.

1. Certain appointed personnel members <sup>stepped</sup> /out of their jurisdiction, as when Ford or Cox attempted to order the Mess Management crew.
2. Important change in work requirement has not been announced with sufficient clarity.
3. Flexibility of work requirement involving extra duties has been extended beyond a reasonable period.
4. There is conflict of opinion concerning the reasonable amount of work to be expected of a worker.

At this meeting of the Fact Finding Committee Fujii introduced a report of his own, which he planned to present to Stafford. Ogawa's report for the Fact Finding Committee covered the incident only up to April 18. Fujii wrote a report which brought the details of the conflict up to date. This report was similar to the Fact Finding Committee report in that it avoided mentioning anything adverse to Stafford, and attacked Miller, Ford, Powers, Cox, and Wilder. The report was given as a factual account of the incident as Fujii experienced it himself. Fujii's explanation for the report was that Stafford was desirous of presenting material to Washington, but that he couldn't write a report himself. Why the report could not have been first presented to the Fact Finding Committee for approval and sent as a supplement to its report was not explained by Fujii. He merely stated:

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1. Fact Finding Committee Report, May 8, 1944

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"I've written a summary of my own, which I would like to hand in apart from the report of the committee. I think it's better if I don't present this report to the committee. I want to have Mr. Kimball analyze this and have him present his own views on the matter."

"I'm going to have this looked over by Mr. Stafford. I shall get Mr. Stafford's reply on this and send both to Washington. I want to keep diplomatic relations with Mr. Stafford. Mr. Stafford himself can't write a report on a matter of this sort. I have an understanding with Mr. Stafford on this."

No opinions were expressed at this meeting against Fujii's private report, which was merely read rapidly at the end of the meeting--for one thing because no time was available for discussing it.

In private, however, comments were made by several members of the committee, not only concerning Fujii's private report, but also about the manner in which he was carrying on secret negotiations with Stafford. Ogawa definitely expressed the opinion that he didn't like Fujii's attempt to fix matters up privately between himself and Stafford. Yamada laughed after the meeting because Fujii had presented his own report, thus showing that he did not favor the Council chairman's action. Takeda maintained a general silence during the whole meeting, showing that he did not approve of the whole proceeding. This attitude was later corroborated by the statement that he made to Sakoda, ex-Tulean research worker, who agreed completely with Takeda in his disdain for Fujii's pro-administration behavior.

The report of the Fact Finding Committee, therefore, was definitely biased in two directions. First it attempted to hide all faults of evacuees. Second it avoided reference to any fault of Stafford's part. The second point was

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championed by Fujii and Takahashi and they succeeded in convincing the other members that this was a wise action on the part of the Council. Some members like Takeda, however, looked with misgivings on the close collaboration between the Council and Stafford.

### F. The Fact Finding Committee Meets with the Administration

The negotiation of the Fact Finding Committee with the administration took the form of a series of seven meetings from May 9 to May 25, with future meetings still planned after this date. The negotiation aspect of the meetings was overshadowed by collaboration between the two bodies concerned. On certain points the two groups were in complete agreement and this kept them on an amicable working relationship. Even on points where disagreement was experienced, the administration expressed its point of view politely, and avoided dogmatic assertion of its might. The result was a discussion on important labor relation problems and the assertion of the evacuee point of view, which seemingly had not taken place until these meetings.

The participants in the negotiation meetings can be grouped in the following manner. First, on the administration's side there was Stafford, attended by his Personnel Officer, Folsom. Stafford lead the whole meeting, introducing new topics and attempting to guide the discussions. He was the chairman for the meetings. Folsom, a man evidently without strong convictions of his own, said very little during the meetings. He was known to lack ability in his work, and was still desirous of retaining his high-paying position. He

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was known to have been careful with two men who might have upset his position--Miller and Stafford. The administration, consequently, was represented largely by Stafford himself.

From the administrative personnel there were also official observers. They included the Reports Officer, the Community Analyst, and the project attorneys. On the whole these observers did not affect either one way or the other the negotiation and collaboration between the evacuees and the administration. This was possibly due to the attitude of fairness maintained by these individuals, with the exception of Acree, the Reports Officer. Acree, who showed that he was the least in sympathy with the trend of the discussions, was helpless in changing their course. The Reports Officer was a recent arrival on the project, and had already had his share of difficulties with the evacuees, where his predecessor had practically none. He was an experienced newspaper man, well on in years, and once worked on a Hearst paper in Alabama. Of those present at the meetings he was the only one who was in any close agreement with the attitudes and policy of administrative management of those who were being attacked--Miller, Ford, Powers.

The other observers were generally understanding of the viewpoints presented by evacuees. This was especially true of the Community Analyst, Elmer Smith, who was considered to be highly sympathetic to evacuees. He did not express any opinion at these meetings. The project attorney was also fair in the remarks that he offered. Barnhart, the Acting Project Attorney, was succeeded by the new Project Attorney,

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Barrett, in the midst of the series of meetings.

The evacuee delegation generally numbered six. It was lead by the chairman of the Fact Finding Committee, who was also the chairman of the Council--Fujii. The actual speaker for the evacuee group, however, was Ogawa, the Community Clerk. An intelligent and fairminded individual, he consistently upheld what he knew to be the rights of evacuees. In this stand he was helped by Fujii, Takahashi, Osawa and Takeda. Osawa had come as a replacement for G. Mihara, who had proved to be of little value in meetings with Caucasians, possibly owing to his language handicap. Kuraoka, also under a language handicap, did not express any opinion at all at the four meetings that he attended. Dr. Shigaya attended only one meeting.

One other person present at the last three meetings was Brooks, Personnel Director from the Washington office. He had come to the project to investigate the trouble. He tended to stick closely to administrative rulings and technicalities, and seemed to get along well with Stafford.

The meetings were held on May 9, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23, and 25 in Mr. Stafford's office, generally at 2:00 P.M.

At the beginning of the first meeting, Stafford set the general agenda for the meetings. He listed three topics to be discussed:

1. Appointed-personnel-evacuee relationship.
2. Flexibility of labor.
3. Reasonable amount of work to expect from a worker.

By evacuee request the overlap of authority on the part of

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Caucasian supervisors was added to the agenda. The topics discussed, however, covered practically every important problem in the employment and labor field. The discussions can be grouped under the following topics:

1. Appointed Personnel Evacuee relationship.
2. Flexibility of labor.
3. Charges against the appointed personnel.

1. Appointed personnel-evacuee relationship One of the first topics to be discussed was the relationship between the supervisor (Caucasian), the foreman (evacuee) and the workers. It was Acree who started the discussion, thereby showing his stand without being influenced by the rest of the persons present. Acree observed that the workers showed their loyalty primarily to the foreman and not to the supervisor. Also, they insisted on working as a crew instead of as individual workers. Acree attacked this arrangement on the basis that it was not the "American system." Stafford took the stand that he had heard differences of opinion on this. Fujii, Osawa, Ogawa, and Takahashi all stated that they believed that work proceeded more smoothly when the supervisor contacted the foremen, rather than the men directly. Ogawa stated that this was especially true in routine work. Stafford then wanted to know whether it made any difference when there was an emergency. Takahashi came back and stated that one man got more emergency work done by merely discussing the problem with his foreman, possibly because he maintained close friendship with him. Stafford was curious to know who this person was, and learned that it was George Anderson. At this

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point Agree admitted:

"I can see a number of advantages that would be gained from that system."

Stafford summed up the discussion by saying:

"Then to sum up the discussion on this point of supervisor-foreman relationship, we might assume that if the crew had been fully manned and if there had been the conventional relationship between the supervisor and foreman there would have been no trouble."<sup>1</sup>

On another occasion Takahashi stated that the hiring of workers was best left up to the foreman.<sup>2</sup> Fujii also stated that when foremen were given responsibility for a job they were less likely to quit their job. He also pointed out that the Co-op has been running smoothly without Caucasian supervision.<sup>3</sup>

In the second meeting Stafford brought up the reverse situation from the above. This was the problem of evacuees' going beyond their immediate superior. He said:

"There are two things we ought to discuss in these meetings: that is, what appears to us to be, and I say appears to us to be, a characteristic of the evacuee, of circumventing his subordinate and going directly to the supervisor, and vice versa. How much of that type of thing do we have? What gives rise to the theory or rumor that there is a characteristic with the Japanese folks to respect nobody but the top man? Is there anything to that?"<sup>4</sup>

In answer to Stafford's question Osawa stated that the matter of appealing to a higher authority was not peculiar with the evacuees. If workers could not get satisfaction from their immediate superior, it was natural for them to appeal to some higher authority. He also stated that they (the evacuees) used to go to Shafer, but this was no longer possible (he had

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1. Stafford-Council Meeting 5/9/44 pp 2-9  
2. Ibid. 5/12/44 pp14  
3. Ibid. 5/12/44 pp 4-5  
4. Ibid. 5/10/44 p 17

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been replaced by Miller).

Takahashi stated:

"Last year, the people had confidence in quite a few members of the personnel. Now, you (Stafford) are the only one left, so they come direct to you."<sup>1</sup>

Stafford stated his case in another way:

"We developed yesterday the principle of confidence in respect to foreman, crew, and supervisor. What happens when the supervisor runs around the foreman. I take it that the psychology works both ways and the happy medium is where the entire crew is in full agreement with the supervisor. The crew would object to the supervisor's coming around the foreman, wouldn't he?"<sup>2</sup>

The implication that evacuee workers should not circumvent their immediate superior, however, was lost, and Stafford did not again make an effort to stress the point.

Stafford introduced a situation involving the sense of responsibility on the part of the evacuee foreman, which he attempted to interpret as "quite common with Japanese people." The Post Office, as Stafford explained, was run by an all-Japanese crew, with an evacuee supervisor. Mr. Umino, the first Postmaster, was relocating and reported to Stafford that he was having difficulty finding a successor. Stafford understood him to mean that he wanted the project director find the successor. Stafford, at any rate, thought that this was only reasonable since he was under \$2000 bond and he was responsible for the Postmaster. As it turned out, however, Mr. Umino selected his own successor, much to Stafford's surprise, and the project director was required to withdraw

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1. Ibid. 5/10/44 p 18

2. Ibid. 5/10/44 p 18

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his own candidate that he had selected. Stafford indicated his puzzled attitude toward this situation when he said:

"I don't personally understand at all and it is quite common with Japanese people, and I think it only helps any situation if we have a discussion on that. If that principle goes down with the responsibility of leadership and with the responsibility of supervisors and foremen in general, if that's the general idea, I think we ought to know more about it and the question I am raising is, does that go all the way thru the rank?"

The evacuee explanation of the successor situation emphasized the sense of responsibility felt by the supervisor. It was explained to Stafford that Mr. Umino was motivated by a desire to see his work carried on in a capable manner. Takahashi stated that Umino felt this responsibility because he was left in charge, and was not ordered about by Stafford. The project director's reply was that this tied in with the discussion that "your elder people, when they do accept responsibility, they accept whole-heartedly." He also thought that the explanation might explain some of the sudden resignations that he had experienced. However, he thought that this arrangement was "quite different from what our ordinary scheme of management amounts to." However, aside from pointing out that he was responsible for the successor he did not try to press his argument.

As a result of this particular discussion, Stafford admitted that his understanding of the situation had improved. He said:

"A better understanding of this thing will help us with better working conditions. Furnish us with some of the material necessary in order to coach some of our folks. People are coming from all over the United States who had no experience with government service and certainly not relocation center operations. We

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have a tremendous job on our hands and what surprises me now is that, for most of us who have worked here a couple of years, we still don't understand you folks."<sup>1</sup>

On May 12 Stafford also brought up for discussion the problem of overlap of authority. Both evacuees and Stafford agreed that overlap of authority caused confusion and was not desirable. Several examples from the present incident and from others were cited to show how certain administrative officials had not adhered to direct lines of authority.<sup>2</sup>

2. Flexibility Stafford introduced the subject of flexibility several times and spent some time in discussing it. On this subject Stafford and evacuees did not always agree, and some compromise was made by both parties. Here again the subtle process of friendly negotiation was evident.

In introducing the topic of flexibility, Stafford seemed to have in mind a definite setup that he desired. He stated that with increasing labor shortage and inability to recruit workers for certain jobs, it was going to become necessary to meet the need for additional workers in some way. He stated categorically that flexibility was going to become necessary in the future to meet this labor situation. He wanted to know, for instance, whether evacuees were willing to meet an emergency labor situation, and whether it would be possible to prorate the labor shortage in such a way that it wouldn't hurt anybody. He wanted to know specifically whether the truck drivers wouldn't do some

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1. Stafford-Council Meeting, May 12, 1944 pp 14-16  
2. Stafford-Council Meeting, May 12, 1944 pp9-12

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light unloading, whether the lumber yard crew would not do other work, whether the workers assigned to Housing or to Community Activities Sections would not do general work under the Property Control swamper crew. In other words, he wanted to know whether a psychology could be developed among the workers whereby they could assume a greater variety of work.<sup>1</sup>

The stand taken by evacuees was opposed to unlimited flexibility of work. One point made by Osawa, Ogawa, and Takahashi was that crews have been working overtime already without extra credit. Takahashi stated that a lumber yard crew could do better work with a special crew. Ogawa stressed this same point, saying that workers--especially Isseis--assumed more responsibility toward their work when given a definite job to do. He also argued that if a supervisor wanted to get extra work done in case of an emergency, he would be able to accomplish this if he kept amicable relationship with his foreman and workers. With proper handling, he said, evacuee workers were willing to help out in cases of emergency. Thus evacuees argued against unlimited flexibility for the workers.<sup>2</sup>

Neither side, however, rigidly opposed the argument presented by the other side. Takahashi, for instance, stated his opinion that truck drivers should help unload cargo. Stafford remarked that where full cargoes were involved and

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1. Ibid. May 9 pp 5, 6, 7; May 11 p. 5; May 12 p.12  
2. Ibid. May 9 p. 6; May 11 pp 3-4, 6; May 12 p.2, 4;  
May 22 p.3

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a crew of workers was on hand to do the unloading, the driver could rest during the unloading. On the other hand, he expected the driver to do light unloading. On the matter of flexibility of work Osawa stated that produce warehouse workers were willing to unload produce, but not other type of material. To this Acree's attack was a "Why not?", but Stafford chose to compromise. He stated that it was permissible if food workers would not handle anything else besides food. But he asked whether those working with building material could handle similar goods, excluding food. At this point, however, the evacuees did not concede the need for increased flexibility. On another occasion Takahashi agreed with Stafford that a crew which was free should be willing to do other work in the same division. Takeda, in answering Stafford, stated that workers assigned to Housing or Community Activities Sections should be willing to do relative work for the Property Control Section. In regards to emergencies Fujii stated that he did not have any trouble in getting office workers to help in blanket exchanging. Stafford seemed to have acquiesced to the evacuee point of view when he stated that he presumed that emergency labor situations would be met by evacuee workers if they were properly handled by the supervisors. Stafford's suggestion for flexibility of labor was greatly tempered by the evacuee point of view.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid. May 9 p6, 7, 8; May 11 p 2, 5, 10; May 12 p. 3

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One answer to the problem of flexibility of labor was the complete restoration of the original Central Service system, which both Stafford and the evacuees agreed upon as the ideal solution. Takahashi was especially a strong advocate of the Central Service organization, and pointed out its advantages. Ogawa had in mind a Central Service crew either in the Motor Pool or in the Property Control Section. The latter idea was soon given up, however, when it was pointed out that the advantage of the old setup was due to the pooling of both labor and equipment in the same place. There was full agreement on the part of evacuees that the revival of the Central Service was the ideal solution of the labor problem. Stafford, who expressed his preference for the revival of the Central Service system, seemed anxious to have on the record the approval of evacuees of this plan.<sup>1</sup>

At the meeting on May 22 the advantages of the Central Service organization to solve the labor problem on the project was reviewed for the benefit of the Washington representative, Brooks. Stafford summed up the advantages in this manner:

"May I summarize it this way? The principle of Central Service was conceived of last year in an emergency. The organization at that time was built up to consolidate labor and equipment and to create a utility unit that would get the job done whether it was an emergency situation or what have you. Now this operation divides itself into static type of things. Going back to Mr. Osawa's conversation, the normal tendency on the part of the worker is that he have a specified amount of duties to take care of and this gets him into a frame of mind that if something comes along, maybe

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1. Ibid. May 11 p. 5, pp 13-14

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it happens once a year, it is difficult to get them to meet these emergency situations. The flexibility of a Central Service arrangement consolidated labor and equipment and took away those odds and ends and the kind of jobs that plagued everyone. Central Service being organized for that purpose raised no particular question about the job to be done. We literally had to devise a Central Service in order to take care of the remaining equipment that we had at that time or else we were going to break down completely. Now there has been passed on to us from a procedure point of view the transportation and maintenance system which will handle all equipment. The labor which was being transferred into Property Control theoretically would assume all of these odds and ends. The Property Control as the need arose would requisition equipment from Transportation who would send a truck out with the driver.

"Mr. Osawa in Community Activities has an extra-ordinary situation that he is confronted with for which he has to plan a special program, like Kuroki week, for example. It didn't happen the week before. He has to have various meetings and has to move furniture. He goes to the warehouse or Property Control and gets some laborers and swampers and tries to reconcile those two agencies, the Property Control and Transport people. By the time he is able to get those two together it may be the next week. They are particularly concerned with their own organization of operating the Warehouses and this presents difficulties; wherein Central Service served the whole project.<sup>1</sup> They were working for everybody as the case might be."

The Central Service system was pictured as a "Flying Squadron," with men and equipment to do any odd job that needed to be done. Both Barrett, the Project Attorney, and Brooks seemed favorably impressed with the advantages of this system.

During the discussion Stafford pointed out some of the objections that the Washington office raised to the Central Service organization. One objection was that the evacuees would not like to work under the Central Service system. Another was that the Motor Pool was not organized to take care of labor--only of equipment. Equipment was supposed to be

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1. Ibid. May 22 pp 9-10

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dispatched by the Motor Pool Supervisor, and under the Central Service system the dispatching would be done by someone else. The Central Service system also involved cost-accounting difficulties. Takahashi stated that he believed that the Washington office considered the 77 laborers in the Motor Pool as "surplus" workers, and for that reason ordered their transfer to the Property Control Section. Folsom explained this on the basis that the workers were not accounted for in the labor budget for the Motor Pool Section. Brooks raised another objection considered by the Washington office--that in presenting the WRA budget to Congress for approval a uniform organizational chart for all projects was desirable.

The discussion also brought out some confusion in other sections besides those in the warehouse area, which had been caused by the abandonment of the Central Service organization by Washington. Both Community Activities and Housing Sections had had their work done largely through the Central Service. When the transfer of workers from Central Service was ordered, however, no provision had been made either by the project or Washington administration for workers for those sections deprived of the use of the Central Service organization. It was revealed that these two sections officially would have no workers available until adjustment was made in the budget for the period beginning in July.

As a result of the discussion both the advantages of retaining the Central Service organization and the objections to it were reviewed. The consensus of opinion was that the

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system was worth preserving, and that the objections of the Washington office could be reconciled. Brooks suggested that a procedure be outlined whereby the Central Service organization would fit into the administrative instructions from Washington--involving such problems as cost-accounting and the allocation of labor to fit the labor quota for each division. He agreed to take this matter to a conference of personnel directors to be held in Denver, where he would attempt to gain approval for the revival of the Central Service system. Consequently, the greatest hope for the solution of present warehouse labor conflict and future labor shortage was placed in the revival of the Central Service.<sup>1</sup>

On May 22 the discussion on flexibility of work lead to a suggestion which was favorable to evacuees. Ogawa suggested that routine work could best be handled by giving workers specific responsibilities, and that emergencies be skilfully handled by the supervisor. This lead to the discussion that instructions should be written for the workers as to what duties should be performed, so that there would be no confusion. Barrett and Takahashi both favored this plan, and received the support of others. The possibility of taking care of emergencies by defining what an emergency situation was and who was to take care of it was discussed. The discussion lead to the possibility of making a survey of existing labor needs of the various sections, apportioning men accordingly. Brooks then suggested that at the same time

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1. Ibid. May 22 ,1944

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the survey was made, a job description could be made of each job involved. There was a general agreement among those present that the sooner this job survey was made the better it was for the labor situation.

Out of the discussion on the job survey came the suggestion that the Council organize a committee to help carry out the survey. It was suggested that the Council set up an employment committee to work in conjunction with the Personnel Technician on this survey. The role of the Fair Labor Practise Board, which was yet to be established by the Council, could be limited to the handling of grievances on the part of workers.<sup>1</sup>

The discussion of the amount of work to be expected of a worker took place off the record. The evacuee point of view was that a full day's work could not very well be expected of the workers because they were not being paid normal wages. Stafford flatly refused to consider recognizing working conditions other than those set by administrative instructions. He is said to have declared that if the representatives of the residents chose to press their point, there was no sense in continuing the discussion any further.<sup>2</sup>

The discussion on the introduction of greater flexibility of the variety of work done by a worker, favored by Stafford, was overshadowed by the evacuee desire for definite work work assignments. The result was the agreement on the part

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1. Ibid. May 22 pp 3-8; May 23, pp 6-8

2. J 7/20/44 #9

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of both Stafford and the evacuees that the Central Service system should be reinstated to handle emergency work and to conserve on labor and equipment. It also resulted in a plan to conduct a job survey, on the basis of joint participation between the two groups, to determine the number of workers to be allotted from the quota to a particular section and to define the work to be assigned to the workers.

3. Charges against the appointed personnel Although it was not included on Stafford's agenda, one of the main business of the meetings was to develop charges against certain appointed personnel members considered to be the source of trouble in the warehouse conflict. The basis for these charges was the report by the Fact Finding Committee. From time to time Stafford himself referred to certain undesirable attitudes taken by certain appointed personnel, and later stated that it would be necessary to conduct an investigation on them. He intimated, however, that it was the evacuees who were to bring up the charges against these individuals. While the revival of the Central Service would have solved the labor problem on the project for some time, and place it on its former working basis, it seemed that certain persons were going to be made to shoulder the responsibility for the trouble that had occurred.

On May 9 and 10 some discussion was held on Ford's attitude toward evacuee workers. On the first day Stafford introduced the subject by saying:

"Another factor and one that has been pointed out is the inability of the Property Control Officer to recruit or hold men. Of course, we have accusations. We may have considerable difficulty with many individuals as

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there is a tendency, which, I believe, has been pointed out, for groups of people to be inclined to be sympathetic to other groups. I think the charges made are fairly well outlined of uncivil conduct. I don't think that you would question that interpretation out of the document."<sup>1</sup>

This remark was sandwiched in between his discussion of the supervisor-foremen relationship. On May 10 Stafford was again instrumental in bringing Ford into the discussion by stating:

"I think we have developed a point here this afternoon that a lot of folks want to go to work but they are not willing to work for Mr. Ford. Is that correct?"<sup>2</sup>

On this occasion Stafford stated that Ford got along with some evacuees who had been working for him for some time, and wanted to know why there was so much objection to him. Acree stressed this point, too, in defense of Ford, and quickly got into a little argument with Osawa, who retorted: "They're few in number." Ogawa ably explained the general objection of evacuee workers to Ford. His manners were antagonistic because he backed up his orders with threats of termination. Ogawa also pointed out that Ford had denied raincoats to the lumber yard crew, who wanted to work through the rain. He also denied his workers the privilege of coffee and sandwiches in the afternoon, to which all outside workers were entitled. He also mentioned Ford's irresponsible behavior on a trip to Spokane. With prompting from Stafford, Ogawa also read into the minutes of the meeting, an account of an incident which took place last summer, when Ford wrongly accused members of the Central Service crew of theft. Takahashi also gave an account of

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1. Ibid. May 9, p. 4  
2. Ibid. May 10, p. 10

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the unjust firing of the Yasutake crew on the grounds of loafing, when it was one of the hardest working crews on the project. The day before Takahashi stated his objection to certain administrative staff members because they considered Japanese workers no better than W.P.A. workers. Charges against Ford from the evacuee side were plentiful, and evidently Stafford was desirous of having them in the record.

On May 23 the seriousness of the charges being brought up at the meetings became evident. Barrett, the Project Attorney, stated that members of the staff should be given a chance to review the material presented by evacuees, and to prepare an answer to them. The answers, evidently, were to be based upon the examination of members of the appointed personnel who were faced with charges. Brooks, Personnel Director from Washington, then stated that he would have to insist upon specific charges based on proven incidents if action was to be taken against anyone. It was brought out that the charges against Miller and Ford were fairly specific, but those against Cox and Powers were general. Ogawa's defense of this situation was that the charges were lodged against the clique, which seemed intent upon deliberately creating trouble. He also stated that many evacuees considered Cox and Wilder not essentially bad, but that they had fallen in bad company and were influenced by the others. Takahashi and the others backed Ogawa on this stand, and the evacuees signified willingness to give clearance to these two, leaving three with charges. Stafford announced that

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Miller had resigned to take another job, and that he would no longer be considered. Keener was also mentioned by evacuees, but he was dropped from the report because he had already left the project. This left only Powers and Ford with charges against them.

Because of the lack of evidence Ogawa was asked to collect together whatever material he had to read into the record. This was done on May 25, when additional testimony by evacuee workers was read into the record.

Both Stafford and the evacuees agreed on the act of charging Miller, Ford, and Powers with deliberate attempt to cause trouble on the project. Both sides made attempt to get into the record as much as possible against these individuals. The observers did not raise any objection to these charges. Acree did not agree, however, when Osawa made the suggestion that appointed personnel of other divisions should be investigated, too. In spite of the insistence on the part of Brooks, the Washington representative, for facts relating to specific events, action against the appointed personnel involved was begun.

As a result of a meeting on May 23 and 25, decision was reached to give Barrett, the Project Attorney, time to write a digest of the material available. Those concerned were to be investigated, their answers prepared, and the whole approved by the Council. This, together with the original documents, was to be sent to Washington. The series of seven meetings between the representatives of the evacuees and of the administration ended here.

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Throughout the meetings, the interplay of forces, as indicated by the stands taken by the various participants, was evident. On the matter of supervisor, foreman, and worker relationship the evacuee point of view and Stafford's stand collided. The evacuees insisted, however, that it was best to have the supervisor contact the foreman rather than the workers, and that the foreman could best carry out his task when given some amount of responsibility for making decisions relating to his work and his crew. Acree, who opposed this evacuee stand, eventually acquiesced to it, as did Stafford, who had not opposed it openly. At the beginning Stafford had a definite idea that increased flexibility of labor was desirable to meet the growing labor shortage and emergency situations. This idea was countered by evacuee stand that workers did better work when given well-defined responsibilities. Evacuees gave in somewhat to Stafford's idea that a worker should be willing to do work within his division or pertaining to his line of work when he was free. Lead by Ogawa, however, the evacuees in the end were able to gain acceptance from the administrative staff members of the advisability of well-defined jobs and of a job survey. The charge of the Fact Finding Committee that Miller, Ford and Powers were largely to blame for the warehouse labor trouble met with agreement from the administrative representatives. Brooks, the Washington representative, declared that specific charges based on proven incidents were necessary as the basis of action against these individuals, and effort

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was made by the others to fulfill this requirement. The dominance of the evacuee viewpoints at these meetings was evident.

This series of meetings of evacuees and administrative personnel served as an educational process for the participants. Because of the dominance of the evacuee viewpoints, it was the administrative staff members who experienced the greatest amount of enlightenment, especially in regards to the nature of the labor problems on the project. Acree, who was least in sympathy with the evacuee point of view, was required to agree with the others or to restrain from upholding too strongly his ideas at the meeting, perhaps because of lack of support for his own views. It was Stafford, however, who indicated the greatest amount of surprise at the amount of material unearthed by the discussions and by the revelations of what he often termed the "evacuee way of thinking." Although his suggestions were opposed by evacuees, he did not seem to find much fault with the alternative plan presented by them. To Stafford the high regard the evacuees had for such individuals like Anderson, Abbott, and Shafer and their skillful method of getting work done seemed to be a revelation. His admittance that he was surprised to find out how little he knew evacuees indicated the effectiveness of the discussions as a medium of learning. The friendly discussion of the major problems in the labor field was, to say the least, revealing to the participants.

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F. May 15-31. Brooks Arrives from Washington, and Miller Resigns.

About the middle of May the project received the visit of the Personnel Director from the Washington office, Brooks. He had been traveling through the western part of the United States, and was suddenly instructed to proceed to this center by the Washington office. The main object of his visit undoubtedly, was the settlement of the warehouse labor conflict, which, according to the report of the Community Analyst, involved several members of the appointed personnel. Brooks was a youngish individual. He expressed attitudes which might be termed characteristic of many administrators in the Washington office. He was "liberal" in his views of the labor trouble on the project, meaning that he considered the possibility of both the administration and the evacuees as being the source of the conflict. He insisted on following government procedure and instructions closely. He also showed some concern for the budget of the WRA and its gradual reduction.

As soon as Brooks arrived on the project, he proceeded to investigate the warehouse conflict. He talked with Smith, and was given the impression that the attitude of certain administrative members was the basis of the trouble. Undoubtedly, he had the opportunity to talk to Stafford, members of the Council, and members of the administrative staff. He maintained a general aloofness from both the administration and the residents, stating that he did this to remain free

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from charges of being biased. He expressed definite attitudes toward two sorts of appointed personnel. One was Ford's kind, who attempted to dominate the evacuees, and was the source of friction. Brooks felt that it was his duty to dismiss such individuals from the staff if it became necessary. In answer to the query whether such action might not infuriate the public on the outside, he replied that he was aware of the danger, but he took the stand that from the standpoint of the country as a whole it was not so important. He also stated that even though a staff member was greatly approved of by evacuees, he would have to be dismissed if he were found to be administratively incompetent.<sup>1</sup> Brooks demanded that any charge brought against an individual be based on proven incidents. He also indicated that it was up to the Council and Stafford to institute the charges.<sup>2</sup> Brooks, then, was ready to take action against any appointed personnel who was found to be administratively incompetent. There were three possible steps that he could take:

1. Iron out difficulties on the project level.
2. Transfer a person to another project.
3. Dismiss him.

Within a few days of Brooks' arrival on the Project he had a long talk with Miller, the Assistant Project Director,

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1. Such a charge was currently being launched against Light, the high school principal. The same charge was later made against Davidson, the Assistant Project Director. Both of these individuals were well-liked by evacuees.

2. J 5/15/44 #2, J 5/19/44 #7

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accused of being the head of the clique responsible for the warehouse labor conflict. Brooks was instrumental in prevailing upon Miller to hand in his resignation. Brooks is said to have told Miller that he would be happier in another job outside the WRA. Miller asked for a release from his job, but stayed on the project until the end of the month.<sup>1</sup>

Brooks insisted upon specific charges against the others--Ford and Powers. It seemed that some time would be required to write up the charges, investigate those concerned, and to arrive at a decision. The Personnel Director had to leave toward the end of the month for a conference in Denver, but later returned to the project to act as the Assistant Project Director in Miller's place.

### G. Action by Administrative Personnel

Because of lack of information the behavior of the administrative personnel during the final phase of the warehouse dispute is obscure. While Stafford was having meetings with the evacuees, representatives of the administration met to present the story of the administrative personnel involved. It is said that Stafford himself ordered Miller to gather material to counteract what was being presented by the Council, and Miller is said to have retorted to Stafford that he would answer the evacuees with his fist. At any rate, a committee made up of Minnesang, Beeson, and Acree is said to have investigated the appointed personnel involved in the warehouse conflict. The result was a memo, which was little publicized.

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1. J 5/19//44 #2, 5/25/44 #4

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Among the content of the memo, there is reported to be a paragraph concerning the maintenance of the relation between the appointed personnel and evacuees on an "institutional level." This matter of "institutional behavior" was directed at staff members who became too friendly with evacuees, and who were suspected of being "in colusion with" evacuees. Stafford himself is credited with the institution and the continuation of this ruling on the Minidoka Project. While members of the appointed personnel differed in their interpretation of what did or did not constitute institutional behavior, it was felt that this was most strongly supported by those least sympathetic toward evacuees.<sup>1</sup>

About the middle of May Civil Service ratings were issued to staff members on the project, presumably on the basis of their work. Miller was rated "Very Good," Pomeroy, "Good," and Davidson, "Fair," according to one report. The other members of the staff were generally at the mercy of their superiors in the matter of ratings. Davidson rated two men in his division--Connor and Olson--highly, but again according to a report, these ratings were by Miller. It was said that Miller retaliated against those staff members who did not sympathize with him--expecially Davidson. Consequently, while Davidson was considered to have come back a little into Stafford's favor once more, his position became more precarious than ever. It was understandable

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that a number of individuals appealed their ratings.

As the result of the action taken by Stafford and the evacuee representatives against Miller, Ford, and Powers the general attitude of the appointed personnel toward evacuees improved. Cox, who had been spared by the evacuees, began to "play up" to them. He was friendly to members of the Council, and on the occasion of the picnic given by one of the warehouses, offered to buy beer for them. Caucasians working in the Property Control Section and the Steward Section furnished the food and beer for the Property Control picnic held several several weeks later.

Toward the end of June Powers resigned. This was probably after he discovered that he was among the three who were being charged as responsible for the warehouse conflict.

At the beginning of July Stafford asked Ford to resign. Ford refused to do this on the ground that he had merely followed orders which had been approved by Stafford. Ford's stand was that it was Stafford himself who had stated at a staff meeting that it was necessary to suppress the evacuees. Ford declared that he would fight Stafford to the last ditch.<sup>1</sup>

### H. Aftermath of the Conflict

The warehouse conflict was notable for bringing about the cooperation between the Council and Stafford. This cooperation was directed against particular element within the administration, known to be highly unsympathetic toward evacuees. On another occasion this cooperation resulted in

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evacuees' volunteering to fix a breakage in the canal. This volunteering was done largely to protect Stafford's position. Since it had not been established at the time that evacuees were responsible for this breakage in the canal, the Council was accused of being too cooperative with the administration by some residents. The same sort of cooperation was noticeable when Stafford agreed to the building of two swimming pools on the project.

All, however, was not cooperation. On two major occasions Stafford chose not to give in to the wishes of the evacuees. Both of these occasions involved important Caucasians who were greatly appreciated by evacuees. The charges against both had been developing for some time. Light, the high school principal, was charged with insubordination, and finally dismissed. Davidson, the Assistant Project Director, was also charged with insubordination, and asked to transfer. In both cases evacuees circulated petitions to retain the men, but they had little effect. Since they were being accused of being too friendly with evacuees, petitions from evacuees could even work against them. Stafford also placed on acting status two men--Connor and Olson who were not disliked by evacuees, in Davidson's division. On these occasions Stafford seemed to be the Stafford of the dictatorial tradition--deaf to the pleas of the evacuees. His stand was that the matters concerning the appointed personnel were beyond evacuee participation.

It soon became evident that Stafford had placed himself in a peculiar predicament. When he broke friendly relations

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with Miller and his cohorts, he made enemies. Ford refused to resign, and openly declared that he would fight Stafford. Cox and Wilder owed their "clearance" to the evacuees, and could not be expected to respect Stafford for abandoning them. Persons like Rawlings, who had aligned themselves with Miller, likewise could not longer feel secure with Stafford. On the other hand, Davidson, Light, Connor, Olson, and the more liberal group were highly indignant against Stafford for his dismissal of Light and Davidson. All of a sudden Stafford was faced with many enemies.