

issue was passed. I have never made any such remark. Let's go over my record. When the advisory co-op council was formed it was felt that the Council should take the co-op over. There was some suspicion among the Isseis that the Council was taking away some power from the Isseis. Who got up and made the motion that the co-op should be divorced from the Council. Who made the motion to have the Planning Board adopted. To create dissension among the block by false report by councilmen do not benefit a councilman. Many good councilmen are resigning because they are losing their self-respect. When a majority, 34-11, pass the motion, then the minority should accept it. All of my block was in favor of a theater except two. I felt that a motion picture absolutely essential for the young people. Therefore I voted in favor of it. I think both sides were presented fairly. I am never definitely against Issei interest as such. If they are right I go all the way in protecting their interest. My record proves that.

I am tendering my resignation to my block. The situation that is creeping into this Council that councilmen cannot act with dignity. If they cannot make their own decision, then it is high time that the Council dissolve.¹

Tom Yego echoed his opinion:

I believe that this theater question has been thoroughly investigated and thoroughly presented to the people. I feel that the different blocks had an opportunity to have two or three block meetings in this matter. I don't see any reason that it should be reconsidered at this moment. I am heartily in favor of cooperation with the Isseis. I respect their leadership. There are no agitators in my block. I have done my share and have reported the proceedings of my block. Some councilmen have not reported to their block correctly. The Council is not responsible for the mistake of a few councilmen.²

Tsukamoto, however, ignored his own and Yego's defense of the action of the Council and suggested that the matter be referred to the residents for a vote. Shirrell, the project director,

1. Sakoda Journal, October 13, 1942, #8.

2.

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143.

asked that he be allowed to conduct the referendum, inasmuch as the Council had already taken a stand on the matter. This was decided upon, and the meeting closed with a motion introduced by a JACL supporter (Fukuyama) and approved by the body that Tsukamoto be asked to reconsider his resignation. The whole issue was a setback for the Council and an additional reason for Issei antagonism against Tsukamoto and the JACL.

Iki-Harada Case: In the meantime, Dr. Iki, who was associated with Tsukamoto in Walerga, was having troubles of his own. In the project hospital tension existed among the hospital staff, which consisted on the upper level of Dr. Carson, Chief Medical Officer, and 13 evacuee physicians and surgeons. Two of the evacuee doctors, Dr. Harada and Dr. Ueyama, were known to be critical of Dr. Carson and the administration in such matters as the lack of hospital supplies. Dr. Iki and Dr. Muramoto were at the opposite extreme and believed in close cooperation with the Caucasians. In August, during Dr. Carson's absence from the project, Dr. Harada, in the capacity of Acting Chief Medical Officer, attempted to requisition supplies which Dr. Carson had failed to get for the hospital. Dr. Carson had arranged for such an eventually by providing that all requisitions would have to be countersigned by the head nurse, a procedure which Dr. Harada denounced as being improper. Soon after this incident Dr. Carson announced that Dr. Thompson, Chief Medical Officer at the Regional Office, planned to transfer several doctors from Tule Lake and bring other doctors from other centers to create a better balance of doctors in each center. It was generally expected among the hospital personnel that both Dr. Harada and Dr. Ueyama would be among the doctors to be transferred from Tule Lake. Hearing of the possibility that Dr. Harada was to be transferred to another project, some of his friends from Sacramento began to circulate a petition requesting the administration not to transfer him because "his transfer would be seriously detrimental to

to the welfare of the people."¹ While the petition was being circulated and signed by many residents, the rumor spread that it was Dr. Iki who was responsible for having Dr. Harada transferred. The difference in the conception of Dr. Harada and Dr. Iki as doctors for evacuees was shown by the statement of a Nisei girl, which reflected the popular opinion among evacuees from the Sacramento area:

Dr. Harada really fought to get a good hospital at Marysville Assembly Center, and he got it. He's always been that way. And he's known to be a good doctor too. Down around Sacramento, people used to count on him to see their tough cases through, and he was always at the service of the people. Dr. Iki had relatively few patients among the Japanese; he was more a consultant to white doctors. . . . Dr. Iki didn't have the interest of the people at heart and didn't try to improve conditions or organize the staff better. He was more interested in politics; he was trying to become Mayor of Walerga.²

None of the doctors wanted to leave Tule Lake, but as a result of this petition Dr. Iki was transferred along with Drs. Harada, Ueyama, and Muramoto. Efforts of residents to retain Dr. Harada had failed, but their antagonism toward Dr. Iki had effected his transfer.³

1. *Infra*, p. 128.

2. *Miyamoto Journal*, September 15, 1942.

3. *Miyamoto, Tule Lake Report*, Chapter _____, "The Strikes," "The Hospital Staff Conflict," pp. 117-137.

Selective Service Issue: Both the Isse-Nisei conflict and the Iki-Harada Case showed the antagonism of residents toward Tsukamoto and Dr. Iki, but it affected them as individuals rather than as leaders of a group. In the Selective Service Issue, the JACL, as an organization, became identified with an unpopular movement. No meeting of the JACL had been called until it became necessary to elect delegates to an Emergency National Conference to be held in November, 1942. One of the purposes of this conference was to discuss a request to the Army to have Selective Service reinstated for Nisei. As early as July, 1942, the Washington office of the WRA was attempting to persuade the War Department to utilize Nisei in the Armed Forces, and the National JACL office had taken steps in the same direction. Learning of the possibility that the War Department might admit Nisei into the Armed Forces, the National JACL requested its representatives in the center to make a survey of the number of Nisei willing to volunteer for army service. Tsukamoto brought this matter up on the Council floor and requested each councilman to make a survey within his own block.¹

The reports of the councilmen, made on November 10, was far from complete, but it was clear that there were relatively few Nisei who had signified desire to volunteer for the Armed Forces. Out of the 61 blocks on the project 40 made reports, 21 councilmen being reported as absent. The reports were:

1. Miyamoto, Tule Lake Report, Chapter _____, "The Nisei Bid for Control," p. 106.

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No volunteers	17 blocks
1 volunteer	4 "
2 volunteers	4 "
3 "	2 "
4 "	1 block
5 "	3 blocks
6 "	2 "
7 "	1 block
8 "	?
11 "	1 "
Several "	1 "

The total number of volunteers, aside from two who were reported to have volunteered for the Military Intelligence School, was 67. Of these 16 were on conditions, such as receiving the same privileges as other soldiers, or not being confined to a labor corps. If all of the blocks had reported the total number of volunteers reported could not be expected to be much more than 100. The number of youths canvassed in each block was specified in only half a dozen of the cases, and they ranged from about 20 to 37. If a minimum of 20 youths per block had been canvassed for their opinion, the 67 reported volunteers would have represented 8 per cent of the total. These results provided little basis for the belief that Nisei were willing to volunteer for the Armed Forces in any large number.¹

In the meantime, on October 30, the JACL called a meeting of its members to consider the selection of delegates, to discuss the volunteering issue and to discuss the formation of a center chapter. Henry Takeda from Sacramento served as chairman for the evening, while men like

1. Minutes of the Council Meeting, November 10, 1942. Miyamoto Notes on Council Meeting, November 10, 1942.

Tsukamoto, Dr. Muramoto, Tanikawa, Hayashi and Takahashi from Sacramento led the discussion. Tsukamoto from California and Ted Nakamura from the Northwest were selected as delegates to the forthcoming conferences. The discussion of splitting up expenses of the delegates among the chapters represented led to the majority support for the creation of a single center chapter.

In the discussion on the Selective Service issue, Tsukamoto strongly urged volunteering by Nisei:

The liveliest discussion centered upon the question, "Do the Nisei want to volunteer or do they want to be drafted?" which Tsukamoto had previously addressed to the Council. Giving his personal support to the method of "volunteering," Tsukamoto stated:

The Nisei may be bitter, but volunteering would indicate our loyalty to our country. This is really a great privilege because no one else is being allowed to volunteer. Furthermore, if we volunteer, we will be able to select our own arm of the armed forces.¹

There was no large-scale opposition to this view, although on the other hand there was little enthusiastic support in favor of it. Several individuals expressed opposition to volunteering in view of the treatment that Nisei were getting:

The opposite extremes of thinking on the question is well illustrated in a discussion between Suzuki and Tsukamoto who frequently found themselves at contrary poles in Council discussions.

Suzuki: If others aren't volunteering, why should the Nisei volunteer?

Tsukamoto: Just to prove our loyalty.

Suzuki: If we are not treated like other Americans, then asking for volunteers would be too much.

Tsukamoto: The Nisei are behind in providing soldiers, and we ought to fill in. If, as Suzuki said,

1. Miyamoto, Tule Lake Report, Chapter VII, p. 108.

we look at it from a suspicious angle, all right; if we want to look at it from a bona-fide angle, all right. The Nisei won't get all choices in volunteering because some branches are closed. We could expect these things in logical terms. The Chinese are colored people and get the same treatment, although China is an ally. We are denied certain privileges because of our ancestry. We must admit, though, that laws against us are not as bad as those against Negroes although we were interned.¹

Even at this JACL meeting it could not be said that those present had given enthusiastic support to the idea of volunteering for the Armed Forces.²

The administration grossly misjudged the number of Nisei willing to volunteer for the Army, giving as its estimate "at least 50 per cent of those at Tule Lake between the ages of 18 and 34 and single."

The administration, too, erred in its estimate of the probable number of Nisei likely to volunteer if the privilege were granted, when it stated that fifty percent of the single males between eighteen and thirty-four would volunteer. This estimate was given by Mr. Shirrell in reply to a request from Mr. Myer for a judgment on the number of men of Japanese ancestry at Tule Lake, by certain age and marital status categories, who would volunteer if the opportunity were offered. Shirrell's reply read:

I have discussed in a very guarded way, with quite a group of our best and leading nisei, what percentage they thought would volunteer for service. They say that if the Army throws open enlistment for combat duty without restrictions, to all American citizens of Japanese ancestry, that at least 50 percent of those at Tule Lake between the ages of 18 and 34 and single, would volunteer. The remainder would await the usual induction proceedings and would gladly serve in that way. . . .³

At the JACL Special Emergency National Conference, held in Salt Lake City on November 17-24, 1942, discussion of the Selective

1. Miyamoto, Tule Lake Report, Chapter VII, p. 109.
2. Ibid., "The Nisei Bid for Control," pp. 107-9. Shibutani Notes, October 30, 1942.
3. Miyamoto, Tule Lake Report, Chapter VII, p. 112.

Service Issue was one of the main topics on the agenda. The National Office staff had already decided that requesting the reinstatement of the draft for Nisei was highly desirable, for one thing, to improve relations. In presenting the proposition to the delegates, it was pointed out that the fight for civil liberties would be hampered if Nisei were confronted with the fact that they had not done their part in the war:

Chairman: It seems to me that in our discussion of the court cases, it was agreed that they could do little for us in that they would in all probability not be decided until after the war. It seems to me that this Selective Service is the only thing left for us in the way of proving what our real attitudes are today. If we are permitted to enlist, or to be drafted, on the same basis as other boys our age, we will have a strong argument for our loyalty. If the army trusts us, then everyone should. It doesn't make much sense to me to try to fight for civil liberties if after the war, when people ask us what've we done for our country, we can only apologize for not having done our part. Our first consideration is to seek the right to be drafted to serve in our country's armed forces.¹

Only a small minority of the delegates in any way opposed this proposition. One delegate voiced himself in favor of voluntary enlistment rather than draft for Nisei until such times as corrections were made in the treatment of Nisei. He took into account the fact that many young people in the center were bitter and that they would resent efforts of the JACL to reinstate Selective Service.

V. Ichisaka, Topaz: . . . In the relocation centers, there has been a tremendous amount of sacrifice; and that is our contribution to the war effort. There is a considerable amount of bitterness among the young people who really don't understand the significant facts behind our

1. Minutes, JACL Special Emergency National Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 17-24, 1942, p. 36.

evacuation. When that does exist, even though we do ask for the same standing as other groups, some of our people resent our efforts. If we are going to have Selective Service, we must have the same privileges as others, and our position in this country should also be the same. . . .

I think Selective Service should be on a voluntary basis, and that it should be left up to the individual until further corrections are made on our general conditions.¹

Such notes of caution were drowned by more optimistic declarations. Saburo Kido from Poston, for instance, declared that "a great number of Nisei are anxious to serve in the Army," thus intentionally or unintentionally ignoring the signs of resentment in the center:

S. Kido, Poston: . . . If that is the case, it is dangerous to generalize that there is bitterness when we know very well that a great number of Nisei are anxious to serve in the Army. If we know that there is a certain amount of segregation in the army today, and there is -- no denying that; should we try to win, at least the right for our Nisei to be included in the Selective Service and then work to eradicate the other discriminatory elements gradually? We can't get everything at one time, but, at least, if we are American citizens and owe allegiance to no other country, we should demand and get the same rights as all other American citizens.²

The National Secretary called for a resolution to the President and the Army asking for a reclassification of the draft status of the Nisei to accord them the same privilege of serving the country in the armed forces with other American citizens.

National Secretary: . . . From my experience in the East and after discussing this subject with many of our friends who are vitally concerned with our future, I have come to the inescapable conclusion that this matter of Selective Service is the cornerstone of our future in this country. Perhaps we may be somewhat short-sighted today in view of what we have gone through, but let me ask you

1. Minutes, JAACL Special Emergency National Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 17-24, 1942, p. 37.

2. Ibid., p. 38.

to think of your future -- and that of your children and your children's children. When the war is won, and we attempt to find our way back into normal society, one question which we cannot avoid will be "Say, Buddy, what did you do in the war?" If we cannot answer that we, with them, fought for the victory which is ours, our chances for success and acceptance will be small. We need Selective Service; the least we can do is to ask for it. As for the work of the Washington Offices, may I say that such a resolution from this body will go far in carrying on our public relations work. Gentlemen, in order to bring this discussion to a head, I call for a resolution to the President and the Army of the United States asking for a reclassification of the draft status of the American-born Japanese so that we shall be accorded the same privilege of serving our country in the armed forces as that granted to every other American citizen.¹

This action by the JACL in behalf of Nisei as a whole was not made public in the center. During December and January there was hardly any reaction. It was not until the announcement of the registration and volunteering programs that resentment against the JACL for this action broke out.

Other activities of the JACL prior to registration caused little comments. It placed itself on record as supporting the resettlement program. The headlines in the Tulean Dispatch read: "Outside Relocation JACL Confab Pledge."² Tsukamoto, Yego, and Takeda were instrumental in changing the system of representation for the permanent Community Council so that each ward of nine blocks would be represented by four councilmen, thus preventing block representation. This step was ameliorated by provisions for a ward assembly of Issei and Nisei block representatives to meet with councilmen. The creation of the Planning Board in November also served to quiet the reaction of

1. Minutes, JACL Special Emergency National Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 17-24, 1942, p. 39.

2. Tulean Dispatch, December 3, 1942.

Issei against the establishment of a Council composed wholly of Nisei. The new constitution was passed by a rather slim majority of voters on November 16. In the re-election of councilmen, Tsukamoto was not returned from his block. While the trend was toward gradually increasing unpopularity of the JACL and its leaders, it was not until the outbreak of a serious crisis situation--in Tule Lake it was the registration crisis--that antagonism against them broke out in full fury.

The concluding statement of the National Secretary of the JACL at the Emergency Conference was prophetic:

National Secretary: May I make a few concluding remarks before we call on our National President.

All of us who are working for the JACL consider that we are on a crusade, a crusade to sell Japanese Americans to the government and the public at large as good Americans worthy of their heritage. No matter how difficult our road may be, and how many our obstacles, you can depend on us to carry on. We, as Japanese Americans, haven't much left, but we do have our citizenship, our ideals, and our future to fight for; and that is more than enough.

We know what many of you have been through. We know, as you know, that many of you are returning only to be beaten up and your very lives threatened because of your participation in this conference. I know of no words which describe our admiration for you, or how proud we are to be associated with you in a cause which we all know to be just.

We all have learned much of sorrow and suffering. We all have endured much and witnessed more tragedy and sacrifice. We shall be called upon to endure more, much of it at the hands of those whom we are trying to help. But this is the penalty of leadership. We have assumed that leadership because it was our duty and our obligation; because we could do no less. I call upon each and every one of you, and all our members, to carry on in spite of all that may come because it is our faith and our future. We have stood united thus far; let us remain so united in the years to come, for there still is "Security Through Unity"!1

1. Minutes, JACL Special Emergency National Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 17-24, 1942, p. 119.

The Relocation Program at Tule Lake

PART III. EARLY RESETTLEMENT

Introduction

The movement of evacuees into relocation centers can be considered the first major phase following evacuation and a short interlude in assembly centers. Under the policy of continuing centers for the duration of the war, the major problem of evacuees was to settle down in their new community. This process was fairly rapid for the majority of the residents, who were soon able to adjust themselves reasonably comfortably in the center. Before such adjustments could be made grievances, differences of points of view and conflicts--especially between evacuees and the administration--had to be resolved. A minority of the residents were unable to find satisfaction in the community life as it was organized and were dissatisfied to varying degrees with their lot in the center. This was the general picture in the centers up to registration program in the spring of 1943.

Even before the process of settling down to an orderly routine was achieved, the WRA radically changed its major aim. The attempt to create as normal a community as possible for evacuees for the duration of the war increasingly appeared impossible of attainment. Up to this time only a limited number of students and workers had been allowed to leave the center permanently to take up residence on the outside. Most workers who were allowed to leave temporarily on work furloughs were required to return to the center. Extensive plans had been made by the WRA to set up

private industries in the centers in order to make use of evacuee labor within the center. In the late fall of 1942 the administration decided to curb expansion of activities within the center and to place its major emphasis upon persuading and aiding evacuees to find jobs and homes on the outside.


During the late fall and winter of 1942 the newly-announced relocation program drew hardly any response from the bulk of the evacuees. They were more concerned with problems within the center and were satisfied to pursue activities within the narrow confines of the barrack community. Only a relatively small number applied for leave, and of that number only a small proportion left the center to take up residence permanently on the outside. In contrast, a much greater number were leaving the center on work furloughs. When the administration and other interested groups began to urge relocation more strenuously, a strong resistance to the program developed among the bulk of the residents. In spite of continual efforts on the part of the administration to make relocation increasingly attractive to evacuees, many of them stubbornly resisted these pressures.

In this section we are interested in examining the factors which operated to encourage or discourage relocation. Numerous factors could be listed which seemed to affect the decision of individual evacuees to relocate or to remain in the center. Some of them were attractions and repulsions within the center, which have already been examined closely. Others were attractions and repulsions outside of the project. The operation of these factors on the individuals could be diagrammed in the following

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manner:



The degree to which an individual was attracted or repulsed by conditions within the center affected his attitude toward conditions on the outside. By and large, those who had succeeded in making a fairly comfortable adjustment within the center tended to discount the advantages on the outside and with many individuals to magnify the disadvantages. On the other hand, those who failed to achieve a satisfactory adjustment in the center evaluated the attractions on the outside favorably and tended to discount the disadvantages. Many of the early relocatees were persons who were "pushed out" by repulsive conditions in the center rather than "pulled out" by attractions on the outside.

There were other factors which reinforced or impeded relocation. The reinforcements included such factors as the loosening of government restrictions, speedier leave clearance, establishment of relocation offices and hostels throughout the country. The impediments included administrative impediments, familial and community pressure against relocation, desire to return to the Orient, the substitution of seasonal leave for permanent relocation, and desire to return to the West Coast. During the early days of the relocation program the reinforcements had not been fully developed and, in contrast, the impediments operated strongly to discourage relocation.

EARLY RELOCATION PROGRAM

From Duration Confinement to Relocation

The earliest plans of the Army and the WRA to cope with the evacuated Japanese was to have them move voluntarily inland from the West Coast. These plans were discarded when it was discovered that such a movement was vigorously opposed by peoples of the intermountain states. The revised plans then assumed that the majority of evacuees would be confined in relocation centers for the duration of the war. When Myer replaced Eisenhower as the National Director of the WRA in _____, 1942, serious consideration was again turned to the possibility of relocating a larger portion of evacuees in normal communities. An important reason for this change in policy was the belief that the confinement in centers was damaging to evacuees:

It was quickly realized that: (1) loyalty would not flourish in an atmosphere of restriction and discriminatory segregation; (2) it was recognized that such wide and enforced deviation from normal cultural patterns of living might have lasting and unfavorable effects on the individuals exposed to them, particularly children and young people; and, (3) that there was an obligation on the part of the War Relocation Authority both to the evacuated people and to the people of the United States to restore all loyal citizens and law abiding aliens to normal useful American life with all possible speed.¹

A tentative leave policy was formulated and issued on July 20, 1942. In Tule Lake this was announced to residents through the Tulean Dispatch on July 31. Permission to leave the center to take up residence on the outside was to be granted

1. War Relocation Authority, The Relocation Program, p. 8. U.S. Government Printing Office.

only to American-born persons who never lived or attended school in Japan, who had a definite job offer outside of the Western Defense Command, and cleared for loyalty status through the National Director of the WRA. Evacuees in the assembly center were under the jurisdiction of the Army and were required to receive clearance from the Army, which it was generally reluctant to do.¹ Very few were relocated under this tentative plan. By the end of September, 1942, in all 273 evacuees had relocated on indefinite leave from all ten relocation centers and 62 from Tule Lake.²

A good portion of the early relocatees were college students. Efforts to relocate Nisei college students to eastern colleges was begun even before evacuation occurred and resulted in the organization of the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council, which worked in cooperation with the WRA to aid Nisei students to attend colleges. In spite of difficulties the organization "by the end of the summer could report 2,321 applications from students in Assembly and Relocation Centers and 152 students enrolled on new campuses."³

In lieu of an active relocation policy and partially as a result of demand by agriculturalists of the intermountain states for badly needed laborers the WRA developed a program of seasonal

1. Ibid., p. 15. Tulean Dispatch, July 31, 1942.

2. WRA, The Evacuated People, Table 10, 10j.

3. National Japanese American Student Relocation Council, From Camp to College, Pamphlet, Philadelphia, p. 4. For a fuller account of the student relocation and seasonal leave programs see Richard Nishimoto, Early Phase of Selective Migration.

leave. This program, also known as group leave or work furlough, permitted evacuees to leave in groups on definite agreements with farmers with the understanding that they were to return to the center after the contract was fulfilled. In the early days many more evacuees participated in this program than in the indefinite leave program. At the end of September, 1942, there were 4,290 evacuees out on seasonal leave from all WRA centers and 620 from Tule Lake.¹

The New Relocation Policy

It was not until October, 1942 that the WRA seriously undertook the relocation of a large portion of the project population. A more liberal relocation policy statement was issued effective October 1. On October 4 Shirrell referred to this policy in passing in a speech at a Nisei citizenship rally, but it was clear that his major attention was still upon center problems, particularly upon having Nisei shoulder more responsibility as citizens to create an American community:

It is a WRA policy to get people out of here as soon as possible. We shall not stand in the way of anyone who desires to go out no matter how valuable here. Somehow the Colony will keep on. We are keeping an employment record, of training, etc., to present to your prospective employers. . . .

I have a heavy job today. I get worn down, but I come back in the morning. I feel responsible for the welfare of this community. But above that we feel a most serious responsibility for the American citizens at Tule Lake. If it were not for the fact that we feel that you are making progress, we would have no joy in our work. . . . Your job is to make this an American community.²

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1. WRA, The Evacuated People, Tables 10, 10j.
 2. Sakoda Journal, October 4, 1942, #6.

Further clarification of the new policy was made by Myer, the National Director, in a speech to a group of block managers and councilmen on October 12. He announced that both aliens and citizens would be eligible for indefinite leave, as well as seasonal work and short-term leaves. The National Director emphasized that he assumed that the majority of the residents expected to continue to live in this country, that they should do so before the end of the war, and that they should scatter to different communities and not congregate in large groups as they had done in the past.

That this policy deemphasized constructive activity within the center was seen by the following quotation from Myer's speech to residents:

This changes the whole setup of the WRA policy and its program, especially in regard to work projects. . . . Now that we must expect many of the colonists within the center to plan on going outside, the WRA will have to hold newly-planned projects under abeyance until such time as the population of the colony becomes more stable.¹

He warned the evacuees, however, that the process of implementing relocation, which included a check by the FBI on loyalty status, might take some time. At Topaz he was quoted as saying:

Our first concern is not the postwar period but the problem of relocating Topaz residents outside the center before the war is over. . . .

The WRA pledges itself to the task of bringing to the public-at-large the realization that the majority now in Topaz expect to continue to live in this country and that they are citizens.

If we fail to secure this understanding, we have lost the war. What will happen after the war depends

1. Tulean Dispatch, October 14, 1942.

on you, but I hope you will not be in Topaz for the duration.

I cannot promise that you can stay here after the war; I do not think you should. I hope you will scatter out to every community in the U.S. so we can learn to understand you. I hope you don't gather in large communities after the war. Then there won't be a problem.¹

Briefly summarized, the new policy carried four major provisions:

1. Give satisfactory evidence of employment or other means of support.
2. Give satisfactory evidence of community acceptance.
3. Receive clearance from government investigative agencies.
4. Promise to keep the WRA informed of any changes of address.²

The program was designed for individual, rather than group relocation, and one of its ideals was to disperse evacuees as widely as possible throughout the country. When asked at the JACL conference whether the policy of relocation was largely on an individual or group basis, Myer replied:

I don't want to throw out the group resettlement idea completely, though. Some small groups may go out. The whole picture is changing daily and there are bound to be some industries which are interested in group employment. I must say that I'm going to try to discourage large groups from going out. I'm also going to discourage groups from going out on a temporary basis.³

He also explained why he was in favor of dispersal of evacuees throughout the country:

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1. Tulean Dispatch, November 2, 1942.
 2. JACL Special Emergency National Conference Minutes, Nov. 17-24, 1942, Salt Lake City, Utah, p. 60.
 3. Ibid., p. 72.

My major interest is the fourth phase of resettlement. I don't like you people to get too well settled and be too smug. But, sincerely, I believe the basic reason why the evacuation took place was because too many people of Japanese ancestry were living too close together in places like Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle and other seaport towns. There was not enough distribution throughout the United States. Not enough people knew you. You didn't know enough other people. It is not true of everyone but it is true of the group. There were at least 115,000 in Washington, Oregon, California and Arizona; so there was too much concentration. Now, I don't know whether we can avoid that in the future or not. That is going to depend on you people, as you represent the Japanese Americans; and, whether you represent them or not, will depend on your actions. We are taking this point of view that it is essential, if the people are going to have the opportunity to live as citizens of this country, that there will be a lot of you living in communities that you never lived in before, before this war is over. I frankly hope that there will be Japanese Americans scattered in, literally, hundreds of communities throughout the United States before the war ends and I hope the war ends soon. The reason why that is essential is this: people are afraid of the unknown. That is the basis of most of our fear. And most people don't know you people--all they know about you is hearsay. Many people think you are the same Japanese as those across the ocean. I know that this is not true and many others know this. . . .

We should not have too many people of Japanese ancestry set up in one place. They should spread out in all possible sections throughout the United States.¹

The program was also designed to discourage return to the center, unlike the seasonal leave program. Provisions were made for the return of only those who had special reasons or were unable to adjust themselves on the outside. (Get quote)

This could also be gathered from Myer's answer to a delegate to the JACL conference who asked whether a person would be allowed

1. Minutes, JACL Special Emergency National Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 17-24, 1942, pp. 70 & 71.

to return to the center:

T. Yatabe, Arkansas: If persons should go out on indefinite leaves and then, for one reason or another, desire to return to the relocation center, may they do so?

Mr. Myer: I'm afraid to say yes, I hope you won't force an answer on that to put on the records. I think, after hearing my talk, you are going to do the right thing. I don't want them to come crying back to mother too soon, but we're going to try not to let anyone suffer.¹

Enthusiasm for the New Policy

During November and December very little fanfare was made about the new policy. Late in November the WRA announced its belief that it would be able to relocate 25,000 evacuees during 1943 and that the FBI was prepared to clear evacuee records within seven days.² In Tule Lake it was not until December 14 that the local administration was ready to accept applications for leave clearance under new regulations employing WRA Form 126.³

The new project director, Coverley, stressed resettlement as his major aim when he took over his office from Shirrell. He was quoted as saying:

Declaring that his job here is "not to do something, but to serve," Coverley smilingly expressed his desire "to get everybody out of the Tule Lake Project" for resettlement on the outside.

"I strongly urge colonists to apply for indefinite leaves," the director continued. "Time will come when we will see a steady stream of people going out of this Project."

"I believe this relocation policy as set forth by the War Relocation Authority offers the best answer to the problems confronting the Japanese American people in this country," Coverley said.⁴

1. Minutes, JACL Special Emergency National Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, Nov. 17-24, 1942, p. 73.

2. Tulean Dispatch, November 27, 1942.

3. Ibid., December 14, 1942.

4. Ibid., January 4, 1943.

Religious leaders on the outside sympathetic to evacuees were among the first to get on the relocation bandwagon. On January 1, 1943, Galen Fisher, president of the Pacific School of Religion, addressed a group of evacuees in Tule Lake and urged them to resettle, pointing out that by so doing they would be able to avoid competition with returning soldiers and discharged war workers.¹

Visiting Christian ministers also urged evacuees to relocate.

There were signs that the Washington WRA was having some difficulty selling its relocation policy to some of its administrative personnel in the center. Many of them were wholeheartedly in favor of it and persuaded individual evacuees with whom they came in contact. This was shown in an interview with Elberson, co-op advisor in Tule Lake:

Elberson believes that getting people out is a good thing for the people. He is beginning to believe that it's best not to build this place up too much. After the war soldiers are going to be coming back, and it will be harder for the people to assimilate themselves into the American community.

When Shirrell came back from San Francisco with the resettlement policy, there were adverse comments from the agricultural division. Don himself was perturbed because he was interested in building up an ideal community here, which presented a great opportunity. The arguments presented against the resettlement policy at the present time is not so much an argument against the policy itself, but a matter of pointing out the difficulties in attempting to carry out such a policy.²

1. Tulean Dispatch, January 1, 7, 1943.

2. Sakoda Journal, January 28, 1943.

FACTORS FAVORING RESETTLEMENT

Introduction

In comparison to factors discouraging relocation, the factors favoring resettlement were weak in the fall of 1942 and spring of 1943. The machinery of the WRA was not fully geared to offer attractive jobs to evacuees and to give them the variety of aids which they offered later on. It was for those who were not well-adjusted within the center that the new program had the greatest attraction, and hence maladjustment was one of the important factors favoring relocation at this time. For those desiring to leave the relocation center no particular attraction on the outside was necessary. This was true of those who desired fun and freedom or association with Caucasians. For some the prospect of going on to college or otherwise pursuing professional careers served as attractions. Some were attracted by the prospect of making money or of serving in the military intelligence corps.

1. Maladjustment

That maladjustment within the center operated to encourage relocation could be gathered from the desire to escape from the center frequently expressed by those who were dissatisfied with their lot. This was true of those who were deviant from the majority of the residents in behavior pattern, whether culturally, in status, or otherwise. Many of them had more in common with people on the outside than within the center and hence had in addition incentives for leaving the center other than the mere thought of escape. There were others, however, who had incentives

for staying in the center, but were motivated by their inability to make an adjustment in the center to leave. There were also some who had little incentive for leaving other than to escape from undesirable conditions within the center.

Those with incentives both to escape and to leave: For the majority of the residents who were maladjusted it was not simply a matter of desiring to escape from the center, but also of achieving goals which were only possible on the outside. Within the center it was possible to have economic security, Nisei social life, interesting jobs. There were other attractions, however, which could not be achieved without leaving the confines of the center. These included higher education, jobs paying outside wages, service in the armed forces, living among Caucasians, freedom. The operation of these attractions will be taken up in the following section; here it will be shown that maladjustment within the center served to enhance the attractions on the outside. The same phenomena will be revealed later by showing how adjustment within the center tended to minimize in the minds of individuals even those goals which could only be achieved on the outside.

a. Ruby Kawasaki: We have already seen how Ruby, who was adjusted to Caucasians on the outside, could not get along with most Nisei. She became unhappy supervising typists in the Records Office, and changed her job to that of typist for a Caucasian. She had relatively little social contacts with other Nisei, and these were largely limited to "rowdy" boys, which gave her a bad reputation. As early as August, 1942, she had already made plans for relocation. It was fairly clear that the thought of relocation

was closely connected with her inability to get along in the center. To requote a pertinent journal item:

• Today I was talking to Ruby as we sat outside, cooling off toward the end of the day. She seems to accept me as someone she can talk to. She said that she was going to get her termination next week. Said that she expected to leave the center perhaps next month. Said she was getting her termination because she thought that she wasn't getting anyplace. She wasn't learning anything. She thought that I was. I said that she was getting fed up with being with Japanese and she admitted it. She tried to change her attitude at Walerga, but she says that she can't seem to be able to do it.¹

In connection with relocation she mentioned that she planned to join her boy friend, who like herself had had little association with Nisei and was now in the Army:

She had always been with Hakuajins, had been working for one. Her chum was a Hakuajin. She said that she wasn't interested in boys here. Her boy friend was in the Army now. He was like her and hadn't associated with Japanese. She said that she was going to his place, but was not going to get married to him just yet. Was going to work in Minneapolis, while he was moved from place to place.²

b. Fumi Sakamoto: Fumi was in a similar predicament. She had had little association with Nisei prior to evacuation, and in the center had little social contact with the majority of Nisei. She found her major outlet in the center in organizing the consumers cooperative in close contact with Don Elberson, Co-op Advisor. When the co-op was organized, however, important positions went to other evacuees, and she was relegated to a relatively insignificant position of Research Director. It was while she was in an unhappy mood that she began to consider

1. Sakoda Journal, August 21, 1942.

2. Ibid.

relocation:

In the evening Fumi Sakamoto dropped in to discuss office matters with me, and she was here till 10. She came to ask me what I thought was wrong with the squabble that was going on in the co-op office, especially between Koso and herself and Koso and Noboru Honda. She asked me whether it was her fault that relations were not very smooth. . . . She said that her sick leave resulted from the fact that she had had disputes with Koso about that time. I asked her why she wanted to go out, and she said that her habits were becoming sloppy in here. Her English, for one thing, was becoming poor. Her head, she also thought, was not receiving much stimulation, except for her co-op work.¹

Soon after that she quit her work. She received a scholarship to Rochdale and made arrangements to live with a Caucasian family. She relocated in _____.

c. Miyoko Hashida (pseudonym): Miyoko had few incentives for remaining in the center. She worked in the mess hall, but quit her job because she could not get along with other workers. She was seen approaching military police on or near the project area, and, when questioned, she showed resentment against the wardens. In April, when Miyoko's sister relocated to Chicago, her parents decided to send Miyoko to her in the hope that she would become better adjusted. There was no record of the attractions of the outside of which she was conscious, but her attempt to approach Caucasian soldiers in the center was somewhat reflected by promiscuous sexual experience on the outside. The WRA sent her back to the project because she had "gone wild."²

1. _____, 1943 (before segregation)
2. Social Welfare Case No. 101.

d. Mixed Marriage Cases: Of the nine cases of mixed marriage which came to the attention of the Social Welfare Department, and which were studied by one of the research workers, all intimated a desire to leave the center and made varying degrees of attempts to do so. This was especially true when the non-Japanese spouse had not been evacuated and the other party signified a desire to join the former. This desire to leave the center was not, generally speaking, a simple desire to join the spouse, but also to escape from center conditions. A Japanese who married a non-Japanese was usually criticized by the majority of the residents and even socially ostracized. A Caucasian generally found it difficult to adjust to living conditions within the center. Both of these factors generally made the center an unpleasant place for those involved in mixed marriages.

The Nisei wife of a Chinese American was "picked on" by two Issei roommates "as soon as her roommates found that she was married to a Chinese." She found it unbearable and first moved in with relatives and then with two other Nisei girls, who had also been ostracized by their families. At the same time she made strenuous attempts to be released from the center, and was refused release on the technicality that she did not have children of the marriage. As an alternative step she applied for seasonal leave and applied from Spokane for leave. That her desire to join her husband was a strong motivating force was indicated by the fact that she proceeded to Seattle

when she was refused a permit and was arrested in Seattle for doing so.¹

The role of maladjustment in encouraging relocation is shown by the account of the Japanese husband who adjusted himself to camp and his Caucasian wife who did not.

George was quite content with his new life in camp but Dorothy Jean was extremely unhappy. She constantly complained about the food and often states that she resented being among Japanese.

Dorothy Jean never did adjust herself to life in Tule Lake and continually asked George to take steps to get out of the center. On August 19 she took him to the Social Welfare Department to make an application to leave.²

Those with incentives both to stay and to leave: While maladjustment reinforced the desire for attractions on the outside, for many individuals this operated in competition with a desire to remain in the center. This latter desire could be the result of some attraction in the center, some repulsion on the outside, or other factors discouraging relocation. In these instances, it could be said that individuals were led to relocate even though they would have preferred to stay. Some of them would have stayed if they had been able to make a better adjustment in the center. These cases clearly brought out the part played by maladjustment in encouraging relocation. Attractions on the outside also played a part, but these were counterbalanced by desires to remain in the center.

Study Group: A good example of the interplay of opposing factors was presented by members of the Study group. The

1. Shibutani, Social Welfare Case No. 4. Pacific Citizen, August 14, 1943, p. 1.

2. Ibid., No. 23.

research workers and their wives had a stake in staying in Tule Lake in order to participate in a unique research program. They realized that it was an opportunity which was relatively rare. Several of the research workers had a personal stake in carrying out the field work in the center since they expected to gather material for a doctorate thesis. One field worker wrote:

In regard to graduate work, please register me at Cal if you can. My temporary gripes about the camp have died down for the time being and although we are not too happy here, I think it would be better if I stuck around for a while and did some field work. Working on this report has put me down to a routine and I find my morale going up a little. . . .¹

And again:

Working on this structural report has done wonders. For one thing, I now know where some of the gaps are that I have been worrying about. I have also made up my mind as to the field and the general nature of the problem that I wish to tackle in this dump (subject to your approval, of course). Furthermore, after writing a few sections I got more into the mood and actually feel more excited about the study. . . .²

This desire to continue doing field work persisted in spite of the discouragements which the task presented.

This desire continued in spite of the attractions of the outside. The latter was reflected, for instance, in the desire to attend a school on the outside. The same field worker wrote:

Indirect I almost forgot to say that we might pull out possibly next year or the year after for a little work in

1. Letter, Shibutani to Director, September 21, 1942.
2. Ibid., December 18, 1942.

some eastern or mid-western school if I find myself getting too stagnant. However, after the brush-up I'll probably come back (my money won't hold out anyway).¹

It was the unpleasant camp situation, however, which was most instrumental in "pushing" several of the field workers out. The wives of the research workers lacked the motivation of their husbands to remain in the center, and they urged their husbands to leave:

Shortly after the Okadas left, Michi began expressing the wish that we could go too. At first she played, as of a little girl who teases in order to get what she wants and I responded accordingly, but it gradually became apparent that behind her play was a seriousness about the whole thing. She kept insisting that I give a promise as to when we should be leaving, something I was hard put to say.²

The field workers themselves were often unhappy in the center and expressed desire to leave it. One of the potential field workers, for instance, was unable to start his field work, and often talked of leaving for the beetfields:

Naj came in and said that he was disgusted with camp life and was planning to leave. He said that he wanted to leave but didn't want to ask a favor of Dr. Thomas because he didn't want to be obligated to her or anyone else.³

JACL: In spite of the unpopularity of the JACL and its important leaders within the relocation center, the latter were motivated to remain. Aside from ties with friends and relatives, they were anxious to maintain what political positions they held and to strengthen the position of the JACL as an organization. When criticism was heaped upon Walter Tsukamoto for having opposed

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1. Letter, Shibutani to Director, September 21, 1942.
2. ~~This is December 18, 1942~~ Miyamoto Diary, October 6, 1942.
3. Shibutani Diary, October 17, 1942.

the sending of the theater project issue back to the block for consultation of the Issei opinion, he protested by offering to resign from his position. In addition, his thoughts turned to the possibility of relocating:

People who have responsibility are at a disadvantage. You do things for the people, but they don't appreciate it at all. When the councilman decides issues with the welfare of the people in mind and then are blamed for making those decisions, then people of ability are not going to run for councilman. Suzuki (councilman) said to his block that I didn't care about the welfare of the Isseis at all. There were some people that said that I ought to be mobbed, and Suzuki didn't do anything to stop it. Have I ever stood against the people? Look at my record. Why should I change my colors now. If people are going to twist things in that manner I'm not going to work any more for the people. I don't have to stay here. There's a lot of places I can go to. I'm not going to stand it. I appreciate my friends, but if my friends are so weak, I can't do anything. They let agitators do what they please.¹

Those showing only a desire to escape from the center: The operation of maladjustment in encouraging relocation could also be seen among those who showed only a desire to escape from the center without any particular desire for some attraction on the outside. This was true of those who were in agony through remaining in the center and whose only thought was to be released from the confines of the project.

Mental case: This is well-illustrated by a mental case who made repeated attempts to be released from assembly center and relocation center.

Tsutomu was born in 1920 in Central California in a Japanese community. He graduated from a rural high

1. Sakoda Journal, October 10, 1942, #1.

school, and also attended Japanese language school for 12 years. From 1938 until evacuation he worked in the vegetable shed for a large-scale Japanese farmer. Even at this time he developed a feeling of persecution. He thought that his friends were against him and made uncomplimentary "cracks" concerning him. He gradually withdrew from his associates.

In the assembly center he felt that the condition of confinement with so many other Japanese was intolerable. In an attempt to obtain a release outside of the center he wrote to authorities: "I've lived in this camp for over two months and every day of it has been both physical and mental torture to me. A few more weeks of this life and I will be very very close to the brink of a mental or nervous breakdown.

"This awful state of affairs is caused by terrible anti-social and anti-old friends complexes I've developed over the last few years. My living in a camp tends to increase it more and more each day. So as a last desperate measure, I decided to write to you to let me evacuate to an out-of-the-military zone area.

"I'm positive that as soon as I'm out where I won't be near former friends and large groups of people, I can begin to live a little more normally again. . . .

"As life is now here in camp, I'm making it miserable for everyone, especially the family. My abnormal life is being talked about in camp, and it makes it very uncomfortable for them. Talk of guys calling me crazy has been near and trouble may break out soon. I assure you I'm not in that mental state of mind yet. Japanese people can be cruel like any people when they want to and I've had more than my share. So if I can be permitted to leave, it will be very beneficial to everyone concerned."¹

The authorities did not grant the release from the center, and he was sent to Tule Lake instead, where it was hoped he would find easier adjustment among strangers. Here he continued attempts to gain release, and finally left the center on seasonal leave. The Social Welfare Department became alarmed when it learned that a person considered to be a mental case had left the project. But when investigations revealed that he was making good adjustment on a private farm in Idaho, he was allowed to remain out of the center. Apparently it was confinement in the center which had been the primary source of maladjustment.²

1. Letter dated July 7, 1942, Shibutani, Social Welfare Case No. 106, Appendix I.

2. See Appendix to the Maladjustment Section, pp. 12-15.

Family Trouble: Many of the cases of family trouble which came to the attention of the Social Welfare Department resulted in movements of one or more parties to the conflict in an attempt to arrive at some sort of solution. These movements included the change of apartment, transfer from one center to another, leaving the project temporarily on seasonal leave, and finally leaving on indefinite leave. These movements were largely made to ameliorate an existing conflict situation, rather than to achieve an additional desirable goal.

This situation is well-illustrated by the experience of a Nisei boy, 21, whose parents were involved in a heated conflict. His mother had gone to live with a man who claimed to be his father's cousin when his father died. She was never legally married, but lived as his wife and had several children by him. George did not like his step-father, and did not hesitate to show it. As a result of friction, George left home to work in a nearby city. At the time of evacuation he rejoined the family and again became embroiled in conflict with his step-father. The latter accused George and his mother of having incestuous relationship. His mother finally separated from her husband, taking her own children with her. George "left for sugar beet work on the previous week because he was sick and tired of the trouble." When he came back, he declared: "I want to leave camp and stay out permanently. I just came in from beet work. I feel the responsibility for looking after the other kids in the family."¹

2. Attractions of the outside

Except for those who were largely interested in escaping from camp conditions, any attraction from the outside had to represent something over and above that provided by the center.

1. Shibutani, Social Welfare Case, No. 2.

Thus the center provided food and shelter and the basic necessities of life and in addition economic security of a sort and an easy life. The food, however, was generally inferior to a meal cooked at home to one's own taste, and the apartment was crude and provided little privacy and comfort. Life on the outside offered prospects of superior food and shelter. Similar comparisons could be made of the social life, education, jobs, political status within and outside of the center. Since it was a matter of comparison, an individual's degree of satisfaction with what he had in the center affected his evaluation of what he could get on the outside. In addition, a person's level of aspiration, and the kind of goals he desired, had to be taken into consideration in determining the attractions of the outside during the early period of relocation.

Basic Needs: As we have already seen, most of the residents were able to adjust themselves to the basic needs provided within the center, while some remained dissatisfied. Most of the provisions within the center were at the level of minimum essentials, and there was much which most of the residents could seek on the outside. Thus with regard to housing, for instance, privacy and comfort of a modern home was greatly desirable. On the outside it would be possible to procure the kind of food which one was accustomed to eating. This included home-cooked meals, steaks, or the possibility of dining out in style. The hospital facilities on the outside were more adequate, and there was the possibility of attention from private doctors, rather than staying in line at the clinic.

Social life: The social activities within the center were set by and large by the majority of the Issei and Nisei. The monoracial characteristic of the evacuee population, and the sharp cleavage between them and the small group of Caucasian administrators left relatively little opportunity for social relationships with non-Japanese. In addition, the concentration of people within a small area in tightly-knit block units made privacy difficult to obtain. On the outside it would be possible to enlarge one's contact with non-Japanese. It would also be possible to escape from the prying eyes of the community and seek fun and freedom on street corners, in poolhalls, and on the automobile. A variety of entertainment possibilities awaited on the outside, such as movies, theaters, bowling alleys.

A desire to relocate while she was still able to readjust herself to Caucasians is shown by Kazuko:

She said that there was an offer of a stenographer's job . . . with the Ford Motor Company in Chicago. She asked me whether I thought that she ought to take the job. I asked her how she felt about the matter. She said that she could see advantages both in staying and in going. If she stayed she might learn how to get along with the Japanese. On the other hand, if she stayed and became too unhappy, it wouldn't do her any good. Also, if she stayed with the Japanese too long she might not be able to adjust herself to Caucasians again. If she went out now, she might be able to work back in more readily.¹

Employment: Within the center Nisei were able to obtain positions which to many were attractive. There were several features of jobs on the outside which were attractive. Except

1. Sakoda Journal, November 27, 1942, #2.

for jobs in camouflage net projects in several of the centers, there were no jobs within the center which paid prevailing wages. The war situation had resulted in higher wages in almost every field, and to evacuees these were potential sources of attraction. As we shall later see, early in the relocation program attractive jobs were not being offered by outside employers through the WRA, and consequently these attractions had little opportunity to make themselves felt. In January it was announced that 600 evacuees had applied for leave clearance, and that they far exceeded the number of job offers from the outside.¹ The desire for jobs paying prevailing wages could also be satisfied through seasonal leave, which was a less drastic step than indefinite leave.

Education: As we have already seen, some attempt was made in the center to offer college courses. This effort did not materialize, and with the emphasis on relocation it was abandoned as a policy. With the possible exception of enrolling in a correspondence course, which did not appear to be a step taken by many evacuees, leaving the center was necessary to obtain education above the secondary school level. At the time of Evacuation, _____ Nisei students were estimated to be in colleges, and about _____ were scheduled to graduate from high school during the course of a year. Of this number, 75 evacuee~~s~~ students had transferred to eastern schools prior to evacuation with the help of the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council. By the end of 1942 the Student Relocation Council claimed

1. Tulean Dispatch, January 11, 1943.

that 2,535 applications for entrance into schools had been filed with them, and 360 were successfully relocated on campuses outside of the West Coast, indicating that higher education was a factor attracting Nisei out of the center.¹

Connie Murayama: The positive attraction of higher education could be gathered from the examination of field material. Connie, for instance, desired to go on to college and do graduate work, and she applied for a scholarship through the National Student Relocation Council. Her intellectual interest could be seen in her philosophical discussions with members of the Study. Her desire to excel scholastically could be gathered by her remark to a research worker of the Study just prior to her leave:

Connie had been waiting for a long time to get her travel permit. I guess she had almost become discouraged about it all, but today when I went around to the No. 3 canteen, I saw her and asked about the permit. It had just come through and she's leaving tomorrow morning. She seemed quite happy about it, in her restrained way. But it was not to this she referred so much in our brief conversation, but rather to the discussion of scientific method we had the other evening. Said Connie: "I'm going out there to learn a lot of philosophy, and the next time I see you, I'm going to beat you all to pieces in our discussion." I remarked that she hardly needed any philosophy to argue with me about anything, but thought to myself, she's certainly an intellectually competitive girl.²

She was not quite certain that she should not remain in the center a little longer to become better acquainted with Nisei. Consequently, when she was informed that she had been accepted

1. Richard Nishimoto, op. cit.
2. Miyamoto Diary, October 9, 1942.

by Smith College and granted a scholarship, she showed little signs of joy and coolly asked until the following day to reach a decision. A research worker who was with her at the time recorded:

After they left Connie discussed immediately whether it was a good thing for her to go. She said that it would be a good thing to get away from camp. I mentioned that she probably had enough education already, and that it was doubtful whether it would do a girl good to go out to school, even though I would advise a boy in a similar circumstance to go out at all cost. Connie seemed to have something on her mind which made her doubt the wisdom of going out.

For some time Connie and I discussed her adjustment to the Nisei group. She said that she had failed in her adjustment to them, and I said that she really hadn't had a chance to make an adjustment. She said that she was bored with them.¹

The following morning she signified her desire to accept the scholarship. She had to wait a month before she obtained her clearance and was able to leave the project.

Study Group: One of the research workers had studied under Blumer at the University of Chicago, and he and his wife had decided to leave for Chicago in the spring of 1943. This aroused a desire on the part of another field worker and his wife to join them. The desire for further training in social psychology could be seen from a letter written by the field worker:

As you know, Frank and Michi are planning to go to Chicago some time next year. Michi doesn't know anyone around there and she wants Tomi to go too. Frank, on the other hand, thinks that a little work in Chicago will do my background a lot of good and was speaking of seeing Blumer or Burgess himself to

1. Sakoda Journal, September 12, 1942.

, to see if something could not be done. Whether we can go or not, the possibility of getting out for a little while will make our life here much easier and it will give us plenty of incentive to put in a little more work. After hearing Frank's tales, I am very anxious to do some work in social psychology under Blumer. . . .¹

Masako Miyake: Masako had attended a junior college in San Jose and made an application for student relocation in Tule Lake in July, 1942. She had \$275 saved up of her own money, but did not know where she was going to get the rest of the money to attend college, since she did not know whether her parents would approve of her attending school:

I discussed (her questionnaire) with her. She went to school in Sacramento and junior college in San Jose. She learned Japanese from her mother, and attended Japanese school for two years. She said that she had many Caucasian friends. She said that she wanted to hear classical music again. She thought that amusement and conversation had degraded to a low level. She wasn't quite sure whether she wanted to go on to school. She had \$275 of her own money saved up, but didn't put anything (on the questionnaire) for the sum her folks could contribute. She had worked six months as a school girl. She had a grade-point of 2.6, and graduated with honors. She wasn't quite sure, either, whether her mother would let her out.²

1. Letter, Shibutani to Director, September 27, 1942.
2. Sakoda Journal, July 4, 1942.

Politics: Camp life provided political positions, such as those of councilmen, which were not available generally to evacuees on the outside. It also provided a congenial atmosphere for those who were antagonistic toward the outside world and maintained identification with their own ethnic group. In contrast, the outside offered identification with the American people, identification with the war effort, and means of expressing loyalty to the United States. This possibility was heightened by the manner in which the loyalty issue was associated with the resettlement program. The relocation program was encouraged by the WRA and complying with this program carried some connotation of identification with the American government. This was especially true because employment on the outside was interpreted by those who were politically minded as contributing manpower to the war effort. Consequently, it was not surprising that those who were dissatisfied with the political attitudes of the majority of the Issei, and some of the Nisei in the center, were attracted by the possibility of living in a different atmosphere on the outside.

(Quote)

Army Language School: One of the first concrete methods by which Nisei were able to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States, since they were excluded from the Armed Forces following Pearl Harbor, was through the Army Language School at Camp Savage

and Japanese language classes at the University of Colorado and other universities. The language school at Camp Savage, Minnesota, was designed to train Nisei volunteers as linguistic experts in the Japanese language to employ them in the war effort against Japan. In Tule Lake the announcement of recruitment for the school appeared in the Tulean Dispatch on August 10, 1942. The qualifications included the following:

1. Candidates must be eligible for the draft.
2. Candidates should preferably possess the following qualifications:
 - a. High school graduates from American high schools
 - b. Possess a fair degree of fluency in oral Japanese
 - c. Should be capable of reading elementary Japanese, i.e., at least Katakana and Hiragana as well as not less than 500-1000 Kanji. They should preferably be able to read Japanese newspapers.¹

In order to fill the quota of volunteers the Army school announced lower language qualifications in November. Also, it called upon Nisei to demonstrate their loyalty through volunteering for the school:

The response to this plan for nisei to enlist in the Army will be looked upon as the acid test of whether the requests for opportunity to enlist being made through the various nisei publications are made in real sincerity backed up with action, or whether they are just shoddy dialects.

It is the first step in re-appraising the status of nisei under the Selective Service, and the standing and treatment to be accorded to nisei under future changes in the Selective Service, as well as their postwar status, will depend to a great degree on the nisei reaction to this plan which Army officers sympathetic to

1. Tulean Dispatch, August 10, 1942.

the nisei have worked out with no small amount of deliberation and trouble expounding the nisei side of the picture with the present Selective Service system.¹

The language school did not attract a large number of volunteers, but the number that did volunteer in November when the recruiting team was on the project--35--indicated that it did attract some Nisei and Kibei.²

(Quote)

3. Reinforcements

The announcement of the new relocation policy was the first reinforcement of attractions of the outside. The program now included aliens and Kibei, as well as Nisei. The administration was now geared to aid evacuees in many ways to leave the center. Within the center a Leaves Office was set up under the Employment Division to take care of matters pertaining to leaves. Job offers began to appear in the Tulean Dispatch, beginning in September, 1942, but they were largely limited to domestic work.³ Job offers from outside employers were relatively scarce even in January, 1943. On January 20 an

1. Tulean Dispatch, November 7, 1942.

2. Miyamoto, Tule Lake Report, Chapter VII, pp. 112-114.

3. Tulean Dispatch, September 9; November 4, 1942.

announcement was made in the Tulean Dispatch of the possibility of resettlement on farms of the Idaho and Utah Sugar Company.

On January 28 it was announced that most of the outside job offers were along domestic lines from the Mid-west, but a handful of others were listed, with the note that more were coming in every day:

Other job offers include a watch repairman, lens grinder, laboratory technicians, bacteriologist, dairy farmers, registered nurses, nurses aides, chauffeurs, electricians, boiler fireman and linotype operator. And more and different positions are coming in by the day.¹

1. Tulean Dispatch, January 28, 1943.

JACL Endorsement of the Resettlement Program: The JACL, through its national representatives, were consulted by WRA officials with regard to its change of policy, and quickly became imbued with an enthusiasm to further relocation. This spirit was evident in report of the National Conference in November, 1942, where resettlement was one of the major topics of discussion and Myer, the National Director of the WRA, explained his point of view of the new relocation program. Questions were brought up by delegates concerning some of the difficulties entailed in the program, but the program itself was accepted as one of the aims of the organization. Dr. T. Yatabe, Chairman of the Resettlement Division, pointed out the brighter side of the relocation program:

The growing manpower shortage should prove valuable to us in opening up employment opportunities in every field of endeavor. We have already discussed the WRA program for resettlement with the War Manpower Commission, the United States Employment Service, the United States Civil Service Commission, the Federal Farm Security Administration, and others. We have found that everyone of them is interested and cooperative. If we can provide skilled, capable, and personable people for the presently existing jobs, and they make good as they must, many more opportunities will open up. In one way, if we look at just the sunny side of the problem, this resettlement program may be the means whereby hundreds of our college graduates who were unable to find work in their chosen fields and who were forced to work in fruit markets and laundries before the war may find opportunities in those fields for which they originally studied and trained.¹

He also accepted the "dispersal policy" in principle:

Eight; I believe that we ought to recognize that there is what is called a "saturation point" beyond which it might be dangerous, or at least inadvisable, to permit further placement. This applies both to a

1. Minutes, op. cit., p. 61-62.

a section within a community and the community itself. We all know that the Japanese people like to congregate together. When they begin to create Lil' Tokyos comparable to those which we had on the coast, we not only defeat the purpose of our program but also give credence to allegations of clannishness. I believe that further permits for employment on an indefinite leave basis in the intermountain region should be restricted; otherwise we may face a repetition of the alarming sentiment of last March which may result in destroying the whole program. I further believe that we should discourage the practice of resettling Japanese to congregate in their own section and to establish their own churches, stores, etc. The more scattered we are, the less likely are we to cause alarm. We must realize that we are at war. Conditions are no longer normal. We have no right to speak for and to demand those normal conditions which may have existed prior to December 7th. Let's wake up and face reality as it is--not as it ought to be, or should be, but as it is.¹

The prospect of resettling soon was expressed by S. Kido from Poston, who said: "Of course, we are going to be out by next spring--at least most of us."²

On the whole, the factors favoring relocation were not strong. It was largely those who were anxious to escape from conditions within the center that were strongly motivated to leave the center. The pursuit of higher education, seeking of jobs paying prevailing wages, and service in the Armed Forces were among the more important attractions of the outside. The WRA had not fully developed its relocation program to offer many attractive jobs and conveniences to evacuees.

Minutes,

1./JACL Special Emergency National Conference, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 17-24, 1942, p. 63.

2. Ibid., p. 119.

FACTORS DISCOURAGING RELOCATION

Introduction

The relocation policy of the WRA attracted little attention among residents at first. In Tule Lake, Myer announced the new policy to a group of councilmen and block managers, but it evidently made little impression upon them and the general populace. One research worker, for instance, wrote pages on the pending Issei-Nisei political conflict, but made only the following notations on the meeting:

Walked to the special meeting of councilmen and block managers to hear Mr. Myer speak. He outlined a program of leaves for anyone desiring to do so. He also explained some of the policies of the WRA which showed that the officials were doing all they could to help the Japanese reestablish themselves in American community.¹

The general public learned of the new policy through indirect channels, if at all, and, as we shall presently see, the negative side of relocation was given prominence. In contrast to heated discussions over the registration issue and immediate effect of the announcement of the segregation program, the new relocation program created no noticeable stir within the community.

Why was it that the opportunity to leave the confinement of a virtual concentration center was not discussed and more plans made to leave the center? There were forces at work to discourage relocation and these were stronger than the factors favoring it. The majority of the residents had settled themselves fairly comfortably within the center and were desirous

1. Sakoda Journal, October 12, 1942, #7.

of pursuing attractions within the center. Many of them also conceived of the outside as being disadvantageous, a conception which was kept alive by numerous rumors. There were other factors which discouraged relocation.

Adjustment

We have already reviewed extensively how the majority of the residents adjusted themselves to center conditions. The center offered economic security and an easy life. Social activities were developed along patterns of pre-evacuation Japanese communities along the West Coast. For most of the residents the nonracial character of the community was a source of sense of security. There were also different types of jobs available on the project which did not pay prevailing wages, but which were attractive to some. Political positions also were a source of preoccupation to some. The life in the community was not "normal," considered from outside standards, but it provided sufficient activities to satisfy many of the residents.

That conditions within the center discouraged many from attempting relocation was clear from the attitude of residents toward relocation. The easy life and the economic security within the center made many of the residents hesitate to leave it. This could be seen from the popular conception of the outside as being fraught with economic insecurity. Life in the center afforded group security, and some were fearful of leaving without friends or proceed to a place where they would have no Japanese friends. Camp life, with its round of social

activities, still had the attraction of being something of a novelty to many, and the general state of boredom which was to set in later had not begun for the majority. By November the stormy political scene had relapsed into a lull, and the project settled down to a fairly quiet routine of living. Even though relocation was announced as the major policy of the WRA, few of the participants in the political scene took cognizance of this fact and continued to make their community life the focus of their attention.

Satisfaction with camp life is indicated in the following:

Mary seems to have definitely made up her mind that she is not going out. She has to rely on her husband, she says, and feels that a good job will be hard to find. She is working in the co-op beauty shop at present and seems to be satisfied with her work. She said that the workers were generally satisfied with their work, although they were kept busy enough. If they are worked too hard they crab, she said.¹

A Nisei girl pointed out the attractions of the center in contrast to the attractions of the outside:

Here we are confined in this Center. The question is "should every opportunity be availed to get out and resettle?"

The pros on the question are obvious: This is not a normal life. Confinement here for any length of time tends to warp the mind. The longer we stay in here the harder it will be to adjust ourselves to outside society.

Con: Resettling or going out to college merely as a means of getting out is not advisable. In this crisis, life on the outside isn't very much easier than it is in here, with priorities and rationing prevailing. As far as education is concerned, with the right application, a person may learn just as many practical things by self-education and extension courses in here as by spending thousands of dollars at some eastern college.

1. Sakoda Journal, January 17, 1943, #5.

Jobs of the kind that an educated man would want are quite scarce. While at least our physical comforts are taken care of and we have a certain amount of security from serious want, such security is not available on the outside.¹

In a psychology class, attended mostly by Nisei in their early twenties, all of the 18 students declared that they did not feel bitter about having to live in the center. One student pointed out that there were many new experiences that he could still get by staying in the center.²

Yesterday, JS had occasion to ask his psychology class how many of them desired to leave the camp. Kiku Tomita said that she wanted to go out, and thought that everyone else would want to do the same thing. However, out of a group of eighteen only one other boy wanted to go out at the present time. One boy is definitely satisfied with the place, saying that there were new experiences he could get from the place. JS also asked them about how they felt about having to live in a place like this. None of them said that they felt bitter. This was also shown by the fact that not many of them said that they wanted to go out.³

Repulsions of the Outside

Many of the evacuees conceived of the outside as signifying economic insecurity, social insecurity and increased probability of being drafted. In order to understand the frame of mind of many evacuees which led them to hold these beliefs it is first necessary to examine the manner in which the thinking of evacuees was distorted by rumors, fears, and suspicions.

Rumors and Fears: The position of evacuees was essentially

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1. QP, November 28, 1942, psychology class theme, Tule Lake.
 2. Sakoda Journal, May 2, 1943, #1.
 3. Ibid.

an insecure one. While they were cared for^{by} the government as its wards, there was little assurance of economic security should they be deprived of this status. This insecurity seemed to be a basic condition upon which fears were built and rumors were spread. In addition, the rejection from the world of the majority through the process of evacuation and confinement tended to perpetuate suspicion toward the administration and Caucasians in general. The situation was ripe for rumors and homespun explanations of events. While the Issei indulged in the transmission of rumors to a far greater extent than did the Nisei, the latter were not free of their influence. The following conversation of two Issei was typical of the kind of thinking often involved in attempting to explain the outside world:

They couldn't understand why they should be treated in this way when they lived here for forty years and have children here. One man concluded that it was all a matter of money-making in the Army. I sat listening, surprised to hear the Army blamed for money-making. But the inevitable qualification came out. It's the Jews who are at the base of this. They are the ones who are directing all of this. The other man agreed to this.¹

There was also a general belief among both Issei and Nisei that the administration had paid evacuee spies within the project, in spite of the declarations of the administration to the contrary:

When the matter of spies in the colony hired by Mr. Shirrell was brought up (at the block meeting), many people seemed to think that Mr. Shirrell wasn't telling the truth when he said that there was no one

1. Sakoda Journal, July 4, 1942.

working for him. One fellow said that on the farm there's a spy because when they decided a thing secretly once, it was known to the administration right away. Then later all three persons who had spoken at the meeting were questioned. This feeling of suspicion is definite, and woe is me if anybody in my block gets into trouble.¹

The tendency to rely upon inadequate information was seen in the rise in popularity of the Ouija board, which was little used among evacuees prior to evacuation. It was first introduced among Nisei as a pastime and was even taken over by some of the Issei. Some of those who took part in Ouija board sessions firmly believed that it was infallible. This can be seen from the following account of several Nisei asking questions of the Ouija:

After some persuasion four people were gotten to sit on four sides of a card table. Mieko, who is not too good-looking nor brilliant, especially, had to be persuaded before she would sit down. It seems that when she takes part the Ouija appears readily. One of the legs of the card table was kicked up so that the leg diagonally opposite would tap when the table was tilted. The four persons laid their hands right on the table. They were not supposed to press down on the table consciously, and they declared that they did not. Mieko started out by saying, "Ouija, Ouija will you please come out. Will you please tap if you are here." Sure enough the table tapped one time. Then they thought for a few moments for a question to ask. Someone suggested the number of people in the room. So Mieko asked, "Ouija, Ouija, will you please tell us how many people there are in this room." The table immediately began to tap and stopped when it came to 10. It was hard to tell, however, whether it stopped of its own accord, because the four of them took their hands off the table too quickly. There were eight people in the room with us, but Sue, one of the girls at the Ouija board pointed out that 2 more were sleeping in an adjoining room.

Then they asked my age, and the board counted up to 24 or 25. When I told them that it was 26, Yoshio

1. Sakoda Journal, October 26, 1942, #1.

wanted to know if I really weren't 25. Then they decided to ask the time. As the time was different according to the person's watch it was decided to go by Sue's sister's watch. All of the four, Yoshio, Sue, Mieko and Mable looked at their watch before beginning to concentrate. The hour was asked first, and was found to be 10, which was correct. Then when the minute was asked the board tapped 18 times. Sue's sister's watch said 10:15, I believe it was. Mine was 10:22. Some of the others must have had some time in between. Anyway, it was decided that that was close enough. . . . Yoshio, who believed in the Ouija board telling the truth, thought that it was an effective device because it told in how many years we would be getting out of here.¹

The spread in popularity of the Ouija board was noticed by a research worker:

For the past two weeks, the "Ouija" fad has spread considerably among the young people, and apparently has affected even some of the Issei. (See page 2, Tulean Dispatch, Oct. 28). Nobu had a party tonight at her home to which she invited the two Komure girls living in our block, who are addicts of the Ouija oracle, because Mrs. Wallance of the post office wanted to see how the thing goes. Michi was invited over, so I dropped in after the block meeting to see what the fad was about. When I arrived, the Komure girls were sitting at a card table with Nobu and Masaye Kawasaki, each at an end of the table. . . .

Michi, I think, made a rather good point about the ouija when she declared, "Everyone here is so concerned about the uncertainties of the future, and they want to know what to expect, it's no wonder that the ouija is so popular." It is a means of trying to anticipate the future. And it is as popular among the Issei as among the Nisei, it seems. But the popularity of the ouija shows the level of intelligence with which we are dealing, for obvious as the manner in which the ouija is conducted, there are still a large number who believe in it implicitly.²

A feature story in the Tulean Dispatch on the popularity of the Ouija board attested:

Ouija Board: Mystifying Oracle Answers Questions
"Come OUIJA come, if you are in this room, please answer yes. This plea can be heard from many homes as

1. Sakoda Journal, November 8, 1942, #3.
2. Miyamoto Diary, November 4, 1942.

hundreds of nisei find amusement in the all mystifying
Ouija Board. . . .¹

From reports of widely different answers obtained through the
Ouija board it could be inferred that one of the popular
questions being asked the Ouija was: "How long is the war
going to last?"

The new relocation policy of the WRA was sometimes dis-
cussed with the distorted outlook described above. While the
WRA made no effort to conceal its intention in advocating
relocation, some of the residents suspected the administration
of evil designs. The following description of a discussion of
the project director's attitude by Issei at a co-op meeting
is illustrative of the suspicious attitude with which the
relocation policy was received:

Mr. Shirrell's attitude has changed since he came
back from San Francisco. There were speculations as to
what he has up his sleeve. Maybe he wants to cut down
the expense here, and for that reason is encouraging
workers to go outside to work, and not come back again.
Someone said that he must have something up his sleeve,
and most people seemed to want to take that view. The
whole attitude is that words are not to be relied on.¹

The following report also shows the suspicion directed against
the relocation program:

The other rumor was a statement by Mr. Kuwada
(an Issei), May's neighbor, that the fact that the
WRA was trying to get people out of here was fishy.
May said that even in the Recreation Department there
was talk of getting people out. The rumor is to the
effect that once people get out of here they are not allowed
to come back in. At least it takes some time to do so--
at least 3 weeks, according to May.²

Many of the residents conceived of the outside world in the same

1. Sakoda Journal, September 2, 1942.

2. Sakoda Journal, November 13, 1942, #2.

suspicious and fearful manner.

Economic Insecurity: Many of the residents--especially the older ones--were fearful of being deprived of the security of the center. This could be gathered from the kind of rumors which were circulating within the project and also by statements made by residents. A rumor often spread rapidly throughout the project and was brought to the attention of many residents in ~~the~~^a matter of days. After a week or so the rumor would no longer be heard, but would be replaced by another one. One type of rumor which recurred frequently was that concerning the movement of residents from relocation centers. This indicated, it can be inferred, a concern on the part of many residents over economic security.

In late September of 1942 a rumor swept the project to the effect that residents of Tule Lake would be moved to Arkansas. The Community Council was informed that the rumor was without basis.¹ Shortly after Myer's visit to the project with the announcement of the new relocation policy, several rumors were circulating. One related that crutches were stored in the warehouse, and therefore wounded American soldiers would replace evacuees at Tule Lake.

The rumor about two warehouses being full of crutches and therefore we are leaving soon was related by one person. George said that some people thought that we are getting ready to leave because 50 hogs, over-fat, were being sent to be slaughtered. Art joked that people will be saying that we are leaving because we are not going to have a theater.²

1. Minutes of Meeting of the Community Council, September 22, 1942, p. 1.

2. Sakoda Journal, November 3, 1942.

Another rumor which circulated about the same time was to the effect that the residents of Manzanar were ordered to evacuate, raising fears that the same would happen to residents of Tule Lake.

George came home today and said that Yagi learned at the Ad. Bldg. that Manzanar was being evacuated. He seemed to think that this report was true. I couldn't believe it because there has been so many rumors of that sort in the past. We shall probably know more definitely tomorrow. At the dinner table we talked of the possibility of having to move out ourselves. If it were true that Manzanar was moving, then we could see no reason why we would be allowed to stay on the coast. The date for Manzanar was stated as November 12.¹

The rumor of moving to Arkansas was revived:

I spoke to the block manager about the recent rumor about going to Arkansas. I asked him whether he had a letter from a friend in Manzanar who said that the people from there were leaving. Mr. Akahoshi denied that he knew anything about a letter sent to him. He said that Mr. Yagi himself had a letter from someone in Arkansas who said that barracks were being set up and that it was best to come early if we are coming at all.²

At a meeting of the Community Council it was announced:

Rumors that this project will be transferred have been prevalent and injurious to the morale. These rumors are without official confirmation. Also, rumors of 2,000 crutches imported here has been investigated by Mr. Miura and found false.³

Another type of rumor which gave more direct evidence of concern to retain the security of the center was those concerning the inability of those who relocated to return to the center.

1. Sakoda Journal, November 4, 1942, #2.

2. Sakoda Journal, November 7, 1942, #3.

3. Minutes of the Meeting of the Community Council, October 3, 1942, p. 2.

This rumor was recorded as early as November, but was more widespread in January.

A still more serious development which affects both Issei and Nisei is the rumor to the effect that no one who goes out on indefinite leave will be allowed to come back in. . . . May says that Kingo heard it from Miss Bogarad of the Leaves Office or somebody. Hattie also heard it from someone. None of us had any definite information on the matter, but it all seemed very plausible. Kingo was applying for leave, but at present he says that perhaps it is best not to go out. Since Hattie's mother has heard about the immediate drafting of Nisei on the outside and not being able to come back in, she has asked Hattie to tell her brother to come back in from college.¹

One of the most often passed rumors is that once you go out you can not get back in. One version says that if you go out as a family unit you are not allowed to come back in. Immediately on hearing such a rumor somebody mentioned that a family is trying to get in but can not, and they find that they can not make a living on the outside. Another rumor says that if you are out for more than two weeks, you are not allowed to come back in. Another says that if you go out on indefinite leave, you can not come back. Another says that ~~if you go out~~ it depends on the type of papers you sign--the warning being that you should read everything thoroughly before signing, because you may not be able to come back, otherwise. The matter was brought up in the Planning Board, and words were passed on to representatives that parties going out should be warned that they may not be able to come back in.²

These rumors were not entirely without basis since the administration had taken the position that return to the center was to be discouraged. Evacuees, not knowing under what conditions relocatees were to be allowed to return to the center, were drawing conclusions that the administration was not allowing

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1. Sakoda Journal, January 22, 1943, #5.
 2. Sakoda Journal, January 29, 1943, #2.

any relocatees to return from indefinite leave. Because of the spread of the rumors, the administration found it necessary to clarify their stand in the project newspaper. It announced that, contrary to rumors, evacuees would be allowed to return to the project under certain conditions:

Spiking rumors that evacuees may not return once they are on the outside, Lorne Hycke, Leaves Officer, reiterated that those who leave the Project can return under certain conditions.

Outside evacuees desiring to reenter the Project must establish a need for returning. They can return in the event of serious illness to immediate relatives. Also, inability to get along with Caucasians in an area of relocation constitutes reason enough for coming back to the project.

However, in the latter case, the WRA officials will make every attempt to provide a solution for the difficulty on the outside, rather than send them back. Perhaps, a new job or a more satisfactory community would be sought. . . .

"If one returns to this project for any other reason than the above specified they must expect to stay here indefinitely," Huycke revealed.¹

This announcement did not serve to dispell the underlying fear of losing the security of the center since it only served to confirm the notion that return to the center was opposed by the WRA and that at best it would be greatly limited.

The following conversation of a social welfare worker with her Caucasian supervisor at the time of segregation indicates the persistence of the fear of not being allowed to return to the project:

Evacuee: Is it possible to return to the center after going out on indefinite leave?

1. Tulean Dispatch, January 29, 1943.

Supervisor: It's on the same basis as before. If he can show a good reason, he can come back.

The evacuee repeats the question.

Supervisor: Relocation offices have guaranteed jobs and housing. If they do not come through, then they have to recourse except to allow them to return.

Evacuee: It depends on what kind of housing and job.

Supervisor: The guarantee involves only temporary housing and only ordinary jobs.

Evacuee: Is it really hard to come back? How difficult is it?

Supervisor: I think that if a person really couldn't get along, he could get back.

Evacuee: It sounds to me as though it's pretty hard to get back.¹

Another source of evidence of the fear of losing the security of the center was the statement made by evacuees. The following discussion of the consequences of relocation between two Issei who were planning to leave Tule Lake for a "loyal" center at the time of segregation was typical of the attitude of many Issei:

First Issei: There's no advantage in going out because it's so hard to make a living. If you do domestic work, as we can, you can save a little, but if you have to support a wife or family on the outside now you won't have a cent left. I know a couple who just barely get along on \$2000. The best thing to do is to go wherever they tell you to go and eat what they feed you. It can't be much worse than it is here. They feed you rice and rish, at least, and provide a bath for you.

Second Issei: They say that because people find it hard to get along on the outside all the girls are becoming prostitutes. The Rocky Nippo warned the parents to be careful about their girls. . . . But it's not good if you can't have freedom.

First Issei: Freedom is a matter of heart. There's no barrier if you don't think about them. After all, this is war.²

Because seasonal leave provided return to the center, many

1. Sakoda Journal, August 10, 1943, #1, #2.
2. Ibid., July 24, 1943, #2.

residents considering going out preferred it to indefinite leave.

As an Issei explained:

I want to go out, but I think I'll go out to do seasonal work. I can earn some money and come back to the center again. I'd be in a fix if I went out and things didn't go right, and I wasn't allowed to come back here again.¹

In a few of the centers camouflage net projects had been started, enabling evacuees to work for outside wages while living in the center. The establishment of a tent factory was proposed in Tule Lake, but it was shelved with the increased emphasis on relocation. Many of the residents desired just such a plan whereby they would be able to cling to the security of the center and work for prevailing wages. One Issei explained:

They ought to let us have a factory to work in on the outside of the center and pay us regular wages. Then everyone would work hard willingly.²

Some of the residents were considering remaining in the center, not only for the duration of the war, but also after it was over. This was shown by a question a delegate from Minidoka asked of Myer, the National Director, at the National JACL conference:

J. Sakamoto, Minidoka: Quite a few people ask me if they can stay there after the war.

Mr. Myer: I think the answer should be "no," but I don't know. I'm not sure that I can make a statement. That depends greatly on how well we do our job. I hope that together we can do this job well enough so that people can go almost any place where they want to and to do those things they have the right to do.³

1. Sakoda Journal, July 30, 1943, #2. (Mr. Kurose)

2. Ibid., July 29, 1943, #2.

3. Minutes, JACL Special Emergency National Conference, November 17-24, 1942, Salt Lake City, Utah, p. 81.

While fear of economic insecurity on the outside was most prominent among the Issei, it was also manifested among the Nisei. It was common for Nisei to hold beliefs and fears similar to the Issei, although usually in milder forms. The following description shows the desire on the part of an intelligent Nisei youth to leave the project, provided he was able to return to the project:

Of those in the block George is probably the most intelligent young person in the block. His family on the whole is rather quiet, and George has a trace of that himself. He was working in the hospital after coming back from the beetfield, but he quit the job recently and has begun to work in the mess hall. He was going to study to become a doctor, but was required to stay at home and work and wasn't able to go on to college. . . .

George said that he was not going to run for co-op representative because he was planning on going out. The other day he filed his application for leave, and also wrote to the man in the USES in Idaho to tell him that he wanted the best job available. However, he wanted to make sure that he was going to be able to come back, and said that he would read any form carefully before he signed it. He said that he wanted to come back because his family was here and he could not be stranded on the outside. Another fellow with him said the same thing. They were willing to go out to work on a work contract, provided they were allowed to come back to the Project.¹

The belief that the outside world did not offer economic security was enhanced by the fact that at first largely domestic jobs were offered to evacuees. On September 9, 1942, the Tulean Dispatch announced:

DOMESTIC JOBS OFFERED NISEI

According to Robert Frazee, assistant chief of employment division from Washington, numerous domestic positions are available throughout the mid west. Prospective

1. Sakoda Journal, January 28, 1943, #1. (George Ike)

localities listed are Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and a few towns in Illinois.

Applicants should be citizens, Frazee added, and preferably girls and couples. Offices at #1208 will be opened for interviews.

A great variety of jobs are continuously pouring into the employment division and names and situations wanted should be left with the placement officer for future reference stated Frazee if suitable jobs are unavailable at present.

A similar announcement appeared in the Tulean Dispatch on November 4, 1942. While some of the residents were willing to take these jobs in order to leave the center, most of them preferred to have better types of jobs. This is indicated by the following account of a conversation between two Nisei girls:

Today I was talking to May Sato's secretary and a reporter from the Dispatch office. Both of them said that they wished they could get out of here. They felt that by doing housework they could get out. The secretary, however, felt that she had a duty toward her parents, and was not sure that she really wanted to go. If she did go, she would want her family and some friends along. The other girl said that she would go if she had one friend to take along. But both of them agreed that they did not want to be stuck with a domestic job. They wanted a job as secretary, which the secretary was doubtful she would be able to get.¹

Social Insecurity: The repulsive nature of the outside world was conceived as being social as well as economic by many residents. Many evacuees were fearful of leaving the all-evacuee community for the outside where they would no longer have the protection of their own group. To many evacuees the outside world meant physical danger, racial prejudice, and isolation from their own group. This fear had been built up over a period of years in many evacuees with or without traumatic

1. Sakoda Journal, December 1, 1942, #5.

experiences and was maintained often through isolation within the Japanese communities on the West Coast. Within the center these fears were kept alive through adverse news and rumors of maltreatment of relocating evacuees by the majority group.

Many evacuees were conscious of their racial difference from Caucasians and manifested it within the center. For some evacuation symbolized the rejection of Japanese by the majority group in a dramatic and concrete fashion. The bitterness with which some residents verbally attacked the administration and the suspicion constantly directed toward its activities were indications of the existing social gap. Consciousness of race discrimination was expressed by a student in a psychology class in a theme on racial discrimination by college fraternities and sororities:

In most of the universities or colleges, it is very hard for a Japanese to be pledged into a fraternity or a sorority. This is true at the college where I attended for two years. If one looks up the Constitution, by-laws, and the rules and regulations governing these organizations, he will find that there are no clauses excluding Japanese, Jews, Negroes or any other minority group. However one will also find that there has never been a Japanese pledged into either of these social organizations.

As we get along so well together in the classroom, on the athletic field, as good friends; as we are in good standing with the faculty and with the student body, both scholastically and in our behavior, I have always wondered why we are not admitted into these groups. Being a small school of about six hundred, it isn't as if we were being pledged into a group of strangers, but into a group whom we come in contact with every day.¹

Even those Caucasians who attempted to sympathize with evacuees were sometimes suspected.

1. Kenji Oyanagi, psychology class theme, Tule Lake

G.S. asked today whether hakujins were really sincere when they sympathized with the Japanese. R. thought that certain people like the Booths were. G. questioned whether Jacoby just looked on us as "Japs." Eki (Nisei) joined in with George. I kept still.¹

Embitterment toward the American Government as a result of evacuation was seen in the following account of a Nisei who was described as changing from a 100 per cent American to one who was prepared to join his father in an internment camp:

One year ago he was a 100% pro-American, a typical nisei and a typical American boy. Now the picture is completely changed. He is no longer a carefree school boy, but rather a man embittered by the turn of circumstances. He goes around professing a pro-Japanese stand, declaring that he would rather join the Japanese army than the United States one.

He has been in Japan for a short while and his older brother is residing there now. He says that whenever he sees propaganda pictures of dead Japanese soldiers it makes him wonder if it could be his brother, although he doesn't know for a certainty whether his brother is in the Japanese army or not.

The change in attitude began when his father and some friends were interned shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. His uncle, afraid that he might be interned also, immediately moved to the midwest, leaving the entire burden of carrying on business to his youthful hands. In the midst of this conflict came the evacuation order.

His plans for the future are grim. He and his mother plan to join his father in internment camp. This would mean confinement for the duration and probably deportment. He says that he could fight for his father and they would be released if he won. However, he thinks that they probably won't do that because many of their friends are also there. To a query as to how he would spend his time there, he replied that he would endeavor to master the Japanese language thoroughly.²

Consciousness of racial prejudice is shown in a married Nisei from a farming area near Sacramento:

1. Sakoda Journal, August 8, 1942.

2. Kiku Tomita, psychology class, February 20, 1943, Tule Lake.

Ikuo came over and invited us to have soup and crackers with pickles, olives, jam and peanut butter. . . . We talked of the war and this and that, but mostly about racial prejudice. It almost seems to be an obsession with Ikuo, he keeps harping on it so much. He keeps pointing out various incidents that he's heard of. He seems to be thinking of perhaps returning to Japan, but at the same time seems to have his doubts as to whether he will be able to adjust himself over there. He feels the hurt of a racial minority, and can't seem to be able to interpret it in any but an unfavorable light. George also kept saying that America was supposed to be a country of democracy, but wasn't. They both had me quite uncomfortable. Ikuo's outlook seems to be so narrow and so inflexible. Toby, his young wife, threw an interesting side light on the conversation when we came upon the topic of Filipinos and she said that "We used to treat them like dirt and they took it out on us after the war." Both of them said that they would have voted no if they had voted on the theater proposition. Ikuo's old man is much more broadminded than either I. or T., and believes that the theater is all right even from an educational standpoint.¹

Consciousness of the gap between the Japanese and Caucasians was kept alive within the center by the underprivileged, semi-prisoner and caste-like status of the evacuees in relationship to the Caucasian administrators. The conflicts between evacuees and the administration, as we have already seen, brought forth heated denunciation of the administration and Caucasians and of evacuees who sided with them.

There were other influences which tended to perpetuate consciousness of racial prejudice. One was the newspapers, both American and Japanese vernacular, which occasionally contained news items relating to the hostile temper of some of the people on the outside. Expressions of hatred against Japanese was more commonly found in the Hearst papers than in others, and evacuees

1. Sakoda Journal, October 19, 1942, #3.

subscribed to these papers as much as to others. Other papers, such as the San Francisco Chronicle, which combined items favorable to evacuees with unfavorable ones, and was on the whole less objectionable to evacuees than the Hearst papers, nonetheless was not free from reading matter which kept alive consciousness of race prejudice in America. Among the "Letters to the Editor" were those favoring fair treatment toward Japanese, such as the following:

DISFRANCHISEMENT

Editor The Chronicle--Sir: I protest against the amazing charge of the civilian defense chief of Oakland, Ralph Hoyt, to the effect that "these people (the Japanese), who do not assimilate, who do not become Americans, who will always be a liability and a potential threat, should be denied citizenship." I protest because this wholesale accusation is not supported by facts. Does the maker of it know his Japanese?

In spite of all the handicaps which bitter race hatred has imposed on them, they have made a reputable moral record. Of course they have their faults, which their enemies have taken pains to advertise. In the light of much hostile legislation, chronic frustration, difficulty in securing employment suited to their qualifications, and Caucasian unfriendliness, it is a matter of surprise that so few have gone wrong. . . .

HENRY STAUFFER

Berkeley.¹

The unfavorable items, however, offset the favorable ones.

In reply to Mr. Stauffer a woman wrote:

JAPANESE

Editor The Chronicle--Sir: I disagree with Mr. Henry Stauffer in regard to the Japanese becoming citizens of the United States. In the first place, they are inferior as a race, no matter how many times they marry into the white race, the men have those little short arms.

1. San Francisco Chronicle, June 20, 1942.

Mr. Stauffer says he knows a Japanese who has 11 children; that is the principal trouble, they multiply rapidly and spread out all over the world, in time they would outnumber us and control the vote. In regard to these children being well educated, why don't they go to Japan and teach their people how to live, show them the benefits of our form of government? Our government has many faults, but with all its faults it is far superior to theirs.

If all the people followed the Ten Commandments there would be no war.

KATHERINE B. HISCHEY

San Francisco.¹

Another person wrote in opposition:

JAPANESE

Editor, The Chronicle: Sir: Would suggest that Henry Stauffer (his letter in the Safety Valve of June 20) read the article by Jan Marsman, "I escaped from Hong-kong," before he lauds the Japanese.

E.C. SHARPE.

San Francisco.²

That the American press helped to keep alive the feeling against of being discriminated/among evacuees is indicated by the reaction of Nisei to a letter to the editor of the Sacramento Bee advocating sterilization of Japanese:

She was reading a letter to the editor of the Sacramento Bee advising the sterilization of Japanese and she seemed to be indignant, while I laughed it off as being silly. When I showed the paper to George and Ruby, they were indignant about it, too.³

Japanese newspapers also served as media for news of racial prejudice against Japanese. The three vernacular newspapers and the Pacific Citizen, a weekly printed in English by the JACL, did not contain the vitriolic anti-Japanese items found in the American press. A large number of news items of favorable

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1. San Francisco Chronicle, June 24, 1942.
 2. San Francisco Chronicle, June 25, 1942.
 3. Sakoda Journal, July 8, 1942.

comments by various people and of accomplishments of Japanese were given considerable space and prominence. In addition, however, every major incident involving a Japanese was routinely reported. While the editorial comments almost invariably protested against the occurrence of incidents and existence of race prejudice, they served nonetheless to keep the evacuees aware of the racial question.¹

The function of the press in keeping evacuees informed of unfortunate incidents is seen in the reprinting of an article-- originally written up in The Colorado Times, a Japanese vernacular paper printed in Denver, Colorado, -in the Tulean Dispatch:

TUCSON, ARIZ.: Requests of the WRA that the University of Arizona provide extension courses, library books and faculty lectures for Japanese in relocation centers of the state have been denied because "we are at war, and these people are our enemies," Pres. Alfred Atkinson reported.

"It is fine to be idealistic and helpful during times of peace," he said, "but these people stabbed us in the back while their representatives were negotiating for peace in Washington."²

The effect of incidents on the outside, even though relatively rare, can be seen in the reaction of a Nisei college graduate who attributed her hesitation to leave for school to dangers to Japanese on the outside of which she had read in the Pacific Citizen:

Came across May on the way home. She said that she wanted to go to school if she could, and that she

1. Most evacuees appeared to give as much attention to the unfavorable news items as to the favorable, and there seemed to be some demand from readers for unfavorable news.

2. Tulean Dispatch, October 21, 1942. Feature column, "Reflections" by Jobo Nakamura.

would learn something she really liked. She said that she enjoyed economics, but that this time she would like to take up something different. She wasn't sure, however, that those who had gone out to school had done the wise thing, because they were in danger. She cited the case of two girls written up in the Pacific Citizen who had to go to jail for protection from a lynch mob.¹

A more insidious source of adverse news of the outside were ~~the~~ rumors. As with other rumors the origin and route of transmission were generally unknown. While news had some basis in reality, rumors sometimes were totally false and fantastic. Even when rumors reflected some actual incident, it was likely to be greatly distorted and the dangers of the outside exaggerated. The following rumors, picked up in Tule Lake, were never confirmed through other sources:

Five Japanese were killed with a machine gun by the road to Klamath Falls.

From Arizona comes one that a train was derailed or something and 200 from Pinedale killed.

From Sacramento the report that babies were born on the train as Japanese were evacuated and no medical facilities were available.²

Another fear of evacuees in considering relocation was that of being isolated from their friends and the Japanese group as a whole. This fear was most frequently expressed by those who had made a good adjustment to the evacuee group, and least frequently by those who had not adjusted themselves to evacuees or had identified themselves with Caucasians. This was more commonly expressed among Issei than Nisei. One indication of this fear was the criticism of the "dispersal policy." This was well-expressed by an intelligent Issei dentist from the

1. Sakoda Journal, July 4, 1942.

2. Ibid., July 31, 1942.

Northwest:

This idea of the WRA to scatter the Japanese is all wrong. Even if they did scatter them, within one year you'd have a Japanese community here and there, and the next year it would grow larger. The Japanese should form large communities for their own protection against racial discrimination, and they are going to form large communities. Many more Japanese would go out if they were assured of being able to live in a Japanese community. But because there's so much discrimination, I think most of us are going to end up in the South Seas. We can't live in Japan because it's too crowded there.

A great many people will go out if they are assured of a decent living. Offering them relief is no good because they are too proud. Also, if they apply for relief they are going to be liable for deportation after the war. After all, the Government stripped the people of all their belongings. They ought to assure them of a living on the outside if they want them to go out.¹

A young Issei, who was attending college prior to evacuation, expressed his opposition to the dispersal policy:

Dispersal is not a good policy. The only protection of a minority group is isolation. It's done by other racial groups in America, and there's no reason for picking on the Japanese alone.²

The usual defense of the Japanese community was the existence of racial prejudice and the need for group protection. Another common method of stating the usual defense was to say that withdrawal into one's own group was common among minority groups.

A related fear was sometimes expressed by parents who opposed the relocation of their daughters for fear that they would be unable to get married on the outside.

It seems that there is a great deal of reluctance on the part of parents in letting girls go out to work. Hattie related the fact that she got in contact

1. Sakoda Journal, July 15, 1943, #7. (Dr. Kuki)
2. Ibid., July 22, 1943, #9.

with a Caucasian lady in Chicago who contacted Mr. Shirrell, who in turn asked for an application from the girls. The lady was willing to house all the girls whom Hattie had recommended. Hattie herself could not type or write shorthand, but she had several friends who could and who wanted to go out. One of them could not accept the offer because her folks said that if she left camp she would not be able to marry. Another girl's parent was indignant when Hattie brought up such a proposal and said that her daughter has to stay in at least another 6 months. She did not think that girls ought to be going out at this time either.¹

Another indication of the fear of isolation was the desire to relocate with a friend or to a point where a friend had already relocated. (See C.K. case histories.) The desire to persuade a close friend to relocate in the spring of 1943 is shown by following account:

As you know, Frank and Michi are planning to go to Chicago some time next year. Michi doesn't know anyone around there and she wants Tomi to go too.²

Typical was the qualification of a Nisei girl who expressed desire to relocate: "If she did go, she would want her family and some friends along."³

In this connection it is significant to note that after a noticeable number of evacuees began to relocate in the spring of 1943, they served to "pull" each other out.⁴ There was also a trend toward concentration in places where relocatees appeared in large number, such as Salt Lake City, Denver, Chicago,

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1. Sakoda Journal, March 16, 1943, #2.
 2. Letter, Shibutani to Director, September 27, 1942.
 3. Sakoda Journal, December 1, 1942, #5.
 4. See discussion of "resettlement fever" following the registration program, pp. _____.

Minneapolis.

The desire for group security manifested itself in the resettled areas in spite of the "dispersal policy" of the WRA.

A more specific fear of young men of draftable age was the possibility of those relocating being drafted. This notion was communicated in the form of rumors, implying that those who left the camp would be penalized, while those who remained would be deferred indefinitely. This rumor appeared before the registration issue, and the idea persisted even after Nisei were made subject to Selective Service regulations. Some of the parents objected to their sons relocating on the basis of this rumor.¹ The effect of this rumor is shown in the following journal entry of a field worker:

Two rumors are rather prevalent these days, one is that Toko Fujii was drafted immediately when he left camp for school. The truth seems to be that he was merely reclassified to 1A, but that seems to lead to immediate drafting. H.K. says that many of her brother's friends are cancelling their leave for school because of such developments. . . . Since H's mother has heard about the immediate drafting of Niseis on the outside and also about not being able to come back in, she has asked Hattie to tell her son to come back in. Which reminds me of Mrs. Kakiuchi who asked her son to wait till about fall before deciding to go out to school.

These are the ways in which rumors spread. May relates about Kingo. Hattie relates about what her father heard on the farm. We all have heard about Toko Fujii, whom Hattie called Joe Fujii. It keeps going from mouth to mouth and is soon spread all over camp.²

Soon after the announcement of the new relocation policy, the draft rumor was heard by a research worker in several different places:

1. See account of George Kakiuchi, pp. _____.
2. Sakoda Journal, January 22, 1943, #5.

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58.

The talk of Niseis being drafted came up in several different places today. A Kibei fellow was mentioning it in the Social Welfare Department. It also came up at the dinner table. George said that someone had told him that Niseis were going to be drafted. Toby said that before the war she felt as though she should be loyal to America and fight for her. She said that if she were a boy she would have wanted to go to war. But since we have been treated in this manner, she feels that a great many people are not going to like the idea of being drafted. She doubted that very many people would volunteer even if Niseis were allowed to join the Army. I said that she was mistaken because the treatment of soldiers was relatively good.

The topic came up after the co-op meeting, too. Harno felt that we were to be drafted. He said that we would be drafted sooner or later. Elberson joked that someone would have to win the war.¹

In response to the rumor a Nisei was reported as follows:

Bill S. was saying today that he didn't want to go to war and carry a gun. He said that he preferred to join a medical unit. He also said that if they tried to put the Japanese in a dangerous spot as they did with negro troops, he wasn't going to stand for it.²

Thus the repulsions of the outside as conceived by evacuees were important factors in discouraging relocation. Fears of the outside operated most strongly on the older generation, generally embracing all of the variety of fears that have been mentioned. The Nisei showed less concern over economic insecurity than for social insecurity and the draft.

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1. Sakoda Journal, October 28, 1942, #3.
 2. Ibid., November 2, 1942, #2.

Impediments

In addition to the attractions of camp life and the repulsions of the outside, there were other factors which operated to discourage relocation. Some of these were administrative, such as the delay in obtaining leave clearance for evacuees. Another set of factors were pressures from family and the community. Still another was a desire to return to the Orient. Another was the possibility of substituting seasonal leave for indefinite leave. One other was to return to the West Coast, which was closed to persons of Japanese ancestry from the time of evacuation in 1942 until 1945.

Administrative Impediments: Of the administrative impediments the most important was the delay in obtaining leave clearance. While no record is available as to the distribution of the length of time it took evacuees to obtain clearance, it was not uncommon for them to have to wait two or three months or more. The WRA announced in November that clearance would be speeded up so that it could be obtained in about a week, but there was no evidence that this was accomplished prior to registration. According to one report, the usual length of time necessary to obtain a leave clearance was six weeks-two months:

The second problem is the one which relates to the six weeks to two months necessary to obtain an indefinite furlough from the WRA. We have been promised that this will be speeded up immediately so that about a week will elapse between the filing and ultimate clearance.¹

One individual who applied in September was still waiting for his

1. JACL Special Emergency National Conference, Salt Lake City, November 17-24, 1942, Minutes, p. 62.

clearance in January. In the meantime, he, like others, had lost contacts which had been made with prospective employers:

He has applied for leave clearance since September, and it has not come yet, meaning that something has held him up, possibly. There was an inquiry about an aeronautical job, but Kingo seems to feel that his chances for getting out is not so good. At any rate, he seems to be considering staying in here for the duration.¹

The hindrance of slow leave clearance was indicated by a delegate to the JACL conference from Tule Lake:

Tsukamoto: I would like to suggest to the WRA that some speedier procedure be adopted. We have cases where jobs have been obtained on the outside but are lost again because a permanent release takes such a long time in coming through. Inasmuch as there are a large number of people making applications, I think that we should recommend that people with jobs be considered first, people with prospects of jobs second, and others last.²

Family Pressures: Pressures from family members to discourage relocation could be treated separately from community pressures, although there was a close relationship between the two. Two different sources of familial pressures could be distinguished. One arose from family ties, which allowed family members less opportunities for migration (mobility) than those possessed by persons without family ties. The second was due to the operation of factors discouraging relocation through a family member, usually the parent. The first usually involved a sense of responsibility toward the family on the part of the member desiring to relocate. In the second situation the

1. Sakoda Journal, January 22, 1943, #5.

2. JACL Special Emergency National Conference, Minutes, p. 66.

individual was often confronted with a more personal and arbitrary opposition to relocation from a member of the family. The definition of the situation sometimes differed between Issei and Nisei, as when parents maintained that it was the duty of at least one child to remain with them, which the son or daughter did not believe. In such cases, we shall arbitrarily accept the Nisei's definition of the situation for the sake of convenience.

In migration phenomenon in general family status discouraged mobility. Among the Nisei the picture was somewhat complicated by the fact that marriage allowed far greater freedom from parental control. It was found that a larger percentage of the non-married than the married relocated prior to 1945 from Poston except among the Nisei males when age was held constant. This can be seen from Table _____.

TABLE

Percentage Migration prior to 1945
 of Persons 17 years of age and over by
 Age, Generation, Sex, and Marital Status

	Male		Female	
	Married	Not Md.	Married	Not Md.
<u>ISSEI</u>				
Below 44	16.1	36.4	13.3	48.0
45-59	12.3	18.0	9.9	11.9
60 & Over	8.9	8.9	10.7	----*
<u>KIBEI</u>				
17-24	---	50.0	29.5	43.2
25-34	40.2	45.9	22.4	---
35 & Over	28.6	---	---	---
<u>NISEI</u>				
17-24	83.3	70.8	51.0	52.3
25-34	82.0	81.6	45.7	67.5
35 & Over	63.7	---	30.4	---

* Less than 30 in the group

Difference in relocation between married and not-married was most marked among young male and female Issei. The greater mobility of the unattached Issei was somewhat traditional, since many of them followed the crops as seasonal farm laborers. Among female Nisei marital status was associated with a slower rate of relocation than among the Nisei. This was to be expected since those who had children have greater difficulty in migrating than single Nisei. Scarcity of housing, high cost of living, unknown conditions on the outside all discouraged the married woman from relocating more than the single ones. The slightly greater rate of relocation of the married male Nisei than the unmarried Nisei is difficult to explain, unless it is the result of emancipation from parental control.

In the Issei-Nisei family group the parents were generally hesitant to leave the center. This was especially true when they were burdened with dependent children. Some of the Nisei who were old enough to leave home were prevented from relocating by family circumstances. When the parents were aged or invalid or the father was interned, the children often felt obliged to remain with their parents. The Japanese tradition of the children looking after the parents was not without its effect on many of the Nisei. While the formal system of the older son taking over the family responsibilities was not always followed, it was common for at least one son or daughter in the family to feel obliged to stay with their parents. This hindered some Nisei from relocating.

More effective than family responsibilities in discouraging

relocation was the attitude of parents toward it. As we have already seen, belief in rumors played an important part in determining the wisdom of relocation. The parents, who generally believed in rumors to a greater extent than did their children, tended to influence the latter to believe them. In addition, they often opposed relocation on the part of their children and used their authority as parents to prevent them from leaving the center. The effectiveness of parental opposition to relocation was dependent, in part, upon the age and sex of the children. Parents were generally more reluctant to allow their younger children and daughters to relocate than older children and sons. Parents were also able to retain greater control over the former two than the latter.

Another factor which determined the effectiveness of parental authority was the degree of conformity of the children. As we have already observed, the attitude of the children toward their parents was an important factor in the extent of acculturation. This in turn was one of the important characteristics which was commonly used to differentiate Nisei. In the relocation issue the parent-child relationship could be observed in operation.

Among the Nisei the terms "typical" and "quiet" or "Japanesy" were often employed to describe the major difference among Nisei. A "typical" Nisei was one who was Americanized, and implied a degree of emancipation from extreme parental control. The Issei considered the "typical" Nisei as being impolite, inconsiderate, and indulging in undesirable activities, such as

dancing and flirting with the opposite sex. A "quiet" or "Japanesy" Nisei was considered by Nisei to be submissive to parents, shy and backward, stay-at home, with interest in Japanese activities. The Issei, on the other hand, considered the "quiet" or otonashii Nisei the ideal type. They were considered to be polite, industrious, obedient, dependable, and with proper interests. The use of these terms can be seen in the following journal entry:

According to Mr. Kishiyama, Yoshie is the hyoban musume (well-spoken-of girl) in the block because she is so quiet (otonashii). Anyway, that's what the Issei think. She is too Japanesy and quiet to be popular among Nisei. He said that Hanako Yasuda was also popular with the Issei. She too is quiet, even though she is from San Francisco. He pointed out Clara Sakamoto as being about the third popular, and I couldn't see that very well because she seemed to be typically Nisei.¹

The following account of an intelligent Nisei girl, age 20, from Sacramento, illustrates the attitude of conformity toward parental authority. H., according to her own account had fairly strict parents. She was taught not to speak English and made to say otosan and okasan instead of "papa" and "mama" as most Nisei did. She spoke English with an accent, and was ridiculed by other Nisei children of her age. For this reason, she claimed, she did not play with other Nisei. In high school her best friend was a Chinese girl. She had never attended a dance. Her submissive behavior had a noticeable effect on her appearance. She was beautiful, but she appeared to be about six years older than her actual age. She wore her hair plainly instead of having a permanent as other girls her age. When, on

1. Sakoda Journal, December 28, 1942, #4.

the prodding of an acquaintance, she changed her hair-do, she pleasantly surprised her friends. But her parents objected to it, and she soon reverted to her plain style. She also wore a dress of a drab color, and had never owned a colorful dress. When a friend persuaded her to make a colorful dress, she expressed a desire to have one. When her mother objected to it on the ground that the family did not intend to remain in America, however, she quickly lost interest in it. In her activities, too, she differed from other Nisei. She did not attend dances or go out on dates, but attended classes. In the sewing class, for instance, she was the only Nisei girl, and was well thought of by the Issei. Relocation for her was out of the question, and at the time of segregation she remained in Tule Lake with her family.¹

The role of a submissive attitude toward parental authority is shown in the following account of a young Nisei who desired to attend college. George K., 18, was brought up in Placer County, California, the oldest of three children. His mother was very solicitous of the family welfare and took good care of her children. The children liked to stay home a great deal and attended the Buddhist church regularly. In camp George worked in the mess hall, attended several adult education classes. He participated in sumo and Japanese plays with some Kibei friends in the mess hall. When juvenile delinquency was discussed in camp and parents were blamed for staying away from the apartment too much, the children asked Mrs. K. to

¹. Sakoda Journal, September 7, 11, 17, 18; November 17, #2; December 10, 1942, #4; January 24, 1943, #2. (Asako Higaki)

stay at home more. Somewhat reluctantly she quit attending classes in English which she enjoyed. George desired to attend college, but when he brought the matter up at home, his mother asked him to remain in camp a little longer. She expressed fear that if he went out he would be hurt because of the racial prejudice on the outside. At the time registration his parents did not want him to go against the decision of the block not to register and persuaded him to follow this course. At the time of segregation, however, the parents agreed with George to leave Tule Lake for another center. There they prevented him from leaving for college on the ground that he would be drafted if he did so. The parents were not so strict that George changed his attitude from one of conforming to that of defiance, which sometimes happened with Nisei when the pattern of conformity became unsatisfactory.¹

An entirely different attitude is shown toward parental authority by a Nisei girl who was fairly Americanized and was straining at the bonds that tied her to her parents. Both her age (18?) and her sex operated against her in her desire to relocate, since her parents considered her too young for a girl to go out alone into the world. An excerpt of her diary of March 6, 1943, is reproduced:

What is it nowadays that makes it difficult for me to concentrate? . . . The reason may be just passed up as spring fever, but the real reason is perhaps the feeling of insecurity and uncertainty. Nobody knows what's going to happen the next minute and every way I turn there is a stone wall. I could just be a nice girl and stay quietly

1. Sakoda Journal, January 7, 1943, #2.

within the stone wall but what a boring life that would be. Man was made to fight for things and it's no fun to just be contented with whatever comes along and never aspire for higher things.

There are several ways out of this stone wall. One would be to go to college which would mean an expense of at least \$1,000 a year plus cramming and a nervous breakdown. . . . Another way is to get outside employment, but the obstacle is that the kind of work I like with sufficient pay is unavilable. If saving money were my primary motive I could get domestic work and make a clear profit of \$15 a week, but I made up my mind years ago that never again would I stoop so low and money as such doesn't interest me. Secretarial work is the next easiest kind of work to get but \$125 a month in a strange city would amount to almost nothing. The WAAC sounds like a good thing but Japanese public sentiment and age limit are against me. But the greatest obstacle is my parents. Of course, I'm glad they're here and wouldn't know what to do without them. Their viewpoint is reasonable and if they said they ~~would~~ didn't care where I went or what I did, that would be a great shock to my ego. However, they insist that the family should stay together; I'm just a child and shouldn't be out alone in the world. Dad came to this country alone when he was only 19, but "boys are different." What gets me is that they make me feel that I would be committing a crime if I left against their wishes and caused them unnecessary worry. How long am I supposed to stay at home? If I knew definitely that it was to be a year or two years, that's a different story but it might be five or ten years or even more.¹

It would have been difficult for this girl's parents to retain her in the center indefinitely. She remained in Tule Lake until segregation, transferred to another center, and from there relocated in the spring of 1944. (?)

Community Pressures: Community pressures can be defined as those pressures exerted by members of the community outside of the family. The two are not independent of each other since parental pressure was partially a function of the opinion in the community. It was a common thing, for instance,

1. Tomita Diary, March 6, 1943.

for parents to appeal to the reputation of the family in the community, such as if the child left the parents without anyone to look after them. Parents were more sensitive to the community sentiment than the children and brought its influence to bear on the family situation.

The tightly-knit block arrangement was an important factor in making community opinion an important factor in guiding the behavior of individual members in the block. In the mess hall, latrine, laundry room, barrack and other places, a person could not avoid contact with other residents of the block. Through gossip, gestures, or advice, people in the block managed to convey their opinion of others. The subtle manner in which community opinion operated can be seen in the experience of a research worker, who did not possess a job for several weeks. This fact laid him open to criticism from neighbors on some such grounds as being a suspicious character (perhaps an FBI agent) or just a lazy individual.

In the latrine the mess checker, an old man who takes interest in community activities, wanted to know if we were working yet. I explained that my brother and sister were working as teachers, while I had gotten a job in the census department. He said that he was hoping that we could get some good work, and was glad to hear that we had gotten something to do.¹

While the man showed no overt signs of hostility toward the research worker, who was a stranger in the block, the latter felt that he was under suspicion.

A less subtle operation of block pressure was shown when

1. Sakoda Journal, July 11, 1942.

the same research worker helped to organize a block youth club, a type of organization which was being formed in many blocks. The main function of the club was to be recreational, but the research worker also believed that it would be effective means of securing a measure of independence from parental control. As soon as the news of the formation of the club was released, the block manager, who had already approved the plan, was attacked by a cantankerous Issei resident on the ground that the parents had not been consulted. The block manager defended the formation of the club. One of the first activities of the club was to plan a series of dance practices and a dance party. The same Issei verbally attacked the research worker at a block meeting on the ground that he did not approve of dancing:

Adachi: The youth has formed a club. I would like to have an explanation from the person responsible.

Block Manager: A meeting was held and a club was formed. The purpose I thought was very good. Mr. Sakoda will explain the formation of the club.

Sakoda got up and started to explain how it came about that the club was formed. At first he was rather scared, but soon he got his bearing and was able to outline quite fully the purpose of the club. It included the organizing of recreation, learning about community matters, taking care of younger groups. Mr. Adachi then got up and asked why the group was formed without the consent of the parents. Sakoda explained that it was his fault that the parents weren't consulted. However, some of the youth leaders and the block manager had been consulted. Mr. Adachi then came back and said that it was all right to have an organization to learn about community matters, but he wasn't in favor of the dance. In Japan there was a proverb that said that at the age of 7 years boys and girls weren't allowed to be together (Danjo hichisai no shite seki o onaju sezu.) He wanted to know that when boys and girls embraced each other (daki atte) and danced anyone could insure that there would not be any sort of danger. Even if a girl were kept at home no one could insure that there would

be no danger. However, he felt that it was a great deal better to have dances within the block where people knew each other and where it could be held under the supervision of people within the block.

The block manager then came to Sakoda's rescue It did not seem that Mr. Adachi had much support from the others because none of the others said anything at all. . . . The block manager said that he would take the responsibility to see that as close supervision as possible was kept. Mr. Adachi accepted this arrangement.¹

Fortunately, block residents were not all opposed to the formation of a youth club and it was allowed to continue.

The operation of block pressure was demonstrated most strikingly at the time of the registration crisis, and more mention of this phenomenon will be made in connection with it later.

In the same manner, community pressure played its part in discouraging relocation. The transmission of rumors, if not their origin, was a communal affair, and those concerning the outside were generally unfavorable to relocation. Sentiment opposing relocation was expressed more openly by the more conservative (culturally) residents, and served to discourage relocation on the part of the more assimilated Issei and most Nisei who were sensitive to community opinion.

In late 1942 the strongest disapproval against relocation was directed at young men desiring to volunteer for the Army language school. The majority of the Issei had definite sentimental attachment to Japan and showed desire at least to maintain their neutrality in the struggle between the two countries, with both of which they were connected. An Issei whose son volunteered for the language school later expressed

1. Sakoda Journal, November 22, 1942, #2. Notes of Block 25 meeting.

his position:

You might think that it was a good thing that Harry did volunteer since the rest are going to be drafted anyway, but there's a difference between volunteering and being drafted. If I should return to Japan people back there are going to ask me why I let my son volunteer to fight against Japan. They are going to accuse me of getting my son to volunteer because I wasn't on Japan's side. I know they're going to say things like that. This doesn't affect the son so much as it does the parent. About the only thing that I can say is that he volunteered for Camp Savage because he didn't want to point a gun at Japanese. I told him not to hurry because Niseis were going to be drafted eventually, anyway, but he wouldn't listen.¹

A research worker noted the disapproval of the Issei of the recruitment for the Army language school:

On the whole, the Issei reaction to the arrival of the recruiting team showed disapproval and some evidences of hostility. Parents were concerned that some of their sons, attracted by the prospect of adventure and of a chance to get out of the center, might volunteer. There was repeated insistence that there was no need for Nisei to volunteer considering what they had undergone in the evacuation, and those Nisei who expressed interest in volunteering were looked upon as fools without sense of self respect. Particularly was there antagonism to the idea of Nisei with Japanese faces volunteering for service in a unit that would fight against the people of their parental ancestry using the language derived from the latter as their chief weapon. A kind of moral repugnance was attached to the idea of the Nisei offering their knowledge of Japanese as a weapon to be used by the United States against Japan. An Issei woman, fearful that her son might volunteer, declared:

"The Army takes unfair advantage of us. They send soldiers wearing bright, nice looking uniforms who tell our sons all kinds of glorious stories about the life in the Army and on the outside. The young people are restless to get out of the center anyway, and they just gobble up all this. I've tried to tell my son that we can't tell what may happen to us here, and that all the family should remain together, but it's hard to argue with him when he's dreaming about other things."²

1. Sakoda Journal, 2/1/44, #1.

2. F. Miyamoto, Tule Lake Report, Chapter VII, pp. 112-113.

A Nisei reported that an Issei advised him not to volunteer for the intelligence corps because it would mean certain death:

According to Shig someone advised him not to volunteer with the intelligence corps because the men were going to be sent out to the front to do reconnaissance, which meant almost sure death.¹

Another indication of community opposition to relocation was opposition to the consumer cooperative setting up a scholarship fund. Elberson, Co-op Advisor, was anxious to have the Co-op set up a scholarship fund with which to send Nisei to co-op schools. He explained his plan to the Board of Directors:

The policy of the WRA is to relocate people. I am trying to relocate people to co-ops and to co-op schools. Many of the young people I am working with don't have enough funds to go to school. Part of the profit could be used to help people attend colleges. I am merely suggesting this for you to think about very seriously. I want you to consider this idea to set up a scholarship fund, to be used for co-op schools or for college, too. I am going to make this request for at least one person I would like to send.²

After the matter was referred to ward meetings, it was clear that the majority of the board members were aware of community opposition to the proposition and were unwilling to approve the plan:

Sakoda: My ward was against it.
Roy: My ward was against it, too. Many felt that they wanted to send their own children.
Koso: It's good for the Co-op Movement.
Fumi: \$250 is not very large for an organization. . . . I asked a Caucasian credit union and they offered me enough money for 2 years.

1. Sakoda Journal, December 2, 1942, #8.
2. Sakoda Journal, November 23, 1942, #1.

Horiuchi: I favor this, as a good idea.

Ryugo: People are touchy about who is sent.

Harry: We are setting a precedent. What would stop the Board from giving the money to all the people.

Mitsutome and Ikeda: It's too early to bring matters of this sort up. The co-op has to be built up first.¹

The result was that the plan was shelved indefinitely.

Evacuees openly advocating relocation were quickly criticized by the more conservative Issei and made an educational program to further relocation difficult to undertake. Some Nisei who reported on conditions on the outside in the summer of 1943 were criticized by some Issei. An Issei Christian minister who advocated relocation was considered to be courageous for undertaking an unpopular task:

As N. later mentioned, Father Dai certainly had courage to urge people to consider the advantages of living on the outside. Nishida said that anyone who dared to speak openly for relocation in that way would be considered an inu. He admired Father Dai because he was thinking of the ultimate good of the people.²

Evacuee recreational leaders, who had sponsored the forum on condition on the outside, refused to undertake the inclusion of films showing the conditions on the outside along with other feature movies for fear of being criticized by the residents, who paid to see the movies.³

Those sensitive to community pressure usually made their plans quietly or even secretly. This was especially true of those who volunteered for the Army or who went to

1. Sakoda Journal, January 11, 1943, #1.

2. Sakoda Diary, August 16, 1943, #4.

3. Sakoda Journal, August 11, 1943, August 12, 1943, #2.

work for the Government. An educated Kibei who decided to accept a teaching position at the Army language school at Camp Savage, Minnesota, told neighbors that he and his wife were relocating to Minneapolis, where his wife's brother had gone:

T. is leaving for Camp Savage next week. He does not tell anyone that he is going there, but merely says that he is going to Minneapolis. It's convenient to say this because his wife's brother or someone is there. "I know it's going to get out sooner or later, but you know how these people think about volunteers," T. said. Then his wife joined in: "Actually he's not volunteering. He was offered the job." . . . While he fears the opinion of the residents because of the fact that his parents are here yet, he no longer feels that he is on the same side with the people.¹

Just as with family pressure, the effectiveness of community pressure depended to a considerable extent upon the degree of tie with the community. Those with family ties were open to greater pressure from the community as a whole through other members of the family. For those with few ties with the community it was possible to ignore the opinion of the community. This was true of the extremely assimilated group and others who were antagonistic toward the majority of the residents and their ways. As we shall presently see, the registration crisis served to create a gulf between those who favored and opposed registration, thus reducing the effectiveness of the pressure of the negativistic group upon those supporting the WRA program of registration and relocation.

1. Sakoda Journal, May 11, 1943.

Return to the Orient: Three other impediments were alternatives to remaining in the center indefinitely and relocating. The first of these was the consideration of returning to the Orient. The idealization of conditions in the home country which immigrants left behind was a common pattern of behavior among immigrants. This was no less true of Japanese in America as it was of other immigrant groups. Even after twenty to forty years in this country the idea that in the Orient a bright future awaited those with the right qualifications did not fade away. While this state of affairs could be expected of the foreign-born and foreign-educated population, it was also a fairly common attitude among many of the American-born and American-educated. The latter often was unable to find a job matching his training and his socioeconomic outlook was usually greatly limited by his racial identity.¹ It was common for a Nisei boy who was unable to find a good job or establish himself economically to think that a brighter future awaited him in the Orient, where he would, presumably, not be faced with racial discrimination. This type of thinking continued in the face of knowledge that the customs of Japan, as Nisei could judge from observing their parents, were distasteful to one who was American-educated. The majority of the Nisei lacked confidence that they would be able to secure the kind of position for which they were preparing, and most of them made mental reservations

1. See Pre-evacuation economic section.

about the possibility of seeking their future in Japan. To the extent that an evacuee thought in terms of seeking his future in the Orient, the likelihood of his planning on resettlement outside of the center diminished.

For those for whom return to Japan in the future was only a remote possibility this was not necessarily a hindrance to relocation. It was those who had more concrete or immediate plans of return who were deterred from considering relocation. Some of the latter expressed this desire by applying for repatriation and expatriation for themselves and their family. Others who expected to return to Japan at some future date did not want to jeopardize their status in Japan by taking part in the war effort or, in some cases, even by leaving the center. Some spurned such a fear, declaring that working for one's living did not constitute an act of loyalty or disloyalty to any country. Others, however, preferred to play safe and not commit themselves by leaving the center. It is in this connection that the rumor that General Tojo advised evacuees over the radio not to leave camp takes on significance:

There was a radio broadcast from Japan, according to gossip that was going on in the showerroom the other day that General Tojo spoke over the air. He addressed the Japanese people and asked them to stay within the camp, instead of going out. He also told those who were outside already to return to the center. One reason he gave for this was that good jobs were not available for Japanese anyway. He did not seem to have promised that the Japanese would be awarded after the war for such behavior. Radio Tokyo's influence on the Japanese here must not be overlooked. One fellow, for instance, has been saying that to leave camp and work for the American Government would be doing something against Japan, and anyone who did such a thing may receive a poor welcome when he went back to Japan. Since so

rewarded

many Isseis say that they are returning to Japan, even if they do not, the news from Japan has a very great effect. If many Isseis do not leave camp for work on the outside, part of it must be attributed to this sort of broadcast from Japan.¹

The following account of a Nisei girl who had visited Japan for a brief period indicates the tentative thought of returning to Japan. Her family and relatives were opposed to registration, and she registered in the negative, saying that she did not believe there was any future in this country for her:

Kiyo Aiura was past 25, an age at which girls found increasing difficulty in getting married. She was brought up in a Christian home in Sacramento. A close relative was a minister, and Kiyo had the advantage of a college. She had associated with other Nisei freely, going out on dates with Nisei boys. After her graduation she attended business college, and then found a job as a secretary to a professor at the University of California at Davis. She had visited Japan briefly, and reported that she enjoyed her stay there. In fact, she sometimes said that she did not mind returning there to live. At the time of registration her family and relatives had been opposed to registration. Her block had first decided against registering, and later allowed block residents to register if they wished. Her relatives (Hitomis of the Hitomi murder) were opposed to registering in the affirmative, declaring their intention of returning to Japan. Kiyo registered in the negative, saying that there was no future in this country and that she wanted to return to Japan.²

However, when she was married after a whirlwind courtship, she relocated with her husband in 1943.

The following account of an educated Kibei with some promise in the field of poetry in this country, illustrates the vacillation typical in the thinking of many Nisei:

1. Sakoda Journal, January 22, 1943.

2. Ibid., March 8, 1943, #3.

Y. spent his 7th to 13th year in Japan, where he received training at a school run by Quakers. After returning to this country he attended a university. He spoke English most of the time with a trace of his Kibei background, and did not associate with the majority of the Kibei, but found companions among the more intellectual Nisei. He was an expert in poetry and showed promise of succeeding in his field.

Y's outlook on the future was tinged with eccentricity. He seriously considered the possibility of becoming a professor of Japanese poetry. He scoffed at the low salary paid to professors, and declared that he could only retain poetry as a hobby. He believed that there would be a good future in Manchuria for Nisei who spoke both English and Japanese, if only they had the courage to make the trip. He declared that he wanted to go to Manchuria where he would be able to "enjoy his Japanese face." He even went to the extent of working in the project hog farm, since he had heard that hog raising in Manchuria was profitable.¹

At the time of registration, however, Y. found himself in disagreement with the more negativistic element of the project residents, and he transferred to another center, relocated from there and pursued his career in poetry.

Three underlying ideas reinforced the thought of returning to the Orient in the future. The first of these was the existence of racial prejudice against Orientals in the United States and the belief that Japanese did not have a good chance for success in this country. This opinion was often expressed by Issei and was believed by some Nisei. Typical advice was that given to a young man, ~~wh~~ with college education in both Japan and the United States, by an intelligent Issei who himself did not intend to return to Japan in the near future. ^{He} She advised him to seek his future on the Asiatic mainland, where he could get a good job as customs

1. Sakoda, Segregation Report, Chapter V, pp. 58-9. (Ken Yasuda)

inspector.¹ An Issei barber in Tule Lake was heard giving the following advice to a young fellow as his hair was being cut. The barber said that the war might last a long time. After the war, he predicted, there would be many opportunities in the Far East for Nisei, if they only had enough sense to keep fit. He advised Nisei to keep out of the Army, if possible, since their future was in the Orient.²

Evacuation entailed considerable economic losses for many Japanese, much of which could not be expected to be regained in the remaining life span of the Issei. Many farms and small businesses, which many of them had taken decades of hard work to build up, were hurriedly liquidated before evacuation. This served to enhance the belief that the future of the Japanese was a bleak one if they remained in this country.

The second idea reinforcing the thought of returning to the Orient was that Japan was winning the war. Japan's rapid advance in the Far East during the first year following Pearl Harbor gave many of the evacuees the impression that Japan was going to emerge overwhelmingly victorious from the war. This belief was very common among Issei and Kibei, but not among Nisei. The former had been brought up to believe that Japan was a righteous and invincible nation, which had never suffered defeat at the hands of a foreign power. This was reinforced

1. Sakoda Journal, March 20, 1943, #1.

2. Ibid., May 8, 1943, #2.

by news from Radio Tokyo via secretly-possessed shortwave sets, which was shared by some of the Issei. Shortwave sets were banned in the centers, but a longwave set could be converted into a shortwave set by the addition of a handmade coil. The Nisei generally did not hear these news broadcasts, and they had been brought up in the American belief in the righteousness and strength of the United States. Nonetheless, during 1942 and the spring of 1943, it was difficult for anyone^{not} to believe that Japan's chances for victory were good. The following expression of a young unassimilated Kibei was typical of those believing in Japan's ultimate victory:

I think it's best not to go out. There's been broadcasts from Japan saying that the Japanese people should stay inside the center. If you go out, then Japan will assume that you are loyal to the U.S. and they won't do anything for you. That's why I think it's better not to go out. It was dumb of the administration to ask the Kibei to register. Even if we are put in jail, it'll only be for the duration. The war can't last very long now. America is going to be invaded soon. And when Japan wins they won't be able to keep us in jail. The trouble with the administration is that they think America is going to win.¹

The third notion was that Japan would protect its citizens abroad and reward those who were loyal to their country. This applied primarily to the Issei, who possessed only Japanese citizenship and who considered themselves to be citizens of Japan, residing in a foreign country. As they were ineligible to citizenship in this country, there was little opportunity for them to make any other interpretation

1. Sakoda Journal, April 18, 1943, #3.

of their national status. The second generation Japanese Americans who possessed dual citizenship, or who had been educated in Japan, were in an ambiguous situation, where they could consider themselves primarily either citizens of Japan or of America. The majority of the Nisei, in the minds of the Issei and in their own minds, were primarily American citizens. This could be gathered, for instance, from the fact that only Issei were included in meetings with the Spanish Consul, who acted as representative for Japan.

When the Spanish Consul visited the project several times to inquire into the treatment of aliens, the latter generally presented a long list of complaints pertaining to food, the hospital, and other living conditions in the center. This happened in Tule Lake, for instance, when the Spanish Consul paid a visit in December, 1942. During the registration crisis aliens made an appeal to the Spanish Consul, but he did not appear. He visited the project again in August, 1943, and brought the following lukewarm message from the Japanese Government to Japanese subjects in the United States:

The Japanese Government requests that the Japanese subjects resident in the United States be informed that the Japanese House of Representatives approved a resolution on February 27th, expressing their sympathy to their national citizens in countries at war with Japan and to send them, in the name of the Nation, a message of hope.¹

1. Mensaje Para Subditos Japaneses de la Camara de Representantes Japonesa, August 29, 1943. See Sakoda, Segregation Report, Chapter IX, pp. 22-30.

Again the alien residents presented the Consul with a long list of complaints to be investigated.

Intermingled with these requests for protection from the Japanese Government were expectations and vague hopes of reward and retribution for the suffering Issei experienced as a result of evacuation. In nature it was a flight into fantasy, but one which was understandable in the light of the thinking of many of the Issei and the circumstances in which they had been placed. It was understandable that these evacuees, who believed in many of the rumors which circulated in camp, also believed it possible that evacuation, discrimination, and deprivation would be compensated and that all personal problems would be solved in one clean sweep through Japan's victory. It was common observation that it was those who had been relative failures before, and who were without confidence of making a satisfactory adjustment on the outside, who tended to believe in the possibility of a reward. The fantasy most commonly expressed was the payment of a lump sum of \$10,000 per person. At a block meeting of Issei to discuss the requests to be presented to the Spanish Consul on his first visit, indemnification for evacuation losses was discussed.

For the indemnity they decided to ask for \$100,000 per person for physical and spiritual damage that the colonists had received. They decided to ask this amount in gold. There was a general understanding, however, that even though they asked for this amount, no one would know till the peace was signed what the actual amount would be.

The meeting was carried on very smoothly. There was a great deal of joking and laughing when a funny demand was made. There were no hard words, and no one became overly excited. The women, especially laughed whenever someone made what seemed to them a funny suggestion. There was very little suggestion about other matters which they were dissatisfied with. It was decided that there was no use listing the dissatisfactions because they were dissatisfied with them all.¹

Another form of the fantasy promised a glorious life in the Orient. This was clearly expressed by a transferee from Granada:

They are going to be given land and opportunity to work. They are going to be sent to different places according to ones' skill. The Japanese government is setting up the whole thing so that it will be possible to become millionaires. . . .

Not only that, when the war is over, we are going to get \$10,000 worth of damages. Even now we can claim thousands of dollars in lost property. But the emphasis is going to be placed on the spiritual damage that we have incurred. The U.S. Government has the money, and the Japanese Government isn't going to hold back in its demand for damages when the war is won. You can't tell how much money we'll get.²

The more sensible residents spurned these fantastic notions. Those who believed in them argued that only those who remained in the center would be eligible for such benefits after the war. This was one way in which these notions served to deter relocation. Those who were uncertain as to whether they should believe in such a possibility were inclined to "play safe" and remain in the center for the duration. An Issei explained:

If I were sure that I was going to live here in the U.S. and not return to Japan, then I'd go out

1. Sakoda Journal, December 22, 1942, #2.

2. Ibid., September 21, 1943, #7.

and start working right now. Under those circumstances, that's the best thing to do. But after the war I expect that something's going to come out of the negotiations between Japan and America. That's why I'm not going out right now.¹

These ideas were rare among Nisei, but they operated to deter Nisei from leaving camp through opposition from their parents.

Seasonal Leave: The second alternative to either remaining in the center or relocating was to leave temporarily on seasonal leave. It was an attractive substitute to relocation in that many of the advantages of the latter could be enjoyed without incurring the disadvantages. While for some it served to encourage later relocation through giving a favorable taste of the outside, on the whole it deterred serious consideration of relocation of many. It was this consideration which led the WRA to restrict seasonal leave gradually in order to encourage permanent relocation. The response to the program, in contrast to relocation, was good. During 1942 the total number of persons on indefinite leave was 866, while during the peak month of October, 8500 were out on seasonal leave. In Tule Lake during the same year 147 had left for indefinite leave, while 920 were out on seasonal leave in October. During the spring of 1943 the rate of relocation picked up. By June 9,589 were out on indefinite leave, while during the peak month of June the number out on seasonal leave was 6,520. The number leaving for seasonal leave kept in step with the number leaving for indefinite leave, as can be seen from the following figures for

1. Sakoda Journal, June 26, 1943, #1.

all ten centers:¹

	<u>Departures</u>		Conversions from Seas. to Indef.
	For Indefinite Leave	For Seasonal Leave	
January	407	133	36
February	369	167	161
March	666	1054	175
April	1908	2145	152
May	2340	2057	207
June	2055	1025	193

The number of conversions from seasonal leave to indefinite leave without returning to the center was relatively small, indicating that most of the seasonal workers returned to the center before relocating.

The seasonal leave arrangement was in several respects highly advantageous. In a sense, it enabled evacuees to enjoy both the advantages of the center and of the outside. Seasonal workers were assured of being able to return to camp as soon as their contract was completed, which was for most a matter of several months. They were assured of retaining the security of the easy life of, and the social life offered by the camp community. They were able to leave their family behind supported by the government and be assured of having their own apartment when they returned. They could work a few months during the harvest season, hibernate in camp during the winter months and possibly leave for seasonal work again in the spring.

Those who found work on the outside unpleasant were especially appreciative of what they termed "the easy camp life."

1. WRA, The Evacuated People, Table 10, p. 30.

Most of the seasonal work was farm work in the intermountain area, and for those who were not accustomed to back-breaking work the life of a farm laborer was not an easy one. A Nisei who received good treatment on the outside, nonetheless wrote:

Even though we are making money out here I kind of miss the easy camp life, my family and my gang.¹

In addition, the living conditions were often poor. The FSA camps were not any better than relocation centers, and the farmer's shack was usually worse. A seasonal worker described one of the latter:

The home where we stayed in an old abandoned farm house surrounded with few poplar trees and weeds. Our first job upon arrival was to set up a small shack over a hole since it was blown down long ago. I doubt whether we have a pane or window intact. Most of windows are covered with boards that our rooms are actually dark in the daylight. No electricity. No chairs, lumbars. We won't have room for them even if we had chairs. No bath, shower except an old wash tub and 30 gallons hot water tank attached to a wood burning stove. We're using pie plates for our dishes, metal tin cups. There is no running watter nor sewage system. It's an abandoned house in every respect. We are now squawking so much that our employer has promised us to be housed in another house which he is now trying to get. If not we're going to walk out. I think it'll be all right in a few days.²

In addition, some of the evacuee workers faced the problem of prejudice against Japanese. Even though many of the Caucasians farmers were anxious to have evacuees as workers, the people in nearby towns sometimes showed hostility toward them. A worker reported:

1. Letter, Nisei to his family. Emet, Idaho, September 27, 1942.
2. Letter, Tom Uyeno to Lily Uyeno, September, 1942. Miyamoto, Tule Lake Report, Chapter VI., pp. 47-8.

Guys around here are pretty prejudiced against Japs. Although we have an 8 o'clock curfew every night except Tuesday when it is 11:00. They slapped a 12 o'clock noon curfew on us for Sunday. We had to eat in town a couple of days and customers didn't like it so we can't even go into a restaurant now. It is pretty bad and most of the fellows wanted to go home, but we all decided to see how it becomes in a week or two. ~~E~~ You wanted the real lowdown and there it is. Let the next bunch know what to expect. Only one night a week in town.¹

Another wrote:

These white guys out here think we're dogs and would never use us unless they needed us bad. There's a curfew from 6 to 8 p.m. except for Thursday and Saturday when the stores are open late and movies are open for us. At the movies we're put in balconies or to one side just like the negroes down South. Guess we'll have to get used to this feeling as it's here for the duration and for years afterwards.²

These reports were corroborated by those from other sources.

A worker from Manzanar reported:

One of the living quarters offered me was a chicken coop, and I didn't work for the farmer.-- When I was taken to the grocery by the farmer to buy provisions, I had to stand in the corner of the store, near the ice box, and look over the whole store. I was not permitted to walk around and select the goods from the shelves. Finding out I needed a cigarette, I walked into a drug store. The druggist asked if I were a Jap. I said "Yes," and he told me to git.³

The tentative conclusions of the Historical Documentarians at Manzanar included the following statements:

About 10 percent "wouldn't go out again under any circumstances," actively advise others that "a Japanese can't get equal treatment."

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1. Letter, Nisei to Frank Smith, Sept. 19, 1942, Weiser, Idaho. J.D. Cook, Reports Officer, Tule Lake, Sept. 18, 1942. Miyamoto Report, p. 45.
 2. Letter, Nisei to a friend. Payette, Idaho. September 22, 1942.
 3. Minutes, National JAACL Conference, Supplement No. 31, p. 3.

The majority feel that "the general American public isn't ready to receive an Oriental U.S. citizen without some display of racial prejudice or discrimination, that wartime relocation is only for those fluent in the English language.

Only a very small percentage, possibly 2 or 3%, returned with enthusiastic reports about "outside relocation"; generally, every furlough worker could relate examples of a "hostile world" on the outside, more than the "fine friends we made" or the "swell treatment we got," although these latter were very numerous.¹

On the other hand, even while retaining the security of the center it was possible for seasonal workers to enjoy certain of the advantages on the outside. These included temporary escape from camp conditions, money-making, and new experiences. The desire for escape from camp conditions was a dominant motive among those who had failed to adjust themselves to camp. We have already seen how many of them sought the solution for their problems in seasonal leave, as well as in relocation. A desire to leave camp is indicated by a Kibei university graduate with a degree in chemistry, who was offered a job as chemical analyst:

The Sloan's Fruit Packing Company in Idaho offered me a job as chemical analyst in their drying plant, and I think I'll accept. I just want to get out. I've been thinking of getting out ever since the evacuation and have been waiting for the chance. I feel I'm wasting my time here; I'm not getting anywhere.²

A Nisei college graduate in agricultural economics who planned to leave for seasonal work declared:

I'm sick of this dump. Everything about it gets me down. When I first came, I thought there was a

1. Togo Tanaka, Joe Masaoka, Historical Documentation, "Effect of Furlough on Evacuee Attitudes toward Permanent 'Outside' Relocation," Manzanar, November 19, 1942.

2. Miyamoto Journal, September 11, 1942. Miyamoto Report, p. 41.

chance of doing something along the line of planning on the farm, but nobody's interested in trying to do anything around here, and the whole farm program is a mess.¹

Among the maladjusted groups there was a noticeable proportion leaving on seasonal work. In spite of the fact that the culturally conservative individuals generally remained in the center in greater proportion than the more assimilated individuals, the Kibei showed a slightly greater proportion of participation in seasonal leave than the Nisei. This can be seen from the accompanying table:

Table
Percentage 17 years and over in
Tule Lake participating in Seasonal
Leave by Generation and Marital Status

	<u>Married</u>	<u>Not Married</u>
Kibei	6.8	24.6
Nisei	2.7	24.0
Issei	3.5	1.3

According to field notes, the Kibei on the warden force came into conflict with Nisei on the force, and as a result many of the Kibei left for the beetfields:

I asked him whether there were many Kibeis on the force. He said there used to be a sizable group of them before and tried to make it tough for the Niseis. The Niseis did not want to take it "on the chin," and as a result of friction, the Kibeis for the most part left for the beet field.²

~~For~~ The small group of Hawaiians from Santa Anita either left for the beetfield, or were making plans to relocate or to

1. Miyamoto Journal, September 1, 1942, Ibid. p. 41
2. Sakoda Journal, November 20, 1942, #2.

transfer to another center:

It was dark and cool outside. Some girls were hurrying home. Some small kids had just finished a game of softball and was giving yells before they broke up. On the other side of the firebreak people were gathered to see a group off to Montana to the sugar beet fields. There were some singing of songs. A group of Hawaiians were singing boisterously in Hawaiian.¹

Several days ago the remnants of the Santa Anita outcasts left for the beetfield. Sabu and a few others expect to join their folks in other centers soon. The rest, May says, are going to try to work their way to a tramp steamer. May was angry because the block manager didn't do anything even when he knew that these boys were leaving. May was willing to go tell them goodbye, and she took along a few people and did so.²

Of the positive incentives to leave the center for seasonal work the possibility of money making was one of the most frequently-mentioned by the workers themselves. One of the handicaps of center life was the low wage scale, and many of the families were using up their savings to add to the comfort of everyday living, especially by buying food to supplement food obtained at the mess hall. By working for several months it was possible to augment the family income sufficiently to make living in the center during the rest of the year fairly comfortable. The need for cash was more acute for those with family responsibilities, and the prospect of marriage or the coming of a baby was a real incentive to go out to seasonal work. Others desired to earn money in order to proceed to college. Still others desired to have money to

1. Sakoda Journal September 15, 1942.
2. Ibid., October 17, 1942.

buy some of the things that they desired over and above the necessities.

The following Nisei looked forward to the prospect of earning some money as well as enjoying the freedom of the outside:

Yeh, I'm going out to the beet fields. I might as well make some money if I can, and a guy has a lot more freedom out there. At least a fellow can go to town once in a while. We're going to get fifty cents an hour, but we're going to have to cook our own meals. There weren't enough fellows in our crew, but this morning we went around to the fire station, my friend and I did, and told the boys that we want them along. They asked us the conditions, so we told them, and twenty of them decided they wanted to go. No I wasn't a fireman, although I almost signed up to become one, but this sugar beet proposition came up, so I changed my mind about joining the fire crew and decided to wait.¹

Another young Nisei was considering his future:

Tom said he was sorry to go, but that he had to think about his future. He is going to work for a while in the beet field and then go on to school to keep up his education. We would have to leave this place sooner or later, and it would be easier if we left earlier.²

A Nisei wrote from Oregon:

We are starting work here tomorrow. Hope I can make a little cash. I put 5 bucks down for an overcoat and bought a new hat. The money I make is going to clothes mostly.³

Another Nisei:

This orchard work is easy and one can make 50¢ an hour easy. The good ones make from \$8 to \$10 per day. Ken and I about \$6.00 so far. We'll be picking prunes the rest of this week and be in the apples next week. I felt sorry for Noji and didn't think he

1. Miyamoto Journal, September 9, 1942, Miyamoto Report, p. 40.
2. Sakoda Journal, September 22, 1942.
3. Letter, Nisei to Frank Smith, September 19, 1942, Weiser, Idaho.

could do much here but here he is picking from 10 to 15 boxes more than the rest of us.¹

Another Nisei began his letter:

Hello. Well, how's everything down there in camp? Is Ben out of hospital yet? I am getting along quite all right. Today is Sunday so we are taking a day off. I am making on the average seven dollars a day picking apples out here. Yesterday I made seven dollars and sixty-three cents. Some days a little below seven dollars. The apples here are very small, otherwise we could pick a lot more. We put in about nine and a half hours of work each day so I am doing better than seventy cents an hour. We get paid seven cents a box. Some of the boys in my group aren't doing nearly as good.²

Along with money-making, new experience on the outside was mentioned most frequently as an incentive to going out on seasonal work. New experience was defined not in terms of what was new to the individual for the first time, but rather what he had experienced on the outside before and was unable to experience in camp. This was generally described in such commonplace terms as eating a decent meal, seeing a movie, enjoying freedom, having fun.

An Issei man, single, about 50 years of age, explained that "he was going just to get some change of atmosphere and that he would be returning shortly."³ A group of boys from a block were described by a block resident as going out to have some fun:

Seven or eight boys from Haruko's block are going out to the sugar beet field. Most of them, she said, are between twenty-six and twenty-eight. They have no parents, although some have brothers and sisters. They want to have some fun outside.⁴

1. Letter, Nisei to a friend, Payette, Idaho, September 22, 1942.
2. Letter, Nisei to his family, Emmet, Idaho, September 27, 1942.
3. Sakoda Journal, September 22, 1942.
4. Ibid., September 10, 1942.

The Relocation Program at Tule Lake
III. Early Resettlement

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Reports from seasonal workers often mentioned the enjoyments of being on the outside. A Nisei wrote:

Certainly was a grand feeling to hit the open road away from Tule. That feeling is well worth a month of hard work. Had a nice trip over on the bus across the Oregon waste land. Wow such desolate country, miles and miles of sage brush and human beings about a 100 miles apart. The beer and the steak dinner we bought certainly hit the spot. Saw our first movie at Nyssa "Take a Letter Darling" with Rosalind Russell and Fred McMurray.¹

Another Nisei reported:

Well, here I am in Idaho. I stayed in Nyssa, Oregon with our crew of twenty in a hotel and had a lot of fun seeing a couple of shows, going bowling and playing pool. It was really a nice town and the people treated us well.²

The above two also reported meeting with unpleasant racial prejudice, indicating that both types of experiences could be combined in an individual. Another Nisei reported pleasant experiences except for the FSA camps filled with other Nisei:

As I said before the people here sure treats us good. They have to in order to keep us here and they got so much work to be done. The secretary of the Chamber of Commerce here and I are very good friends now. He sure treats us good. He took me for a ride and showed me Emmet Valley as it looks. . . . The other night he and I and Jim my boss went to Caldwell a town thirty miles away in another county on a little business errand. . . . We have no curfew on us and can stay out as late as we want. But we are eight miles away from town so that's pretty far. . . . If anybody wants to go out of camp try to stay away from this FSA camp. I've visited two of such camps and all you see is more Japs. Such places they have curfew hours so its not so good. Yoshio Takata is out here not very far. Boy we six young fellows sure can eat and since we are making enough we sure eat good foods too. The atmosphere of being out of camp makes it taste that much better. Our boss wants a family like ours to come here next spring and raise his sugar beets and dried beans for him. . . .³

1. J.D. Cook, Report No. 32, Sept. 18, 1942. Miyamoto Report, Chapter VI, p. 45-6.
2. J.D. Cook, Reports Officer, Tule Lake, September 18, 1942.
3. J.D. Cook, Report No. 32, Sept. 18, 1942, Miyamoto Report, Chapter VI, p. 45.

From the reports it could be seen that the experience on the outside was both favorable and unfavorable. For those who were favorably impressed with the outside seasonal work constituted a factor encouraging permanent relocation. This, however, was often offset by unfavorable experiences, such as racial discrimination and the hard work required on the outside. By and large, seasonal ~~work~~ leave could be considered a substitute for relocation, which tended to delay consideration for permanent relocation. It enabled evacuees to escape temporarily from camp conditions, to earn some pocket money, and to have experiences not possible within the center.

Return to the West Coast: A third and final alternative to relocating in the East or simply remaining in the center was to return to the West Coast. Some of the residents expressed willingness to leave the center provided that they were able to return to their former homes or to the West Coast in general. For many residents relocating in the East was an unnecessary venture with many hazards and few advantages. If they intended to return to the West Coast after the war was over, there was little sense in taking the trouble to establish themselves in a strange community elsewhere. This was especially true of those who had properties on the West Coast to which they intended to return. Many of the Issei had been small businessmen and farmers and did not relish the prospect of venturing into a strange community and working for someone else. This attitude affected the Nisei less than it did the Issei, since most of the Nisei had been employees rather than employers. In

addition, the Nisei were less concerned than the Issei about returning to a Japanese community.

This morning JS talked to Mr. and Mrs. Akahoshi and one young Issei in the block manager's office. Everybody was in good spirit, and no feeling of suspicion existed within the group. JS mentioned that if people would be allowed to go back to Calif. many people would be going out. The rest agreed whole-heartedly, saying that within a short time this camp would be empty. The discussion went on to compare conditions in Calif. and in the Middle West. For one thing, the people did not know what it was like in the Middle West, and were afraid of venturing out. Also, the standard of living there was low in comparison to Calif. In Calif. people were confident of being able to support their families, whereas this could not be assured elsewhere.¹

The Seasonal Factor: Another factor which impeded relocation in 1942 was that few people relocated during the dead of winter even after the rate of relocation increased. During 1943 and 1944 the rate increased steadily from the beginning of the year and reached the peak for the year in the summertime and steadily declined for the balance of the year. In both years the rate of relocation in December was below 10 per cent, while during the peak months it was over 20 per cent of the remaining center population.¹ While the centers did not last^a/sufficient number of years to establish the exact nature of the seasonal trend, it was unmistakable that residents were more reluctant to relocate during the wintertime than during the summertime. Therefore, it was only after the registration crisis, which took place in February, 1943, that more than a handful of evacuees were willing to consider relocation.

1. WRA, The Evacuated People, Table 11, p. 41.

The Relocation Program at Tule Lake

PART IV. REGISTRATION TO SEGREGATION

Introduction

In spite of the numerous factors discouraging relocation, in the spring of 1943 the rate of relocation suddenly increased. This can be seen from Figure _____. This increase in relocation reached its peak in the early summer of the same year and remained the highest monthly departure during 1943 and 1944 prior to the announcement of center closure. This was the result of a combination of factors favoring relocation operating against the factors discouraging relocation, which we have already examined. First, the seasonal trend resulted in low rate of relocation during the winter months and an increasing rate beginning in the spring. Several of the other factors were closely bound up with the registration program, which served to counteract some of the factors discouraging relocation. Briefly summarized, these included the following:

(a) Evacuees were forced to make a decision on the loyalty issue, with which the issue of relocating vs. clinging to the security of the center was closely bound.

(b) The registration issue resulted in a cleavage between those accepting the status of "loyal" and "disloyal," thus breaking some of the influence of the latter group over the former.

(c) This cleavage also resulted in the loss of interest on the part of the "loyal" group in working for the welfare of the

community.

(d) The registration program included the registration of all evacuees over 17 years of age for leave clearance, thus greatly expediting the leave clearance procedure.

Following registration a number of other factors encouraged greater relocation. The WRA provided an increasingly satisfactory service for those desiring relocation. Once the Nisei began to relocate in large numbers they tended to "pull" others out and set the stage for the development of "resettlement fever." The WRA began a serious program of retrenchment within the project, which served to make remaining in the center less satisfactory than before. In line with this policy, restrictions were placed upon seasonal leave. Finally, the segregation program served to consolidate more concretely the cleavage between the "loyal" and the "disloyal" elements of the population.

THE REGISTRATION CRISIS

Introduction

The registration program was basically bound up with the relocation program in at least two respects. First, the WRA pressed the Army to accept Nisei in the armed forces in order to facilitate their acceptance in the general population:

It was the Authority's task "to relocate" Japanese Americans. Such relocation, even if it were a post-war project, would be seriously hindered by a record of non-participation in the armed forces by the Japanese minority group. Aside from this, WRA officials believed the armed force discrimination was a serious factor in lowering evacuee morale, that no aspect of the treatment accorded Japanese Americans cast more doubt on their citizenship status or greater aspersions on their political allegiance, and that phase of the life of the evacuees gave more point to those who argued that the group's lot was with Japan rather than the United States.¹

Secondly, the WRA took the opportunity to register all residents, 17 years and over, at the time the War Department conducted the registration of male citizens only:

When it became known that the War Department would make this registration of draft-age Nisei men, we decided to include in the registration all other adults, age 17 or more, as a means of speeding up our clearance procedure and with the object of providing a pool of workers, available for placement by W.R.A. and the Manpower Commission in private employment including the placement with companies working on war contracts, a matter in which the War Department is especially interested.²

The result was that many of the anxieties of residents concerning relocation became closely bound up with the issues of loyalty and recruitment of volunteers for which the registration was primarily conducted.³

1. Miyamoto, Tule Lake Report, Chapter X, p. 3. Grodzins' statement on WRA's reason for asking for Nisei induction.

2. Ibid., p. 14, Letter from Rowalt to Coverley, February 1, 1943.

3. For a detailed account of the registration program see Spoilage Chapter III, and Miyamoto Report, Chapter X.

The net effect of the registration crisis on the relocation program was to speed up the relocation of one segment of the population, while making it difficult for another segment to relocate. The registration crisis forced many residents to arrive at a decision on the loyalty and security issues, over which many would have preferred to delay a decision. For those who agreed to volunteer for a Nisei combat unit or even to answer "yes" to question 28, the loyalty question, the first step in favor of relocation was taken. For those who refused to register or registered in the negative, the intention of relocating was denied. A split was also created between those who upheld the WRA programs of volunteering, registration in the affirmative, and relocation, and those who opposed these programs. This resulted in loss of interest in community affairs on the part of a good number of individuals, especially among the Nisei. The program also resulted in a number of volunteers for the armed forces, which was one form of relocation. Finally, the registration for leave clearance provided a basis for mass clearance of all adult residents. At the same time many residents who refused to register or registered in the negative were classified as "disloyal" and ineligible for relocation without going through a special clearance process. Finally, on the basis of the registration, those who continued to maintain their disloyalty status were segregated in Tule Lake and became ineligible for relocation for the duration.

The Loyalty-Security Issue

The registration program did not require residents to commit themselves on the relocation issue. The registration for leave clearance was only a step toward clearance and did not involve a statement of intention to relocate. Many residents, however, confused the two issues of loyalty and security (or relocation). Part of this resulted from the fact that the two types of registration were conducted together, part from the suspicion of residents toward the intention of the WRA to force residents out of the centers, and part from lack of proper information concerning the nature of the registration program.

There was abundant evidence of the belief of many residents that the registration program was a means of forcing unwilling residents to relocate. Many considered the declaration of loyalty a preliminary step toward relocation and even a subterfuge to force residents to declare themselves willing to leave the center. A common interpretation of this nature was illustrated by a report of Issei and Kibei views of the registration program before the arrival of the army registration team:

Kazuko related that she hears some Kibeis and Isseis talk about the recent voluntary enlistment which was proclaimed by Secretary of War Stimson. There seems to be suspicion on the part of the Kibeis and Isseis that this enlistment and offer of jobs in war industries was a means of getting people out of the projects. They suspect that there is some ulterior purpose behind the move which would benefit them at the expense of the Japanese people. They also seem to believe that the Niseis are fools to fall for anything like that and volunteer for the U.S. Army. There were grounds for this suspicion because recently the WRA has been trying to do everything it could to get people to resettle, and so far the program has

not been very successful.¹

In Tule Lake the administration and the registration team made little effort to educate the residents properly as to the nature of the registration program. Most of the residents were therefore dissatisfied with the lack of information. Following ward meetings at which residents were read a prepared statement, a Nisei expressed a typical sentiment:

I thought they were going to tell us about the registration today. I didn't learn anything new at the meeting tonight. Suppose the Nisei get inducted into the Army; who's going to take care of the Issei? They're too old to work, at least a lot of them are. I still don't understand why they're having this general registration if all they want are volunteers for the Army. That concerns only a small group. Gee, I wish they'd given us more time to ask questions. A lot of people were grumbling because they didn't find out more of what this is all about. I thought those Army people deliberately tried to avoid answering questions; even if they had to go to another meeting, they could have given a little more time.²

Under these conditions it was easy for residents to develop home-spun theories of the nature of the registration program, and one of the most common was that it was a means of furthering the relocation program against the residents' wishes. An observer at a ward meeting noted:

There was a general dissatisfaction on the part of the Isseis because they were not allowed enough time to understand what the whole thing was about and because there was no room for questions. There was a feeling that the Army was trying to put something over on them. . . .

Another thing that was brought up by a few of the Isseis was that this registration was a means of getting the people out of here. The officer had said that applying for a leave clearance did not mean applying for leave, but many of the people suspected that eventually they

1. Sakoda Journal, February 5, 1943, #4.

2. Miyamoto Notes, February 9, 1943.

would be forced to leave if they signed a leave clearance paper.¹

Questions asked at the ward meeting in Ward II indicated the concern of residents over the necessity of having to fill out a Leave Clearance Form.

Nisei: Does the filling out of questionnaires mean you volunteer for the Army?

Sullivan: No. You fill out another questionnaire for that.

Fagan: It is a leave clearance application.

Nisei: Suppose you do not want to leave?

Sullivan: It is an application for leave clearance, and not an application for leave. Do not get this wrong. If you want to stay in, this questionnaire has nothing to do with it.²

The refusal of the administration to substitute for this form one which did not contain the words "Leave Clearance" only added to the suspicion that the WRA intended to use the form as evidence of intention to relocate.

This suspicion was not a new one, since it was already observed with regard to the relocation program and was similarly expressed as a fear of the outside. The close relationship between the two attitudes could be seen in the following account of an Issei burdened with a feebleminded wife and four little children:

Mr. Tada is a rather poor but intelligent Issei of about fifty-five years. His wife is evidently feebleminded, but they have four little children, the oldest of whom is about twelve and the youngest about six. Although Mr. Tada is generally a rather stable and thoughtful person, he has an exceptional suspicion of the leave clearance form, and in block meetings constantly reverts to the question of whether or not WRA 126-Revised will not be used by the WRA to force people

1. Sakoda Journal, February 10, 1943, #1.

2. Ibid., February 9, 1943, #5. Notes of ward meeting.

out of the centers. He was not a successful farmer before the war, and the family finances are clearly in a bad state. Despite his wife's incapacity for taking care of the family, Mr. Tada went out to do beet sugar work for a couple of months, evidently to improve their depleted income. The fear of having to support this family again on the outside apparently weighs heavily on his mind, and he is strongly against signing the leave clearance application because of his suspicion that the WRA intends to force the people out through this registration.¹

Another issue which was confused with the loyalty issue was that of volunteering of indicating willingness to be drafted. The Japanese were no different from the general American population in not wanting to be sent to the front or have this happen to a member of the family. Prior to evacuation the Japanese had acceded to the draft without protest. At the time of registration, however, the possibility of being drafted or of volunteering appeared as a choice. Actually the loyalty question and that of volunteering were separate issues, but being presented at the same time were confused by evacuees. On this basis many Nisei and their parents, who believed that the preservation of life was more important than any other single consideration, were opposed to Nisei answering the loyalty question in the affirmative as well as to volunteering. As argument in their favor, they pointed to discrimination, abrogation of civil rights, and the lack of a bright future in the United States for the Japanese. An Issei expressed this opinion succinctly when he stated that the issue was one of preservation of life or preservation of a worthless citizenship:

1. Miyamoto Report, Chapter X, pp. 66-67.

IV.

Some Nisei are absolutely baka (fools). The question in this issue is whether one wants to preserve his life, or whether he wants to preserve a worthless citizenship. Any "punkinhead" should know the answer to that one.¹

Fear of the draft was indicated by a young Nisei who decided that he desired to stay in this country and was one of the few from his block who registered on the first day of registration, but who hesitated to answer in the affirmative to the loyalty question for fear of being sent out to the front. An observer learned from his mother:

Seiko, their high school age daughter has consented to return to Japan with them (if necessary), but Ziggy, the older son, has refused to say that he would return to Japan. He says that he will marry in America and stay over here. He was one of the few that registered, and Mrs. A. remarked that people looked at him with suspicion. He has not answered yes or no to 27 or 28, but was contemplating answering no to 27 and possibly giving a vague answer for 28. Ziggy's main fear seems to be that of going to battle and dying, and wants to avoid it if possible.²

Here again was an attitude which was observed earlier as fear of the draft, and which continued to operate to discourage consideration of relocation.

For many, registration resulted in some sort of decision upon the interlocking issues of loyalty, draft, and relocation. These decisions were made in an atmosphere of familial and communal pressures, confusion and emotional strain, and some later reversed their stands. To the extent that evacuees faced these issues and were forced to make some decision resulted in more clearcut decisions later. On the one hand, one group was

1. Miyamoto Report, Chapter X, p. 75.

2. Sakoda Journal, February 18, 1943, #6. (Akahoshis.)

more ready to relocate, and on the other hand the opposing group was more ready to remain in the center or be segregated. To the extent that an unexpectedly large number were classified as "disloyal" as a result of registration the long-run relocation possibilities were reduced. In Tule Lake the number of "disloyals" above 17 years of age was 42 per cent, while in all other centers it was on the average 10 per cent, with a range of 2 to 26 per cent.¹

Development of Cleavages

One of the results of the registration program was the development of a cleavage between those who favored registration in the affirmative and those who were opposed to it. This cleavage was not unlike the cleavage that was already examined between those who were highly assimilated and those who were not. The principal difference was that the issues of registration aroused more intense feelings and involved a greater portion of the population than did the problems of settling down within the camp. The number of persons who were maladjusted within the center due to cultural deviation from the majority group was relatively small, while those who were alienated during the registration program for supporting it was fairly large. Practically all of those who were known to be culturally deviant were ostracized to a greater extent than before during registration, and to this group could be added many others who had formerly made good adjustments among the colonists.

1. Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, p. 62, Chart II.

together and seek security through closer association among themselves. The net result was that this group was freed to a great extent from pressures from the opposing group.

Of those in the culturally deviant group practically all of them were denounced as inu within their block. Kazuko was in one of the few families in the block in Ward V which held out in favor of registration:

During the registration crisis in February and March, when the inu hunt by evacuees reached its greatest intensity, Kazuko was singled out in her block for widespread denunciation. She lived in Ward V, where opposition to registration was overwhelming, and her family was one of the three in the block which refused to accept the block decision not to register. She was greatly frightened by the possibility of bodily harm, and burned her diary for self-protection.¹

Mess hall workers in her block told her that if the block had tables for family groups they would have refused to serve her family, as was done in a nearby block to some families which had registered. It was also rumored that she had volunteered for the WAC. She thought of moving to another block, but decided that this would only serve to confirm the suspicions of the block people. She stayed home at night to avoid trouble. On the other hand, she received sympathy from Caucasians, who told her that if her block refused to serve her, food would not be sent to the block, and she herself would be served elsewhere.²

Eventually the majority of the residents registered, and Kazuko showed little physical effects of the strain suffered during the crisis. But she was now more definitely embittered against the rest of the evacuees, by whom she thought she had been poorly treated. She reported that the block people were trying to be nice to her because they wanted her to get some things for them, such as building material and the use of trucks. She declared that she was not going to make a sucker of herself by doing anything for the people, and laughed at their predicament. She was

1. Sakoda Journal, March 1, 1943, #7.

2. Ibid., March 5, 1943, #5.

amused that her boss had also taken the same attitude toward evacuees ever since registration. When the Floral Arts Department sent in a request for an alcove for an exhibition to take place in a few days, she ignored it. When asked why she did such a thing, she retorted that the people had treated her badly and she was not going to do anything for them.¹

Research workers of the study felt a necessity either for concealing the real purpose of their presence in the center or else of giving an explanation of their work which would not arouse excessive suspicion. By and large their work was carried on in secrecy, and, while they were conscious of some cleavage from the majority of the residents, this did not hinder greatly the collection of data. At the time of the registration crisis, however, research workers were under great suspicion. Not only had their past activities aroused some suspicion, but they also supported the registration program. Several of the more assimilated research workers feared bodily harm during the height of the crisis:

Michi went to bed with much of her clothing on in anticipation of our escape if anything should happen. The plan was to jump out of the rear window, if the opportunity permitted, and run across the firebreak toward the Billigs. Frankly, I didn't think much of the idea, however, for the firebreak is wide and dark, and Michi could not run fast enough to stay ahead of any "toughs." I felt that in the event of a real attack, I would have to fight it out, and while I felt some little fear, yet I waited with a little anticipation of a possible fight.²

Fearful that the field material that they had gathered would be discovered and considered incriminating evidence of being paid agents of some sort, they hid them first in their own apartment and later took them to the apartment of a Caucasian

1. Appendix to Maladjustment Section, pp.
2. Miyamoto Field Notes, February 22, 1943.

field worker. Under these conditions prospects for further field work in the center appeared poor, and several of the field workers left the center before they had anticipated, and participated in the study of resettlers.

Things looked as dark this afternoon as it's ever looked before. It seems now that our research is washed up, for martial law seems bound to come sooner or later. Moreover, the registration issue has forced the division of the population into those who intend to remain in this country in post-war years against those intending to go to Japan.¹

A research worker who had made a fair degree of adjustment to camp life found himself denounced as an inu during the registration crisis. He lived in a block largely inhabited by rural people from the Delta Area near Sacramento, who were culturally very conservative as a group. Prior to registration he had been selected as co-op representative from the block and was given some recognition. At one of the first meetings of the block residents to discuss the registration issue he was called upon for an opinion. Abandoning the role of a disinterested research worker, he gave his frank opinion, which amounted to the support of the registration program.

The opinion of the Niseis were next asked. Mr. Yamamoto, a Kibei with a normal school education in Japan, said that it was natural for Kibei to be loyal to Japan since they had been mistreated here. No one else had an opinion to offer, and the chairman called upon JS to give his point of view. He got up and spoke in English, saying that the time had come for Niseis to get off the fence and make up their mind on which side they stood. If they intended to return to Japan and live there, then it would not matter too much if they answered no to the matter of loyalty. On the other hand, if

1. Miyamoto Field Notes, February 22, 1943. For a more complete write-up see Appendix to Maladjustment Section, pp.

they intended to stay here, then they had to think about the matter more carefully. He pointed out that loyalty to one's country was an important thing, and Niseis had only one citizenship. In his talk, which was entirely unprepared but well-thought over in advance, he pointed out that according to the Japanese loyalty was an important thing and it should not be given up easily. He brought up the example of the wife who left her home and went into her husband's family and was expected to stay by her husband even if there are strains between the two families. He also stated that he himself had told people in Japan that he would be loyal to the U.S. because he was a Japanese and was taught to be loyal. He also hinted that Niseis can not be sure of a welcome in Japan. He stressed the fact that the problem was an individual one and each one should make up his own mind.

After he finished speaking there was a great silence. Clearly the large majority of the audience did not agree with him. Then one young Nisei about 19 or 20 got up and said that he was against serving in the Army because the treatment of the Japanese in the Army was going to be discriminatory. Another said that he was against serving because Niseis had no rights at the present time, anyway. Mr. Y. said that JS was not accepted in Japan because he did not try, hinting that he could not speak any Japanese. He felt sure that Niseis would be welcome in Japan. Tanabe sneered that those who could not be assimilated in a country was at fault themselves. Others got up and favored the Niseis putting down no. . . . There was a great applause by Isseis and Niseis and Kibeis whenever some one made a remark in favor of such an idea.¹

At another block meeting the same research worker attempted to prevent a vote on whether the block residents should register or not, but failed. Since voting was done on ballots and the situation seemed hopeless he handed in a blank paper, while 68 others voted in the affirmative not to register. One Kibei fellow said loud enough for the benefit of the research worker who sat close by that there was only one "dumb" fellow in the block who would be willing to register in the affirmative.²

In spite of the block decision, the research worker, his brother

1. Sakoda Journal, February 11, 1943, #3.

2. Ibid., February 14, 1943, #1.

and sister registered in the affirmative, thus going against a block decision. His family was virtually ostracized from the block, and block residents generally shunned them during the ensuing weeks.

Following the Block 42 incident, in which some boys were picked up for refusing to register and following which suspected agitators were also apprehended, suspicion and antagonism of persons suspected of being inu reached its climax. During this period the research worker stopped attending block meetings. After a ward meeting at which he took some notes, some young Nisei fellows approached him and took his notes away from him. When some Kibei were picked up in Ward V to be taken to the isolation camp nearby for refusing to register, they marched in a military fashion to the administrative section, where they were first questioned. A crowd of people cheered the group of boys and followed them to the administration area. The research worker, who was in the crowd, was seized by an Issei he did not know and, in a threatening manner, was accused of being an inu:

One Issei man spied JS and demanded to know what he was doing around here. JS replied that he was just watching. The man grabbed his mackinaw and told him to watch out, going around acting like an inu. JS replied that he was not an inu, and the man flared up again. His friend stopped him, saying that there would be a time when things would be found out. Someone demanded to know who he was. Another wanted to know whether he was a \$150 inu. JS drifted away, thinking that it was better to avoid trouble.¹

1. Sakoda Journal, March 5, 1943, #8.

It was not until the block residents reversed their decision and agreed to register that antagonism in his own block toward the research worker was reduced.

Koso Takemoto, as a councilman, attempted to reconcile the Issei and Nisei points of view, and consequently was respected by the Issei. His usefulness in the co-op, for instance, was his ability to speak Japanese well and to deal with Issei in their own language and way. During registration, however, he came to a parting of the ways with the negativistic elements of the block population. Along with many of the Nisei in leadership positions, he supported the registration program. As a result, he was in fear of bodily harm for a period. Following registration he felt it was meaningless to work hard for the people and decided to prepare for relocation.

Koso expects a visitation tonight from the Kibei. Since moving to block 41 after his marriage, the block people had been talking of holding a meeting to discuss the registration issue. The effort was to get a general block decision not to register. Koso got together with three Kibei and the block manager and explained to them what the registration meant and why it was dangerous and unwise to oppose the registration. In fact, he talked so convincingly that the Kibei completely changed their view of the registration issue, saying that the proposition had not been put to them in that way before.¹

Koso was a councilman when the registration issue came up. In his own block he called a meeting together and got everyone's consent to go and register. At the Ward III meeting held in Block 32, there were Isseis and Niseis in the hall. He got one of his block residents, an Issei, to make a suggestion that since this matter concerned the Niseis, the Niseis should hold a meeting of their own. Consequently late that night a separate meeting was held. At this meeting he held out

1. Miyamoto Field Notes, February 23, 1943.

for registration. He also told Kibeis who were trying to disturb the meeting that it was none of their business because this was a Nisei meeting. Consequently, when he went home he had to be escorted. After moving to Block 41 he made the suggestion that people should register. Here he was not so popular, and his life was in danger, and for 5 days five wardens guarded his place, while at night a warden patrol car came by about every 10 minutes. Nothing happened ever since, but he is no longer the popular councilman that he used to be. He still has the confidence of some Isseis yet, and he has been consulted on some matters.

The whole matter of helping the people now seems meaningless to him, and he says that it is better to devote his time for preparation to go out. For the third time he handed in his resignation to the co-op because he wanted to stay home and study.¹

Prior to registration the unpopularity of the JACL leaders did not prevent them from living in the community and holding leadership positions. The action of the JACL at their conference in Salt Lake City, at which they passed a resolution favoring reclassification of persons of Japanese ancestry under Selective Service regulations, received little attention in the center until the registration crisis. At a JACL meeting on February 3, 1943, suspicion against the JACL was indicated by a Nisei who asked Tsukamoto to clarify the rumor that the JACL had asked for voluntary induction. Tsukamoto replied that the JACL had only asked for restitution of Selective Service since the majority of the evacuees registered themselves as being opposed to volunteering:

We asked the members whether they would prefer voluntary induction or they would prefer involuntary induction. There were very few voluntary requests. The overwhelming majority was in favor of induction under the Selective Service. The Council canvassed the blocks and I took the minutes. The sentiments in

1. Sakoda Journal, March 23, 1943, #2.

other centers were identical. Therefore, the JACL requested the War Department to open the door for entrance into the Army on a selective service basis and we also opposed a separate Nisei division. (He reads the official resolution.)¹

At the same meeting, however, Tsukamoto stated that the JACL members should be proud of the formation of the Nisei combat unit since they had a hand in bringing it about:

JACL members should feel a little bit better than other Nisei who are not members, because they have helped to bring this about. You may only have contributed \$2 or so, it made it possible to maintain our offices in various cities. These things we have done, and certainly as insignificant as it may seem today, it has had a definite bearing on the recognition of Nisei citizenship rights. I defy any one to show me where the JACL has fallen down in any respect. . . .²

Rumors to the effect that the JACL was responsible for the registration issue spread throughout camp and its leaders were among the most conspicuous targets of inu accusations.

The Isseis and probably Kibeis have been angry because the JACL has asked for Nisei induction into the Army. . . . The rumor spread that the JACL had asked for such an induction. The JACL leaders now seem to claim that they did not ask for it. Probably this, too, is a false statement, because Walter announced at the JACL meeting that they had asked for classification on the same basis as other Americans. . . . The people have been angered, and there are already traces of possible violence. A knife is reported to have been found on Walter's door the other day. . . . Walter is said to have asked a warden for protection in going home from a meeting of some sort. The warden, probably an Issei, is said to have told him "nothing doing."³

Three of the top JACL leaders were called in for questioning by the Planning Board, which attempted to find out whether

1. Sakoda Journal, February 3, 1943, #2. Notes of JACL meeting.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., February 11, 1943, #6.

the rumors were true. At one meeting Yego was advised by friends to leave because some persons were after JACL leaders:

Just before the meeting started, Councilman Tom Yego, a JACL leader and close associate of Walter Tsukamoto, was called outside, and did not return to the meeting. It was later learned that some of his friends had advised him to leave the meeting and make no appearances in public because it was known that some persons were out "to get Yego and other JACL leaders." His departure was quiet and went unnoticed in the flurry of preparation for the meeting.¹

During the crisis Tsukamoto left the project with his family for fear of physical violence.

To the highly assimilated group of Nisei could be added others who were less deviant from the majority of Nisei, but who broke away sharply from the more negativistic elements on the registration issue. A typical example of a Nisei leader who fell into this category was Noboru Honda from Marysville. Noboru lost his parents when he was rather young, and he had to work hard to support the family. The Japanese in the community respected him for what he did. When the war broke out he was offered the position of executive secretary of the JACL, a capacity in which he felt that he served the people well. When he came to the project he was asked to be block manager, a position he filled to the satisfaction of most of the residents, and he earned the reputation of heading the best-managed block on the project. At the time of the Theater Project and Overseas Broadcast Issue he realized that there was no use in bucking the people because "old dogs could not be taught new tricks,"

1. Miyamoto Report, Chapter X, p. 34.

and handled the matter in such a manner that he still maintained the respect of the residents in the block. During the registration crisis, however, through no fault of his own, he became suspected of being an inu, which resulted in disillusionment about serving the people in a leadership capacity:

When registration was to begin, he was asked to do the interpreting in his block the first night. However, he had to attend a meeting of the co-op, and since Corky (Kawasaki) insisted that he attend the meeting, he did not go to the block meeting. Thus, he did not have to express his opinion in his block on the registration matter. The following day or so he had to leave for Salt Lake City to attend the conference of representatives from co-op from other centers, and he was away for 10 days or so. He was so busy during that time, he said, that he did not really enjoy his going out. When he came back he expected that the registration would be over, but to his surprise he found that the following day the boys from Block 42 were taken. He was already under suspicion in his block when he came back from the conference, even though he had gone on business for the co-op. He was careful not to attend any meeting. Orders came out the following day for everyone to stay at home and not leave the block. Consequently he could not go to work. People from the office came to see him, which probably increased suspicion. Don (Elberson) then drove up in his car to pay a visit, and Noboru and his wife were probably very much scared. His wife said that "she was never so scared in her life."

The block manager and two men, who were troublesome in the block, were picked up by the FBI early in the week. The block manager came back after being questioned, but the two men did not. A council of the leaders in the block was held. It was decided that there must be an informer within the block because just the right persons were taken. Suspicion immediately fell on Noboru. After that people refused to talk to him. Only his former secretary kept him informed of the opinion some of the people in the block held of him. There were two women especially, he said, that avoided him. Once he was walking along the road with Yoshimi Shibata and two fellows came by and started to talk about how there was an inu in the block whom they had to get rid of. Only one man is said to have stood up for him as not being an informer. The rest of the people just shunned him. Noboru felt at that time how useless it was to do anything for people. Here he had done nothing that was really suspicious and only suspected on circumstantial evidence. He said he felt bad because not even one person was willing

to come to him and give him advice, much less to stand up for him.

Noboru's stand toward registration had been clear from the very beginning. He had several brothers in the Army, and felt that he had to stand by them. Consequently he made it clear that he was going to register. This was probably the reason why he was suspected. When the time came to register, he did so with about 6 other boys in the block.

For the next several weeks things dragged on. Recently there was a mess trouble and it was decided that several waitresses would be discharged. Suspicion was then transferred to these people, and suspicion toward Noboru was reduced. People were courteous to them more and more, and they were well-treated in the mess hall. A few people, however, continued to refuse to speak to him, even though he had done favors for them before.

Noboru is still careful not to do or say anything that would put him under suspicion. He has come to feel that there is no use in doing anything for the people because they can forget so easily the favors that you did for them. However, he says that he does not regret at all the fact that he did do the tasks that he did because he learned a great many things. . . . He now plans to go to Rochdale to pick up some training and continue to keep studying even though he gets a job so that he can have a school record. One field that he feels that he could try for was accounting. He says that he is not hoping for a good job because he has not the qualification. If he does find a job, however, he feels that he owes nothing to the people.¹

At first he thought that Don's offer was a chance to go through Rochdale and get a job in a co-op was good. After all, he did not have much of an education. But in the meantime he was offered a job by WRA to be a public relations man on the outside at over \$200 a month. He feels that he should consider that job very seriously unless Don can offer him something comparable. Don has pointed out that the co-op would be a means by which he can help the people, that there would be less race prejudice, and hence his job would be relatively secure. Noboru's answer has been that when the war was over soldiers are going to come back, and Japanese are not going to be allowed stay in jobs as long as soldiers ~~are going to come back~~ and remain unemployed. He feels that if he gets the other job it is more likely to be

1. Sakoda Journal, March 23, 1943, #3.

temporary than the co-op job, but at least he will have a chance to save some money. He does not want to be persuaded by Don at this time and then feel sorry for it the rest of his life. About helping the Japanese people he said that 5 months ago he would probably have been swayed by that argument, but since the registration he feels differently. While he's taken a beating all along by thinking about the people, at the time of the registration he came to realize that he will have to watch out for himself, too. He says that if he watches out for himself, he will be of help to the people to that extent. Of course, he won't do anything which will be detrimental to the Japanese people.¹

Another example of an individual who broke away from his family and block residents for supporting registration was J. Matsuda, an educated Kibei. The research worker above became friends with him, partly through the fact that they both shared the same stand on the registration issue.

Norman Koyama's successor (adult education teacher) came around today to see Ruby about the locks. JS was typing a letter and was not paying particular attention to him. Somehow a conversation was started, however, and Matsuda mentioned that he was no longer popular in his block. JS said that he was in the same fix in his block. Matsuda went on to recount his position in his block.

Up to the time of the registration he was the leader in his block, attending meetings, making suggestions. He was in a position where most of the block people looked up to him, and treated him with respect. When the registration came up, people looked to him for leadership. He maintained a calm attitude toward the issue, and thought that it would be best if people went and registered, too. Thus he made himself a marked man, a leader of the opposition. At present, he says that hardly any one in the block speaks to him. The fact that he lives in Block 40, which is in the Ward that has had the most trouble makes him more liable to such treatment. He says that he goes to the mess hall, eats silently, without talking to any one. Formerly he had many friends in the block--now he has practically none. One good family friend even told him not to come to see them.

1. Sakoda Journal, April 7, 1943, #1.

He was working in the Adult Education Department, teaching mathematics. Evidently he enjoyed his work and working for the people, but now he wants to get out of here as fast as he can. His attitude toward the other Japanese here is typical of those who stood up for registration. He says that the people are ignorant. . . .

He saw a mandolin in the room, and asked if it would be all right if he came over to play with us.¹

The registration crisis had caused a split not only with block residents but also with his family:

My old man (oyaji) told me not to register at the time of registration. I felt that I couldn't do that because I was afraid of what would happen to me if I didn't. Consequently, I decided to register. Then he threatened to disown me if I answered "yes" to Question 28. The rest of the family took out repatriation papers, except me. I was determined not to do anything of the sort. Since we lived in Block 41, where sentiment against those registering was very heated, I was put in a very bad spot. My folks were worried about what the block people would say to them if they had a son who went to register. I told my folks that I would go elsewhere to live for a little while to make it easier for them. Consequently, I moved to Ward VI for a couple of weeks. People thought that I had left my family, and it was rumored by my friends in Ward IV that I had been disowned. I answered "no" to Question 28, and then came home again. Later I had my answer changed from "no" to "yes."

I care for my folks, but I couldn't go along with them because I felt that future was at stake. And I knew they were ignorant and didn't know what they were doing. People in the block began to say that education didn't do anyone any good. One Kibei said: "I'm glad that I quit going to school early. At least the people have some respect for me now."

If there's going to be a split in my family I can't help it. I can't go along with them now because my whole future is at stake. I want to do the things that I should be doing. I should have gone out long ago when I had job offers, not exactly what I wanted, but something I could have done.²

Matsuda is a Kibei, but who has received a college education and technical training in the field of aeronautics in America. He had intended to return to Japan

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1. Sakoda Journal, March 17, 1943, #1.
 2. Ibid., July 21, 1943, #4.

prior to the outbreak of the war, but with that possibility out of the question at the present, he wants to go out to work to make a place for himself. At the time of registration he favored it, along with a great many others who had foresight and education. Until then he was respected in his block as a leader of the young people, but after that he was considered an inu, and lost most of his friends. His father threatened to disown him if he dared answer "yes" to Question 28, and consequently when he did register, he registered "no." Because he had an offer of a job to design machine tools, he tried to change his answer immediately, but was not successful. Having been alienated from the block people, the majority of whom were on the other side of the fence from him (Block 41 in Ward V), he no longer feels a strong tie with the people that surround him.

Matsuda's family is a very conservative one. His sister is a Kibei just like himself. His parents were very strict about the way he was brought up, and even now Matsuda cannot reveal to his parents that he goes to dances on rare occasions. His father seems to be especially hard-headed, perhaps typical of farmers from the hills of Placer County. His mother sees his point of view, but his father only holds to his own. Matsuda once mentioned that he wanted to go out to work, and his father wanted to know what sort of work he was going to do. When he heard that it was a job as a "machinist," he exploded and declared that people even objected to those going out to do farm work. A machinist would be helping the American war effort, which would be a treachery toward Japan. Matsuda's father believes that Japan is going to win the war soon and that there is no hope for Japanese in America. He's already sent some money back to Japan, and took out repatriation papers for everyone in the family except Matsuda. The latter thought that there would not be much of a chance for himself in Japan at the present time. The split during registration was settled quietly, and he received his clearance he would have slipped quietly off to work. Segregation, however, has brought the split out into the open again.

Being repatriates, the rest of Matsuda's family (except for a younger brother in college) has to remain in Tule Lake. They have no intentions of ever changing their status. The father insists strongly that Matsuda stay with them. His argument is that he's the eldest in the family, and it is his duty to go back with them to Japan. Matsuda does not want to be tied up in a "disloyal" center, where his future will be ruined. He knows that the war may last a long time and that Japan may lose the war. He feels that if he goes out to work now, he can gain valuable experience, make some money, and make a place for himself some place. If he is in a war industry, he feels that he can get draft deferment. His parents are afraid that if

he goes out he may be drafted, but evidently they don't trust the possibility of being deferred. His mother sees his point of view, and does not object so strongly to his leaving for another center. Matsuda feels the inevitability of a split between himself and his father. The only thing now is for him to leave without causing too much hard feeling between himself and his father. He felt that it was useless to try to argue with him logically, because their points of view and facts were entirely different. He thought that perhaps the best thing for him to do was to keep as quiet about the matter as possible, and quietly leave when the time came.¹

A case of a Nisei splitting away from his family:

JS talked to George as they were drinking soda pops just outside of Canteen One. They had both worked in the Records Office last year and were on speaking terms. JS mentioned the split that had been formed in the community ~~because~~ because of the registration. George said that there was a split in his family. He lives in Block 12, one of the "bad" blocks in Ward IV along with Blocks 11, 19, 20. He did not say how bad the family split was, but now he wants to go out of the camp.²

Shizuko was "Japanesy" in comparison with her sister, Mieko (Mike), who was Americanized. Shizuko often spoke in Japanese and was an expert in Japanese dancing. At one time she had thought of returning to Japan to live, but at the time of registration she sided with her sister. The family was the object of resentment in the block for taking a pro-registration stand, and it was considering relocation.

Shizuko is the "Japanesy" one in the family and had once asked for repatriation (to Japan). It is difficult to say what changed her mind about wanting to go back to Japan and made her stick with Mike (her sister) on this registration issue. She believes that the Kibeis are behaving very foolish and acting very queer. . . . The block people were allowed to register if they so pleased. Mike and Shizuko seem to have gone in the morning when their day to register came. Some one from the block was out there to watch the people register, and demanded of the girls why they had to rush about the

1. Sakoda Journal, August 6, 1943, #4.
2. Ibid., March 19, 1943, #2.

registration . . . Shizuko says that after the war is over she is going over for a visit. The family is now willing to go out to work instead of staying in a place of this sort. The only thing they are afraid of it that they may not be able to find work which will enable them to get along on the outside.¹

A number of families found it necessary to move to another block in order to avoid the antagonism of the negativistic elements in the block. This was especially true of those who favored registration and lived in Ward V or one of the other blocks in which strong opposition to registration developed. Herk Nishimoto had moved from Block 23 to Block 71, which was populated with people from the Northwest.

Herk lived in Block 23, but moved out during the heat of the registration because of the antagonism he created. Evidently there were a group of Kibeis in his block who were active in opposing the registration. Herk was called into several meetings, which he tried to avoid by staying away from home. He finally moved out to Block 71, where he had to ask the permission of the Advisory Board of the block before they did allow him to move. Herk evidently is a "yes, yes" man. He is extremely indignant of the stand taken by many against the registration. He has only contempt for the Niseis who could not make up their mind: "When a fellow becomes 20 and cannot make up his own mind, he is no good. Some of the Niseis were older than I was, but could not decide for themselves. I know some who are mad like heck now because their parents made them answer "No, no." And a lot of them are now beginning to change their answers. I would not be afraid of standing the chance of being drafted."²

This cleavage between the two factions resulted in greater solidarity within each faction. This was especially true of those who were denounced as inu and were a persecuted minority during the crisis. There was a definite tendency for such individuals

1. Sakoda Journal, March 7, 1943, #3. (Imbe family)

2. Ibid., April 24, 1943, #1.

to seek out the friendship of others who had been similarly stigmatized. One of the research workers found that while he was virtually cut off for a while from most of the people in his own block, those who had upheld the registration program and had been denounced as inu were much more cordial to him than before. Following the registration crisis he was able to make contacts with a number of new informants. This was shown by his relationship with such individuals as Jim Matsuda, Noboru Honda, Harry Mayeda, and Tom Uyeno, an educated Kibei:

JS ~~for~~ first met Tom through F.M. and knew him only casually. Since registration, however, they found themselves on the same side of the fence, and Tom was willing to help JS with his thesis material. When F.M. left the project JS approached him about an interview, which Tom was willing to grant. They collaborated, also, in helping Miss Rose define a Kibei.¹

This phenomenon was also observed among a group of Issei women in an Adult English class who lived in Ward V.

Inu Get-Together: This is a peculiar title for a paragraph, but it is rather descriptive. Ruby has several (Issei) students in her English class with whom she gets along well, especially since the registration. Today she arranged for a little get-together to discuss religion. Those invited were Mrs. Yoshikawa, Mrs. Shibata and Mrs. Yano, all from Block 47 (the majority of the residents of which few signified willingness to register). . . . Mrs. Y. was the first one to show up, and she was a little late. She said that she had waited till the block people had gone into the mess hall before she started out.

The interesting thing about the group that gathered was that all of them agreed on their stand on the registration, and that on the ground that to be a loyal American was to be a good Japanese. They were able to discuss things which they were not able to say on the outside to just anybody. The other interesting thing was that the level of intelligence and interest of the group

1. Sakoda Journal, April 7, 1943, #3.

seemed to be higher than that of other Japanese people in America. . . . The group evidently did not feel very bitter toward the American government for being put in a place like this. They said that there were many things that they had to be thankful for because they were being provided with things that many of the people were not getting even on the outside. . . . There was a definite tendency on the part of the group to consider the "mass" of people as being rather ignorant. . . . Mrs. S. said that their future could not be left in the hands of these people. There were talks that when the leaders left the camp, as they seemed to be doing at present, that only the scums would be left behind.¹

Of all the different Nisei groups, the Hawaiians appeared to be the most consistently loyal group. Nisei leaders approached them for aid in warding off the violence from Kibei elements, such as when the Cal Club organized a Hawaiian goon squad when it put on an entertainment and they were warned by a Kibei group that there would be trouble if they carried through their plans. The registration definitely brought the Hawaiians closer to the pro-registration group of Nisei. Individual Nisei found the protection of the Hawaiians comforting:

The registration has certainly caused curious friendships and also unfortunate splits in others. The position of the Hawaiians has improved because they have been able to align themselves with the people who desired to register, who were also in the minority. The fact that the Hawaiians afforded protection against Kibeis who were prone to be violent, gave them an added value in time of crisis. . . .

M.I. says that the Hawaiians in her block (71), have been coming around to sit around in her apartment and play the uke at night. They also go around to protect her because she is one of those that have registered and being looked upon with suspicion by some people in the block. She has found one Hawaiian boy who is arty and who reads serious books. She was surprised, she said, because she always thought that all of the boys were the kind that did not go for any intellectual interests at all.²

1. Sakoda Journal, March 14, 1943, #5.
2. Ibid., March 2, 1943, #3.

2 The development of cleavages within families and block residents did not imply that familial and community pressures were not operative. On the contrary, they operated more strongly during the registration crisis than before or after. Many Nisei, for instance, were virtually forced to refrain from registering because of family and block pressures:

Mary was crying in the office today. She says she doesn't want to go to Japan, but her parents are insisting that she answer "No" and eventually repatriate. It seems her folks are afraid her brother will be drafted. Mary says she wants to stay in this country even if she's here alone, but her parents won't hear of it. She doesn't know what to do, and goes about her work all day with that worried and tense look. For a while she kept saying she was going to register Yes in spite of her family, but I guess her folks are putting on a lot of pressure and she's afraid now that she'll have to agree with them. She's such a nice girl, too, it's a shame her parents aren't more sympathetic to her point of view.¹

(Ted Tokuno): Up till the time the soldiers came and took the boys in Block 42 who did not register, there was no open coercion of people into not registering. Soon after, however, one block called a meeting and asked all those concerned to sign a paper saying that they would not register or get out of the block. Ted lived in that block and unwillingly signed the paper. . . . He really wanted to register because he could see no advantage in not registering. . . . His reason for signing the paper was that he had to think of his family, because if he left the block because he did not want to sign the paper his family would have been discriminated. If he were independent, and his family were living in some other center, it would have been all right, he said. He saw the prospect of being picked up by the soldiers, and being sent off to jail, and did not like it at all, but he felt helpless to do anything about the matter. He was determined to keep the matter a secret because if it ever got out that he had told and it had reached the ears of the administration, he knew that he would be considered an inu.²

1. Miyamoto Report, Chapter X, pp. 71-71a.
2. Sakoda Journal, February 22, 1943, #1.

Where the cleavage did appear, however, the break was usually a sharp one, which precluded communication between the two factions. One obvious result was that persons in one faction ceased to have much influence in the other. Nisei leaders denounced as inu, for instance, lost their leadership status among the negativistic group. Likewise, familial and communal pressures lost their effectiveness on those who had been virtually ostracized. On the other hand, the in-group solidarity of each faction, especially of the pro-registration group, was strengthened. They tended to reinforce each other's notion of relocation.

Loss of Interest in Community Life

We have already indicated how preoccupation with community life discouraged relocation. For many of those who supported the registration program, the crisis resulted in a loss of interest in the community and a desire to seek their fortune outside of the center. This was directly related to the inability to see eye-to-eye with those in the opposing faction, just as the more assimilated evacuees had been unable to accept gracefully the culturally conservative ways of the majority of the residents. This could be seen, for instance, in the manner in which leaders in the block or in the project lost interest in their work following accusation of being inu. It could also be seen in the frequent mention of relocation plans or desire to get away from the camp when recounting experiences during the registration crisis.

Riley's experience during registration was typical of many Nisei, who had made a partial adjustment to camp life:

The registration, however, put a bombshell under me and made me think that I should get busy and do something. Nothing was working out very well--the museum, for instance. I felt that I should go out. The place was losing its value photographically. I wanted to go out and do a story on resettlement, because that was the next story. Since I missed the life of the Japanese, and the relocation center, I felt that the only alternative was to shoot a documentary on the outside. Consequently, that was more or less of a reason to go out in a hurry. So I made plans to go out. I was disgusted with a year of this place. I didn't write any more after a while. As long as you're uneasy about a lot of things you can write, but as soon as you have a slight satisfaction with the rest of the people you don't care any more.¹

Art Morimitsu was about 30 years of age at the time of registration, and came from a fairly Americanized, Christian home. He worked in the Recreation Department and was active in the Creative Writers. He had enjoyed life in the center until the registration crisis, at which time he expressed a desire to leave it. During registration Art did not hesitate to register, since he and his family were convinced that they wanted to live in this country. He expected to be drafted in due time, however, and felt that it was just as well to wait for the draft in the center:

Art used to say that he was enjoying himself here, having enough to do to keep himself busy. Recently, however, his department has been doing hardly any work at all. A project (construction of a museum) on which he was working has been stopped because he could not get the use of a recreation hall as part of it was being demanded by block people. He has not very much to do at present. He has been asked to help with the

1. Sakoda Interview with Hiroshi Sugawara, p. 14.

registration, but does not feel like doing it. He feels that "the noose is slowly tightening" around him. He does not want to stay here any longer. He is thinking about a job in Chicago doing public relation work, but he does not want to go out and then get drafted right away. He no longer feels that he wants to work for the people after the things they called him, such as inu.¹

Jobo Nakamura, a college-educated Nisei, had been unwilling to consider relocation prior to registration. As editor of the Tulean Dispatch Magazine he was doing creative work to his liking. During registration, Jobo, along with most of the staff members of the Tulean Dispatch, had registered in the affirmative and faced the criticism of oppositionists:

Feeling of sectionalists faded with the animosity pointed more at Issei and Kibei as a result of the registration. It seemed that the general attitude of the Dispatch staff was that they were liberal minded and sincerely believed in democratic principles, although they scorned the deprivation of their full citizenship status. Except for one or two, all had answered positively to question 28 of the selective service questionnaire.²

Interest in relocation ran high among the staff members. Before the segregation program practically the whole staff of about a dozen underwent a complete turnover due to depletion of the staff through relocation: Jobo did not know what he wanted to do on the outside and had no particular prospects of either work or attending school, but he decided to leave camp.

Having received his clearance, Jobo has decided to go out to the hostel in Chicago. He has very little to look forward to. He said: "I guess I'll go to the hostel, although I don't have anything in particular to look forward to. I don't know what I really want to do. If I make enough money I may go back to school. But I don't seem much sense in going to school, either. I don't

1. Sakoda Journal, March 2, #5; March 10, 1943, #3; March 21, #2.
2. Jobo Nakamura, Saga of Tulean Dispatch, manuscript, July 31, 1943.

know what's the matter with me, maybe you'd better tell me what's the matter with me, James. I don't want to stay in Chicago long. I'm going there because my dad is there now. There's too many Japs there, and I want to avoid them."¹

Leave Clearance

The registration program served to eliminate one source of administrative impediment--the extremely slow process of leave clearance for individual applicants. The mass registration of all residents 17 years and over made it possible to define the loyalty status of the majority of the adult residents. Consequently, it was possible after registration was completed to transfer the task of determining loyalty status on the project rather than in Washington.

A third major modification of the leave procedures and regulations was made on April 2, 1943. Once registration was completed and all dockets processed through the intelligence agencies, the War Relocation Authority was in a position to speed up clearance as a separate step in the leave procedures. The amendment of April 2 authorized project directors to grant indefinite leave permits without referral to the Washington Office and in advance of leave clearance, provided certain basic requirements were met. The most important of these requirements were: (1) the applicant must have answered loyalty questions during registration with an unqualified affirmative, and (2) the project director must be satisfied, on the basis of evidence available at the relocation center, that the applicant would not endanger national security or interfere with the war effort. Issuance of permits in advance of leave clearance, however, was specifically prohibited in the case of (a) those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan, (b) those whose application for leave clearance had previously been denied, (c) Shinto priests, (d) aliens released on parole from internment camps by the Department of Justice, and (e) those who were planning to relocate in one of the eastern seaboard States in the

1. Sakoda Journal, July 21, 1943, #13.

Eastern Defense Command.¹

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From the foregoing it can be seen that the registration crisis served as an initial force which gave ~~imped~~ impetus to the relocation program. This resulted largely from evacuees being forced to make a decision on the issues of loyalty and relocation, from the cleavage which developed between the so-called "loyal" and "disloyal" evacuees, the loss of interest in the community on the part of the former, and the speeding up of the leave clearance procedure. On the other hand, the registration program hindered consideration of relocation on the part of those classified as "disloyal," and in the long run the initial advantage might well have been counterbalanced by this additional barrier to relocation. The influence of the registration program upon relocation should, therefore, be considered one of short duration, considering the population as a whole.

The registration crisis left the important selective factors of relocation unchanged. It was the more culturally-assimilated individuals who continued to relocate at a greater rate than the less assimilated. Only a small percentage of the older generation relocated, and resettlement continued to affect largely the Nisei population.

We now turn to the period between registration and segregation to examine largely factors which encouraged relocation.

1. WRA, The Relocation Program, p. 26.

THE POST-REGISTRATION PERIOD

Introduction

When considering the factors encouraging relocation in this section, it should be remembered that the factors discouraging relocation, taken up at length in a previous section, continued to operate on the remaining population. During 1943 and 1944 the administration placed its greatest efforts in increasing the rate of relocation and introduced a number of administrative measures calculated to produce this result. Many of these, however, failed to effect any appreciable increase in relocation. By the end of 1942 only .8 per cent of the total population in WRA centers had left on indefinite leaves. By the end of 1943 this had been increased to 16 per cent, and by the end of 1944--prior to the announcement of the closure of all centers--to 31 per cent. Not considering the residents in Tule Lake Segregation Center, the per cent of relocations for the rest of the population was 36 per cent at the end of 1944.

Table _____

	All Centers	
	<u>Remaining Population</u>	<u>On Indefinite Leave</u>
Dec. 1942	110,160 (99.2%)	866 (0.8%)
Dec. 1943	96,963 (84.5%)	17,844 (15.5%)
Dec. 1944	81,288 (69.3%)	35,989 (30.7%)

Source: WRA, The Evacuated People, Table 7, p. 19; Table 10, p.30.

The program succeeded least among the very young and the very old, and most among those between 20 and 35. The program also succeeded in relocating, by the end of 1944, 16.3 per cent of the male foreign-borns and 14.8 per cent of the female foreign-borns, in contrast to 46.9 per cent of the male American-born and 36.6 per cent of the female American-born. These figures reflected the operation of factors discouraging relocation, such as the fear of economic and social insecurity on the outside on the part of the older generation burdened with children. It was largely those who were confident of self-support and of obtaining additional advantages on the outside who relocated before the announcement of center closure.

In an attempt to increase the rate of relocation the WRA employed both positive measures to make relocation more attractive and negative measures to make life in the relocation center less attractive. Many of these attempts failed to overcome the basic fears of many evacuees, among which were most of the negative measures. Impediment such as the leave clearance procedure and the denial of clearance to work in war plants continued to discourage relocation. Evacuee response indicated some of the more effective factors encouraging their relocation, such as desire for freedom from the family and the community, and desire for jobs and education. The attractions of relatives and friends who were either planning to or had left the center became important factors in encouraging resettlement and resulted in the development of resettlement fever. At the same time, life in the center became less attractive for the older Nisei. This

was not due so much to the policy of the administration of reducing activities within the center to a minimum as to the exodus of many of the older Nisei. These factors will now be taken up in greater detail.

Reinforcements

Positive Measures within the Center: The positive and negative measures of the administration to encourage relocation could be divided into those related to conditions within the center and to those related to the outside. The former included the following:

a. Administrative reorganization-- The renewed emphasis upon relocation was reflected in a reorganization of the administrative structure. The Relocation Section, which was formerly handled under the Employment Division, was set up as a separate division with a greatly increased staff.¹

b. Survey of evacuee attitude-- By the summer of 1943 it became evident that the relocation program was leaving almost untouched the older residents with family responsibilities, and surveys were conducted in some centers to determine the reasons behind this phenomenon:

During the summer, surveys were made at several centers to find out what was preventing the families from relocating. The most complete of these surveys was made at Granada where the questionnaire submitted produced 2,587 replies. Evacuees were asked when they wanted to relocate and what their reasons were for hesitancy about resettlement. Only 5.9 per cent were interested in leaving the centers within a few months,

1. WRA, The Relocation Program p. 42-3.

27.1 per cent said they were willing to leave only after the end of the war, 33.2 per cent were undecided as to whether or not they should attempt relocation. The principal reason for hesitation was "uncertainty of public sentiment"; other prevailing reasons were lack of funds against an emergency, lack of information about conditions outside the center, fear of being unable to support dependents, and fear of being unable to find proper living quarters.¹

c. Job Information-- Information of job opportunities began to pour into the center at an increasingly rapid rate, with increase in the variety of fields from which the evacuees could choose. This was a decided improvement from the pre-registration condition when the majority of the offers were in the domestic field. By late 1943 the administration recognized that a point of diminishing returns had been reached and "in November 1943 relocation supervisors and officers were advised to reduce the number of job offers being sent to the centers as the number of these offers had become more bewildering than enlightening."²

d. Information of the Outside-- To supplement job offers the project was flooded with printed and mimeographed material late in 1943, and especially in 1944, calculated to arouse evacuee interest in relocation. This information, printed mostly in English and some in Japanese translations, included news items of successful relocation, descriptions of various communities, description of services available on the outside, and the like. There was little evidence that these were read to any extent by evacuees or that they aided materially in increasing the rate of relocation.³

1. WRA, The Relocation Program, p. 30-31.

2. Ibid., p. 33.

3. Ibid., pp. 33-34.

Printed material was supplemented by visits by relocation officers from various areas which met with small evacuee groups. Generally the attendance at such meetings was small, and the reception cool.¹

e. Evacuee participation-- The administration realized that one of its main problems in encouraging relocation was to reach evacuees with the information that it possessed. As a means to this end, it encouraged the formation of evacuee Relocation Planning Commissions to disseminate information. A definite attempt was made to incorporate this in the structure of the Community Council. This attempt met with indifferent success for "it had been extremely difficult to get responsible evacuees to take active part as relocation was not too popular at the centers."²

f. Credit Union-- Another attempt to encourage relocation took the form of encouraging the establishment of credit unions within the center, through which evacuees would be able to borrow money to use in relocation. This plan did not succeed since there was considerable opposition to the use of evacuee funds for relocation purposes, which was considered by many residents as a government responsibility.³

All of these steps did not succeed in removing the fundamental obstacles to relocation on the part of the older generation burdened with children. Most of them continued to look

1. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
2. Ibid., pp. 44, 37.
3. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

with suspicion upon any attempt of the administration to dislodge them from the center. One of the main problems of the administration was to close the gap that existed between its own thinking and that of the residents, but it was not successful in doing so.

Positive Measures outside of the Center:

a. Relocation Grant-- One of the first important incentives to relocation was the provision made by the WRA for financial assistance for evacuees leaving the center. The grants amounted to \$50 for relocatees without dependents; \$75 for those leaving with one dependent; and a maximum of \$100 for those leaving with two or more dependents. This step was adopted on March 24, 1943. It was not applicable to those leaving on student leave and was restricted to those without independent means. Later in the year the provisions were changed to encourage the relocation of larger families, and the grant was changed to \$25 for each individual leaving, with the addition of coach fare and \$3 per person per diem while en route to their destination.¹ The process of dispensing these grants was liberalized gradually to the point that the majority of the relocatees were able to obtain them without difficulty. In 1944, as further incentive for relocation, the limitation on the amount of personal property that could be shipped at Government expense was lifted. Pullman accommodation was made available to the infirm, and coach fare was allowed for

1. WRA, The Relocation Program, pp. 25-26.

investigative trips in behalf of a group. While the grants were too small to serve as incentives for relocation, they were of aid to evacuees who desired to relocate and who had depleted their savings.¹

b. Field Offices-- The opening of WRA field offices in the major cities facilitated the administrative handling of resettlement problems at the points of destination. The first midwestern relocation office was opened in Chicago on January 4, 1943, and this was followed by others in such cities as Cleveland, Minneapolis, Des Moines, Milwaukee, New York, and other key cities. By the end of 1943 there were 42 of these offices. Staff members of these offices were instrumental in securing employment and housing opportunities for relocatees and prospective relocatees still in the centers:

In the early months of their existence, the relocation offices were primarily concerned with creating favorable community acceptance and with finding suitable jobs that evacuees might fill. As a means of affecting community attitudes, relocation officers gave talks to business, professional, social, civic, church and fraternal groups; met with employers individually and in groups, enlisted the aid of unions when possible, and spoke to employees in plants where employment of Japanese was contemplated. Newspapers were provided with information in regard to the program. This public relations program did not crystalize or become an organized movement. In those few communities in which opposition did organize, sufficient support for the program had been developed that, almost without exception, relocation continued to be possible and satisfactory. As a result of these efforts, job offers quickly piled up in relocation offices in greater quantities than they could be filled. As an example, the Chicago office by July 1, 1943, had offers which would have required more than 10,000 individuals to fill. These offers

1. WRA, The Relocation Program, pp. 44-45.

represented a wide although not all inclusive range of occupations. War plants and employers seeking domestic help were the most numerous and they were the most insistent upon getting the help which they had requested.¹

c. Resettlement Committees-- The WRA, church people, and interested citizens were instrumental in setting up Resettlement Committees in many of the larger communities to aid the adjustment of incoming evacuees.²

d. Hostels-- Several church groups operated hostels in various cities which provided a temporary place to stay at low cost while seeking work and a more permanent place to live. This arrangement was of great convenience to evacuees, since it enabled them to seek jobs and housing after arrival in a city.³

e. Agreement with Governmental Agencies-- The WRA reached an agreement with the Social Security Board that evacuees in need would be cared for even during the one to three year period prior to establishment of residence requirements. While the Social Security Board did provide assistance in a number of cases, the actual number of evacuees who applied for this service was small. There was no indication that this arrangement was made with the National Housing Agency for aid in housing evacuees, but "this did not work out very well since, where housing was easily secured, other relocation factors such as employment were not favorable."⁴

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1. WRA, The Relocation Program, pp. 19-22.
 2. ~~WRAX~~ Ibid., pp. 41-42.
 3. Ibid., p. 33.
 4. Ibid., pp. 38-40.

f. Trial Indefinite-- The trial indefinite, introduced in March, 1944, was a concession to evacuee demand for leave on a trial basis. Evacuees leaving on this type of leave were allowed to work for six months before deciding to return to the center or to remain out on indefinite leave. There were a number of restrictions placed on this leave, such as being required to remain with the first employer for the duration of the trial period and paying one's own transportation and expenses to the place of employment. Evacuees were to be reimbursed with the usual relocation grants if they converted to indefinite leave after the trial period. "It was not too successful since in practice most of the center residents who had been unwilling to relocate on indefinite leave proved also unwilling to make a bona fide attempt under the trial leave program."¹

While all of the positive programs outside of the center were not equally helpful to relocatees, they were more helpful than the ones applied in the center and the negative measures attempted by the WRA.

Negative Measures within the Center: In the belief that the easy life within the center hindered consideration of relocation, the WRA attempted a number of steps calculated to make life within the center less attractive to evacuees.

a. Reduction of Center Activities-- The first of these

1. Ibid., p. 34.

steps was the reduction of activities originally planned for the center. Plans for industries paying prevailing wages were halted, and in those centers where such industries had been started they were stopped. Similarly, unnecessary construction and expansion of activities were discouraged.

b. Change in Employment Policy-- The first employment policy of the WRA was to provide ample work for center residents and to keep idleness at a minimum. In the summer of 1943, with the general administrative reorganization which was geared to lay the emphasis of the WRA upon relocation rather than community building, the employment policy was changed to make life in the center less attractive in the hope of increasing the rate of relocation. An outward manifestation of this policy was the employment cut of evacuee workers of approximately 30 per cent in all of the projects. The policy also specified that evacuees be required to work a full eight hour day with the same standard of efficiency as on the outside.

These measures were designed not only for reasons of project economy and project efficiency, but also to increase an interest in relocation. Unofficially, Mr. Holland wrote, "I would anticipate that of the number of jobs at the center that have been cut down quite drastically, there will be some stimulation for people to go out because they won't be able to find an easy job on the inside, and perhaps no job at all will be available for many of them on the inside." Mr. Holland believed that this was not so much a measure to make center life less pleasant, but rather "to make employment on the project more like holding a job outside."¹

1. Morton Grodzins, Administrative History of the WRA, Chapter XVIII, pp. 2-3.

c. Seasonal Leave Restrictions-- In the belief that seasonal leave discouraged taking out indefinite leave, the WRA made a number of attempts to discourage it. First, commuting directly from the center to the place of work was prohibited:

As the 1943 seasonal leave program progressed, it became apparent that while the seasonal leave program was a major factor in promoting relocation, it also had its retarding effect. Many able-bodied evacuees found it very convenient to leave all their dependents in a relocation center where they would be cared for at Government expense while they were on seasonal leave at high wages. They could then return to relocation centers securing free maintenance for themselves during slack seasons of employment. This worked out to the apparent advantage of the evacuees, and appeared to be a better paying proposition than permanent relocation. In order to meet this situation, it became necessary to insist that evacuees going out on seasonal leave remain for the entire period of their leave rather than commuting back and forth as many of them had done.¹

In 1944 further restrictions were placed on seasonal leave with a view to making it more unattractive. Beginning in February seasonal leave was granted for periods up to 7 months with a privilege of two months' extension, return to the center during this period was prohibited, and the number of seasonal leaves was restricted to two per year.²

d. Closure of Jerome Center-- Another step taken to encourage relocation was to close one of the centers with a view to indicating the impermanence of the centers:

It was realized that some step had to be taken to affect the complacency which was making many

1. WRA, The Relocation Program, p. 32.

2. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

individuals and groups in the centers resistant to relocation. It was hoped that closing one center and indicating that other centers would gradually be closed would have this desired effect. Announcement was made on February 22, 1944, that the Jerome Relocation Center, in Drew and Chicot Counties, Arkansas, would be closed on June 30. Jerome was small at the time, having only 6,600 residents. It was close to Rohwer, making transfer of many of the residents easier. The center was closed on schedule. While the ~~resident~~ center and all field offices made great effort to relocate its residents, the immediate effect on relocation either from Jerome itself or from the other centers was not as great as had been hoped for.¹

The negative steps taken by the WRA, even according to its own evaluation, did not effect the increased relocation hoped for. The reduction of employment within the center did not result in lack of employment for evacuees desiring jobs since the exodus of evacuees on relocation and seasonal leave left the center with a general shortage of able-bodied workers. Seasonal leave continued to attract a sizable group of evacuees during 1943 and 1944 in spite of the attempt to reduce the quota of workers on a particular job or to enforce an eight-hour day almost invariably resulted in hard feeling between the administration and residents. This in turn made it difficult for the administration to influence residents in believing that the outside was attractive and that they should relocate.

One reason that the negative steps did not have more effect than they did was that they were never very drastic.

1. Ibid., p. 45.

The administration was still responsible for the provision of essentials of life for those choosing to remain in the center and keeping evacuees satisfied was often difficult, even without the plans to make center life less attractive. The result was that actually few changes were made in the essential features of center life. On the other hand, the more positive incentives to attract evacuees to the outside were never greatly increased to the point that many of the older people burdened with a family were enticed out of their complacency and clinging to the security of the center. The cash grant of \$25 per person, for instance, was not large enough in and of itself to serve as a strong incentive to relocation.

Impediments

Leave Clearance Hearings: While the registration had provided a basis for mass clearance and the handling of clearance on the project, it left certain groups of individuals who had to be processed further before being granted leave clearance. This included those who had applied for repatriation, those who had failed to answer Question 28 in the affirmative, and certain classes of persons educated in Japan. Leave clearance hearings were held on the project and resulted in greater proportion of clearance than denial of leave clearance. Nonetheless, these evacuees were unable to leave until they had been processed and were placed on a "Stop List," and those who had been denied leave clearance

were eventually sent to Tule Lake.

On June 30, 1944, after 10 months of functioning, the project hearing boards had held hearings on 9,177 individual cases and the review committee had acted upon them in the following ways: 7,187 were approved for the granting of indefinite leave, 1,524 were denied leave clearance and the individuals were listed for transfer to Tule Lake, 50 cases were deferred, and 436 were returned to the project for rehearings.¹

A prime retarding factor and an outgrowth of the segregation plan was the establishment of the leave clearance "stop" list. The removal of a name from the "stop" list could be accomplished only on the basis of painstaking hearings. At the close of 1943, there were still some hundreds of cases on which a final decision as to eligibility for leave clearance had not been reached. Some of the evacuees affected were not only eager to relocate but also were heads of family groups, with the result that upon their own relocation was contingent the relocation of the entire family. These persons also frequently encouraged friends and relatives to delay their relocation until they themselves were released.²

Employment in War Industry: The most lucrative jobs on the outside were in war industries, and many Nisei were anxious to obtain jobs paying good wages. Others were desirous of obtaining jobs in line with their training, such as engineering, chemistry, aeronautics. At the time of the recruitment of volunteers for a Nisei combat unit, the Army released a statement promising jobs in war industries to loyal citizens. The procedure adopted by Government agencies, however, required a special clearance for Nisei desiring to work in war industries, in the merchant marine, and the Civil Service. This process of obtaining special clearance was

1. Ibid., p. 29.

2. Ibid., p. 33.

often discouragingly long and often resulted in rejection, with the result that many Nisei were prevented from participating in some of the most attractive wartime jobs. This contributed to the discouragement of relocation.¹

Keeping in mind the repulsions of the center and the reinforcements and impediments to relocation, we now turn to an examination of evacuee responses for factors favoring increased relocation which operated following the registration crisis.

Attractions of the Outside

For many of the older Nisei the registration crisis had served as an impetus to turn their attention away from their life in the center to the possibility of relocation. A large number of Nisei, however, had not become personally embroiled in the registration issue, and it had therefore little influence upon their outlook. This was especially true of Nisei who had remained sufficiently inconspicuous during the crisis to escape being branded as inu. There were still others who had, through their own choice or through pressure from others, opposed registration or had registered in the negative, but who later decided to relocate. The repulsive nature of the center alone, therefore, could not account for the final decision of many evacuees to relocate. The attitudes of those who relocated indicated that a positive attraction from the

1. WRA, The Relocation Program, pp. 35-37.

outside was operating upon the later relocatees. This was especially true since the factors discouraging relocation continued to operate for most evacuees.

The most common motivations for relocation were the desire for attractive employment and for schooling on the outside.

Employment: One of the major considerations of those who surveyed the possibilities of relocation was employment. Some conceived of employment largely in terms ~~in~~ of ability to earn a good income. This in turn could be expected to afford some of the other attractions of the outside. Others considered employment in terms of obtaining a job suited to one's training or ideals. In either case, employment was the means through which the economic problems of making a living on the outside were to be solved.

The following discussion of the plans of several families from the rural areas near Sacramento by a block manager's wife (Issei) indicates their concern of making money during the war.

In Block 25 the Yagi family, the Nishida family, and the Oshima boys have changed their answers from "no" to "yes" in order to resettle, but none of them have received their clearance yet. They hope to resettle on a farm. It should be noted that both the Yagi and Nishida families have been successful farmers in the past, and they hope to go out and earn more money while the war is in progress. The Uedas were also successful, but the elder Ueda cannot go out because he is a parolee. The interesting point here is that in the two families that want to resettle on a farm it is the son in the family who is holding back the resettlement because they answered "no" to Question 28. In other words, if the registration

had not taken place, many more people would have resettled than are going out at present.¹

An older married Nisei from the Northwest considered the possibilities of relocation, but was waiting for better paying positions:

Taketa is a member of the Board of Directors (of the Co-op). By occupation he is an accountant. So far he had received three offers for jobs in the middle-west as an accountant. The pay ranges from about \$140-\$160. He is hesitating about accepting the jobs and leaving camp because he is not sure that he will be able to make ends meet on that salary. He has a wife and one child whom he has to look after. If rent for an apartment costs from \$60-\$75 a month, it is evident that a family of three will find it difficult to get along in a city at this time. He does not find camp life too bad, and therefore does not feel that he must go out at the present time. Conditions in here must get worse or offers from the outside become better before such a hesitating attitude is broken.¹

Mr. and Mrs. Akahoshi, who had operated a cleaning establishment in the Bay Area prior to evacuation, had received an offer of jobs at one dollar an hour. They calculated that if they both worked, they would be able to earn \$400 a month, which seemed to them an attractive proposition. They did not want to leave until their son, who had changed his answer to the loyalty question from "no" to "yes," had obtained his clearance:

Mrs. Akahoshi asked JS what he thought would be the condition on the outside. Mr. and Mrs. A. had an offer for jobs in a cleaner's establishment at one dollar an hour. If both of them worked, they could earn about \$400 a month. They had their clearance already, and were just pondering whether they should go or not. She wanted to know whether

1. Sakoda Journal, February 9, 1943, #3.

there would be adequate housing in Rockford, where the cleaner was located. JS thought that housing could be arranged, and advised them to go out. They really wanted to go out, but one thing that hindered them was the fact that their son, Ziggy, had answered "no" to Question 28. He regretted this move and changed his answer to "yes," but still was not able to get his clearance.

Mrs. Akahoshi did not believe, as some of the other Issei did, that if Japan won the war unconditionally evacuees would be compensated for the loss they received during evacuation:

Mrs. A., on the other hand, felt that the war would last a long time, and perhaps would not end in four or five years. Consequently she did not expect that the colonists would receive a compensation of \$10,000 or anywhere near it when the war was over. She preferred to rely on her own strength, go out to work, and establish herself while the war was in progress and establishing oneself was relatively easy.¹

Some families, according to reports from their neighbors, were planning to farm on the outside as the best means of combining a number of advantages--money-making and deferment for their sons:

It seems that some people in the block are beginning to talk about going out to work. As Mrs. Ishizuka (Kibei girl married to an Issei) expresses it, "They think it is better to go and make some money rather than stay in a place like this, if by farming 15 acres they can be deferred from the draft." Now that they have calmed down about the registration people are able to think more rationally. In other words some people have changed their mind about not wanting to go out and not wanting their property. If their sons can be kept out of the army many people would prefer to go out to farm and hang on to their property if they could. It is not known how many people think in this way, but at least there are a few people in our block with this thought in mind.²

1. Sakoda Journal, July 1, 1943, #1.

2. Ibid., March 16, 1943, #1.

Advantages of employment on the outside were also considered in terms of following a career of one's choice. A Nisei from Placer County who had majored in poultry farming at the university planned to accept a job on a poultry farm, in spite of opposition from his parents. He planned eventually to operate his own poultry farm:

John majored in poultry farming at U.C. and is from Placer County. He lives in Block 43, where the sentiment is overwhelmingly against resettlement. He has accepted a job in a poultry farm in Rockford, Illinois. When asked what he intended to do about his parents, he said: "I'm the only one in the family, and I want to call my parents out, if I can. I want to start my own poultry business, and then my parents can come and help me then. Otherwise, it's going to be hard for me to work my problems out. My hardest problem now is to convince my parents that it's wise to go out. They are influenced by the other people in the block, and are against resettlement at the present time. If I go out and write to them, I may be able to convince them that it's best to resettle."¹

A Nisei who was reported to have had little financial success prior to evacuation, saw in the co-operative movement his chance for future success. He looked forward to attending the Rochdale Institute, and seeking a suitable position in the co-operative movement:

Chester is another one of the intelligent persons on the Project who has been selected to attend Rochdale. Chester says that he is looking forward to go into co-op work because he feels that in the future co-ops will be important. He thinks that big business and taxation are going to drive many people into co-ops. His field of choice is business administration. Chester does not regret at all that he was evacuated. In fact, it has been a very fortunate thing for him. He believes he has learned so much through his work that it was worth all of the trouble he had to go through. He does

1. Sakoda Journal, July 8, 1943, #4. (John Mashihara)

not feel that he has wasted his time serving the people, because he knows his experience has done himself a lot of good.¹

Bob Kono returned from Japan in 1938, and attended school until a little before evacuation. He studied bookkeeping in Los Angeles, but gave it up because he could not learn English well enough. He then attended Pasadena Junior College and took up photography. During registration he first secretly registered "yes, yes," but later under pressure from others he changed his answer to "yes, no." After registration he decided that he should relocate and get a job in the field of photography, and changed his answer to "yes, yes."

He has changed his answer and at present wants to go out and get a job doing photographic work, if possible. He sees that he made a mistake in answering "no." He feels that if the real purpose of the registration had been made clear at the very beginning, even Isseis would have been willing to register. It was confused with the volunteer combat team, and people felt that if they registered they would be drafted into the combat team.²

Yoshimi Shibata was one of the outstanding Nisei leaders on the project. He was the sponsor of the Planning Board in the City Council, taught in the high school, and later held the position of Assistant Manager of the Co-op. During the registration crisis he lost his position of leader in the block:

Yoshimi's position in the registration issue is most interesting. He was the leader in his block when the registration issue arose. James Nakagawa was the block manager. At the first meeting of the block people, the two of them were able to keep the

1. Ibid., March 29, 1943, #2. (Chester Ogi)
2. Ibid., May 9, 1943, #1.

from making any decision for or against the registration. After the boys from Block 42 were taken, however, things became unmanageable. Yoshimi did not say anything after that for or against the registration, but said that he was going to withdraw from his position because his opinion differed from those of the others.

The result was that he lost interest in working for the people in the center and showed resentment toward those who had opposed registration:

Yoshimi used to feel that Walter Tsukamoto didn't know how to handle the Japanese people. Walter told him that the time would come when the people would turn against him. Yoshimi didn't think so, as long as he handled the men correctly. He realized at the time of the registration that he was wrong. Now he wants to go out and have nothing more to do with the people. Toward those who have opposed registration he is rather bitter. One person who opposed registration came around to his place recently. He asked this person whether he was thinking about going out. The fellow said that if he wanted to go out he would go and register. Yoshimi asked him whether his Yamato Damashi, of which he was so proud, was so skin-deep that he could change his mind so easily about registering. Yoshimi believes in letting these people suffer for their mistake. He thinks they ought to be reminded of their former position so that they will not be able to register. "Let them hang--let them swing--they brought it upon themselves."¹

Having lost interest in remaining in the project as a leader, Yoshimi looked for opportunities on the outside. He obtained a job as a foreman of a large nursery near Chicago, a position which he considered to be fairly lucrative:

Yesterday, Yoshimi made arrangements to leave for Chicago. He got a job as a foreman of a large nursery. He is one of the three foremen on this particular ranch, and is to be paid a salary and commission on the amount he produces. He is confident that he can produce enough to receive a large commission. Formerly, Yoshimi used to feel

1. Ibid., May 26, 1943, #4.

that he was doing something for the people here, but now he doesn't feel like that. He said: "I made the Planning Board for the sake of the Isseis, but do they consider that at all. They go and call me a dog. I used to think Walter and the JACL group never knew how to handle the Japanese people. Walter used to tell me that a time would come when I would understand ~~them~~ him. Well, now I know. Anyone who is at the top is suspected of making money for himself. I don't wonder that Mr. Smith (Co-op Advisor) was suspected. They think that I'm earning \$200 a month right now. When I first came I used to think that I could learn a great deal in here. But now that I have come this far, there's nothing to look forward to any more."¹

A young Issei (?), who was considering relocation, and who had heard of a business opportunity in Spokane, went to investigate it and returned with an adverse report of conditions on the outside:

Conditions in Spokane are not very encouraging. Housing, for instance, is worse than you can imagine. People are renting trailers for twelve or fifteen dollars a week--imagine. Japanese just haven't got a chance. There are too many Japanese there already--doctors, dentists, farmers, and all. Japanese farmers are giving each other so much competition that they are dumping produce on the market. The Japanese farmer's association there is trying to control it, without success. They don't want any more Japanese to come in because there are too many there already. It's not good because they incur the resentment of the Hakujins. Living among your own people may be a good idea, but people outside don't want it that way. They want us to scatter--to disperse. Even going down the street it's better not to go in groups of two or three. The city doesn't want any more Japanese and doesn't want to gain a foothold there. They aren't giving business licenses to Japanese anymore. I went there with the idea of looking over the situation before taking a chance in the East. After all, it was close to my former home in Seattle. I had one business opportunity that I had in mind, but it didn't turn out right. I'm thinking of going East.²

1. Sakoda Journal, May 20, 1943, #1.
2. Ibid., August 5, 1943, #3. (Corky Kawasaki)

Education and Training: The desire for education and training which were available only on the outside was observed as a reason for relocation. This desire was sometimes mentioned by parents as well as children themselves. This was shown by the attitude of a Nisei girl and her father, who were desirous of living in a college town in order to send her sister to college. This desire was reinforced by the fact that the family had lived for many years among Caucasians:

For the last 12 years Hatsume, her sister, and her father have lived among Caucasians, and consequently their attitudes would differ somewhat from those who have lived in a Japanese community. Her sister is still a sophomore in high school, but her father wants to send her to a school on the outside where she could learn more than here. They were thinking of moving to a college town, where Hatsume and her father could work and send her sister to school. Concerning ~~the~~ her going out, she said: "Since we've lived among Caucasians for the last 12 years, we know that we can get along with them. I don't want to live in a place where there are a great many Japanese living together, because I don't think that is so good."¹

The operation of the desire for education as a factor in encouraging relocation was seen in the youths who were faced with the alternative of remaining in Tule Lake as a segregant or of relocating. Mas Tanaka had received several years' education in Japan, but had also been sufficiently educated in this country to be as Americanized as many Nisei. During registration he had vacillated in his choice of a stand and ended up by answering in the

1. Sakoda Journal, July 20, 1943, #3.

negative to Question 28. He quickly regretted this move, and changed his answer. His parents had decided to remain in Tule Lake as segregants, but Mas decided to relocate.

He gave as his principal reason the desire for an education:

JS accidentally ran into Mas today as he was leaving the City Council office where he works. Mas' first question was: "When are you going out, James?" JS replied: "Well, I'm going to stay on a little while longer because I am working for my thesis."

The last time JS had talked to Mas, he was thinking about registering "no, no." Suspecting that he had changed his mind on the matter JS asked: "Did you change your answer?"

Mas was a little confused and explained that he was always loyal.

JS said: "The last time I talked to you you were arguing the other way."

Mas: "Well, a person is sometimes confused, especially when he is emotionally aroused. You know, the Niseis are all wishy-washy. I bet if Japan were to attack the Coast many of them would change their mind again. They are cultural hybrids, that's the word, isn't it?"

JS: "You're right. You mean they're sitting on the fence."

Mas: "Sure, if I were to raise my children I wouldn't bring them up in two different places so that they would be lost."

JS: ". . . But are you intending to go out?"

Mas: "I'm thinking about it now. I have friends who'll go to work in the sugar beet field because I have had experience last year already. I do not want to stay in a place like this. I'm thinking of going to a school if I can. Carleton University has a swell poli-sci course. But I have got to have more money to go to school. I do not want to go out to farm work because you might be frozen in that type of work. . . ."

My mother does not want me to go out anywhere, but my father wants me to go to school. . . . Anyway, I do not want to stay in a place like this."¹

Frank Nishida was brought up in Japan and returned to America about 5 years ago. He attended school up until the

1. Sakoda Journal, April 20, 1943, #2; January 4, 1943, #2; February 17, 1943, #3; February 5, 1943, #3, July 23, 1943, #4.

time of evacuation and had managed to learn to speak English fairly well and adopt many of the American ways of behavior. He did not associate closely with many un-Americanized Kibei and preferred the company of Nisei. During registration he had remained aloof from the Kibei bloc and registered. Since he intended to return to Japan he registered in the negative. Following registration, however, he decided to leave camp to get an education or some training. He said:

I want to go out directly from here if I can. It's best to get an education or some training, rather than to stay in here. Most of my Kibei friends, however, are staying here. They don't see things as I do.¹

Family and Community Sentiment: Up to this point the family and the community were considered as factors discouraging relocation. This could be understood from the standpoint that the dominant opinion as expressed by the Issei in the family and in the community was on the whole anti-relocation. If there were Nisei who were exposed to this pressure from family members and the community, there were also parents who were susceptible to the opposite pressure from their children. Some parents believed that relocation was wise, either as a result of their own thinking or influence from their children and others. These were the parents who were considered to be "liberal-minded" by the Nisei. This could be illustrated by Mr. Sakamoto, a young Issei (possibly Hawaiian-born Nisei), who spoke English well:

1. Sakoda Journal, March 5, #7; August 9, 1943, #1.

Mr. Sakamoto, living in Block 25, said that he is going out to work. His son-in-law, Eddy Masui, is out there handling workers for a company. Mr. Sakamoto is leaving his family behind until he can go out and make arrangements for them to come out and live with him. His comments showed that while he associated with Isseis, he was not thinking so unrealistically as they were. He said: "I think it's better to go out. It's not only for the young people. There's no future in this place. You can't tell what's going to happen when the war ends."¹

An Issei from the Northwest expressed a similar point of view:

Mr. Katagiri is from the Northwest and has been calm and cooperative person. A view that he expressed recently is worth recording: "The one who does the right thing will come out ahead. Niseis should go out and then call the Isseis out. Niseis should realize as a result of the evacuation that they should not rely wholly upon one country. They should go out and become a citizen of the world. Yes, I think everything is going to turn out all right."²

The relocation of the Nisei members of the family sometimes resulted in the willingness of Issei parents to follow their children, which would not have happened if the children remained in the center with them. The general pattern took the form of Nisei relocating first, often against the wishes of the parents, and later making arrangements for parents to join them. In some instances the parents were anxious to join their children and keep the family intact. In others, considerable pressure from children was necessary to persuade reluctant parents to relocate. Parental willingness to relocate is shown in the following examples:

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1. Sakoda Journal, May 22, 1943, #2.
 2. Ibid., July 7, 1943, #4.

The Shibatas are planning to join their son, Yoshimi, in Des Plaines, Illinois. Yoshimi does not like to have his parents work. However, Mrs. Shibata does not like the idea of living off of her son and said that Mr. Shibata was thinking of going into farming, using farm hands to do the work. They reserved a compartment on a train, but were told that those who took a compartment could not get travel grants. Consequently, they cancelled the compartment and asked for the grant.¹

The Sugasawaras came to see JS about their future plans. They wanted to go out to work, and wanted to choose a place where their son, Archie, could go to college. He was taking an architecture course before evacuation and wanted to continue with it. He was not so very enthusiastic about it, however, and was considering it more because his parents were insisting that he go on to college. To hold his children close to him Mr. Sugasawara believed in the adage "Oitewa ko ni shitagai" (When you're old, obey your children). He said, "If we're to hold the respect of our children, we have to be good fathers and mothers." He was anxious to have Mas Matsuda continue his mathematic class, which Archie was attending, till the segregation actually took place.²

Riley's father came in for an interview yesterday. He told JS that Riley had advised him not to go to another center, but to come out. He thought that it would be better if he did not go out too far east. Consequently, Mr. Sugasawara is looking for a job in a laundry and for a place to take his family. He is willing to move out if he can find a house for his family. He is thinking of his children, who should start to school in September. He has been working in the shoe shop here, and has heard that four of the workers who went out on a good offer were disappointed. They were offered 85 cents an hour and were promised overtime, but actually received only \$22 a week and not enough work for overtime. Two of them changed to another job. The boys in the shoe shop are now saying that they won't go out no matter what happens. Mr. Sugasawara, however, is still willing to go out and take a chance on the outside. He hopes to buy a farm if things go well.³

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1. Sakoda Journal, July 27, 1943, #7.
 2. Ibid., July 27, 1943, #6.
 3. Ibid., August 18, 1943, #6.

Another phenomenon was attraction of individuals who had relocated or were planning to do so upon those who were still in the center. Once the process of resettlement was speeded up there was a tendency for those who had relocated first to call or attract others out. In Tule Lake this phenomenon did not have an opportunity to develop fully because of the intrusion of the segregation program. Many individuals waited until they could relocate with a friend before doing so and did not think of relocation until urged by a friend. The early relocatees generally left with a mixed feeling of elation and regret--elation of fulfilling a desire and regret to leave behind friends and acquaintances. After a large number of Nisei had relocated, however, it was those who were doing the sending off who felt that they were being left behind or that life was passing them by.

The influence of another family's plan for relocation is seen in the desire of a mother to relocate to Denver, where the other family was planning to relocate, rather than to Chicago where her daughter planned to go:

Mike has no definite offer of a job, but has made arrangements to go to Chicago on June 15. Since she has a rating as junior typist, she believes that she can get a job when she gets there. She's going to Chicago because, as she says, she believes that her mother will be able to find friends with whom she can associate. She doesn't want to go to a small town because she thinks that her mother can't get along with ignorant farmers and other people. . . . Her mother wants Mike to stay in the Project for the duration, but Mike doesn't want to. Otherwise, Mrs. Imbe wants to go to Denver if May Sato's family goes there. Mike feels that if she goes out to work and

then her sister, Shizuko, finds a job too, they can call their mother out.¹

Segregation Program

The segregation program in the late summer of 1943 served to draw a concrete line of demarcation between the "loyal" and "disloyal" factions. This cleavage, which largely ran along cultural lines, had been noticed from the beginning of project life and had widened perceptibly during the registration crisis. Following this crisis the cleavage tended to become obscured, with many who had failed to answer Question 28 in the affirmative changing their answers to place themselves in the "loyal" group. The segregation program physically separated those who had declared themselves as "disloyal" and the members of their family from families who remained "loyal." When Tule Lake was converted into a segregation center for the "disloyals," its history as a relocation center abruptly came to an end. The administration made an effort to relocate as many of the Tuleans on the Removal List as possible to other centers and succeeded in increasing the rate of relocation from Tule Lake prior to transfer to other centers. Some 6,000 Tuleans who were segregated, except for a small number, were ineligible for relocation until 1945, when closure of all WRA centers was begun.

1. Sakoda Journal, May 26, 1943, #1.