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INTERNAL
SECURITY

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Heart Mountain Relocation Center

Internal Security Section

Final Report

by

Stanley Adams

Chief of Internal Security

Term of Service

December 1, 1944

to

December 1, 1945

COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT DIVISION

Internal Security Section

Final Report

A. DESCRIPTION OF INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM.

Internal Security functions were originally established and subsequently maintained as a part of the Community Services Division, later the Community Management Division. The initial organization was combined with the Fire Protection and Social Welfare functions under one appointed supervisor. The general purpose of Internal Security functions was to maintain law, order and compliance with WRA regulations within the project through a security organization composed of appointed officers as well as an evacuee enforcement group.

Prior to the arrival of the evacuees at the project the law enforcement officials of Park County, Wyoming, were consulted concerning procedure to be followed in dealing with and prosecuting violations of State and Federal laws by the evacuee population. It was agreed that insofar as possible all misdemeanors would be dealt with exclusively and directly through WRA disciplinary action and only crimes of a felony nature would be referred to the County for action. This agreement also provided that county detention facilities and custody under the County Sheriff would be available for use upon request by the Project Director. This system operated effectively until the close of the project, except as modified in 1944. At that time the County saw fit to refuse accepting further custody of prisoners held by WRA Internal Security but not under arrest by the County Sheriff, because of the fear of being charged with false imprisonment. The Project Director thereupon arranged a contract with Yellowstone County, Montana, to hold prisoners at his request for a fixed fee.

It was uniform policy to permit the evacuee police force wide latitude and responsibility in routine policing functions with appointed security officers providing advise, training and guidance and retaining final authority and decision. Likewise, with reference to problems and situations where relationships between the evacuee police and the general evacuee population might be threatened by assumption of power or decision by the evacuee police, the appointed security

officers publicly assumed direct authority and decision. The general procedure and policies enumerated were maintained throughout the operation of the project with no significant changes.

B. ORGANIZATION OF SECTION

1. Appointed Staff.

The first appointed security officer entered on duty August 17, 1942, five days after the first group of evacuees were inducted. He selected an evacuee chief of police, "Rosie" Matsui, who had functioned in a similar capacity at the assembly center. Mr. Matsui was granted authority to organize and staff the evacuee police force while Mr. Griffin was primarily engaged in organizing Social Welfare and Fire Protection functions which, at that time, were also under his supervision.

The initial organization provided for only one appointed Internal Security Officer. Mr. Griffin served in this position from August 17, 1942 to December 1, 1942. From December 1, 1942 to May 24, 1943, no Internal Security Officer was employed and the section was directly supervised by the Chief of the Community Services Division. In May, 1943, the Internal Security appointed staff organization was modified to provide for Chief of Internal Security (1), Assistant Chief of Internal Security (2), Internal Security Officer (2), and Clerk Stenographer (1).

From May 24, 1943 until the close of the project Internal Security Officers employed, together with the duration of service, was as follows:

Griffin, Robert C.	Chief, Int. Sec.	8-17-42 to 12-1-42
Chapman, Marshall	Asst. Chief	5-24-43 to 8-21-43
Graves, Fred	Actg. Chief	6-1-43 to 7-1-43
Thompson, Kenneth	Internal Sec. Of.	7-1-43 to 7-21-43
Campbell, Marcus L.	Chief, Int. Sec.	7-16-43 to 7-16-44
Brown, Weldon	Asst. Chief	8-9-43 to 3-9-44
Miller, Karl W.	Asst. Chief	9-13-43 to 12-26-44
Gorman, E. C.	Int. Sec. Off.	10-16-43 to 5-15-44
Huff, Rodger	Int. Sec. Off.	1-16-44 to 7-1-44
Wilkins, R. W.	Int. Sec. Off.	5-15-44 to 2-1-45
Kinkade, Harley B.	Asst. Chief	6-1-44 to 12-1-45
Adams, Stanley E.	Chief, Int. Sec.	8-1-44 to 12-1-45
McFarland, C. B.	Int. Sec. Off.	7-1-44 to 11-17-45
Freeberg, Joseph G.	Int. Sec. Off.	4-19-45 to 11-17-45
Perry, James D.	Int. Sec. Off.	4-19-45 to 11-17-45

All Internal Security Officers were recruited through Civil Service and required to possess a minimum of previous training and experience in some form of police or investigative work. During all periods when at least four officers were on duty it was customary to schedule their hours of work so as to have at least one officer on duty at all times.

During the latter part of 1944 a change in organization was effected to provide for one Chief, one Assistant Chief, and three Internal Security Officers. The Chief purpose of this change was to provide a clearer and less conflicting line of authority within the section.

2. Evacuee Staff.

As previously stated, Mr. "Bosie" Matsui was named as Chief of the evacuee police force shortly after the first group of evacuees were inducted. He proceeded with administrative approval to staff an organization composed of himself as chief, two assistant chiefs, four captains, six sergeants, and approximately sixty patrolmen. As the force was completed it was divided into four details, each consisting of one captain, one desk sergeant, a switchboard operator, and one-fourth of the number of patrolmen available for duty at any particular time. These details were assigned and periodically rotated on eight-hour shifts to cover twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, one of the details being utilized to cover the swing shifts. The patrolmen were assigned specific districts of the area to patrol.

Selection of evacuee police officers was left to the judgment of the evacuee chief after his ability, integrity, and reliability became known. This proved effective and resulted in an evacuee force which remained loyal, reasonably competent, and respected throughout the period of operation.

In the latter part of 1943 the organizational pattern was altered to conform to a uniform standard adopted at all relocation projects. It provided for the following: Inspector (1), Captains (4), Sergeants (6), Investigators (2), Clerk Stenographers (2), and Police Officer (53). The key evacuee officers, including the Chief held their positions continually from the beginning until near the beginning of close of the project. This made for a stable, well informed and supervised organization.

C. FACILITIES FOR OPERATION

The head office of the Chief of Internal Security and his staff was maintained in the main administrative building until July, 1945. It was then moved to the centrally located high school building as a measure of protection to this property following the closing of the schools, and to give closer supervision to police functions within the area.

The evacuee police force was housed in and operated out of space 20 x 80' in a recreation hall of centrally located Block 21. This space was so arranged as to provide a large entrance room with counter, sitting and desk space; a private office for the Chief; and, a small detention room.

Motor units assigned to the Section included two touring cars equipped with sirens and special search lights and two pickup trucks remodeled as covered patrol wagons for use of the evacuee force. No call box system was provided but the strategically placed special fire phones in the area were used in emergencies. Five small sub-stations were conveniently established within the area to provide headquarters and protection from inclement weather for the patrolman. Firearms were not carried by either the appointed or evacuee staffs as a matter of policy and experience proved them unnecessary. No uniforms were ever provided or used by the personnel of the section, badges for the evacuee police being the only visible means of identification. Other than the small detention room which was a part of the evacuee police station, no jail facilities were established within the project. This omission was deliberate to avoid creation of a facility which it was believed might serve as a focal point for any group resistance which might have developed during the course of operations.

Other than in the matter of police uniforms, it was considered that facilities and equipment provided were adequate. A sustained desire for uniforms was expressed by both the community evacuee leaders and the evacuee police officers and it was accepted that the provision of uniforms would have enhanced the effectiveness, prestige, and respect for the police.

D. SERVICES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE SECTION.

1. Methods Employed.

None of the evacuee police force had ever had previous experience in police work except briefly in

the assembly centers. Experience and knowledge therefore were acquired on the job and by actual performance and from guidance and advice rendered by the Internal Security Officers. For several weeks during 1943 a regular schedule of training classes were conducted by the Chief of Internal Security and his staff in all the important phases of police work.

Caution was fostered and observed in the matter of making actual arrests to assure that (1) no arrest would be made without a warrant unless the criminal was observed by the police in the act of committing an offense, or (2) if not observed, that a warrant signed by the Project Director was first secured based upon a signed complaint. The evacuee police were permitted to make all arrests involving purely local offenses. It was customary for the appointed Internal Security Officers to directly handle all arrests requested by the F. B. I. or the Department of Justice.

Crime prevention early became a major objective and interest not only of the Internal Security staff but of the evacuee police force as well as the majority of parents and community evacuee leaders. Practical application of this principle stemmed largely from the evacuee chief of police and his key assistants in being constantly on the alert to detect potential acts of offense particularly among the youth and without making arrests consult and advise with such individuals and groups as well as parents involved. The respect and prestige enjoyed by the Chief among the residents made this type of approach very effective. In addition, the police worked closely with the Community Activities staff in developing constructive outlet for the energies of the youth through athletic and club activities, organizations and leadership.

Investigative and intelligence work on purely local minor crimes was performed by the evacuee Chief with the aid of two trusted carefully selected evacuees who were not registered as police officers but maintained under misleading titles. This personnel was changed from time to time to conceal their identity and in general were able to function in a reasonably effective and useful manner.

2. Types and Frequency of Offenses.

As indicated in the attached tabular summary of offenses, traffic violations were by far the most numerous with assault and gambling offenses being second and

third in number. Individual investigations and questioning of suspects involved a considerable larger number than indicated in the summary tabulations but only the number of arrests shown were officially made. No epidemic of particular types of offenses occurred during the period of operation. The only thing approaching this condition was the usual increase in acts of minor malicious mischief which took place among the youth each season from the close of the schools until summer recreational and summer school programs were adequately functioning. During the Spring of 1945 there was a noticeable increase in gambling. This condition was permanently overcome by a series of simultaneous raids, arrests, and the conviction of nine defendants in the district court.

Particularly noticeable through the history of the project was the exceptionally low frequency of cases of drunkenness. While intoxicating liquors were not allowed to be retailed or sold within the project there was no restriction placed upon the privilege of purchase outside the project and bringing it within. This may have contributed to the condition mentioned but it was also believed that a particularly sensitive social and community consciousness resulting from a close, compact pattern of living likewise acted as a deterrent.

3. Special Security Problems.

An organizational crises arose early in the operation of the Section. With the first Security Officer, Robert O. Griffin, required to devote much of his time during the first two months of operations in organizing fire protection and welfare services, the evacuee police force was largely permitted to develop it's own organization, philosophy and mode of operation. This took a liberal, social, non-severe form of conducting police work, which conflicted with the theories of the Internal Security Officer. Friction between him and the evacuee Chief resulted and culminated in the resignation of Mr. Matsui, October 26, 1942, followed by the sympathy resignation of his entire evacuee staff. Following a number of conferences which included representatives of the evacuee police, the Council of Block Chairmen, Mr. Griffin, and the Project Director, the services of Mr. Griffin were terminated as of December 1, 1942, and the evacuee police force was reinstated. During November, 1942 when the evacuee police force was off official duty the Council of Block Chairmen requested and was granted permission to establish a temporary evacuee protective force under its jurisdiction. This force made up of volunteers,

including most of the suspended police officers, functioned effectively during November, 1942.

The Army and WRA registration program which took place during the first weeks of 1943 occurred at a time when no appointed Internal Security Officers were on duty. While considerable tension existed in the community over this issue, no special security measures were required.

During the segregation program only one minor incident arose which required attention of Security Officers. One single individual refused to report for departure. He was subsequently taken into custody and his transfer arranged. Otherwise the Internal Security personnel functioned only to control traffic during the departure and arrival of trains.

With the institution of Selective Service among evacuee residents, a widespread resistant attitude developed which was largely promoted by an organization among the residents known as the Fair Play Committee. The history of this episode is set forth in more detail as a part of the accompanying report on Community Government. Participation on the part of the Internal Security Section was limited to the appointed staff and mainly involved increased observation and investigative work to keep abreast of developments. Nothing significant occurred to justify any arrests for disturbance of the peace or other related offenses. Since failure on the part of individual evacuees to report on their draft call was a Federal violation, related arrests by the local Internal Security Officers were limited entirely to performing such services only at the specific request of the United States Marshall when he periodically visited the project to take such persons into custody. Two evacuees who were leaders in the committee activities had received WRA leave clearance hearings which had resulted in a decision to deny leave clearance to both. Upon the recommendation of the Project Director both these people were approved by the Director for transfer to the Tule Lake Center. An appointed Internal Security Officer served as escort in effecting these transfers.

Two major work stoppages occurred among project evacuee employees. They were the temporary strike among the motor pool employees in the Spring of 1943, and the walk-out of part of the hospital staff during the early Summer of 1943, both described in more detail as part of the Community Government report. During the motor pool

strike the WRA staff included no appointed Internal Security Officers. When the initial altercation between an appointed shop foreman and an evacuee agricultural foreman occurred the evacuee police force led by the Chief interested itself and undertook immediate investigation. The incident soon began to take on an anti-administration character and it was determined in a conference between the evacuee chief and the project director that in order not to jeopardize the position of the evacuee force it would be best for them to withdraw from participation in the actual controversy and limit their activities to routine controls in maintaining order within the project. Subsequent solution of the problem was then negotiated directly by the project director aided by the Community Council.

4. Effectiveness of Internal Security Program.

Basically a high degree of self discipline and social control existed among the evacuee population as a whole. A sensitive community consciousness and acceptance of responsibility on the part of the residents with respect to the problem of maintaining law and order simplified the internal security functions. The Administration recognized what appeared from the beginning to be a sincere desire on the part of the evacuee leaders to assume considerable responsibility for controlling crime within the project. This was taken advantage of by granting considerable authority to the proper evacuee organizations such as police and Judicial Commission to handle routine problems of maintaining law and order. It was fully believed that this policy was highly influential in holding to a significant minimum the incident of crime and offenses.

There was abundant evidence to show that any misdeeds were considered to react to the detriment of the evacuees as a whole. The appointed Internal Security Officers were able to maintain a generally good relationship throughout with the evacuees, being accepted as present for the purpose of serving the general good rather than as persecutors.

E. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES AND AGENCIES

1. Community Council.

As the major evacuee organizational body within the project, the Council from the beginning reflected the interest and sensitive awareness of the community as a whole in the proper functioning of internal security

measures. The Council immediately stepped in to assist in the adjustment of the personnel trouble, previously mentioned, which occurred in the Autumn of 1942. From then forward the Council constantly threw its full support back of the program, particularly the efforts of the evacuee police force. The evacuee police chief met frequently with the Council to discuss general problems, secure advice in meeting and dealing with certain phases of the program and to stimulate the cooperation of the councilmen and their respective block leaders and parent groups, particularly in crime prevention measures to counteract potential juvenile delinquency threats.

2. Judicial Commission.

The Internal Security staff maintained an intimate working relation not only with the Judicial Commission but more directly with the Preliminary Hearing Board which came into existence early in 1943 primarily at the request of the police. Prior to the establishment of this Board it had been the practice of the police to investigate crime and largely determine whether a case should be held to the commission for a hearing. The police came to feel that this should not properly be their direct responsibility. The Board was therefore established to receive complaints from the police or others and to determine whether evidence was sufficient to justify holding the case to the Commission for trial. It was customary for the evacuee police, usually under the direction of the evacuee chief, to organize and present evidence related to prosecutions before the Commission.

3. Responsibility for Issuance of Passes and Train Movements.

Issuance of passes was maintained under the direct authority of the project director throughout the period of project operations and was never delegated to Internal Security. The personnel of the Section participated in all major train movements to and from the project related to induction, segregation, transfers from Jerome, and final relocation. This participation was primarily concerned with vehicle and pedestrian traffic control, with incidental responsibility for maintenance of law and order as required. All train movements were devoid of any significant trouble or crisis.

4. Local, Federal and State Agencies:

A close and favorable working relationship was established with the Park County Attorney and Sheriff prior to the first induction of evacuees. This was maintained throughout the period of operation. It provided for local project administrative determination as to whether an offense committed within the project should be tried locally or referred to the County or District officials and courts for hearing, and that insofar as possible, all misdemeanor cases would be handled locally and only felonies would be referred to the District Court. All of the W. R. A. appointed Internal Security Officers were deputized by the County Sheriff as Deputy Sheriffs.

The only significant contact and relationship maintained by Internal Security involved the Department of Justice. It was customary for the F. B. I. agent in whose territory the project was located, to periodically visit the project. His investigations carried out directly, did not involve use of the Internal Security Officers in conducting direct inquiries, and with reference to specific cases the local officers customarily provided the agent with such local information as was available to the local staff.

F. PROCEDURE FOR TERMINATION OF SECTION.

Adjustment of the operation of the Section to conform with closing activities consisted mainly of the following: (1) The addition of six appointed guards to the staff to give more adequate protection to project property, and to assume control of the main gate after the military police contingent was withdrawn September 1, 1945. (2) Transfer of the main Internal Security office to the centrally located high school building in July, 1945, as a means of providing more adequate protection to this facility. (3) Use of the Internal Security Officers in the final stages to help impress a very limited number of the residents that the center was actually going to close and that it was essential that they make final plans for departure. (4) Responsibility for disposal of pets following the departure of all evacuees; and (5) control of traffic in connection with the departure of scheduled relocation trains.

The evacuee police force gradually reduced in number toward the close of the project but continued to function with a final small group of officers until just before the departure of the last train.

Stanley Adams
Chief of Internal Security

ARRESTS AND COURT CASES

1942

<u>OFFENSE</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u>	<u>ACQUITTED</u>	<u>CONVICTION</u>	<u>COURT</u>	<u>PENALTIES</u>
Disturbance of the Peace	4	0	4	Judicial Com.	30 days suspended
Petty Theft	2	0	2	0	Probation
Parking Violation	1	0	0	0	Warned
Traffic Violation	58	0	0	0	Warned

1943

Parking Violations	26	0	0	0	Warned
Speeding	7	0	0	0	No charge - Warned
Traffic Violation	11	0	0	0	No charge - Warned
Traffic Accident	4	0	0	0	Warned
Personal	6	0	0	0	Treated at Hospital
Careless Driving	1	0	1	Judicial Com.	Driver's License suspended.
Disorderly Conduct	4	1	2	Judicial Com.	Suspended Sentence
Assault and Battery	4	0	3	Judicial Com.(2) Dist. Court (1)	Probation (1) Suspended Sentence (2) No charge filed (1)

ARRESTS AND COURT CASES - continued

1943 - continued

<u>OFFENSE</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u>	<u>ACQUITTED</u>	<u>CONVICTION</u>	<u>COURT</u>	<u>PENALTIES</u>
Aggravated Assault	1	0	1	Judicial Com.	Probation
Lost Persons	2	0	0	0	Found
Indecent Exposure	1	0	1	0	Probation
Petty Theft	4	0	2	0	2 Probation
Dog Bite	2	0	0	0	2 Cases Dropped No Charge
Mental Case	2	0	0	0	Hospitalized
Peeping-Tom	1	0	0	0	No charge filed
Malicious Mischief	1	0	0	0	Welfare Case
Gambling	1	0	1	Judicial Com.	No Charge filed Turned over to Welfare 30 Days Suspended
Forgery	1	0	0	0	No Charge
Out of Bounds	5	0	5	Judicial Com.	2 - 30 days suspended
Attempted Assault	1	0	0	0	3 - 14 days suspended
Attempted Burglary	1	0	0	0	No Charge--Hospitalized
Shoplifting	1	1	0	0	No Charge
Injury to Public Property	1	1	0	0	Case dismissed
					Charge dismissed

ARRESTS AND COURT CASES - continued

1943 - continued

<u>OFFENSE</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u>	<u>ACQUITTED</u>	<u>CONVICTION</u>	<u>COURT</u>	<u>PENALTIES</u>
Possession Stolen Property	3	0	0	0	No Charges
			<u>1945</u>		
Parking Violations	8	0	0	0	Warned
Speeding	6	0	0	0	Warned
Traffic Violations	17	0	0	0	Warned
Traffic Accidents	7	0	2	Judicial Com.	2 Driver's licenses suspended, 5 Warned
Assault and Battery	8	4	4	Judicial Com(3) Proj. Dir. (1)	1 - 10 days suspended 1 - 30 days suspended 1 - 6 Mos. probation 1 - 3 Mos. Jail, Billings, Montana
Attempted Suicide	1	0	0	0	Referred to Welfare
Gambling	1	0	1	Judicial Com.	Fined
Dog Bites	4	0	0	0	No Charges
Robbery	1	1	0	0	Dismissed
Petty Theft	1	1	0	0	Dismissed
Illegal Use of Weapon	1	0	1	Judicial Com.	30 days suspended

ARRESTS AND COURT CASES - continued

<u>OFFENSE</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u>	<u>ACQUITTED</u>	<u>CONVICTION</u>	<u>COURT</u>	<u>PENALTIES</u>
Illegal Liquor Sale	1	0	1	District Court	\$50 fine and 30 days suspended
Malicious Mischief	1	1	0	0	No Charge
Mental Cases	2	0	1	Medical Board	To State Hospital
Aggravated Assault	1	0	1	District Court	Two to five years State Penitentiary
<u>1945</u>					
Parking Violations	7	0	0	0	Warned
Speeding	5	0	0	0	Warned
Traffic Violation	12	0	0	0	Warned
Traffic Accident	7	0	0	0	Investigated
Lost Persons	4	0	0	0	Found
Drunkenness	2	0	0	0	No Charge
Assault & Battery	6	0	5	Judicial Com(4) District Court(1)	3 - 30 days Billings Jail 1 - 30 days Cody 1 - 10 days suspended 1 - Probation - Welfare
Aggravated Assault	2	0	2	Dist. Court (1) Judicial Com(1)	6 mos Cody Jail 1 mo. suspended
Gambling	9	0	9	District Court	Fined \$75 each

ARRESTS AND COURT CASES - continued

<u>OFFENSES</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u>	<u>ACQUITTED</u>	<u>CONVICTION</u>	<u>COURT</u>	<u>PENALTIES</u>
Manufacture of Liquor	6	0	6	Judicial Com.	1 - \$15 fine & 15 days 5 - 15 days suspended
Trespassing	2	0	2	Judicial Com.	1 - 7 days suspended 1 - 15 days suspended
Petty Theft	1	1	0	0	No charge filed
Burglary	1	0	1	District Court	1 year State Peniten- tiary