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POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF POSTON I

(Copy of report given by Dr. E.H. Spicer at staff meeting of Bureau of Sociological Research, Sept. 25, 1942)

This report will probably be a little different from most of the other preceding reports. In one respect, certainly, in lack of statistics and tables and facts that can be summarized in a numerical way. There is very little in the report that I do have that is particularly important. What this report is is simply an effort to sketch in and outline one of the social institutions which we have in Poston -- the Temporary Community Council.

What I have tried to do is to map out the structure of the Council -- both the internal structure and the relationships of the Council to other social institutions in the community. Instead of summarizing my data in terms of numbers and statistical tables, I had to reserve to charts, and I want to caution you about the charts -- don't take them too seriously.

In observing the council, the kind of data that I collected was this: First, minutes of meetings of the Council itself and its subdivisions; secondly, the observation of behavior of the Council members in the council meetings and outside of the council meetings under certain selected circumstances; thirdly, interview material that is interviewed with council members and interviews with other persons about the council and in which I tried to get attitudes and feelings in connection with the action that the council is carrying on.

The study of this council led me out from this group of 36 persons into the community into the collection of similar data on the block councils and the block managers' meetings, etc.

The Council couldn't be studied within itself. I had to see where it fit in the whole social structure of Poston. It might be a way to start in presenting the outline of the Council structure by placing the Council roughly at the beginning of what we might call the social space of Poston. How does the Council fit in general into the administrative structure? We could call it the general political structure. It is one of the important social structures of Poston and the Council is a segment of it.

In order to outline social structure, we can start with the very top of a chart showing the relationships of the Council to the Federal government (consult chart I). ^{on next page} First comes Roosevelt, and under him is Mr. Dillon Myer who is the Director of the War Relocation Authority. Also under Roosevelt is the Office of Emergency Management which is a disbursing agent and not an administrative agent. The lines which go down from Myer ^{are} ~~is~~ the administrative staff -- Community Services with John Provise ⁿ as the Chief Officer, Employment, Public Works and Agriculture. These four executive staff work out at the Washington office with Myer as the Executive Officer.

In direct line under the supervision of Regional Director Fryer from the San Francisco office comes the project heads. Poston has been given a special place as it does have a special

place in the administrative setup in the WRA. Poston lies in Indian land and so it is also administered by the Office of Indian Affairs. However, the administrators do act in accordance with the policies laid down by the WRA. The administrative staff of Poston is hired and fired by the Office of Indian Affairs. When it is felt by the WRA that a certain administrator in the project is not carrying out the desired policies, the WRA cannot fire that administrator but they can refer the matter to the Indian Office and see if something can be done.

Since we have two executive bodies administering in Poston, there must be some way of touching each other. This is where the Liaison Officer fits in. The Liaison Officer for the WRA seems to be Mr. Norris James while Mr. Ted Haas is for the Dept. of Interior. They see that the WRA keeps in close touch with the Poston project.

Following our attempt to fit the Council in this "social space", I have also made an effort, a beginning at least, to chart the formal relationships within this project in this over-all administrative political structure. In line with the WRA Liaison Officer and the Office of Indian Affairs' Liaison Officer is the project director. (Consult chart II).
at end of Report.
Under the project director is the associate director and then a line of supervisory authority going down through for the rest of the project staff. I have made eight divisions of authorities:

1. Employment -- Kennedy
2. Research -- Leighton
3. Community Services -- Findley
4. Press -- James
5. Engineering -- Rupkey
6. Administration -- Empie
7. & 8. Agriculture and Industry -- Mathiesen and Knutsen.

Each person is directly responsible to the project director and not to each other.

Each of these has its own setup with divisions and sections under it, e.g. under Community Services you have the hospital under Dr. Pressman, education under Dr. Cary, Family Welfare under Miss Kirkland and housing under Mr. Evans. Administration turns out to mean the following -- the activities in connection with hiring and firing of Caucasian personnel, procurement or the buying and obtaining of supplies, budget and fiscal matters, mails and files, transportation and supplies, and under it, transportation in charge of Barrett, Wickersham in charge of warehouse and Mr. Stultz -- chief steward. Under Mr. Evans who is the assistant director are the departments of fire and police and block manager supervision.

I could point out informal relationships that do not exist in this chart. It is a chart of actual behavior of the people. Actual relationships may have no relationships with this chart but I think it is necessary as a basis of studying the official or ideal relations as set up. Here we have two advisory relationships in connection with the project director which I haven't included. On the other hand, we have the project attorney who is ~~not~~ in an advisory capacity to the Director. He also supervises the Law Department and the

Community Council, to which he is also the advisor.

So much for an attempt to place the Council in its general structure of setting. It might be also a good idea to place it in time. The council has a history already and it is simply one result of a great deal of activities in connection with the development of self-government in the various relocation centers. In March and April of this year, WRA made many circulars promising self-government in relocation centers. Nothing was done about that in Poston until the month of May and at that time Dr. Sol Kimball of the WRA San Francisco Office came to Poston and made a proposal here for the creation of a Civic Planning Board which would consist entirely of residents of Poston. The Civic Planning Board formed itself and was active throughout the month of May on to June. What it did was to consider various plans submitted to the Board. The Legal Department, Dr. Sol Kimball and Rev. Mitani submitted some plans. The Civic Planning Board finally incorporated most of the Legal Department's plan for self-government into a constitution, a bill of rights and also set out to set up a community government and then they were informed that the WRA had already established set regulations for self-government and those regulations were to be put into effect. Those regulations did not conform to the constitution that was set up by the Civic Planning Board so they were disqualified and quit.

The community then proceeded under the direction of Mr.

Haas to set up a Community Council. The Community Council was elected on the 21st day of July and has been meeting ever since the 22nd about once a week. I think I will leave out a discussion of the comparison of the setup and the proposed setup by the Planning Board. I simply mentioned that here as what has been already done and which might conceivably come to existence here. One of the plans submitted by the Civic Planning Board -- this plan was called by a number of people I talked to as "Issei Planning". I don't know whether the Issei call it the Issei Planning or not but the Nisei regard it as a plan which the Issei supported. It provided for a very complicated government. In the first place, it provided for voting and office holding privileges for all persons regardless of the situation. We can call it the "Mitani Plan." The specific structure proposed by the Mitani plan was like this:

The block councils were to be composed of family heads. Apparently the plan meant one family head from each barrack in the block. The block councils were to elect a community council and in addition to that there was also what was called an elected governing municipal council which was something which existed in addition to the city council. There was to be a municipal governing council which would be formed by direct election of all people and in addition to that, a staff council appointed by the city council which would be advisory to the city council as well as to the administrative staff. So you see that the main feature of that plan is indirect election of the governing body. It is a two-chamber system and

fairly complicated. This was carefully considered at several meetings of the Civic Planning Board and as I say, it could have been insisted here. But the one which was apparently supported by the Nisei who finally dominated the Civic Planning Board was worked out first by the Law Department and that system made the block council not a part of the setup. It provided for a municipal council composed of one person from each quad. That person was elected by a general quad election which involved popular voting. That was the one which was to be incorporated in the Civic Planning Board if the new order had not come out on June 5th.

The WRA order of June 5th provided for the following elements in the community government:

1. Restricted office holding to citizens of the U.S. eliminating the Issei from office but allowed for voting regardless of citizenship.

2. Provided for a temporary setup which would be composed of one person from each block and those persons to be elected by popular vote. That system, you see, is very close to that suggested by the Law Department with the exception of restriction of office holding.

That is the form of council that is coming to existence here. We might speak for a moment about the structure of the council as it is at present. It is composed of 36 persons, has a chairman, secretary, vice-chairman and sergeant at arms. It is divided into 11 sub-groups or committees and those committees were appointed by the chairman. A committee consists

of three or four members.

The important thing in connection with the structure of the council itself is that you have created a hierarchy of persons within the council. The chairman, the committee chairmen, and the council itself. That is a hierarchy in regard to the initiation of action. The person who has the best opportunity to initiate action is the chairman. The person who has the next best opportunity is the chairman of each of the 11 committees. The vice-chairman actually has no particular function so long as the chairman is there and the sergeant at arms actually performs no function either.

The formal structure in terms of committees of the council leads to certain things that might be important to the community as a whole. In the first place, considering the importance of this hierarchy within the council of committee chairmen, I think it would be worth our knowing where the chairmen lived in the community since they have somewhat more opportunity for leadership in the community than in the council. This is in the formal sense. Another thing in connection with committee structure is the fact that these three or four members of each committee are forced by the council structure to associate closely with each other. Where they live in the community might be worth knowing and so I have made a chart showing where the various committee members live. For example, members of the Law and Order committee show a social relationship between those four men which cut between the quad lines and brings in persons from almost four corners of the community.

Well, now about the informal structure of the council. In the first place, we ought to stop to consider how we work out the informal structure of a group. The chairman and committees have their relationships defined on paper but it is the relationships with groups that aren't on paper sometimes.

To be specific, one could work out the informal structure of the council this way. You could note where council members sit when they come to the meeting. In that way, you find cliques. In the study of any group, one should pay attention to the seating of people. Another way is to note who makes a motion and who seconds it. In this council, it was quite evident for a while that there was a group of two or three where one of them always seconded a motion made by another. If you notice their behavior and where they sit, you could look for their informal structure to develop. What has happened in this particular council is that the formal structure has paralleled very closely the informal structure.

From the third council meeting to the fifth, the seating was very miscellaneous as the members didn't know each other at first, but now it is very clear that the seating arrangement of the men working on the same committee is sitting together.

Another aspect of informal structure: According to formal structure the chairman is the leader. There is no evidence of the growing up of any effective opposition where competition is within the council meeting itself to the present chairman leadership. He has put it under control at every meeting. He keeps the activities of the council channeled and he always

gets action on things that he thinks need action. In other words, in connection with the chairman, his leadership is parallel to the informal structure.

One would have to go further and be aware of relationships between council members outside of council meetings to detect the beginnings of the informal structure. In order to understand any informal structures that grow up in the council, you should know thoroughly the background of individual members. For instance, one would expect groups and cliques to develop along the line of sex. You might expect lines to develop along age, background -- such as rural or urban life, in the past, education and so on. I have a limited amount of data on the background of the council members. For instance, I have data on age and this data is as follows:

The age in the councilmen range from 23 to 47. It is interesting to compare that with the range for block managers which is 22 to 52. The block managers' range is a little higher. In the councilmen, there are 16 under 30, 18 under 40, and 2 under 50. There is a clustering of the ages of the councilmen around 30. There is very little range below 30 or above 30. The average age is actually 31.2. The average age for block managers is also the same. In other words, I don't think we would have to look for any cleavages as to age.

Another aspect of individual background is in regard to education. The councilmen have the following educational background: 15 university men, 3 junior college, 11 high school graduates, 5 have taken high school work in Japan

and are Kibei, I has not gone beyond grammar school.

Now how about the cleavages in connection with the educational background? What might we expect? Well, one of the things that one hears is there is a great difference between the Kibei and those not. It has been difficult for me to see any evidence of this in the council meetings on the part of the Kibei than on the others. Three are extremely inactive and take little part in actual meetings.

Maybe this is a good stopping point since it is 9:30 and since this is simply preliminary so far. I want to launch into the problems of Issei-Nisei relationships through the political structure.

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(Report continued on Sept. 29, 1942)

At the last meeting I got started on this report on political organization. I presented the background of the council and said something about the council group itself. I think the main point of the last meeting was simply, that one must look for two types of structure in the study of any social organization, the ideal and behavioral, or as some say, the formal and informal structure in the institution. My study of the council was very weak in the matter of informal structure.

In order to define the structure of any social group or institution, one must go beyond the group itself and point out the set of relationships of that group to other groups with which it articulates in the community, if possible its

relationship to all other groups. In studying the council I found it necessary to examine the block council, the block manager system, the relationships of the council to both of those institutions, and also its relationships to the administration and to the people. All of these studies are still in progress. In relation to the block council, I have data on ten block councils in Poston I. In other words, my study is not complete. I find many variations; it is not a definitely crystalized system yet. There are two or three types of block Councils which exist here. The majority have 14 members, that is one person from each of the barracks, but there are variations in that respect. For instance, in the bachelor quarters they sometimes have two members in which case the block council has fifteen or sixteen or more, maybe as many as eighteen members. The block council varies not only in respect to number but also in respect to the proportion of Issei and Nisei. In some blocks, special attention to Issei and Nisei differences are made. For instance, in block 46, the block council consists of ten members, five Nisei and five Issei. So far as number of members and type of members go, let us distinguish, as preliminary, one in which you have fourteen members, one from each barrack, regardless of Nisei and Issei characteristics. Secondly, the block council which consists of more than 14 members. Thirdly, block councils which may have various numbers but which is characterized by a definite proportion of Issei and Nisei.

Another way that the block councils differ from each other is in the matter of who acts as chairman. And again you have three types, but these three types are not to be correlated with the others just mentioned. Specifically, these three types are as follows: (1) block council that elects a chairman usually when it meets; (2) block council in which the block manager acts as chairman; (3) block council in which the city councilman and the block manager act as co-chairman. Don't take these definitions of block chairmen as final.

Briefly, what are the block councils doing? Judging from the ten blocks, the functions are, except in one respect, confined very much to what is going on in each block. One of the chief activities is the organization of the work in the block, such as the making of gardens. One block has a vegetable committee. This vegetable committee took the initiative in getting hold of seeds before seeds were given out and also took the initiative in organizing people in work groups. Not all of the block councils have done that. Another characteristic is apparent in the north part of town, for instance, cooperation throughout the block councils in organizing work crews to clear out the park. The block councils have also had something to do with the kitchens. They have the power of nominating the city councilmen. Some act as advisory boards in planning the use of block land, that is for making places for various playground activities for the children. Then finally, the block councils have been important everywhere in starting complaints

which go from the council to the block managers up to the administration; one of their other important functions is getting information. They ask their block managers and community councilmen in regard to what is going on in the administration and some of the block councils have required the councilmen to give formal reports to the block council in order to give them whatever information they have on actions of the administration. The thing to note in connection with this survey of block councils is simply that there is no clear-cut uniform relationship worked out yet by the block councils and community councilmen. Some have brought the community councilmen in as co-chairman but a great many have not. There is a lot more that can be said about this ^{but} let us go on.

The block manager system ^{or} organization consists of a city manager (in Poston I, John Evans). Responsible to him is the block manager supervisor, and then an assistant to him. Then the block manager executive committee consisting of nine members and then a general block manager council consisting of all 36 block managers which holds meetings twice a week. Finally there is the individual block manager of each block. These block managers with a staff working directly under them consisting of the custodian, a clerk, and in many of the blocks there is a carpenter, a gardener or two, janitor and a night watchman. The numbers of the latter vary according to the block.

This organization is a direct supervisory line from the project director down to the block, each of the individuals receiving orders and being told what to do by the person just above him.

Working from the people up to the project director, there is supposed to exist a constan^tly open channel for complaints, so that the people in the block can make known any dissatisfacti^ons.[^]

Now the most interesting thing in connection with the block managers and the councilmen is the evidence that has developed in the last three weeks of a conflict in functioning between block managers and councilmen. The official philosophy in that respect is that there is no conflict. But a conflict is indicated when interviewing individuals such as city manager, etc. That statement that I ran into very often was that there is no conflict in this system. After all, "the council is a legislative body and the other is an administrative body." We find that attitude expressed regularly on the part of the community council. The idea is that there is no conflict. Evidence for that was given out by the block managers in the form of the duties of the block managers. I would like to read the whole list of block manager's duties but that might take a little too long. Suppose I just mention the general nature of the duties. There are five main types of duty that block managers are responsible for: (1) The block manager is a dispenser of material goods like soap, tools, shovels, equipment ^{and} ~~such~~ blankets. In other words, they are managers of administrative property. (2) Another major task that has been laid down by the administration is the maintenance of the block grounds. (3) The block manager is responsible for the distribution of mail and other communications to individuals. (4) The block manager is supposed to initiate and participate

in the block council. That is laid down as a duty by the administration, and through this contact the block manager is to act as a channel for complaints. (5) ¹he block manager is the dispenser of information, which means that they have to carry out surveys, post the Press Bulletin, relay all information to the people. There is a conflict between the community council and the block manager in regard to the dispensing of official information. Examples of such conflict that I ran across are these: They seem rather trivial, but they can loom large sometimes. For instance, at a community council meeting one time, an announcement was made by Mr. Head concerning the lumber for partitions and apparently one of the councilmen understood his announcement to mean that there was material for partitions here in Poston. The councilman went home and so announced to the people. The block manager found out about it. He had been asked about the partition problem for weeks. Now the partitions were here, but the people told him so rather than he telling them. The block manager was angry that the administration did not give him the information first. It seems like a petty thing and yet it created a little trouble. It turned out however that the councilman's information was wrong and consequently he suffered in the end. There are several other examples of just about the same kind which perhaps you may interpret as jealousies between the two officials in regard to the dispensing of information. There were enough of that sort of thing to bring about an effort to cause the persons concerned to recognize a conflict and do something about it.

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So they arranged a joint meeting of the councilmen and the block managers. The idea expressed in the joint meeting was that the councilmen could get acquainted with the block managers and to get to know them as individuals and consequently any misunderstanding would disappear. At the joint meeting, the issues of information came up and each of the two groups concerned made proposals of their own. No agreement was reached on the two methods proposed. The block managers proposed that the councilmen maintain a desk in the block manager's office and the information could be gone over there, whether or not it was meant for the block managers. The two could work cooperatively that way. In the meeting, this proposal did not receive any response from the other groups. The council's proposal was to send an official representative from the block managers to their council meeting in order to obtain information which would be okehd by the councilman. You can see, I think in that illustration, the issue between the two groups, and how they have been looking at it. The block managers in their proposals, in a sense, subordinated the councilmen by suggesting a desk and on the other hand the councilmen were subordinating the block managers. To date, so far as I know, the dispensory of information has not been settled. There may be cases where the councilmen have set up a desk in the block manager's office. Probably one of the functions of the meeting that was fulfilled was the baseball game which did come off.

One main part of this talk has really just started in this

session. I think everything which I have touched so far is sort of minor. The important thing in setting up the council is what is its actual function as it has worked out in the community? What is it doing for the people and the administration? What has it tried to do and what are the limits of its power? The only way to discuss the function of the community council is to point out its relationship to the administration. I think you can summarize the activities of the council under two main headings. In the first place the council has established rules of behavior for the residents, that is, for the Japanese-Americans living in Poston. It has also carried on another type of activity, and that is the examination and study of all the departments of the administration. Both those aspects are rather complicated. I want to emphasize in connection with the first type of activity, that is, the establishment of means of regulating the behavior of the Poston residents, that the laws that have been passed apply to the Japanese-Americans ^(including the Issei) and not to the Caucasians.

I am simply going to list the types of activities in regard to regulating Poston behavior: (1) Establishing the Code of Offenses. I think it is important to note that the Number 1 offense is gambling. I think the first four or five are in the order of their significance, indicating the things that were uppermost in their minds. (2) They have established a set of traffic regulations. (3) They have established a Judicial Commission (body for trying cases). (4) The council has

established a financial committee for receiving and disbursing funds which come at present from the community store, and (5) They have established an Issei advisory board about which I will have more to say very shortly.

Now the other aspect of the councils' activity is that of investigating all the departments of the administration. This is still very much in process of going on. Let me mention a couple of investigations. At the very first council meeting, the first action, other than the organization of the council itself, was the appointment of a health committee to investigate the hospital. That committee was appointed before any plan for the organization of any of the other council committees. Action was immediately begun and prompt. I think the council was in this case the barometer of community interest. The second investigation which was carried out was that in connection with food. The food committee was appointed in the regular course of events at the third council meeting. It was not extra curricular like the health committee. The third investigation was that of the community store. That is the third extensive report.

Now I think those three investigations are probably indications of the relationship of the council to the people. How are we going to correlate the council and the people and what is going on in the community? It would be very useful if we could rely on weekly council meetings for indications of community interest and community feeling.

Another point that I want to emphasize is the order in which matters were taken up: The order of health, food,

community store profits.

How did the council take up this business of relating itself to the administration? There are a lot of important factors in this connection. I am going to bring out only a few. You can, after you go through the minutes of the meetings and after having observed the council in action in relation to the administration say that there are five periods of getting up the election machinery and setting forth the program for the temporary community council. There were decrees coming from Washington and being relayed by the project director and the project attorney saying what should be done. Secondly, setting up the council organization, the chairman, vice-chairman, etc. at point after point, the council was very responsive to the project attorney and the project personnel. Thirdly, there is a period of direct contacts between the committees and the administrative heads, their departments, and their subordinates. This is the period when members of the administration became the object of investigation. The reaction of the administration should be noted. One can say that they were dismayed, surprised and statements were made that this was not constructive. The Council position was stated as follows: "We can carry out constructive action in regard to suggestions for food and hospital only after we have more information and give the people in information in order to clear them up." There was a lot that went on at that period which could make a report in itself. That the council made itself felt to the administration was clear and channels immediately opened up. Then began a series of conversation by the

chairman of the council and project director and others. The council had become a force to the administration. That, you could call the fourth period in the development of council powers.

Now the fifth period is in process of development; it is important in connection with the administration. That is the consideration by the council of whether or not it has power to call on the carpet the departmental heads for reports. That, I think, has been considered in regard to Japanese departmental heads. It represents the next step in the formation of clear-cut relations with the administration.

The powers which the council has been shown to have in connection with relations with the administration are purely advisory. There have been shown definite limitations, e.g. the refusal of the Fiscal Department to allow the food committee to see the books. That is one sort of limitations. Another limitation is in connection with the council's efforts to make direct contact with WRA officials for the consideration of certain complaints that has turned out to be futile.

Now consideration of the relationship of the council to the people involves a detailed study of attitudes, analysis of election returns, and other things. I am not going into those aspects this morning but I am going to simply sketch another aspect; that is the relationship of the council to the Issei and, as I say, I am simply going to sketch this in. As you all know, the council was set up as a purely Nisei body,

a group of citizens. That was not in accordance with what had been planned by the Civic Planning Board, back in May and June of this year. They had set up a council which admitted both Issei and Nisei to office. However, the relationships between Nisei and Issei as expressed in the Civic Planning Board are of considerable importance and interest. When the Civic Planning Board was organized, it consisted of a very large number from each block, six from each; so it was a very large body. By June 18th, the Civic Planning Board had been reduced to a group of eight, one Nisei from each quad; there were seven Nisei and one Issei. It was definitely a Nisei body. How did that happen and what was the significance of it? From the minutes of the first meeting, there are indications of dissatisfaction, bad feeling over the plans that were being discussed; there were difficulties over language; then you find in one of the meetings that someone made a proposal that the terms, Issei and Nisei, be abolished for the purpose of promoting unity. That was in the form of a resolution. But it was also resolved at that meeting that English would be recognized as the official language to be used in Poston. There was at a subsequent meeting a complaint by one person that the terms Issei and Nisei were still being used.

What form is the issue of the Nisei and Issei taking in the activities of the council? The administrative officials and the chairman of the council have from the first insisted that Issei be brought in for advice in council activities.

Suggestions were made that this could be done by the various committees. That has been carried out -- Issei have actually been working with the Nisei on council committees. At about the third meeting of the council, the question of an Issei Advisory Board came up. When it was first brought up, the first action that resulted was the following question of a council member: "When we have an Issei Board, what language are ^{we} going to use?" The answer came back from the chairman, "Why, English, of course." What action had the council taken in regard to this? The Adult Education group has established an Issei Board, the details of which we do not have to go into. This was established as purely advisory and has only nine members, one from a quad. Another consideration that has been expressed in the council is that the Issei Advisory group do not outnumber the Nisei council. There will be Issei representatives from each block who will sit with and advise the various committees.

What I have given you is a superficial summary of how the issue has expressed itself in council meetings. I don't know anything really of what the Issei think but nevertheless I shall try to give just a suggestion as to what I think is important and it might be studied further. I have set down these points. In the first place, basic to the whole thing is the language barrier, language difference. That language difference is important in connection with several things, e.g. transacting business. Mixed groups of Issei and Nisei do not seem to be able to transact business. Statement of this sort are very common in the interview material I have. Secondly,

in dealings with the administration, the language matter is of extreme significance. There seems to be widespread feeling that persons are getting important or desirable jobs in the administration in various departments merely because they have a knowledge of English, not because they have any other qualifications. Language is important in giving the Nisei close relationship with the administration. Then the matter of information -- there is a feeling on the part of the Nisei that the Issei are very subject to rumor and hence to creating disturbances in the block. This is to a large extent a matter of not being able to understand even what is told them by the block managers through the administration. In other words, the Issei are not in touch with what is going on. That is a superficial interpretation but I think it is an important matter. Then there is the reversal of social roles. In the block council, the Issei maintain leadership. Outside of the block council, the Nisei have leadership. And this seems to be giving rise to two important attitudes, a feeling on the part of the Nisei that they don't have the confidence of the Issei, a feeling that the Issei are pointing to them and calling them young punks and saying that they don't know how to handle their affairs and the Issei affairs. This is expressed by the council chairman and many others. In addition to the language barrier and reversal of social roles which are both complicated phenomena, there is the matter of different points of view in ways of thinking and general concepts. I have not yet had a conversation that goes deeply into that. The few that I have had are in regard to the ideological

conflict. I think I will leave out until they are more surely understood by myself but will open the meeting now for discussion of any of the points that I have brought out. You will notice that I have no recommendations as a result of this study.

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The trend has been quite definitely towards increased evacuee participation and assumption of responsibility, although the community has not moved smoothly and always consistently in this direction.

The second phase consisted in a five month period during which efforts were made to follow the WRA plan. The initiative was in the hands of the project attorney, who put through a general election for a temporary community council composed of one representative from each of the blocks. This council, in accordance with WRA regulations, consisted of citizens only and had the power to make recommendations to the project director. It came into existence late in July and during the next three and a half months attempted to act as a complaint and suggestion channel from people to administration. The young men composing it, however, were not in touch with the people and seemed to be identified ~~with~~ by the community with the administration rather than themselves. ~~They were not in touch with the people~~ In addition, the administration did not accept them as collaborators in community management, except in minor ways. The result was failure of the council to function as a real representative body influencing project policy.

The third phase, lasting for about four months from the middle of November until about March, was characterized by instability and uncertainty. It began with a general strike and an almost complete breakdown of communication and understanding between evacuees and administration--- an indication of the gulf which had developed during the period of the temporary council. The initiative was taken by evacuee groups dominated by the older men who had been denied places in the formal government program of WRA. They set up an executive board and a labor relations board designed to function as communication channels between the people and the administrators. The project director saw the value of this plan, but was faced with the problem of getting the other administrators to accept it and to make the whole organization ~~more~~ fit the WRA regulations. There was strife between the administrators on the one hand and among the evacuees, who disagreed among themselves on whom they wanted for leaders, on the other. The adjustment, however, was eventually made and the evacuee initiated political bodies persisted and began to function effectively.

The final phase has consisted in the development of a political structure which stimulates initiative on the part of the evacuees and has brought about effective collaboration between evacuees and administration. The essential features of this organization are a number of committees or boards composed of evacuees not elected directly but which are responsible to the elected evacuee council. These boards have increasingly recognized that their major problem is one of establishing effective communication between the administration and the residents. They have promoted meetings with block councils and other

groups in the community at which they have presented and discussed community problems, such as the adjustment of manpower ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ to meet the situation of young people resettling on the outside. They have also taken the initiative in combating internal problems such as gambling and the growth of anti-cooperation attitudes among some of the residents. They have been effective in gathering information from the administration in regard to the problems and in assuming leadership in settling them. At present the administrators are increasingly relying on the evacuee boards in the solution of problems. In other words, the community seems to have ~~xxxxxxx~~ entered a phase in which there is both real communication between residents and administration and also real collaboration between them. This has been achieved only after a number of false starts, considerable groping and uncertainty, and careful nurturing of ~~xxx~~ plans which have sprung from the evacuees themselves.

POST-STRIKE POLITICS

Poston I

August 24, 1943

During the period from November 24, 1942, when the strike ended, to January 30, 1943, when chairmen of the Executive Board and Labor Relations Board accepted appointments by the Temporary Community Council, Poston I became organized politically. Before this time a discussion of the political bodies in Poston would have to emphasize the lack of integration between them and any other groups in the community. During the period they became integrated with each other and in that process developed more definite relationships with other groups.

The Establishment of the Executive Board. At the time of the strike settlement on November 24, there existed in Poston I two political bodies. These were the Emergency Committee of 72 and the Emergency Council. The former consisted of 2 representatives from each block who had been selected by the crowd at the demonstration area when the strike began on the evening of November 18. They were therefore not duly elected by WRA or any other regulations. The Emergency Council was a body which grew up during the days of the strike and consisted of some of the representatives on the Committee of 72, and some others who were brought into the negotiations with the administration in regard to the strike settlement. Thus there was no political body which had come into existence by any formal process sanctioned by the project administration or by any other organized group in the community.

The day following the settlement, November 25, block managers

were called in each block which gave approval to the members of the committee of 72 as block representatives. In a few cases the committee of 72 representatives from a block were changed, but for the most part they continued as members of a body which was officially called the City Planning Board of Poston I. At the meetings statements were passed around for the block residents to sign, saying that they gave 100% approval to the representatives named from their block.

The following day the City Planning Board met and set up a Central Committee composed of 14 members, consisting mainly of those who had carried through the strike negotiations, with Nagai and Sugimoto, as chairman and vice-chairman respectively. On the following day, November 27, the Central Committee met and proclaimed the existence of three new bodies. These were a Central Executive Committee, or Board, (called toseibu in Japanese), a Labor Relations Committee, and an Honor Court. They proceeded to appoint members to the first two bodies. On the following day the City Planning Board met again, approved the two new groups and elected one representative from each quad to establish the Honor Court. Thus the evacuees set up speedily, in a space of three days, the framework for an organization.

The basis of this framework was clear to no one in the administration and was called in question by many evacuees. Some evacuees felt that only an election in accordance with WRA regulations could validate positions as block representatives. Some felt that the block meetings were not conducted with freedom and fairness, that nominees had been railroaded through in an atmosphere of emotion.

Some would have accepted the representatives if they had been allowed to vote for them by secret ballot. Some felt that the City Planning Board had no proper authorization from the people to elect a Central Committee from which the members of the Central Executive Board had been chosen. In other words, it may not be said that the newly established bodies had the general sanction of the people in the blocks. Nevertheless statements indicating "100% approval" of the City Planning Board had been signed by many residents and were pointed to by the Central Committee as popular sanction for their existence.

Immediately after November 27, the Central Committee faded into non-existence, leaving behind it the Central Executive Board and the Labor Relations Board. In the course of the next few days, the Labor Relations Committee under the leadership of Rev. Mitani went into immediate action. It met with members of the administration and issued a proclamation announcing a "New Deal in Jobs" for Poston I. The Central Executive Board met several times with the Project Director. They were proceeding to negotiate in the name of the people of Poston. It was two months, however, before they were accepted by either the people or the administrators.

The Second TCC. The block meetings called to give community sanction to the members of the Emergency Committee of '72 were at least in part a result of the administrators' insistence on some evidence of general community support for the negotiating committee. Members of the Central Committee felt that that evidence had been produced in the "100%" statements, and proceeded to establish the dignity of the Emergency Committee of '72 by re-naming it the City Planning Board. In the course of the

block meetings, it was seen to that each block had one Nisei and one Issei as representatives. Those blocks which had had two Issei in the Emergency Committee substituted a Nisei for one Issei. It was thought that the administrators' condition of settlement, namely, that a political organization in accordance with WRA regulations, be set up, could be easily satisfied by holding a WRA election to confirm the Nisei members of the City Planning Board.

This plan was carried out, but before the election the first blow struck at the CEB was carried out by the City Planning Board. The latter met on December 4 and some Issei members of the CPB denounced the Labor Relations Board on the ground that judo and sumo were being reduced by the Recreation Department and the LRB had done nothing about it. Others then said that the LRB had not been elected by democratic methods and had not the right to negotiate for the people. In the face of this criticism the LRB resigned and was followed by the CEB. However, the Nisei members of the CPB together with some of the Issei then cast a vote of confidence in both Boards and they withdrew their resignations.

Meanwhile Haas, the project attorney, was laying plans for an election for a new Temporary Community Council in accordance with WRA regulations. This election was held on December 15 with almost all the candidates consisting of the Nisei members of the Civic Planning Board. They were duly elected and took the name of Temporary Community Council, holding their first meeting on December 16. Dr. Ishimaru, the old TCC chairman, refused to be nominated for chairman, saying that he was at "the crossroads of misunderstanding", and

Franklyn Sugiyama became the chairman of the second TCC.

There were only about a dozen members of the first TCC in the new group. There were a whole new set of officers and four older Nisei who had been prominent in civic affairs before, but not members of the TCC---Kurata, Kozuma, Jimmy Ito, and Frank Fukuda. The average age of the new councilmen was a little higher. One of the first questions they took up was that of the status of Issei members of the City Planning Board, with whom they had been meeting ever since the strike. They decided to recognize them as an Issei advisory council, not officially using the term, "Issei Advisory Board", which the Issei had rejected during the strike in favor of the title, "Issei Council". They immediately voted to hold separate meetings from the Issei, but this did not work out. Instead it became customary to hold joint meetings, the quad system of representation for the Issei was abandoned, and the chairmen of the Issei and Nisei councils acted as co-chairmen of the meetings, sitting together at the same table. The Japanese language was used perhaps more frequently than English in the meetings, and there was no systematic effort in most meetings to translate back and forth.

There were now four political bodies, and at least in name none of those that had existed at the close of the strike were in existence. Two of these were substantially the same as the Emergency Committee of the 72, but the two re-named parts had different sanctions. The Nisei part had the sanction of a formal election and therefore of WRA. It had in turn given its sanction to the Issei part on the basis of the old Issei advisory system which had also had WRA sanction.

The other two bodies, the CEB and the LRB, were developments of political bodies which no longer existed---as Powell said, "like the smile of the Cheshire cat." Their popular sanction had been questioned by almost everyone among administrators and evacuee leaders up to this time, and now they had no organized group they could point to as their sponsors. It is true the City Planning Board had OK'd them twice, but the TCC now refused to admit that the CPB any longer existed and regarded themselves as having automatically resigned from that body immediately on their election to the TCC.

Administrators' Views of the New Political Bodies. The settlement of the strike came as a shock and an unpleasant surprise to some of the administrators who participated in the negotiations. To Kennedy it was "capitulation to gangsters." He and John Powell held "a wake" over Poston in the privacy of Powell's house immediately after the settlement. They felt that "Poston was dead." Haas shared their point of view. The basis of their view was that the strike representatives had obtained power by force and that they did not represent any but a small segment of the community. Negotiation with them on what they regarded as tenuous and shaky community relations was bad enough, but it was worse to reach an agreement with them. They felt that the strike leaders could have been maneuvered out of all position in the community and that (apparently) the administration could have settled on its own terms.

This attitude on the part of these three men colored their relations with the CEB and the LRB as soon as the latter were formed. Kennedy was willing to work with the LRB, but he refused to accept

them as an elected political body and offered them jobs as paid consultants in the Employment Division. They refused, after some uncertainty, to accept such positions. Powell was also willing to discuss the affairs of his department with the LRB, but he refused to come to any agreements with them and admitted that they had ceased discussion with him on the ground that he was "uncooperative". Haas argued that the two groups had no political status, that they must in some way be brought under the provisions of WRA community organization. None of the three was willing to admit that the CEB could function as anything except special advisers to the Project Director. They denied not only executive powers to the group, but also any sort of political status.

Head's view of the CEB was different. He summed up his attitude as follows: "I think something might come of the committee." It is clear from his statements during the months of December and January in staff meetings just what he meant by this characteristically expressed vague hope. He took the view that the CEB had come into existence and that it therefore expressed some need of the community. He did not claim to know what that need was. He appeared to be following a definite principle of action, however, namely to watch carefully the unfolding of political events and to maneuver them, when the time was ripe, in the direction he wished them to go. As Gelvin expressed it, there was no need for the administrators to take sides with the political groupings in the community. The line-up of groups was the people's affair and the administrators should let them work it out, so long as they did not actually interfere with the aims of the administrators. Head felt that he had to maintain the technicalities

of the WRA power setup, but he was not willing to let that hinder the development of the real political forces in the community. He kept looking for the fundamental framework of the community, hoping it would show up clearly as events developed. He seems to have been one of the few among the appointed personnel whose curiosity was roused by the strike and the new Boards and who felt that he could learn from them rather than tell them what the nature of the community was.

Head's first move, in conjunction with Haas, was to recreate the TCC in accordance with WRA regulations. When the newly elected TCC members held their first meeting, Head addressed them and gave a brief explanation of the status of the CEB and LRB. He described the LRB as advisers to the various departments on labor matters and the CEB as general advisers to himself. He said they were "not law-makers". Head then attempted to proceed on this basis but found himself balked by members of the staff. Haas and Kennedy took the stand that the LRB and CEB should be regarded as created only for the emergency and that now they should be discarded. When the LRB refused to take jobs as labor consultants in the Employment Division, Kennedy disclaimed all connection with them and said that he would work only through the council. Powell broke off relations with the LRB and, however, established an evacuee cabinet in the Community Activities Department. He also selected an Issei Coordinator of recreation, after claiming that the LRB were too slow in suggesting one. This condition of refusal to recognize the new boards as official bodies on the part of leading members of the staff continued through December into January.

The positive actions of Kennedy, Haas, and Powell consisted

in immediate cooperation with the TCC. Kennedy gave the keynote speech at the induction of the new council and immediately got under way plans for the organization of a Camouflage project committee of council members. Powell was the first of the department heads to come before the council with a complete outline of the organization and functions of his department and to make a speech saying that he "wanted to conduct the department in the full view of the community." Haas accepted the post of council adviser on condition that it be recognized as the only official political body and that the staff cooperate with it more fully than they had with the first TCC.

Head remains determined to keep the boards in existence and learn what he could from them. On December 22, he made a formal announcement in the Chronicle that the CEB were his advisers. He met the opposition on the part of his staff by working out a plan for the centralization of administration of Unit I and the separation of it from department heads by placing it entirely in the hands of Evans. Evans, as Unit I administrator, rather than various department heads, would be the contact between evacuee advisers, such as the CEB, and the administration. This plan was officially announced on January 12.

Thus Head was attempting to utilize the organization which had grown out of the strike and to devise a means for its continuance in the face of staff opposition. At the same time that he was working this out, evacuee opposition to the boards was developing. This worked itself out during the month of January.

The Community and the CEB. Although staff members like Haas and Powell and Findley did not think that the new boards should have any official

political status, and even doubted the validity of the election of the Nisei members of the City Planning Board who later became the TCC, the fact is that during the period when these groups came into existence there was more political activity and interest among the block residents than ever before in Poston. Reports from the blocks almost uniformly state that the only period when block meetings were well attended were the weeks from November 18 until about January 25. This includes the meetings during the strike and those following it when the City Planning Board was created and also a series of meetings sponsored by members of the CEB during December and early January. In a block as politically apathetic as 31, it is reported that the November and December block meetings had attendances of as many of 100 Nisei, as well as most of the Issei in the block. Persons in political positions were in contact with the people of their blocks as they had never been before. Strong sentiments of approval for and opposition to prominent figures and policies were expressed in many of the meetings. It was a period when people were interested in what was going on politically and candidates could not escape contact with them.

There was no uniform system of sentiments in regard to the new political organization that had developed after the strike. Many both old and young thought that the strike leaders should have retired after the settlement and allowed the administrators to proceed in their own way with the reorganization of Poston. Some were indifferent, feeling that the strike had served its purpose, and that it mattered little what kind of political setup existed. Some maintained the same attitude towards the CEB and LRB that Powell, Kennedy, and Haas did,

namely, that they had come into existence through force or gang politics and should be abolished. Others opposed individuals on the CEB as of bad character and wished them removed, although they thought the CEB a good thing. A large number, though it is impossible to estimate how many and just what kinds of people, regarded the CEB as a symbol of victory in the strike and wished it to continue. The strongest sentiment of this kind seems to have existed in the Orange County blocks in the west central part of Unit I.

On December 4 the Issei members of the City Planning Board staged their first attempt to eliminate the CEB and LRB. As we have seen this failed. For the next two months a political struggle went on between the CEB and the Issei Council, or IAB, as it was called by the administrators. IAB members, including the chairman (Kato of Block 42), Mizushima, the Vice Chairman (Block 45), Tsukamoto of 46, Masukane of 59, and others seemed as determined as the anti-CEB faction of the administrative staff to abolish the board. In the course of the struggle numerous meetings were held in the blocks, many people turned out for these, and the CEB itself became a much discussed political issue.

The first point of attack appeared when some members of the CEB, Nagai and Niiseki, and Mitani of the LRB met with the Spanish Consul and made requests through him of the Japanese government that a \$200,000,000 fund for rehabilitation of Issei after the war be granted. This reused considerable disapproval among many Issei. Some disapproved on the ground that such a request would lower the self-respect of the Issei. Others that Japan should not be burdened with such a request

in the midst of the war and that she would disapprove of Issei for asking. Others felt it would antagonize the U.S. government and injure the Issei future in the United States. Many others, of course, thought it would be worth the asking, though they had little hope that it would be considered by Japan. It was, however, a matter which touched the core of Issei sentiments and immediately gave rise to some political expressions. On December 14, Nagai of the CEB, called a meeting in Block 37 and announced the request, probably a move to get Issei backing in the community for the CEB. This public statement, however, got a negative reaction and a movement was started to have the request withdrawn. The anti-CEB members of the IAB joined the movement, and four days later forced Nagai and Mitani to retract the request at a secret meeting in Block 27. Thus the CEB failed to get Issei support in a cause they had espoused and the anti-CEB faction of the IAB gained strength.

At this same time the CEB backtracked on another issue. At the first meeting of the new TCC they made a series of recommendations to the TCC on the camouflage project. The gist of the proposals was that each worker be allowed to keep what he made and that no general community fund be established. No attention was paid to this by the TCC and the next day Nakai of the IAB announced in council meeting that the CEB had withdrawn its proposals and had decided that the camouflage project was an issue to be decided by the Nisei alone. On December 22 came the announcement by Head that the CEB were to be considered his personal advisers. The CEB was evidently losing ground, gaining strength neither with the administration, the council, nor the

people at large.

During the next two weeks there was apparently an effort on the part of some members of the CEB to gain support of Nisei and Kibei through the seinen kai movement which had begun to develop in the three camps. The CEB members who had been interested in this, Yahiro, Okamoto, Sugimoto, and Kawashima, however, finally lost interest when it became apparent that those who were assuming leadership in the movement did not intend to give support to the CEB. In January, some members of the CEB in conversations with Head recommended that Okamoto and Nakamura of the CEB be removed because their past records in Los Angeles were not such as to give them the respect of other Japanese who knew them. They were accused of dishonesty in business and poor character generally.

It appeared then by early January that the CEB had no clear lines of support reaching anywhere into the community. They had been rejected by a large number of Issei, by the TCC, by Nisei and Kibei outside the council, by at least four prominent members of the administrative staff, and a split had developed within their own group. At this time the anti-CEB members of the IAB began a definite campaign to eliminate the board. On January 5, they called a meeting of the IAB and put through a vote of non-confidence in the CEB. Following up on this they appointed negotiators to advise the CEB to resign. The CEB refused to resign and there was an exchange of public announcements (posted in the messhalls and latrines) by the IAB and CEB, the former giving reasons for requesting the resignation, the latter reasons for not resigning. The IAB put the request on the ground that

the CEB had done nothing to clear itself of the charge made by Head on November 24 that a "pro-Axis group" had controlled the strike, that it had taken the liberty without due consultation to make the \$200,000,000 rehabilitation request, and that it had done nothing to settle the matters proposed in the strike settlement. The CEB accused the IAB of unfair methods in trying to get them to resign. The two groups were now at an impasse. It also became clear that the CEB did have one definite support from the community, namely, six of the Orange County blocks -- 27, 28, 37, 38, 43, 44. The Issei councilmen from these blocks withdrew temporarily from the IAB in protest over the IAB attack on the CEB.

The deadlock was settled finally by the TCC, which was asked to arbitrate by both CEB and IAB. The TCC formed a committee consisting of the oldest members of the council, and they decided that no change should be made in the CEB until permanent government should be established in Poston. The decision of the arbitration committee was accepted by both groups, and the CEB immediately attempted to consolidate its position by presenting to the TCC and IAB a statement as to its powers and duties. It proposed that it be officially recognized by both bodies, that it be the medium of communication between the councils and the Project Director, and that it have the power to pass on the personnel of key project positions. These proposals were opposed by both TCC and IAB. The CEB then presented its resignation to Head, followed immediately by the IAB, on January 26. The two controversial bodies created out of the social upheaval of the strike were not defunct. They had been eliminated not directly by any administrators, but rather by other evacuee political bodies with whom they could not agree as to their proper sphere of action.

However, the CEB and LRB were not to remain dead. At the investigation of Head, Haas had been working on a statement of the functions of both boards. This statement was presented and discussed at a council meeting on January 29 and finally agreed on by both councils. The CEB was given the following functions:

1. Advise with the Project Director.
2. Consult with department heads and block managers on community affairs and execute TCC recommendations approved by the Project Director.
3. Remove key personnel who are detrimental to the project.
4. Provide for translations of administrative notices and information.

The Labor Relations Board was assigned the following functions:

1. Mediate all labor disputes on request.
2. Study labor conditions.
3. Act as spokesmen for evacuee labor.
4. Make recommendations for carrying out findings.

The TCC and IAB accepted these definitions of the functions and relations of the boards to themselves, and immediately proceeded to elect the chairmen of the respective groups. The chairmen elected were Nagai and Kawashima (the latter after Katow's resignation) of the CEB and Nakaji of the LRB, in other words, the same Issei chairmen as before. These chairmen were instructed to select other members of their boards, subject to the approval of the councils.

The Emergence of the TCC. The framework of Poston political organization was at last clear, in main outlines. The basic political body from which all the others derived their sanction was the TCC, elected under WRA regulations. The TCC worked in constant collaboration with an Issei council, which voted with the TCC on equal terms, and for all practical purposes was an integral part of the TCC. The two bodies

met jointly, voted as a unit, and their chairmen were co-chairmen of the whole group of 72 elected representatives. Committees were composed of members from both the Issei and Nisei groups, which carried on their duties on equal terms. Political authority derived ultimately from the TCC, but it was thoroughly integrated in its procedures and actions with the IAB.

Existing by virtue of the authority of the TCC were two bodies not provided for under WRA regulations, but which had been conceived in outline at least by evacuee leaders after the strike. The CEB was something which had not been shadowed forth in any WRA administrative order, namely, an evacuee executive body. Its executive procedures remained to be defined by experience, but its powers were not explicitly stated, and they were defined in terms of the powers of the TCC, namely, the execution of the latter's recommendations. The membership of this body was determined solely by the TCC. The LRB had many of the functions of the Fair Practice Committee as set up under Administrative Instruction No. 26, but the basis of its membership was different. Like the CEB its members were subject to the approval of the TCC. They derived their authority not from election by work groups, but through appointment by the political elective body.

In this way the TCC became the keystone in a political structure which now had not only "legislative" (recommendatory) but also judicial and executive functions, and integrated with it was the economic body of the LRB. This structure had been built up not by the administrators alone or the WRA planners off the project. It had come into existence through the interplay of real political factors within the community. In the form that it had at the beginning of February, it was a combina-

tion of Washington plans, Issei thinking during the strike period, and the Project Director's ideas on self-government.

Political Issues During the Period

One of the most significant aspects of the period just following the strike in Poston I was the breakdown of racial lines of cleavage on the project. These had of course been sharply drawn during the strike. Before that, however, the Project Director had thought in terms of them, as had many other members of the appointed personnel. The Director had often said that the appointed personnel ought to stick together as a group, that none should let an evacuee hear him criticize another member of the staff. On the other side, many Issei had been trying to push the viewpoint that the evacuees were all Japanese together and should recognize that they had a common interest apart from that of any of the appointed personnel. Issei in Camp II made a strong effort to bring this viewpoint into operation as a major political issue in Poston.

It became apparent, however, during and after the strike that neither the evacuees, on the one hand, or the appointed personnel, on the other, were united in their views of the issues confronting the community of Poston. Some evacuees shared the views of some appointed personnel. Appointed personnel were sharply divergent in their views of the same issue. The racial cleavage was evidently quite artificial. The real bases of cleavage appears in an analysis of political issues during the post-strike period.

Issei Participation. One of the things which was apparent to all the administrators who were making policy as a result of the strike was that

Issei had suddenly assumed the role of community leaders. The overturn of the first TCC and the emergence of former IAB and other Issei as the dominant leaders made it clear that Issei should have been considered and brought more effectively into the project setup. There was probably complete agreement on this point among those who influenced policy most strongly in the immediate post-strike period, namely, Head, Evans, Gelvin, Haas, Powell, Findley, and Kennedy. But Issei participation meant rather different things to each of them. Evans was grateful for Mitani's suggestion that he hire an Issei BM supervisor as well as a Nisei. He wondered why he hadn't thought of it before. Similarly, Powell almost immediately chose an Issei coordinator of Issei recreation. To these men, Issei participation meant the selection by themselves of individuals who were technically classifiable as Issei. They were glad to include Issei in their departments, but they must maintain control of them and be the judges of their suitability. They did not feel that any groups outside their departments should or could pass on them.

Andy Sugimoto, Nisei member of the CEB, had a somewhat similar mechanical view of the meaning of Issei participation.

When the LRB first met with the Priorities Board, he said that the LRB's position was that Issei had not been given enough jobs in the various departments for which they had suitable capabilities. He spoke of it as a quantitative matter, as though the issue involved was simply getting more Issei into the desirable jobs.

When Sugimoto expressed this view he came into sharp conflict with the members of the LRB, especially K. Matsumoto, who maintained that it was not a question of getting more Issei into the various departments. It was rather merely a question of getting men with certain abilities,

whether Issei or Nisei, into certain jobs. Matsumoto implied that the selection of personnel had not been carried out successfully because the appointed personnel who hired them were not able to judge the satisfactoriness of their relations to the evacuees with whom they had to deal in the jobs.

In the matter of political participation of the Issei, there were also marked differences of conception. Haas had for some months been pushing the Advisory Board before the strike. He felt that he had nothing to learn about Issei participation and that it was merely a question of getting the IAB going again as it had been outlined in the WRA "Manual for Self-Government". In this he was in agreement with Dr. Ishimaru, who had believed firmly that an advisory relation between TCC and IAB was all that was necessary. Ishimaru had striven to maintain that sort of relationship and had kept clear of any integration of IAB and TCC through co-chairmanship and equal representation of Nisei and Issei in meetings, such as developed in the second TCC.

Head, on the other hand, regarded Issei political participation as having to be worked out on a different basis, in the light of the strike developments. He accepted a view somewhat like Matsumoto's in connection with project jobs. He was willing to admit that the appearance of the Emergency Council and the CEB indicated a necessity for selection of political advisers by groups within the community who perhaps understood the community better than he did. He also felt that he should have such advisers without the TCC standing between him and them.

These differences of conception indicate the manner in which

staff members lined up with evacuees and against each other on one important issue. We might say that Sugimoto, Haas, Powell, and Ishimaru were thinking in rather black and white terms about Nisei and Issei and their participation in the project. On the other hand, Head and Matsu-moto (and with them Nakaji of the LRB) were thinking less in terms of Nisei and Issei and more in terms of communication between the appointed personnel and the evacuees as a whole.

Edward H. Spicer

~~Community Analysis Section~~