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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
TULE LAKE CENTER
NEWELL, CALIFORNIA

Community Analysis Section
9/23/43

#2: EVACUEE ATTITUDES ON SEGREGATION TRACEABLE TO REGISTRATION
(In response to a request of the Project Director)

Our last report on segregation (dated September 16) emphasized the contrasts between the current program and registration at Tule Lake. We dealt with differences in the two periods, -- differences which lay largely in the realm of colonists' reception of the two programs. It was possible to trace these differences back to the decidedly contrasting methods of administrative handling and promotion in either case. We saw, when we considered the results, that the registration program had failed miserably, while segregation succeeded with notable success. The former program was never completed. The latter, from all indications, is virtually accomplished. Tule Lake had the poorest registration record. In regard to segregation, however, with the latest start of any of the centers in education, in promotion and in clarification of the policy, and moreover with the largest job and the most resistant center to contend with, the process will be completed on time. More important, as regards our future operations, while registration saw the colony become increasingly inimical to administration, segregation has enlisted the open co-operation of people from every block and Ward.

While it is easy to note differences between a policy which failed of accomplishment and one which succeeded, it is harder to see the similarities. The point is that we prevented evacuee attitudes from crystallizing along "registration lines" in the segregation period by different methods of promotion. This does not mean, however, that evacuee attitudes on segregation were never traceable to registration. As a matter of fact they were. It was our task throughout the program to convert patterns of thought and action into new molds and channels. The following report, therefore, deals with the legacy of registration in the segregation period. That "legacy", moreover, was not of our making. For segregation policy was based at many points on registration data, and it was impossible to blot out the registration period and its aftermath completely when the one program leaned heavily on the other.

Registration had failed here six months ago, and in colonists' opinion the W.R.A. had failed. A program intended to be carried to completion in little more than a week's time, "registration limped along leaving some 3000 still unregistered late in April" according to a report of the national office. On July 12, after segregation had been announced, we finally counted our registration casualties. Of 10580 required to register, 3030 or roughly one-third refused to comply; 1202 answered no to Question #28, most of them young, assimilated, Americanized youth; only 148 persons bothered to register late. Passive resistance had worked. It had never abated.

P.W.

In considering "legacies", it is important to scrutinize these figures. The following table gives the actual breakdown:

REGISTRATION DATA (as of July 12)

ITEM	Nisei--2nd Generation C I T I Z E N S			Issei--Parents A L I E N S			SUM TOTALS
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
Registered	2414	2308	4722	1803	1430	3357	8079**
Failed to Register:							
"Passive resistance"	656	587	1243	1185	602	1787	3030
Answered "no" to 28:							
"Disloyals"	702	484	1186	9	17	16	1202
Answered "yes" to 28:							Approx.
"Loyals"	304A's	1634		1882	1459	3341	6800
Late Registrants	42	38	80	46	22	68	148
Required to Register	2806	2717	5523	3053	2004	5057	10580

**Included in the 8079 are the late 148; the latter figure was increased earlier, and should probably stand at about 160.

The figures are curious. Large numbers of young citizens and older aliens alike refused to comply with the program; they failed to register. However, while more male aliens fell into this category than citizens of either sex, they were the "most loyal" group, when they did register returning more yes (loyal) answers than their citizenship-laden sons of the nisei generation. Moreover, male citizens, a highly Americanized and assimilated group generally, produced more no (disloyal) answers than all other groups taken together and including female citizens, and both male and female aliens. In fact, the number of male aliens returning a yes (loyal) answer is strikingly larger than the number of male citizens answering yes, while on the other hand, female citizens answered yes more frequently than female aliens. In all categories, few individuals registered late. In other words, the passive resistance or non-compliance never really abated. Male aliens refused to register until the substitute question was provided, and then registered yes. Their own Americanized sons, however, were more "disloyal" (on paper) than their unassimilated alien parents, and indeed, more "disloyal" as a group than the nisei girls or the aliens of either sex. They feared the program since it had been announced in the colony, by administration, as a Selective Service program, and rumored as being a universal draft of nisei youth regardless of marital status and dependency. Male aliens refused to register in the largest numbers because the Revised Form 126 was headed Application for Leave Clearance with connotations of forced relocation for an older generation group. Female citizens answered yes more frequently than male citizens because the draft was not implied in their case. The figures are not consistent with matters of loyalty, assimilation, or Americanization. The only inner logic they possess is explainable by reference to the mistakes and confusions of registration times at Tule Lake. Obviously, registration was no test of loyalty. Months later, the colony realized that not only did it fail to achieve this end, but it failed

of accomplishment. Tule Lake had the largest proportion of failures to register of all Relocation Centers. In many, the failures were negligible.

The segregation program at Tule Lake, by contrast, will be completed on time. Of a community which, less than two months ago, was gripped by a colony-wide passive resistance campaign, and only a month ago numbered over 400 refusals to comply with the program (refusal to go to another center), we now have virtually no casualties. There was the couple who did not leave when a marriage was effected between a "loyal" and a "disloyal"; there were the mistakes in record which placed a pregnancy case near parturition time on the final train list; there was the boy notified five minutes before train time that he had finally gone on the train list; there were the numerous last-minute medical removals. But divided up between various train-lists, such cases did not bulk large. Nor will we know until after a final case check-up, whether any resistance was present in such scattered, individual cases. The major fact of importance is that at the present tentative reading, trains went out according to plan, loaded to capacity, and in some cases even exceeding the Army quotas. To be exact, eight out of thirteen trains have gone out, and people have already left for all of the five projects designated for transferral. The following table, though tentative, summarizes the successful record. In it, the comment 100% indicates merely that the train went out at capacity with no known resistance cases left behind; resistances, if they are discovered, will prove to be a most minimal number. As indicated below, the record has been "perfect" on loadings for all trips save one:

<u>Destination</u>	<u>Trip No.</u>	<u>Sept. Date</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Granada	1	13	100%
Central Utah	6	17	100%
Heart Mt.	8	18	100%
Granada	5	19	100%
Jerome	10	20	Four known resistances, by family: Y. Kawaguchi (1801B, 5 in family); M. Mitsui (1801A, 6 in family); N. Iwasaki (606A, 4 in family); T. Nakao (1718D, 3 in family)
Jerome	12	21	100%
Central Utah	14	22	100%
Minidoka	16	23	100%

While the total for resistance cases is four families, comprising 18 persons, it should be remembered that only a week earlier the record showed seventeen families regarded as resistance cases, refusing to go to Jerome. The Jerome loadings are now complete, and in the five remaining train-loadings for Minidoka, Heart Mountain and Central Utah, there are no known refusals to move, no general patterns of resistance remaining in the colony, and no sign that they will not be accomplished 100% as well.

The difference between the two programs, however, is more than the difference between success and failure. It is a difference ⁱⁿ ~~between~~ handling and promotion. This is not to imply that the registration program was unreasonable, as policy, and segregation

beyond the pale of criticism. As a matter of fact, the situation is probably just the reverse. As one member of my staff (an Issei) wrote:

"Having seen the two trains Jerome-bound leave so smoothly for that most unpopular center, I am convinced that the segregation program was successfully carried out. While undoubtedly mistakes were made in routing certain individual cases to certain centers, time was short and I feel that most colonists realize that this time administration was more considerate and sympathetic than during registration and has done much to maintain the welfare of the people concerned. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that an atmosphere of resignation predominates in the colony. At the same time credit is due the present staff of administration for the good results. Apart from these results and the present mood, it would have been better if segregation did what it set out to do: separate loyal from disloyal; the program should have been utilized to correct completely the mistakes of registration by having hearings on an individual basis for every adult member of the colony. Of course, without careful and thorough preparation, this would have accomplished little. But with the amount of effort given segregation in so short a time, such a policy could have succeeded and with less resistance and fewer disloyals resulting. I personally think that registration was reasonable and I worked for it at some personal risk; but because of lack of preparation, little propaganda, and less education, it degenerated into a hopeless confusion. On the other hand, I am convinced that segregation, based as it was in large part on these past mistakes, was highly unreasonable and often senseless. But because of careful preparation and much educational promotion, it has been handled with success". (Rev. Daisuke Kitagawa)

In other words, according to my informant, the earlier program was reasonable but was mismanaged; while the segregation program, in spite of its unreasonable reliance on such registration records as we have noted above, was carried through to a successful conclusion -- and despite the fact that it was wide open to criticism. The contrast is curious. A poor program won, a good one failed. Evacuees, while they recognize the difference in the handling of each program, do not overlook the incorporation of registration, program and mistakes alike, into segregation policy. While colonists complied and even co-operated with administration in the segregation period, they did not in the least agree that the program had much to commend it.

Without commenting on the truth or falsity of the charges, let us present community attitudes to ^{ward} segregation traceable directly to the registration problem.

The biggest issue during registration was, at first, the so-called loyalty question. Our first point is that evacuation had produced a definite psychological effect on the people as a whole. Many, who in their former communities, were never very conscious of political questions like loyalty and allegiance, found themselves faced with allegations of mass-disloyalty, subjected to investigations, sent mass-fashion to assembly centers and later confronted, in Relocation Centers, with official looking forms and questionnaire sheets. The issei group had been assiduously prevented from

becoming citizens. Yet their children were citizens. In many cases, evacuation proved to them that their children were now second-class citizens, and during registration, parents instructed children, especially young women, to register "yes, if our citizenship rights are restored". For the issei, however, the issue of loyalty was a nebulous concept, since despite their peaceful, law-abiding record in this country, none were allowed to become members, or citizens of this nation in good standing. Consequently, the loyalty issue was easily displaced by such issues as Army draft of nisei, forced relocation for those signing affirmatively the Application for Leave Clearance, and Army "interference" in local administration.

Moreover, as we have stated earlier, the issei's translation for loyalty is "chusei". The word, in strict definition, means loyalty or allegiance. Yet, in common usage, it has a special meaning. In a semi-feudal nation cut off for centuries from outside contacts, "chusei" means the country of which one is a member, or a citizen, -- the feudal duties and connotations of citizenship. At registration time, consequently, elder issei complained against a form which required them to fore swear "chusei" -- or citizenship -- to the only nation which called them citizen. Their doctrine of "chusei" was far from impassioned, blind allegiance, and far from patriotic fervor. Rather, one was born into a country whether one liked it or not. And one changed "chusei" only when adopted into another one of the family of nations. Had the question been: Do you like the United States of America, do you wish to live here, do you regard it as your home? the answer would have been eager assent. As a matter of fact, when the Revised Form 126 was issued and the question later changed to abiding by the laws of this nation, the difference in response was noted, not only at this center, but elsewhere.

During the first phase of the segregation program here, issei particularly noted the variance in answers to the loyalty question among the members of their own families. Thus, segregation (kakuri) was immediately thought of in terms of family and community separation and universally opposed on such grounds. Being somewhat a-political in outlook (from our point of view), the crucial thing, especially for backward rural California issei was family and community separation. For in both these forms of social organization are safeguarded, or so they feel, all those a-political phenomena of customs, language, etiquette, and culture which they know so well. Registration, by its assumed nature, -- Army draft, forced relocation, -- threatened the solidarity of family and community. Whether loyalty meant ties of a more cultural sort, or political affinity, most were unable to judge. Loyalty meant membership, according to the "chusei" doctrine. To regard themselves as "disloyal" in our sense of the term, -- violent saboteurs and perfervid patriots of Japan, -- was a picture which never occurred to mundane imaginations. Hence, feeling cornered on the "chusei" issue, they asked: Do we have to register? What are the penalties? on and on. The question commonly asked of issei during segregation (until we learned better!) was do you want to be Japanese? Again, in the peasant mind, this seemed a silly question. (I speak Japanese, am called Japanese, etc.) At all points in both programs one finds the older colonists, a crucial element, seeking an answer to a vague political concept they never really fully understood.

In registration, "chusei" was confused with Army draft and forced relocation as we have said. In segregation, similarly, since loyalty had connotations of movement, our rumors and resistances also began to follow the idea-pattern of registration times, this time Army draft and forced relocation of issei being thought of as the "penalties" attached to movement to the "loyal" centers. During segregation, however, we were not recapitulating the picture of registration times since the comparable rumors were spiked one by one and early in the program. Nevertheless, the issues arose since during registration, the three policies of registration, Combat Team operations, and the relocation program were stressed simultaneously and confused in people's minds. To quote a Washington report: "Perhaps a more serious example of misinformation was the project director's belief that the army registration was ordered by Selective Service". (Army and Leave Clearance Registration, June '43, p. 17). We are appending three documents which provide abundant evidence of some of these confusions; they are: (1) Chronological Order of Registration (prepared by a Committee of my staff together with the Planning Board); (2) Questions at Tule Lake Pertaining to Form Dss 304-A; and (3) Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Council, February 12, 1943. Comment on these documents would be superfluous. The clarification of questions was accomplished largely through the instrumentality of the Planning Board and City Council after the original confusions were broadcast. A "Statement to the People" was sent by Mr. Coverley to the Planning Board and through them disseminated in the colony at the height of the confusion; it ended: "All the information necessary to a thorough understanding of the registration program has been published. All the questions have been asked and answered many times. It is obvious that the giving of further information is neither necessary or desired..." A statement was prepared by the Planning Board at the time when block patterns of resistance were crystallizing, which read:

"In regard to the current registration problem, this is to remind you again as stated by Mr. Harry Mayeda (Chairman of the City Council) and endorsed by Mr. M. Yamashita (Chairman of the Planning Board) at the first joint meeting of the City Council, Planning Board, and the Block Managers on February 10, that the representatives of the above-mentioned organizations should make every effort to dissuade their block people from making any group decisions. Registration is a matter of individual judgment, and the final decision should be left up to each person..." This document, intended to stem the tide, was returned by the project director with the statement: "I am unable to approve this statement. I hardly believe it would assist materially in clarifying the situation. In particular I feel it would be unwise to concur in the second sentence...Registration is not a matter of individual judgment. It is a requirement..." (dated February 23rd)

While the misapprehensions of segregation were not thus nurtured to the point of crystallization, segregation too suggested family break-up (separation of relatives) and certainly community break-up. By various means, discussed in earlier reports, we prevented block-by-block patterns of resistance from forming and solidifying. Yet with segregation inextricably bound up with movement, and movement reviving notions of the draft and forced relocation, a certain amount of psychological confusion resulted. The primary fact, then, is

that the former communities transplanted to Tule Lake, and the family bonds of earlier times, produced a highly interdependent and interacting group of individuals. At all times when this cohesiveness and solidarity was threatened, the populace experienced a sense of loss. They feared the worse and indulged their penchant for rumors to the hilt. In a sense, the grapevine knit the community together. And according to the grapevine, we are again being made the "guinea pigs" of W.R.A. policy. A mass feeling of discrimination was present in both programs. It was necessary, during segregation, to break this down initially by bringing administration and the colony in closer contact, by disseminating information completely and simply, and by showing, whenever possible, a kind and sympathetic "understanding" of the colony.

There was, nevertheless, the difficulty of determining loyalty accurately in a community in which the crucial issei element was backward politically. In the colony, the feelings of fear and insecurity shifted from fear of movement to fears of particular centers. Thus, during segregation, we were able to cut down obvious resistances by keeping abreast of the mood of the colony. But, while we changed fear to resignation and resistances to open compliance, it was impossible to justify the program, based on registration, in the minds of the colonists. Many more-enlightened colonists confessed the belief that such processes, compounded at some distance from the realities of the colony, and imposed regardless of those realities, dissipated confidence in the W.R.A. The most interesting aspect of this idea is the notion that those basically loyal and committed to remaining in this country are impelled in an opposite direction. In a great many cases, for example, segregation "froze disloyalty" as of February, 1943, by requiring sons of fathers wishing to remain to pledge "disloyalty" in no uncertain terms. In other words, just as registration was confused with extraneous issues, so registration-based segregation was confused with movement, the "penalty" of leaving Tule Lake, the fears of what lay beyond. And with registration revived and utilized in this program, the issue became the possibility of forced relocation, aggravated of course by faulty reference here to Form 130 (Application for Indefinite Leave), by the Chronicle statement about closing the other centers. In registration times, people asked endlessly whether the registration was an "application for leave clearance". During segregation, they watched for any indication that the other centers might close.

Then, too, so far as issei were concerned, assurance was given them during registration that there was, with the substitute question, no "chusei" problem involved. All they were required to do was pledge to be law-abiding and not to interfere with the national war effort. Locally, they were told in addition to rest assured that registration in terms of an application for leave clearance did not mean that those who registered expressed by so doing a desire to relocate. Furthermore, it was made clear to them finally that an Application for Leave Clearance (in print!) was not an application for leave, and that registration alone did not make the registrant eligible for leave.

Because of these emphases, it proved exceedingly difficult to promote the segregation program. Said one colonist: "If the segregation program is carried out to separate loyal from disloyal, as has

been stated repeatedly in official announcements, W.R.A. is contradicting itself with regard to its answer to the loyalty question at the time of registration. If not for the "chusei" question, then what is segregation for? Naturally, the issei yes-answerers who were given all these assurances think that segregation, since it is not based on a "chusei" question according to the substitute Question 28, get suspicious. They end by thinking it is a step taken to force the older issei evacuees to relocate." This statement is not atypical. It occurred in public meetings, and one variation was addressed to the Project Director. Issei if they were aged and did not wish to move, appeared at social welfare interviews proclaiming a combination of illness and "fu-chusei" (disloyalty). In public, they claimed that agreement to abide by the laws of this nation and to refrain from interference with the national war effort was a far cry from "chusei". The reference to the substitute Question 28 was constant. They still insisted in their own minds, and for popular consumption, that real "chusei", or citizenship, had been denied to them. That somehow, the framers of the substitute Question 28 were tricking them into a movement which must mean "forced relocation" or mean nothing.

There is a further connection between registration times and the present policy. During registration, mass decisions were made in many blocks and Ward areas. There were mass movements toward repatriation, hysterical and issei-led. In a Japanese community, notably, when a group of neighbors, family patriarchs, get together and decide on a policy or mode of action, it is bad "ethics", if not bad etiquette for individuals in that group to act otherwise at a later time. As with the doctrine of "chusei" with its feudal pattern of rigorous conformity, so with the act of group decisions: they are adhered to collectively and maintained through a thousand instrumentalities of issei, community-leadership control. There are many persons at Tule Lake, who, in the sheer confusion and hysteria of registration times, shared in a mass decision reached at a block meeting. Hence, the warning, quoted above, from the Community Council-Planning Board-Block Managers meeting to refrain from mass decisions. An assiduous searcher for hobgoblins might find in these uniform responses evidence of "subversive organization" where there is none. Rather the mass-decision is a Japanese community trait, centered in patterns of elder patriarch control, and even recorded in statecraft until recently when militarist guns went off in their direction in the pattern of the elder statesmen making national decisions. At any rate, after the hysteria of registration wore off, people were able to recognize mistakes and shortsighted elder statesmen in their own block. Nevertheless, one whole group, -- the repatriates, -- were frozen in "disloyalty". At the same time, during segregation, individuals who earnestly wished in their private minds to be reclassified as loyal, felt sufficiently guilty at betraying an earlier block decision in which they took a stand earlier, assumed responsibility, and pledged "with the group". Thus while we were able, during segregation, to prevent new block patterns of resistance from forming, we could not erase earlier block decisions. With people afraid to "lose face", we did, in Mr. Best's second colony-wide address, stress so far as was advisable the element of choice. The appeal from the Project Director, who alone carried enough prestige to state the message, had the effect of erasing some slates. Not all.

Connected with this fact and not reported hitherto is another factor which contributed to the difficulty of segregation times. Issei not only felt "put on the spot" by registration, and later, routed out "without choice" to another center for a yes-answer to Substitute 28; they also felt indignant that the penalty of movement was not known in advance. This psychological characteristic of Japanese of wanting to know the "penalty" was well-revealed during registration in the most frequently repeated question of the time. The question then was: Is registration compulsory or not, and if so, what is the penalty attached to it? The significance of this question, and its repetition ad nauseam is that the colonists did not wish to be responsible for personal decisions concerning registration, and did not relish facing the assumed consequences in draft or relocation. If it was compulsory on the other hand, and the penalties known, they could comply regardless of consequences and lay the future blame on official shoulders. Thus, in segregation after the worst fears and anxieties were allayed, it was thought advisable to make a positive statement that transfer was absolutely compulsory for certain categories of registrants. Nisei, more Americanized, tended to view this as unfair and undemocratic. But the limiting of choice, by official order, was far easier for the issei to swallow. Thus, personal interviews with resistant cases routed to Jerome did much to apply the seal of official orders to the transfer; likewise, a letter from the Project Director, tactfully phrased, broke down the resistance to Jerome. By making a policy compulsory at the strategic moment, people whose resistances are individually dissipated can then comply because regardless of consequences they will be able to say they were forced to comply. On the other hand, colonists must be won over and their individual fears destroyed before such rigor and official pronouncement will have effect. During registration, the orders were out, but the fears and resistances were multiplied. In segregation, on the other hand, education and promotion preceded stern orders, and individuals who privately wished to break with a block decision, who viewed the fence, the tanks, the closed gate with apprehension, could find safe-retreat from a resistant stand in official pronouncements. A positive attitude on the part of administration thus furnished a face-saving device for those who somehow wished to leave anyway. This point is no plea for strict orders at all points in any W.R.A. program. As a matter of fact, when the individual does not want to change his mind, there is no necessity to save face. In registration, no amount of stern attitude moved a population convinced that resistance was the proper path. One convinces first, or never. And in a mixed population of nisei and issei alike, the simple formula of "orders and proceed" is dangerous to the morale of a younger generation which knows little of safe retreat and face-saving devices.

In segregation, therefore, we did not correct the mistakes of registration times, and colonists knew it. We did not, nor could we, prevent a telescoping of the two issues of loyalty and movement. A policy which would keep separate and distinct three processes: 1) Individualized loyalty-screening; (2) segregation or separation at a later period; and (3) the actual announcement of movement might have succeeded in dropping the population below 20,000. Instead there ^{are} many people at Tule Lake with memories of mass-handling.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
TULE LAKE CENTER
NEWELL, CALIFORNIA

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION: SEPTEMBER 28, 1943
#3: ATTITUDES OF ISSEI REMAINING AT TULE LAKE

This topic, the attitudes of Issei remaining at Tule Lake, cannot be considered without reference to opinions and ideas which were formed among the older generation group in the recent period of their experiences under the War Relocation Authority. More specifically, the attitudes of Tuleans easily stem from particular experiences at this center. To begin with, there has been at Tule Lake a feeling among the older generation that those who leave this center are leaving with a definite prospect of forced relocation. During registration, the unfortunately-named Application for Leave Clearance tended to fix this idea in people's minds and this form, No. 126, since it was applicable to the older alien group, bore out the notion. Then too, as we have stated in recent reports, the routing out of those Issei who answered yes to substitute 28 in this revised form and who went under compulsion to other centers in the segregation program suggested a new method of obtaining relocation for this older generation group. Besides these two waves of fear in regard to relocation, the Issei, generally speaking, at Tule Lake have always been inimical to relocation since they represent a group who are economically unable to go elsewhere and start anew, or who by reason of large families or the fear of movement eastward into impersonal urban surroundings wished to remain here. Some yes-answering individuals in this group are able to remain at Tule Lake by virtue of no answers among members of their immediate family. They therefore represent a group who wish to stay and when taken together with the refusals to register and repatriate categories, we have a group which has answered the forced relocation fear by settling down solidly in this camp.

It may be said that the reaction against forced relocation and the urge to remain here is intensified by a general dislike in the older generation of further movement. After all, in the vast majority of cases movement was accompanied by economic loss and personal discomforts. The dislike of moving again on the part of the aged is mingled, therefore, with an attitude of resignation and a feeling that mass discrimination has been visited upon themselves and their people. Thus, the phrases run:

"This place is just as good as any other."

"Any camp is a camp as to fences and watch towers."

"We have been taught by everything done to us recently that we have no opportunities in this country."

"A few people here have strong feelings that their future interests lie in Japan."

"After all, all the opportunities were wiped out and the old people are tired and broken and don't know where to start." There are therefore a complex series of reactions involving fear of the WRA relocation policy, annoyance at the recent series of movements, and resignation that verges on defeat.

P.W.

The fear of WRA policy among issei in this center is connected with lack of confidence in that organization. With families separated and communities moved out, the administrator of policy and program, -- the WRA, -- becomes the most convenient target for criticism. Issei, being somewhat a-political in their outlook, are consequently unaware of the pressure groups who really beset them. But with confidence in WRA policy dissipated, it is easy to disbelieve any program. Thus during segregation, a common phrase was the WRA policy will change again within a year, and it will be easy enough to open the doors of the now-closed camp. As a matter of fact, some families have separated willingly and consciously with this belief in mind, and we therefore have some few issei in the present center who have failed to move with their families for reasons of convenience, and the like.

With those who have felt that their hopes are destroyed, there is some wishful thinking concerning the opportunity of returning to Japan at the close of the war. Some who feel, short-sightedly, that their future is gone in this country have told me that all expenses will be paid for such a trip. In addition, I have found relatively few individuals who have looked into the matter closely enough to realize that upon settlement in Japan, there is a fee that must be paid by the registering new comer. Nevertheless the wishful thinking goes to even further lengths, and I have heard during segregation the belief that those remaining will receive compensation as prisoners of war. The feelings of issei who remain are complicated by the patterns of attitudes within their own families. Some filial souls, even in the issei category, feel the duty which is basically not political to parents and relatives in Japan. At the same time those remaining have generally in their second generation or Nisei children a group of youngsters who more strongly feel the duty of remaining with the family. Not all issei however feel that they carry the family with them. Some realize that the imposition of their will upon their children has been accompanied again with feelings of resignation.

While it is difficult to generalize about a matter in which statistics on interviews may be most misleading, it is probably true to say that by and large the issei who have remained at Tule Lake are a group which feel themselves beset with certain problems and already have in mind the solution which this camp offers. For example, in regard to the inter-generation clash, there is the opinion in certain circles that following segregation there will be schools here devoted to education of a completely Japanicized type. Those who feel that their future lies in Japan in an economic sense and who note that their nisei children are already Americanized to an extent, feel that such thoroughgoing education in the language and customs, the history and geography, and the etiquette of their birthplace will fit their youngsters to go with them, thus solving all problems. Some go so far as to think that there will be no recreation or entertainment of an Americanized style. Though the issei who feel completely defeated in this country are a minority even among the segregees, still some who purposely remain here are dreaming of such a state of affairs. During segregation the inevitable phrase, "Do you want to be Japanese?" seem so ludicrous to those who spoke the language exclusive-

ly and came from cultural enclaves that they accepted the end of their careers in this nation with the same thought that rejected any future plans for life here. Consequently, the discussion of the "disloyal center", "Japanese center", etc. stimulated the desire to remain here in some people's minds.

While not all issei remaining have been swayed by these ideas, a number who remain here feel that after segregation, there will be little internal trouble and dissension because of the feeling that those coming here can accept their Japanese language, customs, and culture with no rebuttal. That is, not only is relocation going to be minimized here, but the people here will be of one mind. As long as the privilege of living in conformity with these ideas is satisfied, there will be unity in this center, so they say. However, it should not be forgotten that a majority of segregates hold to these ideas because they feel they fit in with future plans of living and future economic possibilities. The question is not so much one of loyalty. What is more important to a man who relies upon his son for future support is that these sons will not be drafted under selective service. During registration and again during segregation, there was the fear that compliance with each program would lead to army draft of nisei. It must be remembered that the older generation of fathers stands at a considerable distance in age in the majority of cases from their children, and the idea is not so much selfish retiring as a feeling that the number of years left for productive work are mighty few. In addition to this, the feeling of recent discrimination leads to the notion that one's pride as a person of Japanese ancestry will not be injured in this center. Thus the individuals remaining have many of them a feeling of security about this center,--its exemption from selective service, its unity, its pride in common language and custom, and its divorcement from the whole disturbing emphasis on relocation into areas and in times which are fraught with uncertainty.

Against the background of this type of sentiment of the remaining group of issei, one can foresee a conflict both in background and in objectives between themselves and their youngsters. While nisei differ from individual to individual as indeed the issei do, there is little doubt that the average nisei speaks Japanese poorly, writes it not at all or with less facility, and, generally speaking, knows little of the economic and social arrangements of modern Japan. While also some nisei fall in the category of those who remain willingly, and depend entirely upon parental decisions, there are some even in this center who are forced to remain, often by virtue of the fact that the sons were the only no-answerers available in the family constellation who could guarantee the entire family remaining. This is evidenced in the extreme case by some individuals who argued vehemently with their parents when the trains went out or when the fence went up, one case actually being that of a boy who visited violence upon a mother because she required him to maintain a negative answer. Thus many nisei are already highly Americanized, culturally speaking, by virtue of the education they received, the language they learned, the jobs they held, and the life they led; and it would be difficult, in view of the slowness of human adaptations for such individuals to change culture overnight. Some nisei in the back of their minds, crave recreation and entertainment of the Western type, and no matter how unconsciously one runs counter to the desires of the older generation, the nisei have, as everyone knows, a different cultural back-

ground and another set of experiences. Since no one whether issei or nisei will willingly seek a career in the realm of the unknown and the unfamiliar, we may expect two opposite pulls to be manifested in the cultural and ideological life of the center. In dealing with the bi-cultural population, no simple formula applied to either group separately will do justice to the population as the whole. While admitting that in terms of family structure, nisei will respond to pressures on the part of their parents, it is equally true to say that at the same time there will be a number of unconscious resistances, and in a camp of this sort, other psychological pulls and pressures exerted outside the family picture. It is of vital importance for the WRA to decide what policy it is going to follow regarding such matters as the education of nisei in the Tule Lake center; and equally important is the necessity to state the policy concerning Japanicized education in this center. Since people are approaching these matters with definite attitudinal sets in mind, it is probably advisable for the WRA to determine upon a rather rigid policy in this matter, which will be carried out with inexorable consistency. In view of the different generation groups represented and the various motivations and interests found here also, probably the recognition of various types, of various motivations, and various attitudes would be desirable from the outset. Otherwise, there may well be a tendency for groups feeling pressured into a way of life to organize in opposition. What we are saying, at bottom, is that despite the euphonious label of disloyalty applied to all people here, there are still divergent cultures represented, notably in the Americanized nisei, and the culturally Japanicized issei, which by virtue of different backgrounds and knowledge and experience present different types within the local population. In other words, to be realistic one must go beneath the generalized labels. And to be practical, the program must be realistic enough to keep organization open and above board.

In view of these various groupings and the feeling that the center should accommodate their interests, a certain amount of frustration is to be anticipated, especially during the period of movement and the organization of the new center when few activities and little educational program are in evidence. The issei, with their strong feeling of consistency and also because decisions in regard to remaining here or coming here were often made on a group basis, will therefore rationalize and justify the stand they have taken. If the center does not conform to their anticipated standards, many will undoubtedly complain about that fact. Some, those who maintain consistency with a position taken at registration times, are unquestionably regretting to an extent that they chose this course in view of the present discomforts and disorganization. The latter feeling, I feel, was never admitted by the older group beyond the point of viewing the departure of friends during train movements with great sorrow. In this regard, the nisei remaining were more outspoken. But the older generation's refusal to admit mistake or agree to a change in course may result in a more aggressive attitude against "administration" and though it is early to predict, I think complaints about the new center may well take the form of the theme of broken promises, frequently promises made at the other center. Concerning the tendency of the nisei to escape the situation, there is some probability that the older generation may insist all the more strongly that the youngsters conform. We have therefore the possibility of youth problem centered in resentful attitudes.

Refusal to be morally responsible may take the form of "what's the use" or "I don't care". Under pressure of the Kibei groups as well, there is a good possibility that unless organizational outlets will provide for the nisei, they may feel "out of the picture", and act accordingly.

While this essay is not concerned primarily with the attitudes and problems of the nisei, since they fall within the same family groups as the older generation, there will undoubtedly be a reactive influence among the issei in response to the youth problem. When, for example, problems arise in the new center of the type mentioned above, issei may well feel that something is lacking: that the program has overlooked the recreational, educative activities that were expected and that the agency in various ways is not giving them enough control. In the past, there were criticisms of mess arrangements which were ^{not} on a family basis and a considerable furor over the "delinquency problem", (usually phrased as W. R. A. organizing activities that take the young people ^{the} out of a controllable realm and running all the way to criticisms of how long since initiated Hollywood movie program). It is well to remember that in terms of influence and autonomy, the nisei will become more of a minority than at present, that is nisei of 18 and over; they will be a minority both in terms of number and influence, and the way is clear for issei to become the dominant group, with kibei, the second in prestige. As we will see in a later report, a more aggressive type of kibei has tended to take the initiative and leadership in certain respects, particularly those of more mature age. What this adds up to is issei domination, which is to be expected, and in addition, a critical response on the part of the older generation to the problems of their more Americanized children.

"The word, "isei", is too generalized a term, however, to explain many of the variations in attitudes to be expected. After all, this generation group may function in various ways in family organization, religious groups, and activity clubs. To specify the possible trend of religious attitudes, it could be noted that the Buddhist group will share noticeably in control of sentiment and in prominence in the community. Many of the trends noted above apply to this grouping, though, as a religious organization, it has special characteristics. I am thinking now not only of the Buddhist groups in the old Tule center who remain but even more so of the Buddhist groups who are coming to join them. In the past, a noticeable point about this religious organization was that in spite of the fact that it enjoyed a two-thirds majority in the center, there was a tendency for nisei to move over to Christian church organization especially those who planned on relocation. The point was that the Buddhist church had less representation in the middle west and the east coast than on the Pacific seaboard, and nisei realizing this, would look to church organization of the type found in these sections of the country (Christian) as the link between themselves and the community in which they wished to make some headway. Besides this, the young people's Buddhist organization here (Y. B. A.) was somewhat dissociated from the elder Buddhist group. Its types of activities, interests, and promotional schemes were similar to those of the young Christians, and it could be said to function much more as a social organization, with its forms and entertainments and Sunday night lectures, than as the typical Buddhist church which is religious in essence. Thus the Buddhist group proper, that is, the church group excluding the Young Buddhist Association,

was somewhat inactive in participation in civic affairs. It would seem that this was largely because such leaders felt somewhat on the spot under the circumstances and also because of the fact that the Christian group in both adult and youth phases became a rather aggressive, almost civic, organization. Following segregation, however, the ratio of Buddhist to Christian will be further increased, and the Christian community will lose the crucial part of its leadership. At the same time, prominent Buddhists are appearing at this center and they will feel reassured if they can carry on with little conflict. The Buddhist church, further, with its emphasis on the older family pattern and community organization, will be more in keeping with the picture of the center as a whole. Since, however, Christian groups, even as minorities, will attempt to organize, conflict will arise inevitably. Much will undoubtedly depend on the specific types of leadership in each organization but it should be remembered that in the minds of the least acculturated issei, especially the non-Christians, religious and cultural, and national affairs are more closely integrated than are Christianity and Western European culture. To them Christianity is a religion of western nations, and the United States a Christian nation; Christianity might well become kind of pro-Americanism to their way of thinking, wide open to criticism.

Among those issei remaining, there will be some who regret the closure of the camp, perhaps even their earlier decision to remain here. I should think these groups, even if a minority numerically, are no less important than any other special groupings in the local population. There will be some, too, who come to realize the difficulty of changing children in a short period of time and who may come more and more to think of their future as being here. There will be some whose decision is based on economic considerations primarily, and others who already have crystallized opinions to the effect that their treatment here cannot help but be discomfoting. Thus among those staying, there are some who will want a chance to change their decision without wishing to appear to change it unless some loophole is provided. The difficulty in this decision is preventing any impression from arising in the colony to the effect that W. R. A. is again changing policy, since for some, no safe retreat in conformity of official orders was provided for changing the earlier decision, there being a category in the population who do not wish to lose face or to go back on an earlier decision, yet who are in effect frozen temporarily to this center. In regard to this point, great caution must be taken to see that under no circumstances is an impression given that the agency or the government is anxious to relocate or move to other centers those who are supposed to be segrgees.

I think in summary it is safe to say that the general attitude in the colony will become one of cynicism and dependency mixed together. The cynicism will occur when the young people tend to remain unchanged and the dependency will be manifested by the fact that many of the issei who have come here or remained here have done so to escape somewhat insistent pressures to relocate. Besides our general influx of unmarried kibei, there is an equally great influx of issei who with large families find it difficult to relocate. The initial disappointment of income to the center, though it has been based partly on housing inadequacy, the current lack of community activities, together with the difficulty of adjusting to a new center, has also been influenced by the belief that this center within the bounds of California and not too far from the coast is the way out. This notion is probably exaggerated in

people's minds as the solution to their problems. Thus, while this is to be, as some put it, the "Japanese" center, there will remain a great deal of dependency on the part of various groups in this population on the steps taken by the administration to provide a suitable pattern of life for the residents. Once we get away from the idea that the center is not peopled by a uniform and unvaried group or type, we shall be well along the road of recognizing the varieties of social groupings which will, all of them, look to this center and its administration as the solution, although temporarily, for their problems.

The following is a summary of attitudes based on an, as yet, insufficient sampling of the population remaining. While the attitudes may be labeled issei attitudes, there is no presumption that they are not shared by other groups as well, that is, on other generation levels. In our discussion above, we have stated the inter-generation differences to the point to which it is safe to generalize, noting only those variations in attitude and outlook which appear in all interviews almost one hundred percent. Below are attitudes which appear to be prevalent and which will be checked further as time allows.

I: "I'm remaining in this camp because of a stand taken at registration times." Under this head, come those who voted in conformity with a block decision during registration and who held to a group decision. A refusal to register guaranteed one against relocation during registration times, so many thought. Lack of trust in W. R. A. policy led also to disbelief that the Form 126,--Application for Leave Clearance,--was merely a blank for loyalty registration. Very important factor (75%).

II: "I'm remaining because of pre-evacuation, evacuation, and post-evacuation discrimination." Often feeling of group discrimination antedates the war period. The further one goes into this question, the more issei seem to divulge of the entire past history of discrimination. (75% - 80%)

III: "I'm remaining because of family dependency." (About 50% only because of the high percentage of bachelors among those remaining. However, much of the remaining population consists of the larger families. Smaller families have already, many of them, relocated.)

IV: Family members in Japan. While the family without relatives in Japan is few and far between, this reason seems hardly to be a cause. It helps people make up their minds and furnishes a way out if other factors have sufficient weight. Some issei, perhaps 10%, will mention relatives in Japan and the possibility of returning there for last rites. This factor is hardly the deciding factor, however.

V: Property Loss. (Practically everyone can report some property loss. Economic losses seemed to begin in the war period, even before evacuation, though evacuation produced the greatest hardships. The loss has continued in the period of project residence. About 90% discuss economic loss with sufficient concreteness (and vehemence!) to indicate a causal factor.

VI: Discrimination, along with property loss and registration mistakes is the most prevalent factor. As reported earlier, Project Analysis:

Report on Resettlement, evacuee psychology is based on evacuee experiences, especially the feeling of mass-discriminatory handling. (About 90%).

A case, typical for the Northwestern grouping, is appended as typical of personal statements obtained. As can be seen, the above factors integrate into a generalized picture in many of the cases. Few are remaining for a single reason.

Mr. A has been one of the leaders in the project ever since his arrival in one of the first groups. He was a block manager and the first elected chairman of the Block Manager's organization. He has a large family including his elderly parents, his wife and five small children, the youngest of whom was born on the project. He was born and educated in this country, and except for a slight accent has been quite thoroughly assimilated both socially and in his business contacts most of which were outside the Japanese community. He was quite a successful berry farmer on Bainbridge Island just outside Vancouver.

TYPICAL
CASE

His father came to this country over 40 years ago, and had, about 10 years, prior to evacuation, fully decided to live the rest of his life and die here. This is evidenced by the fact that the father returned to Japan before 1930 to dispose of all of his property there except for one small piece of land belonging to his wife's family which he felt he had no right to sell. He then returned to the United States with the intention of remaining. However, now that he has lost most of his property and all chances for success in this country, he says as quoted by his son, "As soon as possible, I will take the first boat back even if it is only a row boat." Mr. A says, "I left high school when I was a freshman to make the first payment on our property on Bainbridge Island. We had a nice place there with a home on it and 15 acres of good land. The water system cost me \$2,000. I spent a thousand dollars for one 5-acre additional piece uncleared, and even the well cost us a lot. It hurt me to spend 12 years building it up and then to have it all torn down. I don't like to do that all over again, and feel that it's going to be torn down again. When that happens to us it really hurts. I'm trying to forget it but I haven't been able to get over it.

"Bainbridge Island wasn't big enough for me so I went on into Oregon and lost my shirt. Then I started farming in Vancouver and did pretty nicely, but Bainbridge Island was always our home. I suppose it's bragging, but I had the best credit standing of anyone around there. You can't just go into a bank and float a two or three thousand dollar loan without any security. But, I could do it.

"Most of my friends were American people. I played sports with them, went to school with them, and worked with them for years. If I went back there, I could start with nothing; but who's going to help me out in the Middle West? If they want to make a workman out of me, I couldn't feed nine mouths. Who's going to pay me three or four hundred dollars a month? Back home, I used to get \$250.00 a month between seasons working for a packing company because they wanted me to buy from the Japanese farmers. Where could I go where there would be many Japanese farmers, and why should a company hire

me to buy from American farmers when they could do it themselves? If I'm going to go into my savings anyway, I might as well stay here and do it and not wear myself out.

"I wish I had saved the letter I got from that real estate agent. He offered me \$3,500 for my home and the land. I got so mad I crumpled it up, threw it into the stove and jammed the top down. It was ridiculous to offer me that amount of money. It didn't begin to come up to the value of the place. When I left, I had to rent it for \$250 a year. That's hardly enough rent for the house itself. When I was leasing land near Vancouver, I had to pay over \$600 a year for land like that. I am not going to sell for any measly \$3,500. I don't care who takes the land over. I don't want to give them a title for that amount.

"It hurt to get kicked around so much. We couldn't join a Labor Union because we were 'Japs'. We couldn't get insurance. I had paid 150 to 200 dollars a year for 10 or 12 years for insurance on the trucks and cars I operated in my business,-- that was \$2,000 in policies. And then one day, the insurance agent came to me and said, 'I'm sorry but the company says we have to cancel your policy.' He was a friend of mine, and I had always bought my policies from him. This was just after Japan had declared war on China. He said that the insurance company made him do it because a 'Jap' doesn't have a Chinaman's chance in the courts. The attorney will look at the case and say everything is fine. It is all right until you get up on the stand, then when they see you're a Jap, you are lost. You know that hurt. After paying over \$2,000 in policies and not being able to have any protection. I never cost the insurance company a cent, and I just wanted the same protection that anyone else gets.

"We used to take our produce down to a big market in Portland, and we'd have to leave home about 3:30 in the morning to hit the market in time. I wanted to get up a caravan so we could still deliver during the curfew. I went to the district attorney in Seattle, and he gave me permission to make up a caravan with an army escort to go as far as the Oregon border. Then I went to the Portland district attorney, Mr. Mac Donough, and he wouldn't do a thing for me. He said, 'We don't want you 'Japs' on our streets.' If the government treats you that way, what chance do you have? I have a witness in a friend went with me.

"If when the war is over, when they open the front gate and say, now you go home and start over, we'll try to help you as you go along, we can't do it all at once because there are so many of you, but we'll do the best we can,--then, I couldn't complain. But, now we're just being bounced around like a football, and we don't know which way we're bouncing. When they try to send us somewhere the American people have just left in the last few years because of drought or weather, and want us to start from scratch with that land, it's hard to take. I had a little more than most of my neighbors and so I lost more. My parents are 68 and 70 so they can't work and my wife can't work because she has too many children. I have five

children. That would give me 9 mouths to feed if I relocated now."

A final word of caution is necessary. While the above factors show high incidence from case to case, all individual cases differ and no two family circumstances may be said to be the same. Besides this, we find that the larger family unit, that is the culturally recognized extended family, is broken up by the process of segregation, some branches of the family leaving while others remain. In many of these cases, it is felt that the family has a stake, therefore, both in this center, and in the outside picture of relocation centers or resettlement. In such cases, parts of the family have removed for educational reasons, or because relocation seems feasible for a smaller family unit within the larger one. In addition, within the larger family, some units have decided to separate, since relocation is a remote possibility, while others have gone out. In the main, it can be said that much of the remaining population is composed of family units of which the family head is handicapped by age, by size of family or by a definite feeling that the work or business to which he is suited is difficult to manage in times like these. Many families exhibiting these characteristics have surprisingly young children in view of the age of the family head and this contributes in no small measure to a feeling of insecurity concerning relocation, the inadequacy of wage rates when one considers the cost of living for a large family. A very common feeling reported to this office is that relocatees will be stuck in antagonistic community in the immediate post-war period when crippled soldiers return and when the post-war boom is over. One recent visitor to the office spoke of a series of incidents in Spokane, Washington which have already occurred because of such circumstances. Add to this the general feeling that relocation may be possible from this center even after segregation is over and the picture is clear that segregates as a group, and the Issei generation in particular, are motivated in remaining here by a variety of extraneous reasons.

(Dictated by M. K. Opler)



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Tule Lake Project
Newell, California

Project Analysis Report #4: July 9, 1943
Community Analysis Section

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AS SEEN IN COMMUNITY REACTIONS TO ADMINISTRATIVE
INSTRUCTION No. 34, SUPPLEMENT 2, REVISED

In previous reports, this office has stressed uniformities in prevalent opinion and attitude at Tule Lake. Our major emphasis has been upon the formation of dominant attitudes at this Center, and, in a general way, upon the social and cultural factors here making for community organization. In the light of this review of prevailing social trends, it is surprising to note that Tule Lake lacks social controls in the realm of political, or civic governmental, organization. What we have dealt with thus far are social forces which are unifying in their effects: similarities in cultural backgrounds or social experiences, identities in attitude, generalized trends in opinion, common reactions. These are the social forces which may be called centripetal. We have seen them emerge in the study of the major contours and general outlines of social organization at Tule Lake, and have described the manner in which they relate, on the side of attitude and opinion, with problems inherent in relocation and resettlement. It is realized, however, that such an approach to fundamental aspects of community life excludes, at certain points, the shadings, the differences in attitude and emotional effect, and the many factions which necessarily appear in any community like the one under discussion.

In other words, the centripetal forces of social organization here are counterbalanced by the centrifugal forces of social disorganization. Both processes take place concurrently. If one attempts to feel the pulse of community sentiment, the odds are that a sensitive touch will reveal both types of pressure. The present paper, dealing with an aspect of social disorganization, cannot completely ignore attempts at organization. The best we can do, therefore, is to filter out each trend, remark the opposite pulls and tensions, and analyze the opposing forces separately.

But to begin, it is necessary first to analyze the social disorganization trend at Tule Lake in its general outlines. The fact is that Tuleans, in their many disparate and former communities, were interdependent particularly in matters concerning economic affairs, the maintenance of community and familial control, the preservation of religious forms, and the provisioning of socialized forms of recreation. No one who has seriously studied the Japanese-American immigrant communities has failed to remark the phenomena generally associated with the phrase "community solidarity." The study of S. F. Miyamoto (in Univ. of Wash. publications in the Social Sciences, vol. II, no. 2, pp. 57-130) entitled Social Solidarity Among the Japanese in Seattle, is a case in point, and countless other studies illustrate the same fact. These communities we have called in earlier reports "cultural enclaves," a term emphasizing cultural distinctiveness. Here we might note

a second characteristic of such communities among the Japanese: their cohesiveness, their solidarity and the interdependence of their members.

In considering the factors making for disunity and social disorganization in community life at Tule Lake, therefore, one aspect of the present community looms quite large. It is an aspect which might be called, in contrast to the foregoing, a centrifugal force in operation. It is simply that in uprooting the former communities, the cohesiveness, solidarity and interdependence have been destroyed also. The principle works many ways. Older leadership (kenjinkai, nihonjinkai, business associations, credit clubs) was either scared out of prominence in the period of Federal Bureau of Investigation "inquiry," or later, in the Assembly Centers and Relocation Camps, lost in the larger community. Lines of prestige and privilege were broken overnight. "Upstarts" who had never enjoyed high status in the former settlements, found a wide audience in the Centers which knew very little about people's past histories, or former social position. The blocks and barracks, the large mess-halls, -- the thousand and one social levellers serving to remove social distinctions, -- acted to inaugurate a new race for rank and role within the new community. And since most people had suffered damaged pride and relative loss in status behind barbed wire, in Assembly Centers where modesty and lack of privacy demanded sleeping in complete attire, in "public" shower-rooms, in jobs at \$12, \$16, \$19, in rules excluding autos from the Projects, and in general mass handling, the general tendency was to recapture status by becoming overnight a community leader, resplendent in one's vocal glory. In brief, with evacuation, the former patterns of education, economic enterprise, and social control were jarringly interrupted. As the several societies moved to new ground, denuded of their former functions, the result was a growth of independence in action, autonomy in judgment, a reshuffling in social rank and role, and a more or less random scramble for leadership. What interests us here, however, is the aspect of independence in thought and judgment. It has contributed heavily to the growth of factionalism and the role of cliques in social control. What is still more important is the fact that random opinion and vocal display appear most frequently in the community in association with lack of social control, unifying organization, and recognized government of the civic council type.

From a theoretic point of view, any aspect of factionalism might be worthy of analysis. The author has collected a number of examples of independence of opinion and autonomy in judgment which throw light on the general topic of social disorganization. From a practical point of view, however, certain developments of factional opinion relating to official W.R.A. policy of recent weeks are of special importance. The most interesting of these has to do with the split in attitude toward Administrative Instruction No. 34, Supplement 2, Revised. The Instruction was promulgated in Washington on June 5, 1943, transmitted by the Project Director on June 18th, and because of the intervening week-end, reached the Planning Board for dissemination in the colony, I am told, on June 21st. The effect of the Instruction in stirring up factional response among colonists, and in intensifying several types of reaction to the whole prospect of community government here should be noted. Here factions have thrived, first, because of the

aforementioned breakdown of lines of interdependence in the old communities from which residents come; and secondly, because of the breakdown of community civic organization in the Project situation. In the absence of centralized socio-political control among residents, the disorganizing effects of the evacuation period and its aftermath are accentuated. The author and his staff are now planning and in part executing a study of efforts to reconstitute community government at Tule Lake. The documents indicate that for many months community government here, and its attendant social controls in the colony and channels to administration beyond, has been virtually non-existent since the days of registration. The prime fact in this connection is that always community government, even in the days preceding registration, has had to fight the rising tide of random leadership, the mushroom growth of factions, the vocal upstarts, the self-appointed messiahs, and all those either bent on recapturing status, or eager to achieve it. In a community where the social controls of former times have been destroyed, where regional differences are set side by side, where enclaves are set within a closely impinging larger community, community government must start out with few effective controls upon which to build community sentiment. Starting out weakly, it can easily succumb in the face of attack. Thus, community government may be said to suffer from an initial lack of support. It is without honor in its own kingdom and entirely vulnerable in relationships with administration. It starts out, as one informant put it, "between the devil and the deep blue sea."

Thus, besides certain trends in sentiment, reported previously, one can note a growth of factions dating back to the registration period and beyond, which have actually gained in cliquishness ever since the registration period. The social process implicit in this development is simply that in the absence of politicalized social controls (civic government), social disorganizational trends, implicit in the Project situation, grow apace. Put more simply, when organization loses, disorganization gains.

The purpose of this report, however, is to show that the opposite is equally true: when disorganization loses, organization wins ground. As is well-known, the registration period here resulted in the resignation of the former Community Council (Nisei) which has the distinction of having functioned here with some success prior to registration along with the so-called Planning Board, composed mainly of Issei. During registration, the Council felt it was not utilized sufficiently as a link between administration and colony until the situation had deteriorated considerably and it was too late. It may be safely said, at any rate, that civic organization broke down during registration, a fact which contributed in no small measure to the disorganization, factionalism, lack of internal social controls, and general turbulence of that period. The interim between that time and this is noted for its cliques and warring opinion. Tension within the community has run high. The people feel more than ever that the community is abnormal, that there is little adequate control exercised by its inhabitants over their life situation. Feelings of helplessness of dependency, and of insecurity discussed in a recent report are aggravated by a lack of internal socio-political organization, on the one hand, and the presence of the irrepressible, vocal, "upstart" variety of leadership, on the other.

There is another type of individual in the community deserving notice, however. This group, I should say, has been most sensitive to the social process here, and is fully conscious of the disintegrating effects of the disorganizational process. Their hope is to see community government reconstituted and they have been able by the sheer logic of their position to convince a majority in the population of Tule Lake of the necessity of such a move if progress is to be the rule of the future. There is a positive emphasis here on the need for community organization, which sees in it an augury of the more constructive emphasis on planning one's future constructively, thinking in terms of resettlement, developing genuine leadership locally, and combatting the disintegrating effects of clannishness and clique. While self-government has been lacking, this group has functioned largely through the Planning Board, which has held on with the general idea of bridging the gap to new official forms of community organization. Thus, in the absence of community "self-government," cliques have arisen along with a faction genuinely interested in reconstituting the governmental function. Only recently, there was circulated in the community a petition for amending the former charter which read as follows:

"The undersigned, constituting not less than one-fourth of the qualified electors residing within the Tule Lake Relocation Center, hereby petition that a special election be held for the purpose of amending the Charter of the Tule Lake Project, in accordance with the procedure in said Charter provided. The amendments ... provide as follows: (1) Issei representation on the Community Council on an equal basis with Nisei; (2) One Issei councilman and one Nisei councilman to be elected from each ward; (3) Election of two block delegates (one Issei and one Nisei) from each block who shall have the following duties: to meet with ward councilmen for the purpose of keeping them informed of the problems of the residents of the block, and to disseminate information to the residents of the block; (4) The five block representatives from each block who convene for the purpose of nominating ward councilmen as provided in Section II, Article I of By-laws of the Tule Lake Relocation Project, shall meet on a block basis as a nominating committee to select the candidates for the office of block delegates."

As can be seen, the new government was conceived of partly on a ward and partly on a block basis of representation, the block delegates being thought of as a kind of lower assembly designed to keep the interests of the smaller units alive in the minds of the Council and to present back the Councilmanic decisions to the people concerned. The system is a good one, since the ward is functionally important in local decisions while the block is a system always recognized in government before.

However, while the community was going ahead on this basis, almost blithely it seems in retrospect, the Administrative Instruction mentioned above appeared out of the blue. A meeting of block representatives for reorganization of the Community Council had already taken place on June 14th

with a representation of fifty individuals. The vast majority of the delegates to the meeting voted (46-3) for reorganization along the above lines. In addition, the organizational trend of the meeting was aided considerably by a report to the effect that the Project Director promised full co-operation in the event of a reorganization of the City Council supported by the residents. A Committee on Amendments was set up and two days later, on June 16, met to amend the City Charter. The amendments suggested followed the same pattern as the earlier petition, and the amendments unanimously carried.

The author and staff are preparing a study of the disorganizing effects of registration on community life at the Center. At this time it may be stated that the intrusion of the Administrative Instruction into the picture had a like disorganizing effect, though a minor one by comparison. The fact is that the granting of Issei representation in community government resulted in a trend toward organization; the restrictions embodied in the Instruction had an opposite effect. The instruction would hardly be a major impediment to reconstituting community government here in view of the former emphasis. Nevertheless, certain wards are now, in the light of registration, practically disqualified from any effective representation. In Ward 5, seven blocks are literally disqualified, and deep resentment toward the order is reported from Block 13 in Ward 1, and Block 35 in Ward 3. Thus the negative aspects of the Instruction, received in the colony at a time when hopes were highest, came like a bolt out of the blue. They came also when registration, with all its confusion and the welter of factional opinion it entailed, had receded into the background. The result was that the splitting and factionalism of registration days began to live again, albeit without the original intensity.

Let us examine the Instruction in the light of its effects on particular areas in the local community. The first ruling, disqualifying the so-called repatriates, excludes a few people. A good many repatriates, it should be noted, have neither the intention or the desire to leave this country; in more than a few cases, the repatriation request was so much sound and fury signifying nothing, -- an angry reaction to the confusions and misconceptions of registration times. (This point has been noted for Wards 4 and 5 in our recent Project Report #3 on the topic of resettlement.) The second ruling disqualified those who had given negative answers to Question 28 and had not since been granted leave clearance. Again, a large proportion of these answers had no connection with loyalty at all, Issei heads of families (shujin) insisting that sons answer "no" largely because they were insufficiently informed as to why they were required to register, felt an application for leave clearance meant an immediate exodus from the Project, feared a universal draft of youth, or otherwise misunderstood instructions. The second ruling excludes a still larger sector from community government, particularly in certain wards. The third ruling eliminates another sector of population, and so it goes. Wards 4 and 5, who otherwise would be considered a party to the self-governing function are especially affected. Of seven wards, only Nos. 1, 2, and 7 feel that real representation is possible. In Ward 5, for example, there is sincere doubt that any real leadership is left in the remaining category of the duly qualified. The recent decision to include Issei in government is more than nullified by the recent ruling.

Consequently, the factional trend is now on the increase, and the disorganizing effects of registration are brought down to the present. A survey of the factional trend will indicate that morale in the community is again at low ebb, since while the instruction obtains, it can be charged (1) that the new ward system will not truly be representative of all wards; and (2) with the exclusion of effective leadership from certain wards, factional disputes are bound to arise in them. What is most interesting in this respect, however, is that it brings in the wake of lowered morale, all the resurgence of cliques and factions which saw their growing period in the post evacuation period when the former community leadership, interdependence of individuals and social controls were erased. I have therefore witnessed the local community move rapidly in the direction of self-government, only to see it slip back into the phase of disorganization marked by factional disputes. The organizational trend, the centripetal trend, is still in the ascendancy; but since it has been disturbed in its progress, the centrifugal trend has been evidenced increasingly.

Let us briefly review this factional trend. Here one can discern three current attitudes about community government -- all of them more or less affected by the restrictions in the recent Instruction. In each group, the factional trend has been manifested since the time of registration. While the community was moving wholeheartedly in the direction of "self-government," the proverbial hatchet was buried. With the injection of the issue of leadership-qualifications into the picture, however, the old feuds have been revived.

Among the first group, the central argument is that there is no reason whatsoever to reconstitute the Council. It should be noted that very intelligent individuals are among the partisans of Group I. Their numbers, further, following the announcement of the Instruction, are growing at the expense of the other two groups. After all, they say, this is not a community of the normal type, and in it self-government has no place. Their negative emphasis carries them all the way to the assumption that community affairs have been on a fairly even keel ever since registration, and this without socio-political organization. The assumption is, of course, erroneous. Not only has Administration been without an officially recognized and duly constituted channel to the entire colony, but factions and dissensions have grown apace. Yet a variant form of this belief is that "we" are not allowed a vestige of self-government anyway, so why try? The lack of economic interdependence in the community as well as a high degree of individual autonomy in the formation of opinion and the conduct of one's affairs produces, in turn, some very vocal adherents to this group. There are other variations with equally negative emphases; and the negative emphases are not unconscious, for after all, says Group I, we are the best realists, while the others are cloudy idealists!

A second group which might be described consists of those who before the Administrative Instruction was announced, held to the position that community government here had only limited scope and unimportant functions. Formerly, and in view of this alleged fact, they wished to see these functions defined quite narrowly, but at the same time definitely enough to be beyond dispute. Their underlying sentiment was that these limitations in function must be explained elaborately to the colonists in order to forestall any later

criticisms from that quarter of ineffectuality. They wished to "admit" the limitations initially to prevent losing face later, and with the recent Administrative Instruction, they have had to shift their position very little. In the main, they contend that they were right all along -- witness the Administrative Instruction itself. Now they are willing to fight not only for functions narrowly defined, but for the Instruction itself. The motivation is not in the realm of loyalty, for everyone here agrees that registration had very little to do with loyalty anyway. Rather, in going along with the letter of the law, they express cynicism and scepticism concerning "self-government" with every breath. Thus, the Instruction proves their point: it's what "we" have said right along -- W.R.A. has no interest in representative government, and it simply is a snare and a delusion to believe it!

Group 2 never had wide appeal throughout the colony, but is limited in its effectiveness to certain blocks; it does not comprise a particularly strong faction, but it does have the effect at present of banking the rising fires of Group 1. Together, both groups are vocal, critical in a basic sense of W.R.A., while expressing variations in attitude, and representing factions. Of course, neither express an interest in the Community Council function worthy of the name, and neither see the essential connection between community organization and morale within the Center and the success of the resettlement program outside. While such factions are symptomatic of community disorganization in its cynical phase, I do not wish to leave the impression that they are wholly irresponsible. These are negative attitudes which grow out of the social disorganizational trend. Their leaders, lacking a constructive conception of the role of Center population in the total resettlement process, wish merely to pose as realists, clever strategic leaders, the wise old men of the community. They illustrate the kind of leadership and attitude which may arise whenever effective social controls are out of order, or as in the present example, temporarily lacking.

Group 3 is composed largely of former community leaders who date their effectiveness back to the days of a smoothly running Community Council, that is, before registration. They remain in the opinion of the majority of colonists the leading faction, though it is the opinion of the author that they are temporarily losing ground in view of the Administrative Instruction. The reason for this is that, formerly in the Community Council and especially in the Issei Planning Board, they now provide effective leadership in the reconstitution of community government. As such, theirs is the unpleasant task of introducing the restrictions of the Instruction to the colonists in the final stage of re-instituting government, and in the opinion of some few individuals in the colony, they are the ones who held up this unpleasant news and are "now putting it over." Their functions as community leaders suffered a severe set-back during and after registration for similar reasons; hence, the resignation of the former Council. Now again, because of the piece-meal dissemination of orders, first good (Issei representation), then bad (qualification-restrictions), they cease at certain points to enjoy the confidence of the colonists. As with registration, so now to a lesser extent, they are forced to lose control of the situation and consequently suffer loss of prestige. During registration, they felt, they ceased at certain crucial points to enjoy the confidence of administration; so now, they fear, the slowing up of the process of instituting community government may be viewed as

disaffection or lack of interest on their part.

The efforts of the Planning Board are particularly interesting in this respect. When, because of the misconceptions and confusions of the registration period, the Council resigned, the Planning Board, composed mainly of Issei, it was decided, should carry ahead. However while the Planning Board was dominant, it was officially powerless. With Issei representation granted, the Planning Board moved cautiously in the direction of reconstituting the Council, hoping by careful preparation and weeks of discussion and explanation to achieve the organization so badly needed. Those leaders and groups particularly represented in this body therefore felt that in reconstituting community government here, one should attempt to obtain a truly effective organization capable of combatting the disintegrating process referred to above. Consequently, as Group 3, they held that one should define the functions of government broadly, if at all, but place major emphasis on real representation and participation throughout the community. On the former point, they crossed swords with the random leadership of Group 2, insisting that one must avoid corrosive cynicism in attempts to attain the real thing. With their other emphasis on the practical problem of real representation, they were making progress up to the time of the June 5th order, actually faced on the week of the 21st. Obviously, the recent Instruction, without laboring the point, knocks the wind out of their collective sails, and in colony opinion generally, revives a picture of the past best dead and forgotten. Already I have heard from countless sources, with particular Japanese-American emphases, of the embarrassment people will experience when, at the time of nominations and elections, old skeletons will have to be brought out of closets, and the confusions of registration enacted again.

In sum, I find that so far as resident opinion goes, the recent Instruction is an almost impossible barrier to anything faintly resembling former community government. It revives the difficulties of the registration period in all minds, it mitigates against the utilization of effective leadership, and it generally causes embarrassment throughout the colony in regard to people's answers on those very official-looking and much misunderstood forms of six months ago. To argue otherwise is to claim that we are dealing with a highly assimilated group quite inured to the mysteries of leave-clearance, official forms, political doctrines, selective service and the like. But as W.R.A. knows full well, these people are not assimilated, and the task of habituating them to American social organization lies largely in the future. A part of this exposure, for an almost feudalistic peasant folk, is habituation to forms of representative government. In Ward 5, rural-Californian Issei-controlled to be specific, I have to date found no one who can suggest effective leadership which is not already disqualified.

These factional differences of opinion and the disorganizational trend they exemplify are but a few examples among many. They illustrate nevertheless aspects of center life which should be avoided. When opinion becomes random enough, it is but a short step to opinion which is wholly irresponsible. And the lack of governmental ties between Administration and residents is, in effect, a barrier not conducive to the promotion of better understanding of W.R.A. policy. As long as residents are on the receiving end of policy formation and enjoy no compensations in the realm of minor

controls over the tenor of center life, they will feel a consequent lack of control over their several existences which acts contrary to the entire resettlement idea and plays into the hands of dependency attitudes. This, too, will contribute to the disorganizing trend and the rule of the irresponsibles to the formation of community attitudes. Similarly, a regulation which calls one group sheep and another goats is not a unifier of community sentiment. The need for a feeling of control over one's life situation has been dealt with elsewhere. Suffice it to say that this feeling and the organizational trend with which it must be associated are in themselves a kind of preparation for relocation.

It should be noted also that while all three factions discussed above disagree, they all share somewhat a negative feeling about community government at the Project. Group 3, in its interest in defining the functions of such government broadly and vaguely, belongs rightly in this category as well. The ideas range from the belief that it is difficult to obtain anything resembling "self-government" here, to the opinion that it is impossible in the nature of the case. But the three separate variations of this idea, and the functioning of other cliques as well, are examples of social disorganization. The basic feelings of inadequate control over the life situation are connected up with feelings of particular groups that the future is insecure and uncertain, just as the past has been. Thus, it seems evident that a measure of the purpose of self-government so-called, namely, the restoring of confidence and the will to plan effectively, is also lost sight of. And of course, a part of the problem of urging resettlement is to restore the evacuee's faith in W.R.A. To a large extent, this will depend on evacuee leadership. In addition, consultation with colonist leadership through channels of truly representative government will help in presenting W.R.A. policies and programs to those who must inevitably carry them out in the final analysis. The establishment of resident self-government is therefore of prime necessity. Effective Issei and Nisei leadership is disbarred by the present order, particularly in reference to certain Wards.

I do not feel that this is the purpose of the Administrative Instruction in question; but it is certainly my function to report that at Tule Lake, this is the result. It is a result which contributes, in turn, to a lack of confidence on the part of residents in W.R.A. policy, and as such, finally provides an additional barrier to resettlement. In a recent report on resistances to resettlement here, we commented on the feelings and attitudes in local population which formed the backbone of that resistance. Now, it should be reported, that the Administrative Instruction, however unintentionally, has already begun to intensify these feelings by strengthening the fears, the doubts, the disappointments which make up which we called evacuee psychology.

It is interesting to note that in discussing this order with individuals and groups in the community, one hears more frequent reference to old complaints which were recently almost on the forgotten side. The feeling of inadequate control is once again linked with the feeling that the community is decidedly abnormal -- that it places restrictions on freedom of movement and pattern of living. One individual, referring to the order, stated that

it was "things like these" which made people tense and excited, and excitability (weak word) has certainly been reported by a number of others. While registration is far from being revived in all its intensity, the order by its very phrasing and reference to registration is felt to be just another continuation of such times. Some people, more seriously inclined, who view the resettlement program as the real "way out," go on to say that the longer a repressive process is continued, the harder it will be for people to feel a restored sense of confidence, and in accordance with W.R.A. policy, a willingness to plan ahead to independence and self-reliance. Perhaps this view is overdrawn. At any rate, community groups meeting time and again find it difficult to see strong community government as a prospect for the future. Another said, "How can any government succeed, when the Instruction looks back to all the mistakes and misunderstanding of the past?" Undoubtedly these reactions to the Instruction are stronger at Tule Lake than elsewhere, first, because of the more difficult registration experience here and, second, because the order came at a time when public hopes were highest and real representation seemed for once to be the order of the day.

(Dictated by Marvin K. Opler,
Social Analyst)

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Tule Lake Project
Newell, California

Project Analysis Report #5 -- July 13, 1943
Community Analysis Section

(In reply to a set of questions from Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division, Wash., D.C. Letter dated July 2, and transmitted to this office, July 8. Also in reply to a similar query from Mr. Harvey M. Coverley, Project Director, dated and transmitted July 13).

Attention: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF SEGREGATION: TULE LAKE

When this study was begun, the segregation program had not yet been officially announced. It is possible, therefore, to deal with prior reactions to the program, as well as the impact of the announcement on Center population.

Segregation, based on loyalty-registration, is an old concern at Tule Lake. When the author first arrived, he explained the purposes of Community Analysis to various resident groups. The response was most encouraging. He was told that such interpretive analysis was sorely needed to promote understanding between colonists and WRA administration, nationally and locally, since by their own admission colonists were often baffled by the policies and assumed, good naturedly, that perhaps their group responses were difficult to fathom as well. Specifically, I was told that such a program would have been of great value in preventing the error and bewilderment that colonists admitted they were prone to, when at the time of registration, rumors flew quick and fast and decisions were reached which were later regretted. Similarly, I am now advised by colonists to make a beforehand analysis of possible effects of segregation. Even before the announcement of policy, when segregation was in the air, colonists flocked to my office to indulge in some rather elaborate crystal-gazing; now they come in even larger numbers.

Was segregation expected at Tule Lake? In an earlier report on resettlement, we indicated that the rumor of segregation has been thought of locally as a kind of threat aimed at the entire community. There are two versions: (1) negative segregation, which implies a kind of dispersal and family break-up, and (2) positive segregation, which apparently means, in many minds, no shifting of parts of local population, but merely the extension of opportunities for changing registration-answers, the easing of leave-clearance procedures, and the providing of additional types of resettlement opportunity.

Obviously, in this vague formulation, segregation had two psychological connotations: the first repressive and threatening; the second sympathetic and helpful. On the segregation issue at least, there were ambivalent attitudes toward WRA.

With the Dies' Committee type of emphasis on segregation recently,

the repressive version gained ground. Within a week after my report, an administrative notice appeared in the Tulean Dispatch, designed to dispel the rumors of segregation, pending the announcement of official policy. The notice was well-timed, since vague and uncritical rumors were then going the rounds and unfounded resistances were being formed to official policy. Casual callers at this office immediately gave verbal and visible evidence of breathing easier; the community ceased, for a week, to count the chickens before they were hatched.

But on July 7th, a brief notice appeared on the front page of the San Francisco Chronicle. It pulled no punches and it named dates. In the colony, it was taken as the opening gun in the instituting of a negative or repressive type of segregation policy. Since the brief notice mentioned the Dies' subcommittee, a "major movement of Japanese-Americans," segregation (without adjectival qualifications), "emotional turmoil," colonists filled in the gaps in information by fearing the worst. The prevailing mood changed overnight from one of complacency to one of turbulence and fear. The word, segregation, immediately took on the negative connotations noted above, newsprint having converted it into the grim and forbidding official policy, to Tuleans, that it now is.

The author has tried now for some time to find advocates of segregation among the colonists. Of hundreds interviewed and questioned, no one has been found in favor of the so-called negative program, and the positive aspects are no longer discussed or thought possible. Center population, since the Chronicle announcement, is expecting such a move; and little attention has been paid, thus far, to the official telegram reprinted in the Tulean Dispatch which does, indeed, stress positive aspects.

It should be added that here, as elsewhere, there were formerly some few advocates of segregation. During registration, when tombstones were drawn on housefronts, and charges hurled publicly at the timid, individuals wished for protection from the rowdy element. But now, when the leading lights of factions were busily discoursing on such mild topics as reconstituting community government, and segregation disturbed the prevailing quiet tenor of community life, the great bugaboo is segregation. No one, within the reach of myself or staff, can think of anyone in favor of the plan, and we have talked with individuals once in favor of it.

Instead, people are avidly discussing the many problems thought to be resultants of such policy. In a cross-section of community opinion, which involved a careful inquiry in all seven wards, we noted a tendency to view the policy not in terms of any broad perspective on the political scene or the resettlement program, but simply in terms of "what segregation will do to my family." The earnest discussion of the program in these elementary terms functions as a kind of catharsis to allay anxieties. The constant review of arguments in disfavor of the program, further, has the effect of dispelling the gloom and foreboding which colonists certainly feel. In the absence of information as to what the policy concretely means, Center life is being affected. Appointed personnel tell me that people are sulking on the job. A few arguments have been heard in the colony, not on the pros and cons of segregation, but concerning what the program "means." It would seem

desirable, in light of this fact, for the duly constituted authorities here to have the facts well in advance and to be in a position to prepare the colony for the actual process. Otherwise, rumor will fill in the gaps where information is lacking, and evacuee psychology will swing over into patterns of resistance where the mere mention of the word segregation will evoke wrath. This process has already begun, and people are thinking loosely of segregation. The kind of questions we are getting is: Will it be this Center? When families are torn apart, will relatives be able to visit the segregated members? Should I get married now; he answered one way, and I another? Can we send presents to people in the segregation Center? And write to them? There are no disturbances now, but will there be later ones? Will administration locally have the entire picture of procedures beforehand, or will there be, as at registration time, a piecemeal dissemination of instructions from the national headquarters?

Obviously, there are already more questions than there are answers. The mere idea of population movement calls up a response typical of every major operation since the original evacuation order. The colonists feel themselves threatened. They are loaded down with anxieties. They wish to be informed, and they want to have the picture of what the entire future will bring. As it stands, they fear the worst. They are recalling every item of discriminatory handling in the past even antedating evacuation, and projecting the picture into the immediate future.

The first question, then: "How would such a program affect life in the Center?" may be answered in part by stating the truism that Center life is already affected. To give a more complete picture, we present below community reactions to a possible segregation program, as seen in arguments advanced before the publication of the official telegram, but after the Chronicle announcement gave the program its imminent aspect.

(1) Segregation will split families if based on the answers to loyalty-registration. In many families, Isseis answered Question 28 affirmatively, but fearing a universal draft of youth, instructed sons who were of age to answer no. There were two main reasons for such decisions at the time of registration: first, the revised questionnaire, the question was made easier for Isseis; and second, many Isseis construed the registration to be not loyalty-registration primarily, but a prelude to a universal draft. In other cases, elder sons, -- for reasons of health, family condition and the like, -- were advised differently from younger sons. There are also families where parents failed to register, whose children were then under-age but loyal. During registration, divergent answers occurred among children (sibling relationship) in the same family, the daughters frequently being enjoined to answer yes to questions and sons no on pain of being disowned. In many families, I have found that daughters dutifully went along with parents on a no answer, while sons, more independent in spirit, broke out of the family constellation to answer yes. There are other cases of parents answering negatively for reasons of anger or misinformation, while both sons and daughters in the Nisei generation, assimilated and less intimidated by official forms, returned a straight forward yes. Without going further into these type-variations, we can safely say that very many families at Tule Lake exhibit divergencies in answers as between parents and children, sons

and daughters, husbands and wives, etc. Marriages have since been contracted between individuals who earlier gave different answers. The repatriation category is similarly affected. In one block, for example, women and girls were registered before the males, and during the time requests for repatriation were being accepted and filed, about three-quarters of the female population so inclined, recorded their intentions; however, repatriation requests were suddenly ordered to a halt, and when they ceased to be accepted, families were found with part of the female contingent "repatriated," the men-folks not. Undoubtedly the order stopping repatriation was a wise one, since in this block and to an extent in the entire ward of which it was a part, a repatriation craze had developed; nevertheless, as the record stands, families were left half-repatriate and half free of the stigma.

In this light, the repatriate group, deserves special attention. I find that the reasons for repatriation vary exceedingly, and in a good many cases have little to do with loyalty criteria. There is the case of the family patriarch upwards of fifty years, who learned, just before the war, that his father in Japan (upwards of seventy) had lost his wife and according to traditional usage required the care of his eldest son in America. Repatriation to him meant being sent back on the earliest boat, and this Issei "repatriated." In another family, now partly "repatriated," political doctrines likewise had no effective part in the decision; the family had been planning a trip back for some time, and with evacuation lost their home, jobs and economic stake here; consequently, when it was announced that repatriation requests would be received, they made a hasty decision, the mother and daughters got under the line apparently thinking they had booked passage, whereupon the "cease repatriation" order came through and the sons missed the boat, much to the chagrin of all concerned.

It is needless to multiply examples. In all categories, -- no-answers, repatriates, etc., -- families are split on the basis of loyalty-registration. Colonists who stress this point add that in families where members ^{have already relocated elsewhere} the division of the remaining members could not help but have an adverse effect on the morale of those "outside," many of whom, I am told, are planning to bring the entire family outside in due time.

(Comment: While fewer families are split as between repatriates and non-repatriates than are divided by no-answers and yes-answers, we may accept as true the fact that loyalty-registration, according to record, divides a great many families. In colonist opinion, this is the major threat of segregation. In the review of cases, through hearing, involving the non-repatriate categories (no-answers, non-registrants), it would seem advisable to introduce a system of family and individual counselling for the benefit of all individuals coming up for hearing if we are to prevent a continuance of past mistakes. I believe such a counselling service should have the appearance of having arisen spontaneously in the colony in order to avoid the stigma of administrative control. It should be manned in large part by older Isseis, well-respected in the colony, but contain also enough Niseis representation to forestall domination by any one group. The counselling service would therefore be an informal adjunct to the hearing procedures, functioning in the individual case (or family case if necessary) directly prior to

the hearing. In this way, it is possible to preclude the eventuality of individuals arriving at the hearing in a confused and undetermined state of mind and with all the latent wrath and misconceptions concerning segregation intact, only to make hasty, angry or invalid decisions. The suggestion is made also because colonists will meet anyway, as they did during registration, to discuss and informally "counsel" concerning segregation, in long night sessions. They are beginning, to an extent, already. Rumors, as we have said, are going the rounds, and the type of discussion stresses the negative aspects of segregation policy often on the basis of erroneous notions or mere guesswork. With the resistance to the segregation program on the upgrade, and the anxieties concerning it centered in the compelling fact of Japanese-American solidarity along family lines, a counselling service might well serve the same purposes as good social case-work technique: re-channeling anxieties and fears to the more constructive end of getting people to face their problems with the aid of information and guidance. Since also, WRA must assiduously avoid the charge of deciding people's minds for them in regard to decisions concerning loyalty, a counselling service of colonists exclusively would be the better part of wisdom. Such service should be connected, unofficially but constantly, with a small committee or information bureau of individuals selected from among appointed personnel who are either trained or experienced and sensitive to problems affecting human relations, know evacuation and Project history from the social and psychological side, and are therefore aware of the impact of colonists' experiences, understand evacuee psychology, and already have earned the respect of residents. The information bureau should have the entire pattern of the segregation program ^{in advance} and be in constant touch with administration on latest developments. Finally, if the need arises, such a committee should be utilized in informal meetings with small groups of colonists to explain both policy and program.)

(2) Segregation, I am told, would stress the negative disloyalty factor in a manner unwarranted by the real facts and in a way which might affect WRA adversely. There is a general feeling in the colony that registration, a similar process, was so poorly handled that no-answers and repatriation-requests resulted in cases where loyalty was not even an issue or disloyalty the case. The argument that WRA is thus endangered is curious, coming from the colony, in that it claims that segregation will not serve the best interests of WRA. Colonists arguing this point, say further that the segregation of hundreds technically called repatriates, no-answerers, and non-registrants, will lay WRA open to the charge of acting as custodian for such a reprehensible group. They say, also, that in view of all the misconceptions surrounding loyalty-registration, the answers on the forms proved to be no test of loyalty in the majority of cases. For example, Isseis who failed to fill out the application for Leave-Clearance held their ground simply because that form was rumored to be a compulsory ticket to the outside, committing anyone who filled it to leaving the Center. Further, this argument has it that segregation of large numbers allegedly disloyal would give pressure-groups so disposed the best possible argument for further attacks on Japanese-Americans.

(Comment: This argument, while it stresses the "best interests" of WRA, does so out of fear that any thoroughgoing change in the current pattern of

administration along lines of segregation will play into the hands of enemies, not merely of WRA, but of the Japanese-American populace in general. As concerns WRA, therefore, the argument is partly a sophisticated form of rationalization.)

(3) Related to this argument is the idea that segregation will stigmatize, as a group, the no-answerers, repatriates, etc. The claim is that this creates an additional barrier to their changing answers, and outlooks, in the future. Actually, colonists say, the shift has been from no-answers to affirmative ones, from non-registration to registration, and from repatriation to a revoking of repatriation.

(Comment: At this Center, about 150 non-registrants have registered, about 233 applications have been filed to change no-answers, and 90 repatriates of an original 560 attempted to revoke their decision and succeeded before the process was discontinued. In addition, I have met a number of individuals who now regret their no-answers, but who are too confused as to procedures, or else too timid to have the record re-opened. However, it must be admitted that a great many individuals are too indifferent to questions of loyalty and disloyalty to take the necessary steps. The argument cannot apply, therefore, to the least assimilated element in local population. On the other hand, it does apply to some no-answerers, non-registrants, and even to some repatriates.) (See point I, above.)

(4) Along the same line, it is claimed that many feel the pinch of segregation already. The process of ever getting resettled from a disloyal center is, now, a remoter future possibility. Since registration was not a real test of loyalty, segregation-hearings are, or will be, prone to the same errors. Consequently, the penalization of any large number of individuals by segregation, will hinder them from achieving a later adjustment. Thus, calling a group "disloyal" will, they say, produce disloyalty where none previously existed. Besides, public sentiment toward such a category will be, in a sense, promoted by their separation as a group -- the disloyal.

(Comment: There is, of course, the need to safeguard against producing mistaken answers and reactions, such as occurred during registration. Since hasty or ill-founded decisions will, actually, hinder individuals from achieving a later adjustment and will certainly not be conducive to engendering feelings of loyalty, the entire hearing process must be carried out in an atmosphere as little charged with emotional responses and rumor as possible. In this sense, especially, the counselling service is necessary; it must have access to sources of authentic information; and the Project administration must, in turn, be adequately informed by the national office. Otherwise, I fear, colonists will angrily assume that the period of investigations and loyalty-registration is being continued into the present and damaged pride will be the motivation of unwise decisions.)

(5) A curious argument heard frequently is that the cost of carrying out the program will be considerable. It is said, also, that WRA could more effectively expend this sum, rather than by transferring people out of Centers for segregation purposes, in spending the funds for resettlement purposes. Suggestions of the "budgetary" type include (a) subsidies for

relocating farm groups, and (2) providing materials in the form of midwest newspapers, government studies, etc., to be used in implementing relocation.

(Comment: The last two suggestions are useful, though of course, anxieties and fears promote the economy argument. The latter point, however, shows how greatly the fear of the segregation process has grown here, since the appeal to WRA to "economize" is hardly genuine).

(6) In view of the fact that there were more affirmative answers on loyalty in the female category, the charge is made that families will see their daughters separated. Two cultural injunctions are involved: (a) the first, the rule that daughters must remain in their parental home until the day of marriage; and, (b) the second is that daughters, if they are eldest children, owe a filial duty in respect to parents. (The same is true of eldest sons, as in point 1). Older people voice their dislike of the segregation plan in these terms, and consequently, they are charging WRA in advance, of promoting immorality and unfilial attitudes.

(Comment: Since nothing is officially known of the plans for the disposal of unmarried daughters and families in general, the argument is somewhat premature. It suggests, however, the need for family and individual counselling, and as soon as possible a statement of the real facts. In regard to the cultural injunctions, they have real importance and should be taken into account in any plan for segregation.)

(7) A rather more constructive argument presented is that individuals can plan better for eventual family resettlement if the family remains intact. In addition, they claim, people who have seen family members resettled would be disturbed if the unit were split up between the Centers and outside world.

(Comment: There is a general feeling here that planning for the future is best done by the family unit.)

(8) It is felt also that one of the reasons lying behind the segregation policy is the notion, in WRA circles, that the disloyal (according to registration) put pressure on individuals and continue to stand in the way of assimilation and WRA policy generally. The people here realize that the underlying thought is of the "bad" influencing the "good." However this may be, the argument now expressed is that the "good" in many cases, exert a beneficial influence on the "bad." In one group discussion where this idea was presented it was stated that the more assimilated (those thinking in terms of resettlement) often got their idea across through letters and news which drifted back to relatives and neighbors in the Project, so that the experience of the assimilated element was shared in a wider circle of neighborhood contacts.

(Comment: A positive emphasis on spreading the benefits of assimilation should undoubtedly take precedence over a process of fencing off the unassimilated in a separate place. Actually, however, this last argument has some reference to neighborhood attachments. All indications point to the fact that at Tule Lake the ward, and to a greater extent, the block, have put down roots of a sentimental and psychological sort. The use of the word, "kuchō"

(from cho, manager and ku, block), reported from Minidoka, is similar here though the word also has reference to ward (manager) representative. However, I have found as much evidence that the assimilated element affects the unassimilated as the opposite.

With the announcement, in the Tulean Dispatch, of the official telegram from the national office, the word went around that segregation was definitely coming. The type of argumentation recorded above continued, but without the same hope of driving the bugaboo out by polemics. Since days intervened before the official telegram was translated into Japanese (Japanese section of the Tulean Dispatch), the word carried home by the Niseis, apparently without too great attention to detail, gave the Isseis little to cogitate on that was not already expected. The general mood, pending the Japanese translation, was one of resignation verging on apathy. The Project Director, in a regularly scheduled meeting with Issei representatives on July 12th, noted this fact, the colonists apparently limiting their discussion of segregation to but a few almost perfunctory questions. As the details of such a plan become clearer by reiteration, the reactions will again become sharper. We should be least of all led astray by the psychology of this interlude, for Japanese-Americans rarely reveal anger, resignation or despair in public places, whereas, as in the present case they are by no means untouched by such emotions.

The impact of the actual announcement should be discussed. Segregation is already meeting with a generalized response, and it becomes evident, again, that the evacuation process has had a very definite psychological effect on the people as a whole. Many, who in their former communities, were never conscious of political questions bearing on the question of loyalty, are now somewhat perplexed by the entire process of emphasizing disloyalty. This is particularly true of the Issei group for whom loyalty remains a most nebulous concept. In individual conference, a reaction I sometimes get is: "I never did any wrong. Why am I treated in this fashion?" It is as if we overemphasized the political consciousness of these people and underestimated their deeply rooted social and cultural affinities.

Thus, the segregation policy is not raising the issue of loyalty in their minds, but becomes a part and parcel of the recent past. With typical political unawareness of what is happening in the national scene, they are evaluating segregation personally, by family situation, and emotionally, by the dogma of despair. Now loyalty is thought of in terms of consequences in family and community separation, not as a political question at all. The wisest injunction to the community occurred in a recent column in the Tulean Dispatch, where the writer (Okada) advised residents not to fly off the handle. Being somewhat a-political in outlook, the crucial point for colonists is family and community break-up, for in both these social forms they feel safeguarded by the customs, the language, and the culture which they know so well. The latter is the familiar world, -- the psychological protection against the officialdom and technicalities which constantly impinge in the Project situation.

I think that in much the same sense the registration process seemed psychologically threatening. Registration, by its very connotations (Leave

from the Project; draft of eligible sons), threatened, so they thought, the solidarity of family and community. Whether loyalty meant cultural ties or political affinity many were not clear. At any rate, the strength of family and community bonds meant an interacting and highly interdependent group of individuals seeking an answer to a vague political concept which Isseis never fully understood. With segregation suggesting strongly the breakdown of interaction and interdependence, a great deal of psychological confusion results. The trend is to culturalize a political question. This process is so far along that many residents are claiming that if Tule Lake is made the Black Center, so-called, vast numbers will seek the status of repatriate, or if that is not allowed, continue the myth of disloyalty in their several cases (no-answerers) simply to remain in this Center.

- (a. "We've fixed up our barrack; we don't want to move again!")
- b. "Now this place will really become an Indian reservation."
- c. "I'm going to buy me more grass-seed, and get me some repatriation papers!"
- d. (Age: in the twenties)--"I'm going to answer like my best girl!"
- e. "If the people in this Ward stick together on their answers, we'll prevent a lot of enemy aliens (laugh) coming in from other Centers.")

A few more imaginative minds have gone farther into the future. Should soldiers appear on the scene, I am told, as they did during registration, a keener sense of discrimination will be felt. (One individual, crystal-gazing, announced that rioting would be inevitable.)

Summary:

The primary fact is that the former communities, and the family bonds of earlier times in Japanese-American society, have together produced a highly interdependent and interacting group of individuals. At all points where this cohesiveness and solidarity is threatened, -- evacuation, registration (as assumed), and segregation -- the populace experiences as a whole a sense of loss. Thus besides the deeply rooted feeling of being discriminated against, noted in our Report on Resistances to Resettlement, the residents complain that they and their communities are the "guinea pigs" of WRA policy.

The difficulty, therefore, of understanding political questions like loyalty, together with the threat of family and community separation, results in feelings of fear and insecurity. In times of crisis (like registration) these emotions dissipate confidence in WRA. The most interesting angle, discussed by more enlightened residents, is the idea that those basically loyal and committed psychologically to remain in this country, who were impelled in the opposite direction by registration, now are likely to be impelled still further in the wrong direction.

Obviously, a great deal depends on the manner in which segregation is handled. On the nature of the loyalty-hearings, the type of personnel conducting them, and the prior handling of those subject to the hearing procedure. I cannot too firmly stress that those subject to hearing have already, many of them, been greatly confused and disappointed by their contacts

with the outer American community as well as by the events which have already transpired since evacuation. To dispel these doubts and genuine worries, much attention will have to be paid to the promotion and explanation of such a drastic program as segregation. Individuals approaching the hearing will have to be carefully counselled and their confidence won in the job of thinking ahead constructively. Colonist leadership is best qualified to do this job, in the light of evacuee psychology.

In all of this, we must remember that the present policy is premised on registration; that following the announcement of the possibility of changing no-answers, people who applied through the established machinery, waited a long time and still wait for the results of such hearing. The words, "hearing" and "registration" have no particularly pleasant connotations. I think it is clear from this report that segregation, likewise, is not off to the best of all possible starts. In view of the fact that this program can make or break a feeling of good-will on the part of residents toward WRA, the process must be carried through at Tule Lake with due consideration for the very real factors of family and community solidarity, evacuee psychology, the political ignorance of the people involved, and the anxieties with which they face their conjurations of the future.

(Dictated by M. K. Opler,
Social Analyst)

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

(Confidential)

Tule Lake Project
Newell, CaliforniaProject Analysis Report #6 -- July 20, '43
Community Analysis Section

IF THE TULE LAKE REMAINS THE "SEGREGATION CENTER".....

In its Weekly Press Review, May 26, '43, the national office of the WRA stated:

"The most significant press development...is the growing opinion...that at least part of the fire directed against Japanese-Americans is not genuinely inspired but is part of a political maneuver to divert attention away from the European theatre of war. In other words, WRA and Japanese-Americans are being used as convenient scapegoats for political diversionists. The strategy seems to be that mass hatred and fear of all members of the Japanese race on the part of the American public will make them demand more military concentration on the Pacific front...."

Much water has gone under since this report. Yet the major conditions remain the same. Public pressure groups and their political conferees have continued insistent demands that Relocation Centers go under military control. The Senate passed a Resolution on July 6 which can hardly be said to have turned the tide. Instead, it would seem, we have witnessed a convergence of forces inimical to the WRA and its charges in general, which segregation policy will serve to appease, but which nevertheless will continue to exist as a future threat. I think we can assume that public sentiment will not be changed overnight and that the agency will not be exempt from future attack.

With this thought in mind, we turn to the subject of this report: the possible effects of segregation at Tule Lake. The report is the second in a series on this topic. It is not our function to comment on the segregation program as policy; it is our function to assess the effects of that policy on Center population, on their attitudes toward WRA administration, and on the reciprocal effects of these attitudes upon the entire resettlement program. This is particularly the case since Tule Lake has been designated as the Center for those considered disloyal.

In our last report (July 13), we noted that in colonist opinion the segregation program was premised on the answers given during registration and on a hearing procedure (for those applying for a change of no-answers) in which there is little faith. We said; (if Tule Lake is made the segregation Center), "vast numbers will seek the status of repatriate, or if that is not allowed, continue the myth of disloyalty in their several cases simply to remain in this Center." Today, after one week of the germination of this idea, the idea has taken firm root. With the thinking in regard to segregation premised on registration, and with registration still thought of as compulsory leave of the Project (the Issei's version of the application for leave-clearance; the Issei-Nisei version of a universal draft or leave for youth), the dominant notion at the present time is that the WRA is trying, by this new method, to "get people out."

Since also, Tule Lake has been selected as the Center which the loyal will leave, there has been, in people's minds, a general flocking to the banner of disloyalty, not for political reasons at all, but simply to prevent the general exodus.

I think a major reason for this reaction is the lack of any explanation of segregation, its "whys" and "wherefores" in the colony. All the evacuees have had by way of explanation is the blunt and unadorned first statement of the program, and then, within a week, the crushing news that Tule Lake is to be the Center. To state the obvious, the residents are uninformed at a crucial time when initial opinions and reactions are forming. They say: Why didn't we have "segregation" before; it could have been at the time of evacuation, it could have been at the time of registration when some people were asking for it, but it should not come now when things are quiet for a change, and after people have been made to move twice already! The position is not logical, but neither are the minds of those emotionally upset by the recent prospects.

It has been said that Tuleans really expected segregation right along, and that some actually are in favor of the policy. It should like to score this notion since it is based on observation true enough at registration, but unfortunately no longer the case. During registration and its aftermath, the version of segregation which went the rounds was phrased as positive segregation. It involved no mass movement of local population, but rather protection for the sanguine yes-answerers, the extending of opportunities for changing loyalty-answers to the affirmative, and the further implementation of resettlement opportunities. With the first press announcement from the Bay region, a second version, more negative and repressive in its implications, arose by the grapevine process. The negative version implied family break-up and a sudden dispersal of sectors of the population. With the official telegram, as we said, this version implied family break-up and a sudden dispersal of sectors of the population. With the official telegram, as we said, this version gained ground. Now with the selection of Tule Lake as the segregation center, this version is universally accepted except for a scattered handful of keen, intelligent minds; and I can find no group in any ward or block openly in favor of segregation, least of all in favor of the selection of this Center.

For these reasons, Tule Lake evacuees were completely unprepared for the latest news, i.e., the selection of this Center for segregation purposes. Dominant opinion has it that Tuleans have a moral right to protest against (1) family break-up; (2) the exodus and dispersal of the so-called loyal (yes-answerers); (3) the rewarding of the no-answerers and repatriates by allowing them to remain. While those who answered no, sought repatriation, or refused to register are rejoicing at their "foresight" and loudly proclaiming that they knew all along that the WRA would break its "promise" first, to penalize them, and second, in assuring yes-answerers at registration time that the application for leave clearance was not a ticket to the outside, community sentiment is unifying. I have already stated elsewhere, that when the entire community feels the threat, when family solidarity is at stake as in the present case, then the community presents a solid front. It unites. The disorganizational trend ceases. And while Tule Lake ordinarily presents a disorganized aspect, in face of segregation, a cohesive body of opinion is formed.

What does this mean? Simply that at Tule Lake a pattern of passive resistance, community-wide, is crystallizing: (1) The so-called loyal (yes-answerers) are, in advance of the event, refusing to move; and (2) The so-called disloyal, (Nay-sayers, repatriates, et al), fearing a collapse of their favored status are deciding, in advance, not to attend the hearings, or if forced to, to present with as straight a face as possible, a most "disloyal" front. For proof, I have the vehement statements of hundreds of individuals in the colony, and I note that both yes-answerers and nay-sayers exemplify the same pattern of passive resistance, though the so-called disloyals feel themselves in a better position to carry through the ironical pageantry of a loyalty-test proving disloyalty. Say the disloyals, almost to a man: "We're going to stay, and those who move out are just the dupes of the government." Say the loyal, "If you work with the government and for it, you get punished and come to learn that promises are not kept." The latter, as a category, fully intends to indicate, in as peaceful and law-abiding way as possible, the depths of their new-found "disloyalty." The real irony of this ludicrously inverted situation is that the so-called loyal, the prey of what they term as WRA duplicity, will in all probability carry their passive resistance to the point of riot should the military be called in to remove them forcibly from the camp. I am not imagining. I have been told as much by both categories. I recall the Manzanar residents, with a like feeling of being discriminated against, refused to move from Barracks which had become "home" for the ideal purpose of making room for schools. The same incident practically occurred at Tule Lake. Nor is it any secret here that during registration, the most obstinate and gangsterish element were a small handful of non-registrants who carried with them 3,000 people in a campaign of the non-cooperation type. Certainly the non-registrants of the registration period showed symptoms of passive resistance as a psychology of protest. Though it is true that selective service was the bugaboo then, family and community break-up, enforced movement (again!), and the penalization of the loyal are the points now. And the sense of discrimination implicit in the latter is far keener than the alleged universal draft of youth could muster up in registration times.

It would be fine, indeed, if the local populace could be made to feel that movement out, as a loyal person, was a privilege and an honor. In fact, the manpower requirements of the nation argue in this direction; the war against racism, against the subjection of small nations and minorities, underlines the fact. The vast majority of the people here, even many in the nay-sayer and repatriate categories, are distinctly loyal in this sense. But it is something otherwise for a minority which has faced discrimination constantly in the past, to agree wholeheartedly to differential treatment at every point, which is, in blunt reality, discriminatory. No group in the nation has shouldered the same burdens; the uprooting of communities, the collapse of morale, the colossal economic loss which continues in its effects daily at the Project. (Insurance policies are lost daily; property sold for a song). If one could start with the idealities, it might be easier. The plain fact, however, is that the colonists start with a keen sense of racist discrimination, recall the hardships of evacuation, and note, at all points, their definite separation from the rest of the American populace.

To return to our first point, WRA is forced by pressure groups to this latest policy. The phrasing of segregation must be in terms of the loyalty-disloyalty bifurcation, and the agency must pose a political question. But let us also remember where our charges are at this juncture. They are least all a politically-minded group. As stated earlier, they culturalize the question in terms of their experience much as they did during registration times. Frankly, they are thinking of segregation already, not as a determination of loyalty, not as the sorting out of the disloyal, not as a privilege in line with the release of manpower for the war effort, -- but simply in terms of another imposed "long march," not of their making. Of literally hundreds who were stampeded and befuddled into no-answers during registration, literally hundreds have come round to an understanding of the issue, and a desire to answer affirmatively. Now, however, with the recent news, it appears that the threat of penalties for no-answers was false. The penalty falls on yes-answerers, and again, stampeded and befuddled, they change their minds.

There are two warnings implied in this formation of community sentiment. The first and most important is that the ironical pageantry of the WRA, standing on political ground, must be brought face to face with the average colonist, thinking of family and community, the recent bitter losses, the seeming travesty of justice. As one colonist summed up the prevailing viewpoint: "The administration of WRA, its machinery, grinds on now as it did at registration. It grinds one loyal American after another into a disloyal person. No one means it, not the administrative machinery, nor the evacuee. But it keeps on happening, and the evacuee gets farther from the war, farther from other Americans, and farther from his own mind (intentions, MKO)." The statement is gross exaggeration taken literally, but it contains a hard kernel of truth, a lesson in the present situation. We must not allow segregation, least of all the motivations behind it, to become transformed at Tule Lake into a comic opera of the disloyalty myth. More important, we must guard against the promotion of disloyalty where none actually existed in fact before as regards the individual case.

There is a second purpose in reverting to our original point. WRA, in previous situations of this general type, drew negative results, results which in the long run, neither promoted the purposes of the agency, nor furthered the role of 100,000 people in the American war effort. These two set-backs were: (1) the utter failure, in promotion, of the combat team; and (2) the utter failure, during registration, of achieving a real test of loyalty, i.e., the recording of the vast preponderance of Japanese-Americans, who were and are loyal, in the proper category. The criticism of both agency and minority was sharp. It left WRA something to live down. A recurrence of a run on disloyalty at this time would be most unfortunate, as the war unfolds and the tasks to be accomplished grow in difficulty. Yet it is my duty to report that a prominent resident, in daily contact with all block managers, told me he feared that Tule Lake would have 13,000 disloyals, or if that were not allowed, 13,000 passive resisters. Perhaps, the number would be less, but to be realistic, I do not see that as the probability. As social analyst, to await the outcome and make the objective autopsy later, would be false documentation of the social process as it unfolds here. Since also, the critics of both minority and agency stand ready to make

the most of our mistakes, it is the better part of valor to be forewarned. (I should like to disclaim any sentimental reasons for presenting this analysis of Tule Lake, should it remain the "segregation Center." The author, as a matter of fact, would find it most interesting theoretically speaking, to study the mass response of local population should the plan go through, or a highly Japanicized group, should they be brought here. I do feel, however, that WRA is endangered in that prospect by a high paper-showing of disloyalty, or if that is disallowed, by passive resistance episodes, and riots. We have been saying right along that this review of no-answerers, etc., will leave residents, as registration did not, with little choice, but resigned compliance. The author, frankly, is by no means so certain."

What WRA should avoid is what social workers call "projection" the formation of a plan which is imposed with the false assumption that the subject is like-minded. In continuing with this account, I shall therefore avoid the following assumptions found to be in error;

(1) That colonists feel the loyalty question to be a simple matter of political choice, or thoughtful adherence to a political question-answer procedure.

Comment: Because of the confusions of registration times (well-illustrated in sheaves of questions presented from the colony at the time), registration was not a test of loyalty. Colonists know this. They know that for similar reasons, individuals gave diametrically opposed answers: e.g., the Issei who answered yes to Question 28 (substitute question) when assured it would not result in compulsory leave of the Project. (Now they're wondering!) Also, their sons who were told, on pain of being disowned, to answer no to 28, simply because in some families where parents were aged, eldest sons are viewed as sole supports and responsible in the realm of filial duty. Or, the Issei who answered no to the same question, fearing an application for Leave-clearance meant Leave-clearance, whereas daughters were enjoined to answer yes, on the original form, since they were draft-exempt. Or the sons, who answered yes simply because they understood and accepted administrative instructions. Yes-answerers and many nay-sayers group together, often in the same family, as individuals who for family or economic reasons wished to prevent compulsory leave from the project, or compulsory (universal) draft. In the group that resisted or voiced protest there are both the Isseis who said yes finally and belatedly on the revised form to the substitute question, along with Niseis and Kibeis who felt trapped into a "no." In addition, loyal colonists of both answer-types, and repatriates as well, charge that the truly disloyal would answer yes with great duplicity. Or else they say the Isseis who finally faced the substitute question and answered affirmatively were not faced with a question, which strictly speaking, declared loyalty. The rural Issei who answered yes for extraneous reasons now say, "We were duped." In Ward 5, where the so-called disloyal Isseis are found in great numbers, and a truly festive spirit is now in the air, individuals are telling me, "I'm not disloyal, you know; I just couldn't leave the Project during registration, and the no-answer was to prevent it. Now I know I was right. I won't have to move again." In brief, the colonists know that the loyalty-question was no test of loyalty.

(2) That colonists feel the government is above error.

Comment: Colonists say that WRA, witness the present impasse, failed to learn anything from registration. They say there was the "promise" that people in the colony would learn everything, whereas now they are merely informed of the choice of the Tule Center, but neither know the reasons underlying that choice, nor the motivation for segregation at this time. (This last should be taken cum grano salis). At least, they say, the choice of Tule Lake should be explained in the colony.

(3) That loyal colonists will deem it a privilege to be moved.

Comment: The constant refrain of the colonists is that they have been moved twice already, from home and from assembly center, to no particularly good end. Now it is claimed the loyal are always penalized:

- (a)--When we evacuated on order, we landed in the assembly centers: stables; lack of privacy and facilities for the existence of a civilized community.
- (b)--When we were asked to give up the shoe ration stamp, those who complied with orders found in the course of time that they were not eligible to three pairs of shoes per person per year, but rather were required to show need. Since the Project was unable to get a rationing board, individuals at present needing shoes are unable to procure them. Some few buy play shoes inadequate to present needs and comfort. On the other hand, the wary who "mislaide" their stamps, ordered shoes through the large wholesale channels.
- (c)--Now, the no-answering are favored. The loyal, who must do the moving, were promised at registration time that they would not have to move once they filled the leave clearance form. The question now is, why are the loyal penalized since through their firm stand they now lose face and position in the community? Likewise, non-registrants are now feeling themselves to be the privileged ones; more ironically, they are gleefully wondering why they are not penalized. (The staunchly disloyal, and there are some, expected some penalty, and incidentally, were the group in local population psychologically best prepared to accept loss of privilege. Instead they now feel themselves the privileged group.) Consequently, the loyal, far from feeling privileged, feel injustice.
- (d)--Along this line, the plight of any hearing commission at this project should be mentioned. In hearings, they will be required to "reward" the loyal with a ticket to the outside. (Cf., Report on Resistances to Resettlement: Tule, #3 Proj. Anal. Reports).

To avoid this penalization of the so-called loyal, and prevent a run on disloyalty here in the guise of passive resistance, I should like to make a series of very tentative proposals, which admittedly may be quite wide of the mark. In the following, I believe we avoid, at any rate, the fallacy of projection, and at least start properly with the social situation here.

I believe it unwise to give as the reason for designating Tule Lake the "segregation center" the reason which I read in the Tulean Dispatch:

"...since it has a very large number of persons who failed to register, etc., it is not surprising that this decision has been reached."

As I say, colonists are not accepting this order in any sense as penalization of the disloyal. If there are good and sufficient reasons why another Center was not picked, they wish to know them. The 11th Center is the solution that loyal Japanese-Americans were hoping for. If only the Army could build it, and now cannot, that explanation is better than a penalization of disloyals which turns out to be, in the case of Tule Lake, the bestowal of privilege.

We have noted above that the paper percentages of disloyals at Tule Lake far exceeds the actual number in that category. This group is being "frozen" in disloyalty so far as the pageantry of loyalty hearings is concerned. The last word from the supervisor of Block Managers here was to the effect that the "loyals" (yes-answerers) are envious. With the recent decision to choke off any appeals of "disloyalty" from the yes-answerer category, they have made their plans, according to the confidential report of this gentleman. Some "loyals," carried away by the spirit of protest, and desirous not to move, have declared that they will write letters of flaming disloyalty to no less than Mr. M. Dies, in the belief that this will freeze them to the center. If this is true, a good many "loyals" are being transformed; their attention is far afield from the resettlement program. And the plan as it applies to Tule Lake would seem to be an excellent way of preventing a good many "loyals" here from taking their place in the American war effort. The effect of such letters in the hands of the Dies' Committee is not difficult to assess. We must in other words make residents conscious of the real reasons lying behind segregation, and the real reasons underlying choice of any camp. Concocted notions will be scored as "phoney." Simpliste explanations, like "you are the most disloyal" will only serve to raise higher the barrier between colonist and WRA, the latter beginning to take on generalized connotations of "the government."

I think we have said enough to indicate the abysmal political ignorance of the average California Issei rural who is crucial in the formation of opinion here. Registration produced "repatriates" who thought they were visiting the folks back home (See Proj. Rep. on Resettlement #3, and Proj. Rep. on Segregation #5), having lost their economic stake at this end. So too, segregation with this as the Center is producing paper-disloyalty. In fact, in every crisis situation implying movement or the threat of movement, the peasant mind is given the loyalty-disloyalty question while at the same time the old threats, insecurities, anxieties, discriminations, and repressions loom large. Psychologists would undoubtedly be interested. We are bestowing the reward at the very time we apply the disloyalty label. The psychologists call it the "conditioned reflex," better still, "the learning process." The only essential difference is that its discoverer, Pavlov, used a dog, meat, and a ball.

With "we aren't moving" in the air here, the question is whether a difficult Center is not actually the worst place on which to impose the segregation process. A premium is placed on expressions of the disloyalty, and none on cooperativeness, where, as at Tule Lake, the resistances are piled

up highest. For example, the rejoicing in Ward 5 actually is taking on the verbalization: "The inus (dogs, informers) have to turn out and move." In the same Ward, the loyals' reaction takes the form of protest: "We have lost face; now we must stick together and try to remain."

Why, then, select a "good" center? (1) In the first place, if it is good enough -- highly urbanized and assimilated group -- the peoples' opposition and sentiment against WRA will not have crystallized as it did at Tule Lake; (2) Secondly, the fine climatic conditions and physical plant of Tule Lake (and its position in California -- a sentimental point) make it the best reward to the disloyal imaginable. Prominent members of the community (loyals) fear the loss of status in a new camp, the dearth of jobs in the face of recent job-curtailement, the heat, the connotations of the "Deep South" centers, et cetera. In effect, Tule Lake however difficult from the Administrative point of view remains a prize. The people here, at least, say we are giving the best center to the so-called disloyals; (3) Thirdly, here where the resistances are high, the loyal stalwarts will leave dejectedly, while the no-answerers of good record who might change will meet with a hearing Board, the unpleasant task of which, in ideal phrasing, is to send them away.

I. It would seem that WRA faces a problem in public relations (riots, passive resistance, run on disloyalty, letters to Mr. Dies) because of the selection of this Center for segregation purposes.

II. We have here at Tule Lake a second problem in preventing the production of paper-disloyalty, and the travesty of having the loyalty elements proclaim themselves disloyal merely to remain here.

III. We have the long range problem, and it will be felt budgetwise, of preventing a large sector of Tulean population, whatever happens to it concretely, from becoming immobilized morally and psychologically.

My second suggestion, therefore, is to change the designated Center if humanly possible. An 11th Center, an Assembly Center, a War Prisoner's camp, rather than the risk of episodes, the breaking of morale among the loyal, and the inversion of justice which now seems upon the horizon. If an Assembly Center were available, proper administration would prevent the stigma of segregation, or the feeling of undue penalization of the disloyal. If at any possible 11th Center, agriculture is impossible, factories are, nevertheless, a substitute. (I recall that at Gila, individuals when first brought in, actually pined for old Tulare). Assembly Centers are after all in the same military zone, many of them, as this Center. In regard to food provisioning, ten centers can supply the segregation center. I have no proposal, but these are the odds.

M. K. Opler, Social Analyst

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
TULE LAKE CENTER
NEWELL, CALIFORNIA

Project Analysis Report 7 -- Aug. 5, '43
Community Analysis Section

THE BEGINNING OF POSITIVE REACTIONS TO SEGREGATION: TULE LAKE CENTER

The trend reported below is only in its first phase. Yet the new administration at Tule Lake is steadily gaining ground in the promotion of segregation, the colony showing indications of a shift in sentiment. This shift, though slight as yet, is already beginning to place WRA in a new light so far as resident opinion is concerned.

The change is striking, but it is hardly the occasion for shallow optimism. Neither is it evidence of fickleness on the part of Center population. What has happened is that residents still base their reactions on colony-wide feelings of insecurity, but that these anxieties (fears of the future, awareness of discriminatory handling) have been rechanneled into constructive planning by skillful and persistent action on the part of administration and staff. It is the purpose of this report to point out how the net gains to date are only temporary and incomplete manifestations of a change in community attitude, how they could easily be cancelled out by a reversal of the process by which administration and colony are being brought into closer harmony, and how, on the other hand, we may capitalize on the excellent beginnings already made to the end of achieving ultimate success.

To realize the extent of our success at Tule, however, it is necessary to recall the situation a few weeks ago:

1. The choice of Tule Lake as segregation center involved the most highly resistant center to loyalty-retesting, to the loyalty-registration of registration times, to the resettlement program of WRA, and to segregation itself.
2. Tule Lake was the least prepared of the centers from an educational and promotional point of view. It was also the Center most recently informed of the official declaration of policy. (The exact date of the announcement for both appointed personnel and colonists was July 7, by notice in the Bay press).
3. Tule Lake had witnessed the sudden growth of a passive-resistance campaign in open opposition to the segregation policy reminiscent of the passive-resistance evidenced during the registration period, the movement then at its peak the weeks of July 16th and 23rd. This was forcibly brought to the attention of the Project Director by residents (e.g., the supervisor of Block Managers, and unofficial council of leading colonists) and by a number of individuals among appointed personnel.
4. The colony was openly antagonistic to the announced plan of separating loyal from disloyal. Community sentiment was unifying in opposition to WRA and "the government." Threats of riots and letters to Mr. Dies indicated a problem in public relations for WRA was looming. A rumor was circulated as far west as Jerome (according to a letter from the Community Analyst there -- July 29, 1943) to the effect that some 80% of Tuleans were going to

seek repatriation. Evacuee caste and persecutory feelings were developing in the absence of detailed information as to what segregation concretely meant.

There were, before the Denver Conference, only two contrary movements in sight:

1. A move on the part of 500 northwesterners, led by H. Shigehara, to seek residence at Minidoka. (The 500, led by Minidokans who had been separated earlier, now feared trouble at this Center and wished to leave before the explosion).
2. There was also a tendency on the part of yes-answerers who formed a much-abused minority group in certain blocks (particularly in Ward 5), to seek escape from ostracism as inu before community attitudes crystallized in their neighborhoods. Neither movement was indicative of widespread change. The northwesterners were always a progressive minority in the Center, more urbanized and assimilated; the Ward 5 "loyals" were likewise an aberrant group. Scattered throughout the Center were random individuals and families who applied for leave to avoid trouble.

There are now very encouraging developments, however, which involve a majority of the population and point to an abatement of the resistance campaign. They are due largely to:

1. The careful planning in regard to segregation both before and during the Denver conference;
2. The educational program now in progress here;
3. The sensitive and intelligent approach to the residents on the part of the new Project Director;
4. The attitude adopted by the colonists toward the Denver conference. We shall begin with the last point.

While the conferees were in Denver, two types of publicity appeared in the Tulean Dispatch bearing upon attitudes toward segregation policy:

1. In both the Tulean Dispatch and in open meetings with Issei block representatives, Mr. Coverley stressed the point that the Denver conferees were going to the conference not simply to bring back orders (though this, of course, would be done), but also to represent the colonists. An effort was made to picture the Conference as the point at which recommendations would be presented which were, in effect, requests from the people of this Center. The impression was left that the conferees represented Center population as spokesmen for the people. Since the conferees were all of them individuals well-respected in the colony, this impression was strengthened. Consequently, residents felt that they had "a hand in" the Conference. However distorted this point of view, it nevertheless lessened the feeling that "Washington" and WRA were proceeding with plans regardless of the exact situation in the colony. To an extent, then, the Conference was "their" Conference and WRA, for once, was taking account of their problems and their fears.

Mr. Coverley, in his last meeting with Issei Block representatives singled out two items for special attention (transcript of meeting): (a) Specific requests would be presented at the Conference. For example, send people to centers of their own choice within the limits of housing facilities and WRA long-range plans; provide lumber necessary for crating movable property of evacuees, etc. (b) The conferees are attempting to plan a segregation program with the specific situation at Tule Lake in mind. Throughout this meeting this emphasis obtained. For example, the following is a typical question asked Mr. Coverley, along with his answer: "Q. Can the decision be reversed with respect to segregation policy? (Can it be changed to: the disloyal going out and the loyal residents allowed to remain at this Center?)" "A. The people's wish will be presented to Dillon S. Myer at the Denver Conference. However, it must be borne in mind that, unless an eleventh camp is found, the same problem will be faced in which ever project is chosen." Whatever the correctness of emphasis in such answers by Mr. Coverley, the residents received a definite impression of being represented at the Conference. In a way, segregation policy in its formation was keeping Tuleans very much in mind. The strategy was helpful in destroying the barrier which had been reared between WRA and colonists in regard to segregation policy.

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When, therefore, the conferees returned with notice that:

1. The Tule Center had been chosen for very practical and unemotional reasons;
2. Tuleans would be given first choice on relocation jobs available through WRA;
3. Tuleans moving would be able, within practical limits, to choose the center of future residence;
4. Tuleans moving would, in all probability, receive a quota of available jobs in the new centers of their choice (according to the consensus of opinion expressed by the Project Directors assembled at Denver);
5. Tuleans would be eligible for travel grants in connection with indefinite leave without having to demonstrate need (means test), there was, by consequence, a general feeling throughout the colony that residents had real friends in administration locally, and generally, in WRA.

The Issei meeting mentioned above (and reported in the Tulean Dispatch, 7/24/43) had produced questions termed by the group as being "one step ahead of WRA." Each question, -- will there be lumber for crating? Will our sons on seasonal leave be allowed to return? -- was prefaced by the phrase, "Here's another, one step ahead of WRA." With the return of the conferees, colonists were surprised to learn that WRA had planned the entire segregation process carefully and completely. The fact that there will be, in all likelihood, a minimum of piece-meal dissemination of orders and information has served to dispel the notion that segregation is a continuation of the registration process.

A second type of publicity of value in setting the tone for segregation policy was the kind of publicity Mr. Best, the new Project Director, received. The notices sent back to the Dispatch were warm and friendly. Upon arrival, Mr. Best took a step without precedent at Tule Lake: an open meeting with the colony. Without dwelling on details, the warm greeting to residents, the frank scoring of rumors, the presentation of a plan for information consultants in convenient locations in the colony, and the request for an Advisory Committee from the colony to work with Administrative Committees, had the immediate effect of lessening the distance between resident and administration which had become sizable in the recent past at Tule Lake. In the colony, administration has already made remarkable gains in winning confidence in WRA. The implementation of the plan suggested above requires immediate attention if we are to capitalize on the gains already made.

In addition, the formation of an information and speaker's bureau, manned by individuals well-respected in the colony, has also had the effect of bringing administration into closer rapport with the colony. (The author, though standing clear of administration and the speaker's bureau, has averaged three informal talks per day, by urgent request of informal groups, to answer questions on segregation; one C.A. staff member, not associated in the minds of colonists with this office, is popular as an information consultant and has arranged meetings at which speaker's bureau representatives appear).

As will appear from the foregoing, administration at Tule Lake stands closer to the colony than it has in recent months. Nevertheless, in view of the starting point at Tule Lake, much remains to be done along the lines already established. Having indicated that the present is no time for shallow

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pessimism, it remains to point out that shallow optimism is equally wide of the mark. The following are a few straws in the wind.

At the first meeting of colony leaders with Mr. Best, the question of an advisory committee (on segregation) was broached. One individual present, representing a minority faction, opposed the use of the Planning Board for the new function. His basic motivation was to prevent the Planning Board (the majority faction in opposition) from assuming control. However, Planning Board representatives themselves were loath to assume responsibility. The colony leaders themselves held back. The leader of the minority faction himself remarked that after all, colonists know full well that we go to the administration center for meetings such as these, and a certain stigma can easily be attached.

In the meeting at which Mr. Best greeted the colony, difficulty was encountered in finding an interpreter. I have since interviewed a number of those who ordinarily function in this capacity. They were in hiding. Finally, the supervisor of Wardens was located. His translation was accurate, but coldly literal.

The fact is that no established groups or previous committees wish to be associated with the segregation process. The difficulty encountered in selecting new leadership is simply that individuals wish to remain anonymous and "safe." While both Planning Board and a system of block delegates have been suggested, neither wish to be stigmatized despite the excellent initial impression made by the new Director. The former realize that any single committee is easy to aim at and recall the fortunes of the Council during registration times. The block managers are notorious for a lack of aggressive leadership, and block representation, besides stirring up recollection of the block-by-block pattern of registration times is further handicapped by the well-known fact that blocks are prone to localized Issei control, and block representation open to unfair pressures.

Leadership of the type sought by administration cannot therefore be centralized in a single committee, easily the target of public pressures. Nor should it follow the block pattern which reifies local pressures, Issei control, and all the sentimental attachments, deeply rooted, which the block connotes. Since Tule Lake is one of the older centers, and one which was originally settled block-by-block by neighbors who had lived side by side in former communities, the block is generally a local social group of great solidarity led or controlled by local Isseis. Familial and community controls are interconnected in such a way that block patriarchs frequently exercise control in family situations by threat of ostracism, by manipulating local opinion, by maintaining status in the narrow community, by precept or example. The administrative key to the community should be in terms of wider group associations.

A second reason for avoiding the block pattern of representation is that certain blocks, building on the earlier pattern of we won't move (see Project Report 6) have already taken informal votes not to move despite segregation orders. A frequent question put to representatives of the speaker's bureau reflecting this fact is: What sanctions will WRA impose upon

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individuals who refuse to move? How will it move passive-resisters? Block representation, I should imagine, will advertise unduly such scattered centers of resistance, largely in Ward 5, within the colony.

To achieve a pattern of administrative contacts within the colony, the following is suggested:

1. Diffuse the contacts sufficiently so that no one group may easily become the target for criticism;
2. Avoid such titles for any committee as "Segregation Committee." (Colonists do not want to be put on the spot, or assume responsibility for a program not of their own making);
3. Make use of contacts widely scattered in the community to disseminate both information and administrative attitude;
4. Maintain as many administrative contacts in the community as possible. (We have made a number of friends already);
5. Use groups with already established functions, comprising a variety of opinion and political factions;
6. Pick groups with functions which are beyond criticism.

There are a number of such groups already established in the colony:

1. Buddhist priest association, and the Council of Christian Ministers. It should be noted that during registration, the Buddhists and Christians split, the majority group (Buddhist) dissociating themselves largely from loyalty-registration and wielding powerful influence, the Christian ministers generally forming an opposite camp.

It is suggested that these two groups be invited to form an Inter-Faith Council. The request should come from the Project Director. The Council should be designated as one general advisory body. It should be comprised of 6 Buddhist priests and 6 Christian ministers. Lay members of each church may be represented; perhaps 4 from each group, 2 Isseis and 2 Niseis. Thus, the Council might either be a Council of 12 or a Council of 20. It is suggested that Father Dai, Christian minister and formerly Project interpreter, function as interpreter for the Council.

2. A Council of representatives from the Parent-Teachers Association would be helpful. All Wards, excepting 5, have such associations organized on a Ward basis.

3. A schedule of meetings with a Project-wide organization called the Parents of Nisei Soldiers would be helpful. Perhaps a Council of this organization could be formed.

While these organizations fulfill the above conditions, there is a problem of integration. They might be integrated, therefore, with such organization on block and ward basis as is formed by the Planning Board, or if such organization is not forthcoming, integrated into a single Council of Associations through delegate representation. The plan thus has two possible uses: (a) an advisory Council can still be had if the Planning Board encounters difficulties in setting up its organization; and (b) the Council of Associations may prevent the Planning Board's organization from having to assume sole responsibility in the event of crises, thus encouraging them to

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function with less fear of consequences. At any rate, a Council of Associations, and contact with member associations will provide top administration with channels to the colony. Such contacts have, to date, met with a most gratifying response.

The Speaker's Bureau should likewise be continued for the same reasons. It is suggested that since the contact to date has been by office staffs and special groups (like Church associations) that a series of meetings be arranged in each of the seven Wards. To this point, the contact has been mainly with Nisei groups. With the return of Father Dai to the project as interpreter, Issei groups should be contacted by Ward meetings. Likewise, meetings arranged for the farm crews will involve Isseis.

Another need of the Center which I have heard expressed a number of times is the need for an official staff of interpreters (perhaps 3). As it is, interpreters are usually stigmatized as "doing a job for the Administration." As with our first project-wide meeting, so in the future: interpreters will refuse to be placed in an embarrassing position. The difficulty is easily overcome, in terms of Japanese psychology, by making the position, not a labor of love, but an officially recognized post. An interpreter staff should likewise have the following functions:

1. Checking all translations of official documents to determine that they do not open wounds dormant but latent in resident-evacuee psychology. Checking all Japanese translations (including the official manual prepared by Naval Intelligence) to see that high standards of accuracy are maintained. I recall that translations of certain documents during registration, while roughly accurate, were confusing because of choice of certain words; while in other instances translations were damaging because they failed to take into account the tender skins and widespread feelings of persecution among evacuees.
 2. Serving as translators at all meetings where Isseis are present.
 3. Serving as an advisory board in all connections where official documents or information is being given the colony.
- I am told that many rumors and misconceptions arise where the Japanese language is not used properly as a means of communication. In regard to the official manual, it should be checked before it is circulated.

Rumors to date, however, have been carefully controlled. While the conferees were in Denver, the colony according to my staff shifted ground in its opposition to the segregation program. Since it was stressed that Tule Lake was represented at the Conference, the passive resistance mood changed to one of criticism of details of the program. Lacking real knowledge of such details, colonists seized upon misconceptions which came to notice. For example, an erroneous notice appeared in the Tulean Dispatch of July 29, 1943; the article, which was the lead article of the day was headlined: "RESIDENTS WHO WISH HEARINGS SHOULD FILL OUT FORM 130." It stated that one could obtain hearings only through application at the Leave Office (on Application for Indefinite Leave). Naturally, this was construed much in the same sense that the Application for Leave-Clearance evoked in registration times: forced relocation. Word went around that those leaving would therefore be forced to relocate from the new centers. Along the same

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line, a misquotation of Mr. Myer (from the Conference) carried in the Oregonian stated: (July 27) "Only one of the present ten WRA centers will be maintained. This one is located at Tule Lake, Cal....." This was again interpreted to mean that those who went to other centers would soon be forced to relocate. Likewise, one speaker at the center spoke of the WRA appropriation as being good for one year only; this was interpreted by less literate Isseis to mean that there was definitely a one-year limit on all Relocation Centers (excluding Tule). The "forced relocation" rumor has already been checked.

Another rumor, shifting opposition from general dislike of the segregation idea to concrete criticism, was the notion that the Army would take over in the internal affairs of Tule Lake Center. This idea has been brought under control by Mr. Best in the pages of the Dispatch, along with the above, while both notions have been laid to rest by the Speaker's Bureau. Other rumors, concerning Army draft of all Niseis in the ten "loyal" centers, have not crystallized sufficiently to warrant any publicity and may die from lack of momentum. The big question of the moment is: What will WRA do if we refuse to move? At the present reading I believe a stern answer should be given to this question, and perhaps to protect local administration should be forthcoming from the Washington office.

We are now at Tule Lake in phase I, an educational phase. The colonists are learning the answers. Phase II will undoubtedly be one in which interpretation and the forming of opinion will play a more deciding role. The present is auspicious thanks to the fine start made by administration. The above suggestions are intended to suggest ways in which our gains may be consolidated and the program carried ahead to ultimate success in Phase II.

(Dictated by M. K. Opler, Community Analyst)