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4/12/42

Memo to Mr. Armstrong

Subject: Re-examination of Military areas and zones, CAD memo 4/8/42

1. A situation exists in Marysville wherein the boundary line of Military Areas 1 and 2 bisects a Japanese populated area. A report on this situation is due to reach us Monday, April 13, from our Field Representative, Mr. Gregg.

2. There is a possibility of a similar situation arising in Visalia. However, we have no definite information, as yet, of the difficulties there.

JCT

4/15/42

Capt T R Young
Rm 420 Whitcomb Hotel
S. F.

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your memorandum dated April 8, relating to definition of military areas, zones, and boundaries.

We are enclosing a copy of a memorandum written at our request, by our Marysville representative, outlining the problem of boundaries in that area. We should also like to emphasize the fact that Japanese in the Military Area No. 2 have proceeded along lines of property disposition which differ from those in Military Area No. 1. They have felt, in accordance with Proclamation No. 1, that they would be allowed considerable more time for any disposition of their affairs which might be required.

Obviously, if an arbitrary re-determination of boundaries is made to include those people in Military Area No. 2, the WCCA may find itself faced with rather acute property and social problems. Conversely, however, it is obviously unjust to allow business establishments in Military Area No. 2 to operate freely, and evacuee residents of Military Area No. 2 to move freely although comparable establishments and residents just across the street are largely restricted in their movements.

Assis. Cashier

J.A.C.L. Marysville 5/13/42.

J.A.C.L. located across boundary #1 & #2 has been excluded from active work in the Yuba City control district. In as much as many of the people are illiterate and/or don't speak English a considerable problem arose concerning the effectiveness of the Bank's counsel both as to understanding & trust. Up to this date attempts to secure permission for J.A.C.L. representatives to work over the line in area #1 has been unsuccessful.

A/T Due to what was considered critical situation permission was obtained for the local Ins + sec. to work with this Dept in civil control station

Regional Files, 103, Wash. D. C.
Grodzins

WCE A

Letter from Chas. A. Nugent, resident of Arcadia, to Secy. of War
May 29th, 1942

The sewerage situation at the Santa Anita Race Track is becoming extremely serious and a definite menace to the health and welfare of every resident in Arcadia and the odor from the surface drainage is very obnoxious.

Inasmuch as the war Department created this situation I demand that they correct it immediately, as any delay is certain to result in serious consequences.

June 8 1942 P.D. Molter, Auburn, Sacto. Office FRB

Determined through conversation today with Tom Yego, Sec. of the Placer J.A.C.L. that of the 25 families which moved into zone No. 2 from the Bay Area and San Jose district that there were actually no businesses transferred or set up in Zone No.2 or sums of money invested. The families who previously operated a business and liquidated it in other areas came to this ~~district~~ district registered as laborers. In this connection, there were 10 additional families, mostly agricultural, who moved into zone 2 from Newcastle and Auburn districts under the same circumstances. There were no transactions involving expenditures of any kind.

June 7 1942 ibid.

Attended meeting called by Mr. Roy Donnaly of the Placer J.A.C.L. at their present headquarters on the ranch of Tom Yego. Meeting was called for the purpose of advising the Japanese people in zone 2, through the J.A.C.L., that liquidation of their business affairs and preparing for eventual evacuation should be given serious consideration. It was visivly noticeable that considerable misunderstanding and mistrust existed among the majority of ~~people~~ fifty odd people who attended, and apparently was gained through a previous understanding that those people in zone 2 would not be necessarily evacuated by the army

Resolution from citizens of Lone Pine, Cal. (near Manzanar) to DeWitt
July 7, 1942

We, the undersigned representative business-men of the communities of Lone Pine and Independence, believe that you should know that we are not in accord with the editorial policies of our local newspapers wherein the same editor has taken it upon himself to assume that our towns do not want in our midst apparently under any circumstances American citizens of Japanese ancestry.

We believe such an attitude is wrong.

We are entirely well aware that in such times as these, there is naturally a certain amount of public doubt and uncertainty that must be given proper consideration. Nevertheless, we feel that this may be overcome to a considerable extent if Americans of Japanese ancestry are permitted to visit, for the purposes of pleasure and business, in the towns of Lone Pine and Independence, in restricted numbers and under proper escort.

It is our further suggestion, that until such times as the citizens of our two communities become more acclimated to these people, the numbers be restricted to perhaps a busload at any one time.

It is apparent that these internees are to be with us for a considerable length of time. It is our opinion that this initial step may be the fore-runner of creating mutual conditions of improvements in attitudes as well as further ~~maintain~~ ~~improving~~ maintaining the high morale of the internees by granting them privileges of occasionally coming onto our communities.

Assuring you of our genuine appreciation for your favorable consideration in this matter, we remain

Very truly yours,

Lone Pine Lumber & Supply Co.
By R. R. Henderson (signed)

Lone Pine Drug Store
By W. E. McLean (signed)

Joseph's Department Store
By I. B. Joseph (signed)

Mt. Whitney Drug Store
By Ben B. Baker (signed)

Sprouse-Reitz Company
By Arthur Ray (signed)

J. C. Penney Co.
By Frank White (signed)

Safeway Stores
By Earl Lehman (signed)

Bank of America
By C. McArthur (signed)

Hopkins Hardware
By J. B. Hopkins (signed)

Desert Holly Sweet Shoppe
By Eva Graves (signed)

(Etc., signed in a similar manner by 18 business men of Lone Pine in total.)

C O P Y

B 2.10

05
July 28, 1942

Mr. Walter T. Tsukamoto
Tule Lake War Relocation Project
P. O. Box 813
Tule Lake, California

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter of recent date regarding the family allowances of the Wartime Civil Control Administration program and stating that considerable ill feeling exists in the project wherein you now reside, because the former residents of Sacramento and Marysville Assembly Centers failed to receive such allowances.

You are advised that allowances were not received by the residents of Sacramento and Marysville for certain specific reasons. In setting up a program of allowances it was necessary to make a number of steps. A number of these steps preceded approval by the War Department of the program; and it was not until there was approval that funds were made available. Then it became necessary to set up the mechanics of the operation. While these mechanics were being set up the entire picture again was reviewed.

It was found that the need in some Centers was greater than the need in others; and it was decided that whatever the circumstance no funds would be distributed once residents of an assembly center were transferred to a relocation center. This decision was made, because War Relocation Authority, a civilian agency of the Government- and not the Army- became the responsible agent once a transfer was made prior to any distribution of funds that such allowances were not retroactive.

On the basis of need, funds were distributed. The reason the residents of the Marysville and Sacramento Assembly Centers failed to receive allowances was because their need was not found to be so pressing as was the need of residents in other centers; and, their transfers took place prior to completion of the mechanical requirements of distribution.

Very truly yours,

W. F. Durbin
Major, QMC
Ass't A. C. of S. C. A. C.

B 2.08

1459 Ferger Avenue
Fresno, California
July 30, 1942

Hon. Elbert D. Thomas
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator:

I wish to comment at this time upon the subject of the Japanese people within the United States, particularly here on the West Coast. It is most gratifying to know of your extensive experience, past and present, with these people. Coupled with this knowledge is my high esteem for our personal acquaintance established over a period of years in Salt Lake City, Utah. Consequently, I feel good about writing you. I have confidence that what I have in mind will receive influential attention.

These past three months I have been policing the Japanese Fresno Assembly Center, which comprises over 5,000 evacuees, and is only one of many such California reception centers of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, a civilian branch of the Fourth Army Command. My branch of the W.C.C.A. is known as the Interior Security ~~Bureau~~ Police. It's personnel was brought together only after rigid interview, elimination, and qualification standards by its organizers, and of course the Civil Service requirements. Those responsible for the organization are Major Ray Ashworth, U.S.A., Mr. J. A. Strickland, Asst. Chief of Sec. Police, and my own Chief W. W. Vaughan of the Fresno Center. I am taking the liberty of inclosing a copy of the interior police duties and activities as drawn up by these men for your information. And I wish here to mention a pertinent fact also. All of the Security Police have attended a special 30 hour schooling and lecture course which dealt with the traits and psychology of the Japanese, some of the subject matter being passed on to us from the experience of the F.B.I.

It is my understanding that the W.C.C.A., of which we are a part, will soon have fulfilled its purpose, when it finishes the task of delivering all Japanese evacuees over to permanent relocation centers at some distant inland from the West Coast. The responsibility and care of the Japanese will then rest with the War Relocation Administration, supervision of which department was invested in Mr. Eisenhower by President Roosevelt last March.

To the best of my knowledge the W.R.A. has failed to recognize the genuine need and importance of inculcating the Interior Police branch of the W.C.C.A. into its own organization. Here we are now an established,—an experienced and capable law and peace enforcement group,—especially trained and respected by the Japanese themselves, which may be dissolved because of W.R.A. failing to recognize our potential importance to itself. We, much more perhaps than the management personnel, do know the positive necessity of the presence of Caucasian peace officers wherever the Japanese may be assembled. Knowing the philosophy of the Japanese as you yourself know it, I am sure that you agree with me the importance of dependable red blooded American white men being constantly on the alert within and among them, cannot be overstressed. We know how jealous the Japanese are for ever so little power or authority. We know their disposition to desire "one" in order that they

might take "two". We know that if we give them an "inch" of liberty, so to speak, they will take first a "foot", a "yard", a "block", or even a "mile" provided they are not halted at the first inch.

At this point I wish to cite our experience within the assembly center pertaining to the Japanese policing themselves. We organized an Auxiliary Police Department, as did the other assembly centers. In our own case as well as all other centers to the best of my knowledge, such auxiliary departments became very much a "farce", instead of a "force". In fact we had to disband them. True to the general rule, they were totally lacking when it came to initiative, or where they should have used fair judgment. They were flight, easily excitable, lost in a panic, and worst of all we could not depend upon them to inform on their fellow race except in the most trivial of infractions of the rules.

I could write at much greater length, Senator Thomas, but perhaps I've expressed myself sufficiently for the present. I sincerely hate to see the W.R.A. make the mistake of attempting to police the relocation centers by the Japanese themselves. It will react to the detriment of both the management as well as to the Japanese. They will be much harder to bring into line after a mistake of this nature has been allowed, and those Japanese to whom law and order was entrusted, once disbanded, will most surely constitute a back-biting, disgruntled, trouble-making group of "once was" leaders. And I also hate to see the disintegration of so select a group of efficient, capable, trained men for the job, which sooner or later, the W.R.A. will need so badly. I feel they will regret it ~~if~~ if they do not act immediately upon the matter of taking over a nucleus at least of the personnel of the Interior Security Police NOW while it is yet functioning.

I shall greatly appreciate judicious consideration of the subject, and more than that I will sincerely appreciate your taking such steps and procedure as your good judgment may dictate. Needless to say I will look forward to hearing from you.

With very best personal wishes, I am,

Yours very truly,

/s/ Frank C. Rich

Appendix
The Army and Evacuation - II.
Document IV.

May 14, 1942

Col. Karl R. Bendetsen
Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division
Western Defense Command
1231 Market Street
San Francisco, California

Dear Colonel Bendetsen:

Your letter of the 24th of April has been given our careful study and consideration. We are particularly impressed with the fullness and frankness with which you express your views and, even though our conclusions differ, our high confidence in the army is not diminished by it.

And so, with equal frankness, I would like to state our attitude and position.

It goes without saying that our most immediate concern is our own system and works, but we have always appreciated the fact that our local problem is only a part of a much larger one. For that reason we have heretofore confined our statements to our own local situation it being our idea that, once this situation is brought to your attention, the military would design a general scheme which would comprehend the solution of as many local problems as possible. We regarded the zone lines drawn in the original order as ones drawn more under compulsions of the immediate necessities than as a finished or final solution of the problem. For those reasons we also refrained from "joining in" any concerted action with any others designed to, as you say, "bring pressure." We did not and do not wish to unnecessarily add to the already heavy burdens and responsibilities of the army; but we do look to the army for informed leadership.

We are unable to understand the reasoning whereby an open road or highway running along the valley floor and which, for a considerable distance, follows fairly close to the natural contours of the foothills, should be a military boundary. The road as it is situated could not, so far as we are able to see, stop or limit military action, but the hills themselves might. If such a boundary line is supported only by the reason that the boundary "must stop somewhere" and that the road is a convenient and easily traced line, then it follows that we in the area are left exposed to danger in order to simplify the job of the surveyor.

We think we fully appreciate the difficulties implied in your statement that the evacuation problem is confused with the general campaign against sabotage and the subversive activities, but the enemy will not be much concerned with the logical niceties of our analytical breakdown. He will invade, sabotage, subvert whenever and wherever and however he can in order to attain his end. In our present situation the district and, so far as we know, all other civil

authorities, have no legal power under which the area can be cleared or practically or effectively policed or protected against the saboteur which is the danger we immediately fear and the army is the only agency we know of which possesses the legal power to make such protection possible. Now, our point is that it would be better for not only ourselves but for all concerned in the protection of this Western area, including the army itself, if the territorial limits which the army places upon its own exercise of that power were drawn along natural and not artificial lines. In this locality such a line would run along the peak of the Sierras, or the Eastern boundary of the State, rather than along a highway which has no apparent relation to the terrain over which it runs or the developments therein.

. To run such a natural boundary would add but a small burden to the evacuation; but it would be the only way in which the area as it naturally exists . . . could be dealt with as the natural unit which it is for all purposes.

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R. E. Stark

Regional Files, 109.2, Wash. D. C.
Miyamoto

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Letter from Sheriff Young of Salt Lake City to Rowalt
November 6, 1942]

I am enclosing a copy of a report ^{that} I made to Colonel Wm. A. Boekel on General DeWitt's staff, who is taking care of the investigation in the Civil Affairs Department of the Army.

This report was made after a conference with 400 Relocation and Army Officials in San Francisco, and I thought you might be interested, as it at least expresses our view of how the Japanese problem should be handled.

Naturally, it is very brief and possibly a little ambiguous, but I am sure that you can get the general idea of it.

Regional Files, 109.2, Wash. D. C.
Miyamoto

Report from Young to Boekel
October 12, 1942

~~For the purpose~~

For the purpose of illustrating the Japanese phase of the Evacuation and Relocation policies as now constituted and their effect on the individual citizen and society as a whole, I will use Salt Lake County as an example and start at the time present enemy activities were first noted.

Many months before Pearl Harbor officials of the F.B.I. began enlisting the cooperation of local enforcement departments to assist in the investigations pertaining to subversive organizations of the above mentioned "present enemies."

The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office went on different occasions three of their officers to the F.B.I. school at Washington. Two of these officers subsequently joined the F.B.I. regular force as investigators. During this period and up to the present we have completed nearly two hundred separate investigations and have nearly one hundred additional assigned, some of these investigations require several days to complete. The reports of these investigations are turned over to the local F.B.I. chief as soon as completed.

The General deductions drawn by us from these investigations are that:

1. Our enemies have very complete organizations and plans. These groups are capable of expanding and executing prearranged plans for neutralization of our war effort.
2. The attitude of the principals involved is non-cooperative and obstructive to the development of a war spirit and a productive policy.
3. The Japanese are definitely regimented and are controlled by leaders tied in to organizations tracing to religious and military leaders of the Japanese Government. They rejoice at Japanese victories and in some cases are arrogant and have shown disposition to strike and possibly revolt.

There is a tendency to demand more all the time and to take advantage of the fact that there is a shortage of labor.

Their objective is to become sharecroppers on the farms abandoned by the whites, who are active in the war effort and to get a permanent foothold for as many of their race as possible.

4. There is indication that, agents of Japanese, regiment the individuals in assembly centers and deal with American agents and in some cases considerable amounts of money are involved in the deal.

The Japanese understand a language of direction and when loosely handled they soon learn to take advantage of this condition to advance their own interests to the limit.

Report from Young to Boekel, cont'd.

I have been Sheriff of Salt Lake County for twelve years and naturally I have had opportunity to analyze the people who are affected by this problem. In the interest of the welfare of these people I am submitting to you my opinion of how it should be handled at this time. I realize there are many other opinions and I present mine for what it is worth.

The Americans definitely do not want the Japs to locate in their communities but they are desperate for labor and resort to almost anything to get it.

The better citizens hope to hold their farms intact to make them available for their sons after the war.

The Japs are splendid workmen and with their organization and regimentation they become very valuable to localities where labor is short.

RECOMMENDATION:

Expression of Policy from Army Authority preferably, either advisory or authoritatively.

Policy should contain:

1. Advice or orders for all Japanese, German or Italian persons to realize at all times that we are at war with their countries and any act on their part that is not cooperative and in every way helpful in appreciating all officials problems and acting accordingly, would be considered at least an unfriendly act and could result in their being confined to Relocation Centers and being denied other privileges.
2. In the process of employing relocated individuals, the policy should be to impress on them that it is a distinct privilege for them to be allowed to leave and any attitude on their part to the contrary would be considered at least non-cooperative and should be considered in all appraisals of the status of these people when making decision on policy.
3. Local authorities should be contacted even if it is only to have them informed as to policies and objectives and to get their reaction.
4. Regulations and organizations that are set up should express the fact that they are necessary during the emergency and the problem ~~of~~ of rehabilitation in all its aspects must be postponed until the war is won.
5. There should be definite regulations maintaining control over individuals leaving relocating centers and rigid provisions for their return to the center when they finish their prescribed employment or should they quit, strike, or be found unsatisfactory for any other reason. The present policy of allowing the employment agency to transfer them from one employer to another is dangerous and will result in complete loss of control by the authorities.
6. We believe it should be the responsibility of all enemy aliens and citizens of enemy blood to make good with the American people

Report from Young to Boekel, cont'd.

during the period of emergency and the final solution of the enemy problem following the war will be arrived at in accordance with the attitude and activities of all aliens and citizens of enemy blood during the war.

7. Permanent solutions of these problems cannot be arrived at during the emergency, all labor and intelligence should be directed to winning the war first and all policies should work to this end.