James

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington, D. C.

To WRA Staff Members

The successful administration of the WRA program, especially in the Relocation Centers, will be dependent to a great extent upon an understanding of the cultural background of the Japanese people and their American children and grandchildren. John F. Embree, who recently has assumed responsibility for documentation of the WRA program, in the Office of Reports, has conducted studies in both Japan and Hawaii, and is recognized by his colleagues as being well qualified to report on Japanese race and culture. The accompanying notes on Dealing With Japanese Americans are commended to the attention of all WRA staff members. Additional notes of similar nature will be prepared from time to time.

D. S. Myer
Director

Attachment

October 1942

DEALING WITH JAPANESE-AMERICANS

By John F. Embree
Documents Section, Office of Reports

1. Race and Culture.

The only thing evacuees in relocation centers have in common is their ancestry, i.e., their race. Because of this fact both the evacuees and members of the WRA staff are likely to assume many things to be racial which are in actual fact not racial but cultural.

What is race anyway? The basic element in race is heredity. A number of people of the same ancestry may be termed a race. Pure races, that is, large numbers of people descended from the same stock, do not exist. All present-day groups of people such as Japanese, English, Germans, Americans, are of mixed racial stock. One consequence of this is that individuals of any so-called racial group differ greatly among themselves in regard to stature, hair form, skin color, head shape, etc. This means that race can only be considered on a statistical basis. Japanese, for instance, are <u>on the average</u> shorter, darker-skinned and more often round-headed than are Caucasians. But individual Japanese are often taller or lighter or more long-headed than individual Caucasians with whom they may be compared.

A look around any relocation center will demonstrate these points. Some Japanese you will notice to be rather short, but every now and then you will meet a tall man; some will have the characteristic straight black hair of the "Mongol" type, but others have wavy hair; some have an epicanthic fold on the inner part of the eye opening (which partly accounts for the so-called slant eye), but many do not. Observe your Japanese acquaintances closely and you will soon have to discard any mythical "Japanese type" you have built up in your mind.

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Physical features of parents are transmitted to their children, racial types persist through generations. But <u>cultural traits are not inherited</u>; they are acquired through learning and education.

Thus, a Japanese born in California grows up speaking English, something his cousin in Japan may never learn. And even though he

attends a Japanese language school, he will never learn to speak Japanese properly unless he goes to Japan to live. President Roosevelt is of Dutch descent, but he cannot discourse in Dutch. To understand his personality you must know his cultural background as an American brought up in eastern New York. Mr. Willkie is of German descent, but he does not speak German, and his culturally determined personality is typically American.

Psychologists and anthropologists have made many studies in regard to intelligence and race, and temperament and race. There is general agreement that as between the major "races" of man there is no positive evidence to show that a given individual of one race may not develop as far mentally as an individual of another, given the same cultural background. Similarly, in regard to temperament, it is culture rather than race that is the predominant factor. Thus, the "lazy" Negro of rural United States is not lazy because of race but because of social status; his cousin in Nigeria is a very energetic individual and one capable of complex political development and strong individual leadership. Similarly, Japanese in California are known to be hard-working, self-sacrificing people with strong family loyalties. These useful traits are not biological and there is a real danger of their disappearing soon under relocation center conditions. (Remember, the Crow and Blackfoot Indians whose cultures stressed individual initiative and personal bravery and what has happened to these brilliant warriors under Reservation conditions where all the old cultural values have been undermined and many are today lacking in individual initiative and possessed of a typical wards-of-the-government-outlook on life.)

The importance of culture in determining behavior may be seen further in the fact that frequently you will find a young Nisei to have a similar temperament and outlook on life as yourself in contrast to his father who may appear to you to be "very Japanese." Of course, under center conditions of life, the administrator, with his security and dominant social position will have so many advantages over any Nisei, insecure as to his future, and in a subservient social position, that the two are bound to look upon problems in the center from different points of view. This social and economic difference in position should always be remembered by a "Caucasian" administrator or teacher when trying to settle some problem with an evacuee.

To Summarize:

Race is hereditary and culture acquired. Races of man today are not "pure" and there is great variability in physical appearance and intelligence within any racial group. The all important factor in determining adult behavior is early education, i.e., the cultural background of an individual. Further, even in what is regarded as one culture (e.g. American) important differences in personality develop as a result

of growth in different regional areas and in different social levels of society.

2. Behavior Patterns as Found Among Issei and Some Others in Relocation Centers.

In order to deal successfully with any group of people it is well to know something about them. A friendly attitude goes a long way, but that is not enough, for good will without knowledge may result in more harm than good.

The older Japanese (Issei)* have a number of fixed ways of living together and dealing with social situations about which it is useful to know.

The Go-Between

First of all, no Japanese (and here is meant no persons of Japanese culture) likes to meet face to face with his social equal or superior in a situation that might cause embarrassment to the latter. Instead, a go-between is preferred, some common friend who will carry the message or conduct the negotiations. In this way, if the negotiations fall through or one party has to say "No," face-to-face embarrassment is avoided. The best known example of this is in marriage where the two families involved wish to inquire into one another's social backgrounds. This, of course, could lead to considerable embarrassment and so a go-between is very convenient. Even some Japanese-Americans who object to marriage arrangements by families do like to have a friend do the proposing, John Alden style.

Similarly, if an important business deal is being carried out, negotiations are often by means of a go-between.

On a relocation center, you may find that if some program or suggestion is not liked, no one will object at first but later through some third party you will hear that there is objection to it. This is the go-between system in operation. You may often get better results in work with older evacuees by working through a go-between than by working

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*Much has been said of the differences between Issei, Kibei, and Nisei. On the whole it is safe to assume that older Issei are Japanese in culture and outlook and younger Nisei are American in culture and outlook. (If a Nisei is bitter and anti-administration in attitude, this is simply evidence that he is American and strongly resents his loss of liberty without trial.) The Kibei, Nisei who have been educated in Japan, have been much written of as a dangerous pro-Japanese element. Probably many Kibei are culturally Japanese, but by no means all. Furthermore, some Issei, born in Japan but educated in the United States, are American in point of view. So, while Issei, Kibei and Nisei are convenient terms of classification, it is worth remembering that generalizations concerning these groups are subject to many individual exceptions.

directly, since each of you can speak more freely and express your ideas more fully to a go-between without fear of hurting anyone's feelings than if you were dealing face to face.

Sharing Responsibility

Another characteristic of older Japanese is a desire to avoid personal responsibility for something that may make him unpopular with his associates. As a result committees are more popular than chairmen. Further, any final decision for action by a committee is usually unanimous, thus making all members equally responsible for it. If people are dissatisfied with some aspect of project life, instead of using a single go-between, a committee may be chosen and that committee will wait upon some member of the staff with its complaints or proposals.

Where a single man must serve, as in the case of block representatives, he will probably either be unanimously nominated or men will rotate in office either by resignations or through having different men elected each election.

(For a comparison, note that in Japan while a certain body of men rule Japan through the years, those who are openly and formally responsible for government change frequently. No single man stands out as responsible for government for long at a time in the manner of Hitler or Mussolini.)

Project Head's Position

As the man responsible for the whole community, the project head in each center has great authority and prestige -- an authority and prestige recognized by the older Japanese in the same way in which they recognize the authority of a village headman.

When a new policy is announced or anything affecting the whole center is inaugurated, it should be made by the project head himself. Furthermore, the project head should make it a point to from time to time meet with the people of the center (or of each camp where there is more than one in a center) in order to discuss new developments, answer questions and so make sure that people understand. Only in this way will the people believe what is said, because it comes from the highest authority. Talks of this sort by the project director should be as specific as possible -- if necessary deal with such seemingly minor but very real things as toilets, soap supply, food distribution, etc., if these questions are raised by the evacuees. Only the project head can effectively kill some rumors. Furthermore, this first-hand word from the highest authority should be given not once a year, but at least once a month. Such duties cannot be deputized. The project head, like the

village headman, is expected to be responsible for taking an active interest in the welfare of his community by traditional Japanese custom. (Resentment of questions implying criticism of administration is not, of course, the best means of answering them, or solving the underlying problems and anxieties that give rise to them.)

After a new policy has been explained by the project head to responsible evacuees involved, later discussions of it may be made by the appropriate division head.

Modes of Employment

Employment problems form an important aspect of center life and need patient and personal attention by conscientious administrators. With Japanese (as indeed with any people), to simply ask for a turnout of 300 men on a work project is not likely to be successful. Instead, first the nature of the work must be considered, then a number of experienced evacuees contacted. To them the nature and purpose of the work must be explained. When they understand what it is all about, they can suggest the people to be employed on it, and make useful suggestions on carrying out the project. In this way a corps of workers with close rapport and good morale can be built up. If any change in conditions of work is made, this also should be carefully explained to and fully understood by the work leaders who can in turn explain it to their work crews.

Sitdowns, strikes and riots are not the result of cussedness, but are the results of misunderstandings and dissatisfactions; in the centers they are likely to be accentuated by anxieties, but the administrator who is careful to develop understanding by the evacuees of the programs he proposes to initiate probably will be favored with their cooperation.

Anxieties

All evacuees in relocation centers have an uneasy feeling of insecurity that determines many of their actions. This insecurity is due to the war, and especially to the relocation program whereby families often had to move, not once but twice or three times, from, say, Berkeley to Zone Two, from Zone Two to an assembly center, from an assembly center to a relocation center. All of this in a few weeks or months. The newspapers carry stories of threats to deport Japanese after the war, threats to deprive Nisei of citizenship, threats to prevent the return of evacuees to California after the war.

WRA policy in the relocation center differs from WCCA policy, and this WRA policy itself has often changed since it was first established.

Small wonder, then, that an evacuee wonders "What next?" He is worried and insecure in regard to what will happen after the war, what will become of his children's manners and morals as a result of life in center barracks, with the common mess halls and lavatories; he is worried about tomorrow's food, tomorrow's health, tomorrow's children.

It is this basic insecurity and multitude of anxieties that cause so many alarmist rumors to fly through the centers and cause so many people to become apathetic toward work.

For the present, the best way to deal with this situation is for everyone from project head down to make sure that he understands and has explained clearly and definitely just what any new policy or new activity means in terms of life in the center. Furthermore, within his sphere of activity, each staff member should make every effort to know personally and well as many evacuees of as many social types as he can. Only in this way can some of the fears and rumors prevalent among the evacuees be brought to light and so killed off just as darkness-loving bacteria die when exposed to sunshine.

Food

In regard to food, any regular eating in common mess halls is unsatisfactory and the food is inevitably going to be criticized whether it is good or not. But it is important to realize the great importance of the slightest change in diet to the evacuees and that anything that even looks like unfair practice by the chefs and the chief steward is going to cause a great deal of dissatisfaction. Unless the chief steward has the confidence of his cooks who in turn have the respect of the blocks, food riots or strikes are going to occur sooner or later on the project.

Most of these last suggestions all add up to the same thing, a need for staff members to be well acquainted with evacuees with whom they are concerned so that they can observe any growth of a critical situation and deal with it on a personal basis and in a peaceful manner before it gets out of hand.

Evacuee Attitudes

There are certain attitudes among evacuees which are fairly common. First there is a tendency to take sides in the war, to be pro- or anti-axis. These two attitudes are often related to pro- and anti-project administration attitudes. Thus, the more successful the staff is in arousing the confidence of evacuees in its integrity, the more converts to the anti-axis group among evacuees.

On the whole older single men who are aliens and who have few ties in America are most likely to be pro-axis in any aggressive way such as criticising pro-American Nisei and telling them their American citizenship is useless.

Japanese born in this country but educated in Japan, especially for several years and since 1935 are, like the old bachelors, a group likely to actively favor Japan.

Parents of children who have made some success in American life are more likely to be neutral in action if not in attitude. Their loyalties are likely to be divided, since, up to December 7 at any rate, they realized that their children's future lay in America and America had given them a chance to rise in the world such as they would never have had in Japan.

Nisei, American born and American educated, are today of many attitudes. First there are the very pro-American. These people are easy to deal with but are often regarded as apple polishers and do not always have the respect of other evacuees, either Issei or Nisei. A large number are normal Americans who rather resent being transported and locked up just because their parents were born in Japan. A small minority are, like some Kibei, actively pro-axis.

On the whole most older married evacuees will cooperate with any reasonable program of center management since they want center conditions to be peaceful and to improve rather than deteriorate. However, it is too much to expect Japanese who could never become citizens to actively participate in programs to celebrate the Four Freedoms or Independence Day. A democracy of works rather than of words is what will be most effective in influencing their attitudes.

Among Nisei, due to inactivity, many problems are going to arise in connection with work, with self-government and with sex which have nothing to do with pro- or anti-axis attitudes, but if handled without human understanding may lead to anti-administration attitudes which because of center social conditions might soon be transferred to anti-American attitudes. This would be a tragedy for the individuals concerned and an indication of failure in the WRA.

To Summarize:

Older Japanese have a number of patterns of behavior, a knowledge of which is useful in project administration. First, there is the desire to avoid face-to-face embarrassment through the use of a go-between. Second, there is a desire to avoid personal responsibility (and so invoke censure against oneself) and a consequent tendency toward group responsibility and, in committees, unanimous decisions, and rotating office

holding. Thirdly, there is the tradition of accepting as true what the government head (in this case the project head) says in regard to government policy -- but to be a successful government head one must give out the policy personally and so accept responsibility for it.

Finally, in all dealings with evacuees it is well to be aware of the anxieties and attitudes which are prevalent in the center among all groups; and the need to become personally acquainted with these in order to lessen tensions that might lead to serious consequences.

DOCUMENTATION PROGRAM OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

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WRA

October 12, 1942

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DOCUMENTATION PROGRAM

I WRA and the Issues of the War

There has recently been established in the Reports Division a section for the Documentation of the War Relocation Authority. Since the WRA program involves not only the fate of 110,000 people, but also carries within itself a number of serious implications, it is imperative that policies and precedents established by it be well recorded.

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that within the WRA are to be found most of the issues of the war and most of the problems of the peace. So far as the war in Asia is concerned, one of its causes has been the white man's absentee ownership of natural resources in that area together with an attitude of superiority toward Chinese, Japanese, and Malays, in other words, toward Asiatics. The war in Asia like the war in Europe is a revolution, one cause of which was the existence of a number of dis-functional situations - i.e. a number of social and political situations which were at odds with one another and finally could be solved only by war.

Our government has declared itself for the Four Freedoms. Japan has declared itself for Asia for the Asiatics. Our ideology is one of national and cultural self-determination, Japan's is an imperialism masquerading as a mission for racial solidarity. Our government, by formal statement and by implication stands by the principles of democracy which means that men and nations should be allowed equal opportunities to achieve material goods and human satisfactions. Japan has declared herself for a racial war and, furthermore, accuses United States and Britain of having brought it about by the exploitation of Asiatics, and by Asiatic exclusion acts.

The evacuation of people from the Western Defense Command and the placing of these peoples in restricted centers on a racial basis has given a good deal of justification to Japan's recent charges that we preach human democracy but practice racial discrimination.

When the war is over and won, the United States will be called upon to arbitrate and aid in the settlement of many large and difficult political problems in Southeast Asia. Even now many government agencies such as the Board of Economic Warfare are making plans for the post war era in this area. Yet, if we cannot settle intelligently a minority problem involving 100,000 people at home we are scarcely in a position to settle problems involving 100,000,000 people of many nationalities thousands of miles away.*

Furthermore, in the course of the war itself, the policies and practices of WRA may have important repercussions. For instance, if the new leave regulations are carried out sincerely and on a scale large enough

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*The population of Southeast Asia: The East Indies, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Indo-China, the Philippines and Formosa.

to substantially reduce the population of the present centers, then in the field of Psychological Warfare in Asia we can effectively refute the charges of Japan that we are operating concentration camps for people whose only crime was to have Japanese parents.

On the home front, also, the program has a bearing. Many other minority groups, e.g. the Negroes, have become seriously concerned with what we are doing to the Japanese minority group. (1) The degree to which various groups within the U.S. are anxious as to their future in the American Republic, determines the degree to which they will agressively defend it. For a united home front all groups within it, racial, religious, and political, must have a firm sense of security that in fighting for the United States they are also fighting for their own future security.

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(1) See "Americans in Concentration Camps" in Crisis for September, 1942.

II Purposes of Documentation

The aims of the documentation of the WRA program may be classified into six main categories:

1. As a guide to project and national administration.
2. For the exchange of knowledge between projects.
3. To provide data for reporting to Congress and the President.
4. To provide data for educating the public in regard to the WRA program.
5. To provide data for social research.
6. To provide records for the National Archives.

1. As a guide to project and national administration. In regard to this first purpose, the aim here is to aid in the successful administration of WRA in such a way as to solve social problems when they arise, prevent critical situations from arising on the projects, and, in the long run, to reabsorb the Japanese Americans into the main stream of American society. The better the documentation of WRA, the better will be the administration thereof.

2. For the exchange of knowledge between projects. Many project workers feel a need for more information not only on what WRA is doing in Washington, but also on what is going on in other projects, what problems are being met and how these problems are being solved. An exchange of knowledge between projects will provide for a pooling of experience whereby each man may benefit from the experiences of every other one.

3. To provide data for reporting to Congress and the President, and to other officials and agencies of government. Such reports on the effectiveness with which WRA executes its responsibility are made regularly on a quarterly basis and of course will be made at any time they may be called for.

4. To provide data for educating the public in regard to the WRA program. Good public relations are important to the successful carrying out of WRA policies. Information given out for publication will be more reliable in itself and can be better handled if we have a documentation adequate to provide a full and useful knowledge of the various phases of WRA.

5. To provide data for social research. The whole relocation program raises a number of interesting and important problems in regard to what happens to human beings when involuntarily removed from homes and various social backgrounds and placed in camps together. The lessons to be learned and problems to be solved in the sociological field can be successfully done only if a proper record of the whole movement is kept.

Such social research has a practical aspect inasmuch as what we learn in regard to the moving of numbers of people, and administration of peoples of cultures different from our own can be of value in post war situations that may involve temporary administration of various Pacific and Southeast Asiatic areas.

6. To provide records for the National Archives. Finally, there is the matter of keeping a record for history. A simple recording of events for posterity, however, will be of little value in itself either to us or to our descendants. The historical value of documentation will be enhanced to the degree in which the above five aims are kept in mind in assembling our documentation.

III Types and Methods of Documentation

Types. Proposed types of documentation are briefly as follows:

1. The record of WRA. This is the main job of documentation and will include the following types of records:

a. WRA printed and mimeographed materials. This includes reports, information round-ups, the daily press digest, project newspapers, publicity releases, and various materials issued for staff consumption.
b. Printed materials: Magazine articles, newspaper stories, non WRA publications by special church groups and others.
c. Graphic materials: Photographs, sketches, motion pictures - both governmental and private.
d. Copies of reports from project staffs, especially such reports as may be made by project reports men and project division heads in line of duty from time to time.
e. Individual reports and letters from evacuees and others on projects reflecting evacuee attitudes and local, social and economic problems. (Material of this nature will be analyzed from time to time and reports based on it issued for the information of the Washington staff and of such project personnel as may be interested.)
f. Interview materials. Attitudes and problems of evacuees and of administrative staff members on projects as reflected in interviews. This material, scanty at present, can be developed to form an important aspect of documentation.

g. Statistical records: Vital statistics, temperature records, records of visitors, records of industrial and agricultural production, school records, crime records, etc.

h. Copies of materials gathered through sociological and anthropological research projects such as that of Dr. Dorothy Thomas in Berkeley and Dr. Leonard Bloom of U.C.L.A. Data gathered by Drs. Leighton and Spicer of the Indian Bureau in Poston would also fall into this category. The persons named are in the process of collecting an important body of material on all aspects of the evacuation and it will be necessary to develop channels whereby the significant portions of these materials reach WRA.

2. The history of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The history of WCCA is of course closely associated with that of WRA. In addition to WCCA records the types of documentation will include most of those outlined for WRA.

3. Documentation of the history of Japanese settlement in the United States.

4. Records of public opinion after Pearl Harbor in regard to the Japanese in the United States. This is largely a job of gathering and classifying newspaper materials, but other sources such as public opinion polls are also of value where they exist.

Methods. The methods by which the various documentary materials listed above will be acquired and catalogued will vary considerably depending on the materials themselves and on the circumstances under which they are acquired. The collecting of printed materials will be a comparatively routine matter whereas the gathering of data on evacuee attitudes may present many special problems in interviewing, recording and classifying.

If evacuee attitudes are to be adequately sampled at regular intervals some special interview techniques must be developed and statistical methods devised from dealing with the resulting data.

In this connection much can be done by working with the schools. Another source is through the collection of letters. The best technique of all, however, is through the training of a number of evacuees in each center in interview methods so that they may at regular intervals interview a representative sample of the population and so present a series of reports on changing attitudes and social situations.

The same or other evacuee personnel can be trained in the gathering of various statistical data.

A body of evacuees organized in such a way as to be able to gather statistical data regularly and to sample public attitudes from time to time should be of great value to various divisions on the project as well as to the administration in Washington (e.g. in regard to employment, public health, the inaugurating of a new policy, etc.)

If such primary contemporary documentation is undertaken, there will need to be some central staff member for it on each project and some means of handling the materials both on the projects and in Washington. This will involve a number of research men with some knowledge of sociology and statistics as well as clerical assistance.

In general, the scope and methods of documentation will depend on the facilities and personnel available.

IV Special Services of the Documentation Section

1. The primary service of the Documents Section will be to make available the materials gathered to members of the WRA staff both in Washington and in the field. This will be done by means of:

a. Notices of new materials as they are received.
b. Analyses of material in various fields such as education, employment, etc. from time to time. Copies of these analyses will be given to the division heads concerned, and to regional and project officials.

2. Library Service. Room 628 is now the WRA library where will be kept all the documentary material. Henceforth a record of everything received will be kept, and in order to keep track of documents, a record will also be kept of persons who borrow material.

A general index of all published material on the Japanese in America is in process of compilation in the library. A number of books on Japanese culture and on Japanese in United States are kept here and may be borrowed by staff members.

A current file of the Federal Register and of the New York Times is on file in the library as well as of all WRA publications such as center newspapers and information round-ups.

The Librarian will be at the service of any WRA staff member who wishes material on any aspect of evacuation.

3. From time to time the head of the documents section will write a report on conditions and social trends in relocation centers.

John Embree

October 12, 1942

TRENDS IN RELOCATION CENTERS.

Summary of a talk at staff meeting December 2, 1942,

by John F. Embree.

Comm Anal Sec.

-RESTRICTED-

A. AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM.

1. The distrubance at Poston.

This disturbance is a symptom of a settling-down period, which seems to occur in relocation centers that are three to four months old. It is characterized by a struggle for power by two groups: Issei and pro-Axis made up of many young men on one hand, and young American Nisei on the other. The Nisei tend to be intimidated by the first group. The Nisei, due to their youth and inexperience, are easily intimidated by small, well-organized groups. To such groups are:

(a) Out-groups;

(b) Solidarity groups such as the Terminal Islanders.

Women are not involved one way or the other. The out-groups referred to above include various evacuees of both first and second generation who for one reason or another do not have much responsibility or any important jobs on the Project. They include young people who have become embittered by the evacuation and so have not been forward in accepting jobs of the WRA, as well as those who are not expert in speaking English and so are not so forward in asking for jobs and favors from the administration people. This large heterogeneous group of people can easily become disaffected simply through a feeling of being left out of things and being given no means of feeling a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the center. On the ~~other~~ contrary, they feel out of things in contrast to the "in-groups" with good jobs. Thus they become generally anti-administration in attitude.

The solidarity groups referred to are rather in the nature of gangs, often made up of young men from a single neighborhood in pre-evacuation days. These groups resort to threats of violence to carry out anti-administration activities and programs of non-cooperation.

2. Possible solutions.

(a) Giving more attention to the out-group, giving members more responsible positions and making their representatives part of the in-group.

(b) Segregating the truly subversive. In this process, however, care should be taken not to remove people simply because they happen to be ill-adjusted socially. Young men's gangs, for instance, are not peculiar to relocation centers.

B. LONGER RANGE PROBLEMS.

1. Growth of permanency of relocation centers.

(a) Both staff and evacuees, through the growth of the new social organization involved in a relocation center, desire to perpetuate it.

(b) Evacuees come to look on it as home. The following quotation from the Heart Mountain Sentinel of November 14th reflects this attitude very well:

"Good as it felt to be free again, even for one fleeting afternoon, the minute we were back inside I relaxed against the car seat and breathed a sigh of contentment. It was good to be 'home' again."

(c) Past insecurities strengthen the desire of the evacuee for stability in the center. For instance, parents wish their children to stay with them rather than go off to school.

(d) Growing bureaucracy in Washington and on the Project, which inevitably leads to vested interests.

(e) The growth of wardship. The acceptance of relief, which is unavoidable in the circumstances will change to an expectance of relief.

Together with this situation goes a general lower standard of livng--mess halls, out-houses, overcrowding, etc.--and a dislike of accepting responsibility. Another effect of wardship is a deadening of ambition. This is illustrated through the following quotation from the Heart Mountain Sentinel of November 14th:

"For many of the younger Nisei the fire of ambition has been quenched by the idea of being set apart from the outside world in these various centers. Their attitudes is one of apathy and their minds and mental facilities (sic!) are stagnating at a premature age."

(f) Growing Japanization of residents, which will make more difficult any re-assimilation, thus creating a serious post-war minority problem.

(g) Possible changes.

(1) Outside employment and resettlement. This at present is very slow. It would take several generations at the present rate. There is a need for a thoroughgoing program of education of the American public with the cooperation of the OWI, which has facilities for ~~us~~ this. (but which so far has received little aid from us).

The large-scale temporary work as farm labor during the past summer may set a precedent in employment difficult to break.

(2) Change in leave regulations, whereby all official contact with the centers is lost when the residents leave. This is unlikely at present because bureaucracy hates to lose track of people and the public at large and other groups might also object.

(3) Removal of barbed wire fences and other boundary restrictions. This is also unlikely at present because public sentiment is unprepared and, in the Western area, the Army would not allow it.

2. The growth in staff and evacuees of caste attitudes.

(A caste is characterized by special occupation, by hierarchy, and by a taboo on intermarriage.)

The centers have "Caucasian" administration and there are no Japanese on the administrative side. This leads to a general upper-caste attitude on the part of the administration officials. Furthermore, it creates a challenge to teachers who must teach the principles of democracy and racial equality. It also, of course, creates cynicism in many young Americans. The caste attitudes are very strong in Poston where they are in part carried over from the Indian Reservation.

3. International aspects of relocation which may grow more acute.

(a) Exploitation of evacuation by Axis propagandists. This is already being done and we may expect it to increase, especially if many more incidents such as that at Poston occur.

(b) A growing action and counter-action, the effects of which will be felt by Japanese-Americans in the United States and Americans in Asia. For instance, in this country in the relocation centers so far we have barbed wire fences, flood lights, searching of returned evacuees, contrd of the electric light system by the Army, a parole system of leaves, Army control of borders, and threat of intervention; and in the Western Defense Area incoming packages are examined and cameras are not allowed. No fraternization between evacuees and soldiers is allowed. These are virtually internment conditions and will be interpreted as such in Japan. They will also be interpreted as such in China and Malaysia and among other minority groups in the United States. This whole situation poses in fact a serious problem--a problem which will probably become worse rather than better.

(c) Suggested remedies.

(1) Removal of pro-Axis groups to official internment centers and unconditional release of all others. This would be possible only through a well-planned educational program and the backing of the Army and the FBI.

(2) Greater education of the American public so that occasional riots in centers will not raise calls for Army control of all Japanese Americans.

4. Citizenship

Unless a more vigorous campaign of public education is instituted, there is danger of the growth of permanent legal strings on the citizenship of Americans of Japanese ancestry. If such legislation came about, it would scarcely aid our relations with China, Russia, and a post-war Asia in general. (The chances of a second war in Asia a generation hence are great enough as it is without our adding to them.)

C. IMPLICATIONS OF ALL THIS ON IMMEDIATE POLICY.

1. Need for WRA to face the problem of a public education program.

(a) Through lectures, through articles--especially from non-WRA people--and through visits to Projects by prominent people.

(b) In relation to the employment program, international implications, implications for other minority groups, post-war problems at home and abroad.

(c) Basic points to be stressed:

(1) The majority of evacuees are American citizens.

(2) Many Japanese-Americans are in the Army.

(3) The oldness of Japanese residents in the United States in contrast to the recency of Japanese colonization in Asia.

(d) Every effort should be made to kill the extensive sabotage rumors which gained currency last January.

2. A need to break down the Army's defensive guilt complex concerning evacuation so that it will not persist in the attitude that all Japanese are mysteriously subversive. Here, as in our basic educational program, the fundamental distinction between race and culture needs to be stressed.

3. A need to provide adequate means of tracing and documenting the various social developments outlined above as an aid to administration on the one hand a means of strengthening our position on the other (vis-a-vis the Army, the public, and foreign countries). This requires the development of some program of social analysis, especially at the Project level, in order to trace the development of social groups, evacuee attitudes, disfunctional situations, etc.

FACTORS INVOLVED IN HUMAN RELATIONS BETWEEN MANAGED AND MANAGEMENT AS APPLIED TO LABOR, GOVERNMENT AND WAR RELOCATION CENTERS.

The following points for consideration of the above were presented and discussed at the recent Community Analysts' Conference by Dr. John Embree formerly of the WRA and now doing special teaching and research at the University of Chicago Civil Affairs Training School.

I. The various types of relations established between the manager and the managed are basic for any understanding of the way either of the parties concerned react to problems and situations.

II. Policy and actions of the managed are but reflections of the policy and actions of the management.

III. Grievances of the managed should be settled immediately and as near the point of their origin as possible.

IV. Issues arising between the groups should be settled on the merits of the case, not on a log-rolling basis.

V. The maintenance of an effective and rapid system of communication among the various parts of the organization is necessary for efficient and cooperative management.

VI. Power to discharge should not be put in the hands of one man, but rather the power of termination should be lodged in a representative board where all the pertinent evidence can be weighed and considered.

VII. A system of close cooperation between management and managed should be worked out for the purpose of policy making and the enforcement of policy.