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November 21, 1942

John Powell

As the Project Administration moves toward a settlement of the present dispute with the residents, there are a few factors of which I have been especially conscious which seem to me vital in looking for a long-term solution of the situation out of which this crisis arose.

1. There is an obvious, powerful, and continued state of terror among loyal Nisei who have been among the friends and co-workers of the Administration.

There have been many threats of violence to those who are openly loyal to the United States and to this Administration.

The present picket lines are being maintained by personal check-up, search of homes, and threats to persons.

Several of the most active, intelligent, and unquestionable young people, including one Issei returned from internment and leading programs of Americanization, have announced with genuine despair their intention of leaving Poston at any price.

None of these phenomena are explained by the Administration's confident description of the responsible and trustworthy group through whom negotiations are now being carried on.

2. The negotiating group is described as "representative." The bivouac around the jail is not genuinely so. Its flags are described as having the red circle on the white ground. Its music is Japanese, as is its language.

True, many of the watchers are Nisei. They are there under compulsion, as many of them have freely said: they do not, dare not be there, and are checked on almost hourly. The Nisei are delegated to that duty.

Similarly, it is possible that the familiar members of the negotiating body were ordered to join it, and dared not refuse. Their presence is not a guarantee of the good faith of those who stand behind them.

There have been repeated statements that the real background group is openly pro-Japan; but that the American group does not feel strong enough, in their position within the whole family-ribbed structure of these people, to openly resist them. They look to the Administration to do that.

3. The whole technique of these incidents is too familiar to require analogies. The first move is to create hatred against some people within the group, as friendly to the Government. The next is to terrorize by a few beatings and many threats. The beatings get worse, but the perpetrators are protected by the people's loyalty and fear, and by the fact that the victims were unpopular.

When a suspect is caught, after particularly brutal assaults, (a)

he is made the occasion for a hero-festival, around which is built up a glittering and specious structure of demands for "the People's Rights". If the legal right is granted, the demands are advanced beyond right, to political gains. The "people" are kept in line behind these demands.

Finally, the demanding group offers to "keep the peace," guarantees to prevent any renewal of violence. By his time, this is not a genuine offer; it is a threat. "No more violence if you . . ." or "until you . . ."

4. Within the cultural and population picture of Poston are an unusually complex set of factors. They include the Issei, who kept the laws of the land pretty well while they were adding hundreds of millions of dollars of wealth to that land; who were dispossessed and concentrated in alien camps, where "self-government" was promised; and who were then explicitly excluded from any overt legal share in that government. There are also the Nisei, who were in full centrifugal flight from the old folks, until they too were dispossessed from schools and jobs and thrown into the arms of the Issei again. There are the Kibei, friends of neither and divided among themselves; young people without a country.

Politically, there are four groups here:

- a. those openly and enthusiastically American, consciously and emotionally so;
- b. those who were born and raised here and take America for granted, like us;
- c. those who, without being favorable to Axis fascism, deeply resent their treatment under Relocation, and are antagonistic to the Government and this Administration.
- d. those who are heartily in favor of Axis policies and aims, and seek to further them.

The (a) and (b) groups are discouraged and frightened; they feel their cause is losing, and themselves under threat. The (c) group easily joins with (d) in action, though without the same ultimate ends.

In relation to "informers", (a) and (b) dislike them, and regard them as traitors to the group. Only (d) has reason to fear them, actually; but (c) also suffers from their activity, or might so suffer. (c) and (d), therefore, would plan and carry out attacks; (a) and (b) would be in sympathy sufficiently not to interfere; and would not inform, both out of sympathy and for fear of being in turn beaten as informers.

5. Many honest and earnest citizens of Poston believe Uchida innocent. Even if he were guilty, however, most of them would want him released; "punishing informers is our own internal affair".

Not less than eight people were active in the assaults; hundreds were sympathetic, and the rest dare not tell. But IF THE COMMUNITY CANNOT HANDLE ITS LAWBREAKERS AND TERRORIST, IT CANNOT GOVERN ITSELF in any sense which this Administration can accept.

Uchida is an incident; perhaps an accident. The basic fact is that slander and terror and violence have reached ends that are pleasing to the enemy, and paralyzing to the project.

Nov. 21, 1942

A genuine desire to accomplish as much self-government as the administered situation can permit should be furthered. But there are elements in this situation that demand extra and unusual safeguards before the Administration can give the power over law and order to a self-announced ruling body.

The "informers" have been accused without evidence and without hearing or defense, in a cowardly and unfair way; and then have been brutally beaten, and their fate used to terrorize others.

The town cannot ask unusual consideration in terms of rights when its hands are not clean. The Administration should, I think, demand and receive guarantees that the Axis and terrorist elements will be eliminated; and these guarantees should be accompanied by sanctions under which summary military or police action may be taken, without protest, if evidence of terror or subversion recurs. The American young people must be given the chance to develop themselves and their programs without fear or falseface. All acts of town government must be carried on in full view of the people and the Administration. The "informers" must be given a hearing on the evidence, and apologies rendered to those unjustly persecuted and slandered.

11/28/42

THE PEOPLE OF POSTON II STATES  
ITS CASE

The issue is not "Strike or no strike", but whether we Poston residents believe in, are capable of and shall maintain law and order under a democratic form of government! We are in active sympathy with the problem of our fellow evacuee residents. We are now doing our utmost to help bring about an early settlement.

A state of strike in Poston Two is not recognized, nor accepted at this time by the Poston Community Council and the Poston Congress now meeting in emergency sessions. By overwhelming popular vote, eleven blocks of this unit have already accorded the Community Council and the Poston Community Congress full confidence.

Initiated by the Community Council, the present Congress is composed of a membership which includes the following recognized representatives; a councilman, advisor, and block manager with his assistant from each block, the Fair Practice Board members, and heads of works divisions. To retain the objectives of representing only the welfare and interest of the residents, the block managers have expressly been relieved of their direct responsibility to the project director of this unit while acting as members of this Congress.

The case for the people of Poston Two is chronologically stated: The source of the present repercussions at Unit One arises from the series of beatings and attempted attacks culminating in the recent severe battery and maiming of Kay Nishimura. Surging the troubles were the extremely irritable circumstances and conditions; the indiscriminate forced evacuation and concentration of all those of Japanese ancestry regardless of citizenship or affiliations, and particularly the extremely depressing locations, heat, dust, hardships, sacrifices, enumerable shortages, and shortcomings, disruption of normal life; the wholesale shattering of ideals, lead many to a state of desperation; confusions by multiple changes, long delays in the payment of token and nominal cash advances, clothing allowances, and other regrettable circumstances aggravated the matters. The immediate incident is the arrest and confinement of George Fujii and Isamu Uchida on Sunday, November 15. Since their arrest and confinement, Mr. George Fujii has now been released on grounds of insufficient evidence although investigation has not been completed and Mr. Isamu Uchida, we are advised, has been charged by the project head with assault with a deadly weapon. The confinement of popular Mr. Uchida brought about a strong reaction expressed in mass demonstration, and demand was made upon the project director of his unconditional release. Failing to succeed in this demand the Council and Block Managers resigned from office and the demonstration and determination of the masses desiring the release of Mr. Uchida increased and became more demonstrative. Recognizing that a serious situation was becoming more so in Unit One, and at the request of Unit One representatives, our Council and the Block Managers were met in an emergency session. Thursday, November 19, they were joined in this anxiety by the Advisors and Council men from Unit Three who met with them. To this meeting Three representatives of the protesting populace of Camp One made their appearance and plan. Their speaker outlined the immediate incident, the charge, confinement and the demonstration following the arrest of Mr. George Fujii and Mr. Uchida. Following the plea of these representatives, they were asked specifically whether they, in Unit One, were requesting that we cooperate with them in a sympathy strike.

The answer of Unit One was clearly "No". They were asked what Units Two and Three could do to alleviate the situation and aid in this matter. The speaker for Unit One stated that that was up to us as Unit Two and Unit Three representatives. However, he stated that since the Council and Block Managers of Unit One had resigned, they were without any organized or recognized bodies which could negotiate with the project director and his staff for an early settlement. Thereupon the joint body of Units Two and Three selected two members from each of the following groups; block managers, councilmen, and advisors of each unit, making a committee of twelve in all who were to negotiate a peaceful settlement of this problem with the project staff. They were immediately dispatched for that purpose to Camp One. Prior to their departure, Mr. Evans, the then acting director, was contacted and the group were informed that an announcement was about to be made to a committee of 72 at Unit One in regards to this case, the announcement being in main that Mr. Fujii was being released and the fact that Mr. Uchida was being charged with assault with deadly weapon before Superior Court of Arizona, Yuma County, where he would be accorded a fair trial. Since the negotiating group felt that such an announcement would still be unsatisfactory to the protestants at Unit One, they went before the Unit people's committee of 72 and after relating the plea of their representative, announced that the negotiating committee had come to endeavor for an amicable settlement for them. The people's committee acclaimed and entrusted our joint committee to negotiate. After a series of conferences and securing no changes from the announcement determined upon by the project staff, the negotiating committee presented their situation to the executive committee of the protesting group, and the meeting then went into the general announcement by the project director of the release of George Fujii and the charge upon Mr. Uchida. The announcement was not accepted with favor by the group and the negotiators having failed to bring about the meeting of the minds between the project director and the protestants, they returned to their respective units to await further results and expecting information on developments from Unit One. The following day after waiting until approximately two o'clock Friday, November 20, Block Managers and certain Councilmen and Advisors, feeling anxiety, requested that a small limited delegation again endeavor to settle the strike situation and mass demonstration at Unit One. They had a personal representative consult with the project staff and securing the confidence of the project staff was able to present to the people of Unit One, the following proposition if they would make it to the project director: that Mr. Isamu Uchida be released immediately upon the condition that the residents of the Poston Community composed of the evacuees only, would give Mr. Uchida a fair trial upon the charges instituted by the Chief of Internal Security. The reaction to such a proposition with the assurance of acceptance by the project director was very favorably received by the central executive committee of the strikers who were at their office. However, they felt that since they were a limited number and since it was a change from their original demand, they would like to share this responsibility with the block representatives in this mass movement. Therefore, the committee of 72 was called in for immediate session. The proposition was thereupon repeated to them. Meanwhile, Number Three Unit also being advised of this new and final possibility for negotiation, also expressed that they would suspend any action pending Unit One's acceptance of this new term. The first vote taken of this group of 72 to Unit One was overwhelmingly in favor. A few were determined to proceed under the original demand of unconditional release. After several speeches by its members, it finally determined that they would take a plebiscite of their respective blocks in deference to the work and demonstration made by the people up

to that time. The answer and the result of the plebiscite was to be made in a meeting to be held on Saturday, November 21, at 10 o'clock A.M. Therefore, The negotiating committee from Unit Two returned late that Friday night to report in detail the matter to the Supervisor of Block Managers, who in turn advised each of the Block Managers immediately.

Late that night, a certain group from a certain block went around the blocks, ringing messhall bells and asking the residents to arouse themselves to a meeting at the Cottonwood Bowl. To those gathered at the Cottonwood Bowl, the sponsoring group made an announcement of the progress of the case only up to the negotiations which had failed on Thursday. The Speaker stated Camp Three was already on sympathy strike. Strike was called for here and with the acclaim of the group sponsoring such movement, it was also claimed for Unit Two, and certain groups from the same body went to Unit One and Three to publish this fact. On Saturday morning, November 21, at a regularly called meeting of the Block Managers, Fair Practice Board, heads of departments, Councilmen and Advisors of Unit Two, a report in full was made of the progress of the negotiations and the fact that further action would necessarily have to wait the definite reply from Unit One which would be gathered at their ten o'clock meeting. During this meeting Unit Three announced that they were not on strike and rejected the statements made in the Cottonwood Bowl the previous night. Although the morning passed and contact was made several times, no reply on whether Unit One had accepted the final negotiation terms was made known. Meanwhile, the same group sponsoring the meeting at the Cottonwood Bowl the previous night came en masse and requested that the reports of the recent negotiations be made before the body and to which it was agreed. In the afternoon, therefore, a report was made at this open meeting which was sponsored by Block 211. At that meeting, a representative from Unit One, led by Mr. Nagai, made a speech which did not reply to the negotiation, but indicated that situation was such that we should go on sympathy strike. This mass meeting was steered for a strike movement. All opposition was squelched effectively. The Councilmen of Unit Two, Advisors together with the Block Managers, the Fair Practice Board and the department heads met immediately in the Personnel Messhall to consider their reaction to this Cottonwood Bowl demonstration. It was agreed that a survey would be made and ballots taken on the popular wish of the people through their respective blocks and with that in mind the body retired to the evening after supper. At that following meeting it was revealed that definitely at least nine blocks were not in favor of the strike as outlined in either meeting at the Cottonwood Bowl and two blocks had no survey yet and, therefore, voted in favor of continuing the organized bodies of this unit. On the following day, Sunday, November 22, the same group of representatives met and determined that for this emergency period, this body would constitute itself as a Poston Two Community Congress and represent the popular will and the self-government of its people. It returned a definite report that an uncoerced secret ballot revealed that residents of eleven blocks voted full confidence to the organized and now existing self-government bodies and against recognition of strike in the form as called by the present sponsors of this strike movement.

The chronological detail is presented solely for the purpose of clarifying those to whom it may concern that the issue is not one of strike or no strike, but one of belief and practice in self-government in a democratic manner. Particularly does the Community Congress condemn the manner in which the meetings at the Cottonwood Bowl were conducted wherein no accord was given the opposing views and wherein speakers seeking to express views contrary to strike were overenthusiastically and vulgarly cajoled. The Congress of Unit Two believes that every person in Poston Two is entitled to express his views and to vote on all issues

by secret ballot and to be represented in a duly constituted manner, and that all action should be taken by such a body of representatives properly chosen by democratic means and procedure. It goes on record as definitely in favor of law and order and expresses confidence that the people of Poston are capable of maintaining law and order under their own constituted judicial system, and will execute the responsibilities of such form of government.

To the people of Poston Unit One, we repeat our full sympathy and again offer our cooperation to aid in the fair, just, and complete settlement of the difficulties and attain a definite progress in our mutual welfare. Since your request we have vigilantly and actively endeavored in your behalf.

November 23, 1942

POSTON II COMMUNITY CONGRESS

Copy given to Mr. Kennedy

COPY

Poston, Arizona  
November 9, 1942

Col. Karl R. Bendetsen  
Chief of Staff  
Civilian Affairs Division  
War Relocation Authority  
San Francisco, California

EVACUEE RESIDENTS AND LOCAL COTTON GROWERS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER ORDER  
RESCINDING PERMISSION PICK COTTON PARKER AREA YUMA COUNTY ARIZONA.  
EXCESS OF 200 PICKERS DAILY IN FIELDS. OVER FORTY THOUSAND POUNDS PICKED  
LAST TEN DAYS. MANY MORE AWAITING PERFECTION TRANSPORTATION. CAN PICK  
ENTIRE PARKER CROP OF 2500 ACRES IF PERMITTED. ALL COTTON ON INDIAN  
RESERVATION WITHIN SEVEN MILES OF PROJECT AREA. REFER YOUR LOCAL MILITARY  
POLICE FOR VERIFICATION COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE OF LOCAL JAPANESE. EVACUEE  
LEADERS ASK THAT THEIR PEOPLE BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE CONTRIBU-  
TION NATIONAL WAR EFFORT. IF YOU DEEM ADVISABLE PLEASE ALLOW CONTINUANCE  
COTTON PICKING IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF PROJECT.

W. WADE HEAD  
Project Director

THH yy  
Prepaid  
Govt. rate  
straight wire

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION  
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY  
1231 MARKET STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

RELEASE NO. 11-5

ISSUED — NOVEMBER 7, 1942  
7

PRESS RELEASE — FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Leutenant General J. L. DeWitt today withdrew permission for the use of persons of Japanese ancestry for harvesting long staple cotton in Arizona.

His decision has been communicated to Governor Sidney P. Osborn.

Notwithstanding the cotton area is within a prohibited military zone, the War Department nearly two months ago made it possible to use the evacuees outside their Relocation Centers.

It was represented to the War Department that a scarcity of labor imperiled the harvesting of this important crop. An appeal was made for assistance on a voluntary basis of residents in the Centers.

In granting this permission, the Army found it necessary to employ troops to guard the exterior boundaries of the cotton areas.

The number of volunteer workers, however, failed to meet the expectations of the growers. Results obtained were not sufficient to warrant the continuance of the use of troops. Hence General DeWitt's decision to withdraw the troops for other services.

Permission to use residents of War Relocation Centers dates back to September 15, 1942 with reference to Gila River at Sacaton, 50 miles southwest of Phoenix, and to October 8, 1942, with reference to Colorado River Relocation Center in the northern portion of Yuma county.

Both centers and the harvesting areas are in Military Area No. 1, from which persons of Japanese ancestry have been excluded. That portion of Military Area No. 1, in Arizona lies south of a line extending from Topack to Yucca, Grandview, Phoenix, Radium and Duncan.

War Relocation Authority, under whose jurisdiction both centers are operated undertook to recruit volunteer harvesters. It also conducted negotiations with prospective employers. Under the plan the evacuees were paid the prevailing wage for comparable work in the area. War Relocation Authority also assumed responsibility for proper housing and sanitation.

OFFICIAL RELEASE  
ON STOPPING OF COTTON PICKING, 2

The plan provided for security measures to be taken by State and local authorities, with Federal troops guarding the exterior boundaries of the harvesting areas.

Picking began in Pinal and Maricopa counties September 21, 1942. The number of evacuees volunteering varied from day to day. On the first day 160. On October 13, 1942, 283 were working. Two weeks later 160.

Survey of the number of employables available at the Gila River Relocation Center revealed that the Center itself required more than 3900 workers and that there were only 311 other employables.

This indicated that while the number of residents volunteering was small, it represented a high percentage of those available.

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DISTBN: All Arizona Publications, wire services, Presidio and floor.

(Secured from Norris James.)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Wade Head

FROM: Mr. Ted Haas

Subject: CONVERSATION BETWEEN 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. (11-24-42)  
WITH ANDREW SUGIMOTO (Part of time consumed in Mr.  
Sugimoto's securing the list of 72 members.)

Mr. Andrew Sugimoto indicated that he had pretty good assurance that this council would accept Mr. Head's proposal.

1.) Release Mr. Uchida in the custody of the emergency council of seventy two (list of members attached).

2.) Just as soon as the council accepts this proposal Mr. Uchida should be taken to the council and turned over to them by Mr. Head.

3.) The release should be in a written form, namely that Mr. Uchida is released in the custody of the seventy-two, and should be tried in Poston, the time and trying body should be determined by Mr. Head. It was suggested that the judicial commission of Poston II might have to be used for this purpose. (Quotation from Mr. Sugimoto's conversation subsequent to his proposal:

"What I am trying to do is to go on this here and after there is calmness because of the passing of Mr. Head's proposal, the executive committee and Mr. Head must get together on the three points which Mr. Head presented and the three proposals which the committee presented. We must settle them and reach an agreement then. Just as soon as we get a vote on the re-

lease of Uchida, we can go to Mr. Head and have a conference. All we want is the council of seventy-two to accept or reject Mr. Head's proposal in regard to Mr. Uchida and the other proposals which we made to Mr. Head can be taken up by the executive committee. As soon as we get the release of Mr. Uchida, the crowd will break up. If Mr. Head must get in touch with the County Attorney before getting in touch with the County Attorney, we should like to get the affidavits."

The release of Mr. Uchida should be signed by Mr. Head as soon as possible. Deliver it at once, either to Mr. Sugimoto or to the Block Manager's office in the block of the Emergency Council Headquarters. The Emergency Council meets in Block #27, Barrack 14. The meeting of the council which was to begin at 10:00 o'clock (the council of seventy two) did not begin, according to Mr. Sugimoto until 10:45. I estimate that there were about 600 people gathered around the block signs. This included a few children, young men and some women and girls, although, as in the past, old men predominated.

When Mr. Sugimoto handed me the list of the seventy-two members of the council, he told me that there were only two ambulances at the hospital and that there was a complaint that these were insufficient, because last night a doctor could not get to a patient fast enough because of a lack of transportation. The committee recommended that the normal ambulances should be

employed. I told him that I did not know how many ambulances were normally used and he estimated five.

I had several conversations with other persons, including the chief, many of the people waiting around, etc. Mr. Kawashima of Block 19 was quick to inform me that he was only on the seventy-two and knew nothing about the members of the executive committee.

C O P Y mm

Confidential

Poston General Hospital  
Poston, Arizona  
December 5, 1942

Mr. Dillon S. Myer  
Director, W.R.A.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

I feel it is an opportune time to report to you some of the details since the flare-up in this Center. At this writing, I can assure you that everything is well under control and since two weeks have passed the minds of the people have settled and we are getting some intelligent thinking on the whole matter.

I was called back from Salt Lake City on November 23rd, and reached Poston on Thanksgiving Day. I had a discussion with Mr. Wade Head about the problem at hand and we more or less came to the conclusion to wait for what may be the developments. My contention at this time was, that up to the time of the incident the Administration was responsible for the welfare of the people, but now it was thrown into their laps and it was the responsibility of the people's choice to carry the load.

In the meantime, the people had organized themselves by electing two representatives from each Block (one Issei and one Nisei) to form a Civic Planning Board, and from within this group was a Central Executive Council, which was the official organ to contact the Administration. I found myself as representative as well as in this council. I had attended three straight meetings without uttering a word, observing and watching the discussions, and the moves these men might make. The above council composed of 14 members was later cut down to 8. My mind was made up in protecting the people as well as the Administration and I was fully in accord with anything constructive but not otherwise. I can report that these men were well behaved and controlled and carried their responsibilities in the best manner possible.

The first step the committee took was to form a Labor Committee to re-employ all workers, because they have been idle for better than ten days. Negotiations were made to the Employment Office and this was taken up immediately, starting Sunday afternoon, November 29th. This progress has been fair to date with plenty of improvements, not due to the fault of the Employment Office but by the inexperience of the committeemen who are not familiar with labor problems and situations.

The next important committee selected was a Honor Committee, which was given the responsibility in selecting or appointing several qualified individuals to form just that committee. To investigate and pass judgment on individuals whose characters and personalities have been questionable. In other words, a checking committee to stop further the "brutal beatings"--that this committee will gather

all information possible to protect the innocent who are wrongfully accused, to help in clarifying them or relocating them if charges were serious for self-protection.

This committee is very important as well as hard to form, but I hope time will bring about a solution. Judging human conduct is extremely difficult and we cannot be too hasty with our decisions. I believe considerable time must be given on this matter so that the people will fully recognize and appreciate the function of such a committee. I also serve on this committee and have requested for time from the other members before we take action.

The general problem at hand prior to noon, December 4th was: that within the board members are certain men who do not qualify themselves as leaders or can cope with the situation, and there has been a strong movement in ousting some of them. These men know themselves that they are disliked and center of criticism due to their past history. However, if these men are conscious of this fact, they must know that they are being watched. Some have expressed the opinion of resigning, but so far, none have been accepted.

The ultimate goal is the Community Council and this will be properly recognized, and the people will understand that the representatives are the choice of the people. I am sure nothing will go against the policies of the W.R.A.

It may have been a good thing for such a thing to happen to Poston and I am sure it has given these people a chance to think and clean house for the good. In the same token, I hope the other Federal Agencies will not hold back the progress of the people in this Center --especially as the Resettlement Program. I know it has hurt public sentiment, but forgive them, for they did not know what they were doing!

I do not blame any one group or the Administration for this trouble. It was probably a natural outcome from dissatisfaction and no one should be charged with the guilt of the incident. Please do not discharge men from this Project due to this outbreak. We have many fine staff members who have been doing a grand job to help the people and I for one can speak for many of them because I know them intimately.

The only thing I regret was that my first "free zone" furlough was cut short. It was my pleasure to meet you in Salt Lake City and I hope that can be of service as things move along.

Hoping your strenuous trip was not too hard on your good self and you have returned safely to Washington with vigorous incentives to do more. If there is anything that I can be of help, kindly let me know and I will be more than glad to comply with your wishes.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Dr. T. G. Ishimaru

11/28/42

T.H.H.

### THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN POSTON

BACKGROUND; There is no question about the fact that more isseis are more favorably disposed toward Japan than the Nissei citizens. In other words the fathers and mothers who have been denied citizenship in the land of their adoption and who in some cases, perhaps the majority of the cases, have lived in little Tokyos, three or four places along the west coast, surrounded by a majority of Caucasians with whom language and custom barriers prevent the more intimate relations which college life, business dealings and even social intercourse as children bring about. There is no question also it seems some of the Isseis have very frankly expressed to some of their friends and acquaintances, including yours truly, their sympathy with their fatherland. Some also say that they are loyal to both United States and Japan. Even some of the nisseis because of many influences including that of their parents, would prefer an early peace between the United States and Japan although they believe in democracy and hope that the United Nations triumph. Furthermore some of the isseis have been interned at Lawrenceberg, Santa Fe, and other internment camps. In some cases perhaps on slight suspicion. Although they have been well treated on the whole, their detention and followed by subsequent parol to Poston, has not added to their love for the country of their adoption. The whole history of treaty, in California and other western states, and the treaty relations between the United States and Japan must also be considered. Their children have been shocked by the evacuation and by the treatment of their parents and friends.

Some of the young Nissei soon after they arrived in Poston expressed

very frankly their feelings to me and undoubtedly to others. They came to me with questions as to what their status was, as to why Japanese were singled out and given different treatment than Italians and German aliens, why they could not join the army any more, why they were not drafted and many were placed in 4C (enemy aliens). Whether they were prisoners of war or wards of the government or what not. Would their citizenship be taken away. Would they be allowed to return to California. Would the government ever compensate for their loss of property or protect them in difficulties with leasing and making money on their farms.

Many tragic pictures were unfolded to me based on legal cases arising out of evacuation. Here is a woman, of middle age, who informs me that ~~she~~ her home in Riverside, California, in a white neighborhood, had been the subject of liturgy as far as the Supreme Court of California (if I remember rightly) and had been a test case. She would rather that the home remain unoccupied, but she feared that perhaps her neighbors might cause property damage or that the government might take it away. Here is a professor who by dint of brilliance and hard work became recognized as an expert in a certain field. He is loyal but he is pessimistic and questioning and embittered. His family has been scattered, because they are professionals, in several centers. He is worried that a lessee will leave the house without paying rent.

Many other instances can be given. I mention these few facts because they emphasize the feeling of insecurity and resentment which few escape. Take new localities. Isn't Terminal Island a particularly acute case? FBI changed orders of the army, at least of the plans as far as the Japanese knew. Sales of property and purchases in what they thought would be a zone in which they could remain -- additional change in plans caused

sale at great loss in addition. Insecurity, fear, hatreds, suspicion, resentment, questioning! What about their children? Could they ever return to California? Would they be deported and their citizenship be taken away? Would evacuation cause them to change their lives? Had they any real future in this country or would their savings too, if they were ever given a chance to acquire property, be largely swept away or partly swept away in a few months? There was questioning among the parents about the morals of their children in crowded apartments. Fears of all sorts of diseases in a very hot climate, full of dust at the beginning.

Then there were the bachelors, old, cynical. When urged by others to work, they scoffed at them and said, "They have to feed us and house us. Oh, will they charge us twenty dollars a month (an original threat against idle able-bodied persons) let them take us to internment camps. We hear they get better food there. It would be a change of scenery. We're tired of Poston anyway. You're chumps to work after all that has happened to you."

Enough along these lines. Discontent breeds revolution, if the discontents are circumstanced so that they can be brought together, have enough energy and resentment to work together, and have proper leaders. The seeds of the Poston revolution were being sown for months before the revolution. Some of us feared this. In a letter to <sup>Dacey</sup> Dorothy <sup>Mc</sup>Michol I voiced the hope that if we went through the critical summer, morale would become much higher with the cooler months. The fence, rejection of cotton picking, a host of other things like stoves, linoleum, ineptitude, broken promises, loss of faith in the administrative officials, resentment against remarks or attitudes of certain Caucasians where were spread quickly throughout all three communities, caused some of us to have renewed fears.

Mr. Kennedy, Mr. James and I met in solemn conclave in front of

Barracks C, Block 34, in order to save the situation. We planned that the impetus of the County Fair gave us a leverage which might save the day. Each week there was going to be some dynamic project started: a dance hall, a school building. Oh there were many ideas. We knew that many remembered their adobe school buildings were, if all helped, to be ready by October. But scarcities of materials and supplies, etc., prevented a single one from opening. We all recalled disappointments, fears and resentments. We all became more persistent in some of our criticisms of the lack of administrative action or of wrong administrative action.

The rumblings came also to me from some of my friends. One came to me the Saturday before I went to Manzanar, another a week before. They were excited. One mentioned the resentment caused by the new chief of internal security. Another mentioned instances of ill considered remarks by Caucasians who anyway were unpopular. Another mentioned the fence, the "luxurious living" of the Caucasian employees, the employees club in which lavish furniture waited the building of little homes for Caucasian employees, the planting of grass and trees and flowers in front of the Administration Building, and the gathering of rocks and cactus for the adornment of Block 34 was even mentioned by an intelligent nissei.

There had been rumblings of general strikes before. One I believe in July. Another a few months later. Could the administration have feared revolt and did this lead them to locate the three camps of Poston a few miles apart. When I asked Mr. McKaskell and Mr. Lowell for the reason behind this move, they said they wanted the people to live close to their farms. Still it is interesting to note that there was an early attempt to separate the people of Poston and this reduced their strength.

As I have said there were rumblings of general strike before. Yet with Dillon Myer in the camp, I felt very confident that all would be quiet in Poston for a week or two. And then the stoves, promised for November 5 would arrive as well as the partitions and linoleum. I thought that the revolution had been licked.

Let us see some of the seeds and compare them with national revolutions. The ruling class numbered some six hundred or so. There were broken promises in connection with these too, doubts even as to whether the workers or idle could be settled with some of their costs. There were doubts as to whether the twelve to nineteen dollar salary scale was to be all that could be made at a time when high salaries were obtainable on the outside and jobs were plentiful. There was winter, with spending money of some going low because of delayed payments of a few months. There were emergency cases of clothing needs. Mr Miano had made a game attempt in conference with Mr. Head and myself, and then in conference with Miss Findley, to find a means to use Community Enterprise funds to meet emergencies in Poston II. Mr. Head thought it could not be done the way suggested.

Dire need, hatred of a ruling class, disparity between the living conditions of the one group and the other, hatred and resentment, workers sharing common grievances, paternalism and social welfar which rankles in the minds of a people who had not sought relief, at least not many of them, even in the depths of the depression, all of the resentments or racial differences heightened by evacuation and prejudicial utterance. The workers worked hard for little. The caucasians lived off the fat of the land. Many of them had high salaries and left the project to go on "official" business trips or vacation trips, or to Parker for beer, denied to the workers. One of them, it was said by one of the intelligent Nissei, used an official car

for his son to go to school seventeen miles away. Their cars they could not use. They were in Poston, "roaston, toaston". Few knew that Poston had many things which were superior to other relocation centers. Today one returning beat worker told me that he liked Poston now that he had seen HardMountain. Several returning from Manzanar saw Poston in a different light.

Well, the workers were loosing faith in the administration. This condition according to Mr. Soule in his "The Coming American Revolution," is, if I remember rightly since I read the book when it was first published, a sine qua non of a revolution. Well the spark of a revolution was smoldering and kept alive by agitators.

The Issei resented their disenfranchisement from community government. Disenfranchisement? They never could vote outside of the project. Yet in pamphlets community government had been promised them and they felt that they too would share in it. WRA said no. They, the older generation, saw their children in most cases receiving the higher and softer jobs in the administration staff and also the elective offices. Were they not losing caste? They, the experienced first generation. For the benefit of their children they should have a voice in the government. The Nissei were taunted by some of their elders as to their much vaunted citizenship which did not prevent their being thrown together with noncitizens.

A few agitators, and I mean this term in no invidious sense for I believe in agitation for good causes and none of us agree always on what are good causes, had several skilled orators who developed a following. Orators are always important in revolutions. It is not by chance that a Hitler is titular head of the German Nazi movement, nor that Trotsky and Lenin were prominent revolutionists. Go down the list of revolutionary leaders --

the American revolution, French revolution, Russian revolution, etc. There are skilled orators in them all. Two of the leading revolutionists were able speakers in Japanese. They had developed a large following. They had asked embarrassing questions. They had been applauded, though perhaps some of their applauders were their ardent admirers who followed them in meetings. They had seized on one or two points to blast the administration, and the WRA, and the United States government. One of their rallying cries in all the projects was, "The issei shall be given a chance to hold office in the community government."

The prime orator in II and perhaps the leader of the largest following had lead what was intended to be a strike against the WRA order that only nissei shall occupy elective offices in the Temporary Community Council. Seizing a mistake by a Community Council Advisor, who apparently had been ~~misadvised~~ misadvised by another expert, a Pre-Temporary Council had been set up with the "sanction" of the administration in Unit II. The administration then saw the error of its ways but not before the Pre-Temporary Council composed of issei and nissei had functioned with committees and with publicity in the Press Bulletin. I was asked after an election date was set, which was to be under the prescribed regulations of WRA, to appear a few days before the final date for nomination by Block Council to the Community Council to a meeting of the Pre-temporary Council. The Assistant Project Director asked me on the one evening that week which was free. I agreed to go and meet Mr. Crawford at the meeting hall. After listening for a few hours, since the meeting began at 8:30, to several committee reports, the major event of the evening began. A committee of the Isseis made fiery speeches, some of which I reported the next day as directed against the United States Government as well as being directed against

certain Nisseis, especially JACL members who were accused of having stupidly sold down the river the Japanese people in America. The words "inu" (dog), and the Japanese word "kill them" directed at some of these nissei was heard freely. The packed meeting, which included not only the pre-temporary council but also a group of followers who apparently had come or been asked to come in order to intimidate the nisseis or to intimidate Mr. Crawford and myself (I do not think they knew I was going to be there until I arrived so evidently it was not myself.) However the demonstration which followed five or six fiery speeches, which were interpreted by an orator who became a main leader of the revolutionary forces (at least I believe he was) for II, and who asked several questions of me and Mr. Crawford, was an attempt to cause WRA or the Administration in Poston to change the rule that Issei can not be elected to office. If this change was not made, the alternative was -- we were told -- that the Pre-Temporary Council would continue to function. After the conclusion of the committee report and after answering several questions, I replied, stating among other things that WRA would not be intimidated, that a recommendation could be made to the Project Director and forwarded by him if he agreed to WRA, but that one unit of three units in Poston would not cause in my opinion WRA to change a rule made for many relocation centers. I stated however that the permanent evacuee government policy had not yet been determined conclusively. I also stated, in reply to questions, that on August 31, the Pre-Temporary Council would expire. The people of Community II should therefore have to decide whether they wanted a Community Council or not; for if the people did not want a Community Council under the rules of WRA and did not nominate candidates pursuant to the regulations and did not vote for them, there simply would be no council. This speech apparently threw confusion into the ranks of the revolutionists. The meeting lasted until 2:00 ending with the

resolution that each of the members of the Pre-Temporary Council should go back to the Blocks and determine whether they intended to elect council men or not and that the majority view would prevail. The leader of the revolution failed by a substantial margin to stop the formation of a Community Council in Poston II.

Mr. Evans spoke to some of the Block Managers some days after this meeting. I do not recall the exact vote, but it would be interesting to see if the blocks which included Blk 2-11, were the same Blocks. And I think some besides Blk 2-11 would be found to be such, in which the revolution permeated during the week of November 18 to 24.

I recognized the desirability of speed and support for the Community Government on the morning when I reported about what I thought was an insurrectionary meeting to Mr. Gelvin in Mr. Head's office. Mr. Burge and Mr. Crawford were there. Mr. Crawford did not agree that it had anti-American implications. I was very irritated feeling that it was a race with time to find that at the suggestion of the administrator of Unit III that the election of a Community Council in Unit III, which had been set by me at the request of Mr. Head, had been postponed for several weeks. I was very vehement in my denouncing staff members especially in Community I. Their thwarting its efforts to remedy law and order, to secure information from the administration -- acting under a policy which I had cleared although I was community counselor for a short period, in which I believe and have said so frequently some mistakes were made.

I was very annoyed by the fact that paternalism caused a lack of confidence in the Community Council and a lack of cooperation on the part of many administrators. A lack of information on essential policies also caused the Council to feel resentment against some of the administrators. I too, though I tried to diminish this resentment, felt very sore about it

because I felt that it was ill-advised and prevented necessary transmission of information to the residents. The rivalry between Block Managers and Community Council was caused in part by the fact that essential information was conveyed to Block Managers rather than to the elected representatives of Unit I. Also there were frequent evidences of resentment against the Council to me. They distrusted the Council and some even went so far as to rebuff the Council rather discourteously. And others stated that if the Council did such and such they would dissolve it. Elementary needs, such as office supplies and transportation, were denied council members. Their desire to erect a town hall was also rebuffed. Many of their resolutions never met with a reply, at least I do not believe so, by the administration.

The council in I was subjected to a constant series of threats. They courageously continued. At one meeting, for which I was late, the Assistant Project Director made a plea to the Council without my knowledge that he was going to do so, asking them to recruit policemen. It was an inopportune time to make this plea because the Council was about to elect a new judicial commission to replace Sahig Imamura who was about to go with the best workers. The vice chairman Mr. Ogawa, who was elected, did not enjoy his election. And there was fear as they joked about the threats. The threats became more persistent. The Council members were subject to attacks by the administration and a lack of cooperation by the administration, and threats and disgruntlements by some of their constituents because they did not get action on many of the complaints. Despite its prestige, which was increasing, it seemed to be a thankless job. The Block Managers, for example, in the early stages of the Council, were visited by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The Council knew of this visit but no direct attention was paid to it although they were meeting on the same day. Furthermore, the

Assistant Project Director urged Block Managers not to run for Council.

It was interesting to observe that an even more drastic ruling was issued in Unit III, that Block Managers could not even run for office. I corrected this ruling, in answer to a question, when I addressed the Block Managers at the invitation of Mr. Munino and Mr. Burge, but the nominations were already in. The council at III weathered a stormy crisis with the Administrator, in which at the request of the council I interceded with Mr. Burge. Mr. Burge, however, made no bones about the fact that he did not think that the Japanese people could govern themselves. However after meeting with Mr. Burge and meeting with some of the Council Leaders, more amicable arrangements were worked out.

Mr. Crawford on the other hand adopted a very fine policy toward the Council. Furthermore, he had regular staff meetings of the evacuee department heads.

Although the Council in II was elected by less than 72% of the eligible voters, partly I believe because of the opposition of the "insurrectionary" group, the Council in III -- at least the first ten, I did not get the figures on the other members -- were elected by 83% of the eligible voters. Unit III had probably a richer population, and it is interesting to observe had the largest police department by far of all the three units although Poston I has about twice the population of Unit III.

The anti-democratic forces in the Community, as well as the honest people like the Commissioner, Mr. Burge and myself, had favored issei representation. We should therefore be careful to remember that a very very good argument, in my opinion, and one difficult to refute can be given for issei representation in the council. However the WRA for reasons which would take too long to tell, some of which are set forth in a memorandum by

Dr. Provinse, decided to continue the policy under the temporary government, merely making concession on the ground of appointive offices which could be occupied by isseis, a plan which I believe sprung from Poston.

The representatives of II came to the organization meeting on permanent evacuation government upon my return from my almost three weeks trip to San Francisco and Manzanar in order to plead again the argument for issei representatives and a change in WRA rules. Remembering that on the previous night I had read Dr. Provinse's reply to an able petition which had been circulated in Gila, I brought it back and read the petition and reply there to, which was translated into Japanese and circulated in the III community. I was told that the arguments which were advanced by the issei delegates from Poston II were practically identical with those advanced in Gila. I was also advised by Solon Kimball, then Acting Project Director of Manzanar, who is head of the Community Reorganization Division of the Regional Office of WRA in San Francisco, when I was on my last trip to Manzanar on the first open outbreak of the revolution, that all of the relocation centers were having trouble on the issei-nissei point. I was also interested to learn that the proposed charter which had been drafted after a visit of a couple of weeks or so by Kimball and which Dillon Myer was proud of since I believe it was the first charter adopted on permanent government for any relocation center, had in the opinion of the several leaders in Manzanar no chance of passing because the issei although represented on the Organization Committee were objecting to their exclusion. Accordingly the time of election was postponed, ~~by~~ by the administration officials for a month, and a group was to review the whole charter again. Is it possible that some isseis were working in concert in the various camps and had united on this as a focal point for stirring up dissatisfaction

with WRA and with the local administrations?

Let me instance one other important focal point of agitation against the administration. Solon Kimball, I understand during the early days in Poston (my guess is in May or the early part of June), had authorized the formation of a Cooperative Study group which was headed by the Reverend Mitani. The Cooperative Study Group was interested in the study of cooperative organizations and the replacement of a Community Enterprise Management by cooperatives. Several of the leading cooperatives were issei or kibeis. One of the strongest arguments which had been used by the Cooperative Study Group was that under cooperatives the frozen fund law was inapplicable. They had been repeatedly told that the law applied to cooperatives as well as to other forms of organization but that isseis who were in the United States since June 1940 were eligible for general licenses, and a special license was obtainable from the Treasury Department by other isseis. However it was considered desirable in a temporary set-up to have only citizens on the boards of ~~directors~~ directors on the Temporary Community Enterprises, although it was stated that an Advisory Board of isseis could in all but name have the same power as the nisseis. However some of the members of the Cooperative Study Group, I am informed, vigorously attacked the Community Enterprises, even spreading reports implicating Mr. Fister, Mr. Ota and others on the ground that they were receiving large sums of money in addition to the salaries; on the ground that cooperatives would cause a reduction in the excessive prices, etc. Although at my suggestion a public relations committee was set up for the store, which from the outset was the subject of numerous other attacks, the committee was late in taking vigorous action and large numbers of the population believed many of the false or incomplete statements that were circulated about the Community Enterprises.

It was interesting to observe that Mr. Perkins and the group of cooperative experts made their appeal on behalf of cooperatives during a whirlwind six weeks visit, in which three or four cooperatives were to be formed in Poston, in a period of five or six weeks before they left to return to their other work. Mr. Perkins also praised the issei who were willing to invest money in the enterprise and did not want everything for nothing, and criticized the nissei who wanted the government to do everything for them. He also attacked the inexperienced council of nisseis after they had refused to sanction the immediate formation of a cooperative. It is interesting to note that Mr. Bob Sakai and Mr. Kawashima were two councilmen who tried to get a resolution passed favoring the immediate transformation of Community Enterprises to cooperatives. Great pressure was exerted for speed by the leaders of the cooperative movement, based in part upon the fact that the project demanded it. Petitions were circulated which were not entirely accurate to say the least. These petitions received the approval of the administration. Furthermore the cooperative study group had not only thirty paid members on its payroll, but also had access through various administrators to large quantities of mimeographing material, paper, etc. Their influence is shown by the fact that they received visits from Mr. Collier, several cooperative experts from many projects including I believe Tule Lake and Manzanar. Several important officials of the administration were active proponents of an immediate cooperative for Poston which would be based upon the surplus of the Community Enterprises. The isseis predominated in this group. It is interesting to observe that -- unless I am mistaken, not only the principle secretary among the women of the Emergency Committee but also four other secretaries of the Committee were employed up to a short time before the revolution by the Cooperative Study Group.

The revolutionists knew how to bore from within and to secure the support of an uncoordinated administrative staff. They also learned how to get paper and other mimeographing material, how to play one administrator against another so that if one refused to OK something you tried another who might OK it. It is also interesting to note that when I returned from San Francisco and Manzanar and was asked about cooperatives by the Council Reporter who was to draw a draft of the interview and submit it to me before publishing it --- I was not anxious to have it published anyway --- Mr. Smut Kato, I was informed by the council reporter, whom I am told likes me, was shown the interview although it was a confidential one until I approved it, and told the reporter that it should not be published because it would injure my popularity with some of the people. Some of the residents said that they opposed cooperatives because they did not like some of the members of the Temporary Council which was elected, I am told, in 15 cases by one vote. (Mr. Mathieson oral statement to me.)

The reason why I am stressing the cooperative aside from its supply angle and its propaganda angle, is that it became a source of disagreement between the council and an important part of the population; i.e. it seemed in part issei-versus-nissei. It is interesting to note that great pressure was exerted on Mr. Head, which he seems to have yielded to, to push cooperatives quickly and that despite Council actions on several occasions to slow down the process.

Another interesting development which should be checked is the Issei Advisory Board, for several of the leaders ---including I believe the chairman and secretary,--- played a prominent part in the revolution. The history of this board is known I believe to Dr. Spicer and I will therefore skip further detailed reference to it.

Give attention to or consider the Teams A and B for speeches in the camp, in which the Reverend Mitani was the chief interpreter for Mr. Head and on a few occasions for Mr. Gelvin and Mr. Evans, arranged at the suggestion of the Adult Education Committee of which Kawashima and Auchi are leaders. Auchi is ~~co-chairman~~ vice-chairman of the Cooperative, and Kawashima is an active member. In fact the Adult Education group maintained close cooperation with the cooperative movement, and I think the leader was a member although for a while the leader was a member of Community Enterprises. Sometime toward the beginning and toward the end I had my first major arguments with Mr. Head over these speeches and in anger said to him that I thought Poston was a democracy. Reason --I had seen stenographic notes of one meeting and surmised that the people were being told things which might not happen, and that just as on Indian reservations it was essential for ethics and for good policy that very great care should be taken in speeches by administrators. Also I objected to the fact that the rest of the staff did not know what was being said in these speeches. I made four speeches on community government in the other team.

It is interesting to note that a few weeks before the revolution, several of the Community Council group were trying to find out what sort of economic future was to be had, made references to the orientation speeches given by Mr. Head and felt that they had been misled because WRA policies were now different.

The people at Poston had claustrophobia, a fear of being very much alone in a hostile world. The blackness of the future, the uncertainty of the war which might even result in the victory of Japan and their anomalous position if they were too active in helping the United States.

The background material has just been skimmed, even though I am

only referring to material which I believe has not been covered or has been covered only very skimpily. Tempus fugit. Let me turn now to the revolution itself, pausing for a moment to summarize.

1. The revolution occurred at a time when fears were rampant, such as a resurgence of fear of FBI, uncertainties because of sudden shift in policy, Dillon Myers talk, Collier's talk, lack of faith in the administration -- example, stoves.

2. The ruling class seemed disordered and unable to solve the problems that were confronting it and the people and unable to end the fears which were increasing. The lack of communication between the ruling class and the ruled helped "agitators" to increase the enmity and the gap between them.

3. Hopelessness because so great that it seemed as if they could not be much worse off.

4. Most of the 700 odd workers (check) who went to the beet fields were nissei and included some of the strongest members of the population, including six or seven members of the council.

5. The council, although it had been able to effectuate something which the Issei Advisory Board had especially desired, the moving of the crematorium from the hospital, had been undoubtedly criticised by some of its constituents for its inability to solve many of its problems, such as stoves, which remain unsolved. Many of its members who had been courageous in sticking out their necks, as they term it, had felt Block disapproval very strongly on certain issues such as the attempt to have a central high school instead of scattered high schools in Unit I. Various rumors including evacuation from houses had been spread.

Those who wished to discredit the Council, including it is charged some of the Cooperative Study Group, had charged the council even with being bribed and had even threatened the chairman for failure to deliver to the Project Director promptly the Council's first disapproval of the Cooperative election date. Some of the nissei lost a little confidence in the chairman because of this action.

The time of the revolution, if one was to devise a plan, could not have been much better. The chairman of the council, a rather strong figure with considerable popularity in the community, who was also chairman of the Council on Permanent Evacuee Government, had left with me and six other people, four going to Salt Lake City and ~~to~~ the others to Manzanar. Four attended the JACL conference in Salt Lake City. The vice-chairman had been working very hard as Head of Supplies for the Education Department in all three units, a task which he had accepted when things were chaotic a short time before school began. The Project Director and Associate Project Director left Wednesday, just as the storm was gathering. I left Monday night at the request of Mr. Head, expecting to return Thursday but was delayed because of missing a bus because of a very late train and having to wait ten hours in Manzanar and by virtue of having to wait until fourteen people were ready to leave Manzanar, including the two I brought up. I was two and a half days in Manzanar. The feeling against some of the Caucasians was at a high point. Mr. Townsend was an especial target because of some of the remarks he had been alleged to have made. Mr. James, who was thought to be connected with the FBI, and Mr. Miller the new chief of Internal Security, who was similarly connected by some, took an active part in the questioning of Uchida and many other suspects or people who were thought to have knowledge. They were prompted by a conscientious desire to

end the beatings which threatened to intimidate the whole population. It is interesting to note that the threats of beatings, although never carried out as far as I know except against so called stool pigeons or dogs "inus", were used to spread terror into persons who collaborated in high positions with the administration and to members of the Council. If I were trying to start a revolution in Poston, I too would attack the representatives of the people. For a revolution should overthrow the constituted authorities to make way for their own recognition. All revolutions attack or subordinate the legislative body, if such a democratic device exists. The fascist pleas has always been on the slowness of a legal body, the lack of activity or power, they are merely a debating society.

Even such a stalwart defender of democracy as Dr. Cary used that expression in relation to the Council. He had, however, not attended, as far as I know, more than one meeting of the Council and only that portion of the meeting where he and Dr. Harris had spoken to the Council.

The council was also discredited by the fact that any other group in Unit No. I, who desired could just as easily as they bring their complaints to the attention of the top personnel. The Block Managers could see top personnel with their problems. Even an ordinary person could do the same on questions of general policy. An occasional aggressive individual could without much trouble get administrative approval to the mimeographing of his own demands. Witness Mr. Kurada's ten points. The Acting Project Director, who was popular because of his sincerity, hard word and golden heart, was inexperienced as an administrator. He was also a paternalist, in my opinion, although he felt that he was a sincere liberal. The two are not of course inconsistent but the former bespeaks an attitude of superiority. It is interesting to observe that Mr. Burge and Mr. Evans are very close together in their social relations and their thinking on council affairs.

The Uchida case furnished the spark. A civil liberties issue which any liberal would have responded to. I have told Mr. Head confidentially that if I were a resident of Poston, I probably would be in the ranks of the strikers. I skip the details of the Uchida incident because they have been narrated frequently before. Let me only add that important general strikes have been frequently staged in cities of the West Coast -- if my memory serves me rightly in Seattle and San Francisco for instance. The word "general strike" I have been informed had been passed around on two other occasions. Basic emotions were involved. Even fear of separation of families, which had already caused great resentment and hardship.

New of the dreaded FBI spread rapidly through the camp. Resentment ran high against Miller who had called the FBI in the presence of a council man, George Fujii who was also held with Uchida during the first few days. There was also resentment on the part of many who were held and questioned during all night session, because of the alleged threats that the FBI would be called in and they better speak up or it might be bad for them. I was informed that George Fujii was told that if Kay Nishimura died he might be held for complicity in murder. The seriousness of the case from the standpoint of law and order was not known to large groups in the population. However there was a misunderstanding as to the nature of the crime of which Fujii and Uchida were accused. I am informed, though I am still ignorant of the evidence, that it was a previous beating. However large numbers of the population felt that a stool pigeon like Key Nishimura who had been in many domestic and other difficulties in addition to being accused of doing work for the FBI deserved all he got. He had been involved in a mild beating before and had been the one Council member that resigned, probably because of threats. When he was elected to the Council, some of the residents and at least one of the administrative staff expressed surprise.

For example, Mr. Kato, formerly chairman of the Works Project Committee, told me that during the revolution that he thought this case was one for the unwritten law. In addition to a popular council member being involved, a popular defendant who is supposed to have had quite a following and whom I believe was well liked by some of the members of the police department was held. Some of the people felt that the administration was breaking faith with it when it stated that it would turn Uchida over to the county of the FBI authorities. It was felt by some that this would be judicial murder since no Japanese would have a chance for a fair trial with the present temper of large portions of the Arizona population. The faith of the populace in the administration was rudely shattered by this belief because they felt the administration should be their friends when they were in trouble and protect them from hostile outside authority.

There are many that maintain that the crowds resulted from mob psychology and were spontaneous. It seems also to be stated that the blocks around the Police Station were the most active ones. Many blocks like those in the thirties who did not learn of the demonstration until long afterwards. Revolutions usually are strengthened by mistakes of the rulers which become more frequent because they are made in an atmosphere of fear and trepidation.

The acting Project Director was not used to tumult and mobs. Few people, it seems to me, would have been more shocked than he. I do not believe that he understood "mob psychology", whatever that means. Shades of Le Bon, Marten. Like a Lord of a Manor, in a phrase somewhat analagous to a member of the administrative staff and to an important resident, the Acting Project Director told the naughty people to go home. No one was more surprised when the naughty people yelled back in a rebellious mood that they wouldn't. The council was in session. It had been subjected to much pressure,

more pressure than ever. Many of its members were probably more fearful than they had ever been because they had heard the rumor that Key Nishimura was very seriously beaten and was probably near death, a rumor that seems to have been spread by the Caucasian leader of the Law Enforcement campaign, just as threats of the FBI coming into the camp seems to have been bruited about by them. Block meetings had presented petitions to the Project Director and to the Council. The Council had received a lot of material which it had had no time to digest by hearing speeches of Dillon Myers and Commissioner Collier. Who knows whether some of the petitions had been stimulated by those who desired to discredit the administration and how many of the rest were spontaneous? This is the job for the social scientist although it may be too late. As I often mention I regret that I was not in Poston during the revolution.

Well, the Council was being subjected to additional pressure by the Issei Advisory Board, whose chairman, I believe, was one of the outstanding orators of the Revolutionists. Much of the discussion was in Japanese. Some of the Council members do not know Japanese well. By the way, one other council member, Harvey Sasuki, I was informed by him, had been "threatened" during the examination in the Uchida case. Mr. Masuta, I understand, only attended a part of the meeting since as one of the two counsels for the defense he went on Tuesday and Wednesday to visit his client and on one of these visits saw for the first time the gathering multitude. Mr. Ogawa, an intelligent but nervous chairman, was obviously somewhat frightened. (Let me repeat the council meeting occurred while I was in Manzanar and I am merely narrating now my belief based on a few accounts by residents and by Caucasians who attended the meeting or part of it.)

The flat rejection without proper explanation of the able resolution of the Council, which I believe was dictated at the Council Meeting by Mr. Matsuda, furthermore the failure of the Acting Project Director, either through lack of knowledge or lack of belief that one should be open with the Community Council or lack of confidence in the Council although he had come to see them with Mr. Nelson as a last resort after his words had failed to quell the rising tumult did not help the situation. He entered dramatically, his entrance showing great adjitiation. This did not calm the fears of an excited Council. Who can say the effect of the dramatic entrance of a boy who announced the fact that the crowd was increasing in fury? This last may be a bit rhetorical. At any ate, some of the council men I believe felt that if they failed the people in this case they would be entirely discredited. They had been on the spot before for failure to obtain action. Perhaps they were influenced a bit by the custom of showing the loss of face by resignation when met with a major defeat. This is not entirely conjectural when you consider there were several kibel in the meeting and the Issei Advisory Board was actively participating. Although ~~The~~ Reverend Mitani had been defeated for that board, there were several members that seemed to be close to him.

The overthrow of the council, as evidenced by its resignation, which might have been stimulated in part by the fear of the acting chairman who is somewhat tempermental and was very discouraged, by the flat rejection of the able resolution of the Council for the immediate release of Mr. Uchida and which raised questions of lack of definite charges and retention for seventy two hours.

Once the crowd had been gathered, it might have been influenced by a small but intelligent group of organizers who probably were prepared to

take advantage of such a contingency. Their propaganda campaign stands out as able if one can forget ethical considerations when contrasted with the lack of information by the administration of the crime and reasons of the holding of the prisoner. False rumors might have been started in other cases besides the attacks on the store. I am well aware that in communities in which fear and insecurity play a larger than usual role false rumors are easily started. Some of ~~the~~ many false rumors that have been brought to my attention seem to follow too regular a pattern to be merely the result of blind chance, although some of them may. Furthermore it seems to me easy to plant rumors and they soon assume varied shapes. Let me state that false rumors represent an important feature of Fascist activity in France and other countries. Let me also add that the "Divide and Conquer" theory seems to have been applied at Poston.

For example, every effort seems to have been made by certain groups, including the cooperative study group, to oppose a central community council, and the tendency seems to be to favor four cooperatives, one for each unit and one central buying one. This somewhat provincial view which did not take into account the desirability also of a central committee in view of many considerations including the necessity for unanimity in connection with many things including the desirability of a law and order code, was also held by two of the paternalists, Mr. Evans and Mr. Burge, for a long time.

The administration had rarely been able to state its case. Sometimes it had used the Block Managers, sometimes it had used the Council, sometimes it had used the press. Usually it had used no source for the dissemination of necessary information. In fact some of the administrative instructions became known to the population through JACL bulletins or

papers of other relocation centers.

Together with other people I had attacked first the inability of members of the staff to receive the bulletins concerned with their departments, and secondly their lack of communication with the people. I had been unable, because I was told I was a lawyer and not an administrator, to tell the Community Council on both these counts. Although finally after raising a tremendous howl I began to receive the bulletins more frequently.

Another thought strikes me. The Community Council of Unit I had been frustrated on a number of things. Let me say that frustrations of Community Councils of II and III are not discussed in this paper because of lack of time. However the Community Council in I was subjected to much more threats than that in II and III. In fact I know of no organized threats to II and III councilmen. Furthermore the three recent beatings of people who had been previously threatened had preceded the council meeting on the day of the revolution.

The manipulators of public opinion from the standpoint of those who opposed demonstration got busy soon to take advantage of the situation which in part they probably helped create or else intensify. They proceeded quickly to notify people that the demonstration and later the general strike was to accomplish all things that the people wanted such as mattresses, linoleum, partitions, speedy pay, clothing, more money, greater speed of administrative action. Who could resist such an appeal? Those who had without understanding in many cases waited patiently for permits to go through or had seen stoves in their mind's eye arriving by November 5 only to find that it was a mirage of the Arizona desert!

The nissei were without leadership. The issei in some cases were desperate for probably they feared more than the nissei who might have feared

for their parents the FBI.

The fact that not a single block in Poston I was not affected by the strike causes me to believe that there was some sort of organization or tie-up or cell existing in each of the blocks. This is just pure conjecture however.

The part of certain parolees should be studied and also the part of the bachelors. Did they not come out to enjoy the excitement and also the chance to blow off steam? Was it chance that the shibai stage was soon erected near the police station and that music mainly Japanese and entertainment by shibai actors and actresses varied the performance? Was it chance that all the blocks were represented by the demonstration and that a fine organization was quickly worked out and in operation of the "picket line" (term in accurate)? Who were the mysterious people who went through the offices and called the administration workers out and what did they tell them? Is it not interesting to note that a week after the revolution large masses of the people are still unfamiliar with the basic facts. The Caucasian staff, including the teachers, seem to be mystified even though they met with the Project Director in a meeting about this subject in which they were privileged to ask questions although answers were not always forthcoming. The technique of silence which had been applied for a long time to the staff with respect to the fence had also been characteristic of the attitude of the administration toward large groups in the population. Notice also that it coincided with the Assistant Project Director's attitude in response to the questions of the Council and added to the lack of faith and confidence in the administration.

So the revolutionists had the edge on propaganda, a very important weapon in all revolution, for the masses must be made neutral, inactive, or your supporters. The workers with grievances are fertile soil for

propaganda. All the spleen which they hold toward the rulers becomes evident. The contrast in luxury comparatively speaking, in the midst of poverty, overcrowding, is too great to require elucidation. And then the supreme betrayal of a popular worker (a Judo instructor) who is said to have had quite a following can not fail to arouse the ire of the workers.

But activity must be directed. The forces of the community which will oppose a demonstration must be neutralized or terrorized. The revolutionists had used terror before in order to intimidate administration workers, council and other leaders including a Block Manager supervisor who was not particularly popular with many people. Furthermore many workers like the police must not actively oppose the revolution. At this point let me state that a general strike according to Laski and many others has certain revolutionary characteristics for it is a defiance of the normal forces of law and order in the community and is most terrorizing to the pillars of society. Let the capitalists tremble. Let them pass the harsh laws against general strikes! It is clear why the newspapers and the chambers of commerce, manufacturing associations and other big business leaders and government officials denounced the general strike. The framework of government is shaken by the successful general strike and sometimes found to be a veneer. This aside was due to my reflections on the Police Department. The chief of police had sometimes been under suspicion on the part of certain administrators. I was advised two days ago by the chief of police in III who is a friend of his that he thinks very much of me. Well I made a fishing appointment with him and his friend Lt. Ono when I was about to go for what I thought would be induction into the army. He is from Terminal Island and was a fisherman. I believe that he is loyal. However since he has red blood in him and is frank in his denunciation of the things

which he considers unjust, it is natural that certain administrators feared that he might not be fully loyal.

It is interesting to observe that Mr. Evans and Mr. Burge and Mr. Head and other administrators felt very sore at the Council in Community I and the Council Chairman at the beginning because they gave vent to honest grievance, which in most cases though in one case exaggerated pointed out real weaknesses in administration.

To return to the Police Department, no police department was smaller in Poston than the police department in I. My guess is that it numbers less than twenty since it had lost several of its members to the beet fields. Its chief had fought valiantly during various periods in which pay scales had been considered unjust for policemen. His men were loyal to him and obeyed him implicitly. By the way, one of the periods when a general strike was a possibility was during the three-fold classification. Well the police chief plowed a n intermediate course between the administration and the demonstrators packed in front of the jail and police station, both in a wooden building which the crowd could easily have stormed. Who however would have been so foolish as to release the symbol of injustice who was being properly cared for in jail, and who apparently at the beginning did not know what it was all about! He became the hero of Poston in the eyes of many people. A person of unblemished character! A model youth!

The propaganda of the revolution had been successful. Was the Public Address system which had been installed also part of the shibei show? I think so but do not know. Was it chance, if I have been rightly informed, that one of the members of ~~the~~ an important revolutionary committee was a shibei actor? The revolutionists had to get the support of people who were known and popular in the various blocks: Council men, block managers, heads of certain departments would serve this purpose. But control must

be vested in the Revolutionary Committee.

Threats were undoubtedly used against the recalcitrant. A few people were able to plead good excuses. The lawyers for example were able to say they were in the picture as lawyers. One of them I believe did serve for a couple of days on the Committee of 72. He was a member of the Council though he did not resign because he was not present at that time. Another lawyer was fresh from the hospital and declined on grounds of health. There were other mysterious coughings and sickness. The recovery of some was as mysterious as that of some shellshocked soldiers who walked after armistice.

The revolutionists had succeeded in calling out most of the workers. There was always the danger however that you will become discredited by the people if you do too much harm with the essential services. The revolutionists therefore wisely concluded that certain things like the hospital, schools, maintenance crews, mess halls, warehouse workers, fire and police department should continue to operate. After all, they believed in "law and order", at least from the standpoint of public opinion.

In ordinary revolutions, the military are sometimes won over by fraternation, or because of discontent refuse to fire on the revolutionists or themselves revolt against their officers. The police did not need to make this choice. They were unarmed, and no order was given for them to clear the ground. However from conversation with the chief and some of his aides, I know that they believed that the revolution was an orderly demonstration and they probably felt that Uchida was innocent or at least that the administration had not clean hands in relation to the Uchida case. They furthermore felt very antagonistic toward Mr. Miller, Head of Internal Security, whom they blamed for the Uchida mix up. They knew intimately about

Mr. Miller's work with the case since many of them including the chief had been up most of the night on Saturday. The Chief I believe reflected the belief of the force that Mr. Evans had a heart of gold and was a gentleman. But Mr. Evans who headed the Police Department of Unit I had never from the administrative angle received the respect of the force.

The mention of the police brings to my mind the fact that the council had been rebuffed by Mr. Evans and others when they attempted to improve the law and order situation. The chief was on the Law and Order Committee as was I and the other lawyers. These rebuffs were on my mind at the time I erupted before the administration just before I got the welcome news of my imminent army induction.

The use of terror to a population, most of which even if they were unfamiliar with the cause of the strike did not feel like sticking their necks out because with comparatively few exceptions they did not feel particularly loyal to the administration. Some few at the risk of a beating, or at least they thought so, brought aid and comfort in the form of information, expressions of solicitation<sup>etc</sup>, etc. to the staff. Their solicitation<sup>etc</sup> to the administrators who deserted by their aides sat disconsolate amidst the quiet administration buildings! The rulers had been dethroned! They who wanted to make all the decisions could make practically none except as related to certain outside agencies such as the army and certain county officials — and even there their decisions were not conclusive and not always influential. In place of planning, the administration was so confused as to be unable to act.

The staff was split into many factions: the liberals which mainly included Hawaiians and the intellectuals, the old line Indian Service employees who clamored for the army and were joined by a few WRA people, appointives like Townsend whom I am told became quite hysterical at times.

The revolutionary committee acted. The administration took no affirmative steps in the beginning save to hold off courageously any move of the army to come in. The supreme loss of prestige of the administration was shown by the fact that at the beginning the personnel dining room lacked even its waitresses. Shades of Thornstein Veblen. Even the servants ceased to minister to the ruling class. Witness also the servants who helped the cleaning up of the houses or barracks of the Caucasians or minded their children. E tu Brute.

Apparently however some of the Blocks like the 30s were least effected by the terror, either because they were more in the shadow of the administration buildings or further away from the place of the music and the gathering crowds, or in the case of one block because it was mainly inhabited by professionals, the revolution lacked as much strength there as in many other places. However all the blocks were represented with fires and signs, and the shifts were well organized. An ample supply of fire wood, and later shelter from the wind including U.S. army blankets were erected. The morale of the revolutionists was preserved by a constant program over the loud speaker system (and the playing of this music was one of the important factors lowering the morale of the Caucasians to whom it was a symbol of revolution, loss of prestige, and the mob spirit.) interspersed at times by announcements such as requests for members of the revolutionary committee to come forward, or calls for certain blocks to come to eat. This last was particularly noticeable in the morning about breakfast time.

I shall not take time to describe the local color of the banners, fires and signs because any social scientist can describe this far better than a mere lawyer.

It was important as in all revolutions to act fast and win over

other regions. Community I, before the administration was awake to the danger, sent delegates including one of its spell binders, to rally additional members to the support of the revolutionary blocks of II, lead by II-11. Part of the story of Poston II has been stated in a memorandum by the Community Congress on November 23. Poston III also was having its travail. I believe that the administration finally awoke and cut off outgoing communication calls to II and III from I, and also towards the end perhaps prevented the ease with which one could go from II to I, or from II to III. Certainly however the administration never conveyed to the people of I the facts that II and III were mainly loyal to the administration.

Furthermore at a time when victories in Africa were very numerous, the Administration did not it seems to me take advantage of this fact nor convey to the people many other ideas such as the effect on public relations on the outside and the possible immanency of the danger of army intrusion. The inactivity of the administration, as I said before, was in marked contrast to the speed with which the revolutionists acted. However since the Bureau of Social Research was in touch somewhat with the administration during part of the strike and has access to the records and the personnel, I shall not talk much about the administration activities.

The transportation system is always another important feature of a revolution. In addition to a loud speaker communication system and a telephone in the police station, the revolutionists captured at the outset several trucks -- ask the agriculture department and several other departments how many. Certainly it was enough to gather adequate fire-wood supply.

The question of subsistence seems to have been easily solved for

the food supply of the various kitchens was entirely in the hands of the revolutionists and they could carry rice and other foods and sandwiches to the demonstrators.

Toward the end I believe, although I do not know -- this should be checked with Mr. Empie, the administration gained control of more of the trucks or at least organized its own trucks into a motor pool which could only be used for necessary purposes. The truck of the Police Department however was available for use by the revolutions.

The revolutionists very generously allowed volunteers to go to Parker in order to help unload subsistence for the evacuees, not for the Caucasians. The crew was not supposed to touch anything else. Owing to the supposed very serious feeling in Parker, which I believe was in part stimulated by Caucasian employees and probably by a few other people although I believe the shoe salesmen have thrust upon them an undue amount of onus. After having stimulated the feeling in Parker and giving rise to newspaper notice, the Caucasians came back with horrible tales of the feeling there. The crews were withdrawn by the administration, who however thanked them for their help. How the mighty had fallen! The administration thanks a few workers for having helped to unload subsistence! That was the right thing to do because the revolutionists controlled the workers.

Fear, at least during one night, seized many of the administration staff who feared that the revolutionists might tear them to pieces or something like that. In fact like in most revolutions, a fair amount of people suddenly found reasons why they should go on official business or otherwise to more quiet surroundings. I fear that the Caucasian staff, and so do the residents fear this, has an unusual amount of business which is often mysterious in Phoenix, Los Angeles, etc. At least for wartime purposes when equipment and transportation are at a premium.

I should not forget to discuss another essential service which was kept going: education. However the schools seem to have been quite demoralized according to many teachers. Many of the children stayed away from school. In many cases they took part in the revolution. One teacher complained that the RisingSun appeared quite frequently.

I was interested to note that in the Red Cross Building, a nazi symbol had been made out of a Red Cross sign.

The schools were interesting also because some of the young nissei were known as anti-strike and showed courage in starting a counter-revolutionary body. Mr. Omori, in a meeting in Block 6, questioned the advisability of teachers entering politics, and one of the meetings of the teachers was said to have been interrupted by the entrance of a policeman.

One other element of communication, spies, appeared, especially on Thursday when strange faces of elderly people peered into the administration building and some spies even went into some of the offices.

Apparently little attempt was made by the administration to find out definite information about the revolutionists until Mr. Head returned, although sociologists were making a field day of this memorable epoch in Boston history. The information of the administration was very poor at the beginning and was hampered by the fact that the revolutionary leaders decided on a code of honor for their actions. Perhaps this code had the sanction of threats, the threat of a good beating.

All revolutions have a rather quick turn over of leaders of certain revolutionary bodies. In fact one revolution is sometimes followed by one or more others, at least there are new eruptions and shifts of power in practically every revolution. There are struggles within revolutionary bodies for the supremacy of the power for which the struggle is in part

directed. Differences in ideas or tactics sometimes permeate these struggles for power.

The administration exposed its own weakness and its own lack of knowledge on several occasions, and it sometimes did not even secure elementary information. It was clear, I believe, that the revolutionists knew that the rulers were not what they used to be. The arrogance with which the vice chairman of the Revolutionary Emergency Committee displayed to the Project Director during the early stages of the negotiations was an interesting example of the use of information about the weaknesses of certain administrative people.

The first aggressive move of which I am aware to move over some of the neutral factions and to propagandize for the cause of democracy appeared on November 23, and apparently was written largely by Mr. Maeno with the help of other leaders of II. I do not know the extent of the distribution of this pamphlet, but realize that the Revolutionary Committee was very anxious <sup>that elementary</sup> ~~to eliminate~~ facts concerning the true state of the affairs in II and III be not allowed to get to the crowd. The flippant attitude of an intermediary of Mr. Head caused some of the revolutionary leaders to be very much perturbed and to take steps to prevent the followers from being influenced by it.

In many of the meetings between the revolutionists and the administration, the revolutionists showed much more adroit negotiating ability. They talked about fairy tales, mob psychology, that they must keep the crowd in control. They cleverly played upon the fears of administrators. They knew that the administrators were anxious to settle. The administrators had most of the cards and yet they quickly acceded to certain requests of the revolutionists. It is interesting also to observe that the word "demand" appeared in Proposal No. 1 even as late as the day of the "agreement", when

the "agreement" was finally decided upon.

In every strike or every revolution, the leaders are anxious to secure some sort of victory, the granting of some sort of demands before the revolutionists become discouraged by hardships and defeat. Consequently the negotiating group secured and carried back some information which they quickly perveyed to their followers to show that they were making progress. And one of the revolutionists, the leading orator, left the second negotiation meeting after a few hours in order undoubtedly to speechify about their successes.

Truthfulness is not usually a part of revolution. For that matter, in the revolution of Poston, neither side seems to have had the monopoly on truth. Both seem to follow the adage of certain groups, I believe certain radical groups, that the end justifies the means. A doctrine to which I do not adhere for ends and means become very confused in much of our thinking.

At  
~~AFTER~~ the first negotiating meeting, the Acting Project Director called the Reverend Mitani to the office. He arrived with a battery of four stenographers I believe, and was met by Dr. Leighton and three other members of the committee. The second meeting was proposed to take place in the Hospital Ward 7. The revolutionists said that neither that nor the administration building were acceptable and contrary to my wishes, although I did not press the point, the Project Director agreed at once to hold the meeting in the Red Cross Building, neutral territory.

The extent to which the mimeographing machine in the administration building was used during the course of the revolution I do not know. I feel confident that mimeographed materials in Japanese and probably in English were circulated. I should be interested to compare the circulation of the

Press Bulletin which was published on November 23, 24, 25, in Poston II with that of some of the propeganda material of the revolution.

The revolutionists had their headquarters in a building near the police station where they were near the demonstration, the telephone of the police, the hero, and also some of their main supporters. The Sumo club was the meeting place of the larger group, the Committee of 72, which was a very fluctuating body.

The revolutionists knew the elementary principles of negotiation and bargaining and barter. Find out what your adversaries want first, get as much detail as you can about their views, then reshape them to your own objectives, present them in a little different form. The revolutionists had to gain success they claimed in order to hold down the mob. Those who had incited the mob were fearful that it would become disorganized and disperse and were anxious for speed, claimed to be upholders of all that was good and righteous. They were performing a public service.

The outside press accounts helped in my opinion to discountenance and throw fear into the minds of many of the revolutionists who felt that they were risking all. Increasing numbers of the committee towards the end of the revolution were openly showing their disapproval. The counter-revolution was ripe and could easily have been effected in a few days. Some of the newspaper accounts of the Poston affair were known to the revolutionists. Inter-communication with outside beetworkers took place by correspondence. The power of the incoming workers came to late to be used but might have been very effective, especially since some of them got reactions to press bulletins and were informed by their relatives about the situation.

By the way, let me say that there should be a plan of action on the part of each relocation center for an emergency set up, whether it be a

revolution, general strike, fire, flood, etc. Each person should know the job which he should do.

An interesting comment came from Dr. Kawaichi of the hospital on Saturday. He said the hospital was normal save that one of the patients was afraid. However the x-rays declined markedly, especially those with stomach trouble.

#### THE FORMAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE REVOLUTION

If a revolutionary group utilizes an incident for its own purposes, it must be prepared to take power and have a plan of action for its retention and development. The plans however must be flexible. The plans very often are adaptations of familiar patterns of conduct or government, only new vitality must be breathed into old institutions. It was therefore not surprising to note that the revolutionaries had one nissei and one issei elected by each block. (Note that one member of the Advisory Board and one nissei is elected from each block to the Community Council of Poston I). However it was essential that revolutionists gain control of the council. A well known technique of revolutionaries was used. The revolutionary group gets elected to an inner sanctum of 12. Here too a familiar pattern was used because each quad elected a representative. This pattern was used not only in the initial stages of political organization and meeting but also for the Committee of 9 for the issei Advisory Board. Mirabuli dictu! Although there were many "innocents" among the 72, there seemed to be few among the 12. Nine of the twelve except the vice-chairman, Mr. Sugamoto, seemed to be issei. The president, vice-president, and secretary, I believe, were elected independently of quads. The Executive Board of the Emergency Council, being controlled by the revolutionists, proceeded to, at times, keep the 72 informed only about such things as they desired and also if

necessary misinformed them. The intercommunication between the 72 and the people is worthy of study. Furthermore the 72, whom I believe met in the Sumo Room, changed rather frequently I believe during the course of the revolution. How were they elected in the first place? The Committee of 12 would reply they were representative of the people. This is also supposed to be the view of Father Clement. And Mr. Evans remarked after he first met the committee that they were certainly the most representative committee in Poston. The revolutionists had done their work well. The innocents, or those who were intimidated, disguised the nature of the Central Committee.

It is interesting to note however that the issei had gained supremacy by an overwhelming majority. Shades of Cooperative Study groups and agitation of the Pre-Temporary Council. However many elements in the population did not like the character of leadership. They were ready for a counter-revolution. The administration however was somewhat vacillating and finally settled the demonstration without dealing directly again with the Committee of 72.

It is charged that some of the elections took place near the demonstration and in some cases no method resembling democracy took place. It is interesting to note that the post-revolutionary committee has not been elected by purely democratic means.

A great deal of mystery was utilized effectively by the revolutionists to mystify and entangle the thinking of the administration. The language barrier of the isseis put them at a great disadvantage. However the results do not show this.

The peace terms were told by the heads of both sides in their own way, both apparently were very inaccurate. It is interesting to note that liberals and radicals (if there were any of the latter around in the administration staff) were dissatisfied with the peace terms on the ground that

it was a sell-out, an appeasement, another Munich, etc. It is also interesting to note that the more conservative branches of the administration, whose spokesman was the Chief Administration Officer, Mr. Empie, seemed more anxious to call the police in, and favored action rather than inaction. Mr. Empie however did not indicate that this was his view. The forces of the ruling class, as usual in a revolutionary situation, were sharply divided. The confusion was great, and in the case of the administrative staff a rally was made around a leader. Mr. Empie called a meeting of the administrative staff and they pledged their faith in him. Furthermore, Mr. Evans, Acting Project Director called for a vote of confidence in himself and his policy in keeping out the army, and received such a vote though I understand there was one dissent, that of Mr. Henry Smith. I was informed that Mr. Henry Smith had tendered his resignation orally but had been persuaded to continue in his function. It is interesting to note that even some of the liberals, moved by fears concerning some of their loyal aides were tempted at one time to favor a temporary entrance of the army. The swing of the administrative staff towards more direct action and greater control over the workers, so characteristic of many employing groups, was met by the belief of the liberals that the repressive measures, the fence, the failure of the administration to uphold the council, maladministration in distribution largely under control of the administrative branch were in part responsible for the strike.

I wonder how much the enemy knew about this dissention in the ranks of the ruling class. Certainly it did not make the task of the Project Director in negotiating easier. It meant that the Project Director's position was threatened by his own personnel. This too is typical of a pre-revolutionary and a revolutionary situation. However the unusual situation was that the instruments of force which were available belonged to another agency.

One of the key issues that kept popping up, although it was disguised in the form of the cooperation of the whole community, was the question of what place was the Council to have. Although the Committee was reminded that the Council had to be nissei under WRA rules, it proceeded to make suggestions giving the Central Executive Committee greater power. Even within the fields within the power of the Council. For example recommendations from the Council were to be made to the Project Director who in turn should get the views of the Central Committee which would be largely dominated by the issei. A great deal of time was spent in playing on the desires of the Administration to have law and order followed it. Fantastic schemes, so far as their effect was concerned, were brightly described, and in some cases an air of credulity was sought by delving into the mysteries of Japanese customs, codes of honor, complete confidence in each other than which no nation can attain a higher stature.

The ranks of the revolutionists were also in danger of splitting apart. For example, some people who were fearful at the beginning courageously disavowed any connection with the Executive Committee. People spoke more freely and were willing to be seen in the presence of certain members of the administrative staff. A few members of the administrative staff led a charmed life and it was permissible to be seen with them and talk to them at all times, though query whether it was permissible to be seen along with them even then.

The proposals of the administration enabled the Committee of 12 to work out what it believed to be an Issei dominated group which would have in a more subtle way than direct threats effective sanctions for its decisions. The Honor Committee which was to be composed of 17 to 20 could examine and condemn even the supreme body of the Central Commission of 8. The patronage, the key jobs that the issei were seeking, also came within that power and they were able to cause the election of Block managers.

taking advantage of any elements of discontent with the block manager personnel.

The terms could also be interpreted to mean a reduction in the power and number of the Caucasian personnel. In other words some of the believers in democracy might be lured into the camps of the revolutionists by the fact that there would be more democracy than previously. For instance, because of the revolution, the representatives of the people were listened to more than before. If plans beneficial to the Poston Community were adopted, the Isseis who had controlled the revolution would gain increased prestige. As it was, the presence of Mr. Head at the celebration, the direct negotiation of Mr. Head with this key body gave them points on which to hamper opposition leaders.

A few words about a technique of the administration. Besides dropping hints of possible army occupation, a drop in its own activities, a loss of public opinion because of the newspaper accounts, it designed to keep the workers in Camps II and III satisfied and in turn show a form of punishment to the workers in I by a new employment policy and by rushing new allowances in clothing, lineleums, and other things to Camp II and II — these things which the Revolutionary Council might claim as the result of its own efforts.

Here again the administration during the course of the revolution was not able to convince the workers of Unit I that this was occurring. In fact most of the workers in Unit I felt that Unit II and III were out. In fact, several reading the Press Bulletin on the day following the peace, disbelieved much of it and laughed at the account of the strike given in some portions of the paper, including a statement by Mr. Head on the front page.

The democratic forces, the Councils of II and III were the principal

leaders holding the line. Other forces such as the Fair Labor Committee, department heads, and Block Managers helped to ~~II~~ keep its equilibrium, which in turn helped to hold III together. The visits of the Community Council and the Issei Advisory Board to Mr. Evans, which meeting was also attended by me at the request of the Council and Mr. Evans, did much to prevent the gap in information which existed between III and the administration. The Council felt that it went back with more information and a desire to inform II about the results of the interview. It was interesting to note that Mr. Burge did not attend this meeting although it took place in Mr. Gelvin's office while he was in Mr. Head's office just sitting.

It is also interesting to know that instead of constructive action being done during many days of the strike and the administration cleaning <sup>for</sup> up many things/which the evacuees seemed to be necessary, there was much talking about. It was especially evident in the Administration Building No. 2, in the mornings that the Project Director was being roasted.

It is interesting to note that the people in II felt strong enough to organize their own vigilantes and though they felt they might be risking their necks were fearless about it. However the Chairman of Unit II thought it best to remain in II for a week or so attending to things there before attending a staff meeting in I. Some of the leaders of the anti-revolutionary forces including the chairman of Community Council No. II, feel that after this is all over they should like to be permanently relocated elsewhere on the outside on a permanent job.

Many of the liberals feel that their main job is to get their followers out of the Project now -- that Poston is dead. Terror and fascism has prevailed. Some of the younger revolutionists who had gotten in to the revolution through threats or believing in the legitimacy of certain com-

plaints and later found that some other elements were present which they did not like, undoubtedly are fearful of the consequences. However they feel that they have staked everything on this and perhaps some good might come out of it.

The leaders of the revolution believe that perhaps they might change WRA rules prohibiting isseis from being elected to the Council. This came up in several discussions. This is not surprising because the leaders of the Pre-Temporary Council for Issei representation came to the fore again, in this struggle.

With the renewed prestige of recognition by the administration they are working feverishly to accomplish genuine benefits to the people in order to keep the power they have acquired. They are fearful that the Council may rise again and be a point around which Nisseis and the believers in the democratic processes may rally. Their explanation that a mere majority by a secret ballot is not the way to handle the situation reflects in my opinion a fascist conception of government. They state that all the people in the block must believe in the man and believe alike. There is no room for minority groups of any size. The fact that the majority must be coerced often is not emphasized.

The administration is seeking means to gain prestige among the people. It is in a dangerous role however because besides possible accusations of double dealing in its attempt to satisfy several factions of the Caucasian staff and the evacuees, it is true that any great improvement that the administration does for the evacuees now may be interpreted as victory for the revolutionists. They were able to do this by undemocratic means — things which the regularly elected representatives of the people under WRA rules had been unable to do. Never has the Project Director spent so much time with

any group or been so conciliatory, or showered so much praise on any evacuee group.

Today Mr. Kennedy employed a staff of 8 members of the committee of 72 headed by the Reverend Mitani as labor advisors. The mass of red tape and indecision has been cut.

## CITY PLANNING BOARD MEETING

THURSDAY 11:00 A.M. November 26, 1942

Each member of the City Planning Board presented his credentials which was a signed affidavit by the residents of his respective Block giving him their assurance of full support and confidence in his representation.

The first meeting of the City Planning Board was called to order by Mr. Sugimoto (Block 3), Vice Chairman in the absence of Mr. Omori, Chairman of the Emergency Committee. Mr. Sugimoto, Mr. Takahashi and Mr. Nagai were nominated for Chairman of this meeting. Mr. Sugimoto was elected.

Mr. Sugimoto opened the meeting by calling for an election for a Chairman and Vice Chairman of an Executive City Planning Board upon whose shoulders would fall the real work of planning a true Self Government Body in Poston taking into consideration all elements which were instrumental in the spontaneous incident just ended.

Mr. Nagai was elected Chairman.

Mr. Sugimoto was elected Vice Chairman.

Mr. Matsubara was appointed as Japanese Secretary.

Mr. Amano was appointed English Secretary.

It was decided to have 12 members, 6 issei and 6 nisei on this Central Committee.

The meeting was divided into two groups, issei and nisei to elect their respective members to the board.

At the nisei meeting the following people were nominated: Dr. Ishimaru, James Yahiro, Hidemi Ogawa, Masaru Kawashima, Franklyn Sugiyama, Seiichi Nomura, Harvey Suzuki, George Fujii, Teruo Kasuga, Smoot Katow, Frank Tanaka. From these nominees, the following six were elected: Messrs. Kawashima, Ogawa, Ishimaru, Nomura, Yahiro, and Katow.

The issei members elected were: Messrs. Matsumoto, Takahash, Mitani, Okamoto, Nakamura, and Niiseki.

## EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

Thursday 2:00 P.M. November 26, 1942

The various elements causing the incident and how to prevent future incidents were discussed in a round table open forum. The meeting was adjourned with the plan to bring back various plans to be discussed the following morning.

## EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

Friday 10:00 A.M. November 27, 1942

Discussions of various plans submitted by Messrs. Mitani, Matsumoto, Sugimoto, and Yahiro were held. The differences in plans were very slight and Mr. Sugimoto's plan was with slight adjustments adopted. This plan calls for no change in the heretofore Council setup but provides for the creation of three new Boards, namely, 1. A Central Executive Board, 2. A Court of Honor, 3. A Labor Relation Board.

The Central Executive Committee was chosen from the Executive Council and will have final decisive powers pertaining to the internal order and welfare of this Community. This board shall at all times work directly with the Project Director. All members of this Central Executive Committee must be qualified by the Honor Court and they may be recalled by a two-third majority vote of their respective councils. The members comprising this Committee at present are: Issei; Mr. Nagai(3), Mr. Okamoto(30), Mr. Nakamura(17), Mr. Niiseki(60); Nisei; Mr. Sugimoto(3), Mr. Yahiro(37), Mr. Ogawa(38), Mr. Katow(12).

The duty of the Labor Relation Board will be to plan on the ability of all applicants for key positions. It will work hand in hand with the Employment Office.

The Court of Honor will have no connections with the Executive Body, Council or other Boards, but will be the people's Honor Court separate from any political or labor affiliations.

J. Omori of Block 6-3-B is the leader with Rev. Mitani assisting. They have plans to send several of their members to Camp 2 and Camp 3 to call on this strike. Omori locked members of Block 6 in our mess hall and told us to do what he says. They have plans of escaping toward river if things get too hot. The whole police force is in back of Omori. Also watch for Kenoshitas of Block 6. Omori says he has his life at stake so he is going to get this boy released or they are going to fight with their life. Yamaguchi of Fire Department is to be watched. Kubota and Fuji i-- formerly from Bakersfield must be watched. Paul Hegashi of Block 6 is the Nisei leader.

(given by N.I. during the  
strike by Clarence Hamada,  
att.)

151  
K  
Refer to Form WRA 26

1. Mitani, Masatane
  - 1a. Henry
2. Poston, 11-1-A --5/9/42
3. None
4. 1016 22nd St., Bakersfield, California
5. Father: Mitani, Tanekichi--Japan  
Mother: Sugeno, Masako --Japan
6. Father-in-law, Miyoji Okazaki --Rt. #1, Mesa, Arizona
7. Education:
  - Tokyo Shogaku (grammar), Japan --1915-1921
  - Hoyama Gakuen (high), Japan, Tokyo --1921-1926
  - Hoyama Gakuen (college) Tokyo, Japan --1926-1929
  - Postgraduate, Ohio Wesleyan Collge, Ohio --1930-1932
  - Biblical Seminary, New York --1932-1935
  - U. of So. California, Graduate school of Religion --1941-1942
- 7a. B.A., STB.; Theology and psychology majors;  
Y.M.C.A., Boys club, youth conferences organization work.
8. Tokyo, Japan --1906-1929
9. Japan cavalry  
Received classification, but no training as such.
10. None
11. None
12. 66 inches; 12a. 130 pounds.
13. Physical condition: No Major physical defects.
14. 39-55-A
15. 39055
16. Sex: male
17. Japanese
18. Married
19. Head
20. 2/16/06; 20a. 36 years
21. Tokyo, Japan.
22. 5140180
23. Yes

24. Japan 14  
Post-graduate 6

25. English --speak and read  
Japanese --speak and read

27. Primary: clergyman  
27a. Musician; 27b. Library Ass't.

28. Employment:  
6/41-5/42 Minister --Methodist Church --Bakersfield, Cal.  
9/39-6/41 Minister --Methodist Church, --Mesa, Arizona  
4/35-12/37 Student Secretary --Nat'l YMCA --New York, N.Y.

29. Music (guitar), collection of books.  
Work  
Preference: minister work or pastoral consulting.

30. Protestant (Methodist)

Date of interview: 6/10/42

Refer to form WRA 126, Rev.

1. Mitani, Masatane  
a) alias: Henry
  2. Nellie Marie Mitani, wife, 24;  
Eileen Miyoko Mitani, daughter, 3 weeks.
  - 51 Bakersfield, California 7/41 to 4/42  
Los Angeles, California 7/40 to 7/41
  7. Registered voter: No
  9. Father: Tanekichi Mitani, Japan, Christian minister
  12. Relatives in Japan:  
Sachiko Mitani, sister, Japanese citizenship  
address, Japan; music teacher
  14. 12/1935, San Pedro, Calif, steamer, student, self, education.
  17. YMCA, social and religious, 1935-1939  
Alumni Ass'n Wesleyan University, Ohio, social 1932- to present
  20. Dr. F. H. Smith, Berkeley, Calif, Supt. Methodist Japanese mission -7 yrs.  
Mr. Gale Seaman, Ret'd YMCA, 7 years, San Gabriel, Calif.  
Mrs. H. H. Muelke, New York, Housewife, 11 years  
Rev. D. W. Throckmorton, Bakersfield, Calif, minister, 2 years  
Dr. F. W. Heckleman, El Monte, Calif, missionary, 18 years.
  21. All no.
  22. blank
  23. U.S.O. Los Angeles, Calif, \$1.00, 1942  
Red Cross, Bakersfield, Calif, \$1.00, 1942  
Alumni Ass'n Wesleyan Univ., Ohio, \$2.00, yearly
  24. Christian Century, Reader's Digest, Fortune, Life, Pulpit.
  - 25 a) Yes
  26. No
  28. Yes
  29. No
  30. No
  31. No
  32. No
  33. First: Minister  
Second: social work  
Third: educational
- 33 a) Yes  
b) New York, Middle West  
DATE: 3/1/43

Refer to WRA 128-P

1. Mitani, Masatane

DATE: 6/23/43

4. Morning, July 2, 1943

6. First destination: Gila, Mesa, Phoenix, Denver, Salt Lake City,  
Topaz, Minidoka, Heart Mountain, Denver, Granada, Santa Fe.

7. Train, Sept. 2, 1943

9. Attend the Japanese Methodist Annual Conference, visit above mentioned centers and cities as the representative of the Poston Christian Church, and also the Cooperative Movement.

10. Tsunezo Kinoshita, Church officer, 19-1-B

I shall go with him from Phoenix as he shall attend the Methodist conference in Denver.

11. Japanese Methodist church, community enterprise and self.

Approved by the three officials.

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14

Refer to:  
Form WRA 26 -Rev. 1

S  
2

1. Mizushima, Nagisa M.
2. Poston, 45-10-A --5/29/42
3. None
4. 3448 E. Second St., Los Angeles, Calif.
5. Father: Mizushima, Kiyotoki, --Japan  
Mother: Mizuno, Shigeno --Japan
- 5a. U.S. none; Abroad, Police chief
6. Son; Mizushima, Shigeru --45-10-A
7. Wakayama grammar, Japan --4/1893-3/1899  
Wakayama Middle School " --4/1899-3/1904  
Mission High, San Francisco, Cal. --9/1907-5/1909  
U. of So. California, Los Angeles --9/12-6/16  
Dr. Wilson's Post graduate course on full plate work --7/1921-8/1921
- 7a. D.D.S.
8. Japan --3/1887-2/1907  
Japan --4/1922-7/1922
9. None
10. None
11. None
12. 62 inches  
12a. 120 pounds
13. No major defect.
14. 23-79-A
15. 23-79
16. Male
17. Japanese; Spouse, Japanese
18. Married
19. Head
20. 3/6/1887  
20a. 55 years
21. Shingu, Wakayama, Japan
22. 5386370
23. No
24. Japan 11; College 4

25. English--speak, read, write  
Japanese--speak, read, write

26. blank

27. Primary: dentist  
Secondary: Semi-prof. NEG

27a. author

28. 8/16-5/42 --Own office in Los Angeles, Cal; --Dentist --\$250. yr.  
8/13-2/27 --Japanese Union Church, L.A. --English language  
teacher for Japanese, evening --\$25. mo.  
2/10/3/13 --Japanese Congregational Church, San Francisco  
--Secretary and English language teacher --\$30. mo.

29. Skills, fine art, poetry and short story writing (Japanese)

29a. none

30. Christian (Congregation)

Date of interview: 7/10/42

Refer to: WRA 126. Rev.

1. Mizushima, Nagisa

4. Citizenship--Japanese

11. Relatives:in U.S.:

John Shigeru Mizushima, son, U.S.citizenship

12. Relatives in Japan:

a) Mizushima, Kazuko (wife) Japanese citizenship  
Address unknown, as she was returning to America when war broke  
out on Tatsuta Maru. (Occupation, housewife.

b) Mizushima, Yutaka George (son) U.S. citizenship  
same as mother --student.

c) Mizushima, Hiroko (daughter) -U.S.citizen --same as mother --student.

13. Other schooling: best Art School, San Francisco, Calif. --1909-1910

14. Foreign travel:

to America, 2/07, Seattle Washing steamship Aki Maru, by self  
to study --To Japan 4/22-7/22, San Francisco, Calif, Shuniyo  
(steaship) by self to visit mother during illness.

17. American dental Ass. 1920-1922

20. Mrs. M.B. Williams, Los Angeles, Calif. --retired --35 years  
Miss Mary J. Hall, So. Pasadena, Calif. -- 15 years.  
L.R. Niles, 1145 W. 18th, Los Angeles, Calif --dental repairman --5 yrs.  
Mr. Moore, Los Angeles, Supt. of Extension Society --5 yrs.

21a.No; 21b. no; 21c. no.

22. all none

23. L.A. Union Church --\$40 to \$50. yr. --1918-1942  
Children's Home --Los Angeles --Amount unknown --unknown  
Red Cross --Los Angeles --\$3.00 --1942  
Community Chest, Los Angeles --unknown --1932-1942

24. Dental Magazine, Dental Digest, Newsweek, Los Angeles Examiner,  
Rafu Shimpo, Financial worlds.

25. Yes

25a. No.

26. No

28. Yes.

29. No

30. none

31. Yes: George, Yutaka, and Hiroko, 1941

32. None

33. First: Dental Techmitician ordentistry  
Second: interpretor  
Third: farming.

33. a)No

b)Colorado or Utah.

Date: 3/3/43

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K

S

Refer to Form WRA 26-Rev. 1

1. Omori, Juro
2. Poston, 6/3/-D
3. Interned --Bismark, N. Dakota, A-1, T-26 --2/26/42
4. Rt. 2, Box 111, Holtville, Calif.
5. Father: Omori, Sakutaro --Japan  
Mother: Amano, Bun --Japan
- 5a. Abroad: farmer
6. Wife: Omori, Towa --Poston 6/3-B
7. Grammar in Japan --1/95-3/99  
High School in Japan --4/99-3/01  
College in Japan --4/01-3/03
- 7a. Major: Agriculture in Japan
8. Japan --12/88-12/05
9. None
10. None
11. Pension: none
12. 66 inches  
12 a. 140 pounds
13. Heart trouble; presbyopia-glasses
14. 7-51-F
15. 7-51
16. Male
17. Japanese; spouse, Japanese
18. Married
19. Father
20. 12/20/88; 20a. 53 years
21. Nakano mura, Yamanashi ken, Japan.
22. 1396463
23. No
24. Japan 10
25. English--speak, read, write  
Japanese--speak, read, write

27. Primary: farm foreman

28. 6/32-2/42 --S. Miyata, Irrigate farm, Holtville, Calif.

--managed 40 acres --\$15,000 year gross

2/38-2/42 --Holtville Farmers Ass'n, Grover and shipper, Holtville  
Calif.; manager and advisor --\$200 per mo.

29. none

29a. 560-28-0947

30. Christian

Date of Interview: 10/7/42

Memo from Census Office to Employment Department. 7/3/43

Subject: Omori, Juro

"According to Population Bureau, Admission and Depxture Files we find the following:

First admission: Dated August 10, 1942

Departed: January 23, 1943

Second Admission: May 29, 1943

(Note) He was absent during the time of the Mass Registration,  
March 1 to 3, 1943.

*duplicate*

November 30, 1942

GENERAL REPORT OF EMPLOYMENT SITUATION

The labor and employment situation in Poston immediately prior to the strike in Unit 1, which occurred on Wednesday, November 18, 1942, presented a very confusing picture, both from the point of view of the evacuees and the Administration. The work being done on the Project had no importance for the evacuees, other than their maintenance. The work was not connected by the people with a better standard of living or of any particular future for them. There was no visible supply of labor for important projects, especially for those jobs that entailed hard work. Non-productive and non-essential projects were heavily over-staffed.

As of September 30, there were 9,456 residents in Unit 1, of these there were 3,247 males and 2,725 females between the ages of 18 and 65 inclusive. There were employed 3,025 males and 1,380 females in the following general classification:

	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Administrative	130	113
Public Works	449	52
Community Services	484	477
Agriculture & Industry	303	88
Transportation & Supplies	278	3
Subsistence	834	623
Maintenance and Operations	547	24
	<u>3025</u>	<u>1380</u>

Agriculture, which had and has the greatest appeal to the evacuees employed only about 450 workers and no apparent progress was being made other than the planting of vegetables between the blocks and in the firebreaks.

The hope of the evacuees that they could establish industries and cooperatives within the Center and thereby raise the standard of living was lifted to high levels by Mr. Collier's speech on November 12, completely blasted four days later by Mr. Myer's talk, when he said that the Trust Fund goes out the window and that all forms of future industries and long-range planning were to be abandoned.

The cotton picking in Parker Valley, which started on October 28 and which continued until November 14, when it stopped by order of General De Witt caused a great deal of resentment. During this period, about 2000 volunteer workers had each spent a day

in the fields and had picked 57,043 pounds of cotton, donating their services to various funds such as school class funds, club funds, block funds, and so forth. For example, the senior high school class in Unit 3 was able to establish a school newspaper as a result of money earned picking cotton. The Recreation Department in Unit 2 was able to buy a public address system. Various blocks picked for the purpose of purchasing coolers for their mess halls, building fund for a Christmas celebration, and various other causes. They had built up a fine spirit and could not understand the military order withdrawing permission to pick cotton.

The knowledge that a barbed wire fence was to be built around each of the units heightened the feeling.

The imminent opening of the camouflage net factory was causing a great deal of concern. The evacuees felt that it was outside industry and that the workers should be paid the outside prevailing rate. They felt that the wage scale at Project levels of \$12, \$16, and \$19 was pure exploitation and that it was unfair to workers on the outside and to the evacuees. They felt that as the work was war work and open only to the Nisei, that an unfair challenge would be made to test their loyalty.

Due to the confused state of mind of the workers, the lack of outstanding leaders, and the absence of purpose or interest in their work, the organization of the Fair Practice Committee was proceeding slowly in Unit #1. (In Units #2 and #3, where there were fewer residents, more outstanding leaders and more evacuees in responsible Administrative positions, and better communication between the leaders and the people, the Fair Practice Committee and the labor organizations had been operating for several weeks. The part these organizations played in Units 2 and 3 during the strike should be noted.) Unit 1 with its large Caucasian Administrative staff, many of whom were unsympathetic, and a few of whom were antagonistic to the evacuees, heightened the general feeling of futility and purposelessness. The evacuees felt that they were over-administered, and were denied the right of filling responsible and even minor supervisory jobs, which right had been granted them in Administrative Instruction No. 27, issued September 1.

While no one seems to have a clear picture of the actual start of the strike, this seems to be the best explanation.

On Saturday, November 14, following the beating of K. Nishimura, whom many of the evacuees had long regarded as an informer two men, George Fujii and Isamu Uchida, were arrested and held

in the local jail. On Tuesday, November 17, agents of the F.B.I appeared and questioned a number of the residents. The word got around that the F.B.I. were going to take these men, both of whom were highly regarded, out of Poston without a trial and without charges being filed against them.

A large crowd formed around the jail, a meeting was held, the Community Council was instructed to demand the unconditional release of the prisoners. " " This was done.

The demand for release was denied by Mr. John Evans, Acting Project Director in the absence of Wade Head. The Council resigned, the mob around the jail growing larger and talking strike. Committees were sent to various mess halls to harangue and arouse the people to strike action. It was interesting to note that the strike was called by the mob rather than by the workers and that work conditions were not an issue. The strike was political and not industrial.

Sometime during this period of confusion, control apparently was taken over by a small group of older evacuees, mostly Issei who had heretofore been in the background. This group apparently understood organizational technique, as there soon emerged a front committee of 72, one Nisei and one Issei from each block. These 72 were presumably elected, though no one seems to have a clear over-all picture of just how. Out of this committee came a top committee of 11, containing a number of the probable organizations.

The Central Committee promptly took over complete control of the community. Police, fire, hospital, and school employees were ordered to report to work. Garbage, subsistence and mess hall crews were ordered to stay at their posts. All essential services were maintained under direction of the Committee. The personnel mess was closed for a day and was re-opened only when the workers were told to return by the Committee. The strike became a complete revolution, with all control passing to the evacuees.

The conduct of the evacuees during the strike was free from violence. Work and picket duty were assigned to all residents. Large crowds maintained a 24 hour vigil before the jail. Watchers were assigned by shifts and the crowd estimated at various times of the day was from 600 to 2000. They were divided into block groups around the camp fire and had improvised windbreaks made of canvass and blankets. All of the groups had banners flying bearing the block numbers. Many of the banners were numbered in Japanese characters, several with

numbers in a red circular background closely resembling a flag of Japan. A stage was erected, a loudspeaker system blared out Japanese music and announcements night and day. Japanese was the official language. The Issei-Nisei conflict became an issue; Injustices of evacuation and racial discrimination were discussed. The strike became a national and international issue. Stories drifted the evacuees who had worked closely with the Administration. However, there is no record of any violence being used against any of these people. All Administrative offices and barracks were without evacuee personnel for the duration of the strike, from Wednesday, November 18 to Wednesday, November 25, 1942.

On the return of Wade Head, meetings were arranged by the administration and the Central Council for the purpose of negotiating a conclusion of the strike. In negotiating, it was brought out that the older people and the late comers had been denied the opportunity of the better jobs. The Committee insisted that they have the right to name people for key jobs. It was finally agreed that all jobs would be declared open and that rehiring would take place at the conclusion of the strike, that skeleton crews in essential services would be rehired on a temporary basis, that certain jobs would be discontinued, and that more efficient work would be insisted on. It was agreed that job descriptions would be written up and posted, and that workers would have the right to apply for any job that they felt they were qualified to fill; that permanent personnel selection would be made on a competitive basis, and in the event that several candidates for a job were equally qualified, the people would be consulted as to their preference, that this preference would be considered in making the selection for the job.

The Committee felt that there were many of the Issei who had successful practical backgrounds who had been excluded from employment considerations, due to language barriers, and a reluctance on their part to push themselves forward. The older evacuees felt more keenly the negative and antagonistic attitude of many of the Caucasian personnel. They felt more keenly the evacuation itself.

The Committee indicated that they were hopeful that an opportunity for new and more suitable employment and a fairer system of selection of job applications would bring about a better feeling and attitude in the community. They indicated that while they realized that a certain amount of confusion would result in the rehiring procedure, that it would be worth it in a better, more positive and more cooperative attitude on the part of the community as a whole.

November 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Wade Head

FROM: Mr. Ted Haas

Subject: CONVERSATION BETWEEN 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. (Nov.24,1942)  
WITH ANDREW SUGIMOTO (Part of time consumed in  
Mr. Sugimoto's securing the list of 72 members.)

Mr. Andrew Sugimoto indicated that he had pretty good assurance that this council would accept Mr. Head's proposal.

1.) Release Mr. Uchida in the custody of the emergency council of seventy two (list of members attached).

2.) Just as soon as the council accepts this proposal Mr. Uchida should be taken to the council and turned over to them by Mr. Head.

3.) The release should be in a written form, namely that Mr. Uchida is released in the custody of the seventy-two, and should be tried in Poston, the time and trying body should be determined by Mr. Head. It was suggested that the judicial commission of Poston II might have to be used for this purpose. Quotation from Mr. Sugimoto's conversation subsequent to his proposal:

"What I am trying to do is to go on this here and after there is calmness because of the passing of Mr. Head's proposal, the executive committee and Mr. Head must get together on the three points which Mr. Head presented and the three proposals which the committee presented. We must settle them and reach an agreement then. Just as soon as we get a vote on the release of Uchida, we can go to Mr. Head and have a conference. All we want is the council of seventy-two to accept or reject Mr. Head's proposal in regard to Mr. Uchida and the other proposals which we made to Mr. Head can be taken up by the executive committee. As soon as we get the release of Mr. Uchida, the crowd will break up. If Mr. Head must get in touch with the

County Attorney before getting in touch with the County Attorney, we should like to get the affidavits."

The release of Mr. Uchida should be signed by Mr. Head as soon as possible. Deliver it at once, either to Mr. Sugimoto or to the Block Manager's office in the block of the Emergency Council Headquarters. The Emergency Council meets in Block #27, Barracks 14. The meeting of the council which was to begin at 10:00 o'clock (the council of seventy two) did not begin, according to Mr. Sugimoto until 10:45. I estimate that there were about 600 people gathered around the block signs. This included a few children, young men and some women and girls, although, as in the past, old men predominated.

When Mr. Sugimoto handed me the list of the seventy-two members of the council, he told me that there were only two ambulances at the hospital and that there was a complaint that these were insufficient, because last night a doctor could not get to a patient fast enough because of a lack of transportation. The committee recommended that the normal ambulances should be employed. I told him that I did not know how many ambulances were normally used and he estimated five.

I had several conversations with other persons, including the chief, many of the people waiting around, etc. Mr. Kawashima of Block 19 was quick to inform me that he was only on the seventy-two and knew nothing about the members of the executive committee.

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As of September 30, there were 9,438 residents in Unit 1, of these there were 3,147 males and 2,725 females between the ages of 18 and 65 inclusive. There were employed 5,025 males and 1,380 females in the following general classification:

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Administrative	130	113
Public Works	449	52
Community Services	484	477
Agriculture & Industry	303	88
Transportation & Supplies	278	3
Subsistence	834	623
Maintenance and Operations	547	24
	<u>3,025</u>	<u>1,380</u>

Agriculture, which had and has the greatest appeal to the evacuees employed only about 450 workers and no apparent progress was being made other than the planting of vegetables between the blocks and in the firebreaks.

The hope of the evacuees that they could establish industries and cooperatives within the Center and thereby raise the standard of living was lifted to high levels by Mr. Collier's speech on November 12, completely blasted four days later by Mr. Myer's talk, when he said that the Trust Fund goes out the window and that all forms of future industries and long-range planning were to be abandoned.

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On Saturday, November 14, following the beating of K. Nishimura, whom many of the evacuees had long regarded as an informer two men, George Fujii and Isamu Uchida, were arrested and held in the local jail. On Tuesday, November 17, agents of the FBI appeared and questioned a number of the residents. The word got around that the FBI were going to take these men, both of whom were highly regarded, out of Poston without a trial and without charges being filed against them.

A large crowd formed around the jail, a meeting was held, the Community Council was instructed to demand the unconditional release of the prisoners. " This was done.

The demand for release was denied by Mr. John Evans, Acting Project Director in the absence of Wade Head. The Council resigned, the mob around the jail growing larger and talking strike. Committees were sent to various mess halls to harangue and arouse the people to strike action. It was interesting to note that the strike was called by the mob rather than by the workers and that work conditions were not an

issue. The strike was political and not industrial.

Sometime during this period of confusion, control apparently was taken over by a small group of older evacuees, mostly Issei who had heretofore been in the background. This group apparently understood organizational technique, as there soon emerged a front committee of 72, one Nisei and one Issei from each block. These 72 were presumably elected, though no one seems to have a clear over-all picture of just how. Out of this committee came a top committee of 11, containing a number of the probable organizers.

The Central Committee promptly took over complete control of the community. Police, fire, hospital, and school employees were ordered to report to work. Garbage, subsistence and mess hall crews were ordered to stay at their posts. All essential services were maintained under direction of the Committee. The personnel mess was closed for a day and was re-opened only when the workers were told to return by the Committee. The strike became a complete revolution, with all control passing to the evacuees.

The conduct of the evacuees during the strike was free from violence. Work and picket duty were assigned to all residents. Large crowds maintained a 24 hour vigil before the jail. Watchers were assigned by shifts and the crowd estimated at various times of the day was from 600 to 2000. They were divided into block groups around the camp fire and had improvised windbreaks made of canvass and blankets. All of the groups had banners flying bearing the block numbers. Many of the banners were numbered in Japanese characters, several with numbers in a red circular background closely resembling a flag of Japan. A stage was erected, a loudspeaker system blared out Japanese music and announcements night and day. Japanese was the official language. The Issei-Nisei conflict became an issue: Injustices of evacuation and racial discrimination were discussed. The strike became a national and international issue. Stories drifted the evacuees who had worked closely with the Administration. However, there is no record of any violence being used against any of these people. All Administrative offices and barracks were without evacuee personnel for the duration of the strike, from Wednesday, November 18 to Wednesday, November 25, 1942.

On the return of Wade Head, meetings were arranged by the administration and the Central Council for the purpose of negotiating a conclusion of the strike. In negotiating, it was brought out that the older people and the late comers had been denied the opportunity of the better jobs. The Committee insisted that they have the right to name people for key jobs. It was finally agreed that all jobs would be declared open and that rehiring would take place at the conclusion of the strike, that skeleton crews in essential services would be rehired on a temporary basis, that certain jobs would be discontinued, and that more efficient work would be insisted on. It was agreed that job descriptions would be written up and posted, and that workers would have the right to apply for any job that they felt they were qualified to fill; that per-

manent personnel selection would be made on a competitive basis, and in the event that several candidates for a job were equally qualified, the people would be consulted as to their preference, that this preference would be considered in making the selection for the job.

The Committee felt that there were many of the Issei who had successful practical backgrounds who had been excluded from employment considerations, due to language barriers, and a reluctance on their part to push themselves forward. The older evacuees felt more keenly the negative and antagonistic attitude of many of the Caucasian personnel. They felt more keenly the evacuation itself.

The Committee indicated that they were hopeful that an opportunity for new and more suitable employment and a fairer system of selection of job applications would bring about a better feeling and attitude in the community. They indicated that while they realized that a certain amount of confusion would result in the rehiring procedure, that it would be worth it in a better, more positive and more cooperative attitude on the part of the community as a whole.