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Final Report
of the Participation of the
FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

In the Evacuation Program of the
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY

Covering the Period
March 15, 1942 through May 31, 1942

Laurence I. Hewes, Jr.
Regional Director
Region IX

30 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, California

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
30 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, California

June 5, 1942

Karl R. Bendetsen, Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Chief of Staff
Civil Affairs Division
Room 447, Whitcomb Hotel
1231 Market Street
San Francisco, California

Dear Colonel Bendetsen:

In accordance with the request contained in your letter of May 19, 1942, I am transmitting herewith a report of the functions performed by the Farm Security Administration for the period March 15, 1942 to June 1, 1942, under the authority and orders of Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt as stated in his letter to me dated March 15, 1942. These activities, as you know, pertain to the agricultural phase of the Japanese evacuation in that area designated by the Western Defense Command as Military Area No. 1.

The duties incumbent upon me and the Farm Security Administration in Military Area No. 1 resulting from General DeWitt's order are now almost entirely completed. A very large proportion of the work has been accomplished. On behalf of the organization which I represent, I wish to state definitely that with the exception of such continuing details as collection of loans which have been made and final withdrawal of personnel from special field offices that the work which we were ordered to undertake has been accomplished. In view of this fact and of the report which is herewith tendered, it is my wish that the conclusion of the assignment of the Farm Security Administration with respect to the evacuation of Military Area No. 1 be formally and officially accepted. I request that the appropriate steps which should be taken to establish such a status be considered by you and that arrangements be made accordingly in the very near future.

We shall be very glad to continue our functions under existing or additional authority in other portions of the Western Defense Command should new or additional evacuations be decided upon, and shall await specific advice from you in this respect.

The attached report gives a complete description of the functions and activities performed. It also indicates the many aspects and phases into which the agricultural phase of the program was necessarily divided. The Table of Contents will serve as a ready reference to indicate where the separate types of activity are discussed.

-2-Karl R. Bendetsen


In order to facilitate your review of the report, however, I call your attention specifically to the portions which deal with progress in completing the disposal of farm properties, progress in making loans, the effects of the evacuation on agricultural production, the use of the freezing power, and the disposal of farm machinery.

Finally, and in conclusion, I wish to say that we have appreciated the opportunity of working so closely with the Western Defense Command and the many courtesies which you have rendered to us and which have so facilitated our work. On behalf of myself and my associates, as well as the organization which I represent, I wish to state that we have enjoyed the relations with the personnel, both civilian and military, composing the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

For purposes of historical interest and the record, it should be borne in mind that the undertaking involved, namely that of transferring, during a period of ten weeks, the farming interests of 6,789 farm operators and 231,492 acres of intensively cultivated land is probably one of the most dramatic events in the agricultural history of the United States. No function heretofore performed in so short a period in the domestic affairs of the United States can compare in magnitude and intensity with the Japanese evacuation in Military Area No. 1.

Under the prevailing circumstances it is our conviction that the greatest credit is due to the qualities of foresight, vision, and general competence which have been so much in evidence during this period on the part of the commissioned personnel of the United States Army assigned to this duty.

Sincerely yours


Laurence I. Hewes, Jr.
Regional Director

Attachments

CONTENTS

I	INTRODUCTION	1
II	BASIC AUTHORITIES DELEGATED TO FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION	2
III	CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPORTANCE OF JAPANESE AGRICULTURE	5
IV	OUTLINE OF PROGRAM ORGANIZATION	7
	<u>WFA Unit</u>	7
	<u>Special Negotiations Unit</u>	8
	<u>Evacuation Control Unit</u>	8
	<u>Information and Public Relations Unit</u>	9
	<u>Service Sections</u>	9
	<u>Regional Director</u>	10
	<u>Hours of Duty and Location of Headquarters</u>	10
V	PROGRAM OPERATION	11
	<u>WFA Unit</u>	11
	Initiation of Activities	11
	Registration of Japanese Farms	12
	Registration of Prospective Operators	13
	Promotion of Transfer Transactions	14
	Progress in Completing Disposal of Farm Properties	15
	Providing Credit to Substitute Operators	15
	Progress in Making Loans	17
	<u>Special Negotiations Unit</u>	17
	<u>Evacuation Control Program</u>	19
	<u>Regional Director's Staff</u>	22
	Regional Director	22
	Liaison Officer	22
	Information and Public Relations Activities	23
	<u>Administrative Services</u>	25
	Reports	26
	Personnel	26
	Communication, Procurements and Travel	27
	<u>Participation of WFA Field Agents in Evacuation Projects</u>	27
	<u>Concluding Activities</u>	28
VI	ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS AND RESULTS	29
	<u>Effects of the Evacuation on Agricultural Production</u>	29
	Land Use	29
	Shifts in Crop Production	30
	Shifts in Farm Tenure	31
	Labor Shortage	32
	Summary	32
	<u>Equity and Fair Dealing</u>	32
	<u>Use of the Freezing Power</u>	33
	<u>Disposal of Farm Machinery</u>	37
VII	FISCAL SUMMARY	39
VIII	ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF COOPERATION OF AGENCIES AND GROUPS	40
IX	CONCLUSION	42
	EXHIBITS	
	APPENDIX A: WFA PROCEDURE	
	APPENDIX B: WFA FORMS	
	APPENDIX C: WFA LETTERS	

TABLES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>After Page</u>
1	Proportion of Japanese Breadwinners in Agriculture in Four States Containing Military Area No. 1	6
2	Relative Number, Size and Value of Japanese Farms in Four States Containing Military Area No. 1	6
3	Average Size and Value of Japanese Farms in Four States Containing Military Area No. 1	6
4	Geographic Distribution and Principal Crops of Japanese Farm Operators in Four States Containing Military Area No. 1	6
5	Percent of Major Vegetable Crops Grown by Japanese in Pacific Coast States	6
6	Importance of Japanese in Achieving 1942 Production Goals in Lend-Lease Truck Crops in California Only	6
7	Tenure of Japanese Farm Operators	6
8	Field Offices in Which FSA Field Agents Operated During the Evacuation Program	11
9	Progress of FSA Field Agents in Registering Farms Subject to Relinquishment	12
10	Progress of WFA Field Agents in Transferring Farms From Japanese to Substitute Operators	14
11	WFA Loans Submitted and Approved, by Weeks	17
12	Corporations Formed to Operate Japanese Farms With WFA Loans	19
13	Personnel of the Farm Security Administration Engaged in the WCCA Program, March 15, 1942 through May 31, 1942	26

I

INTRODUCTION

The Farm Security Administration was authorized and ordered on March 15, 1942 to participate as a member agency of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. This administration was created to evacuate any persons designated by Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt from Military Areas to be proclaimed by him. The agencies included were the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Security Agency and the Farm Security Administration. These civilian agencies operated under the supervision and direction of the Civil Affairs Division of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.

The Farm Security Administration was charged with the responsibility for all agricultural phases of the evacuation. This report describes the authorities, organization, functions, operations and results of the program instituted to carry out this responsibility.

The period of activities reported is March 15, 1942 through May 31, 1942, when the evacuation of all Japanese persons from Military Area No. 1 was substantially completed.

II

BASIC AUTHORITIES
DELEGATED TO THE FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

The basic authority ordering and authorizing the Farm Security Administration to administer the agricultural phases of the evacuation program is contained in a letter from Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt to Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director, Farm Security Administration, Region IX, March 15, 1942. A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit 1.

The responsibilities of the Farm Security Administration were clearly set forth in this letter, namely (a) to insure continuation of the proper use of agricultural lands evacuated by enemy aliens and other persons designated by Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt and (b) to insure fair and equitable arrangements between the evacuees, their creditors and the substitute operators of their property. To discharge these responsibilities the FSA was empowered first, to employ personnel and incur necessary administrative expense and, secondly, to make loans to substitute operators of lands vacated by evacuees. One million dollars of the Chief of Staff's contingent funds was made available for such loans.

In connection with the request and order from Lieutenant General DeWitt, the Department of Agriculture designated the Regional Director as its authorized representative with reference to all matters relating to the evacuation program. A copy of the telegraphic instruction to the Regional Director, dated March 19, 1942, directing him to act as the Department's representative is attached as Exhibit 2.

After a brief period of operation it became apparent that the authorities contained in Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt's letter of March 15 would have to be supplemented to permit the full or approximate achievement of the results intended. The premise underlying General DeWitt's original order and the limited authority granted therein was that the Farm Security Administration through intermediary action and the extension of credit could induce and promote continuity of production and fair dealing. Instances were soon encountered where the interests of landlords, creditors and potential purchasers of crops and farm assets came into conflict not only with the interests of Japanese farmers, but also with those of each other, and where because of this or other reasons, the completion of transactions upon a satisfactory basis could not be effected through the normal processes of negotiation and bargaining.

Specifically, situations were encountered in which landlords by virtue of non-assignability clauses in leases sought to deprive Japanese farm operators of their crops and forfeit rental payments, and to do so by preventing transfers between Japanese tenants and substitute farm operators offering fair prices and whose proposed plans of operation

were consistent with the continuation of agricultural production. In other instances, conditional contract sellers were ready to exercise forfeitures based upon breaches which would be made necessary by the forced evacuation of Japanese. Landlords, creditors and prospective purchasers also appeared ready to take advantage in other ways of the adverse bargaining position of Japanese evacuees, even at the cost of serious loss of agricultural production. Further, there was a possibility that Japanese operators would abandon farm land, would discontinue normal agricultural operations, or would refuse to consummate transfers of their agricultural properties. All of these factors required the vesting in a Federal agency of authority to step in, if need arose, and operate, manage or dispose of farm property and to do so with or without the consent of the Japanese operators, their creditors or landlords.

Additional problems were presented by the lack of time. Thus, despite the complete willingness of all persons to cooperate, in some instances the imminent evacuation and departure of the Japanese and, in other instances, the inability to contact all interested parties made it necessary that the Farm Security Administration or some agency or entity created by it be available and empowered to provide temporary management and to act for Japanese evacuees until satisfactory substitute operators could be found and placed in control.

This problem was recognized after the first two days of Farm Security Administration field operations. A letter from Mr. Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director, to Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff, Western Defense Command, describing the situation and requesting an interpretation of authority to cope with it, is attached as Exhibit 3. A later statement concerning the problems presented and the additional authorities necessary to meet such problems is contained in a memorandum addressed by Mr. Gilbert Sussman, Office of the Solicitor, to Mr. Hewes under date of March 27, 1942. Copies of this memorandum and of the subsequent letter from Mr. Hewes to Colonel Bendetsen are attached as Exhibits 4 and 5. Colonel Bendetsen's reply appears as Exhibit 6. The foregoing request was supplemented by an express request, under date of April 2, 1942, to Colonel Bendetsen for permission to use the loan funds made available to the Farm Security Administration for loans to corporations or other entities, including a corporation organized at the instance of the Farm Security Administration for the purpose of enabling it to accept powers of attorney from Japanese and to operate and maintain their agricultural properties until substitute operators might be found. A copy of this supplemental request is attached as Exhibit 7.

As a result of the requests for additional authority which were made, there was delegated to the Regional Director authority to exercise powers (the so-called "freezing power") under section 5 (b) of the Trading With The Enemy Act as amended by Title III of the First War Powers Act of 1941. A copy of the telegraphic authorization to the Regional Director is attached as Exhibit 8. This telegraphic authorization was confirmed by a letter dated April 8, 1942, from C. B. Baldwin, Administrator, Farm Security Administration, to the Regional Director. A

copy of this letter and of each of the underlying letters and delegations upon which the authority of the Regional Director was based appear as Exhibits 9 to 14, inclusive.

The request for additional authority with reference to the use of loan funds made available out of the Chief of Staff's contingent funds was granted on April 4, 1942. A copy of a memorandum from Colonel Bendetsen granting such authority is attached as Exhibit 15. The granting of such authority was construed to permit the use of such funds as might be lent to an association to pay the nominal administrative and organizational expenses incurred incidentally to its establishment and operation. (See Exhibit 16.) As a result, the California Evacuated Farms Association was incorporated on April 8, 1942, for the purpose of acting for the Farm Security Administration in instances in which authority under the so-called freezing power might be exercised or powers of attorney accepted. Copies of the articles and the by-laws of the association are attached hereto as Exhibits 17 and 18. The corporation was subsequently qualified to operate in the States of Oregon and Washington.

It was pursuant to and in accordance with the authorities thus granted to the Regional Director that the Farm Security Administration proceeded to discharge its responsibilities as a cooperating agency in the Wartime Civil Control Administration.

III

CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPORTANCE OF JAPANESE AGRICULTURE
IN MILITARY AREA NO. 1

Nearly one-half of the Japanese working population evacuated from Military Area No. 1 had been engaged in agriculture. The total number of Japanese workers over 14 years of age was 48,926.* Seven thousand of these were farm operators or managers, and 13,000 were farm laborers, making a total of 20,000 deriving their livelihood from agricultural pursuits.

The number of farms operated by Japanese in the four states contained in Military Area No. 1 was 6,170. These were distributed as follows: California, 5,135; Washington, 706; Oregon, 277; Arizona, 52. Since Military Area No. 1 included practically all of the farming localities containing Japanese operators, these figures give a substantially accurate indication of the distribution of farms affected by the evacuation. Actually when the Japanese farms were registered by the Farm Security Administration it was found that their number exceeded the census figures. The total number of farms evacuated was 6,664.

The number of farms operated by Japanese in the Pacific Coast region comprised only 2 percent of all farms, and their acreage involved only .3 percent of the total farm acreage. These percentages, however, give an entirely misleading indication of the importance of Japanese farming enterprise in the area. The average value per acre of all farms in 1940 was \$37.94, whereas that of Japanese farms was \$279.96. This difference in value is due primarily to the fact that Japanese agriculture has been a highly intensive and productive enterprise. Three out of every four acres of Japanese farm land were devoted to actual crop production, whereas only one out of every four acres of all farm land in the area was planted in crops. The average size of the Japanese farms was 42 acres, and 85 percent of them contained less than 50 acres.

The estimated value of crops grown by Japanese farmers in 1940 in California was \$32,317,700. The values for certain specific crops were: lettuce, \$5,942,100; celery, \$4,667,250; tomatoes, \$4,182,000; cantaloupes, \$2,720,000; carrots, \$2,326,000; and strawberries, \$2,181,600 **

An analysis of Japanese farm enterprises showed that the types of crops grown were largely inter-tilled truck, fruit, and speciality crops, and often each acre was planted and harvested several times during the same year. These crops were invariably of an intensive type such as strawberries, tomatoes, lettuce, onions, celery, nursery stock, peas, beans,

* 1940 Census

** Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Special Report

fruit, cranberries, melons or sugar beets. A report of the estimated percentage of the major vegetable crops produced in the Pacific Coast region by Japanese farmers clearly shows the importance of their agricultural production. For example, in California Japanese operators grew 90 percent of the strawberries, 73 percent of the snap beans, 75 percent of the celery, 60 percent of the cauliflower, and 45 percent of the tomatoes. In the Northwest Japanese farmers produced over 80 percent of the cauliflower, 70 percent of the lettuce, 60 percent of the spinach, and 50 percent of the tomatoes.

The Secretary of Agriculture had established certain 1942 production goals for vital farm products in the prosecution of the war. The Japanese farmers in California had been expected to contribute a very large proportion of certain of these commodities in 1942, such as 92 percent of the snap beans, 54 percent of the tomatoes, and 30 percent of the peas. It was anticipated that they would produce over 40 percent of all California truck crops.

The specialization of Japanese farming is very significant and presented an important problem to an agency which contemplated the removal of the Japanese farm operators. Floriculture, greenhouse operation, and oyster farming are other examples of specialized operations in which many of the Japanese were engaged.

The Alien Land Law of May 19, 1913, has had a decisive effect upon the farm tenure status of Japanese in California throughout the subsequent period. This law prohibits ownership of property by aliens and restricts the conditions under which agricultural lands may be leased. Primarily as a result of this law most Japanese farmers on the Pacific Coast operated their land under some form of lease tenure. Seventy percent were classed as tenants in 1940. Both the legal status of Japanese people and their habits in conducting business have resulted in a complicated farm tenure system. Minor sons and daughters of aliens are found to be the owners or renters of farms. Japanese who report themselves as being farm laborers are often found to be the tenants and operators of land. Tenants and share croppers in many cases operate their farms subject to the vaguest kinds of verbal agreements. Often the remittances for rent or land payments are paid by third parties who from a superficial standpoint would not seem to have any interest in the farm enterprise. These factors are basic to the Japanese tenure situation which was necessarily involved in the evacuation.

In summary it may be fairly stated that the Japanese people were the most important racial minority group engaged in agriculture in the Pacific Coast region. Their systems of farming, types of crops, and land tenure conditions were such that their replacement by other farmers would be extremely difficult. Highly technical personnel would be required to handle such a transition, a credit program would have to be adapted to the peculiar problems presented, and some shifts in the future use of land would undoubtedly be involved.

Table 1

Proportion of Japanese Breadwinners in Agriculture
in Four States Containing Military Area No. 1

	<u>All Four States</u>		<u>Arizona</u>		<u>California</u>		<u>Oregon</u>		<u>Washington</u>	
	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>%</u>
Total Japanese Population	112,985	100.0	632	.6	93,717	82.9	4,071	3.6	14,565	12.9
Total Employed (Over 14 years)	48,926	100.0	235	.5	40,374	82.5	1,771	3.7	6,546	13.3
In Agriculture	22,162	45.3	135	57.4	19,289	47.7	759	42.3	1,979	30.2
Farm Operators	7,076		75		5,807		349		845	
Farm Laborers	13,199		60		11,646		405		1,088	
Paid	8,334		27		7,692		220		395	
Unpaid	4,865		33		3,954		185		693	
All Others in Agriculture	1,887		0		1,836		5		46	
In Other Occupations	26,764	54.7	100	42.6	21,085	52.3	1,012	57.2	4,567	69.8

Source of Data: 1940 Census.

Table 2

Relative Number, Size and Value of Japanese Farms
in the Four States Containing Military Area No. 1

	<u>Number Of Farms</u>	<u>Farm Acreage</u>	<u>Cropland Harvested</u>	<u>Value of Farms Land & Buildings</u>
<u>Four-State Total</u>				
Total - All Farms	294,641	89,345,723	13,454,852	\$3,390,312,675
✓ Japanese Farms	6,170	261,722	198,470	73,272,370
Percent - Japanese	2.0%	0.3%	1.4%	2.2%
<u>Arizona</u>				
Total - All Farms	13,468	25,651,092	525,974	153,676,675
✓ Japanese Farms	52	3,648	3,164	629,370
Percent - Japanese	0.3%	0.14%	0.6%	0.4%
<u>California</u>				
Total - All Farms	132,658	30,524,324	6,534,562	2,166,453,000
✓ Japanese Farms	5,135	226,094	174,942	65,781,000
Percent - Japanese	3.9%	0.7%	2.7%	3.0%
<u>Oregon</u>				
Total - All Farms	61,829	17,988,307	2,824,316	476,817,000
✓ Japanese Farms	277	11,654	8,318	2,548,000
Percent - Japanese	0.4%	0.06%	0.3%	0.5%
<u>Washington</u>				
Total - All Farms	81,686	15,182,000	3,570,000	593,366,000
✓ Japanese Farms	706	20,326	12,046	4,314,000
Percent - Japanese	0.9%	0.1%	0.3%	0.7%
Source of Data: 1940 Census				

Table 3

Average Size & Value of Japanese Farms
In Four States Containing Military Area No. 1

	<u>Average Size Of Farm (Acres)</u>	<u>Average Cropland Harvested (Acres)</u>	<u>Average Value Of Farms</u>	<u>Average Value Per Acre</u>
<u>Four-State Total</u>				
All Farms	303.2	45.6	\$11,504.42	\$ 37.94
Japanese Farms	42.4	32.2	11,875.53	279.96
<u>Arizona</u>				
All Farms	1389.0	28.4	8,321.00	5.99
Japanese Farms	70.2	61.0	12,103.00	172.52
<u>California</u>				
All Farms	230.1	49.3	16,331.00	70.97
Japanese Farms	44.0	34.1	12,810.00	291.14
<u>Oregon</u>				
All Farms	290.9	45.7	7,712.00	26.51
Japanese Farms	42.1	30.0	9,198.00	218.46
<u>Washington</u>				
All Farms	185.9	43.7	7,264.00	39.07
Japanese Farms	28.8	17.1	6,110.00	212.15

Source of Data: 1940 Census

Table 4

Geographic Distribution (Approximate) and Principal Crops of Japanese Farm Operators
in the Four States Containing Military Area 1

	Farms		Acres		Average Size of Farm (Acres)	Principal Crops Grown
	Number	%	Number	%		
<u>Four-State Total</u>	6,789	100.0	231,492	100.0	34.1	Strawberries, Onions, Tomatoes, Lettuce
<u>Arizona</u>	31	.4	1,438	.6	46.1	Lettuce, Cantaloupes, Strawberries
<u>California</u>	5,560	82.0	198,572	86.0	35.7	
<i>Campbell</i> <i>Imperial Valley</i> Irrigated Desert	254	3.7	12,730	5.5	50.0	Tomatoes, Cantaloupes, Peppers
Southern Coastal	2,226	32.7	63,397	26.6	28.5	Celery, Onions, Strawberries
— Central Coastal	394	5.8	15,019	6.5	38.1	Lettuce, Tomatoes, Sugar Beets
San Joaquin Valley	1,644	24.3	65,746	38.3	40.0	Nurseries, Mellons, Tomatoes
Sacramento Valley	1,042	15.4	41,680	18.0	40.0	Strawberries, Tomatoes, Peas, Beans, Fruit
<u>Oregon</u>	368	5.4	14,135	6.0	38.4	Cranberries, Oysters, Lettuce, Celery, Fruit
<u>Washington</u>	830	12.2	17,347	7.4	20.1	Cranberries, Peas, Oysters
Puget Sound Area	715	10.1	10,635	4.6	14.9	" " "
Yakima Valley	115	1.5	6,712	2.8	58.4	Tomatoes, Fruit

Source of Data: Farm Security Administration Field Reports.

Table 5

Percent (Estimated) of Major Vegetable Crops Grown by Japanese
in Pacific Coast States

<u>Crop</u>	<u>California</u> (%)	<u>Oregon</u> (%)	<u>Washington</u> (%)
Asparagus	25	15	50
Snap Beans	73	-	70
Brussel Sprouts	-	90	-
Beets	-	20	90
Cabbage	40	45	60
Cantaloupes	47	20	-
Carrots	40	40	90
Cauliflower	60	90	80
Celery	75	75	77
Cucumbers	63	40	65
Lettuce	30	65	74
Onions	36	25	65
Spinach	57	65	60
Strawberries	90	-	60
Tomatoes	45	50	-

Source of data: Tolan Committee Report, May, 1942,
Pp. 126, 132, 138.

Table 6

Importance of Japanese in Achieving 1942 Production Goals
 In Land-Lease Truck Crops in California Only

	Total 1942 Goals (Acres)	Japanese Share of Goals	
		Acres	%
Total Truck Crops	519,200	218,064	42.0
Tomatoes	111,500	60,595	54.4
Peas	47,500	18,200	37.6
Snap Beans	11,700	10,807	92.3
All Other Truck Crops	348,500	128,462	36.8

Source of data: Bureau of Agricultural Economics
 Special Report.

Table 7

Tenure of Japanese Farm Operators

	Total		Full Owner		Part Owner		Manager		Tenants	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Four-State Total	6,170	100.0	1,204	19.5	379	6.1	262	4.3	4,325	70.0
Arizona	52	.8	7	13.4	1	1.9	1	1.9	43	82.7
California	5,135	83.3	1,977	19.0	293	4.8	249	4.8	3,596	70.0
Oregon	277	4.5	77	27.8	23	8.3	2	.7	175	63.3
Washington	706	11.4	123	17.4	62	8.7	10	1.4	511	72.4

Source of data: 1940 Census

IV

OUTLINE OF PROGRAM ORGANIZATION

Within the framework of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the Farm Security Administration required an organization which could discharge the duties and responsibilities which it was ordered by the Army to assume. It established the administrative and service units hereinafter described. A chart showing in detail the organization which was set up is included as Exhibit 19.

WFA*Unit

The functions of the WFA unit were as follows:

- 1 To promote, supervise and assist in the completion of transactions between evacuee farmers and their landlords, creditors, and purchasers or renters of agricultural properties (including crops, livestock, farm machinery and other farming chattels or interests).
- 2 To provide credit or arrange for the provision of credit to substitute operators who might occupy farms relinquished by evacuees.
- 3 To exercise, if need be, authorities with respect to the acceptance of powers of attorney, the invoking of the freezing power, or the assumption of management or disposal of farm property through the California Evacuated Farms Association.
- 4 To provide accurate information and reports concerning:
 - a The number of Japanese farms in field areas.
 - b The number of prospective substitute operators.
 - c The progress made in effecting transactions between the two above groups.
 - d The characteristics of the farms, evacuees, substitute operators and crops which were involved.

The WFA Unit was operated by a WFA Program Chief, his Headquarter's staff, nine District Officers, and Field Agents in 56 field offices. These field offices were established in every area where any appreciable number of Japanese farmers were known to reside. They were usually located in U. S. Employment Service offices so that the representatives of all three WCCA civilian agencies might be stationed at the same

* At inception the Farm Security Administration entitled its program the Wartime Farm Adjustment Program. It soon discarded this name but retained the symbol WFA to identify certain activities, functions and documents.

addresses. This arrangement permitted of administrative efficiency and convenience of contact by all persons concerned in the evacuation program.

Special Negotiations Unit

The functions of the Special Negotiations Unit were as follows:

- 1 To conduct negotiations with agricultural associations, processors, marketing agencies, cooperatives, or corporations which might contemplate or actually assume the operation of evacuated farm properties or assist others in doing so.
- 2 To aid in the preparation of loans to corporations or associations who contemplate taking over evacuated farm land, crops, or chattels, where alternative sources of credit were not available.
- 3 To assist WFA Field Agents in conducting especially difficult negotiations which might arise in the completion of individual transactions.

The Special Negotiations Unit was operated by a Chief who administered the activities of seven Special Negotiators. It was the duty of these Special Negotiators to visit any point within the area, under the direction of their chief, where their services could effectively be used in accomplishing the functions enumerated above.

Evacuation Control Unit

The functions of the Evacuation Control Unit were as follows:

- 1 To determine at the time of evacuation the status of all Japanese farm operators with respect to the transfer of or other arrangements relating to their land, leases, crops, farm machinery, livestock, or any other agricultural property.
- 2 To assist in the closure or final disposition of any incompleting transactions disclosed during registration (above) in civil control stations.
- 3 To exercise, if need be, authorities with respect to accepting powers of attorney or invoking the 'freezing power.'

It should be noted here, parenthetically, that the WFA Field Agents assisted in preparing farm operators for evacuation throughout the period between March 17 and the date when a civilian exclusion order, applying to a specific portion of Military Area No. 1, was issued by Lieutenant

General DeWitt. Upon issuance of such an order, a civil control station was established within the territory affected. All Japanese heads of families and single persons were required to register at these civil control stations, and to undergo evacuation under military supervision within a period of from three to five days thereafter. The above applies to all involuntary evacuation subsequent to midnight, March 29, 1942, and not to the voluntary evacuation of a small proportion of the Japanese people prior to that date. The activities of Evacuation Control Unit personnel in civil control stations were separate from, but closely coordinated with, the activities of personnel in WFA field offices.

The activities of the Evacuation Control Unit were administered by a Chief, a small Headquarter Staff, five District Evacuation Agents and approximately 50 Evacuation Agents, Assistant Evacuation Agents, Interviewers and Clerk-Stenographers. The latter field personnel discharged their functions in civil control stations and moved from area to area as civilian exclusion orders were issued and civil control stations established.

Information and Public Relations Unit

The functions of the Information and Public Relations Unit were as follows:

- 1 To interpret the policies and the program of the Farm Security Administration to evacuees, prospective operators, and the public by means of news releases and radio programs, and by contacts with news reporters, editors, etc.
- 2 To inform the public concerning progress of the program.
- 3 To coordinate and reconcile the publicity of the Farm Security Administration with publicity issued by any other agency included in the WCCA.
- 4 To instruct and give guidance to field employees of the Farm Security Administration in the handling of their local publicity and public relations program.

The Information and Public Relations Unit was administered by an Information Specialist, with a staff of three assistants. He was immediately responsible to the FSA Regional Director.

Service Sections

To facilitate operations, the following service sections were created:

- 1 Loans and Operations Section.
- 2 Administrative Services Section.
- 3 Personnel Section

The Loan and Operations Section processed loan applications through various servicing sub-units.

The Administrative Services Section handled a variety of detailed functions including provision of arrangements for travel, supplies, space, furniture, equipment, and mail and files. It worked closely with the Farm Security Administration Regional Finance Division which performed the accounting and fiscal functions. It also handled records, reports, and procedure releases.

The Personnel Section was made a part of the regular Farm Security Administration Personnel Division and operated in such a way that its functions were specifically adapted to the needs of the evacuation program.

Regional Director

The Regional Director of the Farm Security Administration in Region IX, with headquarters in San Francisco, assumed active direction of the entire operation. Each Unit Chief was responsible directly to him. Coordination of the program was obtained through his leadership.

Hours of Duty and Location of Headquarters

During the six-week period of heaviest activity the Headquarter's office maintained staffs on duty from 8:30 A.M. until 10:00 P.M., with the exception of the Liaison Office which was established in the Whitcomb Hotel at WCCA Headquarters. This Liaison Office opened at 8:15 A.M. and closed at 10:00 P.M. each day.

The headquarters of the Farm Security Administration organization was established in the regular Regional Headquarters at 30 Van Ness Avenue, San Francisco, California.

V

PROGRAM OPERATION

WFA Unit

Initiation of Activities: On Friday, March 13, 1942, the Regional Director met with his Division Chiefs to organize the activities required by the participation of the Farm Security Administration in the WCCA evacuation program. Key FSA employees were chosen to set in motion and administer the new organization. By Monday evening, March 16, 1942, all basic policies and routine necessary to commence operation in field offices throughout Military Area No. 1 on the following morning had been prepared and mimeographed. All procedure, forms and supplies required to register Japanese farm operators and qualified substitutes, assist in negotiations, and make emergency loans, were airmailed to 48 field locations.

That day, Monday, March 16, 1942, 48 FSA Rural Rehabilitation Supervisors in five states received two letters. The first ordered them to report for duty as field agents at 48 field offices which had been established throughout Military Area No. 1. The second gave concise instructions to field agents concerning the work they would immediately undertake upon arrival at their respective stations, Tuesday, March 17, 1942. Copies of these letters, dated March 15, 1942, are contained in Appendix C.

The 48 field offices which commenced operation on March 17, 1942, were located in United States Employment Service offices throughout the military area. Thirty-nine of these offices were in California, five in Washington, two in Oregon and one in Arizona. During the succeeding ten weeks, eight additional field offices were placed in operation. Special offices were established in principal metropolitan centers to serve as information bureaus and direct Japanese farm operators and prospective substitutes to appropriate field offices.

Upon arriving at their new posts of duty on March 17, 1942, the Field Agents arranged with the local United States Employment Service office managers for desk space, furniture, telephone facilities and secretarial services. Their supplies and instructions arrived the same day, enabling the Field Agents to commence registering Japanese farm operators and prospective substitutes, and otherwise initiating field operations.

During this first day of operation each Field Agent was visited by a member of the Headquarter's office staff which had organized the program during the preceding days. At these brief visits the Field Agent was further instructed in his new duties and his most immediate problems were discussed. Typical problems included the defining of boundaries between field offices, clarifying the methods to be used in supervising transfers of farm tenure and properties, defining the roles of the members of the three-agency field team (Federal Reserve System, Federal Security Agency, and Farm Security Administration) familiarizing each agency with the

Table 8

Field Offices in Which FSA Field Agents Operated During the Evacuation Program

<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>Date Opened</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>	<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>Date Opened</u>	<u>Date Closed</u>
Arizona			S.C. San Diego	March 17	*
Phoenix	March 17	May 26	S.C. San Fernando	" 17	April 30
California			C.C. San Jose	" 17	*
C.C. Alameda	" 17	March 30	C.C. San Mateo	" 17	May 29
S.C. Alhambra	" 17	May 21	S.C. San Pedro	" 17	April 20
Bakersfield	" 17	*	S.C. Santa Ana	" 17	*
C.C. Berkeley	" 17	March 27	S.C. Santa Maria	" 17	*
S.C. Burbank	" 17	May 21	S.C. Santa Monica	" 17	May 21
Chico	" 17	April 15	C.C. Santa Rosa	" 17	*
El Centro	" 17	*	Stockton	" 17	*
Florin	May 11	May 29	S.C. Torrance	" 17	*
Fresno	March 17	*	S.C. Ventura	" 17	May 18
S.C. Gardena	April 16	May 14	Visalia	" 17	May 23
C.C. Hayward	March 17	*	C.C. Watsonville	" 17	*
Indio	" 17	May 23	S.C. Whittier	" 17	May 16
S.C. Inglewood	" 17	May 21	Woodland	May 11	May 29
C.C. Long Beach	" 17	April 23	<u>Oregon</u>		
S.C. Los Angeles	" 17	*	Astoria	March 23	April 27
Merysville	" 17	May 20	Hood River	" 17	May 30
Merced	" 17	May 23	Portland	" 17	*
C.C. Oakland	" 17	March 30	Salem	" 17	May 29
S.C. Oceanside	April 11	May 16	<u>Washington</u>		
S.C. Pasadena	March 17	*	Auburn	May 2	*
C.C. Pittsburg	March 17	May 23	Bremerton	March 17	April 15
S.C. Pomona	" 17	May 29	Kent	May 28	May 30
S.C. Redlands	" 17	April 30	Raymond	March 17	April 14
Richmond	" 17	March 30	Seattle	" 17	May 30
S.C. Riverside	" 17	May 29	Sumner	May 2	May 18
Sacramento	" 17	*	Tacoma	March 17	May 30
C.C. Salinas	" 17	May 29	Yakima	" 17	*

* Offices still open as of May 31, 1942.

duties and responsibilities of the other agencies, and providing emergency measures for continuing crop production in cases of abandonment.

After one week of field operations the four-state military area was divided for Farm Security Administration administrative purposes into nine districts, each under the jurisdiction of a District Officer.

Registration of Japanese Farms: Obviously the Field Agents' first task was to establish contact with Japanese farmers, who would be evacuated, and with qualified substitute operators. During the first week of field operations only those Japanese farmers were registered who voluntarily visited FSA field offices to request assistance in disposing of their farm properties. It was then recognized that immediate complete registration of all Japanese farms was essential and that this registration must provide an accurate record of the location and description of every farm subject to evacuation.

Accordingly on March 22, 1942, all Field Agents were telegraphically instructed to make a systematic census of all Japanese farms in the military area. A deadline of Friday morning, March 27, 1942, was set for the completion of this survey. Upon that date 6,307 Japanese farms had been listed, of which 5,436, totalling 151,063 acres had been actually contacted. The process of registering Japanese farms continued throughout the program, although 80 percent of the task was accomplished within the first week.

The actual registration was recorded on a yellow card, Form WFA-1, * which provided space for a description of the farm property and for recording progress in accomplishing the transfers to substitute operators of the farms, leases, crops, farm machinery, or removable assets. By filing these cards according to location, Field Agents were able to refer prospective substitute operators to Japanese farmers.

Registrations were performed in the field offices, at Japanese farms, and occasionally at meetings sponsored by Japanese-American societies. These societies, the USDA County War Boards, local organizations, and agricultural commissions gave valuable assistance in completing this census.

The registration of Japanese farmers proved a very important factor in promoting the orderly transfer of farm properties, as well as in providing an absolutely indispensable groundwork for the various activities which were later undertaken during the involuntary evacuation.

As the program progressed, it was possible for field agents to compare registration lists, eliminate duplication, and by thoroughly exploring their territories, validate the accuracy of information contained in Form

*Form WFA-1, "Request to Relinquish Farm". See Appendix B to this report "WFA Forms".

Table 9

Progress of FSA Field Agents in Registering Farms Subject to Relinquishment

Reporting Period Ending Friday -	Four-State Total		Arizona		California		Oregon		Washington	
	Farms	Acres	Farms	Acres	Farms	Acres	Farms	Acres	Farms	Acres
March 27	5,436	151,063	30	1,820	4,341	138,462	381	11,457	626	11,574
April 3	6,225	-	30	1,820	5,017	-	432	-	716	-
April 10	6,274	214,712	30	1,820	4,976	180,347	457	14,982	811	17,563
April 17	6,572	217,674	30	1,820	5,333	190,243	375	15,073	834	10,538
April 24	6,460	227,783	30	1,820	5,281	194,482	357	14,960	792	16,521
May 1	6,527	233,510	30	1,820	5,341	200,160	358	14,990	798	16,540
May 8	6,540	233,566	31	1,438	5,293	200,422	366	13,974	850	17,732
May 15	6,647	227,779	31	1,438	5,399	194,941	368	14,135	849	17,265
May 22	6,789	231,492	31	1,438	5,560	198,572	368	14,135	830	17,347
May 29	6,664	232,159	31	1,438	5,437	198,675	366	13,974	830	18,072

Source of Data: Farm Security Administration Field Reports.

WFA-1. The registration of Japanese farmers in civil control stations during the involuntary evacuation also provided information which was useful in correcting and reconciling field office records.

In light of the special factors involved, the comparison of the registration data with the 1940 census indicates that virtually complete coverage of Japanese property was attained.

NOTE: "The final figures for farms registered (6,664) exceeded the 1940 census report of Japanese farm operators in the four states by 494," or about eight percent. This variance of figures, as well as the fluctuation in total registrations reported from week to week, may be accounted for by the following factors:

- 1 Individual farm units were registered, whereas the census enumerates as a farm all tracts of land cultivated by a single operator.
- 2 Duplicate registrations often occurred when a Japanese landlord registered all the land that he owned, and his tenants registered separately.
- 3 Some Japanese registered at more than one field office believing that this multiplied their opportunities for advantageous disposal of their farm property.
- 4 On the eastern limits of Military Area No. 1, some Japanese farmers held and registered land on both sides of the boundary.
- 5 A small number of Japanese farms in the four states lie east of Military Area No. 1.
- 6 The status of some Japanese farm operators with respect to the Alien Land Law caused them to avoid registration if possible, and in some instances to register through friends or family members, who were not in a position to give completely accurate information.

Registration of Prospective Operators: The second most important phase of routine activity performed by Field Agents was the registration of prospective operators qualified to assume management of evacuated farms, and of prospective purchasers of crops, farm machinery, and other types

of farm assets.

Prospective operators were registered on form WFA-2.* On this was entered information regarding the sizes, types and locations of farms which such operators desired to acquire. In the first weeks of the program, only those who came voluntarily to the field offices were registered. After the voluntary phase of the evacuation program ended, on March 31, 1942, Field Agents were instructed to go aggressively into the localities where a shortage of prospective operators appeared to exist and to recruit through publicity, individual contacts or organizational contacts the necessary qualified operators for evacuated farms.

Furthermore, Field Agents were instructed to complete form WFA-2 for each new operator previously unregistered, who took over a Japanese farm, whether or not the Farm Security Administration actually supervised the transaction. These cards were cross-referenced with the WFA-1 cards representing farms which had been transferred and a separate file set up for each farm transaction. During the first ten days of field operation 1,487 prospective operators were registered. One week later this number had doubled, (3,151). By May 15 it had doubled again (6,455). At this time Field Agents were instructed to eliminate from their files prospective operators who had registered in a casual way without serious intention of taking over farms, or who lacked specialized experience in the type of agriculture involved. The removal of these groups reduced the number of registered prospective operators so that on May 22 it stood at 5,897.

At the present time the completed WFA-2 forms which are retained in the files constitute a virtually complete record of all farm operators who replaced the Japanese.

Promotion of Transfer Transactions: In addition to the registration of Japanese farms and of prospective operators, various other methods were used to stimulate the orderly transfer of Japanese-operated farm properties. Field offices proved convenient places in which Japanese and substitute operators could arrange the details of transfer. As former FSA Rural Rehabilitation Supervisors, the Field Agents were familiar with most details of farm operation and tenure, as well as farm financing, and they could assist both parties in arriving at satisfactory terms and in handling special problems of negotiation.

The orderly transfer of all Japanese-operated farm property in a given area to qualified substitute operators was considerably hampered by the following:

- 1 The serious shortage in some localities of qualified operators

* Form WFA-2, "Request to Acquire Farm". See Appendix B to this report, "WFA Forms".

Table 10

Progress of WFA Field Agents in Transferring Farms
From All Japanese Operators to Substitute Operators

<u>Reporting Period Ending Friday -</u>	<u>Four-State Total</u>		<u>Arizona</u>		<u>California</u>		<u>Oregon</u>		<u>Washington</u>	
	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Acres</u>	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Acres</u>	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Acres</u>	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Acres</u>	<u>Farms</u>	<u>Acres</u>
March 27	676	28,042	12	260	561	25,030	76	2,421	43	742
April 3	1,512	59,653	24	1,343	1,259	50,130	115	3,681	114	4,499
April 10	2,624	100,927	26	1,680	2,230	86,194	146	4,805	222	8,248
April 17	4,173	157,755	28	1,759	3,541	133,487	294	12,166	310	10,343
April 24	4,949	179,932	28	1,759	4,290	154,891	354	14,021	277	9,461
May 1	5,419	198,087	28	1,765	4,667	171,380	354	14,403	370	10,539
May 8	5,774	211,846	31	1,438	4,819	182,658	362	13,800	562	13,950
May 15	6,302	221,554	31	1,438	5,172	189,633	365	14,033	734	16,450
May 22	6,505	225,165	31	1,438	5,325	192,726	368	14,135	781	16,866
May 29	6,596	230,248	31	1,438	5,415	197,162	366	13,974	784	17,674

Source of Data: Farm Security Administration Field Reports.

to carry on the specialized type of agriculture practiced by the Japanese.

- 2 The reluctance of many Japanese to transfer their holdings until they were finally convinced by Civilian Exclusion Orders that they actually would be removed from the area.
- 3 The reluctance of shrewd substitute operators to conclude deals until the time factor had placed the Japanese in an adverse bargaining position.
- 4 The tenuous nature of Japanese farm tenure agreements associated with their fear of prosecution if they declared themselves as farm operators.
- 5 The wide-spread fear of a farm labor shortage which deterred many substitute operators from assuming responsibilities or risks involved in the Japanese farm enterprise.

Field Agents were instructed to overcome these obstacles. An important instrument was the dissemination through field offices of information to the public and to the Japanese accurately describing the facilities and opportunities available, and the gravity of the problem which would confront the communities if transactions were not completed in a prompt and orderly manner. Where it was advantageous to do so, the wartime importance of the food crops and the responsibility placed upon the communities were used as the basis for direct appeal and contacts. The joint action of War Boards, agricultural agencies, marketing agencies, community organizations, and other organized groups was freely resorted to and proved to be a most potent factor which solved many serious problems. The extension of credit, and referral of prospective operators to suitable credit agencies, which will be discussed fully hereafter, were also indispensable instruments in the completion of transactions.

Progress in Completing the Disposal of Farm Properties: During the first ten days of field operation when voluntary evacuation was still possible, 734 deals were closed and 28,042 acres, (10%) transferred to new operators. One week later, April 3, 1942, 1,776 deals had been closed, embracing 59,653 acres. By May 31, 1942, over 6000 deals had been completed, involving 230,248 acres and 6,596 farms. For all practical purposes the transfer of Japanese farms in Military Area No. 1 had been completely accomplished. The crops and land were in the hands of the most qualified substitute operators who could be selected under the circumstances.

The disposal of farm machinery was handled under a policy which sought to insure the retention of this machinery on the farmland evacuated. This subject is separately discussed and reported in an appropriate section hereafter.

Providing Credit to Substitute Operators: Short term agricultural credit was absolutely indispensable to many substitute operators desiring to take over evacuated properties. The FSA made 722 loans in the period

of the evacuation, thus enabling the best-qualified operators in many instances to take over farming operations. However, the transfer of 6,596 farms was involved in the entire evacuation, and, while most of these were taken over by substitute operators without the use of special Farm Security Administration loans, the mere availability of this credit had a stabilizing and stimulating effect on the dealings between would-be operators and established credit agencies and between such operators and the Japanese. Provision of credit was important both as an instrument enabling the best qualified operators to take over farm operations and as a stabilizing and stimulating factor in relationships between established credit agencies and would-be operators. Field Agents were instructed to act in a referral capacity as well as to make loans out of special funds provided for this purpose. It was their duty to refer any substitute operators who could qualify for credit from other sources to the appropriate agencies. These agencies were the Farm Credit Administration, the Rural Rehabilitation Offices of the Farm Security Administration and private banks. In every instance where the substitute operator appeared qualified to assume the operation of evacuated property in all respects except eligibility for credit, the Field Agent was authorized to make a special "WFA Production Loan".

In instances where the prospective operator of a Japanese-operated farm needed such a loan, and any serious doubt existed concerning his competence to operate the type of enterprise involved, Field Agents were instructed to obtain the judgment of county war boards as to the qualifications of the applicant.

The authority and procedure for making WFA loans were in the hands of all FSA Field Agents on Tuesday, March 17, 1942, when their offices first opened.* WFA loans were authorized "for the purpose of meeting any expense or charge in connection with land use, feed and fertilizer, livestock, farm machinery, equipment and tools, or supplies and/or services." They were not authorized for land acquisition or for the construction of real estate improvements. Loans were to be made for a period of one year or less with the definite expectation that renewals of notes at maturity would be permitted where the purchase of durable goods, such as livestock or machinery, was involved. The interest rate was five percent per annum. All loans were secured by first liens upon crops and chattels purchased with loan proceeds, and in some instances by liens upon additional property possessed by borrowers. Each loan application included a concise farm operating plan which specified the types of farm enterprises to be continued or established by the substitute operator, and the estimated expenses and incomes involved in the individual farm program.

All loan applications were prepared either directly by, or under the supervision of, the Field Agent, with whose recommendation they were submitted to the Headquarter's office. During the first weeks of the program no intervening examination and field approval of loan applications was provided between the Field Agent's office and the Headquarter's office since speed was an important objective. By the first week in April, WFA field office operations were sufficiently routinized so that it was compatible with efficient handling of the loans to provide for field examination by District Officers. District Officers were then authorized

* WFA Instruction 931.1 (3-16-42). See Appendix A to this report, "WFA Procedure."

to give field approval to all loans in amounts less than \$5,000. Final approval or rejection authority was vested in the Regional Director or the WFA Program Chief, depending upon the size of the loan.

Established Farm Security Administration loan processing standards and routines had been drastically simplified in preparing WFA loan procedure. This was essential in order to obtain maximum speed of action. By the end of March it was apparent that additional safeguards and essentially sounder loan policies could be employed without sacrificing efficiency of operation. Consequently, on April 5, 1942 the entire loan procedure was revised and elaborated to incorporate better standards of eligibility, tenure, security, farm management criteria, and processing*. The volume of loans and the record of completed transactions give evidence at the present time that this tightening of loan policies represented sound administrative judgment. Simultaneously with the creation of the Special Negotiations Unit, appropriate loan policies and procedures were established to handle corporation or group loans. A considerable number of such loans were made involving a large sum of money. This phase of loan activity is reported in appropriate sections hereafter.

Progress in Making Loans: The first two WFA loans were submitted from the field on March 23, 1942. By the end of March, 35 loans had been received totaling \$235,312. At the end of the first week in April, 155 loans had been submitted and 33 approved. During the entire period to June 1, 789 loans were submitted totaling \$4,450,140. Of these loans 722 were approved, totaling \$3,120,243. Forty-two of the loans provided for an advance of funds at future dates. The amount involved in such advances will be \$320,411. The average size of all loans approved was \$4,321.67; 77 percent were for amounts under \$5,000, 22 percent for amounts under \$50,000, and less than 1 percent for sums exceeding \$50,000. The distribution of sizes of loans and the average size is influenced by certain large corporation loans which were made and which involved the assumption of the operation of several farms by a single borrowing agent.

Special Negotiations Unit

The evacuation of Bainbridge Island demonstrated conclusively that larger scale private agricultural enterprises might assume the operation of evacuated land. In this instance the processors and marketing agencies actually concluded agreements with many of the evacuating Japanese farmers whereby responsibility for production and harvesting of the crops would be assumed by the processing and marketing organizations. Concurrently, situations developed in other areas which showed the necessity of having a small, highly-trained group of special negotiators to concentrate on the successful completion of larger scale deals and especially

*WFA Instruction 931.1 (4-5-42). See Appendix A

Table 11

WFA Loans Submitted & Approved, by Weeks
(Cumulative)

	Four-State Total		Arizona		California		Oregon		Washington	
	Number	Amount	Number	Amount	Number	Amount	Number	Amount	Number	Amount
March 27										
Submitted	12	52,398	-	-	10	34,898	1	10,000	1	7,500
Approved	1	2,085	-	-	1	2,085	-	-	-	-
Rejected	1	10,000	-	-	1	10,000	-	-	-	-
April 3										
Submitted	92	503,641	-	-	62	406,452	12	61,185	8	36,004
Approved	28	89,122	-	-	25	73,892	2	7,730	1	7,500
Rejected	3	30,000	-	-	2	20,000	1	10,000	-	-
April 10										
Submitted	167	920,384	-	-	115	606,901	20	80,465	32	133,018
Approved	84	326,135	-	-	62	255,946	6	12,725	16	57,464
Rejected	10	55,362	-	-	6	18,820	2	21,690	2	14,852
April 17										
Submitted	292	1,506,392	3	2,715	183	1,034,398	35	152,283	71	316,996
Approved	233	1,129,365	2	2,250	135	730,783	31	113,323	65	283,009
Rejected	17	171,250	-	-	14	139,560	2	21,690	1	10,000
April 24										
Submitted	465	2,747,977	3	2,715	270	1,417,052	58	222,187	134	1,151,705
Approved	376	1,668,516	3	2,715	210	1,021,252	43	148,884	120	495,665
Rejected	28	250,419	-	-	22	194,335	4	38,960	2	17,124

May 1											
Submitted	550	3,094,605	3	2,715	328	1,697,746	66	242,439	153	1,151,705	
Approved	479	2,013,259	3	2,715	277	1,278,533	59	196,429	140	533,562	
Rejected	37	686,453	-	-	27	205,294	5	41,795	5	429,364	
May 8											
Submitted	635	3,515,617	3	2,715	376	1,998,002	74	266,467	182	1,248,433	
Approved	566	2,328,289	3	2,715	327	1,513,340	69	224,672	167	587,562	
Rejected	42	893,739	-	-	31	272,580	5	41,795	6	579,364	
May 15											
Submitted	706	4,214,226	3	2,715	415	2,539,972	77	281,972	211	1,389,567	
Approved	630	2,666,161	3	2,715	367	1,776,974	70	225,727	190	660,745	
Rejected	46	934,636	-	-	33	289,677	5	41,795	8	603,164	
May 22											
Submitted	761	4,346,365	3	2,715	436	2,598,821	83	291,499	239	1,473,330	
Approved	695	3,016,056	3	2,715	395	1,978,445	77	238,754	220	796,142	
Rejected	51	949,473	-	-	35	291,112	5	41,795	11	616,566	
May 29											
Submitted	789	4,450,140	3	2,715	458	2,632,090	83	291,479	248	1,526,571	
Approved	722	3,120,243	3	2,715	415	2,010,050	77	238,734	230	871,459	
Rejected	52	979,473	-	-	35	291,112	5	41,795	12	646,566	

difficult individual transactions. Processors, marketing agencies, real estate companies, cooperative associations, and local corporations were bound to enter into crop production and property management since their interests were directly involved. It appeared that the most practical way to review, and in an appropriate degree, supervise these larger scale transactions was through a functioning unit such as the one which was set up.

Frequently the prevailing sizes of Japanese farm enterprises made successful operation by individual substitute operators uneconomical, and consequently some consolidation of the operation of these small farms was found to be necessary. In other instances the highly specialized character of these enterprises made the assumption of management by smaller individual substitute operators impracticable. Where either of these two sets of circumstances were encountered, Special Negotiators were assigned to supervise the completion of transactions.

In some instances landlords or creditors sought to insist upon exercising technical legal rights, based upon non-assignability clauses in leases or abandonment clauses in conditional sales contracts, and to prevent the consummation of deals between evacuees and their possible successors without regard to possible loss of agricultural production. In a considerable number of cases lack of agreement on values hindered or delayed consummation of deals. Members of the Negotiation Unit staff were frequently assigned to assist Field Agents in the negotiations and adjustments which had to precede the conclusion of transactions.

The preservation of crops in some areas made it necessary to interest local leaders and established agricultural groups and organizations in the operation of numbers of evacuated farms. Some of these groups and interests were, through their field men, intimately acquainted with the farms and their problems and they were in the best position to undertake continuance of operations. Since many agricultural interests had a stake in the agricultural production from Japanese-operated farms as a source of supply, it was logical for them to find substitute operators or to undertake themselves to provide for the handling of these properties. In instances where existing agricultural concerns did not care to involve their packing or processing organizations with the task of and financial responsibility for agricultural production or the management of properties, special operating corporations were organized for such purposes. Many of the Japanese farming groups had confidence in these concerns since they had the reputation of conducting their business affairs with fairness and responsibility over a period of years.

The usual plan has been for such organizations to provide competent supervision, management and labor, care for equipment and agree to produce crops in the normal manner of the area, subject to limitations which may arise under wartime conditions. Loans were made where necessary to finance continued production and to enable such organizations to acquire the interests of the Japanese in crops, leases, or operating equipment and materials. Each such organization undertook to operate a number of farms.

Subject to the principles and methods discussed above, the corporations named in an accompanying table were formed to operate the farms and acreages indicated, and loans in the amounts shown were made. These organizations have taken over 124 evacuated farms, totaling 4,023 acres, and they have been loaned \$617,987.17. The Farm Security Administration is convinced that the successful disposal of farm properties and preservation of crops would have been impossible in certain areas without the approach which was made under the special negotiations program. The cooperation and action of such agencies and interests in coming forward lent stability to the entire program of the FSA and meant, in a very real sense, the assumption of responsibility for and the taking over of particular farming enterprises which, because of their size and character, could not have been taken over by individual substitute operators.

To handle this work a staff of seven highly-trained men, some of whom were loaned to the Farm Security Administration by the Farm Credit Administration, was organized under the direction of a Special Negotiations Program Chief.

Evacuation Control Program

The process by which the Army accomplished the evacuation of Military Area No. 1 was to issue public proclamations, more properly termed civilian exclusion orders, which served in effect as instructions both to the entire population of the area and more particularly to persons of Japanese ancestry. These orders, which were issued beginning March 25, 1942, required people of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, to leave prescribed portions of Military Area No. 1 under the detailed instructions contained in the orders. As a rule each civilian exclusion order embraced an area which included approximately 1000 to 1500 Japanese persons.

The release of a civilian exclusion order created an evacuation project, and it established within that project one or more civil control stations which were headquarters for both the civil and military agencies of the WCCA. A responsible member of each family affected by an order, and each individual living alone, was instructed to report at the civil control station or stations established within the project, for registration on specified days and for final clearance. These stations were the operating centers for the evacuation process.

On March 24, 1942, Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 was issued by Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt. This order embraced Bainbridge Island, Puget Sound, State of Washington. It established a civil control station at Winslow, Washington, and required the registration of the Japanese family heads or single people on Wednesday, March 25, 1942. The operation of this civil control station was the first activity of its kind in Military Area No. 1. The Farm Security Administration, as well as other agencies included in the Wartime Civil Control Administration, used this experience as the basis for planning to meet the organizational requirements imposed

Table 12

Corporations Formed to Operate Japanese Farms
with WFA Loans

<u>Name of Corporation</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Acreage</u>
Fruit Farms, Inc.	\$148,471.27	20	756
Farm Management, Inc.	60,540.00	5	500
Northern Farms, Inc.	98,077.38	20	910
Loomis Agencies, Inc.	61,934.80	12	524
California Fruit Cannery, Inc.	37,711.00	1	150
California Fruit Cannery, Inc.	38,510.50	1	155
Placer Orchards, Inc.	87,756.67	13	600
Placer Farms, Inc.	23,000.00	14	460
Ingalls Gardens, Inc.	20,523.00	4	166
Western Farm and Produce, Inc.	32,107.00	33	473
Deciduous Farm Lands, Inc.	<u>9,355.55</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>29</u>
Total	\$617,987.17	124	4,723

by this type of operation.

Following this first evacuation project, a planning meeting was held at the request of the Western Defense Command in the Whitcomb Hotel, San Francisco, on March 27, 1942. The methods and policies to be used during the involuntary evacuation through the issuance of civilian exclusion orders were discussed. Each civilian agency was informed that it should be prepared to conduct its necessary functions in at least five civil control stations operating simultaneously for an indefinite period in the future. It was determined that a period of at least five days would usually be allowed for the actual involuntary evacuation of any area. It was also decided that approximately 1500 people would be the usual maximum number to be handled by a single civil control station and that if an exclusion order affected substantially more people than this number additional stations would be established within the same evacuation project. It was contemplated that at least ten WCCA evacuation crews would be required, since transportation of the crews to new stations and brief rest periods would undoubtedly be involved.

On Sunday, March 29, the Regional Director established a special administrative unit, the Evacuation Control Unit, within the evacuation organization of the Farm Security Administration to handle the functions of this agency in civil control stations. A chief was designated and instructed to assemble the requisite staff and prepare all necessary operating instructions.

On March 30, 1942, Exclusion Order No. 2 was issued, establishing civil control stations at San Pedro and Long Beach, California. On the same day Order No. 3 was issued establishing a civil control station in Los Angeles. On April 1, 1942, Orders 4 and 5 were issued, establishing control stations in San Diego and San Francisco.

Shortly thereafter the Federal Security Agency at the instance of the Western Defense Command suggested the immediate provision of sufficient personnel within Military Area No. 1 to handle the simultaneous operation of 15 civil control stations in various portions of the area. Their distribution was to be on the basis of known Japanese population and it was apparently intended that the staff in a given area would handle the work of all civil control stations operated in that specific area.

The Evacuation Control Unit of the Farm Security Administration recognized that the total Japanese population embraced by a civilian exclusion order was not an accurate measure of the number of farms within a specific evacuation project. The responsibility of the Farm Security Administration was directly associated with the number of farm cases being evacuated rather than the total population, both urban and rural. An analysis of the entire military area was immediately conducted, therefore, to determine by townships and precincts the distribution of Japanese farms. These data were placed upon county maps so that it was possible to determine more or less precisely the number of Japanese farmers affected by any civilian exclusion order which was issued.

The Evacuation Control Unit personnel were distributed on the basis of the above information and operations were geared accordingly. A policy was adopted whereby at least one Farm Security Administration representative would be assigned for duty at each civil control station, with additional personnel assigned to a particular station in proportion to the number of Japanese farmers known to reside in the area.

When the evacuation of Military Area No. 1 was approximately one-third completed, the Farm Security Administration received a revised statement from the Federal Security Agency suggesting that the number of evacuation crews be increased in order that 30 control stations might be operated simultaneously. This suggestion was made at the time the Western Defense Command publicly announced that the tempo of the evacuation would be sharply increased and that Military Area No. 1 would be cleared of Japanese people by May 31, 1942.

It was possible by concentrating Farm Security Administration evacuation personnel at stations embracing rural areas, and by assigning a minimum number of personnel to stations embracing urban areas, to operate throughout the evacuation program with a total control station staff not exceeding 55 field employees.

The personnel problem was also met in part by utilizing the Farm Security Administration personnel in Field Offices to supplement the evacuation personnel in civil control stations.

The experience obtained in the San Pedro and Long Beach evacuation projects demonstrated the effectiveness of a plan whereby any cases of incomplete property transactions revealed by initial interview in the civil control stations could be subjected to intensive treatment by all Farm Security Administration personnel in the area in an effort to complete any such transactions during the final 72 hours prior to the actual clearance of the area. It also demonstrated the necessity for thoroughgoing work in some of the areas immediately after the evacuation to inspect properties, handle any transactions yet unclosed, and otherwise insure that every precaution had been taken to avoid abandonment of land, crops, and machinery.

The basic instruction which was issued for the guidance of evacuation control personnel, entitled "Organization and Operation of Evacuation Control Units", and bearing the symbol WFA Instruction 940.1, is contained in Appendix A to this report. It explains the basic procedures which were carried into effect.

On June 1 evacuation control program work in 112 civil control stations had been completed. A complete breakdown by stations of the number of farm cases registered, the status of property transactions at the time of evacuation, the total acreage operated by registered evacuees, the acreage with arrangements completed at the time of evacuation, and the acreage with arrangements incomplete, is attached as Exhibit 20. A summary of the above data follows:

Civil Control Stations Operated	112
Farm Cases Registered	5,349
Cases with Property Arrangements Completed When Stations Closed	5,266
Farm Cases with Property Arrangements Incomplete When Stations Closed	83
Acreage Operated by Registered Evacuees	210,179
Acreage with Property Transactions Complete	207,942
Acreage with Property Transactions Incomplete	2,237

It should be clearly understood that the above summary gives the condition at the time of evacuation. After the evacuation of Japanese was accomplished in any area, field workers concentrated their attention upon all incomplete cases and acreage. As of June 1, 1942 not over 40 cases in the entire area were classed as still incomplete and the total acreage involved did not exceed 1,000 acres.

On the basis of the above reports, the provision of substitute management and operation was over 99 percent accomplished as of June 1. A qualitative analysis of this phase of the program is included in an appropriate section later in this report.

Regional Director's Staff

Regional Director: Throughout the evacuation program the Regional Director of Region IX, Farm Security Administration, was personally responsible for the agricultural phases of the evacuation, and he was also the authorized representative of the Department of Agriculture. He directed the formation of policy and the coordination of all separate program units.

Liaison Officer: In compliance with the Army's request the FSA had a personal representative on duty at the Whitcomb Hotel Headquarters from 8:15 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. each day. This representative was responsible for maintaining a close relationship between the operations of the total organization and the activities of his particular agency.

The Farm Security Administration Liaison Officer conveyed information and handled relationships applying to three major sets of circumstances:

- 1 After the planning division of the Army had determined an area to be evacuated, the Federal Security Agency was made responsible for locating within the boundaries of the area a suitable building for the establishment of a civil control station. The Federal Security Agency Liaison Officer and the Farm Security Administration Liaison Officer were then charged with seeing that necessary arrangements were made by their representative agencies to discharge their functions in the civil control station. The Liaison Officer in performing this duty observed the utmost discretion, since the premature disclosure of information handled would have seriously interfered

with orderly field operations.

- 2 Planning conferences were frequently held to determine action or to inform civil agencies of action expected of them by the Army. The Liaison Officer attended these conferences, occasionally accompanied by appropriate operating chiefs or the Regional Director of the Farm Security Administration, and determined that program activities were adapted to fit the policies or agreements which were developed or announced.
- 3 Either Army officers or the Regional Director frequently required statements or opinions from each other. The Liaison Officer made arrangements for such exchanges of opinion or information.

Information and Public Relations Activities: Immediately after the inception of the evacuation program, the Regional Director arranged for meetings with the Chairmen of the State Agricultural War Boards in each state, together with the members of these War Boards who were leaders in the U. S. Agricultural Extension Service, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and the Farm Credit Administration. The purpose of these meetings was to explain clearly the circumstances surrounding the evacuation of Japanese people, the facts concerning the Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the policies and procedures which would be used by the Farm Security Administration in handling the agricultural phases of evacuation. A thorough discussion of the entire problem was held at these meetings. The War Boards in each case agreed to give complete support and all possible assistance to the work of the Farm Security Administration. In addition the Regional Director was in more or less continuous communication with the War Boards by correspondence, keeping the chairman constantly advised of policies, programs and procedures and requesting comments and suggestions.*

Throughout the evacuation program field agents were instructed to rely principally for advice and recommendations concerning local problems upon the County War Boards. Instruction letters giving concrete suggestions for handling this relationship were issued from time to time as new problems of a general character arose.** The War Boards were particularly helpful in assisting field agents to complete the registrations of Japanese operators and prospective substitutes. They were relied upon in many local areas to stimulate the recruitment of substitute operators.

The California State Chamber of Commerce arranged a special meeting on March 28, 1942, to discuss agricultural problems created by the evacuation. Leading representatives of agricultural agencies and interests in the state were present. The Regional Director gave a comprehensive statement to this conference discussing the character of the problem which had

*See letters to State War Boards Chairmen attached as Exhibits 21, 22, and 23.

** See letters dated April 1, April 3 and April 4 in Appendix C, "WFA Letters".

been created, its scope and volume, and the measures which were being applied to insure the continuance of crop production and the orderly disposal of Japanese agricultural properties. He called upon the persons present and the interests and agencies represented by them for their cooperation and assistance in meeting the situation.

The concentration of Japanese in the Los Angeles area required some special public relations activities. On April 1 the California State Chamber of Commerce sponsored a meeting, attended by representatives of leading agricultural agencies in the Southern California area, where the policies and methods of the Farm Security Administration were presented by the Regional Director and discussed. Later the State Chamber of Commerce sponsored a meeting in Los Angeles which was attended by the representatives of leading agricultural concerns, produce companies, and packers. The agricultural program was presented at this meeting by the Regional Director, and the special problems of interest to companies, produce handlers, and packers considered.

By May 1, 1942, it was apparent that recruitment of substitute operators in the State of Washington was lagging due to peculiar circumstances applying to the area. Some local leaders, and particularly some of the newspapers, were not thoroughly in accord with the program for immediate evacuation because of the possible adverse effect upon the production of crops and the supply of farm labor. Moreover, undue reliance had been placed in the area upon the organization of farming groups to take over evacuated properties. There had been unwarranted pessimism as to the possibility of recruiting enough individual substitute operators. This situation required special handling of public relations by the Regional Director, his Associate Information Specialist, and field agents. The assistance of the State War Board was solicited and obtained in meeting this special problem. It was possible by releasing suitable publicity and holding special meetings to establish a public attitude in which the policies successfully used throughout the coastal area were made effective in the Puget Sound area.

An Information Division was created on March 16, 1942. The established public relations policy of the Farm Security Administration was carried into the evacuation program; namely, responsible local personnel were authorized to give wide dissemination of factual information regarding the program to all public media. The nature of the evacuation work made the handling of publicity a cardinal responsibility and function of field agents. Policy decisions rested with the Regional Director and the program chiefs. Responsibility for reliable and aggressive public relations activities within this policy framework was placed upon the field agents.

The Information Division operated through a chief and three assistants. At the Regional Headquarters the Information Division devoted primary attention to general news releases for metropolitan papers, farm radio programs, releases for wire services, and a radio campaign for local areas to reach the greatest possible number of farmers. Early efforts included daily contact with the agricultural department of the Japanese-

American Citizens League. Numerous special releases were furnished to Japanese papers, and a question-and-answer handbook prepared for distribution to Japanese farmers and prospective operators. This handbook is attached as Exhibit 24. During actual evacuation, Information Specialists were sent to local areas to issue spot publicity concerning problems requiring solution if crop production were to be maintained at normal levels. Numerous special releases were prepared for magazines and periodicals having wide circulation.

The Information Specialist stationed in Southern California spent considerable time assisting the agricultural coordinator in Los Angeles with publicity. He also arranged radio programs and, at their request, conferred with Filipino, Mexican, and Negro groups to inform them of the program.

The files of the Information Division show that 79 press releases were issued between March 18 and May 27, as follows:

General releases from Regional Headquarters	26
Fill-in releases sent to the field	13
Special field releases in Northern California	20
Special field releases for Los Angeles vicinity	12
Special field releases for Puget Sound	8
Total	<u>79</u>

Since the local releases were duplicated and re-issued widely, the agricultural phase of the evacuation received complete and frequent local coverage.

The radio programs which were especially prepared and broadcast to give wide public understanding of the critical situation created in agriculture by the evacuation, and the methods which were being used to handle it, included broadcasts over the Western Agricultural Hour, Western Blue Network; the Farm Hour, KIR, Seattle; the Farm Hour, KQW, San Francisco; and KFI, Los Angeles. One broadcast was also released through the National Farm and Home Hour.

Administrative Services *

The WFA program at its inception contained sections to handle the information, personnel, mail and files, reporting, procedural, loan process, information, liaison, and administrative detail functions. As the evacuation work progressed, and when the Farm Security Administration organization was subdivided into WFA, Special Negotiations, and Evacuation Control branches, certain of these functions were redistributed. The Liaison Officer and Information Specialist were attached to the Regional Director's staff. The Personnel Section was made directly responsible to the Farm Security Administration Personnel Adviser. Other functions enumerated above were combined into an Administrative Services Unit which performed necessary work for the Evacuation Control and Special Negotiations Programs, but which for convenience was administered directly by

* Emergency authorities with respect to personnel, travel and procurements are reproduced in Exhibits 25 and 26.

the WFA Program Chief. The technical details relating to the operation of the administrative services division can be ascertained by an examination of the procedures which apply to these functions.

Reports: Reports of operation progress and of special situations were submitted by the Regional Director to Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, daily during the first weeks of the evacuation. Comprehensive weekly statistical summaries were submitted throughout the operating period. These were prepared from telegraphic reports received from all Field Agents. These reports tabulated the progress made in registration, transfers and loans. A copy of the final weekly report, dated June 5, 1942, is attached as Exhibit 27. The evacuation agents also submitted daily telegrams during periods of registration in civil control stations, and final reports on individual evacuation progress when the stations were closed. The summaries prepared from these reports were submitted weekly to Colonel Bendetsen. The final report as of May 29, 1942 is attached as Exhibit 20.

Personnel: Personnel was recruited from three major sources: (a) Assignment of regular Farm Security Administration personnel from Regions IX, XI, X and VIII, which embrace the Western portion of the United States; (b) appointment of new personnel, and (c) borrowing of specialists from the Farm Credit Administration. The number of regular personnel contributed by each region of the Farm Security Administration was as follows:

Region IX (California, Arizona, Utah and Nevada)	73
Region XI (Oregon, Washington and Idaho)	60
Region X (Colorado, Wyoming and Montana)	14
Region VIII (Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico)	1
	—
Total	148

The selection of Farm Security Administration personnel assumed that the evacuation program would require intensive, high-grade work. Those selected were employees who in their regular Farm Security Administration assignments had shown capacity to work intelligently and rapidly on difficult assignments and under changing conditions.

Rural Rehabilitation Supervisors were necessarily used to head field offices because of their thorough acquaintance with loan procedures and with technical problems of crop production, farm tenure and agricultural credit.

The appointed personnel used in field offices were placed under the direction of regular Farm Security Administration people. It was necessary and possible to staff the Evacuation Control Program largely with newly-employed personnel since the character of operations departed more from usual Farm Security Administration activities.

Table 13

Personnel of the Farm Security Administration
 Engaged in the WCCA Program
 March 15, 1942 - May 31, 1942

TOTAL EMPLOYED	521
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Source:

Detailed from Farm Security Administration	148
Loaned by Farm Credit Administration	6
Specially Appointed	367

Classification:

Administrative Personnel	317
Clerical Personnel	204

Distribution:

Headquarter's Office	96
Field Offices	352
Evacuation Control Units	73

The Special Negotiations Unit was staffed mainly with specialists obtained from the Farm Credit Administration. This unit was headed by a Chief obtained from that agency..

A breakdown of the Farm Security Administration evacuation operations staff by program units and by source of recruitment shows that a total of 521 employees were used, 148 detailed from the Farm Security Administration, 367 newly employed and 6 borrowed from the Farm Credit Administration. The above figures apply to total numbers of personnel used. At the high point in operations, during the week ending April 26, 1942, 375 people were on duty. Exhibit 28 attached gives a comprehensive weekly analysis of the employment and disposition of these employees.

Communications, Procurements and Travel: Communications necessarily required heavy use of telephone and telegraph facilities. The Evacuation Control Program especially involved a time schedule which made the use of mail service impractical. All reporting was by telegraph and to a very large extent instructions to field employees involving program control were given either by telegraph or telephone. Daily telephone or telegraph reports were required from District Officers and from District Evacuation Agents.

Office furniture for Headquarters use was secured through rental arrangements. Equipment and certain facilities for field offices were provided by the United States Employment Service. Procurements of supplies and material were handled through regular Farm Security Administration channels.

Authorization was obtained immediately after the inception of the program to use airplane travel whenever necessary. (See Exhibit 29.) Field personnel necessarily traveled by automobile. Private cars owned by employees were generally used. Serious problems resulting from the rubber shortage arose and had to be handled without the benefit of any blanket provision to meet emergency tire needs. Employees who used their private automobiles in the discharge of their field duties did so at a personal sacrifice and in a spirit of patriotic duty.

Participation of WFA Field Agents In Evacuation Projects: By the time Civilian Exclusion Order No. 7 was issued it had become apparent that the most effective work in areas actually under evacuation could be accomplished by arranging for Field Agents and Evacuation Agents to combine their efforts under a flexible plan of action to give prompt attention to any cases of incomplete property transfer transactions disclosed by civil control station operation. Accordingly the Chiefs of the WFA and the Evacuation Control Units constantly arranged for the assignment of personnel to areas requiring special attention. It was thus possible to assign a task force to any area where the completion of transactions was lagging. Specialized personnel capable of handling difficult transactions, as for instance green-house specialists, appraisers, attorneys, or farm crop specialists, were assigned as needed to specific localities. This arrangement proved to be particularly productive in the Puget Sound and Sacramento Valley areas.

Concluding Activities: As rapidly as areas were evacuated under civilian exclusion orders, the functions of Field Agents were necessarily changed. Instead of promoting transactions and making loans, Field Agents devoted primary attention to the satisfactory conclusion of pending deals, to the delivery of loan checks, to the preparation and filing of securities, and to the inspection of properties and conditions in evacuated areas.

As areas were evacuated, offices were closed and plans made to redistribute such areas to remaining offices which could handle these concluding activities. During the month of May, 26 field offices were closed and the areas served by them were included in the areas of the remaining 17 offices.

Throughout most of the area the major activities from this date forward will be the servicing and collection of loans. Since Farm Security Administration Rural Rehabilitation offices are located throughout the area and are in a position to service the entire area, this function is being made the responsibility of Rural Rehabilitation Supervisors in certain of these offices. It is contemplated that loans made in Oregon and Washington, which area is normally administered from the Regional Farm Security Administration office at Portland, Oregon will be serviced from that regional office. The loans in California and Arizona will be serviced from the Regional Farm Security Administration office at San Francisco.

VI.

ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS AND RESULTS

Effects of the Evacuation on Agricultural Production

Land Use: The utilization of land for agricultural purposes at any given time is determined by a variety of factors including skill of management, available markets, costs of production, prices of commodities, and labor supply, as well as the character and fertility of the land itself. The adjustment of land utilization prior to the evacuation was a reflection of these factors. It would be impossible to conduct an evacuation of Japanese farmers from the Pacific Coast area without materially influencing the future use of the evacuated properties. The specialized character of Japanese farming would tend to accentuate such a change. It was the purpose of the Farm Security Administration to ameliorate as far as possible the forces and factors which would cause a drastic and immediate shift in the previous pattern of utilization of agricultural lands, especially where strategic food crops were involved.

Particularly around Puget Sound, in the vicinity of Los Angeles, and in the Sacramento Valley, the size of Japanese farm holdings and the types of soil made evacuation without a change in land use particularly difficult. Many of the Japanese farms near Seattle were in suburban districts, where intensive crops were produced on city lots without fences to separate the individual holdings, and where any departure from the system of farming already established would undoubtedly result in the consolidation of operating units together with entirely different management and labor utilization.

In some areas, particularly in the Sacramento Valley and near Puget Sound, it was only the customarily heavy use of Japanese family labor together with a painstaking use of farm resources which permitted the profitable production of intensive crops on relatively poor land. Gravelly soil was farmed for strawberry production. Irrigation water was frugally expended under a management plan seldom found except in the case of Japanese operation.

These and similar factors almost inevitably led to some changes in the utilization of land, although such changes were encountered principally in highly subdivided suburban districts or where poor soil was present. In a few instances Japanese farm units which had previously been city lots have reverted to the utilization which prevails on neighboring tracts; namely, pasture or even complete withdrawal from agricultural use. In a few poor soil areas a reversion of crop land to pasture or to extensive crops has occurred.

In general, however, the agricultural phase of the evacuation has been handled in such a way that the tendency to change the use of the land

has been either temporarily checked or completely averted. The establishment of farming groups and the arrangements which were made with processors, marketing agencies, and similar larger scale enterprises have had an important bearing upon the achievement of this result.

Shifts in Crop Production: Traditionally, an American farmer may exercise free choice in determining what crops he will plant and harvest. The skill and experience of the farm operator are important determinants of the types of crops which are produced, as well as the success which can be achieved under any crop planting program. The Japanese farmers possessed certain peculiar skills and experiences with reference both to farm practices and marketing of products which would be practically impossible to duplicate among any other group of farm operators. In certain instances the retail as well as the wholesale markets for products from Japanese-operated farms were controlled exclusively by Japanese. The evacuation program thus effectively eliminated not only the farmer but also the marketing facilities for products from the farm. New arrangements and new marketing channels will have to be established. While such a situation existed only in certain particular localities and not generally it will undoubtedly influence the production of certain crops in such localities.

The general apprehension among Western farmers concerning the labor supply during the war period is a potent factor which is causing them to plant crops which require less seasonal labor. In general the labor supply for Japanese farm enterprises was provided largely by Japanese laborers or by family labor. In some instances Caucasians, Filipinos, Mexicans or Indians were employed by the Japanese, but the presence of 12,000 adult Japanese who continuously derived their income from farm work was an important auxiliary feature of Japanese agriculture. The evacuation has effectively removed this labor supply. In some localities Japanese workers possessed specialized skills which will be extremely hard to replace. For instance, in certain orchard areas Japanese pruners were able to perform their job with such skill that they could predict and control with a high degree of accuracy the crop production per acre. The crop produced each year was adjusted by these skilled pruning operations with reference to price and marketing conditions. In other instances Japanese irrigators were able to distribute water in such a way that crops were produced year after year under difficult natural conditions.

The Farm Security Administration received numerous emergency communications from landlords, community leaders, and other persons interested in the farming of particular areas to the effect that removal of the skilled Japanese would paralyze certain farming operations and urging that the Farm Security Administration intercede to have the evacuation postponed. Such requests were not acted upon but were regarded as indications that potential shifts in types of crops and in land utilization might be expected unless drastic measures were applied.

Crops differ in importance with relation to the wartime food needs of

the nation. In discharging its duties the Farm Security Administration devoted particular attention to the more important crops with the objective of maintaining normal production or achieving increased production as a result of the shift in management. Tomatoes, beans, peas, spinach, lettuce, asparagus, other vitamin-rich vegetables, and sugar beets were among these crops. With respect to other crops the Farm Security Administration felt less apprehension, from the standpoint of national interest, if some curtailment of production resulted. Examples of such crops are flowers, nursery stock, strawberries and oysters. It so happens that among crops difficult to handle from a labor supply and a technical management standpoint, strawberries are outstanding. The evacuation was scheduled during the peak of strawberry harvest in some localities. However it can be said generally that the crop in production was harvested. In certain instances, however, there was some loss of crop resulting from the change of management during the most critical season of operation.

For most individual farm programs the choice of crops had been fairly well established for the present year. The time of evacuation came during the period of growth rather than before planting. Consequently a material shift in the kinds of crops cannot occur until harvesting has been completed. Wherever perennial crops are grown little change in kinds of crops is possible. It therefore should be expected that shifts in crop production, to the extent that they do occur, will take place sometime subsequent to the present date. Where several crops are customarily grown in succession on the same acreage it is possible that the substitute operators will shift to more extensive use of the land after the first harvest has been completed. In other instances these shifts may occur prior to the next major crop season.

It may be safely said that continuity of production for the present year has been fairly well insured but no guarantees have yet been established which will permit a prediction that future shifts are not in prospect or if they occur, the extent and character thereof.

Shifts in Farm Tenure: Since most Japanese farmers were tenants, the usual agreements executed were (a) sale or assignment of leases, (b) relinquishment of tenure to landlords, (c) employment of substitute managers for the duration of the war, or (d) arrangements providing for division on a share basis of crop proceeds either for the present year or for the duration of the war. Where the Japanese operators were real estate owners, leasing of their properties or management on a share or salary basis sometimes occurred. In a few instances owners of farms sold their real estate. It is believed that the Japanese have assumed they will return to their home communities after the war and, consequently, where possible, most tenure arrangements made during the evacuation are of a more or less temporary nature. If the Japanese do not return to the communities from which they have been removed, numerous farm tenure transactions will indubitably have to be made to effect the final disposal of their interests.

Labor Shortage: Regardless of whether the basis is real or imaginary there exists throughout Military Area No. 1, as elsewhere, a general feeling among farm operators that a farm labor shortage either exists or is impending. There is no question but that 12,000 skilled farm laborers have been removed from the area, in addition to those taken by defense industries and military conscription. This factor was a serious detriment to the conclusion of deals on an equitable basis.]

The Farm Security Administration has considerable evidence, through the operation of its migratory labor camp program, of the fact that numerous farm workers particularly in the State of California are still unemployed, or only partially employed. There is no certainty, however, that these workers can, due to transportation problems, be made available to areas where labor demand peaks exist, or that these workers possess the specialized skills generally required by Japanese-operated farm enterprises.

The demand for farm labor to produce and harvest crops on evacuated properties is undoubtedly but a small part of the total demand for the area. There is no reason to conclude therefore that the general farm labor situation on the Pacific Coast has been basically affected by the Japanese evacuation. On the contrary the most that can be said is that its effect has been to aggravate somewhat whatever problem would otherwise exist. This phase of the problem must be answered in terms of a more systematic and efficient distribution and use of the existing farm labor supply, for the evacuated properties constitute only a small part of the total agricultural enterprise on the Pacific Coast.

Summary: It is the opinion of the Farm Security Administration therefore that the first objective, namely, to insure the continuity of agricultural production, has been accomplished beyond original expectations. To the limits of practicability, Japanese-operated farms are in the hands of competent management and the transition has been made without any serious interruption of farming operations. This, however, is a short-run accomplishment and there is no assurance that some future shifts in land use and types of crops planted will not occur.

Equity and Fair Dealing

The circumstances under which the evacuation occurred inevitably placed the Japanese in an adverse bargaining position. Knowledge was widespread that they would have to dispose of their farming assets and interests within a relatively short period and under conditions where buyers would have to assume considerable risks.

There is much evidence to support the statement that the Japanese who disposed of their assets early did so on very satisfactory terms. As the date of evacuation approached the circumstances surrounding the completion of transactions became more adverse. The Farm Security Administration early adopted a policy that intervention to a degree which would

cause the Japanese to rely directly upon the government to handle and supervise the disposal of their properties should be avoided if possible since it would result in a chaotic situation wherein the Japanese devoted little effort to finding suitable buyers. Furthermore, it would almost inevitably result in a transfer of responsibility directly to the government for losses which might unavoidably occur if many forced sales had to be consummated within a short period. It was possible under this policy to rely primarily upon the acuity and experienced business judgment of the Japanese as the primary protector of their business interests in the disposal of their property, and to exert special efforts only on those cases which were brought to the attention of the Farm Security Administration by individual Japanese.

Widespread publicity was given to the fact that the Farm Security Administration was committed to a policy of promoting fair dealing. The Japanese farmers availed themselves of the service of this organization when they felt that they were being placed in unfair bargaining positions or were being mistreated by creditors or landlords. Throughout the evacuation program, Field Agents and Evacuation Control personnel handled a large number of cases where supervision of transactions was necessary and where the absence of such supervision might have resulted in unfair treatment of the Japanese. All responsible field personnel were instructed to report by telegram the essential facts involved in specific cases which in their judgment required emergency action or possible intervention. In most of these instances the assignment of special negotiators or subsequent instructions given to field personnel resulted in a satisfactory solution of the problems. In some instances the cases were reported to the Department of Justice for field investigation through their organization. Such cases were extremely few in number. The possession of the freezing power was undoubtedly the outstanding single factor which promoted fair dealing in those cases in which the usual processes of bargaining and negotiations appeared to have broken down. A full discussion of that subject is presented immediately hereafter.

In summary it is the opinion of this agency that the achievement of the second objective, namely, to insure that fair and equitable arrangements between evacuees and the operators of their property, was accomplished to a degree exceeding the expectations at the outset of the program. Losses sustained were in general those which are normally involved when sale values and use values of property are compared.

Use of The Freezing Power

Conditions encountered at the outset and before authority to exercise the freezing power had been given the FSA were of such a character as to suggest that the actual use of this authority in many individual cases would be necessary. Instances were increasing of attempted abuse and overreaching, obviously the result of a growing recognition among prospective buyers that bargains could be made as time progressed.

There were some indications that the psychological conditions surrounding the disposal of properties would increasingly favor purchasers and place the Japanese in a more adverse bargaining position as time elapsed.

Immediately after the Farm Security Administration was vested with the freezing power, and knowledge of this fact disseminated, a situation was established in which the possession of the authority apparently eliminated the necessity for its use. The responsibilities of the FSA and suggested policies for making use of the freezing power were outlined in anticipation of its authorization. (See Exhibit 4.). Immediately after the Regional Director was authorized to exercise the freezing power, the policies and methods of operation were stated and summarized in appropriate instructions and procedures.*

It was apparent that there were two general types of situations which might require the use of the freezing power: (a) where grossly inequitable and unfair deals were or were about to be effected or where unfair advantage was or was about to be taken and (b) where the removal of the Japanese made it necessary to provide a legal entity or person in the area empowered to execute agreements or conclude negotiations for them.

It seemed inadvisable to invoke the freezing power, as a rule, where the latter situation existed and where the chief problem was to provide the legal and other arrangements under which disposal transactions could be completed. Therefore, the procedure and instructions covering the acceptance of powers of attorney and management contracts were devised.

To provide a legal entity which could assume responsibility for possession, management, operation and disposal of properties where intervention was necessary in either of the above types of situations, the California Evacuated Farms Association, Inc., was created. This Association was incorporated under the state laws of California on April 8, 1942. It was organized and created as a non-profit corporation with officers and directors selected from responsible personnel of the Farm Security Administration.**

* See WFA Instructions 951.1 and 952.1, contained in Appendix A, "WFA Procedure."

**See Exhibits 17 and 18; also WFA Instruction 953.1 contained in Appendix A.

In order to make intelligent use of the freezing power, or to enable the California Evacuated Farms Association to accept powers of attorney and management contracts, the Regional Director felt that it was necessary to delegate to selected personnel authority to recommend the use of the freezing power and authority to accept powers of attorney and management contracts. Twenty-one field employees were given this responsibility. These were selected from among the WFA District Officers, District Evacuation Agents, Evacuation Agents and Special Negotiators. These employees were thoroughly impressed with the fact that the responsibility devolved upon them required the use of great discretion and mature judgment. They were presented with a letter addressed by the Regional Director to all field employees instructing each responsible employee to act with the greatest of reserve and judgment in matters which might involve the use of the freezing power or the acceptance of attorney and management contracts.*

In only one instance was the freezing authority actually exercised. This involved a situation in which a landlord refused to permit the assignment of her lease to a substitute operator who had agreed to pay her Japanese tenant a satisfactory price for property appraised at \$2,000. The substitute operator had offered \$1,500; the landlord's final offer was \$200. The landlord apparently intended to obtain possession of the crop, certain improvements and other assets without adequate compensation. Efforts to effect an amicable and voluntary solution were continued from the end of March until the 20th of April. The landlord was obdurate to the end despite the advice of her attorney. The freezing action was taken April 20, 1942.

In a large number of instances possession of the freezing power had considerable effect upon field negotiations involved in individual difficult cases. Quoted immediately hereafter is a paragraph from a letter addressed by Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director, to C. B. Baldwin, Administrator, Farm Security Administration, under date of May 22, 1942, which describes a typical situation showing the effect of the possession of the freezing power by the Farm Security Administration:

"There was one other situation in which, for some period of time, it appeared that there might be occasion for the exercise of the freezing power. Some 30 Japanese strawberry growers were involved. These growers were producing strawberries under an arrangement with a landowner under which they were to receive a portion of the proceeds to be derived from the sale of the strawberries. Some 80 acres of strawberries valued at from \$200,000 to \$250,000

* See letters dated April 10 and April 13 in Appendix C, "WFA Letters."

were involved. Mr. Russell Robinson of my office was sent to discuss the matter with the landowner, the persons financing the landowner and the Japanese. Immediately upon Mr. Robinson's entrance upon the scene, in the course of which he was able in a very astute manner to indicate the possible action which might be taken, settlement of the controversy between the landowner and 12 of the Japanese was immediately effected and subsequently a satisfactory settlement was arrived at between the landowner and the other 18 Japanese. Agreements covering the settlement were prepared by the Regional Attorney's office."

Many items of correspondence from field employees authorized to recommend the exercise of the freezing power and describing the efficacy of this authority as an instrument to be held in reserve but not actually used are now contained in the Farm Security Administration's files.

One power of attorney and management contract was accepted in behalf of the California Evacuated Farms Association. This action was taken in order to prevent the serious disintegration of a greenhouse business in the Los Angeles Area when it appeared that a period of time would elapse before a transaction could be closed. The Japanese owner could not find a suitable private attorney-in-fact, who would agree to accept his power of attorney and manage the enterprise. This greenhouse is no longer being managed by the California Evacuated Farms Association; final disposal on fair terms has been effected.

Thirteen additional powers of attorney were accepted by a Field Agent of the FSA from Japanese evacuated from Bainbridge Island, the first area to be evacuated. This action was taken at the very commencement of the evacuation program and in anticipation of situations and difficulties which either did not develop or the consequences of which it was possible to avoid. The California Evacuated Farms Association was subsequently substituted as attorney-in-fact for the Field Agent. The evacuees prior to their evacuation had entered into arrangements which more or less completely provided for the management and operation of their farm properties so that the duties of the California Evacuated Farms Association are limited to the performance of a supervisory function. It appears likely that arrangements will hereafter be effected which will make it possible to terminate the responsibilities of the association under the powers of attorney.

Occasionally, powers of attorney were given by the Japanese to private persons who agreed to represent them and dispose of their properties. A relatively small number of such situations developed. Most deals were concluded prior to actual evacuation.

In summary, it is the opinion of this agency that vesting the Regional Director with the freezing power was an outstanding factor enabling the achievement of a reasonable degree of equity and fair dealing between Japanese farmers and the principal parties with whom they had to deal in the disposal of their farming interests and assets.

Disposal of Farm Machinery

There appeared some likelihood that a serious problem would develop with reference to the transfer and disposal of farm machinery. The experience of field agents indicated that many substitute operators had sufficient machinery to operate the farms which they took over and that in certain localities secondhand dealers and dealers in scrap metal were attempting to buy farm machinery from Japanese at sacrificial prices. It further appeared that implement dealers in a number of areas had been somewhat reluctant to purchase machinery from Japanese. To prevent the unnecessary junking of machinery and to keep it available for its normal uses, it was highly desirable that some orderly method for the disposal of surplus implements and equipment through normal trade channels be provided.

The policies which were decided upon to govern the transfer and disposal of farm machinery prescribed the following objectives in the order listed:

- 1 To the extent necessary for the continued operation of evacuated farms, farm machinery was to be retained upon the land for which it was normally used. A separate sale of the farm machinery to persons other than the substitute operator was to be discouraged unless the substitute operator possessed the necessary machinery to continue operations under a satisfactory farm program.
- 2 Where machinery was to be sold off of the farm it was to be retained in the community or locality.
- 3 The storage of farm machinery which would remove it from use during the war period was to be discouraged in view of the difficulty experienced in obtaining farming implements and equipment.
- 4 Farm machinery still suitable for use or capable of being repaired was not to be sold to junk dealers for ultimate resale as scrap metal.

A copy of a statement of policy which was issued by the FSA is attached as Exhibit 30. To achieve the primary objective, namely, the retention of farm machinery for agricultural operations on evacuated lands, or where it was most needed, a direct appeal was made to implement dealers through their associations. On April 18, 1942, the officers of the leading California implement dealers' associations and representatives of the large implement dealer concerns met in the office of the Regional Director and entered into a discussion of methods which could be used to promote the advantageous disposal of such machinery. It was disclosed at the meeting that reluctance of implement dealers to purchase machinery from Japanese was due in large measure to uncertainty as to whether such action would be interpreted as contrary to the objective of keeping machinery on evacuated lands and a feeling that wholesale second-hand machinery prices might be interpreted as unfair prices. When the

situation was outlined to them the implement dealers associations' representatives readily agreed to distribute to their members or local companies a statement of the Farm Security Administration policies and to promote as far as possible their acceptance and application. (See Exhibit 31). Simple power of attorney forms were provided which might be used by Japanese farmers in consigning their machinery to implement dealers for disposal. These instruments designated the implement dealers as attorneys in fact with the authority to sell under conditions prescribed by the agreement.* Concurrently therewith an arrangement was devised whereby county war boards would assist in the disposal of farm machinery which might be left on consignment with implement dealers by reviewing sale prices if it appeared that an advantageous sale would be at a price which was less than the Japanese farmer had tentatively set for the disposal.**

The responsibility of the Farm Security Administration for agricultural equipment and implements, as distinct from the general custodial responsibility of the Federal Reserve System for all other Japanese-owned or operated machinery, is clarified in Exhibits 32 and 33, attached.

On May 8, 1942, a report was obtained from all Field Agents concerning the number of evacuated farms having undisposed-of machinery and the value of such machinery. These reports showed that on only 13 farms in that portion of the military area already evacuated was there any remaining undisposed-of machinery. The approximate value of such machinery was \$11,655.

This information together with information obtained by direct observation of field activities gave sufficient basis for the conclusion that farm machinery was being disposed of in an orderly way and substantially according to the policies stated above.

It is the opinion of this agency that the controls and methods which were used in the supervision of the transfers of crops, leases and real estate were sufficiently effective that they largely controlled also the disposal of farm machinery. The causes for apprehension during the early weeks of the program with respect to a wasteful or unfair disposition of farm machinery in some instances and in some localities were observed to be generally absent during the subsequent period. It also appeared that the possession of the freezing authority effectively eliminated the circumstances which would result in a serious demoralization of the market for farm machinery.

* See Form WCCA-FSA-119, "Equipment Dealer Storage and Sale Agreement," contained in Appendix B of this report, "WFA Forms."

** See WFA Instruction 951.2 and 952.2, contained in Appendix A, "WFA Procedure," and letter dated April 25, contained in Appendix C.

VII

FISCAL SUMMARY

The Finance Division of the Farm Security Administration provided the necessary services in handling the accounts for the evacuation program, thus avoiding the creation of a separate section in the WCCA-FSA organization. All payable accounts were coded to "556", a special FSA account against which costs incurred in connection with the WCCA were paid. When first established, Fund 556 ran "in the red"; that is, costs were posted against it before monies had actually been allocated.

On March 18, 1942, the Army allocated to the Regional Director \$1,000,000 for use in making WFA loans. Administrative expenses were met by means of reimbursement vouchers. (See Exhibits 34 and 35.) By the middle of April, this sum had been exhausted, chiefly by the making of loans in excess of \$900,000. In anticipation of this situation, additional funds were requested on April 9, 1942. (See Exhibit 36.) On April 24, 1942, \$5,000,000 of additional money was received from the President's Emergency Fund with which to continue operations. (See Exhibit 37.)

By the end of May, a total of \$3,584,025.42 had been expended, either for loans or administrative costs. Of this sum, \$3,434,008.08 was for loans and \$150,017.34 for administrative costs. A complete statement showing the amounts and sources of funds used and types and amounts of disbursements is attached as Exhibit 38.

VIII

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION
OF AGENCIES AND GROUPS

The Farm Security Administration wishes to take this occasion to express its sincere gratitude to all agencies, organizations, groups and individuals who have given it assistance in a spirit of unselfishness and national interest during the evacuation program.

The U. S. Department of Agriculture State and County War Boards gave complete support to the policies and methods which the Farm Security Administration believed it necessary to employ. These agencies also provided assistance in the handling both of local situations and special problems which were area-wide.

The Agricultural Extension Service through its Extension Leaders and County Agents gave assistance to Field Agents in the performance of their functions. The Extension Service aided the appraisal of farm properties and in the promotion of transactions by advising both Japanese farmers and prospective substitute operators.

The Farm Credit Administration helped to solve a very difficult personnel problem by lending six highly-trained specialists to the Headquarter's Staff and the Special Negotiations Program. This agency also participated constructively in conferences which were held from time to time, and in its loan activities through national Farm Loan Associations and Production Credit Associations.

The Japanese-American Citizen's League and various kindred societies fostered an attitude among Japanese farmers which was the basis for the active cooperation of their farmer members in carrying out the policies which have been described in this report. It would be hard to overestimate the difference in results which would have been realized had this constructive viewpoint not been engendered by these societies.

The Agricultural Division of the California State Chamber of Commerce took an active and constructive interest in the program of the Farm Security Administration throughout the evacuation period. It also arranged meetings which brought together the representatives of leading agricultural enterprises and assisted in the interpretation of policies to these representatives.

The Agricultural Commissioners of several county governments provided statistical and other information from their files and otherwise gave helpful support.

The Bureau of Agricultural Economics provided, directly and indirectly, statistical information which was indispensable in the operation of the program.

The U. S. Treasury Disbursing Office in San Francisco expedited the payment of emergency crop production loans in recognition of a need for speed in getting loan payment to field points.

The Implement Dealers' Associations assisted in the interpretation of policies to their member dealers and generally facilitated the disposal of farm machinery.

In addition to the above acknowledgments, the Farm Security Administration wishes to state that it has in its files numerous reports from Field Agents and Evacuation Agents commending the various Federal Security Agency and Federal Reserve representatives upon the assistance which they rendered in the performance of their duties.

IX

CONCLUSION

With full consciousness of the nature and extent of the responsibility which was delegated to the Farm Security Administration as a member agency of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, this agency now wishes to state as its considered opinion that this responsibility has been effectively discharged in Military Area No. 1. We believe that the following will be found to be true within all practical limits of judgment:

- 1 The agricultural lands and improvements thereon formerly possessed and occupied by Japanese farmers have been transferred to substitute occupancy and management, within 99 percent of the achievement which might be possible at the present date. This transfer has been made under such circumstances that a minimum of loss and maladjustment has resulted and the farm tenure and farm subdivision patterns have been changed in the least degree compatible with achieving the major objective of the program; namely, the continuation without serious interruption of agricultural production.
- 2 The interests of Japanese farmers in their crops, as well as their chattels and leases, have been disposed of with the maximum protection which could have been given, in the interest of equity and fair dealing, without the employment of drastic measures which would have resulted in the wide scale assumption of management and farm operation responsibilities by the United States Government.
- 3 The farm machinery previously possessed and used by Japanese farmers has been disposed of in a manner consistent with the wartime objective of keeping such machinery available in the farm communities where it was previously used, and without the stoppage of production which would have resulted had such machinery been junked, scrapped, or stored.
- 4 In the achievement of the above results under adverse conditions and in an extremely short period of time the vesting of authority in the Farm Security Administration to use the freezing power was the most important single measure in avoiding a breakdown of disposal transactions. It enabled the maintenance throughout the evacuation period of an atmosphere in which fair dealing could be approximately accomplished.
- 5 The allocation to the Farm Security Administration of funds for the purpose of making emergency crop production loans to substitute operators implemented and facilitated the entire agricultural phase of the evacuation. Many qualified operators were thus enabled

led to take over Japanese farm properties. Moreover, fully as important as the loans actually made, was the stabilizing and reassuring effect which the availability of special FSA credit had on established credit agencies, would-be substitute operators and Japanese farmers.

It is our opinion that on June 1, 1942, the situation in Military Area No. 1 is such as to validate fully the above conclusions. Further trends and developments will be subject to the conditions and factors which are outlined in this report, especially under Section III and Section VI.