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Final Report--
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FINAL REPORT
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SECTION

By

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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY -- DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

GRANADA PROJECT

FINAL REPORT
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SECTION
GRANADA RELOCATION CENTER

A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONNEL SECTION

Originally all personnel work, including payrolling, was handled by the Office for Emergency Management, Division of Central Administrative Services, at Denver, Colorado. Under this plan, requisitions were made by the project to the WRA Regional Office at Denver, indicating types and number of personnel required. Then arrangements were made for project personnel to interview applicants and selections were based upon these interviews. All work incident to the completion of the appointments was then handled by the Division of Central Administrative Services. This continued until April, 1943, at which time all personnel services, including liaison with the Civil Service Commission, were handled directly by the project. The payrolling function itself was transferred to the project in November, 1943.

The original organization of the Personnel Section consisted of a Personnel Clerk and eight evacuee assistants. This office handled all journalization and payrolling for appointed personnel and also handled payrolling for evacuees. The assignment of evacuees at this time was handled by the Employment Office which was part of the Relocation Division. In January, 1944, the Personnel Office assumed the function of handling internal employment for evacuees and released to the Cost Accounting Section of the Finance Section the payrolling of evacuee workers. The staff was augmented to include a Personnel Officer, a Personnel Technician, a Transactions Officer, and one Payroll Clerk. The work of the office was divided into two major categories. One was appointed personnel operations which was handled by the Personnel Officer and the Transactions Clerk and the other was the problems concerning evacuee personnel which were handled by the Personnel Technician.

There was some improvement in recruiting methods and also in working out orientation programs for new appointees. An effort was made to formalize a program which would permit the Personnel Office to retain new appointed employees for a minimum of two working days for the purpose of acquainting them with the program and physical plant, but this program was not entirely successful because, first, the pressure of Section Heads to put new employees on duty immediately upon their arrival, and secondly, because so often the time of the Personnel Section had to be devoted to other work which did not permit orderly handling of new appointees. To some extent a few sections, such as Education, Finance, Welfare, and others, assisted by conducting tours of new appointees to various departments of the project. These tours were usually directed by an older employee who explained the functions and inter-relationships of the various programs. The organization described herein continued until January, 1945, at which time the Personnel Officer and the Personnel Technician transferred to other positions within the WRA and it was determined that because of the limited duration of the project it would be inadvisable to attempt the re-establishment of the Section. After that date the Personnel Office has been staffed with a Personnel Technician, a Transactions Clerk, and intermittently a payroll clerk.

The major liaison work and recruiting work has been done by the Assistant Project Director in charge of Administrative Management. The Personnel Technician has handled internal affairs and some recruitment and interviewing. By the time this stage was reached the recruitment of additional evacuees had ceased to exist as a function since decreases in the evacuee population made such efforts rather fruitless. It was found that the best way to recruit evacuees was through other evacuees who were already employed in the sections.

B. RECRUITMENT AND TURNOVER OF APPOINTED PERSONNEL

Recruitment of appointed personnel, after it was turned over to the project from the Denver office, was handled entirely through the Personnel Management Section by means of cooperative arrangements with various section heads. The general division of responsibilities provided that the Personnel Section would be responsible for all contacts with the Civil Service Commission, initial contacts with candidates, arrangements for interviews, and appraisal of qualifying experience. The operating section heads, on the other hand, reserved the right of interviewing candidates and making final selections from those recruited through the channels described above. Thus, the Personnel Management Section in effect handled the application of administrative civil service and other regulations pertaining to recruitment, while section heads made their own selections from such panels of applicants as could be secured.

Two major exceptions to this general rule existed. One was in the case of Education personnel where the major part of all the work except the submission of requests for eligibles and notifications to the Civil Service Commission of selections was done by the Superintendent of Schools and his staff. In the case of Health Section personnel the recruitment was done mainly by the Washington office. In both these cases the exceptions were imperative as the types of personnel needed were very difficult to secure and a streamlined method of interviewing and selection was essential in order to assure that candidates interviewed could be entered on duty as soon as possible after it was determined that their services were desired. In this connection, the Civil Service Commission, 13th Region, cooperated excellently in giving the project wide latitude in recruiting and arranging for appointments. There never were sufficient candidates to permit the establishment of regular registers and these types of personnel were so much in demand that normal practices were too cumbersome.

One problem that quickly became apparent was the lack of information concerning the type of program which WRA had, physical description of the project, and an understanding of government regulations pertaining to employment. This was met by mimeographing several hundred pamphlets which, in addition to a description of the physical plant, gave a short summary of the WRA program as well as summaries of the more common regulations pertaining to hours of work, retirement deductions, leave privileges, manpower regulations, etc. These were supplied to Civil Service representatives and to all applicants. Later, recruiters equipped themselves with

sets of pictures of the project which were very effective. In general, every effort was made to give prospective employees an accurate understanding of conditions since it was felt that anyone who was not willing to put up with some of the limitations of project life would be better off not to accept a job than to come to work and then be disappointed. Another factor which was considered carefully was the applicant's attitude toward minority groups. This was done in an effort to secure people, particularly in the higher grade positions, who were objective in their attitudes. It was found that individuals who were either overly sentimental or antagonistic about the Japanese minority problem were not effective employees. During the first year of project operations many people were recruited on the basis of interviews conducted in Denver, Pueblo, Colorado, and other communities since most candidates were not willing to report to the project at their own expense so that they could see first-hand what the project looked like. During the calendar year 1944 and early 1945 more emphasis was placed in having candidates report to the project for interviews. Surprisingly a very small proportion of candidates refused to come to the project for this purpose. Having them come to the project aided greatly in weeding out persons who would not be able to adjust themselves. Recruitment was a continual problem, particularly in the clerical fields and in the Education Section. This was true because of changes in organization requiring more clerical personnel, turnover, and in some cases because of the inability of some employees to adjust themselves which required their replacement.

There is attached a table which shows the number of employees on duty at the project by sections at six-month intervals since January, 1943. It will be noted that the total employment varied from 157 in January, 1943 to 181 in October, 1945. Generally, the employment ran around 160 employees, although the number of temporaries as compared to permanent employees increased greatly beginning in July, 1945 because at that time employment was offered on a temporary, rather than an indefinite basis.

An analysis was made of separations for the period from August, 1942 to October, 1944. During this time a total of 167 separation actions were taken. The following summarizes reasons given:

1. Transfer within WRA or to other government agencies	34
2. To accept another position	41
3. To join husband or family	21
4. Marriage	5
5. Military furlough	14
6. Personal reasons not further explained	30
7. Position abolished	4
8. Illness	12
9. Other reasons	7
Total	167

Thus, for that period which extends for slightly more than two years, approximately 80 separations occurred per year, or 50 percent of the normal staff. A further analysis for the remaining year of operations was not made. Beginning in January, 1945 employees were given notice of probable duration of their jobs and although they were not encouraged to seek other employment, the obvious tendency was for many employees to leave. Also, during the calendar year 1945 many programs were completed and employees who could not be used in other functions were released. These factors greatly increased the termination rate. A good example is the Education Section which in January had 60 employees, in July had 32 employees, and in October was down to 13 employees, all but three of whom were assigned to duties in sections other than Education. Similarly the Community Activities and Community Analysis Sections were abolished during the same period.

C. HOUSING

At the inception of the project there was no housing available on the project and some of the hardier members of the staff lived in evacuee barracks. This was extremely inconvenient since there were no facilities of any kind in the barracks, no cooking facilities, and they had either to eat at the evacuee mess halls or cook over a hot plate. This situation continued until the fall of 1943 when eight 2-bedroom apartments and eight 1-bedroom apartments were completed. Thereafter additional units were completed until in September, 1945, there were available for occupancy the following:

Hospital rooms	27
Other rooms	25
1-Bedroom Apartments	22
2-Bedroom Apartments	23
3-Bedroom Apartments	7

Until this housing was available the majority of our employees commuted from Lamar and other communities. Ride pools were arranged and assistance given employees in locating housing, particularly in Lamar which was the most favorable location. After September, 1944, there were 84 employees living on the project and 62 were commuting. The housing situation was tight in that there were always waiting lists until July, 1945 when the departure of members of the Education staff and other employees made it possible to accumulate a small number of available housing units.

D. PERSONNEL PROGRAM IN THE LIQUIDATION OF THE PROJECT

Notice that all evacuees would be relocated from the project by October 15 was received on July 14, 1945. Immediately a staff meeting was called at which personnel were informed of future plans and requested to remain on the job as long as they reasonably could but they were assured that if they located opportunities which they wanted they could reasonably expect a release. They were asked to give thirty days notice wherever possible. At the same time they were told that WRA would do whatever it could to assist

in placement of all personnel who remained. This program was initiated in the Washington office and in October a group of interviewers reported to the project for the purpose of determining qualifications and desires of various employees. At the same time a group of Civil Service representatives began contacting other government agencies for the purpose of securing consideration for WRA employees. To the date of this writing (November 1, 1945) a few job offers have materialized. Most of these have been in CAF-2, 3 and 4 grades. No specific placements have developed in this program but a few good leads have been referred to employees for their consideration.

E. EVACUEE EMPLOYMENT

1. Early Patterns

The first evacuee employees on the project were employed on August 27, 1942 when the original contingent of slightly over 200 persons arrived from Merced, California. Immediately upon their arrival, the project was faced with the necessity of furnishing mess hall facilities, transportation facilities, mail services, sanitation services and other fundamental necessities. In the basic interviews an effort was made to determine skills and qualifications of evacuees but, at the same time, it was found that evacuees were shopping for positions of their own selection. In many instances these selections coincided with the functions that individuals had performed at the assembly center. For example, evacuees who had worked in mess sought out the steward and applied for jobs. Those who had worked in the Post Office sought out the head of Office Services, etc. There was not time for orderly analysis and selection of personnel and as a result placements were made by personal contact rather than through established procedures.

This pattern continued throughout the reception period. It changed slightly as individual evacuees acquired positions where they could influence further employment. Thereafter the pattern involved former friendships or associations. Evacuees would apply for positions on the basis of what friends were working in the given section. Similarly it was found that the most effective method of securing evacuee personnel was to deal through an influential evacuee already employed in the section. Although this pattern did not conform to the carefully laid plans of the project for interviewing and referral by the employment office according to skills, it did get the project staffed very rapidly.

After the reception period it was found that some of the evacuees who had been employed were not as qualified as they claimed to be for various functions. This tended to adjust itself, either by termination or transfer or by loss of stature of such an individual in the eyes of other evacuees. Also it was found that many who were competent to assume positions were reticent about applying. They were sensitive about their relatively new status as persons singled out for evacuation or perhaps were sensitive about breaking into work units where they had no friends. Strenuous efforts were made as maladjustments developed to secure the services of these people through interviews conducted either by appointed personnel or by evacuee assistants. In the main, the results were satisfactory although it never was pos-

sible to secure a general voluntary, self-initiated registration for employment.

In the inception of the project the policy was to employ any evacuee who could work and who was willing to work. As a result there developed a great specialization among the evacuees themselves as to what their functions were. For example, on a sanitation crew the wet garbage employees would not handle dry garbage; truck drivers would not help load or unload trucks; automobile mechanics would not check tires or pump gas into vehicles; property inventory clerks would not help receiving clerks; etc. This specialization in turn made it extremely difficult for appointed supervisors, who were not personally acquainted with all their evacuee employees, to perform their functions. Very often there were misunderstandings when a supervisor would give instructions to do certain work to a crew which considered itself a specialist for other work. Another factor worthy of consideration was the attitude toward pay. Most of the evacuees who had worked for a living in private life were accustomed to prevailing rates of pay and they thought in terms of prevailing rates. They were not willing to accept the premise that they worked for the community good and that the cash allowances of \$12, \$16 and \$19 a month were not the only compensation they would get. They could not recognize compensation in terms of benefits to themselves in the community, public acceptance within the community, etc. They preferred to measure their work in terms of prevailing rates. For example, one proposal made to the Administration by the temporary council was that coal unloaders would work for \$19 a month provided that one hour per day would be considered a full day's work. Thus they would be paid at the rate of approximately 63 cents an hour which was comparable to the prevailing rate for laborers in this area at that time. Other similar proposals were made. In the meantime appointed personnel who had never before been faced with the particular types of problems existing were having difficulty in learning and assuming their own responsibilities, in sizing up their personnel, learning the administrative policies of the Authority, and finding ways and means of getting the best work from their crews.

2. Results of Early Pattern

The result of all these factors was that certain patterns were set which, to varying degrees, have continued throughout the existence of the project. Because of the differences in ability and concepts of the various supervisors, standard policies regarding hours of work, quality of labor, etc., did not crystallize as rapidly as the work habits of the evacuees. Very shortly after the reception period it was found that evacuees were tending to report for work late and quit early. This varied among sections. For example, by the end of December, 1942, carpenters and others on construction crews were working as little as three hours a day. In some functions on the farm evacuees were working full time. In other functions, such as mess operations where it was necessary to work long hours because all mess halls were

not operating, many of the evacuees were working full time and overtime while others worked from four to six hours. The Administration made various efforts to improve this, among which were:

- a. Discussion of all the Section Heads defining responsibilities and setting standards of work.
- b. Insistence upon more accurate timekeeping.
- c. Shifting of crews to other jobs as they completed basic assignments.
- d. Presentation of problems to the temporary community council.
- e. Terminations of evacuees for flagrant disregard of requirements.

The above efforts achieved varying degrees of results but on the whole did improve work results somewhat. These problems occurred during what, for purposes of this discussion, might be called the initial period which extended through approximately March, 1943.

3. Farming Program - 1943

In the spring of 1943 plans for the farm were completed and recruitment for farm laborers was intensified. Again our normal recruitment channels, that is, a requisition to the employment office and referral ~~by~~ the employment office, broke down. They could not secure sufficient referrals. The Agricultural Section was fortunate in having two very good evacuee leaders, one of whom was employed as Assistant Farm Superintendent and the other assigned as Chief Timekeeper. Members of the Administration presented the plans to the evacuee council and various members of the Agricultural Section, evacuees and appointed both, presented appeals for personnel. This was a continuing process but resulted in securing labor to get the minimum requirements of the work done. In many cases it was "touch and go". Quite often, in anticipation of a seasonal problem, appeals would be made for labor but no labor would turn out until the last possible minute before catastrophe. This was very hard on the nerves and equilibrium of the appointed personnel.

Another factor during 1943 was the seasonal leave program which stripped the project of agricultural workers during the season when they were most needed. It was a highly competitive proposition and the outside offers always won.

As the summer went on it became evident that regularly appointed evacuees would not be able to complete the harvest so the Agricultural Section worked out a volunteering program through the block managers who, by that time, had been organized. Also, arrangements were made for volunteers from the schools. This volunteering program, although it was a very important factor in saving crops, resulted in a great amount of dissatisfaction both on the part of the evacuees and the part of the farm personnel. The plan was that the block managers would draft from various sections a certain number of personnel each day who would work

on the farm on specific jobs. Similarly the schools would furnish as many students as possible on vacations, afternoons, etc. The weakness lay in the fact that there was no integration between the needs of the farm and the number of workers furnished. On some days when the farm most needed people to cultivate vegetables there might not be any labor assigned or the labor assigned would not be willing or competent to do that particular job. As a result the evacuees' farm supervisors would in many cases not utilize them. In other cases the persons, since they considered themselves volunteers, would not do assigned work. For example, it was nearly impossible to get volunteers to stack hay. Thus the block managers felt that their efforts to secure volunteers were not appreciated, the volunteers themselves complained that when they went to work there was nothing to do, and the supervisors, on the other hand, complained that there was no orderly flow of labor so that they could plan their work, and too often the labor furnished was lazy or over-specialized. Nevertheless there were no crop losses of any consequence.

During this period relocation was beginning to take its toll. Good mechanics became scarce. Truck drivers were leaving in large numbers either on seasonal or indefinite leave. Clerical personnel was turning over at a rate of about 160 percent per year. In many instances the losses occasioned by relocation were being replaced by less competent or less willing workers. In a few sections it was found that the work could be done with a lesser number of employees and requests for replacements were not being made. Consideration was given to enforced reductions but most of the Section Heads agreed that enforced reductions to improve efficiency were dangerous because too often at the same time that an enforced reduction program was culling the less efficient, the more efficient were leaving for work outside the center. Thus it was felt that an enforced reduction program would result in understaffing. In most sections this opinion was later substantiated by results.

4. Reduction in Force Program

In July, 1943 the Washington office issued instructions for an enforced 10 percent reduction per month to be effective during the months of August, September and October. The first 10 percent was accomplished as ordered and the difficulties attendant, as mentioned above, immediately became apparent and a request was made and accepted by the Washington office to forego the enforced reductions and permit natural attrition to reduce staffs. This worked out satisfactorily until January, 1944 when an effort was made to reduce the number of stokers in the blocks and also the number of mess-hall employees. It was generally agreed by the staff that both of these functions could operate with less personnel but the evacuees objected strenuously. However, the Mess Section employment was reduced approximately 15 percent, but as a result of complications here and on other projects only a slight reduction was made in the stoker employment.

5. Compensatory Time

Another complicating factor developed in our employment relations early in 1944. In the early policies established for the Authority, it was determined that evacuees who worked more than the standard 44-hour work week would be credited with compensatory time which was to be granted by giving an equivalent of time off. During the first 15 months of project operations, as a result of long hours required in organizing, lax timekeeping, and supervision, and various emergencies requiring extra hours, there were accumulated by various individuals a total of approximately 200,000 hours compensatory time. Through administrative action over the same period it had been possible to grant some of this time and because of relocation some of it had been forfeited. However, the balance remaining in January, 1944 of 180,000 hours was sufficient to cause concern, particularly among evacuees who were planning to relocate and who were counting on payment of this compensatory time to add to their funds. An effort was made to secure authority to permit payment upon relocation for all compensatory time to the credit of an evacuee. This effort was considered for two or three months and disapproved by the Washington office. Finally a new policy was issued, permitting payments after relocation for compensatory time earned after January 1, 1944 but did not permit such payments for the large amount in question. In lieu thereof, the Washington office set a deadline of June 30, 1944 for the liquidation of this time. It was evident that this deadline could not be met and authority was secured to extend the deadline until January 1, 1945, at which time a small remaining balance of less than 1,000 hours was written off the books. The difference was liquidated either by forfeiture or by granting time off as required by the regulations. This compensatory time problem was met almost entirely by rigid restrictions which did not permit crediting of compensatory time unless overtime work was required and approved by a Section Head. This took the discretionary power away from the timekeepers and the unit supervisors or other foremen.

6. Farming Program - 1944

During the farming season of 1944 there was a change made in seasonal leave regulations which required approved contracts through the War Food Administration before evacuees could accept outside job offers on farms. This tended to slow down seasonal leaves and gave the farm an opportunity to hold laborers a little longer than had been true the previous year. Also the type of crop raised was changed somewhat from that of the previous year so that smaller numbers of laborers would be required. The number was still large (about 300). This quota was never met yet crops were planted and cultivated. In the fall it again became apparent that some plan would have to be worked out to harvest the crops. When a volunteering plan was first proposed it was not received with favor by any of the principals involved such as Agriculture, block managers, school system, etc. However, it was decided to change

the approach and the volunteering was handled through the Assistant Project Director in charge of Operations. The 1943 principle of drafting workers from other operating offices was applied; however, it was changed so that a section would be assigned a given day when its workers would work on the farm and it would report in advance the number of workers that would be furnished and would also furnish one of the regular section or unit heads to serve as "straw boss". Thus the evacuees would be working under their normal supervision. Some sections, such as the Motor Pool, Hospital, Police Department, and Fire Department, were exempted because of the necessity of continuity of their functions. (In the previous year it was found that the truck drivers had been drafted to harvest onions on the very day when they were needed to load and store potatoes to protect them from the weather.) The schools were requested to cooperate on a rotation basis; thus, the sophomores would work on one day, juniors the next, and seniors the next. (Only the three upper grades were permitted to participate.) The results of this arrangement were eminently successful. The crops were harvested, the supervisors were satisfied, most of the workers were kept busy, and a competitive spirit among sections developed to see who could harvest the most onions, tomatoes, etc. It was amusing to see typists competing with seasoned agricultural workers in the harvesting of onions and incidentally the efforts of the typists showed up very well. Another feature of this program was that the farm was responsible for furnishing transportation and would be given a designated place to pick up supervisors and their crews. This was not done in previous year and resulted in much loss of time.

In both 1943 and 1944 harvest seasons there was a problem of payment for those who were not already assigned. In the first year an effort was made to secure volunteers as straight volunteers without payment. This did not work at all. Finally it was agreed that those who were not otherwise employed would receive payment for their services on the farm. Those who were employed by other sections would continue to be carried on the payrolls of those sections on the days when they worked on the farm. This plan worked out with a minimum of hitches but it did require constant supervision by the Chief of Operations and the Agricultural Section to insure that timing of arrangements was properly made and that commitments were kept. The 1944 program was planned to last about a month but was actually completed in slightly over two weeks.

7. Decrease of Workers

During the period from July, 1944 to date there has been a continual decline in the number of workers. This was the result of relocation of families, breadwinners, etc. In August, 1944 the Property and Warehousing Section was struggling with 38 evacuee employees as compared to a usual employment ranging from 80 to 100. The Finance Section had dropped from 40 to 23. The Motor Pool was short approximately 35 employees from its standard complement. The Hospital was having an extremely difficult time securing nurses aides and other workers. Appeals

were constantly being made to the Council, Block Managers, etc. In many cases the appeals were overlapping but the reservoir of labor appeared to be gone out of the center. About 800 able-bodied men out of approximately 2700 males of all ages (from 1 to 80 years of age) were out on seasonal leave. The outlook was very discouraging. At this time a proposal was received from the Washington office that a joint manpower commission be formed from members of the evacuee community and the appointed staff to study and recommend priorities and labor utilization policies. This plan was presented to the Council in early September and evidently was received with favor; however, it later became a bone of contention in a political squabble which embroiled the Council, Block Managers, and Administration and resulted in nothing. In the meantime the Administration tightened up on proselytizing of employees among sections, in prohibiting reemployment of employees who quit without cause, and other measures. Most sections were able to operate although some like the Property and Warehousing Section, the Hospital and Fire Department suffered as a result. The number of employees continued to decrease and additional strains in the organization resulted.

8. Conclusions and Recommendations

It was unfortunate that the press of getting the project going did not permit more systematic employment practices in the beginning; however, it appears to have been inevitable that employment practices would take the turn they did under the conditions existing. The only way this might have been avoided would have been to have selected in advance the specific persons and number of employees needed before even one evacuee came here and it would have been necessary to have these selected persons here at the project first. This was totally unfeasible and it is hard to visualize any other approach that might have been taken different from the one which, although not planned, actually developed.

The basic policy on compensatory time evidently did not anticipate that there would be such a thing as relocation. If it had, it appears reasonable to expect that some provision would have been made for payment of overtime to evacuees as they relocated. The fact that this did not exist and it was not possible to revise the policy which existed created an unsatisfactory feeling both on the part of administrative personnel and on part of the evacuees with respect to commitments of the government. The evacuees felt that so many other commitments had not been kept that they treated the idea of forfeiture of compensatory time as another worthless promise. This had an adverse reaction in the relocation of many of the most reliable workers who had faithfully performed their duties and worked overtime while they developed their relocation plans and then found the only way they could get their overtime pay was to loaf in the center until they had consumed in idleness an amount of time equivalent to the compensatory time to their credit.

One item not commented upon above was the policy formulated nationally in the Washington office for the classification and control of the number of each individual type of position from Washington. This tended to treat evacuee positions very much on the same basis as standard Civil Service positions. It required a great deal of time, much correspondence, much misunderstanding, and, apparently failed to achieve any purpose. It appears that overall financial and employment ceiling control could have been placed on the projects from the Washington office and from that point out the number and types of assignments could have been made at the project within the limitation of those controls. The original plan was finally modified and generalized to a large extent in the summer of 1945. Prior to that time much effort was spent in discussing titles, securing job descriptions, assigning position numbers and codes, etc. It appears that it would have been better to issue a catalogue of titles from which titles could be selected without any restriction or requirement as to the number of any given title used, particularly when many of the titles involved merely a definition between selected kinds of basic laborers; for example, farm laborers, construction laborers, warehouse laborers, etc., all of whom are paid the same rate and perform only unskilled labor functions.

The policy finally worked out in 1944 for the payment of compensatory time was adequate in all respects with the exception that it would have simplified record keeping and would have added to the pocket money of evacuees when they relocated if authority could have been secured for lump sum payments on the day that an evacuee relocated. Under the policy used it was necessary to continue them on a payroll until the compensatory time was used up which in some cases resulted in individuals' receiving monthly pay of \$16 or \$19 over a period of three or four months instead of a lump sum payment.

The labor program on the whole required a high type of leadership on the part of appointed personnel, great tact, a willingness to change ideas, and above all an avoidance of punitive action except in those cases where offenses were of the more aggravated type. All of these factors made it extremely difficult for supervisors. Termination in itself was not a punishment because it was too much like Uncle Remus' rabbit who didn't want to be thrown in the old briar patch. The evacuees would welcome termination as punishment. In some aggravated cases it was found much more satisfactory to present the case to a community body to let them know the other side of the story which, in turn, often resulted in criticism by the evacuees themselves of the offenders. It was found consistently that evacuees would do almost any type of work for a man they liked and respected rather than work for a more efficient and just as fair individual who might have unfortunately had a peculiar manner of speaking or some other unoffensive but unwelcome trait of personality or appearance. The evacuees on the whole respected fairness but they knew that because of the differences in various supervisors there were not the same standards either of performance or discipline in all departments and they took advantage of this whenever an issue arose between the staff and the evacuees.

Although there never have been any adequate incentives or disciplinary measures available for securing a high standard of work, the project has, through compromising on many points, been able to function. It is true that in the majority of cases the evacuees have worked six hours or less per day as a standard work day. In some cases evacuees would not do certain types of work which they considered disagreeable, while at the same time they did other types of work which were considered by the administrative staff as more disagreeable. Nevertheless in spite of the many complications, the many problems to be met, there never was on the project a general strike, riot, or other demonstration resulting in complete cleavage between the administration and the evacuees. There were isolated cases. For example, a carpenters crew of about 20 men walked out on one occasion because of difficulties with the foreman. On one occasion the slaughter house workers refused for a few days to slaughter chickens since they considered themselves specialists in the slaughter of beef and pork. On another occasion the fire protection crew walked out for a few days because a night mess hall was closed. The coal unloaders, during the first year here, were an on and off proposition over a period of a few weeks but finally got the job done.

In summary then, it might be said that although peak efficiency was never reached, neither did a complete disintegration ever set in. On many occasions supervisors in considering a current problem to which no solution appeared evident had but to recall the numerous instances when they had been faced with a similar situation and at the last moment a crew would develop, either through cooperation of Block Managers, Council, or the efforts of individual evacuees or members of the staff. In many cases results were obtained through the efforts of individuals who, although not immediately associated with the department in which the question existed, were indirectly affected or interested and took a part in working out a solution for the common good.

There is attached a table showing the population and employment by sex, the total evacuee workers, percentage of total population employed, and the distribution of workers according to wage class for each quarter from December 31, 1942 to June 30, 1945. Periods prior and subsequent to these dates are not included as they are not considered significant. As of October 1, 1945 approximately 160 evacuees were still employed and about 50 were volunteering for essential services such as kitchen work, hauling evacuee property, etc.

TABLE I
TABLE OF APPOINTED PERSONNEL AS OF EACH SIGNIFICANT
DATE FROM JANUARY 1, 1943 TO OCTOBER 1, 1945
(Granada Relocation Center)

	1945									1944						1943					
	October 1			July 1			January 1			July 1			Nov.9 - Jan.1			July 1			January 1		
	P**	T***	Total	P	T	Total	P	T	Total	P	T	Total	P	T	Total	P	T	Total	P	T	Total
I. OFFICE OF PROJECT DIRECTOR																					
Project Director	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2
1. Legal Division	1	1	2	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1
2. Reports Division	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1
3. Relocation Division	13	1	14	12	1	13	7	-	7	4	-	4	4	-	4	5	-	5	7	-	7
4. Evacuee Property Section	2	-	2	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	0	-	-	0
Division Total	19	3	22	17	2	19	12	0	12	9	0	9	9	0	9	9	0	9	11	0	11
II. ADMINISTRATIVE MGMT. DIVISION																					
Asst. Project Director	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1
1. Finance Section	13	1	14	12	1	13	10	-	10	12	-	12	9	-	9	8	-	8	8	-	8
2. Supply Section	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0
3. Procurement Unit	1	-	1	2	-	2	2	-	2	1	-	1	3	-	3	3	-	3	3	-	3
4. Property Control & Warehouse	9	17	26	11	1	12	9	-	9	8	-	8	12	1	13	10	-	10	9	-	9
5. Mess Operations Section	3	6	9	4	1	5	4	-	4	4	-	4	3	-	3	3	-	3	3	-	3
6. Office Services Section	2	3	5	5	-	5	5	1	6	5	-	5	6	-	6	4	2	6	7	-	7
7. Personnel Mgmt. Section	2	9	11	2	-	2	3	-	3	4	-	4	2	-	2	2	-	2	1	-	1
8. Statistics Section	4	2	6	3	1	4	3	-	3	1	1	2	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0
Division Total	35	39	74	40	5	45	37	1	38	36	1	37	36	1	37	31	2	33	32	0	32
III. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT DIVISION																					
Asst. Project Director	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2	1	-	1	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2
1. Internal Security Section	4	4	8	5	-	5	5	-	5	4	-	4	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2
2. Welfare Section	5	1	6	8	1	9	7	-	7	9	-	9	5	-	5	4	-	4	2	-	2
3. Health Section	8	1	9	11	1	12	11	-	11	11	-	11	15	-	15	14	-	14	10	-	10
4. Education Section	13	-	13	32	-	32	55	5	60	54	-	54	53	-	53	50	11	61	51	-	51
5. Community Activities Section	-	-	0	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1
6. Community Analysis Section	-	-	0	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	0
7. Community Government Section	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0
8. Business Enterprises Section	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	1	-	1	2	-	2	2	-	2
Division Total	32	6	38	60	2	62	82	5	87	81	-	81	80	-	80	78	11	89	70	-	70

TABLE I
-Continued-
(Page 2)

IV. OPERATIONS DIVISION

Asst. Project Director

1. Engineering Section
2. Agriculture Section
3. Motor Transport. & Maint.
4. Fire Protection Section
5. Industry Section

Division Total

GRAND TOTAL

1945									1944						1943					
October 1			July 1			January 1			July 1			Nov. 9 - Jan. 1			July 1			January 1		
P	T	Total	P	T	Total	P	T	Total	P	T	Total	P	T	Total	P	T	Total	P	T	Total
1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	0	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	0
13	11	24	14	-	14	18	-	18	16	-	16	18	-	18	13	13	26	18	9	27
3	-	3	3	-	3	6	-	6	6	-	6	4	-	4	4	1	5	4	-	4
5	8	13	7	-	7	8	-	8	11	-	11	10	-	10	9	3	12	11	-	11
1	5	6	1	-	1	1	-	1	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2	2	-	2
-	-	0	-	-	0	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	0
23	24	47	26	-	26	35	-	35	36	-	36	36	1	37	30	17	47	35	9	44
109	72	181	143	9	152	166	6	172	162	1	163	161	2	163	148	30	178	148	9	157

*Note: Data was taken from charts prepared periodically. Actual dates of charts used varied from one to four weeks from dates shown on headings in this table.

**p Permanent, Full Time

***T Temporary and Intermittent

TABLE II
TABLE OF EVACUEE POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT BY SEX AND WAGE CLASS
BY QUARTERS FROM DECEMBER 31, 1942 TO JUNE 30, 1945
(Granada Relocation Center)

	Pop. Males	Workers Males	Pop. Females	Workers Females	Total Pop.	Total Workers	Percent of Population Employed	No. C Workers \$19 Per Mo.	No. B Workers \$16 Per Mo.
Dec. 31, 1942	3.752	1.950	3.070	1.091	6.822	3.041	46.6	1,260	1,781
Mar. 31, 1943	3.758	2.223	3.075	1.010	6.833	3.233	47.3	1,397	1,836
Jun. 30, 1943	3.353	1.896	2.857	1.198	6.210	3.094	49.8	1,593	1,501
Sep. 30, 1943	3.496	1.753	3.101	1.197	6.597	2,950	44.7	368	2,582
Dec. 31, 1943	3.694	1.773	3.236	1.077	6.930	2,850	41.1	422	2,428
Mar. 31, 1944	3.294	1.625	3.103	1.038	6.397	2,663	41.6	440	2,223
Jun. 30, 1944	2.909	1.310	3.188	1.121	6.097	2,431	39.9	347	2,084
Sep. 30, 1944	2.598	1.072	3.014	1.107	5.612	2,179	38.8	339	1,840
Dec. 31, 1944	2.975	1.331	3.222	966	6.197	2,297	37.1	402	1,895
Mar. 31, 1945	2.899	1,231	2,930	919	5.829	2,150	36.9	377	1,773
Jun. 30, 1945	2.030	1.027	2.139	833	4.169	1,860	44.6	305	1,027