

Tule Lake

CHAPTER II. THE STRUCTURE OF COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS

In the language of the people at Tule Lake, there were abundant references to such distinctions as "keto" (Caucasians) and "Japs"; "Issei", "Nisei", and "Kibei"; and "Northwesterners" and "Californians". These stereotypes defined some of the major lines of social relationships maintained in the community and served as significant means by which people identified each other and thus regulated their behavior. They also referred to areas of tension in social relations. Whether these distinctions were accurate and objectively real or not, their frequent and glib use in community discussions attested to their importance in organizing the thinking and behavior of the people.

These distinctions existed prior to the evacuation and were often referred to in the discussions of the Japanese communities prior to the war. The evacuation, however, had the effect of greatly enhancing the significance of certain of these stereotypes, for the conditions of the evacuation and of center life brought into close social relationship the different classes of people referred to in the stereotypes and thus raised problems of adjustment which had not existed before with the same intensity. One result of the evacuation was to give Caucasians supervisory authority over Japanese community life. Second, evacuees from disparate parts of the Pacific Coast were thrown together in a single community under conditions of unprecedented intimacy and confinement. Third, where participation in Japanese community life had ~~hitherto~~ hitherto been voluntary, within the relocation center such participation could not be avoided and all the residents had a personal stake in the policies and action adopted by the community.

By the structure of community relationships reference is being made to the popular delineations of the major groupings of people involed in community relations and also to the general forms of behavior characterizing social relations within each category and between one category and another. While the organization of the Tule Lake community was influenced by rapid changes during the first year, the attitudes underlying the above-mentioned distinctions had a persistence not affected by the superficial changes in the community. The fact that these distinctions were persistent and fundamental seems to warrant their treatment as structural features of social relationships.

A. TWO WORLDS: THE CAUCASIANS AND THE EVACUEES

The Discrimination of Evacuation

Setting aside the question of the justification of evacuation, the evacuation was discriminating in that a difference of treatment was accorded the people of Japanese ancestry by contrast with that accorded all other peoples of the country. At the projects it was a question of the utmost importance as to whether this discrimination resulted from a real danger of having the people of Japanese ancestry remain on the Pacific Coast and was therefore based upon military necessity, or whether the discrimination was based upon racial prejudice. No final and conclusive answer to the question could be given. But as far as the evacuees were concerned, the overwhelming majority was convinced that the evacuation had occurred, not in response to any real military necessity, but rather because of the prejudices and the economic greed of the majority people.

The nature of the evacuation gave substance to the view that

the evacuation of the Japanese was based upon racial considerations. The one fact above all others which tended to emphasize this fact upon the evacuees was that the people of Japanese ancestry, and they alone, were evacuated. At the Hearings of the Tolan Committee the view was abundantly expressed that most Issei and Nisei were probably loyal to the United States, but it was the inability to tell the loyal from the disloyal which was declared to be the major reason for the necessity of total evacuation. For instance, Governor Olson of California declared at the Hearings:

. . . . First, let me say, the distinction between the Japanese and the Italian and German is the difficulty of telling who is who among the Japanese. I think they realize that. I don't believe that difficulty exists among the Germans and Italians.^{1/}

It was on the ground that, "We cannot doubt, and everyone is agreed, that the majority of Japanese citizens and aliens are loyal to this country. But the innocent ten in this time of war will perforce suffer for the guilty one,"^{2/} that the evacuation was justified by the Tolan Committee. On the other hand, the same Committee recommended that, "They (a hearing board) should examine all cases of German and Italian aliens on an individual basis."^{3/} At the time persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated, however, it was understood that the evacuation of German and Italian aliens would follow.^{4/} The anticipated movement of the latter groups never occurred, but since no specific announcement was made that the evacuation of German and Italian~~s~~ aliens would not occur, it was only gradually that the Japanese evacuees became aware that

^{1/} Tolan Committee Hearings, Fourth Interim Report, p. 141.
^{2/} Tolan Committee Hearings, Preliminary Reports and Recommendations, p. 15.

^{3/} Ibid., p. 23.

^{4/}

they had been selected for special treatment. The main protests of the evacuees was against the principle of evacuation, for they were concerned with their personal situation and not with whether or not the German and Italian aliens would share their plight, but the realization that the latter were not to be evacuated increased the feeling that the Japanese had been duped and that they were being subjected to racial persecution. The logic of the evacuees' thinking might be summarized as follows: German and Italian aliens were in the same situation internationally as the Japanese; the former were not evacuated and only the Japanese were subjected to such treatment; therefore, since the only difference between the former and the latter was a racial one, the basic consideration underlying the evacuation must have been racial.

The citizens of Japanese ancestry were especially disturbed at the knowledge that they had been evacuated despite their citizenship, whereas aliens of German and Italian ancestry were able to escape evacuation. One Nisei who identified himself closely with America but who was somewhat embittered over the evacuation and had sought to analyze the circumstances leading to it remarked:

It doesn't make sense to me. Here we're citizens of the United States and are supposed to have the rights of citizenship, but the Army tells us that for reasons of military necessity ~~were~~ have to be evacuated so they move us out. But now it seems that German and Italian aliens who as "enemy aliens" have no rights under the Government are exempt from evacuation. As far as that goes, I don't see any reason why the Issei should have been evacuated either. There hasn't been a single known case of sabotage from among the Japanese, only rumors, but it's only the rumors which are written up and their denials are written up in some small item placed in an inconspicuous part of the newspaper. From the standpoint of danger to national defense, I'm sure the Germans are far more dangerous than the Japanese could ever hope to be. It's known that they have a most efficient espionage system. The Japanese couldn't hope

to have a spy system like the Germans. Because they're different racially, if a Japanese spy did anything the least bit suspicious, he'd immediately be spotted. And look at how active the German Bunds have been in this country. Many of them have been openly pro-Nazi. Perhaps the Government would claim that the danger of having German aliens on the Pacific Coast wasn't so great, but the danger on the Atlantic Coast is certainly no different than out here. Using the same argument that was used on the Japanese, the Germans on the Atlantic Coast would have had to be evacuated. I'm not saying that the German and Italian aliens should have been evacuated, but the Japanese aliens should have been given the same consideration. And as far as the citizens go, it certainly doesn't make sense that we aren't given as much consideration as aliens.1/

At a conference of Caucasians and evacuees to discuss the possibilities of education at the Tule Lake Project for high school and grade school children, those present were asked to voice their opinions on what they considered should be the objectives of such education. While older representatives of the two groups dwelt on the desirability of a practical education correlated with the circumstances of the local community, or emphasized the need for a general liberal education, one young Nisei girl who had made a brilliant record as a student at the University of California raised the issue:

I believe I am the youngest person here and I feel I have nothing to offer after listening to those of you who are more mature. But there is one thing I am sure the students here would like to know and which I feel should be clarified for them. That is concerning the meaning of evacuation, of what it was that brought the evacuation about.2/

Her remarks were followed by a round of approving applause and expressions of surprise as if the audience had been jolted into an awareness of a problem that was so close to them that they had overlooked its significance as an element in education. It was generally the "intellectuals" among the evacuees who gave serious thought

1/ Miyamoto Notes, July 17, 1942.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, July 24, 1942.

to an analysis of the reasons behind the evacuation, and it was these spokesmen who presented to the evacuees the more refined discussions of the influence of vested interest groups and political pressure groups as significant influences behind the evacuation.^{1/} While the accounts of the reasons for evacuation given by the masses of the people were less sophisticated, the notable point was that they rejected the Army's explanation in terms of "military necessity", which if accepted would have rendered the evacuation a purely practical issue and not a moral one. The most generally accepted explanations of the evacuation were: (1) the greedy desire of the majority group to usurp control of the rich Japanese holdings in farmland and business; (2) the Japanese had been made a political football for West Coast politicians desiring to strengthen their position by playing upon the prejudices of the people; (3) the prejudices of General DeWitt caused the evacuation; and (4) the racial prejudice of the majority group, fanned into white heat by the rabble-rousing press, influenced the authorities to take an irrational decision.

To most evacuees, but especially to the Issei who frequently reminisced about their experiences in America, the evacuation was only the most recent and most outrageous expression of the long history of anti-Japanese agitation on the Pacific Coast. The term, "hainichi-mondai" (The Anti-Japanese Problem), which from time to time had occupied a prominent place in the Japanese vernacular press and community discussions, was again a much used word in community discussions, indicating the context within which discussions of the

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, July 14, 1942.

evacuation were placed. The historical reaction of the immigrant Japanese to instances of anti-Japanese action has been one of very strong resentment against the attitudes of white supremacy, and one motivation behind their economic struggles in America has been the aim of showing the white majority group that the Japanese are capable of advancing in spite of discrimination, that they are a group to contend with as equals and not to be teated slightly. Such a background which has necessarily kept alive a strong race consciousness among the Japanese gave a predisposition to regard the evacuation as the most convincing evidence of the racial antipathy of the white man against the Japanese.

The evacuation thus had the effect of making the people of Japanese ancestry more than ever aware of their racial distinction from the white man. Since the one factor of their racial-national background, disregarding any other qualities of ^{the} individual members, condemned the entire group to confinement, and it was the white majority group which had authorized the evacuation, the evacuees were forcibly made to feel their racial-national distinctiveness. Also, the conditions of the relocation center, that the "Japanese" were behind barbed-wire fences on the inside, and the "Whites" were on the outside, contributed to the feeling of a schism between the two groups. As a note of caution it should be mentioned that such feelings were not uniformly held throughout the project, although it was rather widespread among the Issei, and that the attitudes on the question were changeable depending upon the subject of discussion.

There were several expressions of pro-Japanese sentiments from Nisei who apparently had once thought themselves to be good Americans. One fellow said, 'I always thought I was an American in spite of what my parents said to me; but this

evacuation proves that my parents were right--race is more important than citizenship." However, he ran into a barrage of criticism from other students who were still pro-American.^{1/}

The "Keto" and the "Japs"

The line of division between the Caucasians and the people of Japanese ancestry is well defined by the two derogatory terms, "Jap" and "Keto". To be sure both terms have a common usage as abbreviations that implies no derogation, but reference is here made to their emotionally toned usage for the hostilities aroused by the evacuation tended to give to the terms, as used at the center, something more than a neutral value. It is needless to mention what ~~by~~ "Jap" means in American parlance today, whether applied to the people of Japan or to the evacuees in America. The term, "keto", literally means a hairy foreigner, in other words, a white man. The word, "ketō" or "ketō-jin", is compounded by adding the character for "hairy" (ke) to the word, "tō-jin", meaning foreigner, but which is also used to mean the Chinese. The confounding of foreigner and Chinese is understandable when it is recalled that that Chinese were the only foreigners known to the Japanese in early history, and it needs to be added that the Chinese, not to mention all foreigners, were regarded as barbarians and inferior peoples by the people of early Japan. This suggests that the word, "keto", has always been used to denote a superiority of the Japanese over the hairy foreigners. The proper terms for white man and for foreigner corresponding to the vulgar terms are, respectively, "haku-jin" (lit., white man) and "gaikoku-jin" (lit., out lands people).

The evacuee references to the keto, therefore, implied an at-

^{1/} Shibutani Journal, July 30, 1942.

titude of contempt and also of hostility toward the majority group. Before the war it was as common to hear among the Issei and Kibei the use of hakujin as the more vulgar term keto, but at the center there was almost a studied avoidance of the more polite form in the conversations of the bulk of the Japanese speaking population. Even with the Nisei among whom there was relatively limited use of the word keto prior to the evacuation, there was a notable increase in its usage at the center.

Because of their confinement at the center, the evacuees had for the most part only limited contacts with Caucasians other than those serving in administrative or teaching positions at the project. Despite ^{the limitations upon} any direct contact between the evacuees and the majority group from which they were isolated, there existed a very real relationship between them maintained by newspapers and other means of communication. The tendency was to interpret any publicity about the evacuees or the centers as either favorable or unfavorable --there were seldom any neutral reactions--and it was particularly to the unfavorable articles that the evacuees responded most strongly. Because the Tule Lake Project was within the State of California and news of the sentiments in that region constantly filtered into the center, the people at Tule Lake, as at Manzanar, were particularly sensitive to the anti-Japanese activity of certain groups and individuals engaged in campaigns against the evacuees. The sensitivity of the evacuees to the unfavorable publicity is reflected in their demands at the time of the registration and of the O.W.I. incident in September 1942 for more government control over antagonistic publicity if the evacuees were being asked to cooperate with W.R.A. programs. One of the several questions raised at the time of

of registration was:

If the Japanese American citizens were to sacrifice their life in the armed forces, why doesn't the Government take steps to stop some of these propaganda movies or the articles in the newspapers about the Niseis being saboteurs and spies.^{1/}

Similarly,

Another thing I'd like to know is, when are the newspapers and magazines going to stop printing adverse accounts of the Japanese. The Government can control these newspapers and magazines, and yet they permit them to continue.^{2/}

A matter of significant concern to the evacuees was the repeated attempts of anti-Japanese organizations of California and Congressional representatives from the West Coast to deprive the American-born Japanese of their citizenship, deport all aliens of Japanese ancestry as well as the dual citizens to Japan after the war, and other measures similarly designed to restrict the rights of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry. This discussion reached its height at Tule Lake in late September 1942 when Walter Tsukamoto reported the passage of a bill in Congress depriving the Nisei of their citizenship, a rumor based upon a report in the A.C.L.U. news organ which was later proved to be incorrect.^{3/} Similar resolutions and bills appearing in the Pacific Coast state legislatures or in the national Congress were reported from time to time in the newspapers reaching the Tule Lake Project, and while the passive reaction of the Nisei at the project to these threats were such as to call forth severe editorial rebukes in the Tulean Dispatch^{4/}, there was a general aware-

^{1/} Minutes of Special Council Meeting, Feb. 12, 1943.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, Feb. 15, 1943.

^{3/} See Tule Lake Report, Chap. VI, Part I, pp.

^{4/} Tulean Dispatch, October 9, 1942, p. 2.
Tulean Dispatch, October 26, 1942, p. 2.

ness that this threat existed. The evacuees were generally unaware of the specific nature of the bills and legal suits for the disenfranchisement of the Nisei, but were aware that "they're trying to take our citizenship away from us," and were indignant at these attempts. News items like the following left no doubt that the bills, suits, and resolutions, though often written to include the disenfranchisement of groups other than those of Japanese ancestry, were specifically aimed at the latter.

ONLY WHITES AS CITIZENS, WEBB URGES

Suit of the Native Sons of the Golden West to disenfranchise native-born Japanese brought the argument from U.S. Webb, former Attorney General, that the Declaration of Independence was written "for and by white people."

Only persons born of the white race he argued before Federal Judge A. F. St. Sure yesterday should be eligible for citizenship. Although he excepted the Negroes, he said that Hottentots, Japanese, Chinese and inhabitants of the Pacific Islands should be barred. Congress "could and should in a fortnight 'citizenize' the Chinese," he added.

Under his interpretation of what the law should be, Chinese would be excluded and a special congressional act would be necessary to enfranchise them.^{1/}

The comment of a Nisei college graduate to this item was:

I see that old race-baiter 'United States' Webb is at it again. The guy must be illiterate. What are Hottentots if they're not Negroes? Gawd, he certainly must have strained himself in deciding that the Chinese should be 'citizenized;' that was quite a consession.^{2/}

A more constant news publicity about the centers was the accusation of West Coast Senators and Congressmen that the W.R.A. was pampering and coddling the evacuees. Statements of this kind were infuriating to the evacuees who felt that far from being pampered

^{1/} San Francisco Chronicle, June 27, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, June 27, 1942.

they were being forced to accept hardships under which any other group of people would rebel. Typical of the kinds of argument presented in the news to which the evacuees objected is this:

Chairman Reynolds (D., N.C.) of the Senate Military Affairs Committee announced today a plan to restore Army control over Japanese relocation camps to halt what he called "pampering" and anti-American demonstrations in these colonies.

Senator Wallgren (D., Wash.) confirmed that he would introduce a resolution for transfer of supervision over the camps back to the Army from the War Relocation Authority.....When thousands of Japanese were first settled in 10 colonies in various States, Senator Wallgren told reporters, the supervision "operated fine under the Army".

Later the camps were taken from Army control and turned over to the WRA, which, Senator Johnson (D., Colo.) described, as "one of those social experimental agencies." Johnson and other West Coast Senators said the Japanese were "being pampered" and that there were reports of riotous demonstrations in some of the colonies against the United States, particularly on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor.^{1/}
made

To the evacuees who felt they had/more than their share of sacrifices, the repeated suggestions that they were being coddled by the W.R.A. was extremely ironical and embittering. When it was learned that Senator Wallgren would visit the Tule Lake Center in ^{March} February 1943 for an investigatory tour, one Nisei remarked with malicious humor, "I hope he stays a few days. We can put him up fine right in our bachelor's quarter. It won't be any trouble squeezing in an extra cot, and I'd be glad to lend him some of my bedding. To show him our hospitality we'll even take him to our mess hall and he can dine on the 'slop suey'. As a professional man, I guess he should be paid \$19 a month, too. If he stayed here for a while he'd get a real inside picture and maybe find out about all the subversive activity. I guess I'll go home and write him a nice invitation to bunk with us at 5507-A."^{2/}

^{1/} San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 15, 1943.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, March 16, 1943.

In a similar vein though less sarcastically an editorial in the Tulean Dispatch expressed the hope that critics of the W.R.A. and the claimants that the evacuees were being "pampered" might see at first hand the life within the relocation centers. The editorial bearing the title, "Now You Know, Senator," declared:

Last week Senator Wallgren, who created quite a stir among the evacuees when he proposed that Relocation Centers be returned to Army jurisdiction because evacuees were being coddled, dropped in unexpectedly here.

Very few people knew of his presence. During his brief stay here he covered as much of camp life as possible. It was reported that he talked with several of the camp residents.

We do not know whether he visited any of the apartments or ate in any of the community mess halls. Neither do we know whether he was enlightened by what he saw here. Only when he returns to Washington will we know what his reactions to camp life conditions has been.

We can, however, be sure of this. Now that he has seen some of the conditions under which evacuees are living by coming into actual contact with them; now that he has actually, figuratively speaking, brushed shoulders with evacuees, his future utterances or actions will be based on first hand knowledge and not on hearsay.

Men who sit in the high seat of the government thousands of miles away from Relocation Centers, and rant and rave and make accusations may have never come into contact with Japanese-Americans.

We doubt if the distinguished Senator Rankin and Jackson, the latter who recently made a statement in Congress attacking the Japanese in this country, have ever tried to get a first-hand knowledge of the Japanese-Americans, or have ever seen or talked with one.

Conclusions should be drawn after fair and impartial study based on facts. That is a democratic way of doing things.^{1/}

It was rather sanguine of the editorialist to assume that the one day visitor of the Senator would give him a "first-hand knowledge" of center life, but the editorial does express the

^{1/} Tulean Dispatch, March 23, 1943, p. 2.

belief of the evacuees that if their critics were themselves required to experience center life they would be more understanding. Even those articles written by persons who had inspected centers and presumably wrote with sympathetic intent were often condemned for the superficiality of their observations. One such article which evoked in the evacuees a sense of futility about having Caucasians understand the evacuee point of view was a half-page, illustrated, human interest story written by Maureen O'Brien, Contract Bridge Editor, of the San Francisco Chronicle, which was entitled, "BRIDGE HAS INVADED REALM OF THE ASSEMBLY CENTER, A Report on Tanforan," which presumed ~~to~~ described that assembly center. Almost half of the article dwelt on the interest in bridge among the evacuees at the center, and the remainder to a pleasant picture of an interesting recreational, education^{al} and social life. The tone was set by the paragraph:

A newspaperman who visited the center a couple of months ago had warned us when we told him we were making the trip and hoped to be permitted to go into the center proper, that we'd be very depressed. Well, we weren't depressed at all. In fact we're darn proud to belong to a country that can do such a swell job of building morale and laying a foundation for the future. For to our notion, that's just what the WCCA is doing, at least in the one center we've looked at.¹

A Nisei who had been at Tanforan remarked upon reading the article, "Jeez, what a lot of sentimental boloney," and proceeded to describe Tanforan as he knew it, a sordid account of cleaning out manure from the horse sheds where they slept, of crowded and inadequate latrine facilities, and of the stupid regulations imposed by the bigoted camp manager. In the "Safety Valve" (Letters to the Editor) column of the same paper, two letters appeared depre-

¹/ San Francisco Chronicle, August 16, 1942.

²/ Miyamoto Notes, August 17, 1942.

cating the superficial and rosy picture of Tanforan presented by Miss O'Brien, one of which was from a Nisei girl, Masako Tabuchi, at the Stockton Assembly Center who described assembly center life as she saw it and ended with the statement, "If people are to be penalized for accidents of birth, then I am a stranger to the ideals of democracy to which I had been exposed all these 22 years."^{1/} Two other letters then followed replying to Miss Tabuchi. They are worth reproducing since they represent the type of attitudes in the Caucasians which most irritated the evacuees.

Editor The Chronicle--Sir:
I have read the letter by Miss Masako Tabuchi and would say to her: You cannot get away from the "accident of birth" as long as you are in a mortal world, be your country a democracy or otherwise.

It's a fine idea to "count your blessings" and to remember the things you mention as sufferings are only a small part of those hardships embraced gladly by the pioneers of this country. Be thankful you are not "by accident of birth" one of those devoted white missionaries who suffered the water cure at the hands of the Japanese.

Palo Alto Dora N. Crosby

Editor The Chronicle--Sir:
After reading Miss Masaka Labuchi's letter in the Safety Valve, September 1, my blood boils. As far as any Japanese birth being an accident, it was not; it was an order from Japan. I wonder how many persons of American blood in Japan are indulging in dances, card parties, baseball, basketball? I wonder what kind of educational and recreational facilities the Japs provide for our boys?

Sonoma

M. Soley ^{2/}

The smug attitude of the first letter implying that the evacuees were receiving more than they deserved, and the racially prejudiced attitude of the second letter which categorically classed all persons of Japanese ancestry as a "Jap" were equally offensive to the Nisei. The Nisei's answer to these and other similar letters/which appeared from time to time in the daily newspapers was that they were not comparable to prisoners of war or foreigners in Japan who had no intent of settling there. They were, after all, citizens of

^{1/} San Francisco Chronicle, "Safety Valve," Sept. 1, 1942.

^{2/} Ibid., Sept. 5, 1942.

the United States trained and brought up in American ways and ideals, and it was unreasonable to compare their treatment with that of the people in internment camps in Japan. The same could be said of the Issei, who were settlers in this country and were not citizens only because they were restricted from naturalization. The Nisei claim was that as citizens they deserved better than they received. As for the Issei, their argument was, "What sabotage could we commit? If we ~~had~~ tried to do anything subversive, we would readily be discovered. If we had been left on our farms, right now we would be producing for the war effort instead of idling here in camp. As it is, the taxpayers are bearing an unnecessary burden of expense feeding, housing and guarding us. The keto are fools."^{1/}

The several metropolitan newspapers sold on the project news stands had a fairly wide circulation among both the Issei and Nisei, and the Issei who could not read English had access to Japanese vernacular newspapers which reproduced most of the important articles bearing on the evacuees appearing in the American papers. Whether or not the evacuees were informed about specific articles and enactments against them, the majority were generally informed on the sentiments being expressed. The claim of evacuee "coddling", for instance, was widely known and resented in the project. This expression aroused the indignation of the evacuees, in many respects, even more than the news of litigations against the evacuees. To the evacuees, nothing was more perceptibly a lie, a distortion of truth, than the picture of center life drawn by various writers for the newspapers and magazines. Nothing seemed to show more clearly the wide

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, August 10, 1942.

gap of understanding between the evacuees and the American public, and the futility of trying to explain the feelings of the evacuees to that public, than the superficially sympathetic and the openly hostile accounts of the evacuees written by those who evidently had little knowledge of the people about whom they wrote. The frequent comment of evacuees was that they wished some of these Caucasians could experience the same thing as themselves so that they might have a better appreciation of the complaint of the evacuees. Lacking such a possibility, the evacuees showed evidences of a desire for retaliatory measures. When an announcement appeared that Governor Olson (Cal.) would ask General DeWitt for a delay of the Japanese evacuation to permit the use of evacuees in harvesting crops that faced losses amounting to tens of millions of dollars because of labor shortage,^{1/} an Issei said with malicious glee, "So now they realize they can't get along without the Japanese farmers. I hope they lose all their crops; it would serve them justly. I rather wish they do come to ask us to work for them. It would give me a lot of pleasure to tell them, 'Go to hell.'"^{2/}

There were also articles appearing in magazines and newspapers which were regarded as favorable to the evacuees, but their contents were seldom as well remembered as the hostile ones. The latter carried definite threats to the evacuees which could not be easily forgotten, such as the coddling accusation, disenfranchisement proposal, plans for confiscating evacuee-owned cars, farm equipment and land, deportation proposal, and accusations of subversive activities. The favorable articles were read with the satisfaction of knowing

^{1/} San Francisco Chronicle, July 7, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, July 7, 1942.

that there were Caucasians defending the position of the evacuees, but it was the arguments and accusations of the hostile group which stuck in the minds of the evacuees. To these letters and articles, some of the more articulate Nisei occasionally attempted to write replies and there were discussions among them as to how they might counteract and fight the hostility of the majority group. For the most part, however, evacuees felt helpless to alter the sentiments of the majority group, the feeling was that it was the responsibility of the ~~majority~~ Government to control the anti-Japanese agitation, and their tactic was to oppose W.R.A. policies as the most direct method of fighting for rights which were threatened by the majority group attacks. The Packing Shed strike of late September 1942 when a major protest of the workers was that they would not ship project produce to the majority group which was seeking to take away Nisei citizenship, the opposition to the Overseas Broadcast proposal, and the rebellion against the registration, all had elements of protest against the unfavorable publicity about the evacuees in the American press.

The attitudes of the American public towards the evacuees had an even more important bearing on the center life of the evacuees because of the concern of the W.R.A. to maintain good public relations. The danger of an unfavorable public opinion resulted in the strict adherence of the W.R.A. to certain restrictive measures to forestall criticisms of a too liberal policy, and the threat was also used by the administration to control the evacuees and impose W.R.A. regulations upon them. Grodzins, for instance, has shown that the low wage scales of the Work Corps, which proved a

a serious source of discontent and low morale among the evacuees, was in direct response to public hostility to the payment of "high" wages to evacuees.^{1/} In fact, the W.R.A. as a federal agency using public funds necessarily had to stress economy in its budget appropriations,^{2/} and its unwillingness to provide anything but minimum provisions of housing, ~~housing provisions~~, lumber for furniture, administrative officers, work equipment, and educational facilities must be attributed at least in part to this need for economy because of public pressure.

While the broader policies of the W.R.A. were influenced by the general public sentiment towards the evacuees, the policies of the project administration were more influenced by the sentiments of the local white population in the surrounding area of the center. One of the major complaints of the local people in Tulelake and Klamath Falls was that the evacuees at the Project were being given free access to foods not available to people on the outside. In fact, the shortages in these towns were claimed to result from the withdrawal of local supplies for use at the Project. Mr. . . . Webster who was assigned as a special agent of the W.R.A. to investigate some of these complaints, inquired in a discussion with Mr. Shirrell:

The complaint is widespread that the evacuees are being given excellent food, including the best cuts of meat, ham and bacon while the same types and quality of food products are either scarce or not obtainable in the local stores. This complaint comes from Klamath Falls particularly. ~~1/~~

Mr. Shirrell replied in part:

This situation in Klamath Falls I attempted to rundown before. Constantly the Safeway Stores, through their clerks, have informed the public in Klamath Falls and Lakeview and Alturas that the reason they were unable to get ham and bacon for their customers was that all of it was going to the project at Tule Lake. Such statements from them are unwarranted, of course.^{2/}

^{1/} Grodzins, "W.R.A. Administrative Policies",

^{2/} W.R.A. Tentative Policy Statement, May 29, 1942.

^{3/} Conference, Shirrell & Webster, Nov. 2, 1942

Other complaints from the local people listed by Mr. Webster included charges of: Japanese outside project boundaries without a white escort, illegal hunting by evacuees on the game preserve, excessive wastage of food, ice, and tires, government losses due to demurrage charges resulting from inefficient management, withdrawal of teacher supply from California and Oregon by their use at the relocation center, evacuee strikes showing lax discipline of the administration, and contraband weapons in the hands of the evacuees. Great numbers of letters were addressed by the local white residents to the .W.R.A., Congressional representatives and even the President, demanding stricter controls over the project, and they were generally referred back to the Tule Lake administration for review.

The steady flow of complaints from the surrounding population as well the ever-present possibility that some investigating committee of the government might suddenly appear at the gates of the project undoubtedly influenced the project administration in maintaining vigilant surveillance against any practices which might subject the administration to criticism. One of the major objections to the farm strike of August 16 pointed out by the administration was the dangerous effect it might have on public opinion. Speaking before the City Council two days after the strike, Joe Hayes, Assistant Project Director, commented:

Suppose the militia had come out and fired a few rounds of shots to disperse the strikers; some people would have been killed and many others would have been wounded. There would have been hell to pay. The thing would have gotten into the news just as the trouble down at Santa Anita did. The newspapers would have magnified the thing beyond reasonable proportions. Do you know what I heard on one of my recent visits to Klamath? One woman came up to me and asked if it were true that the reason beer is scarcer now in Klamath Falls than be-

fore is that a lot of it is being shipped into the project. We have to be careful what we do here, for people on the outside are willing to believe any story that gets around about the project."¹/

Similarly when Mr. Newhall of the San Francisco Chronicle was scheduled to arrive at Tule Lake to get a feature article on the project, Mr. Shirrell's concern was that the construction strike was then taking place and some of the other disturbances within the community were all too evident.²/ Immediately after his conference with Mr. Webster regarding the complaints of the white residents in the local area, Mr. Shirrell addressed a strong warning to the Issei meeting which he attended on the following day describing the kinds of accusations being made and pointing out the danger to the evacuees of permitting any basis for such stories to exist.³/

The main relationship of the evacuees with Caucasians was, of course, with the appointed personnel administering the affairs of the Tule Lake Project. Except for the few personal relations developed by the evacuees with individual members of the appointed personnel, the tendency was to class them categorically with the larger Caucasian population, to refer to them as the keto. The superordinate-subordinate relationship of the Caucasians to the evacuees was most keenly felt by the latter in this situation, for every evacuee, even the best trained and the most experienced, was under the administrative supervision of some Caucasian, and there was seldom, if ever, a reversal of this relationship. A rather common attitude of the evacuees was that the keto administrators were a very mediocre, inefficient group who were in their well-paying positions

¹/ Miyamoto Notes, August 18, 1942.

²/ Miyamoto Notes, September 4, 1942.

³/ Miyamoto Notes, November 5, 1942.

because of the wartime manpower shortage. The attitude of one of the most capable Nisei on the project is described as, "He felt that these damn keto didn't know what they were going and the only reason they were nice was that they were paid to be so,"^{1/} but the same opinion was held likewise by evacuees who themselves held no claim to distinction.

The feeling that their work and their lives were being regulated by keto who were inferior to themselves was particularly widespread in those occupational groups where the evacuees ~~wh~~ had gained some recognition prior to evacuation, for example, in agriculture. Many farmers from northern California claimed to have had previous knowledge of their farm supervisor at the Project, A. R. Kallam, and they spoke with contempt of his series of failures as a farmer prior to the war. The comments of some of the farmers working under him during the first season at Tule Lake reveal a low opinion of his ability, and there was scarcely any variation of this view.

Comments were being made that water is needed in this patch or or taht. These farmers knew where water was needed. 'These keto wait to irrigate all the fields at once instead of doing one field at a time. These keto do the culverts and ditches without testing for elevation. They're surprised when the water doesn't run up hill.' The ditch gates would be placed at a point lower than the rest of the field, where it was ineffective.^{2/}

Kallam goes ahead planting without getting the irrigation prepared. The cabbages and onions are practically all burnt because they didn't have the water ready at the time of planting. These shoots should have come right up if they'd been watered right after planting, but Kallam doesn't plan for those things.

Kallam did not come out to the field today. He is very unpopular among the farmers nowadays. They wish he were out of here. Most of the foremen agree that Kallam is the downfall of the whole farm, and that he doesn't know how to farm anything but sugar beets and barley. Someone put up a turnip shaped like a nude and wrote a tag on it saying, "This is Kallam," and

^{1/} Shibutani Notes, July 7, 1942.

^{2/} Nafima Notes, July 17, 1942.

nailed it on the wall. Remained there all day.2/

Farmers blame Kallam for not being prepared beforehand to harvest the crops. He should have been prepared with shook nails, sacks, trucks, etc. They say that everything is left until the last minute.2/

Since the position of the evacuee farmers did not permit them to compete with Kallam for the supervisory office, there was no violent feeling of envy about his superior position. In fact, most of the farmers that for their \$16 or \$19 per month wage, it was useless to assume responsibilities or to work hard. On the other hand, they took a certain pride in their knowledge and experience at farming, and they disliked working under ineffectiveness conditions. The criticism of the farmers was not limited to Kallam, of course, but was directed at all the Caucasian personnel connected with the farm enterprise.

In the medical field there was a similar feeling among the evacuee physicians that their Chief Medical Officers were but mediocre medical practitioners less capable than most of the evacuee doctors. One evacuee doctor who had received his training at one of the best medical schools in the country and had received specialized training at a well-known hospital in the Mid-West, commented on Dr. A. B. Carson, Chief Medical Officer, by saying:

He's all right. But the trouble is, so many of the Japanese doctors are superior to him in medical knowledge. Some of them have had more training and more experience. It's hard for a man in his position to command the respect of the doctors under him.3/

The same view is expressed even more pointedly in a letter sent by Drs. Hashiba, Baba and Yoshiye Togasaki to Dr. G. W. Carlyle

1/ Hisatomi Notes, September 2, 1942.

2/ Hisatomi Notes, September 3, 1942.

3/ Miyamoto Notes, June 23, 1942.

Thompson of the Regional W.R.A. Office.

We find that the War Relocation Authority considers the Japanese physician incapable of handling the medical situation of these projects and has placed, in our opinion, less than mediocre Caucasian physicians and nurses in charge of the medical set-up. Under these conditions the War Relocation Authority has repudiated the responsibility of the Japanese physicians to his race.^{1/}

As Billigmeier states, "In general it may be said that to the evacuee physicians racial discrimination and professional pride have become closely associated."^{2/} This was certainly the case with Dr. Hajime Ueyama, who was considered one of the best evacuee doctors from the Bary Region, and of whom it was also said that he was "allergic to Caucasians." Another Doctor elaborating on this point remarked,

Dr. Ueyama is one of the bluntest fellows I've ever met. He's absolutely tactless, and says whatever he thinks.... He's pretty rude to the Caucasian staff these days. He won't even speak civilly to Miss Graham, the Head Nurse. Not that the Doctor is impolite, but that it's evident he dislikes Caucasians from the way he behaves.^{3/}

Even where professional training or an extended background of experience were not involved, however, the feeling that the Caucasian supervisors were not as competent as some of the evacuee workers under them not infrequently cropped up. The Nisei workers in the project post office were supervised by a Mrs. Wallace, the attractive wife of an army corporal stationed with the military police unit of the camp, who like the workers under her had no experience in postal service work and was felt by some of the older Nisei to be too young for supervisory authority.

Considerable dissatisfaction has been expressed in the community as well as among the workers about the lack of adequate organization in the office. Work assignments have not been made properly, the Nisei workers are too young in many instances to recognize the responsibility of their position, packages have been lost and even stolen, but Mrs. Wallace fails to impose

^{1/} Supplement to minutes, Japanese American Citizens League, Special Emergency National Conference, Nov. 17-24, 1942. Letter written principally by Dr. Togasaki, signed by Drs. Hashiba, and Baba.

Footnote Cont'd on back

2/ Billigmeier Report, "Health Section," p. 6.

3/ Miyamoto Notes, "Iki-Harada Case," Sept. 17, 1942.

strict regulations within the office so that such mishaps would not recur. Recognizing that there is a lack of trained personnel among the Nisei to operate the post office efficiently, the situation is not improved by placing in a supervisory capacity a woman who is herself too young to appreciate the responsibility of her position. According to an older Nisei woman who spent several months working at the post office as the informal head of the Nisei workers, Mrs. Wallace still likes to have a good time herself and hence is not strict when the young Nisei workers get out of hand at the post office. She is an expert jitter-bugger and frequently is absent on Monday mornings following over-exertion during the week end, and has only gradually come to an awareness of the responsibility involved in handling other people's mail. The disorganization in the post office appears to become more and more acute, and the expectation is that the Christmas rush will snow under the delivery department of the post office. A few of the older girls working there now look with despair upon the situation, and declare among themselves that one capable Nisei with organizational ability could do much to improve the circumstance. Recently, when the City Council asked Mrs. Wallace to appear at its meeting, to answer questions about the condition of the post office, Mr. Shirrell informed her that she need not appear since he had not been previously informed of the Council's action. About the same time she received an increase in pay. Some of the Nisei workers who have been exerting themselves in the effort to keep some order within the confusion are a little upset to think that Mrs. Wallace has had her pay increased despite her inability to organize the post office efficiently.^{1/}

The conditions of the relocation center undoubtedly contributed greatly to the evacuee dissatisfaction with their supervisors. The problem of organizing an entirely new community/under wartime handicaps/ was of such magnitude that it required exceptional ability on the part of the administrators to avoid errors and criticism. The general discontent of the evacuees laid a foundation of recalcitrance among the evacuees with which the Caucasian supervisors had to contend, but any disorganization or inefficiency resulting from the evacuee workers' lack of interest in their work was likely to be blamed as the responsibility of the appointed personnel. However, the dissatisfaction also

^{1/} Miyamoto Report, Preliminary Report on Tule Lake, "Social Structure of the Community," pp. 18-19.

had its basis in the automatic assignment of Caucasians over evacuees, for since this was not an arrangement voluntarily entered upon by the latter, there was the ready tendency to speak of what the situation would be if the evacuees themselves had organized it. It is worthy of note that the appointed personnel least criticized were those most willing to consult the evacuees on administrative plans, including men like Fleming, Elberson and Jacoby, while the reverse was true in the case of those who were considered dictatorial and lacking in respect for evacuee ability, as in the instances of Dr. Pedicord, Mr. Hayes, and Mr. Peck.

The difference in class level of the administrators and the evacuees was further emphasized by their difference in income. One bookkeeper in the finance accounting section was constantly demoralized by the fact that in the books which she kept, young Caucasians~~x~~ truck drivers were listed as receiving \$80 per week while professional evacuees received at most \$19 per month. One of the major reasons for resentment leading to the construction crew strike of September 1942 was that evacuee workers receiving \$16 per month were not only asked to work beside Caucasian workers getting as much pay in a single day, but that Christenson, the foreman, kept driving the evacuees to work as hard as the Caucasians and finally announced that he would replace/^{half of} ~~all~~ the evacuee carpenters with a few Caucasians who would do the job. The claim of the evacuees was that they would any day work as hard as the Caucasians if they received the same pay, and resented the slur upon their industry considering the absence of incentives to work.^{1/} Their resentment

^{1/} Mule Lake Report, Chapter V, p. 115.

was most apparent when the evacuee worker¹ put in his full eight-hour day, made an effort to work efficiently, and then was not appreciated by the supervisor. A Nisei stenographer complained of her "employer":

Mr. Jones makes me mad. He kept me working until 8:30 yesterday evening just because he changed his mind about a letter he was writing. I copied the thing five times. Then he complains that we're not willing to work hard enough and says all the Caucasian staff are working even on week-ends to keep the project going. What does he expect from us when we get only \$16 a month.^{1/}

Because of the low wages, confinement and other undesirable circumstances which the evacuees had suffered in the evacuation, there existed among them a strong belief in their right to demand of the Government that various concessions be made to them. A rather common opinion was that the evacuees should get everything possible paid for by the Government, and on one occasion a Councilman seriously proposed that since hair-cuts were a necessity the W.R.A. should arrange for free barber service.^{2/} Although the Japanese were well known in public welfare offices of the Pacific Coast for their extreme sensitivity and resistance to receiving "charity", at the project, welfare workers often commented on the number of people who came to them demanding public assistance grants with an ~~apparent~~^{obvious} attitude that it was owed to them. To say that the Government owed them a living, however, was to say that the keto owed them a living; the two were indistinguishable. Thus, it may be said that from the evacuee point of view their relation to the Caucasians was that of a creditor to debtor, and as creditors they had every right to make demands upon those who owed them for their losses. Something of the same idea is expressed where an Issei remarked, "Look at these market prices on vegetables (pointing to

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, Aug. 7, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, Aug. 22, 1942.

price quotations in the newspaper). We would be making big money now if we were farming on the outside; enough to see us through our old age," for what they could have earned if they had not been evacuated was included by the evacuees among the debts to be paid by the society which had ~~ev~~ deprived them of their opportunities.

The separation of the Caucasians and evacuees at Tule Lake was physically represented by the spatial separation of their respective residential areas, and for a brief time during the winter of 1942, this physical separation was made complete by the construction of a barbed-wire fence between the two areas.^{1/} To speak of the Tule Lake Center as a single community is, accurately speaking, not correct, ~~although the evacuees~~ for there were two communities, of the evacuees and of the appointed personnel, each living in large part distinct social lives. The usage of referring to the evacuee community as the Tule Lake community has been followed because it was overwhelmingly the larger and, in the present study, the more significant, while the Caucasian community existed only in rudimentary form, but there was in the latter a distinct social life. A limited group of Nisei and Caucasians with common interests sought each other out, but in general there was little mixing between them except during the working day when the two groups met in the offices and in the field to undertake their joint business. Several Caucasians voiced the view, and others undoubtedly felt, that they had no desire to look at evacuees in the evenings after working with them all day, and the evacuees in turn for the most part were disinterested in even attempting to seek out Caucasian

^{1/} The fences were set up following repeated instances of stealing from the warehouses and were guarded only in the evenings to check evacuee loiterers in the warehouse area. But symbolically it represented a further separation of the Caucasians from the evacuees, and it was interpreted as such by many evacuees.

association. Insofar as it was the business of the administrators to know what was happening in the evacuee community, they had some knowledge of the activities taking place therein, but there was generally as little understanding of the ^{meaning of the} events and activities to the evacuees, as the evacuees had for what went on among the Caucasians.

It should be mentioned that a form of public relations work was constantly maintained between the two groups. It was rather common to find in the "society notices" of the Tulean Dispatch such items as, "Honored guests were Dr. and Mrs. A. B. Carson," at a Nisei dance party, or, "Among those present were Mr. and Mrs. Elmer L. Shirrell, Mr. and Mrs. Frank Smith, Dr. and Mrs. Harold L. Jacoby, etc....." at one of the Nisei weddings. The opening nights for the two most prominent entertainments during the winter of 1942, the "Cafe International Cabaret" and the "Little Theater", were on both occasions reserved for the administrative personnel.^{1/} In addition, certain members ~~we~~ of the appointed personnel were very much sought by the Nisei as speakers at various functions, and there is no doubt very often that/a higher premium was placed upon Caucasian speakers than upon those from the evacuee group. These were to be sure all Nisei functions, but the Issei too on rare occasions entertained members of the administrative staff. The Appointed Personnel, especially the teaching group, invited evacuees to dinner and into their homes for visits. While these relations between the evacuees and the Caucasians sometimes went far beyond anything that might be spoken of as public relations work, the very fact of the smallness of the appointed personnel and their limitations of time and energy an

^{1/} Tulean Dispatch, October 30, 1942, p. 1.

^{2/} Tulean Dispatch, November 30, 1942, p. 1.

forming personal acquaintances among the evacuees necessarily made many of these contacts formal. For the large bulk of evacuees there was no social contact of any kind with the appointed personnel.

The barriers of relationship between the Caucasians and Issei evacuees (and many Kibei) were especially severe because of the language handicap. Except for a very small minority of the Issei men (and an even smaller percentage of Issei women), the Issei were unable to carry on anything like a normal conversation with a Caucasian, and although brief friendly interchanges or conversation on routine business matters could generally be managed without difficulty, where discussions became in any way complicated, as for instance at political meetings, the assistance of an interpreter was usually necessary. Related to the barrier of language, of course, were all the gross as well as subtle differences of thought and behavior resulting from the differences of cultural and experiential background between the Caucasians and the Issei and Kibei. A certain amount of misunderstanding between the Caucasians and the evacuees was undoubtedly attributable to this language difficulty^{1/}, and there were even evidences of a resistance among the Issei to the use of English. One reason was their sensitivity about their inability to understand it. At one meeting of Co-op representatives where both Issei and Nisei were gathered, the bulk of the discussion was carried on in English.

There were about 30 present in the room. Niseis and Isseis were about evenly divided. The meeting went on smoothly until the end. Mr. Shirai got up and said that he had been asked by a few people to give the talk again in Japanese and that he would do it after the meeting was over. (Those who had understood were permitted to leave.) Then an Issei fellow with a sour look called everyone's attention as they were getting

^{1/} During both the registration and the segregation programs, misunderstanding by the Issei and Kibei of key terms in the discussions because of a failure to have translations provided or an error in translation, proved an important contributing factor to the resulting disturbances.

up. He said that this wasn't a meeting just for Niseis, and Japanese was as important as English. He thought that there wasn't a Nisei who couldn't understand Japanese, therefore everyone should remain behind to hear the lecture given in Japanese. But Shirai calmed him down and said that those who understood couldn't be forced to stay.^{1/}

The evacuees not infrequently used language differences as a mode of emphasizing their distinctiveness from the keto, and of thus strengthening their identity as a group. At the farm strike of August 1942, a Nisei who at the opening of a strike meeting made a request over the public address system for light globes to illuminate the platform was hooted off the stage with cries of, "Nihongo wo tsukae (Use Japanese!)" and "Eigo wo tsukau mono ga aruka? Koko wa nihon da zoo! (Who dares to use English? This is Japan here!)"^{2/} During tense conflicts between the evacuees and the administration, as in the Overseas Broadcast and the registration issues, there was a noticeable tendency towards an increased usage of Japanese even among the Nisei, and when among a group of aroused Issei and Kibei, the Nisei would studiously avoid English to prevent any suspicion of seeking identity with the opposing element.

The few Caucasians on the Project who had spent years in Japan and could speak Japanese had a distinct advantage over the rest of their group in approaching the Issei and Kibei. The Issei would show undisguised pleasure to find that a Caucasian had taken the trouble to learn the language and would comment on how well the person spoke. The factors involved in the Issei's sense of difference from the Caucasians is rather well illustrated in the case of Miss Helen Topping, one of the high school teachers who had spent most of her life in Japan, had a good command of Japanese, and made

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, Sept. 16, 1942.

^{2/} Tule Lake Report, Chap. V, p. 42.

special efforts to identify herself with the evacuees. Miss Topping was born in the South, but she and her parents went to Japan when the latter were criticized for their stand on the Negro. Her parents remained in Japan, the father being buried there, and her mother living unmolested in Tokyo. Miss Topping had become a disciple of the Christian co-operative leader, Kagawa, and her obvious purpose in Tule Lake was to promote this movement with all her religious zeal. Following one of her lectures on the millenium of the Christian co-operative given in Japanese to an Issei audience, a lecture composed of a collection of bizarre references to American, Japanese and British history, the Bible, the class struggle, the cooperative movement, and the future of the Nisei in America, an Issei arose during the questioning period to say:

Your face is American, but I think you are Japanese. In individual relations, Americans are tops. But when in groups they tend to discriminate against Japanese. I cannot understand this. If Niseis remain behind and are discriminated against, they will not be able to enter the American life. If the Americans will prepare themselves to accept the Japanese; but aren't Americans afraid of Japanese who are too smart. Americans recognize the progress of the Japanese people. If the Japanese make progress in the Middle West, it won't be of any use to go east. I would like to have a frank answer.^{1/}

This question needs to be set within the context of the statements which Miss Topping was making, such as, "Everyone in America wants to make things easy...They spend their money and become poor again, and hence cannot become civilized. The person who seeks the simple life and then spends what he has for other people is the specialty of the Japanese..... The Americans in Florin ^(California) are really low down (katō). (Laughter throughout the room.) It seems that there are only theives in Florin (laughter again)."^{2/} Because of

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, Feb. 7, 1943.

^{2/} Ibid.

these views Miss Topping was accused by the administration of hold- and ingiting ~~ix~~ pro-Japanese ideas. Yet, despite her language qualification and her endeavors to identify herself with the evacuees it was evident in the behavior of the people toward her that she was not regarded as "one of them." The people treated her more as a guest within their midst.

The separation of the evacuees and Caucasians was clearly based not only on racial but also political differences. The antagonism was not merely ~~evacuees~~ the people of Japanese ancestry versus Caucasians, but also, in the case of the Issei and Kibei, pro-Japanism versus pro-Americanism. It is indeterminable as to the extent that the evacuation promoted a pro-Japanese sentiment among the evacuees, but of that promotion there can be no doubt. Racial and political feelings, however, were so closely intertwined that it is impossible to assess in what degree or in what way each contributed to the gap between the evacuees and the Caucasians.

The result of all these conditions separating the evacuees from Caucasians gave to each strong in-group feelings which constituted the most certain evidence of their distinctiveness. Mr. Peck of the Mess Management Section who openly classed himself among the "Jap Haters" of the appointed personnel and was one of those most anxious to see the apprehension of evacuees stealing food from the warehouses, complained when evacuee waitresses at the Personnel Mess Hall turned the same accusation against the Caucasians: "It shows that the Japanese are looking for something to bring against the Caucasians. They never tell on each other."^{1/} During the disturbed months in the Fall of 1942 when the administration was convinced that most of the trouble was developing from a few "agitators" who

^{1/} Billigmeier Report, "Transportation and Supply," p. 8.

were bent on obstructing the success of the W.R.A. program, the administration made serious efforts to gain information from some of the trusted evacuees as to who these trouble-makers were.^{1/} The campaign met with little success, and there was even some tendency to blame the so-called "loyal" evacuees who failed to reveal information about the "disloyal" ones. During the mess hall trouble of October 1942:

She (Mrs. Halle) said that there were just a few individuals at fault and said that they would be removed. She asked me if I knew of any. I said "No," and she replied cynically, "Oh so you won't talk either, huh? If some of our loyal Americans would cooperate a little more we could run this camp decently. As it is what more could we do?"^{2/}

By the same token, the evacuee who would turn against his own group by revealing the secrets of the community or by fawning upon the Caucasians to seek favor were regarded as the most contemptible of all persons. The two types, in fact, were indicated as loathesome objects by the weasel words, "bootlicker" and "inu". The "bootlicker" or the "white-man's Jap" was thought to be a person who either from fear or from a motive of seeking personal advantages would refuse to protest the injustices inflicted by the Caucasians and would render his approval of anything proposed by the Caucasians. They were the spineless accommodaters, the "Uncle Toms" of the Japanese society. And the self seekers among them were thought to use this means of servile flattery to gain favor in the eyes of the keto, use other evacuees as stepping stones to status, and thus rise to positions of authority. For their policy of "cooperation" with the military authorities during evacuation, and the positions of authority which they thus directly or indirectly gained, the J.A.C.L. became one of the chief recipients of the name of "bootlickers".

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^{2/} Shibutani Journal, Oct. 13, 1942.

The term "bootlicker," however, is of course a relative one for depending upon the intensity of a person's hatred for the keto and cooperation there was variation as to the extent of contact/with Caucasians that would be considered bootlicking. Among some Issei who hated the keto intensely, all the Nisei who worked in the administration offices with the Caucasian supervisors were to be designated as "bootlickers", and also as "inu". But it is clear that the very life of the community depended upon some degree of cooperation between the two groups and a certain amount of compromise of the opposing points of view.

The fear and hostility towards the inu was even more intense and rabid. Something of the attitudes toward the inu is illustrated in the views revealed during the questioning of two Kibei who were apprehended for an attempted beating upon Mr. Ohmura during the registration crisis. The discussion was between Project Attorney O'Brien and the two Kibei.

"Why did you go along with the other Kibei if you didn't know the man?" the second Kibei was asked.

"Because they said he was an inu."

Yamamoto was asked the same question, to which he replied, "Well, they were Kibei and I had to cooperate."

"Because you are connected with the Black Dragon Society?"

Yamamoto denied this saying, "No, I just had to."

"Why?"

"Well, if he's an inu we just have to beat him."

"What is an inu?"

"A dog--a spy or informer."

"Do you mean to tell me that if a person you don't know., for example, Mr. Carter, comes to you and tells you that I am an inu you have to kill me?"

"If I feel a man is an inu I'll have to go along and beat him."

"Why?"

"I would have to."

"This was constantly reiterated. Each time O'Brien spoke of killing and Yamamoto of beating.

Then O'Brien asked, "Where did you come from?"

"Stockton."

"Would you have done this in Stockton?"

"No."

"Why would you do it here and not in Stockton?"

"It's different."

"The reason why you would do it here is because the Issei tell you this is a part of Japan."

"No, it's not Japan, but its different from Stockton."^{1/}

The interview is not revealing primarily for the reason that O'Brien was too strongly pressing for an answer, but it tells ~~two~~ three things, first, that the feeling against the inu is not easily verbalized and, second, that it was the ^{the F.B.I. arrests,} war, the evacuation, and the conditions of center life which provided the setting for the intense ^{/and, third, the accusation may be grounded on the merest suspicion.} hatred of the inu, Billigmeier also reports elsewhere, "Dr. Jacoby heard the same spirit toward the inu. "It does something to me here," ^{2/} Kibei asserted, placing his hand against his chest." The simplest explanation for the intense fear and hatred of the inu (informer) is that he threatens the safety of any person who communicates among his fellows the fundamental beliefs of his group, without which communication the strength of the group's opposition to the Caucasians would be completely sapped.

^{1/} Billigmeier, "Registration Report," pp. 42-43.

^{2/} Ibid., p. 43.

There was a point at which an evacuee had to keep things from a Caucasian, even one whom he thoroughly trusted and was on the friendliest terms, which he would not have to hide from another evacuee. One such information was the names of the so-called "Trouble-makers" of the community and their activities, for such revelation to the Caucasians was the surest means of acquiring the inu label for oneself. And for a large section of the community, inclusive of almost all the Issei and Kibei, there were circumstances in which doubts were likely to be raised about the sincerity of even the most trusted Caucasian members of the administration.

The main purpose of the Caucasian administrative staff was to maintain a project fulfilling the policies set forth by the W.R.A., of sustaining the evacuee population within its control, economizing in the expenditure of public funds, producing marketable goods both to reduce the operational cost of the project and to keep the evacuees actively engaged in production toward the war effort, and in general maintaining a smooth running and efficient community. These policies, however, were not in conformity with the interests of the evacuees who felt that food rations were inadequate, that wage incentives were lacking for production efficiency, and that the minimum subsistence standards provided by the W.R.A. in medical service, education, recreation and all other activities of the community were inadequate. Furthermore, there were policies supported by the W.R.A., such as the Overseas Broadcast and the military service programs, with which the majority of evacuees were in strong disagreement. While the appointed personnel showed

varying degrees of sympathy for the evacuee point of view, and some went far towards defending the evacuee position, the Caucasians in the final analysis saw W.R.A. policies from the administrator's point of view as plans which somehow had to be carried into action. Among the appointed personnel, for instance, there was no disagreement as to the desirability of the registration for Nisei military service and for general leave clearance, although there was disagreement as to how the program should be administered, but ~~the~~^{many}/evacuees disagreed with the policy itself. The point of the difference is most clearly made by indicating that for the bulk of evacuees their fundamental demand was the restoration of the conditions existing prior to evacuation, while the administrators, even the most sympathetic of them, were cognizant of the realities obstructing such immediate restoration and, in this sense, held that the evacuees should accept the fact of evacuation and rather make the most of W.R.A. efforts.

This basis of difference between the evacuees and the Caucasians at the project is best illustrated in the case of men like Jacoby, Elberson, Fleming and Shirrell who were regarded as the best friends of the evacuees among the administrators. Jacoby as Chief of Internal Security necessarily had to uncover as much information as possible about the "agitators" in the community and actively sought to get such information, but from the standpoint of the evacuees such activity was inimical to the welfare of their community. Elberson, because of his outlook but also because of his position, was committed to establishing a consumer cooperative on the project and had the advantage of W.R.A. support in this program, but at least in the initial phase of the Co-op program, Elberson was working

in opposition to the desires of the evacuees who were suspicious of the cooperative. It is far from certain that the evacuees, left to themselves, would have chosen the consumer cooperative as the form of organization for their canteens. Information known to the administrators was often withheld from the evacuees for various reasons, and however sound the reasons, such withholding was de facto recognition of the difference between the administrators and the evacuees. For example, in circulating the "War Relocation Authority Tentative Policy Statement" in June 1942, Fryer wrote in an attached memorandum: "Since the statement is as yet tentative, its circulation should probably be limited to employees of the War Relocation Authority and cooperating agencies."1/ Mr. Fryer may have been more concerned to keep the statement out of the hands of anti-Japanese organizations on the outside than of the evacuees, and, as for the evacuees, it may have been just as well that the tentative policies were not widely publicized before them. Nevertheless, this memo as well as other confidential and secret correspondence circulated only among the W.R.A. personnel gave a basis of difference between the Caucasians and evacuees that reflected itself in behavior. Perhaps the best example of information withheld from the evacuees for administrative reasons was the instance of the reversals in policy during the registration when, contrary to previous announcements and much to the surprise of the Project Director, it was learned from the Washington office that failure to register for military service was not punishable under the Selective Service Act, and that registration for leave clearance was not compulsory. So damaging to the prestige of the administration were these reversals of policy that

1/ Memo from Fryer to Project Directors, June 10, 1942.

the facts were not publicly revealed even to the appointed personnel, but most of the latter were quite aware of these new announcements from the Washington office. From the standpoint of the evacuees who were making every effort to avoid the registration and who would have received with joy the information that the maximum imposable (of Nisei males) sentence for refusal/to register was 90 days under W.R.A. regulations rather than \$10,000 or twenty years imprisonment or both under the Selective Service Act, this was key information which they should have /liked to hear. But the evacuees were not apprised of the change in policy, and only a few Nisei close to the administration were given even a basis of suspicion that such a change of policy had occurred.

In the nature of W.R.A. policy the inclination was to minimize the differences between the evacuees and the Caucasian staff. On October 2, 1942 a memorandum was circulated by Dillon Myer on the terminology to use in referring to the evacuee residents of the projects. The summary paragraph of the memorandum cautions:

In lieu of the misleading, question-begging, and emotion-laden terms "Japanese", "Japs", "camps", and "internees", employees of the War Relocation Authority should refer to the persons who have been evacuated from the West Coast as evacuees, and to the projects as relocation centers. Some people have been referring to the evacuees as "colonists". This term is not objectionable, but the term "evacuee" seems preferable. Where the context makes the meaning clear, the term "resident" is, of course, also acceptable.^{1/}

And as regards the use of evacuees in executive positions within the administration, the original W.R.A. policy statements declares:

Except for certain specified positions, maximum use should be made of evacuees in filling administrative and executive positions for which they are qualified. (underlined in the original)^{2/}

During the first year of the Project, however, only two ~~evacuees~~

^{1/} Memorandum from Myer to Project Directors, Oct. 2, 1942.

^{2/} W.R.A. Tentative Policy Statement, May 29, 1942, p. 2.

positions, Heads of Community Activities and of Civic Organization, both in the Community Services Division, were opened to evacuees. While Harry Mayeda and Bob Ota, the heads of the respective sections held administrative status and attended the general staff meetings, at least some members of the administrative staff refused to accept them within their circle. One of those who objected to giving administrative responsibilities to evacuees was Mr. Connor, Chief of the Administrative Management Division, with whom Bob Ota, Head of the Civic Organizations, came into conflict at one time.

Don Elberson was then in charge of the Civic Organization Section. At that time Elberson was making special efforts to delegate increasing responsibility for the Block Managers organization to Bob Ota. Ota in the course of performing his functions came into conflict with Connor. He found it difficult to work harmoniously with Connor; the latter was assertedly rude and unwilling to co-operate and Ota came to feel that Connor treated him as a person racially inferior to himself.

Largely because of the difficulties Ota experienced in his business relations with Connor, Don Elberson wrote a protest in his monthly report on Civic Organization for the month of October. This report was submitted to Mr. Fleming, November 6, 1942.^{1/}

Whatever difficulties may arise in the functioning of the Block Managers organization from now on, will be primarily attributable to certain attitudes on the part of certain members of the administrative staff. Since taking over these duties, Mr. Ota and others high in the Block Managers' organization have felt a distinct racial antipathy on the part of some of the members of the administrative staff.....

(Footnote: ^{1/} At the suggestion of Mr. Fleming, Chief of Community Services Division, this paragraph in the monthly report on Civic Organization was deleted.) ^{1/}

Just as the solidarity of evacuee opposition to the Caucasians was far from being unbroken, so, too, there was considerable variation in the degree of antagonism to the evacuees on the part of the administrative staff. The differences among the latter concerning the correct attitude to maintain towards the evacuees is expressed in the mutually recriminatory terms evolved among the appointed staff,

^{1/} Billigmeier Report, "Administrative Division," p. 3.

which ranged from the so-called "Jap Lovers" or "sociologists" to some of the more rabid anti-evacuee members who were called "Jap Haters" by their opponents. The "sociologists" were those who laid stress upon the cultural and experiential background of the evacuees, contended that the community should be permitted to evolve as far as reasonably possible in relation to this background, and felt that administrative policies should be correlated as much as possible to the character of the people being administered. The ideas of this group were held in contempt by those who ~~were~~ believed that Caucasian authority should be enunciated more clearly than was the policy under the Shirrell administration. The liberal members of the administration looked upon this attitude as deriving essentially from feelings of white superiority and accused the "Jap Haters" of viewing the evacuees as a "white man's burden."

The attitude of the Caucasians toward the evacuees was complicated by the fact that the situation offered the possibility of antagonism towards the evacuees not only on racial grounds but also on political grounds, of Americans against the Japanese. However, among a certain class of the appointed personnel there were clear evidences of feelings of racial superiority. Mr. Peck, for example, was rabidly opposed to the inviting of evacuees as guests to the Personnel Mess Hall, and while there were reasons of overcrowding which gave reasonable grounds for his protest of inviting outsiders, Mr. Peck's own admissions left little room for doubt that his objections were also based on racial considerations. A member of the administrative staff described one of his clashes with Peck.

The Browns had invited the Watanabes to dine at the personnel mess hall last night. There were five in their party

and no tables were open to seat that many. Miss Smith and her father, who were sitting at an otherwise vacant table, offered to move, but Joe Brown consulted the head waitress first to see if other arrangements could be made. The head waitress herself asked the Smiths if it would be all right to change tables, and the latter complied willingly. Peck, who was seated at the next table with a group of teachers kept glaring at Brown all through this discussion. Later when Brown went to Peck's table to speak to one of the teachers in that group, Peck burst forth with some very rude comments about Brown's discourtesy in forcing the Smiths to move just to accommodate some evacuees. Brown kept his temper and pointed out that the Smiths themselves had offered to move, and that he otherwise saw nothing wrong about bringing evacuees to dine there since there were no other places on the project to entertain guests. Peck went on to indicate that he himself had come of a poor family, that he had always felt thankful when others did things for him and showed his gratitude, but that the evacuees were the most ungrateful lot of people imaginable. Brown interpreted all this to mean that Peck "saw red whenever he saw 'Japs' coming into the administration mess hall" to eat on the same level with the Caucasian staff. In Peck's mind the Japanese are all right as long as they keep their place.^{1/}

While clear-cut instances of a discriminatory attitude on the part of the Caucasian personnel occurred only with infrequency, the evacuees who were sensitive to attitudes of superiority on the part of the Caucasians were distinctly aware of those members of the appointed personnel inclined towards a differential treatment of the evacuees. A Nisei who had formed no previous judgement of Anthony O'Brien reported the following impressions after his first encounter when he was seeking legal advice from the Project Attorney.

I talked to O'Brien about it and had a thoroughly disgusting time. He was a bastard of the first order and I took an immediate dislike to him. He treated me as if I were a slave of some kind and kept blowing cigar smoke into my face. He wouldn't even apologize when he accidentally kicked my shoe and I felt like hitting him. Finally, he flicked the ashes off his cigar and told me to speak to one of his assistants.^{2/}

It was said that the wives of the appointed staff were often even more prejudiced than their husbands, and while their contacts with the evacuees were rather infrequent, stories about some of them were current by which the evacuees determined who were their friends

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, Nov. 17, 1942.

^{2/} Shibutani Journal, Feb. 11, 1943.

and who their enemies. A Nisei girl related an incident which she chanced to overhear at the project beauty shop when a Caucasian woman requested special service from the Nisei operators.

While I was sitting under the hair dryer, a Caucasian woman walked into the shop this evening and, in an overbearing manner, asked that she ~~had her~~ have her hair done. The girls pointed out that it was almost closing time (the shop closed at 8:00 p.m.) and it was impossible to start the work at that late hour. The woman thereupon demanded that a special case be made of her request since she had to leave for Washington, D.C. the next day, and she couldn't have her hair fixed before leaving unless they would do it for her. I think the girls would have done it for her if she had made her request in a civil manner, but it was the way she demanded the service that got their 'goat'. The girls absolutely refused to do anything that evening, and they even gave her a rather awkward hour the next day just out of spite. The other woman was red in the face, and you could see she was quite angry, but she couldn't do anything about it so she went out with the appointment she had had to accept. I'm surprised they did it for her at all. The girls were mad. They said she had no business trying to get her hair done there anyhow at the reduced rate the shop offers for the benefit of the evacuees. Why didn't she go to Tulalake, or Klamath Falls, they wanted to know.^{1/}

Incidents of this nature, of course, do not prove that the individuals ~~were~~ concerned were necessarily prejudiced for they may have reflected only a general thoughtlessness on the part of the individuals, but the evacuees interpreted such behavior as prejudiced and often accumulated other information about such individuals to support their contention. In the case of Mr. O'Brien, for instance, there were other stories told of him to indicate his unsympathetic attitude towards the evacuees.

The basically liberal policy of the W.R.A. precluded the gathering of any large number of the appointed personnel hostile to the evacuees; selection of the personnel, for one thing, was in part based on a policy of excluding those evidencing attitudes of racial bigotry. Nevertheless, a certain number of persons predisposed to-

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, Nov. 10, 1943.

wards feelings of white superiority were represented among the personnel, and as the protest activities and the anti-administration demonstrations of the evacuees increased, there was concomitantly an increase of those antagonistic to the evacuees, whose point of view did not greatly differ from that of the persistent "Jap Haters." The peak of Caucasian antagonism to the evacuees was reached during the registration crisis. During and following this critical period, the prestige of the "sociologists" among the administrators steadily declined, and those demanding a greater exercise of W.R.A. authority and discipline over the evacuees increasingly dominated the project policy. Much of the difficulties of the Tule Lake Project, which by then became known as the worst W.R.A. relocation center, were attributed to the earlier domination of the policies favored by the "Jap Lovers". The intensity of the antagonism against the latter may be judged from the fact that Dr. Jacoby, one of the chief objects of ridicule for his failure to exert greater disciplinary measures upon the evacuees, submitted his resignation in April 1943 as Chief of Internal Security.

B. THE GENERATIONAL STRUCTURE: ISSEI, KIBEI, AND NISEI

Differential Characteristics

For the sake of clarity, the literal translations of the Japanese terms for the generational groups is again offered.

Classificatory Term	Meaning
Issei.....	(Lit.) First Generation; the immigrant Japanese born in Japan.
Nisei.....	(Lit.) Second Generation; born in the United States, citizens of this country, and educated and raised here. An alternative term is Jun-Nisei, "pure Nisei", to distinguish from Kibei-Nisei.
Sansei.....	(Lit.) Third Generation; born in America to Nisei parents. At present an insignificant group.
Kibei.....	(Lit.) Returned to America; born in the United States, citizens of the U.S., but lived in Japan and again returned to this country. Abbreviated from Kibei-Nisei.
Issei-han.....	(Lit.) Half First-Generation; Infrequently used reference to the younger Issei who mix readily with either the Issei or Nisei.

These terms are not logically exclusive as are such definitive terms as American-born Japanese or Japan-born Japanese, for these classifications are social conceptions rather than strictly logical or legal. For example, there are a certain number of persons who were born in Japan but migrated with their parents to this country during their infancy or early childhood to receive an American education and training. While these persons are immigrant Japanese of the first generation, that is, an Issei, from the legal standpoint,

they are generally classed among the Nisei socially because they are indistinguishable from the latter in personality and background, except for their ineligibility for citizenship. The greatest difficulty has been encountered in finding a working definition of the Kibei, for although the literal meaning of the term excludes from this class all Nisei who have not lived in Japan, because of the wide differences in influence of Japanese culture upon the Nisei who have been to Japan, there has been much controversy as to how long and what conditions of livelihood in Japan a Nisei had to undergo before he became classed with the Kibei. If the marginal cases are set aside, however, there is considerable agreement among the evacuees as to who are the Issei, Nisei, and Kibei.

Excluding the complications of defining the Kibei, the evacuees especially themselves are/~~fairly~~ clear about identifying the Issei from the ~~Kibei~~ Nisei. The population pyramid of the evacuee population at Tule Lake presents a bi-modal age distribution in which the foreign-born Japanese are rather clearly separated in one modal group from the native-born Japanese (Nisei). Roughly speaking, the picture presented is that of the Issei pyramid balanced on the apex of the Nisei pyramid. This abnormal age distribution of the evacuee population, of course, resulted from the exclusion of Japanese immigrants following the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, and/^{led to}the further consequence that the lower age groups of immigrant Japanese were no longer replaced, but that the replacement came wholly from their offsprings born in this country. It is safe to generalize that the bulk of Issei are over forty-five years old whereas the number of Nisei over that age is yet fery small; on the other hand,

the vast majority of Nisei are still under ~~forty~~ thirty and the number of Issei below that age is of course very small. The factor of age alone has separated these two groups and has thrown them largely into two separate age classes.

Popular recognition of the age separation of the two generations has been given by the practice of referring to the Issei as the "older people" and the Nisei as the "young people". Some interesting examples of these usages appeared during the Co-op Board of Directors' discussion of whether or not to permit a certain haberdashery store in Klamath Falls to establish a branch shop on the project. A buyer for the project canteens remarked, "The younger people are demanding better things because their old clothes are beginning to wear out." And at yet another discussion of the same topic:

Ikeda: "We should discuss whether such a shop is necessary."

Chr.: "Is such a store necessary?"

Ikeda: "I think the older group is opposed to such a shop."

Sato: "People can buy through the mail-order. Public opinion may be against this."

Ikeda: "The younger people may be for this. This is a questionable matter."

Sawada: "I think the young people want things like sport shirts."

Taketa: "If it's clear that the young people want these goods, then perhaps we should give them this service. But if we are going to create the demand, we have to question the wisdom of this move...."^{1/}

The references to the "older people" and the "younger people" in these statements are interchangeable with the words, "Issei" and "Nisei". Moreover, the suggestion, "Public opinion may be against this," reflects the general recognition that public opinion was large-

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, Jan. 8, 1943.

ly influenced by Issei opinion. It is to be expected that in a small community of this kind the young people would be more interested in a haberdashery shop than the older people, and it is conceivable that had there been young Issei they would have been equally as interested as the Nisei. But with the given age structure, the Issei and Nisei tended to uphold the opposite views on questions of this nature.

~~For the Nisei the age difference~~ In the relationship of the Nisei with the Issei, the former have found definite disadvantages in being of a younger age group. The Issei invoked the authority deriving from their older age and longer experience, and either by expressed demands or by un verbalized gestures indicated their right to respect from the younger generation. The conflict in this relationship has largely derived from the adherence of the Issei to the Japanese emphasis upon the patriarchal system, the right of the male heads of the family to dictate in large part the conduct of the other members, particularly of the children, and ~~that~~ the Nisei's resistance to this type of control.

The point of friction, however, is not in the age difference per se, of course, but in the difference of interests ~~in~~ between the two generational groups arising out of their differences of experience and cultural background. In the social sphere this difference was so marked that it was a commonplace that the Issei and Nisei should largely pursue two different courses of activities. In order to satisfy the separate needs of these groups, the recreation department was divided into the Issei and Nisei staff each presenting separate programs of Japanese or of American entertainment. The large scale variety programs performed at the outdoor stage were likely to

draw both an Issei and Nisei audience whether they emphasized Japanese or American entertainment, but even in these instances there was an appreciable difference in the proportions of the Issei and Nisei depending upon whether the program were Japanese or American. But there were certain types of recreational activity in which the relative absence of one generational group of the other could be virtually assured. For instance, such events as the "Little Theater" and the "Cafe Internationale Cabaret" were primarily pointed towards Nisei interest, while such an event as a "Goh" tournament was likely to attract little interest among the Nisei. It was rare to find Issei at the weekly record concert of classical western music, but the Nisei had an equal abhorrence of records of traditional Japanese music. If the Issei attended the Nisei social dances, it was only to chaperone strictly from the side-line, and it was unheard of that the Issei should ~~participate in the American form of dancing~~ have social gatherings of their own to participate in the American form of dancing. Sakoda reports an interesting instance of the difficulties of providing recreational entertainment for a mixed party of Issei and Nisei when a farewell party for Mr. Kendall Smith was held by Co-op officials and canteen employees.

The first part of the evening was occupied with dancing, which was being done mostly by the younger canteen employees. ~~None of the Board members attended~~ The Isseis were bored because they could do nothing but watch the dance. At about 9:00 p.m. entertainments were presented. They were mostly vocal selections. One Issei man rendered a Shigin, and he did it rather awkwardly and because it was too drawn-out the young people began to snicker. In between one verse one fellow started to clap just to try to get him to quit.^{1/}

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, Dec. 16, 1942.

Nothing has contributed more towards maintaining the separation of the Issei from the Nisei than the language barrier. When the two groups associate, the language used is generally Japanese, with perhaps a liberal mixture of common English words, but few Nisei are able to converse comfortably and interestingly in Japanese. Moreover, the language difference has contributed to a difference in the kinds of materials read and the resulting thoughts suggested. The necessity for a Japanese section of the Tulean Dispatch, and the usual request for ~~xxx~~ interpreters at meetings of the administration and the Issei attest to the extreme difficulties of communication related to the language barrier. When the Nisei used Japanese in talking to the Issei, it was likely to sound either childish in its vocabulary and the turn of the phrases, or, in the relation of a Nisei fellow with an Issei man, the former would affect a crude and rough form of Japanese to stress masculinity.

The position of the Kibei has been different from either the Issei or the Nisei. As previously mentioned many Kibei are difficult to differentiate from the Nisei because their identity is principally with the Nisei. For statistical purposes, it is possible to establish a categorical definition such as ^{three} ~~five~~ or more years of education in Japan during the formative years, but it should be evident that definitions of this kind are subject to errors due to the variations in influence of Japanese culture upon the individual persons involved. In each block, however, it was possible to identify those individuals who belonged to the Kibei groups, whose association were much more with other Kibei than with either the Nisei

or the Issei. The background of such association at the project is suggested in the following account of the experiences of a young Kibei of his school years in America prior to evacuation.

I came to this country when I was fourteen years old.... I went to the foreign language class at John Adams Grammar School and worked as a school boy to pay my way. When I finished grammar school and was ready to enter high school, all my friends wanted me to enter Washington High, but I felt that since I had come all the way to this country to get an American education, I felt that I could get most out of it if I mixed with Caucasian Americans, so I purposely avoided going to Washington High where ~~there~~ all my Kibei friends were attending.^{1/}

Sakoda gives the account of one Kibei's evaluation of the Kibei background, which also reveals some of the factors which had drawn them together in a group.

When they came to America they found that they could not get along well with their families. For one thing, some of them were the oldest in the family and expected to be treated as such by their brothers and sisters, but they did not receive the respect they felt they deserved. They did not like the idea that they had to help their parents and obey them when they were at home. Consequently many of them ran away from home several times, and finally lived apart from their parents. ~~His father, s~~ With the Niseis they did not get along either. They felt that Niseis were rather childish in their thought. The fact that most of the Kibeis were older than the Niseis they came in contact with at school was a factor in this regard. Concerning such acts as smoking or visiting prostitutes occasionally, they felt that Niseis were ~~rather~~ very innocent, and they considered themselves more adult for indulging in them. The fact that many of the Kibei boys lived apart from their parents made it easy for them to indulge in such activities.^{2/}

The Kibei are a group with reasons for resentment against both the Issei and the Nisei, for on the whole they were poorly regarded and badly treated in the years before the war. In many instances, the original reason for sending the Nisei children to Japan, generally to be cared for by family relatives, was to permit the parents greater freedom in their money-making activities, and there are cases

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, Feb. 23, 1943.

^{2/} Sakoda Journal, April 7, 1943.

in which Kibei grown to adulthood have expressed resentment of their parents for failing to care for them in their childhood. Not only have the Kibei frequently experienced unhappy circumstances in America, but their life in Japan was often unsatisfactory because of their inability to gain ^{complete} acceptance into Japanese society. The newspapers of Japan have indicated by their occasional articles on the Nisei returned from America that this group, the Kibei in our terminology, were looked upon as in some measure a problem. Perhaps the most serious handicap of the Kibei has been his bi-cultural background, in which his assimilation into either the Japanese or American culture has been incomplete. Some of the most handicapped cases are to be found among those who received some American schooling before being sent to Japan where, as a result, they found themselves classed with younger children because of their retarded Japanese education; but when these individuals were again returned to America, they were retarded as compared to those who remained in this country and were educated within one cultural system. The greatest difficulty of the Kibei as a result of this splitting of their background of schooling has not been in courses like those of the sciences where mental maturity gives material advantage in understanding, but their problem has rested primarily in linguistic handicaps of absorbing the difficult Japanese language and of ~~learn~~ learning or re-learning the English language upon their return to this country. The handicaps resulting from linguistic shortcomings ^{are} ~~is~~ particularly emphasized by the relative success in adjustments of those Nisei who gained a solid foundation in English as well as an elementary knowledge of Japanese before going to Japan; that is,

Those who completed as much as high school education in America before going to Japan, and were able to concentrate on the study of Japanese since their fundamental schooling in other subjects were already behind them. For those whose language training was entirely in Japanese, however, their situation was comparable to that of all the earlier immigrant Japanese who lacked elementary familiarity with English and who therefore had to struggle with the vocabulary and syntax of an entirely dissimilar language.

The unfortunate consequences of this language handicap in the case of large numbers of Kibei has been that their original ambition of acquiring^{an} advanced American education and training has been quickly dulled in many instances, and has led to decided disadvantages in seeking economic opportunities. The same Kibei quoted above remarked concerning the difficulties and discouragement of the Kibei in acquiring an American training.

In Seattle about 45 or 50 Japanese were learning English in a school for foreigners attached to a grammar school. The course took about two years to complete..... the majority of the students were Japanese with about equal numbers of both sexes..... The students studied very hard, and were intent upon completing college in order to go back to Japan to get a decent job. One student bought a dictionary and started to memorize it page by page, tearing out each page as he completed memorizing it. What irritated Tom and the other students the most was the fact that the material they had to learn was childish. They were given American history, for instance, which consisted of an old book filled with anecdotes about the Boston Tea Party or Paul Revere. The material seemed so foolish to them. Also, since there were a great number of Kibeis in the class, they talked among themselves in Japanese, and consequently were not able to learn to speak English. Tom thought it would have been much better if they had gotten jobs as school boys in a Caucasian home and learned to speak well first. There were financial difficulties for some, too, since many of the boys were purposely living away from home. Others were sending money back to relatives in Japan. It was a full time school. Most of the students, however, succeeded in graduating the class.

Tom and two or three students next went to a grammar school since they felt that they did not learn sufficient fundamental English. They purposely chose schools where there were no Japanese, even going five or six miles to do so. Here again the material they had to learn was very childish, but they were able to learn more English. Tom attended a grammar school for one-and-a-half years. The others had gone on to high school entering as freshmen. They felt that Tom was wasting his time, but as it turned out, many of the students were still in freshmen classes when Tom entered high school. He had difficulty in English composition, but otherwise he was able to go straight through high school without any trouble. Many of the other students found that they could not pass some of the courses, especially English courses, and were thus held back. By the end of the Freshman year many began to drop out. Only a bare handful finished high school, and most of them went on to college and completed that. There were only four out of the original group of about forty-five who completed college which had been the goal of the whole group. They were not lacking in ability since Tom believes that most of them could have done college work if they had been able to hurdle the language handicap. The latter seems to have been their main source of discouragement. They tried very hard, but did advance appreciably. ~~It is~~ Another handicap was that many of them had to work while attending school. Some worked in restaurants, others in homes. Those who lived at home had to help their parents, something they disliked very much. Students in Japan were not in the habit of working even during vacations. Others also had financial obligations, such as sending money to relatives in Japan. Thus, there was an inclination to give up trying to get an education and take to money making. They seem to have been gripped by impatience because they did not make as much progress in school as desired. Since their original intention in coming to America was to get a good education over here, their plans were all destroyed. They could not even look forward to going back to Japan to get a decent job.

After leaving school many of the Kibei left for California where there were more jobs among the Japanese. Many went into the produce business, first as workers, some working up to positions of managers. Others remained in Seattle, and a few worked in a greenhouse. Some worked in stores or operated them themselves. A few went into Mitsui and Mitsubishi.^{1/}

Their social adjustments, too, had definite limitations. They were not accepted among the Nisei because of their differences of personality and language; they did not mix readily with the Issei because of age differences and conflicts with the parent generation.

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, April 7, 1943.

They had their own Kibei clubs and associated much among themselves. On the whole, both the Issei and Nisei were critical of the Kibei. The Issei thought well of the Kibei's knowledge of Japanese and his understanding of Japanese culture, by contrast with the Nisei who were considered ignorant in these respects, but there also was a common opinion that the Kibei were an erratic and unruly group. The Nisei finding little in common with the Kibei tended to ignore the group, and in the circumstances of poorer relationships, were deliberately antagonistic to them. A Nisei says of one of these antagonistic situations before the war.

There were a lot of Kibei working as farm hands in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys before the war. I don't know why it was but the Nisei didn't like the Kibei, and the Kibei didn't like the Nisei. Every now and then there would be a gang fight between them on weekends when the farm workers came into town. Some Nisei would get the idea that they didn't like the Kibei so when they'd spot a group of Kibei boys they'd gang up on them and beat the tar out of them. Lots of times I think the Nisei beat up the Kibei just for the hell of it. I can't blame the Kibei for hating the Nisei the way they've been treated in the past.^{1/}

At the Tule Lake Project, the relationship of the Kibei with the Issei and Nisei was much as it was before the war. To be sure, there were several types of Kibei whose relationships with the others differed accordingly. Those who were married tended to be noticeably more stable than those not married, and the same could be said of the unmarried Kibei living with their families by contrast with those living in bachelors' quarters. Apart from marital and familial status, however, the Kibei themselves distinguished the "quiet Kibei" from the "rowdy Kibei". This terminology is unsatisfactory for the distinction was actually not based strictly on the degree of rowdysim, but the former were considered to be those who seemed

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, July 23, 1942.

primarily interested in getting advanced education and training, ~~in~~ while the latter were those without such educational interests who frequently became involved in protest action against the W.R.A. The latter, most of whom lived as bachelors with other Kibei, were largely cut off from social relations with Nisei of either sex, had only a limited range of common interests with the Issei most of whom were married and considerably older, and the Kibei therefore associated ~~al~~ largely within their own groups.

In the nature of the W.R.A. administrative organization, the ^{of economic opportunities} Nisei had advantages/over both the Issei and Kibei, for with Caucasians as supervisory authorities over the project, ability to speak English was an important requisite of those working directly under the appointed staff as administrative officers. Furthermore, professional positions as in the hospital, engineering section, public school teaching, accounting department, and legal aid, all of which required college training in these fields, largely excluded the Issei and Kibei who may have had considerable practical experience in farming or business but who were unequipped for such specialized functions. Workers in the administrative offices were thus largely composed of the Nisei, plus a scattering of the educated Kibei and Issei. Other fields where the Nisei were predominant were: transportation, fire control, newspaper, canteens, social welfare, education, warehouse, recreation, post office, and mess hall waiters and waitresses. The Issei were predominantly engaged in work as janitors, boilermen, mess hall cooks, wardens, carpenters, and farmers. The Kibei were largely intermingled among the Issei ^{and} as mess hall workers, wardens, farmers, /construction workers.

The Issei, more than the Nisei or Kibei, were forced into the

menial tasks such as of dishwashing, chimney sweeps, and ^{block}/utility men cleaning the washrooms and shower buildings, and their loss of economic status was the most radical since they had been the owners and operators of the farms and businesses before the war on which the Kibei and Nisei worked as hired help. Some evidence of their resentment of this reversal of position was given in their occasional remarks of criticism against the Nisei white-collar workers in the administration buildings who were alleged to be "bootlicking" the whites.

Conflict of the Generations

The conflict of the Issei and Nisei was in part a matter of age difference, but also it was cultural and ideological. One of the early complaints of the Issei was that the Nisei spent too much money, and that they had no more serious thought than for the next dance or social event. During the early period when complaints of the canteen were at their height, one Issei was overheard remarking to another:

I think these canteens are a very bad influence on the young people. Every time I drop in there, I find the doorway crowded with young people buying ice cream, soda water, candy and cigarettes. On hot days perhaps you can't blame them, but they make the store a regular loitering place. What is most darashi ga nai (slovenly, sloppy, unsightly) is the way those Nisei girl clerks stand around entertaining the boys while there are lines of customers waiting to be served. The other day, I had to remind one of the girls to mind her business. All the young people think about is to spend money and to play. They don't give a thought to how serious our economic situation will be after the war. Mark my word, the most serious problem resulting from this evacuation is its effect upon the young people. Living in a place like this, they're bound to become shiftless and lazy. They seem to forget that one of these days they're going to have to provide themselves again and that it's not going to be like old times when their parents could take care of them.^{1/}

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, August 10, 1942.

Such an attitude might be expressed by any parent generation who had been accustomed to a life of hard work and scrupulous saving, and were pained at the sight of an easy-going younger generation insufficiently conscious of the hard experiences had by the older people in bringing up their children.. But there was in this criticism
/an element of a cultural difference as well for the Issei who were raised within a more formal society under stricter discipline have always looked with some disapproval of the easy-going mannerisms of the Nisei. Issei criticism of Nisei conduct, based upon cultural differences, was more clearly apparent in their disapproval of the Nisei dances. In one of the more conservatively Japanese blocks a young people's club was formed for recreational and discussion purposes, but when this group undertook dance practices as one of its functions, the club came under criticism from one of the Issei residents.

Mr. Adachi said it was all right to have an organization to learn about community matters, but he wasn't in favor of the dance. He said that in Japan there is a proverb that ~~at~~ ^{from} the age of seven years, boys and girls were not allowed to be together. (Danjo hichisai ni shite seki o onaju sezu) He wanted to know if when boys and girls embraced each other (daki atte) and danced, anyone could insure that there wouldn't be any danger. Sawada (Nisei) got up and repeated that no one could insure that there wouldn't be any sort of danger. Even if a girl were kept at home no one could insure that there would be no danger. However, he felt that it was a great deal better to have dances within the block where people knew each other and where it could be held under the supervision of people within the block.^{1/}

This individual's attitude represented a rather extreme opposition to the Nisei dances, but similar concern for the morality of the young people in connection with the dances was not infre-

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, November 22, 1942.

quently voiced by many parents. ~~The social distance be~~ The cultural distance between the Issei and Nisei on matters of this kind is rather well represented by the above-quoted proverb (Danjo hichi-sai, etc.) which is familiar to all Issei and the acceptance of which is reflected in their behavior, but which to the Nisei appears as incomprehensible as would a ban upon co-educational schools.

The major Issei-Nisei conflicts were based upon a whole series of such differences, but where disagreements led to heated argument, there was a strong tendency towards the definition of the issues as an opposition of pro-Japanese against pro-American points of view. The involvement of the W.R.A. in any community issues, of course, gave impetus to so defining the disagreement. One of the first of these conflicts was the recreation department trouble when the Issei entertainment group threatened to resign en masse because the Head of Community Activities, Ted Waller, refused the Issei permission to establish a department separate from the Nisei. The origin of this conflict lay in their resentment of their subordination to a Nisei assistant supervisor of the section, Harry Mayeda, and to Ted Waller for whom the Issei had little respect. During the first Fourth of July program at the project, disagreement had developed between the Nisei and Issei staffs as to the parts which each group would have in the program, the Nisei claiming that the Issei were not only commandeering too large a part but were emphasizing pro-Japanese programs of questionable acceptability. Waller's attempt to mediate the conflict brought on the accusation of his seeking to subjugate the Issei without an adequate appreciation of what the Issei were attempting to accomplish. It was claimed that

the Issei could not readily work with the Nisei on the same staff.¹/ The conflict in this instance was partly cultural, for both the Issei and the Nisei had a low opinion of the entertainment offered by the other group, but a status struggle was also involved in which the Issei refused to be subordinated beneath a Caucasian supervisor and a Nisei staff. The administration refused to grant the Issei permission to form a separate recreation department, the leader of the Issei group was forced to resign not only because of this trouble but because of friction with other Issei seeking to gain control of Issei entertainment, and the difficulties were settled by selecting for the new chairman of the Issei group a man more amenable to cooperation with the W.R.A. and by forming an Issei advisory council to mediate any further difficulties.

Not only was project organization such as to give the Nisei advantages over the Issei and Kibei in job opportunities, but W.R.A. policy deliberately favored the Nisei for political leadership in the community by excluding the Issei from the right to hold elected offices. Initially, there was general Issei acceptance of this condition, but Issei discontent with their subordinate position became increasingly apparent as the community discontent over the food, wage payment, clothing allowance, lumber and medical service provisions became acute. An immediate reason for the weakening of Nisei control, therefore, was the popular dissatisfaction with the existing management of the center,^{for} ~~and~~ the inability of the W.R.A. to keep the populace satisfied played directly into an ~~increased~~ Issei demand for an increased voice in community government.

The height of this Issei agitation for the right of self representation appeared during the Overseas Broadcast and the Theater Pro-

1/ Tule Lake Report, Chap. IV. 94-107

ject issues. In the Overseas Broadcast question, representatives of the Office of War Information arrived at the Tule Lake Project with a request that the evacuees assist in preparing recordings for radio ~~of~~/broadcasts giving accounts of relocation center life which would ~~be~~ be used to combat false accusations of the Japanese Government that the evacuees were being mistreated. The plea for assistance was supported by the argument that the Japanese government was using the propaganda to mistreat American prisoners in Japan, and that an on-the-spot denial by the evacuees would do much towards preventing further mistreatment of Americans imprisoned in the Far East. It is needless to relate all the discussions which took place over this issue, but the main incidents in connection with this request were: (1) The request was presented to the Council (all Nisei) which decided to refer the question~~x~~ to the block residents, (2) the Council meeting to report on the block discussions was invaded by a large number of Issei who violently protested the proposed broadcast, (3) the Council again met., this time to protest the pro-Japanese views expressed at the previous meeting and to reverse the decision of the earlier meeting with an agreement to cooperate with the O.W.I. under certain conditions, and (4) intense Issei criticism of the Council for independently reversing the stand taken by the Issei, which resulted in a forced withdrawal of the Council~~a~~ from its efforts to gain cooperation. The contrasting positions of the Issei and Nisei are represented in the following quotations:

An Issei: "I believe that we should not have this broadcast and I'm definitely against it. (much applause) If this broadcast is to make the position of Japan worse, what would happen. We are all Japanese. If we broadcast that we are being treated well here, Japan's position may be weakened. To accept the request of enem~~ies~~ and make a broadcast serves only to weakn our

position. There should be other methods to reach Japan. We shall lose the right to request anything from the WRA. (a lot of applause) All strikes and requests will be without power.^{1/}

The ~~position~~ point of view of the Nisei is reflected in the following remarks of a councilman who spoke at a later meeting.

"I was very much disappointed in the way the meeting was conducted this morning. To go back in history on this question, while we were still at Sacramento, a bunch of us Nisei went to the Sacramento Bee to put in an ad about how the Issei were all for America and for an American victory. This came out right after Pearl Harbor. Of course, after the evacuation our feeling is different, but, nevertheless, we want to show our regard for the nation. The way things went this morning, those of us who went to the newspaper to place the ad are made out as liars, and, in fact, gives the American public some evidence to think that the evacuation was justified. We ought to try to support anything that might affect ourselves, and the Japanese who are in the free zone.^{2/}

The Issei were not all as violently aroused as the individual quoted above, and as for the Nisei, while the majority in the Council were in favor of cooperating with the O.W.I. given reasonable conditions, the bulk of Nisei residents were unaware that any issue of the kind existed, and were uninterested. The defeat of the broadcast proposal not only demonstrated the superiority of political power of the Issei, but also illustrated their power to control the Nisei on a rather crucial issue.

The same thing was even more clearly demonstrated in the case of the Theater Project question. The issue, which had been raised when it was learned that Kendall Smith had bought lumber and equipment for a movie theater with Community Enterprises funds (people's money) without the consent of the people, brought the Nisei into conflict with the Issei even more than in the broadcast question.

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, Sept. 29, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, Sept. 29, 1942.

The claim presented was that the theater could be established with a minimum cost to each individual. The main arguments of the Issei were (1) a theater would serve only to further deplete the already reduced finances of the evacuees and the W.R.A., in any case, was responsible for providing an auditorium, (2) American movies are detrimental to the morality of youths, and (3) the W.R.A. had used the people's money without even consulting them about the advisability of such use. The Nisei countered that (1) the theater involved only a minimum charge, (2) the people in general, but especially the young people, required recreational outlets, ^{and} (3) no other opportunity would be had of having a theater since the W.R.A. refused to provide such a building due to wartime restrictions. The hostility of the Issei was initially directed at the W.R.A. which they felt ~~was~~ was attempting to deceive the people into using their own funds for the theater building, but the antagonism was ^{re-}directed at the Nisei Council when the latter body, as in the overseas broadcast issue, attempted to reverse the stand of the Issei. There was no doubt that the Nisei young people wanted a movie theater on the project, and there were even a minority of Issei who were for it, but when a referendum vote was taken on the question, the project was defeated by a three to one vote. Considerable pressure upon the young people was brought to bear by the parents, and there were individual cases of Nisei who were heard parroting the arguments of their fathers and mothers.

The efforts of the Nisei Council to manage the project more in accordance with the Nisei view of community affairs resulted in Issei distrust of the Nisei leaders, and in the November election of the Permanent Council, there was observed a notable increase in

the number of Kibei nominated ~~to~~ as candidates for the office of representative. Throughout the conflicts over the broadcast and theater questions, as well in the other disturbances occurring from the farm strike on, the Kibei alignment was largely on the same side with the Issei. As the Issei distrust of the Nisei increased, there was a tendency of the Issei to turn increasingly to the Kibei, who were citizens like the Nisei but had the additional value of understanding Japanese, to represent them in their protests to the administration.

It will be remembered that during the registration crisis, a similar pattern again developed, of a conflict between the American ~~point~~ Nisei leaders who supported the registration, and the Issei representatives who were largely opposed to it, in which the Kibei appeared as the champions of the same point of view maintained by the Issei. In fact, the Kibei action was regarded as so radical that there appeared the unusual phenomenon of the Issei pleading with the Kibei to withdraw their stubborn opposition to the W.R.A. registration program. The registration, too, revealed the strength of parental control over the masses of the Nisei, and the consequent isolation of the Nisei leadership from the support of their own group.

Sectional Differences

Tule Lake Project is unique among the relocation centers in having large numbers of people from each of the three Pacific Coast states. Of the total 15,000 people (in round numbers), about 1,200 were from Oregon, about 4,200 from Washington, and the remainder of about 9,600 from California. Most of the Oregon and Washington people were from the rural outlying regions of Portland and Seattle,

except for a group of about 700 from Tacoma, Washington, while the Californians were from the city of Sacramento and the rural areas of the Sacramento Valley and Placer County.

Since housing assignments were made by filling one block after another as evacuees were transferred from assembly centers or directly from their homes communities, people who had resided in the same community or district before the war were largely placed in contiguous areas of the project center. In fact, because of an accidental correspondence of the numbers from given areas with the number who could be housed in a ward (composed of nine blocks), each of the seven wards of the community were identified as being populated by people from given districts. Thus,

- | | |
|--------|---|
| Ward 1 | Washington and Oregon with a minority from Clarksburg and Sacramento, California. |
| Ward 2 | Sacramento and rural hinterland. |
| Ward 3 | Sacramento and rural hinterland. |
| Ward 4 | Marysville, California and rural hinterland. |
| Ward 5 | Placer County, California (so-called Free Zone) |
| Ward 6 | White River Valley and Tacoma Washington, plus minority of Placer County. |
| Ward 7 | White River Valley and Tacoma, Washington, plus Hood River and Salem, Oregon. Also a scattering from other areas. |

There was popular recognition of this distribution of people into wards by communities of origin represented in their common references, for example, to Wards 2 and 3 as the "Sacramento Wards", to Wards 6 and 7 as the "Northwest Wards", to Ward 5 as the "Free Zone People", to Ward 4 as the "Marysville Ward", and Ward 1 usually as an "Oregon and Washington Ward". The designation for Ward 1 was

perhaps the least definite since it was a somewhat more heterogeneous group than most of the other wards, and the homogeneity of Ward 4 was a little disturbed by the establishment of the residences for the professional hospital workers in at least one block of that ward. Furthermore, the internal composition of the wards was not as homogeneous as these designations might lead one to believe, for even within the highly homogeneous Sacramento Wards, as an example, there were blocks composed of a majority of Walnut Grove people or of Isleton people, conservative rural groups located near Sacramento, whose background and outlook were quite different. Ward identity was generally much weaker than block identity, and, with reference to the community of origin, local community identity was likely to be stronger than the regional identity. Recognizing, then, that there was this grading of sectional identity, in which a person might be identified at one time as a Californian, another time as a Free Zone person, and yet again as a Penryn evacuee, all these forms of identity are to be treated under the heading of sectional differences.

Strong sectional feelings ^{were} ~~was~~ primarily an early phenomenon appearing in the period of initial contacts when minor differences of background and their unfamiliarity with each other gave some sense of strangeness to ^{group} ~~their~~ relationships. These feelings of difference tended to recede with time, and within a few months of settlement at Tule Lake, the sectional problem which was much talked of at first largely disappeared, but while sectional friction and tension declined markedly, the strength of pre-war relationships persisted to give a latent basis of sectional feelings.

Sectionalism was more a problem of the Nisei than of the Issei

or Kibei, for the Nisei had more occasions for varied contacts, their activities ~~reflected~~ provided more occasions for group rivalry, and they reflected wider differences due to community background. At the time of first arrival of all the groups, skin color was regarded as one of the criteria of difference the general assumption being that the Northwesterners were lighter complexioned than the more tanned Californians. The darker, sunburnt youths from California sometimes referred to themselves facetiously as kurombos (Negroes), a term which the northerners picked up and applied to the Californians, and the latter in turn sometimes maliciously referred to the northerners as the "T.B. Lilies". ^{Fair}~~White~~/complexion, an ideal of feminine beauty in Japan, is an ideal of the evacuees as well, and there was some tendency to make invidious comparisons between the northerners and the Californians on this score.

A Nisei girl from the north who herself is rather light complexioned said, "In the washroom the other day one of the ladies who lives in my block and is from California asked me how the girls from the north kept their complexion so fair. She said she was surprised at how light complexioned all of us were. I told her it was probably due to the fact that the sun wasn't so strong in the north, but that we'd probably become sunburnt too living in a hotter climate and get darker. This lady was evidently concerned about her daughter's appearance and ~~evidently~~ was anxious to learn some pointers, so I told her about using cleansing cream at night and that sort of thing. She apparently came from a farming background and didn't know very much about feminine toilets. She was quite interested in hearing what I had to say."^{1/}

A group of Sacramento and Washington girls were in a group chatting and one of the newcomers from Sacramento said with some self consciousness, "I'm so dark; look at me. It looks terrible where the skin's peeling, doesn't it? It was so hot at Walerga, and there weren't any trees for shade. I just got burnt all over walking around camp." Some of the northern girls expressed sympathy, but one of the Sacramentans commented, "If you stick around here long enough, you'll be kurombos just like us, too."^{2/}

Indeed, differences of complexion became, very shortly, a mat-

^{1/} July 13, 1942, Miyamoto Notes.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, July 2, 1942.

ter of indifference. Likewise, there were certain slang phrases much used among the California youths which were unfamiliar to the Nisei from the north, such as, "getcha down," "waste time," and "Yabo (Japanese)", but these too lost their initial ~~strangeness~~ strangeness for the northerners as the latter also adopted them in their own conversations.

One of the most prominent differences, often remarked upon by Nisei youths, were the distinctive dance habits of Californians and Northwesterners. Whereas "jitterbugging" was very much in fashion among the Californians, especially the Sacramentans, and a great many of the latter were quite expert at it, the youths from the Northwest were generally unfamiliar with it and confined themselves more to the ~~more~~ familiar variations upon the fox trot and the waltz. Some of the earliest community dances held with mixed sectional groups led to some disagreement regarding the number of times each ^{should be played} that "smooth music" and "fast music"/during an evening₁/, a problem that was partially solved by having two dance halls with different emphases on the type of music played. As the project became filled to its residential capacity, the dance halls also became crowded and the Northwest groups, particularly in Ward 7, often held their own dances with some apparent intent of excluding the Californians. Differences also were reduced as the northern youths learned to "jitberbug" from their California friends. In general, the northern youths were regarded as more conservative and formal than the youths from the south, and some of the hostility of the former lay in their objection to the aggressiveness of the latter on the dance floor.

1/ Tule Lake Report, Chap. IV, Part I, pp. 8-9.

For instance, "cutting in" on the dance floor was apparently a familiar practice among the California youths, but much less so among those from the Northwest.

Correlated with the type of dancing engaged in by the two groups, there were also certain noticeable differences of attitude and behavior. Some of the "jitterbugging" youths from California affected "zoot suits", sometimes of a startling variety. A more general fashion among the California youths was a denim trouser, rolled up at the bottom, with a denim jacket worn over a "T-shirt", and a pair of farming boots which looked somewhat like a cowboy's riding boots. This outfit was frequently seen on the dance floor, sometimes including the heavy boots, which the northerners found somewhat objectionable. It was customary to top this style of clothing with a type of male coiffure known as a "Pachook" haircut", otherwise called a "Filipino haircut", the distinctive features of which were ^{that} all the hair were left long enough to reach from the hairline on the forehead to the nape of the neck, oiled and slicked back in a long, heavy pompadour. These habits were largely unfamiliar to the Northwesterners prior to evacuation, although many youths of the latter group were influenced to adopt the style. ~~One~~ While this appearance may ~~not~~ have characterized only a minority of the California youths, and only the "yogores" (lit., "dirties", a youth gang type) completely fulfilled the type, the northerners were inclined to look upon it as a distinctively California group feature.

Certain clubs, particularly the athletic teams, were largely organized among friends known from pre-evacuation communities.

Football, baseball and basketball team names such as "White River Bruins", "Tacoma Busseis", "Marysville," "Florin," "West Sacramento," "Bellevue," "Isleton," and "Riverside", give prima facie evidence of the lines along which most of the athletic clubs were organized. Such teams as the "Wakabas" and "Mikados" of Sacramento were clubs organized for years before the evacuation and were well known in the Japanese communities as strong basketball teams. These clubs were all formed among long-standing friends, and considering the amount of time members of an athletic club spends with his teammates, it may be presumed that primary friendship groups among the Nisei young people at Tule Lake were in ~~large~~ part formed on the basis of old community ties.

The condition contributing most towards the maintenance of old community relationships was the distribution of people roughly by community groups. Because of the distances on the project, the lack of means of transportation, and the poor roads, there was a tendency of the people to seek associations among those living within short walking distances. This was particularly true of the older people some of whom seldom ventured beyond their own ward.

~~Sectionalism, of course, was the basis of certain conflicts~~

A number of conflicts naturally emerged out of these feelings of sectional differences. Because various sectional groups arrived at the project at different times in accordance with army-regulated movements, certain sections arriving early had the advantage of a wider selection of the better jobs, a source of much resentment to the late arrivals who felt that sectional favoritism was practiced to ensure the better jobs for friends. The accusation came especial-

ly from the Californians and were directed at the Northwesters who arrived first at the project and, as it was claimed, saved the better job opportunities for their friends in the Pinedale (Northwest) group which arrived last. According to one girl from Sacramento:

I know from my own case that some of the Washington girls have been saving the better secretarial and clerical jobs at the administration offices for their friends. Just by walking through the offices, you can tell right away there's something wrong because most of the good jobs are filled by the Northwest people. I placed an application for a secretarial position as soon as I got here in June, and I even went a couple of times to the employment office to inquire. When I went to the employment office, one of the girls--I'm sure she was from the Northwest--told me there weren't any secretarial positions open just at the moment but that she'd let me know as soon as there was something and took my name down. I went back two or three times, and it was the same thing. When the Pinedale group came in, some of the girls from the Northwest got jobs right away. I know because one of my friends who works down there told me about it. I've been working in the mess hall, but I don't want to spend all the rest of my time here waiting on tables. Lots of girls I know are in the same fix, and they're all pretty mad about it.^{1/}

On the other hand, the same accusations were made by the Pinedale group when they arrived late and found all the better positions filled.

Sectional feelings were not less intense when the parties involved were both from the same general district. One such conflict which eventually came to the attention of the Internal Security Division involved some youths from Walnut Grove and Isleton, two communities located very close together in the Lower Sacramento Valley, the people from which were living in the same as well as adjacent blocks of Ward 2. While both communities are in the Delta region of the Lower Sacramento River, a district known among Japanese resi-

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, August 1, 1942.

dents from northern California as having contained some of the most "backward" Japanese communities of California, it seems from the language used by these people themselves that Walnut Grove was considered more strictly speaking the delta community, while Isleton was not so regarded. The trouble between the two groups occurred when some of the Deltans (Walnut Grove) fellows were invited into the Isleton Club, but other members objected to accepting them as members. A dispute developed over this insult, and a fight was threatened. A gang of about five of the Isleton fellows hunted out one of the Walnut Grove boys and beat him up badly enough to require hospital attention; eventually the parents of the boys also became involved in a misunderstanding and it was necessary to take the question before the Judicial Commission of the Council for a settlement. The comment of one ~~Walnut~~ Isleton girl on the characteristics of the Walnut Grove youths was:

She said that the "Deltan kids were really dirty." The Walnut Grove kids thought that they were from a city in comparison to the Isleton people, she stated. As a matter of fact, however, Isleton was a larger town and Walnut Grove only a village. Only there were more Japanese in Walnut Grove which gives them the idea that they were swell.¹

Sectionalism, like all forms of provincialism, had at its basis not only the feelings of difference but also of superiority of one's own group to that of others. On the whole, such factors as the bigness of the community from which one came, the attractiveness claimed for it, and the variety of experiences permitted in one's home locale, were the conditions which were presumed to give one group superiority over the other. The claim of the Northwest group was that the Californians from the Sacramento Valley and Placer County

¹/ Sakoda Journal, Sept. 10, 1942.

was that were less Americanized than those from the north, while the counter-charge of the Californians was a denial of this claim and an accusation of the Northwest group of "snootiness", conservatism, and provincialism. Considering the more intense anti-Japanese agitation that existed in the rural areas of northern California than in either Washington or Oregon, it seems plausible that the latter groups historically arrived at a more harmonious symbiotic relationship than the former. But the circumstances of evacuation and center life were such that a premium was placed upon the sensitivity of the evacuees to breaches of their personal rights and willingness to protest against the Caucasians. There was a tendency among the appointed personnel to look on the Northwest people as more Americanized than the Californians, and promoters of the Co-op movement declared the Northwest people of Ward 7 the most receptive to their program. But from the standpoint of the evacuee community, the "cooperativeness" of the Northwest people with the administration, rather than being an admirable trait, was a sign of weakness and insensitivity to personal discrimination. The sensitivity to this criticism from the Californians is reflected in the remarks of one Nisei from the Northwest during the registration protest when he remarked:

All the Nisei have to get together and start fighting. It's when things go hard with you that you learn to fight; you begin to feel like you've got some guts. You can tell the difference right away between the people from Washington and those from California. The California Nisei know how to fight because they've always had to buck prejudices. Up north, we're soft because things have been easier. You can see it right away.^{1/}

In fact, it was true that protest leadership was much more common among the California people than the Northwesterners.

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, Feb. 11, 1943.

Because of the need to live together within a single community, strenuous efforts were made to avoid sectionalism by administrative and community leaders. A basic theory in any organization founded among the people of the community as a whole was that due ^{representation} ~~recognition~~ ~~tion~~ be given to every major sectional area present at the project. Generally, this was accomplished by having one representative from each ward, which would give four representatives from California and three from Washington and Oregon, a rough correspondence to the absolute proportions of population on the project. In the formation of the Farm Committee, following various suggestions for giving fair representation, the proportions agreed upon were: four from California and five from Washington and Oregon.^{1/} Editorials were written and warnings were frequently issued both by the administration and community leaders to reduce sectional feelings.

The preservation of old community ties, however, offered certain advantages which made any complete departure from it impracticable. In having personal favors done, for instance, old friendship connections offered competitive advantage in receiving early attention to his problem. At the time the W.R.A. proposal to transfer some of the doctors was being aired, an Issei in protesting the transfer of Dr. Harada of Sacramento stated:

Dr. Harada is one whom we have known in our midst for a long time, and we have always loved him from the bottom of our hearts. He is one whom we trust and love as one of our own sons, and nothing would grieve us more than to see him transferred. As you know, most sicknesses are sicknesses of the mind primarily, and sicknesses of the body only secondarily. For the treatment of such ailment, one requires a doctor who has long been our friend and whom we can trust.^{2/}

^{1/} Hisatomi Notes, August 17, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, October 23, 1942.

D. RURAL - URBAN DIFFERENCES

External differences between the urban and rural people at Tule Lake were difficult to distinguish, for given the same conditions of life both groups adapted themselves to center conditions in much the same way, and because of the close contacts within the center community it appeared that there was seldom any distinction made between the people of urban and of rural backgrounds in the interpersonal relations formed. The one group at the project composed overwhelmingly of those from a farming background were the men employed on the project farm, a group distinguishable by their attire and their weathered skin.^{1/} Conversely, those employed in the administrative offices were largely from urban backgrounds or had attended urban schools, and they too were somewhat distinguishable as a "white-collar" group although most residents of them generally wore very informal clothing. Externals, however, constituted a poor criterion of distinction between those of urban and those of rural backgrounds, for in addition to the urbanization that has widely influenced rural people in America towards greater conformity with city-ways, the circumstances at Tule Lake were essentially rural and adoption of rural habits, especially of clothing, was common among the city people.^{2/} On the whole, rural-urban distinctions were of relative unimportance for perceptible differences were difficult to ascertain and people seldom referred to such differences.

^{1/} During the farm strike of August 1942, two members of the research staff donned work clothing to permit mingling among the strikers without occasioning too much notice. One of the two was accustomed to laboring jobs in canneries and sawmills, and on this occasion wore such clothing as he had been accustomed to wearing at these manual jobs. However, their friends in the farm crew later made quite a joke of their attempted disguise remarking upon how easily the two men could be spotted among the farm workers. This is far from crucial evidence of the differences in appearance of the farm workers, but it is suggestive of differences that were difficult for outsiders to imitate.

^{2/} See back of page.

2/ At a rough estimate it may be said that over 50% of the people at Tule Lake were from a rural or semi-rural background. By contrast, Minidoka was populated overwhelmingly by city people from Portland and Seattle. An immediate impression in going from Tule Lake to Minidoka was a difference in type of clothing worn by the people at the two centers. More suits were in evidence among the latter group, the ladies appeared to give more attention to clothing, and the young people seemed to copy campus styles more assiduously. In general, the Minidoka people seemed more "dressed up" than the Tule Lake residents. A check among a few transferees from Tule Lake produced confirming affirmations of this observation. In a gross way, then, there may have been differences in the outward appearance of city people by contrast with rural people at Tule Lake. However, if such differences existed, they were of such a subtle character as to defy analysis.

The differences which were alleged to exist were largely in the nature of untested claims most of which were the subjects of comment only during the initial period of adjustments. In those blocks composed of both city and country people, a common accusation during the early days was that the country women were responsible for the clogging of the toilet drains, an occasional occurrence in the women's toilets at the time. A city girl was heard to remark:

This is the second time in a week that one of the o-benjo (toilet) in the women's side has become clogged. I hear that the block janitor was complaining because the women throw their "sanitary pads" into the bowls and flush them down the drain. He says that's what is causing the trouble. I can't blame him for complaining. I think it's these country women who are responsible; some of them probably don't know that you're not supposed to throw the "pads" into flush toilets. Somebody ought to tell them.1/

There is at least one case on record of a country woman making the same accusation of city women, possibly in retaliation for the more commonly heard criticisms of the country people.

K. (a city girl) was telling us of Mrs. Sakura S.'s explanation of why the women's toilets were clogged--the city girls had put kotex in. "City people have no more sense." It seemed much more likely that country girls accustomed to outhouses had done the trick.2/

When the Tule Lake farm was first being organized in June 1942, there was an urgent demand for farm workers to plant \$80,000 worth of seeds ~~of cabbage seedlings~~ which were already arriving at the project, and the administration publicized strong pleas for a turnout of all experienced farmers to save this investment. Considering the number of "soft" jobs available on the project at the time, farming for a token wage of \$16 a month was unattractive, and the pressure upon this particular group to accept this undesirable type of

1/Miyamoto Notes, June 26, 1942.

2/ Shibutani Journal, July 8, 1942.

work caused some resentment among the farming people who felt that they were being held responsible for the farming project while the city people were generally relieved of obligation. In an argument over the question of volunteering for farm work, one Kibei answered an Issei who was urging cooperation with the government:

We farmed for thirty years and were uprooted. You city people don't understnad. We are in a terrible situation and at the mercy of the dirty keto!1/

While no conclusive argument can be made on the point, there is some evidence that the farmers were more embittered over the loss of their farms than the city people were over the loss of their businesses. This condition, if it were true, might be attributed to the conservative outlook of the farming class, but there have been offered economic reasons why the evacuation was a more severe blow to the farmers than to the city merchants. During the registration the rural people of Ward 5, mostly from Placer County, proved to be among the strongest oppositionists; an effort was made to determine whether there were any special economic losses resulting from the evacuation to these people which made them particularly embittered.

Mike Masuda, who came from Auburn (Placer County), was asked whether it was true that people from Placer County were uncooperative during the registration because they had just bought their farms and lost all of it during evacuation. Mike said that it was partly true. Fruit ranches were not paying and many Caucasians found it impossible to keep their ranches. Many Japanese consequently bought these ranches, paying at least several thousands of dollars for them. Since most of these Japanese farmers did not have any extra money, they had to make payments every year on the farm they bought. Also, they had to buy equipment to take care of the farm. Consequently, when the evacuation came along they were caught with their farm and equipment only partly paid for, and which they subsequently lost because they could not continue to make payments.^{2/}

^{1/} Shibutani Journal, June 27, 1942.

^{2/} Sakoda Journal, April 4, 1943.

The foregoing report is substantiated by others who have told of losses to the Placer County farmers because of their relatively late start in the farming of that area, the damage to fruit orchards because of poor care by the Caucasian farmers to whom they were leased, and the instances of "swindling" by the lessees who had assumed control of the evacuee farms. However, farmers from other areas have also claimed special difficulties as a result of evacuation, as in the remarks of a young farmer from the Puget Sound truck farming region.

The trouble was that the evacuation orders didn't come out until March of 1942 and even in April and May there was still some talk that farmers would not be evacuated at least until the farming season was over. We weren't sure that we should go ahead with the planting but the Government told us to go ahead and that we would be repaid for the costs, so a lot of the farmers did start their planting. I believe most of the farmers had the F.S.A. handle the transactions for closing deals, and most of them came out all right, but, even so, there were some farmers who got rooked. There were also some farmers who formed agreements with Caucasian friends or with farm corporations, but they later slid out from under those agreements when they claimed they couldn't get farm labor or for other reasons.

The thing is, farming is a seasonal occupation and the farmer is best off in the fall right after harvesting and he's the poorest in the spring when he's putting his savings into the farm. If the evacuation had come in the fall instead of in the spring, it would have made quite a difference to the farmers. As you know, farmers have to do business on credit; they get loans to buy seeds, fertilizers and labor, and then pay off in the winter after the harvest. On our farm, we had already started to prepare for the coming season, but by the time we paid off all our debts because of evacuation, we had hardly anything left. We had been making investments on the farm, adding new equipment, fixing up the sheds, and so on, which would have paid good dividends if we'd been allowed to stay, but while all that cost money, it hardly amounted to anything when it came time to sell out. Farming is a gamble. Ordinarily you don't make much, just enough to get along, and you work and wait for a couple of good years when prices are up to make some savings and pay off all the debts. My father worked hard building up the farm, and just when it seemed the farm would begin to pay off, the evacuation came along and wrecked our chances.^{1/}

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, September 19, 1943.

The losses of the city business men and professionals have also been great, especially among those whose trade depended upon the continued existence of Japanese communities. But perhaps because of the farmers' closer identity with their property, the soil which they had carefully husbanded over the years, there was a feeling among the uprooted farmers that, "You city people don't understand."

In the original policy of the W.R.A., it had been hoped that farming might be made a major source of income to the project, and there were even schemes suggested for a distribution of the profits from evacuee production. Had these plans been carried out and had farming become the chief source of profit-making to the evacuees, it is possible that the farming class at the center might have gained special status at the project. But the farmers were not, in fact, a favored group, and there were reasons for them to feel rather that they were not adequately compensated for the work they did. Some of the chief complaints of the farm strike of August 1942 were that the farmers were not fed enough for the kind of work they did, they were were not only wearing out their own clothes but were having to wash them after ^{working} ~~being~~ in the exceptionally dusty soil all day, and while their wage payments were delayed, they were spending their own savings to pay for shoe repairs and new work clothing. On the whole the office jobs were preferred positions and were on the average compensated better than the farm workers, but the professional, administrative and even clerical positions were largely held by people of urban background.

^{did}
Nor/~~have~~ the women of farming background acquire favored status by their greater capacity for work. In one of the blocks with mix-

ed residents of both urban and rural background, it was noted that more/^{Issei}women from the country worked in the mess hall were employed at gainful occupation than were the city women. An Issei woman from the city said:

Mrs. Nakamura and the other women who are from the country and are working in the mess hall were saying it wouldn't be necessary for us city women to work because they would take care of the tasks. They were accustomed to working, they said, and only became tired staying at home. What they meant was that we^x city women don't know how to work as they do. I know that is what they are thinking. The country women think we are "soft" and too much interested in "society" life. But I notice that whenever they want some group function of the block women carried out, they call upon one of the city women to do it.^{1/}

The Issei women who worked were largely employed as dishwashers, laundresses, packing-shed workers, waitresses, craft instructors in adult education, cooks helps, and janitresses at the hospital. With the exception of the craft instructors, none of these positions added to the social prestige of the workers. At least during the first year at Tule Lake, there were more/^{Issei}women from rural backgrounds employed than those from the cities.

While the physical conditions at the relocation center were primarily rural, the organizational activities of a community of 15,000 placed a premium upon capabilities of the kind acquired under urban circumstances. For example, of the seven men elected to the Planning Board Directorship, five were from an urban background and only two from a rural, a disproportionately heavy representation of the city people. While the background of the councilmen have not been analyzed, the strongest leadership in the Council were largely from those of urban background or who had received college

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, November 3, 1942.

training in urban areas. In one block populated almost equally by both rural and urban people, block leadership came largely from the urban people and every elected or appointed office of the block, including the councilman, planning board representative, and the block manager, was held by persons from the cities. In an election of the Co-op representative in this block, when a country person was nominated for the office, the reason offered for declining the nomination was:

"I and others of my group are mostly from the farm and are inexperienced in matters of this kind. I think it would be better to elect persons from the city who had had experience in organizational work.^{1/}

On the whole, there was an attitude of superiority attached to the fact of having come from a large city or its suburb. Residence in Sacramento was presumed to be intrinsically superior to residence in Walnut Grove; likewise, residence in Seattle was considered superior to residence in Tacoma.

A girl was asked where she came from and she replied that she was from Sacramento. Later a Sacramento girl who had been in the group when the first girl was asked her place of origin, commented, "Mary isn't a Sacramento girl. Her father had a small farm about thirty miles outside the city, and I don't think she ever lived in the city, although I know two of her older sisters were working in Sacramento. I don't see why she should try to hide the fact that she's not from Sacramento; she could just as well have said that she's from B _____, which is actually where she's from.^{2/}

Each group, of course, tended to defend its community and its way of life, and claims were made for the city people or the country people the validity of which could not have been easily tested. The country people had poor table manners at the mess hall unlike the city people, the city people complained more about the food than the country people, the country people were slow in understanding administrative regulations---such were the claims. But apart from

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, August 21, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, November 12, 1942.

such specific claims which could not have been easily proved or disproved, popular conceptions of the relative superiority of urban or rural backgrounds generally tended to follow the pattern of the larger society on the outside. Among the young people the values which were stressed were ability in sports, expertness in dancing, educational background, specific talents, and poise in social relations. Among the older people the values emphasized were economic and political acumen, adherence to correct Japanese conventions, and general social acceptability. The urban people and those from the country with experience in city life on the whole enjoyed a superior status on the basis of these standards.

Social Classes in a Center Community

Special difficulties are involved in distinguishing the social classes of a center community, for the relocation center was not only a frontier community in the sense of its newness and relative lack of tradition, but it was also a communistic society, placing uniform restrictions on all the people, insofar as its organizational plan was concerned. Under the circumstance, it seems more appropriate to refer to class aspirations in the center community than to any definable and existing class structure, but because of this nebulous, ill-defined class situation, it is necessary that we define the type of strivings which represented class aspirations. It seems legitimate to say that all class definitions presuppose some socially defined conceptions of superiority and inferiority among large groupings of people. As to what constitutes the conditions of superiority or inferiority varies widely with the doctrines held, but in

all the doctrines there is agreement that the "superior" classes have readier access to certain desired values of society. Again, there is much disagreement as to the acquisition of which values gives superiority to a group of people. But as our minimum definition of class aspirations, we assume that people strive for certain socially defined values highly prized in that society but which are not accessible to all the people; and part of our problem, with reference to social classes in the center community, is to define the values sought by the evacuees of the community.

The objects of class aspiration at the center were inevitably influenced by the class ideals of the larger society from which the evacuees had been so recently isolated: wealth, power, material comforts, and their fundamental accompaniment, regard from others and acceptability in the most exclusive groups. The conditions of the relocation center, however, were entirely unfavorable to the development of class differences. Because of the uniformity of housing, wages, meals, privileges, education, medical care, and all other community provisions, the external symbols of upper-class status had little possibility of expression. There were no residences superior to others, and no segregated districts of the wealthy or the poor. There were no shops or places of entertainment for special classes of people. Everyone ate the same meals at the mess hall, although a few of the wealthier families supplemented the mess hall food with meals at home. No evacuee was permitted to have his own car on the project. The uniformity of wages imposed a considerable restriction upon the development of class differences, but more important was the fact that everyone was an employee of the W.R.A. and they

no evacuee could become a member of the "employing" class. The result was a tendency toward the levelling of all evacuee social status, and of impressing upon evacuee consciousness, rather, the contrast of class position between themselves and those outside the centers.

The difficulties of class definition at Tule Lake were also the result of a relative absence of clear class divisions in the Japanese communities even before the war; that is, class distinctions were not totally lacking but there had been neither the time nor the conditions for definite class lines to crystallize. On the whole, the Japanese in America have been profoundly middle class in their economic interests and social-political aims. The occupational census of 1940 indicates that the Japanese were to a large extent involved in proprietorship or managership of their own businesses and farms, others serving as clericals or laborers under the Japanese proprietors, and a small minority in personal services. Many of the private enterprises were family operated and there was little room for the development of a distinction between employer and employee. Even among the laboring and clerical groups working for other Japanese, there was imposed upon them a kind of family conception, of the employer as a kind of benevolent patriarch. Hence, unlike the people of the United States as a whole, there has been very little growth of a working-class consciousness, and the primary impulse has been towards maintaining existing enterprises or of acquiring a private enterprise of one's own. The nature of this ideology is well illustrated in the widespread indifference and distrust of unionization characteristic of the bulk of Japanese population even in recent years, and the acceptance of a few labor unions only in

a few city trades and industries.

No fundamental alteration of this ideology resulted as a consequence of their evacuation and the change of their economic circumstances. The hope of most Issei was that, after the war, they might return to their former positions in the Pacific Coast economy as farm operators or as small entrepreneurs in the cities. The Nisei, although less sure of their future, pictured it in terms of professions or the operation of farms~~x~~ and retail trades following their parents. Much of their embitterment over the losses of evacuation were related to the loss of their private property and enterprises, and the fear that they could not be reconstituted after the war. Frequent references to property and business indicate the close identity of the evacuees' life goals to these objects, and the disruption of their pursuit which was caused by the evacuation. During the registration, questions concerning the possibility of a return to the pre-evacuation circumstances were frequent.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to say a few things. The evacuation has placed the people in a very difficult position. We have all had to give up homes in which we lived for many years. We have given up farms which our fathers worked and improved, sometimes over a period of twenty or thirty years. Some of us have given up property which was valued at thousands of dollars, and often at tremendous losses. We have done all this without complaining because we felt that by evacuating quietly we might cooperate in the war effort. Now we want to ask the Government and the WRA to stand behind us. Won't you help us try to regain some of those things which we have lost? We have given our loyalty to the United States; but if we are prohibited from getting those things which we are asking for, we can't put our hearts into fighting for this country. We fight because we want to go back to our homes. Mr. Coverley, if you would try to help us, I am sure the people would be back of you one hundred percent on anything you say. Don't discriminate against us, but press this point time and again. (Loud~~x~~ applause) 1/

An Issei who owned and operated a retail merchandis~~e~~ store in

1/ Miyamoto Notes, Feb. 15, 1945.

Seattle before the war inquired:

One question which I should like to ask is, what does the statement mean when the Government declares: "...ways shall be found to restore you as quickly as may be to your normal and rightful share in the present life and work of the people of the United States." (Tulean Dispatch, Feb. 10). Does that mean that the Issei and Nise shall be permitted to return to their old homes and businesses and carry on under normal circumstances? If that is what is meant by "a return to normal life" then perhaps we might sign our allegiance to the United States.1/

One of the commonest refrains in the arguments of the Issei was their reference to the years of struggle to build up their economy, an idea that reflected their close identity with the objective of entrenching themselves in the independent status of a middle class entrepreneur. The same point of view was presented by the people who, during the registration, expressed their intention of returning to Japan. Some declared they would go to Japan and start farms or businesses; more frequently the intent was expressed of exploiting the conquered territories of the Greater Asia sphere.

There is no future for the Japanese in this country. I think we should turn our attention towards the conquered territories on the Asiatic mainland, and some of the islands in the South Pacific. In all of that territory, there is bound to be a tremendous economic reconstruction after the war; you can't miss on an opportunity like that. The whole area is scarcely industrialized, but that is what Japan will accomplish for those territories. For a successful economy you need two things, raw materials and people, the latter to provide both labor and a market. Both are already there, in Java, the Malays, French-Indo China, and the Japanese will bring in the organization to utilize what is already there.2/

During an Ouiji (fortune telling) craze at Tule Lake, two girls, sisters of a rather conservative family whose father had operated a restaurant before the war, told of the future Ouiji had outlined for their family.

1/ Miyamoto Notes, Feb. 15, 1943.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, Feb. 13, 1943.

Another thing we asked Ouiji was about our family takara (treasure). My mother says its been lost for a long time. We found out that the treasure is buried three feet from the wall (on the family land in Japan), and we even found out how deep it is. It's two feet deep. So we're going to be rich. We asked Ouiji where we are going after the war, and it said we were going to Singapore and stay fifteen years to make more money. Then we're coming back to the United States. Anyway, we're going to Japan first after the war.1/

There is, of course, nothing specially middle-class in the attitudes expressed, except that these Nisei girls reflected the acute interest in the amassing of wealth which has tended to characterize the immigrant Japanese. An educated Issei from an upper-class family of Japan, who looked somewhat critically upon the fellow immigrant Japanese but had wide business contacts with them prior to evacuation, is stated to have commented as follows during the period of strikes in the Fall of 1942.

He said that the basic attitudes of the Issei were unchanged. He said that any changes were only camouflage for the real acquisitive attitudes that have always been present. He said that the Issei came here to make money and they still have a lust for money. (In other words, if the Issei were permitted to make money at the project, there would be no complaints)2/

Historically, the Japanese immigrants looked upon private enterprise as the best and quickest method of amassing wealth, and the bulk of those working as laborers and hired hands thought of this as a temporary means to achieve sufficient capital for the opening of one's own business. If their "lust for money" had not changed, their ideas on how their incomes at the project might be increased followed the customary pattern. A frequently made suggestion was that the W.R.A. farm land, instead of being managed by the agency, be leased out to individual farmers under a tenant farm basis, or be

1/ Miyamoto Notes, Nov. 4, 1942.

2/ Shibutani Journal, October 12, 1942.

organized into a producers cooperative.^{1/}

A more direct consequence of their middle class background was the unfamiliarity of the evacuees with plans and programs of workers' organizations. In the strikes and slow-downs which occurred at the project, few if any were organized. They were rather spontaneous eruptions in response to given conditions or to the suggestions of a few leaders. The meetings of strikers were characterized by an ignorance of organizational procedures; there seemed only the desire to vent basic dissatisfactions without an understanding of how to establish the machinery for effectively removing the dissatisfactions. Both Mr. Shirrell and Mr. Coverley complained that they did not understand what the evacuees were demanding when they struck or rebelled, but the inability of the administration to cope with the workers' rebellions was often the consequence of an absence of any organization among the workers to represent their grievances to the administration. The one work group that had anything like a satisfactory ^{workers'} ~~work~~ committee was the Mess Hall Committee headed by Kintaro Takeda, who showed a talent for such organizing, but most of the work corps units lacked the organizational leadership to have their demands effectively presented to the administration.

The universal employee status of the evacuees did give rise to an elementary basis of a workers' ideology, as their use of the strike as a protest measure showed. During the farm strike, one farmer was overheard telling others of a plan started by one of his youthful friends to have a C.I.O. union at the project, to which the evacuees nodded with approval.^{2/} But no union organization was ever established at the project, and the general reaction of the evacuees to a sug-

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, "Issei Meeting", Nov. 5, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, August 16, 1942.

gesting of identifying themselves with the C.I.O. was one of alarm and disapproval.

While middle class attitudes were predominant, the people in the pre-evacuation communities were not wholly undifferentiated, and the class distinctions formed in the past had some carry-over into the center community. The bulk of people in this center came from Sacramento, Placer County, White River Valley in Washington, and Hood River in Oregon. Several other large communities were represented. The evacuees frequently knew a great deal about the members of their respective groups, and ~~for~~ would speak of the relative merits of different families. "That family puts on airs here, but, really, they were nothing back home," is the kind of attitude often expressed. Sometimes there was recognition of superior status.

See that well-dressed woman standing with a child? She's from the 'afternoon tea group' in San Francisco, but was evacuated to Tule Lake after having moved to the 'white zone'.^{1/}

Group associations formed in the past among people of similar class interests persisted at Tule Lake. Walter Tsukamoto, lawyer, Dr. George Iki, physician and surgeon, Dr. Muramoto, physician, Henry Takeda, lawyer, and Sumio Miyamoto, accountant, were among those who~~x~~ formed what might be called the upper crust of Nisei society in Sacramento continued their relations at the project. To the extent that they existed, the upper class of Nisei society was constituted principally of college ~~men~~ alumni, usually in the professions or business who had achieved some economic success, played golf, tennis, poker or contract bridge in their own groups, and had mutual friends among well established Caucasian and Issei groups.

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, Oct. 31, 1942.

Families were sometimes pointed out as having amassed a large fortune in their enterprises prior to the war, and the fact that a distinction was made of those with wealth would seem to indicate that economic means was an element of class differentiation. Especially was this true where wealth had led to visible signs of power, as in the case of a farmer who owned large acreages of land and employed a large number of Japanese workers during the harvesting season. But a fortune of itself was not a significant factor in social status, for there were many families who were alleged to be wealthy but who were otherwise undistinguished and received no special recognition from the people.

Jack's folks have a lot of money all right. They had a big farm near G_____. His father is the gambling type when it comes to farming, risks everything on some single crop, but he's always seemed to be lucky and he's hit it off pretty well. But Jack's old man never did command much respect among the people. To begin with, he's a kind of course individual. On top of that, he's not what you would call community minded. People who have worked for him say that you have to watch your dealings with him carefully or you'll come out on the short end. 1/

But in a community of 15,000 people drawn from all parts of the Pacific Coast, there were limits to the people's knowledge of each others background, and in this anonymous situation there were frequent efforts to impress each other with one's background.

Sono was telling me about the kind of home she came from. From what I gathered, I had the impression Sono must have come from a pretty well-to-do family. She's a rather unusual girl and I was curious about her so I asked Mieko about her since she came from the same general area. Mieko was mad when she heard that Sono had been going around speaking of her father's place as a large dairy farm. Mieko told me, 'If you call two cows, a dog, and two cats a large dairy farm, I don't know what to call the farms of most Japanese.' Mieko's a very sincere girl and I'd never seen her mad before. 2/

1/ August 10, 1942, Miyamoto Notes.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, Nov. 7, 1942.

Differentiation of the social classes at Tule Lake was certainly not based on a few simple rules such as one's economic position, place of residence, material goods possessed and the social circle to which one was admitted. It depended upon a variety of factors none of which could be readily paraded before the people to signify one's class status. Among the Issei, the status of the family in Japan was ~~certainly~~ one of the most important conditions, and with it went breeding and a knowledge of Japanese culture, particularly its arts. To say that a family came from Tokyo was to infer its superiority over one coming from a rural and so-called "backward" area such as Kagoshima. Education, previous occupational status, and social recognition of any kind received in the past were factors contributing to one's status at Tule Lake. To name some of the Issai who were looked upon as being ⁱⁿ some sense of a superior class, there were such people as Professor Ichihashi of Stanford, Mr. Shinohara of the Sumitomo Bank, Mr. Kobana who had been connected with some kaisha (treaty merchant) group, and Mr. Shirai who had been marooned in this country after having studied at Heidelberg, Germany and at Stanford University preparatory to returning to Japan. Sakoda's remarks concerning Mr. Shirai might be applied to the others as well.

Shirai is a young Issei, getting his education in America. He was about to go back home when the war broke out. His identification is with the elite group from Japan, evidently. He is said to have remarked that he would prefer to be in an internment camp because there were educated people in there with whom he would have interests in common. He believes that the people here are ignorant and without any culture at all.^{1/}

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, Feb. 17, 1943.

Among the Nisei, while values similar to those of the Issei were also held, differentiation was based on still other factors. Much as they would deny the superiority of the whites, the Nisei were inclined to ascribe superiority to the fact of having had considerable contact with Caucasians in the past and of knowing how to get along with the better class whites. There was in this attitude a certain amount of ambiguity, for the pressure of the community was to deny the value of Caucasian association, whereas the training and experience of the Nisei in this country laid stress upon the values emphasized in Caucasian-American society. Urbanization, as reflecting the more sophisticated features of American culture, was likewise considered desirable; although here again the rural people and those less acculturated to sophisticated tastes were inclined to look critically upon the extravagances of the former group. One gets a hint of this in the remarks made by a country girl to a city girl who was washing some dishes in the washroom.

Those are awfully pretty dishes. I suppose they were quite expensive. We use tin plates in our family, but we feel that in a place like this, there's no use keeping nice things around.^{1/}

Higher education, but also the place of education, were factors in status. A Nisei girl commented of a new acquaintance:

Betty kept referring to her college education and I kept thinking she must have gone ~~up~~ to the University of California, but I found out that she only attended Junior College. If I were she, I wouldn't keep talking of myself as a college grad especially if I'd only completed a junior college course.^{2/}

And on the evening of the first meeting of the "Cal Club" (University of California alumni) ~~xxxx~~ one of the speakers remarked:

"Unless you watch yourselves, you will revert to savages." He referred to rowdiness and asked that at least the "educated" like those in the Cal Club retain some of the niceties of life. ^{3/}

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, Aug. 7, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, Nov. 7, 1942.

^{3/} Shibutani Journal, July 17, 1942.

Possession of these conditions of differentiation, good family background, wealth, culture, education, and social contacts, were recognized as the basis of class distinction, but at Tule Lake their possession did not lead to any undiluted recognition of their superiority. There were families which possessed these traits and felt themselves superior to the masses of the people, but the latter would not necessarily admit the superiority of the former. In fact, one of the irritations of the people who felt their superiority was that the center society was so undifferentiated that the same treatment was accorded to the lowest as well as the highest persons of that community. There was no traditionally distinguished group of the upper class, no exclusive society admission to which constituted prima facie recognition of "superior" status. The project newspaper carried a social activities column which presented the various social events in the community, but the column was indiscriminating as to the type of people it wrote about. The column was not in any sense a "society page" reserved largely for the elite, or whose number of lines of a column were measured in terms of the relative "importance" of a family. The nearest thing to an exclusive association was probably the "Cal Club", exclusive in the sense of having some self consciousness of social superiority, but the major qualification for admittance to this group was attendance at the University of California. There were other clubs which were equally exclusive in its qualifications, such as, athletic ability or sectional background. But, generally speaking, there was no club or association composed strictly of those consciously aware of their social superiority to others.

There was equal difficulty in identifying what might be called the lower class. There were no residential districts of the poorer class, for the least fortunate had homes as pretentious as the most fortunate, and they lived side by side. Every family, the richest and the poorest, the highest and the lowest, used the same public facilities, mess halls, schools and other institutions. There was no social stigma attached to the application by a family for public assistance grants. Perhaps the one condition by which the lower class was distinguished to some extent was their background in the pre-evacuation communities. A man would occasionally be identified as having associated largely with the gambling element, another would be pointed out as a mere migratory laborer in pre-evacuation days, or the former squalid circumstances of a family might be mentioned. But in the re-shuffling of social groups which occurred as a result of evacuation, it sometimes happened that people of low social status in pre-evacuation communities gained positions of status and leadership in the relocation center or that families considered of the lower class before evacuation would associate with those who had been considered of a higher class.

Class differentiation at Tule Lake, therefore, was a process of becoming rather than of a structure already in existence. Superior status was something to be achieved rather than of something already achieved. One of the fundamental processes by which this differentiation was taking place was through the distinction of leadership in the organizational process. A position of political leadership and power was the one means by which one evacuee could come to control the lives of others and thus command their respect and regard. The selection of political leaders was undoubtedly influenced

by the background status of evacuees, and also by the capabilities by which individuals had achieved their former status. It was no accident that men like Ichihashi, Shirai, Shinohara, Ikeda, Yamashita, Tsukamoto, Yego, and Miyamoto were given political recognition. But their position was constantly threatened in the center community by others whose backgrounds may have been undistinguished, but who, under the disturbed circumstances of the center, had the ability of gaining a following. Among the latter were a large number of those identified as "agitators" whose chief method of leadership was to give voice to the discontents of the people. Mr. Ikeda, on one occasion, complained of the latter group:

We have some serious problems here which requires careful study. One trouble is that the conditions here are such that leadership is falling into the hands of the noisiest people. Most of these noisy ones were nothing before the war, but because people will listen to their ranting, the situation is becoming uncontrollable.¹/

Had the community remained in existence for long, it seems likely that a certain amount of class differentiation would have evolved, principally as a result of the organizational process in politics, but also on the basis of the status of individuals in various employment.