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THE LOYALTY CONTROVERSY*-A STATEMENT AND
A SUGGESTED PROGRAM

For some time, and particularly during the past few weeks, the newspapers, the congressional record and radio program have been filled with references to the alleged "disloyalty" of a substantial portion of young Americans of Japanese ancestry. It is charged that a particularly large proportion of the Nisei or American born persons of Japanese ancestry at Manzanar have "proved" themselves "disloyal." The charges come from political figures who have toured a Relocation Center for a few hours or who have obtained their information from a prejudiced and disgracefully untrustworthy west coast press.

5 There is no evidence that any of those who talked so loudly or violently about the "loyalty" or "disloyalty" of the Nisei has ever come to know one of these young people, or has taken the pains to inform himself concerning the difficulties and perplexities with which we have confronted these young citizens. Yet those poorly informed politicians and professional patrioteers, with the noisy blessing of every organization which belongs to the extreme reactionary and fascistic fringe to spur them on, are riding the crest of war emotionalism and are demanding penalties and reprisals of one sort or another against those whom they label "disloyal." Their proposals run an ominous gamut: from segregation of those termed "disloyal" through the establishment of strict, Nazi-type concentration camps for them, to the cancellation of their American Citizenship and their deportation to Japan.

We who are framing and signing this statement are individuals who have had considerable experience and background in relation to the issues presented. ~~Some of us have followed the history and fortunes of these~~

~~presented~~. Some of us have followed the history and fortunes of those of Japanese ancestry in this country for many years. Some of us were well acquainted with the Japanese and the Japanese-American before evacuation. Some of us were working with those of Japanese ancestry at the time of evacuation, and know what distress and dislocation that event occasioned. As a result of our employment in W.R.A. all of us have come to know many Nisei and have become acquainted with their problems and their reactions. Most of us were present when the registration, which is the basis of the harangues about "disloyalty", took place; in one way or another many of us were directly involved in that registration. We know something about it at first hand and we feel qualified to interpret the results.

We are asking you, Mr. Merritt, to present our views to Mr. Myer, and to any other officers of our government it may be possible to reach, and to urge upon the W.R.A. and the government, so far as you can find it within your power and within your mind and heart to do so, the concrete proposals that you will find in this settlement.

We speak for the Nisei. We speak for these young Americans because we believe that every American citizen must receive a fair hearing and just treatment in his native land if citizenship as such is to survive as a meaningful and dynamic concept. We speak for the Nisei because by doing so we strike out against the dangerous and un-American forces which have launched an unscrupulous campaign to discredit them. We do not disguise what we mean or about whom we are talking. Plain speech is demanded; organized reaction has shown its hand too clearly. Those who agitate for segregation, concentration camps, cancellation of citizenship, deportation,

and the like, are the mouthpieces for one or another of equally unwholesome and disreputable groups.

There are, for instance, the out and out racists, the fan^xatically anti-Oriental forces of the west coast, such as the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, the California Joint Committee on Immigration, and their kind, who are unpatriotically using the present war emergency and the resulting distractions to promote their ancient, irrational grudge and their Hitlerite program of a "White America." Shoulder to shoulder with them stand their breathren, the Nazi and Fascist sympathizers, who are so strenuously trying to divert the attention of the United Nation from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Germany and Italy to Japan. These people would like (and their spokesman have said so on the floor of congress) to make this a race war, a contest between the caucasians and the Mongoloids, which would, of course, leave Hitler and Hitlerism secure in Europe. Whether they can at this late date turn this war into a battle between Orient and Occident, between European and Asiatic, instead of a struggle against totalitarianism and brutality wherever found, remains to be seen. Certainly, however, they are sowing the seeds of a future conflict of this order. It is not worthy that the most intransigent of the former insolationists have suddenly discovered that the Nisei are "disloyal" and dangerous. It is no accident that Congressman like Rankin, Chandler and Stewart, who would translate their distain for persons of color into our national war plans, make no distinctions between Americans of Japanese ancestry and the Japanese in Japan. They are all "Japs" to them and therefore all hateful and dangerous.

Then there are those who by the smoke screen of habble about "disloyalty" would hide from themselves their part in evacuation. They are the ones who took the plunge for removal because of "the sabotage and fifth column activity at Pearl Harbor" and because of the assurance of Mr. Kilsoo Haan, a fanatically anti-Japanese alien, that the west coast was to be invaded at any minute. Mr. Haan's qualification^S for advising this nation, as outlined by himself before a congressional committee, seems to be that he has been a real estate salesman in Hawaii and that he managed to graduate from grammar school. Mr. Haan^N still issues his fortnightly prediction of imminent² invasion, and there^S are duly introduced into the congressional Record by obliging congressmen. But for an embarrassingly long time there has been no invasion, and the Pearl Harbor sabotage reports have been offically branded false rumors. Those who advocated evacuation on the grounds of "military necessity" now are glad to salve their consciences by an uncritical acceptance of "disloyalty" charges which purport to prove, belately, that some such action was essential.

Last but not least in this very incomplete catalog come the economic pressure groups, those interest^Ses, such as the Associated Farmers, the Pacific^H league, the Salinas Vegetable Growers--Shippers Association, who wish to eliminate competition or who wish to reduce the Japanese in America to peonage.

To halt the progress of this powerful coal²ition, to halt this dangerous drift toward the unrestrained and viadictive^S mistreatment of a helpless minority group, we propose the following program^S :

1. That the American public be fully informed concerning the nature of the event (registration) and the background of the event upon which all these charges of disloyalty are based.

2. That the same standard of measurement of loyalty and worthiness be applied to the nisei that are applied to other young Americans of their age class, namely their record of obedience to law, and the evidence of past behavior, character, activity, associations and affiliations. We believe that this government cannot, without surrendering concepts of elementary justice, penalize these young people for answers or reactions to questions or conditions which citizens of other national or racial origins were not forced to face. We believe that a government which sets to deprive a racial minority group of rights on the basis of verbalisms or monosyllables obtained from them after a series of political, economic, and psychological reverses and shocks, automatically eliminates itself from the list of champions of the "four freedoms" or any freedom at all.

3. That ^{the} answers to the so-called loyalty question, question 28, be thrown into the waste-basket where they belong, and that any request for an affirmation ^{on} this subject, if one is thought necessary or desirable, be divorced from any other kind of confusing or disturbing registration. We believe that loyalty is a matter of activity, behavior and record and that if there is nothing in these to prove otherwise loyalty should and must be assumed. However, if some expression on the legal and social implications are most carefully explained, and every request for an expression of loyalty should be accompanied by the assurance that the person involved in and will be entitled to the full exercise of this rights as a citizen.

4. That the government and the W.R.A. should make a vigorous and aggressive attempt to explain and defend its program concerning relocation and the rehabilitation of citizens of Japanese ancestry. If the government cannot stimulate respect for the right of a minority for freedom from the most unprincipled justifications (as the Pearl Harbor sabotage scenes in a current Warner Brother picture) what is likely to be its moral force in attempting to secure justice and decency in a post war world? An aggressive and spirited educational campaign is called for that will emphasize that there was no sabotage at Pearl Harbor, that there was no sabotage on the Pacific coast, that the relocation centers are not internment camps or concentration camps, that no charges have been filed or made against these Americans who are seeking work and understanding outside of the Pacific coast area.

Most people who read or hear that "many Nisei are disloyal" or that a given percentage of Nisei "have admitted their disloyalty" have no knowledge of the actual source of his idea or of the real figures.

Therefore a sketch of what actually happened is in order and should be made available to the public.

Pre-Evacuation Humiliation

In February of 1943 all male citizens of Japanese ancestry in relocation centers who were 17 years of age or older were required to fill out a special selective service registration form headed "Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry." Besides its obvious functions as a selective service questionnaire, those who were to sign it were told that his form would act as an application for leave clearance. Besides the usual questions put to those of other ancestries is Selective Service questionnaires there were in this one inquires about relatives in Japan, foreign travel, knowledge of Japanese Language, etc. The last two questions, which the young men were required to fill out before army representatives, were those which have become known as the "loyalty questions- Nos. 27 and 28. No. 27 reads: "Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, whenever ordered?" No. 28 asked: "will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic force, and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?" Young men were directed to answer "yes to No. 27 only if they wished to volunteer immediately for an American-Japanese combat unit which the Secretary of War, on January 28, had announced would be formed,

and would be trained at Fort Shelby, Mississippi. It was stated, at the same time, that all women over 17 years of age, citizens and aliens alike, and all male aliens would be expected to fill out a questionnaire which was an application for leave clearance. This form (WRA Form 126 Rev.) asked for detailed information concerning background, travels, education, organizations, etc. There was also a loyalty question for female citizens comparable to No. 27 for the male citizens. It read: "No. 27. If the opportunity presents itself and you are found qualified would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps or the WAAC/" No. 28 as originally printed on the form asked: "Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance of obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?" As we shall see, so much objection was raised by the aliens to this question, which they interpreted as calling upon them to renounce their Japanese citizenship ^{citizenship} ~~question~~ was *making them people without a country, that a substitute question was arranged for them.*

The intentions of those who framed the registration forms on which these "loyalty" questions appeared were of the best. The War Department, by creating a Nisei combat unit, wished to call attention to the re-entrance of Americans of Japanese ancestry into the armed forces and desired to give the Nisei the opportunity for good publicity and a chance to vindicate their entire group. W.R.A., by interpreting the selective service form as a leave clearance application desired to cut through red tape requirements and clear the way for the relocation

of those not acceptable for army service. By extending the registration to women and aliens the way also being cleared for rapid relocation, and the relocation of whole families, without a tedious inquiry into each individual case as it came up. It was expected, apparently, that the people involved would act in their own best interests, in response to the logic of a present situation.

Evacuation, and the scars of evacuation, were evidently thought of by those who formulated the plan as something which belonged to the past and which would not markedly influence the decision at hand. Both the War Department and many of us in W.R.A. were unpleasantly surprised by the reactions of many of the citizens to questions 27 and 28. The negative aspect can be overemphasized. Actually more than 100 men volunteered for the combat duty, a percentage of the population of military age which compares favorably with the showing of comparable surrounding native white districts. Also approximately half of the citizens answered question 28 in the affirmative and therefore are protected from the criticism of those who ~~was~~ ^{use} question 28 as the sole and infallible criterion of "loyalty."

But what about those Nisei who said "no" to question 28? It is our opinion that if any fair-minded person considers, even in bare outline, the events through which these young people passed during the year which preceded this registration, he could refer the answer and the reactions to something other than a simple concept which we can term "loyalty."

Immediately after Pearl Harbor the Nisei were dismayed to find that there was decided tendency to ignore their claims to citizenship and treat ~~ed~~ ^{ed} them like enemy aliens. Many ~~of~~ ^{at} once lost their jobs, as

Though they were somehow connected with the enemy. Many were denied admission to trains and other public conveyances. A little later much travel was allowed, but only upon producing a birth certificate to prove citizenship. At first no one of Japanese ancestry, citizen or non-citizen, was allowed to cross the Golden Gate bridge. This lack of discrimination or refusal to recognize citizenship status extended to many other matters, large and small. Some companies cancelled the automobile insurance of all those with Japanese names initially. Only some time afterward were those reinstated who could prove they were citizens. Business licenses, such as liquor licenses, were taken away from all those of Japanese ancestry, including the Nisei. When the children of alien fishermen found that their fathers were not allowed to fish, they prepared to take up the work for the support of the family. It was a shock to them to learn that, despite their citizen status, they could not fish either.

In other ways, too, the Nisei felt crowded toward an enemy alien status. If there was an alien in the building, whether he shared an apartment with others who were effected or not, no one, not even a citizen, could retain short-wave radios, cameras, signalling devices, including flashlights, or any knife with a blade more than three inches long. Thus citizens underwent the humiliation of surrendering boy scout knives and kitchen utensils. Later the slight distinction that had been made was erased entirely and the ban was made applicable to non citizens and citizens alike.

By that time the press and radio attacks were beginning and the Nisei learned that no distinction were made between them and enemy aliens, all persons of Japanese ancestry were "Japs" and thereby suspect. Some even argued that the citizens were the more dangerous group, since they were young and strong and could more actively aid an invading force.

No one can comprehend the reaction of the males of military ages to questions 27 and 28 without examining what happened to these young Americans after the declaration of war. Many of those already in the armed forces were discharged. That they received, in almost every instance, an honorable discharge indicates that their dismissal was related to no act or ward that would have given reason to suspect disloyalty. At ~~the~~ time of Pearl Harbor many Nisei and even Issei tried to volunteer for the American army in protest and indignation over the Japanese attack. They were rejected and at Manzanar these were among the ones who answered "no" to what have been miscalled the "loyalty" questions.

At first, when it was decided that the west coast was endangered by the presence of so many persons of Japanese ancestry, the authorities encouraged voluntary evacuation. It was a considerable shock to the Nisei to learn that the officials, newspaper, and people of inland sections paid not the slightest attention to their citizenship, but railed against the "Japs" who had invaded their districts.

Then fall the blow of compulsory evacuation for military area No. 1. in compiling the list of groups considered potentially dangerous, American citizens of Japanese ancestry were placed ahead of German and Italian aliens. Citizens of German or Italian extraction were not even mentioned. This arrangement became the basis for evacuation, with forced

total evacuation from the entire area for only the first two groups, Japanese nationals and American citizens of Japanese ancestry. Fresh rebuffs to the citizen status followed in steady procession now. The decision to evacuate citizens was the ~~greatest~~ ^{To the} ~~affront~~. ~~The~~ ^{last} a great many of the Nisei ~~steaf~~ ^{stead}fastly asserted that it could not happen that their citizenship and constitutional rights would protect them. that. Their faith in the slogans and symbols of democracy, kindled in our schools, still burned strongly. They bitterly reflect now that they offered to wager with ~~Caucasod~~ ^{Caucasod} friends on the outcome, so supremely confident were they that America would not, in ~~this~~ ^{the} last matter, reject them. We know ^{how} ~~that~~ ^{that} faith was rewarded.

For those who did not have the ~~assests~~ ^{assets} to move to the east or to Military zone No. 2 there were next the freezing orders and the ~~curfew~~ regulations. Citizens though they ~~were~~ were, the Nisei were prevented from going more than ~~a~~ ^a few miles from home and in some cases permits were required then traveling even shorter distances. Finally came evacuation itself and the jarring blow at the edifice of ideals and expectations which ~~Nisei~~ ^{Nisei} had built up in an American ~~enviroment~~ ^{environment} during the years.

The nisei attitude ^{at} the time of evacuation was characterized by the army and by all concerned as cooperative and ~~brave~~. The American Japanese Citizens league advised its members to aid cheerfully in the forced migration to consider it as the ~~Nisei~~ ^{Nisei} contribution to the ~~war~~. The authorities, incidently, told the Nisei that their attitude would be an index of their loyalty. This "loyalty" ~~which~~ ^{which} is of such great concern to some people, has been tested in a good many peculiar ~~contests~~ ^{contexts}:

One of the principal reasons why the Nisei submitted so graciously to what seemed an obvious invasion of their constitutional rights was that they had no means of knowing at the time that the Pearl Harbor sabotage accounts which officials such as the Secretary of the Navy and the Chairman of the Congressional Committee on National Defense Migration were describing, were entirely false. Later, when the official refutations of Pearl Harbor rumors were released, much too late to interfere with evacuation, their despair was even more complete.

Even in evacuation, it should be noted, the citizens were uniformly treated as aliens. In fact the property which the citizens were forced to leave behind was placed in the hands of the agency created to care for enemy alien property. And in the evacuation, it will be remembered, no concessions were made to those whose sons or close relatives in the armed services were allowed to stay in restricted areas and were exempt from curfew. No so for those of Japanese ancestry. This was remembered by more than one person when it came time to answer questions 27 and 28. In connection with military matters one other common pre-evacuation occurrence should be mentioned. A large number of young men who were about to be drafted before evacuation tried to clarify their status by asking their draft boards to induct them quickly or to release them so that they might go to the midwest or east and avoid evacuation. Many of them wrote letter after letter to their draft board but received no satisfaction except the implication that their number was to be considered soon. That day of consideration never came. They were kept in the area and without exception got caught up in the evacuation. Their feelings

toward the Selective Service machinery, quite apart from any considerations of loyalty, can be well imagined.

Misfortune and humiliation followed some who had managed to escape evacuation from Military Area No. 1. At great personal and financial sacrifice they had hurriedly removed to area No. 2 upon the solemn promise that they ~~sh~~^would not be molested in their new home. Some had made substantial investment in the place to which they had moved ~~w~~hen the previous decision was reversed on June 2 and they were "frozen" in their latest place of residence to face evacuation from there.

Trial By Evacuation

So much for the pre-evacuation factors which discouraged and angered the citizens. Then came the assembly center period; A good many volunteered to come in advance to Manzanar, believing that they could find employment a fairly substantial wage in the construction of the place. They found that they were denied the opportunity to work as carpenter, plumbers, electricians or with the skill or tools they had been urged to take with them. Only unskilled labor jobs were available for them and the wages for such jobs were even lower than the anticipated ~~W.P.A. wages~~ scale. Those, who began work in March 1 942 were paid late in June 1942 at the W.C. C.A. scale of \$8, \$12, and 16 per mo. Living condition were crowd~~ed~~ and primitive. At first there was sickness dust, quarters much more crowded and inadequate than had been anticipated, and inferior food. By the time some of these physical difficulties were ~~alleviated~~^{alleviated}, much bitterness and irritation had crystalized.

The W.C.C.A. was ~~succeeded~~^{replaced} by the W.R.A. Many of the residents claim they were never paid for work during the W.C.C.A. regime. At first the policy of W.R.A. was to promote model, self¹sufficient towns. Chicken farms were promised, as were hog farms, agricultural implements, model school buildings and more substantial pay rates than were finally allowed. With the departure of Mr. Eisenhower and the coming of Director Myer, a change of policy was accomplished in which stress was placed on relocation and not on the improvement of the physical plants which existed. Consequently many promises that had been made had to be broken. However justified this was from the point of ~~view~~^{view} of of general policy, in the circumstances it was bound to create cynicism and distrust.

Once the excitement of removal and the novelty of the new condition had worn off, the Nisei began to realize how events were ~~harm~~^{em}ing them in. Just before and during the evacuation process, they had been repeatedly ~~repeatedly~~^{ed} assured that relieving the minds of the west coast people of the fear of sabotage was their contribution to the war effort and would be ~~su~~^{re}spected as such, but now, when they were helpless and were rendered financially and politically impotent, legislative measures, resolutions, and legal actions appeared which were aimed at depriving them of citizenship, of preventing their return to the west coast, of placing them in concentration camps, etc. At Manzanar the ~~feeling~~ of frustration and imprisonment was increased by the building of watchtowers and a barbed ~~wire~~^{wire} enclosure. Because it is in California and in a restricted zone, the military supervision at Manzanar has been stricter than at several other centers and this too has added fuel to the resentment of American citizens at Manzanar.

A As the result of all these irritants plus many other factors, Manzanar suffered the disturbance of December 7. At any other time or place the Nisei would not have tolerated the difficulties which a few excited trouble-makers caused. But they were silenced and divided by evacuation and its aftermath. The Japanese American Citizens League which had advocated cooperation with the government, was now ridiculed for being so pliant and gullible. Due to the loss of property and self-respect caused by evacuation, it became unpopular to defend the government or the WRA. No setting was better arranged for troublemakers.

Though few Nisei were directly involved in the December trouble, all of them suffered the consequence. The center became an armed camp and there was consequent loss of freedom; there was work stoppage and therefore loss of income; there was unfavorable publicity and therefore renewal of threats of legislation and repressive action against those of Japanese ancestry.

The sullenness, the animosities, the defensive and negativistic attitude, the fear of violence and reprisals at the hands of the irresponsible, all were still present, though in somewhat diminished form, when announcement was made in late January of plans for registration and for the formation of the combat unit.

It was in this troubled atmosphere, the product of a full year of anxieties, frustrations and disappointments, with the tensions created by the December difficulties still in the air, that registration began at Manzanar. Probably the people at no other center had suffered quite as much personal hardship as those housed at this center. There were

the Terminal Island group for instance, who had been removed from their homes in the most hurried and most poorly planned episode of its kind. Little more than 24 hours notice was given most of these people when they were forced to leave their homes. They had lost much in property; because of the occupation of the elders and the proximity of their homes to naval installations, a large percentage of the older men had been detained or interned.

Manzanar, too, had been originally planned as a reception center only. Therefore it was small in area and less adequate in arrangement and details of construction than the centers which were later and more carefully constructed. Those finally brought to other centers had moved from the crowded conditions of the assembly centers to more desirable conditions at relocation centers. At Manzanar, however, the Owens Valley Reception Center simply became the Manzanar Relocation Center. There was no change, no move. The unhappiness and disruption of life which had become associated with the assembly center period was simply perpetuated and transferred to the Relocation Center.

Registration.

In addition to all the conflicts which grew from the immediate past or were inherent in an unsettled present, there were the difficulties attached to the registration and to the "loyalty questions" themselves.

When the aliens learned that they were to be asked to forswear any form of allegiance to a foreign government on the leave clearance forms, they reacted strongly and negatively at Manzanar, as they did at other centers. Since Manzanar contains a rather high percentage of aliens this

created a decidedly tense atmosphere. It must be remembered that at this time the press was filled with demands that all Japanese aliens be deported to Japan after the war. The Japanese nationals felt that they were being forced by a nation which had withheld its citizenship from them, to renounce their Japan^{ese} citizenship. They saw themselves as men without a country who might well be punished or penalized by Japan for denouncing their Japanese citizenship if they were forced to return to the motherland.

When Washington was advised of the attitude of the Aliens it recognized the justice of their point of view and agreed to a revision of the question. At Manzanar a substitute question was first framed which the aliens answered. This question read: "Are you sympathetic to the United States and do you agree faithfully to ~~for~~ defend the United States from any and all attack by foreign or domestic forces." Unfortunately the Japanese character by which the words "to defend" were translated has a more aggressive, more militant connotation than the English phrase. Many Japan^{ese}s considered that to ~~answer/yes~~ answer in the affirmative would be to agree to take up arms against foreign powers, including Japan. Under Japanese law this, too, is tantamount to the renunciation of citizenship. Partly because of this and partly because of the anger and opposition aroused by the original version, a great many alien resolved to answer in the negative. Once they had made this decision they felt that their future in this country was ended, that repatriation or deportation would be the ^{logical} ~~logical~~ consequence. Their thoughts now turned to their citizen children from whom they did not wish to be separated. They brought tremendous pressure upon these young people to ~~answer~~ answer the loyalty questions according to the same pattern they,

as aliens, had felt obliged to choose. Where they could use moral ^{persuasion} session and appeal to devotion and family ties, they did. Where this failed they used parental authority and the authority of their years to exact obedience. Parents advised, pleaded and commanded; citizens argued and reasoned. Family ties were strained and misunderstandings which still persist, were generated. To claim that the citizens were able to make a calm and thoughtful response to there questions on their merits is fantastic in the light of theme facts.

The said part of it all is that this pressure and domestic strife could have been avoided, as events have proved. The aliens could have been a force directing the citizens toward affirmation of the loyalty question instead of the reverse. Just after the Manzanar revision of the original loyalty question for aliens had been submitted and answered, a Washington version was formulated. This question took into consideration that it was enemy aliens who were to be interrogated and did not raise the two sore points-willingness to fight against the mother country or to renounce that country. This last, final and official loyalty question for aliens reads: "Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States." Because this was the question asked at all other centers except Manzanar (where registration was concluded too early for its substitution) permission was later obtained to allow those aliens who wished to answer it to do so. Over 97 per cent have voluntarily answered it in the affirmative. Now these aliens, having come to an understanding with the United States concerning their role and seeing hope that they may live out their lives peacefully in this country where they have resided so many years, are

greatly concerned over the "no" answers which jeopardize the futures of their children and deeply regret the pressure they exerted to exact those "no" answers.

While the influence of the parents was the most significant factor in the "no" answers, taxing the loyalty, sympathy and obedience of the Nisei to the utmost, other elements were operative too.

For one thing, the matter of questionnaires and the persistent inquiries about "loyalty" was becoming ~~of the war/their~~ galling to the Nisei. At the beginning of the war their "loyalty" was questioned. They pointed to their good records and to the lack of sabotage--but to no avail. They met and pledged their loyalty in statements, resolutions, and letters to government officials. They volunteered for the armed ~~forces~~ services, they bought bonds, they became blood donors, they did everything and more than ^r other American citizens over the country were doing to demonstrate their loyalty. Then they were told that the evacuation and their attitude toward it would be considered a test of their loyalty. After evacuation they were expected to take an oath of loyalty before becoming members of the WRA Work Corps. Those who had been inducted into the armed forces and later dismissed had taken the soldier's oath. Even all this fanfare about "loyalty" was paralleled by a ~~chain~~ chain of events which clearly indicated that their protestations of loyalty were viewed with suspicion, that they were not trusted and that their citizenship rights were being disregarded. Now, from behind barbed wire, after all that had gone before, they were being asked for another affirmation of loyalty. Most of the young men resented the necessity of filling out selective service forms again; they had done so before.

and had received a 4C enemy alien rating as their reward. Moreover, they knew that this new inquiry concerning their loyalty would have been avoided if they had had the funds and opportunity to go east before evacuation, for only those of Japanese ancestry who were in evacuation centers were being made to fill out these forms. This was another indication that they had been "caught" in the western dragnet.

Then too, there was dissatisfaction over the form of the loyalty question designed for citizens, and this question, unlike the one for aliens was never revised to meet the central objection. The question calls upon the citizen to "forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government". This is a question such as is put to a foreigner who becomes naturalized. Three out of four of the citizens who were expected to answer this question are not dual citizens; they hold American citizenship only. To them the question assumed that they were or had been dual citizens and in effect forced such a status upon them, for it is difficult to "forswear" what one never acknowledged. Understandably, and for perfectly patriotic motives they rebelled at the implications of the question.

Other confusions and misunderstandings crept in and were never fully resolved. Many thought that questions 27 and 28 had to be answered uniformly, both "yes" or both "no". Since most citizens who were under this misapprehension, and in view of the manner in which they had been treated, did not feel inclined to go to the ultrapatriotic lengths of volunteering for a combat unit, they answered "no" to both questions, though they were perfectly willing to be drafted in the course of time and events. It was most unfortunate that the matter of volunteering was involved and confused with the

regular registration.

Nor was there a clear understanding of the meaning of "combat unit." It was widely believed that those who joined the combat unit would be trained for special service in place of particular danger; in other words, that the group was to be in effect immolated to vindicate the Japanese in America. This belief still persists. The counter argument which this misconception evoked, of course, was that the American-Japanese, in view of the treatment accorded him, should not be singled out for decimation and the most dangerous missions, but should ~~not~~ receive the same kind of training and should be exposed to no more peril than the ordinary soldier.

One other cause for dissatisfaction was the matter of segregation. It had been announced that the combat unit would be composed of those of Japan^{ese} ancestry only. The argument of the army was that this would dramatize the services and loyalty of the Nisei. But Nisei who felt that they had been already too often treated as a people apart, and that this accounted for most of their troubles, resented a segregation that seemed to them a continuation of the segregation in the centers. The fact that the combat unit was to be trained in the state of Mississippi, where prejudice against persons of color is keen, did not increase their enthusiasm.

Anger and reaction against the Japanese American Citizens league was reflected in the results at Manzanar, too. The feeling had grown, as we have seen, that the league offered too little resistance to evacuation. Certain officers of the Los Angeles chapters who were at Manzanar, were particularly singled out for criticism. When it came known that the JAAC had advocated the registration and the organization

of the combat unit, the hostility that many felt toward the League was transferred to registration and to the plan for the combat unit.

Another factor was the attitude of the army team which came to explain the matter of volunteering, and which took down the answers to the "loyalty" questions for male citizens. In general the individuals who comprised the team were sympathetic and they certainly exerted themselves for a program which they conceived to be in the best interests of the people involved. Whether all of them had the background to cope with the complex situation they confronted is doubtful. For instance a par-Japanese member of the team who hailed from Hawaii could not fully appreciate the attitude of the west coast Nisei. There had been no evacuation in Hawaii. There had been no Terminal Island exodus to give him the proper perspective. He was baffled and more than once irritated by the lack of response to the volunteering question and after some trying experiences is said to have greeted more than one Terminal Island Nisei with, "I suppose you are one of the no, no, boys." No matter what had been in the mind of the candidate this friction stimulated friction, and a "no, no" answer was the inevitable result.

Nor was the story the army team told entirely consistent. At first the opportunity to volunteer was represented as a favor, "Uncle Sam doesn't particularly need you, but he is willing to give you a chance to show your loyalty and vindicate your people." This ran afoul of the conviction of most Nisei that they were more sinned against than sinners, - that not they, but a nation that prided itself on its democracy, needed vindication. Moreover, the attitude that Nisei were really not needed as a source of manpower, rubbed salt in old wounds. During the debate which preceded evacuation, these young citizens had heard too many times that they were ~~not~~ really not essential to manpower, agriculture and

industry on the coast and that the region could get along very nicely without them. The word that was passed became, "If they don't need us, why volunteer?" However, when less than the expected number volunteers, another note was injected. A telegram from an army officer was posted, which hinted that if there was not a sufficiently good response to the call for volunteers for the combat unit, a general drafting of the young men would result. To what was construed as a veiled threat, there grew a stubborn opposition.

It was not helpful either that the leave clearance issue, registration for selective service, volunteering, and the matter of loyalty were all represented on one form. There were a large number of Nisei who feared that a leave clearance for them would mean that they would be soon forced to leave the center and find employment outside. It must be realized that the loss of jobs and property, the humiliation of removal, the hostile press, and a host of other factors, gross and subtle have undermined the confidence of many Nisei in themselves and in the American public. Though they were definitely told that a leave clearance would not mean a forced exodus to some unknown and unfriendly section of the country outside of the military zone, many did not believe this or understand it, and their "no" answers were a reflection of their fear of the outside, rather than test of "loyalty."

There are many other scenes and elements which entered into this drama of registration. Most of us recognize now that for the multitude of legal, personal and political issues involved registration proceeded too rapidly. This is demonstrated by the fact that so many of the Nisei, after tempers had cooled, after a period of reflection had been provided,

have voluntarily come forward and have asked to be permitted to change their "no" answers on question 28 to "yes." Alien parents have come forward to ask that their children be given the opportunity to make this change.

We have our answers now. We can make of them what we will. We can ignore everything that has been said above. We can take those answers literally and translate them into segregation or into legal penalties. We can make Chandis and Sun Yat Suns by the thousands, men and women with an implacable hatred of the western world which has treated them so shabbily. We can loose the floodgates of fear, and watch the troubled waters engulf minority group after minority group until one-third of our population is viewing the other two-thirds with hostility and suspicion. We can write a black chapter in American history which will send the social historian to Nazi Germany for parallels.

Or we can act, even in time of war, like socialized human beings who have some comprehension of complex human situations. We can recognize that no setting was more unsuspecting for a determination of simple loyalty than the one into which the Nisei were injected. We can recognize that the answers wrung from them under the strains and perplexities with which they were faced is no more an evidence of witch-craft. No segment of our population or of any population would have answered differently in the same circumstances. A much more pressing question is that of Americans loyalty to fair-play and the democracy credo.

Sincerely,

<u>Margaret D'Ille</u>	Counsellor
<u>Dr. Morris N. Opler</u>	Social Science Analyst
<u>Dr. Wm. J. Bruce</u>	Chief, Consumer Enterprises Division
<u>Dr. Genevieve W. Carter</u>	Sup't. of Education
<u>Charles K. Ferguson</u>	Director of Adult Education
<u>H.G. Bovankork</u>	Group Worker
<u>Marion E. Potts</u>	Acting Vice-Principal, Manzanar High School
<u>Dr. W. Melvin Strong</u>	Director of Summer Activities
<u>Aksel G. Nielsen</u>	Supervisor of Community Activities

Enclosure: Minutes of the Committee meeting of May 18th at which time the above statement was discussed.

Manzanar
Kibei

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

C
P
Y
Report on the Interrogation of the Manzanar Kibei who came before the Committee for review on the answer to Question 28.

WHAT IS A KIBEI?

The Committee has just finished interviewing the 503 Kibei at Manzanar who said "No" on the question of loyalty to the United States, 431 of whom added that they wished to return to Japan, to find out whether the "No" given at the time of registration is a true picture of their attitude toward this country or whether it should be changed; what the reasons were for the answers; and the extent to which the individuals who made them may be an actual or potential danger either to a relocation center or to the country if they should be released during wartime. We spent a considerable time over many of the interviews trying to discover the motives, hopes, fears, suspicions, resentments, and misunderstandings which had prompted some of the answers, the family loyalties which lay at the root of others, the discouragement which spoke in others. In many cases we had to use an interpreter. A statistical report gives no hint of the variety of individual problems we found, or of the individual dramas from which the curtain was pulled aside for a moment; but it is now possible to distinguish several distinct species within the general family of Kibei.

The largest group by far are the 'citizens in name only' - young people who though born in this country have lived most of their lives in Japan, speak little English, whose parents remain in Japan, and who are culturally and emotionally entirely Japanese. They came here, many of them as late as '41, because times were hard in Japan, to escape conscription, to get jobs, or to go on with their education, and did not expect to stay more than a few years. They are no more American than the Japanese-born son of an American missionary is Japanese when after an American education he goes back to visit in Japan for a few years. Joe Matsanaga would serve as an almost perfect representative.

Joe is 22 years old. He was born in Stockton, California, and immediately registered by his father with the Japanese consul in San Francisco, thereby becoming a dual citizen. He is the eldest son, and when he was five years old the family returned to Japan, to the village in the Wakayama prefecture, where the family and lived for generations. He was sent to grammar school there, and almost forgot what America looked like or that he had ever known a little English. By the time he was 17 things were getting hard in Japan and his father sent him back to California because a young man from a poor

village has better educational and business opportunities here than in Japan. Joe expected when he left that he would return in a few years because of his duty as the oldest son to look after his parents.

In Los Angeles he came to live with the family of a cousin who owned a nursery. They sent him to high school where he was placed in a special language class with a number of other boys like himself. Before and after school he worked in his cousin's greenhouses.

In school he was a respectful student who caused no trouble, but except in the gym he mixed little with other students. The only white Americans he knew were his teachers. He did not take any part in student activities, and was never in an American home. He and his relatives were Buddhists, though some of his friends were Protestant Christians and attended a mission church. He liked America and looked forward to getting a job, and perhaps starting in business for himself. When he was 18 he left school and went to work in a market owned by another Japanese family. He got a small salary and for the first time had a little independence.

When war came his employer and many of the Japanese he knew were very much upset and feared they would lose the businesses they had so carefully built up. He himself was proud of the successes of the Japanese army, though he began to worry about his family because he could get no news of them.

When there was first talk of evacuation from the West Coast his employer debated fearfully whether he would try to go to Colorado or Utah and sell out the business in Los Angeles. Before he could decide voluntary evacuation was stopped, and the family had a few weeks to dispose of the business and to store or sell their household goods. It all came so quickly that his employer took a heavy loss, and became very bitter against the government. The same was true of his cousin.

At Manzanar Joe works in one of the kitchens where he washes dishes. A lot of other Kibei also work in the kitchens. He goes round with a bunch of them, and lives with three other boys. They play basketball or baseball but otherwise there is not much to do. He would like to find a girl, but the Japanese-American girls like the Nisei boys better, and he has not had any luck so far.

Since he has been at Manzanar he has spoken almost no English, though he looks at the Los Angeles Times when he can borrow a copy and keeps up with the war news. There is a lot of talk and thinking about the war, and he is sure Japan will win. He is proud of the great new Empire Japan has conquered. Some of the

older people who want to stay here say the Japanese government will make the American government pay them all damages for evacuation, but he wants to get back to Japan as soon as he can.

He went out on furlough last year to top beets, and he would like to go again this year. He has never thought much about his American citizenship, though he knew it was the reason why he was the only one in his family who could go back to America. In spite of the war, he feels friendly to the United States, and does not want to make any trouble. He and his friends used to talk and boast a lot about what Japan would do, and taunt the Nisei boys because of the way the American government treated citizens. Now he is suspicious of people who talk too much, and even in the kitchen they don't get excited the way they used to.

In the interview he spoke through the interpreter, and says he does not want to change his answer because his parents and all his family are in Japan, and it is his duty as the eldest son to go back and take care of them. He adds that he would never do anything to hurt the United States, but that he wants to be a Japanese citizen. The Committee feels that he is not 'a dangerous character' and could safely be allowed to go outside. He would be a good worker and would probably be careful to keep out of trouble and mind his own business. As the interpreter says of many of this group, "He is not a fighter."

The next largest group among the Kibei are those who now want to change their answers on loyalty from "No" to "Yes" - 138 out of 503. The pattern here shows many more individual differences, though in general the individuals have spent less time in Japan (a good many do not call themselves Kibei and resent being classed as such), have parents or a wife and family in this country, or where the parents are still in Japan are not eldest sons and hence to not have the same obligations, speak more English, are a little further ahead economically, and feel that their future is in America. To the question 'Why did you say "No" in the first place?' their answers are frequently that they were 'mad' at the time because of evacuation and the December riot, or that they were confused and thought if they didn't volunteer they ought to say "No" on loyalty, or, among the younger ones, that all their friends were saying "No" so they 'just followed the crowd'. Some feared that if they said "Yes" they would not be allowed to revisit Japan. A good many said they did not have time to think it over enough and so said "No". A number had already been in to change their answers, some while the Army was still here. Many had heard Mr. Merritt speak, and said that he had cleared up the confusion and anger in their minds. This was true particularly of young men from Terminal Island who had been evacuated on 48-hour notice.

On being asked why they wanted to change now, the commonest answer was that they had thought it over and decided they wanted

to stay in this country and so wanted to be American citizens. Some said frankly that they wanted to relocate and go out on furlough. These were the single boys. Most of the others had not yet decided on what they wanted to do. When they said they wanted to go back to Japan it means they wanted to go back to visit because they had relatives there, but not that they wanted to live there.

A few who wanted to change to "Yes" seemed properly to fall into the big group of 'citizens in name only', but further questioning usually uncovered some reason for wanting to stay in this country. Several were orphans and had no longer any ties in Japan, or had only one parent living and older brothers to take care of the family. Of those the Committee suspected of wanting to change for their own convenience, a few admitted they had not made up their minds whether they wanted to live in America or Japan after the war. It 'depended' on a lot of things, or they wanted to finish their schooling here. These said they would be loyal citizens as long as they stayed here, and, when asked, said they were willing to serve in the Army if drafted.

Outside of the two large groups - the citizens in name only and the repentant Americans - are several small but distinctive classes who want to keep the "No" answer. Most conspicuous are those who have lived a considerable time in this country, speak fairly good English, had built up a business, and except for a visit to Japan some time expected to live here, but who are embittered over evacuation and their business losses at the time, and whose bitterness is fed constantly by the editorials in the Los Angeles Times, and by statements like General De Witt's 'once a Jap always a Jap'. These say that before evacuation they were 'as loyal as anybody', but now the United States doesn't want them and they can't say they are loyal, so they want to go to Japan. Next are a group, young and fairly well educated, who say this is a racial war and they must side with their own race, or that because of racial discrimination in this country there is no future for them here and so they must go to Japan. Another small group are genuinely and deeply torn by the conflict between the two countries, to both of which they feel a loyalty. The statement 'Japan is my father; America is my mother; I must be loyal to both of them' expresses their true feeling. Among these there is deep emotional disturbance, and they resist making a choice. If pressed, the answer is usually "No", because of the last part of the question which calls on them to forswear allegiance to Japan and the Japanese emperor. A few, who would on other counts belong with those who have changed to "Yes", say they have property in Japan and so must go back.

Among those who said "No" are about a dozen who were in

the Army at the time war was declared and were discharged three months later. Most of them kept the "No" answer; several because they said they had not been given any reason for being dropped (though it was probably because they spoke so little English) and it looked as if the United States had denied their citizenship, others for the usual reasons that their parents and families were in Japan. There were also three veterans of World War I who had said "No", and who changed back to "Yes". The first answer expressed anger over the questioning of their loyalty. They are still resentful, but don't want to be Japanese.

The Committee is convinced that in a very large majority of cases the changes from "No" to "Yes" on loyalty represents a genuine decision to be an American citizen. Those who expect to return to Japan are evidently convinced that a "Yes" answer may, as far as Japan is concerned, cancel their Japanese citizenship and make it impossible for them to return, and they continue to say "No", though they would often like to get out and work. Most of those who changed to "Yes" are American enough by speech and education to have some hope of a future in this country, or already have a stake here. Economic advantage as well as personal conviction is on the side of their remaining in this country. In most cases, therefore, the Committee is recommending that the change in answer be accepted and the individual be allowed and encouraged to relocate. A few whose record here is against them, or who are suspected of 'mental reservations' we are not recommending.

As to the 365 who remain "No", the Committee is convinced that most of them are not disloyal in the sense of being dangerous or subversive. They are in their own minds aliens, not citizens, but because of their birth, now feel that as long as they stay in this country they must do nothing to hinder or interfere with the war effort. Most of them, compared to the young Nisei, have had little education, but as workers they could be counted to do a good job. They would probably resist any attempt to draw them into any type of subversive activity, and certainly would not undertake anything themselves, partly as self-protection, but largely because they genuinely feel it would be wrong. There are a few about whom we have some question and would not recommend for furlough or leave. A few others because of their suspected anti-American influence within the camp ought probably to be in a segregation center. But the majority, though they will remain Japanese, are less of a liability dispersed, and as if were diluted, than if they remain packed in a relocation center, and they represent a reservoir of manpower which we believe can safely be released and utilized.

Lucy W. Adams

LWA/bd

Community Analysis Section
Manzanar Relocation Center
September 23, 1943

A Preliminary Analysis of the Segregation Group at Manzanar

The segregation roster for Manzanar has been compiled, and the names listed therein have been sent to Washington. Some changes will undoubtedly be made but the data are close enough to their final form so that analysis of them may be profitable.

The segregation roster contains the names of 2242 individuals. Of these 630,-344 boys and 286 girls, are 16 years of age or younger, and therefore have never been called upon to answer Question 28. These children and pubescents account for 28 percent of the segregants. Of this number only two, a girl 8 years of age and a 16 year old boy, are Japanese nationals. The break-down of the figure according to age and sex is as follows:

Under one year	males 31	females 30	total 61
One year	males 32	females 22	total 54
Two years	males 19	females 19	total 38
Three years	males 17	females 19	total 36
Four years	males 26	females 21	total 47
Five years	males 23	females 8	total 31
Six years	males 21	females 12	total 33
Seven years	males 20	females 15	total 35
Eight years	males 16	females 10	total 26
Nine years	males 17	females 12	total 29
Ten years	males 14	females 14	total 28
Eleven years	males 10	females 13	total 23
Twelve years	males 21	females 18	total 39
Thirteen years	males 13	females 11	total 24
Fourteen years	males 23	females 15	total 38
Fifteen years	males 11	females 23	total 34
Sixteen years	males 30	females 24	total 54

In addition, 244 more of the segregants, 135 males and 109 females, are less than 21 years old, ranging in age from 17 through 20 years. Most countries, where a choice must be made or where an individuals must act

to preserve nationality, set the age at which this is done at 21. The implication is that the youth who has not reached his majority lacks the background and experience wisely to decide so important and far-reaching an issue. We have at Manzanar, then, 874 segregants who are 20 years of age or less, and who are under the age at which binding decisions determining nationality are ordinarily made. This is approximately 35 per cent of the total number of those on the segregation roster.

Beside the 630 minors who have not been required to answer Question 28, there are 483 persons on the segregation roster whose answer to the question has been "yes." Under present rules, were it not for family affiliations governing their decision, few if any of these persons would be subject to segregation.

The total number of persons who have never been confronted with Question 28 or who have answered it in the affirmative is, accordingly, 1113, or almost exactly half of the designated segregants.

The degree to which family considerations intrude and are taking persons with "yes" answers to Tule Lake can perhaps be shown by the following analysis of figures relating to segregants and their families. There are 176 families represented at Manzanar by two or more members in which only one member answered "no." The distribution according to size of family and the numbers involved is as follows:

No. in family	No. of families	No. of "yes" individuals and family members involved
2	37	37
3	33	66
4	40	120
5	32	128
6	17	85
7	7	42
8	6	42
9	2	16
10	1	9
11	1	10
	<u>176</u>	<u>555</u>

Thus, on the face of it, of the 731 members of these 176 families, 555 persons have had their names placed on the segregation roster because of the statement of 176 of their number. In other words, of this group 4 are going to Tule Lake for every one who answered Question 28 negatively!

The rest of the names listed on the segregation roster, with the exception of few special cases, are those of repatriates, expatriates and of those who maintained their "no" answers to Question 28.

The repatriates are 234 in number, 186 males and 48 females. In regard to most of them the question of loyalty does not arise, for the great majority of them voluntarily answered Question 28 submitted to aliens and, like the non-repatriates, have pledged themselves to obey the laws of this country while they remain within its jurisdiction and to do nothing to interfere with the war effort. The right of enemy aliens at a time of international crisis to request repatriation is well established, and, especially in view of the fact that these people are not permitted to naturalize in this country, their action would not seem to call for harsh treatment or a controversy over their loyalties.

The motives of the majority of these repatriates are fairly clear. One hundred thirty-nine of the men and 8 of the women are the sole representatives of families in Manzanar. They are either unmarried or have spouse and families in Japan. The single men who fall into this bracket, and they constitute the majority, are harmless old bachelors who have been unable to establish normal family life in this country because of the disproportion of the sexes among the issei. Now that their economic life has been disrupted they are prepared to return to the land of their origin to die. Eighty-seven other repatriates are linked with 60 family clusters. Of

these 60 families, 14 consist of man and wife only, both repatriates. In 46 instances, however, the action of the repatriate has involved children or other family members. Eighty-two individuals, 71 of them minors, have been listed as expatriates as a result of their connection with repatriates. The 59 repatriates in these 46 families are officially responsible for taking 157 persons to Tule Lake. I have made a survey of the family constellations in which repatriates are involved which will be the basis of another report. In a previous report dated August 24, 1943 and entitled "An Analysis of the Repatriate Group at Manzanar" I paid particular attention to the motives underlying repatriation requests and found them usually linked to factors which I have called personal-family and economic-uncertainty. Attachment to Japan as such, or what I designated as the cultural-national factor was found to be a minor element in the picture.

The expatriates, 170 in number, fall into a number of classifications. Seventy-one of them are minors who were listed by repatriate parents or guardians on family summary forms. Their presence on the repatriate-expatriate list and therefore on the segregation roster is due to no action on their part. Eleven older expatriates filled out individual forms in order to accompany repatriate parents. In addition 40 expatriates are males unattached to any family group in Manzanar. Four single females are expatriates. Finally there are 16 families of expatriates with a total of 49 members and dependents. Of the 49 persons involved, 5 are not expatriates but are listed as family members who are going to Tule Lake with the expatriates. Fifteen are children who have been listed as expatriates by parents. In 97 of the 170 cases of expatriation we can

say that the action was not self-initiated but arose from the acts and decisions of repatriate or expatriate elders. Any search for evidence of disloyalty or for complex motivations must be directed toward the 43 percent, the 73 expatriate individuals who theoretically, at least, enjoyed some freedom of choice in this situation.

We come, then, to the number named on the segregation roster who answered "no" to Question 28. In view of the popular impression in many quarters and the generally voiced press opinion that practically all those destined for Tule Lake have answered "no" to a loyalty question, it is startling to realize that only 796 of those to be segregated or 35 percent of the 2242 total have maintained a "no" answer.

The distribution of the "no" answers according to citizenship, sex and the nisei-kibei dichotomy is interesting. Only 27 aliens, 21 men and 6 women, have failed to answer "yes" to the question submitted to issei. Of citizens, 467 males and 392 females have maintained "no" answers, a total of 769 individuals. A further division of these figures is revealing. The 476 "no" answers from male citizens are divided between 305 kibei and 162 nisei. The 302 "no" answers of the citizen women involve 125 kibei and 177 nisei. In other words, of the 796 "no" answers only 339 or 42 percent come from citizens who have received all or nearly all of their education and training in this country.

These figures point to a very significant factor in the segregation program at Manzanar. This center has numbered among its population a rather large group of kibei. The implications of this for segregation has extended far beyond the kibei group. For instance there are 180 families being segregated in which a male kibei said "no." In a number of instances

this youth was the only member of the family who gave a negative answer. The desire for family solidarity dictates that the others follow. Moreover, these kibeï have not only influenced their consanguinous relatives but have also swelled the list of segregants with their affinal kin. In 90 cases in which a married male kibeï maintained his "no," his wife followed suit. Many of these wives are nisei and this has added to the total of nisei women saying "no."

The female kibeï, too, have had an influence upon the final tally out of proportion to their own numbers. For example, of 31 single kibeï women who held to "no," in 15 cases this "no" was the only one in the family. Of 94 married kibeï women who said "no," 28 or approximately one-third gave the only "noes" registered in the families.

Statistics and the arrangement of figures may be useful and suggestive, but by themselves they are seldom definitive or interpretive in human affairs. Source materials and case materials are inevitably required to breathe meaning into these counts. To illustrate: Of 239 families on the segregation roster which include both citizens and aliens old enough to answer Question 28, in 227 cases it was the citizen alone who answered "no" and who is therefore technically responsible for the family's destination. In but 5 instances is it the alien only who said "no," and in 9 cases only have both alien and citizen members of the same family replied in the negative. It does not suffice to say that the revised question asked of the aliens was mild while that presented to citizens was much stricter and broader. It is scarcely possible that in 227 families, children, many of them no more than 17 or 18 years old,

would have maintained an answer necessitating yet another family upheaval and removal if parental objection had been strong. Certainly one aspect of the problem is to determine the influence of the issei upon the citizen answers. This calls for an inquiry into the state of mind of the elders, a topic which has important implications for the leave clearance hearings to come, for relocation, and for the future of those of Japanese ancestry in America.

I am in the midst of gathering and arranging source materials relating to segregation which lend themselves primarily to the exposition and clarification of such problems. Consequently I have limited this preliminary report to the analyzation of the general picture in respect to numbers and categories of segregants, and have only offered such generalizations and interpretations as seem obvious from the information reviewed.

Yet even this initial and incomplete approach has brought interesting facts and arrangements of facts to light. To summarize, 28 percent of the segregants from Manzanar are children under 16 years of age whose loyalty has never been questioned. Thirty-five percent of the segregants are legal minors, 20 years of age or less. Of those who are bound for Tule Lake, 483 or 22 percent have answered "yes" to Question 28 and are going as "family members" in order to preserve family unity. Thus 176 "no" answers have been found to involve 731 "yes" individuals and family members. Moreover, 80 percent of the repatriates have answered the loyalty question affirmatively, and in respect to this issue stand on the same basis as most of the non-repatriate issei. In addition, a substantial portion of the expatriates are not persons who have shown any positive

interest in Japan or Japanese culture, but are the offspring of repatriates who have been listed by their parents on family summary forms, or the small children of expatriate parents. Actually only 796 individuals or 35 percent of those on the segregation roster are persons who answered "no" to Question 28. In view of the large number of children and of "loyal" family members who are being involved in the segregation program, it is an oversimplification and a superficial reading of the evidence to contend that the only issue involved is one of simple national loyalties.

Morris Edward Opler
Social Science Analyst

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Manzanar, California
May 28, 1943

Manzanar Review Committee recommendations on changes
in answer by male Kibei on answers to Question 28

The Review Committee appointed by Mr. Merritt to interview all male Kibei answering "No" on Question 28 is forwarding herewith a list of 106 persons who prior to, or at the time of the interview with the Committee, changed their answers from "No" to "Yes"; together with a transcript of testimony, and of the Committee recommendations as to whether or not the changed answers should be accepted. The total number interviewed in this group was 432, to all of whose answers the Army interviewers had added the words 'want to go back to Japan.' Another group of 21 changes of answer, from among the 77 Kibei who answered "No" but said nothing about returning to Japan, will be sent immediately as a supplement.

Prior to April 16th when all Kibei who answered "No" in the original interview with the Army Team were called before the Committee, some forty of the group included in this report had come voluntarily to Mrs. Adams' office and asked to change. They were interviewed at the time and wrote down and signed a statement giving their reasons for making the change. These are attached to the interview with the Review Committee, and the names of those changing prior to April 16th are marked with an asterisk on the record.

In conducting the interviews, the Committee had before it in all cases a copy of the Form 26 on the person being interviewed, together with a note of his previous change of answer, if any, and of his present employment. Form 26, which gives details of family, schooling, residence abroad, employment, group affiliations, army service, etc., supplied a considerable amount of the information on background needed by the Committee in making its recommendations, and made unnecessary many questions which must otherwise have been asked. Members of the Committee also had some acquaintance with, or knowledge of, many of the persons interviewed, which obviated extended questioning.

The Committee found that several errors were apparently made in transcribing the list of "No" answers from the Army records, and that

in other cases where individuals claimed to have changed their answers before the Army left, there was no record of it. In some cases the Army interviewers put down answers or comments which the individuals on being recalled claimed were misrepresentations. This was especially true with the words 'wants to go back to Japan.' A number of those who changed their answers to "Yes" said that when they were asked the question 'Do you want to go back to Japan?', they answered "Yes" because they hoped someday to revisit the country and see relatives, but hoped to live in the United States; others said that the interviewer put down the words 'wants to go to Japan' without asking them.

The Committee in making its recommendations adopted the following policy: Where the individual interviewed obviously understood the question, and where nothing in his Form 26, in his record at Manzanar, or to the knowledge of the Committee, raised reasonable doubt as to his sincerity or his loyalty to the United States, the Committee recommends that the change be accepted. Where the individual had come of his own accord and changed to "Yes" prior to the Committee review this was considered an added factor in his favor. Manner and attitude during the interview were also considered in the Committee's decision.

The Committee is convinced that in most cases the change from "No" to "Yes" on loyalty represents a genuine decision to accept the responsibilities and duties of American citizenship. Those who expected to return to Japan apparently believed that a "Yes" answer on Question 28 might prejudice or cancel their Japanese citizenship and make it impossible for them to live there, and reiterated the "No" answer. Most of those who changed to "Yes" were American enough by speech and education to have some hope of a future in this country, or already had a stake or family ties here. Economic advantage as well as personal conviction was on this side of their remaining in this country and declaring their loyalty.

Two changes where the Committee had reason to suspect 'mental reservations' are being forwarded without comment, since there was not sufficient evidence to justify an adverse report. One answer is being forwarded with a report 'not recommended.'

By: Lucy W. Adams, Chief
Community Services Division

By: Robert B. Throckmorton
Project Attorney

7-19-43 BLOCK 16 OFFICE - 15,16, 21 and 22 block s

Notes: Mrs. D'Ille

Mrs. Ueno said she wants to change from Yes to No because husband had said "No" and she wanted to go with him.

Several persons said they thought they must say "No" if wished to go to Japan.

Sawada, 73, asked for repat; to take wife's ashes to Japan; ill, must he go to another camp?

Questions re repat; some wanted to decline; some wanted to ask for repat for the 1st time.

Boy changing to Yes - others in his family has said "Yes."
Boys think that if they say "Yes" they will be taken in draft.

Thinking that if they say "Yes" must relocate at once.

Shintani now in hospital - does not want to move.

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TUYOSHI OKOMOTO, 21-19-3; Eibei, told Mr. Merritt would not change; still doesn't wish to.

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KAMINURA, Suyoko, 22-11-2; mother "Yes" - daughter "No" - daughter refuses to discuss situation; gave daughter Mrs. Adams' name for her to come in and discuss problem with her - girl very American.

ISHIBASHI, Murako - 16-4-2; came in to change to "Yes" - later came in said cross name off; my family changing to "No" - family came in and left name.

FUKUYE, Kimiko - 16-3-3; still wants to say "No" - part of family "Yes" - problem case.

1. If you answer "yes", will you be subject to draft?
2. If you relocate, will you be subject to draft?

Need clarification on:

1. What kind of camp & policy will be the segregation center?
2. What will happen to those left here?
will the young be moved out?
Will they be drafted?

Will attempt to give answer that will yield best advantage to themselves.

E. J. Chester

Guess.

① Separation of family

② Have to say "yes" when go to office?

1. In case of segregation, would the young
people have to go to the segregation
camp?

Questions

Does the answer automatically become No if they fail to answer?

Should all members of the same family register for appointments?

bluse

1. Kiyonaga Shigebo (Miss) - has already changed. Need she register to-night? Ans.

Uyeno Chokichi - 29-5-4 - Changed from no to yes
Mrs. Sato in Block Office. Need he register to-night?

Has asked to join her husband in Santa Fe Camp, but no answer. Does not want to change answer ("no")

What question will they ask us to sign?

Must each go for himself?

Signed "yes"; but parents fearful of separation. Should he sign "no"?

Man signed - "yes"; but guardian to wife + children whose husband is interned. Would he be able to take them to Japan, if they had to return?

Rumors - If you answer "yes," you must relocate within a year.

If you once go out, you cannot return to Center.

1. A widow (husband deceased) with one child, lives with her parents. Shall she be counted as single?
2. Did the changes we made in March or April go through? If so, why can't we relocate?
3. Is it possible to cancel a repatriation request now? The Free Press said June 1st was the deadline.

(1) Can I cancel repatriation request?
He doesn't want to change his answer.
name - Chuichi Ando

2. Do we have to answer yes or no?
Brother came from Salt Lake City to see
about his mother and sister.

3.

7-19-43 BLOCK 16 OFFICE - 15,16, 21 and 22 block s

Notes: Mrs. D'Ille

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c
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p
y

True copy - Kibei

Comm Anal

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER
Manzanar, California

July 17, 1943

Question
28

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Ralph P. Merritt
Project Director

SUBJECT: Comments on Kibei Interviews at Manzanar
from April 15, to May 5.

You have asked me to make a report on the kibei hearings that were held at Manzanar from April 15 to May 5. The hearings were held at your instigation for the purpose of discussing with the Manzanar kibei their answers to the loyalty question, No. 28, in the registration that took place in February. The purpose of the interviews, as already stated by Mrs. Lucy Adams in her report on this subject, was to determine whether the "no" given at the time of registration was a true picture of the kibei's attitude towards this country or whether it should be changed; what the reasons were for the answers; and the extent to which the individuals who made them might be dangerous or subversive.

1. OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED.

You, Mrs. Adams, Chief of Community Services, and I constituted the committee which started out to question the 431 kibei who, in addition to replying negatively to questions 27 and 28 at the time of registration, had informed the Army interviewers that they wanted to return to Japan. Later we extended the hearings to include all kibei who had said "no" to the loyalty question, inasmuch as there were less than seventy-five additional kibei who had said "no" but had indicated no desire to return to Japan. Mr. Robert L. Brown, Assistant Project Director, and Mr. J. W. Gilkey, Chief of Internal Security, served as alternate members of the committee. A stenographic report was made of all interviews and a responsible interpreter was present at all times for the benefit of kibei who did not speak or understand English. The hearings were held from 10:00 to 12:00 a.m. and from 1:30 to 4:00 p.m. on most of the days from April 15 to May 5. We found that we averaged approximately ten interviews per hour, although our policy

was to give each person as much time as he wanted to discuss his case.

Interviews were held in a hearing room in a barracks away from the administrative offices. The kibel were given appointments by mail and, almost without exception, they appeared promptly for their appointments. There was no evidence of rodwyism or resentment at any time nor did the hearings seem to disturb the temper of the Center in any way. We had previously obtained WRA forms 26 and employment records for each of the persons interviewed so that the committee would have this information. We made a decided effort to be friendly, but not to give even the appearance of attempting to persuade any of the evacuees to change their answers from "no" to "yes". We made it clear that we had no authority to change the answers and that we were merely recommending those changes that we thought justifiable to the Washington office, which would make the final decisions.

In interviewing the kibel, we found that, with a few exceptions, they were friendly and willing to talk. Many were somewhat nervous at first, but they were soon put at ease as a rule. It is significant that this was the atmosphere in which the hearings were conducted, as it contrasts decidedly with the tense atmosphere existing at the time of the original registration. The difference is largely due to the lapse of time since registration, which gave the evacuees an opportunity to think over the problem, the relaxation of community sentiment and the efforts of the committee members to make the interviewed evacuees feel at ease.

In general, the kibel were also obviously quite serious and sincere in their answers to the loyalty question. Most of them seemed to feel that they were casting the die for their entire future in answering the question. The committee made it plain that they were being called upon to choose between their loyalty to Japan and their loyalty to the United States. Many of those who reaffirmed their negative answer did so promptly upon being asked whether they wanted their answer to remain as it was. In these cases, the committee thanked the persons for coming in and terminated the interview. No one is apt to question the sincerity of negative answers thus given, although it is quite possible that some of them were based upon a misunderstanding as to the meaning of the question or were prompted by economic or family pressures rather than considerations of personal loyalty. There is also little reason to question the sincerity of those who obviously had great difficulty in arriving at a decision. Many of these persons were given an opportunity to think the question over and to return. Some of these requested that their answers be changed while

others reaffirmed their former negative answers. With few exceptions, answers given under these conditions must be regarded as sincere and reliable.

There is, of course, more reason to question the sincerity of those who wanted to change from "no" to "yes". However, some persons in this category were there solely because of clerical or other errors. Thus, some were not kibel and others had answered "yes" in the first instance and were able to establish the fact that the answer had been incorrectly recorded. Others had come in voluntarily, after registration and prior to the hearings, requesting that their answers be changed to "yes". Many others were unquestionably sincere and demonstrated that their original answer had been made because of pressure, misunderstanding, economic considerations or other factors not directly related to loyalty. Of the remainder, the committee felt that some who wanted to change to "yes" were not sincere and that the change should not be recommended. The committee closely scrutinized the records of those who wanted to change because they professed a change of heart or because they wanted to go out on furlough work. In most of these cases, however, where there was nothing other than the answer to question 28 which indicated disloyalty and where the evacuee clearly understood the meaning of the question and was willing to answer it affirmatively, the change was recommended for the reason that this was the only test asked of those who replied "yes" in the first instance.

II. OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEWS.

After the interviews had been completed, you issued a memorandum suggesting that I review the transcripts in all cases and classify the kibel as follows:

- A. Those who changed answer "no" to "yes" on No. 28, and who are recommended by the Board for clearance.
- B. Those who changed "no" to "yes" and are not recommended by the Board.
- C. Those who do not change from the "no" answer for any of the following stated reasons:
 1. Parents or family in Japan.
 2. Educated in Japan and unable to speak English or to become Americanized.
 3. Property of family in Japan.
 4. Persuaded that citizenship is of no value because of bitterness caused by evacuation or residence in Relocation Center.
 5. No evidence of future in America because of sentiments in public press by Government officials for Japanese Americans.

This group is not disloyal in the sense of being dangerous, but is a group whose primary purpose is to ask that they be returned to Japan at the earliest possible date for one or more of the reasons stated, which group is evidently non-assimilable as American citizens.

- D. Those who reaffirm the answer "no" and are possibly dangerous persons.

Your classification was made in the light of the committee's experience, which disclosed the existence of the "C group". One of the greater values in conducting the interviews was the discovery of the fact that many of the kibel who replied negatively to the loyalty question had understandable reasons for doing so and could not be classified as dangerous or subversive. They closely resembled the issei group in the relocation centers and probably should be treated as such.

In accordance with your suggestion, I began to classify the kibel according to their records and found that, while it was comparatively easy to determine which ones should be permitted to change their answers to "yes" and which should have their answers unchanged, it was difficult to determine which of the "no" answers should be placed in Group C and which should be placed in Group D. The main reason for the difficulty was that, in interviewing the kibel, we usually made no effort to determine why a person wanted to retain a negative answer. Consequently in many cases we did not have sufficient information with regard to those who answered negatively to determine whether they were possibly disloyal or whether they were not disloyal and had understandable reasons for their attitude. However, there were some cases in which there was sufficient evidence to warrant classification into the C or D group. In order that these classifications might have some meaning, I created a new Group E for those who answered negatively but where there was not sufficient evidence to determine whether they should be classified in Class C or D.

The results of my classifications were as follows:

Class A	112
Class B	13
Class C	149
Class D	43
Class E	<u>160</u>
Total	477

My returns are at the present time somewhat tentative as they have not been finally checked for clerical errors nor have they been checked with the other members of the committee

for errors of judgment. Also you will note that I reviewed a total of 477 cases whereas Mrs. Adams reports that the committee interviewed a total of 503. This discrepancy should be accounted for. I particularly feel that you and Mrs. Adams should check the records of those I placed in Groups B and D and that we should prepare statements of our reasons for classifying these persons in these groups.

By way of summary, I should like to say that, while I believe it was an excellent idea to attempt to classify those who confirmed their negative answers, we did not decide to classify them until after the hearings had been held and, as a result, we did not have sufficient evidence in many cases to enable us to reach a decision.

As Mrs. Adams states in her report " a statistical report gives no hint of the variety of individual problems we found, or of the individual dramas from which the curtain was pulled away for a moment:***". For an understanding of the human values involved and the reasons why many of the kibel answered as they did, one should read Mrs. Adams report. I shall make no attempt to cover the same ground here.

III. SOME CONCLUSIONS.

Four conclusions have come to my mind as a result of the committee's work. The most obvious conclusion is that the original answers to question 28 should not be made the basis for any important action unless they are supplemented by additional information. It is quite clear that there was a great deal of misunderstanding as to the meaning of question 28 and there was also much pressure and confusion at the time of registration that caused people to answer question 28 not in the light of their own personal loyalty but on the basis of other considerations. More particularly, it is apparent that question 28 should have been broken down into its two elements, namely, 1) whether the evacuee will swear allegiance to the United States, etc., and 2) whether he is willing to forswear allegiance to Japan.

My second conclusion is that it is more desirable to pass on a person's eligibility for leave clearance than the question of whether he should be permitted to change his answer to question 28. This is not an original conclusion but was originally suggested by yourself. It seems quite apparent that, because question 28 is ambiguous it is difficult to determine whether a person should be permitted to change his answer and it is also difficult for the evacuees to know whether they want their answers to be changed. More particularly, it is bad from a public

relations standpoint to consider changes to question 28, as critics can easily interpret such an action as an attempt on the part of WRA to talk people into being loyal or to establish a "penalty and reward system".

My third conclusion is that hearings designed to determine the loyalty of evacuees cannot be of maximum value unless complete transcripts are prepared. The records must contain enough evidence to satisfy not only ourselves but also interested parties and the courts as to the validity of our decisions. In order to assure an adequate record in all cases, it would probably be advisable to follow an outline of prearranged questions .

My final conclusion, or rather observation, is that the kibel problem at Manzanar has been partially solved as a result of this investigation. The kibel are no longer an unknown, dangerous group--they are now five hundred individuals who have personally talked to the Director and his assistants on the committee. The kibel, who previously had few contacts with the administration and felt that they were misunderstood, have now individually gone on record and had an opportunity to explain their case to project officials. Certain individual kibel still constitute a potential threat to the peace of Manzanar but, at the present time, any danger of unified action by the entire group has been reduced to a minimum.

Robert B. Throckmorton
Project Attorney

RBT/yk/ys

Report on the Interrogation of the Manzanar Kibei who came before the committee for review on the answer to Question 28.

WHAT IS A KIBEI?

The Committee has just finished interviewing the 503 Kibei at Manzanar who said "No" on the question of loyalty to the United States, 431 of whom added that they wished to return to Japan, to find out whether the "no" given at the time of registration is a true picture of their attitude toward this country or whether it should be changed; what the reasons were for the answers; and the extent to which the individuals who made them may be an actual or potential danger either to a relocation center or to the country if they should be released during war-time. We spent a considerable time over many of the interviews trying to discover the motives, hopes, fears, suspicions, resentments, and misunderstandings which had prompted some of the answers, the family loyalties which lay at the root of others, the discouragement which spoke in others. In many cases we had to use an interpreter. A statistical report gives no hint of the variety of individual problems we found, or of the individual dramas from which the curtain was pulled aside for the moment; but it is not possible to distinguish several distinct species within the general family of Kibei.

The largest group by far are the 'citizens in name only'-young people who though born in this country have lived most of their lives in Japan, speak little English, whose parents remain in Japan, and who are culturally and emotionally entirely Japanese. They came here, many of them as late as (41, because times were hard in Japan, to escape conscription, to get jobs, or to go on with their education, and did not expect to stay more than a few years. They are no more American than the Japanese-born son of an American missionary is Japanese when after an American education he goes back to visit in Japan for a few years. Joe Matsanaga would serve as an almost perfect representative.

Joe is 22 years old. He was born in Stockton, California, and immediately registered by his father with the Japanese consul in San Francisco, thereby becoming a dual citizen. He is the eldest son, and when he was five years old the family returned to Japan, to the village in the Wakayama prefecture, where the family and lived for generations. He was sent to grammar school there, and almost forgot what America looked like or that he had ever known a little English. By the time he was 17 things were getting hard in Japan and his father

sent him back to California because a young man from a poor village has better educational and business opportunities here than in Japan. Joe expected when he left that he would return in a few years because of his duty as the oldest son to look after his parents.

In Los Angeles he came to live with the family of a cousin who owned a nursery. They sent him to high school where he was placed in a special language class with a number of other boys like himself. Before and after school he worked in his cousin's greenhouses.

In school he was a respectful student who caused no trouble but except in the gym he mixed little with other students. The only white Americans he knew were his teachers. He did not take any part in student activities, and was never in an American home. He and his relatives were buddhists, though some of his friends were Protestant Christians and attended a mission church. He liked America and looked forward to getting a job, and perhaps starting in business for himself. When he was 18 he left school and went to work in a market owned by another Japanese family. He got a small salary and for the first time had a little independence.

When war came his employer and many of the Japanese he knew were very much upset and feared they would lose the businesses they had so carefully built up. He himself was proud of the successes of the Japanese army, though he began to worry about his family because he could get no news of them.

When there was first talk of evacuation from the West Coast his employer debated fearfully whether he would try to go to Colorado or Utah and sell out the business in Los Angeles. Before he could decide voluntary evacuation was stopped, and the family had a few weeks to dispose of the business and to store or sell their household goods. It all came so quickly that his employer took a heavy loss, and became very bitter against the government. The same was true of his cousin.

At Manzanar Joe works in one of the kitchens where he washes dishes. A lot of other Kibei also work in the kitchens. He goes around with a bunch of them, and lives with three other boys. They play basketball or baseball but otherwise there is not much to do. He would like to find a girl, but the Japanese-American girls like the Nisei boys better, and he has not had any luck so far.

Since he has been at Manzanar he has spoken almost no English, though he looks at the Los Angeles Times when he can borrow

a copy and keeps up with the war news. There is a lot of talk and thinking about the war, and he is sure Japan will win. He is proud of the great new Empire Japan has conquered. Some of the older people who want to stay here say the Japanese government will make the American government pay them all damages for evacuation, but he wants to get back to Japan as soon as he can.

He went out on furlough last year to top beets, and he would like to go again this year. He has never thought much about his American citizenship, though he knew it was the reason why he was the only one in his family who could go back to America. In spite of the war, he feels friendly to the United States, and does not want to make any trouble. He and his friends used to talk and boast a lot about what Japan would do, and taunt the Nisei boys because of the way the American government treated citizens. Now he is suspicious of people who talk too much, and even in the kitchen they don't get excited the way they used to.

In the interview he spoke through the interpreter, and says he does not want to change his answer because his parents and all his family are in Japan, and it is his duty as the eldest son to go back and take care of them. He adds that he would never do anything to hurt the United States, but that he wants to be a Japanese citizen. The Committee feels that he is not 'a dangerous character' and could safely be allowed to go outside. He would be a good worker and would probably be careful to keep out of trouble and mind his own business. As the interpreter says of many of this group, "He is not a fighter".

The next largest group among the Kibei are those who now want to change their answers on loyalty from "No" to "Yes" - 138 out of 503. The pattern here shows many more individual differences, though in general the individuals have spent less time in Japan (a good many do not call themselves Kibei and resent being classed as such), have parents or a wife and family in this country, or where the parents are still in Japan are not eldest sons and hence do not have the same obligations, speak more English, are a little further ahead economically, and feel that their future is in America. To the question 'Why did you say "No" in the first place?' their answers are frequently that they were 'mad' at the time because of evacuation and the December riot, or that they were confused and thought if they didn't volunteer they ought to say "No" on loyalty, or, among the younger ones, that all their friends were saying "No" so they 'just followed the crowd'. Some feared that if they said "Yes" they would not be allowed to revisit Japan. A good many said they did not have time to think it over enough and so

many said they did not have time to think it over enough and so said "No". A number had already been in to change their answers, some while the Army was still here. Many had heard Mr. Merritt speak, and said that he had cleared up the confusion and anger in their minds. This was true particularly of young men from Terminal Island who had been evacuated on 48-hour notice.

On being asked why they wanted to change now, the commonest answer was that they had thought it over and decided they wanted to stay in this country and so wanted to be American citizens. Some said frankly that they wanted to relocate and go out on furlough. These were the single boys. Most of the others had not yet decided on what they wanted to do. When they said they wanted to go back to Japan it means they wanted to go back to visit because they had relatives there, but not that they wanted to live there.

A few who wanted to change to "Yes" seemed properly to fall into the big group of 'citizens in name only', but further questioning usually uncovered some reason for wanting to stay in this country. Several were orphans and had no longer any ties in Japan, or had only one parent living and older brothers to take care of the family. Of those the Committee suspected of wanting to change for their own convenience, a few admitted they had not made up their minds whether they wanted to live in America or Japan after the war. It 'depended' on a lot of things, or they wanted to finish their schooling here. These said they would be loyal citizens as long as they stayed here, and, when asked, said they were willing to serve in the Army if drafted.

Outside of the two large groups - the citizens in name only and the repentant Americans - are several small but distinctive classes who want to keep the "No" answer. Most conspicuous are those who have lived a considerable time in this country, speak fairly good English, had built up a business, and except for a visit to Japan some time expected to live here, but who are embittered over evacuation and their business losses at the time, and whose bitterness is fed constantly by the editorials in the Los Angeles Times, and by statements like General De Witt's 'once a Jap always a Jap'. These say that before evacuation they were 'as loyal as anybody', but now the United States doesn't want them and they can't say they are loyal, so they want to go to Japan. Next are a group, young and fairly well educated, who say this is a racial war and they must side with their own race, or that because of racial discrimination in this country there is no future for them here and so they must go to Japan. Another small group are genuinely and deeply torn by the conflict between the two countries, to both of which

they feel a loyalty. The statement 'Japan is my father; America is my mother; I must be loyal to both of them' expresses their true feeling. Among these there is deep emotional disturbance, and they resist making a choice. If pressed, the answer is usually "no", because of the last part of the question which call on them to foreswear allegiance to Japan and the Japanese emperor. A few, who would on other counts belong with those who have changed to "yes", say they have property in Japan and so must go back.

Among those who said "No" are about a dozen who were in the Army at the time war was declared and were discharged three months later. Most of them kept the "No" answer; several because they said they had not been given any reason for being dropped (though it was probably because they spoke so little English) and it looked as if the United States had denied their citizenship, others for the usual reasons that their parents and families were in Japan. There were also three veterans of World War I who had said "No", and who changed back to "Yes". The first answer expressed anger over the questioning of their loyalty. They are still resentful, but don't want to be Japanese.

The Committee is convinced that in a very large majority of cases the changes from "No" to "Yes" on loyalty represents a genuine decision to be an American citizen. Those who expect to return to Japan are evidently convinced that a "Yes" answer say, as far as Japan is concerned, cancel their Japanese citizenship and make it impossible for them to return, and they continue to say "No", though they would often like to get out and work. Most of those who changed to "Yes" are American enough by speech and education to have some hope of a future in this country, or already have a stake here. Economic advantage as well as personal conviction is on the side of their remaining in this country. In most cases, therefore, the Committee is recommending that the change in answer be accepted and the individual be allowed and encouraged to relocate. A few whose record here is against them, or who are suspected of 'mental reservations' we are not recommending.

As to the 365 who remain "No", the Committee is convinced that most of them are not disloyal in the sense of being dangerous or subversive. They are in their own minds aliens, not citizens, but because of their birth, now feel that as long as they stay in this country they must be nothing to hinder or interfere with the war effort. Most of them, compared to the young Nisei, have had little education, but as workers they could be counted to do a good job. They would probably resist any attempt to draw them into any type of subversive activity,

and certainly would not undertake anything themselves, partly as self-protection, but largely because they genuinely feel it would be wrong. There are a few about whom we have some question and would not recommend for furlough or leave. A few others because of their suspected anti-American influence within the camp ought probably to be in a segregation center. But the majority, though they will remain Japanese, are less of a liability dispersed, and as if were diluted, than if they remain packed in a relocation center, and they represent a reservoir of manpower which we believe can safely be released and utilized.

Lucy W. Adams

LWA/bd

April, 1943

Fried

M-1513

A STUDY OF KIBEI

by Ralph P. Merritt,
Project Director, Manzanar

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

Because 503 of the Kibei at Manzanar answered "No" on question 28, known as the loyalty question, out of the total of 627 Manzanar Kibei registered by the Army Board in February, 1943, inquiry into the questions of what is a Kibei and what creates this amazing percentage of apparent disloyalty, became of vital importance. There is apparently little known of this group of American citizens of Japanese ancestry. They are not the "forgotten men", they are the men who were never known or understood. As a group of possible danger and potential disloyalty, they are the product of American neglect. They represent the crux of the so-called Japanese problem. Therefore at Manzanar the Administrative staff undertook a thorough and prolonged investigation of this group in order that essential facts regarding them might be brought out for the guidance of any interested government agencies dealing with Kibei.

The Review Board of Manzanar consisted of the Project Director, the Chief of Community Services, and the Project Attorney, and the Assistant Project Director and the Chief of Internal Security as alternates. Each of the 503 Kibei men who had answered "no" came before this Board and were interviewed at as great length as seemed necessary in order to permit them to state their position. In many cases the answer was short and definite, "I say no". At many times during the questioning the record would seem to show that the questions were overly sympathetic or lacking in the necessary severity, but

at all times these questions were designed to draw out from each man his point of view in order that on the one hand there would be no restriction of the civil rights of a citizen, but on the other hand that ultimately full protection would be given to the interests of the government in forming a clear-cut judgment as to the loyalty and assimilability of the case.

It is necessary at the outset that the word "Kibei" be defined. In this particular discussion, reference is made solely to male citizens of Japanese ancestry. A Kibei, however, may be either a male or female citizen. A Kibei is a citizen of Japanese ancestry who has been in Japan. Various agencies have various definitions, but, during registration at Manzanar in February, 1943, the Army apparently classed as Kibei a person of Japanese ancestry born in the United States who had been in Japan three years or longer during their formative years. Therefore during this discussion the group of men falling into this class who said "No" were those interviewed. I believe that a better definition of Kibei is "an American citizen of Japanese ancestry who went to Japan before he was 21 years of age and who upon his return to the United States had remained in Japan five years or longer, during which time he received a portion or all of his education".

There came before this Review Board many different types of citizens of Japanese ancestry. There were men who had been partially educated in Japan who were of mature years, and some of whom had served in the last war or others had been volunteers at the beginning of this war and later were discharged

from the Army. Many of them spoke good English and had reasonable appreciation of American customs and ideals. The other extreme was the even larger group of young men averaging about 22 years of age who speak little or no English, whose education had been solely in Japan, whose point of view was Japanese and who returned to this country since 1936 and for the most part in 1940. Men of this group did not grow up in the homes of parents but were reared by relatives. Lacking parental control, they tend to be undisciplined and unstable. With a left little fingernail of abnormal length as a fraternity pin, many of them are the zoot suit boys of Japan. At Manzanar other evacuees call them "Tojo's boys". They are a class by themselves - not so much disloyal as wholly lacking in anything American. They are completely foreign to America.

When the Board reviewed the 503 cases it found 138 of that number who desired to swear allegiance to the United States and forswear allegiance to the Japanese Emperor or any other foreign government or power. Some of these speak English well and some speak English in a very limited way, but all of them express a desire to perfect their English and remain in this country and to be loyal American citizens. The remainder of the group, 365, or approximately 60%, express a desire to say "No" to the loyalty question and most of them added that they desired to return to Japan.

The Board recommends that this record as presented be accepted as the basis of determining "yes" answers for those who previously said "No". The Board saw and talked with each man. Further legalizing is fatal.

The reasons for saying "No" appear to fall into the following classes:

1. Lack of ability to speak English and an education that is Japanese.
2. Parents or other relatives in Japan and a desire to return to them or with them in accordance with Japanese custom and tradition by which a son must support his parents and a family must be a unit.
3. Property in Japan owned by the family.
4. Distrust of American officials or the position of the American Government, and lack of confidence in the future of any Japanese in the United States.

The majority of the men falling into the class of those saying "No" held dual citizenship. Apparently they have always felt a security in the right to ride two horses at the same time. When presented with the necessity of making a definite choice between the two citizenships, many of them openly admit their preference for Japanese citizenship or their fear of renouncing allegiance to the Japanese Emperor. Most of these men would sign a request for expatriation if there were legal means by which a citizen might expatriate himself while still in this country, short of an act of treason. No such legal means now exist. The question has been raised of the legal right of the United States to force a dual citizen to the position of expatriation without an opportunity to make it effective and with the inevitable result of having himself classed as "disloyal" and therefore restricted in civil liberties which are legally still his.

All of these men in the group of 365 took the pledge to obey the laws of the United States while in this country.

Few, if any, of them would appear to be the type that would be selected as foreign agents because they lack in education and astuteness, but many of them are men who would be susceptible to subversive influence if exposed.

In examining into the question of why a large number of Kibei returned to the United States in 1939 and 1940, it developed that the imposing of sanctions by the United States on Japan had resulted not only in Japanese pressure on those dual citizens to return to this country because of shortage of materials and food in Japan, but that there were suggestions by American educators and official representatives in Japan to the men in this group that they should return to America. To many a Kibei it was an obvious escape from service in the Japanese Army.

There is a challenge to view the "No" answers in the Kibei group as an opportunity for the development of an American point of view. This requires a trusting and patient conception of the problem. The major points, however, are to see that hereafter there is no continuation of the growth of any such foreign group and this group should be treated with equity and justice but also with clear concept of possible danger from having a total of 2 or 3000 such men loose in any part of the country at this time.

My recommendation on the Kibei group is as follows:

1. To those who answered "Yes" to the loyalty question during military registration and those who expressed a desire to change their answers who were approved by the Board of Review, I recommend

that they be given leave clearance and that all their rights of citizenship should be unimpaired, including being drafted. The record here presented should be accepted as final. This is no guarantee of loyalty - it is only a recognition that to do otherwise is a violation of the fundamental rights of citizenship.

2. To those who answered "No" in the first instance and continued in that position in their interviews with the Board of Review, I recommend leave clearance be withheld.
3. All those in the latter class should remain in the Relocation Center in the same position as a non-citizen who has sworn to obey the laws of the United States.
4. Whenever a Kibei in the latter group shall be uncooperative, failing to do a full day's work, or is known to be a disturbing factor to the public peace, or develop indications of being subversive, he should be transferred to military control in another Center.
5. Opportunity should be offered to all persons in the Kibei group answering "No" to sign a request for expatriation, if and when the Congress of the United States shall by law provide that a citizen of the United States living in the United States may request expatriation (without an act of treason) and that immediately thereupon the exercise of all rights of citizenship, shall be suspended as to that person and he shall be viewed in the same class as an alien who has applied for repatriation.
6. At the end of the war these Kibei should be returned to Japan.

As has been mentioned in the previous paragraph, I recommend that NEW LEGISLATION SHALL NOW MAKE POSSIBLE REPATRIATION AND A SUSPENSION OF CITIZENSHIP FOR DUAL CITIZENS OR CITIZENS WHO DESIRE TO DIVEST THEMSELVES OF THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BECOME EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ON THE SIGNING OF SUCH A DOCUMENT REQUESTING EXPATRIATION.

I furthermore recommend that, in order to avoid in the future a recurrence of the Kibei who is wholly a foreign product, whether it be of Japan or any other country, legislation be

enacted by the Congress whereby any citizen who may leave the United States prior to the age of 21 and is absent from the United States for a period of five years or longer, shall, after the five year period and upon his return to the United States, have the exercise of the rights of citizenship suspended until such person shall have presented himself to the Court which passes upon naturalization of non-citizens of the United States and shall have passed an examination indicating that such person has an understanding of the English language, a satisfactory understanding of American institutions and citizenship responsibilities and a demonstrated loyalty.

To enact legislation depriving any citizens or any minority of the rights of citizenship raises grave questions with regard not only to constitutionality, but with regard to the very fundamentals of American ideals and concepts. On the other hand, to permit those who do not desire to avail themselves of the rights of citizenship with which they were born to divest themselves of that right by request for expatriation and an immediate suspension of all civil rights as a citizen, would seem to be equitable and entirely within the concept of American ideals. Furthermore, to protect the exercise of the rights of citizenship by requiring those who, by the accident of birth, were endowed with citizenship but who have been educated in the language and institutions of a foreign land, to demonstrate their ability to speak the language of this country and to display a reasonable degree of understanding with regard to the Constitution, the governmental philosophies of the American people, would appear to be a sound and fully justified procedure. Unless such a step

is taken, there will be an infiltration into the United States in future years of people of many nationalities who would hold the right of citizenship but whose understanding and ability to participate in the American system would be of doubtful or non-existent character. Laxity of legal protection on this point by the United States Government has been responsible for what appears to be the most serious phase of the present Japanese problem. The responsibility appears to rest upon American legal procedure rather than primarily upon the group created by that procedure.

In summary, let me point out that the alien Japanese, proven to be dangerous and the Kibei, actually or potentially un-Americanized as shown by his statements or his record, are the two groups requiring closest attention among those of Japanese ancestry in the United States. For the latter group specific legislation should be prepared and applied as outlined in this statement for the protection of the rights of citizenship of all citizens.

#22
"The Caucasians Make the Rules"

ST Kindell
Feb. 1945(?)

Mans...

Merritt: I am concerned about the stated and actual policies of WRA. Particularly so, because he and others must continue to live in California and a need for his friends and others to know the truth and what WRA is really up to. Mentioned a letter to DM and a reply which gave him the answer he wanted. Thinks WRA is skating dangerously close to disaster unless it makes clear what its policies are. Also concerned because so much Pro-Japanese feeling in the center. Mentioned several events which occurred on the emperor's birthday, including a Buddhist party for the hospital staff but which was actually very pro-Japanese including singing of songs sung in war-time Japan, Japanese dances and costumes which had Japanese symbolism on them. Also a dinner party held for the same purpose. There are 14 underground Japanese language schools. All this he sees as evidence that the older people do not have in their hearts a real love for this country, or wish for the success of the democratic way. It is this group, along with the repatriates which have now grown to 400 and which are making rotten the other apples in the barrel which disturb him, and the disturbance extends to official policy and the attitude or reaction of prominent friends in California when they learn what WRA is doing.

Mentioned the difficulty with having any kind of entertainment which does not include a lot of Japanese. Told of war pictures first showing for parents of soldiers and hand clapping for Axis people and silence for American. The next night the announcer asked that there be no clapping at all, and yet there was.

Went to block managers meeting. Told first that only relationship that Japanese understand is that of father and child. He has become the father of Manzanar. The people are his children. Sometimes he is stupid in their eyes because he doesn't understand. He talks to them about the need for speaking only English, learning American ways, having their children speak English, having no Japanese entertainment, yet they still persist and it is a worry to him.

Mentioned the lack of discipline in the schools where small children get up and use bad words at the teacher, and it is an evidence that the parents are using the same bad words, or the children would not do so. Also mentioned Ishii, said he was in bad because when the new servant policy came out, Ishii quit work. Merritt said if you will continue to work, than I will be willing to help you out when the time comes, but if you do not, then you can expect no assistance from me. (Also mentioned confidential letters being shown to Chandler, but he wouldn't do business that way.)

At block meeting, he was introduced as the father of Manzanar. Anzai the chairman. Merritt made reference to it and to his children, and how he was trying to help his children to see the right way. Brought up the matter of the discontinuance of agriculture and explained the reasons, showed it was to their advantage, in terms of food, employment, and the future. Also said such a minor thing he had failed to mention it at the previous meeting. (It led to rumors that Manzanar would close.)

Also mentioned the doctor Ariki business. Told of violations of FCC as well as medical law. People must learn to obey the law. (Obeying the law is another point--those who make the laws can change them to suit their convenience, while those who are subject to them can either disregard or break them. Those who make them have great respect for them, and insist that all regard them with the same reverence as the makers. Obviously law is not looked upon in the same way.)

The Oklahoma dance was held for young people the first night I was here. There was Caucasian and Japanese issei sponsors. The MC was a school teacher. B. Dougherty was the chief promoter. Difficulties included the problem of young men coming drunk. Also that the issei would not attend. The young people wanted to have a Japanese dance, so that their parents would approve. B.D. said we had to scare them to death over a couple of meetings, with the argument that they were going to return to their homes soon and what would the people think there if they knew that they couldn't have a social evening without having Japanese entertainment. At least keep it out of the papers that we have Japanese entertainment at our dances. So happened that boy that went to contact girl dances was told he would have to see their manager, and so they were out of that. Axel Nielsen spoke of the same thing and told of the movies. Said he can't allow them to do anything to show their overt attitude because then the others will find out how many there are that are really wishing to have Japanese entertainment. Merritt said that start out with any activity such as music classes and the first thing that happens is that it becomes Japanese and all stringed instruments and the American ones

disappear.

Mr. Anzai - Tuesday afternoon.

1. I am the one who was responsible for stopping the riot of the bachelors in Block 2. Campbell had ordered the removal of the wash tubs and installing of shoyu barrels. There was a big crowd of 138 with hammers, axes, etc., and they were going to destroy the barrels if they were put in. I happened by and then came to see Mr. Campbell. I argued with him an hour and a half. He didn't want to apologize, he said what about my position. I said his position was unimportant, that what he was interested in was keeping peace and quiet and the center operating smoothly. He said what should I do, and I said, first, apologize, second, make arrangements for them to wash their clothes, and third ? I went over to the group and said what you men want is a place to wash your clothes, that is right. It doesn't matter where you wash them, what place, if you argue over the place and cause a disturbance you are working against the people. If you have a place to wash your clothes that is all you are asking for, if there is anyone who doesn't agree with this hold up his hand,--no one did. I talked with them a long time, until they had agreed to that and I said I could fix it up with Mr. Campbell. I then came back and told him it was all right. I didn't take him with me because it was wrong to make a man in his position excuse himself for something he had done, and I wanted to save him that embarrassment.

I could have saved the riot of December 6, if I had advised Mr. Campbell. He asked me to sit in his office, but I told him I had work to do, I would have kept him from arresting Oyeno.

At that time there were three struggling for power here. There was Ogura Akahoshi, Tayama, and Kurihara. The first two weren't known. They advised the administration and kept all other people away from the administration. The last man did not want personal power, he was not selfish that way. When I came here in April, I kept thinking to myself, how are those people of the administration going to bring unity to these people? I saw there were all kinds and coming from different places and they didn't think alike or know each other. If only the administration had tried to explain that they were here to help the people and were their best friends. They didn't do this. Then if they had told everyone to come to the office and tell their troubles, the people would have had confidence. They didn't do these things, and there was no leadership.

I am optimistic about the movement of people to the west coast. If the WRA will tell the people what they are going. If they will make arrangements for people to have a job, and to make sure that the attitudes of the people where families go are friendly, and if the people here know this and have confidence then there will be no trouble. The people worry about staying here, they are tired of staying here. They have great respect for the government and if the government will say we will

protect you, it will mean a lot.

Assume that the people want to return, that they have worried about staying here, that they have worried about acceptance if they go out. The WRA knows this and is making plans to have people friendly to them, ready to greet them. If they learn that their American friends have jobs for them, then they will want to go back and there will be no trouble. The emphasis must be on the general principles of what the WRA is prepared to do rather than upon the details of how people get relief, etc. Also, there are people who do not like to think of charity, and that side should not be emphasized. The people are expecting the government to help them out to get a new start--they feel it as an obligation of the government for what it has done, and anything less is wrong--so the help should be phrased in those terms, that it is the government recognizing its obligations for what has happened.

We call Mr. Merritt the father of Manzanar, and Mrs. Adams the mother. Some people objected and wrote a memo. I talked with them and told them what the relation of father and son was and that that was the way we wanted our relation to be with Mr. Merritt. (He also went on to explain the solid feeling between members of the Japanese family, and brothers and sisters fight with each other for position, but that in a crisis they will all work together.)

We think of the bachelors as defeated people. They have never been able to take care of themselves, or to think ahead and they are easily led. There are some leaders here who want to secure position, but they don't know how to lead the people. Murakami head of Judo tried to raise trouble over the arrest of Arika. He said something about getting a petition of 1000 names. Anybody would sign such a petition because they don't think. The Judo people are not well thought of. They are muscle people and when you have too much muscle training you have no brains. The people have no real respect for them. (Who in hell are the people.)

Mr. Kondo said that the Japanese Chamber of Commerce raised much money to send the people who were poor and charity cases back to Japan, and that is one reason why Japanese were seldom on relief in this country. They have the feeling of always wanting to care for themselves and charity is an idea which violates their values.