

1:58 JAPANESE-AMERICAN EVACUATION

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171

OUR JAPANESE ARE AMERICANS

By Emil Sekerak

(Antioch Alumni Bulletin, Feb. 1943.)

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Emil Sekerak came to Antioch from Cleveland in 1931. Majoring in business administration, he had co-op jobs as secretary to the chairman of the National Mediation Board in Washington, as junior accountant with Lybrand's, and as a research worker at the Ohio Farm Bureau. After graduating with honors in 1936, he continued with the Ohio Farm Bureau until he took up his job with the War Relocation Authority. He is at present working in the Community Enterprise Division at Topaz, Utah.)

"Military strategy and protective custody"--these are the ostensible reasons why nearly 120,000 Japanese-Americans were shifted from the West Coast to centers farther inland last April. Military strategy because of fear of a Japanese invasion and "fifth column" activity. Protective custody because of fear of vigilante and mob action against the persons and property of the Japanese West Coast residents.

When one remembers the assorted fifth column hysteria which were rife in the country a year ago, the explanation of military strategy appears plausible. Yet it alone does not explain why "race" was made the criteria of evacuation rather than pro-Japan or pro-Axis leanings.

When one ponders the explanation of "protective custody" one has mixed feelings. The realist may be satisfied that the Japanese are safer in the centers than they would be back home. But the idealist is shocked by the realization that in practice the people of the West Coast have fallen so far short of the ideals of democracy. That all Japanese-Americans, American citizens included, without committing overt acts should have to be protected from the illegal violence of other American citizens is a blot on the record of American democracy. No since the acadians were expelled from Nova Scotia has a forced mass evacuation taken place in English-speaking America.

There are many who think that economics was a large factor in the evacuation, i.e. the elimination of the economic competition of the Japanese-Americans in favor of Caucasian business men and farmers.

Yet the decision was made. And on bulletin boards in all the cities and towns and villages on the West Coast appeared one day in February placards headed in large type with the words "Proclamation to all Persons of Japanese Ancestry" which continued, in effect, "you must get ready to move out of your homes and vocations by such and such a date." These posters went on to explain that if the Japanese had not evacuated voluntarily out of the defense zones after one month or six

weeks they would have to go to centers guarded by the Army. No loyalty tests were to be made, no weeding out, no separation of sheep from goats.

A few left voluntarily. Most waited, hoping that the situation would change in their favor. It didn't, so they liquidated their property at a loss, bade farewell to friends, and went to the temporary "assembly" centers pending removal to more permanent "relocation" centers farther inland.

The people of the Topaz Relocation Center came from the "bay area," which includes San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley and environs. The "assembly" center was the Tanforan Race track, some 15 miles south of San Francisco. To hastily converted stables they came to live. Behind they left homes, schools, and jobs, and most of their personal possessions.

After several months at Tanforan, they were sent to a fenced-in square mile of the central Utah desert, guarded by a company of military police, there to live until the war was over.

The Japanese-Americans in this relocation center are accepting their uprooting pretty well. When one considers the tremendous adjustment--geographically, socially, economically, psychologically--they have had to make, they have taken it on the chin gracefully. My norm for measurement is to imagine how any other segment of our population would have taken it, German-Americans, say, or Italian-Americans or American-Slavs, or for that matter British-Americans of comparatively recent immigration.

The most vociferous protests have been made by the Nisei (American born and educated). The reasons: they have the thoroughly American trait of demanding their rights"; they have felt the pain of the insinuated charges most deeply. Perhaps the Issei (first generation) and Kibei their transplanting, but they probably feel that they do not have the right to "rights" like the Nisei do.

Whereas the assembly centers were organized by the Wartime Civil Control Administration (a temporary hybrid of the U. S. Army and other Federal agencies including the WPA), the relocation centers are organized and controlled by the WRA, whose personnel has been selected for fitness in handling a large public welfare situation in all its ramifications. The WRA has done a great deal to infuse faith and hope into the hearts of the evacuees. From stories one hears, the initial assembly had many ugly aspects. The situation was unprecedented; the staff handling the assembly were not experts. Feelings were hurt, many seemingly unnecessary injustices and crudities committed. WRA, on the other hand, is treating the matter from the stand point of a temporary social problem, and is trying to keep it from becoming a permanent one.

We are trying to make the center as much of a normal American community as the facilities and circumstances (and public opinion in the region) will allow. Here in the center the evacuees are called "residents". The Caucasian personnel are called the "appointive or administrative staff". The residents enjoy maximum participation in policy-making within the framework of the rather reasonable WRA regulations. They have an elected city council, empowered to pass ordinances enforceable by the internal police--who are residents. Most of the nonconfidential positions in the administrative offices are held by residents. The stores and services in the center are run by the residents on a cooperative basis. More than half of the school teachers are residents.

At first, the attitude of the newly arrived evacuees was one of suspicion and resentment toward the administrative people and the rules and regulations. Every week saw an incipient "incident" brewing, but persistence toward agreeable solutions on the part of the project administration brought understanding response from a population deeply injured and smarting from forced incarceration. Although community morale has steadily improved, WRA realized that it can never be expected to rise to the heights that a free community composed of free people can reach. So WRA has adopted the policy of re-relocating as many individuals as possible, now. The post-school Nisei for the most part, are eager to be free, to progress in their careers, to show the rest of the country that they are good citizens, to become a part of America again. They are willing to chance the difficulties that might be encountered. WRA is equally anxious to see them go "on the outside" and is giving these Nisei preference in re-relocation opportunities.

Before a Nisei can be re-relocated, however, there must be a job to go to, in a community that will accept him and give him equal treatment with other citizens. Further, the job must be of the kind that the evacuee can accept of his own free will. The requirements of the prospective relocatee are that he meet the qualifications of the work and that he pass an investigation by the FBI and the Army and Navy Intelligence Services. Several hundred evacuees have been relocated in this manner already. As labor shortages increase, the prospect for outside opportunities grows brighter. The Nisei await their day eagerly and impatiently. Until then America will not be America to them. When one has known these Nisei as well as the Americanized Issei and Kibei, one realized that the only barrier between them and the America they sincerely believe in is their racial features. Of talent and skill and training and American culture they have an abundance.

For those who want to complete their college or graduate school education, for those high school graduates who want to enter college, WRA is trying to find campuses which will accept them. Many of those who want to go to college need some financial assistance or an opportunity to earn their expenses, just as is the case in any normal group of college aspirants.

Perhaps the evacuation was necessary, human beings being what they are and wars being what they are. At any rate is an accomplished fact. The Federal Government is being eminently considerate of the welfare of the evacuees, but the plain people of the United States generally could do and should want to do much more. By opening up their communities, their colleges, their work opportunities to the American born Nisei, at least, they can invest in the future of America as a democracy of human rights. America as a democracy of human rights. America, as well as the Nisei, is the loser if this investment is not made.

I should like to appeal to antioch alumni, especially those to whom the inscription on the Horace Mann monument brought a response, a seek openings where there might be some little "victory for humanity".

When Kipling said "East is east and west is west, and never the twain shall meet" he didn't have a chance to become acquainted with our Japanese-Americans. In most of the Issei and Kibei they have met; the conflict between the mores of the Orient, and New World has been resolved by a process somewhat akin to natural selection in the evolutionary sense. In a few it has not. Kipling should have had a seat at the talent show recently in Topaz. Issei, Kibei, blended with tap-dancing in the best Astaire style. The same singer could knock 'em cold with "Sakurai" (Cherry Blossoms) or with "I'm Dreaming of a White Christmas". A saxophonist could bleat wailing oriental notes or the most ghastly American swing. An Issei who can blow from the hips as profusely as anyone who had never left Japan can say "Yowsuh" and "Okay" as well as any Brooklyn urchin. These are superficial Americanism, to be sure, but they indicate cultural adaptation. It is more difficult to observe thoughts, but one gets the confidence that their ideas are no more or less anti- or pro- anything than those of the average American. There is one thing in which the Issei are superior. They love committees even better than Anti-ochians do. Few like to assume sole personal responsibility for important decisions (and some not so important).

Little children in Topaz all look like dolls to me. Issei generation carry them on their backs instead of in their arms. When they play house, they get their little dishes and stand in line, after the manner of their elders who line up in front of the common dining halls. Once in a while, one of them will ask his parents, "Why don't we go back to America, Mommy?"

The Japanese have something close to a reverence for plant life. For their pets, they have plants just as other Americans have dogs and cats and canaries.

Almost half of the religious adherents in the center are Buddhists and the rest Christian. There is no conflict. In the Christmas pageant, for instance, which included the wise men and the manager scene, half of the cast were Buddhists, and they played their parts earnestly and "with feeling."

Unless one is of the school of emotions which wants all American of Japanese ancestry to be sent "back where they came from" (or where their grandparents came from) he realized the time will come when the residents of these centers will again take their place in the American scene. What lingering marks the period of detention and concentration will leave on them is still to be seen.

But much Americanization has already been undone. Most of the younger people are for the first time in their lives living in an exclusively "Japanese" community. Filial loyalty and affection make them respond to Japanese customs more than they are in the habit of doing. Communal living accentuates this. They are hearing the Japanese language spoken more constantly and are speaking it more themselves. The children who were accustomed to Caucasian faces now seen only oriental ones. They are cut off from American scenes, participation in American problems, the stream of American action.

Here is a letter a mother sent to one of the high school teachers (who has given me permission to include it in this article):

"Dear Teacher, Thank you for kindness to our children. I am wondering some of our boys has no hopeless for the education and future. Some of them said it is nothing if we educate and we cannot stand good. When Dr. Rev. Fisk was here someone thinking same way. One of his students was here Block 6. He like to go to college but the college don't like him welcome. But he went (he was thinking I will do my best). He went scholl. When he met with their students what they did? No one against to him, only feel him good. On this war time, we are thinking outside people mad to us. Some of them send their only son to war. But what mothers and ladies did for our children at this Christmas? When I met our mothers, what they talked? They had tears on their faces. Their tears was just talked for thankful on their kindness. America is a defirent country. They praised them and we are loving more America. We have hope. We will do our best wher at, or where to go. You could lead hopeless one to have hope. Thank you."

Someone has said, "God speed the day when there shall be no more hypenated Americans.)

REPORT FROM TOKYO

An Ambassador Warns of Japan's Strength

by JOSEPH C. GREW

JOSEPH C. GREW served as U. S. Ambassador to Japan from 1932 until war came. He repeatedly warned our Government of the danger of sudden attack. Now he says: "A primary axiom of war is to know your enemy. The American people, as a whole, are dangerously ill-informed regarding the strength of one of our enemies—Japan."

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Since his return to this country from Japan last August, Joseph C. Grew has been addressing the American people to warn them that they must not underestimate the determination and the resourcefulness of the Japanese. Report From Tokyo, a book based on speeches delivered by him since his return, will be published by Simon & Schuster on Dec. 7, the anniversary of Pearl Harbor. On these pages LIFE presents extracts from that book.

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There are many questions which we have been asking ourselves since the grim forenoon of December 7, 1941. Some of these questions will be answered only by the historians of the far future. Why did Japan attack the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations? Why did the Japanese wish to destroy us? Why did they risk the venture of war with our peoples, who are known for industrial power and for potential military capacity? Did the Japanese indeed make the most monumental miscalculation in all history? Are they foolish fanatics who have chosen a suicidal war as the only way out from their humiliation by Chinese resistance? Questions such as these have been asked me ever since my return from Tokyo.

I fear, alas, that no man living could answer all of these questions. If there is anyone who knows all the answers, I for one would like to learn from him. I know that there are many important points about the Japanese mind and spirit which

have puzzled and troubled me, and which are probably not clear to the Japanese themselves. Nevertheless, I will put before you two of the main questions, and try to give answers to them which I believe come near to the heart of the matter.

First, why did the Japanese make this war upon us?

Second, how do the Japanese leaders—fanatical but coldly calculating men—dare dream of victory over the combined power of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States, China, and the other United Nations?

Why did they make war upon us? The Japanese attitude toward the English-speaking peoples is based on a concept of Japanese superiority and strength and of our inferiority and weakness. Part of this is a product of their mythology—the only neolithic mythology in the world which still plays a part in the affairs of a government. A part of it is a product of national vanity. A part of it is—in the Japanese view—logical, matter-of-fact, and well founded.

They hold Americans in contempt

It is a paradox of Japanese thinking that, despite their faith in their own innate superiority, they believe that the man who thinks he is superior is ipso facto handicapped. The Japanese have known what we thought of them—that they were little fellows physically, that they were imitative, that they were not really very important in the world of men and nations. Believe me, I have been shamed more than once by the braggadocio, self-confidence and condescension manifested by our English-speaking peoples; and I have grown apprehensive as, through the years, I have observed the Japanese observing us. I have realized the cold, withering contempt of the Japanese for those of our race who gloried in power without possessing the fundamentals of power or who complacently viewed the possibility of war with Japan without understanding how formidable the Japanese really were.

The Japanese have made comparisons not favorable to us. They have pointed to their own thrift and compared it with our wastefulness. They have looked at their own national unity and national reverence and have contrasted it with our partisanship and our readiness to laugh at ourselves. They have seen the comforts with which we have surrounded ourselves, and they envy us these even while they despise us for our possession and enjoyment of them.

It is not meaningless that in Japanese thought "Oriental culture" stands as the antithesis to luxury. To many Japanese, culture means a Spartan ability to endure hard work, hard living, and hard fighting. The inconsistency of their position—the fact that they should pride themselves on their simplicity and ruggedness while fighting to gain material riches—is not apparent to most of them. They look upon us as boastful, vainglorious, rich, and flabby. They think that we are physically soft. They think that our minds are filled with gross considerations of comfort, personal greed, and shallow partisanship.

Why Japan is a tough enemy

I have no wish to praise a people who are our enemies, but I must—in the interest of our safety—list a few of their formidable characteristics:

They are united. Theirs is a unity of solidarity. Foolish or wise though their war government may be, they support it. They believe in the divinity of their Emperor and, through him, in the rightness of their war leaders. For years they have prepared themselves collectively and individually for war. Germany and Italy possess groups of unknown size and power which await only the time and opportunity to revolt. In Japan there are no such groups.

They are trained. The Japanese have said openly that their weapons were inferior to ours but they counted on the fact that we supposed them to be even less well equipped than they really were. This would give them an advantage. This advantage could be further supplemented by their discipline, by their universal training, and by the fact that all Japanese men—all the able-bodied men in Japan—have military service. Trained men and armies with fair weapons can often defeat untrained men and armies with excellent weapons.

They are frugal. The Japanese Empire has almost thrived on short-ages. Bottlenecks, absences of materials, and vexing priorities have existed in other countries under conditions which would have meant abundance to the Japanese. In the midst of poverty, they have built an enormous military machine. They have not done this with wastefulness. They have done it with care and thrift and economy and conserving of materials. The food which we, even now, throw away in North America would go a long way toward supporting the population of Japan.

They are fanatical. They believe in their war, in the government which wages it, and in the incorruptible certainty of their national cause. Who knows how far back the sources of this national faith may lie? Some parts of it go back to the half-mythical centuries of their history before the time of Christ. Others rest, perhaps, in the centuries of sporadic struggles with the Chinese which ended with the great naval victories of the seventh-century Chinese fleets. The shoguns, who began the system of ruling through puppets a thousand years ago, and then the feudal lords, contributed their share. Medieval civil wars, then, bequeathed traditions which toughened Japan for foreign war today.

There are, at least in war, totalitarian. Long ago, while Germany and Italy were still picturesque agglomerations of petty states, Japan was governed by dictatorship, secret police, elite guards, suppressors of "dangerous thoughts," summary courts, and hidden executioners. The Tokugawa shogunate, which preceded the present modernized government, was effectively totalitarian and authoritarian.

We have learned in our time what totalitarianism means. It means the end of political freedom, of religious freedom,

of any freedom, of any true culture. It also means concentrated political, economic, and military power. This power can be used swiftly and ruthlessly by despots who do not stop to explain—still less to justify—their ends or their means. Japan did not have to turn Fascist or National Socialist; morally, Japan already was both. Japan has needed no Hitler. In a certain sense, her militarists are an oligarchy of Hitlers. Democracy was an experiment into which the Japanese ventured only slightly and cautiously. The society itself, and its values, remain today, in wartime, regimented and authoritarian.

With such capacities, and such a government, is it surprising that Japan's leaders did not fear war and that they led their nation confidently into war? At this very moment, the Japanese feel themselves, man for man, superior to you and to me and to any of our peoples. They admire our technology, they may have a lurking dread of our ultimate superiority of resources, but all too many of them have contempt for us as human beings. Add to all this their overweening ambition for conquest, and you can begin to follow the warped but persuasive line of intuition and belief which led Japan to attack us.

Yet we now try to give an answer to the second question: do the Japanese think that they can win this war?

The Japanese leaders do think that they can and will win. They are counting on our underestimates, on our apparent disunity before—and even during—war, on our unwillingness to sacrifice, to endure, and to fight.

The leaders of Japan are not suicidally minded incompetents. History will show that they have made a miscalculation; but they have miscalculated less than most of us suppose. In this they find strength.

Japan has won before by the same strategy that she has followed in launching and waging this war. In 1894 and 1895, Japan defeated the gigantic Manchu Empire of China. Her armed forces won because the nation was prepared, united, determined. The Manchu court of China was corrupt and unprepared, the Chinese Government was supine and disunited, and the Chinese people never had a chance to fight. In 1904 and 1905, Japan attacked and defeated the Empire of the Tsars. Her armed forces attacked Port Arthur, like Pearl Harbor, murderously and in stealth. Port Arthur, like Bataan, withstood a siege and then surrendered. In St. Petersburg and Moscow there was revolt, occasioned largely by the corrupt mismanagement of the war and a popular distrust of the government. The Tsarist Government negotiated peace. Japan could not have defeated Russia; she did defeat the Tsarist forces when the people and government behind the armed forces were diunited and the productive system did not stand up. Finally, Japan, as one of the Allies, fought Germany in the First World War. Germany did not fight to the bitter end. The Germans did not wait for their country to be invaded. They gave in before the Rhine had even been reached—they surrendered even after they had won the Eastern front and had seemed victorious. The Japanese noted this and did not forget it.

Japan remembers these victories. As I have already stated, the Japanese may not intend to take New Orleans or San Francisco or Vancouver or Toronto—in this war. They do intend and expect, in dead seriousness, to conquer Asia, to drive us out, to force us to make a peace which will weaken us, and cause us to grow weaker with time. And then later, in five years, or ten years, or 50 years, they would use the billion men of an enslaved Asia, and all the resources of the East, to strike again.

When the Japanese militarists, committed absolutely to the course of conquest, took measure of their military resources and perceived the extent of democratic rearmament, they had to gamble. The gamble was heroic, but not that of a mere game of chance. Their well-planned campaigns southward were brilliant accomplishments. Today Japan is stronger than ever. We now face not only Japan but Japan and Japan's conquests. These conquests are greater than we have permitted ourselves to realize. They include more than ten times the area of the Japanese Empire as it stood a year ago—Chinese territory, British territory, Dutch territory, American territory. They include populations aggregating three times the population of the Japanese Empire. Many climes and vast resources. A huge aggregate of human beings, the majority of whom are docile and are capable of tremendous toil.

No one—any longer—can prattle now of defeating Japan in three months. We hear no longer about the tinder cities of Tokyo and Osaka. We do not jest about the Japanese fleet, or about their Air Force. We know that we face a destructive, united enemy, and that we must bring to bear against that enemy force as united as and greater than that which he has marched.

The Japs will never crack

The other day a friend, an intelligent American, said to me: "Of course there must be ups and downs in this war; we can't expect victories every day; but it's merely a question of time before Hitler will go down to defeat before the steadily growing power of the combined air and naval and military forces of the United Nations—and then, we'll mop up the Japs." Mark well those words, please. "And then we'll mop up the Japs."

Let's get down to brass tacks. I know Germany; I lived there for nearly ten years. I came out on the last train with my chief, Ambassador Gerard, when in 1917 we broke relations with Germany and shortly afterward were forced to declare war on that aggressor. I know the Germans well; truculent and bullying and domineering when on the crest of the wave; cemoralized in defeat. The Germans cracked in 1918. I have steadfastly believed and I believe today that when the tide of battle turns against them as it assuredly will turn, they will crack again.

I know Japan; I lived there for ten years. I know the Japanese intimately. The Japanese will not crack. They will not crack morally or psychologically or economically, even when

eventual defeat stares them in the face. They will pull in their belts another notch, reduce their rations from a bowl to a half bowl or rice, and fight to the bitter end. Only by utter physical destruction or utter exhaustion of their men and materials can they be defeated. That is the difference between the Germans and the Japanese. That is what we are up against in fighting Japan.

We must realize that the Japanese are already in the Aleutian Islands. Not far from Alaska. Not so far from other parts of our country. Our own armed forces are dealing with that situation. I mention it merely as a concrete indication of what the armed forces of Japan hope to do, and what they intend to do—and what they will do if they can. First, to bomb important American centers and then, eventually, invade America.

There is a little story that throws light upon the spirit which animates these grim warriors. Last year when our country and Japan were still at peace, I received from the Chinese Government the name of a Japanese who had been taken prisoner in China and who wished his family at home in Japan to know that he was alive and well. I communicated the information to the Government in Tokyo and received, in due course, the official reply. It was brief and to the point. The Japanese Government was not interested in receiving such information. So far as they, the Government, were concerned, and also so far as his own family was concerned, that man was officially dead. Were he to be recognized as a prisoner of war, shame would be brought upon not only his own family, but also his Government and his nation. "Victory or death" is no mere slogan for these soldiers. It is a plain, matter-of-fact description of the military policy that controls their forces, from the highest generals to the newest recruit. The man who allows himself to be captured has disgraced himself and his country.

The Japanese Army has one great advantage over her enemies in the Far East—the advantage of five years of hard fighting in the China war. They have paid dearly for it. Estimates of their casualties run as high as a million men. But for this grim price in blood they obtained a proving ground where they could build a tough, veteran army trained in the greatest of all military schools—war itself.

But the Japanese were not content with this. They gave their men further training in special areas where the terrain and climatic conditions approximate those in the regions where they were to fight. The units and commanders for the various sectors were selected months in advance and put to work. The Malayan army trained in Hainan and Indo-China, the Philippine force in Formosa, and both units practiced landing operations during the late summer and fall of 1941 along the South China coast. Even the divisions chosen to attack Hong Kong were given rigorous training in night fighting and in storming pill boxes in the hills near Canton. So realistic were there maneuvers that the troops are reported to have suffered "a number of casualties."

The Japanese High Command was able to make these careful preparations because of years of study of the areas where they expected to wage future campaigns. This study was based on a first-class espionage system. Japanese commentators have not even attempted to hide the fact that the High Command was fully informed for a year before the war of the strength, dispositions, and likely plans of their potential enemies. A good deal of this information is said to have been obtained by "observing" maneuvers in the Philippines and in Malaya. We can seriously question whether much of this information was gathered by official observers. The eyes of the High Command were probably reserve officers, disguised as humble members of the Japanese community scattered throughout the world.

They don't believe in "impassable" areas

The Japanese have borrowed more from the Germans than their tactics in the use of dive and light bombers. Like the Nazi High Command, they refuse to admit that there are any natural obstacles that their forces cannot cross. How often have the German armies shown how the Allied commanders had made the mistaken assumption that terrain that is merely difficult is impassable! In their lightning campaigns of last winter, the Japanese made the same point over and over again. Indeed, the Japanese themselves have said that their tactics have frequently been based on the principle of attacking through a particular area in the knowledge that their enemies have been lulled into a false sense of security and complacency by the very assumption of its impassability. And the Japanese emphasize the disastrous effect on the defenders' morale once a so-called impregnable area has been pierced.

But above all, according to both the Japanese themselves and outside observers, the most important factor contributing to Japanese victories is the spirit which permeates all the armed forces of the Empire. This spirit, recognized by competent military men as the most vital intangible factor in achieving victory, has been nourished and perpetuated since the foundation of the modern Japanese Army. But the Japanese have been careful to develop a tremendous fighting spirit in their armed services and people alike. Indeed, the Japanese armed services and the Japanese nation have become so closely identified that it is difficult to tell where one stops and the other begins. Every Japanese male, of course, must perform military service under a system of universal conscription. Thus in every family, the father or son or brother has served or is serving in the Army or Navy. Every house in Japan, down to the lowliest hovel, proudly flies the Japanese flag at its front door when one of its men is in military service.

They saved their strength for the big show

Nevertheless, the Japanese ability in deception and concealment played a very considerable part in keeping our people ignorant

of the true meaning of what was going on in eastern Asia. Many, for example, took the apparent failure of the Japanese Army to drive to victory in the four years of the China war as evidence of the weakness and inefficiency of the Japanese military forces. It has become more and more apparent since Pearl Harbor that, however much we hoped for peace in Asia, the Japanese themselves throughout the China war were husbanding their resources for the greater struggle which they felt lay beyond. In this connection, the Japanese budget figures released to the press are extremely interesting. They indicate that only 40% of the appropriation voted to the defense forces was expended for the conduct of the so-called China "incident." Sixty per cent—nearly two thirds of the total appropriation—was used to prepare the services and the industrial plants for the greater emergency yet to come. Similarly, of the materials and weapons furnished the services, only one fifth was sent to China—the rest being used to expand and modernize the armies and fleets which were to be called upon when the superwar really broke.

Nevertheless, despite its strength, Japan's new empire should certainly not be considered invulnerable. It has definite weaknesses which, if we take full advantage of them, will lead ultimately to the collapse of her whole position.

Japan, despite an unparalleled expansion over an area of many thousands of square miles in the campaigns of the past winter, has not succeeded in removing strong Allied positions on the flanks of her defensive chain. It is, of course, an axiom of conquest that each time you advance you are creating a future need for a further advance to protect your new position. Nevertheless, Japan hoped that by her concerted campaigns she could drive her enemies back to such a distance that she would be able to halt her forces on natural defensive lines.

This she has not been able to do. The United Nations still hold bases on and from which it is possible for them to organize and launch striking forces to attack the Japanese positions, both new and old. These will be used—amply and effectively—as the war progresses.

And finally, it must be considered a weakness of the Japanese defensive ring that communications and transport must be carried on very largely by water. As we have seen only too clearly here at home, sea-borne communications are extremely vulnerable to attack. At worst they may be cut, at best they compel the defensive country to divert much of her naval strength to convoy and anti-submarine patrol. Japan is not a country which can replace her shipping losses easily, and it may well turn out that the steady attrition of her shipping, both mercantile and naval, will play a considerable part in her ultimate defeat.

But let me emphasize once again that these weaknesses will certainly not of themselves cause Japan to be defeated. They must be exploited—taken advantage of—by determined aggressive action by the United Nations. The strength of the Japanese

(Page 9)

people lies in their fanatical obedience to authority. The great strength of the American people lies in their ability to think and act for themselves, without waiting for orders from above. Our fathers tamed a continent without waiting for someone to tell them how to do it. It took no directive from the High Command to call the Minute Men from their plows to battle. We ourselves can do no less. Let us not wait for our Government to do all our thinking for us. Our leaders in Washington already bear an immense burden. Let us not add to it by expecting them to lead us by the hand every step of the road to victory.

Let us remember one thing—it is our war.

From LIFE - Dec. 7, 1942

DEMOCRACY IS FOR THE UNAFRAID

Chester B. Himes

"Common Ground", Winter 1944,

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What frightens me most today is not the recurring race riots, the economic pressures on "minorities," the internment of Americans of darker-skinned ancestry whose loyalty to the ideology of white supremacy is doubted, nor even the whole scope and viciousness of the recent growth of race hatreds and the insidious beginning of propagandism for a white alliance for "self-protection"--not these so much as the white man's sudden consciousness of his own fear of other races of which these are but manifestations. I can see no hope for any "minority" group, nor even for democracy itself, in the existence of this fear.

People who are afraid are cruel, vicious, furtive, dangerous; they are dishonest, malicious, vindictive; they destroy the things of which they are afraid, or are destroyed by them. The host who is afraid, hearing a noise in his kitchen, tiptoes down the back stairs and blows out the brains of an ice-box raiding guest whom he thinks is a burglar; the policeman who is afraid shoots the manacled prisoner who bends to tie his shoelace; the industrialist who is afraid hires thugs and murderers to fight unionists; the capitalist who is afraid sabotages public welfare; the politician who is afraid attacks leaders of weakly supported causes to hide his own compromises; the statesman who is afraid endeavors to isolate his nation; and the government head who is afraid fails in the execution of laws, both national and international.

A race that is afraid bands in mobs to lynch, murder, intimidate, and destroy members of other races. Long ago we realized the Nazis did not hate the Jewish people so much as fear them. Members of the Ku Klux Klan, Silver-shirts, Bundists, and other similar American organizations whose aims are the destruction and intimidation of certain racial and religious groups are cowards from the word go; they are as representative of cowardly people as the Storm Troopers are of Nazism. Only cowards seek to destroy "minority" groups; courageous people are not afraid of them. In themselves such people are not dangerous. In themselves the cowardly are never dangerous, never more dangerous than Hitler in 1930. But when they become representative of the majority race within a nation, when they infect the entire body with their own cowardice, then a complete breakdown of law and decency follows, and all persons not contained in that race suffer the most cruel oppression.

This is what I fear is happening in America today--the cowardice of a relatively small percentage of white Americans is seeping into the consciousness of the majority and making them all afraid of the darker races.

Fear may easily become the greatest tragedy of this historic period. For the eventual peace of the world and the continuation of progress depend upon the white man's ability to live in equality, integrity, and courage in a civilization where he is outnumbered by peoples of other races. It is imperative that he be unafraid. For if, because of his fear, he finds himself unable to live as a neighbor and equal competitor with other races, there

will be no peace and little progress.

What concerns me more at the present is that, if the white man is not unafraid, the United States will never attain democracy.

Dictatorship is not so much a government for the weak and the afraid, but of the weak and the afraid. With even one dictatorship remaining in the world after the war, there will soon be another struggle. The fear of dictators is an evil and tremendous thing; they are afraid of everything that does not agree with them and of most things that do. Because of this, driven by it, struggling desperately to overcome it, dictators will always try to enslave the world. They have to; they cannot otherwise exist. Many of us have yet to understand this. We have also to understand that in the growing weakness of the white race in America, as demonstrated by its present fear-driven actions, dictatorship may come to the United States before we know what true democracy is like.

When the white man banishes his fear, he will banish with it all the bugaboos of race; and he himself will for the first time be free. For people who nurture race hatreds and dedicate their lives to the proposition that they are superior are never free; their thoughts, efforts, and aims are always limited and hindered by the necessity of proving it.

I once heard a rich and famous white man relate how he freed his mind of all thoughts of race and color and looked upon all peoples as equal in an effort to learn, if possible, whether there was any fundamental and distinguishable difference in peoples of different races. He realized that having been brought up in a tradition of white superiority, this would be impossible as long as he could identify people. So he pretended an eye infection and for a month went about with his eyes bandaged.

For the first time in his life as a rich, famous, white American he felt free. He was relieved of the necessity of pretending superiority, of hating people because of their color, of despising people because of their race; he did not every moment have to be aware of his reactions; he did not have to feel affronted, disgraced, humiliated, tolerant, condescending, or philanthropic because of another person's physical attributes or identifiable religious beliefs; his mind was free from all the psychoses of race antagonisms.

War is teaching this lesson of equality to many of our youths in uniform. Coming upon the bodies of two soldiers lying face downward in the muck of a distant battle field, both having died for the preservation of the same ideal, under the same flag, in the same uniform, they are learning the ridiculousness of thinking: "This man, being white, is superior to that man, who is black." They have learned that in a week's time the color which made one "better" than the other will have gone from both.

Here at home white Americans must learn courage, too. They must learn that Negroes and members of other races working and living side by side with them in a community of interests do not detract from their prestige but add to it; that equal participation by all peoples in the benefits of democracy is not a thing to bring disgrace but a thing to inspire praise and create pride. They must learn that bravery does not consist in persecuting the few and the weak (for them all our enemies would be the bravest of nations) but of protecting them.

The white race has attained leadership in the world of today. Although people of other races have played a magnificent part, the white race is largely responsible for the creation of our present civilization. So far, much of the white race's talent, its ingenuity, creative genius, and ability to organize, produce, and conquer has been employed to subdue and exploit the other races of the world. While the mechanics of this civilization may continue for many centuries to come, its character is bound to change, for the other races of the world have reached the point where they will no longer be exploited or subdued.

Now this is the question: is the white race courageous enough to accept the inevitable, to accept the fact that exploitation and oppression of other races is no longer physically or materially possible, and to continue its leadership in integrity and equality, competing with other races in fairness while respecting their rights of self-determination, meeting with them and negotiating justice and equity for all, dealing with them in culture and commerce? Or is it afraid of ultimate extermination or subjugation?

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S N E A K A T T A C K

On Americans -- By Americans

By William Swain
(From Frauds and Answers Magazine--April 1945)

In 1941, the year before Pearl Harbor, Japanese produce dealers in Los Angeles reported a gross business of about \$30,000,000.

In 1942, the year after Pearl Harbor, Los Angeles people paid about \$50,000,000 for 10,000 carloads less of produce.

The business, in 1942, was wholly in the hands of Caucasian Americans because the Oriental Americans--citizen Japs and alien Japs together--had been evacuated for reasons of wartime necessity.

These dollars and cents figures help tell the story of a dismal troop of bigots parading hyena-like behind the folds of the American flag in a movement almost too sordid to be believed, directed toward vilification of the ideals for which thousands of American boys are dying daily. It is fair to say, however, that some are sincere.

The figures tell plainly what every thinking person on the West Coast admits: that some produce and floral business tycoons are backing an underhanded weeseling race-hatred-promoting program outdone in viciousness only by the Nazis.

This war on Orientals is not new. Ever since 1850, when the Yankee, Jewish, Irish and English paupers came swarming in the wake of the Forty-Niners to cheat the California (Old Spanish) families out of their land either through loan shark methods or by marrying their daughters, the Chinese, the Japanese and the Korean have been singled out for persecution by such nouveau riche.

For years, however, these hatreds have lain dormant, since all new Oriental immigration had been barred and hard-working Japs of the second generation, native Americans, had slowly strengthened their position as landowners and businessmen in their own right and thus won respectability.

With Pearl Harbor, all this changed overnight. The Japs--both alien and native-born--were evacuated from West Coast defense areas as a matter of military necessity and under the Constitution.

To clarify this point: in this racial segregation at relocation centers there is no element of Federal dictatorship. Article 1, Section 9-2 of the United States Constitution states simply:

"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it."

Thus, when in December, 1941, the invasion of the West Coast became a well-founded threat, the basic Anglo-Saxon guarantee of freedom, the right of habeas corpus, was temporarily suspended--and rightly.

But then the jackals leaped--and wrongly. This was the long awaited chance. The Japs are out! Keep them out! Don't let them come back. Organize. Propagandize. Scare the dumb citizens with hints of mob violence. Implant these hints where they'll do the most good!

Just as there was precedent for exclusion of the Japanese in time of war (Lincoln jailed thousands of Rebels and sympathizers at the outbreak of the civil war without trial) so there was precedent, however illegal, for the way vested interests pounced upon the hapless Jap American citizen after Pearl Harbor.

The Native Sons of the Golden West had long since set the pace, of which more anon.

No better expression of the background and fundamental cause of this new wave of racebaiting now rising to crescendo in the nation's most vital war production areas on the Pacific slope can be found than those paragraphs published in "Tidings" official organ of the Catholic archdiocese of Los Angeles.

"They wanted cheap labor; laborious labor; docile labor. There were the Japanese, and so they got them. It started late in the 80s and continued for about 30 years. There were never hosts of them, but they were welcome.

"They started working for less, and infuriated labor; they sound up working for more, and infuriated management.

"Because they followed with ideal precision all Ben Franklin's advice to young men who wanted to succeed in the world they worked harder than we would work, and for less money.

"And they saved what little they earned until they themselves could buy a piece of California fertility. Soon, just as Ben Franklin knew would happen, hard work and thrift bore fruit. Soon these people practically controlled in California the crops that need a lot of manual work: tomatoes and peas and celery and lettuce.

"They were also the middlemen and the retailers and the carmers. They largely became a substantial, self-respecting middle class; their sons were going to college, were becoming doctors and lawyers and professors at universities.

"All of which was a thorn in the flesh" (of white interests).

The actual names of Southern California produce merchants who have interested themselves in the campaign to bar the Japanese from ever returning to the West Coast probably matter very little. Their types are duplicated, though in lesser numbers, all over the coastal region.

Rather it is the surge of sympathetic intolerance (strange bedfellows, those two words!) these shopkeepers have set in motion that is the subject for contemplation here.

However, just for the record, we name a few listed on the letterhead of the Americans League, P.O. Box 8184, Los Angeles, one of the "citizens' groups" which helped father the obnoxious campaign against Japanese who are as good citizens under the Constitution as the next American of Jewish, Irish, English, German, Scotch or any other ancestry.

There are Ray D. Wall, president of the produce brokerage company bearing his name; Anthony N. Castro, vice president of Castro & Son, growers and shippers of fruits and vegetables; W.W. Gray, secretary Los Angeles Produce Dealers Credit Bureau; Nat. J. Beggs, Beggs Bros. Fruit Co.; John Brown, Southern California Floral Industry, Norman Evans, Consolidated Produce Co., among others.

Still another group is the Americanism Educational League, 838 South Grand Ave., Los Angeles, of which Austrian born John R. Lechner is director.

The similarity of names in these two notorious anti-Japanese groups is no accident. Neither is the similarity of the literature they send out.

As already noted, they are merely type-names indicating a trend; their titles and motives are duplicated and reiterated endlessly throughout all phases of their hate-nurturing activities.

Throughout the two years of the renewed anti-Jap campaign they have obviously worked as one, together, and with other like organizations.

All this, of course, is introductory. The thing to bear in mind is that while these produce and floral concerns on the West Coast cooperating with the Native Sons and intrenched reactionary groups like the Grange, Associated Farmers, et al, work to keep the Japs from ever returning, theirs is not the only iron in the fire. Others, too, have important economic interests to further.

In many ways, these others are more dangerous than the tycoons. Poorer by far, they are also cleverer and less scrupulous, perhaps because they are poor.

While produce men want to keep out forever the stiff competition put up by the free farming Jap American Citizen, while they want the profits ordinarily shared by the Jap, their motives are and will remain primarily economic.

The motives of the others are more sinister, those of the Have-Nots who want as against the Haves who merely want more.

These others, it should be clear now, are the promoters, the directors of the anti-Jap campaign. To a great extent they use the merchants as well as the public as cat's paws. Reaching to reap a harvest they have never planted they do not hesitate to magnify an already evil element of intolerance in American life.

... Pick another name at random from the list on the letterheads of either of the "leagues" mentioned. Pick, for instance, Dr. Walter Scott Franklin, who appears as vice-chairman of the Americanism Educational League.

Doc Franklin is an M.D. who no longer practices his trade. Originally a realtor, he got into one land promotion after another over the past years and is now worth a million or more.

Cause of Doc's apathy to Jap-Americans is not far to seek. He is the owner of vast walnut groves and as such a colleague of other landowners who in turn own produce or floriculture acreage or canneries....

As for Lechner, by a curious parallelism he also calls himself "doctor," of divinity instead of medicine. In addition, like Franklin, he does not practice his calling. His history is an odd one.

Lechner was born in Austria. In World War I, he was a corporal. He is an explosive, persuasive orator. For a time he preached in a Baptist church. He got his LL.D. degree in a diploma mill. How he escaped becoming a plumber at some stage of his career is difficult to fathom.

Although reputedly a leader in the California American Legion, Lechner is no spokesman for that group. In a courageous statement printed in the California Legionnaire of January 15, 1944, the Department Commander, Leon Happell, repudiated Doc Lechner in so many words.

"For the purpose of testifying on the Japanese question, it should be plainly stated that he (Lechner) was speaking...not for the American Legion..."

Doc Lechner is presently making the rounds of California areas where Nisei were thickest before the war or, rather, where they offered the most competition.

Before applauding audiences of growers, packers, shippers, canners and sundry citizens who believe this professional demagogery, Lechner berates the Jap-American and blames him for everything the Nips have done to our fighting men, forgetting that by this reasoning he is indicting himself, an Austrian, for what his bestial countryman, Hitler, has done.

Whether the forces represented by Lechner will erect a permanent barrier against return of the incarcerated Nisei to former homes on the Coast is anybody's guess.

As pointed out by Carey McWilliams in his masterly report on the problem, Southern Democrats who wish to keep the rights of all colored citizens buried have openly sided with the West Coasters.

Together, and with other reactionaries in the east and north, they represent an indubitable power in the land--or always have.

Nevertheless, some 2,000 Japanese-American citizens already have returned to the West Coast under permits from the War Department as thousands of their sons and brothers fight and die for the U.S.A. on all the farflung battle fronts.

Perhaps, as the War Relocation Authority fondly hopes, most of these ousted Americans will start life anew in other sections of the nation, a sentiment partially echoed by one Nisei writing in a Nisei newspaper:

"Evacuees will do well to forget California completely, to lock its memory in their chamber of horrors. They've just lost a friend who ran true to form in the pinch; they will find a better and true friend on the rockbound Atlantic, on the rolling plains of the expansive midwest, and on the hills and dales of the stretching Alleghenies."

Whatever happens, one thing comes clear. Here, in this drive of Americans against Americans lies the essence of what the world is fighting against, a microcosm of the greater world fight against prejudice, bigotry, ignorance, greed.

And, maybe, in this West Coast bird's-eye view of interracial frictions and their causes can be found a laboratory in miniature wherein this human phenomenon can be best studied. If so, then a whole new literature awaits curious readers. ...

It is to be hoped, and fervently, ... that the tidal wave of world liberalism at present neck-deep on the stupid and the merely selfish is not receding but, rather, lifting to a new and cleansing level from which it will never again subside.

The 11th Commandment "Love Thy Neighbor" is the solution?

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Summary of Chief Data and Sources

CHAPTER I. THE STUDY OF "THE SPIRIT OF NIPPON"

Western influence in modern Japan and Japanese solidarity.

"The spirit of Nippon" illustrated by behavior toward the sacred person of the Emperor---The resignation of the president of Doshisha University because of a fire on the campus theoretically jeopardizing the person of the Emperor during the Enthronement Ceremonies of 1928---Other similar cases of "taking responsibility" (scapegoat behavior)

"The spirit of Nippon" symbolized by the Japanese soldier in action---Data from a soldier's story of the Russo-Japanese War, and the story of the "Three Human Bombs" of the Shanghai fighting of 1932

Japanese motion picture censorship---Samples of lines deleted from script presenting royalty in an unfavorable light, and films completely banned

The role of the Imperial Photograph in schools and elsewhere---Attempted rescues of the Photograph from burning school buildings and loss of life---The new "Honorable Photograph" shrines for schools

Chief Sources: Contemporary news reports; files of motion picture distributors in Japan; personal investigations.

CHAPTER II. THE NATIONAL CULT

The wealth of national ceremonial---The Enthronement Ceremonies of 1928---National holidays as taught in the Shushinsho (moral textbooks of the primary schools)

The role of Shinto in the new national cult---Shinto history---The leadership of the government in nationalizing Shinto---How the shrines are regarded by poets and other loyalist writers---The Shushinsho on the shrines---A statistical study of the memory of students regarding the Shushinsho lessons on the shrines

Irreverence and its penalties---Fukuzawa---the "shrine-bowing case" in Korea---Dr. Inouye's irreverent writing regarding the Three Sacred Treasures---Contemporary opinions and results

The government's definition of national Shinto as a patriotic, not a religious cult---The significance of this definition

Chief Sources: Writings of Shinto scholars; the Shushinsho textbooks and teachers' manuals; contemporary news reports; various other important sources.

CHAPTER III. "DANGEROUS THOUGHT": FIRST STAGE

Behavior violating the national cult.

The case of Prof. Morito---Anarchist essay---dismissal from Tokyo Imperial University---Expressed attitudes pro and con

Formal definitions of dangerous thought by Japanese writers.

The Kotoku case---Mass execution of alleged anarchist plotters

The foreign and "the dangerous" distinguished

Official definitions of "the dangerous"---A series of "peace laws" to 1900

The development of socialism and the labor movement

Government suppression by legal prohibition offset by the paternalism of the factory law and the cooperative movement

Chief Sources: Contemporary news reports; Haga's study of cases of "dangerous writings"; works in Japanese on "dangerous thought"; the texts of the "peace laws"; studies of the labor and socialist movements in Japan

CHAPTER IV. "DANGEROUS THOUGHT": SECOND STAGE

Later "peace laws" of 1925 and 1928

The growth of the communist movement in Japan, and loyalist and government response---Extra-legal response, e.g., the Osugi murder---Communist arrests, volume and significance

The growth of "thought problems," especially among students---Nature and volume

Case records of "leftist" students and laborers

Studies of "leftist" and banned literature---Examples---Why so regarded

Chief Sources: Contemporary news reports; texts of the newer "peace laws" and contemporary Japanese opinion; studies of "leftism" in Japan; reports of the Kokumin Seishin Bunka Kenkyusho (Society for Research in the National Culture); representative texts of "leftist" literature

CHAPTER V. "GIMBURA"

The role of amusements in relation to patriotism in a "moral state"

The growth and influence of moving pictures in Japan---New experience and thrills---Censorship as official definition of the good and the bad---Examples and volume of deletions

The nature and growth of the Japanese cafe---Case studies of cafe hostesses---Relation of the cafe to geisha and vice houses

The nature and growth of the dance hall in Japan---Case studies of taxi dancers

Relation of such institutions to student life---Opinions of school authorities and loyalist writers

The conflict of traditional morals with the new cosmopolitan interest in amusements due to Western influence

Chief Sources: Data from motion picture distributors in Japan---Personal investigations of places of amusement

CHAPTER VI. TRADITIONAL AND FOREIGN LITERATURE

Literature as reflection of the character of a society

The role of traditional literature in the popular mind---Chushingura and other stories---Poetry in relation to the Emperor

Western literature and its role in modern Japan---Mill's individualism---Fukuzawa's writings---The Romaji movement---English literature as a stimulus for interest in romance

The suppression of literature as injurious to public morals---Examples

Relation of institutions and the news

Chief Sources: Contemporary news reports; texts of Japanese classical literature; texts of Occidental writings which have been introduced into Japan

CHAPTER VII. THE "TWO-TWENTY-SIX" AFFAIR

Internal crises in modern Japan which threaten the solidarity of the nation

The "Two-twenty-six" affair (of February 26, 1936) in detail---The role of possession in such behavior

The element of danger in the over-development of Japanese national sentiments

The declaration of each side (loyalist and rebel) that it is serving the best interests of Emperor and nation

Various other internal crises in modern Japan having elements in common with the "Two-twenty-six" affair

The seriousness of the problem of internal crises

Chief Sources: Contemporary news reports; the Kwampo (Official Gazette); biographies of Japanese statesmen

CHAPTER VIII. PATRIOTIC SOCIETIES

Why patriotic societies tend to develop---Number of such societies which have developed in modern Japan---Explanation of the rapid increase in recent years to be found in the increase of "national crises"

Types of function of Japanese patriotic societies (see "Abstract," p. 5)---Description of the various types of activity

Patriotic societies to some extent a measure of deficiency in national sentiment

Chief Sources: Dantai Soran (a comprehensive compendium of associations in Japan); contemporary news reports; various pamphlets, especially regarding the Seinen Dan (young men's associations)

CHAPTER IX. "THE GOOD JAPANESE"

The development of national doctrine as a result of patriotic activity

Definitions of Kokutai ("national constitution," "national organization," etc.) from Japanese sources---Definitions of several related terms

The volume of literature (in Japanese) on such topics, as found in the Imperial Library, Tokyo

Analysis of representative Japanese writings on national doctrine

Arai's analytical study of the Shushinsho (moral textbooks) of Japanese elementary schools

A study of representative teachings of these textbooks from 1883 to the present---Teachers' manuals---Moral syllabi for teachers

A statistical study of the memory of middle school students regarding the most significant teachings of the Shushinsho in their primary school courses

National teachings in the primary school remarkably effective in inculcating national doctrines in the young

Chief Sources: Various volumes on Japanese national doctrines (some original Japanese, some translations); investigation of the volume of such literature by a comprehensive study of the card catalog of the Imperial Library, Tokyo; Arai's study of the Shushinsho as mentioned above; the Shushinsho texts, 1883 to the present; a special statistical study of the memory of middle school students (as mentioned above)

CHAPTER X. THE ROLE OF THE SACRED IN THE SECULAR

For a summary of Chapter X., see the "Abstract," pp. 6-7.

KOKUTAI

A Study of Certain Sacred and Secular Aspects of Japanese Nationalism

J. Paul Reed

Abstract

The present study seeks to investigate certain aspects of the problem of how ^asociety is able to live, particularly under modern conditions, in view of the deleterious effects which tend to follow the diffusion of Western civilization. Modern Japanese nationalism seems to have developed largely in response to the infusion of Western civilization, particularly of its secular aspects. On the one hand, this impact has tended to conflict with the traditional social patterns of behavior, and on the other hand, to stimulate the development of national solidarity based upon these patterns in modified form. The latter result is in sharp contrast to other situations in which Western civilization has tended to cause the disorganization or disintegration of pre-literate as well as of civilized societies.

This is a case study of this process in operation in modern Japan, and seeks to attack the problem by means of (1) the examination of the role of symbolism, ritual and ceremonial in the national life, symbolic of what is known as "the spirit of Nippon"; (2) the study of various conflict and crisis situations in the national life in which conflicting attitudes and sentiments become available for examination; (3) the study of various types of behavior which tend to arise in consequence of consciousness of these crisis situations, particularly (a) secondary crisis situations due to "super-patriotic" activity, (b) patriotic activity sponsored by individuals and patriotic societies on the one hand, and by the government on the other, and (c) the body of national doctrine which has grown up and the chief methods by which it is propagated in Japan; (4) finally, the role of the sacred aspects of Japanese nationalism in a situation in which secular civilization has come to play an increasing part.

Various examples of behavior with respect to the Emperor as the significant symbol of the nation, suggest a body of attitudes and sentiments defining him as a sacred object, indeed, the most sacred object in the nation. Such behavior indicates that the accepted pattern of "the good Japanese" involves the readiness of the individual to subordinate his personal and special interests in any way regarded as necessary, to the welfare of the Emperor and the nation. Evidence regarding two sub-types of such behavior is presented. In the first, the individual takes the scapegoat role in situations in which the personal safety of the Emperor is regarded as endangered. In the second, the individual soldier stands ready to sacrifice himself in the interest of victory in battle for His Majesty's forces. Moving picture censorship illustrates how the Emperor is regarded. The use of the Imperial photograph in schools as an object of the utmost reverence illustrates a type of secondary symbolism which is significant in developing attitudes of respect and reverence for the Emperor, particularly in the primary school.

Where the degree of national solidarity is high, nationalism tends to become a kind of religion, organized into a cult. This seems to be most effective when church and state are identical. This is the case in modern Japan. Data regarding the wealth of Imperial ceremonial is illustrated by some of the enthronement ceremonies of 1928, and great national days as observed, and also as explained in the moral textbooks of the primary school. The traditional significance of such ceremonial is not well understood by the masses, but the awe, mystery, and sentiment surrounding them play an important role in the mass mind. The development of Shinto, a primitive folk religion, is briefly sketched, and the significance of its renaissance in the modern period is assessed. This renaissance seems to be a reaction to the infusion of Western civilization, and Shinto has for the first time become a unified national religion for the people as a whole. Data on the nationalization of Shinto in general, and of the shrines in particular, and also concerning how the shrines are regarded by the people, are presented in support of this thesis. Irreverence toward Imperial symbols and shrines in particular is penalized, as the data indicate. The logical inconsistency of freedom of religious worship as guaranteed by the Constitution, and the dominant position of Shinto as a national religion which makes its observances mandatory upon all Japanese, is evaded by the official declaration that Shinto is not a religion. Thus its position is made secure, and it becomes a powerful factor in the development and maintenance of national sentiment in the presence of the disorganizing tendencies of the Western secular invasion.

However, in modern Japan, the influx of Western civilization with its emphasis upon the welfare of the individual and the special interest group, has given rise to new wishes and attitudes, some of which have been expressed in non-conformist behavior which has come to be defined as dangerous to the traditional patterns of the role of the individual and the special interest group in the clan and in the nation. These new wishes and attitudes have developed among labor and other groups sufficiently to call forth "dangerous" behavior which has in turn stimulated loyalist response, and crisis situations have thus arisen. In the first stage, these situations particularly involved the labor movement, socialism, and anarchism. The case situations studied represent the following types: (a) academic discussion of socialist and anarchist theories and doctrines in ways which are defined by loyalists as dangerous to "sound national thought"; (b) labor and socialist agitation for rights and privileges defined as dangerous because of its origin "from below"; (c) plots to do violence to the Imperial House and to alter the form of government (kokutai) in the interests of the workers and the lower classes. As a result of these crises, efforts are made by loyalists to define the problem of "dangerous thought", and to discover methods of solving it. These efforts take three concrete forms: (a) discussion of the problem in books and articles by loyalist writers; (b) "peace laws" directed against any form of collective discussion or collective action which might endanger public peace, including labor agitation; (c) government efforts at compensation in the form of the factory law, ostensibly to improve the lot of industrial workers, and of the cooperative movement, chiefly for the farmers and urban laborers.

In the second stage of the development of these crisis situations, communism becomes the chief specter on the horizon which seems to threaten the nation. The crises take the form of (a) activity of radical agitators who seek to organize workers and others into a communist movement in Japan; (b) the appearance of socialist and communist literature; (c) the increasing interest of academic groups, both students and professors, in communism and its possibilities in Japan, evidenced by the reading of radical literature, classroom and group discussions, and the publication of essays. Loyalist response appears in (a) the revision of the "peace laws," particularly the increase of penalties for attempts to alter kokutai; (b) the banning of radical literature; (c) the murder of radicals; (d) official and unofficial attempts to cure those who have become infected by the disease of communism, and to restore their normally loyal attitudes and sentiments.

Certain aspects of this conflict in Japan are unique, but the basic process tends to be found in all societies in which established social patterns have developed into a sacred orthodox system on the one hand, and where, on the other hand, critical attitudes due to doubt, experimentation, or extraneous secular influences have invaded the group and seem to threaten its solidarity,

Japan being regarded as a "moral nation," the influx of frivolous behavior patterns from the West has also come to be defined as a threat to the national welfare by tending to undermine traditional mores in regard to amusements and self-indulgence, to offer certain freedom in individual behavior not characteristic of the nation's past upon which the present is supposed to be modelled in the matter of morals. This problem also has caused loyalists no little concern, although it is somewhat more subtle, and less amenable to such official prohibitions as the "peace laws" in connection with the problem of radicalism. In the study of moral censorship in relation to national welfare, three representative types of institutions, and the behavior associated with them, were examined, namely, the moving picture, the cafe, and the "Western-style" dance hall.

Furthermore, we find in representative samples of the traditional literature of Japan currently popular among the people as a whole, something of the reflection of the character of the nation, particularly in that part of the literature which has received the endorsement of the apologists and of officials, as evidenced by citation in kokutai writings and primary school texts to illustrate the virtues of "the good Japanese," particularly that of loyalty. The Imperial poetry contest, open to all Japanese subjects, functions as a device to link Emperor and people with literary activity of the approved traditional type, thus constituting a powerful sentimental bond making for national solidarity. In contrast, the open-door policy in modern Japan has made possible the entrance of literature from the West which presents such notions as individualism, romance, and birth control, which have been defined as more or less inimical to national doctrines and approved traditional patterns, caused loyalist protests, and in some cases prohibition of the importation of foreign literature, and the banning of news.

A still more knotty problem presents itself to the guardians of the sacred structure in the appearance of an increasing number of internal crisis situations in the form of assassinations of government officials, and attempts to seize political power, which are avowedly motivated by extreme patriotic sentiments, such as the vague notion of bringing about the "Showa restoration." Data regarding recent crises of this type are presented. They do not seem to be revolutionary in character, nor motivated by individual interests. Such activity is characteristically declared to have as its purpose the ridding of the nation of leaders who have betrayed their trust, and the exalting of the Emperor. The courts which have tried offenders have generally conceded this purpose, but condemned the violent methods used. The growth of such crises seems to be traceable indirectly to foreign influence which has stimulated the intensification of national feeling, and which has influenced the behavior of those whom the assassins marked for death as disloyal, particularly government and military officials, capitalists and financiers. This type

of phenomenon is not as recent in its appearance in Japan as is popularly supposed, and can be traced back to early modern and pre-modern times, but its significance for the nation seems to have increased in recent years. Such behavior seems to be capable of explanation largely in terms of suggestion and possession.

In contrast to such "unhealthy" patriotic activity, in Japan as in every modern nation, patriotic societies have tended to arise particularly as a result of the anxiety associated with national crisis situations, with which the numerical growth of patriotic societies in Japan seems to show a close correlation, according to the intensity of the feeling of danger. The activities of patriotic societies in Japan seem to exhibit seven major types of function: (1) to keep alive the memory of the glorious deeds of heroes of the past, and to exalt the Imperial Line and the reigning Emperor; (2) direct evangelism in the teaching of national doctrines; (3) anti-radical activity; (4) mild violence in response to mildly unpatriotic activity; (5) the fostering of militarism; (6) the patriotic training of youth; (7) "Japanese cultural propaganda" among foreigners. These types necessarily overlap to some extent, as do the official and unofficial sponsorship of such activity. The latter distinction is so faint in many cases that it is not advisable to attempt to clarify it. Of these functions, the first, fifth and sixth seem to play the most important roles, although even these may be easily exaggerated. The activity of patriotic societies is to some extent a measure of deficiency in patriotic sentiment.

Tradition and sentiment, in response to increasing consciousness of the presence of factors inimical to the national welfare, tend to issue in national doctrines, which are propagated throughout the nation, on the assumption that the national spirit and morale will thereby be enhanced. The study of national doctrine takes three concrete forms: (1) the attempts of various writers to define kokutai and associated notions, without conspicuous success, because of the vague, sentimental character of these notions; (2) the growth of the volume of general literature on national doctrine correlated with national crisis situations, and the analysis of samples of this literature; (3) the analysis of the ethical teachings of the primary school, and their role in the making of "the good Japanese". The official control of formal ethical teaching has made it possible to present it in a uniform and stereotyped manner in the primary school, which reaches some 99percent of the children of school age. A representative sample of the memory of secondary school students of ethical teaching in the primary school indicates a high degree of efficiency in nationalistic teaching. Chief among the national doctrines are the notion of the divinely-descended and unbroken Imperial Line,

the sacredness of the Emperor and Imperial family, and loyalty to them as the primary duty of every subject, filiality as the stepping stone to loyalty, the nation as a vast kinship group, and Japan's mission in a troubled world.

Running throughout the study, there has been the concept of the sacred aspects of Japanese nationalism on the one hand, and the secular on the other, and their relation to each other. These concepts refer to attitudes, to the ways in which things are regarded, not to intrinsic qualities. This general type of distinction has interested various students of social life for many years, such as Maine, Spencer, Tönnies, Durkheim, and to some extent, Sumner. Among the chief characteristics of the sacred are non-rationality, and sentiment acquired from social experience. Tradition, symbolism, and ceremonial play major roles in the sacred. The sacred seems to be the most essential quality of human society always and everywhere. In contrast, secular attitudes are rational, individual, amenable to discussion, instrumental, and subject to easy and rapid change. The sacred, on the other hand, is concerned with the group as a whole, is not subject to discussion, is an end in itself, and tends to resist change. The sacred tends to be unique in each specific society, while the secular may be common to widely differing societies.

The conflict between the sacred and the secular seems to be a major problem in the ongoing of every society where both aspects are present to any large extent. In a healthy society, the role of the sacred in the secular is that of seeking to control and manipulate the secular for its own ends (i.e., of the sacred). The present study seems to show that this process is in operation in modern Japan, that the maintenance of a position of dominance on the part of the sacred by adapting itself to changing situations, and its ability to utilize the secular for its own ends explains why Japan has been able to live as a society despite the large-scale influx of secular civilization from the West. Examples of this dominance are cited.

The comparison of various aspects of Japanese nationalism with that of other modern nations reveals both similarities and differences. The fiction of the unbroken Imperial Line and twenty-six centuries of national continuity without either rebellion or invasion, together with the rich and close-knit body of tradition, symbolism, and ceremonial accumulated through the centuries or added as a modern interpretation of the nation's past, constitute a set of factors making for national solidarity such as few other nations claim. However, the basic roles of national symbolism, control of the various forms of "the dangerous," literature, and patriotic societies, together with national doctrine, seem to be more or less the same in such nations as France, Russia, Italy, and Germany, and to some extent in Great Britain and the United States.

The role of collective symbolism, ritual, and ceremonial in recreating the society's past and enabling its members to experience it vicariously in the present seems to be essential for the survival of a society in the modern world.

The ability of a society to adapt its sacred aspects to a changing situation in which the secular comes to play an increasing role, will largely determine its capacity to survive.

In a healthy society, the sacred tends to dominate the secular.

Of the various techniques commonly used by nations for "the making of good citizens," training in "national morals" in the primary and secondary schools seems to be most effective.

JAPANESE RELOCATION AND THE CALIFORNIA PRESS

Mary Ogg
Journalism 199
February 11, 1943

The California press has been widely accused of extreme bias and unreliability in its handling of the delicate problem of Japanese-American evacuation, relocation, and segregation in the United States.

"Safe behind the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, newspapers like those of the Hearst chain and the Denver Post prostitute their privileges by undermining the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights and degrading the American Way. They have been foremost in arousing hatred of the evacuees and in denying their constitutional rights," charges Galen M. Fisher, an officer of the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play, in a pamphlet entitled "A Balance Sheet on Japanese Evacuation."

P.M. devoted a double-page spread on January 21, 1944, to an article entitled "Japanese-Americans Targeted of Coast Hate Crusade". It opened by declaring, "The bitterest witches' brew since the black days of the Reconstruction is boiling on the Pacific Coast. A campaign is under way to make lynching popular, and the vast majority of the press, the politicians, the profiteers, and the patrioteers have enlisted for the duration."

These are representative of the charges that have been made, and this study is for the purpose of finding out how much there is in such charges. It is an examination of the treatment of the war-time Japanese-American problem by the California newspapers, based on material from 20 papers. In the case of 14 of these, consecutive issues for a definite period of time, ranging from one month to an entire year, were studied. In the case of the other seven, either the study covered stories on one selected phase of the problem, or merely isolated

editorials giving the editorial stand of the newspaper. (See Appendix I)

Of these newspapers, 11 substantially deserve the criticism of fomenting a prejudice campaign which was quoted above, six have been sympathetic toward the Japanese-Americans and the governmental policy of relocation, and three were non-committal or indifferent.

The Classification of the 20 newspapers is as follows:

Sympathetic toward Japanese-Americans

Los Angeles Daily News*
Pasadena Post*
Pasadena STAR-News*
San Francisco Chronicle
Stockton Record

Antagonistic toward Japanese-Americans

Bakersfield Californian
Contra Costa Gazette*
Gilroy Advocate
Los Angeles Times*
Madera Daily Tribune and Mercury
Marysville Appeal-Democrat
San Diego Union
San Francisco Examiner
Santa Rosa Press-Democrat*
St. Helena Star
Vallejo Times-Herald*
Visalia Times-Delta

Non-Committal

Davis Enterprise
Mail of Woodland
San Jose-Mercury-Herald

The 11 which have attacked the Japanese-Americans and relocation are suprisingly alike in their policy. It is hard to characterize this policy logically, because it is seldom a logical one. The chief thing is that they do not want the evacuees to return to the West Coast, during the war or after it, although there is a lot of hedging on the problem of their return after the war. To make their readers feel the same way about it if they don't already, and to sway men in positions of authority, they adopt a tone of strong antagonism toward the Japanese-Americans. They do what they can to create distrust of the evacuees and to inspire such prejudice against them as to

* Based on isolated examples of editorials or columns

make it impossible for them to return to the West Coast.

They make every attempt to discredit the administration of the WRA, not because they feel it is inefficient or not properly carrying out its job, but because they don't like the WRA's job, which is relocation of all loyal Japanese, alien or citizens, into normal life outside the relocation centers as soon as possible.

Not only do they oppose relocation of the evacuees to California, but they for the most part object to their release from the relocation centers even to middle-western and eastern areas, probably because they figure that if the Japanese are permitted to enter community life in these regions, it will be one short step to their return to the West Coast as soon as military necessity permits.

It is suprising how closely these newspapers agree on this policy, and how similar are the methods they employ. Although the San Francisco Examiner appeals to hate and prejudice and distorts the truth to a much greater extent than does the Los Angeles Times, the general effect of the coverage of the problem by the two newspapers has been the same: feeling has been aroused, and news has been suppressed and distorted to fit in with their policies.

The five newspapers that took a sympathetic stand toward relocation attempted with varying degrees of vigor and success to combat prejudice against the Japanese-Americans, and to clarify facts snarled up by the anti-Japanese-American press.

These are serious allegations. They accuse this considerable segment of the California press, no doubt representative of a much larger group of newspapers, with furnishing the people of California a prejudiced and unreliable account of a highly important problem. If true, they indicate a serious failure in California journalism, a breakdown in the service of the press to its readers.

To To establish these charges and to offer an over-all picture of the coverage of the relocation problem in these 20 newspapers, the following plan will be followed:

I. A brief history of the Japanese-American evacuation and relocation, to establish a basis for discussion of newspaper coverage of the problem.

II. An examination of the editorials appearing in both the pro and anti-relocation newspapers.

III. An examination of news coverage of Japanese-American evacuation, relocation, and segregation in the California newspapers.

I. SUMMARY OF EVENTS

Lieutenant General DeWitt, commanding general of the Western Defense Command, ordered the evacuation of the West Coast by all persons of Japanese ancestry, regardless of citizenship, in February, 1942, for military reasons. Invasion of the West coast by Japanese armies was considered a possibility during the first few months after Pearl Harbor, and it was feared that dis-loyal persons among the Japanese-Americans would aid the Japanese soldiers. Moreover, the West coast was studded with war factories and military and naval emplacements. General DeWitt decided that it would take too long to separate the disloyal from the loyal, and that all the Japanese-Americans must leave the Western Defense Command.*

When the Japanese were ordered from the West Coast they were at first free to go anywhere they wanted within the United States so long as they stayed out of the evacuated area. It was soon found not feasible to permit such voluntary movement because trouble began to develop in places where people were not ready to receive these evacuees. The War Relocation Authority was established on March 18, 1942, by Executive Order No. 9102, to carry out the evacuation and to care for the evacuees. Ten relocation centers were established in seven western states.*

The relocation centers were established as purely temporary centers for housing the evacuees until they could be released in an orderly manner into civilian life. Nothing in the evacuation order or the executive order establishing the WRA gives it authority to hold the evacuees in the centers for an indefinite period of time. Such detention of Americanscitizens is generally understood to be in violation of the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

-Dies Sub-committee report on Japanese War Relocation Centers. pp. 1,2, 17, 18.

The WRA has been carrying out the original policy of releasing the evacuees as fast as jobs can be found for them and communities located where they will be accepted. The chief impediment to the execution of the program recently has been the fear of the evacuees themselves that they will not be accepted in outside communities. For this policy the WRA has met with the sharp criticism of many California newspapers and of such organizations as the American Legion, the Native Sons of the Golden West, and the Chamber of Commerce.

Segregation of loyal from disloyal, in the war relocation centers, admittedly delayed too long, was announced by the War department in April, 1943, and has now been completed. Japanese removed to the Tule Lake center include those who gave negative answers on loyalty questionnaires, those requesting repatriation to Japan, those with intelligence records or other records indicating that they might endanger the national security or interfere with the war effort, and close relatives of persons in the above three groups who expressed a preference to remain with the segregants rather than disrupt family ties.

When the FBI actually has something serious on a Japanese, he is isolated in an internment camp under Army supervision. Japanese in these camps were for the most part picked up by the FBI and put there within a few days after Pearl Harbor. These camps are distinct from both the relocation centers and the Tule Lake segregation center.

II EDITORIAL TREATMENT

A. The Anti-Relocation Newspapers.

There are shades of intensity among the newspapers which have pitched into the campaign against the Japanese-Americans. The Los Angeles Times and the San Francisco Examiner, for example, have adopted a different sort of treatment. The Los Angeles Times has been quiet and sane relative to the San Francisco Examiner, which has shrieked its opinions on the issue of what to do with the unfortunate evacuees in a manner that should scare them out of California forever.

However, it is possible to make generalizations regarding the editorial treatment of the problem in these newspapers, since, allowing for differences in intensity and lack of scruples, the aims and many of the methods are the same.

Underlying the great majority of editorial expressions on the problem in these newspapers are appeals to prejudice and hatred. They wave the bloody shirt. They remind the reader that Japan is our mortal enemy and that this is a war to the death. They shriek that no Japanese can be trusted, that this was proved for all time at Pearl Harbor. They actually threaten, in some instances, violence and murder if the Japanese-Americans are permitted to return to the West Coast during the war or for some time after it.

This is not to say that these newspapers have had no basis for criticism of the governmental handling of the relocation. Even the strongest supporters of the WRA policy would admit that the administration of the centers has had serious flaws. Segregation of disloyal was long delayed.* Personnel has not always been fitted for the job

* Minority Views of Representative Eberharter, Dies Sub-committee Report on Japanese War Relocation Centers.

it has had to do. The WRA has been handicapped by lack of funds and a low civil service priority.* The Tule Lake riots revealed weaknesses in WRA management, although the seriousness of the riots was much exaggerated by the press.

But the anti-relocation press has not concentrated on the real flaws in the program, nor attempted to represent the situation as it really is. Every real shortcoming is seized upon and magnified to discredit the administration's entire program, not merely one phase of that program. Where no shortcomings are readily apparent, there is always somebody to invent some and report them to the press, which gives them a big play and comments upon them as if they were fact. Examples of this sort of thing will be given below.

Arguments and methods

The same arguments and methods appear in paper after paper.

The most serious of all the charges leveled against the California newspapers for their treatment of the Japanese-American problem has been that of trying to stir up hatred against Japanese evacuees that would lead to violence should they return to the coast.

Most of the papers simply predicted that the return of the Japanese to the coast would stir up a great deal of trouble. However, once in a while one of them would mention the possibility of violence with a sort of relish, discussing it as if it were perfectly natural and thoroughly justified.

These quotations from the Madera Daily Tribune and Mercury are illustrative:

Whether those in charge of the Washington asylum for the politically insane realize it or not, there can be no returning of Japanese to this coast from the relocation centers at the present time and probably not for many years to come. To attempt to permit these people to return, regardless of what reason may be

* Mary Jefferds, publicity chairman, Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play.

assigned, is to invite a wholesale massacre at the hands of night raiders. (June 21, 1943)

Though the national administration is hesitant about the removal of any of its Washington inmates, the rumors and reports that are coming out of Washington in regard to the Japanese in relocation centers are causing more and more animosity and threatening critical action if the Japanese are returned to this coast. The feeling is something that laws will not disturb... (June 24, 1943.)

Lives of Japanese released from the relocation centers will be worth little.--(July 29, 1943.)

And this quotation from the Santa Rosa Press-Democrat is also in point:

Cannot the officials in Washington who want to send the Japs back to California realize that the reappearance of these slant-eyed countenances in this region at this time would almost certainly provoke violence, unrest, and bloodshed?

The following typical editorial expressions show how firmly the newspapers under discussion opposed the release of the Japanese-Americans from relocation centers:

The people of the west know more about the Japanese than do the inhabitants of other sections of the nation; they know that these aliens are not to be trusted; they will never consent to their being given liberty to enter civil life during the progress of the war, and, it may be said, perhaps not after the war.-- (Bakersfield Californian, May 28, 1943.)

There's just one thing to do with ALL the Japs, and that is to keep them locked up for the duration, and when the war is over, ship them back to Japan.--(Red Bluff Daily News, July 26, 1943.)

The chief reason given for opposing Japanese return to the West Coast or release of loyal evacuees from relocation centers at all is that there is no way of determining a Jap's loyalty.

A cartoon which appeared in the San Francisco Examiner on June 24, 1943, put this plainly. It showed Little Bo-Peep, labeled "Stupidity", releasing ferocious wolves all disguised in sheep's clothing from a Japanese Relocation Center. But the idea has been put rather bluntly in words, too:

And who is so naive as to believe the most dangerous and clever of the trained Japanese spies and saboteurs caught in the Dewitt

evacuation have not managed to be included AMONG THE TWENTY THOUSAND JAPANESE Director Myer has stupidly released?--(San Francisco Examiner, January, 1944. Capitals are the Examiner's.)

Officials who have appointed themselves as judges to determine those to be set at liberty and those to be confined have accepted a heavy responsibility.--(Maryville Appeal-Democrat, July 9, 1943)

Some papers strongly expressed the opinion that most of the Japanese are disloyal, without offering a shred of evidence for that assertion:

It is true that there are a few in this locality and in other sections, particularly the young women of Japanese ancestry, who are loyal to the country of adoption and not wanted by the Japanese as a result...On the contrary, the majority have proven themselves to be disloyal to this country and most treacherous.--(Madera Daily Tribune and Mercury, June 21, 1943.)

Isn't their presence a menace to people of this state? There is but one answer to that question, even though it is possible that occasionally there may be a Japanese native born resident who is loyal to this country.--(Bakersfield Californian, May 29, 1943.)

Frequently editors say that untrustworthiness is a racial characteristic of the Japanese:

And there is nothing in the Japanese character, as exposed to us over almost a century of relations, that can permit us ever to trust that race again. We have seen too many examples, we have too many dead by treachery, to be fooled any more. Undoubtedly there are many loyal Japanese in the relocation centers, but they are the victims of their own race, as are our own dead at Pearl Harbor.--(St. Helena Star, June 4, 1943.)

It ought to be obvious to anyone who has been reading the newspapers than any Jap spy would swear his loyalty to the United States to win his freedom from a guarded camp.--(Red Bluff Daily News, June 1, 1943.)

The charge that they are creating racial prejudice would not bother many of these newspapers. They frankly admit racial prejudice against the Japanese, and justify it.

It is not a question of tolerance or racial prejudice...The Japs...have placed themselves as a race apart, a race not to be trusted, a race which cannot be assimilated, a race which reverts to barbarism despite the advantages of civilization which we have tried for nearly a century to impart to them.--(San Diego Union, May 19, 1943.)

Comparisons between conditions in evacuee camps and in Japanese prison camps for American soldiers in China and the Philippines, however irrelevant, are popular:

While Japanese military authority withholds supplies of Red Cross food designed to lessen the shortage in camps where American prisoners are held, the business of picknicking goes on regularly down at Camp Poston, Arizona, where there are some 10,000 Japanese evacuees. (Bakersfield Californian, June 11, 1943.)

Agitation in favor of lessening the burden of interned Japs continues, and generally it seems from those individuals who mostly concern themselves with the possibility of depriving an even hostile people of their 'civil rights'. Americans, in name at least, who give so much thought to the possibility might well read the reports that come out of prison camps in Japan and the Philippines concerning the fate of our boys made captive since the beginning of the war. (Bakersfield Californian, July 29, 1943.)

"Seven Los Angeles and Southern California families were notified yesterday that their sons had died in Japanese prison camps.

In the bitterness of their grief they cried aloud against the release of the Japanese from camps to wander where they please with good food, shelter, medical care and comfort; against the coddling of vicious Japanese who spat upon the uniforms of their guards and hoisted the Japanese flag in defiance of the Stars and Stripes at Tule Lake and against the laxity which permitted Japanese internees to picnic and fish footloose and free along the Colorado River as exposed this week by the Examiner... (Los Angeles Examiner, quoted in PM, January 21, 1944.)

Discrediting the WRA administration of the centers as "coddling" by tenderhearted social workers is a favorite device. The words "pampering", "Coddling", and "social worker" constantly reappear.

The Japanese should not only be kept in the camps, but the camps should be under Army administration, instead of being left in the hands of social workers, who in some instances have accorded the Japanese better treatment than our own people receive. (Marysville Appeal-Democrat, June 11.)

Rather than benefiting the Japanese by the pampering tactics, the federal officials are adding to their hazards. The Japanese can never return to the West Coast without risking most serious consequences. (Madera Daily Tribune and Mercury, June 24, 1943.)

One of the most extreme among the California organizations that have gone on record in favor of keeping the Japs out of California, out of the United States, and, to quote former California Pellican Editor Carol Pauker, "generally out of everywhere", are the Native

Sons of the Golden West. They are the originators of the taxpayer's suit to enjoin the registry of voters of a California county to strike off the names of all persons of Japanese descent from the list of qualified voters because the Japanese as a race proved themselves unworthy of citizenship privileges at Pearl Harbor. Two quotations from California newspapers hailing this organization and its methods follow:

As the crowning act of their convention these patriotic Californians unanously went on record in favor of "barring forever American born Japanese from United States citizenship. (Santa Rosa Press-Democrat, May 26, 1943.)

There is a strong sentiment in California, and it is rapidly expanding, that this state needs no Japanese, and wants none of them. (Vallejo Times-Herald.)

California papers have repeatedly insisted that the Army take over the relocation centers. The following is typical of blasts against the War Relocation Authority, urging that somebody else be given its job:

It is a pity the War Department did not retain control of the Japanese relocation problem for the duration of the war.

It is a tragedy of as yet unknown proportions that the inept and incompetent War Relocation Authority came into being and still remains in being. (January, 1944.)

The Dies subcommittee investigating Japanese relocation, which had this same opinion, got firm support from this group of California newspapers: Testimony was quoted as fact in various editorials and commended upon with great indignation. The editorial quoted below, from the San Francisco Examiner for June 20, 1944, is based on testimony which has since been entirely refuted by the War Relocation Authority officers.*

The amazing details (revealed by the testimony of Harold H. Townsend, former officer of the camp, at subcommittee hearings, released for publication by Congressman Costello) include a

* Statement on Testimony of Harold H. Townsend Before the House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Los Angeles, California, May 26, 1943.

Japanese unit of 1000 'officers and men' openly training in tactical problems, admissions by campsinmates that this unit was organized at Terminal Island to fight the invading Japanese formation; thefts of \$100,000 worth of supplies from camp warehouses; a reign of terror by Japanese strong-arm gangs against countrymen suspected of pro-American sentiments; open rebellion and mob rule during riots once described officially as disturbances; caches of food and supplies hidden in the desert for the use of expected parachute troops and invading raiders."

Distortions of fact in editorials

Some typical examples of distortion from editorials in California newspapers will help to show how newspapers have created, either intentionally or unintentionally, a general misconception of the entire problem.

One of the commonest distortions of fact, appearing in editorials as well as in headlines and news copy, is reference to the evacuees in the relocation centers as "Japanese internees". There are Japanese internees in the United States, but only a few hundred of them, all under strict Army guard. They are the dangerous Japanese interned by the FBI. The Japanese in the relocation centers are nearly 70 per cent American citizens against whom no charges of subversive activity have been made. All of the Japanese, either citizen or alien, whom there is any reason to suspect of disloyalty have been sent to the Tule Lake segregation center. Those remaining in the camps, then, are loyal citizens and aliens who have done nothing to warrant detention. To call them internees creates a complete misconception of the problem. It makes possible such a twisting of the situation as appears in the following quotations:

There are a few soft-headed or misguided persons right here in Red Bluff and elsewhere who do not appreciate this war. Some want to ask the internees if they are loyal and liberate those who give the right answer. This would be just dandy for Tojo--for a certain percentage of his subjects in this country are his agents. (Marysville Appeal-Democrat, June 22, 1943.)

The army officers who are giving thought to the liberation of many thousands of Japanese had better think again, both in behalf of the welfare of our own country, and the safety of the interned Japs. (Bakersfield Californian, May 10, 1943.)

The Japanese are, in fact, prisoners of war. (Bakersfield Californian, May 11, 1943.)

This last quotation represents the greatest distortion of all. About 700 Japanese prisoners of war have been taken by the American troops in the Pacific area. They are Tojo's soldiers. The evacuated Japanese are in as different a situation from them as possible.

Another very common falsehood which has played a large role in the whole Japanese-American problem is that the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii committed wholesale sabotage at Pearl Harbor. Rumors of such sabotage, accepted as fact by responsible and intelligent persons on the West Coast, did much to create distrust of the Japanese in this area. Yet the rumors were false. Colonel Kendall Fielder, chief of military intelligence for Hawaii since June 1941, wrote on May 17, 1943;

There have been no known acts of sabotage, espionage, or fifth column activity committed by the Japanese in Hawaii either on or subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

But the false rumor is used to substantiate editorial allegations, as in the following quotation from the Marysville Appeal-Democrat for June 11, 1943:

It would seem that the part taken by resident Japs in the Philippines and Hawaii should be warning enough, but we are an easy-going people, too ready to assume it can't happen here."

A third common subject for distortion is this matter of releasing the evacuees from the relocation centers, according to the original plan contemplated by the President, the War Department, and every other agency concerned.

Although the War department had already declared its policy

against releasing large numbers of Japanese to the West Coast, and although in actual relocation the Japanese have been well scattered throughout interior states, the Bakersfield Californian raises a false bugaboo about the evacuation in an editorial appearing in its June 19 issue:

There are 40,000 Japs in Arizona, and certain organizations that fear somebody's civil liberties are about to be taken from them are urging a program which, if carried out, would imperil the safety of the people of the West.

A popular device in distorting the evacuation picture is to create the impression that the whole program of releasing the evacuees is a scheme cooked up by Dillon S. Myer, head of the WRA, and other Washington bureaucrats who are trying to pull something over on the people. The San Diego Union, in its May 18 edition, reported that Dillon S. Myer had revealed that 10,000 Japanese-Americans had already been released, and quoted him as saying that "The government now realizes the camps were a mistake," and adding that he would like to close them all tomorrow." It then makes this editorial comment:

Who made this decision? Who is the government? Who suddenly realized the segregation of the largest group of potential saboteurs and fifth columnists in the country and their removal from a strategic center of defense was a mistake?

The Red Bluff Daily News comments:

There are a few soft-headed or misguided persons right here in Red Bluff and elsewhere who do not appreciate this war. Some want to ask the internees if they are loyal and liberate those who give the right answer.

Actually, WRA authorities look quite a bit further into an evacuee's record than his answer to loyalty questionnaires to release him. The categories of evacuees that may not be released by the camp director include all those about whom there is generally reason to have doubt.* This quotation, however, although it does not

* Minority views of the Dies sub-committee report on Japanese War Relocation centers.

say that the WRA has no other means than questionnaires for investigating evacuees, strongly intimates that this is the case.

One of the easiest methods of distorting facts is the cartoon. A cartoon appearing in the Los Angeles Times for November 6, 1943, shows a grinning Japanese marked "Jap Return" going around with a halo, and another fierce Japanese lighting a bomb marked Tule Riots. This leads to the impression that the Tule Lake Japanese are being released, which is false. They will be segregated for the duration of the war.

B. Pro-Japanese-American Editorials

Six of the twenty newspapers covered in the study printed editorials and editorial columns trying to quiet prejudice against the Japanese evacuees and to clarify the facts of the situation, and to clarify the facts of evacuation and relocation which had been so badly mauled by the anti-relocation press. They were: The Los Angeles News, the Pasadena Post, the Pasadena Star-News, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Stockton Record.

The San Francisco Chronicle has probably done more in this way than any other newspaper on the Coast. Chester Rowell, the regular Chronicle columnist, has written many calm and reasoned articles directed against the hate campaign being waged against the evacuees by other newspapers and by economic interests and patriotic organizations.

He came out flatly against the Dies sub-committee investigating Japanese relocation in these uncompromising words:

There is a branch of the Dies committee in California ostensibly "investigating" possible Japanese sabotage on "testimony" of which, so far, not one word would even be admitted or heard by any judicial or quasi-judicial body in existence."

The regular editorial columns of the Chronicle have followed a line rather less clear-cut than Rowell's. A well-merited editorial

blast is directed against those who howled over the "coddling" of Japanese in relocation centers:

Japanese in evacuation camps are well treated, as well as they will permit us to treat them, because we are a civilized nation. The Tenney Committee (of the state legislature) and others should bear in mind that not aliens only but all Americans of Japanese ancestry are under forced detention and we cannot doubt that many, if not most, are loyal. (May 19, 1943.)

The phrase "as well as they will permit us to treat them" somewhat qualifies the editorial declaration, and indicates that the Chronicle editorial writer didn't want his paper to be accused of loving the Japs too much. An editorial which appeared on April 24, 1943, is slightly puzzling, and indicates further that the Chronicle was at least worried about pacifying the anti-Jap elements that no doubt tried to bring pressure:

Considering where they come from, Senator Tom Stewart of Tennessee and Senator Chandler of Kentucky are arguing themselves into tight corners on the subject of Japanese citizenship, constitutional rights and military necessities.

Chandler urges that all loyal Japanese--how to be determined he does not specify,--be released from evacuation camps. In this he shows less concern for Pacific Coast order than for the constitutional rights of these citizens of Japanese extraction...

This is the more puzzling since the Chandler subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, which investigated conditions in Japanese relocation camps in seven western states, made three recommendations:

1. Drafting of loyal citizens.
2. Internment of disloyal.
3. Employment of others in areas where they are accepted by the communities.*

The Chandler committee never recommended indiscriminate release of the Japanese to their former homes on the West Coast. The Chronicle, in spite of its fair play, has also been guilty of creating misconceptions.

* N.Y. Times, May 8, 1943.

The other side of the Chronicle's split personality came out in an article by Alfred Frankenstein appearing May 24, criticizing the resolution passed by the Native Sons of the Golden West which called for an amendment to the Federal Constitution barring the first generation of American-born Japanese from citizenship. It came out again in a front page editorial appearing above a news report of a federal court case to deprive Japanese of voting rights. The Chronicle stood firmly opposed to such attempts at disenfranchisement.

In November the Chronicle apparently got disgusted with the WRA handling of the Tule Lake riots, and criticized the agency severely. For this they undoubtedly had justification. The newspapers received reports of rioting in the centers before the San Francisco WRA authorities, and when reporters questioned the local WRA head, he denied that there was any trouble at all. He called the reports Nazi propaganda. This disillusioned the Chronicle, which had been supporting WRA pretty regularly, and lead to such criticisms as the following:

These WRA officials have convicted themselves by denying what could not be denied....We have no hope for WRA. So long as it has charge, we may expect trouble with the disloyal Japanese who want to raise hell.

In the Los Angeles Daily News, Matt Weinstock, News columnist, ran columns against prejudice against the Japanese-Americans. He charged that indignation against the Japanese was "being fed by irresponsible politicians and the prejudiced press."

The Pasadena Post, in its editorial column "The Lookout" came out several times against taking away the civil rights of Japanese-Americans. The Pasadena Star-News, which has the same publisher, took the same stand.

The Stockton Record, through Charles A. Sprague, columnist of "It Seems to Me", stood up for the rights of Japanese and opposed loose talk revealing racial prejudice.

It seems to me that my fellow-ex-governor, Walter Price, sounds the wrong note when he revives agitation against the 'yellow peril'. While he refers directly to the 'Japanese, the 'Chinese, now our allies in war, are also of the Mongolian or yellow race, and our American Indians are probably of the same ethnological origin. Japan has been trying to consolidate the yellow races under its agents, so such rabble rousing as Mr. Pierce indulges in puts water on Japan's wheel. (May 21, 1943.)

III NEWS COVERAGE

The news coverage of the Japanese-American evacuation and relocation has been characterized by a large amount of suppression, distortion, and editorializing in news columns.

Of the 14 newspapers for which consecutive issues were studied, seven exhibited pronounced bias in news stories, while the other seven were fairly objective.

The wire service stories in four of the papers seemed to be selected to omit those which reflected favorably upon the relocation program, while in six of them no such selection was apparent, since both favorable and unfavorable stories were used, and in four of the papers, almost no wire news was used.

However, the wire news that reflected against the WRA and the relocation program was on the whole much more spectacular than that which reflected in its favor. Therefore, the former got bigger play even in papers which were sympathetic to relocation in their editorial policy, sometimes, as in the case of the Los Angeles Daily news, which gave good play to the sensational Dies sub-committee hearing stories.

A. San Francisco Chronicle and Examiner News Coverage Contrasted

A comparison of news coverage of stories about Japanese-Americans in the San Francisco Examiner and in the San Francisco Chronicle illustrates neatly how readers of different newspapers may get entirely different ideas on the issue, even if they do not so much as glance at the editorial page.

The San Francisco Chronicle printed a complete report of the address of Sgt. Ben Kuroki, Nisei hero, before the Commonwealth club, and a news notice that the national broadcasting kept him off the air because "the whole American-Japanese question is too controversial." Both are shown on the following page. The Examiner did not run one word about Sgt. Kuroki, his address before

the Commonwealth Club, or his trouble with NBC.

The two stories on page 22 appeared on the same day, one in the Chronicle and one in the Examiner. Note that the Examiner does not mention in its story that the Tulalake center has settled down into tranquillity, as does the Chronicle story. The return of "recalcitrant Japanese" to their jobs is the lead of the Examiner article. The Examiner does not use the quotation from R.B. Cozzens, assistant director of the War Relocation Authority, stating that agitators are being promptly dealt with, and nearly all of the colonists are cooperating with WRA.

The San Francisco Examiner stories strongly discrediting WRA administration and implying that all right-minded people think that the WRA should be disbanded and the Army put in charge of all relocation centers, are sharply in contrast to the story, shown on the following page, which appeared in the Chronicle. It quotes General Emmons as declaring that the army is too busy winning the war to supervise the Japanese internment centers. Needless to say, the Examiner did not publish this story. The Examiner story on the same page and the two on the next page, show how that newspaper manages to get in its digs at the WRA.

B. News Coverage Examples

The Dies Sub-committee hearings

One of the hottest stories on the Japanese relocation problem was the Dies Sub-committee investigation of Japanese War Relocation centers. It was headed by John L. Costello, (R. Calif.), a representative with an axe to grind against the Japanese Americans. The conduct of the trial was denounced in a statement quoted above from Chester Rowell, editorial writer of the San Francisco Chronicle, as totally unfair. Testimony was admitted, as he said, "not one word of which" would have been accepted before a court of justice or an

administrative tribunal. Charges made by several of the Dies sub-committee witness was so fantastic it is hard to see how any rational person would be expected to believe it. Yet the hearings were front-page news in every newspaper in the state, even in those which were not in sympathy with the aims of Representative Costello, such as the Stockton Record or the Los Angeles Daily News.

Most of the testimony has subsequently been disproven. The WRA issued a 24 page pamphlet denying in substance the entire testimony of Harold H. Townsend, former chief supply and transportation officer at the Poston, Arizona Relocation center. The charges are taken up one by one, and evidence proving each of them groundless is offered. This report has never been denied or challenged. However, in not one of the newspapers which I read, was a news story about the report printed. Some of the press association stories carried denials of charges of various rabid witnesses by Myer and other WRA officials, but the irrefutable logic of this thorough and well-documented report never was presented to the public by the newspapers. It wasn't hot news. It is true that the press associations and the Los Angeles Times carried in full a statement by Myer protesting the manner in which the investigation was conducted "to achieve maximum publicity of half-truths, exaggerations, and falsehoods". However, this story very likely had only a fraction of the audience and influence of the original stories setting forth the dramatic but perjured testimony of such men as Harold H. Townsend and Norris James. A correction never reaches the audience that the original falsehood reached in entirety, especially when the falsehood was more dramatic and therefore got bigger play.

A glance at the following list of headlines of stories on

the Dies hearings appearing in the Los Angeles Times and the Los Angeles Daily News will show that more space by far was devoted to the stories reflecting against the Japanese-Americans, the WRA, and the relocation program, than to stories presenting the opposite viewpoint.*

Los Angeles Times

June 5--Head of WRA Refused to Halt Release of Japs

June 9--Over 600 Nisei at Poston Openly Disloyal

Jap-American Papers Marked for Inquiry

F Firmer Control of Japs Urged by Poston Chief

Poston Camp Riot Version Released; Japs Threatened to Eliminate Caucasian Force, Dies Group Told

June 12--Jap Internee Plot Against U.S. Charged

June 14--Army Rule of Jap Camps to Be Urged

Japs Return to Coast Halted, Costello Says (AP)

WRA Director Will Be Questioned

June 16--Arizona Fears Rioting if Japs Settle There; But Minister's

Plead with Dies Committee for Nisei's Release

June 17--Dies Group Hears of Waste and Liquor in Jap Camps

June 20--Drive for Jap Return Told; Evidence in Hands of Dies Group

Indicates Federal Officials in Move

June 24--Dies to Sift Reports Japs Control WRA (AP)

June 27--Committee to Question Director of Jap Camps

July 2--Official Laxity Blamed for Riots at Manzanar

July 3--Confidential Data Given Japs, Dies Group Hears

July 4--Rift in Army on Evacuated Japs Denied

July 4--Jap Relocation Director Flays Dies Committee

* Files of the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play.

July 9--Loyalty Among Jap Evacuees to Be Sought

Ickes Aide to Teach Judo (AP)

Los Angeles Daily News

June 9--Disloyalty of Japs Pointed

June 10--Secret Files Point to Jap Spy System (UP)

June 11--Riots in Jap Camp Related

June 14--Jap Citizenship League Studied

June 15--Jap Release to Cause Riots, Fear

June 16--Dies Group Rejects Jap Camp Hearing (Reveals that the Dies sub-committee rejected an offer by the WRA to aid the committee.)

June 18--Dies Group at Jap Camp (A sarcastic UP story, lightly poling fun at the Congressmen.)

Solons Oppose Return of Japs to California

June 19--Group Told of Dam Peril

July 3--Nisei Tells Dies of Curfew Fight

The Hearst newspapers took the Dies sub-committee hearings as an excuse to go wild. Charges made in the testimony were blared out in noisy headlines, and were never corrected when proven false.

It is only necessary to go through a few of the June issues of the San Francisco Examiner and pick out examples of reporting of the hearings to demonstrate how serious are the misconceptions which have been created by the Dies subcommittee and its all too cooperative press.

June 1--A headline calling attention to a boxed story above the mast, screams: "Feel Food Shortage? Here's What Disloyal Japs Get!"

Here is the lead of the story: "Food which American Civil-

ians cannot possibly obtain because they have willingly sacrificed them to the armed forces are being fed in profusion to openly disloyal Japanese in the ten war relocation centers by the War Relocation Authority, the Dies Committee investigating un-American activities disclosed today."

Here are the facts:

1. All rationing restrictions applicable to the general public are strictly applied in relocation centers.
2. Food costs have averaged about 40 cents per day per person and are subject to a top limit of 45 cents per day per person on an annual basis.
3. Director Myer testified, without contradiction, to the effect that the centers are instructed to refrain from purchasing commodities of which there are general or local shortages.
4. Within the limitations set by rationing and the 45 cent daily cash allowance, the Authority has provided an adequate diet meeting reasonable wartime standards.*

June 3--A story datelined Los Angeles opens as follows:

Japanese who are being released in large numbers daily from relocation centers by civilian administrators are awaiting orders that will signal the beginning of a widespread campaign of sabotage!

Here are the facts:

Among about 11,000 Japanese-Americans given work leaves from war relocation camps, there has not been a single case of disloyalty to the United States, according to a statement from the House appropriations committee reported in the New York Times for June 17, 1943.

* Minority views of Representative Eberharter, Dies sub-committee report on Japanese War Relocation Centers.

This bit of news did not appear in any issue of the San Francisco Examiner in the month of June.

June 8--The following is the lead of an Examiner news story:

Washington, June 7--(INS) A committee of delegates from the California State Legislature was informed today that the FBI has never investigated any of the 3000 Japanese who were released from relocation centers along the Pacific Coast.

The delegation, headed by State Senator J.E. Seawell, conferred with Lee R. Pennington, an FBI official. According to Seawell, War Relocation Authorities (WRA) had claimed that the Japs were investigated by the FBI before they were released.

Here are the facts:

The WRA did not claim that the FBI sent out officials to "investigate" evacuees before they were relocated. It merely claimed that the FBI files on each evacuee released were checked, and if they contained anything against him, he was not released. According to the minority report of Representative Eberharter of the Dies sub-committee, the evidence indicated that all names of evacuee adults are being submitted to the FBI, and that the latter agency has almost completed its check on all the evacuees. Dillon Myer himself does not claim any FBI investigation of all evacuees. In an address delivered before a luncheon meeting of the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on August 6, 1943, he declared, "As a further precaution, we are acquiring from the Federal Bureau of Investigation all the information available in its files and from other intelligence agencies on all adult evacuees at the centers. The names of nearly 90 per cent of the evacuees have now been checked through FBI and the job should be completed in the next few weeks."

The Los Angeles Times treatment of the Dies sub-committee investigations illustrates in a milder form similar suppression, distortion, and editorializing.

June 5--A story headed "Head of WRA Refuses to Halt Release of Japs" declared:

War Relocation Director Dillon S. Myer today in effect refused to halt release of Japanese evacuees until the House un-American -ism committee has finished investigating the pre-Pearl Harbor affiliations and activities of those reputedly linked with subversive groups and organized for sabotage and espionage.

There is nothing actually false in this. However, it creates an entirely erroneous impression. Why should Myer halt release of the evacuees until the Dies committee has finished its investigations? The impression is given that nothing was known of the background of the evacuees before the Dies sub-committee began its investigations, which is quite false. The FBI records, the WRA records of conduct in the camps, and the WRA loyalty questionnaires, it would be safe to assume, have contributed much more to knowledge about the evacuees than the investigations of the Dies sub-committee. The sub-committee never devoted itself to investigating individual Japanese anyhow.

A story appearing the same day was headed "Interned Japs Allowed Control at Tule Lake. Fresno State Senator Asserts Investigation Proves Subversive Kibei Exert Influence."

This again creates a false impression. The story was printed before Tule Lake became a segregation center. The Japanese were evacuees, not internees. Some measure of self-government was in accord with WRA policies and surely with democratic principles as well. The senators opinions as to the influence of the Kibei were given more prominence than their news value merited.

June 9--The Times printed a report of a Dies sub-committee interview with Ralph M. Gelvin, director of the Poston center. It apparently was a fairly complete report of the testimony, with much material included that the San Francisco Examiner probably

would not have included, but there were subtle digs against WRA administration, and subtle hints that things were worse than the director was painting them, Example:

He heard Japanese music played over the public address system at the strike, but could not say whether it was the Japanese national anthem.

He said, replying to a question, that some of the Japanese had dug cellars under the barracks. There had been reports that they were hoarding rationed food in them but the steward had told him he had checked them... etc.

The device used here is a popular one with the Times. By printing that the director would not say whether the music played was the Japanese national anthem or not, The Times subtly creates an impression in the reader's mind that it might have been the Japanese national anthem. Strong evidence that it was not is the written statement of Father Clement, M.M., of Parker, Arizona, who was present during the sit-down strike at Poston.

Likewise, in regard to Japanese music that was played over the public address system at these meetings, there was no martial or Japanese patriotic music played... As a Catholic priest and chaplain working for the welfare and morale of the whole camp, I testify that I have neither seen the Japanese flag used, nor heard martial music played during the recent emergency.

The phrase "but the steward had told him he had checked them" subtly intimates that the steward might not have checked them at all. Actually, investigations have proved that there was nothing in reports that Japanese had hoarded rationed food.*

It is hard to criticize this particular device, since it is neither asserts a falsehood or exaggerates. But it is an effective device all the same.

June 14--A story appearing in this issue was headed "Army Rule

Minority views of Representative Everharter, Dies sub-committee report on Japanese War Relocation centers.

of Jap Camps to be Urged. Mundt, Member of Dies Sub-Committee, Favors Military Control to Effect Center Disciplines."

The subtle bias of the Times is indicated in this paragraph :

Questions and comment by committee members during the hearing which will be resumed tomorrow in the Federal building have carried the plain implication that members are not at all satisfied with the operation of the relocation centers.

This is too broad a generalization. Representative Eberharter was quite well satisfied with the operation of the relocation centers, and said so in his minority report.

June 16--A story reports testimony before the Dies Committee by two different groups. One was composed of Phoenix, Arizona, officials and businessmen who feared rioting if the Japanese settle in Arizona. The other was composed of ministers from Los Angeles and vicinity, favoring the release of the evacuees from the centers. The ministers' recommendations are discredited by playing up the pacifist tendencies of the men who made them. Example:

Dr. Kirby Page, who described himself as an "itinerant minister", who lives in La Habra, is a Socialist, and has been a pacifist and conscientious objector for years, urged tolerance in dealing with the Japanese in America.

He has been told and feels sure that the FBI checked them (the evacuees) before they were released, regardless of how the press reports from Washington quoted the FBI to the contrary.

This last paragraph is utterly misleading; as explained above, WRA officials do not claim that the FBI check every released evacuee, but only that the names of those released are checked against the FBI files. If the FBI didn't like this system, it could protest about it, and undoubtedly get its way.

June 27--A story by a Times staff correspondent illustrates a deliberate sidestepping of the opinion of Representative Eberharter, who dissented from the opinions of the other members of the committee:

Upon his return from the Pacific Coast, Costello today repeated accusations that "lack of aggressive leadership" by the War Relocation Authority has resulted in virtual seizure of control over the camps by hostile Japanese-Americans and unquestioned subversive activities under the leadership of the Kibei (American born Japanese educated in Japan) element.

Concurring opinions were voiced by one of the sub-committee, Representative Mundt, who echoed demands that administration of the camps be turned over to the War Department.

The State Board of Agriculture Resolution

Press treatment of a resolution passed by the State Board of Agriculture December 20, 1943, declaring that the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from California agricultural and industrial life is a matter of military necessity only, offers an illustration of distortion which can be put under the microscope and analyzed. It shows as neatly as anybody could wish how, by successive steps, the newspapers either innocently or intentionally twisted the original resolution around. Paul Taylor, professor of Agricultural Economics at the University, who introduced the resolution before the board, has all the material showing this phenomenon of journalism in his files. After the newspapers were through with the resolution, the average newspaper reader probably completely misunderstood how it was passed, the reasons for passing it, and what the resolution means.

What the board did is told in the State Board of Agriculture publicity release giving the resolution, the statement in support of it by Paul Taylor, the number present when it was passed, and those voting for and against it.

Sacramento...Dec..20...The State Board of Agriculture today adopted a resolution which declared that the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from California agricultural life and industry is a matter of military necessity solely.

The resolution was introduced by Dr. Paul Taylor, Professor of Economics, University of California, now on leave of absence. It was seconded by Stewart Meigs of Carpinteria, lemon grower. Voting for the resolution were race McDonald, of San Jose, and Meigs.

James Armstrong, of Los Angeles, opposed the resolution, and W.L. Smith of Buttonwillow did not vote.

In a statement supporting the resolution, Dr. Taylor said:
 "Japanese Americans in the uniform of the United States Army are now risking and giving their lives in Italy and the Pacific areas. Their loyal participation in the war effort is saving the lives and blood of other American soldiers, and is assuring an earlier victory by our country than would otherwise be possible.

"They are entitled in view of this patriotic demonstration to a public recognition that the exclusion of people of their ancestry rests on no ground other than military necessity.

"In August the State Board of Agriculture went on record in favor of interracial commissions to ameliorate race relations in agriculture. The present resolution is no more than a logical application of that earlier declaration by the Board to a particular case.

"There is growing disposition in other parts of the United States to accuse elements within California agriculture of introducing ulterior motives into the problem, specifically to seek to serve economic ends by exclusion of competitors who are regarded by these elements as injurious and unfair. Examination of current issues of reputable periodicals of national circulation reveals plainly that the rest of the United States views this problem with an increasingly critical eye.

"It will redound to the credit and enhance the good name of agriculture in California to declare now that we are unwilling to settle this problem on the basis of race prejudice and that we regard it as an issue of military necessity only."

WHEREAS, it will be the responsibility of military authorities to determine the duration of that period of military necessity on the ground of which they decided early in 1942 to evacuate persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast,

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that if and when the military authorities shall decide that military necessity no longer requires that persons of Japanese ancestry shall be excluded from this State, the California State Board of Agriculture in the light of that decision will use its influence to assure that race prejudice shall not jeopardize the lawful participation of this or any other group in the agricultural life and industry of this State.

FURTHER RESOLVED that copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Governor of California, and the California Congressional delegation.

It is important to keep in mind these facts, because when they are twisted or omitted in the news stories on the resolution, the action of the board assumes a very different aspect:

1. There were six members present at the meeting, three of whom voted for the resolution, one of whom voted against it, and two of whom did not vote.

2. Although not stated in the release, McFadden did not vote since he was not accustomed to voting as chairman of the board.

3. Taylor stated that the reason for introducing the resolution to the board was to counteract the tendency in other parts of the United States to accuse California agriculture of wanting the Japanese excluded from the coast states for economic reasons. He did not accuse California agriculture of this motive himself.

4. The first paragraph of the resolution acknowledges that it is the responsibility of military authorities to determine how long persons of Japanese ancestry must be excluded from California:

Taking the stories on the passage of the resolution carried by the Associated Press, the United Press, and the San Francisco Examiner, and checking each of them according to their accuracy on these four points, we find that a newspaper reader would have had to read all three accounts in order to get a complete picture of what happened.

1. Number Present

a. Associated press story appearing in the San Francisco Chronicle of December 21, correctly states the number present, six, and the number voting for the resolution, three.

b. United Press story appearing in the Berkeley Gazette for December 21, incorrectly states that five board members only were present.

The resolution, proposed by Dr. Paul Taylor, professor of economics at the University of California, was approved by three members of the board of five present.

- c. The San Francisco Examiner story of December 21 correctly gives the number present and voting.

2. Chairman McFadden's Position

- a. AP correctly quotes McFadden as saying that if he had voted he would have voted for the resolution. In this respect it is more complete than the publicity release.

McFadden said during the discussion of the resolution:
 "I'm convinced the truth is not in the Japanese, from all my dealings with them, but I don't believe we can afford to abridge the constitutional rights of any racial groups and if I voted I think I would be for the resolution."

- b. UP does not mention Chairman McFadden.

- c. The Examiner correctly reports that McFadden did not vote because, "as chairman of the board, it was not customary for him to vote unless there was a tie."

It does not report that he said that if he had voted he probably have voted for the resolution.

3. Reason for the Resolution

- a. AP incorrectly quotes Taylor's statement. The accusation that the California agricultural interests want to exclude Japanese-Americans for economic reasons is put into his mouth.

Taylor stated:

There are many agricultural interests who were opposed to Japanese-Americans because they were nasty competitors. Do we want to be in the position of barring these competitors on grounds of race prejudice?

- b. UP correctly reports Taylor's statement, in part.
- c. Taylor's statement is omitted, in the Examiner story.

4. The Resolution

a. AP printed the resolution in full, including the first paragraph acknowledging the problem is one of military necessity.

b. The resolution is given in part by UP, with the first paragraph omitted.

c. The first paragraph of the resolution is omitted in the Examiner, and nowhere does the story say that the resolution acknowledged that the problem was a military one and a military one only.*

The AP gives the correct number present, the entire resolution, and the fact that McFadden "probably" would have voted for the resolution.

UP correctly quotes Taylor as to the reason for the resolution.

The Examiner explains that McFadden did not vote because he was chairman.

Therefore, it would have been necessary to read all three accounts to get a thorough picture of the passage of the resolution.

The next day, Governor Warren came out with a statement denouncing the board for its action:

That was just a case of three holdovers on the board taking advantage of a skeletonized meeting to kick up dust and start internal strife in California, rather than help fight the war we are now engaged in, and in which our boys are fighting and dying every day.

The San Francisco Examiner reported the incident as follows:

EXAMINER BUREAU SACRAMENTO; Dec. 21.--Governor Warren today summarily dismissed as an action which will not "help fight the war" the recommendation of a minority group of the State Board of Agriculture that Japanese be permitted to resume farming operations in California when the war is over.
(Statement is given as above)

That
Period", he added emphatically.

The board's resolution read, in part, as follows:

"If and when the military authorities shall decide that military

*See Appendix for copies of the stories.

necessity no longer requires that persons of Japanese ancestry shall be excluded from this State, the California board of agriculture in the light of that decision will use its influence to assure that race prejudice shall not jeopardize the lawful participation of this or any other group in the agricultural life and industry of this state."

The resolution was approved officially as the position of the board although it was favored by only three of nine members. Introduced by Professor Paul S. Taylor of the University of California, it was supported in addition by Stewart Meigs, Carpenteria, and Mrs. Grace McDonald, Santa Clara, appointees of former Governor Olsen. James F. Armstrong, Los Angeles, voted against the measure, declaring if it passed "people will say it would be better if the Governor kicked the board out."

Chairman A.J. McFadden, Santa Ana, and W.L. Smith, Buttonwillow, did not vote. The three other board members were absent.

Note:

1. The story quotes Governor Warren as saying that the resolution will not "help fight the war", but does not mention Taylor's statement which related the resolution to the war effort, as a demonstration of racial tolerance to Japanese-Americans in the services.

2. It stresses that only three of the nine members of the board voted.

3. It says that McFadden did not vote, but does not say, as it did before, that he was not accustomed to voting, as chairman. As it did not before, it does not say that if he had voted, he would have been for the resolution.

Therefore, this news account tends to favor Governor Warren's interpretation of the resolution. The same is true of the AP story, which appears in the clipping from the San Francisco Chronicle on the following page. Note that it:

1. Does give Taylor's argument that American Japanese in the army are risking their lives for the United States.

2. Tends to uphold the "skeleton board" interpretation by incorrectly stating that McFadden "refused to vote."

The crowning illustration of misrepresentation of this event, for which it would probably be unfair to blame the press associations and even the Examiner, came in an editorial appearing in the Contra Costa Gazette of Martinez, California, for December 24, 1943, which stated:

Now comes Professor Taylor as sponsor of a resolution before the State Board of Agriculture, of which he is a hold-over member as an Olsen appointee, stating that agricultural interests opposing return of the Japs to the state are actuated by selfish motives because the slant-eyed sons of Nippon are "nasty competitors" as he put it. He evidently has forgotten that these people were removed from the coast because of the espionage and sabotage in which it was believed Japs might engage. He is advocating a policy that better be left to the federal government.

Could the misconstrual of the resolution be more complete?

The State Board of Agriculture rescinded this resolution in a meeting held January 17, 1944, in the following language:

WHEREAS this board believes that questions of policy such as expressed the resolution adopted at the previous meeting of this board relative to the return of Japanese evacuees not be passed upon by less than a majority of the whole board, and

WHEREAS, there is serious doubt that the said resolution would have been passed had a majority of the board been present to vote, and

WHEREAS, it is the sense of this meeting of the board that said previous resolution was untimely and susceptible of misinterpretation of the views of California Agriculture in relation to a problem that is both military and national in character:

NOW; THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that said action is hereby rescinded.

This strange action of the board was reported with varying degrees of accuracy.

The Sacramento Bee story stresses that five of the members of the board voted to rescind the resolution, whereas only three voted to adopt it. It incorrectly states that only five persons were present when the resolution was adopted. It fails to report that McFadden did not vote the first time because he was chairman, but ~~would have~~ did say

that he said that if he had voted he would have been for it.

The Bee story reported that McFadden "told the board he believes in the principles of the Taylor resolution, but would vote to rescind it."

In view of McFadden's peculiar position on the matter, it is rather misleading to make generalizations that proclaim the former resolution a minority resolution, and the second one a majority resolution.

If McFadden had voted according to his convictions, the vote would have been the same each time. However, the story does make this unwarranted generalization:

The five members who voted to repudiate the December 20th action constitute a majority of the nine member board... The passage of the Taylor resolution last month was brought about by the fact only five members of the board were present. Armstrong was the lone opponent. Chairman McFadden declined to vote.

United Press, in its story on the second resolution rescinding the first, which appeared in the Berkeley Gazette January 19, 1944, repeated its original error that only five were present when the first resolution was adopted, and falsely reported that "Warren later ousted Taylor from the board." It quotes the second resolution as saying that the original resolution was "untimely and susceptible of misinterpretation of the views of California agriculture in relation to a problem that is both military and national", but does not return to the original resolution to find that it too declared the problem was military. That was the whole point of the original resolution--that the problem was military only.

This has been a rather detailed examination of a small segment of the press treatment of the overall Japanese-American problem. However, it is a clearcut example of how a press that is careless or prejudiced, or perhaps both at once, can twist an occurrence around until it is almost unrecognizable. After the press

was through reporting the passage and rescinding of the State Board of Agriculture resolution of December 20, the average newspaper reader probably had in his mind a vague impression that a minority of the board passed a resolution that interfered with the authority of the military in dealing with the Japanese question in some way, and that a majority of the board had later rescinded this ill-advised action. In other words, the interpretation put upon the resolution by Governor Warren was the one that hit the reader in the eye, and stuck in his mind, in all probability. Of course it was the job of the press to report what Warren said about the resolution, but it was not the job of the press to support his interpretation through misrepresenting the number present when the resolution was passed, leaving McFadden's stand confused, and omitting or confusing the reason for passing the resolution. Therefore, the reporting of the Taylor resolution by the California press must be called a failure by any standard having regard to the function of the press as a medium for informing the electorate on public issues.

APPENDIX

Papers Studied

WEEKLIES

Davis Enterprise--all 1943 issues
Gilroy Advocate-- " " "
Mail of Woodland " " "

NON-METROPOLITAN DAILIES

Bakersfield Californian--May and June issues, 1943.
Madera Daily Tribune and Mercury--Feb., June, July, and Aug. issues, 1943.
Marysville Appeal-Democrat--June, July and Nov. issues, 1943.
Red Bluff Daily News and Times Sentinel--June and July issues, 1943.
San Jose Mercury-Herald--May and June issues, 1943.
St. Helena Star--June, July and Aug. issues, 1943.
Stockton Record--June issues, 1943.
Visalia Times-Delta--June issues, 1943.

METROPOLITAN DAILIES

Los Angeles Times--all stories on Dies sub-committee investigations
in files of publicity chairman of Pacific Coast
Committee on American Principles and Fair Play.
San Diego Union--May issues, 1943.
San Francisco Chronicle--scattered issues for November, and December,
1943, and January and February, 1944.
San Francisco Examiner--June issues, 1943; scattered issues for Nov-
ember and December, 1943; and January and
February, 1944.

OTHER PAPERS MENTIONED

| | | |
|---------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| Contra Costa Gazette | (| |
| Pasadena Post |) | |
| Pasadena Star-News | (| various editorials and columns |
| Santa Rosa Press-Democrat |) | |
| Vallejo Times-Herald | (| |
| Los Angeles Daily News |) | |

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"Report and Minority Views of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities on Japanese War Relocation Centers," Union Calendar No. 243, Report No. 717, House of Representatives, 78th Congress, 1st session.

"The Truth About Relocation", an address delivered by Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, before a luncheon meeting of the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California, on August 6, 1943. Available in mimeographed form at the publicity headquarters of the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play.

OWI Advance Release, on War Relocation Authority, OWI 2712, for release Saturday, November 13, 1943.

"Supplementary Information on Events at Tule Lake Center," November 1-4, 1943." War Relocation Authority, Washington D.C., January 19, 1944.

All stories on the Japanese-Americans listed under United States-- Foreign populations, in the New York Times index for the months January to September, 1943.

STORIES ON THE TAYLOR RESOLUTION APPEARING DECEMBER 21.

See pp. 36-37

San Francisco Examiner

EXAMINER BUREAU, SACRAMENTO, Dec. 20--After bitter controversy, the state board of agriculture today adopted a resolution declaring, in effect, that Japanese-Americans must not be excluded from agriculture in the state after the war's close. One board member heatedly attacked the measure, and two others did not vote. Three were absent.

James F. Armstrong, Los Angeles member of the board, attacking the measure, declared that if the resolution were passed "people will say it would be better if the Governor kicked out the board." He charged that the board was going far afield in interjecting itself into such a controversy, and explained he did not feel that he knew enough about the situation. A.J. McFadden of Santa Ana, in Orange County, said he did not vote because, as chairman of the board, it was customary for him not to vote except in case of a tie.

Three board members, W.B. Parker of Berkeley, John S. Watson of Petaluma and Don C. Bull of Marysville, were not in attendance. The resolution was presented by Paul S. Taylor, University of California professor and Berkeley member, and seconded by Stewart Meigs, Carpinteria member. In addition to these two, Mrs. Grace McDonald of San Jose voted for the measure.

"The California State Board of Agriculture", the resolution said, in part, "will use its influence to assure that racial prejudice shall not jeopardize the lawful participation of this group (persons of Japanese ancestry) or any other group in the agricultural life and industry of the state."

Berkeley Gazette

Sacramento, Dec. 21 (UP)--Gov. Earl Warren today denounced a resolution adopted by the State Board of Agriculture favoring return of Japanese to California as soon as military conditions permit as an attempt by holdover members of the board to cause strife in California.

The resolution, proposed by Dr. Paul Taylor, professor of economics at the University of California, was approved by three members of the board of five present. The board consists of nine members.

Asked his opinion of the resolution, Warren said, "It was just a case of three holdovers on the board taking advantage of a skeletonized meeting to kick up some dust and try to cause some strife in California instead of helping in a war in which our boys are fighting and dying every day."

The resolution declared that the board "will use its influence to assure that race prejudice shall not jeopardize the lawful participation of this (the Japanese) or any other group in the agricultural life and industry of this state."

Return of the Japanese to California was made conditional on approval by Army officials in the resolution. It was submitted by Grace McDonald of San Jose and Stewart Meigs of Carpinteria as well as Taylor. All three were appointed by Gov. Culbert Olson. James Armstrong of Los Angeles voted no and W.L. Smith of Buttonwillow did not vote.

Taylor issued a statement in support of his resolution saying Japanese-Americans fighting in Italy are "entitled to a public recognition that the exclusion of people of their ancestry rests on no ground other than military necessity.

He said that accusations have been made against California agricultural interests charging that demands for permanent exclusion of Japanese have been made for the purpose of excluding economic competition.

San Francisco Chronicle

Sacramento, Dec. 20 (AP)--The State Board of Agriculture today, after a heated controversy, passed a resolution which, in effect, declares that Japanese Americans should not be barred from the agricultural life of California after military authorities approve their return.

Presented by Professor Paul S. Taylor of the University of California, Berkeley member of the board, the motion was seconded by Stewart Meigs, Carpinteria member. Taylor stated:

"There are many agricultural interests who were opposed to Japanese-Americans because they were nasty competitors. Do we want to be in the position of barring these competitors on grounds of race prejudice?"

(Resolution given in full.)

A.J. McFadden, board chairman, did not vote, nor did W.L. Smith, Buttonwillow. Three board members...were absent. McFadden said during the discussion of the resolution:

"I'm convinced the truth is not in the Japanese, from all my dealings with them, but I don't believe we can afford to abridge the constitutional rights of any racial group and if I voted I think I would be for the resolution".....

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Williams, Evelyn
Political Science 185
February 9, 1944

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The importance of the War Relocation Authority lies in the fact that although it is dealing with only a small minority of the population it is watched closely by many persons with a variety of motives: the enemy governments which might use any slip as an excuse for otherwise unwarranted activities, the overly cautious Americans who favor military administration of the relocation centers, and the Americans who consider this work as a test case of the "democracy" of the United States and urge equal treatment and opportunities for all Americans, regardless of race or color. Each of these groups brings pressure to bear on the Authority and shapes its policy in one way or another.

Created to care for persons excluded from certain restricted areas along the Pacific, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts,¹ the War Relocation Authority has by the nature of its duties, the immediate necessity for action and the newness of the organization encountered numerous seemingly unsurmountable problems. They include the following:

1. The creation of effective and fair machinery and administration for the removal from given areas of persons deemed dangerous to the national security.²
2. The provision for means to care for property owned by the evacuees.³

3. The location and development of centers to which the evacuees could be moved with the cooperation of the War Department.⁴
4. The segregation of the nisei from the issei in the centers so that it would not be necessary to police and punish an entire area for the activities of a few.⁵
5. The establishment of sound economic, social and psychological practices within the centers. This phase of the problem would include the creation of medical and educational facilities.
6. The struggle against prejudice caused by the insecurity of war, the previous economic competition, the race differences, and hatred caused by presence of enemy nationals. This attitude is indicated by a generally hostile treatment of events by the press, restrictive legislation, and numerous investigation committees.⁶

Faced at first with necessity for restricting the activities of people considered dangerous to our national security and later with the provisions for their relocation, maintenance and supervision, President Roosevelt soon created a new agency to carry out these services since the military was faced with a manpower shortage

and vastly increased duties, both due to the declaration of war. Therefore, on March 18, 1942, the War Relocation Authority was created within the Office of Emergency Management by Executive Order 9102.⁷ Under this order the President appointed a director who is to keep him informed as to his progress in carrying out the order. His office is in Washington D.C., and he is assisted by a Deputy Director and staff in Washington, which is organized under the eight divisions of reports, administrative management, office of solicitor, relocation planning, relocation assistance, committee services, employment, and agriculture and engineering.⁸

Some of the specific duties of the Director of the War Relocation Authority include the accomplishment of the evacuation of all not removed by the War Department or appropriate military commander, the provision for the relocation of the evacuees, and the supervision of their activities. He may find employment for such persons under certain conditions, cooperate with any government agency, issue any regulations necessary to carry out the program, and delegate any authority he feels is essential. In short, he is the chief administrator of this work. He consults with the War Manpower Commission on employment problems, cooperates with the Alien Property Commission to formulate policies of management of alien property, and regularly communicates with other administrative departments in Washington D.C.⁹

This central authority is represented in the field by three Assistant Directors of Authority who operate out of Little Rock, Denver and San Francisco, and are responsible for helping the Director in inspection and supervision of relocation centers and represent the Director in contacts with other government agencies and the public. Each Assistant Director has from one to three principal assistants and a small clerical staff.

Each of the relocation centers, of which there are eleven, is administered by a project director who is responsible for supervising all the activities within the center and for cooperating with the military police on the exterior patrol of the center. Each director is provided with a staff of from 150 to 200 non-evacuee assistants. Top positions in all branches of the community and project administration are occupied by these civil service employees, but many occupations are held by the confined Japanese Americans who are paid a small salary for their work. Each project director is responsible to the Director of the Authority, and is given the authority to expend and account for government funds, employ necessary personnel under the civil service, and to purchase and use necessary supplies and equipment. He is in full control of the center under the Authority and the general laws and regulations of government service.

Management of the property of evacuees is performed

by the property office of the War Relocation Authority in San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle, under the direction of the Relocation Assistance Division in Washington.

To aid in supporting the relocation centers economically, to assist in manpower shortage areas, and to occupy the time of the relocated people, a series of field offices has been created under the direction of the Employment Division of Washington to help relocate evacuees outside the center and to maintain contact with those on leave. Over forty branches of this office have been established mostly in the inter-mountain area. Leaves to assist in harvesting crops are carefully arranged after investigations and study of the person leaving the center, and a careful analysis of the community to which the person is going to see that he will be accepted.¹⁰

The War Relocation Authority is responsible not only for the relocation of the Japanese Americans but also for other individuals who have been excluded from military areas.¹¹ The concentration of a large number of Japanese on the Pacific coast, the possibility of a Japanese invasion and the threat of infiltration of Japanese agents resulted in the mass evacuation of more than 110,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans from this area in the spring and summer of 1942--a job which has become the major concern of the War Relocation Authority.¹²

As originally planned, their presence in coastal areas was considered a threat, but away from those areas, their activities need not be restricted. Subsequent events have indicated that fear of economic competition, and race hatred are greatly hindering this relative freedom. After temporary residence in assembly centers managed by the army, these people are now quartered for the most part in the ten relocation centers established by the War Relocation Authority on Federal land in western and south central United States.

Since the War Relocation Authority must work closely with the War Department, and since their duties might conflict, it was necessary to carefully outline their duties. Executive Order 9102 provides that the WRA shall not evacuate any persons from military areas designated by Executive Order 9066 of February 19, 1942, without prior approval of the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander. The statement of the Director of War Mobilization included in the president's message to the Senate on September 14, 1943 on the segregation of the loyal and disloyal Japanese Americans contains a clear distinction between the control of these two agencies. He points out that the War Dept. is responsible for the evacuation of the Japanese Americans, for the establishment and administration of temporary assembly centers where the evacuees could be quartered until relocation centers were built, for the construc-

tion of basic housing and facilities at the relocation center sites, for the transportation of the evacuees from the assembly centers to the relocation centers, and for the provision of a military guard around the exterior boundaries of the relocation centers. The WRA, meanwhile, is to select relocation sites with the approval of the War Dept., and to assume full responsibility for the management of the relocation centers and the evacuees once delivered by the army to the relocation center.¹³

The structure of the administration for removing evacuees having been outlined, the next consideration is of the actual events which occurred during the evacuation. Throughout March, 1942, the Japanese Americans were encouraged to move out of the military area and resettle inland. Many of them evacuated at this time and have not been assigned to relocation areas, others who evacuated at this time were later assigned to relocation centers because they had not moved far enough and were included within the military zone #2. Many of the inland communities objected to this sudden immigration, however, to such an extent that on March 27, 1942, an order was issued by the Western Defense Command prohibiting further migration from military zone #1. On April 7, 1942, the Director of the WRA and other government officials met in Salt Lake City to discuss plans for relocation. The WRA proposed three plans whereby the evacuees would live

in government operated centers, but would be free to work in various occupations to support themselves. These plans were opposed strongly and the governors of the states present suggested complete military control of the evacuees. The evacuees were then moved by the army to relocation centers, which were hastily assembled and set up. Uncertainty as to the future, lack of means with which to occupy their time, unorganized administration and numerous other causes worked together to make life in these centers dissatisfying. Minor uprisings such as at Poston in November, 1942, at Manzanar in December, 1942 , and at Tule Lake in November, 1943, resulted in adverse publicity and investigations.¹⁴

As a result of the two early "incidents" the Senate passed Resolution 166 on July 7, 1943, requesting the president to direct the WRA to segregate disloyal persons from loyal and to direct the appropriate agency of the government to issue a statement on the conditions in the relocation centers and the future plans. On September 14, 1943, the President delivered a message on this subject, saying that both requests had been carried out. Prior to this time the Senate had conducted hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs on Senate Bill 444, which proposed a transfer of certain functions of the WRA to the War Dept. Dillon S. Myer, the Director of the WRA, certain

residents of Arizona near Poston, and representatives from the War Dept. were interviewed by this committee. All three bodies agreed that a change in the administration from the WRA to the War Dept. would not improve existing conditions.¹⁵ This investigation was conducted in the last part of January, February and March, 1943.

On September 30, 1943, a special committee of three on Un-American activities, headed by John M. Costello of California, reported on its investigation into the administration of the War Relocation Centers. A majority of the committee agreed that the administration was weak, although they made no constructive suggestions, while the third member, Herman P. Eberharter, disagreed completely with their decision.¹⁶

Numerous investigations of the WRA, led by Clair Engle of California and others, were conducted after the Tule Lake Incident from November 1-4. ^{inability to think clearly,} Emotion/ and opposition after this event and the recent announcement of Japanese treatment of prisoners have again increased the difficulty of finding a favorable solution to this problem of the Japanese Americans on the Pacific Coast.

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. President's message on Senate Resolution 166 before the 78th Congress, 1st session, Sept. 14, 1943. Senate document no. 96. 25 pp.
Segregation of loyal and disloyal Japanese Americans.
p. 23
2. U.S. Govt. Manual - Summer 1943. Division of Public Inquiries, Office of War Information
p.3
3. Pres.' message on Sen. Res. 166 (Footnote 1)
p. 14
4. Ibid. p.15
5. Senate Resolution 166 - July 6, 1943 Ibid. p. 1
6. Office of War Information - Statement of Dillon S. Myer on allegation that spies and saboteurs have been released from relocation centers. May 31, 1943

Eberharter, Rep. Herman P. Remarks on March of Time on radio, August 26, 1943.
7. U.S. Govt. Manual (See Footnote 2) p.2

Federal Reserve Bulletin, v.28; pp. 305-306, April, 1942
8. (See Footnote 1) pp. 8-9
9. (See F.N.2) pp. 6-8
10. (See F.N.6 OWI)
American Public Welfare, v.1, pp. 134-139, May 1943
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11. (See F.N.1) pp. 24-25
12. U.S. W.R.A. Japanese Americans in relocation centers
4 pp. (mim) June 1943
13. (See F.N.1) pp. 5-6
14. Quarterly Report - W.R.A. - Jan. 1942 - Dec. 1942

Dillon S. Myer on riots at Tule Lake, Nov. 14, 1943
6 pp. (mim.)
15. U.S. Senate - Committee on Military Affairs
War Relocation Centers- Hearing before subcommittee
Jan, 20-March 6, 1943 on Senate bill 444. 78th Congress
16. (See F.N. 6 Eberharter)
U.S. House - Spec. Comm. on Un-American activities
Report no. 717, 28 pp., Sept. 30, 1943 78th Cong.
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVACUATION AND RELOCATION EVENTS
January 1942 - December 1943

- Jan. 29, 1942 - First order by Attorney General Biddle establishing restricted areas along the west coast and regulating movements of enemy aliens therein. Subsequent orders issued Jan. 31, Feb. 2, 4, 5, 7
- Feb. 13, 1942 - Letter of the President from the Pacific Coast congressional delegation recommending evacuation from strategic areas of all of Japanese ancestry, and others, both aliens and citizens, whose presence might jeopardize or hinder the nation's war effort.
- Feb. 19, 1942 - Executive order of the President authorizing the Secretary of War or designated military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or all persons may be excluded, or in which their movements may be restricted. Period of voluntary evacuation begins.
- Feb. 21, 1942 - Hearing of House Committee on National Defense Migration (Tolan Committee) begun on Pacific Coast with regard to problems involved in dealing with enemy aliens and others living in that area.
- Feb. 23, 1942 - Telegram from Tolan Committee to the President, cabinet members and Congressional leaders urging establishment of the Regional Office of Alien Property in the Pacific Coast area.
- March 2, 1942 - Proclamation by Lt. Gen. J.L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, designating military areas in the states of Washington, Oregon, California and Arizona, from which certain persons or classes of persons might be excluded.

- March 6, 1942 - Federal Reserve Bank , acting as an agent of the Treasury Department, assists evacuees in disposing of property. Federal Security Admin. later took over this function.
- Mar. 14, 1942 - Wartime Civil Control Administration established as agency of the War Defense Council under Col. Bendetsen to have direct supervision of the evacuation program.
- Mar. 18, 1942 - Executive Order 9102 issued by Pres. Roosevelt creating the W.R.A. to form and carry out program for a planned and orderly relocation of persons evacuated from military areas. Milton S. Eisenhower - director.
- Mar. 19, 1942 - Telegrams by Tolan Committee to 15 Western Governors to determine attitude of States toward receiving evacuees(all but one unfavorable).
- Mar. 21, 1942 - Enactment of Congressional legislation (HR 6758) penalizing persons violating orders as to entering, remaining in or leaving military areas.
- Mar. 23, 1942 - Movement of first contingent of Japanese evacuees. 1000 volunteers from Los Angeles to Manzanar to prepare for 9000 more.
- Mar. 23, 1942 - Civilian Exclusion Order #1 issued by Lt. Gen. J.L. DeWitt removing all Japanese from Bainbridge Island near Seattle before March 30, 1942.
- Mar. 27, 1942 - Japanese, Italians and Germans put under curfew law. Possession of equipment dangerous in a military area forbidden.
- Mar. 27, 1942 - Further voluntary evacuation from Military Area #1 by Japanese prohibited by Lt. Gen. DeWitt.
- Mar. 30, 1942 - 3000 Japanese ordered to move from Terminal Island near Los Angeles to Santa Anita center.

- April 2, 1942 - Eisenhower announces meeting to be held in Salt Lake City on April 7, and a five point program for the employment of evacuees.
- April 7, 1942 - Meeting conducted by War Relocation Authority at Salt Lake City and attended by ten western governors or representatives and other state and federal officials. Opposed five point program.
- June 17, 1942 - Dillon S. Myer appointed national director of the War Relocation Authority.
- July 20, 1942 - War Relocation Authority policy adopted under which American born evacuees who had never visited Japan could leave relocation centers for private employment.
- July 25, 1942 - National Defense Appropriation Act, including \$70,000,000 for the War Relocation Authority, signed by President Roosevelt.
- Sept. 1, 1942 - Adoption of War Relocation Authority policy on employment and compensation at relocation centers.
- Oct. 1, 1942 - New leave regulations allow aliens as well as citizens who meet certain requirements to reestablish themselves in private life.
- Nov. 14, 1942 - "Poston Incident " - night attack on evacuee resident at Colorado River Relocation Center. Ends Nov. 23.
- Dec. 5, 1942 - Night assault on evacuee resident at Manzanar begins "Manzanar Incident".
- Dec. 15, 1942 - Announcement made of abolishment of War Relocation Authority Regional offices and transfer of the San Francisco staff to Washington and relocation centers.

January 20 - March 6

Senate: Committee on Military Affairs
Hearing before subcommittee on Senate
Bill 444, parts 1, 2 and 3.
Testimony of D.S. Myer and residents
near Phoenix, Arizona

July 6 - Senate Resolution 166 passed.
Suggested segregation of loyal and
disloyal Japanese Americans, and
statement of future policy of WRA.

September 14-
President's message on SR 166. States
that requests accomplished. Includes
statement from Director of War
Mobilization on activities of WRA.

September 30 -
Dies committee begins investigation
of War Relocation Authority Administration.

November 1 - 4
Tule Lake Incident.

November 14-
Dillon S. Myers defends WRA against
charges made by newspapers and
organizations as result of Tule
Lake incident.

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"Remove relocation centers" - D.S. Myer

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