

## CHAPTER VIII. THE EBB OF REBELLION

### A. MINOR STRIKES AND DISTURBANCES.

Coincidentally with the Issei struggle for power in the Oversea's Broadcast and Theater Project issues, there occurred in the latter part of September and in October certain strikes and disturbances which were not a part of that struggle for ascendance but rather marked the last phase of community rebellion against the conditions of work and life in the center. That is, a distinction is here made between those issues on which the Issei and Nisei found themselves in opposition, and those in which the two generations were in united opposition to the .W.R.A. The distinction is admittedly arbitrary, for there was seldom any issue of community-wide interest in the project on which there was not a difference of interpretation between the Issei and Nisei due to the differences of their ideological background, or where the issues did not presuppose some opposition of both generations to the W.R.A. <sup>B</sup> But it is useful to make the distinction for where there was, in addition to the general evacuee opposition to some W.R.A. policy, a conflict of views between the two generations, the disturbance in the center tended to be heightened by the additional tension between the generations. Moreover, the distinction serves to clarify the point that even if the Issei-Nisei conflict were dissolved, there still remained the <sup>general</sup> evacuee discontent with their life in the relocation center, a discontent that could be removed only by the removal of ~~the~~ evacuees from that situation.

However, the incidents referred to here constituted the ebb phase of the series of rebellions which broke out with the Farm Strike in August. The period is spoken of as the "ebb phase" because while there was an <sup>almost</sup> continuous state of disturbance from mid-August through the <sup>present</sup> ~~incidents mentioned here~~, there seemed to be a noticeable tiring among the people over the frequent community upheavals and a discouragement about gaining substantial improvement of the center through aggressive revolts against the administration. The disturbances here recorded, therefore, may be viewed

as themselves contributing to the decline of rebellion.

#### The Packing Shed Strike

*from the outset*  
The packing shed was a particularly difficult unit to organize ~~from the outset~~ under relocation center conditions. Its establishment was started in mid-August when the harvesting of 2,500 acres of farm crop from the project farm was pending. The site of the ~~warehouse~~ <sup>packing shed</sup> was a warehouse on a railway siding that ~~extended into~~ <sup>within</sup> the project center, a distance of some seven miles from the farm by the original route which was later shortened to three miles by the construction of a new road. Although rough plans for the shed had been projected very soon after the opening of the farm in June, and attempts to procure packing equipment had also been started early, the rush of work in developing a new farm and the difficulty of procuring equipment under wartime conditions apparently operated against giving sufficient attention to the ~~establishment of the packing shed and to the~~ <sup>marketing aspect of the project's agricultural</sup> economy. When packing shed operations were opened in the fourth week of August, George A. Hudson, marketing supervisor of the Agricultural Division who was to direct the shed among other functions, was still new to the project having arrived scarcely more than a week previously. Turnips, which were the first crop scheduled for harvesting and shipment, were rapidly maturing, and Hudson was placed under pressure to familiarize himself with the operation of the farm, hire and organize the working personnel of the packing shed, and organize the plant, all in the space of ~~about~~ a week so that shipments might be started immediately and the danger of the turnips over-maturing in the ground might be avoided. The W.R.A. marketing policy for project-grown crops itself had not been ~~clearly defined~~ <sup>clarified</sup>, and it was therefore necessary that Hudson ~~clarify~~ <sup>determine</sup> the specific markets to which the Tule Lake crops would be sent.

The hiring of packing shed workers offered the least difficulty, for a size-

able number of the Tule Lake people had packing shed experience and, in particular, a large number of women accustomed to this type of work and interested in seeking employment were available. A graver problem was the careful selection of the shed foreman, for in the nature of packing work, the position was easily subjected to criticism from the workers<sup>1/</sup>, and ~~Especially~~ at Tule Lake where the organization of the plant was relatively poor, it required considerable managerial ability to gain the cooperation of the workers in meeting the production demands. Furthermore, there were frequent disputes between the packing shed management and the farm managers in the placing of responsibility for ~~the~~ delays in harvesting, as a result of which several changes were made during the first month in the managerial ~~staff~~ <sup>organization</sup> of the packing shed. The difficulty of coordinating the production and marketing branches of the agricultural division, which was aggravated by personal conflicts between Kallam and Hudson, the respective supervisors of the sections, added to the confusion in the packing shed such that the workers frequently complained of the uncertainty in the lines of authority.

One of the chief sources of discontent among the packing shed workers during the opening weeks was the lack of adequate equipment with which to meet the production demands placed upon them. Because the workers were experienced, they demanded working conditions comparable to those which they had known on the outside, but the project administration was faced with an equipment shortage on the outside that made procurement a slow and uncertain process. A strike was almost precipitated <sup>in the last week of August</sup> when the packing shed workers refused to continue work unless they were provided aprons and boots for protection against the dampness of their job, but it was averted with a last-minute provision of these supplies. Crates, ~~sacks~~ sacks and other containers were not available in sufficient quantities or in the right types such that work was frequently delayed until these supplies could be provided, rollers for the conveying of crated vegetables were inadequate, and various equipment for

<sup>1/</sup> See back of page for the footnote.

1/ Worker morale in the packing houses constitutes a difficult problem for at least two reasons. (1) Because of the variety of vegetables that may be handled in a shed on any given day, and the different packing techniques required for different vegetables, work organization in packing sheds is frequently not well systematized and is subject to frequent changes. (2) The irregularity of work hours during slack harvesting seasons and the intense production demands during the height of harvesting place demands of flexibility in work adjustments upon the workers which they are often unable to make satisfactorily. The foreman had the difficult task of gaining worker cooperation under these unfavorable circumstances, and unless he managed the employees carefully, he was likely to incur their hostility.

icing and handling the packed crates ~~customarily used in packing sheds~~ were not available. There were even criticisms directed at the layout plan of the shed because it was allegedly inefficient and not conducive to the best performance of the workers. A serious shortage of trucks, which affected the entire community but especially interfered with the hauling of vegetables from the farm to the packing shed during the height of the harvesting season, developed in September when the Civilian Conservation Corp recalled 44 trucks which had been lent to the W.R.A. leaving only 75 trucks for the entire project. The extreme difficulty encountered in finding adequate equipment for the packing shed is illustrated in the fact that the W.R.A. called upon evacuees to release their stored shed equipment for use at the project. The Tulean Dispatch of September 19 states:

"To make arrangements for the transfer of his packing house equipment to Tule Lake, where it will be used by the agricultural department, Tom Yego left for his home in Place County Thursday. The city's produce shipping house has been handicapped by lack of equipment. Efforts to purchase the needed equipment have been difficult since the factories have stopped producing them."1/

A no less vexing problem resulting from the character of packing shed work was the question of wages and hours, ~~of the employees~~. On the outside, packing houses frequently operated almost day and night during the height of harvesting seasons to meet the demands of shipping large stocks of perishable goods, but even during the busy seasons there <sup>were</sup> ~~would be~~ occasions when workers would have nothing to do, depending on the flow of crops from the farm. Because of the seasonal nature of the job, workers were generally paid on an hourly basis with extra remuneration provided for the seasons requiring long hours. At the relocation center where wages and hours were standardized and no overtime pay was allowed, a unique problem existed where seasonal employment was necessary, as on the farm and at the packing shed, ~~for this work required special exertion during a few months but allowed leisure during the remaining months of the year.~~ For example, during the harvesting season, the packing shed workers alone were required to work odd

hours, often into the evenings, ~~and continue work~~ <sup>or</sup> on Sundays, when most of the other employees on the project were fortunately confined to an eight-hour day for ~~six~~ <sup>five and a half</sup> days a week. At the same time, there was not sufficient work to justify the use of more than one shift. The problem was superficially solved by permitting the packing shed workers to accumulate overtime hours which they could apply as daily work hours in the future, but from the standpoint of the workers this solution was superficial because it failed to take account of the extra exertion required in heavy seasonal work, the imposition caused by the irregular work hours, and the absence of overtime rates for evening and Sunday work.

Finally, a difficulty existed in the indefiniteness of W.R.A. policy regarding the establishment of producer's cooperatives at the center, which had been much talked of by the administration in earlier months as a source of increased compensation to the evacuees, ~~and~~ <sup>there was also the question of</sup> In relation to this, the markets to which project-grown crops were to be sent. The W.R.A. had initially maintained a vague idea of organizing evacuee-managed producer's cooperatives for such productive units of the project as the farm, the profits from which would accrue as additional income to the evacuees; but because of legal and financial difficulties in establishing producer's cooperatives in W.R.A. operated centers, the idea was finally abandoned. The proposition had raised ~~some~~ hopes among the evacuees of receiving extra compensation for their work in producing and shipping vegetables, but when the W.R.A. abandoned the idea of <sup>a producer's</sup> Co-ops in September, it was ~~never~~ <sup>not</sup> made clear to the evacuees why the project had been abandoned. The evacuees never entirely gave up the idea that the W.R.A. was capable of organizing the farm into a producer's cooperative, and <sup>the agency's</sup> ~~their continued~~ failure to establish a "share the profit" system was looked on as a denial of the right to increase their earnings.

~~The initial ideas about the markets to which Tule Lake vegetables would be~~

~~sold~~. In the early discussions of the farm project, when there was still a prospect of the evacuees' sharing in its profits, it was proposed that Tule Lake produce ~~would~~ be sent to five different markets in the following order of priority:

1. Tule Lake mess halls.
2. Other W.R.A. centers.
3. Army Quartermaster Corps.
4. Lend-Lease.
5. The open market. 1/

The Tule Lake mess halls were the first to receive produce from the project farm, and shipments were regularly made to ~~most of~~ <sup>to</sup> the other W.R.A. centers. As for the latter three markets, legal difficulties were encountered in the cases of the Army and Lend-Lease and these markets were dismissed early, while the W.R.A. had doubts about selling center produce on the open market for fear of arousing public criticism that the Government was entering into competition with individual farmers for the benefit of the evacuees. Nevertheless, a certain amount of produce was sold to individual buyers. In the absence of any share-the-profits plan, the reaction of the evacuees to the sale of center produce on the open market was that the W.R.A. was making money through the use of cheap evacuee labor. In addition, there was talk, even some evidence, that W.R.A. agents were selling Tule Lake produce on the open market at extremely poor values considering the current market prices, <sup>2/</sup> which was profitable to the West Coast produce houses, but only did injury to the evacuee workers' sense of value about <sup>their</sup> ~~his~~ own work and added nothing to their coffer. Rumors circulated that the W.R.A. agents must be receiving personal gains from these sales. From the standpoint

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1/ Najima Notes, July 11, 1942.

2/ The W.R.A. encountered difficulty in disposing of surplus produce on the open market because of the prejudice of California produce houses against buying evacuee-grown vegetables, and it is not unlikely that low prices were quoted in order to overcome this resistance.

of the evacuees, since there was no profit to the evacuees in selling their produce on the open market, it was considered preferable that all shipments be made to their own center and to other W.R.A. centers <sup>to supplement</sup> ~~especially in view of~~ <sup>their</sup> ~~the~~ inadequate food supplies. <sup>Because</sup> ~~at the centers.~~ The packing shed workers ~~who~~ <sup>they</sup> were closely associated with the marketing phase of the farm project, were more keenly conscious of this problem than the remainder of the community, and considerable discussion among ~~these workers~~ <sup>them</sup> centered on the issue of ~~growing and shipping~~ <sup>whites who</sup> vegetables to the ~~population which~~ had ousted the evacuees, ~~from their homes.~~

The immediate cause of the Packing House Strike on the morning of September 28 was the rumor <sup>that</sup> ~~of the passage of~~ a bill in the House of Representatives to disenfranchise the Nisei. <sup>had passed.</sup> Nisei workers loading crated vegetables into freight cars, some of which were destined for the open market, <sup>were aroused</sup> ~~led~~ to considerable resentment against shipping vegetables to a population that was seeking to deny them their citizenship, and they refused to continue loading the cars. In the background of the strike, however, were all the other difficulties of the packing shed which have been previously outlined; ~~and~~ the rumor of disenfranchisement <sup>merely</sup> ~~therefore~~ provided a suitable occasion for demanding an improvement of the general conditions of work which were at the source of their discontent. This strike, as with most other strikes at Tule Lake, was spontaneous, and had <sup>neither</sup> ~~no~~ <sup>an organization</sup> ~~organization of a committee to represent the strikers or~~ <sup>specific</sup> ~~or~~ a program of demands <sup>to present before</sup> which they were making upon the administration.

In his account of the Packing Shed Strike which he assisted in mediating, Don Elberson, W.R.A. Labor Relations Representative, listed the following issues as the basic factors leading to the strike.

1. The rumor of the passage of the disenfranchisement bill caused much resentment among Nisei workers loading vegetables on freight cars, some of which were destined for the open market, and led to their refusal to load cars.

2. Disillusionment about the much talked of producer's cooperative caused the workers to lose what incentive they had in actively pursuing their jobs.
3. This dispute involved the issue of over-time work and whether or not this over-time could be banked to the extent of obtaining it when working for another division.
4. Car loaders considered their work too heavy and strenuous for the pay received. Part of the difficulty was the lack of necessary equipment.
5. Until the strike, labor relations were carried on in mass fashion with the administrative personnel talking to the packing shed workers as a whole. A need was seen of a committee of responsible workers to represent the whole group.<sup>2/</sup>

Negotiations were undertaken by first organizing a group of responsible representatives to meet with the plant management and exchange views on their mutual problems. The effect of the rumor about disenfranchisement, which had precipitated the strike, was largely mitigated by the denial of its truth. The administration explained that the question of banking overtime hours had already been taken up with the Regional Office and that an answer was expected shortly to clarify the peculiar overtime problem of the packing house. Work was re-organized for the car loaders so that they would receive more assistance from other packing shed workers and thus be relieved of the strain of car loading. It was pointed out that new equipment was steadily flowing in and that some of the pressing equipment shortages would soon be relieved. As soon as the committee of representatives was organized, it was found that little difficulty was encountered in clarifying some of the misunderstandings, and it was possible to have the workers return to their jobs after a day and a half of strike.

In summarizing the problems of the Packing House Strike, Elberson declares:

"I am not sure whether Mr. Hudson's attitude toward the Japanese is known to them or not, but I am sure that they must know. The few remarks he made to me relative to the problem of the strike made it appear quite ~~evident~~ obvious that his attitude may have a great deal to do with some of the feelings prevalent..... I would recommend that he be in as little contact with the workers in the Packing Shed as possible and that Mr. Tomita carry on the direct contacts with these workers.

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<sup>1/</sup> W.R.A. Report, Tule Lake Project, "Packing House."

"although many of the difficulties giving rise to this dispute have been eradicated, the problem of sending farm products to the outside world, either on to the open market or to other relocation centers, still presents a major difficulty in labor relations because of the great fears still present in the colony about the food and its possible scarcity. The colonists are even reticent to participate in the sending of produce to other relocation centers unless they can be assured in some way that there is an adequate storage of such products here....."

"I wish to stress again that proper lines of authority, proper production organization, proper labor relations procedures, and a little more incentive for work are the major principles involved in this particular dispute. Because some of them have been improved, the difficulties surrounding the strike have somewhat disappeared, at least there has been no major problem in this regard since my first contact with it." //

### Furniture Factory Strike

The furniture factory was established in late August following the arrival of F. H. Rouner, former superintendent of the Redwood Manufacturing Company in California, to assume the position of supervisor of the factory. His immediate, urgent task was to produce ~~school~~ desks and ~~for~~ chairs for the Tule Lake schools, which were expected to open in early September, <sup>and</sup> ~~as well as~~ for schools of other centers. ~~The urgency of this work may be understood when it is realized that~~ <sup>The</sup> organizational plans for a grammar and high school to accommodate about 3,800 students were already rapidly maturing, ~~that~~ hiring of teachers was progressing, and ~~that~~ a tentative date for the opening of school was set for the second week of September, but no adequate physical facilities for the school, particularly of desks and chairs, were yet available. The plan was to construct all of the latter at the project.

On the day prior to the opening of the public schools, an article headlined, "School Faces Furniture Shortage," appeared in the Tulean Dispatch, in which it was stated:

"Because of lack of materials, there is a shortage of chairs. However, a temporary furniture factory is operating in one of the warehouses, and until a sufficient quantity of seats have been made, chairs and benches belonging to community activities classes, adult education classes, and nursery

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1/ Don Elberson, W.R.A. Labor Relations Representatives, Tule Lake Project, "Report on the Packing House," October 30, 1942.

schools will supplement the school furniture that is already existent."1/

The article went on to state optimistically that at the current rate of production in the furniture factory the shortage would be removed in two weeks; but the actual condition in the schools on the opening day was such that large numbers of pupils had no place to sit while those who found seats were placed at miscellaneous mess tables and benches drawn from all parts of the project. There was little possibility of meeting the furniture demands of the school in a few weeks, but a considerable pressure was placed upon the furniture factory to relieve the equipment shortage of the schools as early as possible.

Given this background of pressure, Mr. Rouner, the supervisor of the factory, undertook the task ~~of meeting the school demands~~ with especial vigor and placed high production demands upon his workers. The evacuee employees in the factory responded poorly to their supervisor, and particularly resented his constant pressure upon them. ~~In speaking of the incident which eventually developed from this situation,~~ Shirrell described Mr. Rouner to the Regional Office in the following words:

"Our furniture factory incident was the result of several conditions. Mr. Rouner, while a very fine craftsman and organizer, lacks the essential elements in dealing with the Japanese---patience and understanding---being a man of direct action, used to getting a job done. He fretted and stewed over the situation until he exploded at the wrong time."2/

Mr. Rouner's labor policy at the furniture factory may be understood in terms of these personal characteristics and his background as superintendent of a similar factory in California. He apparently viewed the project factory as in no sense different from ~~any other plant~~ on the outside, and ~~his expectation of~~ *be expected of* the ~~workers~~ *evacuees* was that they show as much efficiency and industry as under normal circumstances. From the evacuee point of view, however, there was no incentive within the relocation center to work as hard as the supervisor demanded, and

1/ Tulean Dispatch, September 12, 1942. p. 1.

2/ Letter from Elmer Shirrell to Rowalt, October 7, 1942.

it was regarded a sign of a lack in human understanding that he should fail to realize this. For \$16 a month wages, the evacuees felt they should not be required to exert as much effort as workers on the outside who received several times that amount. To some extent this attitude was communicated from the construction workers, with whom the furniture factory workers closely identified themselves, and among whom there had developed a strong sentiment against exerting themselves for a meager compensation. Mr. Rouner's relations with his workers was chiefly characterized by a series of irritations, and this relationship was especially bad between Rouner and the evacuee foreman who constantly sought to impress on the former the impossibility of driving men who felt as the evacuees felt.

The furniture factory strike developed in the <sup>first week of October</sup> ~~last week of September~~ as a result of continued disputes between the supervisor and the foreman and workers. This was a time when the whole community was stirred by several incidents, the rumor of Nisei disenfranchisement, the theater issue, the oversea's broadcast question and the packing shed worker's strike. Billigmeier describes the following conversation between Elberson, the W.R.A. representative assigned to mediate the difficulty, and the <sup>evacuee</sup> foreman of the factory who had, in the meantime, resigned and taken another position.

"The foreman related the repeated difficulties the evacuee workers had experienced with Rouner. Rouner, he asserted, has no understanding of the people he works with nor any desire to acquire such an understanding. He isn't interested in them as people. His chief interest lies in greater production. The ex-foreman had quit, but Mr. Shirrell had persuaded him to have patience and return to work. Mr. Shirrell promised to talk to Rouner. The Project Director had talked with Rouner, but no tangible evidence of improvement were manifest. Another incident had occurred between the ex-foreman and Rouner. The foreman quit, and the rest of the workers were sufficiently disgusted so that they too terminated. The ex-foreman asserted that he was definitely through with the factory. He had made every effort to establish satisfactory relations with Rouner, but Rouner had not met him half way. He would not make another attempt."<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> Miyamoto Billigmeier Report, "Problems of Labor Relations at Tule Lake."  
p. 3-4.

The furniture factory incident was therefore not a strike but constituted rather a mass resignation of the workers. The difficulty was that the administration found it impossible to recruit another group of workers to replace those who had terminated the position, but because of the pressing need for school furnishings, it was imperative that production at the factory be resumed. Elberson's first effort at mediation was directed toward getting the old workers to return to the factory under the two conditions stipulated by Mr. Shirrell, (a) that the furniture factory problem had to be settled by the following Saturday or the factory would be lost to the project, and (b) Mr. Rouner had to be retained as the supervisor of the factory. Since it was evident in the discussions with the foreman and the workers that they had no desire to return to their old jobs, Elberson's further effort was to gain an agreement with the old crew that they would do nothing to prevent the hiring of a new crew. According to Mr. Shirrell, "Despite the fact that the people who have been working in the furniture factory have refused to work under Mr. Rouner and have told Mr. Elberson that they would interpose no objection to anyone else working there, last night they threatened vengeance on four boys who have been working in an apprentice capacity."<sup>1/</sup> *On the other hand, the foreman denied* ~~On this point, Elberson's conversations with the workers~~ *any attempts at preventing new workers from being hired.* ~~reveals a denial of any attempts at preventing new workers from being hired.~~

"Elberson asked him (the ex-foreman) if he had any objections to others working in the factory.

'I'm through, and I don't care if others want to work,' he answered.

Don Elberson then told him of the reports currently circulating that when other individuals wanted to work in the factory, the former workers would warn them of conditions prevailing in the factory. The prospective workers were reportedly persuaded or intimidated to refuse offers for work in the factory. They were assertedly made to feel that they would be taking other peoples' jobs and that the strike wasn't solved yet. Thus, anyone accepting a job in the factory would, in effect, be acting as a strike breaker.

The foreman denied these allegations and reiterated his feeling that others could go to work if they chose. The matter no longer concerned him."<sup>2/</sup> ~~Billigmeier Report, p. 4.~~

<sup>1/</sup> ~~Billigmeier Report, p. 4.~~ Letter from Shirrell to Rowalt, Oct. 7, 1942.

<sup>2/</sup> Billigmeier Report, op. cit. p. 4.

A meeting was called of the factory workers, and those who attended agreed to sign a statement releasing their jobs for the employment of others, yet when the administration tried to get workers to man the factory, the response was negligible. ~~In regard to the point made by Mr. Shirrell that four apprentices at the factory were threatened by the former workers, while there may have been individuals who sought to prevent the hiring of new workers, it is doubtful that this played as important a part in the failure to recruit new workers as the attitude of the community toward the furniture factory played.~~ Not only was there strong feeling among the evacuees about interfering where a strike had been called by fellow evacuees, but among carpenters and construction workers the word was widely disseminated that Rouner was a difficult man to work under and had the "wrong" attitude towards the evacuees. In his report on the furniture factory incident, Elberson remarks:

"It must be evident that to attempt to get other workers to go to work on ~~evident~~ a job of this kind in a community as compact as this one is next to impossible because of the grape-vine method of communication."1/

Failing in the effort to recruit new workers, Elberson again approached the old workers and attempted to effect some kind of conciliation between them and Rouner. After some persuasion, they agreed to return to their old jobs if Elberson could get some kind of guarantee from Mr. Rouner, "That he would treat them differently." Of his conversation with Rouner on this request of the workers, Elberson reports:

"My discussion with Mr. Rouner on this matter was rather<sup>a</sup>/dismal failure and convinced me even more the justice of the men's complaints."2/

The factory problem evoked great concern~~s~~ especially among the school administrators who keenly felt the need for school furnishings, and a plan was suggested by Mr. Harkness, superintendent of the Tule Lake schools, of using school teachers in the factory during the week ends in order to produce the desperately

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1/ Don Elberson, W.R.A. Labor Relations Representative, Tule Lake Project, "Report on the Packing House," Oct. 30, 1942.

2/ Ibid.

needed seats and desks. Glen Walker, vice-principal of the High School, however, opposed the plan because of the fear of involving the schools in a community issue and the undesirability of <sup>thus</sup> jeopardizing the schools ~~in the eyes of the community~~. The plan was never attempted, but Mr. Gunderson, elementary school principal, appealed to the Community Council on the need for school furniture and for other construction work at the schools and the teachers' residences. The Council was stirred by Gunderson's appeal and pledged its cooperation in straightening out the physical difficulties of the school, but no subsequent action came from the Council on the furniture factory issue, and it is even doubtful if most of them knew of the issue. In the meantime, a few Caucasian cabinet makers were hired to continue production of school furniture at the factory, but the need for a larger staff of workers continued to exist.

The factory difficulty ~~continued on~~ <sup>persisted</sup> into the middle of October. Billigmeier states:

"The principal difficulty lay in the person of Rouner. It became apparent that as long as he remained the superintendent of the factory it would be almost impossible to get evacuees to work there. Whether this was because of pressure on the part of former employees or because there was a general feeling against working for this man, was not clear."<sup>1</sup>/

It was suddenly announced that Rouner had left the project and had been succeeded as superintendent of the factory by Clarence Benz, manual arts instructor of the high school. It is not known whether ~~he~~ <sup>Rouner</sup> left the project voluntarily, or whether Mr. Shirrell asked him to resign. In less than a day after Benz was made the new head of the factory, the old workers returned to their jobs and the "strike" was satisfactorily terminated. In the following weeks of operation, it was revealed that the workers were much better satisfied with Mr. Benz as their supervisor, and no further trouble was experienced in the furniture factory.

The difference in attitude of Mr. Benz and Mr. Rouner toward the factory em-

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<sup>1</sup>/ Billigmeier Report, "Labor Relations." p. 6.

ployees is indicated in some of his comments on the problems of labor relations in the factory as he had observed them.

"In the conversation between Elberson and Benz, the latter related some of the discussion he had held with Rouner before the latter departed. Rouner, he said, complained continually about "those god damned Japs" who just wouldn't cooperate with him."

"When Rouner talked to me about running the factory, ~~he~~ continually spoke of those god damned Japs this and those god damned Japs that."

"Benz explained that Rouner had failed to realize that some of the employees working in the factory were men with long experience in that work. They should, he asserted, be treated accordingly. Rouner rode on the backs of these people with spurs, Benz added."1/

In his own supervision of the factory, Benz allowed greater flexibility in worker relationships and offered more independence to the workers. Billigmeier says in his account of Benz's first day at the factory:

"He spoke to his men the day the furniture factory reopened. He explained to them the organization of the factory, and told them the hours which would be established if there were no serious objections. They were satisfied.

The men spoke up in favor of one of the workers who lived in the far corner of the camp. They told Benz that this man had a hard time getting back to work at noon by 1:15; they offered to bear the burden of his work if Benz would permit him to be a little late when the occasion demanded. Benz agreed to this readily."2/

Commenting further on his attitude toward the evacuee workers, Benz declared:

"A little human understanding goes a long way with these people. They have been hurt and you can't talk rough to them as you can with Caucasians. You have to be considerate of them.

When they asked Rouner to get something for them, he would just say, 'Hell, no, I can't get that,' without even trying. A fellow feels sorry for these people. Their lives have been so uprooted; you've got to treat them right."3/

Benz evidently made a special effort to avoid the mistakes which Rouner had made. "He asked the workers if there was anything they wanted. They wanted painters' caps which Benz got for them. He did other things for them."4/

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1/ Billigmeier Report, "Labor Relations", pp. 6-7.

2/ Ibid, p. 7.

3/ Ibid., p. 7.

4/ Ibid., p. 7.

In his analysis of the furniture factory dispute summarized in a report to the Project Director, Elbersen places the chief responsibility for the appearance of the incident upon Mr. Rouner. Elbersen states:

"The primary issue was the way in which Mr. Rouner handled the men that were working for him; his attitude was negative, his demeanor was rather 'sour.' He was not friendly with the men and had a tendency to drive them in their work. Whereas the men were willing to admit some of their mistakes in walking off the job, Mr. Rouner was willing to admit nothing. In addition, my view is confirmed by that of Mr. Fagan (head of employment section). Mr. Fagan is an individual who is both conservative and stable in his views, and, therefore, I would place a great deal of weight upon his judgment in this matter. This appears to be the only case in which there was a permanent feeling on the part of the men that they would not go back to work for a particular individual. There was no exception to this feeling that I know of. In addition, the way in which the men responded when Mr. Benz was put in charge and the way in which they have been working under his supervision merely makes it all the more evident to me the real issue involved in the dispute was between the men and Mr. Rouner.

There were other issues but they were of a minor character, such as the confusion growing out of the clothing issue, the desire to leave their job at the same time ~~as~~ the construction workers left theirs, and the tendency to want to leave the job occasionally for a smoke."<sup>1/</sup>

#### The Hot-Water Boiler Problem

In each block of the project, buildings housing the block public facilities, the washrooms, showers, laundries and ironing room, were located in the central <sup>area</sup> ~~alley~~ of the block. In the early construction in Wards I to IV, the two women's washrooms and showers, one men's washroom and showers, and the laundry, were built as four separate units with a hot-water boiler in each building; but the later construction in Wards V to VII provided one long building to house all these units and had a single large boiler to provide hot water throughout the whole building. Because of the Japanese custom of frequent bathing, considerable quantities of hot water were used daily. Furthermore, because of the high mineral content of the water, it was found that lime deposits quickly accumulated in the boilers, and the boiler firemen frequently stoked up their fires in order to maintain adequate supplies of hot water. By October, four months after the opening of the pro-

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<sup>1/</sup> Don Elbersen, W.R.A. Labor Relations Representative, Tule Lake Project, "The Furniture Factory," October 30, 1942.

ject, the hot water boilers, especially in Ward I which was the first ward opened, developed leaks and holes which put them out of use, and by December it was reported that eighty boilers throughout the project were in disuse due to <sup>damage. //</sup> leaks and holes. <sup>It was</sup> ~~The problem was made acute by the impossibility of repairing~~ <sup>to repair</sup> the cast iron boilers either by welding or by other methods, and the W.R.A. was unable to acquire new boilers for replacement because of priority restrictions.

The problem was initially a matter of individual block concern, at least for the period when ~~the~~ boiler breakdowns were limited to a few scattered blocks, but as the breakdowns became widespread, the problem threatened to become a community issue and therefore be treated as an issue between the evacuees ~~as a whole~~ and the W.R.A. <sup>Because of the use of "standard boiler equipment and the application of much the same firing practices throughout the project, much the same boiler trouble developed in a number of blocks at about the same time.</sup> ~~The case of the boiler breakdowns shows more clearly than many other issues the influence of the use of standardized equipment and organization in the relocation center in producing community-wide problems. Since more or less the same boiler equipment was used throughout the project, and much the same practices were applied in the use of this equipment, it was to be expected that the breakdowns could not be limited to scattered instances.~~

The case of a single block illustrates the manner in which the problem affected the block people. The first boiler breakdown in Block X occurred in <sup>October</sup> mid-September when the boiler for the men's shower sprung a leak, and though <sup>its use was continued for a while,</sup> ~~some effort was made for its continued use~~ with crude patches, the crack quickly widened and rendered the boiler useless. By informal agreement among the block people, one of the two women's showerrooms was released for male use. In the meantime, the block manager made efforts to have the broken boiler repaired by the maintenance department, and was promised that a replacement boiler would be provided as soon as possible. Less than three weeks after the women's shower was converted to men's use, the boiler feeding hot water to this unit likewise developed a leak.

// Ward I Block Managers Meeting, Dec. 6, 1942.

At a block meeting, the subject of the boiler difficulty was presented by the block manager. He explained that he had tried to get a new boiler, but the administration had declared that there were no replacements available. He had asked the adjoining blocks if they could lend one of their boilers to Block X but they had replied that they needed the boilers themselves and they were overworked as it was. In the ensuing discussion, a series of suggestions were offered by the block people of ways in which the difficulty might be met, and by a selective process, a practicable solution to meet the immediate situation was reached. A block resident inquired whether it was possible to gain use of the boiler in Block 70 which was not occupied by block residents because the block was being used as a school area. The block manager replied that the boiler in that block was too large for use in Block X, and anyway the boiler in Block 70 was being used. The block manager suggested that the only solution would be to have both sexes make joint use of the single <sup>remaining</sup> women's showerroom ~~that was still functioning~~ by establishing a schedule for the separate use of the showers. An extended discussion then followed as to how the schedule should be determined, for the women wanted sufficient time for bathing and some men wanted daily showers instead of showers every other day because their work was of a grimy character. It was finally decided that the question would be taken up with the block Women's Club for their suggestion of the most suitable schedule.

As long as the problem was discussed as a problem of the block, there was no heated discussion of the question but only a joint effort to arrive at some satisfactory solution. However, as soon as the issue was defined as a controversy between the evacuees and the administration, tension was not only aroused, but the block manager, as a representative of the administration, was subjected to considerable criticism.

Sam: "Instead of trying to set up a schedule for the use of a single shower-room, why not see Shirrell to see what can be done?"

Block Manager: "I went to see Shirrell already. But he says there's nothing that can be done about it right now because of the material shortage. Mr. Shirrell says that it's the boiler men's fault because they've been letting the pressure get too high for small boilers of this type. He said that with proper care these boilers are designed to last for a long time, and that there shouldn't be any trouble such as we've been having. I also saw the maintenance crew about fixing our boiler again, but they were angry because the fireman built a fire right after they'd fixed the boiler last Sunday and the thing started leaking again. They refused to do any more work on it. Yesterday, I got them to agree to try again, but this morning they said there was no more powder with which to fill the leaks. I told them they should have instructed me rather than the firemen about the future operations of the boiler."

Mr. Mori: "If Shirrell says it's the firemen's fault, there's no such stupid thing. I think these must be just poor quality boilers. According to some people with whom I've talked, these boilers can be readily repaired. Why didn't you insist more on having repairs made? How was it you didn't reply to Mr. Shirrell? That's no way to act accepting everything that he says."

Block Manager: "If there's anyone who can fix the boiler, I wish you would get him to fix it. I've asked....."

Mr. Kubota: "Don't use such language, 'Why don't you get someone to fix it.' Mr. Mori is saying that there are ways of fixing the boiler. It's your job to get it fixed."

Block Manager: "I didn't mean it that way. All I mean't was, why doesn't someone tell me....."

Mr. Kubota: "You said, 'Why don't you fix it then.' That's pretty rude language. It's your job to see that the boiler is repaired, not Mr. Mori's."

Mr. Kawamura: "If Shirrell says it's the fireman's fault, I'll go see him myself. He can't say that when he doesn't ~~may~~ know anything about it. We know how to operate these boilers."

Block Manager: "Yes, you and Mr. Mori speak to Mr. Shirrell to see what can be done." (Mr. Mori hesitates.)

Mr. Kawamura: "We'll see Shirrell tomorrow. Welding or something can be done on these boilers."

Jack (Nisei electrician): "Cast iron can't be welded. No, it can't."

Block Manager: "Well, we'll leave the problem at that for the present."<sup>1/</sup>

At least two of the men who joined in this discussion were themselves firemen and took Shirrell's criticism of the firemen as a personal affront. Dis-

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<sup>1/</sup> Miyamoto Notes, November 18, 1942.

trust of the administration was so pronounced that the Issei were even skeptical of technical advice from the administration on whether or not the boilers could be repaired. By contrast, there was much greater trust in the opinions of others of their own group and in their personal belief that repairs could be made. When the responsibility for finding means of correcting the problem was placed on these ~~men~~ <sup>critics</sup>, however, there was a noticeable change in their belligerence. Not only were they <sup>somewhat</sup> ~~hesitant to some extent~~ about approaching Mr. Shirrell to inquire for themselves, but when their conversations with Mr. Shirrell and the chief of the maintenance section produced no better result than the previous efforts of the block manager, criticism of the block manager and the administration was noticeably subdued. In reporting back to the block after their talk with the administration, Mr. Mori declared:

"Mr. Kawamura and I saw Mr. Shirrell and the chief of the maintenance section concerning the boiler problem which has been distressing us. It seems that replacement boilers have been ordered but are very difficult to procure because of the present priority system. Some effort has been made to get the repairs done in Klamath Falls where there is a shop that handles these things, but it seems that this shop is also short at the moment on the materials necessary for the repairs and are extremely busy on other jobs. I don't see why the administration didn't anticipate difficulties of this kind and stock up on the necessary equipment. However, for the moment we'll just have to wait until repairs can be made."<sup>1/</sup>

Subsequently, all the hot-water boilers in Block X failed, and it became necessary for the block people to bathe at showers in adjoining blocks for a period of two weeks. In December, however, the maintenance section was able to repair some of the leaky boilers, and a further aggravation of the problem in this block was averted.

As long as the breakdown of boilers was limited to a few blocks, the community as a whole was indifferent to the problem and looked on it as the misfortune of those people who lived in blocks with broken boilers. There was even

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<sup>1/</sup> Miyamoto Notes, November 23, 1942.

some tendency to accept the administration view that it was the fault of the block firemen in overheating the boilers. By December and January, however, a large number of breakdowns occurred throughout the project, and the problem took on the proportion of a community issue. The question first appeared in ward meetings of block managers<sup>1/</sup>, and in time was taken up by the Community Council.

Mayeda brought attention to the problem at the Council meeting of February 3, 1943 by pointing out that one or two blocks were without any functioning boilers while many other blocks were being inconvenienced by boiler breakdowns. "Mr. Coverly," Mayeda declared, "has suggested that if a strong letter is written by the Council on the boiler question, he has agreed to press the matter at Washington."<sup>2/</sup> As in the block meetings, the councilmen had various suggestions to offer of the manner in which repairs might be effected. Fukuyama, for instance, reported, "A man in my ward declares that he can fix boilers with 80% success. He says all he needs is bricks, but I didn't want to give him consent without some authority. I wonder if the Council will give me permission to let him try his method of repair?"<sup>3/</sup> The Council recommended the grant of permission. No further reports on the boiler question were made at the Council since the registration issue appeared in the following week to overshadow all other problems of the community.

It is difficult to imagine what developments on the boiler problem might have appeared had not other events superseded it in importance. Furthermore, after December when some materials for repairs arrived at the project, the project maintenance department continued to make a certain number of repairs on leaky boilers and the most critical situations were gradually alleviated. While the boiler problem ~~could be~~ <sup>was</sup> defined as an issue between the evacuees and the administration by ~~placing the blame for the inconveniences of boiler breakdowns upon the failure of the administration to anticipate the problem, there was a~~ <sup>holding the latter responsible for failing</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> Miyamoto Notes, Ward Block Managers' Meeting, Ward IV, December 9, 1942.

<sup>2/</sup> Miyamoto Notes, February 3, 1942.

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid.,

noteworthy difference in this situation from other issues in that the evacuees experimented among themselves on methods of repairing the broken boilers and thus of removing their discomfort. At least, makeshift methods were frequently utilized with sufficient success to keep those boilers which were only slightly damaged in operation. The irritation resulting from the inconvenience of broken boilers was potentially no less serious than that resulting from food shortages, slow supplies procurement, and delayed wage payments, but in the instance of damaged boilers there was room for the evacuees to find their own solutions to the problem.

#### B. THE MESS HALL STRIKE

##### Background of Mess Hall Difficulties

As early as late June 1942 when a rapid increase in the Tule Lake population was occurring, a noticeable deterioration in the quality of food served at the mess halls began to appear, which led to a series of minor disputes over the food question. Most of the early disputes occurred between the evacuee block residents and the block mess crews, for where block residents were dissatisfied with the meals served in the mess halls, they were inclined at the outset to lay the blame upon the books of the block for their failure to prepare tastier meals. In the background of the conflicts between the block residents and their mess crews were the innumerable irritations which accompanied the adjustments to the mass feeding organization which was characteristic of the centers. Much of the preoccupation about food, of which concern there always a great amount, was directed in the first weeks toward adjusting relations within the block mess halls and relatively little attention was given to the over-all mess organization of the project.<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> See, Tule Lake Report, Chapter IV, pp. 28-40, for an account of the early mess hall difficulties.

By late July and early August, however, the concern about mess halls was shifted from the individual mess organization to the ~~project-administrative~~ system of mess supplies. This development was initially the result of widespread rumors of the rapid diminishing of ~~the~~ food supplies in the project warehouses, and as a result of these rumors the evacuees expressed such unusual behavior as of visiting the warehouses to individually ascertain the amount of food on hand, of drying left-over rice for future emergencies, and of stocking quantities of canned goods and sacks of rice bought at the local canteens for a time when no food would be available at the mess halls. Food purchases by the evacuees led to additional rumors that the W.R.A. was restricting its ration of food to the evacuees in order to limit its cost of operations, and it was even argued in the Council that subsistence items should not be sold at the canteens since they were a temptation to ~~the~~ people to use their own savings on items which the W.R.A. was responsible for providing.<sup>1/</sup> Underlying the rumors of food shortages, there existed a real dissatisfaction in some quarters with the food provided, ~~and where~~ criticism of the cooks brought no improvement, it was contended that an unequal per capita distribution of food was causing shortages in some blocks. While the administration denied an unequal distribution of food, and tended to blame the unequal ability of cooks for the variations in the quality of foods served, the administration nevertheless gave attention to the problem of an equitable distribution of food to silence the growing discontent.<sup>2/</sup>

Although the evacuees were not in a position to determine the exact state of the food supplies, an actual shortage developed in early August which the administration explained as the consequence of a change in the quota of Tule Lake population from an expected 10,000 to 15,000. Sugar which had been hitherto available on the mess tables were now rationed by the sponsors by the waitresses.

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<sup>1/</sup> Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, August 11, 1942.

<sup>2/</sup> Tule Lake Report, Chap. IV, pp. pp. ~~42~~ 40-45.

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Eggs appeared less frequently/~~at the~~ the breakfast table and the meat rations, it was claimed, were increasingly skimpy. Emergency purchases of food supplies in mid-August indicate that actual shortages existed,<sup>1/</sup> and that the complaints of the people about their inadequate meals were probably partially justified. The immediate cause of the Farm Strike on August 15 was the discontent of the farmers with the poor breakfast that morning, and one of the main issues of the dispute was the demand for improvement in the meals. It was also at this time that the first attack upon the Assistant Mess Supervisor, Mr. Pilcher, was made with the accusation that the poor meals of ~~recent~~ recent date were the consequence of ~~the introduction of~~ his "Walerga System" of distributing food supplies. On the basis of judgement of Mr. Pilcher formed by the Sacramento people while he was Mess Supervisor at the Walerga Assembly Center, it was claimed that he had no thought for the welfare of the evacuees, had only the objective of saving food costs for the administration, and had always been a trouble-maker for the evacuees in their past experiences with him. A widespread demand appeared for Pilcher's ouster, but the Farm Strike was settled without administrative action on this demand.<sup>2/</sup> Although Pilcher remained at his position in Tule Lake, Mr. Stultz, Mess Supervisor and Pilcher's superior, became discouraged and disgusted with the mess hall problems at Tule Lake and resigned in late August, although he was comparatively well liked by the evacuees. Stultz was replaced by Ralph E. Peck who very soon found himself in a position of hostility toward the evacuees.

Following the food disputes of the farm strike, the evacuee cooks held a number of meetings to discuss their problems, ~~As a result, of which~~ a committee of seven, one man from each ward, was formed to represent the mess hall workers in all future conversations with the administration. This committee, which was announced on September 3, had as its chairman a man from Sacramento named Kintaro Takeda who <sup>had</sup> experienced some very bad relations with Mr. Pilcher while both were

<sup>1/</sup> Tule Lake Report, Chap. IV, pp. 45-48.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., Chap. V., pp. 23-52. Specifically, pp. 23, 34, -37,

working in the mess department at the Walerga Assembly Center. One of the first aims agreed upon by the Committee ~~if food improvements were to be made~~ was to oust Pilcher for it was felt that he maintained an incorrigibly bad attitude toward the evacuees. *and that he was at the source of their mess hall problems.* A petition was formulated demanding among other things that Pilcher be removed, and after two days of its circulation throughout the project (on September 21 and 22), 9,000 evacuee names were *signed* ~~attached to the~~ petition. A Nisei reporting on the manner in which the signatures were acquired states:

"At supper, a Kibei cook made an announcement in Japanese which no one could hear. Then the other cooks came around with blank sheets of paper and asked everyone at each table to sign. When we asked what it was we were signing the Kibei could not understand English and thought we said something against it and left. We heard from Mr. Kikuchi (who knew only by hearsay) that Pilcher was rude and threatening. He said that the cooks are claiming that in August the project spent only \$.35 a day per person for food when they were supposed to spend \$.45. The petition called for: (1) the immediate discharge of Pilcher, (2) the discharge of anyone else who was not working for the good of the community, (3) replacement of these men with Japanese, and (4) complete control over the food situation by the Japanese. The whole thing disgusted me. I wondered if many of the dopes who signed knew what they were doing. Hell, any swindler could get away with anything."1/

It was widely acknowledged that the signatures on the petition were acquired in a haphazard manner, with only the aim in mind of getting the greatest number of signatures, and *only a* few persons in the community knew precisely the charges that were being made against Pilcher although innumerable rumors about him were circulating. ~~The administration refused to recognize the petition.~~

On September 22 ~~was~~ a dispute occurred between the Caucasian Mess Stewards and the cooks in Mess Hall 13, the kitchen which cooked the noon meals for the farmers. Veal was on the menu for the *noon lunch*, ~~afternoon meal~~, but when it was found that there was not enough veal in the warehouse for the entire farm crew, Mr. Pilcher told the Mess 13 cooks to substitute pork and beans. The cooks refused declaring that it required two days to make decent pork and beans since the beans should be soaked over night. Both Mr. Peck and Mr. Pilcher insisted that a tasty dish of pork and beans could be cooked by the time of the noon meal, but the evacuee

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1/ Shibutani Notes, Sept. 21, 1942.

cooks were adamant in their refusal to attempt it. Wakayama, steward for the farm mess hall, declared, "It was the way Pilcher and Peck ordered us around that got the cooks."<sup>1/</sup> The cooks in Block 13 resigned from the task of cooking for the farm crew, saying, "We've been cooking for the farm only because somebody has to do it, but if there's going to be trouble of this kind, we quit since we've got enough to do feeding our own block people." Wakayama also declared he would resign, and the continuation of farm work was threatened not only because there was the possibility that noon meals would not be served at the farm, but talk developed among the farmers that they should walk out on a sympathy strike to support Wakayama and the Block 13 cooks. The problem was temporarily solved by having the farm crew return to the center for their noon meals, and another mess hall was later enlisted to cook for the farmers.

At the Council meeting on the same evening, September 22, to which Mr. Peck and Mr. Takeda, Chairman of the Mess Hall Committee, were invited, the problem of the farm mess hall was reviewed and Wakayama accused Peck and Pilcher of unnecessary imperiousness in dealing with the evacuee cooks.

Peck: "What was the way in which the cooks answered me? They simply refused to cook the food. That's insubordination. Pork and beans do not require much time in cooking, and we had to have the food to feed the farmers."

Wakayama: "We did give reasons why the pork and beans couldn't be made in time."

Shirrell: "Somebody's got to give orders and somebody's got to take them. There are ways of giving orders, but there has to be some regulations if this project is to work. Cooks are the most temperamental people in the world. They own their kitchens."<sup>2/</sup>

Peck's use of the word "insubordination" was made a point of issue by some councilmen. When Wakayama, as chairman of the Council, again raised the question of whether or not the Council endorsed the action of the Block 13 cooks, Councilman Suzuki declared:

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<sup>1/</sup> Miyamoto Notes, Sept. 22, 1942.

<sup>2/</sup> Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, Sept. 22, 1942.

"Since Mr. Peck still claims that there is insubordination, I move that we give mess hall 13 a vote of confidence."1/

Yego and Tsukamoto objected to Suzuki's motion on the ground that further inquiry should be made before the Council form a decision on the issue, but the motion was carried by a small majority.

At this meeting Mr. Peck and Mr. Takeda were given an opportunity to present the administration and evacuee points of view, respectively, on the mess hall situation. Mr. Peck's introductory statement was a praise of evacuee cooperation, which had become the customary approach of the administrative personnel in all public discussions with the evacuees. "I have been here only a couple of weeks," Mr. Peck began, "The problem of feeding 15,000 people is a difficult one, but I have been happy to find cooperation from the people in the mess halls." Two main points were stressed in his talk, (1) that food shortages on the outside and transportation difficulties made it extremely difficult to procure food supplies for the project, and (2) that there was unnecessary wastage of food in the evacuee mess halls, which needed to be curtailed.

"Tonight we had two dozen eggs in the warehouses, and tomorrow mronigg we shall have 200 dozens. That's how close we're running on our supplies. Sugar rationing likewise affects us. Please ask the people of your blocks to recognize the food shortage and the transportation problems.

We received 1,161 watermelons the other day of which 91 were lost. Part of the loss was due to the spoiling of the melons in transporting them, but a large percentage was lost because of the careless handling of the melons in unloading them. We received 1,500 pounds of sugar of which 125 to 400 pounds were lost in the course of handling. We're only going to get eight ounces of sugar per personx per week..... Due to the scarcity of supplies and inadequate transportation, the vendors can't always get food to us on time. We have increased by 33% the requisition of food for November.

Tea will disappear soon. Some mess halls are throwing away the vegetables that are sent in from the farm, but we can't afford to have you waste vegetables. We're having difficulty getting vegetables from the farm due to the lack of crates, and the crate shortage is the result of people taking them home to build furniture out of them or to Burn them as firewood....."2/

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1/ Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, Sept. 22, 1942.

2/ Ibid.,

Except for one remark on the insubordination of the Block 13 cooks in refusing to prepare the meal ordered for the farmers, Mr. Peck's talk was largely an appeal to the people to understand the difficulties of the administration in supplying adequate meals to the evacuees and to cooperate by saving "every ounce of food possible, for every ounce that is wasted causes difficulties."

Kintaro Takeda's talk was largely devoted to presenting evidence on the incompetence and the lack of understanding shown by Mr. Pilcher. Because of his inability to express himself with fluency in English, part of his talk was given in Japanese and was translated. The substance of his remarks was:

"I arrived from Sacramento on June 18th, and following that we received menus which seemed to be adequate. After Pilcher came to this project in late July, the food seemed to become less and less. When the Pinedale, Marysville, and all the groups had arrived, we mess hall workers held a meeting to discuss the whole problem. That was about the time of the farm strike, and Mr. Pilcher was then giving us only one piece of bread per person and one pound of butter for every 100 persons. We wanted to ask Mr. Shirrell to have Pilcher discharged, but since Mr. Shirrell was not here at the time, we decided to investigate the problem first. When we finally talked to Mr. Shirrell, he told us that he couldn't discharge Mr. Pilcher, but the situation in the mess halls has only grown worse since that time.

I know that it's a hard problem to feed the entire project because I work in the mess division and sometimes we have to work night and day to keep the people fed. Sometimes I get home in the evening thinking my day's work is finished, but people start to come around telling me their mess hall is short on this thing or that which they need for breakfast the next morning, and I have to go around to see what can be done about supplying them. One evening we had to supply bacon in all the blocks, but about eleven o'clock at night we discovered that the bacon didn't arrive in certain blocks. Then I went to see Mr. Pilcher and asked him if the bacon couldn't be supplied later to those who didn't get any, but he refused and said, 'I'll do my job if you do yours.' Can't cooperate with a man like that."

In some mess halls the cooks save food and use it for something else later. Pilcher says if you have certain foods in the mess stock room, it will be taken up. I asked him not to remove such food, unless he got permission from the councilmen. Pilcher took away all the eggs in Wards III and VII, and even took those which the baby dieticians needed. I complained about that, and then Douglas called me a 'Communist.' I was so angry that I didn't even eat supper that night.

At a meeting held by the mess division of the Fair Practice Committee we discussed the whole problem again, and the question came up about having Pilcher and Douglas discharged. So we sent out petitions and got 9,000 names. (Takeda indicated a bundle of paper bearing signatures. He read off menus

and showed that in many instances the supplies deviated from the menu.)

I got some information from fish men on the outside, people with whom I've done business, that cod sells at 13¢ to 15¢ a pound now. Now suppose at top price we say that it costs 20¢ per pound. I got only 29 pounds of cod for each mess hall of 250 persons, which at top price didn't cost more than \$5.80 for each mess hall. How are you going to feed 250 people with 29 pounds of codfish? One time beef was ordered for the mess halls, but we found that some mess halls got 125 pounds of beef and others got only 90 pounds. People come to me and ask that I do something about it.

Mr. Peck is a very fine man, better than Mr. Stultz, but Pilcher won't listen to me and he refuses to cooperate. When I try to talk to him, he only says he'll bring in the Army to enforce his orders.

In the month of August, the evacuees received only 35¢ per person per day of food when the administration had promised us 45¢ per day. (Takeda closed his remarks by indicating an analysis of the food costs which his committee had made.)<sup>1/</sup>

Shirrell was perceptibly irritated by Takeda's discussion, and in reference to the analysis of the food costs made by the latter's committee, Shirrell said, "I don't like people going behind my back to get information." Mr. Peck attempted to correct certain of Takeda's statements which he considered misinterpretations of the reasons for taking certain action. Since Takeda's appearance before the Council was specifically for the purpose of getting action on the petition to have Pilcher discharged, the problem of the Council was to determine whether or not to approve the petition and take it up with Mr. Shirrell.

Fukuyama: "This matter was brought before the Merit Rating Board. We had no direct responsibility in this, but since the matter was referred to us, we investigated the petition against Mr. Pilcher. Our feeling is that passing around a petition isn't fair to the party concerned, at least not until the person accused has a chance to present his case before the Merit Board. I feel that we should table the petition until further investigation has been made."

Suzuki: "You can't table a thing that comes from the people."

Henry Taketa: "We're not taking orders from anyone. Pilcher had a reputation from Walerga of being overbearing towards the evacuees, and he should never have been hired to work for the W.R.A. If civilians are going to order us around, maybe it would be a good thing if the Army took over. I'd rather take orders from them."

Fukuyama: "I've had my own difficulties with Mr. Pilcher and I have no reason to defend him. But I think there must be some organized manner of handling

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<sup>1/</sup> Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, Sept. 22, 1942.

this problem. Unless it is organized, petitions will become a general sort of thing, and we'll get chaos."

Kintaro Takeda: "The Mess Hall Committee didn't take the matter up with the Merit Board because noone trusts it since Mr. Hayes is chairman of the Board. Some people say that we should send out a petition asking that the Army be brought in and supervise the camp under the provisions of international law. They say we'll get better living circumstances under the Army than now. Everyone is ready to jump on me."

Fukuyama: (Defends the Merit Board.)

Tsukamoto: "It's quite an important matter when 9,000 persons sign a petition. If some outsider had come in to tell us these things about mess hall operations, I wouldn't believe what was said, but when Mr. Takeda speaks, we know that the man who is speaking to us is sincere in his beliefs. As for the petition, this is a democratic tool of the greatest importance and I don't think we have the right to treat it lightly. The petition should be certified to Mr. Shirrell so that he may refer it to the proper investigatory committee. That body is not the Merit Board; it is the Fair Practice Committee whose business is to look into labor disputes of this kind."

Sugiyama: "I move that the council go on record in favor of the petition and that it be referred to Mr. Shirrell." (Motion carried.)1/

Mr. Shirrell agreed to consider the petition, but he insisted that the question would have to be referred to the Merit Board.

Still another matter of importance regarding evacuee food supplies came up at this Council meeting in a discussion of the relation between the personnel mess hall and the evacuee food warehouses. Oshima who was particularly well informed on the project butcher service stated:

"Does the personnel mess hall get meat supplies separate from the colony? Tenderloin of beef is being cut out of the meat supplies for the colony, and is being sent to the personnel mess. The colony doesn't get any choice meat. Mr. Pilcher has been telling the boys to cut it out. Also, the personnel mess is getting sugar without restriction."2/

Mr. Shirrell agreed that the "matter should be looked into." An investigation was made on the following day and the findings were incorporated in a memorandum from the Project Director to M. C. Cooke, chief of transportation and supply, and Ralph Peck, chief steward. The memo, which was published in the Tulean Dispatch,

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1/ Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, Sept. 22, 1942.

2/ Ibid.

referred to Administrative Instruction 36 which states in Paragraph 2, Section A, that requisitions, separate from those for evacuee messes, should be placed for the personnel mess in accordance with specified conditions, and in Section B continued with the instruction:

"B. When food is issued for an administrative personnel mess from supplies procured for use by both administrative and evacuee personnel, no discrimination in favor of either mess shall be exercised with respect to quality of food, choice of meat cuts, or otherwise...."1/

Shirrell's memo then went on to say:

"I am reliably informed that Item B is not being lived up to and we are requisitioning choice cuts of meat from the butcher shop in the refrigerator warehouse unit. This practice must cease at once. We are violating not only this regulation but such practice also breaks all the laws of decency and fair play.

If in the future you buy meat for the personnel mess from the butcher shop in the refrigerator warehouse, you must buy whole halves of beef, mutton or pork, using all of it for the personnel mess.

.....

Please acknowledge this memorandum so I may be in a position to state that you and your staff realize how seriously I consider this instruction."2/

The findings, in this instance, produced direct evidence of either an oversight on the part of the Caucasian mess supervisors or a deliberate discrimination against the evacuees. The chief responsibility for the discrimination was placed upon Mr. Pilcher who, it was said, had ordered the choice cuts of meats for the personnel mess.

Another immediate consequence of the Council discussion of the mess problem was that a much stricter rationing system than previously was established. It was announced that effective on Friday, September 25, "Ralph Peck, mess supervisor, and his assistants are instructed to split the rations down to pounds and ounces so as to be absolutely fair to each block." 3/ The earlier system had been based on gross allotments calculated for block population categories such as: 225 to 250, \*\*\*\*

1/ Washington W.R.A., Administrative Instruction No. 36, "Mess for Administrative Personnel on Relocation Centers." August 24, 1942.

2/ Tulean Dispatch, Sept. 25, 1942. p. 1.

3/ Tulean Dispatch, Sept. 25, 1942. p. 1.

250-to 275, 275 to 300, etc., but the new system called for rations on the basis of the exact number of individuals in a block.

In response to the petition requesting the discharge of Mr. Pilcher, Shirrell asked that the Merit Board and the Fair Practice Committee convene jointly to investigate the conditions of the mess halls, but Kintaro Takeda, the chief representative of the mess workers, felt that the administration placed numerous obstacles in the way of giving the mess workers' demands a fair hearing. Sakoda, who followed Takeda's activities at this time, reports:

"Mr. Shirrell maintained that charges must be brought against Mr. Pilcher before any action could be taken. Mr. Takeda, therefore, took this matter up with the Fair Practice Committee and the Merit Board. But he did not receive a sympathetic response from Mr. Shirrell. The latter maintained that since Mr. Pilcher was a Civil Service employee, he himself could not do very much about this matter, except to hear the charges. In fact, Mr. Shirrell intimidated Mr. Takeda by telling him that he was an agitator and that as such he was going to be turned over to the F.B.I. for investigation. According to Mr. Takeda, Mr. Shirrell was willing to talk the matter over when Mr. Takeda told Mr. Shirrell that he was willing to go to jail if Mr. Shirrell would take care of his wife and children and see to it that the people are properly fed."<sup>1/</sup>

Three meetings of the joint investigating committee were held, the first on September 30 to hear testimonies, the second at Mr. Pilcher's office on October 1 to review the records of distributed food supplies, and the third on October 2 to draw up recommendations based on the testimonies and evidence.

"The investigation by the Fair Practice Committee (and Merit Board) did not proceed very smoothly. There was a feeling on the part of the members on the Committee that the Caucasians were insincere and were not taking the committee seriously. Specific charges against Mr. Pilcher were brought up, meetings were held and witnesses called in, but the Committee seemed to make very little progress in its attempt to get any result from the Administration. Mr. Shirrell declared that a Caucasian staff members must be investigated by a Caucasian committee, and he appointed a special mess investigating committee consisting of Frank Fagan, Fred L. Connor, and Paul Fleming. The Fair Practice Committee was disgusted because it was powerless to do anything. Some members on the Committee felt that it was better to dissolve the committee if it were not going to have the power to do anything."<sup>2/</sup>

~~was~~  
The report of the findings, ~~which/were~~ published in the project newspaper,

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<sup>1/</sup> Sakoda Report, "Messhalls in Tule Lake," Dec. 16, 1942. p. 62.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., pp. 62-63.

bore only the names of the Caucasian personnel appointed to the special investigating committee which suggests that the evacuee group on the Fair Practice Committee and Merit Board dissented from the conclusions of the report. In the published findings, six specific charges brought against Mr. Pilcher were considered, and most of them were dismissed in favor of Mr. Pilcher. The report conclusion:  
closed with the/~~recommendation~~

The committee feels that Mr. Pilcher understands his business thoroughly and has earnestly tried to manage the distribution of food; that he has not, however, been always alert to see that mistakes are corrected; and that explanations as to the reasons for quotas have not always been given. Also, that he has not at all times been tactful with members of the mess crew, particularly when complaints were presented.

It should be noted that Mr. Pilcher has worked under conditions of very severe over-load, particularly during the period from Sept. 11 to Sept. 18, in which time he was the only staff member concerned with mess problems on the project. It was during this period that most of the complaints arose.<sup>1/</sup>

There was nothing in the report of the investigating committee to warrant Mr. Pilcher's discharge, and Mr. Shirrell therefore continued to ignore the evacuee demand for Pilcher's release. From the evacuee point of view, however, this was a denial of the desire of 9,000 people in the community who had signed the petition. Mr. Takeda and the Fair Practice Committee felt helpless about doing anything further about the problem. A meeting of the Mess Advisory Council was called to discuss further moves, and two alternative proposals were offered, (a) to take the plea for Pilcher's discharge to the Regional Office of the W.R.A., and (b) to call a strike.

A meeting of all the evacuees was called to consider the two proposals and it was finally decided that charges against Pilcher should be filed with the Regional Office and a strike be called at the same time to give support to their demands. The difficulty ~~with~~ calling a mess hall strike was that it would affect the evacuees themselves, for if the cooks refused to prepare meals, the people would not be able to eat, but the problem was circumvented by a clever *device*

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<sup>1/</sup> Tulean Disptach, October 8, 1942. p. 1.

of setting indefinite meal hours. Thus, all the meals were<sup>to be</sup>/served at irregular hours of the day so that noone would go without food, but people would not know what hour of the day they would eat. Children were to be given special consideration so that they could eat early enough to get to school. "The meeting (of the cooks) was ruled by emotion, and persons who made suggestions contrary to the views of the majority were either shouted down or threatened with violence."<sup>1/</sup>

The basic issues on which the mess hall strike was called were:

1. Food was held to be inadequate because only 35¢ per person per day was being spent instead of the 45¢ that was promised. It was demanded that rations be increased so that the latter figure would be approximated.
2. Mr. Pilcher should be removed from his position.
3. Work clothing for mess workers which had been promised but not yet delivered should be supplied immediately.
4. Back pay should be issued immediately.<sup>2/</sup>

The fundamental aim of the mess workers, however, was to have Mr. Pilcher discharged.

#### The Slow-Up Strike

On the morning of October 12, evacuees who straggled to breakfast between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, the customary hour for breakfast, discovered that there<sup>was</sup>/~~were~~ no meals on the tables and that breakfast was promised for a later hour that morning. Morning meals were served anywhere between 8:30 and 10:00 a.m., and most workers remained in their blocks until they had their breakfast. Lunches appeared between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m., and suppers came on between 4:00 to 5:30 in the evening. Work schedules throughout the project were disrupted for few if any of the workers were willing to forego their meals and the irregularity of the meal hours forced the people to remain close to the blocks to wait for the sound of their dinner gong. In effect, the mess hall strike

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<sup>1/</sup> Sakoda Report., op. cit., p. 64.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid. p. 64.

affected the project as a general strike . Many of the farm and construction crew workers refused to work.

Mr. Kallam (farm supervisor) reported to Mr. Shirrell that the farmers refused to go to work, and Mr. Shirrell ordered that no trucks be sent to take the older people out to the farms, and only the high school children, who were working on the farm at this time, be allowed to go out to work. A curious situation was developed where the children went out to work while their parents idled around at home. Mr. Taketa made arrangements for the following day so that lunches would not be prepared for the farm workers, thus preventing even the high school students from going to work."1/

If the mess hall strike originated as a strike strictly of the mess crew, efforts were made to extend it to a strike of all workers. Evacuees interested in supporting the fight of the mess crew, most of whom were Issei and Kibei, attempted to bring pressure upon all others to prevent them from going to work. On the first day of the strike, several ~~of the~~ messhalls served supper at 4:30 in the afternoon to "punish" those who had gone to work and were therefore unaware that an early supper was being served.

"I don't know whether to go to work this morning. Some Issei were saying that noone should go to work because the mess crew is striking to improve food conditions for all the people and we should sympathize with their fight. I don't see why there should be a strike. At least, they shouldn't prevent the rest of us from working. They want their pay, don't they? But if they won't let me go to work, I can't work on the payroll and it's going to slow it up that much more."2/

"I was heading across the firebreak toward the administration area and some man told us not to go to work because there was a strike on, but I just kept on walking. I thought for a moment, though, that I might get into trouble right there."3/

"I couldn't get to the office until 2:30 and worked until 5:30. I got home only to find that supper was all over. They had served supper at 4:40 to punish the people who had gone to work. Tomi said the food was lousy anyway but the principle of the thing griped me. Naj came over. He was mad as hell too. Tomi made some soup and salad and weenies for us and we cooled off. Naj couldn't see why the strike was continuing since Pilcher had resigned last Saturday."4/ (Pilcher's resignation had not yet been accepted.)

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Sakoda

1/ Badoka Report, "Mess Halls in Tule Lake," p. 65.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, October 12, 1942.

3/ Ibid.,

4/ Shibutani Journal, October 12, 1942.

On the second day of the mess hall strike, the mess hall committee was called to Mr. Shirrell's office to negotiate differences. According to the report of the secretary of the mess committee, who took notes on the meeting,

"He (Mr. Shirrell) started the meeting by making it very clear to the committee that he was angry, 'very, very angry with any group of people who would deliberately upset every plan and work schedule in the project with such a clever plan.' The plan, he said, was very cleverly conceived by a man far smarter than Mr. Shirrell himself. However, the organization of this plan put the mess crews on a plane with the C.I.B. or the I.W.W.

After a thorough discourse on his reasons for displeasure with the mess crews for this display of unreasonable impatience, Mr. Shirrell stated that the F.B.I. would be called in on this case, that the F.B.I. would be asked to check on the loyalty of each and every Issei and Nisei citizen in the project; that any disloyal persons found in the project would be sent elsewhere 'so fast that they won't have a chance to pick up a toothbrush.'<sup>2/</sup>

Mr. Shirrell was also alleged to have made a very strong attack upon agitators within the project and blamed the mess strike upon a handful of such men.

"Mr. Shirrell stated that this upset in mess schedules was the result of a dozen or so agitators within the confines of this camp whose loyalties would be checked upon by the F.B.I. He said that he wished that all such persons might be sent to Japan that 'they might be drafted into the Japanese Army and shot with American bullets by American soldiers.'<sup>2/</sup>

The report is probably not exaggerating in stating that Mr. Shirrell was very angry, for he was more disturbed by the mess hall strike than by any other preceding incident. Perhaps the only time he lost his temper at a Council meeting was on the occasion of Mr. Takeda's report of mess hall conditions, and later, before the close of the meeting, Shirrell remarked, "Sorry I lost my temper a little while ago."<sup>3/</sup> The Mess Hall Strike came at the end of a long series of disturbances, Shirrell had been working so hard to keep the conflicts at a minimum that he was cautioned by his doctor against overwork, and by various signs of irritation, he showed that his nerves were frayed. Nothing contributed more to his irritation <sup>of</sup> ~~with~~ the Mess Committee, however, than the fact that he was

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<sup>1/</sup> Mess Committee Report of Conference with Mr. Shirrell, October 13, 1942, 10:30 a.m. Kengo Nogaki, secty. p. 1.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid, p. 21

<sup>3/</sup> Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, Sept. 22, 1942.

forced to discharge Mr. Pilcher as a result of evacuee pressure. With Mr. Shirrell it was a matter of principle that he would discharge no member of the administrative staff without better grounds than the simple evacuee dislike of a staff member. Pilcher had submitted his resignation on October 10 following the publication in the project newspaper two days previously of the ~~mp~~ report by the special committee to investigate the mess halls, but Shirrell had then refused to accept the resignation. When the mess hall strike occurred on October 12, Mr. Dillon Myer, the national W.R.A. director, was visiting the project, and it was alleged by some administrative staff officers that it was Mr. Myer's recommendation of accepting Pilcher's resignation that finally persuaded Mr. Shirrell to do so.

On this point, the evacuee Mess Committee's report of its conference with Mr. Shirrell states:

"He (Mr. Shirrell) next brought up the subject of the discharge of Mr. Pilcher which was indirectly brought about by a petition made up and signed by approximately 9,000 colonists at the Tule Lake Project who had grievances against ~~him~~ Mr. Pilcher in connection with ~~his~~ his handling of the mess personnel and the distribution of food. In Mr. Shirrell's words, 'Mr. Pilcher was the best steward over in this camp. In violation of all laws of fair play, I was forced to allow Mr. Pilcher to hand in his resignation.' Mr. Shirrell was highly incensed over Mr. Pilcher's resignation. However, when it was brought to his attention that Mr. Pilcher was the center of trouble at ~~the~~ the Walerga reception center, he stated that he 'never would have allowed Mr. Pilcher to come here if he had known about Mr. Pilcher's trouble at Walera.' However, at the time of Mr. Pilcher's acceptance as project steward at Tule Lake, the personnel here was desperately in need of a steward and because Mr. Pilcher had been transferred to Salinas and his application ~~xxxx2~~ had been made from there, he was accepted and commenced work here. If a petition can fire Mr. Pilcher, such a petition signed tomorrow could cause the discharge of Mr. Elbertson (whom the evacuees respected). He also added as a final statement that he 'would not blame Mr. Pilcher if he travelled around the country making speeches against the Japanese evacuees. I hope he does.'"<sup>1/</sup>

In the discussion between the evacuee negotiating committee and Mr. Shirrell, the four complaints of the mess crews were taken up in their order. First, in regard to the allotment of a full 45¢ per person per day food allowance, Mr. Cooke,

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<sup>1/</sup> Mess Committee Report, op. cit., p. ~~87~~<sup>82</sup>.

Chief of the Transportation and Supplies Division, stated that the full 45¢ would be spent, but warned that because of the nationwide food shortage there would be less of certain staple foods, particularly meat, in the future. The second complaint asking for Mr. Pilcher's discharge was already settled by his resignation. The third issue was the demand for the issuance of work clothing to mess workers. Regarding this matter, Mr. Shirrell claimed that every effort of the administration to secure mess workers' uniforms had been "met with a stone wall everywhere." Bids from manufacturers had been accepted and orders had been placed, but the manufacturers would fail to fill their orders because of priority orders from the Army. However, there was hope that three ~~orders~~ <sup>orders</sup> from Sears, Roebuck and Company, Montgomery Wards, and J. C. Penny Company, of Klamath Falls, might be fulfilled. Some aprons and uniforms were declared to be "on the rails now" and their arrival depended on transportation. Finally, there was the question of delayed wage payments. Shirrell's answer was, "I have no influence over the Treasury Department." All that he could promise was that their checks would eventually come through, but he pointed out the enormous task of the Government in paying their civil servants as well as the military personnel.

No decision was reached at this conference between the administration and the evacuee Mess Hall Committee, but Mr. Shirrell made it plain that the only conclusion he would accept was a decision of the mess workers to return to their jobs.

"Upon being informed that a meeting of the mess hall representatives would be held to receive their decision, Mr. Shirrell asked that Mr. Cooke and Mr. Elbertson be present at the meeting to explain his stand. He explained that he "was too mad" to be present. However, he made it clear that only one answer could come from the meeting and that was the decision of all the workers to return to work on schedule on the following morning. If such a decision was not made, all mess hall workers would be relieved of their duties and reassigned to other jobs. He closed by saying that this situation cast a 'reflection on my ability as an administrator and upon my ability ~~as~~ as a friend of the Japanese people.' Troubles such as these would cause him to lose face with the staff and with himself."<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> Mess Committee Report, op.cit., p. 4.

From this report, it seems that the W.R.A. made concessions on all of the four grievances presented by the Mess Committee, except insofar as procurement difficulties prevented an immediate correction of all the conditions of complaint. Certain accusations of graft were made at this meeting, however, which were not recorded in the report, that led to Shirrell's outburst against the agitators, and the resulting basis of distrust was something that was left unsettled. According to a member of the committee who met with Mr. Shirrell:

"We had definite proof that Pilcher had been grafting from the WRA and the people of the community. We discovered two carloads of fruits that were not accounted for on the books, and asked Pilcher about them. He replied that the fruits were rotten and he had dumped them. We also found one carload of meat unaccounted, and he replied that this too had been dumped. We asked him where he had dumped the stuff, and he replied that they had been dumped at a certain spot. The committee then insisted that Pilcher take us out to the spot where the meat was supposed to have been dumped, and though he refused at first, he finally took us out but there was no sign of any dumped meat. With this proof the committee went to Mr. Shirrell to show that Pilcher, and probably Peck, had been in cahoots in cheating the people.

Shirrell became extremely angry. He said that he was going to find ~~that~~ the agitators in the community who are causing all the trouble and send them to Japan as fast as he can get them out. He also said he hoped that when they got back there, that American bullets would get everyone of them."1/

The same individual offered the rumor that Shirrell must have been in on the graft himself for otherwise he would not have gotten so angry over the accusation against Pilcher and Peck.

At the mess workers' meeting on the afternoon of October 13, this suspicion of Mr. Shirrell was expressed in another way.

Issei: "If the mess halls do not open at seven o'clock tomorrow morning, all the cooks will be terminated. Did Mr. Shirrell say that?"

Mr. Cooke: "Mr. Shirrell did not say that. He said that he was in a mood to do that. Mr. Shirrell wants me to ask all the cooks to go back to regular hours. We are meeting all of the four points. We are really trying to cooperate and to give what you really want. Mr. Shirrell said that if the colonists had waited a little while more they would have gotten their clothing and more food."2/

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1/ Miyamoto Notes, October 15, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Journal, October 13, 1942.

On the whole, the grievances of the mess workers had been settled by the morning's negotiations, and the main issue of having Pilcher discharged had been removed by the latter's resignation. The announcement that Mr. Pilcher's resignation had been accepted brought applause from the audience. However, the attitude of disgruntlement continued among the mess workers, and they concentrated their complaint upon the point that they should get immediate supplies of clothing. The question had been raised at the morning meeting of whether or not the mess workers might be supplied the stock of mackinaws in the warehouse. Mr. Cooke had explained that they were "surplus commodities from other governmental departments" but that it would be impossible to get further supplies, and the 6,000 coats were therefore being saved for outside workers. The issue was again raised at the afternoon meeting.

Issei: "I hear there are several hundred overcoats. I would like to have them distributed as a sign of good faith. Also, I have heard that the August pay has arrived, but Shirrell has refused to sign them out."

Mr. Cooke: "Over \$15,000 are being spent to buy clothing for you. We have some clothes for outside workers. There is discussion in Mr. Shirrell's office of distributing warm clothing to additional workers. I shall tell Mr. Shirrell to give you additional warm clothing. But to help me I wish you would go back to the regular hours tomorrow morning."<sup>1/</sup>

Grasping at the issue suggested in this discussion, the cry was taken up, "Let's not go back to work unless we get our coats."<sup>2/</sup> One individual offered the opinion:

"If we don't take something back to the mess hall as a gift, it is difficult to go back and ask that we return to the regular schedule. I think that we can manage to get some warm clothing. Let's not return to the regular schedule unless they give us extra clothing by tomorrow."<sup>3/</sup>

The chairman accepted this view and supported the agreement that the strike should not be called off unless the clothing question was more definitely settled.

"I agree. We should return to the regular schedule if they give us the warm clothing tomorrow. If we can believe their words we wouldn't have had to do what we did yesterday and today. We also have to consult the construction

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<sup>1/</sup> Sakoda Journal, October 13, 1942.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid.

and other departments who struck with us. I shall say that we cannot go back to work without your showing your good faith."1/

The question was even raised whether the mess crew should be satisfied with getting clothing for themselves alone; there was some feeling that unless all the divisions that had joined in sympathy strikes were also satisfied, that the mess crews should not return to their jobs. The chairman suggested that this question would be settled in a committee meeting with the other divisions, but he added, "We don't want to do anything which will make other departments say 'Is that all they got?'"2/

The administration was represented at this meeting by Mr. Cooke and Mr. Elberson, but there was a noticeable difference in the attitude of these men toward the mess committee and, correspondingly, of the evacuees toward the two men. Mr. Cooke's primary emphasis throughout the negotiations was that the W.R.A. was doing everything possible to meet the demands of the people, and that <sup>the</sup> mess crew therefore should return to ~~their~~ <sup>its</sup> jobs on the following morning. In fact, he suggested repeatedly that Mr. Shirrell's reaction to the question of distributing work clothing would depend on the immediate termination of the strike. Mr. Elberson's emphasis, on the other hand, was directed toward the establishing of committees to make further investigations into mess hall conditions, to provide a mechanism for a more direct understanding of each other's views, and thus eliminate the basis of disputes before they evolved into major conflicts. At one point in the meeting, Elberson declared:

"I feel that Mr. Takeda is doing a good job of trying to solve this mess hall situation. I feel that he is not trying to whip you into a frenzy. He is not trying to crush you. I feel therefore that Mr. Takeda is a valuable man as far as labor relations go. Therefore, I will support Mr. Takeda in case there is an investigation of his activities. I think he is a valuable man and one who should be kept here."3/

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1/ Sakoda Journal, October 13, 1942.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Ibid.

Evacuee expressions indicated showed distrust of Mr. Cooke's evasiveness on some of their demands, while there was clearly a much greater willingness to negotiate through Mr. Elberson.

The negotiations of the Mess Committee with the administration were carried on into the evening of October 13, and despite the somewhat stubborn stand taken ~~in the afternoon~~ by some speakers at the afternoon meeting, the clothing issue was settled with a plan for the distribution of work clothing shortly thereafter. As a result, the mess hall strike was called off on the evening of October 13, and all workers returned to their jobs on the following morning.

That night at the regular meeting of the Community Council, Mr. Shirrell issued a warning to the people through their representatives.

"Tonight, I'm on the hottest seat I've ever been on, and I've been in some pretty hot spots. My staff feels that I have utterly deserted them. I fired a man, Mr. Pilcher, and practically broke his heart. I wouldn't blame him if he went up and down the highway calling me and the Japanese people a dirty bunch who thrust him out unreasonably. It's going to be a long time before I can live down the fact that I've practically broken a man's heart to satisfy the demands of a group of people. Pilcher is one of the best stewards I have ever known, and he has worked very hard to do his job, one of the messiest jobs, as well as it might be done. Now that I've fired one man under the pressure of 9,000 names on a petition, every person on the staff is wondering if he may not be the next.

"These are very dangerous times for the Japanese people. Such conduct day by day puts just one more plank on the bridge to Japan. If they want to go back, let's have them go back now. I object to those few who make it possible for the rest to follow. There are a few people who should be in some other camp, and they are going as fast as I can find them. There are some people who make it impossible for people on the outside to help you.

"This Council ought to bear this burden with me. This is a responsibility you can't dodge. This is your future, especially if you have children who are going to live in the United States. This is very discouraging. We should quit looking backward, and look forward. I told you fellows that it is very serious. You are going to lose some of the staunchest friends among the staff. If you and we do not work together, it's going to be too bad. It's not the Army. They are only too glad to get out of here. The F.B.I. is next. It's going to be a long day before I break another man's spirit as I did today. He was trying his best, and we were needlessly cruel."<sup>1/</sup>

Notes

<sup>1/</sup> Sakoda Journal, October 13, 1942. Also, Miyamoto/~~XXXX~~, October 13, 1942.

Shirrell was not exaggerating in saying that his staff was disturbed by Pilcher's discharge. In common with Mr. Shirrell, many of the administrative staff blamed a few trouble makers as the source of all the disturbances, which affected the efficiency of their departments and the perceivable merit of their supervision. The "agitator hunt" was begun in earnest about the time of the Mess Hall Strike.

"We (Jacoby and I) went on ~~the~~ to discuss the agitators, about whom Jacoby (Chief of Internal Security) seems to be very much worried. He thought that it would be a very good idea to keep in mind who some of these people who threatened others with violence were, in case something did happen. He wanted to know if some of the people who spoke at the broadcast affair were the same ones who spoke last night."1/

~~"Halle came so I had to return.~~ She (Halle) said that ample food was being supplied but that the agitators and the Japanese cooks were burying it now that they knew the garbage cans were being inspected. She said that there were just a few individuals at fault and said that they would be removed. She asked me if I knew of any; I said, "No," and she replied cynically, "Oh you won't talk either, huh? If some of our loyal Americans would cooperate a little more we could run this camp decently. As it is what more could we do?"2/

"I saw Miss Francis (Head of Adult Education) and asked her about the room that we had been deprived of. She suggested that we go to a mess hall and when I told her that Peck was not popular with the cooks, her reaction was that if the chief cook didn't follow Peck's orders, then all that had to be done was to get a new chief cook. She said that the people in the administration was getting sick and tired of the troubles and that the agitators were going to be punished. It seemed to me that the administration was trying to find a scapegoat for its own errors and the agitators were it."3/

As a result of the increased interest shown by the administration in uncovering agitators, some concern developed among the evacuees about F.B.I. ~~xxxx~~ and administration "stool pigeons" in the community. However, it seems doubtful that this concern was widespread in the community at the time, for no wave of hysteria about the "inu" (informers) appeared such as was developed under certain other conditions of crisis.

If the administration was becoming exasperated by the continued disturbances, fairly large sections of the evacuee community likewise began to view strikes with disfavor. While there were none to oppose the Issei and Kibei extremists publicly,

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1/ Sakoda Journal, October 13, 1942.

2/ Shibutani Journal, October 13, 1942.

3/ Shibutani Journal, October 16, 1942.

many in the community expressed opinions privately denouncing the extreme stand of the "trouble makers." The older Nisei, on the whole, felt that the vindictive distrust of the W.R.A. characteristic of the extremists and the "unreasonable" demands upon the agency were wholly unnecessary. Some Issei expressed the view that the community was too much dominated by greed, and the leaders of the moderate Issei showed irritation because "Issei who were 'nobodies' before the war" were now the rabble-rousers of the community glorying in their power.

"Harry and the rest of us are getting pretty fed up with the distrust which the Issei have for the administration. Admitted that the organization here isn't perfect and there's much that is wanted, considering the difficulties of the W.R.A. in trying to run projects of this kind, they're doing a fair job of it. At least, they are, on the whole, sincere in their effort, and the administration deserves to get more cooperation from the people."1/

"I don't see why the Issei have to be so distrustful. Now they're accusing Mr. Shirrell of graft. I think the main source of trouble is that they aren't getting paid on time, but the Issei are just making it tough for us and themselves by their stubborn attitude. The Issei are more distrustful anyway; they don't trust themselves because they're insincere. They can't understand the sincerity of others."2/

"He (father) said that the basic attitudes of the Issei were unchanged. He said that any changes were only camouflage for the real acquisitive attitudes that have always been present. He said that the Issei came here to make money and they still have a lust for money. He commented on the strikes here and said that he doubted that the same people if they were on the outside, for example the beet-field workers in Idaho, would strike. He felt that the kids who were brought up in this camp would be at a handicap since they were learning that those who did not grab first would lose. He felt that that type of attitude would not be conducive to civilized living."3/

"Mr. Minobe (moderate Issei leader) feels that many persons in the community are getting tired of the repeated strikes and are gradually turning away from their leadership."4/

While these expressions were not typical of the community since they were drawn from those opposing the pro-Japanese extremists, they nevertheless reflected a growing sentiment in the community. Discontent among the evacuees had not disappeared and for that reason even the moderates in the community could not take the same stand in complete opposition to the strikes which the administrative per-

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1/ Miyamoto Notes, Oct. 15, 1942.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, Oct. 14, 1942.

3/ Shibutani Journal, Oct. 13, 1942.

4/ Miyamoto Notes, October 19, 1942.

sonnel took. Considering the evacuation and the continued anti-Japanese publicity in the West Coast newspapers, the evacuees could not completely accept the recommendation that they "quit looking backward, and look forward." The unwillingness to name agitators in their own group was in part a result of fear and of a desire not to be labelled an inu (informer), but it was also in large part due to the view that the position of the extremists was at least partially understandable in the light of the restrictions placed on the evacuees. Nevertheless, there were evidences of a growing satiation in the community with disturbances, and ~~an~~ increasing signs of adjustment to center life which were leading to the view that the people should live quietly in the center for the duration without creating disturbances over minor problems.

## CHAPTER IX. STABILITY WITHIN INSTABILITY

### A. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EVACUEE CONTROLS

#### The Permanent Community Council

By the project-wide election of November 30, twenty-eight Councilmen were elected to the Permanent Community Council, four from each of the seven wards, to replace the sixty-two councilmen who had constituted the Temporary Council. Installation services were held on the following evening, and at the business meeting held on the same evening, Harry Mayeda was elected president of the new Council; Tom Yego, the vice-president; Yoshimi Shibata, the secretary; and Koso Takemoto, the treasurer. The position of executive secretary, newly created by the Council Charter and requiring a person twenty-five years of age ~~and~~ or older and not a member of the Council, was not filled until three weeks later. The committee selected to nominate an executive secretary named Noboru Shirai, administrative engineer in the Public Works Division, and Shirai was accepted by the Council. It is noticeable that Shirai was selected from the large field of possible candidates, for he was an Issei much more fluent in the Japanese language than in English and closer to the Issei point of view than the Nisei; but this would indicate that the Council desired an individual in the office of executive secretary who could serve a liaison function between themselves and the Issei. The Council was further formalized by the establishment of a permanent office for community government in Recreation Hall 1308; here the Council divided office space with the Planning Board and a large meeting hall was provided, doing away with the inconvenience of meeting in mess halls.

In accordance with the articles of the new City Charter, Block Advisory Committees composed of two citizens (Nisei) and two noncitizens (Issei) were elected

in all the blocks, and arrangements were made for the ward councilmen to call bi-ward monthly meetings of the Block Advisory Committees in the ward. Despite the fears which had been expressed before the new Charter was approved that displacement of the system of block councilmen by the new method of representation, of four councilmen from each ward, would interfere with the communication between the councilmen and the Issei, few complaints were raised after the new system was established. In fact, the system of electing Block Advisory Committees to attend the ward assembly meetings with the councilmen tended to weed out the so-called agitators, many of whom were considered too irresponsible to represent the people, and as a result the meetings between the councilmen and the people inclined to be much less marked by conflict than previously. In turn, when the Block Advisory Committees, composed of both Issei and Nisei, returned to their own blocks to discuss community problems with the block people, the Issei representatives tended to have a much more responsible attitude toward the discussions than when they were without the duties of leadership. Unfortunately, the development of this organization was interrupted less than two months later when community government was disbanded during the registration crisis, and it is therefore not possible to give a true evaluation of the Block Advisory Committee and the Ward Assembly as factors in stabilizing community government.

The registration crisis of February 1943, in fact, interrupted the evolution of the entire Permanent Council organization just at the time when the characteristics of the group were beginning to take shape. However, even during the two months of its existence, the Permanent Council gave evidence of taking a role in the community somewhat different from that of the Temporary Council. The three primary issues before the Permanent Council prior to the registration crisis were: (1) the organization and establishment of an army tent factory, owned

and operated by an outside, private company and paying prevailing wages to evacuee employees; (2) the organization of the Permanent Council in conformance with the provisions of the City Charter; and (3) the combatting of a developing problem of juvenile delinquency. A contrast from the Temporary Council that may be immediately noted is that the principal issues before the Permanent Council were somewhat different from the type prevailing in the earlier Council; whereas the Temporary Council largely devoted its time to meeting the complaints and demands of the people, the Permanent Council gave its attention more to the constructive organization of the community.

The tent factory question, which is taken up at length in a later section, appeared for discussion before the Permanent Council directly after its installment. Because this project was to be based on an army contract, it was ruled that only citizens could be employed at it since the international law prohibited the use of aliens from an enemy nation in war industries at the relocation center. The problem was further complicated by the fact that employees in the tent factory would receive prevailing outside wages which would be several times the amount received by the other evacuees of the center. Despite these conditions of the proposal which were discriminatory against the Issei and were complicated in its relation to the normal employment within the center, a surprisingly small amount of dissension against the tent factory appeared in the community. Unlike the earlier circumstance in which the discussion of issues of this kind mainly took place in block meetings of councilmen and block people, the tent factory question was largely argued in meetings of the Council's Tent Factory Committee, on the Council floor, and between the Council and the Planning Board. Moreover, the defeat of the proposal took place within the Council itself following arguments that showed very little influence of the block people upon the councilmen arguing in opposition. Of the discussion that did occur in the blocks, the predominant opinion tended

to be, "Leave it to the Council and the Planning Board to work out the plans."<sup>1/</sup> While the possibility of the evacuees' making money may have been a factor in restraining opposition to the project, the extremists could have found numerous arguments against the tent factory in the discriminatory aspects of employment and in line with the policy of non-cooperation with the war effort. That very little agitation appeared on this issue must be attributed, at least in part, to the loosening of block controls over the councilmen under the new organization, and the trust placed by the Issei in the newly organized Planning Board.

A problem which emerged in December 1942 as one of the primary subjects of community concern was juvenile delinquency. Reports of the wardens' office on the increasing number of juvenile delinquency cases were the source of the sudden interest in the problem.

"Mr. Tsuda (Supervisor of Wardens) reported that the juvenile delinquency is a very serious matter. They already have five cases on stealing. These cases have arisen within a week or ten days time. Many shoes were stolen from the trailer store. There are three cases of shop-lifting in the canteens and about six boys robbing mess 13."<sup>1/</sup>

It is questionable whether a "real" increase in the number of cases of juvenile delinquency was occurring, or the increase of cases only reflected the greater number being brought to the attention of the wardens. For instance, the "trailer store" referred to was a concession granted a haberdashery store in Klamath Falls to bring in a trailer load of clothiers goods and sell them at an open lot on the project. In the absence of normal shop facilities, the goods were stocked on long tables which served as counters, but because of the impossibility of controlling the crowds which surrounded the counters, the circumstance was an open invitation to adventure-seeking youths to see how much they could "walk off with." The invitation was intensified by the common view that was taken of the haberdasher, that he was an outsider coming into the center to capitalize on the evacuees' need for a clothing store and taking away the little income of the evacuees.

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<sup>1/</sup> Community Council Minutes, Dec. 22, 1942.

Whatever the reality of the basis of concern, the people were sufficiently aroused to seek action toward preventing the spreading of delinquency among their children. The issue was first brought up in the Planning Board who in turn suggested to the Council that a committee be formed "consisting of two members from the Planning Board, two members from the Council, two from the wardens, and two from the school," to make an "intensive study of the delinquency situation in the project" and "make recommendations for taking care of these matters."<sup>1/</sup> Thus, as in the case of the Tent Factory issue, the attack upon the juvenile delinquency problem illustrated another instance of joint action between the Planning Board and the Council in attempting to deal with a Community problem.

Tsuda, supervisor of wardens and a former councilman, was invited to appear before the Council to give an account of the juvenile delinquency in the project. Following his report of the seriousness of the problem, and his request that the Council and Planning Board consider the matter seriously, the Council concluded that it should "take the initiative in forming a committee to investigate the Juvenile Delinquency problem," and two councilmen were appointed for the committee.

Following the formation of the joint investigating committee, the group consulted school authorities, wardens supervisors, recreational leaders, and religious and social leaders of the community, for an evaluation of the situation and advice on a reform program. A meeting of ward leaders was held on December 28 to discuss the subject from the point of view of influencing parents toward cooperating with a program of combatting delinquency. As a result of these conferences and meetings, a series of recommendations were adopted among which were:

1. Formation of a permanent committee <sup>if</sup> (if possible a W.R.A. paid board) to continuously study and combat juvenile delinquency.
2. Formation of a juvenile court to try juvenile cases.
3. The Council give prior consideration to establishing ordinances on juvenile cases. Immediate action by Judicial Commission on pending cases.

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<sup>1/</sup> Community Council Minutes, Dec. 22, 1942.

4. A family-table system be adopted in all mess halls to strengthen family institutions.
5. A certificate of recommendation or approval be required from school authorities and wardens before assignment of a part-time student to a job since higher rates of delinquency found among part-time students.
6. Continuation of a program of community education on social problems through lectures and other forms of publicity.
7. Immediate formation of a PTA to provide closer contacts between the school and parents in dealing with student problems.
8. Passage of an ordinance establishing an 11:00 p.m. curfew for all youths, empowering wardens to question loiterers after that hour.
9. The Community Council support the Recreation Department in promoting wider recreational facilities throughout the project.<sup>1/</sup> (Specific recommendations from the Recreation Department were received for enlargening recreational facilities, and these were incorporated in the statement).<sup>1/</sup>

Most of these recommendations were reasonable regulations upon the activity of young people; they were regulations that might be found in normal communities on the outside. Certain of them, such as the plan to adopt a system of family tables in the mess halls and the establishment of an 11:00 p.m. curfew, were designed to meet the special needs of the center conditions. Although the desirability of forming a PTA, of encouraging family tables, and increasing recreational facilities, had previously been recognized and much discussed, the foregoing recommendations of the Council and Planning Board constituted the first sign of a planned effort to bring about these controls. Imazeki, the editor of the project newspaper who was a keen student of the community's development, described the work of the joint investigating committee and its recommendations as an "indication that the Tule Lake Colony has come of age in its desire to maintain law and order."<sup>2/</sup> The effort constituted the first well organized attempt at filling some of the organizational gaps in the community.

The Council gave evidence of its intent of carrying out the program outlined

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<sup>1/</sup> Minutes of the Community Council, January 12, 1943.

<sup>2/</sup> Tulean Dispatch, Jan. 1, 1943.

in the recommendations at its regular meeting of January 19 to which W.R.A. school authorities were invited to present plans for reducing juvenile delinquency. Data were presented showing that discipline problems at the Tule Lake schools were no greater than at schools on the outside and that the rate of attendance was better than the average on the outside.<sup>1/</sup> But in regards to methods of attacking the existing discipline problems, it was requested that ordinances be established prohibiting smoking on school grounds and the nearby fire-breaks, determining the conditions of non-attendance at school, and that publicity be given the PTA groups which it was hoped would be established soon.<sup>2/</sup> The first meeting of parents and teachers to plan the organization of PTA groups was held four days later.

The work of the Permanent Council and the Planning Board on the juvenile delinquency question reflected certain distinguishing features which were in contrast to the function of community government under the Temporary Council. (1) Previously, most issues taken up by the Council first appeared in the discussions of the block people, but in this instance, the issue was created by the attention drawn to it by the research staff of the Planning Board. Moreover, the discussion was not characterized by demands upon the W.R.A. and arguments with the administration, which was typical formerly, but reflected a genuine effort of community leaders to solve the problem among themselves with the assistance of the W.R.A. (2) While advice was sought in the blocks and from ward assemblies, the bulk of work on the problem was done in committee meetings. This was in contrast to the practice in the past when major decisions tended to be made in block meetings and mass meetings. As a result, the work of the committee was efficient, a careful evaluation of the situation was made, and recommendations were offered which the Council could act upon. (3) Finally, specific attempts were started to

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<sup>1/</sup> Community Council Minutes, January 19, 1943. Also, Tulean Dispatch, January 8, 1943, p. 3.

<sup>2/</sup> Tulean Dispatch, January 26, 1943. p. 1.

carry out some of the recommendations. If the Council and the Planning Board were not completely disrupted by the violent crisis occurring in the following month, it seems likely that many more of the recommendations would eventually have been acted upon.

In this instance of effort to combat juvenile delinquency, the difference from previous experiences was in part attributable to the absence of reasons for hostility against the W.R.A. However, the willingness of the Permanent Council to take active leadership in solving community problems was demonstrated in other matters as well, which offers support to the view that a new pattern was emerging. Even as concern about the problem of relocation began to appear in the community, the Council initiated study of the problem through the organization of the Committee on Relocation and <sup>at</sup> ~~on~~ the last Council meeting prior to the registration crisis, the Committee reported on the various objections raised by the people to the relocation program.<sup>1/</sup> These were evidences of the willingness of the Council to attack problems, starting with a basis of analysis, before they developed into major community conflicts; a characteristic of government that had previously been lacking.

The powers of the Temporary Council were never defined, but the Permanent Council had for its basis the City Charter which had been accepted at a popular election. One of the first acts of the new Council, therefore, was to establish a Committee on City Ordinances to draft the basic ordinances of the Tule Lake community, in conformance with the provisions of the Charter. The procedure of the Committee was to study the minutes of the Temporary Council for such legislation as had already been enacted, study the regulations established by the warden's office on <sup>rules</sup> traffic/and other matters, and in conjunction with such other legislation as the Council deemed necessary, to codify them as the city or-

<sup>1/</sup> Minutes of the Community Council, Feb. 3, 1943.

dinances of the Tule Lake Project. At the same time, the establishment of a <sup>7</sup>/<sub>1</sub> panel of Judicial Commissioners was immediately undertaken. These Commissioners were empowered to have

".....jurisdiction to try all offenses committed within the Tule Lake Relocation Project, as defined by the Penal Code of the State of California ~~as~~ to be less than felony, and in all cases of criminal violation of the laws, ordinances, rules and regulations enacted by the community council."<sup>1</sup>/<sub>1</sub>

The first case, a resident charged with disturbing the peace and destroying personal property, was tried on January 22, and the recommendation of the Judicial Commission on this case was that the defendant be placed on 90 days probation, that his residence be moved to another ward, and, if possible, that the person be transferred to another project at the defendant's own request.

Another evidence of the superior organization of the Permanent Council over the Temporary Council was the hiring of a W.R.A. paid executive secretary and the formation of a seven-man executive committee of the Council to work with the secretary. The Temporary Council, which had no office space or paid workers to attend to the Council's business at all times, virtually was non-existent as a body except at the times of its meetings. To remedy this condition, it was the duty of the Executive Committee to meet with the Executive Secretary at frequent intervals throughout the week to dispose of questions requiring immediate attention but which were not of sufficient importance to warrant calling a special session.

The Permanent Council was thus developing into ~~an organization~~ a group vested with the power to lead the community and organized to carry out its functions when this process was completely disrupted by the appearance of the registration question. Its success in disposing of some difficult problems during the short interval when it was able to follow the organization planned for the Permanent Council offers plausibility to the view that the Council might have become a strong controlling force in the community had it not met with a serious crisis at a time

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<sup>1</sup>/<sub>1</sub> Charter of Tule Lake Relocation Authority, Article IX, Sect. 1.

when the Council was just beginning to gain strength.

### The Planning Board

The possibility opened to the Permanent Council of quietly pursuing its business freed from the pressure of block Issei residents, a condition which the Temporary Council seldom enjoyed, was in no small part due to the existence of the Planning Board after <sup>November</sup> ~~December~~ 1942. The preamble to the charter of the Planning Board states:

Because of the W.R.A. ruling that no Issei shall serve on the Community Council, there has been a feeling that the former has not been adequately represented. In the face of such facts, it has become necessary that some kind of an Issei-Nisei organization be formulated to assist the Council in the community affairs.<sup>1/</sup>

The Planning Board was an idea initiated and ~~erect~~ <sup>Temporary</sup> established by the/Council, and it was only indirectly the product of Issei demands for a voice in government. The idea of the Board was directly the result of the difficulties encountered by the Temporary Council in attempting to exert any authority in the community and the recognition that these difficulties would continue as long as the Council failed to have the support of the Issei residents. As suggested in the preamble, it was also recognized that the Issei would continue to take a belligerent attitude toward the Council as long as the Issei were excluded from representation in government. The Planning Board may therefore be described as an instrument created by the Council designed to give a basis of cooperation between the two generations.

Despite some suspicion among the Issei that the Planning Board was a concession to the Issei made by the Nisei Council and the W.R.A. giving the former a hollow form of representation without any real power, the scheme was generally accepted by the Issei as a gain in political power. At a meeting of October 30, where one Issei representative from each block was present, a temporary organization was established after the acceptance of the Planning Board proposal, and a com-

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<sup>1/</sup> Charter of Planning Board, Tule Lake Project, "Preamble".

mittee was designated to write the charter and by-laws of the Planning Board. The assembly of one Issei representative from each block continued to meet as an organizing body, ratified the charter submitted by the committee, and, on November 16, elected seven men, one from each ward, as permanent members of the Planning Board.

Those elected were:

Ward 1, Masahide Yamashita, chairman  
Ward 2, Kihei Ikeda, vice-chairman  
Ward 3, \*Kameichi Nakamura  
Ward 4, Yohei Kato  
Ward 5, \*Kaju Takesuye  
Ward 6, Daisuke Kitagawa  
Ward 7, Matsusaburo Kuki

\*(More information wanted on these two men).

Mr. Yamashita had owned and managed an importing-exporting firm in Seattle prior to the war. Mr. Ikeda had operated a produce business in Sacramento, had been active in the strong Buddhist organization of that city, and was declared to be one of the wealthiest men in the community. Mr. Nakamura was a former insurance agent in Sacramento. Mr. Kato was a successful farmer near Marsyville and a U.S. veteran of the First World War. Reverend Kitagawa, the youngest man on the board, was a brilliant Episcopalian Minister from Seattle. Dr. Kuki had maintained a well established dental office in Tacoma, Washington. In every case, the person elected was a successful and respected member of his former community. Most of them spoke English far more adequately than the average Issei in the community, they possessed a better understanding of American society than the bulk of Issei, and they constituted a group with whom the Nisei Council could well cooperate.

Although an elected body, the Planning Board was officially granted only the powers of investigating community problems, planning and submitting recommendations for community improvement, and of advising the administration, the Council and the people on community policy. The Board of seven men were to meet at least once a week and these men were required to call meetings in their respective wards

at appropriate intervals to report the activities of the Board. The block representatives to the ward meetings in turn were to report to their block residents the activities of the Planning Board and the discussions in the ward meetings, and report back to the Board representative from the ward any problems raised in the block meetings. A technical staff of three, paid by the W.R.A., to carry out research on problems of the community was attached to the Planning Board.

The inconsistency of limiting an elected group of Issei <sup>strictly</sup> ~~only~~ to an advisory capacity in the community has already been pointed out. Except for the power granted to the Council alone of legislating ordinances and laws for the community, the function of the Planning Board was scarcely any different than that of the Council. Even in the matter of legislation, the Planning Board was in a position to bring strong pressure upon the Council in determining the legislation that should be enacted. As for influencing administration action on any problem, the Planning Board was no less powerful than the Council in this respect, for the Council too was limited to recommending to the administration whatever action was deemed necessary. No representative group of the community, whether the Council or the Planning Board, had the power to supersede the ruling of the W.R.A., and since the administration was equally accessible to both groups, either group could initiate administrative action on any community problem. To the extent that the Issei residents of the community were more politically minded than the Nisei and they were more likely to bring their problems to their own group, the Planning Board, than to the Council, the Board frequently had greater influence in shaping community policy than did the Community Council.

Illustrative of this function of the Planning Board ~~ix~~ was the manner in which it dealt with the problem of meat supply which became prominent in late December and in January 1943. Cooks began to complain of a meat shortage, rumors developed that great quantities of meat were being allowed to spoil in the cold

storage warehouse, and other rumors circulated that because of the meat shortage, "horse meat" was now being served in the relocation center. On January 8, a phone call was received by the Planning Board from its Issei representative in Block 6 "that a big supply of meat in the warehouse is spoiled and the supply just received is also spoiled."<sup>1/</sup> A member of the technical staff of the Planning Board was immediately instructed to investigate the report, and tentative findings were presented to the Board.<sup>2/</sup>

<u>Date</u>	<u>Amt. of Meat Received by Butchers</u>	<u>Amt. Spoiled</u>
12-2-42	5,579 lbs.	710 lbs
Date Unknown	1,878 lbs.	135 lbs.
"	6,432 lbs.	350 lbs.
"	2,523 lbs.	200 lbs.
"	11,840 lbs.	689 lbs.

Unfortunately, it is not known what action was finally taken on the question, but it is noteworthy that an Issei first brought attention to the problem, that it was communicated to the Planning Board rather than to the Council, and that this question was typical of the type of problems formerly discussed in the Council. Among other questions taken up by the Planning Board, the tent factory issue and the juvenile delinquency problem were ~~among~~ the most prominent, but much of the work on these questions were left to the Council. On the other hand, certain problems such as the question of serving noon lunches to school children at the school mess hall, rather than having the children return great distances to their own residential blocks, were discussed almost exclusively by the Planning Board and inquiry with the administration on the possibility of increasing the number of children to get this service was made directly by the Planning Board officers. Likewise, the Planning Board sought distribution of clothing allowances to all evacuee residents of the community regardless of their employment status.

The distinction of function between the Planning Board and the Council was

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<sup>1/</sup> Planning Board Meeting, Jan. 8, 1943.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid.

not made clear, but during the short period of activity of these two organizations, there was evident a developing tendency of the Council to concentrate <sup>its</sup> ~~their~~ efforts upon a few major problems of the community such as the tent factory ~~question~~ and juvenile delinquency questions, and upon the passage of legislations regulating the community, while the Planning Board became more the channel of popular complaints to the administration. The division of function had a favorable influence upon the Council in that the Council was able to concentrate more time upon organizing the community, and was less subjected to the complaints and criticisms of the Issei residents.

#### The Tent Factory Problem

The Tent Factory question was presented to the community just at the time the Planning Board and the Permanent Council were first installed and immediately offered a situation requiring the cooperation of the two groups. The Tule Lake administration had been developing the tent factory proposal ever since the inception of the project, and a factory was under construction since late summer. In December 1942, the W.R.A. received a contract ~~to make tents at the project~~ from <sup>to make tents at the project,</sup> the army quartermaster, and arrangements were made with the Sun Tent-Luebbert Company for them to accept a sub-contract as operators of the proposed plant. From the standpoint of the W.R.A., the tent factory offered the first opportunity for evacuees at Tule Lake to increase their compensations beyond the standard wages paid by the administration.

When Mr. Shirrell presented the proposal to the Permanent Council early in December, a Fact Finding Committee on the Tent Factory was immediately appointed to study the proposition. According to the report of this committee made on December 9, the contract required a production of 7,500 tents over a period of five or six months. 10% of the gross income was to go to the W.R.A. for amorti-

*Tent Factory*

zation and other expenses, 10% to the Sun Tent Luebbert Company as profits and for managerial expenses, and 15% to the Company as maximum deductible overhead expenses. Only American citizens were to be eligible for employment, and authority for hiring, discharging and promoting workers was in the hands of Mr. Leubbert as supervisor. Much of the employment was to be on a piece work basis, after an initial apprenticeship period, but time workers were to be paid at the rate of forty cents an hour as apprentices with increases of five cents per hour every four weeks until such workers reached the maximum of sixty centerper hour.

The chief problem in the proposal was the question of the distribution of profits left to the evacuees, for it was considered unfair to the other W.R.A. workers if the tent factory workers were to receive the entire earnings from the special work, yet it was necessary to leave them with a sufficient earning to provide an incentive for work. Since it was expected that the gross income from the project would amount to about \$75,000, and somewhat less than two-thirds of this was expected to constitute the labor cost, there was a possibility of dividing approximately \$50,000 among the evacuees.

In determining the earnings to be allotted the tent factory workers, the committee was required to take account of a \$25 deduction each month for each worker as the basic subsistence cost to the W.R.A. and an additional \$2 deduction for social security and unemployment insurance. The worker was then to receive the standard W.R.A. wage of \$16 per month plus the monthly clothing allowance of \$3.75. The problem then remained of the amount of bonus which the tent factory worker should receive, and the amount that should be deposited in the community trust fund which was ultimately to be divided among all the workers. Following considerable discussion within the committee, the bonus to the <sup>factory</sup> workers was set at 12% of the gross earnings. Based on an assumed earning per worker of \$100 per month, the income to the tent factory worker would then be \$32.25 and the

amount to be deposited in the community trust fund was \$40.75.1/

~~The main objection to the plan~~ The Council presented the problem to the Planning Board for the latter's advice, but there was generally very little objection from the Planning Board to the action of the Council and the Board proposed that the Council committee proceed with the clarification of the plan.

A councilman on the committee complained:

"We brought the question up before the Planning Board, but the Board didn't have anything to say and left it to us to work out the whole thing. One thing about the Planning Board, though, is that as long as they know what we're doing, they share the responsibility with us on this. It gives us more authority to go ahead on the plan, and they assist us in explaining the proposal to the Issei. Most of those men on the Board are pretty reasonable fellows, and it's not hard to talk to them."2/

The main objection to the proposal was that the 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ % bonus to the tent factory workers was insufficient, and many blocks suggested that the wage rate should be increased. Others demanded that the prevailing wages of <sup>the</sup> Pacific Coast area be paid the workers. A further complication developed, that tent factory workers would be assessed for unemployment compensation by provisions of the state law, but that Japanese workers who later became unemployed while ~~working~~ remaining at the center would be ineligible for unemployment compensation.

When the question was presented before the ward assemblies, most wards felt that the question should first be referred to the blocks for the residents' views. In so doing, the Permanent Council was following the practice established under the Temporary Council of referring matters to the block residents before taking any final action, but two notable differences from previous experiences with such issues appeared: (1) that very little agitation occurred during the discussion of this issue, and (2) that no strong pressure was brought upon the councilmen to do the bidding of the block residents. In part, this condition was to be explained by the role of the Issei representatives to the Planning Board assemblies and Council assemblies in their respective blocks, for these individuals took the leader-

1/ Fact Finding Committee on Tent Factory, "Report to the Tule Lake Community Council," Dec. 9, 1942.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, December 16, 1942.

ership in ~~any~~ restraining any irrevocable negation of the project from the outset.

In one fairly typical block meeting, the discussion proceeded as follows:

Planning Board Representative: "I have been asked to present the plan for the operation of the proposed tent factory. (Gives the gist of the proposal) This question was discussed at the ward assembly of the Planning Board and our feeling was that the tent factory should be an asset to the community since it will increase the income of the residents here. The main objection was that a 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ % bonus would scarcely be sufficient incentive to the workers and that some better plan should be formulated. However, you understand that employment at this project is open only to citizens, and for that reason my personal reaction is that the question should be left to the Council to decide."

Block Resident #1: "Wouldn't it be possible for the W.R.A. to assume the subsistence cost to the workers? As long as they are here on this project, the W.R.A. is responsible for their subsistence whether they work or not."

P. B. R.: "That question was raised at the ward meeting, but it seems there is an administrative ruling that evacuees not working for the W.R.A. but living at the project must pay his subsistence rate. However, I shall take the question up again to see if anything can be done about it."

Resident #2: "I agree with Mr. Kimura that this is a question more for the Nisei since they will be the workers, and that the problem should be left to the Council. However, I think the Council should insist that prevailing wage rates be paid. If some means can be found of raising the wage rate of the workers, there should be no objection to the plan."<sup>1/</sup>

On December 17, the Council passed a resolution rejecting three different plans for the distribution of income proposed by the W.R.A. because of "the unreasonable demands made upon individual workers for his subsistence and clothing allowance deductions for dependents, in view of the sub-standard wage scale," but leaving the way open ~~if~~ for further negotiations on any reasonable proposals offered by the W.R.A.<sup>2/</sup> On December 22, a fourth plan was proposed by the Tent Factory Committee in which the major alteration was that only 15% of the gross income of the workers should be deducted for the community trust fund with the remainder, excluding the deductions for the W.R.A. and the Leubbert Company, going to the workers. This proposal, too, was rejected on the ground that the wage rate

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<sup>1/</sup> Miyamoto Notes, December 19, 1942.

<sup>2/</sup> Minutes of Permanent Community Council, Special Meeting, Dec. 17, 1942.

was sub-standard and inadequate. Efforts to formulate further plans were unsuccessful, and the tent factory proposal was completely discarded by the end of December.

#### The Tule Lake Consumer Cooperative

Because of the need for some kind of general merchandise stores on the project where evacuees could purchase necessary goods not provided by the W.R.A., the Community Enterprises Section was established in the administration to open canteens in various sections of the community as the evacuees arrived. While these stores were opened and initially operated by the administration, it was understood from the outset that the agency would not enter into profit-making business enterprises for itself, that profits from the canteens would be held in trust by the Community Enterprises Section for the later disposition by the evacuees themselves, and that some form of cooperative organization would shortly be established to transfer control of the canteens from the W.R.A. administrators to an evacuee controlled group.

That the W.R.A. intended the canteens to be eventually controlled by the evacuees through a consumer cooperative system was evident in that Don Elberson, a Co-op expert, was hired for the project and that the administration gave full sanction to his activities in promoting the cooperative movement among the evacuees. Elberson began his work by contacting interested leaders, meeting with various groups for considering the possibilities of applying the cooperative system to the project canteens, and ~~so~~ by instituting a ten lecture course on the nature of the Co-op movement. His activities coincided with the appearance of concern among the evacuees about the large amount of evacuee expenditure at the canteens, and the desire to acquire management over the canteens to better control the stores and their operation. The evacuee discontent with the Community Enterprises management of the stores gave a favorable setting for Elberson to promote the

cooperative as a method by which the evacuees might gain control of the stores, and this combination of circumstances led in early August to the formation of the Provisional Advisory Council of the Co-op movement whose function was to meet with Kendall Smith, supervisor of community enterprises, to learn about the operation of the stores, advise him regarding the wishes of the people regarding the canteens, and generally serve as the channel of communication between the evacuees and the existing management of the community enterprises. The basis of the cooperative movement were the ward assemblies composed of representatives from each of the blocks in <sup>a</sup>the ward, from which a single member was elected to represent the ward on the Provisional Advisory Council. Aside from its advisory function, this organization was to serve as the means of educating the evacuee mass in the cooperative movement.

A surprising opposition, however, existed to the transfer of canteen control from the W.R.A. to the evacuees through a consumer cooperative system. Fundamentally, there was little understanding among the evacuees of the cooperative movement, and no little skepticism of it as an idealistic plan that was unworkable, especially among the Japanese, and not sound economy. Many preferred that the W.R.A. continue to operate the canteens ~~under the~~ in cooperation with an advisory body of evacuees, only making the single change in policy of keeping the prices at a minimum. Certain leaders in the Council like Tsukamoto, Yego and Takeda who were seeking to make the Council the central authority in the community saw in the Coop movement a rival to the Council's power, and an attempt was made in early August to subordinate the Community Enterprises to the Council and prevent the development of the Co-op movement. Failing in this attempt, a further effort was made by this same group to discredit the Provisional Advisory Council of the Co-op for its failure to prevent Mr. Smith from purchasing lumber and equipment for a theater project. From Tsukamoto's statement at the time, it is clear that he looked upon

the Co-op movement as an instrument of the Issei to rise in political power, but Tsukamoto's effort to hold the Issei responsible for the occurrence of the theater issue only boomeranged upon himself and the Council. The community refused even to consider Tsukamoto's argument that Kendall Smith had proceeded with the purchase of lumber and equipment for the theater without consulting the community because the Issei Co-op advisors had been lax in their duty of keeping close watch over Smith's disposition of canteen profits; rather, the people were only aroused to greater suspicion of Mr. Smith's control of the canteens, they were incited to demand the transfer of community enterprises from the W.R.A. to evacuee control, and the theater issue thus speeded the formation of the Tule Lake Co-op.

It was true that the Co-op movement was primarily an Issei promoted organization, at least by contrast with the all-Nisei Council, and it is therefore understandable why the Issei refused to blame the Co-op in regards to the theater question. In most discussions among the Issei, responsibility for creating the theater issue was placed upon Mr. Smith and the W.R.A., and the responsibility for keeping the issue alive was directed at the Council and the W.R.A.

Nisei: "About the theater business. Is everything too late now? Everybody seems to be against it."

Elberson: "I do not know very much about the matter. What is the feeling of the people about the Co-op in connection with the theater project?"

Nisei: "The important question is can we recover our money? Do we have to over the theater and the stores together?"

Elberson: "I do not know."

Takamoto: "The theater project is the responsibility of Mr. Smith only and not the responsibility of the Co-op. Do not confuse the two."

Issei: "I understand that the theater project lumber was bought some time ago. Where did the lumber come from---from the WRA or from the canteen profits?"

Elberson: "From the community enterprises."

Issei: "If Mr. Smith had been sincere with the Japanese he should have consulted the Japanese people. I think the lumber order should be cancelled or the WRA buy the lumber. Then we could start from there and start the Coop."<sup>1/</sup>

This discussion took place among Co-op representatives and might have been expected to direct responsibility away from themselves, but similar arguments were being raised in Issei meetings which had no relation to the Coop. At the meeting of October 11 to discuss the theater issue, and Issei speaker declared:

"There is also the problem of the canteen. The expenses of the theater are coming out of the canteen. Mr. Smith says that he can control the community enterprises as long as the people have not taken it over. They lectured that in the future the canteen was going to be ours, but they are going to build a show and charge high admission for it and take money from the people. They may start a lot more enterprises."<sup>2/</sup>

The inference of these views was that only by the transfer of canteen control from Mr. Smith to the evacuees could the repetition of such unauthorized expenditure of the people's money be prevented.

Within the Co-op movement, Mr. Smith's independent action in proceeding with the theater project without having consulted the people led to a considerable suspicion of him as the supervisor of community enterprises. Doubt about him had always existed because of his managerial identity with the much criticized canteens and possibly also because of his shrewd, business-like personality, but the theater question served almost as a confirmation of their earlier suspicions. While the resulting distrust of Mr. Smith accelerated the Co-op movement, it also led to some difficulties in the last phases of organization of the Co-op for, inasmuch as Mr. Smith continued as the supervisor of the enterprises which the Co-op was to take over, it was necessary for officials of the movement to work and deal with him. Although much of this suspicion was unjustified, distrust of him was a not insignificant factor in the later organization of the Co-op. A member of the Co-op organizing committee reports:

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<sup>1/</sup> Sakoda Journal, Sept. 28, 1942.

<sup>2/</sup> Sakoda Journal, Oct. 11, 1942.

"The Isseis that gathered at the co-op meeting were against keeping any of the equipment and lumber from the theater project. Not only did the people not like the idea; some saw no necessity of the lumber. There was a suspicion that Mr. Smith had made a crooked deal on the lumber and equipment and it would pain him to have to return the material. There's a feeling that if his financial statement is examined many faults would be discovered."1/

The theater question thus "convinced" the people that the profits from community enterprises would continue to be mishandled as long as <sup>they</sup> ~~it~~ remained in Mr. Smith's control, and the issue did much to speed the incorporation of the Co-op. Almost from the time of its organization in ~~xxxx~~ late July, the Provisional Advisory Council of the Co-op had urged the immediate incorporation of the Co-op and had only been restrained by Mr. Elberson's constant reminder of the widespread ignorance of the Co-op movement among the people. At one stage, the Provisional Council had stepped beyond its assigned functions of advising Mr. Smith on the operation of the canteens, learning more about the operations of community enterprises, and educating the masses on the consumer cooperative movement. The group wrote out a preliminary by-laws to a Tule Lake Co-op, and inquired of the people through its ward meetings whether or not the community wished a Co-op. Elberson was upset by this move of the Provisional Advisory Council for he feared that the community, without proper education on the nature and function of a cooperative, would reject the Co-op, but despite the pre-mature character of the inquiry, an almost uniform reply in favor of the Co-op was received from the blocks which held meetings to discuss the proposition. Steps were therefore taken in September to elect block representatives (one Issei and one Nisei) to the general assembly of the Co-op, the earlier assembly being invalid because the representatives had frequently been appointed by the block managers, and this elected representative body was to proceed with all the necessary steps for the incorporation of the Co-op.2/

Following Tsukamoto's attack upon the Co-op Advisory Board over the theater

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1/ Sakoda Journal, Oct. 21, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Report, The Co-op Movement in Tule Lake, pp. 18-25.

project, Elberson, too, was agreed that the Co-op should be established as soon as possible to remove the possibility for a repetition of such an attack. On the evening of September 28, the same day Tsukamoto attacked the Advisory Council of the Co-op, the first meeting of the newly elected assembly of block Co-op representatives was held to start the election of the Committee on Incorporation (which group was to become the Board of Directors), Committee on By-Laws, and Committee on Committee Work. Ward organizations of the Co-op movement were also strengthened by the election of ward officers, and the election or nomination of representatives to the various committees. This meeting marked the beginning of the establishment of the Co-op at Tule Lake. The smoothness with which the organizational work proceeded was in large part due to Elberson's leadership, a point worthy of note considering the ineptness in guidance of some of the other organizations on the project. On the whole, organizational activity among the evacuees reflected the narrowness of their experience in such work, for the Issei were familiar only with the organizational procedure of such small businesses as they had operated or the local community societies they had participated in, while the Nisei were similarly limited in experience.

A peculiar problem of the Co-op movement was the participation of both Issei and Nisei in its activities as a result of which the language barrier between the two groups continually cropped up in the meetings of the group. The problem was intensified by the presence at most meetings of a number of Caucasians including Elberson the administration organizer, Mr. Kendall Smith of community enterprises, the project attorney, Mr. Throckmorton, who gave legal advice to the Co-op, and Mr. Jacoby the representative of the Caucasian members of the Co-op movement. The difficulty was variously solved by using Japanese on the contention that most Nisei understood sufficient Japanese to follow the Issei's discussions, by the use of translators or interpreters, and by the use of the language most suitable

to whoever were speaking. Not only was there the problem of language, however, but there was considerable difficulty with the rules of order in meetings because the Issei were unfamiliar with western practices and often preferred to use their own methods of arriving at decisions.

"When I went to hand in my minutes (of the ward Co-op meeting), Fumi discussed with me some of the problems she is facing..... We also discussed the desirability of spreading information of parliamentary procedure among the people, especially Isseis, if the Co-op were to run smoothly."1/

Incorporation papers were drawn up by the Committee of incorporators and the by-laws by the Committee on By-Laws. In the discussions of the by-laws, it seems clear that the bulk of the interested Issei were not so much interested in the Co-op movement as a social philosophy, but they saw in the consumer cooperative the only mechanism by which they could gain control of the canteens. Guided by this motive, their further aims in establishing the rules of the organization was to (1) place controls and limitations upon Kendall Smith whom the people deeply distrusted but who was to continue as the liaison officer between the W.R.A. and the operators of the canteens, (2) minimize the risks and liabilities in assuming control of the canteens, and (3) keep at a minimum the cost of operation and the prices of the canteens. While these aims were prompted among the evacuees by their distrust of the W.R.A. and the low income standard of employees at the center, they led to endeavors at establishing "irrational" limitations upon the canteens in the eyes of Kendall Smith who desired to maintain "sound business practices" and a "sound credit basis", and of Don Elberson who was concerned to promote tried methods of consumer cooperatives.

The matter of the risks involved in the people taking over the consumer enterprises was an old argument that had been repeatedly brought up from the first discussions of the cooperative. Most frequently, the argument was put in the form of the question, "Why should we take over the canteen from the W.R.A. if they are running well now?" If the W.R.A. operated the stores, paid the workers and assumed the cost of operation, while making the one change in policy of set-

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1/ Sakoda Journal, Oct. 2, 1942.

ting prices at a low, ~~market~~ cost-plus level, the people would have none of the risks of operating an enterprise while enjoying the benefits of low cost goods. This objection to the Co-op was silenced by the .W.R.A. refusal to operate the community enterprises except during the initial period, but even as the Co-op movement advanced, the same suspicion of the liabilities which the people might be assuming continued to appear. The people in Ward V proved particularly troublesome in this respect.

"The Board of Directors met last night, according to K. (executive secretary), and tried to clarify to people in Ward V about the liabilities of a coop. The chairman of the ward has quit and several other representatives are about to quit. It seems that there are suspicions on the part of the people that they might have to take on too much liabilities if the coop is formed. They want to know the extent of liabilities, what risks are involved, etc., questions which were also brought up in our block."1/

One of the arguments used against the building of a theater with community enterprises profits was the liability that would be incurred at the end of the war from a structure on government land, and the evacuee responsibility for this liability that would result from the transfer of community enterprises to the Co-op. A member of the Board of Directors argued:

We should not invest in real property such as the theater. When the war is over we cannot make use of the theater or sell it off."2/

Whenever any suggestion was raised for the improvement of the real property of community enterprises, the consideration of the liability to the evacuees "when the war is over" was invariably mentioned. A fundamental factor in the formation of Co-op policies, thus, was the view that the enterprise was a temporary one and hence one that should be easily liquidated when the time for the closing of the centers arrived. The recurrent rumor that the evacuees at Tule Lake would again be evacuated, this time to a center further inland, was an example of the popular belief in the instability of their stay at the center which interefered with the

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1/ Sakoda Journal, Oct. 6, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Journal, Oct. 1, 1942.

development of the Co-op movement. In late October the rumor was revived with considerable vigor and interest was again temporarily drawn away from further organization at the center to an anticipation of further movement. To Co-op leaders the problem of these rumors was the possible effect they might have on the growth of the cooperative movement at the Tule Lake Project.

"John came home today and said that Yoshi learned at the administration building that Manzanar was being evacuated. He seemed to think that this report was true. I couldn't believe it because there has been so many rumors of that sort in the past. We shall probably know more definitely tomorrow. At the dinner table we talked of the possibility of having to move out ourselves. If it were true that Manzanar was moving, then we could see no reason why we would be allowed to stay on the coast. The date for Manzanar was stated as November 12. I immediately thought of the coop and how it would have to be stopped. Membership drives will not be possible until this sort of rumors are ascertained. The effect of such rumors are really demoralizing. You can begin to understand why some of the Isseis are against any sort of cooperation with the WRA. No matter how much you cooperate with these Caucasians they still mean to take advantage of you. We evacuate ourselves quietly, and they still want to kick us out still further. This sort of reasoning is probably done by a large number of Isseis and Niseis too. The recent talk of drafting Niseis has also caused a similar sort of uneasiness on the part of the people."1/

One task of Co-op leaders was to stem the ill effects of such rumors upon the movement they were promoting. The fact that these leaders had a stake in a movement the success of which depended upon a certain degree of stability in a healthy the center influenced them toward/~~discrediting~~ skepticism of casual information passed along through rumors. A block Co-op leader in promoting the cooperative movement at a block meeting pointed out the danger of the "short-term" view of the Tule Lake Project.

"There is talk of our going away, but they are only rumors. If you believe those things, it means that you cannot do anything constructive."2/

However, impermanence was a part of the situation of the relocation centers and it was necessary that the Co-op leaders themselves take this fact into account. There was, for instance, the W.R.A. emphasis on relocation which would,

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1/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 2, 1942.

2/ Ibid.

in the long run, gradually reduce the size of the center population. It was necessary to consider how refunds and patronage dividends would be paid to evacuees leaving the center and terminating their membership in the Co-op. A clause in the by-laws was necessary determining the point in the size of Co-op membership at which the cooperative would be closed and the stocks liquidated. Creditors visiting the project and speaking before the Board of Directors emphasized the need of a strong reserve fund so that they would not be caught at the end with unliquidable stocks, and while the evacuees were little concerned with what might happen to the creditors, it was necessary that they give attention to the problem in order to maintain their credit standing with the companies offering them trade. Finally, there was the possibility of a rapid turnover in the managing personnel as individual members relocated, and the appointment of officers therefore had to be made with constant attention to the maintenance of an experienced personnel.

In an enterprise the permanence of which was a relatively unknown and unpredictable factor, the question of risk and liability to the members and of who would be "left holding the sack" was a problem of frequent concern. It was Elberson and Mr. Smith's desire that the membership fee should be much larger than the \$1.00 that was finally determined upon, for it was necessary that the credit structure of the enterprise be strengthened, but few evacuees were willing to invest more than that amount because of the feeling that, "We may not be here long anyway." From time to time, an individual elected or appointed to an important office in the Co-op would resign with the explanation, in part, that he did not wish to be held responsible for the liabilities of the organization.

That the Co-op movement continued to grow despite this adverse circumstance was largely due to the intense distrust of the people for Mr. Smith who was then operating the store as a W.R.A. trustee to the people. From their fears that Mr. Smith was mismanaging the stores and charging unreasonably high prices, the evacuees

concluded that they must gain control of the stores at all cost and through whatever means, of the Co-op or otherwise, as long as they would be able to gain authority over the stores. The Co-op promoters were therefore to be classified in two groups, the small element led by Elberson and composed mostly of Nisei who were seriously seeking to establish Co-op principles as well as operate the stores with benefit to the community, and the considerably greater body whose primary interest in the Co-op was the means it offered of gaining control of the stores and giving the opportunity ~~fixes~~ to save as much as possible for the evacuees. Throughout the discussions of the by-laws, it was necessary to reconcile these two opposing views of the Co-op.

*desire  
for leadership*

In the eyes of Elberson and his followers, for example, the Education Committee of the Co-op was a fundamental and necessary part of the movement since the success of the Co-op depended not only upon the understanding of the people of a cooperative organization but there was danger that the enterprise could be disrupted by the failure of the people to cooperate in the operation of the stores. The group of "hard-headed business men", however, were inclined to look with suspicion upon such unnecessary expenditures.

Chairman: "In our block people thought that the sum for education was not necessary. If it were to be on a percentage basis, it should be only about 1 percent."

K: "How about leaving it at 1% and then if it is not enough get the Board of Directors to vote them some more."

A: "Is the certified public accountant necessary?"

F: "I hear that our bookkeeping system is not so good. The C.P.A. would be necessary."1/

An idea frequently suggested as a method of reducing the cost of operation of the canteens and thus of increasing the profits to the evacuee members of the

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1/ Sakoda Journal, Oct. 21, 1942.

Co-op was to have the W.R.A. provide building and office space for the canteens without cost to the Co-op and even pay the wages of the evacuee canteen workers.

A: "Shouldn't the building rent be asked to be abolished. We aren't being paid the proper amount of wages. I think that the rent should be bargained for."

F: "We are doing all we can along with other projects, but we really have no power to bargain."1/

In discussing the non-business functions which the cooperative might serve in the community, it was suggested:

I: "If we are able, I would like to have the coop contribute money to entertainment clubs, etc."

X: "I think we should have the WRA furnish such funds."

I: "I hear that the W.R.A. says that it hasn't a cent for such funds."2/

It was in the matter of the patronage dividends, which Elberson considered a fundamental principle of the Co-op, that the greatest difference of opinion between various of the leaders existed. Those interested in the Co-op principally for the control they would gain over the canteens saw no reason for patronage dividends and desired only that the prices of goods sold should be kept at a minimum. On the other hand, those promoting the Co-op for the principles which it represented stubbornly fought for the maintenance of prices at more or less the prevailing rates and the distribution of profits through the patronage dividend. The latter argued that the maintenance of prevailing prices was desirable for retaining a favorable credit standing, that the basis of cooperation in the consumer cooperative system rested on the profits of the enterprise and the joint discussion by members of the methods of disposing of the profits, and that the removal of the principle of the patronage dividends would leave the organization with only a principle of self seeking. The numerous doubts about the patronage refund expressed at the coop assembly of October 29 is typical of the discussions on the

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1/ Sakoda Journal, Oct. 21, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Journal, October 30, 1942.

subject which continued until the day the Co-op was finally established.

Chairman: "There will be a little refund, but not very much."

X: "Isn't it trouble to keep records for patronage refunds?"

Chairman: "It's going to be too much trouble, it seems to me, even if we use scrips."

I: "The scrip is going to take a lot of money and we are going to have to pay some people to keep the accounts. But since it's an important part of the cooperative, let's leave it in and then work it out some other way."

D: "Why not make the prices cheaper and have no profit at all..."

Chairman: "I think that this is the difficult part of the by-laws."

X: "Use of the scrips will also protect the Co-op."

X: "Young kids are going to have difficulty in using the right amount of scrip."

F: "I think we both don't know enough about scrips to talk about it. I think the Co-op is the best way to prepare you for going outside. If you didn't have a Co-op, then you wouldn't even be fighting for the profits right now. (Observer's notes: She makes an emotional appeal ~~for~~ on behalf of herself and Elberson. This is the life of the Co-op for which she is fighting. These men are just thinking about the amount of profit involved; they don't care about the real worth of the Co-op. F. was really on the verge of tears. Three months of hard work would have gone to waste if patronage dividends were taken out.)

X: "It's going to be a problem when kids go out with the scrip books."

K: "Let's leave this up to the committee. It can be changed later."

X: "How about distributing the profit evenly."

K: "How about leaving it up to the Board of Directors."1/

This was a discussion among Co-op representatives, all of whom were presumed to know something about cooperative principles; yet the disagreement was regarding a fundamental principle of the consumer cooperative system. It was necessary that Co-op leaders interested in maintaining the principles of the organization constantly struggle against the pressure to lower prices.

X: "In our ward they did not see the necessity of this (the patronage dividend) because the goods are going to be sold as low as possible."

Elberson: "The capital structure is important in buying from the wholesale. The mark-up is important in helping the capital structure. The talk of selling at cost is becoming less and less and the emphasis on having a good capital structure is becoming more important."1/

It was true that there was less and less talk of selling at cost as the organization of the Co-op proceeded. On the other hand, the matter of patronage refund was also assailed from another source, the creditors of the project stores who urged that the dividends be passed for a time in order to strengthen the capital reserve of the enterprises. One representative of a firm doing business with the community enterprises urged that a minimum capital structure of \$125,000 to \$150,000 be established. He strongly approved of a suggestion by Kendall Smith, who declared:

"Would a resolution passed by the Board to the effect that they would not recommend a payment of refunds based on sales to the members until such time as the capital structure is commensurate with the credit they are getting--would such a resolution greatly influence the credit relation with you and other creditors."2/

The Board of Directors finally passed a resolution to forego dividend payments for six months, but as one member of the Board declared:

"I said that I was disgusted because the Board of Directors had passed a resolution to forego payment of dividends for six months and was afraid to announce this at the meeting last night."3/

The unwillingness of the Board to announce its resolution reflected the pressure in the community to have the profits from the canteens distributed as soon as possible. So intent were the people upon the money at stake that it was difficult to argue with them in terms of the need to reinforce the credit structure of or the desirability of the system of patronage refunds.

A similar attitude was expressed when it was learned from Mr. Smith that the community enterprises would have to pay income taxes on their profits. The matter of taxes on the profits of the stores immediately endangered the acceptance of the patronage dividend principle, for the reaction of the people was that instead of accumulating profits, which were taxable, from which patronage refunds would be made, the prices should be reduced to a minimum so that the people might bene-

1/ Sakoda Journal, Oct. 28, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 25, 1942

3/ Sakoda Journal, Dec. 4, 1942.

fit from the low rates and taxes would not have to be paid. Summarizing the discussion at a ward meeting when the income tax question was raised, Sakoda reports:

"The discussion which slowed the progress of the meeting centered on how to avoid having to pay the income tax, to put the matter very bluntly. Mr. S. immediately brought out the fact that the money should stay in the pockets of the Japanese people and should not be allowed to be paid ~~in~~ in taxes. Mr. Komatsu felt that Mr. Smith was a business man and cared mostly about how sound his business was run and not whether the amount of taxes paid could be lowered. The feeling of some of the representatives was that if taxes were to be paid many people in the blocks would be against joining the Co-op. They felt that they would be blamed for not running the Co-op properly..... Mr. Komatsu felt that Mr. Smith must have known that the income tax would have to be paid."

"There were various discussions as to how the profit could be lowered without too much trouble or getting into trouble. I pointed out that Mr. Smith was still in control and that he may not cooperate with the plans. Mr. S. suggested that goods be sold very cheaply so that the profits would be reduced. I brought up the importance of keeping sufficient credit to maintain a good credit structure, but many of the people seemed to feel that it was not necessary to have too much credit to run the business."

"Other plans such as investing the money in equipment, giving money to charity were discussed, but did not seem to be especially bright. One man made an interesting suggestion. He said that scrip books could be sold at a discount thus giving the advantage to the members. I thought this was a good idea because operating capital would be raised by selling scrip." It would encourage people to become members in order to take part in this immediate distribution of profits."<sup>1/</sup>

From the standpoint of the evacuees, the avoidance of income tax payment seemed legitimate because the Co-op was a non-profit making organization in which the money made was returned to the same people who bought at the stores. Furthermore, the members of this Co-op were evacuees receiving but a token income from their employment at the project. Particularly aggravating to the evacuees was the feeling that the W.R.A. was quite unsympathetic towards their efforts to save because of their extremely insecure economic situation, and that Mr. Smith and Mr. Shirrell were making no effort to make the Co-op profits non-taxable.

"On the matter of the income tax, there was a great deal of talk. Mr. S. and Mr. M. offered to resign because this matter wasn't dealt with adequately by the Board and they felt responsible to the block for it. Mr. I. of the Management Committee tonight brought up a heated protest against having to pay so much income tax. This matter was taken up by the Planning

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<sup>1/</sup> Sakoda Journal, Nov. 12, 1942.

Board, of which he is a member, and they approached Mr. Shirrell as to ways and means of avoiding having to pay this amount. Mr. Shirrell is said to have felt that the income tax was something that had to be paid, and remarked that the amount is nothing if the people imagined that they gave it to the war effort. Mr. I. said that things like that cannot be told to the people because it would incense them. The Planning Board suggested that there must be ways and means of handling the situation so as not to have to pay so much tax. There was a suggestion of buying clothes for the needy. Since Mr. Smith was gone to San Francisco, however, nothing was done about the matter."1/

The Board of Directors passed the decision to purchase a truck, a passenger car, a vault, and increase the office space, as means of reducing the <sup>taxable</sup> reserve of the community enterprises. On December 3 it was announced that earnings of the Co-op distributed in the form of patronage dividends would not be taxable, according to the legal opinion of the W.R.A. solicitor in Washington, and the Dispatch announcement quoted Robert Throckmorton, the project attorney, as stating, "This, in effect, means that purchases made with scrip books are not taxable, whereas those made by cash are."2/ While no definite decision was received on the profits of community enterprises prior to its transfer to the Co-op, the advice of the W.R.A. solicitor was used in promoting the sale of scrips and membership ~~in~~ in the Co-op. Concern about the payment of income taxes declined following an announcement that the community enterprises profits would probably not be taxable.

If one phase of the drive to replace the W.R.A. supervised community enterprises with an evacuee controlled Co-op was the belief that the latter would better permit savings for the evacuees, the other phase of the same drive came from the popular distrust generally of the W.R.A. and particularly of Kendall Smith. On the one hand, there was the suspicion that Mr. Smith was seeking to retain control of the community stores and have his policies maintained even if <sup>the stores</sup> ~~they~~ were transferred to the Co-op group, but there was also the suspicion that Mr. Smith or his staff might have misappropriated the profits properly belonging to the people. The extent and the nature of this suspicion is suggested in the response of the

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1/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 27, 1942.

2/ Tulean Dispatch, Dec. 3, 1942, p. 1.

Co-op representatives to Mr. Smith's invitation to the group that they look over the books or the stocks of the community stores. At a Co-op committee meeting:

Issei: "People in our ward believe that there's no use in going ahead with the Co-op until we see the financial statement." (The rest agree)

Chairman: "Last night there was a meeting called by Smith with the Board of Directors. He asked that the Co-op people come at any time to look at the store or look over the books. The people from Ward II and Ward III felt that it wasn't sufficient to look only at the books. It was necessary to look over the stocks."1/

But at other meetings of Co-op representatives:

Chairman: "We are going to inspect the stores. We thought of inviting the public, but if we do that we will get people who agitate (yagiteki) and will slow up the procedure."

Incorporator: "How about dividing up the group to go to different canteens?" (This idea is taken up.)

Chairman: "The incorporators are going to the warehouse on Monday with one person from the ward."

Issei: "What's the use of looking at the stock?" (Several people voice this opinion. The meeting has disorganized a little; people are talking all over the room.)2/

Similarly, to another suggestion of a canteen tour:

K: "What's the use of seeing the goods. You have to see the books."3/

In part, the desire to inspect the stores and the books derived from the need of the Co-op leaders to learn more about the operation of the stores, but in greater part the concern was motivated by a less generous interest. In any discussion among the Co-op leaders, particularly the Issei representatives, of the community enterprises which they were to take over, there was scarcely ever absent an undertone of suspicion regarding the incumbent managing staff.

Chairman: "We should not confuse the financial status of the canteens and the building up of the Co-op. Unless we build up the Co-op, we have no right to investigate the canteen books. We intend to call in an auditor in order to have the books examined..... We would like to have this plan approved. It cost Manzanar \$200. It's only a small amount. The Board of Directors can demand of Mr. Smith to call in such an auditor. What do you all think of it?"

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1/ Sakoda Journal, Oct. 21, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Journal, Oct. 29, 1942.

3/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 5, 1942.

*Coop Move*

Issei: "I think it is very necessary. I hear that Mr. Smith is a yaritè (go-getter) and to be suspected. It's good to have a third party come in and examine the books. (The majority is in favor of having this auditor. There is no opposition.)1/

Since it was suspected that any mismanagement of the stores/<sup>by Mr. Smith</sup>would be revealed in either the books or the stocks of the canteens, suspicion of the latter was most evident in the Auditing <sup>and Inventory</sup>~~Committee and the Inventory~~ Committee of the Co-op. In the matter of auditing it was agreed that a C.P.A. should be called in, and upon Mr. Elberson's suggestion that a Mr. Jacobson of Walla Walla, Washington, who was expert on the accounting methods of Co-ops, was available, it was decided to have him audit the books. Since Mr. Smith readily agreed to this proposal, no difficulty was encountered in auditing the community enterprises books.

The other duty of the Committee was "to check on the taking and pricing of inventory to insure conservative pricing and to prevent 'padding' of figures."2/ Partly due to a misunderstanding of its duties, but basically because of the committee's suspicion of Mr. Smith and his staff in community enterprises, the Auditing Committee developed very bad relations with Mr. Smith and his staff. It was expected that the transfer of the stores from Community Enterprises to the Co-op would be effected in early December, and it was agreed between the Co-op leaders and Mr. Smith that an inventory should be taken at that time, but when the Co-op Auditing Committee met with Mr. Smith to discuss the procedure for ~~checking the~~ <sup>taking</sup> inventory, conflicting views emerged regarding the thoroughness with which the inventory should be checked. On November 22, the Board of Directors met with the Auditing Committee to discuss the conflict between the latter and Mr. Smith and clarify the rights of the Auditing Committee in the inventory. "This meeting was called in order to discuss matters without Mr. Smith's presence."3/ The discussion at this meeting is significant for its revelation of the relationship of the Co-op movement to the underlying sentiments in the community---the discontent

1/ Sakoda Journal, October 29, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Journal, October 21, 1942.

3/ Sakoda Journal, November 22, 1942.

with the W.R.A. operated community enterprises; the suspicion and hostility against Mr. Smith and his canteen workers; the feeling that the W.R.A., and Mr. Smith in particular, had little respect for the ability of the Japanese to manage their own affairs; and the demand that community leaders defend the interests of the people.

The Chairman of the Auditing Committee was called upon to explain the conflict with Mr. Smith. An observer reports:

"It was brought out at the last meeting, according to Tomita, that the only power the Committee had was to verify that the inventory was taken and had no right to interfere otherwise. Even after the Co-op took over it was Mr. Smith's idea that the Auditing Committee would have only about that much power. The Committee felt that if such were the case, it would be better not to take part in the inventory because the people would feel that the committee was instrumental for the sort of inventory that was taken."1/

As frequently happened on other occasions, it was necessary that Elberson smooth over damage done by others, explain the situation to the Co-op leaders, and offer advice regarding solutions, in order to keep the Co-op movement directed toward its ultimate goal of establishment.

Elberson: "I'll give my little speech. I think if most of you know me well enough to know that I felt very badly at the last meeting. I know your feelings were hurt. I don't blame you after what was said about your ability to carry on a thing like this. However, I don't believe any of you will impugn my sincerity in working with you. I have been working for months and days to see this thing go through in detriment of my home life. I feel that you owe it to me and generally to the Co-op to go through with the thing."2/

Elberson pointed out that "technically the Auditing Committee has no power at the present time," "It doesn't have the assets of the Community Enterprises in its hands," and that even the Board of Directors was limited in power prior to the transfer of assets. He went so far as to say, "....the Auditing Committee never will be in a position of power. The Board of Directors is the only body that can make decisions relative to the cooperative," aside from the representative body and membership. In so saying, Elberson rephrased but established the correctness of Mr. Smith's claims regarding the powers of the Auditing Committee.

1/ Sakoda Journal, November 22, 1942.

2/ Ibid.

He further stressed the unique position of the Co-op movement at the center in having transferred to it a business established under trusteeship by the W.R.A.

"Let me stress again this point. It's unique in our organization here. Most cooperatives on the outside organize and immediately elect a Board of Directors which makes all the decisions. The situation here is somewhat different. You have in existence already property called the Community Enterprises. You have an intervening period of organizing the Co-op. It becomes extremely necessary after the Board of Directors is elected to orient them in the activities of the business they are going to acquire. I don't mean to say that you are incapable of doing that thing as was said the other night. The Auditing Committee was picked because it had experience and ability. I feel that it is the most competent committee we have as far as personnel goes. But I think you should acquaint yourselves with the particular organization, which is different from others. The Board has been going through that process. Most of them will admit that they've learned a few things during the last weeks.

Please appreciate that I understand your position fully. What is asked of you is that you supervise the inventory. If the inventory is 80% off or completely inadequate, you have the power to make such report to the Board. This gives you some power-----well, I don't know, that's all I have to say."<sup>1/</sup>

The difficulty was, as Elberson later suggested, that, "The Community Enterprises should have been identified more with the people." From the opening of the project, the Tule Lake people had been given to understand that the community stores were in fact stores belonging to the community. The W.R.A. expressed itself as having no intention of operating stores for the people, Mr. Smith was operating and holding the profits of the canteens in trusteeship for the people, but the latter would in time have to take over their <sup>control ownership.</sup> ~~management~~. There existed the contradiction that the stores belonged to the evacuees, and, yet, that until the Co-op was organized and a transfer effected, the evacuees had no direct control of the stores. While technically there was little reason for confusion about this arrangement, in the popular mind there was constant bitterness over owning something which they could not control, and there was frequent confusion as the people demanded that their right of control be recognized. The history of grow-

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<sup>1/</sup> Ibid.

ing distrust of Community Enterprises (the canteen management and workers) could probably have been avoided only if a representative group of the people had been established at the outset to consult with Mr. Smith on the operation of the stores.

The issue between the Auditing Committee and Mr. Smith was that the former demanded the closing of the stores for several days to allow the Auditing Committee time for a thorough check of the inventory taken by canteen workers, but Mr. Smith contended that only one evening or a half day at most would be necessary for an inventory by the canteen workers and "spot checks" could be made by the Auditing Committee. The Auditing Committee felt that no adequate inventory could be taken in such a short time, and demurred on the suggestion of "spot checks". Mr. Smith became irritated at the insistence of the Committee that the stores be closed several days for inventory, declared that the insistence of the Committee implied distrust of Mr. Smith and the canteen workers, and stubbornly refused to discuss the matter further with the Committee stating that the latter had no such powers to supervise the inventory. Elberson had tried, in his speech, to clarify the lack of power of the Auditing Committee, but Horiuchi, a Board member, then immediately remarked:

H: "I understand you 100% and that you are with us 100%. I suggested that we should close the stores for about a week or ten days. This is the most important stage of our work for the last few months. I can't talk in English so good but----I think we should close one week anyway to take the inventory."

Elberson: "Do you mean to say that you don't trust the present people in taking the inventory?"

H: "The Auditing Committee should have 50% power in checking up on the inventory."

Elberson: "It doesn't take more than a day to take an inventory. It will take a day with the present workers taking the inventory."

H: "I don't think we should trust the present workers."

Chairman: "But we don't own the business yet."

H: "We should have one man for every man who takes the inventory."

Elberson: "In order to establish good relations with the present workers, it's a bad policy. It's saying that they are thieves." ..... "Why don't you supervise an inventory through a spot check method which any business man knows about."

Tomita: "Mr. Smith says that we don't have supervising power either."1/

On the assumption that Mr. Smith objected to the presence of committee members at the taking of the inventory, the discussion degenerated into expressions of resentment against Mr. Smith for his objection with such remarks as, "Mr. Smith said that it didn't matter whether the Auditing Committee was present at the inventory taking or not," and "Mr. Smith hinted that we didn't know how to take an inventory." To the repeated question, "Why does Mr. Smith object to the Committee supervising the taking of inventory," Elberson had to reply ~~in~~ with a correction of the misimpression. "Mr. Smith is not objecting to the spot checking of the inventory." It was clear that the committee members were not satisfied that spot checking would be adequate, but even when they were argued into accepting the plan, there still was an extended discussion of the number of days it would require to spot check. In response to ~~The main argument of those opposed to~~ Elberson's suggestion that spot checking be done at the time the inventory was taken, and that no more than a day be be given to the taking of inventory, the main argument in opposition was, "The question about days of closing the store is a matter of gaining confidence of the people." The chairman of the Auditing Committee, in arguing that his committee needed anywhere from two days to a week because, "If the store is closed then the people will know we are doing our duty," stated:

"The Board is going to take the business on the basis of the report of the C.P.A. It's going to be based on the November 30 inventory. This is the only part where the people will have a say in the matter. Whatever we do the people will count on us. The weight is too much for us to bear. We should have ample time and ample means. We thought that the store ought to be closed for a longer time. If possible the C.P.A. should be present, or delay the time when the C.P.A. is present. If the people knew that the C.P.A. was here at the time the inventory was taken it would help to satisfy the people."2/

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1/ Ibid.  
2/ Ibid.

At the insistence of the Auditing Committee that it would require more than one day to take the inventory, a motion was passed that the stores be closed four days. Elberson very much disgustedly asked, "Are you going to pay the employers in the community enterprises for taking four days off?" but the motion stood.

When Mr. Smith was approached with the plan on the following day, he refused to countenance it. Before the Board of Directors,

Smith: "I won't consider it. It's silly in the first place. I didn't approve of the Auditing Committee at all. I got along with you people all right. I object to their approach. We close on Monday night, and close it down till Tuesday afternoon. (A Board member explained that the Auditing Committee wanted to close for several days just to impress the people and gain confidence from them.) "Do you think that we should close the stores for just some foolishness? It's sheer nonsense, and it concerns a third party."

Elberson: "I think this policy is a policy to fool people, to give the impression that we are doing something we are not doing. The policy of the Co-op is to be honest."

Miyamoto (general mgr. of C.E.): "If the people suspect the employees, then they should go ahead and take their own inventory. It would be much easier if they trusted the employee. It would take five times more to spot check the inventory thoroughly. It'll take all of four days if the spot checking is going to be thorough."

K: (Ex. Secty.): "The Auditing Committee doesn't view the employees with suspicion, but the people may."

Smith: "I said this to the Auditing Committee. I told Ken that if they wanted to verify the count, they could do it the same night by means of spot checking."

Board Member: "The impression I got from the Auditing Committee last night was different from what Mr. Smith said right now. They didn't get a warm reception from you."

Smith: "It's because of what they said. They began with the assumption that everything in there needed checking very badly. I never got this impression from you. Most of the things I said that night were warranted, weren't they, K-Don?"

Elberson: "There was an undercurrent of suspicion."

Smith: "I got that feeling of suspicion. I think the people in the Community Enterprise are all right straight down the line. I don't think there would be any reason for padding that store inventory."

Board Member: "I get the impression that you objected to the presence of the Auditing Committee at the inventory taking."

Smith: "I called your attention to the fact that seven wasn't enough (of Co-op representatives at the inventory taking.). I was the one that invited you. But for accuracy only."

Elberson: "I admit that Mr. Smith's speech was rather picturesque. But I also think Ken is blunt; he said, "If you want to take the inventory, okay. If you don't, I don't give a damn." I may have been responsible for the misunderstanding because I said that the Committee didn't have any power just as the Board doesn't have any power."

Smith: "I believe that a few of the members of the Auditing Committee are funny."1/

The disagreement was finally settled with the compromise that the stores be closed for one ~~night~~ <sup>afternoon</sup> and one day for the taking of inventory. Both groups agreed to explain this plan to their respective members to prevent any further misunderstanding. A separate Inventory Committee (five persons from each ward) was established to spot check, and although the Auditing Committee once declined to cooperate following the rejection of their plan of closing stores for four days, they were induced to supervise the Inventory Committee in the various stores.

On Sunday afternoon, November 29, the Inventory and Auditing Committees met with representatives of ~~the~~ Community Enterprise to review the procedure in taking the inventory, and later the committee members went to ~~one of~~ the stores to meet the canteen workers.

"The workers were huddled near the stove, and watched us rather coldly. There was a tenseness on their part in greeting us. The manager introduced us and his department heads..... Then one of the fellows said that the Auditing Committee seemed to be too suspicious of the canteen workers. This feeling was probably shared by the rest of the clerks. While there was no actual enmity between us, the relation could have been more cordial."2/

The groundlessness of the popular distrust of ~~the~~ Community Enterprises was later verified by Mr. Jacobson, the C.P.A., who assured the Co-op people that there was nothing wrong with the accounts.

Distrust of Mr. Smith and the community enterprise workers was not limited to the instance of the Inventory and Auditing Committees. From the beginning of the

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1/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 23, 1942

2/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 29, 1942.

Co-op movement in June 1942, there was constant suspicion that Mr. Smith intended sooner or later to sabotage the movement, and even when Mr. Smith expressly stated his wish that the people would quickly assume control of the stores and he showed friendly interest in the development of the Co-op movement, distrust of his sincerity continued. At the time of the Theater Project issue, Mr. Smith declared:

"If I were to start all over again before the time that I was offered my present position as supervisor of Community Enterprises, I would refuse the office. I would tell the WRA that the only condition on which I would accept the position would be that I should have nothing to say about what should be stocked in the store or anything else, except as the people demanded them."1/

Again, at a Co-op meeting in November, he said:

"I think you people are just as anxious to take over this business as I am to give it to you. It has been my baby till now, I have done the best I can. I think you will do your best. You are inheriting a very well oiled machinery. But when a thing grows too fast, you can't take care of everything, you will find."2/

Despite Mr. Smith's expressions of desire to turn the business over to the Co-op, it was possible to interpret ~~into~~ his <sup>basic</sup> ~~expressions~~ motives <sup>as</sup> other than those on the surface. From certain of his behavior, it seemed to Co-op leaders that Mr. Smith was accepting the Co-op because he considered it inevitable, but that while he was freely transferring control of community enterprise to the Co-op, he was ensuring a place for himself in the latter system. For instance, in his talk before the Board of Directors on November 6, he spoke at length of how the credits <sup>personal</sup> of the store were dependent upon the/good will of the creditors toward him. Referring to the problem of transfer of credit when the Co-op would take over the stores:

"You are starting with the profit and the stock you are selling to the members which at the most will be \$3,000. That means you are going to have difficulty in getting credit. Much of this difficulty is coming back to me. I'm going to be asked a thousand questions by wholesalers. I don't know what to think myself. You think it over, all of you. I'll answer any questions you want answered."3/

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1/ Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, Sept. 26, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 6, 1942.

3/ Ibid.

"There are 18 people on the book who gave me credit out of the 65 creditors. Much of the credit was due to manipulation of creditors whom I was acquainted with personally. Others were due to my giving the impression that I was a government agent. We get credit from Sears Roebuck; that's due to me and to me alone."1/

Smith's remarks could be interpreted to mean that he was indispensable to management the/~~operation~~ of the stores regardless of who operated it because he controlled the sources of credit. It also seemed that he was using the credit weapon to ensure that the evacuee employees in the stores whom he had hired would be retained by the Co-op.

"You set a limit of one dollar (membership fee) which I don't agree with. I don't know how much credit you have asked for. I have asked for credit. There are a hundred things that a credit man has to consider. More asked about Lawrence Nakano because he has done business with More."2/

"I knew that this thing was coming along on the first of September. When any man of any importance has come in this place--the man who owns the wholesale houses, etc.,--I have made it a point to take them around in my car and introduce them to the managers. When I introduce them, I tell them just what these people do. When this thing breaks, I shall write to the firm and tell them who are working in the store. That's another act you can't get on a financial statement. You gentlemen are in for a run."3/

"Don't get the idea that I think farmers are dumb (many Co-op leaders were farmers). All I want is to see people who have handled large orders. I want to see you hand over the business to people who can handle business."4/

In summarizing this meeting with Mr. Smith, a member of the Board of Directors declared:

"At the beginning of the meeting Mr. Smith did a lot of talking. Just off hand he had come to tell the Board of Directors how much trouble they are faced with. He was just being considerate. On the other hand, more meaning than that can be read into the meeting.... He advised the choosing of a general manager immediately and he had brought along Sumio with him to this meeting.... He brought up the fact that he learned that the income tax just had to be paid.... He said that other problems were minor to that of getting credit, which would be necessary if clothes are to be kept on stock for the clothing allowance. He brought out time and again that the credit of the Community Enterprise ~~xxxxx~~ was due largely to his own efforts and his own personal contacts. ~~xxxx~~ He also brought out that the credit of the store was partially based on the managers of the store and hinted that the credit would be easier to get if the present managers were retained."5/

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1/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 6, 1942.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Ibid.

4/ Ibid.

5/ Ibid.

Although Mr. Smith was as frank and direct in his statements as any member of the administrative personnel, he was perhaps the most enigmatic to the evacuees. Evacuee Co-op leaders were always uncertain as to how much of what he said they should accept at face value. He made it plain that he wanted Sumio Miyamoto, the incumbent general manager of the stores, retained; and he left no question that he felt the other store employees, except for a few inefficient ones, should likewise be retained. On the other hand, in the selection of the assistant manager, who was likely to very quickly take over the general managership because Miyamoto was planning to leave the project, Mr. Smith advised the choice of some person from within the Co-op movement. Most of these suggestions were accepted by the Board of Directors, and when the transfer of Community Enterprise to the Co-op was effected, the store personnel was largely kept intact. In the case of Mr. Smith himself, all the suspicions that he was maneuvering to keep control of the stores even after the transfer of ~~ownership~~ managership ~~was~~ were dissipated when he announced his transfer of activity to another project/<sup>after</sup>~~when~~ his work at Tule Lake was finished.

On the whole, it may be said that the widespread evacuee distrust of Mr. Smith, which played an important part in the organization of the Co-op movement, was largely unfounded. In reviewing his activity at Tule Lake, it may be seen that his behavior was more predictable than that of most other W.R.A. personnel, for ~~him~~ he was clear minded and his thought and action consistently followed business rationale; but it was his directness and his disregard for social conventions where they interfered with economy that the evacuees found greatest difficulty in understanding. In the case of the theater issue, for instance, his basic argument in support of the project was that it was a sound business proposition; the evacuee objection was that Mr. Smith overlooked the evacuee interest in the subject.

One reason for disbelief of his expressed interest in the Co-op was the assump-

tion that Mr. Smith, as supervisor of community enterprises, would have a personal interest in maintaining the existing system since the transfer of the stores to the Co-op would radically curtail his functions. Furthermore, his personality was such as to draw popular distrust upon him for his every word and action seemed imbued with the characteristics of a shrewd, hard-headed, almost ruthless, competitive business man. As Billigmeier, who was very close to Elberson and the Co-op movement, states: "It often seemed that the Chief of Community Enterprises, Kendall Smith, was sabotaging the program (Co-op)," yet it was difficult to specify actual instances in which Mr. Smith was found undermining the cooperative. His conflicts with Co-op leaders largely resulted from his tendency to view all matters connected with the store strictly from the standpoint of its worth as a "purely business proposition," whereas the ~~former~~ Co-op leaders felt it necessary to take account of public feelings but his opposition did not necessarily imply any effort to undermine the cooperative movement. The peculiar combination of the attitudes of admiration and distrust with which evacuees looked upon Mr. Smith is well expressed in the remark, "Mr. Smith knows how to take care of his own interests."

The establishment of the Co-op thus depended upon several preliminary steps. First, it was necessary that the people accept the Co-op as the mechanism of their control over the community stores, and this was accomplished largely through the effort of Mr. Elberson through an extensive program of education. The program was materially assisted by the decision of the W.R.A. itself to promote the Co-op as the operator of project stores, as over against the alternatives of privately owned businesses or a "Government store"<sup>1/</sup> for the W.R.A. insistence upon the Co-op did much to silence those urging that the W.R.A. continue to operate the stores at low cost to the evacuees. Nevertheless, even with W.R.A. support, the Co-op movement had to do considerable educational work to overcome the opposition of

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<sup>1/</sup> Letter from Dillon Myer to Ralph Merritt, Project Director Manzanar, May 6, 1943. In this letter, Myer explains the reasons for the selection of the Consumer Cooperative as the means of conducting a general merchandise business on the projects.

*p. 46 omitted*

those not wishing to assume responsibility for the risks and liabilities of a cooperatively owned and operate store. Apart from the question of accepting the cooperative movement, there was also the question of the kind of cooperative that should be established. It was Elberson's belief that the Tule Lake Coöperative should follow and be a part of the general Consumer Cooperative movement in America, which also meant that the evacuees should accept the Rochdale principles on which the American Co-ops are founded. The popular demands that store prices be reduced to wholesale cost (plus ~~the~~ overhead) and that patronage dividends thus be done away with are illustrative of the kind of resistance encountered in gaining acceptance of the Rochdale principles. Beyond instructing the people on the strict mechanisms of a Co-op organization, however, Elberson's constant concern was to imbue the people with the liberal-democratic social philosophy on which the cooperative movement is based and to show its advantages to the Japanese minority in America. Very few Co-op leaders had any serious appreciation of Elberson's point of view, for most of them were primarily interested in gaining control of the community stores, but Elberson achieved at least the first step toward success in this propaganda work by gaining the respect of the Co-op leaders working with him.

The first major step toward the establishment of the Co-op was taken with the emergence of evacuee leaders promoting the movement. The Provisional Advisory Council, selected in early August, was the forerunner of this leadership, and the formation of the ward assemblies in September and the selection of the Board of Directors and various committee members constituted a further advance in this direction. The manner in which these leaders came to identify themselves with the movement and the manner in which their number expanded over the months reflect the growth of the movement itself. Initially, there was the small number of Nisei composed of people like Fumi Sakamoto, Najima, Bob Ota, Sakoda, <sup>and</sup> Takemoto who were interested in the Consumer Cooperatives as an economic philosophy and saw the pos-

sibility of its application to Tule Lake. Issei leadership was introduced when men like Ikeda, <sup>Hitomi,</sup> <sup>and</sup> Matsumoto, Horiuchi, Nakamura, Komatsu, who were primarily interested in gaining evacuee control of the stores and also of playing a political role in the community, joined forces with the cooperative movement. The leadership was further enlarged with the appointment or election of block Co-op representatives from the list of which there emerged individuals who showed keen interest in the cooperative movement and evidenced ability to lead in the discussion of the subject. Some rose by their greater power of leadership, others by popular recognition and insistence that they assume leadership roles, and still others by virtue <sup>and</sup> of special training/experience such as in accounting or in general merchandising operations. Some showed fleeting interest in the Cooperative and later dropped out as their interest <sup>lagged.</sup> ~~turned in other directions.~~ By such processes a group of Co-op leaders developed and became established upon whom responsibility for the organization of the Co-op was placed. The establishment of these relationships is suggested in the comment on a ward Co-op meeting.

"With the exception of one person, all who were able to come had turned up. There was a friendly atmosphere pervading at the meeting and Mr. Donao hit on the prevailing spirit when he said that he felt that he was in a friendly group when the coop representatives of this ward gathered together.

The attitude of the members in the block toward the coop representatives seem to be one of trust. The matter of patronage dividend was left up to the Board of Directors, even though the people in some blocks were opposed to it. This feeling trust adds a great deal to the harmony of the coop organization."<sup>1/</sup>

A further step toward the establishment of the Co-op was the adjustment of relationships between the Co-op leaders and Mr. Smith. Hostility between the representatives of the Co-op movement and of the Community Enterprise would have considerably affected the stabilization of the stores under either management. As has already been indicated, a certain amount of distrust existed between these two groups even at the time of the transfer of canteen control to the Co-op, but Sakoda suggests that this distrust was gradually dissipated as the two groups came to know

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<sup>1/</sup> Sakoda Journal, Nov. 6, 1942.

each other personally. Speaking in particular of the relationships with Mr.

Smith, he points out:

November 16, 1942:

"One change in the meeting (Board of Directors) tonight was that everybody wasn't scared as they were the last time.... Mr. Smith in turn seems to have lost some of the fear that he had and seems much more friendly at present.... Part of this is due to the fact that the Board of Directors have decided to select Sumio Miyamoto as the general manager and it seems that the other people in the canteen are going to be allowed to keep their present job."1/

November 22, 1942: "The most interesting thing about this meeting was the suspicion with which the Auditing Committee viewed Mr. Smith and the canteen workers..... This Auditing Committee met Mr. Smith for the first time, and seems to bring the feeling of suspicion of the people directly. The Board of Directors have already had some contact with Mr. Smith and has learned something about the Community Enterprises so that they are probably not as suspicious as the members of the Auditing Committee."2/

November 28, 1942: "The interesting point of the stand of the Board of Directors, the Auditing Committee, and the Management Committee, is the relative degree of distrust directed toward Mr. Smith. So far the Board is most compromising in its stand. It desires to take the safe road and pay what must be paid. The Auditing Committee had a clash with Mr. Smith, but at the present time, it has accepted the task of taking the inventory roughly under conditions which are reasonable, which was suggested by the Board of Directors and Mr. Smith. The Management Committee is the newest of the three committees. For that reason it comes directly from the people with all of the suspicions that the people have against Mr. Smith. The longer the contact, the more reasonable seem to ~~the~~ be the attitude of the committees. If this observation is true, it just goes to show the importance of personal contact in settling many of the ~~important~~ disputes between the Japanese and the Caucasians. Often times it is not a matter of difference in opinion so much as a matter of suspicion and misunderstanding."3/

The function which the Co-op movement served of bringing its representatives in contact with Mr. Smith and his staff, and of removing popular misunderstanding of the canteen operations, did much toward ~~removing much of the popular~~ distrust of the Community Enterprises which had been one of the focal points of discontent. The removal of these misunderstandings and the establishment of the Co-op in December contributed toward the stabilization of community relationships as much as the establishment of the Permanent Council and the Planning Board did.

The transfer of the Community Enterprises to the Tule Lake Consumer Cooperative

1/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 18, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 22, 1942.

3/ Sakoda Journal, Nov. 28, 1942.

was effected on December 1, 1942. The By-Laws had been accepted earlier and incorporation papers were filed in late November. From the standpoint of organization, the Co-op was probably the most highly systematized of any group in the community, and the various ramifications of the organization seemed to function within the larger unit more smoothly than in other groups. In part, this was due to the greater possibilities in the delegation of responsibilities because of the large membership of the Co-op, whereas the active membership of the Planning Board or the Council tended to be limited to elected representatives, but the active interest in the various committees and ward assemblies displayed by the Co-op people was also due to the large scale educational work which was carried on earlier towards getting membership participation.

Membership in the Tule Lake Cooperative Enterprise, Incorporated, was granted on the payment of a \$1.00 fee, and following the Rochdale principles, gave the member one vote in the corporation. Members in each block elected a representative to the ward assembly of the Co-op, and the ward assemblies in turn elected one Issai and one Nisei to the Board of Directors, a body composed of fifteen persons including one Board member from the Caucasian group. To serve the various detailed business of the Co-op, a series of committees were established most of which were represented <sup>by</sup> one member from each ward. Provisions were also made in the By-laws for the allocation of 10% of the savings to a general surplus reserve, the payment of patronage dividends, the dissolution of the Co-op and for limited liability of members.

As might be expected, a drastic change in the nature of the discussions at the Co-op meetings <sup>of the stores</sup> occurred as soon as the transfer from Community Enterprise to the Cooperative was effected. Where much of the previous attention had been directed toward the problem of organization, following December 1, attention was largely shifted to the problems of management. Much of the business was executed

by the Board of Directors. Typical of the matters discussed was the question of accepting offers for the sale of goods from Montgomery Wards, the Oakland Cooperative wholesaler, and the Reeder's haberdashery of Klamath Falls. The basic issue in each instance was the question of the profit to the Tule Lake Co-op in contracting with these companies. Most of the offers were at least tentatively accepted. A different type of problem was the question of the amount to charge for the cashing of government checks, in which evacuee employees of the W.R.A. were paid, and of personal checks. Earlier, the Bank of America which operated a small branch on the project charged ten cents per check and incurred considerable wrath from the people. Moreover, the irregularity of the bank in opening its door, and the long lines which would consequently form whenever the bank was open, had been to a source of irritation/~~of~~ the evacuees. The initial suggestion of the Board was that a five cents charge be made on all checks, but Co-op members buying at the canteens in scrip were to be allowed free check cashing privileges. Other variations on this suggestion were made, but later, under pressure from the public, the decision was passed to cash all checks free of charge. The instances cited illustrate the type of problems discussed and passed upon within the Board of Directors.

While attention was increasingly turned to the problem of management, there was a continuing process of readjustments in organization as well. As the Board of Directors assumed a large amount of the responsibility for the management of the canteen business, the popular discontent over the lack of voice in store controls which had initially been directed at Mr. Smith was now in part turned upon the Board of Directors. This was expressed in the form of ward and block groups arguing that decisions of the Board should be more restricted, that a greater number of/<sup>the</sup> problems which the Board was deciding by itself should first be referred back to the ward and block people. The source of this trouble was

in part the dissatisfaction of persons in the wards and blocks excluded from the Board of Directors who nevertheless desired to wield power in the same degree as the Board members. It was also the result of an ancient problem on the project, of the inability of the general evacuee populace to understand the difficulties and responsibilities of higher administrative offices such as the W.R.A., the Community Council and the Co-op Board of Directors.

Mr. Ikeda was one of those with strong political ambitions and with strong popular backing who was <sup>ineligible for</sup> ~~excluded from~~ Board membership because of his blocked alien status. He proved particularly disturbing to the Board because of his tendency to quibble over decisions made by the Board. For instance, upon the announcement at a ward meeting of Sumio Miyamoto's appointment as general manager of the Co-ops:

Ikeda: "Mr. Miyamoto is not the sort of person who has handled a lot of merchandize. It has to be someone who has handled his own money and made a profit."

Matsumoto: "You have to train young people. But at the start it's important to give a good impression on the people."

Ikeda: "If you don't bring important matters back to the block the Board is going to be looked upon like Mr. Smith was."<sup>1/</sup>

Sakoda who was closely associated with the Co-op activities in this ward interpreted the tone of this meeting in the following manner:

"There seemed to be a feeling of wanting to show the Board who was really boss in the coop business. The feeling of wanting to seem important by opposing the decisions of the Board seems to have been rather strong. Mr. Ikeda, who feels that he is a 'big shot', seems to feel rather left out because he is not on the Board. He would be if it were not for the fact that he is a blocked alien. Coupled with that is the fact that these people who opposed constructive measures passed by the Board or suggested from the office are those who are relatively new in the Coop movement." "They have not been in long enough to know all of the facts and understand all of the people in the Movement."<sup>2/</sup>

Within the Board of Directors itself, there was some difference of opinion regarding the questions which should be referred to the ward meetings and those

<sup>1/</sup> Sakoda Journal, Dec. ~~1941~~, 1942.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid.

which the Board should decide upon independently. There were those who desired to take every other question back to the ward and block meetings for popular approval of Board suggestions; but there were also those who felt the danger of the Board becoming "messenger boys" unable to make any independent decisions if such a precedent were established. On the whole, the general sentiment among Board members was that ~~the~~ their group should have powers of independent decision if the Board were to fulfill its managerial functions efficiently, but if the Board took such independent action, there was the danger of its encountering the same type of popular opposition which the Temporary Council had met, under the pressure of which the Council had fallen to pieces. One condition favoring the Board of the Coop, which had not been the case with the Council, was the presence of Issei on the Board. The opposition in this instance, therefore, was not the conflict of generations, or the conflict of the Japanese against Caucasians, but it was a disagreement among those of essentially a like kind. The greater basis of confidence in the Board enabled by this condition frequently brought forth individuals in ward meetings willing to support the position of the Board when the latter was subjected to attack from ward representatives. At a ward meeting when the Board of Directors was being attacked with particular severity for certain of its decisions, the Issei chairman of the meeting declared,

"The Board ought to know more about some of these matters more than we do. They work hard and pass things. It makes it hard for the Board of Directors. If we don't support the Board member, it's going to make it hard for the members. It may mean that there will not be anyone to be a member of the Board. I think we should think about this, too. I think we should understand a matter fully before trying to vote against a Board's decision."<sup>1/</sup>

On this occasion, the chairman's remarks assisted materially in stopping the avalanche of criticisms. Furthermore, the existence of such support enabled Board members to argue their views vigorously and gain a fair hearing from the ward meeting. This again was in contrast to the experience of the Temporary Council which

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<sup>1/</sup> Sakoda Journal, Dec. 10, 1942.

found itself unable to make any decisions because its every independent decision was likely to be attacked by the block Issei and there were none among the powerful Issei group to support openly a decision of the Temporary Council. Because the possibility existed for the Board of Directors to argue their case before the people and gain a hearing, the Board members could win over ward and block support to their view.

Additional strength was given to the position of the Board of Directors when some of the disgruntled ward committee men were given greater responsibilities in the Board activities. In the case of Mr. Ikeda, although he was ineligible for official membership on the Board, he was <sup>invited</sup> ~~attended~~ to attend the Board meetings, following which there was a noticeable change in his attitude about the role of the Board of Directors.

"Since Mr. Ikeda has come to the Board meetings, he has come to favor more action by the Board. I think he sees that the Board is doing its best to get through with its business."<sup>1</sup>/

Similar changes of attitude among other ward representatives were noted as they became familiarized with the organization of the Co-op.

Readjustments occurred in other relationships within the Co-op. Very early after the establishment of the Co-op, it was found that the Executive Secretary was somewhat lacking in administrative ability, particularly because of his over concern with details and the inability to delegate responsibilities properly. The first conflicts with the Executive Secretary occurred in the Co-op offices where other members of the personnel felt he was seeking to assert too much authority, delegating responsibilities without sufficient regard for organization, and wasting his time on clerical work and therefore not giving sufficient time to his <sup>executive</sup> ~~secretarial~~ functions. In time, committees outside of the office likewise

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*Jan 4 1943*  
<sup>1</sup>/ Sakoda Journal, Dec. 10, 1942.

began to criticize the Executive Secretary for his failure to perform certain tasks which the committees requested of him. In late January 1943, the Executive Secretary, harrassed by these criticisms, threatened to resign, but to maintain favorable relations and avoid misunderstandings, the Secretary was asked to remain at his position although it was recognized that others might serve better in the administrative function. In the course of time, the Executive Secretary displayed an improvement in understanding of his functions.

There was also the problem of the relationship between Co-op members and the canteen workers, a group which had long been subjected to popular criticism for their "namaiki na" (fresh) attitude towards customers, their lack of courtesy, and their inclination towards favoritism in dealing with customers. After taking out membership in the Co-op, some evacuees who resented the attitude of the store clerks began to take an authoritative mode of conduct in their relations with the store clerks. For a time, the relationship of the store workers to the community became somewhat strained, and an Employee Relations Committee was established to study personnel relations and smooth out difficulties. Efforts were also directed towards enabling the store workers to participate more in the Co-op movement and thus have a greater voice in the discussion of problems affecting them directly.

With the transfer of community enterprise control from Mr. Smith to the Tule Lake Cooperative, much of the intense distrust of canteen operations was dissolved. Questions continued to be raised concerning the disposition of the store profits, but the questions now concerned how much of and when the profits would be disbursed. There no longer existed the former doubt that the people would not receive any of the store profits. By removing this source of discontent, and also by giving the Issei a larger voice in community affairs, the establishment of the Co-op contributed toward the stabilization of the community.

18

THE REGISTRATION ISSUE AT TULE LAKE

Background to the registration

The reaction of the Tule Lake people to the registration question did not, of course, arise as a spontaneous response to the announcement by the War Department early in February of the proposal for the enlistment of Nisei. The setting of the community was ripe for some kind of reaction to such a proposal, and although the degree and character of the reaction depended on the manner of its presentation, a person well informed about this community might have predicted that any presentation of the question would at least temporarily be met with an unfavorable reception. Some of the early conditions bearing on the registration issue are described in the following paragraphs.

The question of military service and volunteering for the Army was not new in this community, for at least on two previous occasions, once at the instigation of the JACL and again on inquiry from the Army language school, the problem of volunteering had been discussed in this community. The purpose of the JACL's investigation was to determine the extent of interest in military service among evacuees of all centers so that the organization might make some recommendation to the War Department for reconsideration of the 4-C classification then established for all Nisei. At Tule Lake the question was first raised at the Council meeting of October 27, 1942 by Walter Tsukamoto, three weeks prior to the National JACL Conference that was to be held in Salt Lake City. Tsukamoto declared:

"I have a matter I wish to bring up. I received a letter from JACL headquarters telling us that the Army is now considering the induction of Nisei into the Army. The JACL wishes to conduct a survey to determine whether it is the desire of the Nisei to volunteer for service or be inducted by the usual procedure. Will you go back to your blocks and ask the Nisei what they would prefer?"

<sup>1</sup> Miyamoto document, City Council Meeting, Oct. 27, 1942, p. 4

From the type of questions about military service raised at this meeting, it is apparent that no definite opinion regarding this issue existed among the councilmen, for the inquiries of those present were directed toward getting scattered bits of information about military service and no clear-cut opinions as to what the Nisei should do developed. Three days later at the local JACL meeting, however, a much clearer definition of the problem was evident though the opinions expressed here were those of the Nisei and indicated very little of the Issei influence. The nature of the JACL's interest in this problem is presented in a news item appearing in the Dispatch, which says:

The JACL is launching a country-wide movement to ask the War Department to allow the Nisei to serve their country in the same category as other Americans.<sup>2</sup>

Nonconclusive opinion was arrived at in this meeting of October 30, 1942, but three currents of opinions developed. First, the party-line JACL members showed strong favor toward the idea of volunteering, their view being that by this method the Nisei could prove their loyalty which had been questioned at the time of evacuation. Another group, constituting perhaps the largest majority of those present, were opposed to volunteering unless the Nisei were to be enlisted for combat duty and the usual discriminations, about which much has been heard, were done away with. A third group, a skeptical minority, were raising questions as to the kind of treatment that might be forecast for the Japanese in America in post-war years and the guarantees for the future that might be elicited from the Government. Although the point was not made explicitly, it was evident that this group was inclined to reject entirely the idea of military service unless a clearer definition of guarantees could be secured from the Government. From their pronunciation of the English language, it also seemed that these speakers were perhaps the most Japanese of those in attendance.

The reaction of the block people to the question presented by Walter Tsukamoto was not reported to the Council until their meeting of November 10, 1942. Some of the typical responses reported by the block representatives are:

Block 4: Some are willing to volunteer, others want to wait for selective service, and others just don't give a darn.

Block 15: There are not many of draft age in my block. Two definitely wish to volunteer, while some are indifferent. Many of them feel that the damage has already been done against the Nisei, and there's no use in trying to appeal by volunteering.

Block 18: Three are willing to volunteer, but the rest wish to wait for induction. Their reason is that they wonder if the Army is sincere in asking for volunteers. They also ask that if they are inducted, some steps are taken to give back to the Nisei their citizenship rights, and that parents are taken care of. If there is no discrimination and they are permitted to volunteer, they are willing to go.

Block 46: They'll volunteer if the discrimination is wiped out. They don't want the JACL to ask or appeal for service as long as we're retained in relocation centers.

Block 73: Five will volunteer if they are given combat duty and aren't required merely to take care of the camps, etc. The remaining are willing to go if there is correction of the wrong done citizens.<sup>1</sup>

Because of the way the problem was stated at the time, as to whether the Nisei wished to volunteer, or be inducted, the reports do not offer a complete picture of the community's reaction to the question of military service itself; but it was already evident in these reports what were the chief concern of the Nisei with regard to the question of military service. Most prominent at the time was the point that there was no desire to volunteer as long as the discrimination within the Army against using Nisei for combat duty existed. But the points which were to stand out in later discussions of the registration issue, the questioning of the Government's sincerity about returning citizenship rights if Nisei are inducted, the request for parental security in the event of induction, and even the feeling that "the damage has already been done", were all brought out in this early discussion of the problem. If Tsukamoto had

1. Miyamoto Document, Council Meeting, November 10, 1942. p. 1-2

hoped that there might be a favorable response to the idea of volunteering, he did not get it from this community, for the over whelming opinion in the community was against voluntary enlistment. In fact, even these reports on the floor of the Council were not entirely representative of the community adverse opinion, for in many instances the councilmen questioned the block Nisei individually without consultation of their parents, and the weight of parental opinion which was to become a major influence in later discussions were not taken into account.

What is more illuminating than these reports in the Council is the discussion of this question in the block meetings where Issei were able to air their views. In the meeting in Block 5, the councilman at first attempted to exclude the Issei from the discussion on the grounds that this was essentially a Nisei problem and that the Nisei should be permitted to solve it in their own way. The Issei, however, immediately objected to such a separation and one Issei declared typically:

I have a son whom I have cared for over twenty years and in whom I have always maintained an interest. In a question of military service in which my son is being asked to give his life on the battle front, I have as much interest in the question as anyone else. Moreover, if he is taken into the Army, what security do we, his parents, have in the years to come after the war? Who will there be to look after us in our old age? I think we Issei have as much interest in this question as anyone else.

In the ensuing discussion the view was expressed by a Nisei that there is certainly no need to request the privilege of serving in the armed forces, but rather that they should concentrate effort in making demands upon the Government to return those privileges of a citizen which were taken from them. Moreover, there should be some provision made for the security of parents who would be left behind in the event of induction. The whole discussion at this meeting was in this tenor, and the conclusion of the discussion might be summed up as one Issei declared:

Certainly, there is no need for the Nisei to volunteer. Who ever heard of such nonsense? If the Government were to return full privileges of citizenship to the Nisei and guarantee the security of their parents, and then ask the Nisei to volunteer, that would be a different question, but is that the nature of this proposal? As long as nothing of this sort is being proposed, let the question alone. If the Government eventually asks conscripts the Nisei into military service, maybe we can't do anything about it, but, in the meantime, let sleeping dogs lie.<sup>1</sup>

In general, the opinion of the community in response to the question raised by the JACL was summarized in the apt phrase, "Let sleeping dogs lie." Behind this attitude one could sense the people's underlying motives for objection to the proposition, the fear of seeing their sons inducted, their resentment of the evacuation and the consequent view of non-responsibility toward the Government, and the hope that nothing should disturb or alter their life in the relocation center for the duration unless it be a proposal to return the evacuees to their former homes.

At the same time that the JACL was raising the question of voluntary enlistment in the Army, publicity began to appear in the Tulean Dispatch about the proposed recruitment for the Army Language School at Fort Savage. From the Army's point of view, apart from the value of having Nisei who already know something of the Japanese language as students, the program would serve as the initial stage of the effort to regain for the Nisei their right to serve in the combat forces of the United States. This was especially the view of Colonel Rasmussen, commandant of the language school, of whom it is said that his fight in Washington has been against the high Army officials who are skeptical of Nisei loyalty and are loathe to use them in the responsible position of interpreter. At least, this was part of the argument used by the Nisei recruiting officers who visited the project during Thanksgiving week, and from this assumption they drew the conclusion that it was up to the Nisei themselves to demonstrate their loyalty by supporting the Colonel's faith in them.

<sup>1</sup> Miyamoto Notes, November 9, 1942

Because of the limited number of persons who volunteered for the school, the reaction in the community was not active; but, nevertheless, the question was prominent in public discussion for several days and there was no doubt as to the majority of Issei's opposition on the question. While no single reason for this opposition can be stated, some of the views expressed by Issei indicate something of the underlying feelings that were involved.

I guess the Army sends out those Nisei recruiting officers in their uniforms to impress the youngsters, excite their imagination and seduce our boys into the Army.<sup>1</sup>

I think only a traitor could use a language against the very people from whom he learned it.<sup>2</sup>

The Nisei are fools. Anything a keto tells them to do, they'll do.<sup>3</sup>

The extent of the hostility against volunteer enlistees, however, is not adequately brought out in these expressions of views. For one thing, according to rumors, there were pro-Japanese nationalists here who went around threatening persons against enlisting for the school, and whether such active agitators were present or not such stories gave further indication of the community's disapproval of volunteering for the American Army. Moreover, some of the mothers of boys who were volunteering started the traditional senninbari (thousand person stitches, a belt of cloth on which a thousand persons put in one stitch each to give the soldier the strength of all these people), but in more than one instance their door-to-door solicitation of stitches was met by having the door slammed in their faces. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the community's opposition to voluntary enlistment for the school lies in the absence of the sobetsukai (farewell parties) for the departing soldiers, for under ordinary circumstances there would have been ~~an~~ elaborate parties throughout the project for the volunteers. Thus, opposition to military service in the armed forces of the United States was evident at least three or four months before the announcement of the registration.

1. Miyamoto Notes, November 26, 1942

2. Ibid. November 29, 1942

3. Ibid. November 21, 1942

The other issue created by the registration program was the questions of the advantages or disadvantages to the evacuees in relocating, but this question too had a background reaching back several months to the early discussions of the relocation program. The earliest attitudes on relocation or resettlement expressed by the evacuees are found in the rumors that persisted in the project for almost half a year, of the possibility that the Tule Lake evacuees might undergo further movement.<sup>1</sup> Despite repeated denial by the Administration of any further forced migration of the evacuees in this center, the slightest evidence of a possible invasion of the Pacific Coast by the Japanese forces, the use of this center as a base hospital for wounded soldiers, or the unwillingness of the Administration to improve conditions here, was interpreted as a sign of the WRA's intent to relocate the evacuees in some inland district. This rumor was not directly related to the official WRA program of relocation and resettlement, but it had bearing upon the program. The constant discussion of the possibility of forced migration from this place, although carried on with inadequate unofficial information, aided in crystallizing the attitude of fear and resentment against further movement; and an understanding of the assumptions behind this rumor provides a partial answer to the resistance in the community against resettlement.

Most generally stated, this rumor may be described as a reaction to their forced migration from their homes; it was an expression of anxiety and resentment against a condition which limited personal control over their movement. Underlying this anxiety must have been a basic distrust of the WRA's intentions, for, officially, the Administration had repeatedly denied the intention of any further forced movement. Moreover, there was also the assumption of greater strength of the Japanese military than was admitted in the American press and of an ultimate Japanese victory within a short time. "

1. See the chapter on "Collective Behavior" for full account of this rumor

"Knowing" the imminence of a Japanese invasion of the Pacific Coast it was assumed that evacuees would have to be removed from a center so near the Coast; and, on the other hand, assuming the nearness of a Japanese victory, the people were loathe to migrate further inland where it would only create further problems of moving back again. These and other assumptions warped the minds of the people so that they were willing to accept any cue as a signal of the realization of their premonitions.

This talk fitted into the evacuees' mental picture of the relocation which was announced by Mr. Shirrell as early as August 29, 1942 at a mass meeting following the WRA regional conference in San Francisco. What Mr. Shirrell emphasized then and in the following months was the desirability and advantage to the evacuees of the relocation program, but the Issei's interpretation of these announcements was that the WRA, for some unrevealed reasons, wished to get rid of the evacuees and was therefore planning means by which to scatter the local population throughout the unknown and undesirable inland areas of the United States. Although this reaction was slow to develop, especially since interest in sugar beet work intervened during the fall months, with a rising tempo in the WRA's program of resettlement, the resentment and anxiety about the program also increased.

From the day that Mr. Coverly arrived in December to replace Mr. Shirrell as project director, the former's emphasis in all his addresses to the people was on the resettlement program. Where Mr. Shirrell's discussion of the program was generally bolstered by explanations of the "reason why" behind the relocation program, Coverly spoke more directly of the facts of relocation, of its mechanism and the purpose it would fulfill. Specifically speaking, Mr. Shirrell had learned to understand some of the underlying fears and resistances among the Issei and he was more careful than has been Coverly in removing the basis of these resistances. The reaction of the people to Coverly's

talks and the increasing tempo of the WRA relocation program/<sup>was</sup> accompanied by a concomittant crystallization of opinion against relocation.

At a meeting of the City Council on February 3, 1943, only a week before the introduction of the registration program, the resistance in the community to the relocation program was discussed. In the report of the committee selected to study the problem, some of the objections to the program expressed by the Issei were:

1. Fear that girls cannot get married if they are sent out into areas sparsely settled by Japanese.
2. Fear of injury at the hands of irresponsible whites.
3. Dislike of breaking up families that have only recently been brought together.
4. A belief among some people of a rumor that the Government of Japan will reimburse the evacuees for their property losses if they remain in the relocation centers for the duration.
5. Fear that in post-war years the people of Japanese ancestry will be deported from this country and that families will be broken up during the course of this deportation if they are scattered.

These reasons for objection were offered by the committee with the declaration that only a small sample of opinion had been assessed and no final conclusions about the reasons for the objections could be drawn directly from the expressions; but whatever the reasons for the resistance, it is clear from the report that there were underlying fears and anxieties that restrained the people from participating in the program. In other words, the trend of sentiment in the community was increasingly against resettlement and if the program were to be successfully instituted, it was first necessary to undermine this trend by a careful program of education favorable to resettlement.

With regard to trends, the striking fact is the directly contrary directions in which the trend of WRA policy and the trend of community sentiment were flowing on both the military service and the relocation program questions.

1. Miyamoto Notes February 3, 1943, Council Meeting.

As early as September 1942 murmurs were heard among WRA officials of the desirability of extending the resettlement program for all loyal evacuees (and the assumption seems to have been that most of the evacuees were loyal) and of gaining the right of military service for the Nisei. It is clear that the WRA saw itself as an agency for the rehabilitation of an evacuated people, of regaining for them some of the rights which had been lost by evacuation. One might place the WRA among the category of agencies which are "benevolent protectors and teachers of the underdog." From the theoretical assumptions in the WRA policy, it was logical to resettle the evacuated Japanese in those areas where antagonism had not developed into a tradition, and it was logical to seek military conscription for the Nisei as a safeguard against future accusations of non-participation in the war effort. In terms of foresight it was necessary to carry on a program of resettlement before the end of the war while it was still possible to find a place in American communities for these people. Thus, the murmurs of September 1942 grew into a definite view and policy of the needs in the relocation program, and the work of the WRA in the past several months has been concentrated on the realization of this policy. It seems clear that the WRA played a more or less significant role in bringing about the program to reclassify the Nisei fit for military service, and this, too, was probably done with "the welfare of evacuees" in mind.

If the evacuees actually felt themselves the underdogs, the WRA program might have succeeded better for there would have been no alternatives for the evacuees. But from the standpoint of the Issei, and even the Nisei, there is an alternative of choosing Japan instead of the United States, and convinced as they are of ultimate Japanese victory the matter becomes more than an alternative. With such a bargaining point in hand, the view of the evacuees is not directed toward seeking rehabilitation in new, untried areas, but rather toward demanding a return to their former homes with exactly the same conditions given them prior to evacuation; or of merely waiting out the war (a short one) in the

relocation center and reaping the rewards of a Japanese victory. Since the evacuees' view assumes a dependence upon the Japanese nation, there is naturally a rejection of any program designed toward the further Americanization of these people; that is, the evacuees could not possibly see nor recognize any advantage in Americanization. The parting of the ways in the trend of the two groups lies essentially in the fact that the WRA is essentially pro-American and the evacuees are to a large extent pro-Japanese.

How these people came to feel as they do is a part of the two chaptered history of the Japanese in America, of their years of building in their immigrant communities and of their despair and anger following evacuation. An important part of that career, also, was the evolution of a two-fold orientation in these communities with one window looking out upon Japan and the other window facing America. The inability to resolve the dilemma of whether Japan or the United States was to be their permanent home, caused a great many of the immigrant Japanese and their children to maintain only a tentative loyalty to this country, but it was just this tentativeness which the registration questionnaire asked the evacuees to forswear.

In the background of the registration issue was also the many months of discontent with the relocation center situation which had been expressed in various forms of refusal to cooperate with the Administration. Arising out of the dissatisfaction with their present circumstances was likewise their increasing concern over the international status of evacuees and the demand for a clarification of their status as citizens and residents of this country. In some instances, rather than accept the nebulous status of the evacuee, many persons preferred to have the clearer category of "prisoners of war" attached to themselves; and under the influence of pro-Japanese propaganda heard over obotleg short-wave sets, the identification of the evacuees with the purposes of the Japanese Government became more and more secure. And the basic concern

of all these people in their effort to adjust themselves to the situation following evacuation has been the problem of security in the post-war world, but without absolute and certain information of their prospects in the world of the future, the people had to depend upon their prejudices, feelings, and sentiments in order to form their judgements.

This was the background of experience among the Tule Lake people upon which the registration program suddenly descended on February 10th. With very little preparation given them, the evacuees were suddenly asked to make the choice between Japan and the United States which they had kept postponed for the past several decades.

#### Preparation for Registration

On January 29, 1943, an article appeared on the front page of the San Francisco Chronicle headed in large caps, "U.S. JAPS IN THE ARMY" that told of the instructions received by Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, Military General of Hawaii, to induct 1,500 Americans of Japanese descent to serve as volunteers in an all Nisei combat unit. In a separate item following the continuation of the above article on page 2, a more detailed account was given of the announcement by Secretary of War Stimson on which these new instructions were based.

Stimson is quoted as saying:

The War Department's action is part of a larger program which will enable all loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry to make their proper contribution toward winning the war--through employment in war production as well as military service.<sup>1</sup>

The article went on to say that combat units of Japanese-Americans, numbering several thousand men, would be organized. At the end of the article a rather significant mention is made of the current interest of the Senate Military Affairs Subcommittee in determining the loyalty of those in the relocation centers. The article declares:

1. San Francisco Chronicle January 29, 1943 Pp. 1-2

Chairman Chandler, (D., Ky.) of the subcommittee said "something should be done to separate the loyal Japanese from the avowed enemies of this country in those camps."<sup>1</sup>

It was through this release by the Associated Press that the people of Tule Lake first learned of the War Department's plan to induct the Nisei into the Army. This article was covered by the Tulean Dispatch on January 30th, accompanied by statements from Coverly, Rowalt, and Dillon Myer. Something of the WRA's official attitude toward this new plan is offered in the statements of these administrators. Coverly states, "Nothing that has occurred since evacuation offers greater hope and promise to persons of Japanese ancestry . . . ." Coverly also took care to bring special attention to Secretary Stimson's statement that voluntary induction is a part of a larger program which will enable the Nisei to contribute to the war effort, through employment in war production as well as military service. Rowalt's statement emphasized the "inherent right of every faithful citizen, regardless of ancestry to bear arms in the Nation's battle," but he, too, brings out the place of voluntary induction within a larger program. And there is no question of the importance which Dillon Myer places on this new program, for he declares:

" . . . This announcement makes January 28, 1943 the most significant date of the last ten months for persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States.

Many have told me, in conversations and letters, of their desire for active service in the armed forces of this country. For many months I have been looking forward with them to the time when their desire might be realized."<sup>2</sup>

There seems no reason to doubt the sincerity of these WRA officials for their policy had been committed to a program of resettlement and anything that would promote favorable public relations would be considered an important step in the WRA program. From the WRA point of view it is necessary to gain favor-

1. San Francisco Chronicle, January 29, 1943 p. 2, col 5.
2. Tulean Dispatch, January 30, 1943

able public opinion in America before the evacuees may be returned to their normal life, and objectively seen this is perhaps the only way in which a return to normalcy may be gained. Had the evacuees seen the registration question in this light, no problem would have arisen in the matter of registration, but subsequent were such as to throw considerable doubt upon the sincerity of the WRA from the point of view of the evacuees.

There is a story current among the liberal members of the administrative staff of the successful manner in which Mr. Throckmorton, Project Attorney at Manzanar, prepared the people for the registration. It is said that he took four days after his return from Washington where he had attended the conference to discuss the proposed selective service registration, in holding mass meetings and publishing information in the Manzanar Free Press on the pending registration, and that the people were thus prepared to register. Likewise, it seems that information on the registration was available daily in the Topaz newspaper from February 4th, at least a week before the beginning of registration, to the date of the first registration.

One of the chief criticisms directed against the administration for the appearance of the crisis is regarding their failure to prepare the people adequately for what was to come in the registration. This is naturally the view taken by the leaders in the community who found themselves unable to control the situation after the mass resistance developed, but even within the administrative staff, the liberal members are inclined to the view that the whole thing was badly mishandled. The question is, did the reaction arise as a consequence of a misunderstanding among the people as to the purpose of the registration, or was it the inevitable result of an incorrigible obtuseness on the part of the evacuees? Were the people given sufficient preparation to form their own decision of how to answer the questions on the registration questionnaires?

As far as is known, the first public discussion of the registration for military service took place at the council meeting of February 3rd. Ever since the appearance of Secretary Stimson's statement in the newspapers, parents had begun to show some concern over the possibility that their sons might be drafted into the Army, but no definite trend of opinions evolved at that early date. The dominant characteristic of their thoughts seems to be anxiety, and accompanying this was an effort to find out more of what was to take place; but the policy of the Administration was apparently not to reveal anything of the plans for registration. The Dispatch of February 3rd carries an item that declares:

Those who are anxious to obtain further information regarding the volunteer induction program announced by the Secretary of War Stimson last week, are requested to wait until the arrival of military representatives who are to come here in the near future.

No further information other than that already released is available, Director Harry Coventry announced Tuesday.<sup>1</sup>

This discussion of the registration which took place in the council meeting of February 3rd appeared in connection with a discussion of the WRA relocation program and of the methods of encouraging this program among the people. Yego mentioned that the relocation program was not proceeding for several reasons, and one of these reasons is that the appearance of the selective service problem has thrown doubts into the minds of potential resettlers as to what plans they should form. Yego declared:

In connection with this (the relocation program), the military service question has not been satisfactorily clarified and hence there is some confusion among those who were intending to leave for jobs on the outside.<sup>2</sup>

It was apparent that no one else in the council knew anything about the selective service registration, and John Fukuyama thereupon moved that some person in the administration who knows about the selective service program be invited to present the problem to the Council. It was suggested that Joe

1. Tulean Dispatch, February 3, 1943 P. 1

2. Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, February 3, 1943

Hayes had just returned from a conference in Washington to discuss this question and that he would be the appropriate person to ask to the next Council meeting. Tom Yago, a strong JACL proponent from Placer County, then inserted a remark that may be significant of the part the JACL wished to play in the announcement of the selective service registration. Said he:

This discussion of selective service brings to mind that it was only four days after the announcement in the papers of the proposed voluntary induction that we received any information about it. The Legal Aid Department has been trying to get information ever since the announcement without much success. Now, we should have been given all the dope as soon as it was known here, but the policy seems to be to keep us in the dark. I think the Administration ought to tell us what it knows about the draft.

Yago's point apparently was that the Council as the representative body of the community should be informed of the intended programs of the Administration, a point that was substantially supported in the later course of events. Furthermore, one suspects that the JACL, the leaders of which are in the Legal Aid Department, probably felt affronted at being left out of the announcement of a program which it felt responsible in starting. From the JACL point of view the public announcement of the voluntary induction program was a significant JACL contribution to the future of the Nisei in the United States, and men like Tsukamoto undoubtedly must have felt that the JACL officers in Eule Lake should have been taken into the utmost confidence in the carrying out of the registration. Some indication of this attitude is given in the fact that at the JACL meeting of February 3rd, Walter Tsukamoto publicly assumed for the JACL full responsibility for the inception of the program. To those wise to the trend of sentiments in the community, it seemed that Tsukamoto was publicly asking for violence to himself, but it seems that Tsukamoto was eager to receive full credit for something which he considered an important step toward the rehabilitation of the Nisei and he may have been blinded to the dangers in his statements. No doubt the failure of the WRA to give recognition of the JACL's part in bringing about the voluntary induction of the Nisei must have

I. Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, February 30, 1943

provided an added incentive to make public claims of their deed.

The preliminary period prior to registration was thus chiefly characterized by ignorance on the part of the people as to what the registration implied, an effort on their part to find out more about it, a general parental concern over the possibility of their sons being inducted into military service, and fear on the part of many parents that their sons would volunteer. The latter fear was not without foundation for many youths, bored by the monotony of camp life, were willing to take any means of getting out and the picture of the uniformed soldier leading a life of adventure in distant lands was probably not without attractions for many youths. The parents, on their part, seemed to feel that in the event of normal induction by selective service, nothing could be done to prevent their sons from going into the Army, but most of them feared and resented the idea of volunteering. All these attitudes and sentiments were current between January 28th and February 9th when the military representatives from the War Department arrived to give more detailed information of the proposed registration; but in the absence of public discussion of the issue, no clear-cut opinions crystallized in the community.

The first information in the community that the registration would be applied not only to prospective volunteers but also to all Nisei of military age and as well to females and Issei over 17 years of age was received through the Tulean Dispatch on February 4th.<sup>1</sup> In this announcement by E. M. Rowalt, acting director of WRA, it was pointed out that the registration of the Issei was for the purpose of facilitating leave clearance, but that it would not imply any forced movement of those who did not wish to be relocated. Information of this type dribbled out of the Dispatch press, but little that was specific concerning the registration could be found, and there was an even

<sup>1</sup> Tulean Dispatch February 4, 1943 p. 1

greater paucity of information on the registration in the Japanese section of the paper. The evacuees in this community approached the pending registration with interest in what was to take place, but the relative calm of these days prior to registration contrasted sharply with the storm that broke overnight after the initial public appearance of the Army recruiting team on February 9th, and the beginning of registration on the following morning.

On the afternoon of February 9th, a special meeting of block managers was called to discuss the procedure of registration. It had been decided that both the Caucasian and Nisei school teachers should be used as the registrars (school was to be closed for the period of the registration) and they were to be placed in pairs in each block manager's office. Since the block manager's offices were to <sup>be</sup> the headquarters of registration, it was necessary that the block managers also be informed of the nature of the registration procedure. At this meeting, for the first time, evacuees were permitted to see the registration forms, and Lieutenant Evan W. Carroll who headed the Army recruiting team read off the prepared statement of the War Department introducing the registration while Frank Smith who was the WRA representative responsible for the carrying out of the registration gave instructions on the procedure.

(Correction above: A joint meeting of the Council and the Planning Board was called on the morning of February 9th, at which time Lieutenant Carroll was introduced to these representatives and they were permitted to hear the prepared statement. It is possible that the registration forms may have been shown the councilmen and planning board representatives, but this fact is unverified at the moment.) It is apparent from the later remarks of block managers that the instructions received at this meeting were far from being clearly understood, and there seem to have been numerous questions that Mr. Smith did not adequately clarify before the meeting was adjourned. Most of the main points of this instruction appears in the Tulean Dispatch Supplement February 11, 1943.

In the evening it was announced at all messhalls that members of the Army recruiting team would discuss the voluntary induction program at meetings in each of the wards. The meeting in War 1 was held in mess hall 17, and by 7:30 when the meeting was called the hall was packed to overflowing. At least two-thirds of those in the audience were Nisei, both males and females, but there were quite a number of Issei present and a surprising number of Caucasians from the teaching and administrative staffs. One of the block managers in the ward introduced Sergeant Sabatini and Sergeant Tsukahara, the two men from the recruiting team represented at this meeting, and there followed the reading of the prepared statement of the War Department by Sergeant Sabatini. (See the Tulean Dispatch of February 10, 1943 for a full reprint of this message.) The block representatives who had earlier heard this message had described it as a "mooth piece of writing done by someone who really understood the Japanese evacuees such that there was nothing one could say against it," and, indeed, the statement carefully answered or laid aside all the bitter criticisms evacuees might have against the Government. The message opened with a general statement about the purpose of the voluntary induction program, went on to answer possible objections that evacuees might have against the injustice of evacuation, enlarged further upon the Government's intentions in pursuing the program, and ended by showing the possible implications in the successful completion of this program. Sergeant Sabatini then read off a series of possible questions that might exist in the minds of the listeners and answered them, but no time was given to questions from the floor, the excuse being that Sabatini and Tsukahara were required to attend other ward meetings to make similar announcements.

The Caucasian teachers had attended the meeting in the hopes of gaining further information on the procedure and purpose of the registration, but several of them came away with the feeling that they had learned nothing new

of their tasks of the following day. No doubt, this feeling must have been held in common by the evacuee audience who attended the meeting, for while the explanations of the War Department gave a general setting to the registration, the need was to answer specific questions which were forming in the minds of evacuees. In the absence of a more detailed discussion of the general statements read that evening, a definitely unfavorable reaction to voluntary induction seems to have started to crystallize following that meeting. Only vague hints had been given of guarantees for the future, but this was the question uppermost in the minds of evacuees. The very tactfulness of the message seems to have given the impressions that these were "honeyed words" to serve in glossing over the harm done against the evacuees in the past. In spite of the careful and complex argument used by the War Department in its statement, evacuee sentiment seemed to drive straight to a single point: "They kick us around, and now they come to ask us to volunteer." Whatever of a larger purpose might have been seen in the program by the WRA and the Army, that, ". . . ways shall be found to restore you as quickly as may be to your normal and rightful share in the present life and work of the people of the United States," it was lost upon the evacuees whose interest and attention were directed toward the relative gains or losses that would be sustained by the proposed program.

At the periphery of the main action certain events took place that were not without their significance in influencing the sentiment of the community. News that several Caucasian teachers had been suspended because of their unwillingness to cooperate with the registration for military service leaked out. The objection of these teachers to acting as registrants lay in the fact that they were "conscientious objectors" who desired no part in the recruitment of boys for military service. Certain of the teachers openly expressed their unwillingness to participate in the registration; while others avoided the

problem by having their Nisei teaching assistants act as registrars on the military service questionnaire. This problem became so acute at one stage that many of the teachers were said to have handed in their resignation, or were to be suspended, but the problem was settled through arbitration by Mr. Harkness, the supervisor of the public schols, and Mr. Fleming. The significance of this event to the community was that the evacuees interpreted the teacher's revolt as an indication of sympathy with the evacuees' opposition to registration, although it is clear that the issues in the two cases were quite different. Remarks such as the following were heard in the community, "Why, hell, even the Caucasian teachers are objecting to the questionnaire and to the registration. If we all work together and oppose the registration, we'll get out demands recognized." This idea was not perhaps widely prevalent, but it was a definite part of the effort of the evacuees to reinforce their position of opposition with every possible rationalization.

It seems clear that the people of Tule Lake went into the first day of registration on February 10th with very limited knowledge of what they were being asked to do. An issue existed throughout this period of pro-volunteering on the part of many Nisei and of anti-volunteering on the part of their parents, but these conflicts existed as family "squabbles" and in the absence of mass meetings no community opinion on the issue evolved during the preliminary period. The Administration had followed a policy, whether wilfully or as a matter of chance, of not giving out any information on the pending registration to the people; and after the Army recruiting team arrived on the project on February 6th, almost all the responsibility of explaining the purpose of the registration was left up to them. Neither Mr. Coverly nor Joe Hayes appeared before the people in any kind of meeting to explain the registration, and, as far as is known, no one among the evacuees were consulted in making preparations for the registration. In fact, it is said, but this again is unverified, that Mr. Coverly appeared before the Planning Board and declared

that while he would be glad to listen to their advice he would not be bound by their suggestions--and in the light of the Project Director's personality, this was interpreted to mean that he was not particularly interested in what the people might have to say to him. All this is in contrast to the more or less preparation for the registration which was given in other centers. At Minidoka, the Project Director and his assistant, Mr. Stafford and Mr. Schafer respectively, went from section (ward) to section prior to the registration explaining the advantages of volunteering to the people. It would constitute a means, according to them, of combating the anti-Japanese feeling throughout the country and was bound to pay dividends to the Japanese people in the United States in the future. At Poston sufficient thought was given to the problem by the Administration so that it was decided from the outset to separate the registration of Nisei for military service and the registration of all others for leave clearance, the one being completed before the latter was begun.

#### First Day of Registration

The morning of February 10th was clear and sunny, though the streets grew slightly slushy towards noon as old snow melted, and it was an ideal day for registration. The procedure of registration was not entirely clear to the evacuees, for there had been reports of a plan to make the registration by a house to house canvas by the registrars, but it was understood that the registration would begin in the first barrack in each block, and that the block managers' offices would be the focus of registration. If there had been any orders to go from barrack to barrack registering the evacuees, the actual practice was that of sending notices to the registrants, starting with the first barrack in each block, and carrying on the registration at the block manager's office. Those who went to register learned that there were three different forms to fill, Form 304-A for Nisei of military age, Form 126-A for all Nisei both males and females over 17 years of age, and Form 126-Revised for alien Japanese over 17 years of age. The latter two forms were from the

WRA and were for the purpose of registering for leave clearance. These two forms could be completed under the supervision of the WRA at the block manager's office, but form 304-A for military service required questioning by the Army representatives, who were located at strategic spots in the project, and the Nisei males were required to go to these offices to complete their registration. At this latter point, also, he was asked whether he desired to volunteer for the proposed combat team, but after the first few days of registration when it became clear that there was considerable opposition in the community to the idea of registration, the Army representatives no longer raised the question of volunteering unless the Nisei himself inquired about the question. These simple regulations constitute no problem to persons properly informed regarding them, but to the evacuees in Tule Lake ignorance of these procedures was an element in the widespread confusion that followed.

The registration started quietly on the morning of the 10th, but difficulties became evident very shortly. In the first place, instructions to the teachers acting as registrars had been inadequate and there were numerous problems about the questionnaires which many of the teachers could not answer. Moreover, it was soon found that there was considerable difficulty in translating the questionnaires to Issei who could not understand English and there was some doubt as to whether people were answering questions as they meant to answer them. But the question that aroused the greatest concern was question 28 on form 126-Revised, the clearance form for alien evacuees, which required the registrant to reply "Yes" or "no" to the inquiry, "Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and fore swear any form of allegiance to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?"

The difficulties in this question to aliens of Japanese ancestry should be immediately apparent to anyone familiar with the status of these people in this country. Since aliens of Japanese ancestry are unable to gain

citizenship in the United States, they necessarily must maintain their citizenship in Japan, and if they forswear allegiance to Japan, they would become "men without a country." This was the alleged reason for objection to the question. But deeper than the question of citizenship lay the force of sentiments, of feelings of sacredness attached to the name of the emperor of Japan, that was revolted by the demand that that person be rejected. The desire of the WRA was to determine who among the evacuees maintain unqualified allegiance to this country and question 28 could not have been better worded to determine that single fact among alien Japanese. But the ambiguity in the status of Japanese immigrants in this country that was increased by the restrictions imposed on them following Pearl Harbor was sharply articulated by question 28; and the sudden demand that this ambiguity be dissolved caused consternation and resentment throughout the project. By noon of February 10th, question 28 on form 126-Revised had become a public issue. Telephone calls and visits were made to the Council and Planning Board offices and to the Administration to gain advice on what to do with the question. It was as a consequence of these inquiries from the community that a joint meeting of the Council, the Planning Board, and the Block Managers was called in the afternoon.

Because notice of the meeting was not widely publicized, very few besides the representatives appeared. By the nature of the groups meeting, the composition of the meeting was more or less equally divided between Issei and Nisei (including Kibei). Harry Mayeda, chairman of the Council, presided at this meeting flanked on either side by members of the executive committee of the Planning Board. "Father Dai" (Reverend Kitagawa) acted as interpreter. No Caucasian representatives were present; in fact, no Caucasians were present.

Just before the meeting opened, Tom Yego, "bigwig" of the Placer County JACL and close associate to Walter Tsukamoto, was called outside and did not return to the meeting though he should have been in attendance as one of the councilmen from ward 6. It was later revealed that some of his friends had

suggested that he make no appearance in public, and that he disappear from this meeting, because it was known that some persons were out "to get Yego" as well as the rest of the JACL leaders. His departure was quite and went unnoticed during the flurry of preparation for the meeting.

The meeting was called about 1:30 in the afternoon by Harry Mayeda who presided throughout the afternoon although Mr. Yamashita of the Planning Board might just as well have acted the part of chairman, but it seems that the Planning Board officers preferred that Harry take over the brunt of controlling the discussion. The chairman announced the purpose of the meeting as specifically that of gathering together those questions which had arisen during the first morning of registration; it was not to be a meeting at which any decision would be made as to the kind of answers to give on any question, especially question 28. These questions, Mayeda declared, would be submitted to the Administration for answering, and he further pointed out that he himself was not acting as a representative of the Administration able to answer the questions raised, but was only there to receive the list from the people. These statements concerning the purpose of the meeting were very carefully presented by Mayeda, and they were equally carefully translated by Father Dai for the benefit of the large group of Issei present.

The issue which immediately arose was the one concerning question 28 on form 1260--Revised. The ensuing discussion of this question brought out immediately almost all the points that became current in the community concerning question 28. At least three main points of view appeared: (1) Is it not somehow possible to get this question re-stated or taken out so that the Issei will not be placed in the embarrassing position of having to answer "Yes" or "No" to question 28? (2) Is there not some clause in the Geneva Agreement regarding treatment of "prisoners of war" which prevents any nation at war from forcibly demanding answers to questions from prisoners, and, thus, may not the evacuees avoid the necessity of registering? (3) There is no

question as to the manner in which the Issei should answer question 28; the answer is simple, it is "no"!

Regarding the first point of view, Mayeda's reply was that Mr. Coverly had agreed upon the ambiguity of question 28 to the Issei and would request its change by the Washington office, but he also wished the people to continue registering giving qualified answers to question 28 until sufficient evidence had been gathered to indicate the impossibility of the question to immigrant Japanese. This answer by the Project Director, however, is hard to understand, for the difficulty in the question may be immediately recognized once the ambiguity is pointed out, and there hardly seemed any necessity of gathering evidence of the difficulty. One suspects that Coverly's bureaucratic mentality could not quite bring itself to make a direct rejection of an Administrative ruling, and his answer strikes one as a stall to gain time while he corresponded with Washington. The answer ~~it~~ was obviously unsatisfactory to the evacuees, and it was evident that no registration would take place as long as the question was retained in its existing form.

The second point of view, of not registering because of the international illegality of forcing a group in a camp to answer questions, was taken up and investigated immediately by the Planning Board officers who thumbed through the Geneva Agreement for such a clause. The only thing to compare with the proposition was a statement regarding "prisoners of war", principally those taken in active combat, and the illegality of forcibly extracting answers to questions from such persons. It was apparent that this road was closed to evacuees, but the significant fact is that the idea of avoiding registration became one of the most prevalent throughout the community during the following days. Moreover, in this connection, the view was expressed that the Spanish Ambassador should be consulted to determine whether or not it was necessary to register. Beyond the question of international agreement, however, there was further confusion as to whether the registration of Issei was compulsory or not. It was agreed among the block managers that Frank Smith had declared at the meeting of the previous afternoon when pro-

cedures were discussed that the registration of Issei was not compulsory, but Bob Ota, the chairman of block managers, declared that a statement had been received from Rowalt on that day which said that the registration was compulsory for everyone. No reasons were then given as to why the registration was compulsory--an important consideration--in view of the fact that the registration of the Issei was for an "Application for Leave Clearance."

But it was the expression of the third point of view that was most vigorously stated and caused the greatest tension in the meeting. Despite Mayeda's initial caution that the meeting was not for the purpose of deciding answers to the questionnaire, there was a strong tendency in the audience to discuss the matter of how questions should be answered, and the dominant note was that there could only be the answer "No" to the proposition that allegiance to the emperor be foresworn. Some of the attitudes were:

If the Government of the United States proposes to give us citizenship, that is a different matter. But it has always denied us citizenship. I think it is too much to ask that we foreswear our allegiance to Japan and the emperor, for if we do so we will be men without a country.<sup>1</sup>

I believe there can be no problem for us Issei as to how we should answer question 28. The only answer possible is "No". For us Japanese who were born in Japan and have been trained to honor and follow the Emperor wherever we may go, there can be no thought of foreswearing allegiance to him. In my opinion we should all boldly register the answer "No" to question 28. (applause)<sup>2</sup>

We have suffered immeasurably in the United States. Discrimination was rampant against us on the outside, we have been evacuated and thrown into camps as if we were prisoners, and now the Government asks us to swear allegiance to this country. My answer to question 28 is "No"! (applause)<sup>3</sup>

Some people sat back in stony disapproval as they listened to this impetuous reaction, but the loud applause seemed to show hearty approval of the views expressed among a majority of the Issei present. For a time it seemed that the discussion was to get out of hand and the possibility of forcing the representatives to arrive at a uniformly negative answer to question 28 seemed imminent, but the chairman stood firmly against any further pursual of such

1 Miyamoto Notes, Council Meeting, February 10, 1943

2 Ibid.

3. Ibid.

discussion and the moment for heated expostulation passed. There were some inquiries concerning question 27 in form 304-A, the questionnaire of induction for military service, but the vagueness of the inquiries showed the absence of crystallized opinions about it. Some scattered references to other questions on the registration forms appeared. But it was clear that the main interest throughout this meeting was regarding question 28 in form 126-Revised. The reaction caused by the manner in which this question was stated tends to indicate this issue as the starting point of the rebellion which was to pervade the community for the following several weeks. The intensity of this reaction was in large part due to the unpreparedness of the people for such a question, and because the question struck at the deepest-lying sentiments of the people, of loyalty to the emperor of Japan, which had been reinforced by the resentments against the United States created by evacuation, the response was characterized by psychological tendencies approaching hysteria.

NOTE: The procedure of registration chosen at Tule Lake undoubtedly contributed to the impulsiveness of the reaction to question 28, form 126-Revised. At Minidoka the registration was done a block at a time starting with block 1 and working toward block 44 at the other end of the project. This gave to individuals in later blocks some time to think about their questions and answers. But in Tule Lake the registration was carried on in all the blocks at once. Hence, the same problem confronted all the people in the Project at the same time, and the immediacy with which all those people would be required to arrive at some decision undoubtedly contributed to an intensity and impetuosity in their answer

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This joint meeting of February 10th was closed with the advice from the chairman that all the representatives return to their blocks to gather up those questions which troubled the registrants in the blocks. These questions would then be compiled, be submitted to the administration for reply, and be re-submitted to the people. Block meetings were therefore to be called throughout the project that evening, and these meetings were to be strictly for the purpose of gathering questions about the questionnaires, and there was to be no discussion of how to answer questions.

There was some variation in the discussions which took place in the block

meetings that evening. At one pole were those blocks in which it was agreed that registration should go on, and at the opposite pole were those blocks which attempted to get a uniform refusal to register on the part of all blocks; but it was the latter tendency to refuse or to wait out the registration that prevailed. This discussion that took place in Block 5 is probably typical of the later class of blocks.

Tom Uyeno, a Kibei councilman from Ward 1 who lived in the block, presided while the Planning Board representative from the block acted as a sideline rooster for Uyeno. The block manager merely introduced the chairman and then retired into the audience. It was clearly evident that everyone wished to hand over the responsibility of leadership in the discussion to someone else, and especially did they avoid acting as intermediary between the people and the Administration for that position was destined for criticism from both sides. Uyeno opened the discussion by indicating the purpose of the block meeting, and then reviewed the discussion of the afternoon joint meeting. He singled out question 28 as the one most objectionable to the people, and he referred to the various opinions expressed that afternoon regarding that question; but because Tom Uyeno himself favored a quiet intelligent discussion of the problem rather than the heated impulsive kind that had appeared during the afternoon, he subtly played upon Issei sentiments while referring to the need for careful consideration of the dangers involved in an outright rejection of registration. Mr. Shigehara, the Planning Board representative, was then called upon and while making statements acceding to Issei opinion, he too urged careful thought before any irrevocable decisions might be made.

The attitude of the articulate persons present was one of utter rejection of registration until certain questions had been clarified. This was the one uniform fact evidenced among them, but as to the reasons for rejecting the registration or as to the underlying motivations that led them to offer these

reasons, they were probably as numerous as the number of persons who arose to express an opinion. At the head of all the reasons for opposing registration was the fact of past discrimination against the Japanese, symbolized principally by the evacuation, and the losses and hardships sustained because of it. Some of the opinions expressed give some indication of the sentiments which prevailed.

Most of us Issei have lived in this country for twenty or thirty years or more, and we have received privileges from this nation as well as assumed responsibilities in it. We are not ungrateful for what we have received, but, on the other hand, we have had to struggle for what we have gained. One thing we have not received is, of course, our citizenship and under the circumstance we have remained citizens of the Japanese empire. Considering this situation, it seems to me too much to ask that we sign our allegiance to the United States and reject the Japanese emperor. By the nature of our circumstance we are dependent on the Government of Japan, and by our natural sentiments, we cannot reject the emperor. We have been removed from our homes and have been forced to give up our property, often at losses amounting to thousands and even tens of thousands of dollars. What assurance do we have that in the future we shall be reimbursed for our losses? If the Government declares that we may return to our former homes and businesses then perhaps we may be in a position to sign our allegiance. But if that is not the intension of the Government, I wonder if it isn't too much of the Government to ask that we reject Japan and sign our allegiance to the United States, in which case we would be people without a country.<sup>1</sup>

There is no place in the United States for any but the white race. Look at what is happening to the colored peoples of the south, and look at what has happened to us. Under the circumstance, isn't it too much of the Government to ask that we give up sons for whom we have given everything over twenty years and more? If we send off our sons, what assurance does the Government give us that their parents will be cared for?<sup>2</sup>

I think we should fight for our rights rather than continue to be kicked around by the keto.<sup>3</sup>

If we join the Army, will the Government guarantee citizenship to the Issei?<sup>4</sup>

If the Nisei are sent to the battlefield, it may be expected that they'll be sent into the most dangerous areas of conflict, just as the Negroes have been sent forth. The keto won't care how many Nisei lives are lost.<sup>5</sup>

A further reason that was frequently mentioned was the fact that parents could not be adequately cared for if their sons were inducted into the Army. The two Issei who made statements regarding this matter were men who have shown

1 Miyamoto Document, Block 5 meeting, February 10, 1943, p. 2  
 2 Ibid., p. 2-3  
 3. Ibid., p. 4  
 4. Ibid., p. 5  
 5. Ibid., p. 3

the greatest psychological dependence on their sons, the one because his personal shortcomings has prevented him from gaining success in this world and his personal/<sup>in</sup> security causes him to cling to what he possesses, and the other because a fundamental characteristic of acquisitiveness and selfishness would not permit him to relinquish any of his holdings. But it was the Nisei even more than the Issei who emphasized the importance of remembering the needs of the parents, as if the Japanese conception of obligations to the parents had been grounded into them by rote.

The demands that were made at this meeting, which were to be forwarded to the Planning Board, as requirements that must be fulfilled before any favorable registration could go on were not only demands of equality of opportunity with the rest of America, but in some instances it was a demand for a return to the "normality" of conditions before the evacuation. According to declarations, the Nisei would willingly volunteer for the Army if their parents were guaranteed security in the post-war years, if discrimination on the outside and in the Army were eliminated, and if they were permitted to join combat teams formed for other than all Japanese. But there was also the demand among both Issei and Nisei that the Japanese evacuees be returned to the Pacific Coast with the freedom of movement guaranteed all other citizens of this country, and they asked for security from violence as well as a program of rehabilitation. If these demands were to persist, it was obvious that the registration could not go on for it was clear that the Government would neither permit Japanese evacuees to return to the Pacific Coast nor guarantee their security from violence. The difficulty in the situation was that the spirit of the people was such that they refused to be dislodged from their position by any rational arguments.

Very rapidly the sentiment of the meeting shifted to the agreement that there should be no registration among the block people until more definite information on the purpose of registration, the penalties that might be sustained in the event of failure to register, and the guarantees for the future of the

evacuees, were all clarified. A motion was made by a Nisei that everyone refuse to register until this information was received, and despite all efforts of the chairman to avoid a vote on the motion, the motion was called and it was passed. Tom Uyeno, the chairman, explained during the discussion of the motion that the registration for selective service was compulsory by Army orders and that no motion refusing to register could be entertained, but all such warnings were met with the taunt that the Nisei have to fight for their rights now and possibly be thrown in jail for their rebellion, or never fight for their rights.

Such was the tone of this meeting, and this was likewise the characteristic of many other meetings which took place in the project that night. Even for those taking a relatively objective view of the registration issue, it was understandable why the Issei felt that they could not register and perhaps they had a right to demand suspension of registration until question 28 had been modified; but as the course of registration went on, it became clear that the objections to registration were much more complex than a mere unwillingness to become men without a country. That is, it was actually not sufficient that question 28 be modified. One indication of the complexity of their objections is indicated in the general Issei opposition not only to their own registration but to any registration at all. Particularly was there the effort to get all the Nisei to oppose registration and to make a unified stand throughout the community against the demands of the WRA and the Army. This too was understandable from one point of view, for without a clarification of the Issei registration, a "Yes" answer among Nisei males to question 28 on form 304-A might bring families into direct opposition on the matter of allegiance. The Issei position naturally made it difficult for them to say "Yes", and in the event that question 28 on their form could not be modified, many Issei undoubtedly would feel pressed to say "No" on the question. This difficulty was partly alleviated by Mr. Coverly's announcement that a qualified answer could be given by Issei to question 28, but Issei skepticism of WRA rulings ran so deep

that they could hardly trust any such hazy answer from the Project Director.

One other problem which remained to be clarified for the Issei was the question of signing any form entitled "Application for Leave Clearance". During the past months, even as the WRA increasingly emphasized the relocation program, the Issei were more and more stubbornly opposing the idea of leaving the relocation center. In their minds the one safe place in the United States for the Japanese is in the relocation centers, and even if it were safe to go out, they conceived little opportunity for themselves on the outside. Under the circumstances, there was intense suspicion of the WRA's efforts to speed up the resettlement program, and the appearance of the title on the registration form served to reawaken all the suspicions which had been aired among Isseis in their private discussions. Coverly's answer was that the title "Application for Leave Clearance" could be crossed out and in its place the words "Registration Only" might be substituted. But this was as if the WRA had revealed its hand by mistake, and then after covering up was attempting to pursue the same purpose.

A final complicating factor which had much to do with the Nisei joining the Issei in refusing to register was the failure of the registration form to distinguish the Kibei from the Nisei. As far as legal status goes, the Kibei are citizens of the United States and therefore are undistinguished on this score from the Nisei. But as far as cultural background and sentimental attachments go, in a majority of the cases the Kibei were more closely allied to the Issei than the Nisei. If the Nisei were to continue registration, the Kibei would be confronted with the problem of having to answer "Yes" to question 28 and fore-swear allegiance to the emperor of Japan, or they would have to answer "No" and run the risk of losing their American citizenship. It is true that many Kibei overtly expressed scorn of their American citizenship, yet among them were many who had escaped conscription in Japan or who were still hoping to retain both their American and Japanese citizenships to give broader scope of possibilities to their future. Placed in this difficult spot, the Kibei were

particularly vehement in urging a Nisei refusal to register, along with the Issei.

14 ? The refusal to register, however, was not a universal phenomenon in the project. Some blocks agreed that the question of registration issue was essentially an individual problem, (kojin, kojin no mondai da) and while there was some opposition to the idea of having to answer question 28 in the existing form there was no pressure placed on all the people to oppose registration. The appearance of this view in the meetings was often the result of a certain type of leadership, especially the leadership of stabler elements in the community who desired to prevent any rash action on the part of the people. In block 16, the trend of sentiments was rapidly moving toward a refusal to register, but Reverend Kuroda suddenly arose and said, "I am an Issei born in Japan, and I do not therefore have citizenship in this country. However, since it is my intention to remain in this country, I intend to register and to register "Yes" on question 28." It is said that this single statement made in the midst of a rather heated discussion opposing the registration completely broke up the opposition and it was decided in that block that the registration should proceed according to individual choice.

The outstanding facts which stood out at the end of the first day of registration were the wild confusion that existed in the community concerning the procedure, the purpose and the consequences of registration; the spontaneous and strong resistance to registration that appeared in consequence of this confusion; the effort to gain community-wide opposition to the registration; and the sudden appearance of a definite strain within the community. The worst confusion existed in the intermixing of the Issei and the Nisei problems; the objectionableness of the Issei registration form caused objections to arise against the Nisei registration as well. As one person declared, "There should be no question for the Nisei as to how they should answer question 28. Our answer has to be "Yes"." But such views had no fair opportunity for airing, and rather was the discussion centered upon the airing of past grievances. Had these two

problems been kept separate, it might have been possible to discuss the main issues of the registration, of whether to answer "Yes" or "No" to question 28, of whether to volunteer or not volunteer, but in the confusion the issue itself became confused and the consequent discussion was over the question, to register or not to register?

The harm done by this initial confusion of issues became evident later. Weeks later when the hysteria of the first opposition to registration had died down and people settled to the business of determining how to register, it was discovered that many persons did not even know what the contents of the registration forms were. It is said that some persons who registered later remarked, "Why, is this all there is to this registration? I wonder what the people have been opposing it for?" Whether these remarks were really made or not, there was clearly no opportunity for quiet discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages in replying to the questionnaires in one way or the other.

#### The Nature of the Issue

During the following week, between February 10 and February 17, registration proceeded very slowly, especially in the case of Issei. Throughout the project block managers' offices remained relatively empty of registrants except for an occasional Nisei who found sufficient courage to defy community opinion and register. Teachers found themselves sitting in the office frequently spending a whole day without registering a single person, but despite their inquiry as to whether they should continue to remain at their position, they were informed by Mr. Harkness that they should remain even if they had nothing else to do but read books.

On Saturday, February 13, a notice appeared in the Tulean Dispatch in which it declared that question 28 on form 126-Revised, the Issei clearance questionnaire, on allegiance to the United States and willingness to forswear allegiance to the emperor of Japan had been revised to read: Will you swear to abide by the

laws of the United States and agree not to commit any acts designed to obstruct the war efforts of this country?" (or something to this effect). It was felt among leaders of the community that this revision should serve to allay the opposition of the Issei to registration. According to the instruction from the administration, the Issei would be permitted to answer either the original or the substitute question, and the substitute question obviously could not endanger the position of the Issei either with the United States or Japan. But despite the publication of this new question, no marked inclination could be noted among the Issei to register. Once resistance to registration had been established in the community, it was difficult to create a new view of the registration program and those who desired to register found that the community attitude of non-registration had not altered despite the announcement of the substitute question.

The announcement of the substitute question did one thing for the registration; it separated the Issei and Nisei issues which to that time had been confused with each other, and it brought out the Nisei problem of induction into military service as the outstanding problem of discussion. During the first week of registration, Nisei registration proceeded quite regularly in some blocks where the opposition to registration was weak, for the Army representatives were kept busy even during these days, but it was evident that the bulk of Nisei males in the community were not prepared to register for one reason or another and nothing was being done to alter this condition. In fact, in many blocks the initial outburst of hostility aroused by the registration crystallized into a defiant and stubborn resistance to registration. As was previously indicated, the issue developed into the question "Shall the Nisei register or not register?" and the question of how to register was cast into the background of consideration.

The essential aim of this resistance was to retain citizenship while still avoiding induction into military service. As one person put it, the people were trying to "have their cake and eat it"; but if this attitude existed, it

it arose less out of cowardice than out of a sense of irresponsibility toward the nation which was conceived to have mistreated the particular Nisei segment of its citizens. To be sure, there was undoubtedly some fear of induction and a desire to avoid it among the Nisei of military age, and in a few instances it seemed that it was born of that extreme selfishness that has no appeal from any sense of loyalty, but on the whole the desire to evade induction was of the same character and proportion as that which may be witnessed anywhere in the United States. What is peculiar to the Nisei, however, is the fact that there was less predisposition to serve the nation, that could be appealed to in promoting the induction program, than is generally true in the majority population of this country; there appeared to be less at stake for them should they fail to participate in this way in the war effort. The nature of this attitude can be understood by following the line of argument followed by the Nisei in resisting registration.

Foremost among the grounds of opposition was the fact of discrimination as it had been vividly felt through evacuation and as it had been created among evacuees by widespread discussion of instances during the dangerously long hours of inactivity in the center. The formulation of the arguments about discrimination vary widely but the essential fact of a felt discrimination is uniform in all cases. For instance, one Nisei declared at a very early meeting on the registration question:

I'd like to say a few words concerning the problem of the Nisei. It seems to me that we need to start fighting for our rights. We've been kicked around all our lives because of race prejudice, and it's time that we started doing something about it. When we were evacuated, we didn't say anything against it, and didn't move a finger to prevent it; that's why we're here today. Everywhere we've gone, we've been discriminated against. In Seattle, the Japanese couldn't buy homes in 9;10 of the residential districts. They were excluded from these areas. The Nisei have been discriminated against even in the Army. I don't think we should go on taking it forever.

Even in the Army, there is the story that a group of Nisei who wanted to sit down at one table with a group of keto were told to go and eat somewhere else.

The extent of discrimination as stated in these examples is unquestionably magnified beyond all proportions of the true state of things on the outside, but the concrete illustration of the evacuation as an outstanding instance of discrimination colors all other experiences which the Nisei may have had and distorts their images of the actual conditions. Whether the views about racial prejudice against the Japanese are exaggerated or given with a fair amount of objectivity, not a single evacuee could deny the fact that the Japanese as a single element in American society had been singled out for evacuation, and thus the argument of opposition to the registration for induction into military service in this country because of past discrimination had its appeal for almost everyone in the center.

The argument which followed the establishment of this assumption of discrimination was that until Nisei rights were restored there was no need for the Nisei to fight for this country. Yet, at the same time, there was no immediate movement toward rejecting this country forthwith for no one among the Nisei proposed immediately that their answer to question 28 should be "No". (A Kibei did propose such an answer, but the Jun-Nisei ((pure Nisei)) only hinted at the possibility of such an answer to point out the dilemma confronting them.) As it was conceived at the time, the choice for the Nisei was between answering "Yes" to question 28 and thereby excluding himself from the possibility of going to Japan in the post-war years, or of answering "No" and of losing his citizenship here and choosing to seek opportunities in Japan after the war. The difficulty in either choice indicates the profoundly insecure position in which the Nisei were placed by the demands of registration.

The difficulty in this registration was, of course, that a decision was required which had far-reaching implications for the future, and yet a future that is clouded by numerous uncertainties. The fact which stood out beyond all others was that Caucasian-Americans discriminate against people of Japanese ancestry, or for that matter against any racial group other than their own,

and since the history of Japanese in this country may be illustrated by an endless number of accounts of such evidence of prejudice, it seemed logical to assume that the future could not hold any greater hope than the picture of the past. One of the main considerations was the economic opportunities open to Nisei in this country, and in this connection it seemed that the whole effort of the nation was bent on reducing the evacuee population to the status of a low-class migratory group. The hope among a majority of the farmers in Tule Lake is to return to their farms on the Pacific Coast for opportunities of starting individual farms in other parts of the country seem limited, but confronting that hope was the unveiled effort of important groups on the Pacific Coast to prevent the return of Japanese to that area. Even the job opportunities in the Middle West listed in the Tulean Dispatch were those of domestic workers or of farm hands on Caucasian-owned farms, and there was nothing to encourage the feeling that virgin opportunities exist for the Nisei in other parts of the country. If anything, the frontiers being discussed among the evacuees was the newly conquered territories of the Far East, where, as it was declared by the Nisei, wonderful opportunities of exploitation exist for the Nisei. This conception of a future was decidedly attractive for from this distant point it appears that adventure and opportunity exist for their seekers in the picturesque and unexploited lands of Manchuria, Siam, Burma, Malay, Java and even possibly Australia. The main problem in accepting this latter road to the future lies in the perils of rejecting, once and for all, a citizenship in the United States that cannot be regained. Moreover, it meant the rejection of all the experiences in America that had become an ingrained part of the ~~experience~~ Nisei and of preparing for an adjustment to new ways of life.

Considering the imponderables involved in the decision, it was inevitable that the finally decisive factor in making a choice should be the immediate, impulsive, emotional reaction to the possibilities in the future. The first reaction to the demands of the registration, that some irrevocable choice be

made between the two futures, was the deep-lying sense of insecurity and uncertainty. In this situation there was to be found among individual persons the interplay of emotion against emotion, sentiment against sentiment, and fragments of thought against fragments of thought, in the effort to arrive at some decision. A hint of this uncertainty is seen in the often heard complaint from the leaders of the community, "The trouble with the people is that they want us councilmen to make up their minds for them. They want our advice on how to register, but if we tell them, they don't like our opinion and they kick like hell." It was undoubtedly this sense of uncertainty concerning the answer to give on question 28 which led people to oppose any kind of registration and to seek a universal identity of purpose in resisting registration.

One of the reactions to this position of insecurity was an outburst of anger from many Nisei. In the heat of argument one Nisei came out vigorously:

Sure, maybe it's a losing battle. But when are we going to fight if not now? This thing makes me so mad that I don't care what happens. I've got some property back in Bellevue where I come from, but I don't care what happens to that. All I care is that our rights haven't been recognized, and now they come to tell us that they want us in the Army. Our citizenship isn't worth a goddam if the keto aren't going to give us our rights.

It is said that some Nisei (probably Kibei) burned their birth certificates in the stove or tore them up and threw them away. In another instance it is reliably reported that two teachers spent a couple of hours arguing with a young Kibei who threatened to go to the Internal Security Office and demand his repatriation, but after the long session of brooding and argument, the Kibei suddenly arose and walked out declaring that he had decided to repatriate. These are symbolic acts of the cheapness with which citizenship in the United States had come to be held by Nisei in view of the discrimination which had been practiced against the Japanese, and they also represent the height of crystallized anger at the thought of being asked to assume responsibilities when none of the normal privileges had been granted them.

A more prevalent reaction was to seek greater assurance of the future by making demands upon the Government and the WRA for specific guarantees of security. At a block meeting on February 16, the nature of the demands were roughly summarized by a Nisei who declared:

I'd be glad to shoulder a gun for the United States, but before I do that I want to know three things. In the first place, there has been a lot of discrimination against the Nisei in the Army. I think it's pretty serious when Nisei who are even willing to give up their lives for their country are discriminated against. Another thing I'd like to know is, when are the newspapers and magazines going to stop printing adverse accounts of the Japanese. The Government can control these expressions, and yet they permit these things to continue. I think we should also wait to find out how the government is going to take care of our mothers, fathers, and sisters, before we go into the Army. We've got to think of our parents and folks that we leave behind; we Nisei can't just go our own way without consideration for our parents. We should demand that the Government give us an answer to these three points before we register. The Nisei have to unite to gain these demands.

Of all these demands, however, the one which was most frequently repeated at these meetings was the one asking for the security of the parents. It seems doubtful that the prevalence of this idea existed so much among the Nisei as among the Issei, and it was probably the parental demands upon the sons that thought be given to their security which was being voiced through the mouthpiece of the Nisei. Among other demands of this class were those inquiring why it was that even after leave clearance was granted or induction into the Army was fulfilled that the evacuees could not enter the Western Defense Zone, whether there would be any guarantee of right to return to the Pacific Coast ever, and whether Issei would some day be given the right to file for citizenship. The obvious impossibility of gaining these requests suggests that these questions were raised not so much because of a feeling of insecurity as out of a spirit of malicious argumentation. In these latter demands we get a definite indication of the attitude of irresponsibility toward the United States which was earlier mentioned.

Fundamentally, the registration was a test of evacuee loyalty to the United

States, as it was designed to be, but unfortunately question 28 did not specify the price at which loyalty would be bought from the evacuees. The fact that loyalty had become a matter for bargaining indicates the malicious effects which discrimination and evacuation had had upon evacuee mentality; for normally loyalty is a matter of sentiment and not of utilitarian choice, but whatever sentiments of loyalty had existed among the evacuees, even among Nisei evacuees, had been severely strained and distorted. If irresponsibility toward the United States had developed, it was the product of a long series of experiences in which it was felt by evacuees that the United States was promoting the interests not of Americans but of the Caucasian race. The character of this mentality can be better understood after further elaboration of other views which were expressed during this first week.

On the opposite side from those who resisted registration were a minority of Nisei and an even smaller minority of Issei who were intent upon registering their allegiance to the United States, or who felt that the resistance to the registration was stupid and unwarranted. Among the Nisei the motive for registering came from various sources. First, there was a large number who desired to leave the project for jobs on the outside, and it seemed clear to them that a failure to register would completely block every possibility of gaining this freedom. There were still others who saw their future as here in America rather than in Japan or elsewhere. Among these people were many Kibei who having seen both Japan and the United States consciously selected this country as their place of residence. But fundamentally the willingness to declare allegiance to the United States was a matter of sentimental attachment to this country and the absence in past experience of a sufficiently severe discrimination or segregation to cause a split with this country. There is scattered information pointing to instances of Nisei reaction to parental coercion as a reason for registering; others registered because the regulations required them to do so; but the fundamental reasons for registering are included in those given above.

The tension between those who desired to register and those who opposed it was extremely great right from the beginning. Opposition to registration was so much stronger than the willingness to cooperate that the latter group hardly dared voice their opinion publicly, and one could gain an understanding of the latter point of view only by the private discussions that took place. It is of particular interest to compare the views of the future held by those who favored going to Japan and those who intended to remain in this country. The view of the future of those intending to go to Japan has already been outlined. It was a view colored by a very bright conception of the Orient and especially of Japan. Some people seemed to think that after the war they might even start farming in some areas of Japan. But the view of some Kibei who only recently came from Japan is that opportunities along these lines in Japan are limited for the immigrant Japanese or their children. Said one Kibei:

The Japanese who are talking of returning to Japan and possibly starting a farm there don't realize the possible hardships they will encounter. They're not going to find fifty and hundred acre farms that they can cultivate with machinery; but they're going to have to get down on hands and knees and eke out a living off a narrow soil. Some days they may have enough to eat, but other days they are going to have only break and water. The people don't seem to realize all this.<sup>1</sup>

Concerning the limitations of economic opportunities in the post-war Far East, others have brought forth the arguments that Japan proper could not possibly accommodate any influx of workers especially during the years of economic readjustment from war to peace-time economy, but even on the "conquered" mainland it would be difficult to compete against the indigenous people accustomed to lower standards of living and to the character of the country. To be sure, people with professional or special training would undoubtedly have advantages that they might be able to sell, but such individuals are relatively few among the Nisei or Issei.

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seems unlikely that the Nisei as a whole could make a favorable cultural and social adjustment to Japan.

I don't see how these Nisei expect to adjust to Japan. Their interest is in jitterbugging and American comic sheets and movie stars and sports, but they don't know how to speak Japanese properly nor even how to behave properly in Japanese society. I'm afraid their going to be terribly disappointed when they get to Japan because if they behave the way they do here they're not going to be accepted over there. They'll be as foreign as anyone could possibly be over there.

Apart from the question of adjustment, however, prominent leaders of the Japanese Government have frequently urged the Japanese immigrant group to remain in America and, in the event of war, that the Nisei should fight for the United States. One Kibei girl remarked:

When I was in Japan all the prominent people I heard told us Nisei that we should think in terms of making our livelihood in the United States. They declared that Japan was too small a country to maintain a population from outside the country as well as those within it. I also know a man who used to listen to all the short wave broadcasts from Japan and he says that even just before the outbreak of war, the Government was urging the Nisei to fight for this country if there were ever a war between the two nations. I guess they knew that something was likely to happen.

It is said that men like General Araki, Matsuoka, and some of the premiers of Japan have held this view and have expressed it in their visits to the United States or through other channels of communication.

The counter argument developed in the community by the Issei and the Kibei is that the evacuation has completely changed the complexity of the situation and that there is no longer any need to comply with this obligation. Japan, they say, does not hold the same view which it held previously, for the evacuation has brought about a condition in which it is no longer possible for the Japanese in America to maintain the same position that was held by these leaders prior to evacuation. Still another view is that Japan is a nation that looks after its own race of people whereas the history of the United States has been riddled with instances of racial discrimination. Regardless of the difficulties Japan may face in trying to assimilate an uprooted group of evacuees from America, Japan would somehow take care of these people as long as they have Japanese faces.

1. Miyamoto Notes, February 13, 1943

2. Miyamoto Notes, February 28, 1943

The failure of the Nisei males to register during the first week and a half of registration was in large part due to the general community resistance of registration. As previously mentioned, the question therefore became one of whether the registration was an individual matter or whether there was need for the community to stand together against the registration. It was thus that the Nisei question became confused with the Issei question. From the standpoint of "loyal" Nisei, failure to register would bring about an unfavorable reaction from the people of the United States and possibly lead to loss of citizenship. Among Issei, however, there was no question of losing citizenship and they had no stakes in this country except where property was involved. The latter, to be sure, was a restraining influence among the Issei from taking too extreme action, but persons who were afraid of losing property were themselves restrained from openly supporting registration by the view that this was no longer a question of property but rather of civil and human rights. And many Nisei themselves took up this cry of "human rights" to declare that if the Nisei were not to fight now, they would never have an opportunity to fight again. Whatever were the reasons for refusing to register, the general community feeling was that weak-kneed acceptance of WRA and Army orders could not be countenanced among a people who have always maintained their self-respect. The general community sentiment was a powerful barrier against participation in registration; any who were willing to register required an abundance of courage, sufficient to oppose the opinion of a majority in the community.

#### Early Developments in the Crisis

One of the first reactions after the first day of registration on February 10th was a raising of the question within the community of the JACL's responsibility in bringing about the registration, especially of the Nisei for the volunteer combat team. Tsukamoto had openly made claims of the JACL's part in bringing about the volunteer program, and as soon as the strong community sentiment against the program became known, it was necessary for the JACL to

institute immediately a retraction of these claims. Even before the beginning of the registration, the Planning Board had held an investigation of this very question and an announcement appeared in the Dispatch of February 8th which declared, "The Planning Board officials declared that they will make an announcement of their hearing soon to clarify a lot of aspersions being cast on the JACL by some members of the Colony."<sup>1</sup> Talk of the JACL's part, however, persisted and it soon became evident that the anger of the community might be directed entirely against the JACL leaders. On February 15th, the findings of the Planning Board in regard to the JACL's part was published in the Dispatch, but no conclusions were offered by the Board as to what that organization regarded was the judgement to be placed upon the JACL's part. All that was given in this statement was the pertinent sections of the minutes of the Salt Lake City Conference of the JACL in which a resolution was made and sent to the War Department asking that all Nisei be classified in military service on the same basis as any other American.

In the meantime, however, the attitude against JACL leaders like Tsukamoto, Yego, and Takeda had become extremely hostile. Threatening letters were received by them. In the first few days after the beginning of registration, Tsukamoto suddenly left the community for Chicago, and left his wife and children to follow him. As soon as Tsukamoto's departure was known, people of his block refused to permit his wife or children to eat at the messhall. No one offered to help Mrs. Tsukamoto pack except for one Nisei who was brave enough and strong enough to disregard the threats of small groups of Kibei. Takeda and Yego who were both still "on the spot" scarcely dared show themselves around the administration offices, and it seems that even their friends preferred to steer clear of these JACL leaders out of fear of being associated with them in the minds of the people.

Not only were the JACL leaders endangered, however, but anyone who declared willingness to volunteer or those who openly supported registration were free-

1. Tulean Dispatch, February 8, 1943, p. 1

quently threatened by extremist members in the community and were made to feel the community's hostility against them. Arguments took place that were so heated that there were dangers of their spilling over into mob fights. Within families the arguments between Issei parents and Nisei children over the question of seeking their future in the United States or in Japan were so numerous and keen that strained family relations were to be found everywhere and there were instances in which Nisei youths were disowned by their parents.

The issue in these family "squabbles" arose out of the attempt of the parents to prevent their sons from joining the Army and thus possibly losing their lives, or they arose in those situations where parents desired to seek their future in Japan whereas the children were loathe to give up their lives in America. An instance is reported where the parents forced a son to take out repatriation papers so that he might avoid the draft, and his sister was asked to do the same in order to go to Japan with her younger brother, while the parents were to register so that they might not lose their property. Nor was this an exceptional instance for other reports of a similar kind have been noted. Where the Nisei children had grown to an age where they could maintain an independent attitude, however, one sometimes found the Nisei telling the parents:

Well, if you don't trust the Caucasians enough to believe they'll give us a fair deal in the future, and if you want to go to Japan, why don't you go ahead and take out your repatriation papers. We're going to stay here in this country; you go ahead and go to Japan.<sup>1</sup>

It is noteworthy that where the Nisei are older and able to maintain an independent view, it is the parents who frequently give in to the children's position, though with unveiled reluctance especially in the case of the male parent.

On Saturday, February 13, the notice of the substitute question for question 28, Form 126-Revised, appeared in the newspaper, but no appreciable difference in Issei registration followed. On Monday, February 15, a joint meet-

<sup>1</sup> Miyamoto Notes, February 12, 1943

ing of the Planning Board, Council, and Block Managers, was called to hear the replies from Mr. Coverly and Lt. Carroll on the questions submitted after the block meetings of February 10th.<sup>1</sup> The reaction of the representatives present was that the answers were so entirely irrelevant or weak that it was impossible to create a favorable attitude toward the registration through the communication to the people of these answers. Several criticisms were directed against the administration because of the difficult position in which the representatives were placed by having to communicate this information to the people. As was anticipated, the actual presentation to the people only caused a further reaction that since the Government was unwilling to commit themselves to giving definite replies to their inquiries, there was no grounds for suspecting that the administration's efforts were "to put something over on the people."

The reaction in the block meeting in No. 5 (Block 5) to the long list of questions and answers mimeographed and presented to the people on February 15 is perhaps somewhat indicative of the type of reaction that was evidenced in the community.

"It seems to me that these questions and answers are absolutely useless. They have been prepared, as I understand it, by Mr. Coverly and Lt. Carroll at this project, but we have no guarantee what what they say is necessarily what the Government in Washington actually things. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

"Without knowing what the citizenship status of the Nisei is, how can the Nisei say whether they will fight for the United States or not? I think the wisest thing for the Nisei to do is to wait until the decision from the trials of February 19th (Court of Appeals trial of Hirabayashi, Yasui and Korematus Civil Liberties cases ) are known and then to register accordingly. There is no hurry about this matter, and the Nisei should give the question a great deal of thought before they register. Why don't all the Nisei in this block get together and make a unified decision not to register until the trials are over and they know what their citizenship status is? If a unified stand is taken, the Nisei will be that much stronger."<sup>3</sup>

"I think this is the time for all Nisei to get together and make a stand for their rights. I am willing as anyone else to shoulder a gun for the United States. But before I do that, I want to know three things. (Three points were: removal of discrimination in the Army; Government proscription of discrimination in newspaperk etc., on outside; and guarantee of security for the prents.)"<sup>4</sup>

1. See Tulean Dispatch, February 18, 1943, p. 2. sample of questions

2. Miyamoto Document, Block 5 Meeting, February 16, 1943, p. 1

3. Ibid., p. 2

4. Ibid., p. 2

It is clear that the issue of registration now centered about the question of military service among Nisei. There was a remnant of the Issei question for it was still being heatedly argued that the title "Application for Leave Clearance" on their form was entirely unsatisfactory even if it were permitted to strike it out and change it to "Registration Only", and especially was this true as Coverly had stated in one of his answers that the change of title would actually make no difference in the purpose of the registration. He also assured the people that no forced movement would be made, but this was lost in the argument. But the Issei question was no only a reinforcement of the arguments for non-registration of Nisei males. The general attitude was that unless guarantees could be gained, the Nisei should not commit themselves to any future that was not clear to them, and, in any case, it was felt that there was plenty of time to carry out the registration and no need to rush into it. The Nisei who desired to register, however, were now placed in an especially difficult position, for Lt. Carroll had announced that failure of Nisei of military age to comply with the registration would subject them to the maximum penalty of \$10,000 and/or 20 years in jail, a penalty invoked through the Espionage Act of 1917. The penalty for the failure of all others to register was to be (at maximum) \$5,000 and/or 10 years in jail by virtue of the "Residential Proclamation of February 1942. On the other hand, there was fear on the part of many Nisei that if they did register, they would receive the retributive action of violent members in the community who were opposing the registration.

Leaders of the community like Harry Mayeda, Reverend Kitagawa, and Mr. Ikeda who were deeply concerned over the unfortunate consequences which would undoubtedly follow as a result of the community's opposition to the registration were then seeking means by which people could be returned to their senses. Frequent meetings of the Council and the Planning Board were taking place in the effort to solve this problem, but not satisfactory solution seemed in sight. A meeting of a small group to discuss what should be done was called

in the Union Chapel by Harry Mayeda, and Rev. Kitagawa, and the conclusion of this discussion was that some definite stand must be taken by the Council and the Planning Board recommending registration without saying anything about the manner of answering the questions. But when the problem of determining a resolution to present to the people was given the Council and the Planning Board, each group met with difficulties that could not be overcome. The effort of the Council to formulate a resolution resulted in a split of the group<sup>(a)</sup> into those who wished to form an outright and forthright statement favoring registration (those supporting this view were largely from the wards occupied by Northwest people where opposition was weak), and (b) into those who preferred to grant the wishes of the people in refusing to register and support this by a resolution (supporters of this view were largely from the Sacramento and Marysville wards where opposition was keen). The consequent resolution written up by the chairman and secretary of the Council was a weak and confused statement which declared in effect, "Register if you wish, don't register if you desire not to." The difficulties of the Planning Board were similar, but in their case they encountered opposition from the Administration which desired them to strike out a recommendation that Nisei youths consult their parents before registering. What the people desired and needed was leadership and guidance on the registration, but because of a lack of clarity and agreement among the leaders themselves as to the nature of the issue, they were unable to provide the required leadership. In consequence, the community drifted along, confused in their thinking on the problem, responding rather to their emotional impulses on the question.

Because of the failure of the original procedure of registration, of having people register in their own blocks, the registration procedure was suddenly changed on Thursday, February 18. It was apparent to the Administration that much of the failure of registration among Nisei was due to parental and Issei coercion preventing the younger generation from freely expressing their mind. Moreover,

it was also evident that many persons were afraid to register in their own blocks where they might be observed by their neighbors and be accused of acceding to WRA wishes. To prevent these methods of coercion, the Administration changed the place of registration to the Personnel Recreation Hall which is far removed from the community, and started anew with a canvas of the blocks beginning with Blocks 18, 25, 32, 9, 42, and 53, for male citizens over 17 years, and with Blocks 15, 38, 36, 21, 44, and 70 for female citizens. The Issei were to be registered following the completion of Nisei registration.

The new procedure did produce a slightly more favorable rate of registration. But, on the contrary, the increasing pressure of registration from the Administration and the immediate requirement of decision caused a rush of Nisei males to the repatriation office. On the morning of February 18, a line began to form outside the Internal Security office to get repatriation papers--while the registration offices at the Personnel Recreation and the Leaves office were comparatively empty--and by the afternoon of that day the line had swelled in size until it curved outside the building and out into the parking space at the far northwestern corner of the administration building. The effect of this line on many Nisei in the community was to cause those who had been unable to make the decision of repatriation to that moment to decide suddenly in favor of repatriation. Nisei in the community who had been working to preserve the citizenship of Nisei and members of the Administrative staff who had entered the project with the hope of elevating the position of a mistreated people looked on this with disappointment and disillusionment. On the following morning, however, a new regulation was announced to the effect that anyone desiring to repatriate must first register. The response in the community to this regulation was, "The WRA won't even let us decide which country we want to sign our allegiance to." The people wished to know why it was first announced that anyone who repatriated need not register, and then this regulation should be suddenly reversed.

There were rumors also that some members of the appoint staff were firing workers who had repatriated. This rumor remained unconfirmed, and it is likely that there was actually no such thing taking place. But, especially with reference to Chief Rhodes of the Fire Department, it was said that all those under him who had taken out repatriation papers had also been given their termination slips. The increasing pressure from the Administration upon the people to carry out the registration undoubtedly was increasing their sense of insecurity and inability to arrive at a decision, and rumors of this kind had a favorable seeding ground. The reaction of the community to measure of this type, however, was bound to be an even greater solidification of resistance to the registration.

There was evidence, however, that the resistance to registration might break given sufficient time. Some of the blocks, and these included not only those in Ward 7 where cooperation had been relatively good from the beginning but those in areas like Ward 3 which had started out with strong resistance, seemed to be wavering. Many persons in these blocks were registering, though it was done quietly so as not to direct hostility against themselves for their act of "weakness". But in still other blocks, the resistance was as strong as ever, and there is some evidence that this was particularly the case in Ward 5 where the population was composed <sup>mostly</sup> of Marysville, and Free Zone people. The week ending Saturday, February 20th, indicated a confused situation in the project over the registration question. The dominant influence was still the community's opposition to registration and an attitude of waiting to see what would happen before taking any action. But it was also evident that the Administration was becoming increasingly impatient with the obstinacy of the people, and there was signs of their intention to take more direct action in order to bring about the desired results. Under the pressure of the Administration's evident impatience, as well as a consequence of their personal desire to get the registration over with, some elements in the community were strongly inclining toward registration

and since most of them could not register openly, they were doing so on the quiet.

### The Block 42 Incident and the Reign of Terror

From the standpoint of the Administration the registration had reached something of an impasse by the Saturday of February 20th. To be sure, since the change of place of registration from the individual blocks to the Personnel Recreation Hall near the administration buildings, the Nisei male registration was proceeding with greater certainty than had been the case up to that time, but the demand upon the Administration was to register everyone in the project and by this standard the registration was proceeding all too slowly. In order to accomplish their ends, The Administration, and in particular Mr. Coverly and Mr. Hayes, began to assume a policy of enforced registration, the use of threats to cow the people into registration. It seems that even within the administrative group there were dissenting members from this rapidly evolving policy, and people like Mr. Fleming and Mr. Jacoby played their part in this policy only because of pressure from their superiors.

One evidence of this policy in the Administration were the visits by members by the appointed personnel, but also including Lt. Carroll, to those blocks where resistance was greatest in the effort to persuade the people to a more reasonable view of the registration. Mr. Coverly, Mr. Jacoby, and Lt. Carroll appeared at several blocks which were supposed to have registered on Thursday, February 18, and called off the names of those who had failed to register and urged them to come down to the personnel recreation before the registration for their block would be completely over. One of the worst offending blocks in this regard was Block 42.

Carroll, Coverly and Jacoby appeared at the messhall of Block 42 at lunch time on Friday, February 19, and called off the names of Nisei males who were supposed to register but had failed to do so. The first half dozen names which they called off failed to bring out any response, though this was in part due to the fact that some of these boys were away working and were eating somewhere

else, but Frank Tsukamoto, who had evidently failed to register up to that point, responded and others responded in like manner after him. Some eight persons who thus indicated their presence in the messhall at the time were asked to get on a truck which had been brought for the purpose of transporting these persons to the registration office, but none was willing to comply in this way and expressed preference for going down individually.

On that same day the repatriation office was closed because of the new ruling that registration for military service must precede the taking out of repatriation papers. At 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon a group of boys composed in large part of Block 42 members walked down to the repatriation office in the form of a minor demonstration to demand of Jacoby why it was that they had to register before taking out repatriation papers. One person who observed this mob at the administration building making demands of Jacoby declared that he thought a riot might break out at any time; in any case, the hostility of the group must have been quite apparent. This group, however, was sent home without further incident. A petition was formed in Block 42, following this "interview" with Jacoby, in which the Nisei males of this block declared their unwillingness to register under any circumstance and even expressed preference for being arrested rather than to comply with the administration.

At a block meeting in 42 that evening, Jacoby suddenly appeared by himself to plead with the boys for a more reasonable view of the issue. The reception which he received, however, was one of utmost discourtesy. People beat upon kitchen pans so that he could not be heard, there were catcalls, and some Kibei spoke rudely in Japanese to express their scorn of him. There had been a similar demonstration at the time of Coverly and Carroll's appearance, but these signs of resistance were elaborated at Jacoby's second appearance in this block.

About 5:00 o'clock on Sunday evening, February 21, a line of cars headed by the project director's sedan, followed by several empty trucks, and several

jeeps of soldiers, appeared at Block 42. The soldiers were immediately posted all around the block with instruction to allow no one to enter or go out of the block, and they carried bayoneted rifles to hold off the crowd which rapidly gathered. Machine guns were also manned at strategic points and pointed toward the crowd, while tear gas bombs were available in the event of a riot. In the meantime, a group of the administration personnel went from barrack to barrack calling upon all those who signed the petition that requested arrest rather than be required to register, and these thirty-seven Nisei and Kibei were loaded on the empty trucks with the single suitcase which most of the boys carried.

As news of the arrest spread throughout Ward 5, a large crowd rapidly gathered and milled around the area where the boys were being placed on the trucks. The atmosphere was shot through with tension, and it was apparent that the slightest incident might stir the crowd to riotous action. Young boys stood at a distance from the soldiers and jeered and sneered at them, saying, "You yellow bastards, bet you're scared to shot at us." "You cowards, coming in here with bayonets and machine guns. I'd like to see you take a shot at us." Some of the soldiers were extremely tense and it may be imagined that the jeering of the crowd must have aroused them sufficiently to wish that they might shoot into the crowd. Four or five of the less experienced soldiers were nervously fingering at the trigger, but others were nonchalantly watching the activity of the people and those who were carrying out the arrests. One Kibei reports that he brushed up against a soldier just to see what the other would do while some of his friends edged closer to the truck loaded with tear gas bombs with the intention of grabbing them and throwing them at the soldiers. No doubt many of these stories are told out of a feeling of braggadocio, yet in view of the irrational impulses that may be aroused in crowd situation, serious consequences might have developed from the slightest misdeeds from either side.

When all the boys were finally loaded on the trucks, and the drivers started to follow the leading car back toward the administration buildings, the boys smiled and waved their hands as if they were leaving for a picnic. The attitude of the Block 42 people to this point apparently was that the administration would not dare to carry out its threat of arresting the boys, and the fact that these youths were treating the arrest as something of a lark indicated a residue of their confidence that no serious harm could come to them even in the face of the obvious seriousness of the administration about arresting the boys. As the trucks pulled away, the crowd spontaneously broke out into shouts of "Banzai, Banzai" and raised both their arms toward the sky in the customary manner.

When the soldiers were withdrawn so that the block was no longer barricaded, a large number of friends of the arrested boys' families, "rubber-neckers" and agitators, gathered in Block 42 and started milling around in a mob. One large mob formed in the middle of the block next to the washrooms, composed largely of young people, both males and females, and their main concern seemed to be that of uncovering the inu who had reported these boys and caused the arrest. A little investigation would have revealed to these "inu-hunters" that no spies had been necessary to cause the arrest of the boys since the WRA had picked up only those who had signed the petition of refusal to register. But even as the spirited discussion about inuz went on, people went about cautioning each other against talking openly about their opinions because of the presence of inu among them.

The nature of the inu-hung is indicated by the experience of the H. family living in Block 42 who was ostracized from an early date in the registration period because the husband had ~~openly~~ fought the movement in the block to prevent anyone from registering, and he himself registered in the face of block opposition. On the night prior to the arrests of the boys, someone tacked on their door a sign in Japanese that read, "Inu", and shortly after the arrest of the boys, another note was passed under their door by a group of young girls

which read "Keto no inu (white man's dog). From the attitude that anyone who registers must be capable of becoming an inu (a spy), the attitude rapidly changed over to the view that anyone who registers in an inu; but in the absence of any evidence that the persons labelled inu were actually "squ<sup>2</sup>aling" on the evacuees it is apparent that the term inu had been broadened to mean anyone who is on the other side, that is, a traitor. During the following week, the H. family suffered the humiliation of having children and even grown girls bark at them to imply that an inu (dog) was among them.

Of the thirty-seven boys who were arrested from Block 42, three were immediately released when it was discovered that they had previously registered, but had signed the petition because of the pressure within the block. The story was prevalent in the community that these boys went home to their parents and asked the latter's forgiveness for having registered against the will of the block. Seven more must have gained release through other means, for when the official announcement was released by the WRA, it was declared that only twenty-seven boys had been arrested. The twenty-seven boys were held without charge, some in the county jail at Alturas, and the remainder at Klamath Falls. Repeated efforts of WRA representatives to gain a change of attitude from the boys so that they could be brought to register failed, for though it was evident that the youths had refused to register at the instigation of older people they stubbornly held to the view that they intended to go to Japan at the close of the war and that they had no intention of registering even if they were required to serve a long prison sentence. The attitude of the WRA was that the youths had been misled by agitators, that they didn't seem to realize the seriousness of what they were doing or the implications of the choice they were making, and that some means should be found to mitigate any sentence that might be applied to them.

The Block 42 incident stands out as the most dramatic event of all the disturbing occurrences of the registration period, and it was a turning point in

the trend of registration. The incident was the climax of the stubborn resistance to registration exhibited in the community during the first week and half of registration and it was the catalytic agent that released the pent-up hostility in the community.

On the same evening of the arrests, a special meeting of the Planning Board and City Council was called at 9:00 p.m. and in a heated discussion that continued until 1:30 in the morning, the plans for meeting this last move of the administration was discussed. The desire of some of the representatives, especially of the more emotional Issei, was to call a general strike as a protest against the arrest of their boys. It was generally recognized, however, that a general strike could only hurt the community and add little to the strength of the people in fighting the administration for release of the boys. It was argued, for instance, that at least the messhall crews, the base hospital, the boilermen, the fire squads, the wardens, and some of the office and warehouse workers would have to continue if the people were not to starve and be without protection. But the continued operation of such a large proportion of the workers would destroy the effectiveness of a general strike. The representatives therefore decided that a general strike should be called only as a final measure against the administration, while in the meantime every other method of conference and arbitration should be used to gain the freedom of the arrested youths. In Ward 3 many of the representatives returned to their blocks and immediately called meetings of their block people, routing people out of bed at 2:00 a.m. to inform the people that there should be no general strike in the morning.

In the meantime, the people of Ward 4 in which Block 42 where the arrests had taken place is located, called a ward meeting on the same evening. The feeling was that martial law might be declared at any time and mass meetings would not then be possible; hence, there was an immediate need to hold meetings while the opportunity remained. At this ward meeting it was agreed that no one

should register in that ward until the boys had been returned. The tension in this ward was extreme, and their hostility against the Administration and the Army was so strong that registration was now entirely out of the question there. Anyone who had registered or had expressed favorable opinions toward registration were in the position of suspected inu. On the following morning watchmen were posted throughout the ward to see that none of the ward people should go in the direction of the administration buildings either to register or to "inform" the Administration of what was taking place.

The Monday of February 22 was ominously gloomy and gray, an appropriate setting for the dark mood within the community. Just before eight o'clock, when all the workers would normally be on their way to work, the sharp wail of the fire siren broke the stillness of the morning. The notes came in five waves--the prearranged signal to indicate that the school was closed due to emergency--yet the shrill call cutting through an unhealthy looking atmosphere seemed to portend an evil far greater than the mere closing of school. Shortly thereafter messhall gongs began to ring in various parts of the project to call people to early block meetings, an unprecedented occurrence. Some of the gongs seemed to toll with the depressing rhythm of funeral bells, others seemed to ring with the staccato notes of an alarm. Whatever the actual condition of that morning scene, people's minds were sufficiently disturbed to perceive nothing but the ugliness in the community.

The discussion in the block meetings throughout the project was probably not uniform, but something of the attitude of the people may be gained from the discussion in the meeting in Block 5. Typical statements were:

If everyone had refused to register from the beginning, nothing like the present trouble would have occurred. We know who the persons, the two or three persons, were who opposed our view that everyone should join in the refusal to register (The latter in a threatening tone.)

We know that there are some inu among us. Such persons must be hunted out in one way or another and proper disposition of them should be made.

I cannot help but feel aroused at the thought that there are those among us who carry the blood of 2600 years of Japanese ancestry in their veins who

would be so despicable as to turn in the names of those who are their own people to the keto. I am old and I have been ill, but this thing makes my blood boil so that even I should like to find out the inu and give them what is ther due. If I feel this way, I cannot blame the blood thirstiness of those who are younger and more vigorous who wish to "get" those who have turned against their own people.

The demand of the Council and Planning Board must be the unconditional release of the thirty four boys who were arrested in Block 42.

Three objectives were clearly stated in these meetings and became the purpose of the people. First, it was decided that there should be no general strike of the people, yet the attitude in the community against cooperation with the administration was so obvious that few persons found the courage to go to work. Second, the inu hunt took on something of an organized character in which it seemed that there was a definite effort by the people to take some action against those who were considered "informer" to the adm inistration. Third, a demand was placed before the two representative bodies in the community for the unconditional release of the <sup>B</sup>lock 42boys which wa s to be transmitted to the administration, but in view of the obvious impossibility of gaining such a request, it was clear

# The Emergence of Social Unrest

A. Prob. & conflict.

1. Scrap lumber con-  
flict.

2. Sectionalism

3. Army consorship of  
mail.

4. Community Enter-  
prises of some.

5. Recreation Dept.

6. ~~Construction~~  
~~Wages~~ Work groups.

7.

1. The decline of ~~anti~~  
Authority controls.
2. The methods of  
communication.
3. Events & inter-  
pretations; the na-  
ture of the issues.
4. Symbolism & rep-  
resentation.
- 5.

# Work Corps Diary.

## 1. Structure

1. Growing during 1st months
2. About 5500 worker
- 3.

## 2. Major work corps diff.

1. Procurement & supplies
2. Organization
3. Confusion about policies

## 2. Examples of.

1. Housing
2. Recreation Dept.
3. Records office
4. Time-Keeping & accounting
5. Farm
6. Construction

4. Wages question

1' Pay question

2' Equal wages.

3'

## Censorship of Mail

1. The back ground of the prob<sup>ship</sup>
  - 1' WRA. announcement of no censol.
  - 2' The M.P. - WRA conflict.
  - 3' The influence of one corporal on the shape of events.
2. The consequence upon evanues.
  - 1' Fear
  - 2' Resentment & desire to show them
  - 3' Reasons why it didn't affect people too severely.

4. Distrust of Caucasian  
authorities & increased sense  
of insecurity.

EMERGENCE OF UNREST

1. Sectionalism.
2. Scrap Lumber Conflict.
3. Censorship of Mail.
4. Canteen Issue.
5. Recreation Department Prob.
6. Work Corps Disorganization.
7. ~~Farm Workers.~~
8. ~~Construction Crew.~~
9. Messhall problems.

## Social Solidarity of the Nisei

- I. Problem: to ascertain how group solidarity and personal organization is maintained among the Nisei in Seattle.

(See page 2 for Definitions and page 3 for the Setting of the Prob.)

### II. Scope of the inquiry:

- A. Study of the historical and persistent experience of the Nisei in Seattle to indicate the factors which attack and threaten their collective life, taking account of both the conditions to which they give conscious attention, and those which they try to evade. The Nisei problems are:
1. Those arising in their relations with the majority people in consequence (a) of their minority-group situation, and (b) of the international issues between Japan and the U.S.
  2. Those arising within the community (a) in their relations with their parents, (b) in the conflicts of Japanese and American norms of conduct, and (c) in the natural process of community growth.
- B. The collective means by which they cope with such factors. What kinds of adjustments have they made?
1. The definition of their situation in terms of (a) their mode of arriving at the definitions, (b) the clarity with which they see their problems, (c) their goals and the limitations recognized, and (d) their view of how to act under various circumstances.
  2. Organizations for release, for protection and for control. To observe the function of these organizations (a) under normal conditions as agents for defining the roles of community members and for giving them psychological satisfaction, and (b) under conditions of crisis as agents for collective action.
- C. Study of the careers of experience of the Nisei who participate in the Japanese community life. To show how personal integrity and control is maintained.
1. The typical processes of adaptation by which personal integrity is maintained. To study the Nisei mode of emotional control, repression and sublimation, self-expression, and their conception of the meaning of authority and responsibility. Their philosophy of life.
  2. The areas where difficulty in such self-maintenance exists. How are such areas met by the Nisei who are community members?
- D. Study of the detached Nisei. To show the relative absence of community organization, i.e., definitions, mutual support, protection, release, etc., and the difference it makes in adjustment.
1. The Nisei living in white communities. The personality conflicts arising out of their anomalous situation.
  2. The detached Nisei living in the community, and their mode of adjustment.
  3. The Kibei (Nisei raised in Japan) and their personality problems. Their mode of adjustment.