UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

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COUNTY SUMMARY--FRESNO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1/
Cities of Fresno and Clovis

General Remarks. - Fresno is one of the largest cities in the San Joaquin Valley, having a Census population of approximately 60,000 inhabitants. It lies in the center of a county devoted largely to grapes--raisin, table, and wine. Many of the farms in the area are quite small, and the population of Fresno services a large rural group. There are a number of small communities in the county, of which Clovis is one.

The city of Fresno has grown very much in the last decade, the population having moved out beyond the city limits so that, as the map shows, the subdivided land extends far beyond the city limits. The sample taken, however, since it was based upon the population within the city, did not include these outlying areas. In the past 2 years there has been much building in Fresno of houses of all classes. The construction of Friant Dam undoubtedly contributed to this construction. At present, however, there are no large construction projects, there are no civilian defense activities, and only a very small Army camp stationed in or near Fresno. The result has been that a very large number of vacant houses exist in the city. One businessman made the statement that there were 12,000 such homes, and the frequency of "for rent" and "for sale" signs substantiates this claim. Vacancies exist in houses of the poorest and of the best, but most are in "middle-class" homes. The fact that Fresno is so overbuilt means that rents are low and that business people in general are depressed. It also means that rent is never mentioned as a factor in the rising cost of living.

The city of Clovis is an old town, incorporated in 1912, and dependent upon servicing the rural area of the vicinity. Its houses and its population are both old, there being practically no new development in the town, which seems dead in comparison with other communities in the San Joaquin Valley. The sample from this community includes 3 persons receiving public assistance and no person who is regularly employed in the ordinary work of daily life in the town. It is perhaps significant that the head of the one worker family interviewed was several hundred miles away, working on a defense job.

Cost of Living. - Virtually everyone recognizes the cost of living has risen and usually mentiones groceries. They all agreed, if they did not mention the fact spontaneously, that materials had risen, and the feeling seemed widespread that this was due to profiteering either upon the part of the merchant or of

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1/ Attitudes study made in cooperation with the Division of Program Surveys. By Walter R. Goldschmidt, Junior Social Science Analyst. Twenty-one interviews were taken from Fresno and 7 from Clovis, both in Fresno County. Of these, 19 and 6, respectively, were taken by me. Since I took no rural interviews, this summary will apply only to the urban problems.

the "middleman." Practically everyone felt that price controls should be established and that such controls could be made effective. The sample showed, however, that the cost of living has risen less sharply in Fresno than in Kings County or in other urban areas.

Sugar and Rubber Shortages. - Though frequently the interviewee expressed the opinion that there was no real shortage of sugar they all felt the rationing was a reasonable thing to do in time of war and that it had been handled expeditiously.

In Fresno, as in Kings County, no one seemed able to estimate very accurately the length of time which he would still be able to drive his car, and most felt that when the time came they would make the necessary adjustments without too much difficulty. Perhaps the best illustration of the point of view being taken came from one man who picked me up while I was waiting for a bus, saying that he hated to drive down town with an empty car. Many bicycles now appear on the street so that it is evident partial adjustments have already been made to the tire situation. These adjustments with very few exceptions are recognized by the people.

Hoarding. - If the answers to questions 11 and 12 can be accepted at face value, the people do not know of any cases in which people are storing up goods for future use, and would not approve of doing so.

Fixing of Prices and Wages. - Most people felt that prices, wages, and income should all be fixed but few recognize the real difficulties that might derive from such action. Rarely, for instance, do any interviewees make specific suggestions as to the wage they feel should be allowed or the profit they feel should be allowed. In Fresno, as in Kings County, there appears to be some recognition that the control of one implies the control of all three.

Taxes. - Considerable feeling was expressed on the parts of persons in various walks of life against the lowering of income tax exemption. They all point out that a person cannot live on $600 a year and felt that the previous exemption was low enough. Many feel that the present structure of taxes is very fair.

It might be suggested that any future question on taxes be so worded that it elicit an opinion as to where the incidence for a raised tax should fall.

Purchasing Power. - Questions on purchasing power were not very applicable to the Fresno area. For the most part the experience of the people does not include a large number of persons who are making more money at the present time. When industrial laborers were suggested they agreed that there must be many families making more money, but most seem to recognize that the cost of living was higher in defense areas. A number of people seemed to feel that the larger incomes created higher prices because business was anxious to take advantage of the situation.

Post War Outlook. - Most people felt that there would be a depression after the war and many suggested personal saving and Government economies as the means for avoiding such a situation. However, in general the opinion seemed

to be that such a depression was the inevitable result of the war.

Defense Bonds. - The people who bought Defense Bonds appear to have done it in response to advertising. They frequently give such causes as to "help the cause." They occasionally mentioned the value of bonds as an investment. Opinion differed considerably as to whether such savings should be forced upon the people, some feeling that it would be better to keep it a matter of personal choice. Occasionally suggestions were made that a 10 percent enforced saving was good if exemptions similar to those for the income tax were made.

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JAPANESE POPULATION CALIFORNIA 1940

(INCLUDES BOTH AMERICAN AND FOREIGN BORN LOCATED BY MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS)



SOURCE OF DATA: U.S. Bureau of the Census

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JAPANESE OPERATED FARMS CALIFORNIA 1940

(INCLUDES BOTH AMERICAN AND FOREIGN BORN LOCATED BY MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS)



SOURCE OF DATA: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

The Ecological Position of the Japanese Farmer in the State of Washington
By John Adrian Rademaker

Chapter I. Introduction

A. Statement of the Problem

A study of dynamic relationships of the Japanese farmers with other inhabitants and with the natural resources of the State and the world to provide some additional knowledge of the nature and function of ecological processes. Has taken political rather than economic boundaries because of the political influence on the people, ie., Land tenure differs in the three Pacific states.

Occupational specialization, as the Japanese, allows for a study of the division of labor.

B. Data and Methodology

1. Life histories
2. Case studies
3. Analysis of literature
4. Analysis of statistical data

Chapter II Position of Japanese Farmers as Defined by Cultural Conditions of Land-Holding

A. Trends and Developments in Legal Tenure of Farm Land

The constitution of the State prohibits holding land by aliens who have not declared intention of becoming citizens, also a corporation whose capital stock is owned by aliens. The United States Consititution denies Japanese citizenship so in Washington the Nesei can only own land.

Many Japanese came with the intention of returning with money saved but permanet ties grew, like a family and kept them here. At the same time a tide of antagonism arose due to:

1. Increase in numbers of the Japanese
2. Attempt to take up land to work it for themselves

The increase in numbers was due to:

1. Economic conditions of the period
2. End of the Russo-Japanese war
3. Diffusion of knowledge about the Pacific Coast states
4. Wives brought over

From 1880 to about 1905 the Japanese was a pioneer "laborer" learning new ways of producing, distributing and consuming goods and services. The urge to private enterprise was strong in the Japanese culture. This resulted in the leasing or buying of land. So long as work, land, and economic opportunities were plentiful there was little opposition to them but during the economic depressions of 1900, 1907, 1913-1914, 1920-21 (the latter being coincident with the return of the A. E. F.) the opposition grew. The temporal conjuncture of these occasions of economic competition and opposition to the Japanese is too exact to be insignificant. The writer investigated 9 leaders and nearly 100 followers of the Japanese opposition and found it to be closely related to the use of this issue as a political stepping stone. White residents failing to compete joined with the politicians and this junction led finally to the act of exclusion. During the periods many labor unions excluded Japanese from membership (names of the unions given) and passed resolutions calling attention to their menace, only occasionally mentioning the economic reasons.

The writer says that in fact the competition was slight but:

1. The economy of the coast was delicately adjusted, the ratio of capital, men and resources efficiently balanced. A slight increase or decrease in any one of the factors was sufficient to disturb the balance.
2. Whites were apprehensive of the result of unlimited numbers.
3. Cultural attitudes of whites were conditioned by dealings with Inddans, Mexicans and Negroes so were ready for the J.

However, the Japanese immigrants refused the role assigned to them by the whites and continued to contend for equal privileges, and continued to compete for economic, social and political advantages. Their behavior was channelized by their culture and hence made their objections take the form of dignified but resolute remonstrance. Hence formal legislative enactments were passed by city and town councils, by the state Legislature and by the national Congress. The Land Acts of 1921 and 1923 are a case in point. The Acts extended the prohibiyion against owning farm land to every interest in land, and any "right to the control, possession, use, enjoyment, rents, issues, or profits, thereof". The second Act, passed in 1923, made it presumptive evidence of violation of the first Act if non-declarant aliens were found upon land owned, rented, or otherwise held by their minor children citizens. Were forbidden to act as guardians. Resulted in a series of fifty to a hundred prosecutions. Altho the Japanese immigrants were cheifly from the lower social and econ. classes of Japan they did not take easily to an acceptance of inferiority. The number of Japanese farm operators and farm laborers gainfully employed decreaded by 78% between Oct. 1, 1920 and Oct. 1, 1924. (From the Imperial Statistical Yearbooks of the Dept. of Foreign Affairs of the Govt. of Japan)

Others remained awaiting the time when their children would be old enough to hold land without discrimination. Hence temporary arrangements were made to secure the use of the land.

A. Leased by Hawaiian-borns and turned over to Japan-born
B. Minors leased or bought acting under guardianship of a white
C. Verbal arrangements were made with owner so would be legal.
D. Rented house, and given use of land around house
E. Corporation organized by Nesei purchased and leased farms, employing Issei to operate them.

Prior to land acts a high percentage of tenancy was the universal rule. Since the land acts managment and ownership increased, while tenancy and rented decreased (Table given , 1900 to 1930)

B. Analysis of the Provisions of the Acts of 1921 and 1923

Full text given in Appendix A. A digest of both acts is given here.

(1) Escheat or sale might take place up to the value of the alien's interest, but was not restricted to the actual property conveyed to him.
(2) Redefined "land" as: every interest therein and right to the control, possession, use, enjoyment, rents, issues or profits thereof. In other words, this Act extends prohibition from ownership only to every type, kind, and degree of tenure which may create a right in the land to its user. Only managemtn and the position of farm laborer were excluded.
(3) Not qualified to act as guardian. Revue of cases under this clause. The author goes through the clauses and cases in the 1923 act with reference to Constitutionality and escheat

Summary: "To a marked extent, the ecological position of the Japanese farmers in Washington has been defined by cultural conditions and restrictions upon land-holding.

Chapter III The Significance of the Land Acts to the Dynamics of Position

A. Motives and Men: Land Acts purely motivated and fought by selfish interests on part of both sides.
B. Groups which Favored the Acts
   1. Farmers competing with Japanese farmers
   2. Politicians found the issue useful
   3. Press used the issue
   4. Veterans' Organizations
   5. Organized labor in cities gestrued about question only
C. Groups which Opposed the Acts
   1. Northwest American Japanese Association was only organized group
   2. Property owners who rented land to Japanese

3. Buying public favored efficiency that cut the cost of vegetables
4. Two types of merchants who did business with the Japaneseand those who were engaged in the import and export trade with Japan.
5. Religious organizations, philanthropical societiesand Japan Society of Seattle.

D. The Struggle for Advantageous Position

Mass of people could be aroused by:

1. Threat of war with Japan
2. Japanese were taking possession of some of the best land in the region (was treated as a wedge since there had been cut off the great number who might have taken up more land)
3. Standard of living of the Japanese was popularly thought to be very low. Was thought to give an advantage of lower cost to the J.
4. Birth rate argument was employed even more largely. Used as biological competition argument. Overlooked age distribution of J.

These four siturations threatened:

1. Progress and very existence of white civilization and population on the Coast
2. The economic benefits and dependednt social status derived from choice geographical position
3. The economic plane of subsistence
4. The biological supremacy of the whites on the Coast

The majority of the people were indifferent, but there was the threat of danger which could, by propaganda, be conjured up to bring them into line in favor of the Acts; there were strong, well-organized factions possessed of great political and economic power demanding the passage of the Acts, and in opppposition numerous, but unorganized groups of dubious political and economic strength, save the exception of importers and exporters and the Northwest American Jqpanese Association. The outcome was ineviable.

During the first year of the existence of the Act of 1921, Japanese farm acreage diminished. Many whites took over the farms, but they were still unable to in certain fields compete even with handicapped Japanese comeptition. So by Jan. 1923 the acreage held by Japanese in the region had increased to above that of 1921. In eastern Wash. it had decreased considerably. In 1923 began another wave of anti-Japanese propaganda on the entire Coast. The defeated famers were far from satisfied. Therir attitude was reflected in the positon maintained by the State Grange. The result of the second joining of forces was far more disastrous to Japanese farming than was the first The State began prosecution immediately upon passage of the act. J. were forced off farms but the new owners or lessees retained the j. to work as laborers for them. Author states the farmers were no better off for this act, as were forced to compete with other regions In other words, the objective of the Acts was attained, as far as the competing farmers could have reasonably hoped to attain it, but the objective did not enable non-Japanese truck-garden farmers to overcome the obstacles to success in that type of agriculture. (gives produce examples) The result appeared to be further specialization by the Japanese in truck-gardening. The politicians won their office on appeals they made. The press benefited bykeeping the issue alive. The Veterans kept an active watch to see the law was enforced. But it is improbable that the Legion derived any immediate and direct benefit from the act. In the opposition the landlords lost a source of income and rentals declined. Some passed out of cultivation. The Japanese had been the few people who could farm the land and earn profits sufficient to apay a rent that would enable the owners to pay the taxes and have a small income left for living costs. Merchants in the communities where the Japanese farmed were also hurt.

With the advent of the Coolidge prosperity and the beginning of the market boom, the pressure of economic stringency was relieved and the anti-Japanese sentiment was dissipated and died down. Besides, contact with the Jpaanese, instead of with the propaganda disseminated about them, has been noted in many instances to result in attitudes more favorable. In this way, competition unaltered by legal handicaps soon defined the division of labor necessary for the welfare of the relatively new and growing industry of tnuck gardening. Lately attention was turned to the Filipino. From 1927 to 1930 there was a tendency to enlarge farms beyond the size suitable for family labor, hence Filipinos were used as stoop labor. As a result, many of the Japanese who held farms larger than 15 acres or so employed Filipino farm hands. The agitation against Filipino laborers thus fell upon the Japanese indirectly. Some Japanese agree to employ whites and not Filipinos.

There appears to have been a definite relationship between the enactment of the Land Acts and the decrease in the Japanese farm population of the State.

Summary: The struggle for supremacy among the factions of the people of the State, their competition for advantageous ecological position, is the vital process in which are to be fou d the incentives for the Acts. The proponents were well organized, and strong politically. Opponents were numerous, but unorganized and of dubious political and economic strength. The victory of the supporters of the Acts was thus assured in the political arena. The Japanese were forced upon themselves by the superior role and behavior of the shites. Mutual cooperation has developed to a noticeable extent since then.

Chapter IV. The Division of Labor as a Definition of the Position of Japanese Farmers in the State of Washington

A. Farming as an Occupation Specialization of the J. in Wash.

By occupational specialization is meant the tendency to enter and engage in certain occupations to the exclusion or reduction of others. The Japanese who arrived first found their best opportunites in clearing land, building railroads, and logging, in rural areas and in domestic work in the cities. Because of the new culture several expediants were used:

1. Difficulties of understanding the language led to the use of laboring gangs, with a boss who knew the language and gave instructions in Japanese. Worked on a contractual basis and took care of their wants by the money paid them.

Reasons for their ability to secure work:

1. Shortage of white laborers
2. Ambition to make money which underlay their energy in their work and so ability to please their employers
3. Their customs of mutual helpfulness which allowed them to live on much lower wages than others could. So their bids were low and so there was friction with whites who called it unfair competition.

Gives a case example of low bidding

Meanwhile in the cities similar self-suffient communities were being built up. Mostly in the services. Their occupational organization might be characterized as of a nationality type or pattern. But with the passing of the peioneer stage of settlement this type of organization began to break down. They left these restricted occupations and tried others, going further afield from that nationality pattern of organization as they did so. Land clearning crews lost members to the farm laborer group, and the latter soon diversified into such un-Japanese fields as dairying and potato farming, poultry and hog raising. However, segregated vocational boudaries are still observale in many cases. The tred away from nationality organization is clearly defined in the period since 1907, however, and may be expected to continue.

In the "settling period", or period in which the Japanese immigrants gave up their earlier objective of "getting rich and going home", following the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907, the occupational deiversification of the Japanese was becoming strikingly noticeable Was one reason for anti-J. antagonism. But this diversification made for lightening of competitive influence and efficienty in every line of work. So was the result of competitive trial.

The present social division of labor is not based entirely upon unmitigated and free individual competition:

1. The existence of the latter state is in doubt
2. Group selections have distrubed indiv. compet., though perhaps approximating group competitive abilities.
3. A number of factors are involved in any selection of occupational specialization
   A. Total specialization in farming as a whole was always less for the Japanese than for the total population of the State, until some time after 1925
   B. A large percent have been in farming since 1905
      Reasons for this:
      1. <u>The Japanese Culture:</u> excellent training in ag. of an intensive type. The extended family system gave them an advantage. <u>Kenjin</u> of persons from the same prefecture helped if family was inadequate. If needed much capitl <u>tanomoshi</u>, or Japanese pool money was resorted to. (See Myamoto for use of this system) Since the Jap. became acquainted with Am. banks this was not used. Also part of the culture was: a well-developed desire for normal family life and a high respect for the occupation of farming.
         The Japanese are helpful to each other but not cooperative (see Mead's distinction) This is because they refuse to remove their front and lay their cards on the table so that the goal may be mutual. The mutaal helpfulness aided them in their farm life. Furthermore there was a fatalistic acceptance of drudgery and hard work.
      2. <u>The American Culture</u>: Held the J. to this niche of hard labor as suitable to a different race. Race feeling was transferred from experience with the Indian, negro and Chinese and partly from the Christian complex of heathenism. Whites welcomed the stoop labor and low pay of the J. which whites would not do.

3. Economic Opportunity: Offered comparatively large returns in agric. when joined with industry and skill.
4. Competition in Other Occupations: Were other immigrants with whom they had to compete. These groups possessed advantages ofer the J:
   a.) Unlimited opportunity of supplying big gangs because of non-restriction of immig.
   b.) Greater physical strenth--bigger bodies
   c.) Belonged to a white race.
5. Relation to Economic Development of the Community
6. Legal Restrictions

Japanese have specialized in two types of products, vegatable and berry growing and dairying because:

1. Possibilites of the Natural Environment
2. Possibilities of the Technological Knowlege available to the Inhabitants: Intensive agric. was known thru cultural background and partly from study of soils and climate; Distribution methods became more efficient as they organized and found new methods of merchandizing; Changes in comsumption trends in the market have resulted in changes in their crops and the market in which they sold.
3. Possibilities of the Actual Economic Organization for Profitable Exchange: Transportation has increased scope of vegetable shipping
4. Selection from among the Possibilities by:
   A. The Inclusive Regional Community or Group: The group acting to safeguard its own welfare, imposes further (political) limitations to the possible selections of the individual land holder.
   B. Selection by Individual Holding the Land

C. Significance of the Division of Labor to the Position of Japanese Farmers in the State of Washington

Because of the necessary contact with the same persons in a small agric. community, the J. farmers have been able to achieve a relatively noticeable degree of assimilation. Have laid stress upon the American education of their children--one way of maintaining self-estemm in the face of opposition. Pressure encourages the children to become outstanding in school. Thus the nationality type of of division of labor, or specialization of occupation, has given way under the force of partial competition, to a more organic arrangement in the economic field, wherein comparative abilities are the deciding factors to a considerable extent in assigning economic roles to the various elements of the State's population. Legal conditions have been a factor in the competitive process of the social division of labor. (Summary of Chapter given)

Chapter V. Spacial Distribution of Japanese Farmers

A. Introduction: Social relationships ~~in which they he~~ indicative of or expressive of the status and funcitions which they hold in the sociol organization of the society in which they live may be said to define their social position. The sustenance relationships which exist between them and other inhabitants of the State and the world are indicated by the term ecological position. An important aspect of these sustenance relationships is their distribution in space. Another important aspect of these sustenance relationships is their variation in time. Spatial pattern (concentration of J. on the coast)

is discussed with use of census data. Tables given. Concentration has been due partly to nearness to Japan and partly the result of discouragement of movement to other states carried on by Japanese consular officers who sought to localize competition and friction in this manner. Within the Pacific Coast states, distribution has tended to manifest greater and greater concentration within specific areas, but there has also been a pronounced scatteration in a few places. (Map of distribution in P.C. states 1900-1930 given) Certain areas stand out as concentrated centers. The bursting and scattering out can be seen in the case of the Sacramento cluster between 1910 and 1930, and the San Joquin Valley and Portland clusters between 1920 and 1930. The shifts into areas of new emphasis are most outstanding in the cases of the lower Imperial Valley, Santa Barbara County, the Salinas district, the upper delta of the Sacramento River Valley in Calif. and the Yakima Valley in Wash. Calif. early preponderance was declining during 1880-1900 but increased steadily since 1900. An analysis of the Los Angeles City population is given. (Tables of urban population in the three states 1900-1930 given) Tables show that Calif. leads in urbanization, Wash. next and Ore. represents decreasing urbanization of Japanese population.

> "The Japanese population of Washington is next to lowest in the ranking of percentage of population living on farms. Only 24.3% of its 17,837 population were found on farms in 1930. On the other hand, in Colorado the percentage was 74.6--three fourths of the total population. So it can hardly be said that Washington presents an outstanding problem in the invasion of rural areas by Japanese."

Japanese, despite concentration, have never beome a proportionally dominant element in the population. (Table shows the proportions of the J. population to total pupulation by 3 states) At no time in Washington have the famers formed a majority of the population in any locality. (May be different for Calif, Millis suggested) At first the population was diffused then came a period when th Japanese began to centralize. But from the beginning there was some tendency for Japanese to move out of the central communities. This was not much in evidence until after 1914 or 1915. They located at places where economic activity was greatedt. In rural areas these places are those of most intensive agriculture. Ecologically, the principle of distribution of population in direct proportion to the intensity of ~~population-in-direct-p-~~ economic activity is well-known. It was clearly operative in influencing the distribution of the Jap. immigrants in the State of Washington.

The land held by Japanese for farming has been concentrated in a few very definite and limited localities. The rasults have Been:

1. Limited contacts of Japanese and "whites" and if contact was made it was in the presence of a considerable number of Japanese, comparatively.
2. The competitive impact ws considerably greater than if they had been more widely disseminated. So the influence of the J. was seen in terms of their membership in a competitive group. But services were more readily obtained due to this.

B. Distribution

1. General: Five major aggregations exist in the Puget Sound Region, five in the lower Comumbia-Willamette region, and four in the Inland-Empire Region. The first five are entirely in Washington and comprise:

a. Puyallup-White River Valley
b. Vashon Island
c. Bainbridge Island areas
d. Green Lake
e. Bellevue-Kirkland-Hollywood

Only one of the five in the Lower Columbia-Willamette Region is in the state, that at Orchard. Two of the four major areas in the Inland Empire region are in the state, that south of Yakima and the Spokane district.

2. In the Inland Empire Region

Began in 1892. Japanese leased the land in eighty-acre lots from the Indian agency and farm as cash tenants. This was contested by the American Legion Post but in 1925 were again allowed to lease. In 1930 ~~eal~~ the U. S. Census found 51 farms and 1,924 acres operated by Japanese. In 1932 only 30 farms and 779 acres of crop land was harvested were reported by the Japanese Association of Yakima. At present are 136 farms and about 10,000 acres operated by Japanese. Are in cordial relationships with their white neighbors. Whites are more engaged in packing and shipping, Japanese in production. The specializations of the two groups are complementary rather than directly competitive.

The second area of concentration of Japqnese farmers in the Inland Empire region is that around Spokane. Are 13 farmers farming almost 600 acres of small fruit and truck crops, most of which are marketed in Spokane. Gives the number and acreage for the entire region, includes scattered farmes.

3. In the Lower Columbia-Willamette Region

In 1930 contained about 2,300 Jpanese farm population, 262 farms, and 7,769 acres, only about 50 persons, 8 farms, and 110 acres being in the state of Washington. Increases since 1930 have not been great

4. In the Puget Sound Region

The floor of the valley formed by the Puyallup, Stuck, Green, and White rivers has been the site of the oldest, most permanent, and largest communities of Japanese farmers in the Puget Sound Region. Description of the valley, soil, climate. Besides the valley, have farmed the upland slopes east of Lake Washington and the fertile muck and peat soil drained with difficulty. (Maps and tables show the distribution in this area.) The present Japanese farm population of 4,165 operate 476 farms in the Puget Sound Region (1939) of which 344 farms are in the White-Puyallup River Valley. (Map shows holdings in acres) History of increase in acreage given. But the Japanese have never operated more that 20% of the total acreage of the alluvial valley lands---just before the Land Act of 1921 the percentage was only 16.7%---which is far from approaching a monopoly. The enforcement of the Land Act brought distortions to the holdings and now the major trend indicate a noticable increase in holdings in Yakima Co. and very low growth elsewhere.

Of farms outside the Puyallup-White River Valley, those on Bainbridge Island and on Vashon Island are the largest in number and acreage. (Short description of the other regions, mostly scattered farms)

C. Soil and Topography

Comparison of the distribution of Japanese hodings in the Puget

Sound Region with the soil map for the area covered brings out a most peculiar fact. There are Jpanese farms on only six of the twenty-six types of soil found in the Region. (description of the types of soils) Such soils as those enumerated are the best soils of the region. Were taken by the Japanese when they were taking up marginal land to clear it. In the localities where the Japanese concentrated, certan soils preponderated--all of this "best" soil. But the percentage of the Class One land held by Japanese in the area of greatest Japanese concentration prior to 1923 did not exceed 10% of the soils in which they specialize. Nor did they hold as much as 7% of all the Class One of the three counties in which they have concentrated most. The fact is that the Japanese have not monopolized the best lands of the Region.

The fear was of future monopoly but after the Gentlemen's Agreement a sufficient check had been placed upon the number of Japanese immigrants who were destined to take up farms. (Table gives date of arrival of the farmers who occupied farms in the three largest communities in the valley) After 1907 only 10.2% arrived. Then why this fear?

1. Error of inadequate sampling involved in the derivation of the popular beleif of monopoly
2. Seeing well-cared for Japanese farmers the casual observor jumped to the conclusion that the whole community was being taken over. (some were even Italian farms)

D. Transportation

Since widespread introduction of auto trucks, Japanese holdings have tended to develop more independently of local market locations. Interdependence of shipping and packing houses and the production fields grown out of this. In one other respect the Japanese seemed to be gaining an advantage in place locations. Most of their holdings were in the most accessible locations, near the city markets of the State and served by well-maintained transprotation facilities. But there were just as accessible locations where there were no Japanese and the fact that they were there and needed shipping for their produce made possible the maintenance of excellent systems, A lot of railway points depend upon their revenue from the Japanese shippers. Also the Japanese aided in making these lands the "best" by clearing it and draining it. The Acts have shifted the work of developing marginal agricultural lands from the shoulders of the Japanese, and placed it upon others. This has caused a change in the selection of the lands developed and in their use after clearing and prepartion for agriculture.

E. Mobility

No generalization but a substantial part of the author's sample have been on the same farm for twenty years or more, while others show as high a rate as one move per year. Mobility is probably lower than during the early years of Japanese farming. The average turnover is apprently one move in seven to ten years in the Puget Sound Region, and one in three to five years outside the Region.

Chapter VI. Temporal Factors in the Subtenance Relations of Japanese Farmers

A. Introduction

It is to a considerable extent the result of synchronization of effort and of production that a satisfactory division of labor has been worked out. The occupations in which they specialized during

the "pioneer" stage of their settlement were those typical of the frontier economy wh ch they found here---those which had to do ith the exploitation of natural resources, and the furnishing of personal services. During 1920-30 when the Japanese were expan ing into lettuce and green peas the white farmers were decreasing their acreage in these and other truck crops. They went into dairying and poultry and the Japanese decreased in these.

B. Temporal Factors in the Division of Labor

Table given of farm operators--large decrease in the number between 1920 and 1924. Gradual increase from 1924 onward. After the pioneer clearing and railroad work was developed they found it better to expand. Further diversification rose to its greatest peak during the last war period. Before this had beden competing now because of scarcity were not. It was chiefly during the beginning of the peoneer period and again during the rapid expansion of the war period that the Japanese experimented with various types of farming as well as with other occupations. Finding certain types of farming in which they could successfully meet competition in whatever form it prese nted itself, the Japane e farmers specialized in these and withdrew from the others. Thus by 1920 they ahd established recognized pre-eminence in the growing of small fruit and vegetable crops, and had withdrawn from the growing of grains and cereals, from orcharding, and from poultry farming.

The economic depression of 1920-21 and the return of the AEF during 1919 and 1920 brought into the limelight the fact that Japanese were holding jobs and farms that had once been held by white men. Resulted in the Ladie s Agreement of 1920 and the Land Act of 1921. It shifted the Japanese out of certain occupations and they left dairying and cattle, hog raising. The various shifts since 1923 have been less drastic and thoroughgoing. The period since 1924 may be called the nisei period. Since then the chief concern has been in finding places for them. The one outstanding fact apparent today is that the second generation are able to carry on cooperative enterprises with success (examples given)

C. Temporal Factors in Production and Marketing of Crops

While temporal factors have been important to the ecological position of the Japanese farmers as defined by occupational specialization , they have been even more influential in the nature of th sustenance relationships developed between these farmers and their customers. There has been a growing demand, and response to it by production, from the cities for the vegetables. With refrigeration this demand could be met. Case of lettuce growing, packing, shipping and marketing is given. The Japanese by 1930 grew 79.0% of the lettuce and green peas that were shipped from the Puget Sound area. Shipments are either made by season contract with a commission merchant or broker or else are sent on consigment or for sale on delivery to the market that offers the best price when the crop is mature, or el e are sold f.o.b. cash track. Author then estimates the importance of Washington lettuce to the vavious cities which consume it. (Detailed survey of various cities during 1930) A careful consideration of the question as to why non-Japanese have not been successful lettuce growers leads to the conclusion that the Japanese have made a success of lettuce because of their greater efficiency in meeting the competion of growers in other regions. They have spared no pains to make their methods of farming and of market-

ing as well adjusted to the demands of the markets in the East as possible. The author has made a detailed survey of the time of shipment, marketing, etc. In the second place, through their organizations of co-operative type they have been able to pool sales effort and marketing costs. Through their efforts, a cooperative coordination of production and shipment has made the regions of the State important liks in the chain which supplies fresh fruits and veg etable the year around to the populations of the cities in the east. This has strengthened their ecological position greatly, and has tended to raise their staus and stregthen their social position to a noticeable but lesser extent.

In this chapter over 10 pages are devoted to the study of the Japanese lettuce industry from soil to market.

Chapter VII Conclusions

A. The Etiology of Position
1. Pioneer period--concentrated in a few occupations and sold their services as groups and bought on same basis
2. Settling Down stage--more diversified and numerous occupations. Became a more permanent-minded group. Realized during the agitation period that equality was not open to them. Many returned to Japan.
3. Competition decreased during the twenties and the Japanese became more organically integrated with the ecological organization of the whites. The field of action became better-defined. Into this situation came the Nesei.

B. The Position of the Japanese Farmers in Washington
1. From the first were forced to accept the "laborer" status
2. Progressed to position of settled entrepreneur and family head. Worked at their vegetable crops. Needed services to sell their crops outside the state. Their goods were excellent and customers were unaware of their racial differences.

C. Position as a Scientific Concept

It has been seen that position refers to the functional place in the web of sustenance relationships. In this study the position of the Japanese farmers has been determined by:
1. the cultural limitations on and definitions of the functional place they fill in the entire mesh of interrelationed sustenance relations.
2. the division of labor with whites, as to farming
3. the spacial patterns which these relatioships have taken
4. the shifts of thos patterns of relationships through the peiod of time which has elapsed since the coming of the Japanese.

There is also position in the social sense, but beyond the scope of the study. There is no doubt influences of social factors upon ecological proceses and visa versa.

Appendices
1. Laws and Treaties pertaining to legal tenure of agricultural land by Japanese in state of Washington
2. Statistical data pertaining to the distribution of Japanese farmers in the state of Washington

3. Statistical Data relating to production and distribution of Agricultural products.
4. Documents relating to the determination of the ecological positio of the Japanese Farmers in the State of Washington
(these are items cut from the Washington newspapers)

Has article appeared?

WHAT IS A MINIMUM ADEQUATE FARM INCOME?

Lloyd H. Fisher 1/

Readers of the Land Policy Review are familiar with the Columbia Basin Joint Investigations. Its purpose is to plan the development, settlement, transportation, and general economy of an area of about 1,200,000 acres of land to be irrigated from the waters of the Columbia River. Settlement at present is very sparse, confined to a few large wheat farms and a small acreage of irrigated land. The conversion of this large semi-arid area to irrigated farming will involve a complete transformation affecting virtually every aspect of life within it.

The Columbia Basin Joint Investigations, in order to reduce the problem to manageable terms, recognized 28 component problems, which although not unitary, were sufficiently discrete to permit separate consideration in the initial phases of the investigation. One of these was the determination of the levels of living that should be sponsored in the establishment of new farms in the Columbia Basin. The Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics agreed to examine this problem and attempt to devise a method whereby these objectives might be determined and expressed as an income level which might in turn influence the types and sizes of farm recommended for the area. The discussion that follows is in partial fulfillment of that agreement.

1/ Social Science Analyst, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture. March 18, 1942.

Prominent among the needs of planning groups in agriculture has been some valid answer to this question of what constitutes the minimum adequate farm income. The answer has frequently rested either on authority or expediency. To many it has appeared a moral issue and, therefore, not susceptible of rational or empirical solution. To others it has seemed to belong to the specialist--the home economist and the budget expert.

However vexatious the problem, it is nevertheless inescapable. Without some reliable solution there is no adequate objective for many farm programs, no satisfactory answer to the subsidiary questions of what is an adequate size of farm or what is an economic unit. The approach most widely employed is that of the budget which specifies that an expenditure of a given number of dollars for food, clothing, housing, recreation, education, etc. is the least expenditure for which an adequate supply of these commodities can be obtained. These expenditures added together yield a sum which is thought of as a minimum adequate income.

These budgets rest on slight scientific or pragmatic foundations. The exception is, of course, food. In the instance of nutrition valid scientific standards of adequacy of diet have been developed and are in current use. There is no lack of specifications on what constitutes adequate housing but these specifications are in the nature of a trade agreement among professional housers and depend more on unanimity than on evidence. In the matters of clothing, recreation, and education there is not even unanimity.

An equally serious objection to the budget procedure concerns the technique employed. The householder's problem is one of choice in the distributing of a given income. The technique he employs is one of preference or substitution. The budget experts' arithmetic is based on addition. Customarily an adequate income is the sum of a series of expenditures in adequate amounts for purposes considered proper or necessary. At almost every step moral issues intrude. We have to deal not only with whether one or two suits of clothes are sufficient, whether one movie a month is essential and two are excessive but whether an allowance should be made for tobacco, liquor, and a better automobile. It is obvious that if provision is not made for certain of these wants which may on moral grounds be thought to be better suppressed, they will be satisfied at the expense of morally unexceptionable wants. Tobacco inadequately provided for will be bought out of money budgeted for food. Liquor will sometimes be preferred to running water. Consequently it is inevitable that it will cost more to realize an adequate level of living than the sum of the expenditures that will provide it.

There are many who will argue that society has no responsibility for the irresponsibility of its members--that it must proceed on the assumption that its members will behave prudently according to the majority definition of that term. If liquor competes with running water in the value system of any consumer so much the worse for him. However comfortable this position may be morally it will not secure a more provident expenditure of income.

The intention of this article is to propose an alternative procedure which is free from these objections. It has its own shortcomings but these are on the whole less serious than those of a prescriptive budget. There are now available, for many sections of the country, the results of the Consumer Purchases Study conducted in farm areas and small towns by the Bureau of Home Economics in 1935 and 1936. This study has yielded an unparalleled wealth of data on patterns of consumption in relation to income and has provided for the first time a broad empiric basis for determining the choices and decisions that consumers make with reference to their own incomes according to their own wants.

The Columbia Basin Joint Investigations no less than other planning ventures in agriculture found it necessary to deal with minimum income objectives for farm planning. The method used to determine these objectives was almost the obverse of the budget approach. It was assumed at the outset that there was in every family's disposition of its income a competition between saving and spending. It was further assumed that saving would not appear as an important element in this allocation of income until the minimum requirements of family living, as the family defined these requirements, were met. It followed, therefore, that there ought to be an income level below which the characteristic of income groups would be an excess of expenditure over income and above which there would be an excess of income over expenditure. The results for a sample drawn from 948 full-time, native-born, farm families operating small general farms in the Pacific Northwest are shown in figure 1.


INCOMES, VALUE OF FAMILY LIVING AND SAVINGS, 948 NATIVE BORN FARM FAMILIES* IN OREGON AND WASHINGTON.
EARNED INCOME
VALUE OF FAMILY LIVING
DEFICIT & SAVING
Dollars
0-249
250-499
500-749
750-999
1,000-1,249
1,250-1,499
1,500-1,749
1750-1,999
2,000-2,499
2,500-2,999
3,000-3,999
4,000-4,999
0 500 1000 2000 3000 4000
Dollars
Expenditures for family living.
Value of farm furnished goods
0 500 1000 2000
Dollars
-500 0 +500 +1000 +2000 +3000
Dollars
Prepared by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics from data of the Consumer Purchases study, Bureau of Home Economics.
*non-relief families

Figure 1

There are two points of particular interest in the chart. The first of these is the income level at which income and expenditure approximately balance. This is the income class $1,000 to $1,250. The second important observation is the plateau in expenditures which is reached at the income level $2,500 to $3,000. Beyond this point all additional income is saved or, more precisely, little or no additional income is spent for family living.

The first relationship--the point of balance between income and expenditure--might well set a lower limit on income objectives in agricultural planning. It would hardly be defensible to aim at an income level at which the average experience is one of deficit. Again, although this may not be so readily agreed to, the second relationship might well set an upper limit. For at an income of $2,500 to $3,000 all immediate income needs are provided for and substantial savings occur as well.

There still remains a wide range between the $1,000 level at which balance between income and expenditure is achieved and the $2,500 level at which spending for family living ceases. Somewhere in this range the income objective lies. Presumably an income level of $1,000 to $1,250 would not be sufficient since balance is only an average achievement of the income class and a substantial proportion of the members of the class will fall below. A policy which aimed at this minimum would at the same time preordain the failure of many of those it proposed to help.

Table 1, derived from the Consumer Purchases Study in the Pacific Northwest, presents for the several income levels the proportion of families which, in terms of actual behavior, have lived within or beyond their annual incomes. From this table it becomes possible to predict the effect of any income on the solvency of a group of farm families conforming to the general characteristics of the sample. Thus, if annual income is less than $500 it may be anticipated that more than 90 percent of all farm families will fail to live within that income. If income rises to the next level, $500 to $749, the casualties drop to 70 percent. At an income of $1,000 to $1,249 only 30 percent of all families will live beyond their incomes. As one might expect the proportion of casualties declines steadily as income rises. There is a single aberration in the series, occurring at the income level $1,500 to $1,749, where the proportion of insolvent families is actually higher than at the preceding income level. This can only be ascribed to a sampling error and it must be assumed that had the sample been larger the irregularity would not have occurred.

The next step is the application of these solvency rates to a specific planning situation. One of the problems of the Columbia Basin Joint Investigations is the allocation of, let us say, 100,000 acres of land to a number of dairy farms, and our problem is to determine how many farms this area can best accommodate while preserving an acceptable standard of living and at the same time maximizing the total social gain. Obviously, income varies with size of unit. The farm management specialists working on the Columbia Basin Joint Investigations have furnished a series of budgets based on the analysis of established dairy farms in neighboring areas where conditions are

Table 1.- Farm income and solvency

Income	Solvency rate 1/
Dollars	Percent
Under 500	9.0
500 - 749	29.6
750 - 999	52.0
1,000 - 1,249	70.3
1,250 - 1,499	80.7
1,500 - 1,749	78.3
1,750 - 1,999	85.0
2,000 - 2,499	92.0
2,500 - 3,000	95.0
3,000 - 4,000	97.8

1/ Solvency is used here to mean an excess of income over expenditure. The data in this column are derived from the Consumer Purchases Study of 948 full-time, nonrelief farm families in the Pacific Northwest.


INCOME, SURPLUS AND DEFICIT, 948 NATIVE BORN FARM FAMILIES*
IN OREGON AND WASHINGTON
INCOME CLASS (DOLLARS)
DEFICIT
SURPLUS
0-249
250-499
500-749
750-999
1000-1249
1250-1499
1500-1749
1750-1999
2000-2499
2500-2999
3000-3999
4000-4999
500 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
DOLLARS
PROPORTION OF FAMILIES HAVING
DEFICIT
SURPLUS
100 75 50 25 0 25 50 75 100
PERCENT
Prepared by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics from data of the Consumer Purchases study, Bureau of Home Economics.
*non-relief families

Figure 2

similar to those anticipated for the Columbia Basin. In these budgets all factors apart from size were held as nearly constant as possible and the probable income available for family living was calculated for a 40-, 60-, 80-, 100-, 120-, and 160-acre dairy farm.

On the assumption of an area of 100,000 acres to be distributed among an unknown number of farms, table 2 provides the elements whereby the determination can be made. If farms of 40 acres in size were established, the total area would yield 2,500 farms. The probable annual income available for family living would be $875. But only a little more than half of all farm families with incomes of $875 may be expected to remain solvent at that income. Consequently, of the 2,500 farms which could be established at 40 acres, 1,300 would be solvent and 1,200 insolvent. The net solvency would be 100 farms.

As farm size is increased, the total number of farms decreases, the family income increases, the solvency rate increases, and the total number of both solvent and insolvent farms decreases. The essence of the method proposed here lies in the fact that the number of solvent farms has a different rate of decrease than does the number of insolvent farms. Thus an increase in farm size from 40 acres to 60 acres results in a decline of 128 in the number of solvent farms while the number of insolvent farms declines by 705. If the problem at hand were to maximize the number of solvent farms the obvious choice from table 2 would be farms of 40 acres yielding incomes of $875. However, this also maximizes the number of failures. There will be no disagreement with the proposition that the objective of farm planning is to minimize the failures as well as maximize the successes. It

Table 2.- Estimated numbers of solvent and insolvent farms at particular farm size and income levels

Farm size	No. of farms 1/	Net farm income	Solvency rate	No. of solvent farms (Col. 4 x Col. 2)	No. of insolvent farms (Col. 2 minus Col. 5)	Net solvent farms (Col. 5 minus Col. 6
Acres	No.	Dol.	Pct.	No.	No.	No.
40	2,500	875	52.0	1,300	1,200	100
60	1,667	1,101	70.3	1,172	495	677
80	1,250	1,312	80.7	1,009	241	768
100	1,000	1,500	78.3	783	217	566
120	833	1,750	85.0	708	125	583
160	625	2,316	92.0	575	50	525

1/ On the basis of an area of 100,000 acres.

is not always clearly understood that the one is not a necessary function of the other.

If we are willing to consent to the assumption that a failure counterbalances a success we can take the final procedural step and calculate the net number of solvent farms. The problem then resolves itself into determining the size of farm and consequent income at which the maximum net number of solvent farms is realized. This can be read easily from table 2 as an 80-acre farm yielding an income of $1,312. The 100,000 acres which the hypothesis stipulated will then yield 1,250 farms.

It follows, then, that the largest net number of solvent farms is achieved at an income level at which 20 percent of all farms are insolvent. These must be reckoned the probable casualties of a utilitarian goal.

There are refinements which might profitably be introduced. The analysis would obviously gain in precision if a correction were made for size of family since family expenditures will be in part a function of family size. The data on which this analysis is based are records of a single year's income and consumption. It would be far better for the purposes of this procedure if the record had covered several years for the same families since it is very much to be doubted that a year provides a sufficient period to reveal the complete adjustment of a family to its income when that income fluctuates from year to year.

Obviously the terms "solvency," "insolvency," "failure," "success," and "casualty" are used in a somewhat figurative sense. One should not draw the inference that the consequence of a single year's deficit is bankruptcy or that success follows from a single year's surplus. However,

since we are concerned here essentially with the concept of a standard of living it does follow that where income is less than expenditures there are only two alternatives--a forced decline in the level of living or economic casualty. One final qualification upon the use of these data needs only a mention. The prices used in computing expenditures are those of 1935-36. Subsequent use of these data will require adjustment of prices to the levels suitable to the time of use.

If these refinements were introduced they might dictate a slightly different choice of income objective or farm size. Before any final choice is made for the Columbia Basin the modifications will be made. The present purpose of this article, however, is to propose a method--and the method would be essentially unaltered by the considerations above.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Bureau of Agricultural Economics

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THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE

by

Lloyd H. Fisher, Social Science Analyst,
and Ralph L. Nielsen, Junior Agricultural
Economist, Bureau of Agricultural Economics

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Testimony submitted to the Select Committee
Investigating National Defense Migration

Berkeley, California
March 16, 1942

THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE

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Testimony Submitted to the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, March 16, 1942

There were, in 1940, almost 127,000 Japanese in the United States, of which almost three quarters lived in California. The Japanese population in California is distributed much the same as the total population except that there are more than proportionate numbers of Japanese in the truck farming areas of the Delta, on the Coast, and around the large cities.

An evacuation of Japanese from the western section of California cannot fail to have important consequences for the agricultural economy of California.

The total number of Japanese farm operators in the State has been variously estimated. The U. S. Census of Agriculture records 5,135 Japanese farm operators in 1940. The U. S. Census of Population, taken for the same date, enumerated 5,807 Japanese farm operators. The number of Japanese farm operators is, in fact, somewhat larger than either census, although no measure exists of the underenumeration. The Alien Land Law is specific in prohibiting either ownership or tenancy of agricultural land to Japanese aliens. The law has not been widely enforced and evasions appeared common even though legal liability is shared by both white landlord and Japanese tenant. Where illegal tenure exists there are obvious motives for the concealment of the fact and alien Japanese tenants apparently frequently report themselves as foremen or hired laborers.

The Japanese farmer in California, as elsewhere along the Pacific Coast, is predominantly a truck farmer. Japanese [illegible]

[redacted]

of better than $[illegible] and farm implements and machinery valued at almost $6,000,000. By no means all of this capital is owned by Japanese. Much of it belongs to white landlords. But it does represent a body of productive capital that has been used in agricultural production by Japanese, and its continued productive use will be disturbed by Japanese evacuation.

There have been various estimates of the commercial importance of Japanese production. No precise measures exist but the three estimates that

are at hand are in reasonably close agreement and lend substantiation to one another. These estimates would place the value of the annual production of truck crops by Japanese in California at between $30,000,000 and $35,000,000 grown on between 175,000 and 200,000 acres of land. Since the value of all California truck crops grown both for the fresh market and processing is approximately $100,000,000 the proportion of the value grown by Japanese would be between 30 and 35 percent.

This is a far from negligible proportion not only for California but for the Nation as a whole. While Japanese produced 30 or 35 percent of the truck crops of California, California produced more than 25 percent of the Nation's total. There should be no presumption that present plans for evacuation of Japanese from sections of California will result in the loss of all or even a major part of the Japanese production in 1942. These simply indicate the amount of production which will be influenced to some degree by the evacuation.

Reduction in the supplies of some crops in which Japanese have specialized will be felt more at the middle class dinner table than in the Food for Freedom program. Strawberries, almost all of which are grown by Japanese, will be missed by many consumers. Losses in the production of tomatoes, carrots, green peas, snap beans, and onions will more seriously impede America's war effort. Of these latter crops the Japanese contribution is most important in tomatoes where an estimated 35 to 40 percent of the canning tomatoes grown in the State are grown by Japanese. Although less important in amount of acreage, Japanese production of market peas, snap beans, carrots, and onions is sizable and represents a large proportion of the State production.

The United States Department of Agriculture has published production goals for California in furtherance of the Food for Freedom program covering tomatoes, green peas, and snap beans (both fresh and canned), cabbage (fresh and kraut), and onions. Half of the 1942 quota for canning tomatoes was grown in 1941 by enemy aliens and Japanese Americans. The proportion of the fresh tomato goal grown by these farmers was one-third, fresh snap beans 95 percent, snap beans for canning 51 percent, cabbage 34 percent,

[redacted]

Although Japanese have not been important producers of poultry products in California, their loss will confront the poultry industry with a special problem. The esoteric occupation known as chick-sexing has been largely Japanese in California. Without the services of a chick-sexer it is between two and three months before the sex of a chick is apparent. The skill of the chick-sexer lies in his ability to determine the sex of young chicks so that the poultryman may segregate pullets from cockerels, disposing

of the latter if his primary enterprise is the production of eggs. A waste of two months feed, facilities, and labor on cockerels constitutes serious inefficiency for any commercial egg producer.

Of 138 certificates granted in California by the International Baby Chick Association to chick-sexers, 96 are held by Japanese, all of them native-born since the certificates are open only to American citizens. The occupation of chick-sexing is not so esoteric that it cannot be learned but it depends upon proficiencies acquired by long practice. ?

An elusive but extremely important relationship is that of Japanese produce merchants to the marketing of fresh vegetables. Japanese marketing organizations are spread widely throughout the metropolitan areas of the State and they virtually control the distribution of fresh vegetables in the Los Angeles market. The web of relationships is not well understood but it is known that produce merchants frequently are at the center of a network which reaches from the Japanese farm operator to the ultimate retail distributing unit. The probable disorganization of this distributing mechanism will be one of the more serious consequences of Japanese evacuation.

The obvious necessity for evacuating Japanese from certain areas of California should not obscure the fact that it will be difficult to replace them in California agriculture. Skill and aptitude in truck farming is far more highly developed among the Japanese population than will be true of any new group which may operate the properties from which evacuation takes place and some loss of efficiency is inevitable. Even if the complicated property relationships are settled with speed and dispatch and new tenants are found for Japanese operated farms without delay the incoming operators and managers cannot in the immediate future be expected to maintain the level of production characteristic of Japanese operators on truck farms.

There is a notion, rather widespread in California, that Japanese in agriculture function primarily as managers and entrepreneurs and that they contribute little to the physical aspects of production. The occupational characteristics of the Japanese population as revealed by the 1940 Census of Population do not support this view. Of approximately 40,000 Japanese employed workers over the age of 14 morethan 19,000, virtually 50 percent, were employed in agriculture. Of these 19,000 only 5,800 were farm operators. That is to say that some 70 percent of all Japanese in the labor force and in agriculture did not function as entrepreneurs or managers. Of the remaining 13,000 odd persons employed in agriculture some 4,000 were unpaid family laborers and between 7,500 and 8,000 were hired wage workers and foremen. The potential loss, then, is not confined to a loss in management or enterprise but includes the potential loss of a sizable farm labor force.

A loss of 11,000 or 12,000 laborers would not have been a serious loss to California producers during the 1930's, a period of heavy migration

of distressed farm families to California. In 1942, however, there are widespread indications of an inadequate supply of labor. Although it is not yet foregone that there will be a widespread shortage of unskilled harvest labor there is a very real possibility that supplies of labor for specialized crops such as sugar beets and vegetables will be short. It is in these crops that Japanese labor is reckoned to have special skills.

The loss of a supply of experienced hired labor in agriculture will bear as heavily upon white producers as upon Japanese. In the past there has been no pronounced tendency for Japanese operators to hire Japanese labor. Japanese operators have used white, Filipino, and Mexican labor as well as Japanese while much of the Japanese farm labor force has been in white employ.

Slightly more than 50 percent of the Japanese population is employed in industries other than agriculture. The bulk of this labor force is employed in wholesale and retail trade, personal services such as laundering, cleaning and dyeing, and in domestic service. There are about 4,400 Japanese employed as domestics,representing more than 10 percent of all Japanese employed. A portion of the Japanese employed in nonagricultural industries serve the Japanese population exclusively, or in large part. Virtually all of the professional persons and many of the persons employed in retail trade fall into this category and their functions will depend on the future location of the evacuated Japanese population. The loss of those workers engaged in personal service will not be seriously felt since laundries, cleaning and dyeing establishments, and other representatives of the category exist in profusion. The facilities remaining will probably not be seriously strained. The withdrawal of 4,400 persons employed in domestic service will undoubtedly contribute to the "servant problem" but since this is a perennial problem with the group which finds it a problem at all this need not be a matter of serious concern.

The economic consequences of restrictions upon Japanese cannot be measured by the volume of physical evacuation alone. Since any disposition of the Japanese problem must, in the nature of the case, be subject to modification there are disruptions of normal business arrangements that reach beyond those physically affected by evacuation. Any Japanese is now a bad commercial risk irrespective of where his business may be located and there is, as has been indicated, a growing withdrawal of normal business facilities which will present obstacles to the continued gainful employment of all Japanese whether within or without restricted zones.

Appendix, Table 1

Japanese population of California by citizenship
and by county, 1940

County	Total	Native (citizens)	Foreign-born (aliens)
State total	93,717	60,148	33,569
Alameda	5,167	3,382	1,785
Alpine	-	-	-
Amador	2	2	-
Butte	216	143	73
Calaveras	6	6	-
Colusa	155	103	52
Contra Costa	829	518	311
Del Norte	-	-	-
El Dorado	3	1	2
Fresno	4,527	3,019	1,508
Glenn	-	-	-
Humboldt	-	-	-
Imperial	1,583	994	589
Inyo	1	-	1
Kern	756	397	359
Kings	508	323	185
Lake	1	-	1
Lassen	-	-	-
Los Angeles	36,866	23,475	13,391
Madera	170	118	52
Marin	150	68	82
Mariposa	-	-	-
Mendocino	53	21	32
Merced	715	481	234
Modoc	4	-	4
Mono	-	-	-
Monterey	2,247	1,530	717
Napa	54	20	34
Nevada	-	-	-

Continued

Appendix, Table 1 - Contd.

Japanese population of California by citizenship
and by county, 1940

County	Total	Native (citizens)	Foreign-born (aliens)
Orange	1,855	1,178	677
Placer	1,637	1,147	490
Plumas	1	-	1
Riverside	552	369	183
Sacramento	6,764	4,489	2,275
San Benito	526	381	145
San Bernardino	346	211	135
San Diego	2,076	1,283	793
San Francisco	5,280	3,004	2,276
San Joaquin	4,484	2,759	1,725
San Luis Obispo	925	639	286
San Mateo	1,218	800	418
Santa Barbara	2,187	1,419	768
Santa Clara	4,049	2,829	1,220
Santa Cruz	1,301	931	370
Shasta	2	1	1
Sierra	-	-	-
Siskiyou	7	4	3
Solano	906	518	388
Sonoma	758	549	209
Stanislaus	369	231	138
Sutter	423	274	149
Tehama	38	27	11
Trinity	-	-	-
Tulare	1,812	1,101	711
Tuolumne	-	-	-
Ventura	672	421	251
Yolo	1,087	699	388
Yuba	429	283	146

Bureau of the Census. Census of Population 1940.

Appendix, Table 2

Japanese population of California by residence, 1940 1/

County	Total Japanese	Urban Japanese	Percent urban	Rural Japanese	Percent rural
Total California	93,717	52,252	55.8	41,465	44.2
Alameda	5,167	3,958	76.6	1,209	23.4
Alpine	-	-	-	-	-
Amador	2	-	-	2	100.0
Butte	216	36	16.7	180	83.3
Calaveras	6	-	-	6	100.0
Colusa	155	-	-	155	100.0
Contra Costa	829	127	15.3	702	84.7
Del Norte	-	-	-	-	-
El Dorado	3	3	100.0	-	-
Fresno	4,527	1,008	22.3	3,519	77.7
Glenn	-	-	-	-	-
Humboldt	-	-	-	-	-
Imperial	1,583	381	24.1	1,202	75.9
Inyo	1	-	-	1	100.0
Kern	756	352	46.6	404	53.4
Kings	508	113	22.2	395	77.8
Lake	1	-	-	1	100.0
Lassen	-	-	-	-	-
Los Angeles	36,866	30,112	81.7	6,754	18.3
Madera	170	15	8.8	155	91.2
Marin	150	77	51.3	73	48.7
Mariposa	-	-	-	-	-
Mendocino	53	14	26.4	39	73.6
Merced	715	-	-	715	100.0
Modoc	4	-	-	4	100.0
Mono	-	-	-	-	-
Monterey	2,247	838	37.3	1,409	62.7
Napa	54	1	1.9	53	98.1
Nevada	-	-	-	-	-

Continued

Appendix, Table 2 - Continued

Japanese population of California by residence, 1940 1/

County	Total Japanese	Urban Japanese	Percent urban	Rural Japanese	Percent rural
Orange	1,855	89	4.8	1,766	95.2
Placer	1,637	66	4.0	1,571	96.0
Plumas	1	-	-	1	100.0
Riverside	552	221	40.0	331	60.0
Sacramento	6,764	2,884	42.6	3,880	57.4
San Benito	526	3	0.6	523	99.4
San Bernardino	346	203	58.7	143	41.3
San Diego	2,076	1,137	54.8	939	45.2
San Francisco	5,280	5,280	100.0	-	-
San Joaquin	4,484	1,441	32.1	3,043	67.9
San Luis Obispo	925	55	5.9	870	94.1
San Mateo	1,218	730	59.9	488	40.1
Santa Barbara	2,187	807	36.9	1,380	63.1
Santa Clara	4,049	815	20.1	3,234	79.9
Santa Cruz	1,301	412	31.7	889	68.3
Shasta	2	-	-	2	100.0
Sierra	-	-	-	-	-
Siskiyou	7	-	-	7	100.0
Solano	906	30	3.3	876	96.7
Sonoma	758	42	5.5	716	94.5
Stanislaus	369	87	23.6	282	76.4
Sutter	423	35	8.3	388	91.7
Tehama	38	7	18.4	31	81.6
Trinity	-	-	-	-	-
Tulare	1,812	242	13.4	1,570	86.6
Tuolumne	-	-	-	-	-
Ventura	672	285	42.4	387	57.6
Yolo	1,087	69	6.3	1,018	93.7
Yuba	429	277	64.6	152	35.4

1/ Based on U. S. Census of Population, 1940.

Appendix, Table 3
Rural Japanese population by sex, nativity, and farm residence
for California by counties: 1940

	Total rural Japanese population	Native	Native Japanese				Foreign born	Foreign born Japanese			
			Under 21		Over 21			Under 21		Over 21	
			Male	Female	Male	Female		Male	Female	Male	Female
State	41,465	27,206	10,398	9,508	4,492	2,808	14,259	71	51	8,844	5,293
Rural nonfarm	7,196	4,628	1,683	1,531	820	594	2,568	18	13	1,659	878
Rural farm	34,269	22,578	8,715	7,977	3,672	2,214	11,691	53	38	7,185	4,415
Alameda County	1,209	830	317	260	148	105	379	2	3	210	164
Rural nonfarm	323	220	83	80	34	23	103	1	1	60	41
Rural farm	886	610	234	180	114	82	276	1	2	150	123
Amador County	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rural nonfarm	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rural farm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Butte County	180	122	51	39	21	11	58	-	1	36	21
Rural nonfarm	18	10	4	2	3	1	8	-	-	5	3
Rural farm	162	112	47	37	18	10	50	-	1	31	18
Calaveras County	6	6	2	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rural nonfarm	6	6	2	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rural farm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Colusa County	155	103	44	39	14	6	52	-	-	31	21
Rural nonfarm	91	63	24	26	9	4	28	-	-	15	13
Rural farm	64	40	20	13	5	2	24	-	-	16	8

Continued

Appendix, Table 3
Rural Japanese population by sex, nativity, and farm residence
for California by counties: 1940 - Continued

	Total rural Japanese population	Native	Native Japanese				Foreign born	Foreign born Japanese			
			Under 21		Over 21			Under 21		Over 21	
			Male	Female	Male	Female		Male	Female	Male	Female
Contra Costa County	702	435	171	152	65	47	267	1	1	175	90
Rural nonfarm	92	61	30	19	5	7	31	1	-	18	12
Rural farm	610	374	141	133	60	40	236	-	1	157	78
Fresno County	3,519	2,377	848	885	397	247	1,142	5	5	637	495
Rural nonfarm	327	215	69	92	30	24	112	-	-	70	42
Rural farm	3,192	2,162	779	793	367	223	1,030	5	5	567	453
Imperial County	1,202	771	336	314	72	49	431	1	2	258	170
Rural nonfarm	15	5	1	2	1	1	10	-	-	6	4
Rural farm	1,187	766	335	312	71	48	421	1	2	252	166
Inyo County	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Rural nonfarm	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Rural farm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kern County	404	166	58	47	43	18	238	-	1	206	31
Rural nonfarm	37	24	6	8	9	1	13	-	1	8	4
Rural farm	367	142	52	39	34	17	225	-	-	198	27
Kings County	395	257	96	115	23	23	138	1	-	88	49
Rural nonfarm	121	75	28	36	5	6	46	-	-	32	14
Rural farm	274	182	68	79	18	17	92	1	-	56	35
Lake County	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Rural nonfarm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rural farm	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-

Continued

Appendix, Table 3
Rural Japanese population by sex, nativity, and farm residence
for California by counties: 1940 - Continued

	Total rural Japanese population	Native	Native Japanese				Foreign born	Foreign born Japanese			
			Under 21		Over 21			Under 21		Over 21	
			Male	Female	Male	Female		Male	Female	Male	Female
Los Angeles County	6,754	4,427	1,718	1,569	685	455	2,327	11	6	1,389	921
Rural nonfarm	1,415	943	347	324	142	130	472	2	1	299	170
Rural farm	5,339	3,484	1,371	1,245	543	325	1,855	9	5	1,090	751
Madera County	155	105	36	42	14	13	50	-	-	26	24
Rural nonfarm	6	4	2	1	-	1	2	-	-	1	1
Rural farm	149	101	34	41	14	12	48	-	-	25	23
Marin County	73	36	6	4	15	11	37	-	-	30	7
Rural nonfarm	57	25	3	1	12	9	32	-	-	28	4
Rural farm	16	11	3	3	3	2	5	-	-	2	3
Mendocino County	39	12	3	1	7	1	27	-	-	20	7
Rural nonfarm	28	7	-	-	6	1	21	-	-	16	5
Rural farm	11	5	3	1	1	-	6	-	-	4	2
Merced County	715	481	204	162	67	48	234	1	2	124	107
Rural nonfarm	42	25	12	8	3	2	17	1	1	8	7
Rural farm	673	456	192	154	64	46	217	-	1	116	100
Modoc County	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	3	1
Rural nonfarm	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	3	1
Rural farm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Monterey County	1,409	966	359	302	188	117	443	4	1	272	166
Rural nonfarm	283	197	70	58	42	27	86	-	1	50	35
Rural farm	1,126	769	289	244	146	90	357	4	-	222	131

Continued

Appendix, Table 3
Rural Japanese population by sex, nativity, and farm residence
for California by counties: 1940 - Continued

	Total rural Japanese population	Native	Native Japanese: Under 21: Male	Native Japanese: Under 21: Female	Native Japanese: Over 21: Male	Native Japanese: Over 21: Female	Foreign born	Foreign born Japanese: Under 21: Male	Foreign born Japanese: Under 21: Female	Foreign born Japanese: Over 21: Male	Foreign born Japanese: Over 21: Female
Napa County	53	20	5	7	5	3	33	-	-	22	11
Rural nonfarm	28	6	1	-	3	2	22	-	-	16	6
Rural farm	25	14	4	7	2	1	11	-	-	6	5
Orange County	1,766	1,125	423	360	221	121	641	1	2	432	206
Rural nonfarm	342	208	76	69	39	24	134	-	-	93	41
Rural farm	1,424	917	347	291	182	97	507	1	2	339	165
Placer County	1,571	1,100	423	369	194	114	471	5	2	264	200
Rural nonfarm	112	70	20	27	12	11	42	2	1	26	13
Rural farm	1,459	1,030	403	342	182	103	429	3	1	238	187
Plumas County	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Rural nonfarm	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Rural farm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Riverside County	331	230	96	76	28	30	101	1	-	60	40
Rural nonfarm	34	29	8	11	4	6	5	-	-	3	2
Rural farm	297	201	88	65	24	24	96	1	-	57	38
Sacramento County	3,880	2,579	1,035	942	368	234	1,301	7	1	779	514
Rural nonfarm	824	524	202	170	90	62	300	4	1	185	110
Rural farm	3,056	2,055	833	772	278	172	1,001	3	-	594	404
San Benito County	523	380	138	137	67	38	143	2	1	78	62
Rural nonfarm	60	45	15	18	6	6	15	-	-	8	7
Rural farm	463	335	123	119	61	32	128	2	1	70	55

Continued

Appendix, Table 3
Rural Japanese population by sex, nativity, and farm residence
for California by counties: 1940 - Continued

	Total rural Japanese population	Native	Native Japanese: Under 21: Male	Native Japanese: Under 21: Female	Native Japanese: Over 21: Male	Native Japanese: Over 21: Female	Foreign born	Foreign born Japanese: Under 21: Male	Foreign born Japanese: Under 21: Female	Foreign born Japanese: Over 21: Male	Foreign born Japanese: Over 21: Female
San Bernardino County	143	80	24	25	19	12	63	1	-	41	21
Rural nonfarm	49	20	4	4	8	4	29	-	-	22	7
Rural farm	94	60	20	21	11	8	34	1	-	19	14
San Diego County	939	592	220	229	92	51	347	-	1	245	101
Rural nonfarm	113	75	30	32	7	6	38	-	-	28	10
Rural farm	826	517	190	197	85	45	309	-	1	217	91
San Joaquin County	3,043	1,864	682	647	359	176	1,179	5	-	839	335
Rural nonfarm	199	115	50	34	18	13	84	-	-	60	24
Rural farm	2,844	1,749	632	613	341	163	1,095	5	-	779	311
San Luis Obispo County	870	605	226	223	96	60	265	-	-	167	98
Rural nonfarm	191	130	46	52	13	19	61	-	-	38	23
Rural farm	679	475	180	171	83	41	204	-	-	129	75
San Mateo County	488	332	132	99	54	47	156	-	-	99	57
Rural nonfarm	147	94	37	23	16	18	53	-	-	37	16
Rural farm	341	238	95	76	38	29	103	-	-	62	41
Santa Barbara County	1,380	905	316	267	200	122	475	1	2	309	163
Rural nonfarm	763	526	153	149	137	87	237	-	2	148	87
Rural farm	617	379	163	118	63	35	238	1	-	161	76
Santa Clara County	3,234	2,261	801	826	370	264	973	5	8	537	423
Rural nonfarm	427	284	100	97	52	35	143	1	1	88	53
Rural farm	2,807	1,977	701	729	318	229	830	4	7	449	370

Continued

Appendix, Table 3
Rural Japanese population by sex, nativity, and farm residence
for California by counties: 1940 - Continued

	Total rural Japanese population	Native	Native Japanese				Foreign born	Foreign born Japanese			
			Under 21		Over 21			Under 21		Over 21	
			Male	Female	Male	Female		Male	Female	Male	Female
Santa Cruz County	889	638	240	222	104	72	251	1	1	138	111
Rural nonfarm	106	79	26	30	14	9	27	-	-	18	9
Rural farm	783	559	214	192	90	63	224	1	1	120	102
Shasta County	2	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	-
Rural nonfarm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rural farm	2	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	-
Siskiyou County	7	4	1	1	1	1	3	-	1	1	1
Rural nonfarm	7	4	1	1	1	1	3	-	1	1	1
Rural farm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Solano County	876	504	197	175	80	52	372	4	3	258	127
Rural nonfarm	198	99	38	38	13	10	99	2	2	86	29
Rural farm	678	405	159	137	67	42	273	2	1	172	98
Sonoma County	716	519	206	178	81	55	197	-	1	111	85
Rural nonfarm	182	128	51	35	24	18	54	-	-	31	23
Rural farm	534	391	154	143	57	37	143	-	1	80	62
Stanislaus County	282	169	77	50	30	12	113	-	-	75	38
Rural nonfarm	12	7	4	3	-	-	5	-	-	3	2
Rural farm	270	162	73	47	30	12	108	-	-	72	36

Continued

Appendix, Table 3
Rural Japanese population by sex, nativity, and farm residence
for California by counties: 1940 - Continued

	Total rural Japanese population	Native	Native Japanese				Foreign born	Foreign born Japanese			
			Under 21		Over 21			Under 21		Over 21	
			Male	Female	Male	Female		Male	Female	Male	Female
Sutter County	388	251	125	85	19	22	137	2	1	84	50
Rural nonfarm	50	34	19	9	1	5	16	-	-	12	4
Rural farm	338	217	106	76	18	17	121	2	1	72	46
Tehama County	31	22	8	10	3	1	9	1	-	5	3
Rural nonfarm	10	7	2	5	-	-	3	1	-	1	1
Rural farm	21	15	6	5	3	1	6	-	-	4	2
Tulare County	1,570	957	401	325	161	70	613	2	4	425	182
Rural nonfarm	131	94	50	27	9	8	37	-	-	23	14
Rural farm	1,439	863	351	298	152	62	576	2	4	402	168
Ventura County	387	229	93	74	39	23	158	3	-	107	48
Rural nonfarm	128	57	17	13	22	5	71	1	-	54	16
Rural farm	359	172	76	61	17	18	87	2	-	53	32
Yolo County	1,018	657	252	221	115	69	361	4	1	227	129
Rural nonfarm	211	110	49	26	27	8	101	2	-	75	24
Rural farm	807	547	203	195	88	61	260	2	1	152	105
Yuba County	152	86	27	28	23	8	66	-	-	52	14
Rural nonfarm	3	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-
Rural farm	149	85	26	28	23	8	64	-	-	50	14

U. S. Bureau of Census, Census of Population, 1940.

Appendix, Table 4

Number of Japanese farm operators, April 1, 1940, California

County	Japanese farm operators (total)	Full owners	Part owners	Managers	All tenants
State total	5,135	1,015	280	240	3,583
Alameda	130	28	14	10	78
Alpine	-	-	-	-	-
Amador	-	-	-	-	-
Butte	23	4	4	4	11
Calaveras	-	-	-	-	-
Colusa	1/ 7	-	-	-	-
Contra Costa	70	14	4	3	49
Del Norte	-	-	-	-	-
Eldorado	-	-	-	-	-
Fresno	412	175	27	36	174
Glenn	-	-	-	-	-
Humboldt	-	-	-	-	-
Imperial	212	20	-	15	177
Inyo	-	-	-	-	-
Kern	18	6	-	5	7
Kings	30	9	3	5	13
Lake	-	-	-	-	-
Lassen	-	-	-	-	-
Los Angeles	1,523	73	40	46	1,364
Madera	16	12	-	-	4
Marin	1/ 4	-	-	-	-
Mariposa	-	-	-	-	-
Mendocino	2/	-	-	-	-
Merced	107	57	7	8	35
Modoc	-	-	-	-	-
Mono	-	-	-	-	-
Monterey	130	16	5	5	104
Napa	1/ 3	-	-	-	-
Nevada	-	-	-	-	-

Continued

Appendix, Table 4 - Continued

Number of Japanese farm operators, April 1, 1940, California

County	Japanese farm operators (total)	Full owners	Part owners	Managers	All tenants
Orange	245	33	15	-	197
Placer	157	75	7	21	54
Plumas	-	-	-	-	-
Riverside	57	19	5	4	29
Sacramento	416	173	32	13	198
San Benito	40	3	-	3	34
San Bernardino	19	14	5	-	3/
San Diego	144	25	14	-	105
San Francisco	-	-	-	-	-
San Joaquin	214	38	15	5	156
San Luis Obispo	82	5	9	-	68
San Mateo	71	16	5	-	50
Santa Barbara	61	5	-	3	53
Santa Clara	390	63	23	18	286
Santa Cruz	106	11	12	-	83
Shasta	2/	-	-	-	-
Sierra	-	-	-	-	-
Siskiyou	-	-	-	-	-
Solano	73	15	-	10	48
Sonoma	48	35	-	-	13
Stanislaus	34	12	-	5	17
Sutter	21	8	4	-	9
Tehama	3	-	-	-	3
Trinity	-	-	-	-	-
Tulare	139	33	21	16	69
Tuolumne	-	-	-	-	-
Ventura	24	5	3	-	16
Yolo	92	6	6	5	75
Yuba	11	7	-	-	4

1/ No distribution by tenure, to avoid disclosure.
2/ Less than three farm operators.
3/ Included with full owners.

In various counties full owners include part owners or managers to avoid disclosure.

Census of Agriculture, 1940.

Appendix, Table 5

Acreage of commercial truck crops grown by enemy aliens and Japanese-American citizens in California 1/

Commodity	Total 1940 acreage for State	Estimated acres grown by enemy aliens	Est. total acres grown by enemy aliens as percent of St. acreage for item	Est. acres grown by aliens and Jap.-Amer. citizens	Est. acres grown by aliens and Jap.-Amer. citizens as pct. of St. acreage
Artichokes	10,600	5,300	50	5,300	50
Asparagus	79,780	16,176	20	20,164	25
Canning snap beans	563	239	42	287	51
Marketing snap beans (spring)	6,950	6,254	90	6,602	95 ✓
Snap beans (fall)	4,600	4,140	90	4,369	95 ✓
Green lima beans	2,373	892	38	1,011	43
Cabbage	6,850	2,019	29	2,362	34
Cantaloupe (Imperial)	26,100	6,525	25	7,830	30
Cantaloupe (other)	12,000	2,279	19	2,880	24
Carrots (fall and winter)	9,800	3,115	32	3,605	37
Carrots (spring)	13,700	2,945	21	3,630	26
Cauliflower (fall and winter)	6,700	4,152	62	4,487	67
Cauliflower (spring)	8,850	5,860	66	6,302	71
Celery (fall and winter)	8,850	5,185	59	5,627	64
Celery (spring)	3,100	2,790	90	2,954	95 ✓
Celery (summer)	1,800	1,620	90	1,710	95 ✓
Cucumbers (pickle)	2,330	1,048	45	1,165	50
Cucumbers (table)	2,200	990	45	1,100	50
Garlic	1,890	1,327	70	1,420	75 ✓
Spring lettuce	30,350	8,774	29	10,530	35
Lettuce (Imperial)	15,200	3,040	20	3,800	25
Summer lettuce	16,500	4,110	25	4,935	30
Fall lettuce	27,550	6,260	23	7,637	28
Bermuda onions	800	240	30	240	30
Intermediate onions	1,350	540	40	675	50
Late onions	3,200	1,280	40	1,440	45
Canning peas	2,394	182	8	182	8
Peas, spring Imperial	7,500	750	10	1,125	15

Continued

Appendix, Table 5 - Continued

Acreage of commercial truck crops grown by enemy aliens and Japanese-American citizens in California 1/

Commodity	Total 1940 acreage for State	Estimated acres grown by enemy aliens	Est. total acres grown by enemy aliens as percent of St. acreage for item	Est. acres grown by aliens and Jap.-Amer. citizens	Est. acres grown by aliens and Jap.-Amer. citizens as pct. of St. acreage
Peas, other spring	20,700	5,632	27	6,855	33
Peas, fall	8,500	6,625	78	7,387	87 ✓
Peas, fall Imperial	2,300	230	10	345	15
Peppers, Bell	2,300	2,070	90	2,185	95 ✓
Peppers, chili (dried)	3,865	3,478	90	3,672	95 ✓
Peppers, canning	442	377	85	400	90 ✓
Peppers, pimento	690	210	30	279	40
Spinach, canning	9,538	4,769	50	5,723	60
Spinach, table	3,200	2,400	75	2,600	81
Strawberries, southern	2,380	2,142	90	2,261	95 ✓
Strawberries, northern	3,470	3,123	90	3,296	95 ✓
Tomatoes, canning	71,531	28,613	40	35,765	50
Tomatoes, Imperial	4,000	3,600	90	3,800	95 ✓
Tomatoes, summer	11,000	7,307	66	7,857	71
Tomatoes, fall (northern)	5,850	1,227	21	1,520	26
Tomatoes, fall (southern)	6,100	4,515	74	4,820	79 ✓
Watermelons, Imperial	5,500	550	10	825	15
Watermelons, other	9,900	2,040	21	3,030	31
Total	485,146	176,940 (36%)	36	205,989 (42%)	42

1/ Estimates made by Carl Schiller, Division of Agricultural Statistics, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and Murray Thompson, Economic Advisor to Western Region, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, to gauge the effects of evacuation of enemy aliens and Japanese-American citizens. Released by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics for submission to the House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration.

what is the State total figure based on?

Appendix, Table 6

Table showing estimated acreage of vegetables in California and the probable percentage and amount grown by Japanese nationals and Japanese-Americans

Crop	Total acreage 1938	Percent (estimated) grown by Japanese	Acreage (estimated) grown by Japanese	Value (estimated) of crop grown by Japanese
Artichokes	9,700	5	485	93,850
Asparagus	71,510	25	17,877	1,355,250
Canning snap beans	919	50	459	93,500
Market snap beans	9,180	75	6,885	1,108,500
Green limas for manufacture	1,280	0	0	0
Cabbage	7,700	40	3,080	313,200
Cantaloupes (Imperial)	28,000	50	14,000	2,720,000
Cantaloupes (other)	10,150	40	4,060	888,400
Carrots	21,100	40	8,440	2,326,000
Cauliflower	14,500	60	8,700	1,478,400
Celery	14,900	75	11,175	4,667,250
Cucumbers (pickle)	1,956	50	978	132,500
Cucumbers (market)	2,100	75	1,575	283,500
Garlic	2,310	50	1,155	225,000
Lettuce	99,050	30	29,715	5,942,100
Onions (Bermuda)	1,250	20	250	64,000
Onions (intermediate)	1,800	40	720	156,000
Onions (late)	3,140	40	1,256	301,600
Canning peas	3,740	0	0	0
Market peas (spring)	30,850	25	7,712	847,250
Market peas (fall)	15,200	60	9,120	1,239,000
Chile and dried peppers	5,200	85	4,420	531,250
Potatoes (early)	34,000	5	1,700	251,950
Spinach (canning)	9,466	50	4,733	124,500
Spinach (market)	2,800	80	2,240	549,600
Strawberries	5,030	90	4,527	2,181,600
*Tomatoes, canning (North)	61,905	35	21,667	-
Tomatoes, canning (South)	9,626	40	3,850	-
Tomatoes, market (South)	16,300	90	14,670	4,182,000
Tomatoes, market (North)	10,650	40	4,260	-
Watermelons	17,200	25	4,300	322,500
	522,512	37	194,009	32,378,700

Estimates made by Carl Schiller, Crop Reporting Service, and P. A. Minges, Agricultural Extension Service.

* 1940 acreages.

Appendix, Table 7

Importance of aliens and Japanese-Americans to the achievement of production goals for specified truck crops in California

Commodity	Total California acreage in 1940	Estimated acreages in 1941	Production goal for 1942 1/	Percent of State acreage grown by alien & American-Japanese 2/	Alien & Am.-Jap. share of 1942 production goals
	Acres	Acres	Acres	Percent	Acres
Tomatoes, fresh	26,950	28,150	28,500	67	19,095
Tomatoes, canning	71,531	80,620	83,000	50	41,500
Green peas, fresh	39,000	39,300	45,000	40	18,000
Green peas, canning	2,394	1,650	2,500	8	200
Cabbage, kraut and fresh	6,850	6,000	6,500	34	2,210
Onions	5,350	5,380	7,500	44	3,300
Snap beans, fresh	11,550	10,800	11,000	95	10,450
Snap beans, canning	563	540	700	51	357
All truck crops	485,146	495,370	3/519,200	42	218,064

1/ Preliminary goal announced in September 1941.

2/ Percentage estimates made by Carl Schiller and Murray Thompson.

3/ Does not include strawberries.

Appendix, Table 8
Japanese employed workers 14 years old and over by sex, nativity, major occupation, and industry groups, California, 1940 1/

Occupation and industry group	Japanese employed workers					
	Total		Male		Female	
	Native	For.born	Native	For.born	Native	For.born
EMPLOYED WORKERS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP						
...Employed (exc. on public emergency work)	17,165	23,209	11,883	18,227	5,282	4,982
Professional workers	371	589	202	435	169	154
Semiprofessional workers	97	102	68	92	29	10
Farmers and farm managers	1,663	4,144	1,584	3,911	79	233
Proprietors, mgrs., and officials, except farm	1,049	3,168	888	2,754	161	414
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	3,154	1,454	1,983	985	1,171	469
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	296	385	269	356	27	29
Operatives and kindred workers	1,375	1,342	1,017	789	358	553
Domestic service workers	1,829	1,406	370	808	1,459	598
Service workers, exc. domestic	802	1,619	334	1,015	468	604
Farm laborers (wage workers) and foremen	2,781	4,911	2,481	4,363	300	548
Farm laborers, unpaid family workers	2,493	1,461	1,536	221	957	1,240
Laborers, except farm	1,118	2,487	1,077	2,401	41	86
Nonclassifiable	137	141	74	97	63	44
EMPLOYED WORKERS BY INDUSTRY GROUP						
...Employed (exc. on public emergency work)	17,165	23,209	11,883	18,227	5,282	4,982
Agriculture	7,598	11,691	6,191	9,570	1,407	2,121
Forestry (except logging) and fishery	175	552	171	543	4	9
Coal mining	-	-	-	-	-	-
Crude petroleum and natural gas production	4	2	3	2	1	-
Other mines and quarries	3	2	2	2	1	-
Construction	25	57	25	57	-	-
Food and kindred products	171	424	63	141	108	283
Textile-mill products	6	14	-	8	6	6
Apparel and other fabricated textile products	24	12	5	4	19	8
Logging	-	1	-	1	-	-
Sawmills and planing mills	3	3	3	3	-	-
Furniture, store fixtures, and misc. wooden goods	28	31	23	27	5	4
Paper and allied products	18	9	15	9	3	-
Printing, publishing, and allied industries	110	141	83	123	27	18

Continued

Appendix, Table 8 - Continued

Occupation and industry group	Japanese employed workers					
	Total		Male		Female	
	Native	For.born	Native	For.born	Native	For.born
Chemicals and allied products	21	45	16	43	5	2
Petroleum and coal products	7	4	7	4	-	-
Leather and leather products	4	4	2	3	2	1
Stone, clay, and glass products	1	1	1	1	-	-
Iron, steel, and their products	4	2	4	2	-	-
Nonferrous metals and their products	4	2	3	2	1	-
Machinery	2	6	2	6	-	-
Automobile and automobile equipment	1	-	1	-	-	-
Transportation equipment, except automobile	7	1	7	1	-	-
Other and not specified mfg. industries	7	13	6	10	1	3
Railroads (incl. repair shops) and Ry. Express	6	49	6	46	-	3
Trucking service	92	69	87	69	5	-
Other transportation	25	36	18	36	7	-
Communication	2	1	2	-	-	1
Utilities	9	4	7	4	2	-
Wholesale trade	1,036	844	851	764	185	80
Food and dairy product stores; milk retailing	2,254	1,847	1,755	1,442	499	405
Eating and drinking places	480	1,092	231	724	249	368
Motor vehicles and accessories: retailing & filling stations	100	57	85	54	15	3
Other retail trade	742	884	416	694	326	190
Finance, insurance, and real estate	105	343	66	293	39	50
Automobile storage, rental, and repair service	189	67	184	67	5	-
Business and repair services, except auto	36	68	30	67	6	1
Domestic service	2,178	2,215	702	1,599	1,476	616
Hotels and lodging places	133	654	53	406	80	248
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services	455	630	301	442	154	188
Misc. personal services	271	360	70	242	201	118
Amusement, recreation, and related services	67	152	44	132	23	20
Prof. and related services	457	640	211	453	246	187
Government	113	6	31	6	82	-
Nonclassifiable	192	174	100	125	92	49

1/ U. S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Population, 1940.

Appendix, Table 9

Japanese employed workers 14 years old and over by sex, nativity, and major occupation for California counties, 1940 1/

Counties by sex and nativity	Employed (Exc. on public emergency work)	Farmers and farm managers	Farm laborers (wage workers and foremen)	Farm laborers, unpaid family workers
State total				
Male, native	11,883	1,584	2,481	1,536
" foreign born	18,227	3,911	4,363	221
Female, native	5,282	79	300	957
" foreign born	4,982	233	548	1,240
Alameda		5,807		
Male, native	671	49	110	39
" foreign born	873	121	77	5
Female, native	367	2	20	18
" foreign born	315	8	27	29
Butte				
Male, native	30	9	13	1
foreign born	41	12	16	1
Female, native	6	2	-	1
" foreign born	11	3	1	3
Colusa				
Male, native	16	3	3	4
" foreign born	23	6	10	-
Female, native	7	-	-	1
" foreign born	7	-	-	-
Contra Costa				
Male, native	98	27	53	2
" foreign born	190	55	114	2
Female, native	31	3	2	6
" foreign born	31	4	11	5
El Dorado				
Male, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	1	-	1	-
Female, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	-	-	-	-

Continued

Appendix, Table 9 - Continued

Japanese employed workers 14 years old and over by sex, nativity, and major occupation for California counties, 1940 1/

Counties by sex and nativity	Employed (Exc. on public emergency work)	Farmers and farm managers	Farm laborers (wage workers and foremen)	Farm laborers, unpaid family workers
Fresno				
Male, native	587	170	178	111
" foreign born	773	283	302	19
Female, native	204	11	26	45
" foreign born	191	12	66	44
Imperial				
Male, native	116	41	20	19
" foreign born	336	149	98	1
Female, native	37	4	-	2
" foreign born	41	4	3	9
Inyo				
Male, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	1	-	-	-
Female, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	-	-	-	-
Kern				
Male, native	82	7	32	3
" foreign born	254	18	177	1
Female, native	23	-	-	1
" foreign born	29	1	2	4
Kings				
Male, native	45	6	17	7
" foreign born	101	27	52	-
Female, native	14	-	-	1
" foreign born	10	-	2	2
Lake				
Male, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	1	-	1	-
Female, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	-	-	-	-
Los Angeles				
Male, native	4,956	298	435	605
" foreign born	7,305	1,287	684	62
Female, native	2,323	12	113	432
" foreign born	2,421	94	203	647

Continued

Appendix, Table 9 - Continued

Japanese employed workers 14 years old and over by sex, nativity, and major occupation for California counties, 1940 1/

Counties by sex and nativity	Employed (Exc. on public emergency work)	Farmers and farm managers	Farm laborers (wage workers and foremen)	Farm laborers, unpaid family workers
Madera				
Male, native	19	12	2	2
" foreign born	24	16	6	-
Female, native	1	-	-	-
" foreign born	3	-	-	2
Marin				
Male, native	15	3	-	1
" foreign born	40	2	-	-
Female, native	14	-	-	-
" foreign born	16	-	-	1
Mendocino				
Male, native	4	-	2	-
" foreign born	8	1	6	-
Female, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	-	-	-	-
Merced				
Male, native	70	26	15	20
" foreign born	108	78	22	1
Female, native	9	-	1	5
" foreign born	5	2	1	2
Modoc				
Male, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	3	-	-	-
Female, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	-	-	-	-
Monterey				
Male, native	340	51	98	25
" foreign born	381	85	138	3
Female, native	92	1	15	11
" foreign born	87	8	18	14
Napa				
Male, native	3	-	1	-
" foreign born	7	3	2	-
Female, native	1	-	-	-
" foreign born	3	-	-	1

Continued

Appendix, Table 9 - Continued

Japanese employed workers 14 years old and over by sex, nativity, and major occupation for California counties, 1940 1/

Counties by sex and nativity	Employed (Exc. on public emergency work)	Farmers and farm managers	Farm laborers (wage workers and foremen)	Farm laborers, unpaid family workers
Orange				
Male, native	240	76	87	49
" foreign born	427	172	207	2
Female, native	71	6	8	39
" foreign born	82	10	12	44
Placer				
Male, native	219	44	122	35
" foreign born	248	94	123	3
Female, native	36	-	7	7
" foreign born	17	6	3	1
Plumas				
Male, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	1	-	-	-
Female, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	-	-	-	-
Riverside				
Male, native	55	19	10	5
" foreign born	92	46	21	1
Female, native	20	-	-	2
" foreign born	14	-	3	1
Sacramento				
Male, native	728	111	149	156
" foreign born	1,128	309	297	29
Female, native	397	4	12	90
" foreign born	342	22	27	108
San Benito				
Male, native	81	33	23	18
" foreign born	72	31	38	1
Female, native	11	1	3	5
" foreign born	6	-	3	2
San Bernardino				
Male, native	33	5	10	3
" foreign born	64	12	14	1
Female, native	16	-	2	3
" foreign born	10	1	-	1

Continued

Appendix, Table 9 - Continued

Japanese employed workers 14 years old and over by sex, nativity, and major occupation for California counties, 1940 1/

Counties by sex and nativity	Employed (Exc. on public emergency work)	Farmers and farm managers	Farm laborers (wage workers and foremen)	Farm laborers, unpaid family workers
San Diego				
Male, native	232	48	72	35
" foreign born	508	115	170	10
Female, native	114	4	11	34
" foreign born	123	9	23	44
San Francisco				
Male, native	525	-	9	-
" foreign born	1,194	1	4	-
Female, native	494	-	1	-
" foreign born	367	-	2	-
San Joaquin				
Male, native	557	97	272	41
" foreign born	1,015	151	620	17
Female, native	185	6	6	30
" foreign born	165	3	14	53
San Luis Obispo				
Male, native	116	23	62	17
" foreign born	169	70	58	1
Female, native	24	-	1	2
" foreign born	36	1	6	12
San Mateo				
Male, native	176	31	45	15
" foreign born	241	57	30	3
Female, native	116	1	1	21
" foreign born	88	3	5	19
Santa Barbara				
Male, native	310	19	122	11
" foreign born	423	37	211	1.
Female, native	92	-	16	1
" foreign born	90	1	38	6
Santa Clara	464	57	387	19
Male, native	561	167	126	140
" foreign born	591	264	133	24
Female, native	286	13	29	105
" foreign born	203	10	27	114

Continued

Appendix, Table 9 - Continued

Japanese employed workers 14 years old and over by sex, nativity, and major occupation for California counties, 1940 1/

Counties by sex and nativity	Employed (Exc. on public emergency work)	Farmers and farm managers	Farm laborers (wage workers and foremen)	Farm laborers, unpaid family workers
Santa Cruz				
Male, native	190	39	45	78
" foreign born	178	77	46	13
Female, native	88	2	7	54
" foreign born	38	5	3	20
Shasta				
Male, native	1	-	1	-
" foreign born	1	1	-	-
Female, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	-	-	-	-
Siskiyou				
Male, native	1	-	-	-
" foreign born	1	-	-	-
Female, native	-	-	-	-
" foreign born	-	-	-	-
Solano				
Male, native	91	14	42	14
" foreign born	234	53	87	-
Female, native	18	3	1	1
" foreign born	31	-	5	6
Sonoma				
Male, native	101	25	46	9
" foreign born	106	36	56	-
Female, native	29	2	6	9
" foreign born	15	5	4	2
Stanislaus				
Male, native	40	10	15	9
" foreign born	70	29	29	-
Female, native	5	-	-	-
" foreign born	7	-	3	1
Sutter				
Male, native	33	5	20	5
" foreign born	80	16	57	1
Female, native	9	-	1	1
" foreign born	9	3	2	1

Continued

Appendix, Table 9 - Continued

Japanese employed workers 14 years old and over by sex, nativity, and major occupation for California counties, 1940 1/

Counties by sex and nativity	Employed (Exc. on public emergency work)	Farmers and farm managers	Farm laborers (wage workers and foremen)	Farm laborers, unpaid family workers
Tehama				
Male, native	8	1	4	-
" foreign born	6	2	2	-
Female, native	1	-	-	-
" foreign born	3	-	1	1
Tulare				
Male, native	238	54	131	22
" foreign born	450	88	305	6
Female, native	4	1	8	7
" foreign born	84	10	17	13
Ventura				
Male, native	81	6	18	5
" foreign born	156	28	45	3
Female, native	32	-	2	3
" foreign born	36	1	6	8
Yolo				
Male, native	157	52	36	30
" foreign born	217	66	69	8
Female, native	49	1	1	20
" foreign born	51	7	9	15
Yuba				
Male, native	57	3	35	-
" foreign born	85	13	35	2
Female, native	20	-	-	-
" foreign born	15	-	1	5

1/ U. S. Census, Census of Population, 1940.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Bureau of Agricultural Economics

JAPANESE FARM HOLDINGS ON THE PACIFIC COAST

By

Adon Poli
Agricultural Economist

Berkeley, California
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JAPANESE FARM HOLDINGS ON THE PACIFIC COAST

By
Adon Poli, Agricultural Economist

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

Persons of Japanese ancestry residing within the continental United States in 1940 numbered 126,947, less than one-tenth of one percent of the total United States population, according to the U. S. Census. Of this number, 112,353 persons were concentrated in the Pacific Coast States, distributed as follows: 93,717 in California, 14,565 in Washington, and 4,071 in Oregon. Almost two-thirds were native-born citizens of the United States.

War Department reports indicate that because of military necessity, 114,222 persons of Japanese ancestry moved from their established residences in all of California and the western portions of Washington and Oregon during the period from March 2 to October 31, 1942.

In 1940, prior to evacuation, 45 percent of the Japanese workers in California, Washington, and Oregon were employed in agriculture. Their agricultural activities included the operation, as farm owners, tenants, and managers, of 6,118 farms, consisting of 258,074 acres of farm land, valued at $72,600,000. These farms represented 2.2 percent of the number and value of all farms in the three States, 0.4 percent of all land in farms, and 1.5 percent of all cropland harvested. Most of these farms, about 84 percent, were in California.

The size of Japanese-operated farms was considerably smaller than that of all farms in California, Washington, and Oregon. In 1940, Japanese-operated farms in the three States averaged 42 acres of land, whereas all farms averaged 231 acres. Japanese-operated farms in Washington were about one-third smaller than those in California and Oregon. In general, Japanese operators farmed their land more intensively than other farmers.

In 1940, 70 percent of the Japanese farmers in the three States were tenants, as compared with only 19 percent of all farmers. The large proportion of tenancy among Japanese farmers probably has been due in part to the unfavorable attitude in many areas toward land ownership by Japanese, and in part to the fact that most Japanese farmers started as farm laborers and were able to advance to tenancy but not to ownership; while comparatively few inherited farms as have a large proportion of non-Japanese farm owners.

According to a survey of recorded farm property ownerships by the War Relocation Authority, persons of Japanese ancestry, on March 1, 1942, owned approximately 71,000 acres of farm land within the West Coast evacuated area. This acreage was less than two-tenths of one percent of all land in all farms in the evacuated area. Individual Japanese ownership units were mostly small, averaging only 31 acres. Almost nine-tenths of the ownership units were of less than 50 acres, and about two-thirds were of less than 30 acres. Ownership units were largest in California and smallest in Washington.

War Department reports show that during the military evacuation period, from March 2 to October 31, 1942, nonevacuee operators were placed on 7,212 evacuated farms, involving 253,392 acres of farm land. This represented slightly more than 99 percent of all the farms and of all the farm acreage registered as subject to relinquishment.

During the evacuation period and the year following, approximately 9,100 acres were transferred from Japanese to non-Japanese ownership, and 1,300 acres were acquired by Japanese from non-Japanese giving a net decrease of 10 percent in the number and 11 percent in the acreage of Japanese ownerships. Present indications are that farm sales by Japanese are continuing, but that there are few acquisitions.

Because of the present relocation program of the War Relocation Authority and high land prices, it is likely that land will continue to be transferred from Japanese to non-Japanese ownership. Assuming that the post-war period will begin sometime near the end of 1945, post-war land holdings of Japanese probably will not exceed 22 or 23 percent of the total pre-war land holdings, including leaseholds, or roughly 55,000 to 60,000 acres of farm land, about 0.14 percent of all the land in farms within the West Coast evacuated area.

THE JAPANESE ON THE PACIFIC COAST

Japanese Immigration

Although there was considerable migration of persons of Asiatic origin to the Pacific Coast during the last half of the 19th Century, few Japanese[1] arrived until after 1885 when the Japanese Imperial government sanctioned the emigration of its people principally as contract workers for Hawaiian sugar plantations. Because of emigration restrictions imposed by the Japanese government before 1885, early Japanese entrants consisted largely of shipwrecked sailors, occasional stowaways on foreign vessels, and casual sojourners who came and went. In 1870 and 1880, the total United States Japanese population amounted to only 55 and 148 respectively.[2] The subsequent legalization of labor emigration by the Japanese government, the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 restricting Chinese immigration to the United States, the local demand for low-cost labor, and activities of emigration agencies stimulated Japanese immigration. Even throughout the economic depression of the 1890's, the United States Japanese population increased to 24,326 persons in 1900. Of this number, 18,269 were then in California, Washington, and Oregon (table 1).

In the following decade, economic conditions in this country became much more favorable to increased immigration. Consequently, by 1910, the number of Japanese in continental United States rose to 72,157, with 57,703 in California, Washington, and Oregon. In spite of restrictive measures enacted to discourage immigration to this country, the United States Japanese population continued to increase steadily, until it reached a maximum of 138,834 persons in 1930. In 1940, however, it dropped to 126,947 with 112,353 in California, Washington, and Oregon.

Most of the early Japanese immigrants came directly from their home country. Later, when the Japanese government discouraged emigration directly to continental United States many Japanese re-emigrated from Hawaii, their "stepping stone" to the mainland.

1/ The term "Japanese" as used in this report refers to all persons of Japanese ancestry including both alien Japanese and American citizens of Japanese ancestry.

2/ U. S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration. National Defense Migration; Fourth Interim Report (H. Rpt. 2124). 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Pursuant to H. Res. 113, A Resolution to Inquire Further into the Interstate Migration of Citizens...Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones, May 1942. pp. 59-61. Washington, D. C. U. S. Govt. Printing Off. 1942.

Table 1.- Distribution of Japanese population in the United States, by decades, 1890-1940.

Area	1890		1900		1910	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
California	1,147	56.3	10,151	41.7	41,356	57.3
Washington	360	17.6	5,617	23.1	12,929	17.9
Oregon	25	1.2	2,501	10.3	3,418	4.7
Three-State totals	1,532	75.1	18,269	75.1	57,703	79.9
All other States	507	24.9	6,057	24.9	14,454	20.1
U. S. totals	2,039	100.0	24,326	100.0	72,157	100.0
American-born	-	-	269	1.1	4,502	6.2
Foreign-born	2,039	100.0	24,057	98.9	67,655	93.8

Area	1920		1930		1940	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
California	71,952	64.8	97,456	70.2	93,717	73.8
Washington	17,387	15.7	17,837	12.8	14,565	11.5
Oregon	4,151	3.7	4,958	3.6	4,071	3.2
Three-State totals	93,490	84.2	120,251	86.6	112,353	88.5
All other States	17,520	15.8	18,583	13.4	14,594	11.5
U. S. totals	111,010	100.0	138,834	100.0	126,947	100.0
American-born	29,672	26.7	68,357	49.2	79,642	62.7
Foreign-born	81,338	73.3	70,477	50.8	47,305	37.3

Source: Bureau of the Census.

FIGURE I

JAPANESE POPULATION

CALIFORNIA WASHINGTON AND OREGON
1940

LOCATED BY MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS

INCLUDES BOTH AMERICAN- AND FOREIGN-BORN PERSONS



EACH DOT REPRESENTS 10 PERSONS

POPULATION IN CONCENTRATED AREAS INDICATED BY NUMBER

LARGER FIGURES INDICATE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN EACH COUNTY

PORTION WEST OF DASHED LINE REPRESENTS EVACUATED AREA

STATE	AMERICAN-BORN	FOREIGN-BORN	TOTALS
CALIFORNIA	60,148	33,569	93,717
WASHINGTON	8,882	5,683	14,565
OREGON	2,454	1,617	4,071
TOTALS	71,484	40,869	112,353

SOURCE: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

C.M.J.

Restrictive Measures

The accelerated Japanese migration to this country during the period from 1900 to 1908 created considerable anti-Japanese agitation, which was expressed in organized campaigns sponsoring measures designed to limit this migration. Restrictive measures enacted and employed are described in the following excerpt:

"When the arrival of Japanese immigrants began to stir up reaction in the cities of California, the Japanese government was responsive to the feeling and attempted to discourage emigration of their subjects to the continental United States. They were, however, permitted to emigrate to the Islands, to Canada, and to Mexico, and after their arrival at these places, the Japanese government no longer had control over them. Thereupon they remigrated to the United States. It was not until February, 1907 that the immigration laws of the United States were amended so as to permit control over this class of immigrant. This amendment gave the President of the United States the right to refuse entry to aliens bearing passports to other countries or insular possessions of this country if he were satisfied that the bearers of these passports were attempting to enter continental territory to the detriment of labor conditions. On March 14, 1907, President Roosevelt took action under this law and refused admission to skilled and unskilled Japanese and Korean laborers attempting to enter United States after having received passports to Mexico, Canada, and Hawaii. After the promulgation of this order, the Japanese government agreed not to issue passports to their laborer subjects for emigration to either continental United States or Hawaii. This agreement remained in effect until superseded by the immigration law of 1924, which absolutely excludes Orientals."3/

Population Distribution

According to the U. S. Census, 126,947 persons of Japanese ancestry, less than one-tenth of one percent of the total United States population, resided within continental United States in 1940. Of this number, 112,353 persons were in the Pacific Coast States and distributed as follows: 93,717 in California, 14,565 in Washington, and 4,071 in Oregon (table 1). Almost two-thirds of these persons were native-born citizens of the United States. Within these three States, this population was largely concentrated in or near the edge of large urban centers of Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco Bay Region, Portland, Tacoma, and Seattle; in the Yakima and Hood River farming areas of the Pacific Northwest; and in the coastal and central valleys of California (fig. 1).

3/ Fuller, V. The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the Evolution of Farm Organization in California. In U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor. Hearings...76 Cong. 3d Sess., Pt. 54, Agricultural Labor in California, p. 19829. Washington, D. C. 1940.

Military Evacuation

Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan on December 7, 1941, authorities charged with the military security of the Pacific Coast became concerned about the large number of persons of Japanese ancestry residing along and near the western coast. Consequently, in order to permit efficient and unhampered military operations in this region, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, acting under Executive Order of the President, issued a public proclamation on March 2, 1942, excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from designated military areas.

As a result of this and subsequent proclamations and exclusion orders, 114,222 persons of Japanese ancestry moved from their established residences in all of California and the western portions of Washington and Oregon during the period from March 2 to October 31, 1942 (table 2 and fig. 1). Of this number, 109,391 persons were evacuated directly by the military authorities and placed in 10 relocation centers, and 4,831 migrated voluntarily from the West Coast into the interior States.4/

Table 2.- Japanese evacuated or migrated from the West Coast, March 2 to October 31, 1942.

State of origin	Evacuees	Migrants 1/	Totals
	Number	Number	Number
California	92,785	4,203	96,988
Washington	12,892	499	13,391
Oregon	3,714	129	3,843
Totals	109,391	4,831	114,222

1/ Net total number of persons migrating voluntarily from evacuated areas before evacuation and who did not return to a center before October 31, 1942.

Source: War Department. Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942. pp. 362-8. Washington, D. C. U. S. Govt. Print. Off. 1943.

During their relatively long period of residence within the western evacuated area, these persons had acquired considerable interests in many types of property, including agricultural land.

4/ War Department. Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942. pp. 353-380. Washington, D. C. U. S. Govt. Print. Off. 1943.

Although the Army's evacuation program included the southern part of Arizona, this area is not included in this study because of the relatively few Japanese-operated farms involved.

THE JAPANESE IN AGRICULTURE

Farm Acquisition

The initial tenure status of the Japanese immigrant farmer was that of farm laborer. He usually worked under the direction of Japanese "bosses," individuals "who more or less controlled the disposition of the working forces under their leadership."5/ These Japanese "bosses" organized labor groups and bargained with farmers in supplying laborers on a wage or contract basis. Owing to the convenience of recruiting workers on a group basis, and to the adaptability and reliability of the Japanese as farm workers, these leaders of Japanese labor groups readily became recognized by farmer employers as a dependable source of farm labor. As the Japanese farm laborers, however, gained proficiency in farming operations, they soon aspired to the more desirable status of farm operator, which offered greater economic and social stability and independence. "The contractor system which prevailed in the farming regions of the west coast created circumstances favorable to the transition from wage earner to farm owner or tenant. Enterprising Japanese bosses, with a ready supply of manpower at their disposal and an intimate knowledge of the operating problems in any given region, were in a position to induce the farmers with whom they negotiated to lease holdings to them under different forms of tenure."6/ Landowners, particularly those who leased to eligible Japanese on a share basis, found renting to Japanese profitable. This was due to the Japanese tenants' skill and diligence in farming operations which resulted in higher yields, with consequent greater financial return to the landlords. Leasing also simplified the labor problem, because the Japanese tenants' previous experience as "bosses" gave them an advantage in obtaining the large working forces needed during peak labor seasons. "A consequence of this arrangement was that as a number of farms in a locality were leased to Japanese, these tenants secured a monopoly of the most efficient Japanese laborers, and other farmers experienced difficulty in getting good Japanese farm hands for themselves. They too, then, were eager to lease to the Japanese."7/

Another feature which encouraged this transition from farm laborer to farm operator was the need for little or no capital of their own by reliable Japanese operating under certain forms of tenancy. In some instances, the landlord furnished all of the farming equipment. In other cases, processing companies and commission merchants advanced part or all of the operating capital, taking for security a lien on the crops. In years when competition among shippers was unusually keen, the shippers would lease land themselves in order that they might sublease to desirable Japanese operators with whom they could negotiate marketing agreements. Another common practice which simplified financial problems of Japanese operators was the forming of partnerships among themselves. In this way, through hard work, industry, and shrewd bargaining, many Japanese farmers proceeded upward along the "agricultural ladder" from farm laborer to sharecropper and tenant, and some to ultimate farm ownership.

5/ U. S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, op. cit., p. 67.
6/ Ibid., p. 69.
7/ Ibid., p. 69.

Although, in 1940, 45 percent of the Japanese workers in the three States were employed in agriculture, farm operation by persons of Japanese ancestry has always been limited to relatively small proportions of the total number of farms and of the total farm acreage in California, Washington, and Oregon. In 1910, Japanese operated 2,215 farms and 113,274 acres of farm land, which represented 1.2 percent of all of the farms and 0.2 percent of all of the land in farms in these three States (tables 3 and 4). During the following decade, Japanese increased their farm operation to 6,075 farms and an all-time high of 394,696 acres of farm land. This represented 2.6 percent of all of the farms and 0.7 percent of all of the land in farms for 1920. These proportions were the highest for any recorded year for the three States combined. Both the number of farms and the farm acreage operated by Japanese dropped considerably in 1930, then increased again to 6,118 farms and 258,074 acres of farm land in 1940. These farms were valued at $72,600,000 in 1940 and represented approximately 2 percent of the total farming interests of the three States (tables 8 and 9).

In the Pacific Coast States, most of the Japanese farming activities have always been in California, and the least in Oregon. In 1940, 84 percent of the farms and 88 percent of the land operated by Japanese were in California. The highest proportions of the total number of farms and of all the land in all farms operated by Japanese, 3.9 and 0.7 percent respectively, were also in California (tables 4 and 10). Most of the Japanese farming activities were concentrated in the intensive farming areas of southern California, the great Central Valley, and the central coastal region of California; the Seattle, Tacoma, and Yakima areas of Washington; and the Portland and Hood River regions of Oregon (fig. 2).

The size of Japanese-operated farms in California, Washington, and Oregon has always been considerably smaller than that of all farms. In 1910, the average size of Japanese-operated farms in the three States amounted to 51 acres of land, whereas that of all farms was 270 acres (table 11). In 1940, the average size of Japanese-operated farms decreased to 42 acres of land; that of all farms to 231 acres. In Washington, Japanese-operated farms averaged 29 acres; in California and Oregon they were about one-third larger, averaging 44 and 42 acres respectively.

Principal farming enterprises favored by the Japanese were truck, fruit, berries, grapes, nursery stock, and some poultry, in various combinations. Japanese farm operators were most prominent in the growing of the intensively cultivated crops of vegetables and berries. The production of these crops by Japanese farmers has been estimated at about one-third of the total acreage grown. The proportional production by Japanese farmers of some of the individual crops like strawberries, celery, snap beans, peppers, cauliflower, and spinach ranged from 50 to 95 percent of the total. The vegetable, berry, and nursery enterprises were usually quite small and located in and near the outskirts of large urban centers. These small farms were operated almost entirely by use of farm family labor.

FIGURE 2

JAPANESE-OPERATED FARMS

CALIFORNIA WASHINGTON AND OREGON

1940

LOCATED BY MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS

INCLUDES FARMS OPERATED BY BOTH AMERICAN- AND FOREIGN-BORN PERSONS

EACH DOT REPRESENTS 5 FARMS

FARMS IN CONCENTRATED AREAS INDICATED BY NUMBER

LARGER FIGURES INDICATE NUMBER OF FARMS WITHIN EACH COUNTY

PORTION WEST OF DASHED LINE REPRESENTS EVACUATED AREA

TENURE OF FARM OPERATORS

TENURE	NUMBER	PERCENT
FULL-OWNERS	1197	19.6
PART-OWNERS	378	6.1
MANAGERS	261	4.3
TENANTS	4282	70.0
TOTALS	6118	100.0

Scale in Miles

0 20 40 60

(FOR COUNTY NAMES, NUMBER OF OWNER- AND TENANT-OPERATED FARMS, AND PERCENTAGE TENANCY, BY COUNTIES, SEE FIGURES 3, 4, AND 5)

SOURCE: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

C. M. J.

Table 3.- Japanese-operated farms and farm acreage in California, Washington, and Oregon, by decades, 1910-1940.

State	1910		1920		1930		1940	
	Farms	Land	Farms	Land	Farms	Land	Farms	Land
	Number	Acres	Number	Acres	Number	Acres	Number	Acres
California	1,816	99,254	5,152	361,276	3,956	191,427	5,135	226,094
Washington	316	9,412	699	25,340	523	12,636	706	20,326
Oregon	83	4,608	224	8,080	265	8,001	277	11,654
Three-State total	2,215	113,274	6,075	394,696	4,744	212,064	6,118	258,074

Source: Bureau of the Census.

Table 4.- Proportion of all farms and all land in farms operated by Japanese in California, Washington, and Oregon, by decades, 1910-1940.

State	1910		1920		1930		1940	
	All farms	All land in farms	All farms	All land in farms	All farms	All land in farms	All farms	All land in farms
	Percent		Percent		Percent		Percent	
California	2.06	0.35	4.38	1.23	2.92	0.63	3.87	0.74
Washington	0.56	0.08	1.05	0.19	0.74	0.09	0.86	0.13
Oregon	0.18	0.04	0.45	0.06	0.48	0.05	0.45	0.06
All three States	1.16	0.22	2.59	0.7	1.81	0.35	2.22	0.41

Source: Bureau of the Census.

In general, Japanese operators farmed their land more intensively than other farm operators. This is indicated, in part, by the much higher proportion, 76 percent, of the gross farm acreage classified as cropland harvested on Japanese-operated farms, than the 20 percent for all farms (table 9).

The Alien Land Laws

As long as the Japanese remained in the wage labor class, agitation against them arose largely from nonfarm groups. This movement developed primarily from fear of competition from so-called "cheap labor" and from inherent local prejudices against any "foreign element." Farmer-employers, on the other hand, welcomed, for economic reasons, activities or conditions which provided them with a source of cheap labor readily available for irregular periods and requiring little or no responsibility on their part. For this reason, unrestrained Japanese immigration was, for a while, considered desirable by this latter group.

The gradual transition of the tenure status of the Japanese from laborer to farm operator, however, tended to change the farmers' attitude. The Japanese farm labor groups hired through their Japanese "bosses" had originally been a convenient source of dependable and cheap farm labor. As the Japanese became farm operators, however, the farm labor pool was reduced accordingly. Furthermore, since these new operators utilized most of the remaining available Japanese labor force on their own farms, a labor shortage resulted for non-Japanese farmers. Thus, the Japanese gradually changed from a convenient source of manpower to active competitors for farm labor, farm land, and agricultural markets.

For these and other reasons, sufficient pressure was eventually created to secure the enactment in the various Western States of legislation limiting Japanese rights to certain economic benefits derived from the use of land. California enacted the first alien land law in 1913. Essentially, this first law provided that "the Japanese might lease and occupy houses and shops, or lease land for residential and commercial purposes; that, in addition, they might lease agricultural lands for a maximum of 3 years. Lands already owned or acquired in the future in satisfaction of existing liens, might be retained, but could not be bequeathed to heirs under a citizenship disability, though proceeds from sale of the lands would be turned over to such heirs. Corporations, a majority of whose members were aliens ineligible to citizenship or a majority of whose issued capital stock was owned by such aliens, likewise came within the provisions of the law."8/

This law was amended in 1920 and several times thereafter to restrict further the rights of those aliens who were ineligible to citizenship to benefits derived from the use of agricultural land, including the abolishment of the farm leasing provision. In 1921 and 1923, the States of Washington and Oregon enacted alien land laws, the general provisions of which were very similar to those of the amended California law. In general, the alien

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8/ Ibid., pp. 77, 78.

land laws of the three States up to the time of military evacuation, with reference to ownership of agricultural land, may be briefly summarized as follows:

(1) In all three States ineligible aliens cannot own any interest in agricultural land by purchase.

(2) In all three States, they can take by inheritance. In California and Oregon, they can inherit proceeds from sale of land but not the land itself; in Washington, the land itself for a period of not more than 16 years.

(3) In each State, they can foreclose mortgages in good faith and collect debts bona fide. In California and Oregon they must dispose of the land, so taken, within 2 years; in Washington, within 3 years.

(4) In all three States, the Asiatic alien's title to land is defeasible only by the State and is good against all individuals.

(5) In Washington and Oregon, ownership of land or an interest therein by the Asiatic alien indirectly through a corporation is restricted. In California, it is prohibited.

(6) In all three States, the American-born Asiatic child has the right to own land. But in California and in Washington, if the alien parent pays for the land, the burden is on him to prove that the transaction was in good faith.

(7) In all three States, the laws are not retroactive, and titles acquired and vested prior to adoption of a particular prohibition, are not affected.9/

Farm Tenure

In terms of proportion of number of all farms, Japanese farm ownership in the Pacific Coast States was not very significant in 1940. The 1,575 farms classified by the U. S. Census as owned by persons of Japanese ancestry in California, Washington, and Oregon represented slightly more than one-half of one percent of the total number of farms in the three States (table 5).

The proportion of farms owned by Japanese operators in all three States combined amounted to 26 percent of all Japanese-operated farms. The proportion of Japanese owner-operated farms in each of the three States was the highest in Oregon with 36 percent, as compared with 25 and 26 percent for California and Washington, respectively.

9/ Mears, E. C. Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast: Their Legal and Economic Status, pp. 157-187. Chicago, Ill. University Chicago Press. 1928.

United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, Office of the Solicitor. Opinions Numbers 80, 81, and 82. Analyses of Alien Land Laws of California, Washington, and Oregon, as They Affect Persons of Japanese Ancestry. 17, 10, and 6 pp., mimeo. Washington, D. C. 1944.

Table 5.- Japanese ownership of farms in California, Washington, and Oregon, 1910 and 1940.

	California		Washington		Oregon		All three States	
	1910	1940	1910	1940	1910	1940	1910	1940
	Number	Number	Number	Number	Number	Number	Number	Number
Full-owned farms	207	997	1	123	15	77	223	1,197
Part-owned farms	26	293	-	62	1	23	27	378
Totals	233	1,290	1	185	16	100	250	1,575
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Proportion of all Japanese-owned farms in each State	93.2	81.9	0.4	11.8	6.4	6.3	100.0	100.0
Proportion of all Japanese-operated farms owner-operated in each State	12.8	25.1	0.3	26.2	19.3	36.1	11.2	25.7
Proportion of all farms in each State Japanese-owned	0.26	0.97	-	0.23	0.04	0.16	0.13	0.57

Source: Bureau of the Census.

Ownership of farms, including part-owned farms,[10] by persons of Japanese ancestry in California, Washington, and Oregon increased from 250 farms in 1910 to 1,575 farms in 1940. In 1910, farm ownership by persons of Japanese ancestry represented 11 percent of all Japanese-operated farms and 0.13 percent of all farms in the three States. In 1940, it increased to 26 percent of all Japanese-operated farms and 0.57 percent of all farms (table 5).

During the period from 1910 to 1940, California's proportion of the three-State total number of farms owned by persons of Japanese ancestry dropped from 93 to 82 percent; that for Washington increased from almost 0 to 12 percent; that for Oregon remained almost constant at about 6 percent.

Fresno and Sacramento counties in California had more farms owned by persons of Japanese ancestry than any other county (fig. 3).

The majority of Japanese farmers in the three States have always been tenants. In 1940, 70 percent were tenants, as compared with only 19 percent of all farmers (table 6). The highest proportion of Japanese tenant-operated farms was in Washington and the lowest in Oregon, 72 and 63 percent respectively. There was considerable variation between counties in the proportion of tenancy of Japanese-operated farms, ranging from none to 100 percent (figs. 4 and 5). In counties with very small numbers of Japanese-operated farms, however, the extremely high and low figures are not very significant.

Table 6.- Percentage of Japanese farms and of all farms that were operated by tenants, California, Oregon, and Washington, 1940.

State	Percentage tenancy	
	Japanese operated farms	All farms
California	70.0	19.1
Washington	72.4	17.7
Oregon	63.2	18.2
All three States	70.0	18.5

Source: Bureau of the Census.

10/ Part-owned farms are those in which the operators own a part and rent from others the rest of the land they operate.

From 1910 to 1940, the proportion of Japanese farmers in the three States who were tenants decreased almost 17 percent. The largest proportionate decrease occurred in Washington where all but 4 of 316 were tenants in 1910 (tables 12 and 13).

In these three States there is normally a relationship between amount of tenancy and general type of farming in the various areas. For example, there is less tenancy in fruit farming areas like Hood River County, Oreg., than in truck- and field-crop-producing areas such as Imperial Valley, Calif. There is evidence that this relationship was also true of Japanese farmers. In general, there was less tenancy in counties where they produced considerable fruit, grapes, and other perennial crops, than where they produced mostly vegetables and other annual crops.

As indicated previously, Japanese farmers usually started at the bottom of the so-called "agricultural ladder" as farm laborers, worked their way upward to farm tenancy, and then advanced, perhaps, to farm ownership. Even under ideal conditions, this method of attaining farm ownership status requires quite a long period of time, for the reason that a person must work many years as a farm laborer and tenant in order to earn and accumulate sufficient capital with which to buy and equip a farm. The high proportion of farm tenancy of Japanese-operated farms may be indicative, therefore, of a period of residence of Japanese farmers sufficiently long to permit considerable tenancy, but yet too short to enable much farm ownership by farmers of Japanese ancestry.

Although doubt has been expressed concerning the real effectiveness of the alien land laws, the forces which effectuated these measures may have served to make eligible persons of Japanese ancestry hesitant about acquiring too permanent a tenure status, particularly ownership of farm land, in areas where local attitudes were not very favorable. Because of this uneasiness, these persons may have preferred a land tenure which would permit them to move on short notice if necessary. For somewhat the same reason, most of them purposely may have become proficient in a type of agriculture that requires a minimum of capital investment for permanent farm structures and perennial crops. Although the restrictive measures may have directly or indirectly achieved the primary objectives of their sponsors in preventing extensive farm ownership by persons of Japanese ancestry, they may have also served to establish in its stead an unstable tenure pattern associated with some of the undesirable features inherent in short-term leasing, insecurity of land occupancy, and high tenant mobility.

DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE FARMING INTERESTS

Arrangements During Evacuation

The military evacuation of Japanese farmers from the West Coast evacuated area, which consisted of all of California and the western portions of Washington and Oregon (figs. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), raised a serious problem because of the possibility of disrupting the agricultural economy of that region by an abrupt removal of several thousand established farm operators. In order to insure uninterrupted performance of farming operations on Japanese-operated farms and to provide maximum protection to growing crops, then considered vital in the successful prosecution of the war, Japanese farming interests were analyzed with a view of accomplishing the intended evacuation with maximum expediency and a minimum of crop loss.

"At the request of the Commanding General transmitted to the Department of Agriculture by the Assistant Secretary of War, the Farm Security Administration was named as the designee of the Department of Agriculture in its evacuation operations participation.

"Accordingly, on March 15th, the Farm Security Administration, through its Coast Regional Director, was authorized and directed to institute and administer an appropriate program. The program outlined was one designed to secure the continued operation of Japanese agricultural lands and assure a fair and equitable disposition of Japanese farming interests."11/

A field organization was established, consisting of agents stationed at service centers located throughout the evacuated area. Their duties were to register and obtain information about farms of Japanese subject to evacuation, and to find suitable nonevacuee farm operators to take them over. Considerable publicity was given the evacuation program in order to inform the evacuees and the general public concerning the agricultural aspects of evacuation and to induce substitute farm operators to take over the farms as they were relinquished by the evacuees.

To further encourage the taking over of evacuee-farms by nonevacuee operators, special short-term agricultural production credit for general operating expenses was provided to otherwise eligible substitute farm operators. In addition, a special negotiations unit was established to handle transactions involving the consolidation of small specialized evacuee farms into larger farm enterprises. In some instances, corporations were organized and sponsored by local leaders, agricultural cooperative groups, associations, and real estate companies to acquire and manage these consolidated farm holdings. Financial assistance was provided for this purpose also when necessary.

By the end of the evacuation period, substitute operators had been obtained for 7,212 farms, involving 253,392 acres of farm land and representing slightly more than 99 percent of the 7,280 farms and 255,303 acres registered as subject to relinquishment (table 14).12/

11/ War Department. Op. cit., pp. 137, 138.
12/ Ibid., pp. 136-144.

Following the completion, during the military evacuation, of this phase of the farm protection plan by the Farm Security Administration, further responsibility for problems connected with farm property was delegated to the Evacuee Property Division of the War Relocation Authority, the agency now authorized to assist evacuees in the management and disposal of their properties.

Ownership Transfers During and After Evacuation

The transfer of operation and management of evacuee farming interests in most cases involved negotiation, reassignment, or cancellation of leases, rather than actual transfer of ownership title from evacuees to nonevacuees. But the evacuation program also stimulated transfers of ownership of farm properties from evacuees to nonevacuees, largely because of future uncertainties facing the evacuees.

A survey of farm property ownerships recorded by persons of Japanese ancestry in 18 principal Japanese populated counties within the evacuated areas of California, Washington, and Oregon has recently been made by the Evacuee Property Division, War Relocation Authority. These counties include about 80 percent of all of the Japanese farm ownership interests in the West Coast evacuated area. This survey reveals that on March 1, 1942 there were, within the West Coast evacuated area, approximately 2,300 Japanese farm ownerships[13/] comprising about 71,000 acres of agricultural land valued at $21,000,000. Most of this property, between 85 and 90 percent, was in California. In terms of all land in farms, Japanese ownership within the evacuated area then represented about 0.16 percent. By States, it represented about two-tenths of one percent of all land in farms in California, and less than one-tenth of one percent of that in each of the Washington and Oregon evacuated areas.

As individuals, Japanese generally did not control large acreages of agricultural land. As previously stated, the size of Japanese-operated farms in 1940 averaged only 42 acres. Individual ownership units (the total amount of land owned by a Japanese individual, group of individuals, or organization on March 1, 1942) were even smaller, as they averaged only 31 acres per unit for the entire West Coast evacuated area. Almost nine-tenths of these ownership units were smaller than 50 acres, and about two-thirds contained less than 30 acres. Ownership units were slightly larger in California than in either the Washington or Oregon

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13/ All agricultural land of one acre or more recorded in the name of a Japanese individual, group of individuals, or organization, whether in contiguous or noncontiguous parcels located outside or inside of incorporated urban centers, is considered an ownership. Because this section deals with recorded agricultural ownerships, the definition and characteristics of which are not comparable to those of "farms" as defined by the U. S. Bureau of the Census, the figures presented herein will obviously differ somewhat from those based on data from the Bureau of the Census.

evacuated areas. The smallest units were in Washington, where they averaged about 15 acres, and almost nine-tenths were smaller than 30 acres (table 15).

During the period of military evacuation, which extended from March 2 to October 31, 1942, about 11 percent of the ownerships involving 8 percent of the acreage, were transferred from Japanese to non-Japanese (table 7). At the same time, about 3 percent of the Japanese ownerships and 2 percent of the acreage, were transferred from non-Japanese to Japanese. The net result was a decrease of about 8 percent in the number of Japanese ownerships and 6 percent in the acreage. Thus, by October 31, 1942, Japanese agricultural land ownership interests in the West Coast evacuated area dropped to about 2,100 ownerships comprising about 66,000 acres of agricultural land.

In California and in Oregon, transfers of agricultural land ownerships from Japanese to non-Japanese exceeded considerably those from non-Japanese to Japanese. In Washington, the reverse was true, by a slight margin.

During the year following evacuation, transfers from Japanese to non-Japanese were equivalent to slightly more than 2 percent of the March 1, 1942 ownerships and to almost 5 percent of the agricultural land (table 7). Transfers from non-Japanese to Japanese during this yearly period were negligible. The net decrease of Japanese ownership interest in agricultural property for the entire period of 22 months was about 11 percent.

In all three States, most of the transfers were recorded during the first several months of the evacuation period. There were periods of little or no activity immediately before and after the final date of evacuation, followed by a resumption of transfers in 1943. The uncertainty of future developments in nations at war and the desire to liquidate property into ready cash for emergency use were undoubtedly strong motives for disposal of property at the beginning when evacuation measures were being formulated and publicized. Acquisition of property by Japanese as indicated by recorded instruments, particularly during the early part of the evacuation period, may have been stimulated by settlement of business affairs before leaving, such as the payment and termination of land purchase contracts and other liens and outstanding obligations. The periods of inactivity immediately prior to and after the final evacuation date may have been due to difficulty of evacuees in negotiating business transactions while moving first, into Army Assembly Centers, and later, into WRA Relocation Centers. The slight increase in activity during 1943 may be due in part to the efforts of the Evacuee Property Division of the War Relocation Authority, which was by that time well established to assist in handling of evacuee property transactions, and also to the fact that most evacuees by that time had become settled in the Relocation Centers, and were again able to divert some attention to their property.

Table 7.- Transfers of farm land between Japanese and non-Japanese in the West Coast evacuated area during the evacuation period and during the following year.

Transfer period	Ownerships	Acreage	Value
	Number	Acres	Dollars
Japanese-owned farm property, March 1, 1942	2,300	71,000	21,000,000
Evacuation period: March 2, 1942 to October 31, 1942	Percent	Percent	Percent
Transfers from Japanese to non-Japanese	11.0	7.9	9.1
Transfers from non-Japanese to Japanese	3.1	1.8	1.4
Net transfer of farm property from Japanese to non-Japanese during evacuation period	7.9	6.1	7.7
Japanese-owned farm property, November 1, 1942	92.1	93.9	92.3
November 1, 1942 to October 31, 1943			
Transfers from Japanese to non-Japanese	2.7	5.0	2.9
Transfers from non-Japanese to Japanese	0.3	0.1	0.1
Net transfer of farm property from Japanese to non-Japanese	2.4	4.9	2.8
Japanese-owned farm property November 1, 1943	89.7	89.0	89.5

Source: Computed from results of a survey by the Property Survey Section, Evacuee Property Division, War Relocation Authority, of recorded ownerships in 18 principal Japanese populated counties in California, Washington, and Oregon, representing approximately 80 percent of all Japanese agricultural land ownership interests in these States.

The survey of Japanese-owned recorded property is being continued by the Evacuee Property Division of the War Relocation Authority. Recent figures for transfers recorded during the latter part of 1943 and most of 1944 in four of the original 18 counties surveyed and in several additional counties indicate that farm property transfers from Japanese to non-Japanese are continuing. Probable reasons for this continued activity are the influence of the present relocation program of the War Relocation Authority and current high land prices. As evacuees become permanently relocated in the interior States, they may be inclined to dispose of their pre-war property holdings on the West Coast.

PROBABLE POST-WAR FARM HOLDINGS

It has been pointed out that although Japanese pre-war agricultural land holdings in the West Coast evacuated area amounted to about a quarter of a million acres, their holdings were very minor relative to total agriculture in the area, except for certain specialized crops. Furthermore, about 70 percent of their holdings were leases. Another 3 or 4 percent were Japanese manager-operated farms of non-Japanese owners. During the military evacuation, practically all leaseholds were transferred to non-Japanese. Because most leases were short-term and many of the longer-term leases were canceled or reassigned during evacuation, it is likely that little, if any, of the leasehold interests of former Japanese tenants will be carried over into the post-war period.

The principal remaining interest of the Japanese in agricultural land within the West Coast evacuated area, therefore, will be that retained through their ownerships, which amounted to about 27 percent of their total pre-war holdings. About 11 percent of their pre-war ownerships were transferred to non-Japanese ownership during the evacuation and the year immediately following, and such transfer is continuing. The present relocation program of the War Relocation Authority and the current high land prices are likely to encourage continued transfer of farm property for the duration of the war because as evacuees become permanently relocated in communities within the interior States, they will be inclined to take advantage of present land prices to dispose of their holdings. Taking these factors into consideration, and assuming that the post-war period will begin sometime near the end of 1945, it is unlikely that the probable post-war land holdings of Japanese in the West Coast evacuated area will exceed 80 or 85 percent of the pre-war ownership interests or about 22 or 23 percent of the total pre-war land holdings, including leaseholds. This will amount to roughly 55,000 or 60,000 acres of farm land, or about 0.14 percent of all of the land in all farms.

DETAILED TABLES

Table 8.- Comparison by decades of Japanese-operated farms with all farms in California, Washington, and Oregon, 1920-1940.

Item	1920	1930	1940
Number of farms	234,164	261,733	276,173
Japanese-operated	6,075	4,744	6,118
Percent	2.6	1.8	2.2
All land in farms (acres)	56,153,000	60,526,000	63,694,000
Japanese-operated	394,696	212,064	258,074
Percent	0.7	0.4	0.4
Cropland harvested (acres)			12,929,000
Japanese-operated	1/	1/	195,306
Percent	1/	1/	1.5
Value of farms (land and buildings) (dollars)	4,669,000,000	4,824,000,000	3,236,000,000
Japanese-operated	148,400,000	93,000,000	72,600,000
Percent	3.2	1.9	2.2
Value of buildings (dollars)	1/	737,486,000	649,474,000
Japanese-operated	1/	7,016,000	9,086,000
Percent	1/	1.0	1.4
Value of farm implements and machinery (dollars)	1/	228,839,000	233,046,000
Japanese-operated	1/	4,121,000	6,829,000
Percent	1/	1.8	2.9
Average size of all farms (acres)	239.8	231.3	230.6
Japanese-operated	65.0	44.7	42.2
Cropland harvested (average acreage per farm)	1/	1/	46.8
Japanese-operated	1/	1/	31.9
Average value of all farms (dollars)	19,939	18,431	11,717
Japanese-operated	24,428	19,604	11,867

1/ Comparable data not available.

Source: Bureau of the Census. Also War Department. Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942. p. 408. Washington, D. C. U. S. Govt. Print. Off. 1943.

Table 9.- Comparison by States of Japanese-operated farms with all farms in California, Washington, and Oregon, 1940.

Item	California	Washington	Oregon	All three States
Farms (number)	132,658	81,686	61,829	276,173
Japanese-operated	5,135	706	277	6,118
Percent	3.9	0.9	0.4	2.2
All land in farms (acres)	30,524,324	15,181,815	17,988,307	63,694,446
Japanese-operated	226,094	20,326	11,654	258,074
Percent	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.4
Cropland harvested (acres)	6,534,562	3,569,803	2,824,316	12,928,681
Japanese-operated	174,942	12,046	8,318	195,306
Percent	2.7	0.3	0.3	1.5
Value of farms (land and buildings) (dollars)	2,166,452,648	593,366,445	476,817,354	3,236,636,447
Japanese-operated	65,780,572	4,313,757	2,547,605	72,641,934
Percent	3.0	0.7	0.5	2.2
Value of buildings (dollars)	379,708,056	154,520,136	115,245,583	649,473,775
Japanese-operated	7,568,459	1,099,505	418,395	9,086,359
Percent	2.0	0.7	0.4	1.4
Value of farm implements and machinery (dollars)	132,337,109	56,101,147	44,607,932	233,046,188
Japanese-operated	5,910,441	561,588	356,571	6,828,600
Percent	4.5	1.0	0.8	2.9
Average size of all farms (acres)	230.1	185.9	290.9	230.6
Japanese-operated	44.0	28.8	42.1	42.2
Cropland harvested (average acreage per farm)	49.3	43.7	45.7	46.8
Japanese-operated	34.1	17.1	30.0	31.9
Average value of all farms (dollars)	16,331	7,264	7,712	11,720
Japanese-operated	12,810	6,110	9,197	11,8[illegible]

Source: Bureau of the Census.

Table 10.- Proportion of all Japanese-operated farms and farm acreage in California, Washington, and Oregon by decades, 1910-1940.

State	1910		1920		1930		1940	
	Farms	Land	Farms	Land	Farms	Land	Farms	Land
	Percent		Percent		Percent		Percent	
California	82.0	87.6	84.8	91.5	83.4	90.3	83.9	87.6
Washington	14.3	8.3	11.5	6.4	11.0	5.9	11.6	7.9
Oregon	3.7	4.1	3.7	2.1	5.6	3.8	4.5	4.5
All three States	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bureau of the Census.

Table 11.- Comparison of average size of Japanese-operated farms with that of all farms in California, Washington, and Oregon, by decades, 1910-1940.

State	Average size of farm							
	1910		1920		1930		1940	
	All farms	Japanese farms	All farms	Japanese farms	All farms	Japanese farms	All farms	Japanese farms
	Acres	Acres	Acres	Acres	Acres	Acres	Acres	Acres
California	317	55	250	70	224	48	230	44
Washington	208	30	200	36	191	24	186	29
Oregon	257	56	270	36	300	30	291	42
All three States	270	51	240	65	231	45	231	42

Source: Bureau of the Census.

Table 12.- Tenure of Japanese-operated farms in California, Washington, and Oregon, 1910 and 1940.

Tenure	California		Washington		Oregon		All three States	
	1910	1940	1910	1940	1910	1940	1910	1940
	Number	Number	Number	Number	Number	Number	Number	Number
Owners	207	997	1	123	15	77	223	1,197
Part-owners	26	293	-	62	1	23	27	378
Managers	36	249	3	10	4	2	43	261
Tenants	1,547	3,596	312	511	63	175	1,922	4,282
Totals	1,816	5,135	316	706	83	277	2,215	6,118

Source: Bureau of the Census.

Table 13.- Percentage distribution of Japanese-operated farms in California, Washington, and Oregon by operating tenure, 1910 and 1940.

Tenure	California		Washington		Oregon		All three States	
	1910	1940	1910	1940	1910	1940	1910	1940
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Owners	11.4	19.4	0.3	17.4	18.1	27.8	10.0	19.0
Part-owners	1.4	5.7	-	8.8	1.2	8.3	1.2	6.1
Managers	2.0	4.9	1.0	1.4	4.8	0.7	2.0	4.3
Tenants	85.2	70.0	98.7	72.4	75.9	63.2	86.8	70.0
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Percent in each State	82.0	83.9	14.3	11.6	3.7	4.5	100.0	100.0

Source: Bureau of the Census.

Table 14.- Farms and farm acreage transferred from evacuee to nonevacuee farm operators during military evacuation in the West Coast evacuated area, 1942.

State	Registered farms	Transferred		Registered acreage	Transferred	
	Number	Number	Percent	Acres	Acres	Percent
California	6,084	6,062	99.6	223,257	221,744	99.3
Washington	830	784	94.5	18,072	17,674	97.8
Oregon	366	366	100.0	13,974	13,974	100.0
All three States	7,280	7,212	99.1	255,303	253,392	99.3

Source: War Department. Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942, p. 144. Washington, D. C. U. S. Govt. Print. Off. 1943.

Table 15.- Percentage distribution of Japanese agricultural land ownerships and farm acreage by size of ownership, West Coast evacuated area, March 1, 1942.

Size of ownership	California		Washington		Oregon		All three States	
	Number of ownerships	Farm acreage	Number of ownerships	Farm acreage	Number of ownerships	Farm acreage	Number of ownerships	Farm acreage
Acres	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
0 - 9	26.3	3.4	55.1	20.4	11.9	2.4	23.3	4.2
10 - 29	37.1	20.5	33.7	36.1	51.7	31.4	37.7	22.0
30 - 49	22.1	25.6	6.4	15.9	25.4	32.8	20.7	25.6
50 - 99	10.8	22.5	3.7	17.5	8.4	20.1	9.9	22.1
100 and over	3.7	28.0	1.1	10.1	2.6	13.3	3.4	26.1
All sizes	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Computed from results of a survey by the Property Survey Section, Evacuee Property Division, War Relocation Authority, of recorded Japanese ownerships in 18 principal Japanese populated counties in California, Washington, and Oregon, representing approximately 80 percent of all Japanese agricultural land ownership interests in these States.

WHITE GROWERS WOULD TAKE UP JAPANESE ACREAGE

Los Angeles

February 27, 1942

With handling of the Japanese population on the west coast now solely in hands of the United States Army, by Presidential order made late last week, no material changes in the situation were recorded up until late this week.

Under terms of the order, the Army has power to establish military zones in any part of the western states, and move or evacuate from these zones any persons regarded as dangerous or potentially dangerous to the nation's war-time activities, regardless of citizenship. Thus, the Army could, if it deemed advisable, remove both alien and American-born Japanese from any area in coastal states, including any producing area in the three states. Late this week it appeared that Army officials were approaching the problem conservatively and would undertake gradual evacuation from vital areas rather than precipitate removal from large sections, all at one time. However, no indication has been given by official quarters as to what is to be done.

Meantime, evacuation of alien Japanese from so-called "prohibited areas" adjacent to defense plants, military centers and power sites proceeded on schedule and in some cases ahead of schedule. Additional arrest of alien Japanese, Italian and German people were made and now runs into hundreds, perhaps thousands. These aliens have in most instances been entrained for concentration camps in north central states, it is reported.

W. S. Rosencrans, recently appointed agricultural coordinator at Los Angeles, yesterday announced he had received 250 applications from American farmers seeking to take over vegetable land in the county formerly operated by Japanese. Of these applicants, fully 50 per cent appeared

qualified, he said, and 20 per cent had ample capital and equipment. It is not believed that the government will enter this transfer picture further than to bring interested parties together, nor are loans of funds expected from any official source, it was stated.

From Salinas this week was issued a searching analysis of Japanese vegetable production in California compiled by E. M. Siefert, Jr., prominent shipper in that district and president of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association. Mr. Seifert's report is as follows:

"Only one per cent (.00995) of all the vegetables produced in the United States for processing (canning, freezing, etc., excluding canned tomatoes) is grown or controlled by Japanese growers in California.

"Authority for this statement is taken from the U.S.D.A. Crop Reporting Board of Acreage and Production of Commercial Truck Crops in the United States for 1941, released as of December 1, 1941.

"The following statements are made in an attempt to prove the relative unimportance of truck crop production in California by Japanese. Those s udying this report must bear in mind that all acreage and production figures are taken from the United States Department of Agriculture report above referred to.

ACREAGE FIGURES

"Only 3½ per cent (.0356) of all commercial truck crops grown in the United States for processing (canning, freezing, etc., excluding canned tomatoes) is grown in California.

"Only 4-3/4 per cent (.04772) of all the vegetables produced in the United States for processing canning, freezing, etc., excluding canned tomatoes) is grown in California.

"Only 8½ per cent (.0868) of all the vegetables produced in the United States for processing including canned tomatoes, is grown in California.

"The largest important item for cannery purposes, and which is generally considered a very important item for defense and for lend-lease

to Britain is canned tomatoes.

"Of all the production in the United States, California grows only 18 per cent (.1832) of the cannery tomatoes, and this percentage includes all Japanese production. On a tonnage basis, the ten-year average for the United States, 1930-39, shows that California produced, including Japanese production, only 18 per cent of the cannery tomatoes.

"After a careful canvass of those in the industry, who should know, it was estimated that of the total acreage in California, on which cannery tomatoes are produced, the astoundingly large figure of 60 per cent is credited to Japanese production, which means acreage either supervised, owned or controlled by Japanese or on which acreage Japanese labor is used. Nevertheless:

"Only 11 per cent (.1094) of the tomatoes canned in the United States is produced by Japanese in California, and it is suggested that if this item is important enough, canned tomatoes be rationed to our citizens, curtailing supplies to them by 15 per cent and we will then have an increased figure in canned tomatoes produced, instead of a decrease.

"Even if all Japanese acreage is completely eliminated and not any of the so-called abandoned acreage is either taken up by white growers or new acreage produced by white growers.

"Only 23 per cent (.2296) of all the vegetables produced in California for fresh market and for fresh consumption is grown by California Japanese or Japanese influence in California, notwithstanding the various reports we have read and heard in the newspapers and over the radio, ranging from 37 per cent to 80 per cent.

"Only 4½ per cent (.04508) of all the fresh vegetables grown in the United States are produced by California Japanese or Japanese influence in California.

"As above stated the largest single item, which seems to be important, is canned tomatoes. Thus far, no consideration has been given to whites taking over evacuated Japanese acreage or evacuated acreage

being replaced by new acreage grown by whites.

INCREASE TOMATO ACREAGE

"In the Wasco, Shafter, and Bakersfield area, approximately 35,000 acres of early potatoes are grown, most of which are harvested during April and May. The need for a replacement of probably evacuated Japanese acreage was brought to the attention of one grower in Bakersfield, who personally increased his already large acreage by 500 acres of canning tomatoes, and has called a meeting at which time a total of 2,000 acres will be signed with the cannery. The climate in and around the Bakersfield area is suitable to the production of tomato plants on lettuce beds and open fields, whereas, other districts must use hot beds or cold frames. This one firm is in position to grow 10,000,000 plants for use in other districts, provided they can be furnished only 125 pounds of tomato seed. By immediate action being taken, there seems little question but what this district alone would have an additional 5,000 acres on which cannery tomatoes could be planted.

"In the Salinas district, where very few tomatoes had been previously grown, already lettuce and carrot growers have signed with a local cannery for almost 500 acres of cannery tomatoes.

"It is safe to assume that in even considering all the new acreage which growers could be persuaded to plant as a patriotic effort, undoubtedly no less than 50 per cent of evacuated Japanese acreage would be taken up by white growers, thereby reducing the prospective shortage by the probable complete loss of all Japanese grown acreage, to less than 5 per cent of the pack of the United States.

"No actual figures are available showing the exact percentage of Japanese grown or Japanese influenced acreage for the various truck crops in California, but those who are in the best position to estimate, have been conferred with and the average of their estimates has been increased so that the estimates used as a basis for the above calculations and statements probably represents a higher percentage than actually exists.

As an example: It was estimated that Japanese grow or influence or control the production of 90 per cent of the strawberries; 75 per cent of the cucumbers, onions, spinach for fresh shipment; and 75 per cent of the cucumbers and tomatoes for cannery; 65 per cent of the fresh shipment of snap beans; 60 per cent of the canned tomatoes acreage; 50 per cent of the production for fresh shipment of cauliflower and celery; for processing -- snap beans and spinach; which is followed on through down to 10 per cent of the potatoes, asparagus, cantaloupes, honey dews, honey balls and watermelons. The figure of 10 per cent is the lowest one used in any case.

"Broccoli, Brussels sprouts, chicory, parsley, parsnips, rhubarb, radishes, squash, turnips and sweet potatoes were omitted only because they are not included in the United States Department of Agriculture report used.

SEE LITTLE LOSS

"Allowing for errors in judgment, it must be conceded by those who would study these figures carefully and sincerely -- if all vegetable acreage produced, controlled, or influenced by Japanese were completely eliminated, the loss in available fresh food supply to the United States and Canada would be entirely insignificant, not to take into account the large volume of other foods, including meats and grains, etc., which would further reduce the percentage of loss in food to the people of this country."

March - April 42

NO JAPS NEEDED

ONLY 1% (.00995) OF ALL THE VEGETABLES PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR PROCESSING (CANNING, FREEZING, ETC., EXCLUDING CANNED TOMATOES) IS GROWN OR CONTROLLED BY JAPANESE GROWERS IN CALIFORNIA.

AUTHORITY FOR THIS STATEMENT IS TAKEN FROM THE U.S.D.A., CROP REPORTING BOARD OF ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION OF COMMERCIAL TRUCK CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR 1941, RELEASED AS OF DECEMBER 1, 1941.

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE MADE IN AN ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE RELATIVE UNIMPORTANCE OF TRUCK CROP PRODUCTION IN CALIFORNIA BY JAPANESE. THOSE STUDYING THIS REPORT MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT ALL ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION FIGURES ARE TAKEN FROM THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE REPORT ABOVE REFERRED TO.

ONLY 3½% (.0356) OF ALL COMMERCIAL TRUCK CROPS GROWN IN THE UNITED STATES FOR PROCESSING (CANNING, FREEZING, ETC., EXCLUDING CANNED TOMATOES) IS GROWN IN CALIFORNIA.

ONLY 4 3/4% (.04772) OF ALL THE VEGETABLES PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR PROCESSING, (CANNING, FREEZING, ETC., EXCLUDING CANNED TOMATOES) IS GROWN IN CALIFORNIA.

ONLY 8½% (.0868) OF ALL THE VEGETABLES PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR PROCESSING INCLUDING CANNED TOMATOES, IS GROWN IN CALIFORNIA.

THE LARGEST IMPORTANT ITEM FOR CANNERY PURPOSES, AND WHICH IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED A VERY IMPORTANT ITEM FOR DEFENSE AND FOR LEND-LEASE TO BRITAIN IS CANNED TOMATOES.

OF ALL THE PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES, CALIFORNIA GROWS ONLY 18% (.1832) OF THE CANNERY TOMATOES, AND THIS PERCENTAGE INCLUDES ALL JAPANESE PRODUCTION. ON A TONNAGE BASIS, THE 10-YEAR AVERAGE FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1930-39, SHOWS THAT CALIFORNIA PRODUCED, INCLUDING JAPANESE PRODUCTION, ONLY 18% OF THE CANNERY TOMATOES.

AFTER A CAREFUL CANVASS OF THOSE IN THE INDUSTRY, WHO SHOULD KNOW, IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT OF THE TOTAL ACREAGE IN CALIFORNIA, ON WHICH CANNERY TOMATOES ARE PRODUCED, THE ASTOUNDINGLY LARGE FIGURE OF 60% IS CREDITED TO JAPANESE PRODUCTION, WHICH MEANS ACREAGE EITHER SUPERVISED, OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY JAPANESE OR ON WHICH ACREAGE JAPANESE LABOR IS USED. NEVERTHELESS ---

ONLY 11% (.1094) OF THE TOMATOES CANNED IN THE UNITED STATES IS PRODUCED BY JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA, AND IT IS SUGGESTED THAT IF THIS ITEM IS IMPORTANT ENOUGH, CANNED TOMATOES BE RATIONED TO OUR CITIZENS, CURTAILING SUPPLIES TO THEM BY 15% AND WE WILL THEN HAVE AN INCREASED FIGURE IN CANNED TOMATOES PRODUCED, INSTEAD OF A DECREASE - - - EVEN IF ALL JAPANESE ACREAGE IS COMPLETELY ELIMINATED AND NOT ANY OF THE SO-CALLED ABANDONED ACREAGE IS EITHER TAKEN UP BY WHITE GROWERS OR NEW ACREAGE PRODUCED BY WHITE GROWERS.

ONLY 23% (.2296) OF ALL THE VEGETABLES PRODUCED IN CALIFORNIA FOR FRESH MARKET AND FOR FRESH CONSUMPTION IS GROWN BY CALIFORNIA JAPANESE OR JAPANESE INFLUENCE IN CALIFORNIA, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VARIOUS REPORTS WE HAVE READ AND HEARD IN THE NEWSPAPERS AND OVER THE RADIO, RANGING FROM 37% TO 80%.

ONLY 4½% (.04508) OF ALL THE FRESH VEGETABLES GROWN IN THE UNITED STATES ARE PRODUCED BY CALIFORNIA JAPANESE OR JAPANESE INFLUENCE IN CALIFORNIA.

AS ABOVE STATED THE LARGEST SINGLE ITEM, WHICH SEEMS TO BE IMPORTANT, IS CANNED TOMATOES. THUS FAR, NO CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO WHITES TAKING OVER EVACUATED JAPANESE ACREAGE OR EVACUATED ACREAGE BEING REPLACED BY NEW ACREAGE GROWN BY WHITES.

IN THE WASCO, SHAFTER, AND BAKERSFIELD AREA, APPROXIMATELY 35,000 ACRES OF EARLY POTATOES ARE GROWN, MOST OF WHICH ARE HARVESTED DURING APRIL AND MAY. THE NEED FOR A REPLACEMENT OF PROBABLE EVACUATED JAPANESE ACREAGE WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF ONE GROWER IN BAKERSFIELD, WHO PERSONALLY INCREASED HIS ALREADY LARGE ACREAGE BY 500 ACRES OF CANNING TOMATOES, AND HAS CALLED A MEETING FOR FRIDAY NOON, FEBRUARY 19, AT WHICH TIME A TOTAL OF 2,000 ACRES WILL BE SIGNED WITH THE CANNERY. THE CLIMATE IN AND AROUND THE BAKERSFIELD AREA IS SUITABLE TO THE PRODUCTION OF TOMATO PLANTS ON LETTUCE BEDS AND OPEN FIELDS, WHEREAS, OTHER DISTRICTS MUST USE HOT BEDS OR COLD FRAMES.

THIS ONE FIRM IS IN POSITION TO GROW TEN MILLION PLANTS FOR USE IN OTHER DISTRICTS, PROVIDED THEY CAN BE FURNISHED ONLY 125 POUNDS OF TOMATO SEED. BY IMMEDIATE ACTION BEING TAKEN,

THERE SEEMS LITTLE QUESTION BUT WHAT THIS DISTRICT ALONG WOULD HAVE AN ADDITIONAL 5,000 ACRES ON WHICH CANNERY TOMATOES COULD BE PLANTED.

IN THE SALINAS DISTRICT, WHERE VERY FEW TOMATOES HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY GROWN, ALREADY LETTUCE AND CARROT GROWERS HAVE SIGNED WITH A LOCAL CANNERY FOR ALMOST 500 ACRES OF CANNERY TOMATOES.

IT IS SAFE TO ASSUME THAT IN EVEN CONSIDERING ALL THE NEW ACREAGE WHICH GROWERS COULD BE PERSUADED TO PLANT AS A PATRIOTIC EFFORT, UNDOUBTEDLY NO LESS THAN 50% OF EVACUATED JAPANESE ACREAGE WOULD BE TAKEN UP BY WHITE GROWERS, THEREBY REDUCING THE PROSPECTIVE SHORTAGE BY THE PROBABLE COMPLETE LOSS OF ALL JAPANESE GROWN ACREAGE, TO LESS THAN 5% OF THE PACK FOR THE UNITED STATES.

NO ACTUAL FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE SHOWING THE EXACT PERCENTAGE OF JAPANESE GROWN OR JAPANESE INFLUENCED ACREAGE FOR THE VARIOUS TRUCK CROPS IN CALIFORNIA, BUT THOSE WHO ARE IN THE BEST POSITION TO ESTIMATE, HAVE BEEN CONFERRED WITH AND THE AVERAGE OF THEIR ESTIMATES HAS BEEN INCREASED, SO THAT THE ESTIMATES USED AS A BASIS FOR THE ABOVE CALCULATIONS AND STATEMENTS PROBABLY REPRESENTS A HIGHER PERCENTAGE THAN ACTUALLY EXISTS. AS AN EXAMPLE: IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT JAPANESE GROW OR INFLUENCE OR CONTROL THE PRODUCTION OF 90% OF THE STRAWBERRIES; 75% OF THE CUCUMBERS, ONIONS, SPINACH FOR FRESH SHIPMENT; AND 75% OF THE CUCUMBERS AND TOMATOES FOR CANNERY; 65% OF THE FRESH SHIPMENT OF SNAP BEANS; 60% OF THE CANNED TOMATOES ACREAGE; 50% OF THE PRODUCTION FOR FRESH SHIPMENT OF CAULIFLOWER AND CELERY; FOR PROCESSING - SNAP BEANS AND SPINACH; WHICH IS FOLLOWED ON THROUGH DOWN TO 10% OF THE POTATOES, ASPARAGUS, CANTALOUPS, HONEYDEWS, HONEYBALLS, AND WATERMELONS. THE FIGURE OF 10% IS THE LOWEST ONE USED IN ANY CASE.

BROCCOLI, BRUSSEL SPROUTS, CHICORY, PARSLEY, PARSNIPS, RHUBARB, RADISHES, SQUASH, TURNIPS AND SWEET POTATOES WERE OMITTED ONLY BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE REPORT USED.

ALLOWING FOR ERRORS IN JUDGMENT, IT MUST BE CONCEDED BY THOSE WHO WOULD STUDY THESE FIGURES CAREFULLY AND SINCERELY - IF ALL VEGETABLE ACREAGE PRODUCED, CONTROLLED, OR INFLUENCED BY JAPANESE WERE COMPLETELY ELIMINATED, THE LOSS IN AVAILABLE FRESH FOOD SUPPLY TO THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA WOULD BE ENTIRELY INSIGNIFICANT, NOT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LARGE VOLUME OF OTHER FOODS, INCLUDING MEATS AND GRAINS, ETC., ETC., WHICH WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE PERCENTAGE OF LOSS IN FOOD TO THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY.

UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA VEGETABLES IN ACRES

FOR PROCESSING - 1941

(AUTHORITY - UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE)

	CALIFORNIA	CALIFORNIA JAPANESE *	% CALIFORNIA JAPANESE *	ALL OTHER STATES	TOTAL UNITED STATES	
ASPARAGUS	39,550	3,955	10	0	39,550	10
LIMAS	0	0	0	61,700	61,700	0
SNAP BEANS	640	320	50	72,720	73,360	0.4
BEETS	0	0	0	14,870	14,870	0
SWEET CORN	0	0	0	427,880	427,880	0
CUCUMBERS	2,890	2,168	75	103,110	106,000	2
PEAS	1,850	370	20	358,690	360,540	1
PIMENTO	730	548	75	12,000	12,730	4
SPINACH	7,440	3,720	50	86,000	16,040	20
TOMATOES	83,000	49,800	60	372,310	455,310	11
TOTAL	136,100	60,881	44 3/4	1,431,880	1,567,980	
(EXCLUSIVE OF (TOMATOES	53,100	11,081	21	1,059,570	1,112,670	

UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA VEGETABLE PRODUCTION IN

ACRES FOR FRESH MARKET - 1941

(AUTHORITY - UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE)

	CALIFORNIA	CALIFORNIA JAPANESE *	% CALIFORNIA JAPANESE *	ALL OTHER STATES	TOTAL UNITED STATES
ARTICHOKES	10,000	0	0	9	10,000
ASPARAGUS	35,940	3,594	10	52,020	87,960
LIMA BEANS	0	0	0	17,650	17,650
SNAP BEANS	11,450	7,442	65	163,060	174,510
BEETS	0	0	0	12,770	12,770
CABBAGE	7,100	2,840	40	174,600	181,700
CARROTS	22,900	3,435	15	26,650	49,550
CAULIFLOWER	16,600	8,300	50	16,200	32,800
CELERY	12,720	6,360	50	28,970	41,690
CORN (SWEET)	0	0	0	23,000	23,000
CUCUMBERS	2,100	1,575	75	40,470	42,570
EGGPLANT	0	0	0	4,050	4,050
GARLIC	2,210	1,105	50	1.770	3,980
KALE	0	0	0	1,100	1,100
LETTUCE	94,700	11,837	12½	64,070	158,770
ONIONS	5,430	4,073	75	89,800	95,230
PEAS	31,200	4,680	15	58,800	90,000
PEPPERS	2,750	2,100	75	20,320	23,070
POTATOES	39,000	3,900	10	303,900	342,900
SPINACH	2,800	2,100	75	58,210	61,010
TOMATOES	28,500	11,400	40	172,870	201,370
TOTAL	325,400	74,741		1,330,280	1,655,680

* - ESTIMATES, AND THEREFORE ACREAGE ARRIVED AT IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXPLANATION IN BODY OF REPORT.

UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA VEGETABLES IN ACRES

FOR CANTALOUPS, HONEY DEWS, HONEY BALLS, WATERMELONS AND OTHER

MELONS AND STRAWBERRIES FOR FRESH MARKET - 1941

(AUTHORITY - UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE)

	CALIFORNIA	CALIFORNIA JAPANESE *	%CALIFORNIA JAPANESE *	ALL OTHER STATES	TOTAL UNITED STATES
CANTALOUPS, HONEY DEWS, HONEYBALLS, ETC.	38,420	3,842	10	87,490	125,910
STRAWBERRIES	3,680	3,312	90	207,430	211,110
WATERMELONS	16,000	1,600	10	251,630	267,630
TOTAL	58,100	8,754	1.45	546,550	604,650

S U M M A R Y

SHOWING TOTAL ACREAGES FOR ALL TRUCK CROPS IN THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE REPORT

	CALIFORNIA	CALIFORNIA JAPANESE *	% CALIFORNIA JAPANESE *	ALL OTHER STATES	TOTAL UNITED STATES	
PROCESSED VEGETABLES	136,100	60,881	45	1,431,880	1,567,980	4%
FRESH VEGETABLES	325,400	74,741	23	1,330,280	1,655,680	4%
TOTAL VEGETABLE	461,500	135,622	30%	2,762,160	3,223,660	
MELONS, STRAWBERRIES	58,100	8,754	15%	546,550	604,650	1.5%
GRAND TOTAL	519,600	144,376	27 3/4	3,308,710	3,828,310	

* - ESTIMATES, AND THEREFORE ACREAGE ARRIVED AT IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXPLANATION IN BODY OF REPORT.