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A PRESENTATION ON THE PANEL 'THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
IN THE COMMUNITY STUDIES OF EVACUATION'

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For the Conference Honoring Professor Robert O'Brien, Ph.D.

Conference: "The American Concentration Camp: A Contemporary
Perspective," April 3-4, 1981

Whittier College, Whittier, California

Panel: Saturday, April 4, 1981, 9:15 a.m.

[The contents of this paper are composed of excerpts from the author's forthcoming article, "A Documentary Study of Anthropologists and the Wartime Camps for Japanese Americans," in the journal *Dialectical Anthropology* ©. Permission to quote any portion of this paper must be granted by the journal's publisher, Elsevier Press of New York.]

(The author bears sole responsibility for all statements in this paper.)

I thank Whittier College for inviting me here and wish to state that I think it is particularly appropriate to honor Professor O'Brien by including in this conference a panel whose topic has been dealt with so far solely by the White social scientists who worked in the camps.

Undoubtedly many of you have felt a certain sense of unease regarding the fact that these social scientists worked in the WRA camps.¹ I regret to inform you that there has been ample justification for this sense of disquietude. I wish to share with you this morning some of the findings of my research in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. This research was first begun in 1952 and was continued in 1975, 1977, and 1978; also, several weeks ago, on March 18, 19, and 20, I was doing research in the Archives.

Consider the following.

Despite JOHN F. EMBREE's admonition as head of the WRA Community Analysis Section, to the social scientists who worked for the Section, that these anthropologists "must never take on any administrative functions,"² G. GORDON BROWN, anthropologist at Gila, AZ, worked for the administration of that camp when he was "put in charge of maintaining the accuracy of all lists of those to be removed to Tule Lake," the segregation

camp, and was appointed to a "special review committee," which
³
 judged cases of removal to Tule Lake.

JOHN deYOUNG, the anthropologist at Minidoka's Community Analysis Section, quickly notified the proper authorities, including EDWARD H. SPICER, the anthropologist who had succeeded Embree after Embree had left WRA, when some dissidents of Minidoka filed complaints about camp conditions to the Spanish Government, which was the neutral power representing Japanese interests in wartime America. DeYoung provided names of the dissidents in his communications,
⁴
 despite Embree's policy that Community Analysts (the term for the social scientists who worked in the Community Analysis Section of each camp)
⁵
 "should be interested in what, not who."

ASAEL T. HANSEN, the anthropologist at Heart Mountain's Community Analysis Section (now professor emeritus of Alabama)

...learned what a Project Director [camp director] wanted and needed to know about the community and what the administration was doing and planning to do. The long-continued contacts had another result, closely connected with the above. They tended to keep the Analyst [Hansen] from "going over" to the evacuees.*
⁶

The renowned anthropologist E. ADAMSON HOEBEL (now professor emeritus of anthropology, Minnesota), while a Community Analyst at Granada in the summer of 1944, requested from the camp's Relocation Officer "a list of the names and addresses of the [Japanese American] boys...who failed to answer the Selective Service call, giving the
⁷
 date of the delinquency." He then analyzed the information which he had received and made a list and a map showing the distribution
⁸
 of the evaders, which he then passed on to the Relocation Officer, in addition to a lengthy classified report on the subject of evaders

*"One very good discipline (sic) we have on the project [camp] is that we put our reports through the project director so that we must be careful [of] what we say": statement by G. Gordon Brown of Gila. 6A

to the Granada camp director.

WESTON LABARRE (now professor emeritus of anthropology, Duke), in addition to his distorted analysis of Japanese character, based upon his 44-day tenure as Community Analyst of Topaz, UT,¹⁰ was praised by that camp's director because "... the [Topaz camp] Attorney and the Social Science Analyst [LaBarre]...worked together with profit, regarding individual members of the resident community [i.e., Topazeans]."¹¹ Furthermore he made a detailed "block by block" map of Topaz showing, among other things, the places of residence of the dissidents who had complained to the Spanish Consul and of the inmates who had apparently made statements to the FBI.¹²

ALEXANDER H. LEIGHTON (presently professor emeritus, Harvard) as head of the Bureau of Sociological Research at Poston, in two reports to the Poston administration, strongly advocated the policy of segregation; that is, the removal of dissidents, to a special camp.¹³ He also aroused strong suspicion among both Whites and inmates of Poston by constantly walking around in a navy officer's uniform -- he was a Lt. Commander of the Navy -- thus causing him to be seen as a spy by both peoples.¹⁴

McVoy
The Community Analyst at Jerome, AR, EDGAR C. MCVOY did a series of interviews of various inmates. All of these were for intelligence-gathering purposes. In one interview he wanted to get information about the "most dangerous group" in Jerome,¹⁵ and in another, about "the separation of loyal and disloyal groups,"¹⁶ while in a third, about the loyalty to the U.S. of a Buddhist priest's followers.¹⁷ The significance of all these interviews plus some 16 others he conducted on similar topics takes on an added dimension when one learns that the Jerome director shortly thereafter, "removed"

a Buddhist reverend, a certain Rev. T., who, along with two other men, was sent to Leupp, AZ, the isolation camp for "trouble-¹⁸ makers," for his alleged pro-Japan attitude. He also informed on Whites in Jerome. Here is an excerpt from a memorandum marked "Confidential" which he wrote to the Jerome Community Management Division Chief:

All statements concerning appointed personnel[Whites] shall be sent to Mr. Taylor[Camp Director of Jerome] in a confidential form. He may then use his own discretion about submitting such statements to Washington. For the most part, however, these statements must continue to be in anonymous form. I cannot be placed in the role here of being an informer to the administration about either evacuees or appointed personnel[Whites]. I should much prefer to go myself to the person or the staff involved and discuss the situation with him. Then, if it seemed advisable, I might report the instance to you and Mr. Taylor. In flagrant cases, however, which seem to jeopardize the operation of the project, I shall make an exception and give what facts I know to you and Mr. Taylor directly.¹⁹

A major division within WRA, the Community Management Division, under which the Community Analysis Section in Washington operated, was headed by JOHN H. PROVINSE, an anthropologist. As Chief, he constantly dealt with security matters and therefore with specific inmates. In addition to this kind of activity, of which there were too many cases to mention at this time, in a September 4, 1943 letter to J. Edgar Hoover -- declassified in 1975 -- Provinse wrote:

As outlined in my letter to you, dated April 5, 1943, arrangements have been made to furnish the Washington office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a card giving the destination of evacuees leaving relocation centers on indefinite leave. Our understanding is that the Washington office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will forward this information to the appropriate field offices of the Bureau.²⁰

He then stated: "We agree that any evacuee who becomes a persistent and serious source of trouble in a relocation center should be returned to an internment camp or transferred to the isolation center at Leupp[,AZ]."²¹

The Community Analyst at Granada, CO, for more than a year, John A. Rademaker, who had suspected from 50 to 100 "disloyals" at Granada, once segregation became the official policy, in a confidential letter to the camp director, wanted to hold

immediate hearings on 10 or 12 Kibei leaders...and send them forthwith to Leupp. The evidence[against them]would be fragmentary but after the vociferous leaders are yanked out, it will be easier to get further evidence from loyal residents.²²

Rademaker then proposed to the camp director that those who were denied leave clearance and could not relocate or did not qualify for a pass to leave camp temporarily, "might be used as a criterion for shipping them out[to Leupp]. We could catch most of them that way without delay and without further hearings and fuss."²³ This Community Analyst also routinely passed on reports to "the F.B.I. agent and to the representative of the Naval Intelligence[stationed

at Granada]" regarding the "disloyals."²⁴ In order to find out more about them, Rademaker, with the permission of the camp director,²⁵ attended inmate meetings which were known to both as being illegal. Furthermore, in line with this kind of work, from March 25 to April 7, 1944, when "a colored attorney from Los Angeles," Hugh MacBeth, visited Granada, Rademaker immediately reported this event to the camp director of Granada. What struck Rademaker was that the visitor wanted to form "a comprehensive alliance of colored peoples,"²⁶ and, because, according to MacBeth, the Japanese, like the Negroes, were "slaves," this Black urged cooperation between the "slaves" to overthrow their "masters."²⁷ Rademaker concluded that "...the evidence we have here indicates that Mr. MacBeth is genuinely and sincerely concerned about the injustices which are unquestionably being suffered by colored people the world over."²⁸ Nevertheless, a report on MacBeth was duly sent to the FBI agent at Granada²⁹ by Rademaker; furthermore Rademaker provided the Naval Intelligence Officer of Granada with information about MacBeth.³⁰

Rademaker did not confine his intelligence work to gathering data on inmates and visitors, however. The camp director of Granada requested him to sit in on staff (composed solely of Whites) meetings, where, for example, Rademaker "...listened carefully for reaction to that [staff] meeting [of July 12, 1943] and for conversations concerning such meetings in general,"³¹ and in two separate documents to the director, reported to him conversations³² he had overheard among the White staff members. The result of this type of work was a document of 17 single-spaced typed pages sent to SPICER, in which 23 key White administrators of Granada³³ were evaluated.

Earlier, in October 1943, Rademaker had felt uneasy about investigative work, as revealed in these passages from a letter marked "Personal" and "Confidential" to FRANK L. SWEETSER and EDWARD H. SPICER:

As a matter of fact, this investigation [of dissidents] has me a bit concerned. In the first place, we're not an FBI nor detective outfit. If we do this sort of thing and it gets known that we do (as it unquestionably will if we do much of it), it will stop us from getting a lot of other information which we ought to get. On the other hand, it is essential to know the tenor of public opinion in any question which seems to involve loyalty or disloyalty to the United States, and the threats against the life and safety of any loyal Americans. However, digging out the dirt on that sort of thing is not our job. Can you give me any enlightenment on the problem?

As ever, but somewhat puzzledly yours,

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(signed) John Rademaker

At the request of the Granada camp director, Rademaker also assumed membership on the segregation review panel of that camp. 35

As can be inferred from Rademaker's letter just quoted, EDWARD H. SPICER apparently encouraged such intelligence work. In concert with Provinse, Spicer suppressed two detailed reports by ANNE O. FREED of the Washington Community Analysis Section because these reports detailed the deplorable conditions which had prevailed 36 in the detention or assembly camps. Another bit of information he collaborated with Provinse to successfully have suppressed had to do with the good relations which existed between Japanese Americans and Whites in Hawaii, and the fact that one-sixth of the Honolulu

police force were of Japanese ancestry. The Chief of Internal Security at Tule Lake wanted to publicize the information, but³⁷ on the advice of Spicer, Province suppressed it. Moreover, Spicer passed on to an official at Tule Lake -- the segregation camp -- the names of two former inmates of Topaz, UT, who³⁸ may have been in a strike which was going on at Tule Lake.

✓ The anthropologist who^{had} worked for the Evacuation and Resettlement Study headed by DOROTHY S. THOMAS at Berkeley, ROSALIE HANKEY (later ROSALIE WAX), was described by Thomas in her book, The Spoilage, as the researcher who was able to obtain "confidential reports from a group of determined 'disloyals' with whom no Japanese-American staff member [of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study]³⁹ could possibly have established contact." Yet, Rosalie Hankey⁴⁰ is not mentioned by name at all in The Spoilage. Rosalie Hankey turned informer on one of Tule Lake's "disloyals." She denounced a vigorous proponent of renunciation of U.S. citizenship because he himself did not renounce it. Thus, Hankey approached the proper authorities, "...suggesting that they [the Department of Justice investigators] call in Mr. Kira [the proponent of renunciation] and question him about his loyalties in the presence of some of the young Hokoku [renunciants] officers. Mr. Kira [subsequent to the⁴¹ interrogation] applied for denationalization."

Subsequently, he [Mr. Kira] was sent to Japan with the expatriates, and they were all once again confined in a "center," this time by the Japanese government. Many months later, a friend sent me a clipping from a California newspaper. The clipping told how a certain expatriate, Stanley Masanobu Kira, confined in a detention area in Japan, had appealed to the

American army to remove him because certain of the
 young men confined with him were threatening to kill him. 42

Rosalie Hankey, shortly thereafter, received a telephone
 call from Dorothy Thomas in Berkeley telling Hankey to leave
 Tule Lake immediately, "without letting anyone know." 43

She left Tule Lake under cover of darkness that very night. She
 was expelled by WRA, among other reasons, for having contacted
 the Department of Justice; that is to say, the FBI. 44

These then were the bare facts regarding some of the
 activities -- roles, if you will -- of the social scientists
 and the concentration camps. Time does not permit me to go
 over the personnel policy actions which were taken regarding
 MORRIS E. OPLER, anthropologist at Manzanar or JAMES H. BARNETT,
 Community Analyst at Gila. Also left unmentioned must be
 Roalie Hankey's truly bizarre behavior while at Tule Lake. Nor
 can I go over the devastating criticisms of Leighton's Bureau
 of Social Research by John Walker Powell, Chief, Poston Community
 Management Division, in his 51 single-spaced typed analysis.*
 Most unfortunate, however, is the fact that I do not have the
 time to deal with the publications -- in professional journals
 and between hard covers -- of these social scientists (predominantly
 anthropologists). Suffice it to say, except for the few
 ethnographic/ethnological publications, the vast majority of
 the others, including the books The Governing of Men, The Spoilage,
Impounded People, and Doing Fieldwork and some 25 journal articles,
 can be accurately characterized as one or a combination of the
 following: self-serving, disengenuous, superficial, distorted,
 expiational, pseudo-scientific, bizarre, surrealistic, ethnocentric. One
 publication by an anthropologist is outright dishonest.

*Nor can I go over how the review process was used by the American Anthropological
 Assn. to keep my manuscript on these social scientists from seeing print when I
 originally submitted it to American Anthropologist, its official journal.

Just a few weeks ago -- on March 19th -- I came across this statement by JOHN EMBREE to the FBI (declassified only in 1975):

... [T]o keep the project director [camp director] informed of any unrest that may be developing or of any attempt at agitation, is desirable: but we question the advisability of utilizing the Internal Security organization for monitoring purposes. Instead, the control of community activities through the Community Activity Supervisor as provided in Administrative Instruction No. 73 could be made a channel of information, and the Documentation Section [Reports Office] and the newly organized Community Analysis Section can be expected to provide additional channels.

The information should be obtained and should be brought to the project director's attention, but the task had better be undertaken by some other unit than the Internal Security Section.

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This policy statement may have been the basis for the actions of the social scientists I have mentioned this morning. Whatever the case may have been, it is clear to me that the role of social scientists in the community studies of Evacuation included spying, gathering intelligence data, informing, and, in general, working against the welfare of the inmates, and, quite naturally, with a singular lack of compassion for or understanding of the victims. What a sharp contrast these social scientists present to the service performed for the Japanese Americans during the same period by the person we are honoring this week! Thank you, Professor O'Brien!

Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen

[To minimize the bulkiness of this paper, I have not included the footnotes and references. For anyone interested in them, I have a copy with me.]

(For those who are interested, I have brought copies of some documents in the National Archives as exhibits.)