

A12.04

67/14
C

ALLEN PRINTING COMPANY
100 N. WASHINGTON STREET
ANN ARBOR, MI 48106
(313) 763-0000

Grodzins to Washington
Report #1
September 16, 1942

There is never any difficulty in scaring up a conversation about the Japanese. This train is populated with soldiers of two wars. There ~~are~~ ^{is} the usual complement of young bloods -- on leave, going to new camps, on special missions, etc. In addition, there are several dozen corpulent ancient ~~soldiers~~ ^{warriors} --- legionnaires on their way to the national convention at Kansas City. By peculiar coincidence, I took a seat in the crowded Club car last night next to a man who made constant reference in his conversation to Jim Fisk, State Adjutant of the Legion. It was natural enough for me to tell him of my own connections with Fisk. Soon I was a member of the group. Someone bought me three drinks.

Spokesman for the Legion group was the ~~skatxx~~ California Grand Chef of the state's Forty and Eight. He's a large, well, dressed, obviously well to do gentleman (diamonds on his fingers and orchids on his wife's bosom) who served twenty ~~months~~ ^{months} in the last war without getting anywhere near a front line but who managed nevertheless to get shot through his hand by an American sentry. At one time he was an embalmer; later a sports writer (Fresno Bee!); now he is circulation manager of the Hearst newspapers in San Francisco and the Bay Area. He talks loudly and emphatically and to what he said there was no dissenting voice from among either his own group or the several soldiers who were also present

Grodz - Sep't. 16 -2-

First --

"I was damn glad that they rounded up all the Japs. Never did like the bastards. There used to ~~be~~ be a town in the Valley that had a big sign up at each end of the main street. It just said "JAPS NOT WANTED."
And there were no Japs there. I always wanted to ~~live~~ ^{live} ~~live~~ in that town."

Later --

"I know just what to do with every last Jap in the country. They used to ship millions of chickens out of Petaluma in wooden crates. But they don't use ~~those~~ that kind of crate anymore and ~~ix~~ I now there's mustbe a big pile of the hanging around somewhere. My idea is to put one Jap to a crate and ~~ship~~ ^{orsail} them -- orsail them - back to ~~ax~~ Japan where they belong.

"And I mean all Japs, too. Once a Jap always a Jap. And I'll tell you what I base that statement on. Take any white man and let him be born in Japan. Give him a Japanese education and let him grow up in that country. Wouldhe be a Jap? ~~You're damn right~~ "You're damn right NOT. I would just like to see someone take me for a Jap if I had been born andlived there. I know damned well I would still be an American andnot a Jap and if someone called me a Jap, I'd knock hell out of him."

Still later, in talking to a soldier Le Grand Chef expressed an idea that I had not heard before, but which apparantly is widely held. At least one would gather that

Grodz -- Sep't. 16, -3-

from the general assent that the statement evoked.

"If I had to carry a gun this time, I wouldn't like to go to Europe. We're fighting white men there and Germans and Italians make damn good Americans -- some of them. But I sure would like as hell kill a couple of those yellow skins. The less Japs ~~ix~~ in the world the better, and I ~~wax~~ ^{want} to do my part in decreasing the yellow population." (Gradzins herewith uncrossed his fingers and decided to ask about the Chinese, chaged his mind and went to bed.)

Dear Dorothy --

This machine of Mr. Moon's is bewitched ~~and~~ (see what I mean?) and thrice accursed. It doesn't space ~~as~~ when you want it to and, furthermore, spaces when you don't. But ~~wax~~ bear with me and Ruth will do better, I'm sure.

I'm also sure that the above isn't important ~~enough~~ enough to waste so much paper, but 'twas interesting and I didn't have anything better to do at the time. But I do now. Dinner has just been called and I want to beat ~~hungary~~ the hungry horde.

Very best regards and thanks again for everything

Though he did not say so, Gitlin implied that all this took the starch out of the Attorney General and made his backing of Ennis' opposition to evacuation less strong than it might have been.

(3) Gitlin said that he saw a confidential report from the West Coast Naval Intelligence that stated definitely that mass evacuation over such a wide area was not necessary.

(4) Gitlin quoted a conversation that he overheard between Hiram Johnson and Ennis which went as follows:

Johnson: "We have to get the damn Japs out."

Ennis: "Senator, you don't really think they are dangerous."

Johnson: "Well, not really dangerous."

Ennis: "Well, are they unscrupulous?"

Johnson: "No, not unscrupulous. They just work too damn hard and we can't compete."

I will check this with Ennis. Gitlin said he "almost fell over" when he heard it.

(5) The editor of one of the Los Angeles papers came to Washington to tell the Justice Department that mass evacuation was not necessary. Gitlin will find the name of this man for me and try to find the memoranda that were written following his visit.

(6) (Gitlin)

Gitlin said the Justice Department "was elated" when Tom Clark was appointed in the West Coast, but "terribly disappointed" at Clark's actions. "We felt Clark sold us out," Gitlin said.

While I was talking to Gitlin, he called a file clerk of the Justice Department and asked her to send down "all the Japanese material." Twenty minutes later, three boys came in pushing a large library truck, all three shelves of which were filled with files. The leader of the file boys said, "There's at least twice as much upstairs."

The very mass of the stuff astounded me. A cursory examination showed that much of the material was extraneous to our study. The filing system is so lousy, however, that it will be necessary to examine almost every one of the files to extract from the mass of general crank letters those on Japanese. Furthermore, there is much material in these files that does not pertain directly to public sentiment on the West Coast but that does pertain to other aspects of the evacuation study. The problems arising out of the possible methods of handling this mass of material are covered in the attached letter.

* * * *

Grodzins on way to Washington
Report #2
September 17, 1942. 5:30 P. M.

I have spent the entire day talking to Larry Tajiri, managing editor of The Pacific Citizen. Though working for the JACL Tajiri enjoys the respect and confidence of all Nesei that I know. He deserves it. He is highly intelligent and articulate. At the same time, he possesses a complete coolness; he is entirely dispassionate as he discusses evacuation.

I was glad to have the opportunity to meet Tajiri, but was ~~extremely~~ ~~amazed~~ disappointed in the fact that he had virtually no data on pressure group activity that I didn't already have. He was most helpful in giving me the names of people that I ought to see. These are:

1. George Knox (Is this Ruth Stanislaus' man?)
of Los Angeles. Knox is now in jail on a contempt charge growing out of some pro-Japanese broadcasts that he made just prior to evacuation. He is well acquainted with Los Angeles politics and the entire Southern California situation, but according to Tajiri is too biased in favor of the Japanese to be a reliable informant. Nevertheless, of course, he could be useful. Knox is supposed to have attended a meeting of the Los Angeles County Defense Council at which Mr. Cecil of the State Agricultural ~~Department~~ Department is supposed to have said that members of the Associated Farmers were arming Filipinos and getting them drunk, then urging them to go after the Japs. Also Cecil declared that the Associated Farmers had refused to plant ~~some~~ some of their crops until the Japanese were moved. The end result of this conference was the opinion that the Japanese had to be moved

or they would be massacred.

2. John Anderton of Los Angeles. Anderton is a close friend of John B. Hughes and an anti-Japanese. He might have been influential in converting Hughes ~~to anti-Japan~~ so early but it is probable that Anderton, in turn, was encouraged by farming interests.

3. John Lichner, prominent and active anti-Japanese leader of Los Angeles.

4. Reporters Cohee and Jenson of the ~~Los Angeles~~ Daily News, ~~xx~~ Fred Chase of the Herald Express and Chuck Bernstein of the City News Bureau, all of Los Angeles. One or more of these men attended virtually all of the defense council meetings. Chase and Bernstein are sympathetic towards the Japanese.

5. Mike Masuoko in Washington. I was going to see Mike in any case. ~~xxx~~ While I was in the office, he called from Washington and Tajiri gave me a good introduction.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Tajiri was ~~xxx~~ very much interested in our study, especially the public opinion question. He said he had thought of doing the ~~same~~ same sort of thing. Wanted to find "the man who pushed the button" to start ~~the~~ evacuation, but had come to the conclusion that no single man had. He offered ~~to~~ to cooperate in any way possible and promised to send any material that he thinks might be useful. Tomorrow he is leaving on a five day trip to Heart Mountain, and I sorrowfully turned down his invitation to go along. But he ~~xx~~ said he would be glad to ~~xxx~~ take a swing through the Utah and Wyoming camps anytime I have the time. He introduce me to his wife and to George

Inataki, one of the national officers of the JACL. We all went to lunch together. They insisted on paying for mine.

Inataki has just come back from Washington. He said that Masuoko and he worked very closely with the WRA and that both had been offered jobs by the WRA. Masuoko's call today corroborated this and is another bit of evidence on the antagonism between the WRA and the Army. ~~xxxx~~ DeWitt has just given permission to long cotton growers in Western Arizona to import Japanese "to save the crop." This is the first time that permission has been given ~~for~~ Japanese to work in Military Area #1. (Correspondance between DeWitt and Stimson enclosed.) But special military guard has to be provided and Washington offices of the WRA ~~has~~ heard indirectly that negro troops are being imported for the purpose. The army won't tell WRA anything, and WRA asked Masuoko to inquire. WRA will object if ~~the~~ negroes are to be used. Masuoko can't find anything in Washington and he called Tajiri to ask him to get the information.

Tajiri showed me the strongest statement I have seen yet in condemnation of evacuation. It's in The Crisis, organ of the NAACP for September. "Americans in Concentration Camps" by Harry P. Howard. Address is 65 Fifth Avenue, N. Y. Single copy costs fifteen cents. I think Mrs Paquette might write for it.

Tajiri also told me that Masuoko had supplied "most of the material and most of the ideas" for Norman Thomas's pamphlet, which is published by the Council for Post War ~~Freedom~~ Freedom. (I think that's the name of the organ. We have ~~the~~ a file on it under pressure groups. We are supposedly on ~~the~~

their mailing list but I suppose that they want \$.25 for this piece. I think weought to have it.)

In all, I think I made a valuable contact today, though the material received is unimpressive. Nw that Tajiri knows what we want, he promised to ~~keep his eyes~~ keep his eyes open and and to keep us informed.

Yesterday afternoon on the train, I entered a soldiers' poker game with an idea of scaring up a conversation on the Japanese. Academically, the idea was a bust. ~~Financially~~ Financially, it wasn't. I won three bucks and couldn't lose it back no matter how hard I tried. So I bought them all a ~~and~~ drink. Total gain: one dime. The boys were all non-~~California~~ Californians: an Italian from Patterson, New Jersey; a Jew from New York; a Swede from Montana; ~~and nondescript from~~ a nondescript from Iowa. They didn't know anything about the Japanese ~~and weren't interested.~~ and simply weren't interested.

3333
4444-----

Last night, coming from Ogden I met one, Ed. S. ~~Aki~~ Akamine, just out of Tanforan and ~~on~~ on his way to the University of Nebraska through the efforts of the Student Relocation Committee. We talked for an hour. He told me of a Dr. Dunbar who has collected a ~~large mass~~ of material through visits to all the Relocation Centers. He will ~~send~~ send us her address which he had in his luggage that had been sent ahead. He also said that someone was making a survey of the Hawaiians who were caught by evacuation. He's

■

an Islander, himself, and will therefore get the results which he will send.

He liked Tanforan, as a whole. He didn't work~~xxxx~~ and didn't study. "Just romanced and played." He always had something to do and apparantly would have been~~xxxx~~ satisfied except for the fact that he knew he was penned in.

Congress

Grodzins in Washington,
Report #3,
September 23, 1942

The first person I saw this morning was Mr. Buckles, secretary to Congressman Tolan. Buckles was familiar with my mission and immediately phoned introductions to Dr. Lamb and Mr. Roback of the Tolan Committee. At my request he furthermore allowed me to dictate a letter for Congressman Tolan's signature to the secretaries of other West Coast congressmen and senators. This letter describes the study and asks that I be allowed access to all file material as a personal favor to Mr. Tolan.

Roback, Lamb's ^{chief} ~~first~~ assistant, was the first person to whom I talked. He was exceedingly interested in our study and was full of the usual vague and undocumented ideas about farm groups putting the squeeze on their congressmen for evacuation. His one good suggestion was that I try to get access to the files of the Justice Department where, he thinks, I will find evidence of form letters being sent by many people associated with western growers and shippers, and other such groups. Roback also suggested that I see Tom Clark, who is now head of the War Frauds Division of the Department of Justice; Roback thinks that Clark may want to talk in order to justify and vindicate his own "smelly actions." He suggested John Burling as a good man to see for access into the Justice Department's files.

Roback, with six years of Washington experience, impressed me as being a rather good observer. He thinks that the Department of Justice actively worked to slide out from under the Japanese problem and to have the Army take over. There is no documentation for this, however.

Roback immediately turned over to me all file material of the Tolan Committee which has not appeared in print. There is surprisingly little of this and much of what there is ~~is~~ concerned ^{itself} with a period of subsidiary interest, that following evacuation. I immediately went to work abstracting and filching, there being several copies of almost everything of interest. With the aid of Ruth and a stenographer, I think I can go through all this material in two days. I immediately looked for Attorney General Warren's maps. They were not to be found. I interrogated every member of the staff and all of them were sure that Warren had never sent them

* with permission, Duplicate copies

despite his promise to in his testimony before the Committee. This, in itself, I think, is a significant fact. I am going to get a letter from Dr. Lamb to Mr. Warren requesting that the maps, if they have been prepared, be turned over to me.

At 4:30 P.M., I had an interview with Dr. Lamb, Chief Investigator of the Tolan Committee. He told me something, that, if it can be substantiated, ^{might} ~~would~~ be worth this Washington trip. On January 7, (or 10), General DeWitt told James Roe, the Assistant to the Attorney General, that military necessity did not require evacuation of the Japanese from the West Coast except for limited strategic areas.

Roe is a good friend of Lamb's and told this to Lamb in the strictest confidence after he returned from an official visit to the West Coast early in January. My job is to get it from Roe directly, if possible. For that purpose, Lamb is writing a letter of introduction for me. Lamb said ~~that he heard from Roe~~ ^{replied} that DeWitt ~~said~~ ^{thought} ~~he thought~~ Naval Intelligence and the F. B. I. were doing a completely satisfactory job and that the situation was under control.

Lamb suggested as a means of entering the Justice Department files a letter from Tolan to Charles Fahy, the Solicitor General, and I will try to get Buckles to dictate this tomorrow. I think it can be done. If it cannot, I will wire Aikin to write a letter for me.

* * *

Note to myself: Visit Senate Documents Office, Senate Office Building for transcripts of Senate Immigration Committee hearings and Eisenhower's testimony before Finance Committee.

Grodzins in Washington
Report #4
September 24, 1942

I spent the entire day briefing and turning over to typists unpublished material from the files of the Tolan Committee. The files contain interesting evidence on the following matters:

1- The progression of the anti-Japanese sentiment on the part of the Pacific Coast Delegations, which, as far as I know, has never before been brought to public attention. Two documents illustrate the point: on January 31, the Delegation's recommendation to the president was that all enemy aliens should be evacuated from critical areas and that dual citizens be asked to resettle voluntarily as a patriotic contribution; on February 13, these same delegations recommended "immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage. ...from all strategic areas." I am confident that in the next week I will be able to complete this story of the metamorphosis of the representatives of the Pacific Coast. The difficult job--and the main job--is to determine exactly why the change took place.

2- The extent to which actual hysteria took possession of responsible persons: thus, C. A. Ricks, Mayor of Martinez, wrote to Tolan on February 20. "The Constitution can go overboard, if necessary, as regards the Japs. I don't think it is possible to crystal gaze well enough to determine whether the locally born Jap is loyal or not. Do it constitutionally if you can. If not possible, then we must win the war by dictatorship methods."

3- The large degree to which the American Legion was responsible in stirring up anti-Japanese propaganda: I have on hand circular letters from the Oregon Legion posts urging special meetings on resolutions for mass evacuation, letters to congressmen with a form attached, suggested news stories for local papers.

4- The Justice Department had things under control before the War Department took over: in my San Francisco notes, I have statements from Hawley and Magistretti on this point. The brief I sent Dr. Thomas this morning of an interview with a Los Angeles FBI man corroborates the San Francisco statements. Further evidence on the same line is contained in an interview with Herbert David, president of the Sea Pride Canning Company on Terminal Island. According to Davis, the Navy and the FBI had been working on

Sept. 24, 1942

GR - page 2- Report #4

Japanese groups for over five years. They had the Japanese sorted into categories and felt very confident that they could control espionage in time of war.

5- The Japanese themselves, and liberal groups generally, were immobilized by sight of the flag in which the ^{anti-}Japanese groups were able to clothe themselves while howling for evacuation. Evidence for this is mostly indirect, but statements of the Nisei Democratic Club and the JAACL sitting in a file next to statements from American Legion posts and county defense committees seem to make the point very clear. I will try to follow this up here in Washington but I think the best substantiation will come from the Nisei leaders themselves.

There is a large mass of miscellaneous material that falls into no ready category^{ies} but will shed considerable light upon our general understanding of the function of the FSA, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the WRA in the early stages of evacuation. Also, there is much pertinent material on the activities of the Tolan Committee and especially the criticism of staff members directed at the activities of the Property Custodian, the various civilian agencies, and the handling of the public relations program.

Of the several hundred letters sent to the Tolan Committee after the hearings ~~about the general problem of evacuation~~, at least 95 per cent were solely concerned with speeding up evacuation and liquidating the yellow menace as rapidly as possible.

- -

GRODZINS IN WASHINGTON
REPORT #6
SEPTEMBER 26, 1942

Interview with Congressman Bertrand W. Gearhart:

Apparently Congressmen don't work on Saturday and Mr. Gearhart was my first successful contact out of ten or eleven attempts. He is one of the very good friends of the American Legion and despite my attempt to set him right, he introduced me to several people in his office as "Jim Fisk's representative." He had no records in his office of the meetings of the Pacific Coast Delegations, but did call Leland Ford for me. Gearhart said: (1), The Pacific Coast delegations started working early in January on evacuation. At first there were disagreements and fierce arguments over the necessity of evacuation. Only Voorhis and Tolan held out for any length of time. ~~men~~ ^W "public pressure was put on, everybody came around." (2) Gearhart's ~~own~~ ^{For} argument ~~after~~ mass evacuation, briefed, is: the Japanese is crafty, intelligent. He has imagination. He knows that he will be better off under a victorious Japan than under a victorious America. Therefore, he will work for Japan. (3), Gearhart displayed an animus toward Tolan that I suspected existed but had not been actually seen before. Gearhart said that Tolan went to the Pacific Coast in the middle of important meetings and did not say he was going until it was too late to stop him.

(Saturday afternoon in Tolan's files I found a letter from Representative Elliott ^{according} ~~confirming~~ that Tolan's Pacific Coast jaunt was "a waste of federal funds." ^{I have copy of this letter})

Interview with Leland Ford:

Gearhart called Ford for me. Ford was just getting ready to leave for the Coast to "make the hardest fight of his life." He is the most unique character I have ever met. He showed ~~me~~ such a wide and unexplainable range of emotions for me that I suspect actual insanity. He made three campaign speeches for me personally, complete with gestures.

About the Japanese, Ford spewed forth the usual racial stuff and told me other things

that I will not accept as authentic until I can check them. For example, he said that on January 18, following Tolan's departure for the Coast, ~~he~~^I phoned the Attorney General's office and told them ~~to~~ to stop fucking around, ~~and~~ I gave them twenty four hours notice that unless they would issue a mass evacuation notice I would drag the whole matter out on the floor of the House and of the Senate and give the bastards everything we could with both barrels. I told them they had given us the run around long enough and that Johnny Tolan's journey was no excuse for holding things off any longer and that if they would not take immediate action, we would clean the god damned office out in one sweep. I cussed at the Attorney General ^{and his staff} himself just like I'm cussing to you now and he knew damn well I meant business."

Reasons for doubting this story are many and obvious but it does at least give an insight into Ford's viewpoint and methods.

Ford's secretary is a witch and though he gave me permission to look through some of his papers, she is making it exceedingly difficult. The following, in any case, is apparent: (1), Ford's real action came subsequent to March 6, when he was appointed chairman of the subcommittee to watch over activities of the Japanese evacuation. From that date on, he dogged Eisenhower and made life miserable for the whole organization. I have documentation on his vociferous objections to allowing college students to leave the camps and of his hysterical outbursts following the erroneous announcement of wage scales in the relocation centers. I also have a copy of his report on Manzanar and have notes on minutes of subcommittee meetings with various government officials from March 6, to date. These minutes are interesting and instructive but I will be much more interested in trying to see if I can get the minutes of the previous meetings of the entire delegation, which actually pushed evacuation through. Senator Holman of Oregon is the chairman of this large group and I will go after him at the earliest opportunity.

that I will not accept as authentic until I can check them. For example, he said that on January 18, following Tolan's departure for the Coast, he phoned the Attorney General's office and told them "to stop fucking around." "I gave them twenty four hours notice that unless they would issue a mass evacuation notice I would drag the whole matter out on the floor of the House and of the Senate and give the bastards everything we could with both barrels. I told them they had given us the run around long enough and that Johnny Tolan's journey was no excuse for holding things off any longer and that if they would not take immediate action, we would clean the god damned office out in one sweep. I cussed at the Attorney General himself just like I'm cussing to you now and he knew damn well I meant business."

Reasons for doubting this story are many and obvious, but it does at least give an insight into Ford's viewpoint and methods.

Ford's ~~secretary, the only person who~~ gave me permission to look through some of his papers; ~~and I have been able to find out the following in my own way~~
~~secretary~~ (1), Ford's real action came subsequent to March 6, when he was appointed chairman of the subcommittee to watch over activities of the Japanese evacuation. From that date on, he dogged Eisenhower and made life miserable for the whole organization. I have documentation on his vociferous objections to allowing college students to leave the camps and of his hysterical outbursts following the erroneous announcement of wage scales in the relocation centers. I also have a copy of his report on Manzanar and have notes on minutes of subcommittee meetings with various government officials from March 6, to date. These minutes are interesting and instructive but I will be much more interested in trying to see if I can get the minutes of the previous meetings of the entire delegation, which actually pushed evacuation through. Senator Holman of Oregon is the chairman of this large group and I will go after him at the earliest opportunity.

38
A 1015

GRODZINS IN WASHINGTON
REPORT #7
SEPTEMBER 28, 1942

Entire day spent examining Justice Department files, briefing California letters and copying pertinent documents. Results of briefing will show when cards are analysed. Have one hundred cards to date, preponderantly anti-Japanese.

Mr. Leland Ford's early interest in the problem is seen in his letter to the Secretary of State of January 6th, urging evacuation. Ford wrote to J. Edgar Hoover, Frank Knox, and Attorney General Biddle on January 16th, again urging evacuation. The significant fact is that on January 27th, the Attorney General replied to Mr. Ford saying in part, "...the decision of this department is that the program I have outlined above, together with the extensive investigations which have been carried on by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would adequately control the problem of the Japanese population of the Pacific Coast. For this reason, and also because of the legal difficulties presently involved in attempting to intern or evacuate the thousands of American born persons of Japanese race, who are, of course, American citizens, this Department has not deemed it advisable at this time to attempt to remove all persons of the Japanese race into the interior of the country."

I consider this statement exceedingly significant. It demonstrates that as late as January 27th, the Justice Department was opposed to mass evacuation. I discussed this problem last night with Leo Gitlin. He said that it was his opinion that the decision for mass evacuation did not actually take place until after February 12th. This fits very well into the scheme of Justice Department mail. The greatest flood of mail came, I think the cards will show, between February 1st, and February 15th.

Gitlin believes (and I will check this with Ennis, who unfortunately had to leave for New Orleans last night for a week) that evacuation was actually decided upon only after Stimson, under pressure from DeWitt, asked Biddle for it point blank and Biddle replied, "This is war and you can have anything you want." The Justice Department did not back out until Ennis insisted it was not capable of handling the situation. Gitlin affirms that with the terrific public pressure that had been aroused, Biddle would have

lost his job if he had said no to Stimson. If ~~anti~~^{pro}-Japanese forces had been active, on the other hand, Biddle could have refused mass evacuation.

Gitlin is obviously trying to justify both Biddle and Ennis. Nevertheless, it is obvious that a fundamental clash existed within the Justice Department itself. Ennis was adamant in arguing for the retention of the old system. Biddle, with terrific public pressure opposed to him, with Clark on DeWitt's side, and with Stimson applying personal coercion, wavered and the thing was carried.

There are still many gaps in this story but I do think it is beginning to approximate a complete picture. The gaps I am quite sure I will be able to fill in conference with Ennis, Rowe, and Lamb.

GROZINS IN WASHINGTON
REPORT #8
SEPTEMBER 29, 1942

Notes on P.O.

A1055

DJustice
^

The number of briefs of letters now approached 400. A cursory examination of the mail after February 20, shows the awakening of liberal sentiments in favor of hearing boards for individual Japanese. The immobilization of liberal groups before February 20, is difficult to explain. From the point of view of the Japanese, it is tragic. Mr. Ennis confirmed Mr. Gitlin's statement that evacuation might not have taken place if these liberal statements had appeared earlier.

I hope to finish with the Justice Department files about the end of this week. I have an appointment with Mr. Ennis for Monday or Tuesday evening of next week when "we will work all night" to put together a consecutive story. After that, Mr. Ennis will arrange interviews for me with Messers Rowe and Fahy. After that, also, I will see Mr. Clark.

Material being copied from Mr. Ennis' personal files which ^{is} ~~are~~ informative about the following topics: (1), the large farming organizations put concerted pressure on the Attorney General personally in support of evacuation. Letters in the file include messages from the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association of Central California, The Ralph E. Myers Company, S. D. Christerson, and the California ^{Prune} ~~Peach~~ and Apricot Growers' Association.

(2), Conclusive data to the effect that the Justice Department had a long list of Japanese deemed dangerous, who were incarcerated immediately upon the outbreak of war. This is substantiated in the Ringle report (Naval Intelligence) part of which is attached.

(3) The survey of public opinion on the West Coast by the Division of Intensive Surveys, which shows that there was no concerted mass opinion for evacuation at the end of January.

(4) The decisive part played in evacuation by Manchester Boddy, publisher of the liberal Los Angeles Daily News. Boddy's letters to the Attorney General are being copied and Ennis will report a conference that was had with him in Washington. Boddy's idea was a voluntary evacuation camp for the Japanese to

which they could go before being permanently employed in other sections of the country. Apparently he was very influential.

(5) When the February 19th Proclamation was made, plans were only laid for voluntary evacuation. Mass evacuation was decided upon only after trouble in communities to which the Japanese wished to go. Ennis will fully substantiate this next week. Documents in the files are only indicative.

(6) Continued evidence of conflicts between the Justice Department and the War Department.

(7) Substantiation of the statement that I had only received verbally before, that the policy promulgated at the recent San Francisco meeting of WRA authorities is one of using WRA camps as a faucet from which Japanese will be sent for employment in the central regions of the country.

* * *

GRODZINS IN WASHINGTON
REPORT #9
OCTOBER 2, 1942

Since my last report, I have had interviews with: (1), Congressman Anderson of California. It is Mr. Anderson's 305 resolution that is aimed at depriving Japanese Americans of citizenship. I could only talk briefly with the congressman since I had a previous appointment, but he is the first man in Washington that I have spoken to who has the intelligence to look forward to the post-war period and ~~to~~ actively ^{to} plan some solution of the Japanese problem before the war is over. This statement seems true whether or not you agree with Anderson's own peculiar solution. I have an appointment with him for 3:00 P.M. Monday afternoon. He will turn over his file material to me and furthermore will write introductions for me to the leaders of the California farm pressure groups. (2), Senator Hiram Johnson, of California. Mr. Johnson is senile. ^{BUT REALLY!!!} His secretary has promised to look up some material for me which I will be able to examine at 2:30 P.M. Wednesday. (3), Mr. Mitchell, secretary to Senator Wallgren of Washington. He will turn over the Senator's material which I may examine on Tuesday afternoon. (4), The secretary of Senator Thomas of Utah. Thomas is one of General Barrow's best friends and almost a liberal. I have an appointment to see him at 3:00 P.M. Tuesday.

By consolidating material from the files of Tolan, Ford, Holman, the Justice Department and others that I will get next week, I will be able to put together a rather complete story of the work of the congressional delegations. This will form one of the main chapters of my final report.

The following items of importance were found in the various files: (1), As late as February 10, 1942, the Justice Department refused to designate a military area from which the army had requested both aliens and citizens to be removed. This information is contained in a letter from James Rowe, Assistant to the Attorney General, to the Honorable James Forrestal, Under-secretary of the Navy. It substantiates all I have said of the sudden manner in which mass evacuation was planned. (2), It was the WRA, // and not the Army that insisted upon the end of voluntary evacuation. This was done because of the riots and threats of riots where Japanese appeared. Information from memoranda of Mr. Ennis, following phone conversation with Mr. Eisenhower.

GR - Report #9, October 2, 1942

(3), The attitude of the Assistant to the Attorney General is shown by his comment about the letter of R. P. Alexander. I am enclosing a copy of this comment and of the letter. (4), I am enclosing also for your information a memorandum of Mr. Ennis' in regard to the WRA's policy of releasing more Japanese.

I apologize for the skimpiness and inadequacy of this report but I am exceedingly busy in the collection of data and so far have not had sufficient time to digest it or to dictate a detailed report. I think, however, that I am covering a reasonable part of the field and that fuller reports can be written at moments of greater leisure.

* * *

Congress

GRODZINS IN WASHINGTON
REPORT #10
October 7, 1942

1- Interview with Senator Thomas of Utah, October 6, 1942.

Not coming from one of the Pacific coast states, Senator Thomas has not been actively concerned with the evacuation and resettlement. But, having spent eight years in Japan as a missionary, he knows the Japanese people. He asked me more questions than I could ask him about the evacuation and though he refused to comment directly upon the point, it was clear that he considered evacuation an unnecessary, cruel hardship. "For a nation of 130 million to fear a minority of less than 200 thousand, most of whom are women and children, is absurd." "Nothing that the Japanese have ever done in America is as shameful as the refusal of states to accept the Japanese who voluntarily evacuated under military orders." "The Japanese are intelligent and hard working. Even in the desert spots into which they have been sent, they will be successful. The states that receive them will benefit and California will be the loser." These typify Senator Thomas' attitude. He is a great friend of the University of California and exceedingly interested in the entire study project. Though the information above is not itself of any great importance, I think Senator Thomas was sincere when he said that we could call upon him in the future for any assistance that we may desire.

2- Interview with Congressman John Costello, *October 5*

date?
Costello is a straightforward and intelligent anti-Oriental. It was he who drew up the original resolution asking for the evacuation of aliens and for the government to give assistance to dual citizens to move from the West Coast. He, among others, suggested to Congressman Lea (Senior Member of California's representatives) that the California delegation should meet in caucus on the evacuation problem. In a previous report, I noted that Senator Holman suggested to Senator Johnson that congressmen and senators should meet together from the entire Pacific coast. In other words, it is now clear that there were two congressional groups that formed at almost precisely the same time. The California

House group met on January 30, and adopted Costello's recommendation, copy of which I have. This group was called together by Congressman Lea and not only included California House members, but also ^{some} House members from Oregon and Washington. The larger Senate-House group did not meet until several days later at the call of Senator Johnson. It absorbed the first group and Senator Johnson ~~was~~ appointed committees which held frequent meetings with members of the Justice Department, the Army and the Department of Agriculture. I have copies of the minutes of most of these meetings. Costello turned his files over to me and I am making the usual records. Costello seems to have no particular animus in regard to the Japanese. Their evacuation was simply good politics.

3- Interview with Congressman John Z. Angerson, of California, *October 5*

Anderson, representing a good part of the San Joaquin Valley, is very close to the farm groups and his files show it. They also show the inspiration for his disfranchisement amendment as coming from these groups and further, the dissatisfaction of these groups when it became apparent that the amendment would not immediately rid the country of all Japanese forever. There is also a remarkable letter in his files from one of the very large farm organization to a Filipino organization which almost urges the Fillipinos to take up arms against the Japanese in California. All these things I am copying. Anderson is quite sure that his bill is dead for the present congress, but he asserts that he is determined to reintroduce it in the next session of congress. I have a copy of the State Department's negative report on the bill. It is based on the unfavorable reaction that would come from other oriental nations because of the racial discrimination.

4- Interview with Senator Wallgren's secretary, *October 6,*

He simply turned over all the files of the Senator to me and they illustrate so beautifully the pressure applied by organized groups such as the American Legion, that I am making a special little analysis of it.

The interviews above were sandwiched in between examination of file material which I am carrying out. The above represents only a small fraction of what I am finding and what I am trying to do.

~~To~~ I have full notes on the
session with Funnis last night.
They will be incorporated into the report.

Interview with Congressman Lea, October 9, 1942.

Lea is the oldest member in point of service of the California Congressional Delegation and has been from the very first a close collaborator with the American Legion and the Joint Immigration Committee. He repeated the usual clichés about the danger of sabotage, the impossibility of distinguishing between loyal and disloyal Japanese, and the perfidy of the Japanese race. Lea said that in meetings of the Delegation, Anderson and Elliott of California were most active while the men of Washington and Oregon were less interested. In Lea's files, which I examined and which were very fragmentary, there is a letter to him from Congressman Rolph of California which acknowledged a press release of the California Joint Immigration Committee of February 13, and in which Rolph states that he ~~will~~^{would} introduce the resolution contained in the press release to the House "within a few days." In these files, also, I have noticed ^{the} a very interesting fact that the resolution passed by the Del Norte County Board of Supervisors is identical with the resolution passed by the Board of Supervisors of San Benito County. This is the first such repetition that I have noted and it suggests a common pressure applied to the county boards. I have a copy of the resolution and will see if it was used in other counties. This might lead to some interesting insights.

GR REPORT #12 - Page 3

In these files also, I noticed the Pacific Rural Press of December 27, which had an article calling for ~~some~~ work on the Japanese problem.

GR REPORT #12 - Page 3

In these files also, I noticed the Pacific Rural Press of December 27, which had an article calling for some work on the Japanese problem.

Interview with Congressman Jerry Voorhis, October 9, 1942.

Mr. Voorhis is the youngest and the most reasonable of the congressmen that I have met. I was told by Congressman Gearhart that Voorhis at first opposed evacuation. Voorhis denied this but said that he had (1) pleaded for same and fair treatment and (2) argued with his colleagues over their statement that "every Japanese was disloyal." Voorhis said that he had grave doubts over the necessity of evacuation but that he had finally decided that it was necessary because:

1. He feared that attack by the Japanese on the West Coast was feasible at one time and that in such circumstances some of the alien Japanese might be forced to collaborate with the enemy and that some indeed might want to collaborate ~~with them~~; and
2. If the Japanese actually attacked, he was afraid that vigilantes would spring up in California and "indulge in mass murder."

* * *

GRODZINS IN WASHINGTON

REPORT # 13

OCTOBER 12, 1942

Interview with Congressman Coffee, of Washington, October 12, 1942.

I talked with Coffee in the cloakroom of the House and he had the following ~~statements~~ things to say:

1- Voorhis and Coffee were the only ones who had a "reasonable attitude" toward the Japanese. Voorhis said that the flag-waving in the meetings of the Congressional Delegation was "so damned disgusting that after the first three meetings I just forgot to go." "Ford, Costello and Elliott were the worst yowlers about the 'yellow bastards.'" "Even Welsh, of California surprised me by joining in."

2- Coffee says that his definite impression is that the War Department was not at all anxious to take over evacuation and that he is sure the War Department would not have taken action if it had not been for the strong remonstrance of the Congressional Delegation and the strong recommendations sent to President Roosevelt. In Coffee's own words, "The War Department needed prodding, and the flag wavers supplied it."

3- Coffee said that mail was evenly divided on mass evacuation, but that he saved none of it. He is sure, however, that he received "less than fifty pieces all told."

4- Coffee believes most Japanese are loyal and is greatly worried over the fact that camp conditions will shake this loyalty.

5- Coffee thinks that the reason so many of the chambers of commerce were interested in getting rid of the Japanese is because many of the individual members had a chance for personal financial gain ^{especially} out of Japanese land transactions, ~~especially.~~

Interview with Congressman Harry R. Sheppard, October 12, 1942.

Congressman Sheppard is an ex-secret service agent of the U. S. Army. He expressed interest in our study but refused point blank and absolutely to let me examine his file material. The reason he gave for this was that he had five or six fellow ex-secret service men with whom he corresponded and with whom, also, he had an unwritten agreement of absolute secrecy. "One man once showed some of our correspondence and as a result another one met a horrible death," he explained. I told him I would write a letter to him explaining our purposes and asking him to write to his correspondents asking them for permission for us to examine the mail. ~~but~~ (I really don't think it's that important.)

Sheppard took an early stand for complete evacuation "regardless of any minute constitutional rights of citizens." He did this because of his dependence upon the correspondence mentioned above and because of some documents that the Korean Society turned over to him. He believes firmly in the perfidy of the Japanese as a race and "I am willing to take a public stand upon this issue at any time." He was in complete agreement with Leland Ford's program. As far as ^{the} post war period, "I am in favor of sending every Japanese and every Japanese American back to Japan and ridding this land of them forever."

Interview with Congressman Richard J. Welch, October 12, 1942

Next to Lea, Welch has the longest service in Congress of the California representatives. He is an elderly man and referred to me kindly as "son." He used the same word with reference to the Japanese, but added three others. Welch is apparently of a higher degree of general intelligence than Ford or Sheppard, but displayed almost unbelievable naivete in his conception of racial characteristics. Thus, "the ~~Japanese~~ Chinese are trustworthy, gentle people; the Filipinos mind their own business and are addicted almost exclusively to sexual crimes; the Japanese are completely untrustworthy."

Welch said that ^{he was} ~~he~~ very early ~~was~~ in complete agreement with the program of mass evacuation but that he consistently argued for decent treatment for the evacuees. As far as the post war period, however, Welch is "in favor of repatriating every one of them

Oct., 12, 1942

if this is possible. " " If it is not possible, we will continue to have a horrible problem on our hands."

Welch is sure that the Army had not ^{believed in} thought of mass evacuation until it was convinced of the necessity by the congressional delegations.

He refused to turn over his files to me because, he said, the letters from California meant nothing. Everyone knew, and had known for a long time, that the Japanese were completely unreliable and had to be moved. The mail, therefore, was of no influence as far as he was concerned.

Welch wrote the exclusion section of the Filipino Independence Act at the request of V. S. McClatchey and is very proud of his friendship with McClatchey.

Interview with Senator Sheridan Downey, October 13, 1942.

Downey, like Coffee and Voorhis, has a much more scientific attitude toward racial characteristics and believes, "90% of the Japanese are loyal to the United States." He said that he had taken an attitude in the congressional delegation meetings much less strong than he would have liked to, but that he thought he accomplished more by not butting up against Ford and his cohorts too sharply. He lamented that his most potent argument for the decent treatment of the Japanese had to be a selfish one, namely, that unless the Japanese were treated fairly, the American prisoners in Japan would suffer the consequences. This, he said, was the only argument that had any effect upon Ford and the other hotheads.

Downey said that Ford and Elliott were exceedingly unreasonable at the meetings, shouting and swearing at the tops of their voices and yelling all sorts of unbased accusations at the Japanese Americans. He said he thought he might be mobbed when he declared in one of these meetings that he considered the Nisei just as good an Americans as anyone else. Downey supported the Justice Department to the end, even making a radio speech on its behalf on February 3 (I have copy) but he he finally agreed to evacuation because of the preponderant public opinion and because, like Voorhis, he feared what might happen to the Japanese in the hands of vigilantes.

Downey, like others, testified that the impetus for mass evacuation did come from the Army but rather came from the congressional delegations.

Oct. 12, 1942

Downey said that he hoped that the Japanese population could be assimilated into our population after the war and he deplored the movement to deprive them of citizenship rights or to send them back to Japan. Downey said he is writing a book that will have the opposite thesis of Mein Kampf, namely that civilization will advance only by cooperation among the races and utilization of the talents of each race where they are best fitted.

Interview with Congressman Rolph, October 13, 1942.

Rolph, of San Francisco, is the only congressman I have met who looks like a congressman and talks like a congressman. I judge him to be a political windbag.

"The congressional delegations acted as a unit in this thing. There was no doubt that we had a job to do and we did it. The Japanese were not to be trusted so they had to be moved."

Rolph said that the impetus for mass evacuation was definitely not the Army's and not congressmen's either. "Rather it came from the people and the congressmen simply transmitted it to the Army. The President was most cooperative in accepting their recommendations."

Rolph talked about the thousands of letters that he received but an examination of his files showed less than 50. His secretary said that no mail was thrown out and allowing for the maximum file misplacement, I don't see how he received more than a hundred, all told.

The only new aspect that is indicated in his files, ^{is} ~~was~~ a reference to four resolutions presented at the meeting of February 5 by ~~the~~ groups from San Francisco, Los Angeles, Fresno and Sacramento. I have quotations from these resolutions but ~~did~~ do not have the names of the groups which presented them. I hope to find out who they were from Ingebretsen of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce tomorrow afternoon.

As far as the post war period, Rolph refused to commit himself. "We have to win the war first. After that we will decide what to do with the Japanese."

Note on talk to Ennis, Oct. 10: I asked Ennis about the congressional response to the testimony of Admiral Stark to the effect that the West Coast could not be successfully

Oct. 12, 1942

attacked in force: "The congressmen simply told the Navy representative to go to hell
and that ^{stark} ~~he~~ didn't know what he was talking about. They pointed out the errors at
Pearl Harbor and said that they refused to accept ~~his~~ professional advice. Their
attitude was 'we know better: we refuse to have another Pearl Harbor in Los Angeles.'"

#####

GRODZINS IN WASHINGTON
REPORT #14
OCTOBER 14, 1942

Interview with Congressman Ward Johnson, of California, October 14, 1942.

Johnson said that he had many personal conferences with Attorney General Biddle, with whom he is well acquainted, even before the formal meetings of the congressional delegations. Johnson is a lawyer, ^{but} ~~and~~ his argument was "To hell with constitutional rights, move them all out now and discuss it later." Biddle's reaction ~~to this~~ was, "We are considering methods of doing this" but he never would commit himself and obviously was reluctant to take any action.

Johnson is sure that the War Department was also reluctant to take on mass evacuation until congressional pressure was applied.

"I am convinced that the Japanese will never be assimilated into our civilization -- they just don't have the background," Johnson asserted. When I interrogated him about post war plans, he said that he had no definite program ~~to~~ to put forward at this time, but that he was considering seriously, after careful and long thought, ~~and~~ proposing that the Japanese be given the alternative of (1) being repatriated, or, (2) accepting sterilization. The last idea was a new one to me and I ~~asked~~ asked him about legal difficulties. He simply shrugged his shoulders and said, "Anything is possible, and the Japanese menace must be destroyed in America."

I looked through Johnson's files but they were obviously incomplete, containing less than twenty letters on the Japanese problem. He said, all told, however, that he had not received very many.

Interview with Congressman Albert E. Carter, October 14, 1942.

Compared to Johnson, Carter is a reasonable man. He said that he attended very few of the meetings of the congressional delegations because he was convinced that the matter should be handled by the Army and that he had no business influencing policy in a matter on which he had no special information or competence. He did think, however, that evacuation of citizens and aliens was a necessary thing but did not

OCT. 14, 1942

realize that the congressional delegations had been so potent in bringing evacuation about. His own constituents were mainly worried about the hardships of evacuation on aged Italians and Carter had aided ^{them} that as much as possible. He also was instrumental in passing a special appropriation of \$300,000 for the Justice Department to investigate aliens on the West Coast, prior to evacuation. This appropriation, incidentally, was not requested by the Justice Department.

Carter dodged the question re post war policy by saying, "We have to win the war first." His files showed only 32 communications about the Japanese.

Interview with Congressman Ed V. Izac, October 14, 1942.

Congressman Izac had one interesting addition to the story that is shaping up: he said that it was his definite impression that many of the anti-administration Republicans (Senator Johnson of Calif., Holman, and Mott of Oregon, by name) ~~did~~ use ^{and} the Japanese situation and later the Pacific coast defense criticism as a means by which they could make political profit. Izac was most positive in this statement and said that it was apparent to all. "In great part, it was ^a move to embarrass the Roosevelt government." Izac said that this was most noticeable in later meetings of Holman's committee, which was investigating the West Coast defense set-up. This was after evacuation took place.

Izac said that he is sure that the Army was only a little less unwilling than the Justice Department to accept mass evacuation. He said it never would have happened if the congressional delegations had not applied such terrific pressure on the President, the Attorney General and the Secretary of War. He was surprised to learn from me that the War Department finally became so insistent upon the matter.

Izac is a militarist and when I asked him about the post war policy toward the Japanese in America, he countered by asking: "Are we going to let the menace ^A hit us again in 30 years?" He thinks that the United States will have to take over "every island in the Pacific Ocean except the Japanese islands themselves."

Oct. 14, 1942

As for the place that the Japanese Americans would have in this set-up, he seemed to have no definite ideas, ^B but he did give ^{He} a definite impression that he was in favor of liquidating the Japanese Americans in this country in some fashion.

Interview with James C. Ingebretsen.

Mr. Ingebretsen is the Washington representative of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, which maintains elaborate offices in the Farruget-Medical Building. I became interested in him because I saw a copy of the attached communication in every congressman's files and because recommendations 1 and 2 of this communication were so closely followed by the delegations at the February 4th meeting.

Ingebretsen is a youngish man, obviously proud of his position, and vain about the close personal relationships he maintains with the congressmen and senators of California. He said that his chamber of commerce became interested ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ the Japanese problem as early as December 20--which, I think, gives the Chamber of Commerce the distinction of being the first group to take action on the Japanese problem. Ingebretsen said that the Chamber of Commerce had deliberately kept in the background because "We frequently accomplish measures for the public good more easily by remaining anonymous."

Ingebretsen said:

1- He had conferred with Congressman Costello before the January 30th meeting and had assisted Costello in drawing up the resolution adopted at that meeting.

2- He had gone to several luncheon meetings that the Congressmen held before January 30th at which the Japanese problem was discussed and at which "various representatives and various writers" had urged evacuation. One of these writers, he is certain, was one of the authors of "Mutiny on the Bounty." Several newspaper columnists also spoke.

3- He was the only person, other than the congressmen themselves, who was allowed to be present at many of the meetings that were held. He assisted in drawing up the resolution and in formulating the policy recommended to the President. "All

Oct. 14, 1942

"... told, ~~he~~[↓] was a very useful person to have around because ~~he~~[↓] was well acquainted with the problem both on the coast and in Washington and enjoyed the confidence of the congressional representatives as well as groups from the Pacific coast."

4- There was no organization of various chambers of commerce. "It was not necessary to organize. We saw very early that the thing could be carried."

Ingebretsen said that he had some brief written reports of the early meetings that he had transmitted to his home office. These are exceedingly important if at all complete, since none of the congressmen kept records of the early meetings. Ingebretsen ~~is~~[↓] had his secretary bring out the file at my request and almost turned it over to me then and there. At the last moment, however, he said he would have to confer with his superior who was in Washington and that I could call him in the morning to see if the file would be made available. I hope it will! If it won't, I think I can get some more information by correspondence.

Interview with Armando DiGirolamo, Chief of the Records Division of the Department of Justice, and Mr. Mayhall, his chief assistant., October 13, 1942.

I went to see these people because I was worried over the fact that, all told, we have found only approximately 1600 letters on the Japanese problem in the Justice Department files, whereas, estimates of the number of letters received by Ennis, Gitlin and other officials were from five to ten thousand. I thought that if only 1600 letters (with 10% added for errors in filing and briefing) had been received, this in itself was a significant fact. On the other hand, I thought if a much larger number had been received, my survey would be very incomplete.

It is the firm and definite opinion of these gentlemen that no more than 1600 (with ~~10~~[↓] possible 10% error) were received on the general problem. They recounted to me the many errors in mail judgment of officials that were continuously made. "To somebody who has to answer them, a hundred letters seem like a thousand and the officials of the Department never know exactly how many letters they receive. Furthermore, they always greatly exaggerate the number. On one problem, when we received by

Oct. 14, 1942

Page 5 - Report #14

by actual count 19,000 letters, one of the Attorney General's assistants estimated they were 'over 200,000.'"

These men are experts in mail and filing problems and are in the best position to know exactly how much mail was received. I think we can fairly accept their decision that we have briefed all the general letters that came in on the Japanese evacuation.

#####

V Interview with Congressman Carl Hinshaw, October 16, 1942.

Congressman Hinshaw represents a Los Angeles district. He looks intelligent but at times talks nonsense. He repeated every one of the Japanese horror stories that I have heard and even added a few more. These include the old saw about the Japanese gardener ("Next year you work for me."), the Japanese maid ("No mistress, I won't kill you if Tojo tells me to but I will burn your house down."), the Japanese golf players (they were all told about Pearl Harbor in advance and so did not show up for their golf game on December 7,), and the flashing lights in the hills (they were signals to submarines as well as to airplane pilots who were to bomb Los Angeles).

All these stories convinced Hinshaw of the necessity for evacuation and he actively pushed it. Later he was the chairman of one of the subcommittees on national defense. He has no particular views as far as the post war period is concerned. He did not save his mail on the problem.

VI Interview with Congressman Thomas F. Ford, October 16, 1942.

Thomas is a more reasonable man than Leland. But he wholeheartedly was in favor of moving every Japanese out of California and is the chief critic of the "damned fool stunt of putting all those Japs next to the Los Angeles water supply at Manzanar." The danger of this situation was the thing he insisted upon talking about. He refused to comment about the post war solution of the Japanese problem by saying that, at this moment, he was disturbed by the loss of his nephew in action, that he could not think rationally

Page 6 - Report #15

about the Japanese and would therefore make no statement in regard to them at this time.

VII Interview with Robert Lamb of the Tolson Committee, October 16, 1942.

One of my greatest regrets is that I have not had more time to talk with Lamb during the last three weeks. He is certainly one of the best informed men in Washington about the Japanese and one of the most intelligent people I have met. I went to see him to check with him on some of my results. He was delighted with some of the evidence that I told him about and promised to do anything he could for us in completing the data. During our discussion, we agreed that if we could find the person who had inspired John B. Hughes to begin his series of broadcasts, we would probably find one of the chief instigators of evacuation. I noted with surprise suddenly during the meeting that McLemore, Limpus and Young were all I.N.S. or King Features employees. They were among the very first to urge evacuation. ^{work for} These are all Hearst syndicates and Lamb added the interesting fact that Hughes has a long record of friendship with Hearst organizations.

Lamb is a good friend of Rowe in the Attorney General's office. I suggested to him that he try to get Rowe to make an examination of Hughes to see if we could find, actually, some organization behind Hughes' evacuation ideas. Because it is clear that the organization behind Hughes is also probably the organization behind Limpus, Young and McLemore. Lamb agreed to urge the investigation of Hughes, after I send him some material about Hughes' public statements. This I will do immediately upon returning to Berkeley. Lamb gave me a very good idea. That is, to compare the names of those people who wrote letters on evacuation with the membership lists of the Associated Farmers that were published in the LaFollette Committee hearings.

Lamb has some wild sounding ideas, which he admits are wild, but which may have some semblance to the truth. Thus, he amplified my statement about the anti-administration political angle of evacuation. He said there very well might be a connection between the evacuation movement and America-First -- German Bund activities on the West Coast; that the Hearst line up of Hughes, et al, might very well be closely tied up with the "McCormick-Patterson-Pegler-McLemore Axis" and that he would try to send me some information about this.

No more time for this though I ^{do} have some more data. It has been a beautiful 5 days in Washington.