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WRA Library Washington

War Relocation Authority
Employment Division
February 8, 1943

CHICAGO RELOCATION OFFICE

| | | |
|--------|-------------------------|------|
| CAF-12 | Relocation Supervisor | 4600 |
| CAF-11 | Asst. Reloc. Supervisor | 3800 |
| CAF-11 | Asst. Reloc. Supervisor | 3800 |
| CAF-11 | Relocation Officer | 3800 |
| CAF-9 | Relocation Officer | 3200 |
| CAF-9 | Assoc. Reloc. Officer | 3200 |
| CAF-9 | Assoc. Reloc. Officer | 3200 |
| CAF-7 | Asst. Reloc. Officer | 2600 |
| CAF-5 | Senior Clerk | 2000 |
| CAF-4 | Clerk | 1800 |
| CAF-3 | Asst. Clerk-Steno. | 1620 |
| CAF-3 | Asst. Clerk-Steno. | 1620 |
| CAF-3 | Asst. Clerk-Steno. | 1620 |
| CAF-2 | Junior Clerk-Steno. | 1440 |

Minneapolis, Minn. F.S.

| | | |
|--------|-----------------------|------|
| CAF-11 | Relocation Officer | 3800 |
| CAF-9 | Assoc. Reloc. Officer | 3200 |
| CAF-3 | Asst. Clerk-Steno. | 1620 |

Milwaukee, Wis. F.S.

| | | |
|--------|--------------------|------|
| CAF-11 | Relocation Officer | 3800 |
| CAF-9 | Assoc. Reloc. Off. | 3200 |
| CAF-3 | Asst. Clerk-Steno. | 1620 |

Madison, Wisc. F.S.

| | | |
|--------|--------------------|------|
| CAF-11 | Relocation Officer | 3800 |
| CAF-3 | Asst. Clerk-Steno. | 1620 |

Peoria, Ill. F.S.

| | | |
|--------|--------------------|------|
| CAF-11 | Relocation Officer | 3800 |
| CAF-3 | Asst. Clerk-Steno. | 1620 |

Rockford, Ill. F.S.

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|--------|--------------------|------|
| CAF-11 | Relocation Officer | 3800 |
| CAF-3 | Asst. Clerk-Steno. | 1620 |

Indianapolis, Ind. F.S.

| | | |
|--------|--------------------|------|
| CAF-11 | Relocation Officer | 3800 |
| CAF-9 | Assoc. Reloc. Off. | 3200 |
| CAF-3 | Asst. Clerk-Steno. | 1600 |

Fort Wayne, Ind. F.S.

| | | |
|--------|--------------------|------|
| CAF-11 | Relocation Officer | 3800 |
| CAF-3 | Asst. Clerk-Steno. | 1620 |

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington

May 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE STAFF

From: M. S. Eisenhower, Director

Subject: Functions of the Employment Division

The name of the Reemployment Division has been changed to the Employment Division. Subject to change, this division will be concerned with the subjects outlined below. These subjects indicate the scope of the activities of the Division in the relocation centers, in the regional office and in the Washington headquarters. In operation, the functions of the Employment Division will divide up among these three levels of organization within the War Relocation Authority.

Functions of the Employment Division:

- (a) To study and investigate opportunities for gainful employment and to make recommendations with regard to them.
- (b) To recruit the work force necessary for each employment opportunity.
- (c) To study the problem of re-training and to make recommendations as to the necessity and scope of re-training activities.
- (d) To study and recommend the adoption of and changes in occupational classifications, remuneration, hours, and other working conditions.
- (e) To study the adjustment of the worker to the job and to recommend necessary reassignments.
- (f) To establish and maintain employment records.

/s/ M. S. Eisenhower

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Washington

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/s/ M. S. Eisenhower

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON

May 8, 1943

MEMORANDUM

To: Relocation Supervisors, Employment Division

From: Leland Barrows, Executive Officer

Subject: Administrative Procedures for Field Offices Of
The Employment Division

This supersedes my memorandum of February 6, 1943, all copies of which should be destroyed. The Relocation Supervisor at the Relocation Office will handle all administrative details for his own Office and the Field Stations in the area under his office. The staff in the Field Stations who wish administrative services should notify the Relocation Supervisor.

I. Personnel

A. Classification :

No appointments can be made except to positions previously classified and established. All positions will be classified by the War Relocation Authority's Classification Staff in Washington.

A set of model jobs has been established by Washington. Descriptions with position numbers of jobs above \$1800 are attached. The Relocation Supervisor will receive an approved personnel organization chart showing the positions he is authorized to fill in his area. Modification of the approved organization may be made, with approval from Washington, in order to retain flexibility in meeting changing needs. In particular, Relocation Supervisors may make an appointment to a field headquarters at a lower grade than that shown on the chart, if the duties and responsibilities at that headquarters conform more closely to the duties and responsibilities described in the standard description for the lower grade position. If establishment of a new job or one in addition to the quota is desired, the Supervisor should submit the request and justification to the Chief of the Employment Division in Washington who will, if approval is granted, arrange for the classification. Two copies of description listing actual duties and responsibilities of the individual particular position should accompany all the requests for appointments.

The approved area chart indicates the maximum number of clerical assistants that may be employed. The Relocation Supervisor may determine what functions to assign to each to meet requirements of his organization.

Relocation Supervisors are, however, authorized to fill only so many of such jobs as their quotas specify. If more jobs are felt necessary a request must be made to the Chief of the Employment Division, accompanied by a written justification for such additions.

B. Recruiting

The filling of War Relocation Authority jobs is subject to the approval of the Civil Service Commission; therefore, the staff should be recruited from lists of eligibles secured from the Civil Service Commission; or from people already working for the Government and so possessing Federal status; or, in case of a person with no Civil Service Certification and no Federal experience, on the basis of Civil Service approval following submission of the applicant's qualifications on Form 57 to the Civil Service Commission.

A set of minimum qualifications for each position paying over \$1800 is attached. Substitution of comparable qualifications for required education and experience may be accepted subject to approval of the Washington Office.

C. Washington Approval

Approval of the Director must be secured for: appointments to positions carrying a salary of \$3200 or more; promotions and reassignments which do not meet the requirements of the Civil Service Commission's Departmental Circular 257, Revised; and all disciplinary actions. For Washington approval of an appointment, one copy of Form 57 executed by the applicant should be sent to Washington with one copy of Form OEM-28 covering it in transmittal. This should be sent to the Chief of the Employment Division. Approval or disapproval of the appointment will be wired back.

For disciplinary actions, the same should be followed, except that if Form 57 has previously been submitted, it need not be sent to Washington at this time.

In the case of promotions or reassignments which do not comply with Circular 257, one copy of S.F.-62, with parts A and C completed, must accompany the OEM-28.

D. Processing of Appointments

For appointments to positions anywhere in the territory under the Relocation Office, papers should be submitted to Washington as follows, through the Relocation Office:

OEM-28 in triplicate signed by the Relocation Supervisor, three copies of Form 57, two of which should be notarized, and Civil Service authority.



The Washington office will verify the existence of a classified position and journalize the action. The employee's copy of the journal (white copy) will be sent to the relocation supervisor for distribution to the employee. A second copy will be sent for the relocation supervisor's files. Payroll and audit copies will be sent directly to the appropriate CAS offices. Relocation Offices will be notified by wire of approval of appointments, and it will be the responsibility of the Relocation Offices to arrange for the employees to report for duty. The entrance on duty date should be sent, by wire, to the Personnel Management Section in Washington on the day the employee is inducted. Arrangements should be made for inductions at the various Relocation Offices and Field Stations.

In case of a termination, three copies of OEM-28 should be forwarded to Washington together with a copy of Form OEM-11.

E. Change of Official Station

Transfers involving change of official stations at government expense must be in the interest of the government and not for the convenience of the employee. The authority to incur traveling expenses and expenses for movement of household goods, incident to such transfer, must be authorized in advance by the Director or the Acting Director. This authority may not be delegated. The Personnel Section of the Washington Office will secure directoral approval, in such cases, on OEM Form 598, upon receipt of the following information by letter or wire from the Relocation Supervisor: Date employee is starting to travel, method of travel, and effective date of transfer. Upon approval, authority to travel will be wired. The original and one file copy of the 598 will be sent to the Relocation Supervisor. The original should be forwarded to the employee concerned. Two copies will be sent to the appropriate CAS office for fiscal purposes.

According to decisions of the Comptroller General, Federal employees must pay their travel expenses to their first post of duty. Temporary assignment for training in a city other than that where actual duties are performed does not establish a post of duty. Actual duties must be performed at one place for a reasonable period, generally set at a month, to establish a post of duty. If a new employee is requested to report to his official station via another place for a short period of training and instructions, he may be reimbursed for any excess cost of travel above that required to go direct from his home to the official station. He may also be allowed per diem at the place of training.

F. Leave

Leave will be handled by the Fiscal Office of Central Administrative Services. Leave Slips, Form OEM-8, should be executed for absences, approved, and forwarded to Central Administrative Services. The Relocation Supervisor has the authority for final

approval of leave of all employees in his area. Leave regulations can be ascertained from Administrative Instruction No. 13.

G. Efficiency rating

An efficiency rating must be prepared after March 31st of each year for each employee. The Relocation Supervisor should execute forms on all employees in his area, and forward them to the Chief of the Division in Washington.

H. Payrolling

All payrolling will be handled by Central Administrative Services, which will be responsible for timekeeping, certification of the payroll, and issuance of the checks to the employees at their address of employment. Cooperation of the Relocation Supervisor may be requested by Central Administrative Services on these points.


II. Finance

Each area will be given an allotment on the basis of a budget submitted to the Executive Officer. The budget should include estimates under each major breakdown supported by organization charts and other justification material. The allotment will be made to the Relocation Supervisor, and the Regional Manager of Central Administrative Services will be notified of the allotment and be requested to furnish all accounting services.

The allotment will cover the entire area, including all Field Stations under the Relocation Office, and will be broken down by objective classification. That is, so much will be specifically allotted for salaries, so much for rent and utilities, so much for travel, etc. Each objective classification must be treated as a separate allotment and this amount may not be exceeded even though there is a balance under some other objective classification. If the allotment needs adjustment later on, a new budget estimate should be prepared and forwarded to the Chief of the Employment Division who will take it up with the Executive Officer. If a supplementary allotment is made, the Relocation Supervisor and the Regional Manager of Central Administrative Services will be notified.

Obligation against the allotments for personnel, travel, procurement, etc., can only be authorized by the Relocation Supervisor, and his signature, or that of someone to whom he officially details the responsibility during his absence from headquarters, must appear on all authorizing documents.

It is suggested that each Relocation Supervisor have a memorandum account of the allotment maintained in his office so that he will be able to keep up to date with obligations and balances. This memorandum account should be checked from time to time with the official figures of the Central Administrative Services Regional Fiscal Office, but it probably will be more convenient for constant reference than



depending on Central Administrative Services for figures in each case. The Relocation Supervisor will be responsible for keeping within his allotment. One copy of each allotment account will be furnished to Relocation Supervisor by Central Administrative Services Regional Office at least every 15 days. He may make sub-allotments as he wishes to individual Field Stations. If so, these will be administered by him and adjustments between Field Stations may be made without reference to Washington. The allotment itself will be available for expenditure anywhere within his area. Of course, major changes in plans of operation from the original estimate must be submitted to the Chief of the Division for approval, whether or not this represents any change in the total amount of funds needed. The Chief of the Division may request advice as to organizational soundness from the Executive Officer. The appropriation symbol to be used is 1130500.

III. Travel

Travel by the field Employment Staff can only be made on the basis of proper travel authorization. Travel authorizations for all personnel in the area including the Relocation Supervisor himself will be issued by the Relocation Supervisor. For travel outside the area, application shall be made to Chief of the Division in Washington, where authorization for the trip will be issued. This authorization will be made on Form OEM-71 made out in quintuple and signed by the Relocation Supervisor. The original goes to the traveler; other copies will be routed as follows; a copy for Relocation Supervisor's files; three copies to OEM Regional Office; one of which will be attached to the first travel voucher and forwarded to the General Accounting Office. Travel authorization should not be made for periods in excess of a month. It is suggested that the Relocation Supervisor arrange to have all travel letters expire at the close of the month so that there will be a set time for re-writing letters for all personnel in the area and thus there will be no danger of leaving anyone out.

Travel funds are limited and must be used very carefully. Each Field Station should know definitely how much money it can spend. The Relocation Supervisor may, if he wishes, adjust these amounts so that one Station spends more than another. His main concern must be to get the job done and still keep within the total amount available to him for travel. Each traveller should have a book of standard travel regulations. These can be secured from the Central Administrative Services. The rates for War Relocation Authority will be \$6.00 per diem, and 5¢ per mile when the traveller, under proper authorization, uses a privately-owned car, subject to restrictions issued by the Washington Office. If common carrier is not available, a privately-owned car or a Government car should be used. Any request for purchase of Government cars must go to the Chief of the Division in Washington, who will make arrangements with the Washington Procurement Officer. Whenever a Government-owned car is used on War Relocation Authority business, tax exemption certificates should be

used for buying gas unless a credit card is used. Arrangements for securing credit cards can be made through Central Administrative Services. Tax exemption certificates may be secured through the WRA Washington Office. Gasoline bought under a credit card is chargeable to supplies, not travel.

IV. Procurement


All procurement for the Field Stations will be made through the Relocation Supervisor's Office. The Relocation Supervisor, whether ordering for his own use or for a Field Station, will place all requisitions as follows:

A. Central Administrative Services of OEM

1. The Regional Office of Central Administrative Services, serving the area will accept requisitions for:
 - a. Office space
 - b. Office services, heat, light, water, telephone, etc.
 - c. Office supplies and equipment including WRA stationery and envelopes
 - d. Duplicating (mimeographing, multigraphing, etc.)
 - e. Books, pamphlets, periodicals, etc.
 - f. All Forms, except WRA and Standard Forms 1029 and 1094
 - g. Gas and oil credit cards
 - h. Repairs to automotive and other equipment
2. The Regional Office of CAS will handle the details for all purchases or it may refer the request to one of their District Offices if the items or services are for a Field Station of WRA.
3. Relocation Supervisors should confer with Regional Managers of CAS and work out procedures for requisitioning the various types of supplies and services.
4. Relocation Supervisors will also be required to submit advance estimates of their needs to the CAS office and should include in these estimates all materials and supplies which may require priorities.

B. Washington Office of WRA

1. The Washington office of the War Relocation Authority will supply or place orders for the following items:



- a. WRA Forms (See Administrative Instruction No. 42, Revised, Section VII.)
 - b. U. S. Standard Forms No. 1029, Government Request for Transportation, and No. 1094, U. S. Government Tax Exemption Certificates
 - c. Automobiles
2. All requests to the Washington office should be made in letter form.
 3. Prior approval of the Washington office, as required by Administrative Instruction 42, Revised, Section II, must be obtained before requisitions are placed with CAS for purchasing any of the restricted items.

V. Office Services

Each employment field headquarters should set up its own files and be sure to maintain adequate records of all public business transacted. This will be the responsibility of the War Relocation Authority staff, as well as delivery of mail, messenger service, etc. Identification cards shall be issued to all personnel in the area by the Relocation Supervisor, under procedures outlined in Administrative Instruction No. 38.

Heland Barrows

Executive Officer



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office

Redescription approved January 28, 1943

Senior Relocation Officer (CAF-12)

Under the administrative supervision of the Chief Employment Officer, CAF-15, directs the activities of a Relocation Office, and group of Field Stations operating out of the Relocation Office, in the placement and adjustment of qualified evacuees in positions where they may be of maximum service to the war effort.

Analyzes community sentiment towards evacuee employment.

Organizes local committees to assist in evacuee placement and adjustment to community life.

Maintains contact with state and local officials, FBI representatives, U. S. attorneys, law enforcement officers and similar persons to determine policies and secure assistance in executing program.

Maintains liaison with prominent members of community who are sympathetic to Authority purposes and who assist in providing contacts with employers, social and religious organizations and other groups whose cooperation is needed.

Analyzes employment needs in relation to available evacuee labor.

Maintains liaison with United States Employment Service and various other public and private employment agencies.

Informs employers of qualifications of evacuees and obtains employment orders for specific positions or groups of positions.

Locates and evaluate qualifications of individual evacuees on projects who may fill employment orders.

Analyzes and adjusts problems of evacuees who have been placed in outside employment.

Reviews labor contracts, leave agreements, and similar proposals for employment of evacuees and determine acceptability of provisions. Subject to overall policy directives, determines standards of acceptability for guidance of Relocation Officers in area.



Confers with regional OEM - CAS offices in the provision of essential services.

Selects personnel subject to approval of Washington Office in cases of key positions.

Generally outlines internal and external procedures subject to overall policy instructions from Washington Office.

Incumbent works within the general policy framework set up by the Washington Office but personally decides matters confined to area to which he is assigned. At own discretion consults on problems which may affect Authority's national program.



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office
January 28, 1943

SENIOR RELOCATION OFFICER (CAF-12)

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

Education:

Graduation from college or university of recognized standards with major study in social sciences. (Qualifying experience in addition to the minimum required below may be substituted for the educational requirements on the basis of one year of experience equal to two years of education).

Experience:

Four years of any one, or a combination of the following types of experience: (1) Personnel or employment work involving employee relations, employee placements, and/or employee training in the field of agricultural, industrial, or commercial occupations or (2) social work in a private or public agency including resettlement of minority groups, counselling, and/or adjustment of a variety of personal problems or (3) direct contact work involving the establishment and maintenance of public relations with groups or in areas of major importance, including large scale employers, industries, public and private agencies, or comparable groups, or (4) administrative work involving responsibility for installing and/or directing a program requiring the cooperation of important agricultural or industrial groups.



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office

Redescription approved January 28, 1943

Relocation Officer (CAF-11)

Under the general supervision of the Senior Relocation Officer, CAF-12, in charge of a Relocation Office, undertakes the most difficult duties connected with the relocation of evacuees in employment outside the Relocation Centers.

Organizes local committees in areas presenting major problems of relocation.

Contacts U. S. attorneys, FBI representatives, state and local officials, law enforcement agencies and other agencies or officials to obtain cooperation for furthering the program.

Maintains liaison with and attempts to secure employment of qualified evacuees in major industries with large scale employers or with businesses presenting peculiar problems. Determines possible place of employment, informing employer of types of employees available.

Assists supervisor in working out cooperative arrangements with various public and private groups such as United States Employment Service, social and religious organizations, farm organizations, etc.

Reviews standards of proposed employment of evacuees to determine acceptability and negotiates for necessary revisions rejecting those which do not meet requirements.

Analyzes and attempts to solve adjustment problems involving large or important areas.

May direct the activities of Relocation Officers of lower grade in the performance of above and related functions.

May act as head of the Relocation Office during absences of supervisor whose duties require frequent travel in the field, or may direct work in a Field Station in an area presenting particularly difficult problems.



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office
January 28, 1943

RELOCATION OFFICER (CAF-11)

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

Education:

Graduation from college or university of recognized standards with major study in social sciences (qualifying experience in addition to the minimum required below may be substituted for the educational requirements on the basis of one year of experience equal to two years of education).

Experience:

Three years of any one, or a combination of the following types of experience: (1) Personnel or employment work involving employee relations, employee placements, and/or employee training in the field of agricultural, industrial, or commercial occupations or (2) social work in a private or public agency including resettlement of minority groups, counselling, and/or adjustment of a variety of personal problems or (3) direct contact work involving the establishment and maintenance of public relations with groups or in areas of major importance, including large scale employers, industries, public and private agencies, or comparable groups, or (4) administrative work involving responsibility for installing and/or directing a program requiring the cooperation of important agricultural or industrial groups.



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office

Redescription approved January 28, 1943

Associate Relocation Officer CAF-9)

Under the direct supervision of a Relocation Officer of higher grade, in charge of a Relocation Office or a Field Station, assists in the relocation of qualified evacuees outside Relocation Centers.

Maintains continuous liaison with local committees cooperating in placement and adjustment of evacuees. Discusses problems arising in connection with evacuees and works out solution in conjunction with committees or other cooperative groups or individuals. Assists in or independently organizes committees as assigned. From observation of sentiment of various areas recommends to supervisor overall programs of action to be followed in facilitating employment and adjustment of evacuees.

Contacts employers in fields or areas of comparatively favorable sentiment to inform them of available applicants, to stimulate their interest in the program and to secure employment orders. Obtains leads on major employment possibilities to be followed up by Relocation Officers of higher grade.

Works with various public and private employment agencies in obtaining and filling employment orders.

Interviews employed evacuees, employers and other interested parties on individual problems arising in conjunction with employment of evacuees and works out complete solution. May work with Relocation Officers of higher grade in adjustment of problems involving communities having particular importance in the program.

May work with and direct the activities of Assistant Relocation Officers, CAF-7, on specific assignments. May direct work in a Field Station in an area presenting comparatively routine problems.



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office
January 28, 1943

ASSOCIATE RELOCATION OFFICER (CAF-9)

Education:

Graduation from college or university of recognized standards with major study in social sciences. Qualifying experience in addition to the minimum required below may be substituted for the educational requirements on the basis of one year of experience equal to two years of education).

Experience:

Two years of any one, or a combination of the following types of experience: (1) Personnel or employment work involving employee relations, employee placements, and/or employee training in the field of agricultural, industrial, or commercial occupations or (2) social work in a private or public agency including resettlement of minority groups, counselling, and/or adjustment of a variety of personal problems or (3) direct contact work involving the establishment and maintenance of public relations with groups or in areas of major importance, including large scale employers, industries, public and private agencies, or comparable groups, or (4) administrative work involving responsibility for installing and/or directing a program requiring the cooperation of important agricultural or industrial groups.



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office

Redescription approved January 28, 1943

Assistant Relocation Officer (CAF-7)

Under the direct supervision of the Senior Relocation Officer, CAF-12, in charge of a relocation Office, or under the direction of a Relocation Officer of higher grade, assists in the simpler activities connected with relocation of qualified evacuees.

In conjunction with a Relocation Officer of higher grade or in accordance with instructions as to procedure, studies community sentiment by interviewing various members of community, analyzing pertinent reports and publications, observing key points in community such as type of newspapers read, major sources of income, favored type of social and religious organizations, and similar indications.

Interviews voluntary evacuees and explains services available to them. Maintains routine liaison with employer groups and employment agencies in communities which have already worked out cooperative arrangements with the Authority.

Assists Relocation Officers of higher grade in informing major employers of particularly qualified evacuees. Sifts applications of evacuees to find those most qualified to fill specific positions.

Investigates individual adjustment problems and reports findings. Recommends solutions subject to review of supervisor. Assists Relocation Officers of higher grade in obtaining data about and preparing recommendations for solution of complex adjustment problems.



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office
January 28, 1943

ASSISTANT RELOCATION OFFICER (CAP-7)

Education:

Graduation from college or university of recognized standards with major study in social sciences. (Qualifying experience in addition to the minimum required below may be substituted for the educational requirements on the basis of one year of experience equal to two years of education.)

Experience:

One year of any one, or a combination of the following types of experience: (1) Personnel or employment work involving employee relations, employee placements, and/or employee training in the field of agricultural, industrial, or commercial occupations or (2) social work in a private or public agency including resettlement of minority groups, counselling, and/or adjustment of a variety of personal problems or (3) direct contact work involving the establishment and maintenance of public relations with groups or in areas of major importance, including large scale employers, industries, public and private agencies, or comparable groups, or (4) administrative work involving responsibility for installing and/or directing a program requiring the cooperation of important agricultural or industrial groups.



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office

January 28, 1943

Junior Relocation Officer (CAF-5)

Under the detailed guidance of a Relocation Officer of higher grade, assists in the performance of the simplest activities in connection with the relocation of evacuees, as a trainee for a position of higher grade.

Performs detail work in a variety of activities undertaken by Relocation Officers of higher grades. Accompanies Relocation Officers on conferences to become familiar with procedures and policies, and to assist in following up on matters discussed at the conference. Compiles and makes preliminary analyses of information on community sentiment from data supplied by various agencies or by the Relocation Officers and prepares consolidated reports for the detailed review of supervisor. Follows up on placement orders received and filled by other Relocation Officers to determine that arrangements are being completed as expeditiously as possible.

Interviews evacuee applicants for employment and makes recommendations as to qualifications.

Designs forms and works out procedures, subject to detailed review by supervisor, for the processing of various essential actions. May be assigned specific adjustment or employment problems to be worked out in accordance with detailed instructions and under direct supervision.



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office
January 28, 1943

Position #T.X-1060

JUNIOR RELOCATION OFFICER (CAF-5)

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

Education:

Graduation from college or university of recognized standards with major study in social sciences. (Experience of the type listed below may be substituted for the educational requirements on the basis of one year experience equal to two years of education.)

Experience: (To be used as substitute for education):

(1) Personnel or employment work involving employee relations, employee placements, and/or employee training in the field of agricultural, industrial, or commercial occupations, or (2) social work in a private or public agency including resettlement of minority groups, counselling, and/or adjustment of a variety of personal problems, or (3) direct contact work involving the establishment and maintenance of public relations with groups or in areas of major importance, including large scale employers, industries, public and private agencies, or comparable groups, or (4) administrative work involving responsibility for installing and/or directing a program requiring the cooperation of important agricultural or industrial groups.



Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Office
January 29, 1943

Senior Clerk (CAF-5)

As Office Manager for one of the main Relocation Offices, arranges for provision of administrative services for, and directs a small staff engaged in the clerical activities necessary for the maintenance of the office.

Maintains day to day contacts with the Regional Office of the Office for Emergency Management, Central Administrative Services, to obtain fiscal, personnel, supply, and other services. Maintains control fiscal records to supplement those provided by the Office for Emergency Management.

Makes preliminary selection of, and trains clerical assistants.

Devises, installs, and directs the use of various office procedures.

Issues and maintains control on travel authorizations.

Maintains attendance reports of all employees working out of the Relocation Office.

Greets visitors and explains the program to them in absence of Supervisor. Answers a variety of personal and telephone inquiries concerning the purpose of the office, status of specific employment cases, and related subjects.

Since supervisor and assistants will be traveling in the field, a large part of the time, the incumbent will be expected to direct the routine operations of the office with a minimum of supervision.



INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

In this paper, labor relations in the relocation centers have been analyzed to show:

1. What the dynamic factors are;
2. How they create a pattern, the recurrent elements of which are traceable in several centers; and
3. How the growing manpower shortage in the centers has put a superficially different aspect upon familiar factors involved in labor relations.

Suggestions are added which may be helpful to those concerned with center labor problems.

The information available about center labor relations has both shaped and limited much of the material presented here. Because certain examples of poor labor relations are referred to over and over again does not mean that the centers involved have more labor trouble than others. It is merely that the examples quoted are documented.

The use of only negative illustrations is also the fault of documentation. There are many instances of good supervisor-worker relations, and many competent, hard-working labor crews in the centers. Much could be learned from such positive illustrations that would be helpful in improving labor relations if we had material about them.

Dynamic factors. Both the underlying and immediate causes of labor trouble stem from the unusual structure of the center community and the relation of workers to it; the peculiar social and economic status of the residents; and relations between evacuees and appointed personnel on the job.

Because relocation centers differ from normal communities "outside", they have an unusual employment situation fraught with labor difficulties. Every center has had at least one work stoppage and some have had many.

Unlike residents of normal communities, evacuees are restricted in movement unless they relocate; and they must take up all matters, whether concerned with labor relations or daily needs with the center administration, headed by the Project Director. Evacuees, unlike people outside the centers, lack freedom of economic competition since all their work is for the center and reimbursed by a small cash allotment, a weak bargaining point. As most center

work serves essential needs only, labor trouble more often than "outside" directly affects the entire community and not just the work unit with the grievance.

Resentment over evacuation from their homes in normal communities to relocation centers and their changed social and economic status make not only workers but the whole community sensitive to any suspected or actual indication of prejudice or domineering attitudes among the appointed personnel. Dissatisfied workers often find that they can count on these basic grievances to get the community behind them in a labor dispute with the administration. The community strikes at the administration and releases some of its tensions by supporting the dispute. However, it may then strongly favor a return to a peaceful equilibrium even before the direct or indirect causes of the labor friction have been eliminated. Either through public opinion or mediating bodies or both, it will work to settle the trouble.

Some labor disputes originate because evacuee workers feel that the community does not sufficiently recognize the contribution they make to public welfare. They may then strike as much at the community as at the administration and get the community to placate them with money gifts and verbal appreciation.

Pattern of labor disputes. Trouble may develop in any unit, though the hospital, the mess, janitorial services and the farm tend to have more difficulty than other units. An analysis of three, fairly well documented labor crises shows that resentment against evacuation and certain administrative steps as well as long standing conflicts between evacuees and the appointed personnel require only a very small igniting incident to cause them to flare into serious trouble. A few tactless words of a supervisor are frequently the precipitating factor. Two of the communities at first sided with the workers; the third community did not because the walkout endangered the care of hospital patients. Later the two which favored the workers withdrew their support and sought to end the trouble so that the center would be quiet again.

Manpower shortage. The major problem now in center labor relations is the manpower shortage caused by relocation, seasonal leaves, and selective service and worsened by poor distribution of available labor, low efficiency, and the accumulated, unsolved grievances of the past.

Washington has recommended Manpower Commissions composed of both evacuees and appointed personnel to study and seek solutions of the problems. They are now being formed.

Suggestions. Analysis of labor relations before crises develop is recommended to find and eliminate, when possible, sources of friction which may lead to serious trouble. Study of supervisory attitudes and relations with evacuees, improved information channels, cooperation with evacuees, particularly foremen, will also help to promote better relations.

In the event of a dispute, well stabilized channels of appeal and mediating committees should be available as well as face-saving means for both the administration and the evacuees. The administration will find it an advantage to watch for community efforts to aid in restoring center peace.

DYNAMIC FACTORS-IN LABOR RELATIONS

Basic factors affecting labor relations in the relocation centers are:

1. Structure of the center community and the relation of evacuee workers to the community.
2. The peculiar social and economic status of evacuees caused by life in the centers.
3. The job relations between evacuee workers and appointive supervisors.

Structure of a Center Community

The structure of the community in a relocation center is fundamental in understanding employment problems. Compared to communities "outside" -- the normal communities -- those in the centers are abnormal. Their origin and organization give them peculiar tensions that put an unusual aspect on their labor difficulties.

Differences between normal communities and relocation centers.
Relocation centers differ from normal communities in four major respects:

1. Residents of normal communities enjoy unrestricted movement.

Residents of relocation centers were evacuated there from their homes in normal communities. Evacuation, a basic source of emotional tension, profoundly affects labor relations in the centers. Unless the residents relocate, they are restricted in travelling outside center boundaries.

2. Normal communities are segmented societies composed of independent farmers or businessmen, laborers or white collar workers in private enterprises, and government workers. They have freedom of economic competition.

Relocation centers, on the contrary, are organized along civil service lines with ultimate responsibility resting with one person, the Project Director. Essential needs are furnished the residents; in addition, workers receive a small monthly cash allotment for their services.

3. Normal communities deal with labor and management in regard to labor problems, and with local, state, and national administrative authorities in regard to administration.

In these aspects of life the relations of center residents are always with the administration of the center.

4. In normal communities, labor problems that arise in a private business may directly affect only the business and its workers. The community as a whole is rarely drawn into the problems.

In relocation centers, employment exists chiefly to provide residents with necessary services. Consequently, labor problems frequently concern the entire center, not merely the operating unit with the grievance.

Role of a Center Community in Labor Relations

Whether a labor dispute occurs between evacuees and administration or between different groups of evacuees, the support or non-support of the community helps determine its development and solution.

Community response in evacuee-administration labor disputes.
In disputes between evacuees and administration, dissatisfied workers can often count on resentment over evacuation as a bond to rally the community around them and perhaps to bring out other workers in sympathy strikes. In supporting a strike, the community identifies itself with those opposing the administration. Sympathy strikes are part of this identification. Relatively unimportant labor issues may assume serious proportions when projected against growing tension throughout a center. Sometimes, an administrative program, like segregation or labor reduction, may stir up the latent antagonism and disturb the entire community. Then it is largely a matter of chance in which work unit active trouble springs up.

Community sentiment determines the strength of many strikes. For example, a poorly organized hospital strike at Heart Mountain had little support because the prevailing sympathy favored the patients rather than the workers. During the Minidoka boilermakers' dispute, residents protested strongly to the administration when the work stoppage caused them inconvenience.

If community support lags, it is sometimes mobilized by special pressure groups, who seize upon crises and community disorganization to further their own purposes. These groups, operating as gangs, use accusations of "inu" (dog) and "stool pigeon" as well as threats of bodily harm to bring aloof residents into line. They are not organized on block bases,

but include special political, occupational, or other interests.

In certain conflicts, however, the block does form the unit to mold opinion and mobilize support. This appeared occasionally during registration when blocks held meetings to thresh out the matter of "yes" versus "no" answers until each block could register solidly one way or the other.

Although not the result of a labor grievance, the organization of the general strike at Colorado River in November, 1942, illustrates the role of the blocks in crises. The purpose of the general strike was to effect the release of two evacuees arrested on suspicion of beating up a man thought to be a stool pigeon.

Committees representing a few blocks, after an unsatisfactory meeting with the Project Director and FBI representatives, returned to their blocks and organized to resist the removal of the two prisoners from the center. Block groups picketed the jail while their leaders drew other people into the demonstration. They held meetings to discuss the issues, petitioned Councilmen for action, and finally instructed evacuee administrative workers to strike.

Then the Council resigned in protest against the continued detention of the two men. Block leaders who had planned the demonstration mobilized the community under Issei leadership. The demonstration was on a block basis with residents assigned specific block stations.

Community response in labor disputes over prestige. Some strikes are directed not only at the administration but at an indifferent community which has not recognized the contribution of certain workers. Because workers lack satisfactory financial and perhaps supervisory recognition, they depend heavily on community appreciation as an incentive to work. Jobs with no prestige, such as janitorial work, are unpopular and difficult to keep filled. Comparing available center jobs with pre-evacuation jobs adds to the workers' disgruntled attitude and feeling of being unappreciated. Trouble easily flares up which forces the neglectful public to take note of its oversight. Minidoka janitorial workers went on a strike through which they hit as much at the community for not appreciating their contribution in low-prestige jobs as at the administration. In several centers, the community has eventually had to placate workers who felt that their hard work earned them little in wages or recognition.

For instance, at Granada in the spring of 1944, the joint Agricultural Committee of the Community Council and the Block Managers contacted slaughterhouse workers individually to smooth out misunderstandings. Then they gave these workers a testimonial dinner and money collected to supplement wages from the Authority.

While workers in jobs with little prestige usually have to command public attention to their discontent, the public spontaneously shows appreciation to workers in positions of high prestige. Hospital personnel, the outstanding example of such workers, receive both private gifts and community funds to add to their WRA wages.

Evacuee attitudes toward certain work can accentuate community cleavages. For instance, conflict between Issei and Nisei has carried over into labor relations. In the early days at Manzanar, some Issei resented Nisei getting the good office and supervisory jobs. Although this was due to education and language ability, it rankled with Issei in low-prestige jobs as laborers.

Community urge for settlement of disputes. After first supporting a dispute and letting off steam, the community tends to shift its point of view and desire a return to an organized and peaceful environment. It then participates in helping to settle labor grievances either through spontaneously expressing its opinion or through organized units of the community government.

Public opinion is important in restoring peace, even when it does not support an effective, organized mediating body. Influencing quick settlement are the public's lack of sympathy for the strikers, its withdrawal of favorable recognition or its outright condemnation.

At several centers, disputes have been mediated, with varying effectiveness, by the Labor and Fair Labor Practice Committees. Their success depends on to what extent evacuees and appointed personnel recognize the value of such committees. Without a favorable milieu, neither committee can function successfully.

Influence of Economic and Social Status on Labor Problems

Status before and after evacuation. The difference in the economic and social status of the Japanese before and after evacuation affects labor relations. Many who were self-employed on the West Coast in businesses or on farms find it hard to adjust to their new role as employees. Many who had been

employees before evacuation had worked only for Japanese.

Events since Pearl Harbor have made evacuees very sensitive to any differentiation from other people. In the centers, they are keenly aware, for example, of the sharp distinctions between themselves and the appointed personnel who are invariably in supervisory positions, receive higher salaries and special privileges, eat apart from evacuees, live in better houses, and go in and out of the center gate at will.

Evacuees are quick to react against prejudice, whether actually observed or merely suspected. A Caucasian supervisor's prejudice or discrimination leads to friction and tension which may develop into serious trouble. Workers in relocation centers will not "take things" from a disagreeable supervisor. Not only is the economic motive for doing so lacking, but workers know that if they strike their basic necessities will still be met.

Cash allotments and status. Though rarely raised as the main issue in any labor dispute, the cash allotment of \$16 or \$19 per month to workers is an extremely important element in their dissatisfaction.

Unlike in a normal community where wages are a bargaining point, the cash allotments in the centers are a weak basis for special negotiations because of their uniformity and seeming unchangeability.

The scant sum, besides being a weak bargaining point and making workers less inclined to overlook real or fancied discrimination or dominating attitudes, constantly reminds them of their reduced economic status and subordinate role in the employment hierarchy of the centers.

The wage differential between evacuees and appointed personnel is most strongly felt in regard to evacuee doctors. That evacuee doctors should receive only \$19 a month has caused much shock to the community which has made greater effort to increase the salary from their own pockets than in the case of any other occupation represented in the centers.

Because the wage differentials are so small, men often do not want to do strenuous or unpopular work for the same wage paid to office workers and others in what are regarded as "soft" jobs.

In Minidoka, for instance, farmers complained that they earned the same amount as office workers but worked harder and under less pleasant conditions. In several centers, jobs on the coal and garbage crews have been unpopular for the same reason.

Professional workers among the evacuees also feel the slight of the small wage differential. In this connection the following statement was made by an evacuee:

Supposing all the appointed personnel in the relocation center should work on the same wage scale; if the Project Director (who has heavy responsibilities) should get the same pay as the farm foreman, would there be any type of efficiency? The same applies to us.

Work habits and status. To many evacuees (but by no means all), the low wages justify poor work habits such as not putting in the full 8-hour day, slowness, sociability, and lack of seriousness. Feeling that center life is not real life and what is done in the center does not count, they do not see why "outside" rules of conduct should be carried over. A large number of evacuees firmly believe that the government has the sole responsibility of providing them with food, clothing and shelter. One man expressed this attitude clearly:

We did not ask to come here. We were forced to leave our legitimate type of work for the Caucasians to take over and make money on during the war. Therefore, if we choose not to work the government still has the obligation to see to it that we are treated right.

The attitude that evacuees are the creditors, not the debtors, in employment is strengthened by the frequent calls for volunteer labor in some centers.

At one center, at least, it is becoming nearly impossible to get any volunteer workers in making center improvements (such as building a new gym). The evacuees feel that such labor is exploitation; the following statements express this attitude:

WRA is trying to get work done for nothing in order to keep a good record for some of the administrators.

The more we volunteer, the more we will be expected to work for nothing, and it's little enough we get for what we do, as it is.

Evacuees who are concerned about the poor work habits feel, nevertheless, that they are a purely center reaction which will disappear with the center situation. Among the appointed personnel, some regard low efficiency as evidence of a subversive attitude, while others fear that poor work habits may be permanently adopted. The major complaint of the administration about evacuee labor is its inefficiency.

Evacuees have resented administrative efforts to insist on better working habits. Illustrative of the resentment is a worker's reply to a supervisor's plea for more efficiency on the basis of patriotism:

Don't give us the loyalty talk again! What the hell do you expect for \$16?

Another instance comes from Minidoka. During the boilermen's dispute, a Block Manager explained:

These men aren't working for the \$16 or \$19 that they are getting paid. They are doing it for the service of the people in this place..... A man isn't going to work his head off for \$16 or \$19.

Occasionally, indignation at pressure for more efficiency explodes into labor walkouts.

For example, at Rohwer in April, 1943, the tractor drivers of the agricultural section quit work when the timekeeping system was changed from a daily to an hourly basis and the hours worked each day were more strictly observed. The drivers, claiming that the new system did not provide for time lost by bad weather, went on strike. They returned the next day but continued to express their resentment.

At Minidoka, in July, 1943, stricter enforcement of the 8-hour day also led to a walkout. The farm field crew, already dissatisfied with working conditions, struck because the new policy was the last straw. Though they returned to work, trouble continued with a big turnover in the agricultural section.

Influence of Evacuee-Staff Relations on Labor Problems

Present labor force. In the early history of the centers, many adult Nisei were employed. As relocation got underway, however, and the most able Nisei left, supervisors had to rely more and more on Issei and young Nisei for labor. They have not found it as easy to achieve a meeting ground with Issei employees as with Nisei, and most of the younger employees are inexperienced and just out of school.

Troublesome negative attitudes of supervisors. Actual relations on the job are affected by the characteristics of the labor force, the economic and social status of workers which has made many resentful and sensitive, and the organization

of the community.

Community morale and tensions are such that a supervisor ordering men to "quit if you don't like it," or "work or get off the lot" is the final touch needed to precipitate a strike. The Minidoka boilermakers' discontent, for example, was aggravated by the supervisor telling the men he could replace them and adding that "anytime you want to quit, you quit." The men quit but nobody appeared to replace them.

In Jerome, in May, 1943, administrative demands for more efficiency and the reputed prejudice of the Caucasian supervisor against evacuees led to a Motor Pool strike. The rumor that the supervisor was prejudiced because his son or brother-in-law had been killed in the Pacific war later proved untrue. The immediate cause of the strike was the supervisor's discovery of the men resting after they had agreed to cooperate with him. Without pausing to investigate (~~it later turned out they had worked through their lunch period~~), the supervisor told them that he could get as many greenhorns who would do more work. The workers, after inviting him to go ahead and get them, walked out.

A staff member's arbitrary or overbearing manner often leads to his being accused of being anti-evacuee. Because the staff represents the government and symbolizes the Caucasians who evicted them from their homes, the community may rally around workers lined up against appointed personnel.

An instance from Jerome in the fall of 1943 illustrates this feeling against the appointed personnel. To protest against chopping wood for both the Caucasian staff and themselves and to demand the weeding out of anti-evacuee personnel, a few workers threatened to call a general strike.

Lack of positive attitudes among supervisors. Workers resent not only the negative attitudes of their supervisors but also the lack of positive attitudes and actions. An important factor in poor work efficiency, according to a manpower survey in one center, is the workers' feeling of not being appreciated when they do work hard and well. Recognition of ability and effort is vital to job morale.

Supervisors do not assign appropriate responsibility, according to evacuees, to evacuee foremen. When given, they say, the authority to back it up may not accompany it. Some supervisors consistently overlook their foremen in their relations with work crews. Or, they may suddenly interrupt the work habits established by the crew with their foreman without

consulting the foreman first. The prestige of key workers is thus hurt, and snubbing them may seem to the community the equivalent of a snub to it.

At Minidoka, in the spring of 1944, when terminations left the property-control crew short of the number called for by a new plan of distributing labor, carpenters, utility crews, and warehouse workers were asked to help the property-control crew do some unloading. They refused and were terminated.

During negotiations to reinstate the men, complaints about unsatisfactory labor relations came to the fore. Certain staff members, including supervisors, were, the workers said, not only extremely uncooperative, anti-evacuee, and domineering but used offensive language in giving orders. Evacuee foremen were not taken into the confidence of the administration on rules about working conditions and jobs to be done.

Evacuee sensitivity had probably been increased before this labor trouble by a staff member's verbal attack on the chairman of the Community Council. When evacuee leaders are disrespectfully treated or not consulted for action and cooperation, the community comes to their support. Community solidarity rests largely on its loyalty to leaders and the leaders' loyalty to the people.

Complicating the friction in the case of the property-control unit was the lack of clarity in the new labor regulations. Workers said that they did not know which division they worked for and whose orders they should take.

\ Influence of Informational Policies on Labor Problems

Unrecognized necessity for regulations. Workers have been both irritated and amused by the "red tape" involved in working in a government organization. Some of the misunderstanding in labor trouble comes from workers not recognizing why certain regulations are necessary. Had supervisors explained the regulations and the reasons for them some misunderstanding might have been averted.

Need for explaining regulations. Because rules and regulations about center employment are made by Washington and the local administration, evacuees are frequently unaware of approaching changes of policy until they are put into effect. With no hand in the changes and insufficient explanations for them, workers feel the action to be arbitrary and against their

best interests.

An example is the labor reduction program adopted in 1943 to meet budget requirements and eliminate "made work" jobs. It aroused much evacuee resistance and anxiety. Many believed it was a method to force relocation. Those who had worked out what they considered a fair relationship between the amount of work they did and the amount of money they received regarded the employment cut as a threat to the ratio.

Although the new policy was presented in the centers as a plan already decided upon, the method of making the cuts and the extent to which evacuee opinion was consulted varied from one center to another.

At Minidoka, rumors circulated about the possibility of a cut before the announcement was made. Evacuees assumed that with fewer workers there would be increased pay. Those without other sources of income worried about possible termination.

When the cut was finally announced, it was put into effect in two weeks instead of the three months allowed. The impact on the community was heavy. Evacuees held meetings to discuss the cuts. Few understood the reason for the cut, the most accepted explanation being that relocation was being pushed.

An early decision to have Community Enterprises close the movie houses, flower shops, fish shop, dry goods store, and newspaper delivery service was especially resented.

The Stewards Division was a major spot of dissatisfaction; evacuee kitchen supervisors mobilized the chefs to back them in protesting the terminations, especially of supervisors. It was finally agreed to base terminations in that division on age, marital status, number of dependents, previous occupation, and plans for relocation. When the administration decided to cut the Block Manager group in half, the news unfortunately appeared in the center paper with the names of the terminated Block Managers before the matter had been mentioned to the Block Managers themselves.

Following the cuts, a Central Services section was set up as a labor pool. Coal Division workers resisted merger with this new section for some time because of their desire to retain group identity.

Another center illustrating the effect of the 1943 labor reduction program is Granada.

The Granada administration, like that at Minidoka, found the Mess Division to be one of the most able to take reductions. The mess workers, however, refused to accept reductions without increased pay. They evidently feared that acceptance would lead to further cuts. Farm workers also held out for no cuts. To discuss the whole problem, the administration met with the Community Council and later with the Council and the Block Managers.

After consulting evacuee staff workers as to the number of workers needed in each section, the administration finally arrived at a compromise labor cut. Many were only paper cuts as the positions had been vacant. Although stokers, janitors, and runners for Block Managers were to have been cut, fear of undesirable complications led to their number remaining the same.

PATTERN OF LABOR CRISES

Immediate Causes and Areas of Flare-ups

Igniting incidents. Both the underlying and immediate causes of labor trouble in a center originate from the factors discussed above. Always active, the volcanic tensions and pressures caused by life in an abnormal community quickly erupt into quarrels and strikes when a provocative incident or remark intensifies the antagonism between evacuees and appointed personnel and heightens the resentment and unrest which started with evacuation.

For example, a superintendent may give his men a brusque order or ultimatum. Being under no economic compulsion to accept this treatment and discontented with their work status anyway, the men may walk off the job.

Trouble areas. Labor disputes can and do occur anywhere in a project. However, certain labor units, such as the mess, the hospital, janitorial services and the farm, smolder more than others. Although attempts to reduce the number of workers account for much of their difficulty, these units have been susceptible to labor disputes for other reasons also.

Because mess halls are very important in block life, the workers there are continually exposed to cross currents of block antagonisms. Trouble has originated not only over suspected favoritism by evacuees or appointed personnel in distributing food but over the preparation of food and the personalities of the chief cook and other kitchen workers.

In all centers, hospitals have been focal points for anxieties and diffuse insecurities which crystallize as concern for the health of the community. The community interests itself in those tensions among the hospital personnel which revolve around the use of young, inexperienced evacuees on the staffs and the contrast between the professional status of evacuee doctors before evacuation and their present position and authority particularly in relation to Caucasian chief nurses.

Janitors, like mess workers, are especially liable to block conflicts. They have created labor trouble because they are unwilling to work outside their blocks and are dissatisfied with the low prestige of their jobs.

Farm crews walk out because of difficult working conditions or because they want to be consulted more often about farm methods and plans. They resent being given orders rather than explanations about their work.

Since the community shares with the workers the psychological scars from evacuation and center life, it at first frequently backs up labor disputes through sympathy strikes, pressure group activities or generalized sanction. However, after the initial explosion relieves tension, the community swings toward restoring peace with the administration. The dispute may then fade away though the fundamental irritants and even the explosive factor may still exist.

Three Labor Crises

The three histories below from Central Utah, Heart Mountain, and Minidoka illustrate common elements in center labor disputes and the similar pattern these elements form.

Central Utah garage-repair strike. In September, 1943, the garage-repair crew at the Central Utah Relocation Center stopped work for eleven days and was followed by workers in units functionally unrelated to transportation services. The strike seemed to have much community approval, as there was danger for a while of the stoppage spreading to still other crews.

Before the strike, an atmosphere of uneasiness had prevailed in the center. One cause was the approaching movement of segregants to Tule Lake. Another was the announcement of an employment cut; workers were left uncertain of how it would affect them. Also contributing to the mounting tension were the anti-administration activities of a small group who believed that the government had caused the plight of the evacuees and should, therefore, be solely responsible for supplying their needs. To this group, work on the center was much the same as forced labor.

The immediate cause of the strike was the stationing, through a misunderstanding, of a military guard instead of the customary WRA man at the gate to inspect incoming freight for smuggled liquor. The garage-repair crew refused to pass this guard and brought the matter up with their superintendent. They were indignant too about prohibiting evacuees from bringing liquor into the center when the appointed personnel could. Tired of the discussion, the superintendent told the men either to go to work or get off the lot. Resenting his manner, the repair crew protested by stopping work and demanding first

a written apology and then his resignation.

The administration met with representatives of the crew to discuss the grievance. Meanwhile, the focus had shifted from the military guard (who had been replaced by a civilian) to the relations between the crew and their superintendent. The crew charged that the superintendent was discriminatory, played favorites, and did not give his evacuee foreman sufficient responsibility. After a meeting with the superintendent, the crew was about to return to work when strike leadership passed to agricultural workers who insisted on holding out for a written apology from the superintendent.

Two hundred agricultural workers along with the carpenters, maintenance and operations men, plumbers, and the transport and supply crew went out on a sympathy strike. There was danger that the strike would become centerwide and prolong or hinder the coming transfer of segregants.

At the suggestion of the administration, the Labor Committee of the Community Council negotiated with the administration and representatives of the striking crews. The latter continued to insist on either a written apology from the superintendent or his dismissal. While negotiations proceeded, the Labor Committee tried to get the strikers back to work. Aided by public opinion which now disapproved of the stoppage, the Committee carried its point and the strike ended.

Investigation of the charges against the superintendent were dropped when he left the center after receiving his draft call. Later, on his return after being rejected, the investigation was resumed. The matter ended after the Legal Committee of the Council announced that most of the charges were unsubstantiated.

Heart Mountain hospital walkout. In June, 1943, hospital employees at the Heart Mountain Relocation Center walked out, leaving only a skeleton crew to care for the patients. Though the walkout involved many tensions, it lacked concrete issues and organization.

Three major factors contributed to pile up the tensions which finally exploded in the walkout.

1. The hospital had become the center of employee social life to the extent of interfering with the comfort of the patients and relaxing professional standards. As life was more interesting at the hospital than in barrack homes, employees spent leisure hours there to visit with friends and hold parties.

2. A personal feud and professional rivalry between two evacuee doctors became a struggle between them for prestige in the community. Other employees, preoccupied with hospital problems and accustomed to participate in its life, took sides and fed information to the rest of the community.
3. Many employees were antagonistic toward the appointed personnel on the staff, principally the Chief Medical Officer and the Chief Nurse. The latter was accused of dictatorial behavior.

Striking had already been established at Heart Mountain as the way to express dissatisfaction, for evacuees had struck previously to attain the removal of the project steward, of a fire-protection and police officer, and of an appointive employee in the Motor Pool. Moreover, they had frequently threatened to strike and had spontaneously walked out several times.

The immediate cause of the hospital walkout seems to have been an intensified dislike of the Chief Nurse. However, no particular incident can be pointed to as directly precipitating the action. The strike was poorly organized, for no leaders came forward to discuss grievances and no petitions or demands were received by the administration. Many strikers were vague as to why they were on strike. Some were expressing displeasure with hospital discipline; others were afraid of intimidation from fellow strikers.

The Hospital Committee of the Community Council was disappointed to find no concrete issue to negotiate and no inclination for either side to use its services. Because popular sentiment was with the hospital patients, sympathy for the strikers was at a minimum. The workers finding themselves with neither rallying point nor support ended the walkout. In reinstating them, the administration took the opportunity to reduce the hospital staff.

Minidoka boilermen's dispute. In January, 1944, the difficulties of the boilermen at Minidoka Relocation Center culminated in a six-day suspension of janitorial and boilerman services, which involved the entire community.

The dispute took place against a background of community resentment built up over a year and a half against the local administration. It had, however, more direct roots. The igniting incident began to develop in July, 1943, when the number of maintenance workers was substantially reduced as part of a general cut in employment. At the time an attempt was made to merge the duties of boilermen, janitors, and

stove tenders. The dissatisfaction over the changes, nevertheless, did not become serious until cold weather and winter increased the work of boilermen. Adding to the trouble was dislike for the superintendent of maintenance whom workers felt to be prejudiced against evacuees.

The actual stoppage occurred when the administration, fearing the danger of fires in boiler rooms left untended at night, tried to institute a 24-hour working schedule for maintenance workers. The workers, inamenable to staggering their hours and doubling up on the functions they performed, asked for extra men for the extra work. Because they had developed a rigid status definition of the job titles of boilerman, janitor, and stove tender, the boilermen refused to do janitorial or stove-tending jobs. The attitude that it was unnecessary to work a full 8-hour day for WRA wages undoubtedly increased the resistance to the proposed program. Stating that the maintenance quota was filled and there were enough to do the work, the administration refused the extra help. The matter remained a deadlock for over a month until colder weather forced the issue. The workers then received a memorandum ordering the 24-hour schedule and changing the title of all sanitation workers to janitors. All except three of the boilermen and janitors quit.

The lack of hot water and other inconvenient results of the work stoppage drew the community into the dispute. Other evacuees went out on a sympathy strike, and a group of from 25 to 30 young men used intimidation to keep the strike going and strengthen anti-administration attitudes. Warning fire tenders in the administrative area to stay off the job, they made the rounds of the center putting out laundry and lavatory fires and threatening people who resisted.

Numerous negotiations were held between the administration and representatives of the workers and the community. The administration asked the Block Managers to recruit a new janitorial crew but were told that this was out of the question. Evacuees asked Washington for permission to add extra manpower but were refused. Tired of not having hot water, they began to press the administration to settle the dispute and finally started to build fires themselves.

The work stoppage ended when the local administration withdrew the 24-hour schedule and accepted as its own the responsibility of safeguarding government property outside of the janitors' working hours.

No provisions were made in the agreement, however, for tending laundry and lavatory fires; the problem was left to each block to work out with its janitors. In some blocks it was solved by volunteer workers (not entirely happily); in others

with janitorial cooperation.

Recurrent Elements in the Three Disputes

Although representing three distinct situations, the disputes discussed above have certain common elements.

Resentment against evacuation and administrative action. All three disputes had a background of resentment due to evacuation, and at Central Utah and Minidoka, there were additional tensions which had resulted from certain administrative steps.

Conflicts between evacuees and appointed personnel. In each dispute, conflicts between the appointed personnel and the evacuees were important. The Central Utah garage-repair crew believed their superintendent to be anti-evacuee. At Heart Mountain, the hospital staff rebelled against the Chief Nurse's discipline; and at Minidoka the janitorial workers resented their supervisor's attitude toward them.

Resentment against a supervisor, the igniting incident. A very small thing unimportant in itself may cause a labor flare-up when workers, conscious of a subordinate social status and an unusual economic condition, feel that the community will sanction sharp protests. Workers might overlook such a thing in a normal community in ordinary times, but in an abnormal community under intense strain, it quickly results in a strike or other labor dispute.

The igniting incident in the three labor disputes described was resentment toward an immediate supervisor. The Central Utah garage-repair crew went on strike after being peremptorily told to work or get off the lot. Besides the concrete issue of the 24-hour schedule, Minidoka workers objected to the undiplomatically written memorandum in which their superintendent announced the new schedule. The Heart Mountain walkout seems to have resulted from resentment toward the Chief Nurse.

This case differs, however, in that no particular incident can be pointed to which touched off the trouble. The strike resulted from a general swelling of the existing hostility toward the appointed personnel at the hospital. Here the underlying tensions and grudges were strong enough to produce a break between the workers and the administration without a specific final incident.

Community participation in labor disputes and settlement. The community participated in the three disputes described. In Central Utah and Minidoka it first supported the workers'

protest, but after the initial outburst which let off steam, it reacted in favor of restoring peace and effected a settlement with the administration, although the underlying and even the immediate causes remained uncorrected. Evacuee desire for peace and quiet was reasserting itself when the Community Council at Central Utah acted effectively, when the Minidoka residents pressed the administration to solve the boilermen's dispute, and when the Heart Mountain hospital walkout ended because of community disapproval.

Local conditions lead to peculiar labor conflicts. Most labor crises in the centers follow a pattern with elements similar to those outlined above. However, labor situations peculiar to local conditions result in unique problems. At Jerome, voluntary evacuee labor was depended on for cutting wood for fuel. This dependence set loose conflicts between evacuees and appointed personnel and among the evacuees themselves. At Central Utah, the almost continual repair of the pipeline has led to numerous labor difficulties.

For example, in October, 1943, strained relations between two evacuee groups led to the pipeline crew resigning. Most of the crew were ex-Tuleans who had taken the pipeline work because old Topazians had the more attractive jobs. The Tuleans felt that the more sophisticated urbanites of Topaz looked down on them because of their predominantly agricultural origin. The igniting factor in this tense situation was an article in the Topaz Times which seemed to assign pipeline workers an inferior status and intimate that their work was unsatisfactory. The crew, feeling that they had been making the best of a poor job, resigned. They did not return to the pipeline until the writer of the article explained that he had been completely misinterpreted and that no slur of the crew had been intended.

MANPOWER SHORTAGE

Relocation, seasonal leaves, and selective service have gradually made the manpower shortage the major problem in center employment. While increased efficiency and improved distribution of labor would partly solve the difficulty, neither can be achieved without cooperation from evacuees. Labor relations bear directly, therefore, on the manpower shortage.

History of the Employment Policy

In the early days, the War Relocation Authority attempted, through encouraging small industries, public works, agriculture, and seasonal labor, to provide work for all evacuees who desired it. It hoped by making each center as self-sufficient as possible not only to furnish jobs but to lower administrative costs. However, as early as the summer of 1942, seasonal labor was causing a labor shortage in some centers.

Emphasizing relocation more and more, the Authority substituted a maintenance program for its attempt at self-sufficiency. Then, in the spring of 1943, after reexamining the luxury jobs established in the early days, it introduced the policy of eliminating jobs unnecessary to community welfare. Labor reduction was achieved partly through terminating workers of low efficiency.

Before the cuts were made, evacuees, especially those who were afraid of being terminated, felt very insecure. Some resisted the cuts and secured compromises with the administration. Many interpreted the labor reduction as an administrative instrument to push relocation and as an economy measure rather than as a device to get greater efficiency and better distribution of manpower.

Unemployment resulting from the reduction has been counteracted by adjusting the program and by draining off manpower through seasonal work, relocation, selective service, and segregation. Actually it is the manpower shortage, not unemployment, which is serious.

Factors in the Manpower Shortage

The seriousness of the present shortage of manpower has been intensified by the character of the labor force. As the more experienced male Nisei have left the centers, supervisors have

had to depend more and more on Issei and younger Nisei men and women. Further aggravating the problem are workers' inexperience, their different standards for center work, lack of seriousness on the job, and evacuee-appointed personnel relations. The experiences of one center illustrate some of the difficulties aroused by the manpower shortage.

Shortage at Central Utah. During the spring of 1944, Central Utah evacuees and appointed personnel became worried about maintaining necessary services. The available manpower was threatened by selective service and seasonal leaves for canneries or railroad work. Seasonal leaves during the summer of 1943 had created a labor shortage, and the situation promised to be more acute in 1944.

The shortage first became serious in the mess halls, a work area where trouble might be expected. Some cooks left on seasonal leave and others were reluctant to work in the hot kitchens during the summer. In April, two kitchens operated with volunteer labor.

Some evacuees regarded the shortage as purely an administrative problem of no concern to them. Others, however, took the opposite point of view. The Labor Committee of the Community Council, becoming concerned, tried to acquaint evacuees with the problem by asking representatives of the Block Managers and the Interfaith Group to weekly labor meetings. It also suggested that the Project Director and his assistants take part in order to get better understanding between evacuees and administration.

The stewards decided, at an emergency meeting, to close three mess halls and perhaps others if further consolidation proved necessary. They asked the blocks either to cooperate in operating their own mess halls or to be prepared for closure. Families relieved the workload somewhat by taking the prepared food to their own apartments and eating it there.

Other shortages became more acute. There was a lack of school teachers, welfare workers (nine clerks relocated in one month), typists, laboratory technicians, secretaries, farm hands, and plumbers. Since they do not involve such direct needs as mess work, these services were not of the same interest to the center. Evacuee leaders were concerned, however.

Pipeline repair became a pressing problem; leaks throughout the center endangered health, sanitation, and water conservation. Because of the history of the pipeline and the general manpower shortage, enough workers could not be recruited to repair the breaks.

During the Tulo Lake transfer, an emergency pipeline was constructed. As Tulcan labor was plentiful, the work progressed rapidly until the job neared completion when the pay was lowered from \$19 to \$16. Crews disliked the job but were willing to see it through. Then the Caucasian foreman told one of his crews to terminate because it was too lazy. Sympathy for the discharged crew and dislike of the work led other pipeline crews to resign. Evacuees became reluctant to work on the line, and though the pay was put at \$19 again, few would accept employment when the new emergency arose in 1944.

The administration then tried to get volunteers on an overtime basis. The overtime was to be used within ninety days or the balance paid in cash. However, the first ruling that overtime accumulated before January 1, 1944, was not valid had aroused centerwide controversy between evacuees and administration. Consequently, prospective workers on the pipeline were wary of the plan. Finally the administration got high school students to work temporarily on the line.

Effect of low efficiency on the labor shortage. Members of the appointed personnel have pointed out that poor efficiency has made the manpower shortage worse than it otherwise would be and that greater efficiency would lessen the seriousness. Affecting the efficiency of the workers, however, is their economic status, their particular characteristics as a labor force, and their relations with the appointed personnel and the rest of the community, as discussed above.

Effect of poor distribution on the labor shortage. Both appointed personnel and evacuees have recognized that poor distribution of the available manpower also contributes to the problem. Evacuees have pointed to jobs that they consider unjustified since they are peripheral to the functioning of the community. Two cases are cited below.

In the winter of 1944, Granada evacuees protested labor cuts in the mess halls and agricultural units. They suggested to the Project Director that if cuts had to be made, they should be among the silk screen workers who make recruiting posters for the Navy and perform no essential service for the evacuees.

At Poston I, in the spring of 1945, it was realized that although the available labor was sufficient, it was ineffectively distributed so that some departments suffered from a shortage. The Temporary Community Council sponsored a manpower conference of

both evacuees and appointed personnel. The conference recommended that a joint manpower commission be formed of six evacuees and six appointed personnel. The commission was formed and graded center jobs according to how essential they were to the security, life, and health of the center.

For example, Class A jobs of high priority included agriculture, food production, essential maintenance services, hospital, school, and Block Managers. Excluded were positions in garden landscaping, flower nurseries, road construction, land levelling, and the like. Class A jobs were put in the 19 category, with the hope that evacuees wishing jobs would prefer those paying the most money and performing the most essential services.

A year later, the Labor Commission, which was composed of administrative and evacuee representatives, recommended that work on fish culture and land subjugation also end, and that women replace men as janitors in the administrative barracks and in some jobs in the seed nurseries.

The Proposed Manpower Commissions

Pointing out the impossibility of recruiting additional appointed personnel to replace evacuee workers, the national office of the War Relocation Authority has advised centers to seek the solution to their labor shortage in the joint planning of evacuees and administration.

The national office suggested that Project Directors appoint a staff committee to work with an evacuee committee in forming a Manpower Commission similar to that which operated a year ago at Colorado River. After a comparative analysis of labor resources and vacant positions, the Commissions were to make recommendations for securing labor necessary to essential services. Efficiency, labor distribution, improvement in work techniques, and the use of part-time workers were suggested as considerations in studying the manpower problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Basic Principles in Labor Relations

Good labor relations in the centers stem from certain fundamental principles applicable in any business enterprise and from understanding the situation in relocation centers.

General principles important in labor relations are:

1. Mutual understanding by labor and management of goals and problems.
2. Free interchange of ideas about plans and procedures.
3. Adequate machinery, fully accepted by both parties, to handle grievances as they develop.

Analysis of Labor Relations Before Crises Develop

It might be helpful for administrative personnel dealing with workers to take stock of labor relations within their sections or work units.

1. It is important to examine labor relations critically before they develop.
2. It is easier to correct weaknesses which analysis may reveal and thereby prevent strikes and other labor disputes at their origin than to coast along until open conflict occurs.
3. It is fundamental to take into account the larger setting of the community, the attitudes of both evacuees and appointed personnel, and the nature of not only the jobs to be done but the available labor force.

Improvement of Existing Labor Relations

Some factors discovered to be contributing to poor labor relations will be out of the power of staff members to modify; others will be modifiable.

Unmodifiable factors. Certain events and conditions while extremely important in molding evacuee attitudes can neither be erased nor acted upon directly. Evacuation and the administrative history of the centers are such events. However,

studying the unmodifiable factors in a situation does assist in understanding those factors which can be affected.

Wages constitute another unmodifiable factor. But if the supervisor recognizes that the wage incentive for center work is very weak, he will realize the importance of stressing other incentives, such as the community and the supervisor recognizing the worker's contribution, and encouraging the worker's participation in planning work goals and how to achieve them.

Modifiable factors. Appointed personnel-evacuee relations in general, and supervisor-worker relations in particular, can be directly affected. It is in these two kinds of relations that much labor friction originates.

1. Particular labor relations should be carefully studied for hints of appointed personnel assuming a domineering or contemptuous attitude. Whether such an attitude derives from actual prejudice against evacuees or from the personality of the staff member, it is dangerous in view of evacuee sensitivity and their changed economic and social status.
2. Good informational channels from the administration to evacuees are essential.
3. Cooperation with evacuee representatives in evolving labor plans and procedures are helpful in achieving harmonious working relations.
4. Foreman responsibility, in particular, should be encouraged.

Factors Helpful in Treating a Labor Crisis

When a labor crisis does occur, analysis of the situation including the part played by the community in the conflict will help reveal the basic causes as well as clarify the immediate issue.

1. Well stabilized channels of appeal should be available for workers.
2. In settling labor disputes, the administration should take advantage of the drive within the community for restoring peaceful relations. The community may send out feelers which, if seized upon, will hasten a settlement.
3. Evacuee machinery for mediation should be recognized

and encouraged to function, whether it be a Community Council Labor Committee or a Fair Labor Practices Committee.

Administrative bargaining with single individuals should be avoided because if the compromise is not accepted by the community, nothing is really settled.

4. When Issei are involved in negotiations, allowances should be made if they find it difficult to express their point of view in English.
5. Finally, in arriving at a settlement, the necessity of saving face on the part of the evacuees as well as the administration should be recognized.

Manpower problems are accentuated by poor labor relations and may be relieved by establishing good relations and redistributing the available labor with the cooperation of the community.