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WRA

STATEMENTS

1942-45

C-A

171

STATEMENT BY J. EDGAR HOOVER ON THE LOYALTY
OF JAPANESE AMERICANS

(Excerpts from testimony before the House
Appropriations Committee on the Department
of Justice appropriation bill)

"We have had practically no trouble with the Japanese in Hawaii. I made the statement before that there has been no sabotage or espionage committee in Hawaii, subsequent to Pearl Harbor. There was espionage committed prior to Pearl Harbor, but not by the Japanese population as such, but by espionage agents and consular agents of the Japanese government.

"I want to mention briefly the work which the bureau has performed in the field of enemy control.

"Immediately following the incident at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, we were called upon to effect the apprehension of potentially dangerous aliens enemies.

"The action taken and the prompt manner in which it was taken, took out of circulation those individuals who might have been the nucleus of any espionage or sabotage rings of either Japanese, Germans, or Italians in the United States.

"I think that is the reason why we have had so little trouble from subversive agents in this country at the present time. Of course, we are constantly on the alert as to the activities of such groups that are still in the country in the alien enemy class.

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EXTRACTS FROM TESTIMONY OF J. EDGAR HOOVER

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE OF APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 18, 1943

Mr. Hoover: "We have had practically no trouble with the Japanese in Hawaii. I made the statement before that there has been no sabotage or espionage committed in Hawaii, subsequent to Pearl Harbor. There was espionage committed prior to Pearl Harbor, but not by the Japanese population as such, but by espionage agents and consular agents of the Japanese Government."

Mr. Carter: "Of course, you have pretty well corralled the Japanese in (Calif.) this country?"

Mr. Hoover: "Yes."

Mr. Carter: "I understand that we have a good many of them in the Army. This is not within your jurisdiction, but do you know of any trouble that we have had with them?"

Mr. Hoover: "I have not heard of any."

Immediately following the incident at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, we were called upon to effect the apprehension of potentially dangerous alien enemies. I have here for the committee's information a tabulation showing the number of alien enemies who have been apprehended as of December 31, 1942, by nationalities, and their disposition. There was a total of 12,272.

Disposition of Alien Enemies Apprehended as of December 31, 1942

	<u>Japan- ese</u>	<u>Ger- mans</u>	<u>Ital- ians</u>	<u>Hungar- ians</u>	<u>Ruman- ians</u>	<u>Bulgar- ians</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Interned	2,712	1,522	230	1	1	1	4,467
Paroled	1,448	1,121	331	0	3	0	2,903
Released, repatriated or deceased	678	1,559	1,518	4	1	0	3,760
Dispositions pending	<u>225</u>	<u>717</u>	<u>191</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1,142</u>
TOTAL	5,063	4,919	2,270	10	9	1	12,272

ARE JAPANESE AMERICANS LOYAL

Statement by:
Colonel Kendall J. Fielder
Chief of Military Intelligence
Hawaiian Department

(Excerpts from speech given at the University of Hawaii
Forum, March 1943)

"Without revealing secret military information, I can say truthfully that members of the Japanese race have themselves constituted our chief liaison with the Japanese community and our most reliable check on its morale, its needs and its activities.

"How differently a Himmler or a Rosenberg would have handled this delicate situation. Does anyone believe for a moment that any of the axis crowd would give one of enemy race a fair chance to prove himself? Yet that's what was done in Hawaii--and so far it has proved militarily sound. That the situation is working out well is a tribute not only to wise administration, but to tolerance on the part of the rest of our good Americans here. We have lived up to President Roosevelt's description of democratic peoples as 'men of good will'.

"It would take much too long to tell you of the many concrete ways in which many of these people who were put on the spot have proved their love for America and have helped solve an otherwise ticklish military problem here. For the information of all who might be misled, there is none among us who has been led into this policy out of a mawkish sentimentality or gullibility. To us Japan and her people are a race of stubborn, hardy, despicable warrior zealots, who would stop at nothing to snuff out our lives and our way of life. Her army and navy must definitely be crushed. The question of Americans of Japanese blood is far different. They are Americans--and until they prove (or show themselves dangerously capable of proving)--traiterous, they should be treated as Americans."

(over)

Statement by:
Elmer Davis
Director of the Office of War Information

(Excerpts from a nation-wide radio broadcast on
April 23, 1943.)

"The assassinations (of American flyers by Tokyo) have had no effect in this country except to produce universally a grimmer determination to fight through to complete victory-- a determination that seems to be felt by American citizens of all sorts. Let me read you some extracts from one newspaper editorial-- 'We know today the nature of the brutal enemy we face across the Pacific, and this knowledge should serve to intensify our efforts to achieve a speedy and complete victory. The American people will not brook a negotiated end to this war. There can be no peace with murderers. We must and will gain the unconditional surrender of our axis enemies. The enemy will give no quarter, and the salvation of our way of life rests on complete and irrevocable military victory'.

"Those passages come from a Salt Lake newspaper called the Pacific Citizen, the organ of the Japanese-American Citizens' League; and it shows that American citizens of Japanese ancestry who have grown up in this country and absorbed the American faith in freedom and democracy feel just the same about this outrage as do all other Americans citizens. At Camp Shelby, in Mississippi, there are three thousand American soldiers of Japanese ancestry; and they turned out yesterday and put the better part of a month's pay into war bonds, to show what they thought of this performance in Tokyo. Thousands of other Americans of Japanese blood, from Hawaii and from the relocation camps in the west, are now being inducted into the army-- all of them tested and known for their loyalty to their country, and all of them just as eager to avenge this sort of behavior as are any other Americans."

EXTRACTS FROM ADDRESS BY HON. JOSEPH C. GREW, FORMER AMBASSADOR
TO JAPAN, AT UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK, ON APRIL 26, 1943:

"We know, in this country, what persons of Japanese race, retaining part-the good part- of Japan's wonderful culture, can perform. The Americans of Japanese origin are an invaluable element in our population; I welcome their presence, and regret the bitter necessity of imposing on a trustworthy and loyal majority of nisei the restraints which are made needful by the bad behavior and evil repute of a minority. There are among Americans of Japanese race as fine people - individually- as you can find anywhere, and many of them are peculiarly anxious to repay America for freedom by making especially arduous efforts in the prosecution of the war. I welcome the policies of our government which are designed to relieve the nisei of discriminatory restrictions as rapidly and fairly as possible, and I applaud the action of the Army in setting up facilities whereby these Americans will be able to show the world what they are able to do.

"These Americans of Japanese origin are to Japan what you and I are to England, Scotland, Ireland, Germany, France and other European countries. They are Americans, but they are also the "cousins in the New World." I am proud of my trans-Atlantic cousins, and do not feel myself to be any the less American for that; and I would respect any American of Japanese descent who tried to contribute to our common, free American life those especially good qualities which he may have inherited from his trans-Pacific origin. We in America are in a real sense the apostles of the future; we show the rest of mankind what men of diverse races and cultures can accomplish with a common good will. We Americans, of all races and creeds, fight the evils of despotic and selfish militarism. There can be no compromise between ourselves and the arrogant exclusiveness of self-styled men-Gods of Japan- no more than between ourselves and the self-styled Aryans of Germany. In our war-against caste and privilege, wherever they may exist or occur- the contribution of Americans who are of Japanese descent is of real value first, because they are living proof of our non-racial free unity; secondly because they make a valuable and wholesome contribution to the sum total of our American civilization."

Broadcast by R. B. Cozzens
Field Assistant Director, War Relocation Authority
DIAL CLUB PROGRAM
Station KLX, Oakland, California
Phil Ray, Sponsor of the Dial Club, Interviewer
12:05 to 12:30 p.m., June 24, 1943

Introduction by Phil Ray.

Q. How was W.R.A. established and what was it directed to do?

A. W.R.A. was established on March 18, 1942, by an Executive Order signed by the President as President of the United States and Commander and Chief of the Army and Navy. This order established W.R.A. in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President. Under this order the Director of War Relocation Authority was authorized and directed to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal of persons or classes of persons from areas designated by appropriate military commander under Executive Order 9066. The order just referred to was the Executive Order which delegated to the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander the authority to establish military areas and to provide for the exclusion of any or all persons therefrom.

Q. How did these orders you refer to, Bob, affect the Japanese population of the West Coast?

A. Well, Phil, in the first place, Executive Order 9066 brought about the military areas on the West Coast and the exclusion order that followed. Next the establishment of Assembly Centers. Executive Order 9102 established the War Relocation Authority; and, under this order, 10 War Relocation Centers were constructed for the purpose of handling the Japanese evacuees.

Q. When were the War Relocation Centers occupied?

A. The Relocation Centers were occupied between May and November 1942. People of Japanese ancestry were transported by the military from the Assembly Centers to the Relocation Centers and were there turned over to War Relocation Authority.

Q. How many people were sent to Relocation Centers, Bob?

A. The total figure, Phil, was approximately 107,000, which was divided roughly as follows: 60 percent American citizens and 40 percent aliens.

Q. You mentioned in the beginning, Bob, that W.R.A. was directed to provide for the removal of certain people. Give us some of the other items you are directed to carry out under this all-important Executive Order.

A. Very glad to, Phil. The question you have just asked is an all-important one, as many people who discuss this subject lose sight of the fact that W.R.A. is operating under an Executive Order and that the order has directed us to provide for not only removal

of certain people but also for the relocation, maintenance, and supervision of this group; and, in addition, insofar as feasible and desirable, provide for their employment at useful work in industry, commerce, agriculture, or on public projects.

Q. You have mentioned so far, Bob, the Executive Orders which led up to evacuation, the order establishing W.R.A. and what you are directed to do. Did these Executive Orders affect all people of Japanese ancestry residing in the United States?

A. No, they did not. The orders only affected the military areas established in the Western Defense Command and small areas with reference to entry in the Eastern and Southern Commands.

Q. Then do I understand that there was a substantial number of people of Japanese ancestry now in the United States that have never been under any Exclusion Order?

A. That is correct, Phil. The evacuation order affected only those people of Japanese ancestry who were living in California, coastal areas of Oregon and Washington, and the southern one-third of Arizona on a certain date in the spring of 1942. Only these persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated and subsequently provided emergency places of residence in Relocation Centers. In addition to this group are those who voluntarily moved prior to the freeze order and some 20,000 persons of Japanese ancestry who were living in other parts of the United States in the spring of 1942. None of the people in the two latter groups have ever been in Relocation Centers.

Q. That's very interesting. Tell me, is there any other group which has never been in Relocation Centers?

A. Yes, there is a certain number of Japanese aliens, like other aliens of enemy nationality, which were considered to be of potential danger to internal security, which were apprehended by the Department of Justice and confined in enemy internment camps. Those camps, as you know, are not under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority.

Q. That's fine, Bob, and appears to bring us to this stage in our discussion. That is, some 20,000 to 25,000 people of Japanese ancestry were and are living throughout the United States and have never been evacuated; a rather large number of aliens considered dangerous have been interned for the duration by the Department of Justice; and the balance are in Relocation Centers, or should I say were in Relocation Centers because I understand W.R.A. has a program of relocation which is permitting certain evacuees to relocate in parts of the United States outside of the Western Military Areas. Is that true; and, if so, tell me how it works?

A. All your statements are true, Phil; but there are a few things which I think you should know. The leave policies which permit people to relocate were checked with the Department of Justice and War Department before they were executed. These policies are in accordance with the directive in the Presidential Executive Order which created the agency and are aimed at bringing about the relocation into normal communities of the largest possible number of the evacuated people consistent with the national security.

Q. I believe we understand most of those things, Bob; but what I would like to know is who may make application for leave and how may they secure it?

A. I am glad you raised that question, Phil, because I believe many of our listeners think we just turn the evacuees loose. This is not the case. Any resident of a Relocation Center may apply for permission to leave the center; but permission is granted only if the following conditions are met: (1) There is nothing in the record of the person to indicate that he would be dangerous to society or to the national security; (2) he has a place to go and means of supporting himself; (3) there is evidence that his presence in the community to which he proposes to go would not cause a disturbance; and (4) the evacuee agrees to keep the War Relocation Authority informed of his address at all times.

Q. That all sounds very simple, but how do you establish such information and facts?

A. Well, Phil, the War Relocation Authority has basic records on every evacuee 17 years of age and over who is eligible for consideration for leave. These records provide information on the evacuee's education, affiliations, foreign travel, employment, religion, and other pertinent facts in addition to his own statements on the matter of allegiance to the United States. Both records are carefully checked when the evacuee applies for a permit to leave. If there is any question about the desirability of granting a permit, the records, if any, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other intelligence agencies are secured before a determination is made.

Q. You started, Bob, by saying you had records on all who were eligible for leave. What do you mean by that?

A. All are not eligible for leave, Phil. That is, leave permits are not issued to persons who have applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan, those who have not pledged unqualified loyalty to the United States, or any others whose records indicate reason to question the advisability of their living outside the Centers in normal communities during the war. You will note from the last statement, Phil, that everyone must have a clean bill of health before ^{he} has any opportunity to leave a Relocation Center, and I am sure you further understand that even though he does have, he cannot return to the West Coast Military Areas.

Q. Your discussion so far, Bob, has cleared up many points which have caused me great concern; but while I have you here, explain for me how the people are fed.

A. In Relocation Centers evacuees are all fed in mess halls operated by the Authority with the use of evacuee labor. Each mess hall feeds from 250 to 300 people per meal. It is the policy of the Authority to provide the evacuees good substantial food of a quality and quantity comparable to that available to the general public. Food is purchased for the Centers through the Quartermaster Corps of the United States Army under specifications established by the Army. It is issued to the mess halls under circumstances which provide strict control over the kind and quantity of food used. All rationing regulations and recommendations applicable to civilian populations of the United States are applied in the operation of mess halls in Relocation Centers. If regulations governing the population are modified, corresponding modifications will be made in the feeding program of the Relocation Centers.

Q. What does your food cost and have you a limit which you cannot exceed?

A. Yes, Phil. Food costs cannot exceed 45 cents per day per person and to date our average is approximately 40 cents per day per person.

Q. That is about 13 and 1/3 cents per meal for food. Tell me what do the evacuees do in the way of producing their own food?

A. It is the policy of the Authority to provide facilities which will enable the evacuees to produce as much as possible of the food required for their own subsistence, and all Centers will have substantial amounts of agricultural land available this year. It is, therefore, planned that each Center will produce vegetables necessary for the requirements of the Center during the production season in each locality.

Q. Will any Centers produce more than they need, Bob?

A. Yes, Phil, that part of the program is also planned and production programs to provide basic commodities needed are now under way on a large scale. For example, vegetables produced in the winter in Arizona Centers are shipped to Centers in Idaho and Wyoming, which, in exchange, will ship summer-produced foods to Arizona Centers.

Swine and poultry projects are established at some Centers and will be completed in the balance of the Centers this year. In a few Centers having the necessary grazing land, beef cattle will be produced; and dairy projects will be established where necessary to relieve serious competition with the general public.

Q. That surely sounds interesting, Bob; but what will this all amount to in acreage, dollars and cents, ton, or any way that you care to express it?

A. Well, Phil, to sum up the entire production program, let's think of it in these terms. It is planned to have 7,632 acres under production, which should produce 82,250,500 pounds of food with a total value of approximately \$5,113,000. This, of course, is in addition to swine, poultry, beef cattle, and dairy projects which it is planned will equal \$1,688,000. In other words, it is estimated that during the current crop year, food equal to one-third of the total cost of the ration will be produced by Centers for their own consumption. This will be a great saving to the taxpayers.

Q. Tell me, do you believe the loyal can be segregated from the disloyal; and, if so, why hasn't segregation been done before?

A. Yes Phil, I think that the loyal can be very definitely segregated from the disloyal. The reason that it has not been done before is that it is not a simple problem. If it had been a simple problem, segregation could have been undertaken by the military when evacuees were transferred from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers by sending all the loyal to certain Centers and the disloyal to other Centers. One of the reasons this was not undertaken is that at that time complete records did not exist on all of the evacuees. After records are secured, such as those now in the hands of W.R.A., together with other information available from the intelligence agencies, it is purely a matter of time in analyzing each individual's record to determine, as stated earlier, what his previous affiliations were, his family background, his schooling,

and many other factors that have affected his entire life. Those who have been purely American and whose families have lived purely American lives do, I believe, without a doubt fall into groups which are just as loyal as any American citizens that you and I know. I think this is borne out by the fact that many evacuees who are now serving in the Armed forces have been decorated by the military and many, according to military authorities, have rendered excellent service even against the Japanese Empire. Therefore, segregation is not something that is impossible, but something which the War Relocation Authority will undertake only after giving thorough and individual consideration to each particular case.

July 1943

TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT
ON TREATMENT OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Secretary of War, after consultation with the commanding General of the Western Defense Command, as well as other officials and agencies of the Government, authorized the evacuation of citizens and aliens of Japanese descent from the West Coast areas, under the authority of executive order 9066. The objective was to evacuate the entire Japanese population from a sensitive and threatened military area. It was a precautionary measure and carried no implications of individual disloyalty.

The indications were, however, that there were a number of unidentified persons of Japanese descent, both citizen and alien, who, by reason of their attachment to Japan, constituted a potential threat to our security. The Army effected the original moves in connection with the evacuation and set up the assembly centers into which the evacuees were first gathered.

A detailed report on the evacuation and the part played by the Army has been prepared by the commanding General, Western Defense Command. It will shortly be made available to the President and the Congress.

The Army has not, however, attempted to deal with the problem of relocation and resettlement of the evacuated people. Shortly after the evacuation was decided upon, the War Relocation Authority was set up in order to relieve the Army of nonmilitary burdens and to assist the evacuees in re-establishing themselves away from the coastal zone.

The first step was the establishment of widely separated inland points of 10 large relocation centers which were built by the Army but have been managed from the beginning by the War Relocation Authority.

The great bulk of the evacuated people are still living in these centers. They are quartered in barrack-type buildings of frame construction, and take their meals in mess halls, each accommodating upward of 250 people. They are not allowed at any time to leave the center without a permit, and after dark are restricted to the limits of the barracks area.

Preservation of law and order within the centers is a responsibility of the War Relocation Authority. However, the external boundaries of each project area are guarded by a detachment of military police, who are available for duty within the center in the event of disorder. Thus far, they have been summoned to quell a disturbance on only one occasion.

Evacuees at the centers are provided by the Government with food, housing and medical care. Schools are maintained for the children. A portion of the food is produced by the evacuees themselves on Government-owned or Government-leased land within the project area; some perishable commodities are purchased locally, and practically all other food is bought through the quartermaster depots of the Army.

All rationing restrictions applicable to the civilian population are strictly followed and two meatless days are observed each week. In areas where the local milk supplies are short, milk is provided only to small children, nursing or expectant mothers, and special dietary cases. Beef served at the centers is third grade and no fancy meats of any kind are furnished.

In general, the food is nourishing but definitely below Army standards. The cost of feeding at the centers over the past several months has ranged from 34 to 42 cents per person per day.

In order to hold down the costs of operating the centers, the War Relocation Authority has utilized evacuee labor to the fullest possible extent in the production of foodstuffs and the development of agricultural land, and in providing the necessary community services. Top positions in each line of work, however, are occupied by non-Japanese civil service employees. These evacuees who work are paid at the rate of \$12, \$16 or \$19 a month, and are provided, in addition, with clothing allowances for themselves and their dependents.

The clothing allowances range from \$24 a year for small children in the southerly centers to \$45 a year for adults in centers where winters are severe. Approximately 90 per cent of the employable evacuees at the centers are engaged in some line of work at the present time.

The second step in the WRA program for the evacuated people is to help the loyal American citizens and the law-abiding aliens in resettling outside the relocation centers and away from the evacuated coastal zone. Present regulations provide that any resident of a center--citizen or alien--may apply for permission to leave the center in order to take a job in agriculture or industry and establish residence in a normal American community.

Before permission is granted, however, the evacuee's background and record of behavior are carefully checked, and the attitude of the community toward receiving evacuees is ascertained.

The War Relocation Authority has acquired extensive information concerning the past history, affiliations and attitudes of evacuees past the age of 17 years. On the basis of these records, leave permits are granted. As a further precaution, names of more than 85 per cent of the evacuees have been checked against the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and these checks will be continued until the list of adult evacuees has been completely covered.

If there is evidence from any source that the evacuees might endanger the internal security of the Nation or interfere with the war effort, permission for leave is denied.

In addition, there has been established a joint board, composed of representatives of the War and Navy departments and the War Relocation Authority. This board maintains liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Approval of the board is required for evacuees who desire to work in war industries or wish to relocate from relocation centers into the Eastern military area. Such approval is given only after all pertinent information available from the co-operating agencies has been examined and evaluated.

The War Relocation Authority is now undertaking to segregate those evacuees whose loyalties lie with Japan. The segregated group will be quartered in a center by themselves and will not be eligible for leave. Others, however, will continue to be eligible for leave and will be encouraged by the War Relocation Authority to take useful employment in normal communities outside the evacuated area.

The evacuation was the result of military considerations, and decisions of the War Department in the matter were based, and will continue to be based, only on such considerations. The original restrictions have been modified slightly, particularly with respect to soldiers of Japanese ancestry in the United States Army.

In a few mixed-marriage cases and in emergency situations, individual permits to enter evacuated areas have been, and will continue to be, issued by the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command.

In all other respects the original restrictions remain in force. There is no present intention to alter them, nor is any relaxation under contemplation.

From the beginning, the War Department and the commanding General of the Western Defense Command have been in close and continuing consultation and agreement on all matters relating to evacuation and security of the West Coast areas. The present restrictions against persons of Japanese ancestry will remain in force as long as the military situation so requires.

Prior to the outbreak of war there were a number of American citizens of Japanese descent in the army. Since the outbreak, a combat team of soldiers of Japanese ancestry has also been inducted from Hawaii and the mainland. These men in the combat team have been screened; they are all citizens of the United States, and they have all volunteered for service. Thus far their record has been excellent.

Other American soldiers of Japanese descent have performed useful and hazardous services in connection with our operations in the Pacific and a number have already been decorated for meritorious service. It is the policy of the War Department and the Army in all respects to accord American soldiers of Japanese ancestry the rights and privileges of all other American soldiers.

A more complete report in accordance with the terms of resolution 166 will be prepared and will be made available shortly.

Statement by Dillon S. Myer
Director, War Relocation Authority

Constitutional Principles Involved in the Relocation Program

The evacuation and relocation program raise important questions of constitutionality. This is so because two-thirds of the persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from West Coast military areas are citizens of the United States, and the great majority of the remainder are law-abiding aliens.

It is the position of the War Relocation Authority that its Leave Regulations are essential to the legal validity of the evacuation and relocation program. These Leave Regulations establish a procedure under which the loyal citizens and law-abiding aliens may leave a relocation center to become reestablished in normal life.

We believe, in the first place, that the evacuation was within the constitutional power of the National Government. The concentration of the Japanese-Americans along the West Coast, the danger of invasion of that Coast by Japan, the possibility that an unknown and unrecognizable minority of them might have greater allegiance to Japan than to the United States, the fact that the Japanese-Americans were not wholly assimilated in the general life of communities on the West Coast, and the danger of civil disturbance due to fear and misunderstanding--all these facts, and related facts, created a situation which the National Government could, we believe, deal with by extraordinary measures in the interest of military security. The need for speed created the unfortunate necessity for evacuating the whole group instead of attempting to determine who were dangerous among them, so that only those might be evacuated. That same need made it impossible to hold adequate investigations or to grant hearings to the evacuees before evacuation.

When the evacuation was originally determined upon, it was contemplated that the evacuees would be free immediately to go anywhere they wanted within the United States so long as they remained outside of the evacuated area. Approximately 8,000 evacuees left the evacuated area voluntarily at that time and 5,000 of these have never lived in relocation centers. The decision to provide relocation centers for the evacuees was not made until some six weeks after evacuation was decided upon, and was made largely because of a recognition of the danger that the hasty and unplanned resettlement of 112,000 people might create civil disorder.

Detention within a relocation center is not, therefore, a necessary part of the evacuation process. It is not intended to be more than a temporary stage in the process of relocating the evacuees into new homes and jobs.

The detention or internment of citizens of the United States against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made, or can be made, for longer than the minimum period necessary to screen the loyal from the disloyal, and to provide the necessary guidance for relocation, is beyond the power of the War Relocation Authority. In the first place, neither the Congress, in our Appropriation Acts or any other legislation, nor the President, in the basic Executive Order No. 9102 under which we are operating, has directed the War Relocation Authority to carry out such detention or internment. Secondly, lawyers will readily agree that an attempt to authorize such confinement would be very hard to reconcile with the constitutional rights of citizens.

The Leave Regulations of the War Relocation Authority, instead of providing for such internment of loyal citizens or law-abiding aliens, set up a procedure under which any evacuee may secure indefinite leave from a relocation center if he can meet the following four conditions --

1. WRA must be satisfied from its investigation -- that there is no reason to believe issuance of leave to the particular evacuee will interfere with the war program or endanger the public peace and security;
2. The individual must have a job or means of support;
3. The community to which the individual wishes to go must be one in which evacuees can relocate without public disturbance;
4. The evacuee must agree to keep WRA notified of any change of address.

The War Relocation Authority is denying indefinite leave to those evacuees who request repatriation or expatriation to Japan or who have answered in the negative, or refused to answer at all, a direct question as to their loyalty to the United States, or against whom the Intelligence agencies or WRA records supply direct evidence of disloyalty or subversiveness. The great majority of the evacuees fall into none of these classes, and are thus eligible to leave under the Authority's Regulations.

On June 21, 1943, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its decision in the case of Gordon Hirabayashi v. United States. Hirabayashi had been convicted of violating both the curfew orders and the evacuation orders applicable to Japanese-Americans. The court held that the curfew was a valid exercise of the War Power. Although the question of the validity of the evacuation orders was directly presented to the Court in that case, the Court did not decide that question. There is evidence in the majority and concurring opinions of the Court in the Hirabayashi case that, although it found the curfew to be valid, it believed the evacuation orders present difficult questions of constitutional power, and detention within a relocation center even more difficult questions. Mr. Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion said concerning the curfew orders: "In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power."

Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion said: "Detention for reasonable cause is one thing. Detention on account of ancestry is another...Obedience to the military orders is one thing. Whether an individual member of a group must be afforded at some stage an opportunity to show that, being loyal, he should be reclassified is a wholly different question...But if it were plain that no machinery was available whereby the individual could demonstrate his loyalty as a citizen in order to be reclassified; questions of a more serious character would be presented. The United States, however, takes no such position." The Chief Justice, in the majority opinion, was careful to point out that the Court was limiting its decision to the curfew orders and was not considering the evacuation orders or confinement in a relocation center.

More than a year has passed since evacuation was begun. During this year we have, of course, had time to make necessary investigations and to begin the process of considering the evacuees on an individual basis. The Leave Regulations are intended to provide the due process and hearing which fair dealing, democratic procedures, and the American Constitution all require.

Presented before Costello sub-committee of House
Committee on Un-American Activities.

July 7, 1943

REMARKS OF REPRESENTATIVE HERMAN P. EBERHARTER
March of Time, August 26, 1943.

ANNOUNCER:

Last June, in Los Angeles, a three-man congressional subcommittee completed an investigation of western evacuee centers for alien and U.S.-born Japanese. One high spot was the testimony of a former official of the Poston, Arizona, Japanese relocation center, Harold H. Townsend:

VOICE 1:

The Japanese are hoarding food, bread, and other supplies for Japanese parachute troops and invasion forces.

ANNOUNCER:

This week, the subcommittee published its report. Said chairman John M. Costello of California:

VOICE 2:

Japanese are being released without adequate checks on their loyalty to the United States. Among the Japanese set free are 23 members of the Butoku-kai, a subversive youth section of the Black Dragon society.

ANNOUNCER:

But Chairman Costello was speaking only for himself and South Dakota's Representative Karl E. Mundt. Hearing the same testimony, the third member of that subcommittee disagreed with his colleagues' conclusions, disputed their statements, had recommendations of his own to make. Tonight, that congressman, Herman P. Eberharter of Pennsylvania, is at our March of Time microphone in Washington, D. C. Mr. Eberharter.

EBERHARTER:

After careful consideration, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the report of the majority of the investigating subcommittee is prejudiced. Most of its statements are not proven. The stories of Japanese hiding food, bread, and other supplies for an enemy invasion force were shown ridiculous when projects were visited. So far 16,000 evacuees have been released, yet the report seeks to make a great deal of the release of 23 who were members of Butoku-kai--a Japanese fencing society. Neither the report nor the hearings offered any evidence that any of the 23 were subversive.

After wind and fury, the report implies the War Relocation Authority is doing a very bad job, stressing a few shortcomings and ignoring the many good points our investigation disclosed. The evidence showed the WRA is doing a good job in handling an extremely difficult problem. The majority report repeats the charge that the Japanese evacuees were supplied with food in greater variety and quantity than to the average U.S. citizen. Evidence completely rebutted that charge. All rationing restrictions are strictly applied, and food costs have averaged about 40 cents a day per person.

Contrary to the majority report of the Dies subcommittee, evidence indicates there is much less crime of any kind in the relocation centers than in an American community of the same size. The climax of the majority report is three feeble, meaningless recommendations. I agree fully with the first: that segregation of the disloyal Japanese be effected at once.

But this program was announced by WRA months ago. Intelligent determination of the loyalty of more than 100,000 people cannot be made in a week or a month, and the WRA's efforts to be fairly certain in its actions is commendable. The second recommendation of the majority is that a new board be made up representing the WRA and the intelligence agencies of the government, to pass on applications for release. But there has always been close cooperation between the War Relocation Authority and army and navy intelligence and the FBI. One more board is unnecessary and would simply divide responsibility. The third and last recommendation favors a thorough-going program of Americanization for Japanese who remain in the centers. Of course I favor that, just as I'm against sin. Considering the magnitude of the job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved--that is, the constitutionality of confining citizens not charged with any crime--and considering the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling such a large number of people in the midst of a war, the WRA has acted efficiently and capably. I think it is better to let the WRA carry on, unhampered by unfair criticism.

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PORTION OF ADDRESS BY ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS BIDDLE BEFORE THE
WEST VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION, OCTOBER 9, 1943

One of the most difficult and delicate problems presented by the war is that presented by the situation of American citizens of Japanese descent. Over 100,000 persons have been evacuated by the military authorities from the West Coast to relocation centers established by the War Relocation Authority. Roughly two-thirds of these people are American citizens by reason of their birth within the United States. The remaining one-third are aliens not considered sufficiently dangerous to be interned as enemy aliens under the procedure established for that purpose.

I suppose that no group in the history of the country has ever been confronted with the degree of antipathy visited upon these Japanese--in terms which draw little distinction between citizens and aliens or between those who are loyal and disloyal to the United States.

The first problem confronted by the Government was to provide a sanctuary for all evacuees, citizen and alien alike, establishing so far as possible under such adverse circumstances the conditions of civilized life. Once this was accomplished, the problem was to distinguish so far as practicable between the loyal and the disloyal, segregating the disloyal in separate centers. This program has been under development for a long time and is now well under way. Finally, the problem is to assist the loyal Japanese, and especially those of United States citizenship, to accommodate themselves to the exceptional sacrifice exacted by conditions of war and to help them to re-establish themselves outside the centers in places where they may gain understanding and sympathetic acceptance.

Theoretically persons at relocation centers are not interned; subject to prescribed regulations, loyal citizens and law-abiding aliens may apply for temporary or indefinite leave. The theory of the relocation program is that it is designed to assist rather than to restrict re-establishment in normal life. So far as Japanese citizens of the United States are concerned, this theoretical basis of the program is probably essential to sustain its validity. Detention of citizens on the sole ground of their race for a longer period than is necessary to separate the loyal from the disloyal and to facilitate re-settlement in new communities is difficult to reconcile with the constitutional rights of citizens. The War Relocation Authority strongly pressed as it is to intern all persons of Japanese descent for the duration of the war, has no such power under the President's Executive Order, under which the Authority was set up. There are, moreover, strong indications in the decision of the Supreme Court in the Hirabayashi case that no such authority could constitutionally be conferred. The only question decided by the Court, as the opinion of the Chief Justice makes clear, was the validity of the curfew orders applied by the military authorities prior to the evacuation of all Japanese on the West Coast. The Court did not consider the validity of the evacuation orders and certainly not the more difficult problem of detention. But even the curfew order was said by Mr. Justice Murphy in his concurring opinion to go "to the very brink of constitutional power." And Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking in passing of the problem of detention, was careful to observe: "Detention for reasonable cause is one thing. Detention on account of ancestry is another."

Excerpts from an address by the Honorable Joseph C. Grew, Special Asst. to the Secretary of State, at the annual banquet of the Holland Society of New York, New York City November 18, 1943.

One of the proudest achievements of our country is our assimilation of many different races within our borders. We take well-justified pride in the term "melting pot" as applied to our nation. The existence and purpose and membership of the Holland Society are a living testimonial to that great principle, and it is especially interesting to note that even three centuries ago, when the Dutch West India Company had extended to all friendly European countries the privilege of trading with the then province of New Amsterdam, the town of New Amsterdam rapidly assumed the cosmopolitan character for which it has ever since been noted and that according to contemporary reports, eighteen languages were spoken among its 400 or 500 inhabitants in 1643.

The point I wish to make is this. In time of war, blind prejudice is always rampant. In the last war I remember that even loyal Americans with German names were all too often looked at askance. That bigotry fortunately does not exist today, but it does exist today among a large proportion of our fellow countrymen with regard to American citizens of Japanese descent. In fact many, perhaps most, of our compatriots refer to those fellow-citizens of our quite indiscriminately as "Japs". In reading the many letters I receive from all over the country on that subject I very seldom know whether the writer is referring to Americans or to outright enemy aliens. There is, or should be, a great difference there.

In time of war, especially, we must take every proper step to protect our country from hostile acts, especially from espionage or sabotage within our gates. We have competent official authorities to attend to that consideration, and they are attending to it, constantly and effectively. I do know that like the Americans of German descent, the overwhelming majority of American of Japanese origin wish to be and are wholly loyal to the United States, and not only that, but they wish to prove that loyalty in service to their native land. Reiman Morin, of the Associated Press, reports from the Fifth Army in Italy that the first unit of American-born Japanese troops went into combat smiling with satisfaction as if they were going to a baseball game; their motto is "Remember Pearl Harbor", and their commander said that he wouldn't trade his command for any other in the Army. Their officers, said Morin, are unanimously enthusiastic about the quality and spirit of those men and said they never had seen any troops train harder and more assiduously and never had any doubt as to what to expect of them in combat. A German prisoner was brought past their encampment one day; he gaped with surprise when he saw their faces and asked if they were Japanese. An interpreter explained that they were Americans of Japanese parentage. The German shook his head in wonder and said: "Ach; that's American." There are camps in our country today engaged exclusively in training these men for military service. I have met and talked to them. Their officers are proud of their charges.

What I wish to say is merely this. Those Americans of Japanese descent have grown up in our country, in our democratic atmosphere. Most of them have never known anything else. Among those few who have been to Japan, most of them could not stand the life there and soon returned to the United States. The overwhelming majority of those men want to be loyal to us, and, perhaps surprisingly, the few who don't want to be loyal to us often say so openly.

It does not make for loyalty to be constantly under suspicion when grounds for suspicion are absent. I have too great a belief in the sanctity of American citizenship to want to see those Americans of Japanese descent penalized and alienated through blind prejudice. I want to see them given a square deal. I want to see them treated as we rightly treat all other American citizens regardless of their racial origin-with respect and support, unless or until they have proved themselves unworthy of respect and support. That fundamental principle should apply all along the line-to every citizen of the United States of America.

Once, again Gentlemen, I heartily thank you for the honor you have accorded me tonight.

Department of the Interior
War Relocation Authority
461 Market Street
San Francisco 5, California

ADDRESS BY ROBERT B. COZZENS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, WRA
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA-ARIZONA METHODIST CONFERENCE
FIRST METHODIST CHURCH, PASADENA . . 4:30 p.m. June 26, 1944

Members of the Conference, Ladies and Gentlemen:

The subject matter selected for me to discuss here this afternoon is probably the most important human problem faced by the American people since the abolition of slavery.

"When will the Japanese-American evacuees return to the West Coast?" is the subject.

It is assumed that as assistant director of the War Relocation Authority I should have the answer.

To begin with, I want to settle a matter of jurisdiction that is not clearly understood. The powers of the War Relocation Authority are defined up to a point where they might invade the duties and responsibilities of the military. The military is in charge of our security and in times of war this has to be recognized. It must be recognized that ten million Americans have gone forth from their firesides and comforts to fight and die for those of us who remain behind. The yardstick of peacetime can not be used for measuring American rights in war time.

From reading some of the antagonistic press one might easily assume that WRA can at its own whim permit the return of the evacuees. But the return of the evacuees to the West Coast is not a WRA responsibility at this time.

To begin with, a Presidential Executive Order gave the Western Defense Command the right to determine what it considered the best program for the safety and security of the West Coast.

The Western Defense Command decided -- after we had been at war with Japan for four months -- that the presence of 112,000 Japanese-Americans and Japanese aliens was a hazard to West Coast security.

It was said at the time that the evacuation of the Japanese-Americans and Japanese aliens would protect these people from any evil effects of war hysteria.

The Western Defense Command, under Lt. General John L. DeWitt, ordered the evacuation, set up centers in this State and moved the 112,000 into these centers. From the first camps they were moved to Relocation Centers -- 10 in all at the time -- and then the civilian authority -- the War Relocation Authority -- was placed in charge of them.

The movement of these people from the West Coast was -- and is --

a military responsibility. The Military, by proclamation, established an area extending down the West Coast and including all of California as well as part of Arizona. These people, citizens and aliens alike, were excluded from this area. And that military exclusion still exists, except where the Military decides in individual cases that some may return. No Japanese-American is permitted to return to this area except with full military approval. The military zones still stand as ordered and when they will be rescinded, we do not know!

There have been a number of persons permitted by the Military to return. Now and then some persons in our Relocation Centers are given such military clearance and you can be assured that when they are given this clearance, the Army has full confidence in their loyalty.

During the past week a Japanese-American, his wife and two children were taken from a Relocation Center by the Military and returned to a West Coast metropolis. This man and his family will resume their normal rights as citizens. This man has been assigned by our Government to a strategical war agency. The work this Japanese-American will do will probably hasten the end of the war in the Pacific.

A few months ago, the War Department gave clearance to 33 women and 12 children to be returned to their homes in the Hawaiian Islands. These women are for the most part wives of Japanese-Americans who are in our armed forces. Their husbands are fighting now on the Italian peninsula.

It must be remembered that of the 112,000 who were evacuated that 74,000 are Americans of Japanese ancestry and 48,000 are aliens ineligible to citizenship.

Out of that 112,000 original population, 24,000 have been relocated in other sections of the United States. We still have 88,000 in our centers.

Your question and your interest is centered in the return of these people to their civil and property and human rights.

The answer must be supplied by the Military. If and when the Western Defense Command determines that the military necessity no longer exists on the West Coast, the Army will probably change its proclamation of two years ago.

If and when the Army does change its proclamation, it will be part of our job as the WRA to sustain its decision.

In the meantime, it is the responsibility of the War Relocation Authority to do just what the name implies -- relocate those people in civil and economic life in those areas not covered by the military proclamation.

You may read in some of the press that some organizations are opposed to the return of ANY Japanese-Americans to the West Coast. There are various schools of thought under the exclusion banner. Some few have gone so far as to suggest that they be kept in the Relocation

Centers indefinitely. Some others that all persons of Japanese ancestry be returned to Japan as soon as the war is over.

Others demand that disloyal Japanese-Americans and Japanese aliens be put in cargo vessels -- they do not say passenger liners -- and be sent post-haste to the land of their ancestors. Still others want a recheck on the loyalty of all these people on the basis that they are guilty of disloyalty until proven innocent -- an inversion of an age-old civil and American right.

But there are still those who are opposed to Japanese-Americans who recognize that a legal process has to be followed. Every school-boy knows, or should know, that the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution has not been challenged up to this time.

To refresh your memory and possibly bring it to the attention of some of the race baiters on the outside, I quote the Fourteenth Amendment:

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside.

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Those words are plain enough. That first paragraph of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a responsibility on all citizens. We have a stewardship for which one day we must account both to God and man.

When the hour of our duty arrives, we must be ready to face it. In the meantime we must prepare for it.

I must say here that it would be a mistake for those people to rush back to the West Coast when the military restrictions are finally lifted. The movement back must be orderly -- just as orderly as was the evacuation.

We must picture to ourselves the economic and social state that will exist on this coast, when the emergency is lifted. Will the industrial West find itself with a problem of unemployment due to cancelled war contracts? Will there be order or chaos? Will we find those among us who will seek to pit those evacuees who wish to return against the unemployed caucasian and thus arouse further racial antagonism?

Only by orderly return can the civilian economy not be disturbed, and standards of wages and living not endangered. We can't flood a crowded housing area and a crowded unemployment area without bringing about further evils.

We cannot at this time visualize all the elements involved in this gigantic relocation problem.

There will not be as many returning as were here before the war. Added to the 24,000 who have been relocated from the centers to other sections of the country are about 7,000 who voluntarily moved out of this area prior to the evacuation order. That makes well over 30,000 who have resettled in other sections.

All do not plan to return to California. Nearly 12,000 more are in the services of our Army. Before the war is over it is possible that more than 20,000 Japanese-Americans will be in uniform, according to present estimates.

Many of these veterans -- as they will be -- may not return to this State -- many will not return to any other State.

I would like to say here that there is some common ground on which we are met by those who oppose the return of the Japanese-Americans. Recently at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, Seth Millington, past commander of the State American Legion and past President of the Native Sons, said that men like Sergeant Ben Kuroki, who had flown in 30 air missions over Europe, including the bombing of the Ploesti oil fields of Rumania, could live next door to him the rest of their lives. Sergeant Ben Kuroki, who won the Distinguished Flying Cross for his contribution as an aerial gunner, will be multiplied by many thousands by the time this war is over. I assume that Mr. Millington, who said he was speaking for the Legion and the Native Sons, would also permit Ben Kuroki's father and mother, brothers and sisters, and -- when he has them -- wife and children to live next door to him.

This is a logical conclusion that means the spokesman for the Legion and the Native Sons admits there are some good Japanese-Americans. Of course, he will find that there will be many race baiters who fail to distinguish between the Japanese enemy and the Japanese-American, and who will disagree with him. At least some of them have not yet made the concession made by Mr. Millington.

In very recent stories from the European battlefields correspondents have pointed out that the wrecking of the Ploesti oil fields was the most serious blow hit at Hitler's war machine. It cut down to five or six weeks the available petroleum supply of our enemy. Sergeant Ben Kuroki was only one of many who participated in those raids, but it was a contribution that will save its share of American lives. In addition to receiving the Distinguished Flying Cross, Sergeant Kuroki also received three oak leaf clusters for his contribution toward winning the war.

Other Japanese-Americans have given their lives in the Italian campaign. The Associated Press last month reported more than 900 Japanese-American soldiers at Anzio had received the Purple Heart.

I believe that when fair-minded westerners get the complete story of this loyalty on the battlefields those who demand mass deportation or mass exclusion will not be considered seriously. The Chicago Sun, in a recent editorial, declared that Private First Class Hoshino Omiya, the nisei who was blinded in Italy and whose picture was printed in practically every newspaper and news magazine in the country, should be permitted to appear before the Congressional committee con-

sidering exclusion laws. Said the Sun:

"The sightless eyes of Hoshinoo Omiya might help persuade some thoughtless Congressmen that vindictive legislation against a small minority would be unworthy of America."

To return to the post-war or post-emergency problem of evacuees:

An investigation made by a San Francisco Chronicle reporter, Mr. William Flynn, who toured the Utah area and talked with many evacuees, discloses that 40 to 50 percent do not plan to come back to the West Coast under any conditions. They have found new homes, a new social environment, have settled down as accepted members of many churches in the new areas and are producing for the nation and for their families.

Approximately every state in the union has its complement of relocated Japanese-Americans and Japanese aliens. Nearly 6,000 are resettled in the state of Illinois. Colorado has 2,500. Ohio and Utah have 1,700 each. More are relocating daily. Our records of moving household and portable goods for these relocatees to other states has tripled since the first of the year. One relocation center -- the Jerome camp at Denson, Arkansas -- closes on June 30. More than 5,000 residents -- half of the original population will have moved to four other centers whose populations have been decreased by relocation in other sections of the nation.

This is the basic work of the WRA and despite the heavy criticism levelled against our agency, the work has been carried on successfully. American citizens are regaining their civil rights with very little friction.

You have read of instances where there have been flareups by eastern communities. These are the rare exceptions -- in view of the 23,998 uncontested relocations to date.

What we have done is shown in part in a motion picture called "Challenge to Democracy", which is our report to the nation. This film, which is available to any group with facilities to project it on a screen, is a 16 millimeter sound and color depiction of the evacuation, life in the camps, the school and church work done at the centers, community life, the relocation in war industry in many sections of the nation as well as the rigid training undergone by the Japanese-American Army unit at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. To those who are as interested, as are you here, in relocation of men and women in the normal stream of American life, it has an added appeal. In this film many evacuees are shown at their lathes in industrial war plants. The film shows dozens of evacuees doing the job of the man behind the machine behind the gun, not alone in war equipment production, but also in producing and processing food.

We have had some criticism from our own group that the film does not show the drab side of this restricted life.

However, the film does show the work we have done to offset the adverse conditions that these people faced. Many came from homes not dissimilar to yours. They found themselves transplanted to bar-

racks. Their children were taken from the grammar schools, highschools and universities of our state -- many with scholastic honors to their credit, with scholarships awaiting them in advanced institutions.

I am sure that in seeing this picture you will project yourself into their places and speculate on how you would accept this changed environment. There is no certainty that if we can do this to the least of our population, it might not be done in succession to others. Therein lies our mutual danger when the war emergency is over.

Our observers at the centers tell us that the most frustrated employees we have are those who teach civics and American history to the young American-Japanese in our center classrooms. The teachers explain the Constitution and when they reach the Fourteenth Amendment, with its clear, ringing statement of equality, they are met with either smiles or bewilderment from the children.

This Fourteenth Amendment is one of the democratic principles for which we are fighting -- for which I fought in the last war. That principle is that all men were created equal. It doesn't say in the commandments of this country that all white men were created equal and that after running the chromatic scale or cultural stage, some were created with fewer rights than others.

Any discrimination is the Hitlerian pattern of Aryan superiority which is being defeated now by 10,000,000 American men and women in service. We have learned in recent history that it was a short step from persecution of the Jews to the persecution of Pastor Neimuller and the Roman Catholic priests of Germany. The rights of political beliefs went out even faster. Then the juggernaut of the German war machine began the persecution of its neighboring nations, whose sole crime was that these neighbors were not Germans.

We have been charged with pampering and coddling those in our centers. Those who are loudest in these charges have never visited our centers and have never felt the oppression one would feel behind wire fences.

We invited two men who had been in Santo Tomas prison in the Philippines to visit Tule Lake Segregation Center. Each had spent nearly two years in the civilian prisons of the Japanese. Each had returned to tell of the misery and restrictions and barbarity of the camp in which he had been held.

One repatriate was Ray Cronin of the Associated Press. The other was Royal Arch Gunnison, syndicate and magazine writer. Each was bitter over the treatment he had received at the hands of the Japanese.

Yet Cronin did pay a compliment to the civilian administration of the camp in the Philippines in contrast to the Japanese Army jurisdiction. Cronin said after his visit to Tule Lake that he did not consider any pampering or coddling was going on.

Royal Arch Gunnison after his visit to Tule Lake declared that there is no such thing as pampering or coddling persons who are behind wire fences. He stated further that those in the Center were leading a Spartan existence.

I quote Gunnison: "What is being done at Tule Lake is what any civilized country should do". He pointed out that where our food provided 3,000 calories daily to the evacuees, the Japanese camps provided but 1,000 calories.

I assure you that we are not pampering or coddling. Nor are we striving to imitate the sordid administration that has prevailed in Japan's concentration camps.

Some organizations have passed resolutions asking that the administration of the Relocation Centers be turned over to the Army -- that they be taken out of the hands of the civilian administration of the WRA. This is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief and the Congress to determine.

One important factor which is ignored by those who charge pampering and coddling is that 72,000 of these people are American citizens. They are American businessmen, farmers and workers, doctors, dentists, collegians, young men and women. There are thousands who are children. I ask, what treatment would they have us give to the children in these centers?

We are Americans dealing in a war emergency with our fellow citizens. We are not Japanese-Japanese dealing in brutality.

We of the WRA face two extremes of criticism -- we are called either Jap lovers or Gestapo.

But we have attempted to steer a middle course in view of the suffering all people must bear in a war.

Our program is not the idea of any one man. It is arrived at by the meeting of many minds in the WRA. The democratic processes are pursued to a final agreement with every element involved being evaluated.

Our National Director Dillon S. Myer sits down with his staff of legal authorities, social service advisors, administrative chiefs, community planners, educational directors, transportation men and public relations men.

All the problems that come up in daily life in any community exist in our centers. So all these problems have to be weighed by the WRA staff in its sessions. I might say the representatives from the Far West -- and I am a Native Californian -- have much to say in these programs, although all the staff members are personally acquainted with all the centers and all the factors involved.

I have told you of the opposition to the return of the evacuees. But I can say also that we of the WRA are not alone in this work of relocation. Our office in San Francisco has a file of thousands of letters from many westerners who recognize the implications of racial prejudice. There are job offers and offers of dwelling places for the evacuees when the emergency is lifted. One group here in Pasadena recently filed with the War Department a list of over 50 jobs, promises of housing for 150.

There are many fine, outstanding individuals among our top ranking educators, church and labor groups, businessmen, industrialists, professional men and editors and journalists of the West Coast who have stepped forward in championing these basic human rights. Daily we are approached by westerners who have personal friends among the evacuees and who will attest to their loyalty. They ask that their Japanese-American friends be returned.

In the radio world of commentators we have heard many sterling voices raised in protest against those who would exclude citizens because of their ancestry.

Most recently the Northern California Methodist Conference held in Sacramento passed resolutions calling for a restoration of the rights of these people.

Simultaneously the Catholic Bishop of the Fresno-Monterey Diocese told a State council of the Knights of Columbus that they must fight race prejudice. He lauded the Christian faith of those Manzanar Japanese-Americans who are members of his church. The American Principles and Fair Play Committee and other groups are fighting discrimination of every sort. The Commonwealth Club of San Francisco is making an exhaustive study of this problem and its members are awake to its threat to the future.

In an article in a recent Cosmopolitan magazine, Lloyd C. Douglas explained why he wrote that best of best sellers, "The Robe", which undoubtedly most of you must have read.

This story, which deals with the inception of Christianity, was inspired by a question on what had become of the Robe worn by Christ.

"As I proceeded with my task," said Douglas in the article, "it became increasingly more apparent that the First Century was menaced by much the same problems as have set the whole world on fire today! We drew the map of the Roman Empire under old Tiberius and found that we had also drawn a map of Hitler's Europe! You couldn't dodge the facts that the world into which Jesus came was enduring the same slaveries, brutalities, aggressions that have made our hearts sick in our own time."

He pointed out that the same problems, the same fears and passionate indignations existed today.

Perhaps that is why "The Robe" has gone through more than 31 re-printings.

Should you ask one of those who object to the return of the evacuees why they do not make the same objection to the bringing of Italian and German war prisoners to work in the fields and industries of the West Coast, they probably would reply that so long as the Army holds a rifle over these war prisoners there is no objection. They haven't yet openly declared that they would welcome back the evacuee -- American citizens -- to work in the fields and factories under armed guard, but the implication is plain.

Could it be possible that we in California would sanction the return of persons of Japanese ancestry -- citizens, mind you -- to work on the same plane with prisoners of war -- to work under military guard?

The picture is clear. The proponents of exclusion view its Americans of Japanese ancestry in the same light as they view prisoners of the batt lefields.

The West Coast has to assume its responsibility in a democracy. There seems to be no objection of western race baiters to relocation of the Japanese-Americans in other states of our union. They are perfectly willing to recognize the evacuees' citizenship rights in other states.

I am not here to decide this for you. I am here to present a side of the picture of a democracy to which we all belong, and in which we all have a voice. You are the ones to decide this issue. Our form of Government guarantees your rights, but it demands you take responsibilities.

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DEMOCRACY IS FOR THE UNAFRAID

Chester B. Himes

"Common Ground", Winter 1944,

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What frightens me most today is not the recurring race riots, the economic pressures on "minorities," the internment of Americans of darker-skinned ancestry whose loyalty to the ideology of white supremacy is doubted, nor even the whole scope and viciousness of the recent growth of race hatreds and the insidious beginning of propagandism for a white alliance for self-protection"--not these so much as the white man's sudden consciousness of his own fear of other races of which these are but manifestations. I can see no hope for any "minority" group, nor even for democracy itself, in the existence of this fear.

People who are afraid are cruel, vicious, furtive, dangerous; they are dishonest, malicious, vindictive; they destroy the things of which they are afraid, or are destroyed by them. The host who is afraid, hearing a noise in his kitchen, tiptoes down the back stairs and blows out the brains of an ice-box raiding guest whom he thinks is a burglar; the policeman who is afraid shoots the manacled prisoner who bends to tie his shoe lace; the industrialist who is afraid hires thugs and murderers to fight unionists; the capitalist who is afraid sabotages public welfare; the politician who is afraid attacks leaders of weakly supported causes to hide his own compromises; the statesman who is afraid endeavors to isolate his nation; and the government head who is afraid fails in the execution of laws, both national and international.

A race that is afraid bands in mobs to lynch, murder, intimidate, and destroy members of other races. Long ago we realized the Nazis did not hate the Jewish people so much as fear them. Members of the Ku Klux Klan, Silver-shirts, Bundists, and other similar American organizations whose aims are the destruction and intimidation of certain racial and religious groups are cowards from the word go; they are as representative of cowardly people as the Storm Troopers are of Nazism. Only cowards seek to destroy "minority" groups; courageous people are not afraid of them. In themselves such people are not dangerous. In themselves the cowardly are never dangerous, never more dangerous than Hitler in 1930. But when they become representative of the majority race within a nation, when they infect the entire body with their own cowardice, then a complete breakdown of law and decency follows, and all persons not contained in that race suffer the most cruel oppression.

This is what I fear is happening in America today--the cowardice of a relatively small percentage of white Americans is seeping into the consciousness of the majority and making them all afraid of the darker races.

Fear may easily become the greatest tragedy of this historic period. For the eventual peace of the world and the continuation of progress depend upon the white man's ability to live in equality, integrity, and courage in a civilization where he is outnumbered by peoples of other races. It is imperative that he be unafraid. For if, because of his fear, he finds himself unable to live as a neighbor and equal competitor with other races, there

will be no peace and little progress.

What concerns me more at the present is that, if the white man is not unafraid, the United States will never attain democracy.

Dictatorship is not so much a government for the weak and the afraid, but of the weak and the afraid. With even one dictatorship remaining in the world after the war, there will soon be another struggle. The fear of dictators is an evil and tremendous thing; they are afraid of everything that does not agree with them and of most things that do. Because of this, driven by it, struggling desperately to overcome it, dictators will always try to enslave the world. They have to; they cannot otherwise exist. Many of us have yet to understand this. We have also to understand that in the growing weakness of the white race in America, as demonstrated by its present fear-driven actions, dictatorship may come to the United States before we know what true democracy is like.

When the white man banishes his fear, he will banish with it all the bugaboos of race; and he himself will for the first time be free. For people who nurture race hatreds and dedicate their lives to the proposition that they are superior are never free; their thoughts, efforts, and aims are always limited and hindered by the necessity of proving it.

I once heard a rich and famous white man relate how he freed his mind of all thoughts of race and color and looked upon all peoples as equal in an effort to learn, if possible, whether there was any fundamental and distinguishable difference in peoples of different races. He realized that having been brought up in a tradition of white superiority, this would be impossible as long as he could identify people. So he pretended an eye infection and for a month went about with his eyes bandaged.

For the first time in his life as a rich, famous, white American he felt free. He was relieved of the necessity of pretending superiority, of hating people because of their color, of despising people because of their race; he did not every moment have to be aware of his reactions; he did not have to feel affronted, disgraced, humiliated, tolerant, condescending, or philanthropic because of another person's physical attributes or identifiable religious beliefs; his mind was free from all the psychoses of race antagonisms.

War is teaching this lesson of equality to many of our youths in uniform. Coming upon the bodies of two soldiers lying face downward in the muck of a distant battle field, both having died for the preservation of the same ideal, under the same flag, in the same uniform, they are learning the ridiculousness of thinking: "This man, being white, is superior to that man, who is black." They have learned that in a week's time the color which made one "better" than the other will have gone from both.

Here at home white Americans must learn courage, too. They must learn that Negroes and members of other races working and living side by side with them in a community of interests do not detract from their prestige but add to it; that equal participation by all peoples in the benefits of democracy is not a thing to bring disgrace but a thing to inspire praise and create pride. They must learn that bravery does not consist in persecuting the few and the weak (for then all our enemies would be the bravest of nations) but of protecting them.

The white race has attained leadership in the world of today. Although people of other races have played a magnificent part, the white race is largely responsible for the creation of our present civilization. So far, much of the white race's talent, its ingenuity, creative genius, and ability to organize, produce, and conquer has been employed to subdue and exploit the other races of the world. While the mechanics of this civilization may continue for many centuries to come, its character is bound to change, for the other races of the world have reached the point where they will no longer be exploited or subdued.

Now this is the question: is the white race courageous enough to accept the inevitable, to accept the fact that exploitation and oppression of other races is no longer physically or materially possible, and to continue its leadership in integrity and equality, competing with other races in fairness while respecting their rights of self-determination, meeting with them and negotiating justice and equity for all, dealing with them in culture and commerce? Or is it afraid of ultimate extermination or subjugation?

Dec 18, 1944

Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes today issued the following statement:

"The Western Defense Command's action in revoking the blanket exclusion order for persons of Japanese ancestry on the Pacific Coast means in a simpler term that the War Relocation Authority will immediately expand its relocation program to cover the entire country, including the West Coast.

"It most definitely does not mean that there will be a hasty mass movement of all evacuees back into the coastal area.

"The War Relocation Authority will continue and intensify its efforts to relocate in parts of the country other than the West Coast those loyal and law-abiding persons of Japanese ancestry who are willing to participate in this program.

"It will also aid those who prefer to exercise their legal and moral rights to return to the West Coast.

"The persons who are eligible for relocation or return to the West Coast have been found by the Army authorities to be loyal citizens or law-abiding aliens.

"They are entitled to their full constitutional and legal rights and perhaps to something more than ordinary consideration because they have really suffered as a direct result of the War.

"In a real sense, these people, too, were drafted by their country. They were uprooted from their homes, substantially deprived of an opportunity to lead a normal life. They are casualties of war.

"It is the responsibility of every American worthy of citizenship in this great nation to do everything that he can to make easier the return to normal life of these people who have been cleared by the Army authorities.

"By our conduct toward them we will be judged by all people of the world.

"I call upon state and local officials throughout the country and especially on the West Coast and on public and private agencies to assist in the enormous task of returning these people to ordinary community life.

"I believe that the response will be enthusiastic and wholehearted and I particularly hope that we may see veterans' organizations, like the American Legion, church and welfare groups in the forefront of those who will consider it their responsibility to aid these people and by so doing show their devotion to the American principles of charity, justice and democracy.

Ickes Statement

"All the evidence available at the Relocation Centers indicates that the majority of the evacuee residents have not yet finally decided whether to return to their former homes or relocate elsewhere and that most of those who will eventually elect to go back will need considerable time to make necessary arrangements before they can actually leave the Centers.

"The War Relocation Authority is now formulating detailed plans for keeping the westward relocation movement on a gradual, orderly,xxx systematic basis.

"People of Japanese ancestry, both at the relocation centers and elsewhere who have been found eligible by the Western Defense Command for residence in the West Coast area are of course free to go back at any time.

"However, only those whose specific plans for resettlement in the evacuated area are approved by WRA will be eligible for the travel assistance which the Authority now extends to those relocating in other parts of the country. This includes the payment of rail or bus fare to the point of relocation and transportation of personal properties such as household furnishings.

"Since most of the evacuees at the relocation centers have had little opportunity to accumulate savings over the past 2½ years they will doubtless need such assistance.

"Only a few evacuees, therefore, are expected to leave the Centers for the West Coast or any other destination without first having their plans checked and approved by WRA.

"In view of the fact that the evacuees were moved from their homes in 1942 by governmental order, the War Relocation Authority will make assistance available to those evacuees, both at the centers and previously relocated who now have urgent reasons and sound plans for returning to the West Coast area.

"Simultaneously, however, the Authority will continue and intensify its efforts to relocate evacuees in other sections.

"One of the major WRA aims from the beginning has been to encourage the widest possible dispersal of evacuees throughout the nation and this will continue as a prime objective during the final phase of the program.

"Of the 110,000 people of Japanese descent originally evacuated, more than 35,000 have now relocated under WRA procedures outside the West Coast area. This includes nearly 70% of the American citizen evacuees beyond the age of 17 who have been eligible for relocation.

Ickes Statement

"It also takes in nearly 2,500 Japanese-Americans who have been ~~inducted~~ inducted into the Army of the United States from relocation centers.

"The great majority of the 35,000 relocated evacuees have become satisfactorily adjusted in their new locations and will possibly want to stay where they are. Many of them, in fact, will doubtless now make arrangements for having their parents and other family members still at the centers come out and rejoin them at their new home.

"The mass exclusion order is revoked and the great majority of evacuees are free to establish a residence anywhere in the United States.

"The War Relocation Authority will now work toward an early liquidation of the relocation centers which were established originally for the temporary maintenance of a dislocated people.

"No center will be closed in less than six months but it is anticipated that all will be closed within a year. Funds have been provided to the Federal Security Agency for public assistance to the state and local welfare agencies for those evacuees who are incapable of self-support.

"As the War Relocation Authority enters the final phase of its program its immediate aims, as always, will be to restore the loyal and law-abiding evacuees of Japanese descent to a normal American environment, to relieve local manpower shortages and to cut down government expenditures for the maintenance of a displaced segment of the population.

"Its long range objective will be to bring about a better economic adjustment and a more satisfactory nationwide distribution of a minority group which was doubtless too heavily concentrated before the war in one particular section of the country."

oOo

12/18/44

The following statement on West Coast War Relocation policy was issued today by Robert B. Cozzens, Assistant Director, WRA:

The War Relocation Authority's staff on the West Coast will continue to carry out provisions of Executive Order 9102, dated March 18, 1942 which empowered the agency to relocate evacuated persons of Japanese ancestry.

Despite modification of the military order, the War Relocation Authority expects and hopes that relocation to the middle west, the east and the south will be intensified in the months ahead.

With full constitutional rights having been restored, to loyal citizens of Japanese ancestry and to law-abiding aliens, many of the evacuees will be free to return to the West Coast area.

Those who are free to come back will be only individuals of Japanese descent who have full military approval for freedom of movement.

Individual exclusion will continue under control of the military.

Movement of loyal evacuees will be conducted in an orderly manner and no mass exodus from the Relocation Centers to any part of the country is contemplated.

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LA-9-OD-12/18/44

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U. S. Department of the Interior
War Relocation Authority
461 Market Street
San Francisco 5, California

Phone: DO 8173

The following statement by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, was made in answer to four questions posed by the California congressional delegation with regard to the War Department's policy concerning the exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas of the Pacific Coast, and a copy sent to the War Relocation Authority. In consideration of the possibility that copies may not be available to all editors, the War Relocation Authority is mailing this to you for your information or use.

ROBERT B. COZZENS
Assistant Director

December 6, 1944

Honorable Clarence F. Lea
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Lea:

In the absence of the Secretary of War I am replying to the motion which was approved at a meeting of an informal committee of the California delegation on December 4, 1944 that the Secretary of War be requested to make a statement for publication on the following points:

- a. The policy of the War Department on the release and relocation of individual Japanese under the present mass exclusion program.
- b. An explanation of the question of who has the authority to release individual Japanese and who would have the authority to terminate the mass exclusion of Japanese.
- c. Explanation of the legal sources of authority under which the War Department is acting.
- d. A statement of the basis of future policy with respect to the mass exclusion of Japanese.

The legal authority of the mass exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast was supplied by Executive Order No. 9066 and the act of March 21, 1942, both of which are attached as enclosures.

The Executive Order after reciting the necessity of protection against sabotage and espionage, authorized the Secretary of War, or any military commander who was designated by him, to establish military areas from which any or all persons may be excluded and with respect to which the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave may be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or military commander may impose.

The Commanding General of the Western Defense Command was designated as military commander under the terms of this Executive Order and carried out the evacuation under its authority.

As you are doubtless aware, the program for the mass exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast was instituted at a time when an attack on the West Coast was a definite probability, and an invasion on a large scale had to be considered as a real possibility. In view of the difficulties of making an immediate determination of which

persons of Japanese ancestry were loyal and which were not, mass exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast was a necessary military precaution.

The military necessity which was created by the emergency with which we were faced in the spring of 1942 and the urgency of preventing sabotage and espionage afforded the justification of this action. It was the basis on which the Supreme Court in the Hirabayashi case vs. the United States (320 US 81) upheld one of the measures which preceded exclusion--curfew for persons of Japanese ancestry.

The initial evacuation program in 1942 is now before the court in Korematsu vs. United States (No. 22 October term 1944) and we hope it will be sustained on the basis of the opinion in the Hirabayashi case. It is also clear from the opinion in the Hirabayashi case, however, that continued mass exclusion can be sustained under Executive Order No. 9066 only so long as military necessity requires it. We are a lot further along in the war today than we were at the time the evacuation was ordered. The war has moved a good deal closer to Japan. Although there is a lot of fighting still to be done it can no longer be said that the West Coast is in danger of large scale invasion. At the same time it has been possible to get information about our Japanese population and to make considerable progress in separating those who are apt to be dangerous from those who are loyal to this country. One of the first steps in this direction was taken by the Army in selecting those persons of military age among the Japanese who were acceptable for the Army, initially as volunteers and later in Selective Service. Although many of these men were inducted from Relocation Centers, and many of them have families still in the Centers, their record of courage and devotion to this country in Italy, in France and in the Pacific has shown that sound judgments of this kind can be exercised.

Similarly the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, for the past year and a half, has followed a policy of permitting the return of some American persons of Japanese ancestry in cases of special merit where the records of the individuals are absolutely clear. Cases involving mixed marriage, direct family connections with individuals in the Armed Services and cases of illness or other especially meritorious cases are covered by this policy.

As a result of these considerations I think it is clear that the mass exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast will be continued only so long as the military situation requires. How long this will be is a military question. No assurances as to time can be given except the assurances that when the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, the officer who is responsible for the defense of the West Coast, determines that the continuation of mass exclusion is no longer required for the prevention of sabotage and espionage, it must be terminated by him. The question is one which is continually involved in litigation and each law suit requires a redetermination of the question. It must

also be borne in mind that the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, as the officer responsible for the defense of the West Coast is not going to take any action which in his opinion would endanger the security of the West Coast. As a result, if at some future date, mass exclusion should be rescinded, it is quite clear that this would be accompanied by an individual exclusion program of all those Japanese who are felt to be disloyal.

I realize that if mass exclusion should be rescinded certain problems will be created. I wish to emphasize again that those adjustment problems are the problems for which the civilian agencies of the State and Federal government, and not the Army, are responsible. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the civilian agencies are incapable of handling any problem which may be presented. I assume that the War Relocation Authority intends to keep up its efforts to relocate evacuees in other parts of the country and I assume that if mass exclusion were to be rescinded the civilian agencies would see to it that such evacuees as were permitted to return to the West Coast would do so on an orderly and gradual basis.

My attention has also recently been directed to a statement of Governor Warren of California, that if the military authorities decide that military necessity no longer requires the continued mass exclusion of persons of Japanese descent from the West Coast area, the civilian authorities of California will cooperate on that decision.

I realize also that many persons may say that there is a possibility that disorders might occur if persons of Japanese descent are permitted to return to the West Coast. Although this is not a matter which can be taken into consideration in acting under Executive Order No. 9066 the War Department is interested in this question because any serious trouble might result in retaliation against American soldiers who are held as prisoners of war by the Japanese. If the military authorities determine that military considerations no longer require mass exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast, we have every faith that the people on the West Coast, as have those of other areas in the United States into which persons of Japanese ancestry originally removed from the Coast have been relocated, will show their good citizenship by abiding by the military judgment, and do their utmost to prevent any acts of discrimination against any of those people who may be permitted to return.

Sincerely,

/s/ John J. McCloy

JOHN J. McCLOY
Asst. Secretary of War

Department of the Interior
War Relocation Authority
Room 202, Sheldon Bldg.
461 Market Street
San Francisco 5, California

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ISSUED BY MAJOR GENERAL H. C. PRATT, COMMANDING
GENERAL, WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND, DEC. 17, 1944 SIMULTANEOUSLY
WITH PUBLIC PROCLAMATION NO. 21.

Every American has been pleased to note the steady improvement in our military situation in the Pacific during the past year. The improvement is so great that an invasion of the West Coast on a large scale is only remotely possible. On the other hand, it is still possible for the enemy to send minor forces to our shores. Commando type raids by small submarine borne units, attacks by parachute units of limited size and airborne attacks on a small scale are still possible. Appropriate measures must be continued to guard against such action. Similarly, sabotage and espionage are definitely within the capabilities of the enemy. In fact, these two types of enemy action must be particularly guarded against.

When the military situation was not as favorable as it is at the present time, it was necessary to exclude all persons of Japanese ancestry from the sensitive areas of the West Coast. The action taken at that time was based solely on military considerations and was made necessary largely due to the fact that there was little or no information concerning persons of Japanese ancestry.

During the last two years a vast quantity of information pertaining to the history and activities of all persons of Japanese ancestry, both citizens and aliens, has been assembled. This material has been the subject of exhaustive study and as a result it is now possible to consider persons of Japanese ancestry on an individual basis rather than consider them as a group as has been necessary in the past.

I consider it of great importance that the people of the West Coast understand and appreciate that the most careful scrutiny of the vast amount of information now available has led to the conclusion that the great majority of Japanese-Americans have severed all connections with Japan and are prepared to assume all the responsibilities of their situation as Americans.

However, this same scrutiny has clearly revealed that there are still a considerable number of persons of Japanese ancestry, both in the citizen and in the alien group, who continue to give their loyalty to Japan, who do not wish to be Americans and who are willing to sacrifice themselves to advance the interests of Japan. Military necessity requires that such individuals shall continue to be excluded and that those requiring control shall be adequately controlled.

I am sure that all our citizens clearly understand that such authority as the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command may have is based solely on military considerations and that any authority over civilians can be exercised only when military necessity justifies it.

In view of the improved military situation, the availability of individual data and the fact that the existing military necessity does not justify control over American citizens who have been determined not to be potentially dangerous, it is apparent that the logical and proper course is to terminate mass exclusion based solely on ancestry and to substitute for it a system which, while continuing to exclude and control those individuals who still remain loyal to Japan and are considered to be potentially dangerous to the military security of the West Coast, will restore full liberty of action to all those who have been cleared by the Army.

(More)

General Pratt's Statement.

To make effective this change of policy, Public Proclamation No. 21 is being issued today. It becomes effective at midnight 2 January 1945.

The fact that those who are to be permitted full freedom of action, including the privilege of returning to the West Coast, have been cleared by the military and that those who are potentially dangerous will continue to be excluded should reassure any who may question the adoption of the new program.

It is my sincere hope that the return of those persons of Japanese ancestry who choose to come back to the coastal areas may be accomplished without undue incident. I am confident that the fine American citizens of the West Coast will realize that the present is not the proper time for internal controversy.

It is realized that the inauguration of the modified exclusion program must be accomplished in such a way as to take into consideration existing housing shortages and available employment. It is expected that the program will be carried out gradually and that every effort will be made to disrupt existing conditions as little as possible. I feel sure that when the people of the West Coast realize that those persons who are permitted to return have been cleared by Army authorities that they will accord them the consideration to which they are entitled as law-abiding residents.

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Carter

U. S. CONGRESS HEARINGS
Before The
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
On The
NATIONAL WAR AGENCIES
APPROPRIATION BILL FOR 1946

Page 256
Monday, April 30, 1945

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Statements of Dillon S. Myer, Director; Malcolm E. Pitts,
Assistant Director; And Arthur J. Muir, Budget Officer

ESTIMATES AND APPROPRIATIONS

Mr. Cannon. We have an estimate before us, Mr. Myer, for the War Relocation Authority for 1946 for \$25,140,000, which represents a net decrease of \$12,521,352 below the 1945 appropriation of \$39,000,000, if you take into account the overtime of \$1,338,648.

This appears to be a liquidation budget, with the exception of the Tule Lake segregation center and the emergency refugee shelter.

SCHEDULE FOR RELOCATION OF THE EVACUEES

We will insert in the record at this point page 7 of the justifications and the first three paragraphs of page 8, which gives a statement of the schedule for the relocation of the evacuees.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

The following tentative time schedule is our aim in liquidation of the program:

War Relocation Authority centers other than the segregation center, will be closed to evacuee residents within 12 months after revocation of the general exclusion orders.

Not later than 15 months, after revocation of the general exclusion orders, all evacuee property services to persons other than excludées (including segregees) will terminate, and all evacuee property warehouses not utilized for the property of such persons will be emptied.

Not later than 15 months after revocation of the general exclusion orders all War Relocation Authority field offices will be closed except (1) evacuee property warehouses, (2) an office in San Francisco servicing excludées.

In order to further orderly and planned relocation of evacuees, an approved relocation plan will be required as a condition to the granting of relocation assistance and property transportation assistance to (1) any center resident who wishes to relocate, or (2) any relocated evacuee who wishes to return to the State or Territory in which he resided prior to evacuation.

The relocation of dependent and handicapped persons who may need Government assistance on relocation represents a special problem. Every effort will be made to assist such persons to relocate to a place of their choice and to obtain assistance for which they may be eligible. State agencies administering State programs of general relief, hospitalization, institutionalization, and boarding or nursing home care, and federally aided programs of categorical assistance (old-age assistance, aid to the blind, aid to dependent children), child welfare services, services for crippled children, and vocational rehabilitation, are primarily responsible for determining evacuee eligibility for assistance under those programs. State agencies also administer funds appropriated by Congress to the Federal Security Administrator for temporary aid to persons affected by wartime restrictive action of the Federal Government, and make initial determinations of evacuee eligibility for such aid. Additional funds are included in this estimate to supplement the appropriations to the Federal Security Administrator for this aid where needed.

A number of persons unable at the time of evacuation to move to centers because of tuberculosis or other illness ("deferred evacuees") still remain in institutions in the evacuated States, their expenses paid by the War Relocation Authority. Responsibility for maintenance of these persons will be transferred to appropriate State or private agencies as rapidly as possible.

Only functions necessary to the maintenance of essential operations will henceforth be continued at the centers. All work will be undertaken with the purpose of furthering speedy and satisfactory relocation of the evacuees, providing the essentials of community and administrative services, and closing all centers except the segregation center or centers to evacuee residents by 12 months after revocation of the general exclusion orders. Every effort will be made to reduce center expenditures.

GENERAL STATEMENT

Mr. Cannon. We would be glad to have a statement from you at this time outlining the plan for the liquidation of the Authority.

Mr. Myer. Mr. Chairman, I would like to review briefly where we have been, where we are now, and what we plan to do, without going into great detail.

The War Relocation Authority was set up to assist in the relocation of people evacuated from military areas within the United States.

Our major job has been that of helping move evacuees from the Pacific coast, that is evacuees of Japanese ancestry evacuated in March 1942. About 110,000 were evacuated from the coast and made the responsibility of this Authority during the year 1942; and most of that year was taken up in the movement of that group from California, Oregon, Washington, and a

part of Arizona into the 10 relocation centers established at that time.

It was a new program. There was no precedent. Policies had to be developed without experience. During that year we outlined general plans for a relocation policy, on the assumption that the relocation centers were simply temporary homes for people to live in until an orderly process of relocation could be developed.

We found that there were a few people who started out to try to prove to the public during 1942 that we had a misconception of our duties, and tried to get the American public to believe that the Japanese evacuees were in interment camps, and that if they were allowed to leave the centers they might be dangerous. I think it has been proven that such has not been the case.

But we had to deal with that problem which we had not expected, because there was a small group of people, particularly along the west coast, who devoted a lot of time to starting propaganda, with a lot of misinformation about the program.

During the first year we recommended to the War Department that selective service be reestablished for boys of Japanese ancestry, because we thought it was essential to the sound relocation of these evacuees, and also, if these youngsters were to live as American citizens they should have the right to fight for their country.

Our first leave program started in May 1942, when a few people were allowed to work in the beet fields in the mid-Mountain States, and before the summer was over I think there were 10,000 working outside the relocation centers and assembly centers.

During 1943, in January of that year, Secretary Stimson announced the organization of what is now known as the Four Hundred and Forty-second Regimental Combat Team, made up of a group of Japanese-American boys who volunteered for service and who are now fighting in Italy.

That was an important item in relation to this program and in my judgment it was an important historical event as far as this country was concerned.

About the same time we established our first field offices in Chicago, Cleveland, and other points throughout the country.

Almost immediately following, we carried out our registration program in all centers, where we asked all evacuees 17 years of age and older a number of questions, and had them fill out a questionnaire giving full details of their history, of membership in organizations, and a number of other facts.

We utilized this information for carrying out a segregation program later in the year, which involved the movement of about 15,000 people into Tule Lake and out from Tule Lake. During that year, 1943, 17,000 people were relocated from the relocation centers.

During the following year, 1944, early in January, Secretary Stimson announced the reinstitution of selective service for practically all

boys of Japanese ancestry.

We continued our relocation program, and on December 17, 1944, the War Department announced that the mass exclusion order which had been in effect for nearly 3 years would be lifted as of January 2.

When this announcement was made we announced plans for the closing of the relocation centers within a year except for the segregation center at Tule Lake.

We also announced that any remnant left of the program involving segregees would be turned over to the Department of Justice, at the end of that time. We announced the establishment of three additional area offices on the west coast to assist in the relocation program.

We also announced that the farming operations of the relocation centers would not be carried forward during 1945, except to complete the programs under way, that our livestock programs will be continued for sometime and that the programs at two of the southern centers, where the harvest will not be completed until the middle of this calendar year, will be continued until that time. We have also announced the closing of schools at the end of this school year. Farming operations on a limited scale and school operations will continue at the segregation center, Tule Lake.

Mr. Taber. What do you mean by that, as far as dates go?

Mr. Myer. For the schools at the relocation centers, about 2 months,

Mr. Taber. There will be a little summer school work up until August 31, but that will be the final date. Most of the school work will close about June 1.

Our schools have been operating on an 11-month basis throughout the year, and we will continue some work during the summer for some students who are behind schedule, until August 31, which is the final date of any school work in the eight relocation centers.

The present status is about this: There are approximately 42,000 people who have relocated up to date, outside of centers; some of them are in the United States Army.

Mr. Wigglesworth. You mean 42,000 out of the 110,000?

Mr. Myer. We have had more than 110,000, because there have been additional births and there have been some additional people paroled out of the internment camps. There are also some additional people from Hawaii, so we have had nearly 120,000 that we have had the responsibility for at some stage.

There have been about 18,000 Japanese-American boys inducted into the American Army, and of that group, of course, some have been Hawaiian boys. There have been approximately 8,000 inducted from the mainland.

Mr. Case. Were there 8,000 of those you have been dealing with?

Mr. Myer. Yes; except that there had been some of that group in the evacuation, but their parents have lived in the relocation centers, for the most part.

I am including all people of Japanese ancestry, Mr. Case, because it is hard to keep the figures separate.

We at the present time have about 53,000 people who are free to be relocated, who are still in centers; that is a job we have to complete during this calendar year. This will mean that we will have a job of assisting between about 6,000 or 7,000 people each month to move back into normal communities.

When we formulated this plan we anticipated that as of March 1 there would be 60,000 people, and that as of July 1 there would be approximately 44,000, who would be eligible to resettle. This would mean the relocation of about 16,000 during the rest of this fiscal year, which would leave us about 44,000 until the last half of the calendar year.

I want to summarize the problems we are now facing in regard to the relocation program.

Our major problem is one we have had for some time, and that is concerning the reluctance, particularly on the part of the old people in the centers to be relocated, because of a feeling of insecurity; they are aliens and they are not sure that they would be accepted. They fear that they would not be able to make a living, and also have a fear of actual bodily harm, because there have been small groups of people who have committed certain atrocities.

In certain areas, particularly on the coast, during the last 3 months, we have had some occurrences such as shooting into dwellings, boycotts, and other atrocities on the part of misguided un-American patriots, and a small group of people who have an economic interest in opposing the return of evacuees.

We have also had difficulty with housing because of the crowded situation, particularly in cities which have expanded war industries, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle, as well as in the other cities throughout the country where they are relocating.

We have also had some job discrimination on the part of misguided, uninformed individuals who are very fearful of the individuals themselves, or fearful that public sentiment is such that their position will be jeopardized if they hire these people.

The only other comment I wish to make in my general statement, is to point out the major changes in our Budget this year as compared to last year.

There is the reduction in this Budget of \$16,480,066 in the cost of operating centers this year as compared with a year ago. The only increase is an increase of \$5,007,532 for relocation assistance. It is not quite that much because, as you will remember, that part of the Budget in the past has been on a different basis and we have utilized savings from the relocation center costs to pay for the relocation costs.

We have included in this Budget funds for the refugee shelter at Oswego, N. Y., which was not in the picture last year. We have a reduction in all our costs except for relocation assistance amounting to \$14,527,075, which includes overtime pay in the amount of \$1,338,648.

I think that summarizes the general status of the program.

CHANNELING OF EVACUEES TO NORMAL LOCALITIES

Mr. Cannon. You are winding up the affairs of the Authority and channeling the evacuees back into their normal localities as rapidly as you can?

Mr. Myer. That is correct.

Mr. Cannon. How soon do you expect to complete this operation?

Mr. Myer. We expect to complete the operation as far as the eight relocation centers are concerned about January 1, 1946.

TRANSFER OF TULE LAKE TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Cannon. That does not include Tule Lake?

Mr. Myer. It does not include Tule Lake or whatever the alternatives might be as to those that are still in the status of detainees. They will be transferred by that time to the Department of Justice, who are already running interment camps.

Mr. Cannon. Up to this time the Department of Justice has exercised no jurisdiction at Tule Lake?

Mr. Myer. No.

Mr. Cannon. It has been entirely under your authority?

Mr. Myer. That is right. Except for a short period following the so-called Tule Lake incident when the Army were in command.

Mr. Cannon. What disposition do you expect to make of the internees at Tule Lake?

Mr. Myer. Any of them that are left will be transferred to the Department of Justice.

Mr. Cannon. The Department of Justice will maintain the camps?

Mr. Myer. They will maintain the segregate camp.

Mr. Cannon. By that time, how many will you have at the Tule Lake camp?

Mr. Myer. We are estimating that, including family members, there will be 20,000 people there. It is a little hard to make that estimate because that will depend on the action of the military authorities since they make the determination. They are now making determinations as to

who should be recommended for segregation and who should be recommended for exclusion.

They have set up a series of appeal boards who are now reviewing a large number of those cases, and I think it will depend on the trend of the war and the facts which finally develop. But the best estimate we could make at the time we made up this budget was that there would be 20,000 people, which includes all of the family members, which would involve about 7,000 adults who have declared their intention. There are a lot of youngsters and family members who are tied in.

PROBLEMS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The Chairman. What other problems besides the Tule Lake situation do you have in connection with liquidation?

Mr. Myer. Our major problem, Mr. Chairman, is what I would call a bad case of institutionalization. We have spent about 3 years making people dependent, and now our big job during the rest of the calendar year is to try to make people independent again and build up their courage and their morale to the place where they feel that they can face the public without fear and make a living.

The Chairman. That applies largely to the older members?

Mr. Myer. That applies to all of them but particularly to the older members who are Japanese nationals, who feel that they cannot go about as freely as others. A good many of them have language difficulties.

Then, too, a good many of the old people in centers have sons in the United States Army fighting on many fronts, who feel that they are dependent upon these soldier boys because they are affected by the alien property laws on the coast. The boys own the land, and they work with them, but they feel that their homes will be in jeopardy for the reason that their boys cannot will their real property to alien parents because of alien land laws.

It is a very complex problem.

DESIRE OF SOME JAPANESE TO RETURN TO JAPAN

The Chairman. Do any of them indicate a desire to return to Japan?

Mr. Myer. A good many people are planning to return to Japan.

The Chairman. You encourage that?

Mr. Myer. We encourage them to do so if they want to go. We have taken this position, that if they live in this country they should be allowed to make up their minds as to what they want to do, and when they have done that they should be treated accordingly. If they want to go back to Japan, of course, they should be allowed to go whenever it is possible to go. When we carried out the segregation program we had that in mind when we moved those to Tule Lake, who said that they wanted to go to Japan. Most of those older people were not dangerous people, in my judgement. A good many of them were simply old folks who felt that they were not going to be able to make the adjustment in this country, and some of them were too old to start over again.

Some of them felt that they were not going to be allowed to live in the United States, and they were simply looking for security. That has created some of our problems because I think a good many of them thought they would be able to return to Japan immediately.

Some of them have property there that they were to inherit, and there were all kinds of mixed reasons. Tule Lake is not a place where we have a lot of dangerous people, but it is a place where we had to put all the people who wanted to be Japanese. There are still some people at Tule Lake who are not in the category.

REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY TO BE LIQUIDATED

The Chairman. What property will you have on hand, both real and personal property, if you are successful in liquidating your internees?

Mr. Myer. We have real estate of our own only at two centers. We purchased real estate at the Central Utah center and at the Granada center in Colorado. All of the rest of the centers were situated on Government-controlled land or leased land. Two in Arizona are on Indian reservation lands and there are three others on reclamation land, and that land will go back to the Reclamation Service. We only have two places where we own real estate. We have already declared all of our farm lands surplus at Granada. That has been leased by the Army to private operators.

We will, of course, have a large amount of equipment and materials used in the operation of the centers, such as automobiles, trucks, and other equipment of many kinds, but we are already declaring these items surplus as fast as we can possibly do it.

We have already declared surplus practically all of our farm equipment that we have used in those centers where we are not farming this year. What that will amount to in the total amount-I could not give you the exact figure at the moment, but it is a pretty large amount. We are working closely with the Surplus Property Board and the Treasury Procurement Division in turning over month by month any equipment that we do not need.

CHARACTER OF EVACUEES AT TULE LAKE

Mr. Ludlow. You say there are about 7,000 Japanese families at Tule Lake?

Mr. Myer. No; I said that in connection with the figure of 20,000 the estimate we made probably would not include more than about 7,000 adult individuals who had made a declaration as to what they wanted to do.

Mr. Ludlow. How was it decided as to what Japs would go to Tule Lake? Are they all recalcitrants?

Mr. Myer. No; I would not call them all that. At the beginning we set up certain categories of people to be sent to Tule Lake, including those who had requested repatriation to Japan, and then there were also certain people who had requested expatriation as American citizens.

Many of those people were not in any way dangerous to the country; they had simply made up their minds that they wanted to go back for

various reasons. Anyone who said "No" to the allegiance question was transferred to Tule Lake and the only other group involved was a small group of people who, because of their intelligence records, we decided ought to go to Tule Lake even though they may not have requested repatriation. We had a check with the F. B. I., the Army Intelligence Service, and the Naval Intelligence Service, and we took the information they had as basis for certain decisions.

Those determinations are now no longer made by the W.R.A. At the time the mass exclusion orders were lifted, the Army took over the determination and we are no longer doing that.

Mr. Ludlow. Are some of those at Tule Lake American citizens?

Mr. Myer. Yes.

Mr. Ludlow. What proportion?

Mr. Myer. The proportion ran pretty close to 70 percent in the beginning. Some of them have renounced their citizenship.

Mr. Ludlow. How long do you think Tule Lake will be used for that purpose? How long would it take to wipe it out?

Mr. Myer. I cannot answer that. It will depend on the policy of the War Department and the Department of Justice as to how long they feel it is important to maintain people under confinement, and, since they are making the determination, I have no basis for an estimate.

Mr. Ludlow. I notice in your justifications of the other eight centers they will all be liquidated and will be entirely gone by January 1, 1946.

Mr. Myer. That is right, according to the plan, providing everything works the way we expect it to work. We will have a tight schedule to meet, but that is our expectation.

Mr. Ludlow. This is an estimate for \$25,140,000. Will that pretty well liquidate all of the war-relocation activities?

Mr. Myer. If everything works smoothly, as we proposed to try to have it work. This is the tightest budget we have ever had. It has been trimmed to the absolute limit. However, if nothing unforeseen happens, I think we will make it.

DESTINATIONS OF RELEASED EVACUEES

Mr. Ludlow. Are these evacuees going back to their original lands?

Mr. Myer. The major relocation in the last 3 months has been to the East and to the Middle West. However, it is getting to the place where it is pretty close to being 50-50. A good many are beginning to go back. It took them some time to make those decisions. There are a good many ready to go back home. There are 40,000 of them relocated in the rest of the country.

There is hardly a family that did not have people relocated in other parts of the United States. Every family had some difficulty in making up their minds what they wanted to do. It has been a rather complex problem for the families to decide where they were going to locate.

Mr. Ludlow. What proportion of them in relocation centers still own property?

Mr. Myer. There is not a large proportion that own property. Many of them had long-term leases. The proportion, I should say, is fairly small. There are some. Some have already gone back to their properties.

As I pointed out in my general statement, because of the alien land laws, most of this property is held in the names of American citizens, and some of them are in the armed forces. Alien adults have some reluctance to try to operate that property because they are fearful that there will be escheat proceedings brought against them, as there have been in several cases recently. I may say that many of the parents are in a position where they would inherit the property of a boy killed in action on account of the alien land laws on the coast.

PAYMENT OF COST OF TRANSPORTATION OF RELEASED INTERNEES

Mr. Ludlow. The Government pays the cost of transportation at these relocation centers?

Mr. Myer. Yes; we are paying the cost of transportation wherever they wish to go.

Mr. Ludlow. Wherever they decide to go, the Government pays the cost of transportation?

Mr. Myer. That is right.

Mr. Ludlow. Regardless of what the situation is, whether they have resettled in their own right?

Mr. Myer. That is right; the same thing applies to all of them.

DISPOSITION OF BUILDING MATERIALS

Mr. Ludlow. I think you said there were two of these centers where the Government owns land or purchased the land?

Mr. Myer. We purchased the land.

Mr. Ludlow. In the case of the habitations in the eight centers, are those being moved, or are they being knocked down and sold?

Mr. Myer. There has not been any disposal as yet. We have closed only one center up to this time. We closed the Jerome center in Arkansas last year. That was taken over by the War Department and is now being used as a prisoner-of-war camp. I do not know what disposition will be made of it. That disposition will be made by the Surplus Property Board. Practically all of the buildings are temporary structures. It is what they call the theater of operations type of construction, with tar-paper barracks.

type of construction, with tar-paper barracks.

Mr. Ludlow. It was good lumber?

Mr. Myer. Yes, sir; all of the frame work was good lumber. I presume it will be salvaged, under contract, perhaps, but that is only a presumption.

WAR RECORD OF JAPANESE AMERICAN SOLDIERS

Mr. Ludlow.. You said, as I understood you, that 8,000, approximately, of these Japanese have been inducted into the United States Army and some are fighting in Italy?

Mr. Myer. Yes; 18,000 all told-approximately 8,000 from the mainland.

Mr. Ludlow. Are they fighting as a separate unit, or are they infiltrated into other units?

Mr. Myer. I mentioned the Four Hundred and Forty-second Combat Team, and that is all a Japanese-American unit; they have made a wonderful record. There are a large number intermingled with other units.

Mr. Ludlow. Where?

Mr. Myer. In Italy and France. The One Hundredth Infantry Battalion was the first unit to go overseas. In the beginning that was a unit of all-Hawaiian boys who had mostly been in the Hawaiian National Guard. At the time when the Four Hundred and Forty-second Combat Team completed their training the One Hundredth Infantry became a part of that unit. That is the outfit, incidentally, that saved the "lost battalion" of the Thirty-sixth Division. That is an example of what they have done. I have here a statement about that in a press release.

Mr. Ludlow. Can you insert that in the record?

Mr. Myer. Yes; I will be glad to do that; but I would like to read this one paragraph into the record:

In France, the story of the One Hundredth's heroic rescue of the Thirty-sixth Division's "lost battalion" has been told and retold. In its present position in the French Alps, it could easily rest on its laurels: 21 Distinguished Service Crosses, 6 Legions of Merit, 73 Silver Stars, 7 Soldier's Medals, 96 Bronze Stars, 16 Division Citations, 2 awards from the Italian Government, and the War Department Distinguished Unit Citation. The One Hundredth's infantrymen have been awarded over 1,547 Purple Hearts and Oak Leaf Clusters for wounds received in battle.

That is the first Japanese-American unit that went over. It later became a part of the Four Hundred and Forty-second Regimental Combat Team. The Four Hundred and Forty-second was the outfit that rescued the lost battalion of the Texas unit in the Vosges Mountain area.

(The press release referred to is as follows:)

Editor: Soldiers from your locality are mentioned on attached

sheet. Passed for publication by Field Press Censor JW 201.7

Sixth Army Group, France.--The One Hundredth Battalion of the Four Hundred and Forty-second infantry Regiment, made up of Americans of Japanese ancestry, is writing another thrilling chapter in its already massive book of courageous action. In a sector of the formidable barrier that separates France from Italy--250 miles of jagged mountain ridges and snow-capped peaks--this battalion, one of the most famous in American military history, is engaged in hazardous mountain warfare.

Along the Franco-Italian border, part of Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Dever's Sixth Army Group front, wary Nisei patrols probe their way into German defenses with a skill born out of long combat experience. Their buddies are well entrenched in defensive positions, ready for enemy counter thrusts or patrols. In the shadows of towering cliffs, German ambush traps are dealt with in deadly thoroughness.

The One Hundredth gained a reputation as "the fightin'est outfit" in Italy. In one of the most sensational actions of the Italian campaign, the battalion was ordered to wipe out a strongly defended German bastion, a small town north of Rome. In short time, it took the town, cut the main German escape highway at three points, destroyed the enemy's right flank, and forced a withdrawal over 6 strategic miles. Germans killed, wounded, and captured totaled over 270. For this action, and consistently outstanding combat operation in Italy, the battalion was awarded a War Department Distinguished Unit Citation.

In France, the story of the One Hundredth's heroic rescue of the Thirty-sixth Division's "lost Battalion" has been told and retold. In its present position in the French Alps it could easily rest on its laurels: 21 Distinguished Service Crosses, 6 Legions of Merit, 73 Silver Stars, 7 Soldier's Medals, 96 Bronze Stars, 16 Division Citations, 2 awards from the Italian Government, and the War Department Distinguished Unit Citation. The One Hundredth's Infantrymen have been awarded over 1,547 Purple Hearts and Oak Leaf Clusters for wounds received in battle.

Mr. Myer. I have heard that that one battalion had 60 percent casualties. They have had a marvelous record. I have also heard it said that for 3 years they have never had a case of A.W.O.L. They were the spearhead that took Genoa 4 or 5 days ago. They moved into France and then they moved back into Italy. They are not only fighting in Italy and France but some are scattered throughout other battle areas; they are fighting in the South Pacific, in the Philippines, in Iwo Jima, and in Okinawa. They were at Kiska, and Attu, and Saipan. There are several hundred boys there doing special service work. There have been a number of similar engagements that they have been in, in Leyte and other parts of the Pacific. They have rendered service on all fronts.

DISTURBANCES IN RELOCATION CENTERS

Mr. Ludlow. Aside from the disturbance at Tule Lake, have you been troubled by disturbances in any of the other relocation centers?

Mr. Myer. We have had three disturbances in three different centers, two of them occurring in 1942. We have had one disturbance at

Poston, and we have also had a disturbance at Manzanar. Then in 1943 we had the disturbance at Tule Lake.

The groups of people who caused those disturbances have been disciplined. The disturbance at Tule Lake was not as bad as it was painted. But there was some fire there, and I would think there were about two or three hundred boys that got out of line, but they were brought back into line.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNEES AFTER RELOCATION

Mr. O'Neal. Have you any responsibility after you once relocate them?

Mr. Myer. No; except that we do try to get them connected up with their personal property where we have had it in storage. We do serve as consultants if they get into difficulties, and try to give them advice and help. We try to make them as independent as possible as quickly as possible.

Mr. O'Neal. Suppose they do not make good on their job, then it becomes the job of the State to take care of them, I presume?

Mr. Myer. Most of them have not gone on the land. Most of the locations have been in the cities. But in the western irrigated areas there have been a good many working on the land there as hired laborers, or they have worked as sharecroppers. They have made their own arrangements, largely, and they are able to shift for themselves. We have had an arrangement with the Social Security Board under which, if an individual got into real difficulties such as illness, they have received assistance if needed. The last figure I had showed that there had only been an average of 147 people per month up to the time when the exclusion order was lifted who had been relocated, who had received aid under that program. I will say that they have been a pretty independent group of people in that respect. They have prided themselves that they have had practically no one on relief, and they have taken care of their own situation. They usually do not ask for help unless they are actually up against it.

NUMBER OF PERSONS UNDER JURISDICTION OF W. R. A.

Mr. Taber. I want to get a picture of this question as far as I can. You have got 7,000 adults at Tule Lake, who are obstreperous more or less?

Mr. Myer. No; they are not obstreperous; the most of them are just people who decided they want to go back to Japan.

Mr. Taber. Have you moved any of them back through the exchange of nationals?

Mr. Myer. There have been a few; there has been only two shiploads on the Gripsholm during the whole period, Mr. Taber, that have gone to Japan, and just a few have gone from Tule Lake. First, because there has been no exchange since this segregation program was carried out.

Mr. Taber. Seven thousand adults are there now. How many are there

altogether?

Mr. Myer. Seventeen thousand eight hundred and eighty-six, if you include the family members.

Mr. Taber. How many have you got right now altogether, including Tule Lake?

Mr. Myer. There were, as of April 21, 72,755 in all the centers, including Tule Lake.

Mr. Wigglesworth. I thought you said there were 53,000.

Mr. Myer. There are 20,000 that we estimate will not be eligible for relocation, and if you subtract the 20,000 from the 72,755 it will leave you around 53,000.

Mr. Taber. You have some who will not be eligible for relocation scattered at other places?

Mr. Myer. That is right. There will be about 20,000 as near as we can estimate, in that category.

Mr. Taber. I would like you to set out in the record how many you have and where they are.

Mr. Myer. Mr. Taber, I cannot give you the exact number. That is only an estimate based upon what we think will be the Army action; they make a determination as to the number of people and that estimate is changing every day.

Mr. Taber. I see.

Mr. Myer. We do not make that determination, and we simply have had to make that an estimate.

Mr. Taber. The 72,755 is an estimate?

Mr. Myer. No; the 72,755 is an accurate figure.

Mr. Taber. I thought you said it was an estimate.

Mr. Myer. No; that is not an estimate.

Mr. Taber. Can you give me a break-down of the number in the centers?

Mr. Myer. I have some figures right here that I will be glad to give you for the record, or I can give them to you now.

Mr. Taber. I believe I would like you to put the table in the record, setting it up in tabular form.

Mr. Myer. Very well.

Mr. Taber. How does this figure of 72,755 compare with the number

that you had a year ago when you were up here?

Mr. Myer. Approximately 18,000 less.

Mr. Taber. I would like to recheck that figure as of April 1 last year because I do not have the figures with me, but I can get the figures for you.

Mr. Taber. I wish you would put that in the record as a separate column on this other table.

Mr. Myer. The figures to compare with a year ago of approximately April 1?

Mr. Taber. Yes.

(The statement requested follows:)

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF CENTER POPULATION

Center	Apr. 1 1944	Apr. 21, 1945
Central Utah	7,026	5,376
Colorado River	12,991	10,258
Gila River	9,251	8,684
Granada	6,404	5,484
Heart Mountain	9,368	7,638
Jerome	6,440	-----
Manzanar	6,415	4,989
Minidoka	8,456	6,421
Rohwer	6,133	6,019
Tule Lake	16,914	17,886
Total	89,398	72,755

Mr. Taber. You told us that you expected to get rid of -- I understood you to testify that there would be only about 40,000 by the 1st of July.

Mr. Myer. Forty-four thousand. Including the 20,000 that was estimated for Tule Lake, there will be all told about 64,000 by the 1st of July.

Mr. Taber. You only expect to get rid of about 8,000?

Mr. Myer. During the next 2 months, about 9,000.

TIME NEEDED TO LIQUIDATE OPERATIONS UNDER WAR RELOCATION
AUTHORITY

Mr. Taber. How long do you expect to have to operate this situation?

Mr. Myer. We expect, Mr. Taber, to be out of the business, so far as the War Relocation Authority is concerned, within the next fiscal year. We do not know as yet just how long it is going to take to dispose of the property and get the final details in order. We have two types of property to dispose of: One of them is the property that we are looking after for the evacuees, personal property in warehouses up and down the coast. We are estimating that we can get that job done by about April 1 so we can turn it over to someone else. If we can get it geared up with the disposal agency we hope to have most of the Government property disposed of by April or May of 1946.

Mr. Taber. How much do you expect to have on hand at the 1st of January 1946?

Mr. Myer. About 20,000 persons.

Mr. Taber. And how many of the 1st of April 1946?

Mr. Myer. None; because they will have been turned over by that time to the Department of Justice and we will be out of the business January 2 and have nobody in residence if our schedule is maintained.

Our job, from the 1st of January on, will be to complete the liquidation of the other eight centers, the property, and to complete the job of adjustments as far as the evacuees' property is concerned, and to assist those not finally adjusted for 2 or 3 months after centers are closed.

Mr. Taber. That is, to complete the adjustment job altogether of the individuals who are being relocated.

Mr. Myer. We plan to maintain our relocation staff until about the 1st of April 1946, and there will be a few things probably that will require attention after the 1st of April, but the staff will be drastically reduced after April 1, 1946.

Mr. Taber. These estimates were made on the basis of that reduction, were they?

Mr. Myer. They include, however, as far as personnel is concerned, the terminal leave that would accrue within this fiscal year; there will be an accumulation, as you know, of leave, so that the estimates are based not only on the completion of the work job but terminal leave of those who may resign from the Government or move out.

Mr. Taber. How many people did you have in this group on the 1st of April, or right around the 1st of April 1944?

Mr. Myer. That is what I told you I would have to get for the record. I do not have that figure.

Mr. Taber. You could not give me an estimate now?

Mr. Myer. I can give you a pretty good idea. It was around 91,000 or 92,000 people.

Mr. Taber. Ninety-one or two thousand?

Mr. Myer. Yes; in all centers. I would like to have the opportunity to correct that figure for the record, because I can check it accurately when I get back to the office.

[The exact figure for April 1, 1944 was 92,715.]

EXPENDITURES, 1945 and 1946

Mr. Taber. I would like to have you give me your expenditures to this date, altogether, and a table indicating the monthly expenditures so far this fiscal year, with an estimate of what you will have the rest of the fiscal year; and then I would like to have you give me an estimate of what you expect to expend in the next fiscal year, by months.

Mr. Myer. I would like to ask you a question: Do you want the total expenditures for the whole life of the Authority, or just for this fiscal year?

Mr. Taber. I am asking for this fiscal year.

Mr. Myer. We will furnish that.
(The information requested follows:)

Monthly expenditures for the fiscal year 1945 (estimated for the months of April, May, and June) and apportionment by months of estimate of appropriation for fiscal year 1946

	Fiscal Year 1945	Fiscal Year 1946
July	\$3,162,072	\$3,416,916
August	3,188,386	3,250,851
September	3,206,552	3,227,731
October	3,124,877	3,038,224
November	3,139,725	2,797,453
December	3,176,548	2,552,780
January	3,179,755	1,621,883
February	3,130,143	1,485,303
March	3,050,874	1,115,058
April	3,754,198	903,220
May	3,790,531	872,559
June	3,763,414	858,022
Total	39,667,075	25,140,000

Mr. Taber. You have another activity which I do not believe has been touched on yet.

Mr. Myer. The refugee shelter?

Mr. Taber. Yes. I will take up when we reach that item in the justifications. I believe that is all I have until we get to the details.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Mr. Myer, when was your estimate presented to the Budget?

Mr. Myer. About January 15, Mr. Wigglesworth. We started working on it immediately after the mass exclusion was lifted, December 17, and I think we actually got it over to the Bureau of the Budget about the middle of January.

Mr. Wigglesworth. What was the first day you were requested to appear before the Budget?

Mr. Myer. February 5.

Mr. Wigglesworth. That was the first date you were requested to appear before the Budget?

Mr. Myer. Yes, for this year's budget, you mean?

Mr. Wigglesworth. Yes; for this year's budget.

Mr. Myer. Of course we have met with the Budget committee from time to time to report progress.

Mr. Wigglesworth. You prepared this on a man-year basis at the request of the Budget?

Mr. Myer. Yes; it was prepared on a man-year basis at their request.

PENALTY MAIL

Mr. Wigglesworth. I wish you would put in the record a statement showing the penalty mail costs, by years, including the estimate we have before us.

Mr. Myer. This last fiscal year.

Mr. Wigglesworth. For each fiscal year you have been in operation, and including the request you are now making, and also a similar statement in respect to the money expended on publicity, public relations, by fiscal years, including the one we now have before us.

Mr. Myer. Yes.

(The information requested follows:)

PENALTY MAIL COSTS

There were no penalty mail costs prior to the fiscal year 1945 which are estimated at \$26,250. This estimate of appropriation does not provide for an estimated \$30,000 for the fiscal year 1946 as it is being included by the Department of the Interior in their estimate.

PUBLICITY AND PUBLIC-RELATIONS COSTS

Publicity and public-relations costs are estimated, by fiscal years, as follows:

1943-----	\$ 84,380
1944-----	122,744
1945-----	204,168
1946-----	160,740

Mr. Wigglesworth. You have already given us a statement as to the promotions in the higher brackets, I believe.

Mr. Myer. That is right.

BREAK-DOWN OF FUNDS AVAILABLE BY FISCAL YEAR

Mr. Wigglesworth. Would you also furnish for the record a statement covering the over-all activities, showing a break-down of your construction and operation, and the outside sources of funds and the amount you have received?

Mr. Myer. From the beginning?

Mr. Wigglesworth. Yes; any emergency funds that have been appropriated, and funds received from other sources.

Mr. Myer. The total cost, and the total funds we have had available; that is what you want?

Mr. Wigglesworth. Yes.

(The Information requested follows:)

SOURCE AND AMOUNT OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE AND EXPENDITURES BY FISCAL YEAR

Fiscal Year	Amount received by--		Expenditures
	Transfer ¹	Appropriation	
1942-----	\$5,632,925	-----	\$5,632,925
1943-----	-----	\$70,000,000	47,869,753
1944-----	-----	48,170,000	42,435,141
1945-----	667,075	39,000,000	² 39,667,075
Total-----	6,300,000	157,170,000	135,604,894

Approximately \$11,852,000 of the total was expended for construction of additional facilities to meet our requirements and the balance for operation of the centers. The original construction of the centers was done by the War Department and the cost is not included in these figures.

¹The transfer from "Emergency fund for the President, national defense" in the fiscal year 1942 was \$6,300,000 of which \$667,075 was unexpended and made available for the operation of the emergency refugee shelter for the fiscal year 1945.

² Expenditures, estimated for the months of April, May, and June 1945.

Mr. Wigglesworth. This request you are making is a full fiscal year's request?

Mr. Myer. That is correct.

Mr. Wigglesworth. A 12 months' request?

Mr. Myer. That is right.

PROBLEM ATTACHED TO RELEASING INTERNEES

Mr. Wigglesworth. As I understand it, since the decision by the War Department to which you have referred, and since the decision by the Supreme Court, overruling some of the regulations and requirements, all of these evacuees are free to leave and go home immediately if they want to, except such persons as may individually be--

Mr. Myer (interposing). Excluded by the War Department,

Mr. Wigglesworth. Except those excluded by the War Department.

Mr. Myer. Yes.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Why should we not turn Tule Lake over to the Department of Justice to handle and tell the other people they are free to go?

Mr. Myer. For the simple reason, Mr. Wigglesworth, that Tule Lake is now a mixed center; it is not only a segregation center. As I pointed out to the chairman, we have at Tule Lake several thousands of people who are free to go, who are now in that category, but who were placed at Tule Lake, but now under the decision of the War Department it has been determined that it is not necessary they be detained there any longer.

And, that ties in with the whole relocation program, and we feel that it is possible to assist some of those persons to relocate before we finally turn the center over.

We furthermore feel that it would be unjust to the program at this moment if we had any large movement of people between centers now for it adds to the feeling of insecurity, the feeling of not knowing just exactly what is going to happen, and the whole problem is so complicated that it is going to take another, perhaps, 2 or 3 months to determine how many people are eligible to relocate and it may take longer. We have turned over approximately 1,000 people to the Department of Justice since about the 1st of January.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Well, here it is the 30th day of April and the Army's revision of its ruling was made December 17, was it not?

Mr. Myer. All the determinations were not made--

Mr. Wigglesworth. I mean the decision on the policy.

Mr. Myer. The decision was made December 17; yes.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Prior to that date, you have told us, in previous hearings, I think, that you had made a very careful investigation of every one of the evacuees under your jurisdiction.

Mr. Myer. Yes.

Mr. Wigglesworth. And you knew who they were.

Mr. Myer. We also had segregated some of them.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Particularly in respect to last year?

Mr. Myer. That is right.

Mr. Wigglesworth. You have had altogether $4\frac{1}{2}$ months elapse since the change of policy by the War Department. Can you give us some figures comparable to the figures prior to the time the change in policy was made? I am just wondering why you cannot complete the process more rapidly than you suggest.

Mr. Myer. I am trying to explain to you that the change in the policy, and the making of a determination about the individuals and those who are members of the family, involves a rather large task.

Mr. Wigglesworth. You must have some of those figures.

Mr. Myer. Oh, we do.

Mr. Wigglesworth. On each individual case.

Mr. Myer. We do.

Mr. Wigglesworth. It would seem to me to be a simple matter for the War Department, in the light of this information, and the information secured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to decide whether an individual was someone that should be or should not be detained further.

Mr. Myer. It is not that simple, the fact is that they are still making changes in their lists.

Mr. Wigglesworth. And they are deducting some?

Mr. Myer. They are.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Certainly you have some estimate.

Mr. Myer. They are following through with the revision, and maybe the next day we will find out they are listing some additional people.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Listing them?

Mr. Myer. Yes. The Army's list is changing.

Mr. Wigglesworth. That they are letting more of them move?

Mr. Myer. Yes; that is changing all the time. And I would say that at the time this determination was made that probably instead of 20,000 people there were probably 30,000 people, all in all.

Mr. Wigglesworth. In other words, using the 73,000 roughly, that you have got under your jurisdiction now, of that number the War Department is satisfied to let 43,000 go now?

Mr. Myer. They were at that time. They have more than that on their clear list now.

Mr. Wigglesworth. And that number is increasing?

Mr. Myer. That number is increasing.

Mr. Wigglesworth. But there are 43,000 that the War Department is ready to let go?

Mr. Myer. Approximately 53,000. Some of those are at Tule Lake.

Mr. Wigglesworth. That gets back to my original question: Why can you not turn the 43,000 loose almost immediately instead of taking $4\frac{1}{2}$ months that you have had since the War Department's order went into effect plus another 6 months that you contemplate now in which to let them go back home?

Mr. Myer. I misunderstood your question. I thought your question was why can we not turn them immediately over to the Department of Justice.

Mr. Wigglesworth. That was only a part of my question. Now, why can you not let them go?

Mr. Myer. We can let those go that are free to go at any time. However, it is not an easy thing for people to go who have been out of circulation for 3 years, and whose property, if they had any, is either leased for a period of months, or if takes time for them to decide, between their family members, where they are going.

I would like to point out, Mr. Wigglesworth, that during the evacuation movement in 1942, when the Army moved people without any question as to the consideration of those people at all, that it took about 7 or 8 months to move the 110,000, by trainloads, and now when you are dealing with the movement of a large number of people, trying to get them established, according to our plan, it will take about 20 months to move approximately 65,000 people on an individual family basis. We have figured they should have the opportunity to determine in their own way where they want to go, and to make that determination with the rest of the family, and in working out a plan they must look over the territory to determine where they are going. And we have adopted the policy of not moving the people out, especially the older people and the children until they have had a reasonable time within which to determine where they want to move. It is a delicate and patient operation, and it is just almost impossible, for anyone who has not lived with it, to know the human problems involved.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Your obligation to these people is very different.

First, to those who are at Tule Lake, and the others who are under your jurisdiction which the War Department has told are free to leave.

Mr. Myer. Yes, but we feel we have a reasonable obligation, since they were taken away from their homes, to help them get reestablished, and it will take a few months for them to do so.

Furthermore, there is the transportation question: Suppose they were ready to leave the centers now, we could not move all of these people at once if we wanted to do so; it would be a physical impossibility.

AUTHORITY TO ASSIST PERSONS AFTER RELEASE

Mr. Wigglesworth. Do you feel you have the necessary authority to look after these people indefinitely who are now free to go?

Mr. Myer. We have the Executive order of the President, plus the congressional appropriation acts, and I think we have been quite clear in what we planned to do and we have been careful not to exceed the authority that has been given us here. And we hope Congress will see fit to give us some flexibility, to continue the centers until we can get this job done in a decent and humane manner.

After all, I would just like to say that we take a little pride in the fact that we are an emergency agency that is trying to get out of business by the time the war is over, and we believe we should, from the standpoint of what is best for the program itself. From the standpoint of what we think is good and sound for the United States Government, since we have been assigned the task of looking after these people, we should continue the program we have started for a reasonable time until we can find some place where they can make a reasonable adjustment. We feel we are simply following in the normal line of procedure in line with the principles of the United States Government. We are dealing with a group of people who have been badly torn and we are endeavoring to help them make adjustments. Many of them do not speak English very fluently, and there are a number of other problems involved.

Our authority, Mr. Wigglesworth, stems entirely from this committee and the Congress; we must leave it with you to determine whether or not you feel our proposal is sound.

Mr. Wigglesworth. There is no legislative authority for your present program.

Mr. Myer. No; and there never has been except the Executive order and the appropriation acts.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Do you feel you have authority to provide assistance, special assistance for every one of these people who are free to go, and if so, for how long?

Mr. Myer. We are asking that authority from this committee now. The only authority we will have is the order to do the job, with the funds that are given to carry out that authority, and I hope that the money will be available, and we hope if possible to complete the major part of the job by the 1st of January.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Do you feel that you have the authority to grant relocation assistance to these people after they are free to go?

Mr. Myer. There is no question about that.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Where do you think it comes from?

Mr. Myer. We laid out our program this last year on that basis, and we have explained the basis on which the job was to be done, and we have granted relocation assistance during this whole period.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Yes; but I am talking about now. That refers to the condition that existed at that time, but now you are under the War Department policy that says they are free to go.

Mr. Myer. Our major responsibility has always been relocation.

Mr. Wigglesworth. But whatever authority was implied at that time was not given in the light of the picture we now have which authorizes the evacuees to leave immediately. In other words, the situation has changed materially now.

Mr. Myer. We made the statement, I think, to the Congress, certainly to the Bureau of the Budget, and I think to the Congress as well that if the situation changed, if there should be a sudden change in the program it would necessarily affect our program. I think we have made it clear all along the line what our responsibilities are and what we intend to do in the operation of the program.

Mr. Wigglesworth. But I am looking ahead and not looking back. I am talking about your authority at the present time.

Mr. Myer. We think we have the authority.

Mr. Wigglesworth. You mean as to the evacuees that are free to go home?

Mr. Myer. Yes.

Mr. Wigglesworth. As to these people who are free to go home, do you feel you have the authority to assist them in securing jobs and working out the adjustments in the centers until they are evacuated?

Mr. Myer. Yes.

Mr. Wigglesworth. Even though they are free to go?

Mr. Myer. That is right; that has been our job right straight along, Mr. Wigglesworth.

Mr. Wigglesworth. But the situation has changed now.

Mr. Myer. No; it just expedites the operation, Mr. Wigglesworth, but we have never been jailers or never have operated a concentration camp; our job has been simply to assist in relocating these people, we were established as an agency for that purpose.

Mr. Wigglesworth. But that has been done.

Mr. Myer. No; it has not been done; our job is not complete.

Mr. Wigglesworth. You are talking about the old program.

Mr. Myer. We feel that we have an administrative responsibility to assist them to get relocated into normal communities, and I think you will find that is what we have tried to do.

Mr. Wigglesworth. But you go back to what has been done; the condition has changed, the emergency has passed, and you want to go back here and assist these people until they go home.

Mr. Myer. That is right.

Mr. Wigglesworth. You spell out the authority given you in the acts of this committee as contained in the appropriation made to you.

Mr. Myer. Partly. Our authority stems from Executive Order 9102.

Mr. Wigglesworth. That does not go to these estimates; I do not believe that covers this picture.

Mr. Myer. I believe it will, assuming that you consider the Executive order valid, and the authority which is set up under the appropriation act. I want to repeat that we have complied with the policies which have been laid out in the appropriation acts by the Appropriations Committee in the expenditure of funds and I do not believe that we have overstepped that authority.

Mr. Wigglesworth. I do not believe you have developed in the record as yet, in detail, this fact, but I think there must be some limitation, because you do not plan to keep these people who are free to go home indefinitely, do you?

Mr. Myer. I thought I had made it clear, Mr. Wigglesworth, that January 2 was the date we have set for liquidating the centers other than Tule Lake.

Mr. Wigglesworth. That is your present plan; if this works out as expected it would take how long?

Mr. Myer. There are certain things of course we cannot control, and I would like to make it clear that if the transportation situation is tied up through the movement of troops, for instance, we cannot of course transport all of these people. It might be impossible during certain periods of movements of troops, for instance, to get transportation facilities, and that would make it necessary for us to revise our plans. And these are other elements that might change the situation, when you are thinking of the movement of fifty or sixty thousand people. But we are trying to assist these people to relocate with the thought in mind that they are American citizens, most of them. Some extremists on the one side, who have battled us throughout the whole relocation program, and on the other side, some of our best friends, feel that we are attempting to close these centers too soon. We have tried to hit what we think is a reasonable

ground in order to do the job as efficiently and humanely as possible.

I would like to repeat that it would not be possible, assuming that all these people wanted to go tomorrow, to move them tomorrow. We have more than 50,000 people and that involves a tremendous job; we have a difficult administrative problem, and we are trying to help this little minority group adjust themselves throughout the country, and we think it is a pretty good thing, and in doing so we are trying to give these people a reasonable time to make up their minds where they want to go.

Mr. Wigglesworth. May I just make this observation, Mr. Chairman. I do not care to ask any further questions now on the general statement, but I do want to make this observation for the record, that in reading the justifications it seems to me that some of the activities are doubtful from the standpoint of authority, and that doubt is very much increased since the War Department has now determined that a great proportion of these evacuees are now free to go at any time they may see fit.

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(The reproduced portion covers the Director's testimony during the forenoon of the day of the hearing. The afternoon testimony was not included because it went into detailed discussions of individual budget items.)

EXCERPT FROM TALK GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR JOSEPH C. GREW
AT NEW YORK ON NOVEMBER 18 BEFORE THE ANNUAL BANQUET
OF THE HOLLAND SOCIETY

"In a few moments I shall speak briefly about that other enemy. But first, let me make an appeal. I realize that this will be a digression from my train of thought, but I do wish, if only for a moment, to dwell on another subject in which I am deeply interested, and I venture to hope that I may interest you gentlemen also.

"One of the proudest achievements of our country is our assimilation of many different races within our borders. We take well-justified pride in the term "melting pot" as applied to our nation. The existence and purpose and membership of the Holland Society are a living testimonial to that great principle, and it is especially interesting to note that even three centuries ago, when the Dutch West India Company had extended to all friendly European countries the privilege of trading with the then province of New Amsterdam, the town of New Amsterdam rapidly assumed the cosmopolitan character for which it has ever since been noted and that according to contemporary reports, eighteen languages were spoken among its 400 or 500 inhabitants in 1643.

"The point I wish to make is this. In time of war, blind prejudice is always rampant. In the last war I remember than even loyal Americans with German names were all too often looked at askance. That bigotry fortunately does not exist today, but it does exist today among a large proportion of our fellow countrymen with regard to American citizens of Japanese descent. In fact many, perhaps most, of our compatriots refer to those fellow-citizens of ours quite indiscriminately as "Japs". In reading the many letters I receive from all over the country on that subject I very seldom know whether the writer is referring to Americans or to outright enemy aliens. There is, or should be, a great difference there.

"In time of war, especially, we must take every proper step to protect our country from hostile acts, especially from espionage or sabotage, within our gates. We have competent official authorities to attend to that consideration, and they are attending to it, constantly and effectively. I do know that like the Americans of German descent, the overwhelming majority of Americans of Japanese origin wish to be and are wholly loyal to the United States, and not only that, but they wish to prove that loyalty in service to their native land. Reiman Morin, of the Associated Press, reports from the Fifth Army in Italy that the first unit of American-born Japanese troops went into combat smiling with satisfaction as if they were going to a baseball game; their motto is "Remember Pearl Harbor", and their commander said that he wouldn't trade his command for any other in the Army. Their officers, said Morin, are unanimously enthusiastic about the quality and spirit of those men and said they never had seen any troops

train harder and more assiduously and never had any doubt as to what to expect of them in combat. A German prisoner was brought past their encampment one day; he gaped with surprise when he saw their faces and asked if they were Japanese. An interpreter explained that they were Americans of Japanese parentage. The German shook his head in wonder and said: "Ach; that's American." There are camps in our country today engaged exclusively in training these men for military service. I have met and talked to them. Their officers are proud of their charges.

"What I wish to say is merely this. Those Americans of Japanese descent have grown up in our country, in our democratic atmosphere. Most of them have never known anything else. Among those few who have been to Japan, most of them could not stand the life there and soon returned to the United States. The overwhelming majority of those men want to be loyal to us, and, perhaps surprisingly, the few who don't want to be loyal to us often say so openly. It does not make for loyalty to be constantly under suspicion when grounds for suspicion are absent. I have too great a belief in the sanctity of American citizenship to want to see those Americans of Japanese descent penalized and alienated through blind prejudice. I want to see them given a square deal. I want to see them treated as we rightly treat all other American citizens regardless of their racial origin - with respect and support, unless or until they have proved themselves unworthy of respect and support. That fundamental principle should apply all along the line - to every citizen of the United States of America."

QUESTION OF LOYALTY OF JAPANESE

Statements made in October, 1942 Harper's Magazine. This article, written by an Intelligence Officer, states in part as follows: "I consider that at least seventy-five per cent of them (Nisei) are loyal to the United States." (P.490). ... "Many of the Nisei voluntarily contributed valuable anti-subversive information to this (the author's) and other governmental agencies. The Japanese Consular staff, the Central Japanese Association, and others known to have been sympathetic to the Japanese cause did not themselves trust the Nisei. A great many of the Nisei had taken legal steps through the Japanese Consulate and the Government of Japan to divest themselves officially of Japanese citizenship (dual citizenship) even though by so doing they became legally dead in the eyes of the Japanese law and were no longer eligible to inherit any property which they or their families might have held in Japan." (p.491)... "Of the Japanese born alien residents (the Issei), the large majority are at least passively loyal to the United States.

"There are among the Japanese, both aliens and United States citizens, certain individuals, either deliberately placed by the Japanese government or actuated by a fanatical loyalty to that country, who would act as saboteurs or enemy agents. This number is estimated to be less than three per cent of the total, or about 3500 in the entire United States." (p.491).

A STATEMENT OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF
THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

1. The War Relocation Authority recognizes that the foremost task before the people of this country is to win the war. This means concentrating on fighting the enemy rather than fighting among ourselves, and using all the available manpower where it can do the most good.
2. We have faith in the American democratic way of life, with equal rights, privileges, and responsibilities for all, regardless of race, creed, or national origin.
3. We assume that the great majority of the people of Japanese ancestry now in this country will stay here during the war and afterward.
4. We have confidence in the ability of the Armed forces to wage the war, and of the authorized intelligence agencies of the government to give proper surveillance to all suspected or potential enemies within our country.
5. We believe that it is possible to distinguish between the loyal and the disloyal people of Japanese ancestry, as well as with other national or racial groups, to a degree which will insure the national security.
6. We believe loyalty grows and sustains itself only when it is given a chance. It cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and discrimination.
7. Steps which this government takes to suppress or discriminate against the people now in relocation centers give weight to the enemy's argument that the United Nations are waging a race war. This argument is used in propaganda directed at the peoples of the Pacific areas, and others whose collaboration with the United Nations can help to speed up the day of victory.
8. Repressive or discriminatory treatment of people of Japanese ancestry in relocation centers will be used by the Japanese militarists as a pretext for reprisals against American prisoners of war and American civilians held by the Japanese government.

ATTITUDE OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT ON THE QUESTION OF TAKING
OVER THE OPERATION OF WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY FUNCTIONS.

In response to a direct question by Senator Chandler of Kentucky regarding the War Department's views on S. 444 , a bill providing for the transfer of certain functions of the War Relocation Authority to the War Department, Colonel Scobey had this to say:

"The War Department is not in favor of the bill. The War Department looks upon the measure as giving to it a responsibility which it is not particularly qualified to handle, because the objective to be accomplished is of a social nature rather than of a military nature.

" The War Department has a tremendous job on its hands. It needs all of its personnel on military projects rather than on social projects, as this is looked upon. That, basically, is the reason the War Department feels that it doesn't want to handle this job."

WAR DEPARTMENT STATEMENTS ON JAPANESE AMERICANS

Statement by:
Hon. Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

(Statement made in announcing the formation of a
combat team of American citizens of Japanese descent.)

"It is the inherent right of every faithful citizen, regardless of ancestry, to bear arms in the Nation's battle. When obstacles to the free expression of that right are imposed by emergency considerations, those barriers should be removed as soon as humanly possible. Loyalty to country is a voice that must be heard, and I am glad that I am now able to give active proof that this basic American belief is not a casualty of war".

Statement by:
Colonel W.P. Scobey, Executive Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of War

"It is hoped that the Japanese American combat team will become one of the outstanding units of the American Army. This combat team will fight with and as a part of a Caucasian force. The War Department has faith in the loyal Japanese Americans. This is a splendid opportunity to demonstrate to the American people and to the War Department that the Japanese Americans have faith in America. A success of the program and the voluntary feature of induction will be a great step forward in the rehabilitation plans for the Japanese Americans."

Statement by:
Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons
Commander of the Hawaiian Department
April 3, 1943.

"Enough Hawaiians of Japanese ancestry have responded to the call for volunteers to form a combat team of approximately 4,000 men... The response to the call was highly gratifying... I believe they will make a splendid record... I hope no further call for volunteers will be made now, because many can ill be spared by Hawaiian industry."

(OVER)

ATTITUDE OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT ON THE QUESTION OF TAKING
OVER THE OPERATION OF WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY CENTERS

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